Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes
rendus en Philosophie

Editors/Directeurs:

Robert Burch
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

J. N. Kaufmann
Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec
à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec
Canada G9A 5H7

As a rule, the editors publish only invited reviews. However, they will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English. They should be submitted to the francophone or an anglophone editor as appropriate.

En général, les rédacteurs ne publient que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, ils prendraient en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais. Les manuscrits devraient être envoyés au rédacteur francophone ou à un rédacteur anglophone selon le cas.

academic printing & publishing
P.O. Box 4834, South Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada T6E 5G7

TABLE OF CONTENTS / TABLE DES MATIÉRES

Vol. VII no. 4 April / avril 1987

JEFFREY H. BARKER. *Individualism and Community: The State in Marx and Early Anarchism.* New York: Greenwood Press 1986. Pp. xiv + 235. US$35.00. ISBN 0-313-24706-4.

The relationship between Marxism and anarchism has posed over a century of disagreements, problems, continuities and confrontations. The pendulum of its description has ranged from extreme opposition (totalitarian statism versus individualist utopianism), to coterminous social objective ('from each according to his ability, to each according to his need'). The relationship has not been well understood.

Jeffrey Barker's *Individualism and Community* seeks to plumb the historical roots of the Marxist-Anarchist debate through a study of the formative works of the post-Hegelian radicals, Max Stirner, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Karl Marx. His inquiry focuses on outlining the general positions of Stirner and Proudhon, and the reasons why Marx, though ultimately an anarchist in vision himself, relentlessly disparaged and attacked these anarchist contemporaries — Stirner for his jejune ideal of the 'omnipotent ego' and Proudhon for the strutting naivete of his exchangist 'mutualisme.'

Barker divides his book into five chapters: (1) 'Hegel and Marx'; (2) 'The State, Alienation and Human Emancipation'; (3) 'Stirner's Egoistic Anarchism and The Challenge of Community'; (4) 'Proudhon's Moral Vision and the Poverty of Philosophy'; and (5) 'Individualism and Community: State, Society and the Individual.' His unifying mode of analysis throughout is to sketch the general position of Marx's object of criticism (Hegel, Stirner, Proudhon), and then to explain Marx's grounds for rejecting each account of the state and freedom.

Much of what Barker writes is usefully expositional, sensibly balanced, and persuasive that Marx had thought through his problematic far more deeply and realistically than his theoretical adversaries. But there is a great deal of meandering waffle and exasperating vagueness in the middle, and the book strikes out on no new paths of exploration. Its essential values are that its core sections reliably exposit Stirner's and Proudhon's anarchist positions, and coherently state Marx's general argument against them.

Barker's central argument is that Marx's concept of the state advances beyond both Hegel's and the anarchists' by its recognition that the state is not sovereign in its regulation of civil society, but dependent in its nature and operations upon underlying and contradictory economic class interests. The state, as Hegel idealized it, operates as an institutionalized bearer of the Universal, inexorably reconciling the private and particular interests of civil society. Marx exposed this façade, Barker recognizes, by showing that in fact the state is determined by merely the most powerful of society's private interests — those of the ruling ownership class, organized as a class precisely *through* the state. It is on account of this class-contaminated nature of the political state, thought Marx, that it must always operate as an external, coercive mechanism squatting outside society's general membership to enforce the special interest rule of one part of it, those in control of that society's capital or economic power. Because Hegel's conceptualization of the state as the community's higher life merely sanctifies the ruling class economic power underlying and determining it, and because the anarchists' fixation on abolishing the state to achieve individual freedom just as superficially overlooks this same underlying, determining system of ownership power, both kinds of theory, though opposite in purport, are for Marx guilty of a similar error of shallowness. Neither sees beyond the apparatus of government to who controls it, and by what means. The state must for Marx, on the contrary, be understood in terms of its rootedness in the system of society's material reproduction, and the monopoly control of this system's technology and surplus by society's class of capital owners — on behalf of whose economic interests the state operates as a '*super*structural' mechanism of collective protection and co-ordination.

It is along this line of argument that the critical thesis of Barker's study is pursued from p. 30 on. From the beginning, Barker emphasizes the main implications of this Marxian analysis. The first is, that because the state is thus a *reflection* of underlying ruling class interests made into an independent political body of coercive rule, it follows that it is *as* such a body alone that the state 'withers away' in the Marxian idea of the social future. 'Thus,' says Barker, 'when the political state disappears, it is as political state, not necessarily as a state or form of social organization' (31). In other words, the Marxist idea of a stateless society is quite consistent with a society that is highly organized and governed by law, but only so far as these are not imposed from without as the organized political power of a dominant class dictating to the rest of society (210-12).

The second implication is that Marx's concept of a democratic society entails a deeper, *economic* democracy, since the institution of elected representatives to state organs, etc., is only illusory, abstract democracy that leaves the production and exchange base of society untouched. Thus, 'true democracy [an early Marxian phrase] requires, beyond political democracy the "democratization of economic power" ' (35).

In short, Marx seeks the sort of society that socially conscious anarchism seeks — a society without the coercive mechanism of the state standing above it — but insists on the transformation of the ruling-class economic order upon

which, unlike his anarchist contemporaries, he holds such a state is based. This difference is what ultimately puts him at odds with Proudhon, who conceives 'liberty and government as ... quite simply zero-sum alternatives' (167), and who ignores such economic structures of unfreedom as selling one's labour for wages and possessory market exchange as the basis of the social bond (171-3). On the other hand, the differences between Marx and the socially unconscious anarchists, of whom Stirner is the prototype, are more profound still. Not only are they thought by Marx to be altogether blind to economic forms of oppression and to the state's relationship to these as their enforcer (98-104), but their inability to see beyond the egoistic interest as the cornerstone of human enterprise exemplifies a reactionary infantilism for which Marx has nothing but scorn. While Barker tends for the most part to lose the cutting edge of Marx's criticisms on these issues in a characteristic wooliness of statement, he is nevertheless quite aware of their bearings, and in parts very clear and compendious (e.g. 212-16). There is no misrepresentation of the sort one is used to in both right and left anarchist/Marxist debates. The book is a modest but fair contribution to the historical foundations of this very wideranging controversy, and not at all tendentious in assay.

Many readers will be interested to learn that in stark contrast to his heirs, the egoistic libertarians of today, who advocate the unfettered freedom of private capital, Stirner was, according to Barker, 'far from supporting the domination of labour by the capitalist ... [and] in fact argues that such economic domination is the destructive basis of an equally degrading social order' (92).

JOHN McMURTRY
University of Guelph

Bernasconi's book is 'concerned with the insight that introduces us to the history of Being and the transformation in our relation to language that accompanies that insight' (ix). It addresses those who having already read works by (and on) Heidegger find themselves at the end of philosophy as metaphysics with two questions. First, how are Heidegger's own works to be (re)read? As having overcome metaphysics or also as metaphysical? Second, how are those works which comprise the history of philosophy to be (re)read? Only as the

history of metaphysics understood as the forgetfulness of Being or also as the history of the remembrance of Being? This short but dense book is not for beginning readers of Heidegger. The 'double reading' it proposes is instead for the very few. 'The danger,' according to Bernasconi, 'would be if these interpretations were ever to become commonplace' (63).

There are six chapters. In the first, Bernasconi discusses the importance for Heidegger of Hegel's discovery of the history of philosophy at the end of philosophy. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger understands the history of metaphysics to be the history of the forgetfulness of Being. Around 1939, however, Heidegger comes to understand that the history of the forgetfulness of Being leaves traces of the history of the remembrance of Being (38). Accordingly, Heidegger's history of Being rests on the insight that there are 'different historical words for Being unrecognized as such' (11) until the end of philosophy as metaphysics.

In chapter two, Bernasconi connects this insight to *aletheia*. He starts by taking a statement from 'The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking' (written in 1964) which appears to retract an important but controversial claim made in 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth' (1930/31), namely the claim that the history of philosophy as the forgetfulness of Being begins when 'a change in the essence of truth [from *aletheia* (unconcealment) to *orthotes* (correctness)] takes place "unsaid" in Plato's work' (17). Bernasconi relates the 1964 statement to Heidegger's responses to Friedländer, and concludes that it is not a *retraction*, but instead a *rereading* of his own earlier work on Plato. This earlier work now claims, according to Bernasconi, that 'What remains unsaid in Plato is not a shift in the definition of the essence of truth..., but in *aletheia* as *a-letheia*' (23).

Bernasconi argues that Heidegger's insight into the history of Being enables him to recognize Plato's language to be ambiguous. The ambiguity is not that when Plato uses the word, *aletheia*, it means both correctness and unconcealment, but that when the word *aletheia* means unconcealment, it both 'says' and 'does not say' the concealment of concealing (the *lethe* of *a-letheia*). Bernasconi takes Heidegger's rereading of the word *aletheia* in Plato to be a model for 'double reading,' a way to reread both Heidegger and the works of metaphysics. Heidegger's insight transforms his relation to language into one where words (of Being) like *aletheia* admit of two readings, one metaphysical and forgetful of Being, the other a trace left in and by language of remembrance of Being.

In chapters three and four, Bernasconi discusses how this transformation takes place. He focuses on Heidegger's two readings of the last lines of George's poem, 'The Word.' He takes the second reading — the poet 'renounces' his mastery over language when he learns that it is not the poet but rather language which speaks — to be another case of 'double reading.' He connects this 'double reading' to Heidegger's 'double reading' of 'What is Metaphysics?' (1929) in his 1943 postscript and 1949 introduction to this work. Bernasconi concludes that Heidegger's relation to language undergoes a transformation when he recognizes first, that it is not the thinker but language

which speaks as 'the ringing of stillness,' and second, that 'in the silence of the word for Being, previous words [of Being] begin to echo from afar' (62).

Chapters five and six link the transformation of Heidegger's relation to language from one of mastery to submission (59) to his works on the *Kehre* and *Ereignis*. Language within the *Kehre* is a 'saying not-saying'; it is both the language of metaphysics and of the overcoming of metaphysics. *Ereignis* is 'a fundamental word of Heidegger's later thinking,' but not a 'word of Being.' It is instead 'the word of the overcoming of metaphysics' insofar as it is 'the word that arises from the experience of *the lack of a word* for Being' (86-7). In these last two chapters, Bernasconi returns to Hegel in order to distinguish his concept of experience and of language as the speculative proposition from Heidegger's experience of language as a 'saying not-saying.' He ends by raising, rhetorically, the question of how to read Heidegger and the works of metaphysics. Despite his disclaimer in the Preface ('My sense of the proper response that should be made to Heidegger as read here ... is barely indicated ... in the present book...' [ix], Bernasconi does approach the question of language in Heidegger's history of Being as more than 'an invitation to a certain kind of reading where we hear first the metaphysical at work throughout language and then in a second reading the silence, the concealment, that resounds in it' (93). 'Double reading,' he concludes, is the 'task for the moment' (95).

Bernasconi does not say how 'double reading' differs from, or why it is preferable to, other more compelling modes of interpretation. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, for example, is treated reductively in the first few pages of the book. Derrida's deconstructive reading is barely mentioned, although Bernasconi does add somewhat presumptuously in the Preface: 'I would ask anyone who would wish to label my efforts a "Derridian reading" to consult a companion essay to this book ...' (ix). At the end of this too short book, the reader is left with two questions. Can 'double reading' do more than account for Heidegger's later rereadings of two works written between 1929 and 1931? Does 'double reading' occur only in Heidegger's interpretation of George's poem 'The Word,' or also in Heidegger's interpretations of the poetry of Hölderlin, Trakl, and Rilke?

Bernasconi's unconcealed reverence for Heidegger and barely concealed disdain for 'Heideggerians' (63) weakens his book in two ways. First, he fails to *respond* to alternative readings of Heidegger that might challenge his own. For example, O. Pöggeler (in 'Geschichtlichkeit im Spätwerk Heideggers') questions the identification of history with destiny which Bernasconi assumes on page 5 and throughout his book. Second, he fails to *question* Heidegger's language. Heidegger, according to Bernasconi, 'asks us to believe....' (67) and the task of the commentator is to attempt 'to be faithful to what claimed Heidegger ...' (94). Bernasconi follows Heidegger beyond 'questioning' to 'submissively listening': 'Thinking is not a putting of questions but an entrance into a prior grant' (78). He fails to consider Heidegger's own warning: 'It is not we who possess language but rather language that possesses us — in a good and a *bad* sense' (*Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 39, 23, my translation, emphasis ad-

ded). Those who continue to believe in the need to question will not wish to follow Bernasconi's way of 'double reading.'

The reader will encounter typographical errors on pages 17, 22, 29, 31, 56, and 68. Footnote 5 is missing in the Notes to chapter four and part of the text in the first paragraph on page 54 is repeated, part is missing.

<div style="text-align: right">

KATHLEEN WRIGHT
Haverford College

</div>

WILLIAM BORMAN. *Gandhi and Non-violence*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1986. Pp. xvi + 287. US$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-330-6); US$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-331-4).

