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LAWRENCE C. BECKER. *Reciprocity*. Agincourt, ON and New York: Methuen 1986. Pp. 436. Cdn$51.95: US$32.50. ISBN 0-7102-0828-6.

In much moral philosophy today there are attempts to explain morality in terms of some presumptively non-moral idea such as a rational agreement or game strategy; and reciprocity can figure prominently in such explanations. Becker has in mind the quite distinct project of arguing for reciprocity as a moral ideal.

As his hundred-page scholium shows, Becker realizes reciprocity can be treated as the object of scientific study, and he takes some advantage of the fact that in one form or another reciprocity has currency in every culture, in order to argue that obligations of reciprocity are 'grounded.' But his aim and his argument are thoroughly normative. Beginning with a definition of morality as the activity of deciding what rational agents ought to do and be, all things considered (and of striving to do that), he presents the arguments for regarding reciprocity as a fundamental moral virtue, which has priority over many competing considerations.

What is defended is a specific conception of reciprocity. Briefly, 'we should return good for good, in proportion to what we receive; we should resist evil, but not do evil in return; we should make reparation for the harm we do' (4). This may not be the 'tit for tat' notion of reciprocity that springs to mind, and which is so prominent in thought and action. But it is the morally favored conception, a claim Becker defends in terms of the purpose of reciprocity, which is the promotion of the social equilibrium, self-esteem and social exchange required for a productive life for all rational agents, under the presumption of equality (134). The explanation and defense of this thesis occupies Becker in the five chapters of 'Part I: Theory.'

A defense along these lines does not strike one as a defense based on the idea of a virtue. It looks instead like a defense of a certain kind of conduct, or of certain maxims and the disposition to conform to them (that is, the virtue), based on consequentialist considerations. But Becker emphasizes that his argument is to be a virtue-theoretic one, in that his thesis is to be supported by considering what character traits moral agents ought to have. The question of character must be given a fundamental place in moral theory because

'most of our conduct is controlled by dispositions' and 'the moral analysis of an act or a rule is seriously incomplete if its consequences for moral character are ignored' (37-8).

The relation of virtue and obligation within the central argument of Part I is not altogether clear. Chapter 3 argues for eight maxims of reciprocity (for example, number 4 is that 'Evil done should be made good'), as well as for the thesis that we ought to be disposed, as a matter of moral character, to act in the ways outlined by those maxims. The argument, along the lines just indicated, is that there are good reasons, all things considered, for accepting the maxims and hence for concluding that moral agents ought to have the corresponding disposition to reciprocate. Later on, Chapter 5 concludes with an argument to the effect that, since the virtue is morally justifiable, and since it is a deontic virtue, which disposes us to think of certain kinds of conduct as obligatory, acts of reciprocity are obligatory. But the point of the latter exercise is hard to see, since it seemed natural to take the argument for the maxims as having already established that the acts are obligatory in the relevant sense. The Chapter 5 argument does appear to make the idea of virtue basic, and so to accord with Becker's preference for a virtue-theoretic approach. The two arguments taken together illustrate the deep and genuine difficulty of finding a theoretically satisfying way to reconcile the insights of competing approaches to moral philosophy.

'Part II: Practice' includes Chapters 6, 7, and 8, which apply the theory of reciprocity to such areas of life as the family, future generations and law, as well as a non-chapter on friends. It contains a lot of fresh insight and good sense, and provides a splendid example of the application of philosophical theory to everyday practical matters.

The Scholium properly occurs as Part III of the text, since it includes somewhat more than notes and an annotated bibliography for the other chapters. Here one finds additional interesting arguments, most of them developed in the context of discussion of a wide range of scientific and philosophical material on topics related to his themes. By placing these scholarly (and this term implies no stodginess) materials here, Becker finds a way to stick in Part I and II to the important business of developing his main line of argument without distraction.

Reciprocity displays Becker as a multi-talented, imaginative and highly engaging writer, and one who is not unduly constrained by conventional forms. He writes in several distinct modes in this book, but always with wonderful clarity and accessibility. The development of Parts I and II proceeds most of the time in a very straightforward and professional philosophical fashion, with definitions, theses, explanations, and arguments clearly identified and well ordered. But this is frequently supplemented by dialogues of objections and replies which are equally important and sometimes even more persuasive than the main argument.

And there is yet a third mode of writing in Parts I and II, in the many extended epigraphs scattered throughout the argument. These serve as much to provide pleasant distraction as to illustrate and challenge the main line of

thought. Discovering their connection with that main line frequently requires serious reflection. They present Becker as a highly gifted storyteller, deeply sensitive to character and to the development of human relationships. Their appropriateness in so vigorously philosophical a text testifies to the usefulness of literature in serving the aims of philosophy.

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GRAY COX. *The Ways of Peace: A Philosophy of Peace as Action*. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press 1986. Pp. v + 211. US$11.95. ISBN 0-8091-2797-0.

The lack of a positive definition of peace is a source of frustration for persons who are engaged in peace related activities, whether these activities be political involvement, education, or research. For bureaucrats and government officials there is the complex, frustrating and seemingly endless round of negotiations aimed at heading off violent confrontations. For political activists there is the frustration of being unable to influence government policy and being relegated to a negative position, associated in the public mind with fringe elements marching in the streets. Peace education, too, becomes tinged with these same images of protest because it finds difficulty in articulating a positive programme for peace.

It is an odd and damaging contradiction that something that is in its essence positive and peaceful should be mainly associated with conflict and protest. How does one begin to discover what peace is, when it is now recognized only by its absence? Without an adequate definition of what peace is, persons cannot then see how they might accomplish peace as an activity which can be done. This particularly limits possibilities for peace education, for example, because educative aims are, by nature, positive ideas oriented towards human improvement. Thus the aim of this book 'to discover the meaning of peace and how it might be practiced' is significant for the development of peace education, as it is to the development of a peace practice. But it goes considerably beyond this, for in addressing the problem of peace, Gray Cox also presents a systematic critique of dominant assumptions, knowledge and action derived from post-Renaissance science.

The book itself is divided into four parts. In the first part, Cox reflects upon the current situation in which we have come to understand peace as a problem. Because we live in a culture which interprets conflict as 'normal,' alternative

ways of acting are not available. Cox illustrates this by pointing to the meanings of peace inherent in everyday talk. Such talk could be a request to desist from doing something, like a parent telling a child 'give me some peace and quiet.' Or, it could be a reference to some abstract mystical state, like 'the peace that passeth all understanding.' The difficulty is that these do not imply what a person does to achieve peace. This is the dilemma, we hope for peace, but precisely because it is obscured in a culture of conflict, we also lack alternative ways of acting.

Aspects of the present culture of conflict are described in the second part of the book. Cox points out that this is constituted by an institutionalized network of assumptions and practices which support and reproduce a world view of differences which become interpreted as oppositions. These include eristic forms of discourse which pit the partners in discussion against one another in order to arrive at objective truth, as well as the notion of objectivity itself as a domain of fact as distinct from feelings and choices. Such assumptions remain invisible and unchallenged because they underpin and are perpetuated through institutions like the legal system, collective bargaining, business negotiations, education, academia, as well as in the experience of everyday life.

There exists the possibility of a different network of assumptions and practices, founded upon an alternative view that we participate together in a shared world. Cox describes this alternative in the third part of the book. This is based upon a critical participatory social science, which he argues, provides a better understanding of the social world, quite apart from what this might imply about peace. The alternative view will be familiar ground for those already acquainted with critical and interpretive paradigms of social science which hold that human action cannot be understood purely from observations of external behaviours. Action is intentional and dependent upon a network of beliefs and perspectives held by the actor. However, participatory human action is also 'naturally flawed' (81) as a form of rational action, because it is based upon implicit, partial, and possibly inaccurate assessments of reality. Hence there is need for critical reflection on participatory understandings which are directed intentionally towards the cultivation of peaceful alternatives.

The way of peace as a critical participatory social science is developed in the final part of the book. The positive definition of peace which Cox proposes is 'a commitment to cultivating agreements.' Key to this is the fact that cultivating agreements designates ongoing activity rather than a fixed state. He provides excellent examples of the process of cultivating agreements (132-59), giving extended descriptions of the Quaker meeting, Gandhi's satyagraha, and the procedures of principled negotiation as outlined by Fisher and Ury in their recent book *Getting to Yes* (1981). These examples of peaceful practice are both informative and well chosen as they reflect proven possibilities drawn from historical, cross-cultural, and contemporary experiences.

The groundwork is now laid for a final chapter which focusses on the implications of accepting an emergent philosophy of action. He dispenses rather

neatly with some of the conventional arguments against pacificism, while acknowledging that there may be times when it is unwise. Pacificism is not an empirical claim, but a presupposition of practice. In the end this is the argument of the book too, that there is no ultimate way to peace except through the cultivation of peace through practice.

This is a convincing and useful book. In the manner of its presentation it is consistent with a philosophy of peace as action. As Cox indicates 'the ultimate appeal [is] not to a premise we can state but to an experience in which we participate' (170). He writes philosophically for the lay person in accessible and non-technical language. For instance, in a chapter subtitled, 'what I learned near the broccoli dip,' he introduces the difference between eristic (eris = strife) and maieutic (maieusis = midwifery) forms of discourse through the example of two kinds of cocktail party conversations. He gives concrete shape to peace as an ongoing philosophy of action by encouraging and giving practical suggestions for the introduction of maieutic styles of reasoning and critical participatory practice in everyday life. In my judgment Cox has successfully accomplished his aim to write an book for a broad audience that is 'intellectually compelling without being academic' (1).

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R. CUMMINS. *The Nature of Psychological Explanation*. Boston: Bradford-MIT Press 1983. Pp. x + 219. US$22.50. ISBN 0-262-03094-2.

This is an important book, I think, and an illuminating one. It is also a frustrating book and a poorly organised one. It has taken three attempts over 18 months to complete a review — a result of the quixotic habit of wanting to understand a book before reviewing it. I am still not sure I should be reviewing it.

The subject of the book is explanation, in psychology. The over-arching theses are these:

1. There are two distinct kinds of explanation, causal subsumption and analysis.

2. Causal subsumption only explains transitions between states of sys-

tems, not why systems have the properties, especially the capacities or dispositions, they do.

3. Explaining the properties of systems (other than their transitions) requires a quite different explanatory structure, one supplied by analysis.

4. There is much confusion in science and (especially) in philosophy of science generated by ignoring the existence of explanation by analysis.

5. In particular, much psychological explanation, indeed essentially all information-processing explanations in cognitive psychology, are instances of analysis, not causal subsumption.

These theses are set out and developed in the first two chapters or 50 pages of the book. A longish Chapter 3 (66 pages) then applies this theoretical framework to various aspects of cognitive psychology, especially to computational models of mental capacities. Chapter 4 (45 pages) contains a miscellany of historical reflections on Titchener (vis-à-vis Behaviourism), Hull and Freud designed to illustrate theses 5, 4 and 3 (in that order).

The abstract philosophical analysis of explanation occurs in the first 50 pages and it is this which is difficult to absorb. I shall shortly present a summary of Cummins' conceptual structure as I understand it, but first a few terms need explaining. An *instantiation law* (7) is an expression of the form, 'For all systems S, if S has components S^i with properties $P(S^i)$ and S has organisation O relating its components, then S exhibits or instantiates P, where P may be either a disposition or capacity of S (say, the ability to compute arithmetic functions or wash clothes) or a non-dispositional property (e.g. S's size, mass).' A *nomic attribution* (7, 8) is the attribution, to a class of system components (usually most basic components), of a property which enters essentially into basic laws of nature; e.g. all electrons have charge *e*, and all charged objects obey Maxwell's electromagnetic equations. ('Ball lightning is a manifestation of magnetically stabilised electrical discharge and obeys Maxwell's equations' gives an example of a nomic attribution to a class of complex systems; but these beg for further analysis of some kind.)

An *interpretive functional analysis* (32) specifies input and output symbolically and the function of a system S as transforming input symbols into output symbols in some way. Altering an input in a manner conforming to its being a symbol (whatever natural properties it may possess) is a *computation* (42), so under interpretive analysis S's functions are computations. By contrast, a *descriptive functional analysis* (32) specifies input and output in terms of the natural properties they possess as physical entities and the function of the system; accordingly, though the system may transform the input in systematic ways it will not be performing computations on it. The distinction between *morphological* and *systematic functional analysis* is that be-

tween a system whose sub-system structure alone ensures a given input transformation without need for a programmed internal interaction among subsystems and a system which relies strongly on this latter. Having a morphological/systematic analysis is generally a matter of degree; more importantly, so is having a descriptive/interpretive analysis, especially for natural systems, though we presently keep them pretty distinct in our technology. (The brain as computer proposes the sufficiency of interpretive analysis for cognitive psychology, the brain as gland advocates a major role for descriptive analysis.)

