

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

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In 1955, Herbert Marcuse published *Eros and Civilization*, subtitled "A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud". The preface begins with the claim that "psychological categories . . . have become political categories." It goes on to argue that "the traditional borderlines between psychology on the one side and political and social philosophy on the other side have been made obsolete by the condition of man in the present era . . ."¹, a claim that receives its most provocative formulation in Marcuse's hypothesis of a non-surplus-repressive civilization. This hypothesis is a radical revision of Freud's well-known pessimism regarding the prospects for happiness in modern society. In addition, however, it is a twentieth century version of a conception as old as Western philosophy — that is, that freedom, necessity and happiness can coincide in human existence.

The importance of Marcuse's attempt to integrate the two great conceptual realms distinctive to twentieth century thought — Marxism and psychoanalysis — is that it takes the form of a critical dialogue with Marx and Freud which turns on the problem of happiness.² In this article, I will be concerned to elaborate the problem of happiness as it emerges from this dialogue, and to relate it to the broader tensions and polarities which animate both Marcuse's work and twentieth century political thought in general: those of theory and practice, reality and appearance, freedom and necessity.

This elaboration will proceed in five sections. The first three are concerned to develop the problem of happiness, which is conceived negatively as the problem of domination and the occluded pre-history of humanity, and positively as the prospects for liberation and the construction of a free existence. The last two sections expand the discussion by drawing out the implications and psychodynamics of liberation in Marcuse's terms, and by clarifying some theoretical and political implications of the Marcusean analysis, with particular reference to the issues of true and false needs, and the relationship between theory and practice.

CHARLES RACHLIS

Freud and the Political Economy of Repression

As a natural being . . . man is on the one hand equipped with *natural powers*, . . . these powers exist in him as dispositions and capacities, as *drives*. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being, he is a *suffering*, conditioned and limited being, . . .

Karl Marx

A generation before *Eros and Civilization*, in *Civilization And Its Discontents*, Freud remarked that

it is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction . . . of powerful instincts.³

Against this view, Marcuse argues for a reconceptualization premised on the differentiation of history from ontology. Such a revision is validated by two sets of considerations. First, it produces an internal historicization of Freud's analysis, with the result that the fateful continuum linking progress in civilization with progress in repression is grounded historically, and thereby rendered subject to historical eclipse. Second, it permits traditional Marxist analysis to incorporate a psychoanalytic dimension, the metapsychological structure of which is consistent with traditional Marxian concerns.

Accordingly, Marcuse draws a distinction between "basic-" and "surplus-repression"; surplus repression is defined as that portion which is in excess of the level necessary to sustain a specific civilization at a given time.⁴ Underlying this distinction and, in fact, the concept of repression itself, is the notion of scarcity. Marcuse criticizes as un-historical Freud's view of repression as an undifferentiated response to the material scarcity which characterizes human existence. In his view, Freud's analysis fails to distinguish the biological and historical elements of socially-imposed repression, because it hypostatizes scarcity as an "eternal, primeval exigency of life".⁵ Scarcity, Marcuse argues, is a social phenomenon; hence, the effort to explain it in anthropological terms ignores the historical sedimentation of civilization into social structure. And, consideration of this dimension reveals that scarcity is neither undifferentiated nor primeval; rather, it is organized and imposed as a hierarchical distribution. Thus, the Freudian view, in which the necessity of repression is contained in the very notion of civilization,

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

is fallacious in so far as it applies to the brute *fact* of scarcity what actually is the consequence of a specific *organization* of scarcity, and of a specific existential attitude enforced by this organization.⁶

Accordingly, Freud's fatalism regarding happiness is unfounded; the seeming rationality of prevalent levels of repression presupposes an ideological collapsing of a given *form* of civilization — patriarchal, class-stratified, surplus-repressive society — into civilization *per se*.

The ideological legitimization of surplus-repression is accomplished in advanced industrial society by the "performance principle". Defined as "the prevailing historical form of . . . [Freud's] reality principle"⁷, the performance principle defines the relationship between social necessity and instinctual gratification. And, in exemplifying the ethos of productivity, renunciation and sacrifice, in the midst of a social order capable of universal affluence but characterized by an appallingly-skewed distribution of that affluence, the performance principle reflects for Marcuse the social rationality of domination.

Domination is a form of oppression distinguished by its totalizing character and by its virtual invisibility. It is a "new, improved" form of subjection, in that it operates not "from above", but "from within". Because the regime is sustained by the internalization and reproduction of the performance principle, its subjects meet tyrannical demands without experiencing oppression; their actions are happily voluntary. In Marcuse's view, domination

is in effect whenever the individual's goals and purposes and the means of striving for and attaining them are prescribed to him and performed by him as something prescribed.⁸

In social terms, domination is revealed within the structure of the relations of production and reproduction,

insofar as social needs have been determined by the interests of the ruling groups at any given time, and this interest has defined the needs of other groups and the means and limitations of their satisfactions.⁹

CHARLES RACHLIS

As a systemic form of oppression in advanced industrial society, domination embodies an irrational logic which is apparent in the hierarchical distribution of scarcity and in the imposed surplus-repression which support it. This irrationality is evidenced at two levels. First, in absolute terms: to the extent that the imposition of surplus-repression serves to maintain a hierarchical distribution of scarcity and thus also of the social product created by scarcity-induced labour, the rule of the performance principle subordinates the collective prospects for the free development and satisfaction of needs to the private interests of a privileged minority. In addition, the irrationality is relative: to the extent that societal needs and interests are defined by a privileged few, a fundamental discrepancy is maintained between the historically-constituted potential of a given society and its particular mode of organization and level of performance. Just as the distinction between basic- and surplus-repression expresses the discrepancy between socially necessary repression and repression required to sustain domination, so the performance principle expresses the discrepancy between hierarchically-distributed scarcity as a "bad" historical solution to natural scarcity, and the same distribution of scarcity as an institution of social domination. This latter discrepancy exists, Marcuse claims, because "... the achievements of the performance principle surpass its institutions . . ." ¹⁰. By this he means that advanced industrial society has the technological and productive capacity to eliminate scarcity — that the prevailing scarcity is a man-made and deliberately perpetuated institution of domination. Equally this irrationality pervades and animates individual experience, via the goals and cultural patterns that support a society premised on needlessly-competitive economic performance. And here, the experience of domination is most bitter: in the brutalization of men and women in stultifying jobs, and in the miserable poverty and unemployment generated by the constraints of "free enterprise". These phenomena are not unrelated. Nor are they "economic" as opposed to "psychological" issues; common to both is a systematic degradation of humanity most strikingly apparent in the ease with which men and women come to view their well-being and happiness in strictly instrumental terms — as the incidental consequences of their productive activity.