This is not another biography of Gandhi with the concept of non-violence serving as a leitmotif. There is, in fact, very little in the way of biographical detail. Instead, Borman has focused specifically and with considerable penetration on an analysis of *satyagraha* (non-violence). However, Borman has written anything but an introduction to Gandhi's understanding of this concept or, for that matter, its genesis in Gandhi's peculiar interpretation of the *Gita* and the *Upanishads*. In spite of the fact that Borman supplies the English equivalent (in parentheses) with every, mostly Sanskrit, term, without some previous acquaintance with the *Gita* as a bare minimum, the context for Borman's analysis and criticism of *satyagraha* is simply too alien for general consumption. However, this general inaccessibility is anything but a fault of the text.

The text is divided into three sections. The first is a thorough and fairminded exposition of the ideology and metaphysics underlying Gandhi's concept of non-violence. The second is an exposition of the practical applications of non-violence especially as a means of spiritual realization. However, the practical applications of Gandhi's theory are much more mundane. Gandhi's claim, after all, is that '*Satyagraha* can rid society of all evils, political, economic, and moral' (61). Non-violence of the strong, given the adequate purity and innocence of the practitioner, quite literally is said to be able to melt the hearts (78: *tapas*) of ravagers (100), murderers (100), Hitler (211) and the Nazis (213), and even the threat of nuclear violence (126). Borman is particularly sceptical about this last claim.

Section three assesses the inadequacy of Gandhi's practical claims in light of the threat of nuclear suicide. Using violence as a 'Last-Resort' argument,

Borman demonstrates that Gandhi's claim for the absoluteness of *satyagraha* must be limited (238). Gandhi claims that *satyagraha* is an objectively valid, universal moral law which makes non-violence an imperative without exception. Borman successfully challenges Gandhi using a commonsense counterposition (119): There are times, such as the threat of nuclear suicide, when violence is justifiable.

However, Gandhi's arguments are found to fall short for many reasons: they are impossible to verify independently of his ideological framework (206); they assume an absolute a priori dichotomous analysis (148, 184, 189, 207); they are also circular (162), biased (251), self-contradictory (188, 194, 203, 239), and inconsistent (164, 172). Most decidedly, Gandhi conflates the distinction between violence and evil (192). Then, given the moral metaphysics in which 'Violence is unreal; Non-violence is Real' (58) he goes on to confuse appearance and reality (192), the real and the ideal (166) within an already confused view of reality (201), a corruption, it seems, of the *advaitic* position of nondualism. Gandhi argues, in spite of what seems to be obvious to any reader, that the *Gita* is a sermon on non-violence (174), an allegory of a war within each individual. Borman demonstrates that Gandhi's position and interpretation of the *Gita* is in direct opposition to the traditional sources he himself uses (137, 194), citing the case of the *Ramayana* epic in particular (149ff).

In sum, in both theoretical conception and in practical application, Borman proves that *satyagraha* has inherent weaknesses sufficient to disqualify its universalizability but not sufficient to discredit the concept entirely. Although it should no longer be considered to have an absolute application, Borman believes that it must still be considered to be generally valid.

RICHARD S.G. BROWN
Brock University

This is an introduction to philosophy of mind from a materialist standpoint. It is unencumbered by scholarly apparatus (except for a short bibliography at the end of each chapter) since 'students new to philosophy are distracted by a work which is full of names and references' (i). The disadvantage is that

the reader has to guess which ideas Carruthers supposes to be his own and which he would be willing to credit to others. The book is attractively written but the quality of argumentation is uneven.

The book is divided into four parts which I will discuss in turn.

In the first part Carruthers argues that certain plausible assumptions, Weak Dualism (WD) and The Cartesian Theory of Meaning (CM), together undermine any possibility of justifying belief in other minds. According to WD, conscious states are 'non-physical' (22) (not publicly observable?) although they may be states *of* physical things. According to CM, the meanings of all terms referring to conscious states concern exclusively the 'subjective feels' of those states. WD undermines any *inductive* basis for belief in other minds because I have only the *one* piece of evidence to go on that with *my* body conscious states are associated. CM undermines any *deductive* basis because from what I can observe of the other I can deduce nothing about what he/she feels.

I would question that the fault lies with WD and CM. I think what is wrong is the assumption that justifications are exclusively inductive or deductive.

Part 2 is a critical examination of Strong Dualism (SD), a position which entails but is not identical with WD. According to SD conscious states are states of a non-physical substance. Carruthers begins by rejecting the view that experiences could be 'bundled' together in the absence of substance. According to him this is impossible because the experiences would first have to be individuated. But two qualitatively identical experiences — and such are clearly possible — can't be individuated except by being associated with different substances.

Carruthers rejects SD because he sees no way to individuate non-physical substances. The only plausible try is in terms of difference in experiential contents. But this won't work because it's conceivable two minds could have identical contents.

I have no wish to defend mental substance, but I believe Carruthers too summarily rejects the bundle theory. His objection that experiences can't be individuated without substance seems answerable as follows: my experiences have the non-physical attribute of being mine; yours have the attribute of being yours; and this is all that's required to individuate them. (A bundle theory along these lines is ably defended in Geoffrey Madell, *The Identity of the Self*, Edinburgh University Press 1981.)

In Part 3 Carruthers tries to construct a satisfactory basis for belief in other minds. He first purports through the following argument to establish Mind-Brain Identity (MB): (1) Some conscious states cause physical ones; (2) There's no need in a scientific explanation to appeal to other than physical/physical causality; (3) It's unlikely some conscious states are physical whilst others are not; (4) Therefore all conscious states are physical (and presumably brain) states. I leave the reader to judge the cogency of this. What's strange is that Carruthers considers the argument to establish only that his *own* conscious states are brain states. He uses MB in order to argue by analogy that others have conscious states (182-3) and this would be pointless if MB were already tantamount to the existence of such states. But Carruthers' reasoning is flawed here. He previ-

ously rejected induction from one case only. He shouldn't now reason from the existence of an identity in one case to its existence in all cases.

Carruthers also proposes a theory of meaning according to which terms referring to states of consciousness mean not *just* certain feels but rather those feels in their characteristic causal roles (178). There is no space to spell out this theory more fully or to appraise the arguments given in its favour. Interesting is that the theory is supposed to secure a *logical* tie between subjective feels and 'discriminatory abilites' (183) sufficient to overcome the inverted spectrum problem. 'Colour-spectrum reversal is, despite appearances, inconceivable' (183). I think Carruthers *has* to be wrong about this because there's obviously nothing *contradictory* about a scenario where you and I both manifest the same discriminatory abilities but where I have the subjective feel 'red' and you have the feel which, if it occurred in my experience, I would call 'green.'

In his treatment of personal identity and survival in Part 4 Carruthers closely follows Parfit. It seems the most satisfactory criterion of identity is psychological continuity or 'connectedness' (84). But there might in future be more than one person bearing this relation to me. This means psychological continuity can be retained as criterion only if we make identity depend upon a comparison. I.e., only an individual who is the *most* continuous with me will be me and if *two* individuals are equally most continuous with me then I don't survive at all. A preferable strategem is to dispense with identity altogether since it's unimportant. What matters is survival, and I could survive in two individuals *both* of whom were sufficiently continuous with me.

Despite the popularity of this approach it is fatally flawed. What I fear when I fear future pain is *not* merely that a mind psychologically continuous with mine will feel pain. For *this* condition could be satisfied without *me* feeling anything at all. It follows that psychological continuity leaves out the thing that matters most to me: me!

ROGER SMOOK
University of Guelph

CLAIRE DUCHEN. *Feminism in France: From May '68 to Mitterand*. London: Methuen 1986. Pp. 162. US$12.95. ISBN 0-7102-0455-8.

Claire Duchen's *Feminism in France* answers a long-standing need. There have been a handful of articles in scattered journals over the last ten years which

have pointed out some of the characteristics of the women's movement in France. But these have been limited by the fact of a history still unfolding, and therefore, useful but potentially outdated. There has been the need not only to know how feminism has developed in France, but also to translate its concerns in relation to feminist concerns elsewhere in the white, anglo-american first world.

Duchen's work comes close to a full answer especially if paired with Toril Moi's *Sexual Textual Politics* (London: Methuen 1985). The latter takes up in detail the work of feminist *theorists* in France: Simone de Beauvoir and Lacan followed by Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva. What Duchen explores are the histories of the *activist* strands and webs in the women's movement in France. She does a great deal to clarify the peripatetic and sometimes 'terroristic' developments of the group known as *psych et po* which has had the largest part in defining and shaping the centralized focus of feminism out of Paris. Not only the major publisher of feminist texts, in French, it has also copyrighted and appropriated the movement once named by the French press, and called it its own. Duchen makes the distinction between those who are part of *psych et po* and those non-aligned feminists a clear one and follows the trail of the non-aligned feminists into arenas that are more political than theoretical, though the inadequacy of these terms for this context becomes apparent.

Duchen can array for her readers a variety of feminisms but she speaks *for* none in a partisan fashion. What is notable is that in a field that has been shaped by the currents of post-structuralism and its critique of the unified self of Western thought, Duchen is able to write this history as if that discourse had not taken place. She speaks without difficulty of *women creating* their *identities* (2). I want to note this because it gives non-French feminists a history in terms that are eminently accessible, yet it also renders unproblematic the crosscurrents of political and intellectual life in France in these same years that are underscored by the book's subtitle.

In her first chapter ('Beginnings') Duchen offers a telescoped history from 1789 to 1968 and a year-by-year account of events of major importance from 1970 to 1975. There are illustrations from early ephemeral feminist publications, and a selected and annotated bibliography for further readings. Duchen locates one of the polarities between the 'class-struggle current' feminists and the 'femininity current' as exemplified by *psych et po* who called themselves 'anti-feminists.' Duchen outlines a third current, the non-aligned, with which she says she is 'most comfortable'; this current can best be followed through the journal *Questions feministes* and *Nouvelles questions feministes* also available as *Feminist Issues* in English.

In her third chapter ('French Feminists and Motherhood: Destiny or Slavery') Duchen replays the peculiar though inevitable logic that we also find in *The Second Sex*. Like Simone de Beauvoir, in her chapter on 'The Mother,' this takes up the history of the battle for contraception but more specifically the struggle to change the laws on abortion. This can be read as a larger cultural problem whereby women are almost always specified whether implicit-

148

ly or explicitly by their reproductive capacity; and it can also be understood as central to the debates in the early years of contemporary feminism with its focus on women's access to control of their bòdies. That Duchen recasts these debates in terms of motherhood seems to gloss over one of the major contributions of feminist politics and theory of the late 20th century — that is, the split between sexuality and reproduction. She moves too quickly through the debate that viewed motherhood as destiny, then slavery with a return to a notion of destiny which, while perhaps transformed, does not clearly emerge as such in Duchen's analysis.

The second half of the book deals with the place of feminism in the philosophical and political climate in France in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Duchen aptly arrays the 'influences' in feminist thought as it developed concurrently with the writings of Barthes, Foucault, Derrida and Lacan, and led to the critical debate on (neo-) femininity. Duchen is too satisfied to name the problem as one in which 'the questions themselves have not yet been adequately formulated' (102). This seems to weaken her argument against the *psych et po* current and at the same time defuses the provocative and productive aspects of the work of French feminist theorists. It is here that the reader would do well to amplify a sense of the situation by at least going to Moi's book, if not the work of Cixous, Irigaray and Kristeva themselves (all now available in excellent translations in English).

The final chapters follow the entry of women into party politics after the socialist victory of 1981 which has produced a movement of reform and a cadre of 'professional feminists' out of the Ministry of Women's Rights. With the bureaucratization of women's issues has come a more silent fragmentation of the 'movement.' Duchen charts in interviews which are quoted at length in the closing pages of her book the ways in which feminist work, thought, and activism seem to have been rechanneled into 'research' and the establishment of token university positions. These forms of institutionalization are both a confirmation which can lead to important new work and thought about the situation of women, but also a recuperation of a struggle that changed the everyday life of a generation of women. The book ends with a quote from an interview in which the speaker suggests a quiet semi-plenitude in the slowed if not arrested development of feminism in France. The longer view is more congenial to me, and to Duchen, when she points out that 'the huge sweep of the movement has disappeared' but that feminism must be seen as 'part of centuries of struggle on a collective scale' (135). I am less sanguine than Duchen or some of her informants that this disappearance 'may not matter' since it is a signal that feminism, like the struggles of others who are oppressed, is in retreat in the white, western world, and some of the real gains and changes made by women in what are even relatively privileged situations are sure to be lost before the next advance.

<div style="text-align:right">

FRANCES BARTKOWSKI
Carnegie Mellon University

</div>

LARRY GOLDBERG. *A Commentary on Plato's Protagoras*. New York: Peter Lang 1985. Pp. 352. US$33.70. ISBN 0-8204-0022-X.