With these terms (briefly) introduced, my summary of Cummins' scheme is given in the following diagram, where numbers in parentheses refer to Cummins' pages where the concepts are discussed.

The diagram should be reasonably self-explantory, but the two double arrows are worth a brief comment. These arrows express internal consistency constraints. The earlier double arrow (reading down) requires that whatever structural organisation a system S is required to have by an analysis A of its functional properties, O must be compatible with that revealed by a systems analysis of S. One can't plausibly analyse a diplodocus' swimming ability in a way which requires a unified motor command centre if physiological analysis of its nervous system reveals two loosely connected motor centres, one in the head and the other in the pelvis. The later double arrow requires that the instantiations of functional properties be causally feasible. This means that it should follow from the basic causal or transition laws that a system organised in the manner specified and whose components have the properties specified will, on presentation of a suitable input, causally run through a set of internal states which yield the production of an output constituting a relevant instance of manifesting the relevant disposition or capacity for that occasion.

In some sense, then, causal laws appear to be basic, the ultimate explanatory referent. Cummins would deny this; indeed, he spends Chapter 1 fulminating against the hegemony of causal subsumptions in philosophy of science. I think of this view as being methodologically right and metaphysically controversial. We surely can envisage using an entrenched functional analysis to correct a causal law (as Cummins points out, this is roughly what happened in Einstein's explanation of the photo-electric effect). And we can even envisage circumstances in which we had confidence in our functional analysis and yet couldn't discover the underlying causal mechanisms. Bohr holds our own world to be just this way. Conceptually and methodologically it seems to me Cummins is right and his work represents a long-overdue overhaul of the philosopher's toolbox. But I have deliberately used the quantum-mechanical examples here to indicate the degree to which holding out for the autonomy of functional explanation is metaphysically controversial. I shall say no more here.

What then of the book as a book? The first, analytic, part is marred by unsystematic, unclear development, all of it unnecessary. Trivial untidinesses block the way, e.g. first calling systems analysis compositional analysis (15) and then calling it componential analysis (29), while throughout continuing


EXPLANATION
Causal Subsumption
Analysis
System S makes a transition from State S_1 to State S_2
Explains
System S exhibits (possesses) property P (15)
Subject to
Constraints
Only genuinely causal laws to be invoked
No uncaused events (transitions)
Causes & effects independently testable and confirmable
Only instantiation laws genuinely derivable from basic nomic attributions to be invoked
No analyzed properties reappear in the analysis
Nomic attributions and analyses independently testable and confirmable
Using
Common Premises
Nomic Attributions
(applied to basic components of S)
plus
Systems Analysis
(of S into components exhibiting organisational structure,
= componitional analysis (15) = Componential analysis (29))
and
Special Premises


Analyses
Basic Dynamical (Transition) Laws (fundamental causal laws applied to basic components of S)
Property (properties are non-dispositional, either S-wholeistic or of components of S)
Functional (properties are dispositional, = capacities of S or of sub-systems of S (28,n.1))
Explains
Step 1 (28): Programmed Sub-function Analysis. (Disposition analysed into a programmed sequence of contributing elementary dispositions, perhaps several levels of such analysis.)
Transition Laws, not involving functional properties
Varieties (33): Interpretive
Descriptive = Information-Processing (39)
Morphological
Fiber optics imaging
Abacus representation
Systematic
Assembly line production
Calculator representation
required to be consistent with
Completely
None
Organisation/Function Correlation
Step 2 (31) = Instantiation
Descriptive
Interpretive
= Information-processing
Instantiation Laws
required to be consistent with
Descriptive
Interpretive
explains
initial (initiating) condition
explains
Sequence of state changes
=
Manifestation of disposition/capacity

to use 'analysis of systems.' Indeed, I have had to give the RHS of my diagram the heading 'Analysis' since Cummins gives it none, reserving 'property analysis' for non-dispositional properties, even while referring to the whole RHS willy nilly as expressing 'property theories.' The index is woeful in this respect, actually a further hindrance rather than a help. E.g., the first entry for compositional analysis is given as p. 36 (!) and there is no entry for 'capacity' despite the fact that Cummins slips unannounced between disposition-talk and capacity-talk (e.g., at p. 31). It takes a patient eye to note that at note 1 to Chapter 2 Cummins argues that dispositions and capacities are the same sorts of things. Often Cummins' own discussions in earlier journal articles are clearer than his presentation here.

But this part of the book is littered with gems of insightful illustration of analysis and how philosophical psychology goes wrong when it ignores it. This continues into the second part of the book where Cummins discusses cognition. There is a small defect carried over from the anti-causal fulminations of Chapter 1: Cummins ignores the need to integrate explanations for changes of psychological state with functional explanations at all levels, directly (e.g. from drugs), within running programmes and even the events of acquiring programmes themselves. On what more there is to human understanding than programming to draw inferences from inputs (* - cognition) Cummins leaves us ignorant, but it is a solid discussion of our ignorances and a good read. The historical case studies at the book's close are intended to illustrate the value of having an analysis alternative to causal explanation available. I have neither the space nor the expertise to comment at length here; they seem more modestly clarificatory and less supportive of analysis against cause than Cummins imagines and of dubious historical accuracy.

I still think everyone interested in explanation and/or in philosophy of psychology should read the book, but selectively, sceptically and, above all, patiently.

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[Received July 1986: the subsequent delay in the appearance of this review is the fault of Prof. Shiner, and he is deeply apologetic. Eds.]

UMBERTO ECO. *Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages*. Tr. Hugh Bredin. New Haven: Yale University Press 1986. Pp. x + 131. US$12.95. ISBN 0-300-03676-0.

Eco argues that in spite of differences in definition and perspective from the present day, aesthetics and art theory did exist during the Middle Ages. To convince us, he singles out topics that together typified thinking on art and beauty during the medieval period. Rather than delve deeply into the often murky details of medieval philosophies, whose prime interest was rarely in aesthetics or the arts in any case, then, he focuses on large issues like the use and interpretation of light in medieval art, or the analogy between art and nature as organisms. The result is a succinct and highly readable overview. Eco tells us in his *Preface* that this book was originally published in Italian in 1959: the fact that as an introduction to the aeshtetics of the Schoolmen it remains useful is a testimony to his work.

In an opening chapter on 'The Medieval Aesthetic Sensibility,' Eco discusses the crucial relationship between medieval ideas on art and the traditions of Classical Antiquity. Here and throughout the book he is at pains to show that beauty 'did not refer first to something abstract and conceptual ... [but] to lived experience' (4) and also to demonstrate that medieval theory was closely related to artistic production. Eco is aware that his views go against the conventional wisdom that medieval aesthetics is abstract, moralistic, and removed from practice. In his second chapter, therefore, he acknowledges this more rarified element by discussing the ideal of transcendental beauty as it was elaborated from Platonic and Neoplatonic sources. In Chapter Three, however, he points to the balance that he claims existed between metaphysical speculation and concrete application by examining discussions of proportion, measure, and number in both their abstract and applied incarnations. The book proceeds by setting up similar categories (light, symbolism and allegory, sight, the notion of an organism, the inspiration for and status of art) and then exemplifying both what the central thinkers like Aquinas wrote on the topic and how artistic practice was affected.

The advantages and disadvantages of Eco's approach to medieval aesthetics can be gleaned from his reference late in the book to the 19th-century German art historian Alois Riegl's now notorious notion of *Kunstwollen*. According to Eco, Riegl demonstrated 'that the aesthetic theories of a given period are an indication of its *Kunstwollen*: the formal characteristics of an art are reflected in the theoretical consciousness of its contemporaries' (118). We can be sympathetic with Eco's desire to provide a synthetic overview of medieval aesthetics broad enough to reveal the period's will to a certain set of principles and artforms. At the same time, however, *Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages* demonstrates painfully well the limits set when one assumes the existence of something so vague and yet encompassing as Riegl's *Kunstwollen*. The book suffers from being too general and from largely failing to link medieval art theory with contemporary practice. While Eco laudably claims

at the outset that he will avoid writing only a history of important philosophers, his thematic approach ends up being little more than an alternate vehicle for discussing the 'great men' of philosophical aesthetics from Augustine to Aquinas. The reductiveness of this approach shows in Eco's inability to link these theories convincingly and specifically with artistic production. As he colourfully but reluctantly admits in his concluding remarks, the medieval 'philosophy of beauty appears cut off from its artistic practices as if by a sheet of glass' (118). The two may see one another, but they cannot completely engage. His repeated references to 'the medievals' are again symptomatic of the levelling wrought by his search for unifying principles. Especially in light of recent scholarship by the *Annales* historians in Europe or by Natalie Zeman Davis in the U.S.A. — which compellingly joins social realities to cultural manifestations in the Middle Ages — this aspect of Eco's book is dated.

Eco set out to provide an overview of medieval theorizing about beauty and the arts, and in this he was successful despite his inability to get beyond a narrowly philosophical history. He also expresses a desire to relate medieval ideas to present issues in aesthetics and to demonstrate how some of these tenets remain useful. For example, he claims that medieval aesthetics 'can inspire critical methods committed to rigour and rationality' (119). The measure of Eco's success here will very much depend upon his readers' sympathies, but with this introduction he has certainly made such a reassessment of the Middle Ages' contribution to aesthetic discourse more likely. As his own subsequent scholarship (for which he is better known) shows, one area in which medieval thought excelled — the investigation of symbol and allegory — has indeed had a seminal impact on recent semiotic theory.

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MAURICE FRIEDMAN. *Martin Buber and the Eternal*. New York: Human Sciences Press 1986. Pp. 191. US$16.96. ISBN 0-89885-284-6.

The core of religion, for Martin Buber, is neither metaphysical nor theological; it is existential. God can only be spoken *to*, not spoken *about*. The focus of religion is not a provable abstract reality, nor its result a system of beliefs, for both presuppose a conceptualization of God. Rather, human beings address and respond to God, experienced as the Absolute Other and Eternal Thou

in their lives. Thus religion consists in meeting and religious knowledge in direct contact. And the lived encounter of a human being with God finds expression in the personal encounters between one human being and another. In Buber's thinking, religion is rooted in both his philosophical anthropology and in his philosophy of dialogue.

In his latest book on Buber, Maurice Friedman both clarifies and expands Buber's insights on religion. Seven of the nine chapters, as well as an Appendix, have previously appeared in print in somewhat different form. The first and last chapters are original to this volume.

Friedman touches on various themes drawn from Buber's thought: the distinction between philosophy and religion along the lines of Buber's fundamental relations of distancing (I-It) and meeting (I-Thou) (ch. 1); the influence of Biblical Judaism on Buber's philosophical insights through the notions of *emuna*, creation, revelation, and redemption (ch. 2); the difference between faith, an existential response, and reason, a conceptual response, both in relation to revelation (ch. 3); the question of an autonomous ethics, whose foundation lies with human beings, versus a religious ethics, whose foundation involves a transcendent dimension (ch., 4 and 5); Buber's approach to other religions, given his emphasis on the uniqueness of dialogue (ch. 6); the significant influence of oriental thought, such as Taoism and Zen Buddhism, on aspects of Buber's thinking (ch. 7); Buber's general educational theory and contemporary problems facing religious education (ch. 8); the need for renewed existential trust in light of the modern religious malaise (ch. 9). An Appendix reprints Friedman's critical response to Stanley Hopper's interpretation of Buber.

Buber scholars will be familiar with the content of the book. Nevertheless, both academics and students less expertly familiar with Buber will find much of interest in such areas as existential thought, philosophical anthropology, ethics, theory of action, philosophy of education, philosophy of religion, oriental thought, and comparative religions. In addition to accurately restating Buber's views, Friedman also seeks to correct or obviate misunderstandings. Thus he contrasts, among other views, Buber's general existential thought with that of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, his ethics with both Kantian and Sartrian ethics, his understanding of religion with oriental and Hasidic mysticism, his phenomenological approach with that of Husserl. Friedman's lucid style and extensive textual knowledge of Buber leave little room to quibble with his interpretations.