Paradoxically, the patent irrationality of domination serves to further the interests of those who rule. Two factors apply here, both of which relate to the socio-epistemic function of ideology. The first is that the rule of the performance principle is irrational in a substantive, as opposed to a formal sense. ¹¹ Thus, its unreasonableness is a function not of an internal logical inconsistency, but rather of its suppression of human potential and its denial of gratification. Beneath the material abundance of advanced capitalism lies a "political economy of repression", which generates psychic winners and losers according to a calculus of needs derived from the functional imperatives of domination. But its totalizing character enables a perverse inversion of norms and expecta-

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

tions, and the creation of an internalized system of invisible surplus-repressive controls. Thus, the fact that the system is irrational, inasmuch as it promises freedom and happiness at the same time as it delivers misery and exploitation, is experienced not as an indictment of the system, but as evidence of personal failure and a need for renewed self-discipline on the part of dominated men and women. Here, as elsewhere, the winners make the rules — and legislate normality. This form of control permits an equation to be drawn, in the minds of winners *and* losers, between their performance and their inherent claims on the game itself. A self-validating logical circle surrounds the relationship of performance and fulfillment, which tends to preempt any attempt to connect misery with its social origins.

The second factor is that the totalization inherent in the performance principle necessarily articulates a political universe. The combined effect of advanced capitalism's interpenetration of public and private life, and instrumentalization of personal experience is to produce a situation in which external and internal performances become interchangeable, and in which means and ends tend to merge. The individual as worker performs according to standards demanded equally of individuals in their private lives; increasingly, men and women relate to themselves as if to other people: one reads one's emotions as those of an intimate stranger. Response is calculated, efficient; satisfaction a matter of matching category with function. Together, these factors accentuate the fundamental contradiction embodied in the surplus-repression imposed under the performance principle: the technological achievements of advanced industrial society enable intensified oppression, but they simultaneously illustrate "the extent to which the *basis* of civilization has changed (while its *principle* has been retained)"¹².

Art as Form of Reality

In advanced industrial society, domination is evidenced in the irrational disparity which is maintained between actuality and possibility, and the imposition of surplus-repression that this implies. As the twin processes of public rationalization and private instrumentalization advance, it becomes increasingly apparent that the perpetuation of this social order demands the forcible suppression of universal potential — in other words, that the prevailing social rationality is rational only for the maintenance of the status quo. This betrayal of human potential is accomplished by the performance principle, which describes a totality within which surplus-repression can be rationalized: under the performance principle, what is pleasurable is equated with what is normal and socially useful.¹³ As a result, the articulation of a negative, or critical, dimension increasingly becomes a utopian undertaking. Not surprisingly: the

CHARLES RACHLIS

continued expansion of productive and technological capacities beyond the level necessary to provide for a humane existence, and with it, the increasing obsolescence of the performance principle, requires a correspondingly steady mobilization against the spectre of liberation.

The effect of such mobilization, and the progressive tendency it reflects toward "the closing of the universe of discourse" is to restrict liberation, at least initially, to claims advanced in and by the imagination. In this sense, the struggle to articulate a reality principle based on gratification rather than sacrifice parallels artistic expression. The parallel lies in what Marcuse calls "the power of negative thinking" — the ability to pierce the reified given-ness of immediate experience, and posit, at least negatively, an "other" existence. The articulation of this other existence — a universe founded on the claim of the whole individual — traditionally has occurred in art; over the historical span of bourgeois culture, the aesthetic realm has been a refuge for transcendent conceptions of freedom and enjoyment. Art offers the possibility of reconciling the perennial conflict between happiness and reason, of reconciling the claims of necessity and gratification. Therefore, in Marcuse's view, the artistic portrayal of a pleasurable existence premised on an integral humanity embodies an essential aspect of the struggle for a different reality principle.

In addition, art has the ability to capture non-distorted dimensions of human existence, to represent aspects of humanity which are denied historical realization — thereby preserving, "between memory and dream", the promise of happiness. For this reason, art as a cognitive form has a special significance for Marcuse. In the artistic realm, he says, "... the relation between the universal and the particular manifests itself in a unique and yet representative form".¹⁴ For Marcuse, what is represented and preserved in the negative moment of artistic expression constitutes an imaginative subversion of historical reality. The artistic "promesse de bonheur" (Stendhal) exposes not only the relegation of sensuous enjoyment to the artistic realm; in a society where realism is a mask for madness, the "utopianism" of art bears eloquent testimony to the distance separating its claims from the demands of surplus-repressive society. Against the bland assent of affirmative culture, imagination "retains the insoluble tension between idea and reality, the potential and the actual."¹⁵

The preservation of this tension is increasingly problematic in advanced industrial society because, Marcuse argues, "irrationality becomes the social form of reason" at the same time as it is manifestly a form of *social unconsciousness*. In addition, because domination implies the manipulation of individual and social factors *within* individuals, liberation is more complex than the notion of consciousness suggests. Domination is more than oppression operating "behind the backs" of men and women. It is, as Kontos puts it, "a satanic thief" — a specific set of institutional and psycho-sexual controls which

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

mediate and constrain roles and perceptions. Accordingly, the links between consciousness and action, social change and personal liberation, have to be specified inclusive of the needs and drives which operate in the instinctual structure, and which establish the psycho-sensual foundation of the individual. Here, Marcuse argues, "the closing of the universe of discourse" is paralleled in the historically-produced "second nature" of man. Second nature refers to socially-defined human nature, as distinct from the biological and ontological capacities and potentialities it overlays. Thus, it describes the pattern of "revealed preferences" which exist in the instinctual structure, as the result of the internalization of social values.

The notion of liberation is, therefore, dialectical. Because dominated men and women's self-experience is socially manipulable, the relationship between critical consciousness and material interest constitutes a paradox. On the one side, the workings of the performance principle ". . . have created a second nature of man which ties him libidinally and aggressively to the commodity form." As constitutive of second nature, "the needs generated by this system are . . . the counterrevolution anchored in the instinctual structure."¹⁶ On the other side, however, the internal dynamics which are presupposed in this notion of "inorganic human nature" would seem to provide the simultaneous basis for transformation. As Jacoby notes, "second nature is first nature refracted through but not altered by history; it is as unconscious as first nature with the difference that this unconsciousness is historical not intrinsic."¹⁷ Accordingly, the primordial potentiality which is suspended in this refraction, and which is the target of such intensive efforts at neutralization on the part of the culture industry, is the raw material of freedom. Ironically, ontology is preserved within historical amnesia.