Larry Goldberg observes at the outset: 'Plato's dialogues are not containers of philosophy; instead they are imitations of philosophical discourse which may, if properly confronted, lead the way to philosophy' (2). This is a misguided approach to Plato's dialogues. They lead to philosophy, but the route characteristically starts from the philosophy in them.

It is not merely the general approach that is flawed. So likewise is the book's detailed interpretation and evaluation of the philosophical arguments of the *Protagoras*. If one wants philosophical assistance with the Socratic defense of the principle that no one does what he or she knows to be wrong, for example, one would be better advised to read Vlastos and Irwin.

While Goldberg's analysis of the *Protagoras*' philosophical arguments is weak, his book should not be written off too quickly. Its strength derives from an approach to the text of the *Protagoras* as a philosophical drama centered on the contest between two complex, enigmatic characters, Socrates and Protagoras. The text lends scope to this approach. Among Plato's early dialogues, it is unusually rich in literary invention. Its distinctive narrative technique is well suited to its cautionary tale about the dangers of infatuation with sophistry. There are also the archly ironic duel between Socrates and Protagoras over the literary criticism of a Simonidean poem and Protagoras' brilliant myth on the necessity of a universal distribution of justice in human communities, to mention but two. But it is in its dissection of the character of Protagoras that the book's real interest lies.

The main device Goldberg uses to probe Protagoras' character is the contrast between the way he might strike the impressionable and footloose young men gathered to pay him court at the house of the wealthy Athenian, Callias, and the way he is meant to appear to the attentive reader fully responsive to the literary context supplied by Plato. To the former Protagoras would seem not only self-assured, but disarmingly direct. So viewed, he appears to be an able apologist for Athens' democratic political institutions against the Socratic doubt that these, if they testify to anything, evidence the unteachability of the political virtue Protagoras professes to teach. When, moreover, Socrates points to the failure of the young men gathered around Protagoras to live up to the expectations of their parents, supposing political virtue to be transmittable, Protagoras makes it clear that he for one is not prepared to write them off. He would seem to them to show a welcome confidence in their powers.

When the reader probes beneath the congenial and reassuring surface Protagoras takes such pains to project, there comes into view a different and less appealing figure: someone self-seeking, opportunistic, calculating and manipulative. He is not a friend of democracy, but contemptuous of the judgments of the many. While Goldberg marshalls a considerable body of evidence, here a single instance must suffice.

After Protagoras has presented his myth in which Zeus assures communal

survival through the gift of a universally shared justice, Protagoras attempts to nail down the proposition with a non-mythic proof. For it would be regarded as a sign of madness on the part of an unjust person to admit to a universally shared justice. On the contrary, such a person would be well advised to pretend to be just. While this may evidence the strength of the general conviction that justice ought to be possessed in some degree by everyone in a human community, as a proof it does not support the proposition that justice is universally shared. Glaucon for one knows how to turn these Protagorean considerations to rather different ends in the *Republic*. There they sustain the tyrant who is careful to preserve the appearance of justice while enjoying the claimed advantages of practicing the contrary.

Goldberg, however, displays a tendency to overcolor the contrasts in his characterisation of Protagoras. Consider, for example, the contrast between him as the apparent supporter of democracy and as showing contempt for the common man. At one point Goldberg represents Protagoras' myth as demonstrating that 'Zeus founds the democratic polity' (51). No such thing. Protagoras does not purport to show that democratic political institutions are a corollary of his thesis of the universality of political virtue as Goldberg suggests. He is careful to indicate only that the universality thesis supports the *reasonability* of Athenian political practice. Notwithstanding such exaggerations, Goldberg's approach is a welcome antidote to unidimensional pictures of Protagoras.

Unfortunately the book lacks the range of indexes that are now expected in publications dealing with classical texts.

J. DYBIKOWSKI
University of British Columbia

SANDRA HARDING. *The Science Question in Feminism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1986. Pp. 271. US$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-1880-1); US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9363-3).

In *The Science Question in Feminism* Sandra Harding has written an ambitious two hundred fifty-one page feminist critique of the broad core of science. The book was published in 1986 by Cornell University Press with an ample ten-page bibliography and a serviceable index for the teacher or serious reader. Harding has the credentials to write such a sweeping work, with two large books already to her credit.

Harding is not primarily interested here in what she takes to be an early seventies question: 'What is to be done about the situation of women in science?' This has been called 'the woman question in science.' Instead Harding is interested in the science question in feminism, thus her title. She translates this concern as the following large question: 'Is it possible to use for emancipatory ends sciences that are apparently so intimately involved in Western, bourgeois, and masculine projects?' Harding's pursuit of this question is designed to challenge the foundations of scientific thought. The work defies abbreviated analysis.

Harding argues that feminist science-critiques have assumed a reversal of the unity of science thesis central to the Vienna Circle. For feminists, she points out, it is moral and political, not scientific, discussion that has served as the paradigm of rational discourse. Harding holds that both science and theorizing must be reinvented to make sense of women's social experience.

The book is tightly argued and tightly woven with many threads. For a reader to be fully appreciative, she or he should be acquainted both with contemporary sciences and with contemporary feminism. However, the bibliography would aid the reader with scant background in exploring any needed particular area. Certain values are given precedence: anti-racism, anti-classism, and anti-sexism. Along with the value analysis, there is a critical survey of the feminist science critiques, and a critique of various epistemological approaches.

Harding's text requires a serious reader who wishes to cover a wide range of modern and postmodern literature from a feminist perspective. One who is a beginner in the sciences and in feminist theory might find the text rough going. But it is accessible to a serious neophyte. The teacher of feminism and science might find this one of the books from which to choose a required text.

DEBORAH A. ROSEN
(Department of Psychiatry)
LSU Medical School

In his introduction, Helm quotes Henry Steele Commager as saying that Americans almost invented time. That exaggeration is one prelude to the ensuing discussions of the theories of time embedded in the philosophies of Peirce,

James, Royce, Santayana, Dewey, and Whitehead, with a very brief epilogue on Mead. Helm's purpose is to assess the adequacies of these theories of time. But since he considers the account of time in each case as integral with the philosophy that contains it, his judgments are, in the end, judgments of the philosophies themselves. A preliminary judgment appears in that Whitehead merits two chapters and 69 pages, whereas the others get one chapter each, the longest being Royce's 27 pages. Peirce, James, and Santayana are dealt with systematically, while Royce, Dewey, and Whitehead are treated developmentally. Whitehead's developed philosophy turns out to be the only one that does not leave Helm with some serious question of failure.

Peirce's view of time is presented through his doctrines of synechism, tychism, and evolution. Evolution means that time comes into being, as firstness becomes secondness by means of thirdness. Neither firstness nor secondness is temporal, but thirdness is essentially temporal and continuous. Tychism means gaps in continuity, which then becomes, in Helm's image, a rope of many strands, discontinuous in its parts yet continuous as an interacting whole. Helm's seemingly gratuitous criticism is of Peirce's failure 'to account for the vexatious, aversive, destructive aspects of human finitude which gnaw at the time-worn mind.' Peirce addressed that concern in an 1897 letter to James: 'No man can be logical who reckons his personal welfare as a matter of overwhelming moment.'

James is examined in relation to five basic problems: the epistemological; the psychological and ethical; the anthropological; the ontological; and the metaphysical. What Helm finds is a series of distinctions between felt times and thought times; individual times and public times; human transition and nature's transition; and four kinds of reality — time, space, psyche, the collection of qualities and facts — and a mysterious More. This mystery makes James's metaphysics inadequate for Helm — a failing he says Dewey shares. Yet one wonders how mystery could be avoided in a theory rooted in James's psychological concerns.

Both Peirce and James are judged to have more nearly adequate theories of time than Royce has. Helm says that Royce's idea of time connects, by successive inclusion, individual times, communal times, and Absolute time, as so many modes of will or interpretation. But the inclusion of all times in the Absolute indicates to Helm that Royce has confused eternity and perpetuity, a confusion never cleared up in Royce's persistent thinking about time from his early reaction against classical physics through his version of Peirce's theory of signs. Helm concludes that Royce does not fully account for 'purposive activity, as aversive and appetitive.' Just why is not clear, however, in light of Helm's earlier discussion of Royce's 'guilt-commissioned time' of individuals that is taken up into the failures and hopes of communities.

For Santayana, Helm points out, absolute time is a human creation. Real time emerges from the flux of matter, which in turn produces life and spirit as epiphenomena, hence produces natural time and sentimental time. His Heraclitean sense of passage is seen as prompting Santayana's attitude of disengagement from society, though not from the world of matter. Hence, Helm

finds, his theory of time is consistent with modern biology, physics, and psychology but not with a sociology such as that of Mannheim.

Dewey's theory of time is traced through three stages: 1) his idealistic reading of the new psychology, which gave way to 2) his expansion of the idea of evolution to encompass the physical, the individual, and the social as well as the biological, and 3) his incorporation of the rhythmic functional patterns found in 2) as the basis for explaining stability as relatively slow change. Because every existence is an event for Dewey, time is generic, a primitive quality of reality. But Helm finds an insupportable paradox in that what Dewey 'takes to be *most real* or most natural as a feature of all things — temporal quality — is *least important* as a feature of temporal orders within which human value is achieved.' Helm's own quotation from Dewey, offered as evidence for this paradox, appears more an answer: 'Apart from conversation, from discourse and communication, there is no thought and no meaning, only just events, dumb, preposterous, destructive.'

Whitehead's theory, as was anticipated, is judged to be 'the most disciplined view of time worked out by any major American philosopher during the classical period.' The first chapter on Whitehead deals with the linear theory of time developed during his mathematical and physical phase and the second with the epochal theory developed after he began his metaphysical phase in the United States. Among other things, Helm sees Whitehead as correcting the mistake attributed to Royce: 'There will be a consummation in which transition and perishing no longer exist, for the divine nature itself is not temporal.'

Helm concludes that there is at present no way to gather these theories into one framework. Certainly there is not such a basis in these essays. Perhaps there might be avenues for exploring common assumptions about a common world if the differences in problems, purposes, and methods of philosophies grounded in logic, psychology, metaphysics, poetry, biology, and physics, respectively, were recognized from the start.

DARNELL RUCKER
Skidmore College

An English translation of Peter Janich's *Protophysics of Time* is welcome. It introduces Anglo-Saxon readers to a program that has aroused controversy among philosophers and physicists in Germany. It provides both a critique

of and a clear alternative to logical positivism and historicism. 'Protophysics' raises rather different questions about the conceptual foundations of science. However inadequate protophysicist answers to them might be, their questions concerning the conduct of scientific experiments and the conditions of measurement are important.

To recommend the book on these grounds is also to suggest that its discussion is largely programmatic. There is little here to interest those working on technical problems in the philosophy of time. Many of these problems are not addressed and there is no mention of Grünbaum, for example, or of any of the cosmological literature.

Protophysics is a foundationalist program in the Kantian sense, i.e., it seeks to isolate the a priori conditions that must be satisfied if physics, as an objective, empirical, quantitative activity, is to be possible. It develops the insights of Hugo Dingler in the 20s and 30s and extends the work of Paul Lorenzen and the so-called Erlangen School in the 50s and 60s. Dingler's aim was to show 'that it is possible to establish an enduring ... *absolute science* apart from and logically independent of all sciences which have become historical and conditioned by historical contingencies.' Apparently this science is 'absolute' in that it is the science of all presuppositions, hence itself presuppositionless, and because it is rooted in reflection on the *pre-scientific* 'standpoint of daily life' or *Lebenswelt* which is taken to be 'unconditioned.' The presuppositions isolated are not propositions, but abilities (and norms guiding same), including the linguistic and manipulative abilities which allow us to carry out experiments and in particular to produce devices to measure properties of objects in a precise way. These properties are space, time, and mass, hence the protophysical accounts of geometry, chronometry, and hylometry.

Protophysics emphasizes the active, experimental, normative role of human beings. Kant had argued: there is science only where there is *intervention*. Protophysicists focus this emphasis in two places: the *closure* (undisturbedness) of the experimental conditions which (classically) alone makes possible the attribution of causes and the uniqueness of measurement results and the *design and manufacture* of devices which alone makes measurement *precise*. Protophysicists claim that these 'methodological' presuppositions provide criteria by which the adequacy of particular physical theories can be assessed.

Time measurement is usually characterized as follows. Data are gathered from measurement by clocks (all of which involve apparently periodic motions, the daily revolution of the sun for instance). Hypotheses are proposed to give a systematic account of these data. The clocks are then corrected in accordance with these hypotheses, and the data reinterpreted. No one motion is *truly* periodic, for the measurement of that motion would depend on taking another motion as periodic, and so on. Motions selected as periodic more or less provide us with the same measurement data and specification of a standard is in part with respect to the eventual simplification of the equations of mechanics. But this procedure is obviously (and according to Janich, viciously) circular. To break the circle, Janich proposes taking uniform, rec-

tilinear motion as the measurement of time. If such motion is construed as inertial, then the circle reappears, for the definition of inertial motion presupposes time measurement. Janich develops an alternative account, by means of what he calls a clock-free kinematics. We must skip the details; I don't think the account is successful. But the more immediate point is that he has tried to develop an alternate and, if nothing else, provides us with a new vantage point from which to look at the traditional discussion.