However, a fundamental philosophical question does arise. Friedman admits to be dealing with 'Buber's philosophy of religion' (11). But it is philosophy in an existential mode. Here philosophical reflection focuses on authentic human existence, trust, dialogue, presence, and meeting, rather than the more usual concerns — usual in either historically or analytically oriented circles — with, for example, the existence and nature of God, the intelligibility of God-talk, or the rationality of religious beliefs. These latter concerns are bypassed because they involve a conceptualized distortion of religion, revelation, and God. Yet it seems legitimate to ask whether authentic human exis-

tence does or must in some sense entail or point to an address and response to God. Sartre's existentialism, for one, does not. Why does Buber's?

Friedman's response on behalf of Buber is in terms of knowledge and faith: knowledge in the sense of 'mutual contact' (16) with the other, who is known not as object but 'as *person* in the I-Thou relationship' (47); and faith (the Hebrew *emuna*) in the sense of 'a relationship of trust depending upon contact of my entire being with the one whom I trust' (90). Though dependent on each other, both knowledge and faith in this existential sense raise further questions.

In human affairs trust can become unreasonable, especially if a mutual rapport has collapsed. Can the same be said of trust in existence or trust in God? It seems not, for both Friedman and Buber urge 'a renewed and deepened existential trust' (159) in face of a pervasive 'social and cosmic insecurity' (152) and the silence of God (149). But why continue to trust? To give an address when there is no response? If it is because of knowledge in an existential sense, then what justifies that knowledge? Friedman suggests that such knowledge is self-validating: 'The ultimate check of the authenticity of an I-Thou relationship is the verification that comes in dialogue itself' (86). But in the case of the Eternal Thou, how do we tell whether there is indeed a meeting? Why do some people experience this dialogue and others do not? Is it simply because some do and can encounter others with their whole being; others can not?

Such questions challenge more the underlying existential epistemology than specifically Buber's views, which Friedman seems more ready to restate than to push critically. They also ask for further philosophical dialogue — and that, I take it, would be as Buber would have it.

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AMEDEO GIORGI, ed. *Phenomenology and Psychological Research*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1985. Pp. x + 216. US$12.50. ISBN 0-8207-0174-2.

Amedeo Giorgi is well known as the author of *Psychology as a Human Science* (1970), as a founder and editor of the *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology*, and as a co-editor of three volumes of the *Duquesne Studies in Phenomenological Psychology* (1971, 1975, 1979). The book here reviewed,

Phenomenology and Psychological Research, unlike those just mentioned, focuses on research methods.

In the Preface Giorgi speaks of the 'gap' in publication this book was intended to fill. Giorgi was trained in experiemental psychology, specializing in psychophysics, and has become a pioneer in developing phenomenological approaches to research in psychology. But in moving from the natural science orientation of experimental psychology to the human science orientation of phenomenological psychology a host of foundational problems first had to be faced. During this time (1962-1970), Giorgi tells us, he 'sat in on numerous courses on philosophical phenomenology' and engaged in discussions with philosophers until he was satisfied that phenomenology could indeed provide a foundation for psychology as a human science. But when it came to research methods, he had to start *de novo*. In September 1970 he offered for the first time a course in 'Qualitative Research' in psychology: 'there was no text, and the only guidelines the students and I had was Husserl's dictum "Back to the things themselves." The "things" the students elected to investigate were feelings and emotions.' Some basic strategies were evolved in those seminars, and over the years since then a number of research projects have been completed. But publication on the research strategies themselves remained very scanty; Giorgi mentions one publication and calls it 'minor' — he is referring to his paper in the second volume of the *Duquesne Studies*. *Phenomenology and Psychological Research* is intended to fill that gap in publication and, we are told, is to be followed by a further book on research methods.

The book gives accounts of research on four different topics (learning, thinking, self-deception, criminal victimization), dealt with by Giorgi, Christopher Aanstoos, William Fischer, and Frederick Wertz; in addition, Giorgi has contributed the preface, an introduction of 7 pages, and a 15-page 'Sketch of a Psychological Phenomenological Method.'

Giorgi places the methods which he and his associates are developing within the tradition of descriptive psychology, which dates back at least as far as Dilthey (1894), but with a specific phenomenological orientation. He points out that descriptive psychology erroneously came to be identified with introspectionism and along with the latter became discredited, but that nevertheless descriptions, in one form or another, continue to be used in psychological research (verbal reports, interviews, questionnaires, etc.); this is so, because in fact we can never do without at least some rudimentary descriptions. It is the importance which is attached to descriptions as 'raw empirical data' and the manner in which descriptions are analyzed and interpreted that distinguish the phenomenologically oriented psychologists from psychologists oriented towards psychology as a natural science with its attendant experimental and statistical research procedures.

Giorgi and his associates make systematic use of 'naive descriptions of personal experiences provided by individuals from all walks of life in situations that are easily recognizable as belonging to everyday life' (1). In the research reported in this book Giorgi (on learning) simply asked persons to describe

an experience they had had of learning something. Aanstoos (on thinking) arranged for a game of chess to be played and gave the subject instructions 'to think out loud as completely as possible all the thoughts you are having throughout the game ... exactly as they occur to you.' Fischer (on self-deception) asked each student in a graduate psychology class 'to find a subject who was not a psychology major and who is willing ... to describe a situation in which he/she had been engaged in self-deception.' Wertz (on criminal victimization) taped open-ended interviews with victims of crime.

Naive descriptions form the 'raw empirical data.' The more important issue is 'what one does after the descriptions are obtained' (3). Giorgi describes the basic four steps in the 'Sketch': reading the whole text to get a 'sense of the whole'; reading through the text once more with the specific aim of 'discriminating "meaning units" from within a psychological perspective' and with a focus on the phenomenon being researched; reviewing all the meaning units in order to express the psychological insight contained in them; and fourth, synthesizing all of the transformed meaning units into a consistent statement regarding the subject's experience. This synthesis is usually referred to as the structure of experience, which can be expressed at different levels, specific and general. This method of analysis is followed by all four contributors, but with variations and helpful elaborations.

Each of the authors makes a comparison between the insights gained by his own phenomenologically oriented research and the results provided by leading researchers in the experimental tradition. This will give other psychologists the chance to decide for themselves whether anything has indeed been achieved.

The relation of phenomenological psychology to philosophical phenomenology is referred to by all four authors, but especially by Giorgi and most fully on pp. 42-53. He concludes: 'phenomenology, to be helpful to psychology, *must not remain just a philosophy*; it must be expressed in a way that makes it proximately helpful to psychological praxis, and that would be the meaning of phenomenological psychology as a human science rather than phenomenological psychology as a subfield of philosophy.' He accepts the general criteria of the phenomenological method as formulated by Merleau-Ponty 'but only with modification.' The whole book deals with some of these modifications.

The book will be welcomed by psychologists who are already sympathetic to phenomenological psychology or who, though skeptical, are sufficiently openminded to want to see for themselves how phenomenologically oriented research is conducted and what, if anything, is achieved. The philosopher will be interested in seeing for himself how the phenomenological descriptions of psychologists differ from those of philosophical phenomenologists.

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M. GLOUBERMAN. *Descartes: The Probable and the Certain*. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann; Amsterdam: Rodopi 1986. Pp. 374. US$21.95. ISBN 3-88479-700-X.

As I struggled through Glouberman's book, Shakespeare kept intruding: 'Polonius. What do you read, my lord? Hamlet. Words, words, words.' It is not just that the language is unnecessarily complex ('Descartes' dismissive attitude towards perceptual cognition has as its core a compositionally recessive but doctrinally basic *structural* analysis of a sense-based mode of contact with the world' [20]; and ' the wax experiment of Meditation 2 is designed to show that there are object-directed intensional structures capable of providing a non-selective ... grasp of wax' [291]), or bombastic ('Descartes' position isn't what it seems in the optic of one who is overimpressed' [21]; and 'The following substantive questions are still orphans of response' [56]). Most of the book is verbose. Especially poor in this respect are Chapter II parts 2 and 3, Chapter III part 3, and Chapter VII part 7. The second last of these contains a great example of straw-man argumentation (is there really any need to contend that, in the Second Meditation, Descartes does not argue that existence is the essence of 'the meditator'?). The passage from Chapter VII touts as new insight ('I uncovered a distinction between several senses of "reason" and its cognates' [290]) something which needs no 'uncovering' because Descartes put it quite explicitly, and no special emphasis because scholars are well aware of it. Passages like these reminded me of my average introductory students' essays. This resemblance did not stop at the level of argument; it extended to individual sentences and to headings of sections: Descartes is said to be 'an avid exponent' of 'the Cartesian categorial system' (6); Anthony Kenny is accused of 'unwitting flitting' (35); and the author pronounces himself capable of an astonishing equestrian maneuver: 'I may appear here to have switched horses in midstride' (83).

There are meagre rewards for one who perseveres and reads the entire book. A few sections are really interesting. Perhaps the best are the first and fourth parts of Chapter II — although the extension of the argument of the first of these degenerates into the arcane discussions of Chapter III, parts 4 ff.

The problem is not that Glouberman is unfamiliar with the major Cartesian texts. The problem is that much of what he says is only tangentially related to these writings, and that most of the rest is an idiosyncratic interpretation which, though generally coherent in itself, does injustice to these texts. The 'basic constructive project' of the book is to 'establish that the various well-known Cartesian distinctions' (like that 'between the probable and the certain') are 'genuinely explicable in terms of the distinction' between 'an Aristotelian categorial system and a Platonic one' (7). In view of Descartes' repeated statements of antagonism to both Plato and Aristotle and his well-established status of 'father of modern philosophy,' this is not an initially credible project. It gains no plausibility as it develops.

Instead, it presents the reader with an increasing number of puzzling mo-

ments. Is it really 'a fundamental misunderstanding of the argumentation structure of Descartes' masterpiece' to 'assume that the sceptical materials of Meditation 1 are directly related to the principle of doubt'? (16) Is it correct to say about 'Meditation 1' that 'its major outcome' is the conclusion 'that the senses are an improper avenue for gaining knowledge about the world'? (18) Is it in fact the case that Descartes held 'knowledge of the world ... to be achievable by ... *exclusively* ratiocinative means'? (51) Some 200 pages later Glouberman returns to the last two questions in a surprising way. 'Descartes' problem of validating reason collapses back into his problem of superseding the senses.' But, he adds, 'It isn't as if having proved that the senses can't supply certain knowledge, Descartes goes on to ask an entirely different question: is reason equal to the task? [For Descartes] cannot justifiably claim to have established that reason is part of mode of [*sic*] world-cognition different from the sense-based mode' (247). From this point on we read much about the 'defect of reason,' a 'defect' of which the author is able to establish existence in part through conflation of what Descartes says about 'the imperfect,' 'the defective,' and 'the finite.'

The argument culminates in 'establishing' that Descartes' 'categorial system' is Platonic, anti-Aristotelian. This, for Glouberman, entails that the Cartesian position has no legitimate place for sense experience. Descartes, of course, insists on the necessity of sense experience for the achievement of important, that is, useful, scientific knowledge. On this point Descartes is judged to be confused. 'Once sense-based factors are brought onto the scene' Descartes has left his 'proper categories behind' (314). In other words, 'once a tincture of sense-perception is superadded to the metaphysical categories, it is a sense-based mode of cognition, with its anti-Cartesian categorial structure, that crystallises, inexorably, out' (315).

I have indicated some of the many puzzling moves in this book. These moves fit coherently in the story Glouberman tells. However, his story makes Descartes a fundamentally incoherent thinker. That alone would make Glouberman's account suspect in general. The oddity of the details then further detracts from the credibility of the account.

Glouberman 'systematically misrepresents Descartes' position.' He has covered himself against this charge: the words in quotation marks are his own, applied to 'the English, analytic, tradition' (4). No doubt he will classify me as belonging to it. It is, however, not just that tradition which reads Descartes as assigning a necessary role to sense experience, a role which legitimately fits into the Cartesian system. French and German commentators are equally insistent on this point.

From the perspective of 'the English, analytic, tradition ... interpreters systematically misrepresent Descartes' position.' I agree with the tenet implicit in Glouberman's position at this point: philosophy, including history of philosophy, is necessarily done from some perspective. I disagree with him on the impossibility of anything but 'systematic misrepresentation' except from one specific point of view — especially when that point is taken up in relative isolation from other thinkers ('although analytic interpreters of Descartes serve

as my foil, very little will be found it the way of direct engagement with the vast literature they have created' [9]; and 'my book is not a fully-armoured piece of scholarship' [10]). Surely the object one interprets has essential characteristics which will help to shape the contours of any competent and careful commentator's interpretation?