From this perspective, the power of the imagination is also the power of memory: the ability to "re-collect" and reassemble "the bits and fragments which can be found in distorted humanity and distorted nature."¹⁸ And memory, as Orwell has shown, is essential to liberation; it alone preserves the awareness of betrayal. In this sense, art can retrieve aspects of human "nature"¹⁹ which have been repressed: the aesthetic experience, as memory, can reanimate the individual awareness of historical amnesia. And, for Marcuse, the significance of art as negative representation lies in just this possibility: the reanimation of suppressed possibility — a "return of the repressed". The positive significance of this negative moment lies in the awakening from amnesia it can produce — once, among individuals, in pre-history; again, and collectively, at the advent of human history.

What remains problematic in this preliminary conceptualization of liberation as imaginative subversion of the world-as-given, is the relationship between the individual awareness of domination that can occur through art, and the dynamics of social transformation. As Marcuse noted in "The Affirmative

CHARLES RACHLIS

Character of Culture" (1937): "This is the real miracle of affirmative culture. Men can feel themselves happy even without being so at all."²⁰ Thirty years later, he returned to this problem in the notion of "the new sensibility".

"The new sensibility" is Marcuse's term for the socio-psychological transvaluation of values presupposed in and manifested by liberation. Liberation, from Marcuse's point of view, is not a project carried out within current conditions; rather, it involves a restructuring of those conditions — a restructuring of human existence. Liberation constitutes a rupture within the historical continuum of domination, which leads to a radical change of experience, and not to the "ever bigger and better" perpetuation of "mutilated human experience"²¹.

However, the fact of surplus-repression and the "voluntary" reproduction of servitude it bespeaks, operate as a powerful counter-tendency to the historical rupture envisioned in the notion of liberation. From Marcuse's point of view, liberation as a qualitative change in the infrastructure of society equally refers to a qualitative change in the infrastructure of man.²² The new sensibility is "... the mediation between the political practice of 'changing the world' and the drive for personal liberation"²³, and is thus the positive correlate of second nature, with regard to instinctual needs. While the second nature of dominated man reflects "the counterrevolution anchored in the instinctual structure", the new sensibility connotes the instinctual basis of revolution in the name of human freedom — in Marcuse's provocative phrase, "the biological basis for socialism". By this he means the emergence of a new reality principle, characterized not by surplus-repressive instinctual organization and the "cult of rewarded efficiency"²⁴, but rather by a relation between man and nature that he terms an "aesthetic ethos".

Thus constituted, the relationship of man and nature would be one of pacification²⁵ — a relationship in which the self-determination and self-realization characteristic of free human activity become universal. And, fundamentally, this implies for Marcuse "... the liberation of nature as a vehicle for the liberation of man"²⁶, and hence a transcendence of the alienation and reification which characterize the relationships among dominated individuals and between both human and non-human nature.

This totalization is conceived by Marcuse as an aesthetic ethos for two reasons. First, an authentic liberation from surplus-repressive historical conditions presupposes an emancipation which cannot properly be called "political" in Marcuse's terms. Indeed, this is his criticism of all past revolutions: by failing to effect a break with established patterns of needs and satisfactions, they guaranteed the reproduction of "the old Adam" in the new society. In contrast, the emancipatory change envisioned by Marcuse would result in a changed perception of needs and their content — a change at once individual *and* social, political *and* pre-political. In this sense, Marcuse uses the term

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

“aesthetic” to refer to the broader realm in which this change would occur — the realm of sensuous experience.

The second reason for conceptualizing liberation in terms of an “aesthetic ethos” has to do with the status of art as historical phenomenon. In Marcuse’s analysis, liberation is validated by the construction of an existence in which theoretical and practical reason on the one hand, and joy and beauty on the other, achieve reconciliation. Such a reconciliation is “utopian” relative to prevailing historical arrangements *and* in an etymological sense as well; it could be realized only within a free human existence, and such freedom “is nowhere already in existence”²⁷. Hence, the aesthetic dimension of liberation: the construction of a free existence is an aesthetic undertaking in that it is guided by criteria which traditionally have characterized works of art. The sensibility implicit in this process is aesthetic in the additional sense that it is societally repressed, and is prevented expression as a dimension of historical reality, except in a highly sublimated form. The construction of a free existence would thus constitute the historical realization of art: the conscious development and elaboration of ontological possibility — art no longer signifying just the form of imagination, but rather art as the form of reality.

Liberation

. . . but occasionally, from out of this matter, there
escapes a thin beam of light that, seen at the right angle,
can crack the shell

Tom Stoppard, *Rosencrantz
and Guildenstern Are Dead*

As the foregoing presentation indicates, a central problematic in the analysis of domination is that of reality and appearance. And, as I have suggested, it is manifested at two analytically-distinct levels: (1) at what has been termed the socio-epistemic level, which refers to the Marxian dialectic of ontology within history; and (2) at the level of instinctual organization, which I prefer to term biological. Further, Marcuse’s analysis indicates that the links between Marxian ontology and Freudian biology are historical; in advanced industrial society, they are revealed in the second nature of dominated men and women. Through this “inorganic human nature”, individuals reproduce an internal political economy of repression, which is governed by the performance principle, and which consists of a set of cultural and institutional controls manipulated by those who dominate. The mode of this control is psychological; by internalizing the surplus-repressive values of the performance principle, dominated men

and women unwittingly transform a falsified version of historical reality into the perceived "natural order of things". This refashioning of history into nature occurs within an affluent and technologically sophisticated universe that is mobilized against the coming to consciousness and articulation of alternative modes of existence. The result is an insidious flattening of the distinction between reality and possibility — the phenomenon of one-dimensionality.

From this perspective, the concept of domination warrants special attention. It is established on psychological grounds, but it is not neurosis; there is no flight from reality. It dehumanizes by suppressing ontology within historical development, but yet is not alienation; unlike the proletariat in Marx, those who are its victims do not actively embody the negation of their predicament.²⁸ Rather, domination — as oppression by the manipulation of needs, perceptions and sensibilities — is better interpreted as a form of ideology, which constitutes a two-fold revision of the Marxian conception.

In Marx, ideology is distinguished from objective truth by its partial character. Because capitalist society subsumes individuals under classes and negates the naturally creative basis of their existence by appropriating the product of their labour, their world views are constrained by their reduction to reified factors of production. And, because the creative power of labour is appropriated by the capitalist in the form of surplus-value, while the worker receives as wages only the monetary equivalent of the use-value of his labour, the structure of capitalist exchange obscures its exploitative content. This discrepancy is the unspoken truth behind the "free exchange of equivalents" that capitalist production is claimed to represent, which claim in the Marxian sense is ideological, both as a partial representation of a true event (i.e., at the level of appearance) and, by virtue of not telling "the whole truth", a deliberate falsification of the real dynamics of production. In the case of domination, however, the obscuring of reality is more drastic.