Janich goes on to claim that in the traditional (pre-quantum) discussion there is no precise and non-circular criterion of a system's remaining 'undisturbed.' Janich tries to provide conditions, satisfaction of which would result in our being able to produce and isolate an 'undisturbed' clock, making possible a unique and objective measurement of time. The production of an 'undisturbed' clock would establish one of the sought-for 'foundations' of physics. Again, I don't think the attempt is successful, but the reasons have to do with special relativity.

Dingler seems to have been motivated originally as much by an animus against the special theory of relativity (and certainly against the person of Einstein) as he was by the desire to establish a 'foundation' for physics. This animus disappears in the work of Lorenzen and Janich, yet there remains a bias against the special theory. Perhaps it is just that accepting the special theory ·means giving up so many basic protophysical tenets, the possibility of 'undisturbed' clocks for example. If we follow the protophysicist program, at least as characterized by Janich, then we are committed to Euclidean geometry (implicit in our characterization of 'rigid body') and a unique temporal interval. Of course, such commitments put us in a position to criticize relativity theory. But for most physicists and many philosophers the price of being able to do this would simply be too high. If 'foundations' are to be found, then at the very least they will have to be compatible with contemporary physics.

The difficulty dates from Kant and it is a merit of the protophysics program to have underlined it. Can a 'foundation' (in the appropriate sense) be found for physics which at the same time does not preclude confirmable scientific hypotheses? Or, to put the shoe on the other foot, can relativity theory (and quantum mechanics) be developed in such a way that they do not preclude the possibility of finding a 'foundation' for them? It seems to be the case at the present time that no foundation rooted in the *Lebenswelt* is possible; in particular, Kant's attempt to show that the conditions of the possibility of experience are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the objects of scientific experience has to be given up. Perhaps this is as much a comment on the *Lebenswelt* and on the presumed conditions of 'objectivity' as it is on contemporary physics.

GORDON G. BRITTAN, JR.
Montana State University

ROBERT B. KRUSCHWITZ and ROBERT C. ROBERTS, eds. *The Virtues: Contemporary Essays on Moral Character*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company 1987. Pp. vii + 263. ISBN 0-534-06720-4.

An anthology of essays (all non-historical) on virtue and character, *The Virtues* contains seventeen articles or excerpts from books. All but one have been published elsewhere. The papers were selected with a view to their accessibility to bright undergraduates, and each selection is prefaced by a helpful introduction which summarizes the piece and places it in context. There is also a remarkably extensive (although awkwardly organized) bibliography of work on the virtues, and a long introduction. The main body of the book is divided into three sections: 'Ethical Theory and the Virtues,' 'Moral Psychology,' and 'Some Vices and Virtues.'

There are several dimensions along which to appraise *The Virtues*. As a collection of high-quality essays on character, virtue, some specific virtues and moral motivation, the book is largely successful. It brings into one volume many excellent papers, among them Susan Wolf's 'Moral Saints' and R.M. Adams' reply, 'Saints,' Lawrence Blum's 'Compassion,' Michael Stocker's 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,' T.E. Hill, Jr.'s 'Servility and Self-Respect' and Mark Jefferson's 'What is Wrong with Sentimentality?'

Viewed with an eye towards its use in the classroom, the anthology again fares well (although I would recommend using it only in an intermediate or advanced course, or perhaps a freshman honors seminar). The introductory summaries serve to make these already readable essays more accessible, and many of the essays, for example, Robert Louden's 'Some Vices of Virtue Ethics' and Michael Slote's 'Is Virtue Possible?' are eminently discussible. Almost all lend themselves nicely to both lectures and discussion.

But the book has a further aim, as well: to tell us something about what virtue ethics is and what it is opposed to, what the issues are and what stands one might take. In this endeavor it is, I think, less successful. The task, to be sure, is not an easy one. Those who advocate virtue ethics frequently do not spell out just what a virtue ethics is; where they do, they tend to disagree. Of course it is not the special responsibility of the editors to rectify the problem, but it would have been helpful if the introduction, or perhaps an invited essay, had provided a sketch of the variety of forms that a virtue ethics might take, and the current range of views as to what forms it *can* take.

Louden's is the only paper in the volume which tries to explain what a virtue ethics is, and it needs to be supplemented by a discussion which addresses some of his (rather breezy) objections to virtue ethics and questions his characterization of it. For instance, he criticizes virtue ethics on the grounds that we often cannot tell who is virtuous, given the difficulty of 'establishing an agent's true moral character' (74). The thought is that it is easier to discern whether a particular action is right than whether a particular person is virtuous. If we cannot know 'with any degree of certainty who really is virtuous' (73), virtue ethics is, Louden thinks, in trouble. 'To advocate an ethics of vir-

tue is, among other things, to presuppose that we can clearly differentiate the virtuous from the vicious. Otherwise, the project lacks applicability' (75). But that depends on what we should expect of an ethical theory, and how we mean to apply it. That it does not allow us to rank people as to how virtuous they are may not be much of a problem. (It may even be an advantage, since if we recognize our epistemological limitations we will be likely to do as Kant and Nietzsche bid and refrain from moralizing.) Suppose we can (with reasonable success) strive to be virtuous and teach children to be virtuous without knowing for sure who instantiates virtue (or particular virtues)? Louden cites Kant approvingly: 'The real morality of actions, ... even that of our own conduct ... remains entirely hidden from us' (75). But he fails to note that even this extreme skepticism did not lead Kant to conclude that he should not focus on 'real morality'!

The editors' long introduction devotes a few paragraphs to general remarks, two and a half pages to summarizing Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy' and twelve pages to MacIntyre's *After Virtue*, primarily to summarizing MacIntyre's 'history of the virtues.' While *After Virtue* is unquestionably the most important book in contemporary virtue ethics, centering the introduction around it will mislead readers (especially students). First, it fails to note that MacIntyre's history of ethics is idiosyncratic. In addition, it gives the impression that virtue theory is basically a MacIntyrean project: at odds with rationalism in ethics and the 'Enlightenment Project,' and motivated by an acceptance of some form of moral relativism. An introduction which shortened the part on *After Virtue* and greatly lengthened the general discussion would have strengthened the anthology. Rather than summarize Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy,' the editors would have done better to include it in the collection. A note on the contributors would have been useful. Some invited discussion pieces, perhaps one on Anscombe's paper and another addressing Louden's, would have improved the first section of the anthology.

As is usually the case with anthologies, there are writers whose work should have been represented (in particular, Philippa Foot and James Wallace), and there are essays, namely those of Harold Alderman, Derek Phillips and Leslie Farber, which either because they are inherently weak or because of the topic, do not enhance the volume. But most of the essays are very good indeed.

I hope that the fact that I have devoted so much of this review to the book's one shortcoming will not be taken to indicate my overall opinion of the book. I chose to discuss the problem at length in order to indicate a direction that other work should take, and to caution against a possible misunderstanding of the nature of virtue ethics and the state of the art. It needs to be emphasized that the motivation for virtue ethics is multifarious, the metaethical stances of virtue ethics proponents about as diverse as one could imagine, and even the location of points of agreement a matter of contention. But it is by no means the case that the success of the anthology hangs on its ability to provide the reader with a good appreciation of the various forms that an ethic of virtue might take, and to explain the issues and the controversies. The book has several aims, and it is certainly successful in collecting together many ex-

cellent papers on character and virtue, papers which have the further advantage of being accessible to undergraduates.

MARCIA BARON
The University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
and the University of Michigan

This is an intriguing book which, despite having a title suggesting a work about logic and inference, is in fact about some basic issues in epistemology. Palmer's interest in transcendental or presuppositional inferences lies in their uses against philosophical scepticism, particularly as it is directed at the basic explanatory principles which ground our sciences and general world views. In so far as they are intended to provide epistemological warrants for these explanatory principles, Palmer argues that these forms of inference are failures. This failure of transcendental inference has momentous consequences, he suggests, for the epistemology of science.

Much of the book explains by way of examples, among them some of the more celebrated of philosophical arguments: Descartes' 'I think, therefore I exist' and Kant's deductions of the universal principle of cause and effect and of the transcendental ideality of space. Palmer wishes to display two main features common to his examples: that they can be classified as transcendental inferences (only the Kantian examples are commonly thought of in this way), and that each commits a fallacy that Palmer calls 'presumptive circularity.' Accordingly, he traces the failure of these inferences in rebutting scepticism to this presumptive circularity. This fallacy is described as one where the premises of the argument can be known to be true only with the aid of the conclusion. This informal fallacy is somewhat different from its formal cousin. Circular arguments typically are those with the conclusion appearing as a premise; presumptive circularity is somewhat more subtle in that the conclusion must be presupposed if the premises be known to be true. The emphasis is upon the epistemic merits of the arguments; the truth of the premises, which is required for their soundness, can only be established by assuming that their conclusion is true.

Palmer analyzes Descartes' reasoning to his existence as an argument of this basic form: (1) I think, (2) thoughts need thinkers, therefore (3) I exist (27). This argument, while valid, is said to be presumptively circular because establishing that the premise 'I think' is true requires that the conclusion be known to be true. Palmer argues that there are no independent means available for determining the truth of this premise. Kant's deduction of the subjectivity of space is said to suffer from the same flaw. Its conclusion, 'Space is contributed by us,' indeed follows validly from the premises, 'Geometry can be a genuine science only if space is contributed by us' and 'Geometry is a genuine science.' However, knowing the truth of the second premise and thus establishing the soundness of the argument requires knowing beforehand that the conclusion is true (59ff). Thus, Palmer claims, Kant's proof is incompetent.

The book contains many other examples from more recent times which Palmer thinks display the same fault. In addition, he provides a logic of presupposition (a taxonomy as it were of the logical features of presuppositional inference), a general discussion of transcendental arguments, and a concluding chapter on the implications of this failure of transcendental inference for the epistemology of science. Because he considers transcendental inference to be the only presently available argument for rebutting scepticism (159), its circularity means the re-emergence of the sceptical threat. He says that we find ourselves faced with these options: (1) finding a better argument than transcendental inference to dismantle scepticism, (2) giving-up science, (3) accepting that there is no ultimate epistemic justification for science, but proceeding nonetheless by adopting a pragmatic attitude, or (4) denying the meaningfulness of the justificatory question. Palmer finds the first two options hopeless for now and the fourth only as a motivation for the third. Thus, he takes the pragmatic turn in a way that reflects a broadly Kuhnian attitude toward the epistemology of science (178-9).

Palmer's book is written in a non-technical style and should be easily understood by most students of philosophy; it is written with the air of a rather informal college lecture, though at times seems more glib than conversational. Upon completing the book, however, some might wonder just what kind of book this is supposed to be, despite its having a recognizable general thesis. It is not clearly epistemological because so much of it gives way to history and logic; indeed, I wish that Palmer had spent more time developing the epistemological thesis which is to unify the book. But supposing it is an epistemic work that is motivated by features of presuppositional inference, one then has to determine what role the historical examples play, whether Palmer is trying to give an historical explanation of the current state of the epistemology of science or is using these examples to make an ahistorical point of the logic of justification. Palmer's interpretations of the historical texts are unquestionably controversial, yet he does not devote nearly enough space to arguing or sometimes even articulating his interpretations. At times, he explains this by denying that his concerns are historical (26); yet, at other times he displays a strong concern for historical accuracy (32-4). The result of this ambivalence may be to frustrate the historical scholar and perhaps to bore or

bewilder those whose interests lie in the logical and epistemological theses. This can be said for roughly half the book, those chapters that are by way of historical example.

Some might be taken aback by the alleged circularity of some of the examples; it is by no means obvious that there can be no independent evidence for the premise of 'George smokes, so he exists' (29), nor is it clear that someone, a child perhaps, could not know that he thinks while being ignorant of the concept 'existence.' Some might also wonder just how Palmer finally deals with scepticism, even in its sensible form where it inquires into the reasons underlying our basic explanatory principles. Palmer admits that there are no compelling reasons that could justify our principles and that we are forced into providing weaker justifications that appeal to the pragmatic benefits of systems of explanatory principles. The sceptical questions seem more to drop out than get answered, and one wishes for more. Each of these problems might be traced to Palmer's covering too many things in such a short book. Its topics are interesting and important to philosophers, but I feel that they receive better treatment elsewhere. This book is best considered as somewhat of an introduction.

HOWARD DUNCAN
Ottawa, Ontario

RICHARD H. SCHLAGEL. *From Myth to the Modern Mind: Volume I, Animism to Archimedes.* New York: Peter Lang 1985. Pp. 281. US$30.00. ISBN 0-8204-0219-2.