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IRA GOLLOBIN. *Dialectical Materialism: Its Laws, Categories, and Practice*. New York: Petras Press 1986. Pp. 608. US$30.00. ISBN 0-9614568-1-7.

In an age when philosophy is held to be the private preserve of those with advanced degrees in the field, here is a work by someone who is not a professional philosopher. In an age when most philosophers refuse to reflect on philosophy's place in society, here is a work that passionately insists that philosophy has political implications. In an age of increasingly narrow specialization, here is a work of breathtaking scope. Unfortunately, however, this book does not really help the case for expanding the audience, relevance, and subject-matter of philosophy as much as could be hoped.

G., a civil rights attorney, attempts to establish that dialectical materialism is the science of sciences, providing the most comprehensive perspective on the sum total of human knowledge. He divides dialectics into two main areas: the dialectics of the object, which describes the very general aspects of all things, and the dialectics of the subject concerned with rational consciousness. The former is broken down into two headings. First comes the laws of the dialectics of the object: the unity and conflict of opposites, the transition of quality into quantity (and vice-versa), and the negation of negation. Then G. discusses categories used in formulating these laws. Under this heading he runs through appearance and essence, form and content, relative and absolute, finite and infinite, possibility and actuality, contingency and necessity, and the particular and the general. The dialectic of the subject has three sections. The first discusses the laws of epistemology and consists of a detailed summary of Piaget's work and an attempt to extend it to societal development. The second looks at various categories used in epistemology, such as abstract and concrete, analysis and synthesis, theory and practice. G. then looks at epistemology as a whole in terms of the contrast between relative and absolute claims to knowledge. He concludes the work with a comparison be-

tween dialectical logic and formal logic, a defense of dialectical materialism as the highest form of wisdom, and an addendum on the history of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China that attempts to apply some dialectical laws.

For the most part the same procedure is used throughout the book. First 'prescientific views' on a specific topic are presented. Here everything from everyday proverbs to poems and the sayings of early philosophers are quoted. G.'s breadth of reading is truly impressive. He is to be especially commended for his lack of Eurocentrism. It is extremely illuminating to read passages from poets and philosophers from the Orient and Africa on a topic like the essence/appearance distinction alongside the more familiar representatives of Western culture.

Next comes the 'scientific view' on the various topics. For G. the scientific viewpoint seems to begin with Hegel and reach its high points with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao. The many passages from Lenin are especially effective in establishing just how remarkable a theorist this person of action was. But here too the references go far beyond the expected. G. successfully documents numerous cases where the principles of dialectical materialism come into play in the contemporary natural and social sciences. For instance in the discussion of the first law of dialectics G. cites examples of polarity from medicine, physics, chemistry, anatomy, mathematics, education, music, linguistics, economics and politics (114-15).

The discussion of the given law or category concludes with a presentation of 'anti-scientific views.' Here the enemies of dialectical materialism receive their lumps, ranging from Sidney Hook and Karl Popper to Paul Tillich and Krishnamurti. Somewhat surprisingly, the most sustained attack is against Sartre, despite his contribution to Western Marxism.

One relatively minor shortcoming of the work is that its discussion of Marxist philosophy is somewhat dated. Recent thinkers such as Althusser and Habermas are totally ignored, despite their contribution to debates on historical materialism. A far greater difficulty stems from the style of the work. Like a good lawyer, G. seeks to prove his case through exhaustively piling up statements from more and more witnesses. But an effective technique in the courtroom is not necessarily the best way to do philosophy. Taken separately most of the quotations are interesting enough. But 2,286 quotations are a bit much! The problem, of course, is that with so much space taken up by quotations little room is left for independent argumentation. The comparison would horrify G., but his method is reminiscent of Medieval compendia in which scribes 'refuted' pagan authors through quoting the Church Fathers.

The other major problem with the book is that G. is often not fair to his opponents. For one thing he presupposes an unmediated relationship between philosophy and class struggle. Thus he assumes that philosophical positions that do not further proletarian struggle were consciously designed against it. For instance: 'In essence, logical positivism is an ultra-sophisticated bourgeois invention to immobilize the consciousness of intellectuals' (340). Logical positivism may very well often work in this way. But it certainly was not consciously invented by the ruling class to further its rule. As it happens, a number of its

founders were sympathetic to socialism. Another source of G.'s unfairness to his opponents stems from his attitude towards Stalinism. As a Maoist, G. criticizes Stalin for not taking peasants into account sufficiently. But he insists that the U.S.S.R. was an example of socialism prior to 'the regression of socialism to capitalism' that supposedly took place with Khrushchev (470). This means that for G. attacks on Stalinism count as attacks on socialism. Hence he cannot understand someone like Sartre on his own terms, who in his later writings attempted to re-think socialism in a way that might avoid Stalinism.

The best way to use this work is as a source for quotations on the central topics of dialectical materialism. As a philosophical defense of dialectical materialism it cannot be recommended without serious qualification.

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ROBERT B. KRUSCHWITZ and ROBERT C. ROBERTS, eds. *The Virtues: Contemporary Essays on Moral Character*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1987. Pp. 263. US$17.95. ISBN 0-534-06720-4.

This anthology is the first to be devoted entirely to the virtues. An increasing number of articles and single-author books are appearing on this long neglected subject, but with the exception of *The Virtues* and another recent anthology — Christina Hoff Sommers' *Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1985) — little has made its way to the introductory level. Sommers' anthology is intended for entire courses, containing selections both on traditional subjects and on the virtues, whereas *The Virtues* is intended as a supplement for standard introductory ethics courses.

Those who have not studied the virtues will be curious about the need for including material on virtues in an introductory course. Isn't the deontological-teleological distinction exhaustive? Cannot virtue be reduced either to duty or production of good? The four essays in Part One, 'Ethical Theory and the Virtues,' deal with this issue.

In 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,' Michael Stocker argues that the justifying reasons in utilitarianism and deontological ethics — pleasure and duty — cannot be motives for action. Although virtues such as love, friendship and community result in pleasure, our motivation for exemplifying them is not the pleasure we get from them. Nor can our motivation be

the duty to have these virtues, since that would undermine their value. Our motivation for these virtues is simply to have them; we should want love, friendship and community for their own sake. Thus, Stocker concludes, utilitarianism and deontological ethics are schizophrenic: the justifying reasons do not fit with the motives for having virtues.

Harold Alderman, in 'By Virtue of a Virtue,' argues that virtue is more fundamental than duty or good. The paradigmatic character is the basic ethical category, not pleasure, duty or the categorical imperative. Robert B. Louden criticizes this claim in 'On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics.' Virtue ethics is unacceptable if it is reductionistic, i.e., if it reduces duty and goodness to virtue, but it is acceptable if it complements duty and goodness. We need to have a nonunitary ethics, Louden claims, an ethics in which the legitimacy of both duty and virtue is recognized.

The essays in Part One make a convincing case that we can no longer simply assume that ethics is either deontological or teleological, or that if it is one of the two, a study of the virtues is superfluous. Although it would be good for introductory students to be exposed to Kant and Mill before reading these essays, the essays can be understood without that exposure. They put Kant and Mill into a broader perspective, and justify an examination of particular virtues.

The six essays in Part Two, 'Moral Psychology,' discuss a variety of issues, some more closely connected to moral psychology than others. In 'Is Virtue Possible?' Michael Slote argues that being virtuous is not possible, because in every society there is some widely accepted practice that is clearly wrong, such as slavery or discrimination against women. In 'Desires and Deliberation' N.J.H. Dent argues that deliberation does not consist simply of the waxing and waning of desires, as Hobbes claimed. It consists, rather, of the weighing of the significance of desires. Two of the essays, 'Moral Saints' by Susan Wolf and 'Saints' by Robert Adams, discuss the issue of whether being a moral saint is compatible with the pursuit of nonmoral interests. Wolf argues that being a moral saint is undesirable since it is incompatible with the pursuit of legitimate nonmoral interests. Adams argues against Wolf, claiming that being a saint does not mean expending all of one's energies on moral activities.

The seven essays in Part Three, 'Some Vices and Virtues,' discuss a number of different vices and virtues: envy, self-respect, sentimentality, justice, autonomy, generosity and compassion. Some of the essays are largely descriptive, while others contain mainly argumentation and analysis. Those philosophers who are accustomed to argumentation and analysis — and that will be most outside the phenomenological tradition — may be uncomfortable with the descriptive essays. Without theses, subtheses, arguments, criticisms and responses to objections, some will feel at a loss how to teach these essays. Yet studying them, and learning how to teach them, is immensely rewarding.

Of the descriptive essays, 'Faces of Envy' by Leslie Farber is particularly good. It contains a rich and careful analysis of envy, and distinguishes envy from greed and jealousy. Though very readable, the essay contains many in-

sights and subtleties which will demonstrate to students that there is more to the moral life than simple unself-reflective consciousness. Other essays will have the same effect. 'Compassion' by Lawrence Blum describes the object of compassion, the attitude of compassion, and the connection of compassion to beneficent action. Alasdair MacIntyre's 'Justice as a Virtue: Changing Conceptions' (from MacIntyre's *After Virtue*) describes contemporary Western society's individualistic conception of justice and contrasts it with the conception of justice in the virtues tradition.

The Virtues is described in its preface as being intended for use in standard introductory ethics courses 'populated by bright students.' I found, however, that somewhat over half of the essays are no more difficult than selections in standard anthologies in ethical theory, thus making the anthology suitable for courses populated by average undergraduates. I also found, unfortunately, that several essays seem much too difficult for even bright undergraduates. This fact should not prevent the book from being adopted, though, since it will be used as a supplement, and most instructors will not want to use the entire volume anyway.

The book is also useful to philosophers who were not trained in the virtues in graduate school. In addition to introductory summaries of each essay and a general introduction, the book contains an extensive bibliography — 27 pages long — which groups work on the virtues into a variety of categories. Publication of *The Virtues* is indicative of a new trend in ethics.

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VINCENT LEMIEUX. *Systèmes partisans et partis politiques*. Québec: Presses de l'Université du Québec 1985. xiv + 275 p. ISBN 2-7605-0367-4.

Ce livre de Vincent Lemieux, professeur au département de science politique de l'université Laval, est rédigé de façon à servir de manuel de cours aux étudiants des collèges et des universités. 'Les chapitres sont au nombre de quatorze, ce qui correspond à peu près au nombre de semaines d'une session, à l'université ou au collège' (vii). Dans chaque chapitre, l'auteur indique clairement ce qu'il veut démontrer et pour faciliter la compréhension il résume les principales thèses de ceux qui ont déjà traité le thème et illustre ses idées par un tableau ou bien par un graphique. De plus, à la fin de chacun des chapitres,

il y a un résumé thématique et une liste des ouvrages les plus pertinents qui touchent au sujet traité.

L'idée directrice de cet ouvrage est la suivante: 'les systèmes partisans cherchent à contrôler les mandats d'autorité dans le système politique. Différents aspects de ce contrôle permettent de définir les types de systèmes partisans et de partis, leurs composantes, leurs fonctions et leurs transformations. Ils permettent aussi d'évaluer les systèmes partisans et les partis' (vii). L'auteur utilise une approche comparative et systémique pour analyser les partis politiques et les systèmes partisans selon qu'ils sont compétitifs, c'est-à-dire ouverts à la variété, ou monopolistes, c'est-à-dire appuyés sur la contrainte.

Les deux premiers chapitres servent d'introduction. Le premier rappelle les contributions importantes en ce domaine (de La Palombara, de Weiner, d'Ostrogorski, de Michels, de Duverger, de Schlesinger, de Crotty, de Wright, d'Eldersveld, de Sorauf, de Janda, d'Epstein, de Jupp, de McKenzie, de Downs, de Sjoblom, de Robertson, de Katz, de Sartori et de Charlot) et soulève trois grandes questions sur les partis: 1^{e} 'le parti doit-il sélectionner des positions en fonction de son action dans le public, ou en fonction de son action dans l'appareil gouvernemental?'; 2^{e} 'faut-il rechercher le plus grand nombre d'appuis possibles afin que le parti se trouve en bonne position dans l'appareil gouvernemental, ou vaut-il mieux se limiter à des appuis plus aptes à sauvegarder l'identité du parti?'; 3^{e} enfin, 'le parti doit-il gouverner en fonction de ses adhérents ou en fonction de ses électeurs?' (11). Le premier chapitre se termine en proposant 'une perspective unificatrice centrée autour de l'idée de contrôle des mandats d'autorité dans le système politique' (viii). Le deuxième chapitre précise les concepts de contrôle, de variété et de contrainte et développe l'approche systémique que l'auteur emploiera dans les chapitres suivants.