In addition, the "technification of experience" characteristic of advanced industrial society complicates the tension between ideological part-truths and the reality of oppression. The decisive shift is that the extraordinary productive and technological capacities of advanced industrial society permit a simultaneous *deepening* of the truth/ideology antithesis *and* highly-effective efforts at its erasure from awareness. Because dominated men and women reproduce the rationality of this social whole through surplus-repressive socialization, the perception of these tensions is undermined by the legitimacy accorded the totality. Again, the paradox noted by Marcuse: "Men can feel themselves happy even without being so at all."

There are two differences between ideology in the Marxian sense and the view of domination advanced here. First, the productive capacity of advanced industrial society enables it to continue to "deliver the goods" despite its fundamental irrationality. This provides not only a material basis for the establish-

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

ment of surplus-repressive needs and satisfactions — Marcuse's "false needs" — but also a profound obstacle to the consciousness of oppression. After all, "we never had it so good". Second, this material and technological capacity extends the ideological falsification into the psycho-sexual foundations of the individual. Accordingly, material interest constrains ontological potential and the perception of such constraint in a more basic sense than Marx envisioned. As Marcuse notes, "... personality and its development are *pre-formed* down to the deepest instinctual structure, . . ." ²⁹

As a form of ideology, domination consists in the falsification of reality by particular social interests, and the substitution of this falsehood for reality via the surplus-repressive controls embodied in the performance principle. And, as ideology, domination suppresses ontology by screening it behind an exploitative and historically false "reality" which concomitantly is elevated to the status of nature in the instinctual-sensual constitution of its victims.

It follows that liberation, as the harbinger of a new social reality, must be situated at the nexus of historical consciousness and instinctual need. For if, as Jacoby argues, the maintenance of mutilated human reality depends on the legitimization of obsolescent necessity and surplus-repression through the mediations of second nature, then the consciousness sufficient to crack the shell of domination must embody *both the awareness of historical amnesia and the beginnings of a transformed sensibility*. Cognition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for liberation; the struggle for liberatory gratification must originate in *and* transcend dominated reality. Accordingly, the predicament that domination poses for liberatory awareness is well-expressed by Adorno's remark, that "... it is not ideology in itself which is untrue but rather its pretension to correspond to reality."

After the Deluge

Liberation implies the elimination of surplus-repression, and the replacement of the performance principle by a non-surplus-repressive reality principle. It also implies, as far as is technologically possible, the minimization of basic-repression. Thus, both individually and socially, liberation would lead to a transformation in the realm of sensuous needs and satisfactions, produced simultaneously by the emancipatory "un-binding" of instinctual drives, and a drastic attenuation of administered reification. This transformation marks the psycho-sexual precondition and the first step in the process that Marx calls the "free development of individualities" ³⁰. And, clearly, the movement from a change in consciousness to a transformation in sensibility and the reconstruction of reality involves fundamental political, as well as psychological change. In this regard, Marcuse is unambiguous: liberation as the seed and fruit of a

CHARLES RACHLIS

changed consciousness is only initially private; beyond transformed awareness, "... the fight for life, the fight for Eros, is the *political* fight."³¹ The inherent promise of liberation — that of freedom — is necessarily a product of revolutionary struggle, of a revolution in the name of the freedom and happiness of whole individuals.

But, because liberatory consciousness precedes *and* follows social transformation, there are two aspects to the emancipation implied in the concept of liberation, corresponding to the two levels of organization within the instinctual structure. The first is a negative aspect which corresponds to the "historical layer" of surplus-repression, and which involves a relaxation of the hyper-aggressive and possessive individualism fostered under the performance principle. Second, and more significant, is the positive aspect. Liberation in a positive sense implies for Marcuse the free human appropriation of nature, conceived here as external nature *and* as the underlying "biological layer" in the instinctual structure.³² This positive aspect implies the historical redefinition of the relationship between man and nature, according to what William Leiss has termed

the non- [surplus-] repressive mastery of nature, that is a mastery that is guided by human needs that have been formulated by associated individuals in an atmosphere of rationality, freedom, and autonomy.³³

The basic implications of this are captured in three related themes in Marcuse's work. These are (1) the liberation of Eros; (2) the transformation of sexuality into Eros; and (3) the redefinition of the relationship between freedom and necessity.

The liberation of Eros captures Marcuse's insistence regarding the totalizing nature of liberation, manifest in the claim that it involves "a new mode of being" — an existence where being is essentially a striving for pleasure. Therefore, by "the liberation of Eros", Marcuse means transforming human existence from its present organization around "the cult of rewarded efficiency", to an existence whose basis is Eros. Such an existence could be characterized as embodying the pursuit of happiness, where, in Marcuse's words, "the reality of happiness is the reality of freedom as the self-determination of liberated humanity in its common struggle with nature."³⁴

A basic element in this transformation is the elimination of surplus-repression achieved by the dissolution of the performance principle, and its replacement by a non-surplus-repressive reality principle. However, even though this transformation would inaugurate a human relationship with nature

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

that is "pacified", as against its pre-history of domination, still it would be "determined by necessity and mundane considerations"³⁵. Therefore, the liberation of Eros does not mean an end to labour, but rather an end to the instrumentalized definition of existence by (alienated) labour. Concretely, Marcuse views the reduction of the working day to a technologically-rationalized minimum as the first prerequisite for freedom.³⁶ As he notes, this would likely cause a reduction in current standards of living; however, he is adamant that such standards be viewed relative to the possibilities they now fail to deliver. From this perspective, the notion of "bigger and better" performs a vital ideological function: the diversion of people's attention "from the real issue — which is that they could both work less and determine their own needs and satisfactions."³⁷

The implications of eliminating surplus-repression are several. First, to the extent that surplus-repressive reality requires a quantitative diversion of instinctual energy to the performance of alienated "necessary" labour, the liberation of Eros involves a corresponding release of libidinal energy — energy available for the free development of individual needs beyond the realm of necessity. Second, this release of energy is produced by the collapse of previously-imposed restraints. In the wake of their collapse, the release of instinctual energy and the opening of experiential realms hitherto forbidden by surplus-repressive controls converge; within the emancipatory un-binding of surplus-repressive ego structures, these two forces are mutually-reinforcing.