This book has two heroes: Piaget and Democritus. Schlagel's overt purpose is to document the development of 'rational' modes of thought from 'primitive' ones; and as the sub-title might suggest, the paradigm of such primitive modes is animism, the belief that the world and its inhabitants embody, or at least exemplify, the workings of creative intelligence. As such, he leans fairly heavily on Piaget's account of the development of the capacity for self-awareness and abstraction in the mental processes of children, and finds in it a model for the gradual dispersal of the clouds of superstition and myth by the illuminating sun of scientific rationality. Democritean atomism, with its rigorous eschewal of teleological and purposive explanation in favour of a thorough-going materialist reductionism, becomes for Schlagel the talisman

of this development, and the superceding of the atomist world-picture by Aristotle's teleology one of the tragedies of western intellectual history.

That picture over-simplifies Schlagel's account, but it is not unfair to it. Schlagel's approach is essentially that of the traditionalist: He considers the attempts of Lévi-Strauss and his followers to dissolve the idea of there being a radical difference between primitive and other modes of cognition only to dismiss it (34-42). Thus the first three chapters set up in a brisk, not to say hasty, fashion the general assumptions, methodological and interpretative, that underlie the rest of the work: and chapters 4 to 15 attempt to follow them out. Thus Schlagel will occasionally invoke a contemporary anthropologist or philosopher of science in an attempt to elucidate some point he is making about an ancient thinker (this habit occasions some of the book's larger irritations: on page 211 there is a reference, apparently to a work of Levy-Bruhl, with no indication as to which is the work in question; one has to look back to page 32 before discovering the necessary clues).

Schlagel himself on occasion warns against an excessive eagerness to find modern points of view adumbrated by the Greeks: he quotes with apparent approval Cornford's strictures against reading 'into Plato's words modern ideas that are ... foreign to his thought' (168); yet a mere six lines later, Schlagel claims that Plato's instructions to treat the cosmology of the *Timaeus* as a 'likely story' anticipates Popperian faliibilism. And that is only the most egregious example of many.

Part of the trouble with this book is that it doesn't seem to know quite what it's doing. The opening sections on method prepare the reader for a unified, structural account of the development of the Greek mind (in this respect it is scandalous that Schlagel seems unaware of the work of either Snell or Rohde) employing the conceptual tools of modern anthropology (where reference to Dodds' pioneering study *The Greeks and the Irrational* might not have gone amiss). What they tend to get is a selective account of the views of various ancient thinkers on cosmology and science, with a brief appreciation of their contribution to 'scientific rationalism' tacked uncomfortably on the end. Frequently Schlagel seems reduced to a sort of breathless hyperbole: 'One realises that [one] confronts a personality and intellect extraordinary in [its] diversity and vitality' (Empedocles); 'probably no individual has been so extraordinarily gifted' (Plato), to abstract but two.

More serious than that, however, is the fact that Schlagel's scholarship is to say the least uncertain. He seems unaware of any literature published in any language other than English (with the possible exception of French), which is a serious blow to the compendious pretensions of the work; and even his reading of English material is extraordinarily selective (his principal sources appear to have been Cornford and de Santillana). Presumably this accounts for his claim that 'two of the most brilliant physical theorists of all time, Leucippus and Democritus, remain relatively unknown' (147): try telling that to a philosopher (or indeed anyone else) in Moscow (or for that matter in Italy, where the ideological pull of materialism is not so readily explicable in Marxist terms). And there are further gaps, most particularly noticeable in his treat-

ment of the Eleatics. Parmenides, we are told, was responsible for 'a fundamental confusion between logic and ontology' (110) (a confusion that Schlagel ascribes, in an astounding footnote, to Quine). But that 'confusion' rests on the persistent and unfounded belief that Parmenides' deduction proceeds from the *logical* principle of non-contradiction: and there is no reason at all to imagine that that is so. Schlagel also perpetuates the old myth that the Way of Seeming must be accorded some degree of reality 'to console those who could not follow the cold logic of his vision' (110); Parmenides may have been bad at logic, but there is no reason to think that he was that bad.

The greatest omission in a book that purports to chronicle the development of the scientific mind is the absence of any treatment of Hippocratic medicine, and of any reference to Lloyd's magisterial treatment of the growth of Greek science in his *Magic, Reason and Experience*; one might charitably suppose that it appeared too late for Schlagel to take account of it. Although it is not clear where the next volume will take the story up, the absence of any account of the world-systems of the Stoics and Epicureans is to say the least surprising (but perhaps that will be remedied).

But the most serious deficiency of this book (apart from its lack of a bibliography) is its espousal of an unhistorical (though all too common) notion of rationality. Just because it is now rational to believe in atomic physics, it does not follow that it was in any sense rational to do so in fifth-century Greece (even given the enormous claim that Democritean atomism was anything much like its dangerous modern homonym). Rationality is relative to evidence; and while no doubt the efforts of Democritus were remarkable for their sustained intellectual thrust towards material explanation, it is not clear that, given the way things stood at the time, materialist explanations were the best ones available. After all, the world *looks* purposive: and until you can come up with a complex cybernetic theory to account for it (which the atomists clearly did not), the rejection of directed teleology may seem to be the merest expression of dogma.

This book may fulfil a purpose if it serves to introduce the 'general reader' to the history and philosophy of science, and if they are forewarned against inaccuracy and tendentiousness (the inaccuracy is not confined to ancient scholarship: Schlagel seems to imagine that the 'Steady State Theory,' which even its progenitors abandoned some years ago, is a live cosmological option: 158, 166); but with a little more expenditure of intellectual effort, they could find infinitely greater rewards in Lloyd, a book which genuinely does what this volume only claims to do: produce a coherent, systematic study of the development of Greek science, on the basis of great scholarship, with the benefit of modern developments in the social sciences. Why settle for second best?

R.J. HANKINSON
McGill University

M. SCHOFIELD and G. STRIKER, eds. *The Norms of Nature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986. Pp. 330. US$49.50. ISBN 0-521-26623-8.

This collection of nine papers on Hellenistic ethics deserves serious attention from philosophers as well as students of the ancient world. As Günther Patzig says in the preface, these essays 'may help to bridge the gap between historical and systematic work in philosophy, a gap which is, in itself, somewhat artificial, since historical studies without systematic guidelines tend to be lacking in vivacity, whereas systematic discussions without historical perspective seem often somewhat parochial.' The best of the papers in this collection illustrate just how important the cross-fertilization between historical and analytical work has become.

Part I contains four essays centred on the relation of argument to convictions and emotions. Julia Annas' paper ('Doing Without Objective Values: Ancient and Modern Strategies') deals with the fundamental question of the differences between ancient moral theories and their modern counterparts. Ancient sceptics (here this means Pyrrhonian scepticism, and only Sextus Empiricus is discussed at length) saw their radical lack of conviction about morals as part of a general scepticism about everything, and found in that suspension of judgement complete human happiness. Their ability to find peace rather than angst in uncertainty is a mark of the profound differences between scepticism then and now. Most instructive is the Pyrrhonian determination to live by the conclusions of their scepticism, not (Annas argues) availing themselves of that 'insulation' of doubt from practice which often prevents philosophers from confronting the practical implications of not believing.

Martha Nussbaum ('Therapeutic Arguments: Epicurus and Aristotle') writes on Aristotle and Epicurus, analyzing their use of the analogy between ethics and medicine. She argues persuasively that Epicurus was responding to Aristotle on this point, and takes the occasion to continue her important exploration of the modes of ethical discourse open to us and her advocacy of a broadly Aristotelian approach.

David Furley ('Nothing to Us?') discusses Epicurus' argument that death ought not to be a subject of concern to a rational agent; this is easily the best treatment of this central Epicurean problem of which I am aware. The comparison with contemporary work on attitudes to personal identity and survival and to death is crisp and to the point. The conclusion which Furley reaches is instructive: Epicurus' views on the emptiness of the fear of death are sustainable only if one accepts 'the hedonist premiss of Epicurean morality in its fullest strength.' If a watered-down hedonism or a wishy-washy utilitarianism is substituted, then the argument fails. It is this tightness of fit between the components of Epicureansim (and so for other Hellenistic systems) which most needs emphasizing; time and again the apparent weaknesses and implausibilities of these philosophies are dissolved when one sees that the entire philosophy, logic, physics and ethics, is meant to stand or fall as a tightly coordinated unit.

This is particularly true of Stoicism, and so Michael Frede ('The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul') gives an excellent account of the often paradoxical Stoic theory of the *pathe*, in part by properly linking it to their general ethical and psychological theory; particularly useful is his exploration of the relationship between assent and the passions (as I would prefer to translate the key term), one of the more difficult aspects of their theory.

Part II contains five papers on an equally crucial general theme: the relation between what our tradition calls the *summum bonum* and the primary foundations of ethics. Malte Hossenfelder's essay ('Epicurus — Hedonist Malgré Lui') might better have stood in part I; although it does deal with the Epicurean *summum bonum*, the most serious question it raises is in fact about the relation between reason and ethical dogma. Hossenfelder argues that the best explanation of the very ascetic form of Epicurus' hedonism lies in the hypothesis that he worked from a commitment to a general Hellenistic thesis that happiness is to be found in the attainment of all the goals which a man has personally set *for himself*, and that Epicurus, like all Hellenistic philosophers, subordinated his rational enquiry to an antecedent desire to find *some* sort of ethics which might appear to make such complete desire satisfaction secure. This is the important question: whether rational enquiry in Hellenistic ethics is used to solve inherited problems or is instead a tool for justifying ethical stances chosen for non-rational reasons.

The other papers in Part II fall into pairs: two are on the Hellenistic practice of grounding the highest good of a mature human in an analysis of his nature, as revealed in the simplicity of the animal at birth, and two specifically on the Stoic *summum bonum*. Jacques Brunschwig ('The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism') elegantly extracts the common features of this form of argument and clarifies a great deal about the texts on this problem, from Epicurus himself to Hierocles the Stoic. By contrast, Troels Engberg-Pedersen ('Discovering the Good: *Oikeiosis* and *Kathekonta* in Stoic Ethics') gives a long and perhaps needlessly complex account of the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiosis*; still, the crucial evidence is aired and subjected to an exacting scrutiny, and that is always a valuable exercise.

Gisela Striker ('Antipater, or the Art of Living') and Terence Irwin ('Stoic and Aristotelian Conceptions of Happiness') give us two contrasting and fruitful discussions of the Stoic *summum bonum*. Striker concentrates on a short but crucial historical period in the development of Stoic doctrine and shows, for the first time I think, how Antipater's revision of the formulae used to express the goal of life was meant to clarify their position and make it more defensible. She balances nicely between a sympathetic exposition of the Stoic position and an appreciation of the ambiguities in their expression of it which left them open to the kind of attacks which we see in Plutarch, for example.

Irwin's study of Aristotelian and Stoic views on whether virtue is sufficient for happiness shows the same sort of careful balance, only here it is Aristotle who is the chief beneficiary. Irwin rightly sees early Stoic ethics as a constructively critical development of Aristotelian ethics, and surveys the nature and strength of their critique, canvassing at each stage the possible

Aristotelian responses. His final position is sensible: the Stoic attack will force Aristotelians (who allow other goods besides virtue to contribute to happiness) to restate their position, but it is quite possible that such a clarification will be successful.

I should conclude with a word about the larger importance of the paper; it is a *philosophical* appraisal of what became the central question of Hellenistic ethics, the Stoic claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness. The Stoic commitment to this position is often explained as a consequence of their determination to guarantee a priori that every individual is self-sufficient with respect to his own happiness; the arguments are often supposed to exist *merely* to prop up this sociologically determined preference. By showing that even this Stoic doctrine is explicable as a rational elaboration of earlier philosophy and by bringing out the genuine strengths of the Stoic position, Irwin shows that there is no longer any excuse for condescending to Hellenistic ethics.

In the last twenty years there has grown up a realization that the history of Hellenistic philosophy really is a *philosophical* history, and not a listing of quaint dogmas to be accounted for by the thesis that Greek culture somehow lost its commitment to reason. This volume shows that Hellenistic philosophers still have a contribution to make to the study of human happiness.

<div style="text-align: right">

BRAD INWOOD
University of Toronto

</div>

The subject matter of Shalom's book centers around the question of the nature and unity of the person. The first sixteen chapters are devoted to a critical appraisal of what various contemporary philosophers, psychologists, and neurologists have had to say about the human entity. Shalom intelligently discusses, in varying degrees of detail, such notables as the early and later Wittgenstein, Strawson, Feigl, Smart, Armstrong, N. Wiener, Freud, Parfit, Julian Jaynes, R.W. Sperry, Thomas Nagel, and others. Then, in the last four chapters he offers his own account of the nature and identity of persons.