La première partie de l'ouvrage, composée des trois chapitres suivants, analyse les types de systèmes partisans. Le troisième chapitre présente d'abord une discussion des typologies existantes et ensuite l'auteur propose sa propre typologie fondée sur les phénomènes de contrôle. Ensuite, le quatrième chapitre traite des systèmes monopolistes où un parti contôle seul durant une longue période la direction du gouvernement tandis que le cinquième chapitre traite des systèmes compétitifs où le contrôle du gouvernement est le fait de plus d'un parti simultanément ou successivement.

La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage porte sur les différentes composantes des partis. Dans le chapitre 6, l'auteur analyse la composante interne des partis et distingue en fonction de la variété et de la contrainte les partis décentrés de ceux qui sont centrés. La composante publique est l'objet du chapitre 7 ce qui permet de distinguer le caractère plutôt intensif ou plutôt extensif des contrôles sur les publiques des différents partis. Le chapitre 8 traite, pour sa part, de la composante gouvernementale; ainsi un parti sera soit programmatique ou soit opportuniste dans ses relations de contrôle. Enfin, le chapitre 9 fait en quelque sorte la synthèse de ces différentes composantes structurelles des partis en proposant une théorie qui 'conciste à expliquer la caractéristique

des composantes par l'ordre d'importance des contrôles exercés par ces composantes les unes sur les autres' (ix).

La troisième partie traite des fonctions des partis: le chapitre 10 porte sur les fonctions de sélection, le chapitre 11 sur les fonctions de représentations et le chapitre 12 sur les fonctions de gouverne.

Les chapitres 13 et 14 servent de conclusion à cet ouvrage. Le premier explore les différentes voies de transformation des partis et des systèmes partisans et le dernier tente d'évaluer selon un schéma systémique les systèmes partisans et les partis.

Vincent Lemieux constate au terme de son étude que la solution du dilemme de la contrainte ou de la variété réside dans un harmonieux mélange plutôt que dans le choix unilatéral et radical de la variété ou de la contrainte. En somme, il s'agit d'un bouquin qui sera utile non seulement pour les étudiant(e)s mais aussi pour tous ceux et celles qui sont intéressés à avoir une vision d'ensemble de l'articulation des systèmes partisans et des partis politiques.

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DAVID MICHAEL LEVIN. *The Body's Recollection of Being: Phenomenological Psychology and the Deconstruction of Nihilism*. Agincourt, ON and New York: Methuen 1985. Pp. xi + 390. Cdn$62.95 : US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7102-0149-4); Cdn$28.50 : US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7102-0478-4).

Among the purposes Levin establishes for his phenomenological study of the body is the deconstruction of philosophical methods that obfuscate the issues they allegedly articulate. This includes the Continental tradition itself, which Levin calls to task as part of his critical and therapeutic review of the prejudices against the body that are so deeply entrenched in Western philosophy.

Without sacrificing sensitivity or reverence, Levin's scholarship exposes the mistakes and missed opportunities of earlier phenomenologists, including Heidegger, whose work he criticizes for its 'excessive formalism and intellectualism' (16). What is needed to correct these defects, he argues, is a thinking and recollection of being that cannot be done merely through a scholarly reading of the history of being; for by itself, this only perpetuates the metaphysical abstractions it sets out to deconstruct (156). Rather, the recollection of being must be schematized in the bodily mode in which Dasein itself

primordially occurs, in order to 'flesh out' experientially the living hermeneutic and 'body of understanding' that Heidegger sought, but overlooked.

Since thinking is rooted in experience, and experience arises from our embodied being-in-the-world, Levin claims that bodily gesture and motility must be examined first if ontology is to be truly fundamental. Drawing from the work of Jung, Merleau-Ponty and Eugene Gendlin, among others, Levin returns the body to the focus of philosophical concern by examining the individual's embodiment in early childhood and adult pre-reflective experience, and humanity's collective celebration of being in the traditional gestures of religious ritual and liturgy. The body's recollection of being is not a repetition of some individual or phylogenetic event that occurred earlier in time, but is a renewed participation in modes of embodiment that have been denigrated and repressed by our representationalist metaphysics and the process of socialization in a technological world. By listening with a more sensitive attunement to the body's own *logos*, the recollection of received traditions and of the forgotten spontaneity of an innocent motility can be facilitated by religious gesture, choreographed movement and tactile experience. In so doing, we reclaim ourselves as beings who feel the world as we move through and with its fields of emotionally toned meanings.

The cultural resurrection and phenomenological appreciation of the forgotten significance of gesture and movement require that the body itself be the medium in which the recollection of motility occurs. Through suggested programs of therapy and education employing movement, touching and dance, Levin's study thus aims to achieve a hermeneutics of embodiment that is also an embodiment of hermeneutics (117). By means of this process of self-interpretation, the body at one and the same time is the 'subject' engaging in interpretation, and is the 'object' that is interpreted. The body thereby transcends traditional subject/object distinctions, which is essential for the deconstruction of the Western metaphysical tradition and the nihilism it engenders; for through this process of self-recollection, the body is no longer reified by a disinterested and disembodied observing subject as just one physical object among others in a static Newtonian space, but is re-experienced as the self-constituted process of becoming celebrated by ancient rituals and felt in pre-reflective movement. The body's long-forgotten significance for human being is thus re-membered, rather than dis-membered as it has been by the dualisms of abstract metaphysical thinking.

But lest it be assumed that the body's recollection of being aims at a terminus that completes phenomenological disclosure once and for all, Levin is careful to describe this project of ontological interpretation as 'a rigorously sustained attending to openings' (28). 'It is the continuing opening and deepening which is genuinely ontological, not the articulation of an "absolute certitude," a "true origin," a "first cause," or an 'ultimate ground"' (29). Foundationalism, Levin argues, is a symptom of the nihilism that his hermeneutic intends to deconstruct. Insofar as our experience of being is a continually unfolding and emerging process of opportunities for openness, to declare the necessity of a ground or first condition is to miss entirely the character of the

motility phenomenon expressed by the body's ontology. There is no finished text of embodiment that stands already interpreted at any given moment, even in the future; there are only continual processes of writing and reading the text, the incompleteness of which opens possibilities for a future in the first place. This does not imply on the contrary that the body's hermeneutic is anti-foundationalist; to infer thus is to employ the reductionist and dualistic categories of thinking that genuine embodiment transcends. Our possibilities for being comprise a richly variegated field of experience, the limits of which indeed are circumscribed by the body's motility character; but the appropriation of these possibilities is nonetheless an infinitely opening medium of growth for individuals and their communities.

The more notable literary virtues of Levin's work include a poetic sensitivity to language that enables him to explore the ontological revelations of metaphor in a truly original manner. However, at some crucial junctures of the study it seems that metaphor becomes over-worked; e.g., 'lending a hand to Being,' 'taking the Earth in stride,' and discussions of celebration through dance are poignant and suggestive as philosophical metaphors, but Levin's pursuit of these terms to more exact and literal consequences makes his descriptions elusive and confusing at times.

It is also rather puzzling that a writer of Levin's ability should lapse so often into the opaque vocabulary and tortured syntax of Heideggerean jargon. His work has a great deal to contribute to practitioners of disciplines other than academic philosophy, such as primary education and psychotherapy. Unfortunately, too much prior training is required in order to follow his study, including mastery of difficult works by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and others.

But these issues aside, *The Body's Recollection of Being* revitalizes a tradition of philosophy that has been allowed by its apologists to devolve into a slavish devotion to dated texts. Levin's extension of phenomenology beyond Heidegger is a most welcome turn for Continental thought, which has expended far too much effort compiling only archives of commentary, and thereby underestimating its own power and sensitivity as a method for independent philosophical thinking.

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GEORGE E. MARCUS and MICHAEL M.J. FISCHER. *Anthropology as Cultural Critique. An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1986. xiii + 205 p. ISBN 0-226-50449-2.

Cet ouvrage s'adresse d'abord aux chercheurs en sciences humaines (anthropologie, sociologie de la culture, histoire) qui réfléchissent sur l'orientation et la portée de leurs disciplines. Grâce aux relations qu'il fait avec l'art et la littérature, il concerne aussi un plus large public d'intellectuels. Il intéresse également les philosophes de la culture et les épistémologues (au sens large).

De nombreuses thèses sur l'anthropologie et son histoire sont imbriquées dans des descriptions; je procéderai en rapportant ce que les auteurs décrivent et je m'attarderai ensuite à certaines thèses. L'ouvrage s'assigne deux tâches principales: d'abord retracer l'évolution de l'anthropologie comme critique de la culture, pour ensuite examiner le statut de cette dernière fonction et proposer des manières de l'assurer. L'évolution est présentée selon un schéma classique: les idéaux du XIXe siècle, c'est-à-dire les grandes généralisations, les théories globales, le projet d'une science générale des sociétés et d'une évolution vers une plus grande rationalité, tout cela a maintenant décliné et entraîne une crise de la représentation dans l'ensemble des sciences humaines. Cette situation détermine une impressionnante effervescence à l'intérieur de l'anthropologie culturelle, un repli vers l'essai, la monographie, l'étude des micro-niveaux, ainsi qu'une constante réflexion sur les projets et les œuvres. C'est ce que les auteurs appelleront 'l'ethnographie interprétative' et c'est spécialement sur son développement qu'ils insistent. Et ce ce point de vue le livre est instructif et stimulant. On y trouve des présentations bien documentées des sujets privilégiés de cette ethnologie, la Personne, le Soi, les Émotions, les notions d'individu et de parent, en relation, bien évidemment, avec la façon qu'ont les cultures *autres* de construire et de vivre ces 'entités' culturelles. On y rencontre aussi les genres privilégiés d'événements: l'histoire de vie, les cycles vitaux, le rituel, la nature de la pensée, l'expression des émotions. Le mouvement en question est allusivement rattaché aux trois Grands de l'ère du Soupçon (Marx, Nietzsche, Freud), et avec un peu plus de détails à divers développements de la culture du XXe siècle (Weber, Parsons, le structuralisme, l'herméneutique). Mais on apprend surtout beaucoup de choses sur la place occupée par et l'influence de l'École de Francfort, du surréalisme français (particulièrement le groupe dissident formé de Georges Bataille, des ethnologues Michel Leiris, Marcel Griaule, et autres), et, aux État-Unis, dans les années 20 et 30, de l'apparition d'une multitude de publications (revues, films, photos) destinées à représenter plus adéquatement la réalité ambiante (l'ensemble sera désigné par l'expression 'Documentary Criticism in America'). Malgré sa situation académique à l'intérieur de l'anthropologie, on comprendra que l'ethnographie puisse souvent voisiner avec la littérature, le roman historique et les arts plastiques.

En tout cela, par l'ethnographie interprétative, l'anthropologie culturelle se cherche une motivation, une raison d'être. Les auteurs insistent sur le fait

qu'il s'agit d'expérimentation. au cours de cette phase, deux intentions originaires de l'anthropologie seraient reprises et elles deviendront le plan pour présenter la matière. D'abord une préoccupation pour l'objet: des descriptions de d'autres mondes, des autres cultures; ce qui provoque le dépaysement (*Defamiliarization*) chez l'anthropologue et chez ses lecteurs. En second lieu un intérêt pour la méthode: une réflexion sur les fondements épistémologiques de ces comptes rendus et de ces interprétations. À cet égard les auteurs s'appliquent à décrire la méthode interprétative beaucoup plus qu'à l'expliciter et à l'expliquer. Leurs efforts se concentrent plutôt sur les aspects suivants: comment raccorder cette ethnographie, et par le fait même l'anthropologie, à l'histoire globale et à ses structures mondiales (on se situe ici relativement au concept de 'modern world-system' [Wallerstein]); et aussi comment relier cette anthropologie *interprétative*, pour laquelle la culture est un texte, la vie sociale une négociation de significations, dans laquelle on se nourrit d'Écriture et de réflexivité, comment la relier à la matérialité de l'histoire, aux structures économiques et politiques.

Les tentatives qui sont faites pour répondre aux deux questions précédentes sont bien décrites; quelques exemples, de styles différents, sont analysées. Cette description des cheminements de l'anthropologie, partant d'une crise de la représentation et des discours scientifiques, passant par le développement d'une ethnographie interprétative, et s'efforçant de faire valoir sa pertinence dans un monde qui s'homogénéise (où les différences s'abolissent) et sa relation aux structures économiques et politiques, cette description parvient, dans les deux derniers chapitres (5 et 6), à sa fin naturelle: un rapatriement (*Rapatriation*) de l'anthropologie comme critique de la culture (ch. 5) et deux techniques contemporaines de critique de la culture (ch. 6).