The effect is a radically restructured experience of reality, produced by a qualitative shift in the *basis* of social existence. The reality principle engendered by the "libidinal economy of reason" reflects for the first time a uniquely human reality, because the "free play of human faculties" made possible by the rational conjunction of the pleasure and reality principles belongs to a realm essentially distinct from that of blind necessity. This other realm — freedom — is the realm of human fulfillment and, as Marcuse argues, "it is the definition of the human existence in terms of this sphere which constitutes the negation of the performance principle."³⁸

For Marcuse, the redefinition of social labour under a gratificatory reality principle means a reduction of reification in social relations. And, just as the quantitative release of energy produced by the elimination of surplus-repression effects a qualitative reordering of those relations, so Marcuse posits a parallel in the libidinal realm. Work as alienated labour is the fundamental societal institution through which surplus instinctual repression is exacted. It follows, therefore, that the disappearance of surplus-repression would drastically alter the character of work, now organized into a minimal quantum of socially-necessary labour. Indeed, according to Marcuse, eliminating the surplus-repressive organization of work tends to redefine the *nature* of the historical conflict between necessity and pleasure in the performance of labour.

CHARLES RACHLIS

This redefinition results from a two-fold transformation of the libido, produced by the elimination of surplus-repression. And, in Marcuse's analysis, its significance is that of a transvaluation of libidinal values. First, it consists in a reversal of the desexualization of the body which occurs under conditions of alienated labour. Accordingly, "the body in its entirety would become an object of cathexis, . . . an instrument of pleasure." This would be manifest in the "reactivation of all erotogenic zones and, consequently, in a resurgence of pre-genital polymorphous sexuality and in a decline of genital supremacy"³⁹. The second aspect of this transformation is what Marcuse calls the "self-sublimation of sexuality", which refers to the non-surplus-repressive character of economic necessity under a social rationality of gratification.

With the elimination of surplus-repression, the socially-necessary functions of basic-repression would be performed by the ego without the imposition of additional controls. For Marcuse, this implies changes in the psycho-sexual constitution corresponding to the changed experience of nature — external and human — brought about by the transformation of "alien" necessity. These changes reflect "the restoration of the primary structure of sexuality" — that is, the substitution of Eros for domination as the ordering principle of individuation. Accordingly, "the organism in its entirety becomes the substratum of sexuality"; ". . . the field and objective of the [sexual] instinct becomes the life of the organism itself"⁴⁰. The result is not only a changed experience of historical existence: the very struggle for existence is altered by this "transformation of sexuality into Eros".

If Marcuse is correct in this regard, the struggle for existence undergoes redefinition as a result of the *changed instinctual value* of previously-performed tasks and functions. As he notes:

A transformation in the instinctual structure . . . would entail a change in the instinctual value of the human activity *regardless of its content*.⁴¹

Therefore, Marcuse argues that liberation from the rule of the performance principle makes possible the emergence of a realm of freedom which, although it is contingent upon a realm of necessity (socially-necessary labour), effects an experiential transfiguration of this relationship.

For Marcuse, labour is an ontological category of human existence, an existence animated by scarcity of the means of survival, and hence by the necessity of production. Scarcity is historically relative; however, for Marcuse, as for Marx, labour remains a constant aspect of human existence. Indeed, Marcuse remarks that to posit its elimination is to repudiate the Marxian conception of

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

man as natural being.⁴² Nonetheless, his claim significantly alters Marx's analysis. For Marx, necessity — as the realm of socially-necessary labour — can be reduced, but never abolished. It persists as a haunting substratum beneath all possible futures. Freedom, on the other hand, is the realm of the "free development of individualities", distinguished from the mundane compulsion of the former by the fact that free activity is an end-in-itself, self-realization in fulfillment of individual and social needs.

Marx's conception is unsatisfactory to Marcuse, because the relation between necessity and freedom as "the two great realms of the human reality" is static; he contends that even Marx's qualitative distinction, lacking as it does an internal psychodynamic which is afforded by psychoanalytic categories, tends to collapse into a quantitative differentiation. Thus, as against Marx's seemingly temporal dichotomy, Marcuse counterposes the solidity of lived experience — in other words, he asks how it is that an individual performs his quota of socially-necessary labour, and then fulfills freely-developing needs outside this sphere of activity, within one existence.

Marcuse directly challenges the Marxian conception — according to which freedom and necessity remain distinct — rejecting Marx's polarity on the grounds that technological advance can permit a libidinal transvaluation of necessity. This possibility, from Marcuse's perspective, indicates that the Marxian analysis is "not radical enough and not utopian enough"⁴³; accordingly, he argues for the alternative division of freedom/alienation, which in his view more accurately reflects the liberatory implications of this reappropriated "necessity". Against Marx's view that necessity at best can be experienced as rational "un-freedom", Marcuse maintains that the current level of productive capacity suggests the possibility of "freedom *within* the realm of necessity". Existing technology could produce a quantitative reduction in labour time, sufficient to result in a qualitative change in the experiential nature of necessity. In the wake of this revolution in the libidinal economy, ". . . the potentialities of human and nonhuman nature would become the content of social labour" and, for the first time in human existence, one would witness "the union between causality by necessity and causality by freedom."⁴⁴

Prospects

The power to restrain and guide instinctual drives, to make biological necessities into individual needs and desires, . . . the 'mediatization' of nature, the breaking of its compulsion, is the human form of the pleasure principle.⁴⁵

It is at this point and with this possibility that Marcuse in my view exits the dialogue with Marx and Freud, and reenters the realm of Marxist thought. But,

CHARLES RACHLIS

if my interpretation is correct, he does so neither uncritically nor without having altered our understanding of basic theoretical conceptions. Of particular interest vis-à-vis a concern with human happiness are (1) the question of true and false needs; and (2) the notion of theory and practice that is contained in Marcuse's analysis of domination and liberation. These issues are of vital significance not only in a narrow theoretical sense, but also to our broader self-understanding in the struggle against domination.

The question of true and false needs, needs characteristic of freedom and domination respectively, recently has come under critical scrutiny by William Leiss, in his *The Limits to Satisfaction*, in this *Journal*, and elsewhere.⁴⁶ Leiss's examination reopens the issue of needs and satisfactions in a refreshing and stimulating manner; despite my reservations, his critique is a valuable contribution which can only hone the acuity of the discussion. Fundamentally, Leiss's objections are to (1) what he sees as the objectivistic positing of a standard against which current practice is judged; and (2) an alleged substitution of cultural elitism for critical analysis, produced by the historical ambiguity of the notion of truth. In what follows, I hope to clarify these objections and indicate a response to them, in terms of the analysis presented so far.

In a general sense, the objection to "true" and "false" as terms adequate to the analysis of socialization, is correct, and non-controversial. To the extent that all societies define and interpret instinctual impulses, and transmit them as needs through socialization, any society which is not free in the sense of realizing human universality would create "false needs". In this sense, the notion is synonymous with Marxian pre-history. However, this is to abstract culture from its socio-historical horizon, which for Marcuse is the basis of evaluation. In contrast, the judgment that the needs of dominated men and women are false is a two-fold evaluation, corresponding to the double illusion perpetrated by domination — that is, that what is real is rational, and that what is real (and thus rational) conforms to the inherent possibilities of current existence. It follows that false needs — false in reflecting this illusion — are built in at every level of dominated historical existence, from the ecological blindness of public policy planning to the frenzied acquisition of new objects of consumption.

According to my interpretation, this accords with Leiss's analysis. Where it differs is in the grounding of these processes. As opposed to the possibility of historical ontology, Leiss limits himself to a "critical phenomenology of consumption".⁴⁷ In doing so, he does not falsify; indeed, the complexity of his argument preserves for consideration many details lost in other presentations. However, despite their shared basis in the rationalist tradition, Leiss distances himself from the Marcusean analysis by his rejection of ontology — or, in the case of Marcuse's Freudian component, of the notion of the unconscious. This factor, in my view, traps him in the problematic of consciousness and the

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

historical mediation of needs and satisfactions.

Leiss argues that the thesis of manipulated needs attributes a false homogeneity to the experience and satisfaction of needs, and is itself part of a more general puritanism regarding the sphere of consumption activity. Thus, whether individual needs are judged vis-à-vis an objectivistic standard of "truth", or simply branded as "false" by an "ill-concealed snobbery"⁴⁸ relative to mass culture, the judgment of their falsehood reflects a basic prudishness with respect to consumption, and an aristocratic denial of liberatory potential in market activity.

The weakness of this approach is that it tends to subsume satisfactions as a moment in the process of needing, as opposed to dialectically relating needs and satisfactions as twin moments in the instinctual-sensual constitution of the individual. This relates directly to the problem of domination. If the view of domination advanced here is accepted, then the cultural mediation of instinctual drives acquires a transformed significance, as does the unconscious. Corresponding to the dialectic of individual and society in the definition of culture, there must also be a dialectic of society and individual in the transmission of culture. But, this latter dialectic is intrapersonal; it connotes the psychocultural definition of the individual which occurs in socialization, and which is the core of all behaviour, autonomous or heteronomous. Thus, its significance is that it establishes a psychodynamic within which the conflict between the id's undifferentiated demand for gratification and the rationality of social necessity can be located, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically.⁴⁹ This dynamic links the notion of true and false needs to the problem of domination, for as Agnes Heller has noted,

(Radical — i.e., "true" — needs) . . . are not the 'embryos' of a future formation, but 'members' of the Capitalist formation: it is not the *Being* of radical needs that transcends capitalism, but their satisfaction.⁵⁰

Therefore, Leiss is correct to reject the quasi-Heideggerian notion according to which the historical dross of domination would be washed away by liberation, revealing the true, autonomous individual. But, this is not the consequence of the position tentatively outlined here. Rather, the notion of true or autonomous needs is a negative conception; as Marcuse notes, "In truth, an *a priori* element is at work here, but one confirming the historicity of the concept of essence. It leads back into history rather than out of it."⁵¹ True needs, therefore, are "true" relative to human universality and happiness — these constitute the *a priori* element — and the historical possibilities for realizing

CHARLES RACHLIS

this notion of freedom. Accordingly, it follows that the need for frenzied consumption in advanced capitalism, with its resultant over-development and ecological destruction, is false (1) because it degrades the humanity of its subjects; and (2) because the realization of their humanity — the *satisfaction* of the “need” for freedom — is historically possible. In contrast, the need for a conserver society would be a “true” need. But note: the “historical-ontological” truth of the conserver society is defined by the *objective possibility of the satisfaction of human needs*.

Together, these two aspects of the needs-satisfactions relation define the problem of happiness — in Marcuse’s phrase, as “the historically possible extent of freedom.”⁵² Hence, true needs are those which foster the development of human universality, given the achieved level of material and intellectual resources; false needs those which blindly reproduce the irrational necessity of current domination. In this respect, Marcuse’s claim, that dominated individuals are not competent to judge the truth or falsehood of their needs⁵³, reflects the paradox of dominated consciousness, rather than overweening elitism. Just as the revolutionary class in Marx is constituted “in-itself” by the material contradiction of its existence, but only comes to exist “for-itself” through *consciousness* of this contradiction, so true needs are defined by the *conscious* appropriation of *objective* historical possibility — a process which implies the struggle not only for happiness, but also for awareness.

This notion of true and false needs does not resurrect a mechanistic model of subjective and objective factors. In linking needs *and* satisfactions to historical practice, it embodies a praxis-based conception, which conforms to Marx’s opening remarks in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Accordingly, the identity of development and progress is denied, a non-identity which permeates the conception of surplus-repression, and is articulated directly in Marcuse’s claim that the performance principle is an obsolete artifact of domination. This claim rests on the historical evidence that scarcity is no longer a legitimate element in “the natural order of things”, and it is *this* factor which indicts the irrational rationality of the performance principle, and which indicates the possibility of liberation from pre-history. Thus, strictly speaking, it is not the “need” for freedom which invalidates pre-history, for previous to the eclipse of natural scarcity, the realization of such needs could result only in rational “un-freedom” in the realm of necessity. Nor does the invalidation occur in the area of the satisfaction of needs; the hierarchical distribution of scarcity has always meant luxury for the privileged few. True needs — true in their potential for articulating a free humanity — *are* produced under domination; their denial defines the falsehood of historical reality.

Of course, even if one accepts this interpretation, one is a long way from answering Leiss’s request that critical theory begin specifying true needs. But even though the non-programmatic nature of all critical theory imposes a cer-

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

tain negativity on the analysis, some observations can be made. First, to the extent that domination is not simply a matter of false consciousness, the "need" for liberation necessarily involves contingency; the fact that the foundations of domination's hegemony are psychological implies that even horribly oppressive social conditions may be inadequate as the impetus to transformed awareness. (Nor should one underestimate the efforts on the part of those who dominate to block, repress and obscure critical reflection.) In this regard, the experience of the Women's Movement is instructive; the psychological shift to a critical consciousness is difficult, painful and risky. And, even having accomplished it, one is only at the threshold — having pierced the ideological veil, the vista of oppression is revealed, not transformed. Nor is changed consciousness necessarily sufficient: a false, often comfortable happiness is a constant alternative.

The fundamental implication of this example is that the issue of domination must not be allowed to become a problem of and for consciousness: such a formulation mystifies even as it attempts to clarify. Consciousness must be built, supported and expanded, but each of these stages implies changing the social conditions that impose surplus-repression and fuel domination.

What, then, are true human needs relative to the historical obsolescence of the performance principle? In the broadest sense, they are straightforward — they are needs for the free development of human faculties, for the happy deployment of individual and collective desires, for the rebuilding of the natural and built environments, and so on. And, as these are expressed concretely (albeit negatively) in the distortions engendered by capitalism, it follows that they would include, among others, needs expressing the eclipse of capitalism — for example, needs for an end to private property and class stratification, and for the automation of soul-less repetitive work. But even such elaborations as these suffer from abstractness — an abstractness that follows, I think, from a failure to grasp the distinction in the passage quoted from Agnes Heller, above. The defining characteristic of true needs, she argues, is that their satisfaction transcends capitalism. And this, I take it, is precisely Marcuse's point when he argues that "... the achievements of the performance principle surpass its institutions . . .".⁵⁴ The struggle for liberation is not a matter of promoting needs which are somehow inherently inimical to capitalism — this sort of thinking is rightly the object of Leiss's sarcasm regarding "Havana cigars, French wines, and first-class European hotels"⁵⁵ — but rather a matter of conceptualizing, and therein attempting to articulate alternatives to, the current constraints and distortions. That these are expressed primarily in the ideological realm of advanced capitalism does not mean a lapse into idealist *kulturkritik*; as Joel Kovel shrewdly notes, with reference to the dialectic of individual and society within the notion of base and superstructure, "... what is 'base' for society is 'superstructure' for the individual"⁵⁶.

CHARLES RACHLIS

The forms that such struggle takes are as diverse as the ideological representations which they oppose. In current advanced capitalist society, I would think they include:

- (a) breaking down the work-income nexus as the ordering principle of social identity. This is an enormously variegated project, ranging from the politicization of work relations in terms that aim beyond the impasse of economism, and which Gorz has attempted to elaborate in his *Strategy for Labour*⁵⁷, to activities which combine organizational and ideology critique. Here, I would include various forms in which collective structures can replace imposed individual atomization, such as workers' control, cooperative enterprises and, more generally, the demystification of expertise. Notwithstanding the inherent limitations of such activities, they serve a valid function not only in penetrating the ideological opacity of power and its exercise in capitalist society, but also in advancing demands that challenge what Habermas calls "the Achievement Ideology"⁵⁸. Developments in this direction can be seen in immanent criticism of "free" enterprise, and of the defense of socio-economic privilege by supposed equality of opportunity, as well as in the rejection of received wage hierarchies that presuppose a capitalist division of labour.
- (b) challenging the irrational subordination of individual existence to imposed definitions of social necessity. One of the clearest examples is the struggle against sexism and the dual oppression of women through their sexuality and their exclusion from "productive" activity. Here also the mediations of pseudo-existence are most problematic. As Juliet Mitchell and others have argued, the psychology of the domination of women is neither a matter of biological destiny nor a microcosmic reflection of economic structures. Rather, the domination of women has its basis in the prevailing cultural definition of individuality, and accordingly its overcoming must be both part of and distinct from efforts to transform the nature of capitalist social necessity.⁵⁹

Concretely, this implies alterations in consciousness and the fostering of counter-organizations and oppositional groups, within which this struggle is defined and given focus. Additionally, such efforts would have to be accompanied by changes within existing institutional structures, which would be sup-

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

portive of a break with traditional feminine roles. These would include such things as abortion-on-demand, equal-pay-for-work-of-equal-value coupled with affirmative action programs, universal day-care, and so on.

- (c) As a related, though not strictly analogous project to (b), restructuring our relationship to external nature.⁶⁰ This would involve breaking the irrational imperative of economic productivity, ending the alienation characteristic of our conceptions of nature — environmental impact has the status of an “externality” in the neo-classical economic analysis of production — and breaking down the reification of nature typified in most current business thinking.

While these observations demonstrate the centrality of the problematic relationship between theory and practice, and suggest some preliminary strategic considerations, systematic treatment would require extended analysis. Here, I can only indicate the distance separating my position from the notion of “dialectical sensibility”, outlined in this *Journal* by Ben Agger.⁶¹ From my perspective, this conception results only in rhetoric and obscurantism. The conception is marked by utter nominalism, which is evidenced in its juggling of the notions of “constitutive subjectivity” and “radical empiricism”, and which results in the analytical implosion of the theory/practice relationship. Moreover, its conceptually loose and fancy free substance is coupled with a pernicious form of expression — a declamatory style sufficiently convincing apparently to have persuaded the author that what he wishes to be so, is so. This produces, in my view, an insensitivity to the desperate contingency of liberation, and an ingenuous severing of liberation from the historical structure of dominated reality. What follows is not dialectical response, but naive celebration: opposing “. . . inhumanity in different songs of joy.”⁶²

Against such mystifications, we must preserve distinctions necessary to the historical differentiation of reality and appearance within the flow of history; the alternative is the relinquishing of critique, and the unwitting screening of the potential for freedom from its subjects, who remain thereby “hidden from history”. More than ever, as Adorno knew, “the almost insoluble task is to let neither the power of others, nor our own powerlessness, stupefy us.”⁶³

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CHARLES RACHLIS

Notes

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1. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization. A Philosophical Inquiry Into Freud* (Boston, 1955), xvii. Hereafter cited as *E&C*.
2. For an analysis of Marcuse's political thought in terms of this dialogue, see my "Freedom, Necessity And Happiness: An Introduction To The Political Thought Of Herbert Marcuse", unpub. mimeo, Toronto 1976.

In what follows, I am aware that this interpretation is problematic for some students of Marx, who object that although Marx speaks of freedom and reason, he "... never adopted the idea of happiness as a goal." (George Lichtheim, review, *American Political Science Review*, 63, 2, p. 593). This objection, in my view, is both overly restrictive and potentially misleading. First, it focuses on Marx's concern with exploitation and misery (products of alienated labour and its fragmentation of existence), while giving insufficient attention to the possibilities inherent in an historical existence not premised on such alienation.

But more importantly, it fails to incorporate Marx's own demand in the "Theses on Feuerbach". In contrast to previous materialism, in which "... the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the *object or of contemplation*, but not as *sensuous human activity, practice*, not subjectively", Marxian materialism is to concern itself with "the active side ... real, sensuous activity as such." (*Early Writings*, Colletti, ed., Harmondsworth, 1975, 421).

From this perspective, and given Marcuse's attempt to incorporate psychodynamics into the Marxian analysis, the idea of reason and its realization under freedom would seem to warrant renewed consideration. Indeed, I interpret Marcuse as suggesting that in the absence of the misery that is derived from exploitation, a non-surplus-repressive "sensuousness" — approximating "the free play of human faculties" — would establish the instinctual-sensual precondition for the positive (happy) appropriation of the human existence. In this sense, I interpret Marcuse's concern with happiness not as indicative of a break with Marx, but rather as an attempt to elaborate Marx's conception from within.

That this attempt incorporates the Freudian dynamic of instinctual repression and social necessity is, in my view, more than adequate protection against the charge of Feuerbach-ian regression levelled by Lichtheim; in any event, the necessary premise for Marcuse is that the free realization of human universality would result in happiness. This does not imply the elimination of human tragedy or the eclipse of poetic imagination (Frye's "motive for metaphor"), but rather the rationally-effected freedom from misery.

3. (New York, 1962), 44.
4. *E&C*, 32.
5. Freud, *Introductory Lectures On Psychoanalysis* (Harmondsworth, 1974), 353-4.
6. *E&C*, 33.
7. *Ibid.*, 32.

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

8. *Five Lectures. Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia* (Boston, 1970), 1.
9. *Ibid.*, 2-3.
10. *E&C*, 141. Cf. Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, "Four Myths About World Hunger", *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 116, 21, (May 22, 1977).
11. Cf. Theodor Adorno: "... it is not ideology in itself which is untrue, but rather its pretension to correspond to reality", *Prisms* (London, 1967), 32.
12. *E&C*, 126.
13. *Ibid.*, 46; Cf. Marcuse, *Negations* (Boston, 1968), 184-9.
14. "Theory and Therapy in Freud", *The Nation*, 185, 9 (Sept. 28, 1957), 201.
15. Marcuse, *Counterrevolution And Revolt* (Boston, 1972), 70. Hereafter cited as *CR&R*.
At the risk of anticipating the later discussion, but in order to prevent misunderstanding at this point, the relationship between art and political action should be specified in terms of this tension. Art is the figurative expression of the perpetual difference between potentiality and actuality; as aesthetic form, it exhausts neither the source nor the need for poetry in human experience. Conversely, the confrontation between poetry and reality which occurs in philosophy, clarifies the limits of political action and the empirical boundaries of the imagination. But philosophy, like art, neither does away with politics, nor eliminates the tension between idea and reality. Art reconciles, but only via an *artistic* reconciliation. The movement from imagination to action is the step into politics. It can be animated, guided and corrected by the imagination, but the political and the aesthetic never achieve identity. Art is conceivably the *form* of reality, never its content.
16. *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston, 1969), 11.
17. Russell Jacoby, "Towards a Critique of Automatic Marxism: The Politics of Philosophy from Lukács To The Frankfurt School", *Telos*, 10, 144. The term "inorganic nature" is from Hegel, *The Phenomenology Of Mind* (New York, 1967), 90.
18. *CR&R*, 70.
19. "... culture becomes nature as soon as the individual learns to affirm and to reproduce the reality principle from within himself, through his instincts." *Five Lectures*, 11.
20. *Negations*, 122.
21. *An Essay on Liberation*, 45.

CHARLES RACHLIS

22. *Ibid.*, 4.
23. *CR&R*, 59.
24. In an address at the University of Toronto, "Aesthetics and Social Change", Oct. 6, 1976.
25. *An Essay on Liberation*, 31.
26. *CR&R*, 59.
27. *Five Lectures*, 69.
28. Alkis Kontos, "Domination: metaphor and political reality", *Domination*, Kontos, ed., (Toronto, 1975), 222, and *passim*.
29. *E&C*, 230.
30. *Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy* (Harmondsworth, 1973), 706.
31. *E&C* (2nd ed; Boston, 1966), xxv.
32. *CR&R*, 64 for these two aspects. The metaphor of levels comes from *E&C*, 120, and is elaborated in *An Essay on Liberation*, esp. ch. 1. The spectre of ontological deformation raised in *E&C* cannot be dealt with here.
33. *The Domination of Nature* (Boston, 1974), 212.
34. *Negations*, 199.
35. Marx, *Capital* (New York, 1967), III, 820.
36. *E&C*, 138.
37. *Ibid.*, 91.
38. *Ibid.*, 142.
39. *Ibid.*, 183-4.

MARCUSE AND THE PROBLEM OF HAPPINESS

40. *Ibid.*, 187.
41. *Ibid.*, 196.
42. As he argues: "I believe that labor as such cannot be abolished. To affirm the contrary would be in fact to repudiate what Marx called the metabolic exchange between man and nature. Some control, mastery, and transformation of existence through labour is inevitable." *Five Lectures*, 70.
43. Marcuse, "The Obsolescence of Marxism", *Marx and the Western World*, Nicholas Lobkowitz, ed., (Notre Dame, 1967), 413. Cf. *E&C*, 203-4; *An Essay on Liberation*, 18-22.
44. *Five Lectures*, 66; *An Essay on Liberation*, 22.
45. *E&C*, 35.
46. *The Limits to Satisfaction: An Essay on the problem of needs and commodities* (Toronto, 1976); "... an ontology of stoned concepts", *Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory*, 1, 2 (hereafter cited as *CJPST*); review in *Telos*, 29.
47. *CJPST*, 1, 2, 104.
48. *Telos*, 29, 208.
49. Accordingly, both dialectics are presupposed in Marcuse's remark that "history rules even in the instinctual structure". *Five Lectures*, 11.
50. *The Theory of need in Marx* (London, 1976), 76-7.
51. *Negations*, 75.
52. *E&C*, 81. See footnote #2, above.
53. For example, *One-Dimensional Man. Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston, 1964), 6.
54. *E&C*, 141.
55. *Telos*, 29, 210.

CHARLES RACHLIS

56. Review in *Telos*, 27, 192.
57. (Boston, 1967).
58. *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston, 1975), 80-3. The notion of "the Achievement Ideology" expresses the functional legitimation of possessive individualism.
59. In particular, Juliet Mitchell, *Woman's Estate* (Harmondsworth, 1971), and *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (New York, 1975); Sheila Rowbotham, *Women, Resistance and Revolution* (Harmondsworth, 1974), and *Woman's Consciousness, Man's World* (Harmondsworth, 1973).
60. See Leiss, *The Domination of Nature* for a critical analysis of this relationship. Also, his "The false imperatives of technology", *Thinking about change*, David Shugarman, ed., (Toronto, 1974).
61. "Dialectical Sensibility I: Critical Theory, Scientism and Empiricism", *CJPST*, 1, 1, and "Dialectical Sensibility II: Towards a New Intellectuality", *ibid.*, 1, 2.
62. Ben Agger, "On Happiness and the Damaged Life", *On Critical Theory*, John O'Neill, ed., (New York, 1976), 32.
63. *Minima Moralia. Reflections from Damaged Life* (London, 1974), 57.