A dominant theme in Shalom's impressive work is that the remarkable success of the physical sciences since the sixteenth century has quite mistakenly

led us to accept science as a basic philosophical presupposition. That is, we mistakenly treat as an incontrovertible truth the assumption which asserts that matter alone constitutes the ultimate reality in terms of which philosophical problems and answers are to be formulated. For Shalom, the central failing of that presupposition is that it loses sight of the particular, living, *existing* subject. Thus, while science can tell us something about the abstract kind to which a particular belongs, it can never tell us something about the particular *qua existing*. As Shalom puts it, 'What is real is the particular entity. And if it is entirely true that there cannot be a *science* of the particular, it is also true, I think, that particularity remains the most fundamental existential category' (121). What, then, is the proper conception of the particularity of an organism that is capable of subjectivity?

Accepting the physical sciences as a basic presupposition implies that the particularity of, say, a rock, is derived from the combination of rapidly and constantly moving micro-elements. Shalom maintains, however, that if we treat the particularity of the creator of the scientific discipline in the same way, then we are led to an inevitable impasse. For what the various materialisms cannot do is explain how consciousness and self-consciousness are related to the electrochemical processes of the nervous system. More specifically, Shalom claims that one question that identity and central state theories, cybernetics, and Freud, cannot answer is 'how is it possible for brain processes to be, at one and the same time, purely physical in the sense in which physics and chemistry are purely physical, and psychical ...' (157)? Furthermore, within the scientific framework the permanence or unity of a particular is built upon unceasing change or continuity of physical processes. For Shalom, on the other hand, a person is 'a basic unitary reality' (419) whose internal identity cannot be understood in terms of bodily or psychological continuity, or a Freudian system of agencies.

Shalom is not claiming that 'I' refers to a third thing, a 'mind-substance' or soul that underlies the changing person. To think that I am either a mind or a body or some combination of mind and body is to presuppose the 'body/mind' framework. Another main theme of Shalom's work is, however, that the body/mind framework cannot give an adequate answer to the problem of the person, since 'it is *in principle* incoherent to conceive of subjectivity as emerging from purely physiochemical processes' (448). Nevertheless, it is a fact that a fertilized ovum usually develops and grows into a person, and in order to explain how that is possible we have to adopt a new 'ontological' framework.

According to Shalom, it is of fundamental importance to distinguish between the existence of the constant flux of physical processes and the sheer existing of matter; what he calls 'the permanent existential reality in and through continuous change' (423-4). Within the ontological framework, the sheer existing of matter is recognized as the ultimate reality from which a potential subjectivity will emerge and in terms of which the particularity of the human entity will be explained.

The key to Shalom's analysis of the potential subjectivity from which the

existing subject will emerge are the twin reciprocal concepts of 'internalization' and 'deployment.' Shalom maintains that at the moment of conception there is 'subtending' the fertilized ovum a locus of permanence that has written within it a potential subjectivity. Internalization is the metaphysical condition by means of which physical, chemical and neural activities are registered or discerned by an active locus of potential subjectivity, and deployment is the expliciting or actualizing of something that is implicitly present from the start. Thus there is, from the moment of conception, an interplay between the temporal change of physical processes and an 'existing potentiality' (448) that is the locus of these changes. It is this interplay through time that constitutes our personal identity. 'A subject seen in this manner is no longer a mere succession, he is an active locus of self-realization involving both "body" and "mind." And what constitutes him as an internal identity is neither body per se nor mind per se, but that locus of subjectivity which subtends both body and mind' (451).

The subtleties and details of Shalom's own analysis of the person go beyond the limited confines of this review, but enough has been said to indicate a difficulty. Shalom first draws a distinction, but not a separation of entities, between the dual polarity of change and permanence (the existence of process and sheer existence). All particulars have sheer existence. Yet, Shalom also claims that within the sheer existence of the fertilized ovum there is a potential subjectivity, 'a quasi nontemporality determining that living cell to be what it in fact becomes' (456). In other words, the permanent existing is an existing potentiality, a natured entity, that metaphysically interacts with physical processes to achieve its status as an actualized living entity or human being. The problem is that he cannot intelligibly maintain that all particulars involve mere existing, and also claim that mere existing has within it a nature that determines the specific kind to which it belongs. Or, to put the point differently, while Shalom's view avoids the body/mind problem he is faced with an equally intractable one, namely, that of explaining the 'relationship' between sheer existing and potential subjectivity.

L. NATHAN OAKLANDER
The University of Michigan — Flint

JOSEPH VINING. *The Authoritative and the Authoritarian*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 1986. Pp. xix + 261. US$25.00. ISBN 0-226-85663-1.

This is, as the dustjacket fairly warns, a 'remarkable' book. It begins with a poem, flits intriguingly over many issues of legal reasoning and public law, ends with another poem, and then appends a set of discursive notes called 'amplifications.' Notwithstanding its title and professed aims, it does not provide 'an introduction to the problem of legal authority' (5). (The title refers to the more general distinction between willing compliance and blind obedience.) Perhaps of most interest to readers of these *Reviews* will be its claims that law is not a natural or social science but a humanistic discipline nearer theology, and that as courts become increasingly bureaucratized it will become harder to respect or impute meaning to their decisions.

It is unclear what is being denied by the first thesis. Vining attacks the 'once dominant professed conception' that law is 'a scientific enterprise in the tradition of the mathematical and physical sciences' (16). But who held such a view? Not the formalists, although they may have espoused a simplistic deductive model of legal reasoning. Not Hohfeld, despite his 'legal equations' (27). The debates over the use of conceptual analysis or the place of deduction in legal reasoning have nothing to do with the explanatory ambitions of a natural science. Nor has anyone argued that law *itself* is a social science, although many from the realists on have sought to illuminate the study of law by such techniques. One detects here, *sotto voce*, a note of resentment and disappointment about the new-fangled subjects of law and economics, the sociology of law, and perhaps even legal philosophy. But why then turn to theology? Of course it is true that the legal profession is a bit like a priesthood (188). And, more significantly, law and theology share a concern for authoritative texts and rely on the sciences of interpretation. The relevance of hermeneutics, however, is not explored in much detail here. Beyond this, Vining is struck by the thought that both depend on 'faith in the possibility of meaning, and belief in one's ends and identification with them' (200).

More interesting is the claim that the interpretation of legal texts as documents which command respect requires the presupposition that those texts are the products of a mind. Moreover, this presupposition is said to be necessary for the existence of law (111). The very phenomenon of authority Vining regards as personal; impersonal authority is a contradiction in terms (157-8). When an institution becomes highly bureaucratized, with an opinion-writing staff whose job it is to provide post hoc rationalizations of decisions taken on other grounds, the presupposition of mind fails. The American Supreme Court, he fears, is moving in this direction and as it does American law will lose, not only focus or direction, but also meaning and authority (80).

It is unclear what is to count in favour of this thesis, for Vining says: 'To try to specify in a prior definition what we mean by mind would be to fall into the very way of thinking and talking that it should be our purpose above

all to bypass' (205). Yet the Court is not in any ordinary sense of the term a mind; the rhetoric of its judgments cannot conceal the truth that they are the product of at least nine minds whose identity changes over time. Vining replies that the question whether there is a single authentic voice does not depend on whether there is a single individual speaking (111). It only requires that collective decisions be statements which arise from genuine discussion, and 'not merely the product of negotiation and compromise' in the sense of bargaining (112). Some kind of mutual accommodation and deference is needed for a joint decision, however, and that is no threat to the presupposition (223). Vining feels that this is at least possible in a group of nine judges. At the same time, however, he suggests that 'The law is neither the majority nor the dissent but that edifice to which both appeal' (114). But that points towards a less personal image of law, as something which depends not on minds but on the existence of certain interpretive conventions in the legal community. Moreover, accepting the necessity for a mind makes it hard to explain the nature of statutory interpretation. The American legislatures are not small collegial bodies but large anomic ones in which compromise and bargaining are the normal decision processes. Why doesn't this show that legislation cannot be read as the product of a mind? Vining ranges widely on this point, rejecting doctrines of democracy and separation of powers as accounting for the authority of statutes, and ultimately conceding that, here, mind is at best a necessary illusion (123). In the end, he thinks that all persons except individuals are useful fictions. But this seems to lessen the initial worries about bureaucratization.

Finally, two comments about Vining's own method. First, he proceeds more allusively and less argumentatively than a philosophic audience may prefer. This is not a book which is paralyzed by rigour. Another departure from philosophers' habits is the fact that Vining does not discuss any other accounts of legal authority: Kelsen, Hart, Raz, Finnis, Flathman, Dworkin etc. are all absent. This is particularly unfortunate in the case of Dworkin, whose well-known views about the role of coherence in legal interpretation bear centrally on the author's interests.

Second, Vining does not adequately distinguish the local from the global. What might be searching criticisms of the American Supreme Court seem less plausible as truths about the nature of law and legal reasoning. The demanding political tasks with which that Court is charged, and the peculiar political system in which it must survive, make it in many ways an unrepresentative example of the species. This book may shake some lawyers from their dogmatic slumbers, but it will rouse fewer legal philosophers.

LESLIE GREEN
York University

DOUGLAS N. WALTON. *Courage: A Philosophical Investigation*. Los Angeles: University of California Press 1986. Pp. xiv + 241. ISBN 0-520-05443-1.

Professor Walton considers courage to be primarily an attribute of actions, and only secondarily to be an attribute of character. 'Courage and cowardice are adverbial in their deepest semantical structure. They are properties that have to do with the process of how an act is executed' (130). In outline, his view is that to act courageously is to be prepared to incur, in the course of lucidly undertaken action, known proportional danger or difficulty for the sake of bringing about some objective reasonably believed to be (highly) worthwhile. Courage is thus a good aspect of action first because it is always connected with a good end; second, because it betokens the depth and firmness of commitment to that end; and third, because it increases the likelihood of actual realisation of the end. Where the end is no good, even though danger or difficulty is knowingly embraced in its achievement, there we may speak of bravery or an intrepid act. Where there is no lucid practical reasoning informing the course of action, there we may speak of foolhardiness or blind anger; and so on in other cases where one element or another from the proposed analysis is absent in a particular instance. One feature of the account which Walton stresses is that fear is not necessarily present whenever courage is. Walton uses the point to argue that courage and cowardice are not 'direct opposites' since the latter does involve fear (89). Walton several times quotes with approval Hemingway's remark that courage comprises 'grace under pressure'; this in his (Walton's) view gives a concise pointer towards the overall conception being propounded.

The discussion covers ten chapters, which fall roughly into four groups. Chapters 1-3 introduce the subject matter, look at 'popular images' of courage, and survey, with too great brevity really, some previous philosophical treatments of the topic. Chapters 4-6 contain the heart of Walton's own account; the 'Basic Structure of the Courageous Act' is presented in Chapter 4, with further 'overtones' being considered in the next Chapter ('The Outer Edges'), and the complex assessments of individual deliberation informing courageous acts are scrutinised in Chapter 6. In Chapters 7-8, he examines aspects of practical reasoning, feeling called to do so since in his account courageous action incorporates purposive reasoning with a view to bringing about an end. These are, I think, the weakest chapters of the book: the account of practical reasoning is thin and too detached from the material which prompted the investigation — little is added by these pages. Finally, in Chapters 9-10, Walton looks at the value we attach to courage, both in actions and as a quality of character. I referred to his account of this above.

The writing throughout is sober and direct, although the discussion is sometimes a little slow. Many concrete examples are given which highlight the various aspects involved in courageous acts and in the courage of men, and these help very much in seeing how courage is like and how it is different from its near relations such as bravery, daring, determination, endurance and so on

— often help more, indeed, than abstract argument. Walton makes a good case for his own view as much by dealing fairly and carefully with cases which appear difficult for it to accommodate as by arguing for it directly, although he does neglect courage under torture where purposive action is rather absent. I do not think anyone could come away from his investigation without a sharpened awareness of the order in difference there is in this arena of human activity. There is one area of reservation I have, however. Walton is much perplexed by the (supposed) courage of mountaineers and returns several times to this topic (e.g. 53-4; 207 ff.). His difficulty is plain: the 'good end' of their activity seems elusive. 'What is the point of standing on a particularly high or inaccessible piece of rock?' he asks (208). He toys with the idea that self-knowledge or character-development may be incorporated here, but ends finally in bafflement. I think he is baffled for two reasons. First, he never quite brings into focus that aspect of courage which has to do with displaying indomitable force of being, the power to retain personal integrity as an agent capable of holding unswervingly fast to one's intent, dominating whatever terrors or disasters may threaten to subordinate one. This exalted power of spirit is, no doubt, capable of perversion, but our esteem of it is revealed in, for instance, the shame we feel if we ourselves are cowardly or the contempt we may feel for the cowardice of another. These reveal that humiliation is involved here, a sense of having been rendered servile and subjugated, of having been beaten. We may enjoin courage upon someone by saying 'Be a man!' The sexist, and social class, evaluations suggested by this should not lead it to be blanked from the mind. Mountain-climbing involves, I would suppose, just such confrontation with the possibility of dominance or being dominated, and thus enacts this drama of personal force.