Tout ce que j'ai rapporté est agréable à lire. On décrit un mouvement (*trend*) intellectuel. L'ouvrage ne défend pas explicitement de thèses. Mais on pourra dégager plusieurs présuppositions. Je terminerai en faisant quelques remarques concernant ce que l'on pourrait considérer comme deux thèses. Elles sont bien précises et de modestes dimentions. (Ce n'est pas le moment d'affronter des objets aussi considérables que le sont les 'motivations de l'anthropologie' [ou de 'l'anthropologue'] ou ce qu'est la 'critique de la culture.')

En premier lieu je ressens un certain malaise à propos de l'objet pour ainsi dire historique de l'anthropologie. On rencontre ici comme ailleurs (*e.g.* A. Kuper, *Anthropology and Anthropologists. The Modern British School*) l'énoncé d'un problème: les 'cultures primitives,' ces raisons séminales de l'anthropologie sont maintenant presque totalement disparues; et l'homogénéisation de la planète se poursuit. Pour l'anthropologue la situation n'est donc pas de tout repos (24, 37, 42-3, 131-2). Pourtant la thèse des auteurs est que l'anthropologie, malgré la perte de son objet, peut faire ses preuves, c'est-à-dire représenter la différence culturelle et se livrer à une critique de la culture (131-2). C'est en fait aussi cela même — l'expérience des différences culturelles — qui dispose au dépaysement, et à la critique de la culture. Il y a donc un présupposé, à savoir qu'il y a des cultures, qui motive toute l'entreprise. Et ces cultures, qui sont substituées aux sociétés primitives

des origines, ce sont tout simplement les cultures 'autres.' Et il est bien vrai, comme les auteurs le signalent (39), que pour le technocrate et le planificateur (et j'ajouterai pour l'esprit positif) la culture — et les différences — tout cela n'est qu'un mystérieux résidu, une résistance au changement. Ce que je veux signaler à ce propos est bien simple: malgré les efforts des auteurs pour faire valoir l'intention de l'anthropologie et sa reprise dans l'ethnographie interprétative depuis les années 60, malgré un chapitre (*'Conveying Other Cultural Experience: The Person, Self and Emotions'*) sur ce qui l'alimente, tout cela demeure justement passablement mystérieux. La thèse c'est qu'il y a là quelque chose qui compte. Ce qu'on aimerait c'est qu'on nous le fasse mieux percevoir. D'autre part, à l'origine, comme le diront des historiographes de l'anthropologie — ici Michèle Duchet — 'la découverte d'une humanité exotique avait ébranlé jusque dans ses fondements l'ancienne conception du monde.' Comment à cela peut-on comparer le dépaysement qui résulte de l'expérience de ce qu'est aujourd'hui une autre société contemporaine?

Ce que je vise au fond c'est une faiblesse théorique. Mon second et dernier point se rapproche du premier et se soucie de la même précarité. Afin d'illustrer ce qu'est le propos de l'anthropologie (ou ethnographie interprétative), Marcus et Fischer se réfèrent à des auteurs qui sont représentatifs. Certaines références sont très heureuses. Par exemple, aux concepts, à la méthodologie et aux analyses de Clifford Geertz. Mais un éclairage qu'ils jugent fondamental se fait au moyen de travaux de Marshall Sahlins (*Culture and Practical Reason*; traduction française: *Au coeur des sociétés*). Ils nous renvoient à ces passages où Sahlins étudie les codes ou classifications concernant les vêtements, la couleur et l'alimentation et où il soutient que ces classifications sont culturelles, c'est-à-dire que, par exemple, en ce qui a trait au boeuf en Amérique du Nord, ce ne sont pas des conditions techniques et économiques mais une logique culturelle qui détermine la place du boeuf dans l'alimentation. En résumé 'l'Amérique est la terre sacrée du chien' et 'dans son modèle culturel du repas, la viande principale, le boeuf, évoque le pôle masculin d'un code sexuel qui doit remonter aux identification Indo-Européennes des bêtes à cornes avec la virilité' (Marcus et Fischer, 142). Or un autre anthropologue, Marvin Harris (v. *Cultural Materialism*), éreinte facilement l'argumentation de Sahlins lorsqu'il explique, parmi bien des choses, que le jambon a prévalu au XIXe siècle, et que la consommation massive du boeuf est bien plutôt le résultat de l'apparition des wagons réfrigérés et d'une industrie agro-alimentaire qui s'est développée parce que le boeuf et non le porc pouvait se nourrir de l'herbe gratuite des grands pâturages de l'ouest. Que Marcus et Fischer nous disent un peu plus loin (150) que la thèse de Sahlins à l'effet que l'ordre naturel des choses n'est pas donné mais culturellement construit constitue le coeur théorique du message de l'anthropologie concernant la critique de la culture n'est pas de nature à nous rassurer. Il nous est donné un beau livre sur l'ethnographie actuelle mais il n'est pas superflu de souhaiter qu'on en clarifie certains fondements épistémologiques. Il se peut, notamment, qu'une explication des activités sociales doivent tenir compte à la fois des conditions objectives et naturelles et de conditions qui dépendent des institutions, des traditions

et d'une 'logique culturelle.' Il importerait alors d'insister plus sur une théorie de l'articulation des unes aux autres que sur un seul des deux pôles.

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JOSEPH MARGOLIS. *Pragmatism without Foundations*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1986. Pp. xix + 320. Cdn$68.75 : US$34.95. ISBN 0-631-15034-X.

There seem to be three different ways of responding to the challenge posed by recent critiques of traditional philosophy such as Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1979). The first is the familiar one: 'I've read enough bits to know he's wrong.' The second is perhaps best evidenced by the collection *After Philosophy*, in which the editors speak of philosophy being transformed in our time into the sort of thing Donald Davidson and Jürgen Habermas are doing in their respective ways (the closest we get to business as usual), the sort of thing Hans-Georg Gadamer is doing, or the change of conversation Rorty offers (K. Baynes, J. Bohman, and T. McCarthy, eds., *After Philosophy* [MIT Press 1987]). The third sort of response is what Richard Bernstein and Joseph Margolis have attempted in differing ways, namely, showing that we are in a period of transition to a new synthesis of previously antithetical traditions. Bernstein's objective is to show how we have gone beyond the distinction between objectivisim and relativism into a new intellectual context (R. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* [University of Pennsylvania Press 1983]). Margolis' project is actually to reconcile realism and relativism more or less as presently understood. Whatever doubts one might have about Bernstein's chances for success, his project turns on saying how traditional positions have been superseded, so there is no reconciliation attempted. On the other hand Margolis is committed to a reconciliation of positions which he attempts to clarify, but which he accepts pretty much as traditionally conceived. This means that he must in effect show the tradition *wrong*, whereas Bernstein need only show the tradition has changed.

Bernstein thinks we have entered a new era, one in which philosophy can no longer avail itself of distinctions taken as unproblematic prior to challenges to conceptions of philosophy and human rationality by Rorty, Gadamer, Habermas, and others. His task, therefore, is to make out at least the outlines of what

he sees as the new, dialogical and hermeneutical activity that is supposedly supplanting older analytic techniques. Bernstein can *begin* with the critiques he thinks have forced abandonment of the old methodologies and categories, and go from there. But Margolis, at least on my reading of his book, has to show that positions familiar to us have been misconstrued — and he argues precisely that with respect to relativism, distinguishing 'Protagorism,' 'incommensurabilism,' and what he endorses, 'robust relativism.' Margolis conceives of his problem in terms of realism and relativism as two horses in the same race — as if they were rival hypotheses in a scientific dispute occurring within the same theoretical context. This is what I can neither accept nor quite understand. Nor will it do to have recourse to Margolis' own definitions of realism and relativism, for unless the positions he is treating are recognizable as those at odds in philosophical debate since Protagoras, his project could not be what he claims it to be. I do not, in any case, think his refinements of the characterizations of the positions materially affect my point. Margolis' juxtaposition of realism and relativism (of whatever sort) is odd, for it is of the essence in each case that the other is not a position at all but a confusion. They could be *competing* positions only within a larger context which, if we had it, would render Margolis' project redundant and vindicate Bernstein. It does not help that Margolis contrasts *realism* with relativism, instead of objectivism, because given the methodological emphasis Margolis puts on realism, the difference comes to very little.

The prefatory part of the book is basically a sifting out of three senses of 'relativism': the more or less self-refuting 'Protagorean' version, the more fashionable 'incommensurability' version, and what he describes as 'robust relativism.' If one read this first part cursorily, and perhaps unsympathetically, one might conclude that 'robust relativism' amounts to only a sort of restricted or contextualist relativism. The book proceeds, in Part One, with a number of chapters devoted to consideration of relativism vis-à-vis other topics. Representative chapters are titled 'Historicism and Universalism' and 'Rationality and Realism.' In Part Two Margolis tackles issues of monumental scope: e.g. 'The Legitimation of Realism' and 'A Sense of *Rapprochement* between Analytic and Continental European Philosophy.' Throughout he often apologizes for taking the reader on what appear to be tangential discussions but which he feels are central to his project. In fact he manages to have his say on just about every major contemporary philosophical issue and philosopher, and this reviewer was not convinced of the necessity of much that is said. I also found the style self-indulgent in terms of allusions and parenthetical remarks which almost never help the argument along — on the contrary, they often obscure his point and make the structure of the argument very problematic.

Because of the sheer amount of material, I will comment only on what I took to be a pivotal chapter: 'Realism and Relativism.' In this fifth chapter of Part One Margolis offers a discussion which, as in the case of others, is well-larded with lists of propositions and emphasized passages. Neither seemed to me to be particularly useful in following the argument. The chapter's conclu-

sion is that '*there remains no possibility of precluding a robust relativism at the center of our philosophy of science*' (133).

The realism that is being reconciled with 'robust' relativism is most succinctly articulated much earlier: 'Minimally, by *realism* one signifies that...the capacity of humans to sustain and discipline an investigation into what they take to be the real world — and, doing that, to state what is true about the world — is a capacity justifiably affirmed' (xiv; see also 111). As for the relativism at issue, it is perhaps most briefly, though also minimally, articulated in terms of '[R]elativistic systems (of the interesting sort) provid[ing] for *incongruent* judgments...that (a) are epistemically eligible within the same context of inquiry; (b) would, on a model of truth and falsity, be contradictories...; (c) are only assigned truth values weaker than "true" and "false"; ... (d) are not detachable in the evidentiary sense' (17).

Margolis lists resultant skepticism and inherent incoherency as the 'peculiarly extravagant' (129) charges leveled at relativism. He then tries to meet the incoherency charge, expecting to then be able to demonstrate the efficacy of relativism in particular domains or issue-contexts in order to meet the charge of resultant skepticism. What he then does is basically contend that any effort to apply a bipolar model of truth will founder on the evidential underdetermination of scientific claims. He tells us that 'the most powerful version of the defense of relativism cannot but be based on the claim that the nature of the questions raised, the properties of the entities or phenomena under examination, the very structure of the disciplines in question disallow resorting to a bipolar model of truth values' (131).

The trouble I had with this chapter, and throughout the book, was getting clear on how much of what Margolis laboriously tries to establish could be *conceded* by a realist without loss. I also was left wondering what 'robust' relativism came to. At too many crucial junctures Margolis uses aesthetic comparisons to illustrate how a position is robustly relativistic, but it often seemed to me the most he could get from those comparisons was appreciation of *complexity* and concessions about lack of exact judgmental criteria and the difficulties attendant on their application.

Margolis contends that

> [I]n a nonrelativistic system, probabilized...claims are...ideally capable of being true or false, even if there is now...no epistemically operational way in which to apply the values "true" and "false" *simpliciter* ...[A] robust relativism provides for *another...dependent* range of claims to which truth values...weaker than "true" and "false" alone apply... The profound novelty of this way of conceiving relativism is straightforward enough: it is *not* necessary to hold that, if *some* domain of inquiry behaves relativistically, then *every* domain does as well. (22)

I just do not see how this is a 'profound novelty.' Surely the very examples Margolis uses from aesthetics illustrate such a 'dependent range of claims' which may be accommodated comfortably within a realist position *without* that accommodation being an acceptance of relativism.

The problems with Margolis' book are perhaps clearest when he takes on

Rorty on transcendental arguments, maintaining that Rorty — and Donald Davidson — are wrong about the 'third dogma' of empiricism (the scheme/content distinction) which is 'easily avoided' (303) and so rejection of which does not preclude transcendental arguments. After yet another list of conditions and several more emphasized passages we are told that a way has been provided to '*construe transcendental arguments relativistically*' (305; his emphases). Much of this has to do with the claim that 'transcendental arguments proceed by way of historically salient exemplars rather than universal rules' (307). I went back and reread the relevant sections a number of times and still do not see how the concluding claim constitutes a *novel* form of relativism.

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PETER J. MARKIE. *Descartes' Gambit*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1986. Pp. 278. US$27.50. ISBN 0-8014-1906-9.

The Gambit (always capitalized in the book) is Descartes' deduction of his theory of the self from premises about his self-knowledge. These are: 'P1: I am certain that I think. P2: I am certain that I exist. P3: I am uncertain that I have a body' (21). The theory of the self is composed of two parts: first, that he is a substance and is essentially thinking but is not essentially extended, and second, that he is not extended, is numerically distinct from his body, and capable of existing apart from every other contingent substance. Markie differs from many other interpreters by way of being an enthusiast. This is exhibited in his claim that the deduction proceeds without blunders such as begging the question and misapplying the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. And, according to Markie, Descartes' reasoning is impeccable and based upon assumptions which are not outrageous (269).

The book is somewhat more and somewhat less than a book about the Meditations. It is somewhat less in that Markie is not specifically concerned with Descartes' proofs of the existence of God or his resolutions of the problem of error. However even here certain of his discussions, for example, that regarding the essence of God (204-8), and that regarding objections to the deceiver hypothesis (145-50) are illuminating. It is more in that the author brings in with skill and erudition salient points from all of Descartes' philosophical writings, and discusses in detail particular claims of such major contemporary scholars as Kenny, Williams and Wilson. Even if one were to dislike the book as

a whole, particular discussions of such thorny problems as the nature of clear and distinct perception would remain of value.

In the second chapter ('Certainty') Markie quite correctly emphasizes that an understanding of Descartes' concepts of certainty plays a central role in the development of his position. Markie distinguishes and provides definitions of three kinds — metaphysical, moral and psychological. It is, however, rather unfortunate that the critical definition of metaphysical certainty seems dubious. It is: 'D2 p is a metaphysical certainty for S = df. (1) believing p is more reasonable for S from the standard epistemic perspective than doubting p or denying p, and (2) it could never be more reasonable for S to believe some proposition q than it is at present for S to believe p' (39). To understand this definition two points must be kept in mind. First, by 'doubt' Markie means the suspension or withholding of judgment. Second, the reference to the 'standard epistemic perspective' (believing all and only what is true) serves to indicate than one is not concerned with, say, being more reasonable from the standpoint of maximizing satisfaction. The problem lies in the second clause. Is the 'could' determined by the character of the particular agent S? If so, it would seem that for a particularly stupid agent (one who couldn't follow most arguments or understand very much) who forms, for example, reasonable perceptual beliefs, those beliefs would be metaphysically certain. Perhaps there is more in the 'could' than this. Perhaps we are to suppose that the agent could alter his character, say by becoming as clever as Markie. Then perhaps it could be that some proposition q would be more reasonable for our stupid agent to believe than those beliefs are at present. But to put matters this way is to suggest that one should follow Firth and take metaphysical certainty as maximum warrant, where for an individual S to have maximum warrant for p at t it must not be possible to imagine circumstances in which any proposition would have more warrant for anyone than p has for S at t. This has, in my opinion, several advantages over Markie's definition. It does not, in order to be sufficiently strong, require a supposition of capacity alteration in S. And it brings out what I should argue to be a fundamental trait of metaphysically certain propositions, namely that we are in as good an epistemic position with respect to them as is God. Be this as it may, the principle used in much of the subsequent argumentation is EP1. It states that 'p is a metaphysical certainty for S if and only if p is a moral certainty for S and S has no reason to doubt p' (42). Morally certain propositions are, roughly, those which are more reasonable to believe than any save those which are metaphysically certain. (Markie throughout claims that Descartes is concerned with the moral certainty of various principles and propositions. I do not believe this, but I lack the space to discuss the issue.) Upon reading EP1 one might suppose that if one had overlooked bits of counter-evidence one might be morally certain and have no reason to doubt. What prevents this is a modal built into the definition of a 'reason to doubt.' However, pursuing this topic would require the consideration of further droves of epistemic principles. The droves are conveniently assembled at the end of the book (271-4), but since they are not on tearaway pages

the reader who would understand the book should rush to the nearest copier and keep the copies close at hand as he wades through the book.

In the third chapter ('The Contents of Self-Knowledge') Markie argues that Descartes thinks that propositions are the contents of his intentional attitudes. He informs us that the matter is quite important, but neglects to inform us of any interpretative alternatives arising from Descartes rather than from some particular squabbles among contemporary philosophers. For example, Markie discusses the view of David Lewis that intentional attitudes are not attitudes toward propositions, claiming that this would challenge central Cartesian claims (99). I can only confess that I do not see how it would — the impression which I gain is that Markie has some views on the subject which he wishes to try out. Indeed this seems to be the problem with most of this chapter.

In the fourth chapter ('The Body, Senses, and Uncertainty') Markie argues that Descartes' defense of P3, succeeds. One controversial claim made is that in the first Meditation Descartes is only concerned with what we can be metaphysically certain of given that our only evidence is sensation reports (including introspection) (104-7). He then turns to an extended and difficult discussions of the dream and deceiver arguments. He claims that Descartes uses the dream argument to support P3, even if having a body is construed simply as being extended. I do not think that Descartes does this, and would in part support my claim with the very arguments and points Markie makes to suggest that the argument does not support P3 (135-7).

In the fifth chapter ('The Mind, Clear and Distinct Perception, and Certainty') Markie turns to P1 and P2. The initial portion of the chapter is concerned with the rather controversial claim that while all metaphysical certainties are clear and distinct the converse does not hold. As the chapter proceeds more principles pop up. We find in EP14 that if S clearly and distinctly perceives that p, then S is morally certain of p (166). Further discussion would require the above-mentioned consideration of the role of moral certainty.

In the sixth chapter ('Substance and Essence') and the final chapter ('Body and Soul') Markie explicates and provides the 'Gambit Defense' of the claims involved in Descartes' theory of the self. The argument for C3, the claim that one is not essentially extended, is presented in 12 steps. The penultimate step is, in a nutshell, that it is logically possible that I exist and am neither extended nor related to an extended thing. Why believe this? For all the fancy maneuvering we still get back to the claim that the deceiver hypothesis shows this. P1, P2, and P3 are used, but not, in my view, essentially. They merely allow the exhibition of the core claim that the belief that I exist and have no body is shown to be possibly true by the deceiver hypothesis. Much of the complexity seems mere window dressing.

A blurb on the dust cover (the blurb, unsurprisingly enough, originates from Brown University) describes Markie's writing as 'exceptionally clear' and his logic as 'impeccable.' But to grant this is not to say that the book is either easy or enjoyable to read. Making one's way through it is rather like making one's way through a thicket. Rest stops are necessary along the way. And one

will often lose one's way, retrace one's steps. Is the way worthwhile? If one is not familiar with and, perhaps, sympathetic to analytic epistemology and philosophy of mind, one will not find the way worthwhile. One might even be disposed to claim that Descartes disappeared somewhere along the way (probably around page 17). But this is too harsh. Descartes is there, and a dogged and determined reader will find his efforts rewarded. Is the overall claim correct? You will no doubt recall that to be in an optimum epistemic position re a deduction, one must not only follow step by step, one must also keep the whole in mind. I have followed the steps, but I cannot as yet keep the whole in mind. Consequently I am uncertain....

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GOTTFRIED MARTIN. *Arithmetic and Combinatorics: Kant and his Contemporaries*. Tr. & ed. Judy Wubnig. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press 1985. Pp. 198. US$27.50. ISBN 0-8093-1184-4.

The work of Gottfried Martin on Kant is well enough known that he needs no introduction to contemporary scholars. His position as editor of *Kant-Studien*, and of the general Kant and Leibniz indices, and his position as co-editor of *Studia Leibnitiana* ensure his lasting influence on our understanding of 18th Century philosophy. The present work, however, arises from a period when Martin was completing his doctoral studies: it was originally published under the date 1938. It was subsequently reprinted by Walter de Gruyter in 1972, and the translation is taken from the latter edition.

Because this is an early work, however, it must be read in context and with certain reservations. First of all, it is a period piece in the sense that it attempts to correct a rather one-sided view of Kant's relation to mathematics (his general competence in the area, and his contributions to the field) which had become prevalent during the early part of the present century. Secondly, the work indicates that Martin himself had not yet developed the fine sensitivity to the subtleties of Kant's philosophy which characterizes his later work. Both of these points are worthy of comment.

Martin is clearly concerned to defend Kant against his detractors, insisting that scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were entirely wrong in their observations that Kant had a very poor grasp of mathematics, and that he contributed little or nothing to the field (xix-xx). His 'Introduc-

tion,' therefore, is given over to a summary of the mathematical courses taught by Kant, and a list of the various mathematical works contained in his library. He then goes on to attempt to establish that certain very important developments in mathematics can be traced directly back to Kant and a small group of his close friends and students. The early chapters of the work are thus dedicated to arguments in support of the position that: 'A conscious axiomatics is first found included in the work of [Johann] Schultz and in that of Kant's immediate students: Johann Gottfried Karl Christian Kiesewetter (1766-1840), Christian Gottlieb Zimmermann, and Jacob Sigismund Beck (1761-1840)' (14). Ultimately, Martin wants to show (in agreement with Giulio Vivanti) 'that much of modern set theory is contained in Schultz's work' (22), and therefore 'that there is a direct line from Kant to modern mathematics' (34). This final step is provided by an examination (at the end of Chapter Three) as to whether the axioms isolated are to be attributed to Schultz, or to Kant.

Martin provides a great deal of evidence to support his position that Kant is the ultimate source of the axiomatic tradition. Because the works cited are not readily available, the book is an important contribution to our understanding of developments in the philosophy of mathematics during the decades before and after 1800. But the argument offered is not immune to objections. For example, J. Fang mounts a veritable diatribe against Martin's position in his review of the 1972 (German) edition of the work (*Philosophia Mathematica*, Vol. 10 [1973], 194-211). His essential objection is that Martin entirely neglected the 'working mathematicians' of the period, who could perfectly well account for the developments in mathematics at the time. Moreover, he points out that none of the side-effects which one would naturally expect to accompany these revolutionary insights are to be found in the work of Kant, or of his students. Fang had only recently published his own views on the importance of Kant for modern mathematics in *Kant-Interpretationen I* (Regensburg, Munster [Westf.] 1967: Part II, 'Kant and Modern Mathematics').

It would be inappropriate, however, to permit this controversy to occupy the reader's attention to the exclusion of what may be seen as the more essential aspects of Martin's work. These aspects are not as clearly defined as one would desire, but the most important elements of Martin's presentation relate not to the historical development of axiomatics, but rather to the more central Kantian question concerning the *epistemological* foundations of mathematics. Once again, Martin's arguments are not clear and strong, but the material he presents permits the reader to formulate a very interesting perspective. For example, Martin finds it curious that Kant should be much concerned with logistics. That is, he notes Kant's clear differentiation between philosophical knowledge on the one hand and mathematical knowledge on the other. Yet he recognizes that Kant is concerned to provide a complete and systematic conception of transcendental philosophy, and that he sometimes mentions a systematic derivation of all the predicables which might be obtained from the basic categories. What Martin has neglected to note here is the clear and important difference between the origins of knowledge, in virtue of which mathematics and philosophy are quite different, and the sys-

tematic relationships which obtain within *any* systematic body of knowledge once it is constituted.

It is precisely because Martin is so concerned to demonstrate Kant's role in the development of axiomatics that most of his material is focused on this historical question, thereby inadvertently setting off particular contributions of figures like Lambert and Fries who understood and contributed to Kant's more genuine concern. It is the epistemological element, and the logical process in virtue of which the mind is capable of formulating an axiom that Kant must isolate. It is the conditions which make a mathematical judgment (i.e., a synthetic judgment *a priori*) *possible* that is his specific concern. Kant maintains consistently that the essential conditions of consciousness are synthetic, and when (in the Method, A832/B860) he provides a discussion of systematic knowledge — which is, of course, analytic — he has not forgotten that point.

What we find, therefore, is that formal systems are (ideally) entirely composed of analytic relationships. In this sense, science and mathematics (as fully constituted formal systems) may be seen by Kant as 'analytic,' and therefore Kant could make them the subject of logistics, as Martin suggests. But this would not imply that Kant had given up his distinction between various kinds of knowledge. Kant can quite consistently maintain that analysis is simply one form of synthesis performed by the mind: the consideration of logical relationships among elements held in one mental unity. And clearly the legitimacy of analysis is dependent upon the original synthetic process in virtue of which the formal system bears an actual relationship to our experiential framework: i.e., is true of experience. Thus, science and mathematics are (or can be expressed as) formal systems for Kant, and in this (insignificant) sense are analytic. But this is not what grounds them, and gives them validity as knowledge.

Martin has some awareness of the background which he is working against, obviously. It surfaces occasionally in his comments about the 'ontological' character of arithmetic (e.g., 110). But his treatment of this problem is not clearly defined as distinct from the question of how Kant may have contributed to the development of an axiomatic treatment of mathematics — which could only be of secondary interest to Kant. Yet the elements of the argument are made available by this work, and a great deal more information is provided which will certainly prompt a more careful consideration of the precise role of mathematics in Kant's thought, as well as the precise role of Kant in the development of modern mathematics.

Wubnig provides excellent additional material in her notes which supplement those of Martin. Moreover, there is an Appendix which contains an excerpt from the work of Johann Schultz to which Martin constantly refers. These contributions certainly make the translation more helpful to the reader. In general the book is very well done. There are only a few typographical errors that will trouble the reader, mostly without occasioning any confusion. There is only one mistranslation which seriously troubled me: the long quotation on page 69 (note 41) would lead one to believe that Kant was working on a conception of philosophy which would give it 'a direction permanently much

more advantageous *than* that of religion and morals.' But, of course, the student of Kant knows that what he is saying in this letter to Herz (1773) is that he is attempting to provide a conception of philosophy which will in fact be more advantageous *for* religion and morality. A reference to standard translations of that passage would have eliminated this misconception. Apart from these minor problems, however, this will prove to be an important contribution to Kant scholarship in English.

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STEPHEN NATHANSON. *The Ideal of Rationality*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1985. Pp. xiii + 177. US$25.00. ISBN 0-391-03166-X.

Writing as an analytic philosopher Nathanson explores the notion of rationality in a context both historical and contemporary. In the first half of his book, N. presents and criticizes 'the classical ideal' of rationality with particular reference to Plato, and a passing nod at Aristotle. Chapter 1, using Socrates as dialectical 'model' of platonic rationality, elicits reason's commanding role in 'controlling our emotional reactions to things in order that our beliefs and actions can be based on deliberations rather than impulse' (13). Also, N. says: 'I do not think that Plato succeeds in showing that the moral life and the self-interested life coincide...' (12). Chapter 2 begins N.'s critique by setting up a vivid literary context for rationality with material from John Barth's works, *The Floating Opera* and *The End of the Road*. Here, and serving a wider readership than philosophers alone, N. illustrates Hume's claim that 'Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions' by showing the effects of too much reasoning on Barth's main characters. Over-reasoning 'either halts activity, as in Jacob, or leads to a subordination of more important values, as in Joe. Rennie...comments, "All our trouble comes from thinking too much and talking too much" ' (29). The four chapters of Part II, relating reason to deliberation, nihilism, objectivity, knowledge and truth, argue for serious defects in classical rationality, making it 'not itself a worthy ideal' (77). N.'s main point: classical rationality begets nihilism because it (1) exaggerates deliberation at the cost of recognizing action as a test of rationality, (2) produces 'cosmopsis' by urging the objectivity of a cosmic viewpoint for values while neglecting the agent's role in judgment, (3) exalts cognition and evidential standards, thus slighting the role of emotions and other interests in human life.

The second half of N.'s book consists of Parts III and IV. The four chapters of Part III, dealing with means/end rationality, relate reason to efficiency, success, motives, morality, irrational desires, and to rational and irrational ends. Having discussed Baier and Gert on irrational ends, Rawls on primary goods and life plans, and Brandt on rational action and the extinguishability criterion of irrational desires, N. concludes that means/end rationality, though attractive, and however sophisticated, fails. It fails 'since it allows *any* end to be chosen and requires only that effective means be used for attaining whatever one desires' (103). It cannot grant, let alone resolve, the problem of irrational ends. Finally, in the three chapters of Part IV, N. advances his own theory of rationality as 'acting for the best.' But what is that? It cannot be desire, since we might desire irrational (harmful) ends. It cannot be pleasure alone, since we rationally pursue other ends, e.g., 'virtue, truth, fame, ...religious devotion...' (146). For N., 'the best' is pluralist and objectivist such that he 'avoids both the idea that one ideal is best for all, and the idea that there is no such thing as an irrational ideal' (154).

The merits of this book, apart from its important theme and attactive production, lie mainly in its combining a nontechnical style with a telling critique of the means/end theorists, Rawls and Brandt, among others. Though brief in each case, N.'s remarks elicit vital defects: The rationality of Rawls's 'life plans' and 'primary goods' founders on the subjectivity of both such that Rawls's theory 'stresses the importance of a person's satisfying his most central and fundamental desires, but which desires are fundamental is a matter of subjective preference' (106). In short, Rawls's theory cannot eliminate irrational desires. The same fate befalls Brandt's 'extinguishability' criterion of rationality. As N. shows, the criterion of extinguishability of a desire through 'cognitive psychotherapy' (itself a dark horse), though central to Brandt, cannot exclude irrational desires. N. is equally telling on Gert, whose theory of rationality is based on interests, not desires. Though objective in a way that desire theories are not, Gert's interest theory overstates the distinction by, inter alia, incorrectly suggesting 'that the persistence and intensity of desires are not relevant to whether an act is rational' (121) and failing 'to emphasize the important connection between rational action and the range of available choices' (120). Gert's notion of an interest is too abstract. In sum, then, N. functions well as an analytic philosopher among others.

Though definite, the merits of N.'s book are outweighed by its deficiencies. Much should but cannot be said here. A few concentrated remarks must do, and they will address his treatment of classical rationality, and his own view of rationality.

Despite his disclaimer (39), N. does set up a 'straw man.' Indeed, his treatment of classical rationality amounts almost to caricature of a supremely complex matter. First, his scholarship is simplistic and self serving: Plato *never* holds that rationality or knowledge is true belief plus a 'justification.' N.'s citing neither *Euthyphro* 4e (4) nor *Theaetetus* 201d (57) allows this empiricist gloss, and at *Theaetetus* 210 Plato denies that knowledge is sensation, true opinion or true opinion plus *any* account. Moreover, neither Plato nor Aristotle

makes of the just man a 'purely rational' creature, with spirit and emotions cast aside. Plato's just and rational man integrates his reason, spirit and passions such that each functions in harmony with the others (*Republic* 442-3). Aristotle's just and rational man knows the limits of deliberation and that the mean, hard to reach, is grasped by perception not by reasoning (*NE* 1109b, 1112b-1113a). Second, N.'s claim that the nihilism of 'cosmopsis' arises because the objectivity of classical rationalism excludes the feeling subject is mistaken. Neither Plato nor Aristotle (nor Spinoza, also accused) excludes the subject. For all three, the subject as agent discovers objectivity, and continues within it.

N.'s own view of rationality, apparently Humean, is throughout deceptively argued. Because (Ch. 13) he both asserts 'an essential connection' between goodness and rationality (155), and yet utterly separates them such that 'the rational person need not be a good person' (161), he is forced to embrace a fatuous conclusion: In being rational and 'acting for the best,' we discover that immorality can be truly in our interest. Thus, his pluralism lapses into a Humean subjectivity (and, indeed, a means/end rationality), but without that universal sympathy delivering Hume the moralist from Hume the epistemological skeptic.

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LAWRENCE SKLAR. *Philosophy and Spacetime Physics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1985. Pp. 335. US$27.50. ISBN 0-520-05374-5.

This book is a collection of twelve reprinted articles by the author. Though they are on a variety of topics relevant to the philosophy of space and time, certain themes recur repeatedly, giving the volume some unity. Chief among these is the question of what to believe about competing theories which agree on all their empirical predictions, or even whether to believe in claimed unobservable features of reality at all. His main foil in this discussion is traditional verificationism (positivism), with its attitude that the very meaning of a theory is exhausted by its empirical consequences — hence 'two' theories with all the same such consequences are really just different ways of asserting the same thing, contrary appearances notwithstanding. Sklar is clearly not happy with verificationism, for all the standard reasons, though he also feels uncomfortable with the alternatives.

This issue is discussed most directly in the chapter labelled 'Saving the Noumena,' which explores ways of preserving theoretical realism in the face of verificationism's tendency to reduce the unobservable to the observable. By this reviewer's lights, Sklar reveals the poverty of verificationism most clearly with his hypothesis that he is only a brain in a vat, fed sensory experience through a cable: the claim that, on grounds of epistemic indistinguishability, this *means the same thing* as ordinary beliefs about one's body and the external world is bizarre. Surely skepticism, realism and fictionalism are all superior to that. (Unfortunately, Sklar often conflates verificationist reductions with fictionalist claims.) Yet he also points out the serious problems facing the alternative views.

The most significant article in this collection, for philosophy of science in general, is the one on semantic analogy. If there is a common-sense view about how non-observational terms get their meanings, something like this is surely it. And given the strange consequences of the standard verificationist and holistic role-in-the-theory accounts of such meaning (among other things, they threaten to turn laws of nature into empty tautologies), surely this one should be studied much more than it has hitherto been. The basic idea is the startling one that a word used in both observable and non-observable contexts has the same meaning, or a closely similar one, in the latter as in the former — say, talk of the size and shape of things too small to see. By my lights, Sklar is not sufficiently bold in this; he retreats to merely dispositional meanings for terms like 'electric charge' and 'charm.' (Confusing a disposition with its physical basis also robs him of the most potent argument he could have used against relationism and causal theories of time, though that is a longer story.) But a partial meaning for them, based analogically on their mathematical similarity to empirical qualities like color and length, is surely an option here. He also fails to mention that the standard arguments against well formed but 'meaningless' propositions can be met by insisting they are just literally false, as they stand.

Of special interest for their clarification of the issues involved are the two chapters on 'causal' theories of spacetime. Sklar explores the two types of attempt to reduce spacetime to causation, verificationist ('distant spatiotemporal relations are known to us only through causal processes, therefore that is what they really are') and theoretical reductionist (e.g., 'it is more economical to posit causal relations alone that both causal and spatiotemporal relations; we don't need the latter'). On grounds that I personally endorse, Sklar rejects both kinds. For example, the Humean concept of causation that most causal theorists want makes the reductions circular; similarly for their employment of genidentity. But he goes on to discuss what he considers the interesting idea motivating at least the verificationist variety of causal theory, the attempt to reduce spatiotemporal relations in general to an epistemically privileged subset of spatiotemporal relations. Sklar overlooks certain crucial aspects of some proponents' theories, notably those of Grünbaum and Salmon, but his treatment of the issue is very thorough and enlightening. Similarly enlightening is the chapter on the asymmetry of time, which spells out what is at stake in

that debate with remarkable clarity. (See my own essay on the subject for further analysis: *Erkenntnis*, March, 1987.)

Somewhat less insightful, by my lights, is the chapter 'Time, Reality and Relativity,' which appeared concurrently with my own article on the same subject in the *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* in 1981. (The latter is also lacking, in ways I hope to correct.) Among other things, it makes the common error of conflating Minkowski's reinterpretation of Einstein's theory with the original one: in the former, basic reality is *not* observer-relative, which has importantly different consequences for the question of whether events not happening to the observer are also real. The same error threatens the central argument in 'Modestly Radical Empiricism.' There Sklar holds, against those who would relativize or trivialize the observable/unobservable distinction, that it is integral to our best scientific theories, namely, the two theories of Relativity. He is certainly right about those theories as Einstein originally intended them, but others interpret them in different ways — indeed, the nonverificationist Minkowskian interpretation is seemingly today's standard view.

In my opinion this is a very worthwhile volume — all of its sections contain rewarding insights, though some have now been around awhile. Many philosophers of science are over-technical and esoteric; Sklar's chief virtue is his ability to decipher and explain what others are attempting to say. He doesn't always succeed in this — witness his late realization that believers in a 'causal' theory of time or an extrinsic directionality for time needn't do so on verificationist grounds — but he perhaps does it better than anyone else now publishing on the philosophy of time and space.

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