The point may be deepened if we remember that mountains are primary embodiments of sublimity, and as such call out some of the deepest possible human responses. Kant's treatment of the sublime, in his discussion of the 'Dynamically Sublime in Nature' (*Critique of Judgment*, Book II, §28), is highly pertinent. The mountaineer confronts 'the irresistibility of the might of nature' which 'forces upon us the recognition of our physical helplessness as beings of nature.' But, Kant goes on, at the same time we discover 'a pre-eminence above nature that is the foundation of a self-preservation of quite another kind ... This saves humanity in our own person from humiliation.' 'External nature ... challenges our power ... to regard as small those things of which we are wont to be solicitous ... and hence to regard its might ... as exercising over us and our personality no such rude dominion that we should bow down before it, once the question becomes one of our highest principles and of our asserting or forsaking them.' It is our sense of our very standing as moral persons that is heightened in the struggle with Everest, which is, therefore, an emblem of the honour of humanity in contending with adversity as such. Courage itself can be sublime; one misses this a bit in Walton's discussion.

N.J.H. DENT
University of Birmingham

PAUL WEISS. *Toward a Perfected State*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 1986. Pp. xii + 459. US$44.50. ISBN 0-88706-253-9.

Professor Weiss is known as one of America's great metaphysicians, concerned with the nature of reality and our mode of access to it. His political thought sustains these inquiries by seeking to 'join a reasonableness characteristic of mature people in daily life to an understanding of the structures, natures, and relations characteristic of ultimate realities' (153). 'A study of society and state,' Weiss reflects, '... should come after one has engaged in the boldest specula-tive adventures' (432n.). The present study is, obviously, one of great scope. Each page brims with provocative probings and assertions challenging the read-er to consider his social totality in all its infinitesimal aspects. It is also intend-ed to generate enthusiasm for Weiss's political project: a commitment to 'effective action' aiming towards an 'ideal,' using 'ideology' to minimize social risk in the service of a 'Commonhealth' where each would 'maximize' him-self as a 'private being' while acting in accord with the State's demands.

Weiss's study conveys a grand vision of a united and perfected Mankind, bound by 'sophisticated reasonableness.' The theme of the work is captured by the recurring statement, 'People are private beings existing in public,' an invocation of the mutual dependence of privacy and the public world. What is meant by 'privacy' is in no way merely solitude or isolation. Rather, as the metaphysical ground and initial source of man's activities, 'privacy' consti-tutes what it is to flourish as a human being. The 'perfected state' is the final good towards which the basic unions and ideals manifest in them are direct-ed, a realizable goal if people in existing states form a single historic mankind and in consonance act as accountable beings: 'There is however, little likeli-hood that that ideal will be realized, unless actual societies are first reconstruct-ed' (142). Weiss analyses the modes by which the requisite stabilities, consensus, and unities can be determined and then effectively implemented and administered to produce long-term commitments.

This restoration of a public world is not however that of the Greek polis: Aristotle's polity 'overlook[ed] the importance of theoretical studies, art, and individual decisions and control' (326) and was wrong to neglect certain in-alienable rights deserving satisfaction. Weiss's 'perfected state' is moreover universal and homogeneous: a 'humanized world' that constantly evaluates and holds accountable its 'mankind' — 'a constant in every person' (366) — an ideal that annuls the discrimination stemming from distinctions of race, ancestry, gender, age, religion, class, nationality, or culture. It is a state where each citizen can say that he is fully and definitively satisfied when his perso-nality is recognized, in its reality and in its value. Weiss writes, 'Today the Commonhealth is an ideal awaiting the maturation of people to the point where they know and accept accountability for what is done in a limited part of the humanized world' (383), a world which will at once be in agreement 'on the essential dimensions of the ideal' and yet recognize each particular state in its uniqueness, modelled on the resolution of the problem of the one and the many proposed in *The Federalist Papers*.

Weiss's elegant theme of 'collaborative efforts' by 'a world of people' demands that we 'face what is not human as forming an alien world,' a 'formidable' world, whose 'vastness, power, implacable impersonality' engenders the need for collaborative work of 'experiment and adventure,' deploying an arsenal of 'theories, technologies, and controls' to subdue what arises as challenge. The challenges we discover are those gaps between us 'which birth or opportunity happened to produce': the mastery of fortune and contingency in the service of ideals, actualizes what we are as a people. The guarantee that the reconstructing and civilizing process will be a humane one is a primordial, unifying substratum — the *dunamis* — a bond of sympathy nourished by facing the world as alien. The *dunamis* is experienced 'below the surface' of our worldly engagement with bodies and objects, a primal continuum or 'intimate joining' that renders our associations 'collaborative.'

Despite its elegance, reading Weiss's account is troubling. Why should we believe, in the wake of what is by many accepted to be a crisis in Western metaphysics, that another willful project of 'reconstructing actual societies' to produce global harmony, directed by the expectation that realities can be forged by sufficient collaborative mobilization of peoples, values, and philosophic guidance, is not at best wishful dreaming and at worst inhumanely repressive? It is to many a question whether talk of 'moral superiority,' commitment to 'undeviating and steady progress' (279), and the celebration of technology as 'a splendid way' by which power could 'be harnessed, channelized, brought under control, and used so as to make possible the achievement of what is desirable' (246), not to say a commitment to a totalizing philosophic position and the assumed homogeneity, univocality, and closed unity of the political world purported to be the objects of its inquiry, can carry us through this age, without more grievous injury. One might debate again whether the great order of referential finalities that has ordered the tradition of Western metaphysics and the recurrent effort to conjure up new permutations of its themes, has been our best guide in political life and also whether our commitment to those finalities is still an option. Some have suggested that modernity's project on behalf of liberty, equality, and fraternity, serviced by a preference for utility, has finally been overreached by its own driving force, efficiency, the sole remaining criterion for all judgement. Now these might not be the only interpretations of our situation, but as dominant ones, a reader might expect some reasons as to why we should not find them compelling. Weiss's analysis is confined, instead, to classic terms of contract, legitimacy, sovereignty, state, juridical power, and individual right — in short, a world of discrete and singular actors, of centers and margins, form and contents, of a great order of referential finalities where the world is compartmentalized, taxonomically ordered, and prescriptive. Whether these sharp and clear distinctions have not been replaced by the language and political reality of fluid process, relations, de-centred subjects, exchanges, and feedback is a question whose answer decisively determines the appeal of Weiss's position.

To affirm Weiss's vision, one must forget the haunting spectre of Heidegger's will to will underlying technology, the tyrannical implications of Kojève--

Hegel's universal and homogeneous state, and Foucault's recognition of the vulgar voyeurism of a biopolitically managed, panoptical society — warnings in each case concerning that public space of power that is this century's legacy of the metaphysical tradition, political manifestations and perceptions which however vulgarly appropriated from that majestic tradition, are nonetheless politically relevant. The dream of a 'perfected state' is one that cannot remember the reality of power.

PETER EMBERLEY
(Department of Political Science)
Carleton University

Parmi les approches du problème d'une éthique philosophique qui ont été proposées ces dernières années, celle mise de l'avant par K.-O. Apel (d'abord dans 'Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grundlagen der Ethik,' in: *Transformation der Philosophie*, t. II, Francfort 1973, p. 358 et suiv.) et reprise depuis par J. Habermas ('Diskursethik — Notizen zu einem Begründungsprogramm,' in *Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln*, Francfort 1983) est probablement la plus ambitieuse, puisqu'elle prétend réfuter une fois pour toutes le point de vue du scepticisme ou du relativisme moral qui, comme on sait, sévit en philosophie et dans les sciences humaines depuis le début du siècle. L'argument d'Apel consiste à renvoyer l'amoraliste ou le relativiste aux présuppositions pragmatiques nécessaires de son discours, parmi lesquelles on trouve aussi des présuppositions éthiques. D'après Apel, une réflexion transcendantale pragmatique sur les conditions de possibilité du discours scientifique, voire de toute argumentation rationnelle, permettrait de découvrir les présupposés nécessaires de celle-ci que l'amoraliste ou le relativiste ne saurait nier sans se contredire lui-même. Cette réflexion permettrait ainsi de dégager une 'éthique du discours,' où 'discours' doit être entendu dans son sens archaïque en tant que dialogue ou discussion rationnelle.

Dans son livre qui porte le sous-titre: 'Éléments du jugement moral chez Kant et dans l'éthique du discours,' A. Wellmer ne propose pas d'exposé de l'éthique kantienne ni du programme d'une éthique du discours, mais plutôt

une critique de deux des principales composantes de celui-ci tel qu'il est formulé par Apel et Habermas, soit la présupposition d'une théorie consensuelle de la vérité et la prétention à fournir une justification ultime (*Letztbegründung*). En effet, Wellmer soutient que l'éthique du discours comme *procédure* rationnelle pour la discussion des problèmes non seulement éthiques, juridiques et politiques, mais aussi scientifiques, esthétiques et philosophiques au sens large serait plus viable philosophiquement sans l'hypothèque que constituent pour elle la présupposition de la théorie consensuelle de la vérité et la prétention à une justification ultime. Or, l'abandon de ces deux éléments importants, mais non-essentiels du programme d'une éthique du discours tel que formulé par Apel et Habermas entraîne une nouvelle détermination de son rapport à l'éthique universaliste de Kant, dont l'éthique du discours prétendait être à la fois l'héritière et le digne successeur en ce sens que le principe d'universalisabilité, tel que redéfini par Habermas à la lumière de la théorie consensuelle de la vérité, était censé *prendre la place* du principe équivalent chez Kant, soit l'impératif catégorique. Si l'on retranche cette prémisse, il ne reste alors qu'une formulation du principe d'universalisabilité qui se trouve déjà, au moins implicitement, chez Kant. Car bien que Kant ne se soit jamais soucié de la question des conditions de possibilité de la validité intersubjective des jugements moraux, la formulation de l'impératif catérogique que l'on trouve en particulier dans les *Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs* permet un tel *élargissement* et semble même l'appeler ainsi que le soutient Wellmer (p. 18 et suiv.), suivant des indications en ce sens de M.G. Singer (*Generalization in Ethics*, New York 1971) et de J.R. Silber ('Procedural Formalism in Kant's Ethics,' in *Review of Metaphysics*, XXIII, 1974). C'est d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelle Wellmer examine, dans la première des trois sections de son livre, les diverses approches du principe d'universalisabilité qui ont été proposées ces dernières années et qui visaient à pallier aux faiblesses de sa formulation originale kantienne. Il reste toutefois que seul le programme proposé par Apel et Habermas d'une éthique du discours procède de l'intention de faire sortir l'éthique universaliste d'inspiration kantienne de l'ornière monologique. Et c'est aussi pourquoi Wellmer, après une critique, dans la deuxième section de son livre, des éléments les plus contestables du projet d'Apel et de Habermas, tente, dans la troisième section, de réconcilier une éthique kantienne élargie pour y inclure un principe dialogique avec une éthique du discours débarassée d'une prémisse plus que problématique et sevrée d'une prétention démesurée.

Sans même reproduire ici le résumé que Wellmer donne lui-même de sa critique de la théorie consensuelle de la vérité (70), signalons au moins le motif de cette critique. Elle tient au fait que dans la formulation habermasienne du programme d'une éthique du discours, aucune distinction n'est faite entre les règles morales et les normes juridiques, distinction pourtant bien établie chez Kant. Selon Wellmer, ce manque de différenciation dans la problématique d'une éthique dialogique chez Habermas tient essentiellement à sa présupposition d'une théorie consensuelle de la vérité. Wellmer ne mentionne cependant pas que cette distinction chez Kant pourrait bien être à l'origine

du caractère monologique de son éthique. De plus, si la critique que fait Wellmer de la théorie consensuelle de la vérité nous paraît convaincante, il ne donne guère d'indice nous permettant de reconnaître la conception de la vérité qu'il privilégie. Cela tient peut-être à la thèse qu'il développe plus loin (100 et suiv.), dans sa critique de la prétention d'Apel à fournir un fondement ultime de l'argumentation rationnelle. D'après Wellmer, cette position d'Apel, même dans la version 'adoucie' que lui donne Habermas, fait abstraction de l'*interprétabilité* des énoncés, ce qui s'applique aussi aux évidences tant empiriques que philosophiques qui peuvent être mobilisées dans une discussion rationnelle. L'interprétabilité des faits empiriques et *a fortiori* des thèses philosophiques commande, selon Wellmer, une conception *faillibiliste* de l'éthique du discours qui ne requerrait pas de situer le lieu possible de la vérité dans un consensus appréhendé (qui ne pourrait se réaliser qu'à la fin des temps), ni de présupposer une communauté idéale de communication qui, pour en arriver à un accord, devrait en fait abolir le langage ordinaire, source principale de tous les malentendus.

Si, dans cette critique de la prétention à un fondement ultime, les arguments que présente Wellmer contre la thèse apelienne de la présupposition *nécessaire* d'une communauté idéale de communication semblent concluants, on peut regretter qu'il ait choisi de ne pas confronter la conception faillibiliste qu'il propose à celle qu'Apel intègre à son programme (voir 'La question d'une fondation ultime de la raison,' in *Critique* 413, octobre 1981, 895-928). Wellmer précise toutefois que la conception faillibiliste qu'il soutient ne signifie pas, *eo ipso*, une rechute dans le relativisme dénoncé par Apel. Pour Wellmer, le relativisme n'est que l'envers de la médaille de l'absolutisme, et si celui-ci est intenable, le relativisme l'est tout autant. Il s'agirait donc d'un faux problème dont l'abandon n'affecte en rien la possibilité d'une éthique rationnelle.

C'est d'ailleurs en un tel sens que Wellmer propose sa conception faillibiliste du programme d'une éthique du discours, soit d'une éthique qui ne prétend pas être fondée sur un quelconque point archimédien, mais qui vise uniquement l'élimination de positions morales intenables, conception qui n'est pas sans rappeler celle de la 'dialectique négative' mise de l'avant par Adorno, à laquelle on aurait toutefois retranché l'idée d'une réconciliation ultime à survenir dans un futur indéterminé (cf. les excellents articles que Wellmer consacre à ce sujet dans *Zur Dialektik von Moderne und Postmoderne*, Francfort 1985). En outre, le problème de l'éthique ne se réduit nullement, comme le fait valoir Wellmer contre Habermas, à la question de la *validité* des normes morales et juridiques, puisqu'il y a déjà un consensus très large sur les *principes* de la morale et du droit: le problème a trait bien davantage à leur *applicabilité* et c'est à ce niveau que Wellmer voit la pertinence et la force du programme d'une éthique dialogique (132 et suiv.), alors que Habermas soutenait que les deux problèmes sont tout à fait distincts et que le problème de l'application des normes, soit celui du *jugement*, n'était guère susceptible de faire l'objet d'un consensus rationnel en raison de l'infinie variété des situations particulières.

Il faut savoir gré à Wellmer d'avoir lui-même bien indiqué la portée de sa critique du programme habermasien d'une éthique du discours. C'est en effet la théorie de la rationalité qui en *découle* et que Habermas a développée dans son ouvrage *Théorie de l'action communicationnelle* qui s'en trouve atteinte, car celle-ci repose sur le postulat de la primauté de la raison pratico-éthique sur la raison théorique. À cette théorie Wellmer oppose la conception d'une *égalité de droit* entre les sphères du théorique, de l'éthique et de l'esthétique, soit d'une égalité telle que l'une n'est pas concevable sans l'autre. C'est dire qu'aucune n'est entièrement réductible à l'autre ni ne peut prétendre être plus fondamentale ou plus 'vraie' que les deux autres. Sont donc rejetées aussi bien les diverses formes modernes du scientisme que les tentatives de le surmonter, que ce soit par le biais d'une 'réconciliation esthétique' telle que proposée par Adorno, ou par le biais d'une 'éthique du discours' comme fondement ultime de la rationalité scientifique et technique que proposent Apel et Habermas, bien que Wellmer fasse sienne la critique du scientisme positiviste qu'ont menée ces derniers. Il faut cependant remarquer que les éléments de la médiation entre l'éthique universaliste de Kant et l'éthique du discours que propose Wellmer dans la troisième section de son livre ne sont pas encore suffisamment développés pour servir de base à une théorie de la rationalité qui aille au-delà de celle de Kant. Car Wellmer reste attaché à une conception de la *morale* qui ne s'écarte guère de celle de Kant, malgré l'élargissement qu'il propose du principe fondamental de la philosophie morale de Kant. Or, suivant cette conception, imprégnée par la théologie protestante, la morale est *essentiellement* une affaire de la conscience individuelle, ainsi que le laisse entendre Wellmer dans son explication de la troisième des différences caractéristiques entre droit et morale qu'il identifie (117 et suiv.). Il avait d'ailleurs fait valoir un peu plus haut (106 et suiv.) qu'une distinction devait être faite entre les obligations morales et les obligations de la rationalité dans la mesure où celles-là ont trait à la reconnaissance de personnes et que celles-ci ont trait à la reconnaissance d'arguments; mais là encore, il omet d'offrir une explication quant à ce qui pourrait commander les unes ou les autres.

Même si le livre de Wellmer nous laisse à bien des égards sur notre faim, il reste qu'il offre une discussion brillante du programme, formulé par Apel et Habermas, d'une éthique du discours, et que le débat autour de ce programme, débat qui ne fait sans doute que commencer, devra en tenir compte.

PHILIPPE CONSTANTINEAU
Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean

ALLAN B. WOLTER, O.F.M., ed. *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press 1986. Pp. x + 543. US$54.95. ISBN 0-8132-0622-7.

Aside from the 'natural' ethics of Thomas Aquinas, medieval moral theory has provoked little interest among modern philosophers. A twentieth-century moralist is justifiably suspicious of any ethical doctrine which presupposes that the universal end for all mankind is union with God and that the means for achieving human perfection are prescribed in the scriptures. So alien is this kind of thinking to the modern philosophical mind that even medievalists have generally ignored the vast number of treatises on ethics which were composed in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Because of this indifference the first task of any philosopher who undertakes a study of medieval ethics is to demonstrate that the subject is of genuine philosophical interest and not merely an exercise in historical research.

Allan Wolter in his book on Duns Scotus, the early fourteenth-century Franciscan theologian, attempts to justify his study by showing 'the unity of his [Scotus'] ethical system based on right reason, for it is his rational approach ... that makes his conceptions of morality and especially the will of more than historical interest' (ix). By concentrating upon the rational basis of Scotus' ethics Wolter also hopes to correct a common misinterpretation of Scotus' thought: that things are good because God wills them, so moral truth is not accessible to reason.

Wolter's task is made more difficult by the nature of the texts which are available. Scotus left no independent treatise on virtue, nor did he compose a commentary on the *Ethics* of Aristotle; and, unlike Thomas Aquinas, Scotus did not produce a vast *Summa* in which topics such as beatitude, happiness and virtue are treated. Wolter is forced to extract portions mainly from Scotus' commentary on the *Sentences*, a theological work, which, while touching upon ethical issues, does not really focus upon human morality. The texts Wolter has selected and translated comprise a large portion of the book (126-533) and they alone would make the work worthwhile since they come from sources that are not readily accessible.

In addition to the Latin texts and the facing-page translations Wolter has provided a rather lengthy introduction (1-123), in which each selection is discussed. The introductory remarks, which are generally clear and informative, identify Scotus' own contribution to medieval moral theory as the subtly persuasive arguments against Thomas' intellectualism and in favor of the supremacy of the will. Scotus argues often that if the will were not free to choose against the dictates of the intellect, then there would be no basis for judging an action right or wrong. Just as one makes no judgment about a speculative theory except that it is true or false, but not right or wrong, so too would one be restricted to the same kind of judgment about human actions if the will

179

were determined by the intellect. In advocating volitional supremacy Scotus believes that he can preserve both the philosophical concept of free will as well as the theological notion of sin.

Wolter argues that Scotus' moral philosophy deserves our attention because it is grounded in the natural law (22). Reason leads Scotus to formulate one categorical imperative: that 'God should be loved.' This precept is so rooted in the natural law that even God Himself could not dispense man from its obligations. Any other action that is consonant with this moral law must be considered 'morally good or bad independently of the fact that God commands or prohibits ...' (22). Because of this transcendent moral law Wolter believes that Scotus cannot be accused of constructing an ethics dependent solely upon the will of an arbitrary God. Particular actions may be good or bad depending upon changing circumstances, but every action done in accordance with the command to love God is morally good.

If Wolter is successful in freeing Scotus from the charge of constructing an arbitrary moral system, he has some difficulty in explaining the relationship between the will and natural law. The moral law is understood as grounded in 'the will's affection for justice; this native liberty frees it, to some extent, from what "nature" demands, allows it to "moderate its affection for the advantageous" ' (23 & 28; selection 29). Wolter admits that reason leads man to knowledge of God (which seems to be an intellectual process, as Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Metaphysics* are cited), and man must realize intellectually that what is most advantageous to himself is union with God. Nature would then dictate to the intellect to pursue what is most advantageous — to know and love God (89). If the will does not assent to the intellectual dictates then it contradicts the moral imperative cited above and is thereby necessarily wrong. If Wolter is correct in his analysis of the rationality of Scotus' ethics the intellectualism that marks the morality of Thomas Aquinas seems a more reasonable position than Scotus' alleged voluntarism.

The answer to the dilemma created by Scotus' ethics may lie in the dualistic nature of the approach to morality taken by such Franciscan thinkers as Scotus and, later, William of Ockham. On the one hand is their belief in the power of human reason to discern the rational principles of an ordered life. They accept almost without question the validity of abstracting universal concepts from a limited number of experiences. On the other hand, is their desire to preserve the unlimited power of God, on whose will all principles of human science depend, and are, theoretically at least, subject to change. When Wolter says that grace builds on nature and that the supernatural presupposes the natural as a necessary cause, he ignores the dictum of Scotus, repeated by Ockham, that God is a debtor to no one (238). There is no necessity for a man to be moral if God decides to grant him eternal beatitude. This possibility undermines the foundations of a *rational* Christian ethics, and both Scotus and Ockham have difficulty with its destructive possibilities.

Wolter's desire to interest philosophers in Scotus' ethics may not be totally successful since the primary aim of Scotus' moral doctrine is to lead man to God, and not to teach a harmonious mode of human conduct. Since man

becomes moral by loving God, topics that are far removed from modern moral theory (beatitudes of the gospel, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, confession, etc.) seem more suited to a Church historian than a philosopher. Still, a rationally based ethics that purports to preserve the freedom of the will does merit some contemporary philosophical investigation.

The revised Latin texts are well edited, and generally well translated. At times Wolter succumbs to Scotus' notoriously difficult style and produces a passage difficult to comprehend without consulting the facing-page Latin. The selected bibliography is useful as is the topical index. In summary the book is a useful tool for the study of medieval moral theory.

ANTHONY J. CELANO
Stonehill College

APEIRON

a journal for ancient philosophy and science

Since its inception in 1967, APEIRON has had an established reputation as a specialist journal in the field of ancient philosophy and science. After 19 years of publication from the Department of Classical Studies, Monash University, Australia, APEIRON is moving its base of operation to Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.

APEIRON's new editorial board is drawn from the Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta. The members are Richard Bosley, John King-Farlow, Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Mohan Matthen, and Roger Shiner.

The new publisher is **Academic Printing & Publishing** of Edmonton, publisher and producer of a number of leading academic journals in Canada.

Vol. 19 no. 1 (Spring 1985) was the last issue to be produced in Australia. Vol. 19 no. 2 (Fall 1985), the current issue, was produced in Edmonton. Vol. 20 (dated 1987) will be published in two issues in Spring and Fall of 1987.

The price for Vol. 19 (1985) and Vol. 20 (1987) is Cdn$22.00 (Canadian subscribers); Cdn$29.00 or US$22.00 (non-Canadian subscribers) per volume. A discount of 15% is available for **new** subscribers who order both Vol. 19 and Vol. 20. Subscriptions may be ordered for complete volumes only.

Please use the order form below to order APEIRON direct from **A.P.P.** APEIRON may also be ordered through the usual booksellers and agents.

TO: Academic Printing & Publishing   P.O. Box 4834
South Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6E 5G7

Please enter my name for a subscription to APEIRON.

I wish to order Vol(s). _____ / Payment of $ _____enclosed.

Name: _____

Address: _____

_____

_____

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editors:

Robert Burch, University of Alberta
Roger A. Shiner, University of Alberta
J. N. Kaufmann, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières

A bi-lingual journal for publications in academic philosophy and for theoretical work in other fields of interest to philosophers.

Academics in the humanities and social sciences routinely complain that there is no rapid dissemination of informed and informative opinion concerning publications in their fields. This is doubly unfortunate when more books than ever before are being published. Philosophers in particular need to be informed not only of work that is strictly philosophical but also of work which is primarily theoretical in nature in such areas as law, psychology, sociology, literary criticism, physics, medicine, linguistics and classical studies. *C.P.R. /R.C.C.P.* is the first journal based in North America to aim systematically to meet that need.

Twelve issues per volume:

Institutions:	Cdn$78.00 (Canadian); US$72.00 or Cdn$88.00 (Non-Canadian)
Individuals:	Cdn$40.00 (Canadian); US$36.00 or Cdn$50.00 (Non-Canadian)
Students:	Cdn$28.00 (Canadian); US$25.00 or Cdn$36.00 (Non-Canadian)

Subscription orders to be sent to: