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APEIRON

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RICHARD COHEN, ed. *Face to Face with Levinas*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 1986. Pp. x + 264. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-258-X); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-259-8).

Face to Face with Levinas is a well edited collection of twelve essays devoted to the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, next to Jacques Derrida, probably France's best known contemporary philosopher. In this volume there is something for almost everyone — an indication that, with a qualification I will mention later, the editor has done his job well.

The attraction of Levinas' philosophy probably rests upon the way in which it combines seemingly separate strands of thought. In contrast to so much contemporary continental (and Anglo-American) theory, Levinas has a very distinct ethical message to deliver: the 'self's' 'infinite obligation' to the 'Other.' This message, however, also has religious implications, since it is only through the 'Other' that we can relate to God. Levinas, furthermore, expresses himself in an obscure and highly metaphorical style which can capture the imagination of those whom it does not disgust. Finally, his exposition moves in the same phenomenological-deconstructionist universe as the writings of Husserl, Heidegger and Derrida.

The editor's high sounding introduction is a less useful first guide to Levinas' thought than the twenty-page 'dialogue' between the philosopher and Richard Kearny. In clear (translated) prose Levinas discusses the main influences upon him (Husserl, Heidegger and the Talmud) as well as his relation to Bergson, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida. He delivers astonishingly clear (to those who have suffered with his books and articles) summaries of his main themes. 'The interhuman is ... an interface: a double axis where what is "of this world" qua *phenomenological intelligibility* is juxtaposed with what is "not of this world" qua *ethical responsibility*. It is in this ethical perspective that God must be thought, and not in the ontological perspective ... God, as the God of alterity and transcendence, can only be understood in terms of the interhuman dimension' (20).

Those thirsting for the big issues may find refreshment in pages that flow so smoothly and grandly. They may, however, choke on the second selec-

tion, a short piece by Levinas entitled 'Bad Conscience and the Inexorable.' To understand why 'nonintentional prereflective consciousness ... is straight-away passivity' (37), one must have done one's homework in Husserl and deciphered Levinas' two most famous works, *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*. In both, the grandiose and prophetic often give away to the obscure and, indeed (at least to me), the totally opaque.

Maurice Blanchot's impressionistic (and unevenly translated) evocation of many of the great Levinasian themes will only strike a chord in those who have already read Levinas and have a feel for a certain type of French philosophical discourse which unfolds in the uncertain territory between prose and poetry and makes its points not by careful conceptual analysis but by half-lifting the veil on universes of mysterious and portentous meaning. The book's last piece, 'The Fecundity of the Caress,' by the French feminist psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray is a good example of this type of writing. It is a creative extension of a section in *Totality and Infinity* and must be swallowed whole (and preferably in French) or not chewed on at all, since most sentences defy clear analysis. Whether Irigaray is saying anything more than that sexual relations between man and woman must be in a Buberian 'I-Thou' mode rather than in an 'I-It' mode (with, obviously, man the 'I' and woman the 'It') is an open question.

Jean-François Lyotard's 'Levinas' Logic,' the most brilliant piece in the collection, is, by contrast, definitely analytical. For Levinas, ethical language, the language of commands and appeals in which the 'Other' opens himself to the 'self,' is independent of and more fundamental than speculative or descriptive language. The self 'obeys' before it 'understands.' The 'an-archy' of ethical language, the ineradicable 'dia-chrony' in the relation between self and Other (that is, the fact that the relation between self and Other cannot be captured by theoretical or descriptive language) is, indeed, the concern of a number of the articles in this collection. The problem is evident. How can Levinas develop a *theory* of the relation between self and Other which, by the very terms of the theory itself, escapes theoretical formulation? Lyotard calls upon speech act theory and deontic logic not to challenge the coherence of Levinas' project but to give it a precise formulation. He seeks to show in just what sense imperatives cannot be reduced to descriptions and in the process shows that, despite Levinas' obvious affinities with Kant, the categorical imperative contains an uneliminable descriptive element (universalization) which renders it unacceptable as an expression of the ethical demand at the root of Levinas' philosophy.

Robert Bernasconi, in 'The Question of the Closure of Metaphysics,' writes in an interesting but perhaps overly 'in-groupy' way about Levinas' relation to Heidegger and Derrida. Since I have read and re-read most of the texts which Bernasconi discusses and *still* do not follow some of his moves, I wonder to whom this article is addressed.

Other pieces in the volume, for example those by Charles Reed, Theodore de Boer and Jan de Greef (the latter raising some of the same issues as Lyotard) contain further useful reflections on Levinas' methodology and his relation

to thinkers who influenced him. They do not, however, bear the stamp of great originality.

A solid piece of editing — this collection — but something is missing. We either read about 'Levinas' relation to *x*' or 'the problem of the coherence of Levinas' position,' but nowhere are Levinas' powerful insights regarding one's absolute and limitless duty to the Other — one's status as *hostage* of the Other — developed and analyzed for their own sake. In quality, the essays move from the highly competent to the brilliant, but are they not all, in some sense, missing the point? Should we not be following Levinas' example by taking the ethical (or ethico-religious) plunge instead of worrying endlessly about the possibility of ethical discourse? Levinas' ideas may be paradoxical and obscure, but at least he is trying to say something important.

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BENOÎT DE CORNULIER. *Effets de sens*. (Coll. 'Propositions') Paris: Editions de Minuit 1985. 212 p. 99 FF. ISBN: 2-7073-1050-6.

Cet ouvrage s'inscrit dans un courant aujourd'hui dominant en pragmatique, celui qui s'inspire des travaux de Grice et (pour la France) de Ducrot. L'un des principes fondamentaux de cette approche est qu'il ne faut pas multiplier les significations au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire. Dit autrement: plutôt que de gonfler notre sémantique d'une foule d'ambiguïtés lexicales, tâchons de voir ce que l'on peut faire en partant de la signification ou du sens des mots et énoncés 'dans la langue' (sens 'littéral'), et en faisant l'hypothèse que le locuteur est rationnel, qu'il respecte les 'maximes conversationnelles,' et que le locuteur et l'allocutaire ont en commun la connaissance des traits pertinents de l'arrière-fond conversationnel. Ceci étant donné, la tâche la plus difficile est de construire un ensemble d'algorithmes qui rendent manifestes toutes les étapes (nécessaires et suffisantes) que doit franchir un auditeur pour calculer ce que le locuteur a voulu dire (ou 'signifié') à partir de ce qu'il a dit (le sens 'littéral'). On aurait ainsi un algorithme (ou schéma d'inférence) typique pour les cas d'ironie, un autre pour les métaphores, un autre pour les actes de discours indirects, etc.

Effets de sens s'inscrit bien dans cette perspective, mais le traitement est

moins ‘formel’ que dans la plupart des analyses s’inspirant de Grice et Cie. Le premier chapitre, intitulé ‘Introduction à l’analyse dérivationnelle du sens,’ applique la stratégie esquissée plus haut aux soi-disant ambiguïtés des conjonctions ‘ou,’ ‘et’ et ‘si’ du français contemporain. Ce chapitre a le grand mérite de faire voir l’absurdité d’une approche qui fait une large place aux ‘ambiguités lexicales.’ Et il la fait voir à l’aide d’un exemple ‘frappant.’ Supposons que des fonctionnaires du Ministère des Transports décident, par souci d’économie, de réduire le nombre de feux de circulation de trois à un seul (le rouge). Le nouveau code de la route stipulerait que le même feu rouge ‘veut dire’ tantôt ‘Vous pouvez foncer tête baissée,’ tantôt ‘Arrêtez-vous sur le champ!’, ou encore ‘Passez, si vous croyez en avoir le temps!’ Un tel système, appliqué à une mégapole, conduirait sans doute à la catastrophe! La circulation routière y serait bientôt impossible. De la même façon, comment des locuteurs compétents du français arrivent-ils à comprendre, lorsqu’ils entendent un ‘si’ dans une phrase, qu’il s’agit bien d’un ‘si’ de condition suffisante, ou d’un ‘si’ de concession, ou un ‘si’ de conditions nécessaires et suffisantes, ou autres ‘si’ ‘à la douzaine’ ... ? La même remarque vaut pour le ‘et’ et le ‘ou’ en français. Les logiciens savent depuis longtemps que les conjonctions des langues naturelles n’expriment pas toujours et seulement leur sens ‘véri-fonctionnel,’ sans quoi on ne verrait rien d’étrange ou de choquant dans les phrases suivantes: ‘Ils eurent beaucoup d’enfants et se marièrent,’ ‘Il fit feu et dégaina,’ ‘Il partit travailler et se leva,’ etc., et l’on pourrait conclure de ‘Ce drapeau est bleu et blanc,’ que ‘Ce drapeau est bleu,’ et en voyant un ivrogne réclamer furieusement qu’on lui apporte du whisky et de l’eau, nous conclurions sans fausse note que l’ivrogne veut qu’on lui apporte de l’eau! ... Le défaut des analyses traditionnelles, c’est de distinguer plusieurs sens d’un même mot, alors qu’il n’y a qu’un sens, et plusieurs effets de sens. Dans l’analyse ‘dérivationnelle’ de Cornulier, le ‘si’ en français (‘dans la langue’) n’exprime que l’idée de condition suffisante, les idées de concession, de condition nécessaire, etc., ne sont que des effets de sens. Le ‘si’ de condition suffisante, plongé dans un contexte, exprimerait l’idée de concession, dans un autre, l’idée de condition nécessaire, tout comme une bille bleue paraît verte si on la plonge dans un liquide jaune, violette, dans un liquide rouge, etc.

C'est malheureusement l'aspect ‘dérivationnel’ de cette analyse dérivationnelle qui laisse le plus à désirer. Les soi-disant dérivations ne sont jamais clairement présentées et reconstruites avec précision. Sans doute, *Effets de sens* traite un grand nombre d'exemples, et refaire à chaque fois intégralement ces dérivations eût été fastidieux pour l'auteur comme pour le lecteur. L'auteur ne définit nulle part clairement ce qu'il faut entendre ici par ‘dérivation.’ À un certain moment, il parle rapidement de certaines ‘relations de dépendance qu'on peut appeler “de dérivation”’ (14-15). Au tout début de son ouvrage, il nous avertit qu’‘il s’agit de dérivations très informelles’ (8). Et à la fin de son premier chapitre, il affirme que son analyse atteindrait son but si elle ‘incitait des spécialistes de l’intelligence artificielle ou des langages formels à se méfier de la formalisation précipitée’ (102). En fait, il s’agit moins de dérivations que d’explications informelles, dont le but est toujours d’arriver à dis-

tinguer 'l'apport lexical des interférences contextuelles.' Quelquefois les 'dérivations' sont faciles à suivre et pourraient aisément être reconstruites. Par exemple, pour éviter de postuler, en plus du 'si' (littéral) de condition suffisante, un 'si' 'non conditionnel' (ou 'bi-affirmatif'), comme dans 'Si la vie et la mort de Socrate furent celles d'un sage, la vie et la mort de Jésus furent d'un Dieu' (Rousseau), et pour expliquer que le conséquent puisse être ici affirmé catégoriquement, de Cornulier montre qu'un 'si' de condition suffisante, plongé dans ce contexte, suffit à rendre compte de l'effet de sens qui paraît s'attacher à un 'si' particulier. Dans le contexte où Rousseau écrit cette phrase, il va sans dire que l'antécédent est tenu pour vrai; Rousseau affirme 'Si P, Q,' dans un contexte où P va de soi; par *Modus Ponens*, il s'ensuit que Q est aussi affirmé catégoriquement. Parce que le contexte donne P comme une évidence, le 'si' de condition suffisante peut opérer normalement et Q être catégoriquement affirmé. Mais lorsqu'il s'agit de montrer qu'on peut faire l'économie d'un 'ou' exclusif au profit du 'ou' inclusif (littéral) dans l'énoncé 'Fromage ou dessert' (lu dans un menu de restaurant), la 'dérivation' doit faire appel à la nature des produits en cause, et à toute une série de principes de sens commun concernant nos pratiques commerciales, 'la liberté de choix du client' et 'la signification commerciale du choix.' En d'autres occasions, ce sont 'des considérations de "bon sens" (83) qui sont invoquées, ailleurs, c'est "la mesquine rationalité économique et communicative," et un peu plus loin encore, on lit que "C'est la vie, qui explique l'inférence..." (86). En dépit du caractère très informel de ses 'dérivations,' de Cornulier parvient néanmoins à rendre très plausible l'idée centrale de son approche 'dérivationnelle': simplifier la sémantique en retranchant la genèse des divers effets de sens au niveau de l'énonciation. De Cornulier semble se méfier des généralisations, et il n'en formule guère; mais il faut tout de même noter que plusieurs des cas qu'il étudie sont expliqués à l'aide de 'lois du discours,' qu'il appelle 'présomptions d'exhaustivité,' et qui semblent être des applications particulières de la maxime de quantité de Grice.

Les chapitres suivants tirent les leçons du long premier chapitre en les appliquant d'abord à une question d'intelligence artificielle et de formalisation du raisonnement 'ordinaire' (chapitre 2: 'Logique spéciale, ou pragmatique? Sur un problème d'intelligence artificielle'), ensuite à un traitement des questions alternatives (chapitre 3: ' "Ou" asymétrique et les questions alternatives'). Ce chapitre sur les questions alternatives fait cependant intervenir une notion, apparemment importante, de 'décrochage énonciatif' qui, sans être elle non plus très clairement définie (l'auteur dit que le 'décrochage' consiste 'en une espèce de surimpression sur le plan de l'énonciation' [8]), constitue un outil d'analyse intéressant et prometteur dans le cadre d'une stratégie visant à simplifier l'analyse des significations lexicales. Enfin, le dernier chapitre ('L'énonciation conditionnelle'), revient brièvement à l'étude du 'si' dans le contexte d'un pari, ou du discours fictif, etc.

Effets de sens est susceptible d'intéresser les philosophes, logiciens, linguistes et les spécialistes en intelligence artificielle. L'ouvrage est bien écrit, simplement, dans un style très vivant. Et même si la précision n'est pas à son maximum dans les 'dérivations,' ce défaut est largement compensé par la

justesse de l'approche globale et par la quantité et le choix des exemples qui sont traités dans ce petit livre.

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ARTHUR C. DANTO. *The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art*. New York: Columbia University Press 1986. Pp. xvi + 216. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-231-06364-4.

Prof. Danto's latest is a collection of nine previously published or presented essays — it takes its title from the first in the assembly — together with a preface that states some of the themes and strategies that give the collection a measure of unity. Danto's Constant Reader will encounter most of his already familiar theses: Duchamp's *Fountain*, along with the other Readymades, is a crucially important work of art — pardon, 'artwork'; it shows that there can be perceptually indistinguishable objects, one of which is an artwork while the other is not, and how this can be is the most important question in the philosophy of art; art, especially in the twentieth century, is largely constituted by theory while aesthetic character is secondary; just about everything requires interpretation; and New York since the forties is the center of all attention. To get Danto's parade going one has to buy into these theses and since Danto is one of the great influences in aesthetics nowadays his contentions demand the most careful and critical scrutiny. I shall limit my remarks to two of the most important themes in the collection and which connect the title essay with 'The End of Art,' and 'Art, Evolution, and the Consciousness of History.'

The argument of the title essay is this. Start with the premise that art can have no effect on the course of the world and its history; it can make nothing happen. An explanation why art has occasioned so much political opposition and oppression is thus required. The explanation is that philosophical theories have been imposed upon art. Art has been thought to present a danger and philosophy has developed two moves to counter it. The first is to 'ephemeralize' it. Plato did this with the claim that it can present only appearances of appearances. So did Kant with his notion of disinterested pleasure and later theories of objectified pleasure and aesthetic distance follow suit. The way that philosophy makes art into something useless in order to dominate it is

said to be analogous to the way that men have dominated women by turning them into useless objects of adoration.

Philosophy's second move against art is to take it over and claim that art properly understood just is philosophy. Plato sought to do this, but the key figure in our time is Duchamp whom Danto sees darkly through Hegel. Duchamp said that aesthetics, i.e. prettiness, was the great danger to art and sought to eliminate it with *Fountain*. More importantly, the Readymades raise the question why they are artworks and other things just like them are not. We are told that this is an instance of Hegelian Spirit achieving an awareness of its identity as Spirit and art thereby has achieved consciousness of itself as philosophy. Yet art will have its revenge. If art is philosophy and art makes nothing happen, then philosophy can make nothing happen. (Is Danto putting us on here with unsubtle irony? Philosophy did manage to oppress art!)

Danto wishes to separate art from the philosophical theories that have imposed themselves upon it. One consequence of this separation is that the question whether art can make anything happen becomes empirical. It is, nevertheless, in the nature of art to make things happen because it works on the feelings of people. (But wasn't that Plato's contention and so much for the premise that begins the story!)

This is extraordinarily careless history. It assumes Plato is offering a theory of *art*, not just imitative poetry and it ignores the power he saw and feared in poetry because of its role in Athenian life and recent history. Plato did not theorize that poetry is powerless, but sought to exile it where it could not exercise its power. The account of Kant confounds his analysis of natural beauty with a theory of art and we are asked to suppose that eighteenth century theory was calling the sets for art rather than reflecting changes in artistic practice brought about by other forces, a far more plausible view. No argument of any sort is offered in support of this history.

Furthermore Danto's assertion that *Fountain* is a work of art is plainly question begging. It ignores Duchamp's own claim that he was making anti-art rather than art and it seems equally plausible to dismiss it simply as a rude gesture. Is the only reason for calling it art to get Danto's question going about perceptually identical objects?

Now that he has introduced Hegel into his cast of characters Danto wants to take him seriously and announce the instantiation of the Hegelian possibility that art has come to an end. Hegel provides the model of art history that allows the post-modern scene to be described as the end of art. This model is supposed to be an improvement over Vasari's that the history of art is the history of perfecting the techniques of presenting visual illusions, over Croce's non-history of art as expression, and Gombrich's that it is a chronicle of incommensurable symbolic forms. Hegel's model is one of cognitive progress with history ending with self-consciousness and self-knowledge. This very conveniently allows Danto to give a cosmic dimension to his own view that recent art has tended to become its own theory. We are now entering a post-historical period where there no longer are any directions and it no longer matters what you do. 'Post-historical life, for Hegel as for Marx, will have the

form of a kind of philosophical *Club méditerranée ...*' (113). Danto sees all distinctions between artists, dealers, philosophers, and who knows who else tumbling down as we all exult on the topless beach of freedom from historical necessity. But we are not, of course, told what any of this would be like.

There is much in the practices (and capers) of both the artists and philosophers of art of our time that demands the most rigorous exercise of our good sense as well as our critical wits. It is doubtful that the sloppy scholarship and conceptual confusion that Danto's mannered prose conveys will contribute anything to that exercise. The virtue of this collection has to lie in its rousing us to get our own thinking about these very important matters of art in our time straightened out.

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GILLES DELEUZE. *L'image-temps: cinéma 2*. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, collection Critique 1985. 379 p. 22.95\$CDN. ISBN 2-7073-1047-6.

Il faut d'abord mentionner que cet ouvrage est la suite d'un autre du même auteur paru en 1983 et intitulé *L'image-mouvement*. De manière générale, on peut dire qu'au travers de ces deux ouvrages, Deleuze s'intéresse tout particulièrement à jeter les bases d'un cadre d'analyse de la production cinématographique à partir d'une grille de lecture que l'on pourrait qualifier d'alternative.' À contre-courant de plusieurs écrits récents sur le cinéma, l'auteur propose une interprétation dont l'originalité première est d'aborder le fait cinématographique selon un ensemble de concepts et de paramètres originant de la matière visuelle même du film. Et l'on pourrait ajouter, de ne s'en tenir qu'à ceux-ci. En réalité, cela revient à dire que Deleuze pose le cinéma comme une entité dotée non seulement de spécificités, mais également d'une relative autonomie par rapport à l'ensemble des domaines de l'agir et de la pensée. Ce qui est remis en question par cette prise de position, ou mieux ce parti pris, c'est finalement l'assujettissement des études cinématographiques aux discours linguistique et psychanalytique, qui, jusqu'à maintenant, ont largement accaparé l'avant-scène des débats sur le cinéma. Mais Deleuze ne se fait cependant pas pour autant polémiste. Le principal de sa tâche consiste bien davantage à développer son point de vue et à fonder ce dernier sur une analyse serrée de la 'chose' filmique. À partir de certains schémas bergsoniens (en particulier ceux mis de l'avant dans *Matière et mémoire*) et en s'appuyant

sur la classification des signes de Pierce, l'auteur fait état de ces divers concepts et paramètres qui constituent les éléments premiers de la matière visuelle et sonore du film. Tout en ayant comme visée ultime la constitution d'une véritable sémiotique du filmique, Deleuze s'intéresse d'abord et avant tout à montrer comment le cinéma, et plus précisément le fait de sa production, est dans sa nature première acte de pensée. Ni langue, ni langage, parce que non réductible au principe de la double articulation, le cinéma ferait essentiellement état d'une matière signalétique non linguistiquement formée. Ce que donne à percevoir un film, ce sont en premier lieu des images et des sons 'organisés' selon des modes particuliers. Or pour qu'il en soit de même, c'est que quelque part une pensée en a décidé ainsi. En tant que matière organisée, le film dépend et découle d'une série d'opérations (cadrage, plan et montage) qui révèle des constructions, des architectures sonores et visuelles, relativement complexes en regard des schèmes perceptuels et cognitifs sous-jacents. Par là, le film et plus globalement le cinéma comme modalité opérante et opérationnelle de l'intellect est en soi un système de connaissance, ou mieux encore de reconnaissance, des opérations mentales liées à la saisie de certaines réalités physiques. Tel est du moins une des approximations que l'on peut faire à partir des analyses de Deleuze. Par le jeu des multiples références aux grands philosophes et penseurs de la modernité, l'auteur s'appliquera à littéralement démonter la mécanique du film pour en faire apparaître le caractère profondément original en tant que lieu de jonction et de conjonction des schèmes perceptifs et réflexifs. On comprend d'autant mieux alors la nécessaire rupture avec l'analyse linguistique et la nécessité d'une lecture 'alternative' du film. État en lui-même de la pensée, et ce au même titre que le langage, le cinéma ne pourrait alors être réductible qu'au seul modèle langagier. Ainsi se trouverait légitimé le fait que le cinéma devienne un objet de considération par d'autres discours et méthodes d'analyse. Ce qui fait dire à Deleuze que 'le cinéma lui-même est une nouvelle pratique des images et des signes, dont la philosophie doit faire la théorie comme pratique conceptuelle. Car aucune détermination technique, ni appliquée (psychanalyse, linguistique), ni réflexive, ne suffit à constituer les concepts du cinéma même' (366). Mais quels sont ces concepts ou plutôt ces articulations conceptuelles qui vont fonder ce regard autre sur les faits de cinéma? Essentiellement, il s'agit des notions de mouvement et de temps qu'induit le dispositif cinématographique et qui va être médiatisé comme tel par l'élément minimal du film, soit l'image. Primaute donc à celle-ci, car c'est évidemment par elle que tout vient et que c'est par elle qu'existera et prendra forme la matière sonore et visuelle du film. Deleuze s'attaquera donc à la définition de ce qu'est l'image cinématographique pour en montrer les multiples formes et avatars, et surtout pour en faire apparaître les deux principaux registres: l'image-mouvement et l'image-temps. Mais ces deux grandes catégories ne font pas que renvoyer à des formes particulières de l'image cinématographique. Elles représentent bien davantage des états d'achèvement de deux conceptions radicalement différentes du cinéma, correspondant grossièrement à deux âges distincts du cinématographe. Qu'on ne se trompe cependant pas ici, sur le sens donné au mot âge. Deleuze ne cherche

pas, comme il le dit lui-même, à constituer une histoire du cinéma. En s'intéressant à certains temps et plus encore à certaines productions particulières qui jalonnent la filmographie internationale, l'auteur est d'abord préoccupé à faire le constat de ces états achevés, évoqués plus haut. La recherche ou plutôt les efforts d'élucidation ont donc porté sur la mise en évidence de la complexité des processus en cause par les deux grands types d'images. Il est extrêmement difficile de résumer, pour les fins de ce compte rendu, la matière de l'une et l'autre forme de l'image cinématographique. Au risque de simplifier à outrance, on dira que l'image-mouvement est celle qui fera coexister la prise en compte à travers le plan (cinématographique) de la durée (d'une action, d'une situation) en rapport avec un tout qui change et n'est autre que le film pris comme totalité. Cette prise en compte, selon Deleuze, atteindra son état le plus achevé dans des œuvres comme celles de Hitchcock et de Welles. Mais avec le néo-réalisme italien et surtout la nouvelle vague française, ce n'est plus le temps qui est la mesure du mouvement, mais bien plutôt le mouvement qui devient la perspective du temps. On verra ainsi apparaître une nouvelle conception du montage où les faux raccords deviennent emblématiques. En outre, les éléments de l'image, non seulement visuels, mais sonores, entrent dans des rapports internes qui font que l'image entière doit être lue. Enfin, la caméra subordonne la description d'un espace à des fonctions de la pensée. Plus que visible, l'image-temps est celle qui procède par des signes qui veulent donner accès à une présentation directe du temps. Nouvelle pragmatique du cinéma, l'image-temps établit un nouvel ordre de lecture, celui-là indirect, donnant prise à des images optiques et sonores pures pour une appréhension dont le temps et uniquement lui, devient fil conducteur de l'événement cinématographique. Godard et Resnais semblent être, aux dires de Deleuze, les cinéastes les plus importants de ce registre autre de l'image-cinéma. Mais tout cela c'est beaucoup trop réduire. Il faut retourner à Deleuze, à ses exemples. Car c'est là que l'on peut voir son système à l'œuvre. Et les exemples abondent car Deleuze ne se contente pas de 'théoriser,' il fait voir aussi. Énormément. Travail de véritable exégète, *L'image-temps* est aussi exégèse: celle du cinéma de maintenant.

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ROBERT E. GOODIN. *Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1985. Pp. xii + 235. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-226-30298-9.

In *Protecting the Vulnerable*, Goodin seeks to show that if we pay careful attention to the moral notions most of us already accept, we will come to realize that our current moral practices give too much weight to the various special duties we have and not enough to our general duties of aid to unspecified others. If we, as it were, take seriously Rawls's suggestion that we bring our intuitions into reflective equilibrium with our views about what we ought to do, we will find that our general obligations are more pressing and our special responsibilities relatively less important than we previously thought. In short, we have misweighted our responsibilities, thinking that those to whom we have some sort of special obligation are heavier than our obligations to those with whom we stand in no special relationship and, hence, with whom we have no special moral duties.

Goodin suggests that we make this mistake because we have adopted the wrong model for thinking about special duties. Our way of thinking about special obligations is the voluntarist model, according to which special duties arise due to some voluntary act of the will (promise-keeping being the paradigm case). But, argues Goodin, this model is mistaken and we should substitute for it the vulnerability model, according to which special duties arise because we find ourselves in situations where those with whom we interact are in some way especially vulnerable to us. Goodin then argues that careful examination of the vulnerability model leads to the view that we have substantial obligations even to those needy persons with whom we have no special relations. He then argues that such obligations are best fulfilled (given the present state of the planet) by having governments act on our behalf. For example, one ought to help alleviate the plight of starving Africans, and one ought to do this by working to get one's government to increase aid to these unfortunate people.

Goodin's attack on the voluntarist model is very effective. He does not argue, as some have, that there is a conceptual problem with this way of looking at things and that, hence, the entire approach must be abandoned. Rather, Goodin grants the adherent of the voluntarist model everything she needs to make her case and then proceeds to show that, even so, there are lots of problems with it. He shows, in case after case, that the model just does not yield the proper account of what we take to be our special duties. We all knew, of course, that there were some problems with the voluntarist model. But everyone who reads Goodin's book will discover that these problems are a lot more extensive than she had previously thought.

Goodin develops his alternative to the voluntarist model by examining several cases where we all grant that one has special duties to a beneficiary. In each case, he attempts to show that what best accounts for the character of the special duty is that those persons owed the duty are in some respect especially vulnerable to whomever has the duty. When this vulnerability is

removed, our intuitions tell us that the duty disappears also. This part of the book (chapter 4) is the heart of Goodin's argument. He is attempting to show that his account of why we have certain special duties works better than the voluntarist account in explaining the very cases the voluntarist account was specifically designed to handle and for which it is usually thought best suited. Here the quality of argument is extraordinary, approaching that of, say, Sidgwick in its care and close observation.

The remainder of the book is devoted to discussing the consequences of accepting the vulnerability model as an account of our moral duties. Goodin shows that one is forced to the conclusion that our duties of aid to unspecified others are much stronger than many have previously thought, and he begins the task of sorting out what the vulnerability model has to say about issues such as intergenerational and environmental responsibilities. He then argues that his model requires each of us to take steps to ensure that no one is exceptionally vulnerable to anyone (in order to remove the opportunities for exploitation), and he holds that governments, rather than privately funded organizations, are the best vehicle for fulfilling our general duties to those in need.

It is clear that Goodin's motive in writing this book is to show that our duties to those in need are very pressing indeed. And in making this argument, his tone becomes, appropriately, much more passionate. Yet his arguments remain careful. The brief discussions of how the vulnerability model would handle intergenerational and environmental duties consists primarily of Goodin showing that his approach has much the same features as a straightforward utilitarian account. However, his arguments that the vulnerability model requires one not only to aid those whom one finds are vulnerable to one's actions but also to ensure that, so far as possible, people are not especially vulnerable to one, are surprisingly vague and weak. Of course, we all think that, at least for most types of vulnerability, it would be better if no one was in such a state. But I could not understand how Goodin's model yields this conclusion. And the account of why governments are the best vehicle to fulfil our duties of aid to unspecified others seemed to me to consist of nothing more than Goodin's conviction that they would be most effective. He gives the distinct impression that there is a reason why we should think this, but I could not find it.

It is unfortunate that the last chapter is weak, for in general Goodin's arguments are careful and convincing. I recommend this book to anyone interested in these topics.

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JOHN HORTON and SUSAN MENDUS, eds. *Aspects of Toleration*. London and New York: Methuen 1985. Pp. ii + 180. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-416-39290-3.

This is a fine collection of eight essays dealing with those thorny aspects of law and morality that we associate in Canada with Keegstra, Zundel, Sunday closing laws, pornography legislation and the like. Most of the contributors are members of the politics or philosophy departments of the University of York in England. All of them were brought together by the C. and J.B. Morrell Trust which provides, among other things, for numerous seminars and an annual conference on such topics. Each writes with an awareness of the work of others, so that there is an overall unity to the collection. While there is coverage of familiar territory I found each of the essays to provide some novel insight; overall there were half a dozen or so of those really worthwhile distinctions that can help so much to get a permanent grip on elusive questions. I recommend this book highly to anyone working in the field.

The general tenor of these essays is liberal, but second-thought liberal. We find not so much solutions as additional questions for the already problematic liberalism associated with Mill. It is well known that Mill's principle of liberty has problems both with regard to what counts as self-regarding and what as other-regarding actions, and with what counts as 'harm' to oneself or others. Several of these essays give sustained examination of the concept of harm, with the result that the notion of liberalism as a kind of neutral position between a plurality of competing moral or religious standpoints, is dealt a severe blow. It emerges looking a little more like one among the other competitors. It is also shown to be paradoxical, as for example in Peter Jones's discussion of the 'moral effect' argument in 'Toleration, Harm and Moral Effect.' If A takes a risk of harming himself, such that B will have an inescapable moral duty to assist A if harm results, then B's liberty is curtailed by A, and equity suggests that B have some remedy against A or the possibility of preventing A from taking the risk. The attitude that is liberal concerning A's actions is not liberal concerning B's, so we are wrong to think of the case simply as liberalism vs. non-liberalism. But Jones, like many other of the contributors, does not like what second-thought liberalism could lead to: compulsory long-distance walks and Japanese-style diets enforced on all of us may be only half-way down this slippery slope.

Albert Weale, in 'Toleration, Individual Differences and Respect for Persons,' finds consequentialism and contractarianism inadequate as defences of toleration, and proposes a principle of neutrality as an ideal in its own right as a better alternative. He distinguishes between *intentional* and *causal* neutrality. The state may *intend* to be neutral regarding different religious or secular outlooks, but in abolishing Sunday closing laws it will *causally* tend to disadvantage the devout Christians who feel obliged to treat Sunday as a day of rest. Or they will violate their conscience in subservience to the economic law: Thou shalt maintain thy share of the market. In a causal sense the state will then not be neutral. Weale is bothered enough by causal non-neutrality

to suggest some positive support for disadvantaged groups, but others might wish to push causal neutrality further, towards actual restriction. He himself thinks neutrality must be intentional if the principle of equal respect is to be pursued.

David Edwards, in 'Toleration and the English Blasphemy Law,' makes a spirited defence of a law, not necessarily a law of blasphemy, that would protect religious sensibilities, not just Christian sensibilities, from a certain form of outrage that is impervious to counter-argument, leaving the offended no means of rejoinder short of violence. Keen offence to deeply held beliefs is sometimes necessary if human society is to be 'distinguished from an ant-hill.' But Edwards denies that as a matter of principle the law should not interfere with obscene and blasphemous presentations that give others good cause to be profoundly wounded and distressed. Religious beliefs differ from others because they are ultimate and compelling for those who accept them. The state has an interest in promoting respect for persons, but if the criminal law is used the ideas themselves must be seen as worthy of respect. Having made this point, Edwards then backs off from a championing of blasphemy law because he sees that the law would eventually have to protect some but not all religions, and this would require making invidious distinctions.

John Horton, in 'Toleration, Morality and Harm,' and Susan Mendus, in 'Harm, Offence and Censorship,' take aim at the conclusions of the Committee headed by Bernard Williams, the *Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship*, Cmnd 7772, 1979, which wanted to replace the Hicklin-inspired wording of the 1959 Obscene Publications Act where obscenity is defined in terms of a tendency to 'deprave and corrupt,' with the notions of harm and what would give offence to reasonable people. Horton argues that what is considered harmful is not independent of particular moral perspectives. Imprisonment for a Raskolnikov might not be a harm. As against Feinberg, whom Horton represents as thinking that moral corruption is harmful only if a person has an antecedent interest in being good, Horton treats such an interest as non-optional; moral corruption in that case becomes a harm, whether or not the person recognizes this. Horton does not claim that because an activity may be conceived as harmful from a particular moral perspective this is sufficient for its being prohibited. It is rather that in so far as liberalism purports to maintain some kind of neutrality between different moral perspectives it fails to recognize the viewpoints he has outlined and attempts the impossible.

Mendus thinks that most people who favour stringent pornography laws do so on the ground of moral damage, not so much of traceable harm caused. (I am not sure this would be correct in Canada today.) She thinks the Williams Committee failed to justify adequately its preference for 'offence' as a criterion of obscenity, and that it did not take sufficiently into account the nuisance, as distinct from violation of privacy, argument against pornography. If privacy is the issue, you can seclude sale of the material, but if generalized nuisance is the problem, and if like Andrea Dworkin one sees it as in itself violence against women, then the problem is not so easily settled.

Thomas Baldwin, in 'Toleration and the Right to Freedom,' takes Locke as a jumping off point for an argument that neither a simple right to freedom nor Lockean consent are firm enough anchors for the duty of toleration. The basis of democratic rights, he argues, in a way that echoes Habermas, though in a very different idiom, is the rational requirement of a right to participation in political debate. A right of participation places on fellow citizens a duty to permit such participation; and this permission is inseparable from toleration of the expression of, and indeed emphatic presentation of, political positions other than one's own.

Alex Callinicos, in 'Repressive Toleration Revisited: Mill, Marcuse, MacIntyre,' sympathises enough with Marcuse and the Frankfurt School to have doubts about individual autonomy under late capitalism and to accept some intolerance of political parties, though he would not follow either Marcuse's denigration of logic or his support of intolerant minorities of the left who might abolish the major political parties of Britain and the U.S. as well as most philosophy departments in the English-speaking world. Callinicos would abolish fascism but not racism as such. He thinks that incitement to violence is a necessary feature of the National Front, as with fascism generally. Mill's corn-dealer passage may stop short of supporting this intolerance, but he agrees with Marcuse that Mill was not in tune with the world of Hitler or Stalin. Britain, he thinks, is not immune from the bacillus of fascism.

Somewhat by contrast, Peter Nicholson in the concluding essay, 'Toleration as a Moral Ideal,' makes a strong case for a wide measure of tolerance of even the intolerant on the basis of treating toleration as a moral ideal. He thinks a government should not suppress even racist views, though it may discriminate by subsidizing opposing ideas. No office, he says, should be closed to a racist merely for his opinions. But even Mill thought a person should suffer the natural consequences of what he says, and I would think unrepentent racism would unfit a person for the post of e.g. Human Rights Commissioner. Nicholson's argument that intolerance of racism is elitist because it supposes a low opinion of other members of one's society might be countered by the notion that an exceptionally high opinion of one's society is socially elitist, given that other societies have been taken in by racist ideology.

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DON IHDE. *Consequences of Phenomenology*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 1986. Pp. xi + 210. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-149-9); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-141-7).

Don Ihde's latest collection of his essays 'attempts to draw consequences of phenomenological philosophy ...' (ix), while remaining constantly aware of phenomenology's minority position in American philosophical circles. The result is typical of many of the strengths and weaknesses of the school of thought for which he claims to speak.

The book consists of three sections, each with three essays. The first, 'Perceptual Polymorphy,' maintains that our way of existing in the world brings us primarily into contact with rich fields of intentional objects; this is as opposed to the idea that humans are primarily perceivers and that perception is of some impoverished form of raw data. Part II, 'Technics,' bases itself within Heidegger's understanding of technology as a way of letting the earth show itself (i.e., technology is a mode of disclosure, rather than the set of technological instruments). Part III, 'Critical Essays,' discuss Ortega y Gasset, Ricoeur, and Rorty; the first two essays in this section, while worthwhile, do not seem well-integrated into the book as a whole.

Ihde writes: 'I continue to situate myself within the philosophical community of American Continental philosophers, but open to the plurality of positions in this diverse continent' (26). But the 'Analytic Establishment' (which Ihde abbreviates as 'AE') is not likely to be as tolerant. Ihde presents ideas for our inspection, approval, and acceptance. But he conspicuously avoids presenting evidence for them. This is what has made phenomenology so hard for the 'AE' to swallow. Sometimes Ihde's ideas are sufficiently powerful to arrest our attention and sometimes they even compel acceptance. Other times, they do not.

For example, in the first essay Ihde wants to maintain, as Heidegger does, that speech is prior to perception — not necessarily temporally prior, but prior in that perception is possible only because we live in a world linguistically. He says that 'every material thing has a voice — which, however, is all too easy to miss' (32). Since the first part of the sentence seems obviously false, the second part of the sentence is necessary. Here one has the essential dramatic technique of phenomenology: Since it is going to reveal to us the world in which we already live, and since it relies not upon proof but upon recognition of the truth once uttered, phenomenology must either say the obvious (in which case it is trivial) or must locate a truth which is not obvious *until* it is stated and expounded. In this particular case, however, Ihde is able to dispel the mystery he has posed (how can everything have a voice?) only by showing the mysterious to be trivial: What he really means is that everything has a *sound* if struck. His point — that it is dangerous to reduce the phenomenon of sound simply to information — is important; his way of reaching that point is unenlightening.

His essay 'Technology and Cultural Variations' is to be commended for

raising one of the hardest questions phenomenology faces: If it is our participation in a shared world which enables us to talk philosophically without having to rely upon 'strict' proofs (i.e., proofs that put themselves forward as being independent of grounding in any particular world), what do we do about the fact that different cultures seem to inhabit different worlds (in phenomenology's sense of 'world')? Ihde's essay raises good questions, but his sense of how 'The Third World' understands technology seems untroubled by the meagrest anthropological factual knowledge and is plagued by his lumping all non-European and non-North American cultures into one generalized entity.

Throughout the book Ihde plugs for his version of Husserl's variational method, which he says is 'the very heart of a phenomenological inquiry ...' (119). He does not defend this method, and he does not actually employ it enough in the book for us to be won over by the vigor of its results.

The book is badly hurt by Ihde's writing style. One great strength of Heideggerian phenomenology is its attention to the language in which it is expressed. Ihde, however, makes up words the way bureaucrats do. Within a few pages, he commits the following verbal atrocities: 'actional' (50), 'perceptualistically' (51), 'horizontalized' (53), 'Parisocentric' (55), 'visualistically' (61), and 'complexure' (67).

The book is interesting sociologically as a document within the complex, contemporary, American battle over the nature of philosophy. It has good ideas and bad strewn over its pages with seemingly little discrimination by their author. Not surprisingly, Ihde is at his best when commenting on other philosophers. That is, given the evidence of this book, Ihde is a better scholar and conversationalist than original philosopher ... like all of us, except each generation's handful.

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JERROLD J. KATZ. *Cogitations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986. Pp. 206. US\$16.95. ISBN 0-19-503744-8.

The best part of Katz's book is the jacket illustration: Paul Klee's 'Old Man Figuring' conveys an intriguing combination of intelligence and naïveté. It characterizes the contents of the book admirably.

The book's subtitle is *A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy of Logic and Language and a Study of Them in Relation to the Cogito*. To

the extent that it is about the philosophy of logic and language the book is intelligent, often exciting, sometimes iconoclastic, generally well-argued (although the arguments are often not new ones). It is the application of conclusions from this part of the argument to Descartes' *cogito* that is naïve; its naïveté goes hand-in-hand with arrogance.

Descartes needs Katz to be rehabilitated. No 'Cartesian scholar' has been capable of performing this service (a conclusion based on examination of four recent works by such scholars) and so all of them suffer the embarrassment of 'the Cartesian scholar's dilemma': with respect to the *cogito*, 'either ... Descartes gave a palpably fallacious argument or ... he couldn't manage to give the right one' (131; also 9, 14). Katz presents 'a positive account of the *cogito* as inference exclusively based on language' (10). In this way he fills out the deficiency in the original presentation, establishes the *cogito*'s validity, hence rehabilitates Descartes and destroys the dilemma. He argues that 'The fault lies not with Descartes' — even though, until Katz's arrival, Descartes 'lacks the means to say what he wants to say' (132) — 'but with the logical framework within which Cartesian scholars have tried to explain the inference. The source of the obscurity of the *cogito* is that the framework makes no place for formally valid inferences whose validity depends on language' (7).

When Katz uses conclusions drawn from considerations of semantics, he misinterprets the *Meditations* when he asserts that, for Descartes, 'knowledge of the occurrence of thought' is 'not knowledge of existence' (141), knowledge of the *cogito* is 'the first step toward providing' 'absolutely indubitable ... foundations for human knowledge' (159), and 'Descartes can judge that he exists on the basis of his comprehension of the *cogitatio*' (163). He then continues by stating as new insights items which Descartes knew well and articulated clearly (169-70). I will not belabour these carping comments of mine.

Without considerations of a linguistic kind, is Descartes, or for that matter, 'the Cartesian scholar,' in as great a predicament as Katz would have us believe? Not really. Katz himself gives the clue when he argues that, because of the unavailability to him of Katzian semantic theory, Descartes 'compensates ... by switching from language to epistemology' (132). He then adds that 'From the viewpoint of the *cogito* as an analytic entailment, Descartes' epistemological remarks are an accurate account of how we come to know the truth of its conclusion: a simple act of mental vision shows us that the proposition expressing the existence of the thinker is contained in the proposition expressing the thought of the thinking' (132-3). Many a Cartesian scholar has argued that, at the level of epistemology and without reference to propositions or introduction of linguistic theory, Descartes' remarks offer a satisfactory account of the *cogito* within the Cartesian framework. Their arguments neither saddle *them* with 'the Cartesian scholar's dilemma' nor *Descartes* with problems about the legitimacy of semantic considerations in the first three of the *Meditations*.

The second part of the preceding sentence points at the main question about this book. Is the overall strategy Katz employs — that of the importation of semantic considerations into the argument of the first three of the *Medita-*

tions — at all legitimate within the Cartesian framework? This moot point Katz never considers.

Many seventeenth century thinkers took language to be an artifact and held thought to be independent of language so that relations among ideas or concepts were considered to hold strictly on grounds of logic or epistemology, and considerations of a linguistic kind were deemed irrelevant to the question of the validity of an inference. Language was taken as an artifact which functions either as a mnemonic aid for the individual thinker or as a means of transmitting concepts and inferences in a community of thinkers. In the latter case language obtains objective (or intersubjective) status and functions in accordance with public (but artificial) rules. How much of this position — clearly articulated in Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding* — is Descartes? And if it is (or, also, if it is *not*) how does that affect Katz's program?

Descartes does not explicitly address the question of the nature of language, but about its role there is at least part of an implicit answer. It is that, in the argument concerning the *cogito*, language has no role to play.

From the end of the first Meditation to near the end of the third, there is no objectivity in the sense of intersubjectivity; and during that period Descartes characterizes his memory as totally 'fallacious.' Hence language as an artifact has no role to play: it can serve neither as a means of communication nor as a mnemonic aid. But perhaps Descartes holds that no thought is possible apart from language so that the very process of thought can only be carried on in terms of language? Since he does not think of his intellect as artificial that would then make also language non-artificial; it would be innate. Would he then consider this non-artificial language as 'private' or 'public'? If *private*, we should either have difficulties with Descartes in terms of the traditional problems about a private language, or we should adopt a notion like Fodor's on the private 'language of thought.' Katz does not introduce Fodor in this context, but had he done so, there would be the problem that at this stage in the argument there is, for all Descartes knows, no structure to thought. Since there is no language without a structure, Fodor's conception of a private language would not apply. If *public*, we should have a problem because of the fact that no intersubjectivity, and hence nothing public, is possible before the end of the third Meditation.

In the parts of the argument which are Katz's concern, Descartes has no use for an artificial language and cannot without serious objections employ a non-artificial one. Hence Katz's entire project is problematic to begin with.

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MICHAEL J. KATZ. *Templets and the Explanation of Complex Patterns*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986. Pp. x + 127. US\$24.95. ISBN 0-521-30673-6.

This brief book aims to present an account of scientific explanation based upon the notions of templet and pattern. According to Katz, a pattern is an abstract model of a configuration of 'real world' items and a templet is a device for transforming one pattern into another. Katz sees science as largely concerned with giving configurational explanations, that is, with explaining how certain patterns arose. To do so is to show how they arose from real world 'precursor' patterns through the application of real world templets. (Comparing Katz's account to more traditional ones, templets are analogous to laws of nature while precursor patterns are like initial conditions.)

Katz restricts himself to finite, discrete patterns, indeed, to patterns representable by finite graphs. One of his patterns consists of a finite number of elements (the 'raw materials') and a relation of degree two holding among these elements. If there are N elements in a pattern then the pattern can be represented by an $N \times N$ binary matrix (of zeros and ones), where an entry of one indicates that the pattern's relation holds between the elements associated with the entry's row and column. For example, if the elements of the pattern are A, B and C, and besides each bearing the relation to itself, A bears it to B, B to C and C to A, then the matrix for the pattern is

	A	B	C
A	1	1	0
B	0	1	1
C	1	0	1

Templets can be represented by binary matrices too, on this scheme, since a binary matrix can be converted to another of the same dimension by combining it with a binary matrix (the templet matrix) using the operation of logical 'addition' (conjunction). If we take the above matrix and combine it with the middle matrix below by conjoining corresponding elements (1 = Truth, 0 = Falsity), then we get the matrix on the right.

$$\begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \end{array} \wedge \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \end{array} = \begin{array}{ccc} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 \end{array}$$

Katz calls the matrix corresponding to the precursor pattern the matching matrix (MM) and the one corresponding to the pattern to be explained the adjacency matrix (AM). Thus the transformation of an MM into an AM *via* a templet can be represented by the equation

$$MM \wedge T = AM.$$

After exploring some of the technical aspects of this scheme, Katz observes that since binary matrices can be represented as finite strings of zeros and ones, the transformation of an MM into AM can be represented as the result of the operation of a finite automaton. Configurational explanations are thus modelled by finite automata and scientific theories by concatenations of finite automata.

These ideas are developed in the first three chapters of the book. The fourth chapter, 'Templeting,' discusses the construction of templets by scientists and contains a brief but suggestive discussion of simplicity and interesting biological examples. The fifth chapter, 'Self-assembly,' is concerned with precursor patterns whose raw materials can fit together in just one or a few ways. In this domain templets of minimal complexity suffice to produce final patterns. As one might expect, self-assembly of this sort is abundant in the biological world, which Katz ably mines for illustrations of his ideas. Chapter six, 'Rules for Configurational Explanations,' is a four page excursion into applied methodology. The next chapter 'Simple, Complex and Random,' addresses a variety of questions about the complexity of patterns and ends with a definition of life: 'Life is characterized by maximally-complex determinate patterns, patterns requiring maximal determinate templets for their assembly' (84). The last chapter, 'Reductionism,' is concerned with how and to what extent scientists reduce observations to patterns and these to component patterns. The book concludes with an appendix which reviews and expands upon the technical ideas presented in the previous chapters.

Despite its suggestiveness, this book disappointed me. I suppose that I was asked to review it because of my own work on patterns. Certainly that is why I accepted the invitation. But Katz never tells us what a pattern is, and he turns his back upon the most interesting and difficult patterns in science and mathematics — those with infinitely many elements. There is little here for the philosopher of mathematics.

The book is not good philosophy of science either. A typical example of why it is not is Katz's discussion of explanation. His citations from Duhem, Popper and Nagel suggest that he believes his configurational explanations comprise the greater part of explanation in science. But this cannot be right: Even Hempel's deductive-nomological explanations require quantificational logic, which is not reducible to a collection of finite automata. Katz's suggestion that explanations are finite automata is certain to jolt a number of philosophers. So too will his assertion that since Galileo scientific explanations answer how-questions rather than why-questions.

I would hazard that Katz devotes more space to quoting poetry and the

literary writings of scientists than he does to presenting careful arguments and explanations. If you read this book, do so on account of its suggestiveness.

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ARTHUR KROKER and DAVID COOK. *The Postmodern Scene: Excremental Culture and Hyperaesthetics*. Montreal: New World Perspectives 1986. Pp. 320. Cdn\$29.95. ISBN 0-920393-X.

Many readers of *The Postmodern Scene* will have thought, at least once, of writing such a book. In the grand tradition of Nietzsche's philosophising with a hammer, the authors have staked their reputations on a book that is bound to shock and to provoke angry reactions. Writing of this kind is as much a part of the Canadian scene as shooting American airplanes or brawling with Soviet hockey players. In this case, however, the authors risk sacrificing a hyper-atrophied philosophical 'rigour' for a rhetoric designed to expose and exhaust the over-determined but central metaphors of an intellectual culture which is not theirs.

That this book is not the 'Cole's Notes' for Canadians to the French intellectual scene is a sign that some Canadians are no longer in need of such notes. Part of its importance lies in starting where some Canadians have just barely left off. *The Postmodern Scene* is more important, however, for setting a 'postmodern' mood. Although most of the work discussed is not, in fact, postmodern at all, the quasi-retrospective analysis of French philosophers, sociologists, historians *et alii* makes this work an incipient postmodern perspective on an essentially modernist culture. Much like the new Coke commercials, the book assumes a mood. 'But, then, why be surprised? Heidegger always said that "mood" would be the locus of culture at the end of history, tracing a great ellipsis of decline, disintegration, and disaccumulation *par excellence* TV life' (278).

Kroker and Cook risk the most by identifying the postmodern primarily with French intellectual culture. The first section of the book, 'Sunshine Reports,' introduces the central figures, theses, metaphors and images of what the authors claim is postmodernism and sets these in a rather blurred historical and cultural perspective which nominates Saint Augustine as the 'father' of the postmodern scene. While Kroker and Cook do pinpoint the major tropes

of post-structuralist France, readers still are no closer to understanding just what is postmodern about them. And that these tropes should also, by implication, apply to Moshe Safei's new National Art Gallery, for example, or to the postmodern signposts of other cultures apart from the French, is seldom demonstrated. What is more often assumed is that the will-to-will, power, nihilism, the disembodied eye and the simulacrum, among other tropes, are postmodern and that they are scattered throughout the detritus of other 'postmodern' cultures.

An admirable feature of *The Postmodern Scene* is its cohesiveness. Kroker and Cook, who exhibit somewhat different styles, offer analyses of various painters, writers, philosophers and cultural artefacts and manage to unify their bifocal vision by extending and sustaining the central theses of the book. The major writers discussed include Michel Serres, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jean Baudrillard, and Georges Bataille. Each section is unified by a thesis or theme and theses are linked together, less consistently, by the ever elusive reference to postmodernism. One of the more interesting theses involves the working out of the idea that 'late capitalism art ... is the commodity form in its most advanced (postmodernist) representation' (17). In this interpretation, Nietzsche becomes a kind of turned-on Marx and Kant is the aesthetician of liberalism's 'dead power.' The hyper-aesthetics of 'postmodernism' which emerges from this twisting of traditional philosophical perspectives casts an interesting light on the certainly outmoded analysis of advanced capitalism in terms of the commodity form, without, however, meeting the challenge presented to it by the information bit. Such 'sliding signifiers' are provocative and exciting but they are also in need of a little more processing.

The excremental culture of postmodernism finds its metaphors in Georges Bataille's solar anus and his disembodied eye. The ideas extorted from these metaphors are those of the decay, nihilism, dead power and perverse seduction of the postmodern culture scene. That power is essentially dead (dispersed, decentralised and deferred) and that it is this dead power with its empty signifiers which seduces us, is what characterises the postmodern condition as excremental. According to the authors' reading of Baudrillard and Nietzsche, we are surrounded by the signs of a decomposing power which defiles us because we desire its empty forms. Kroker and Cook fall short of indicting postmodernism. Nevertheless, their virtual parody of the excremental tropes of postmodernism and their sometimes virulent and often aggressive prose makes postmodernism appear as symptomatic of a dying culture on the verge of collapse. This apocalyptic vision is more postmodern than the supposed postmodernism of the work discussed. It effectively disarms and disowns the French intellectual scene.

Finally, Foucault's language of transgression stands as one of the major signposts under which postmodernism is explored. It is an incessantly self-reflexive and non-discursive language which transgresses the sacred limits of modernist culture: God, the self or subjectivity, and sexuality. In its transgression of these limits, the language of writers such as Bataille or Nietzsche heralds the end of modernism and the beginning of the postmodern. Nevertheless,

the authors fail to examine critically why Foucault ultimately rejected the idea that the language of transgression signalled the postmodern. Had they done so, they might have had to reevaluate their characterisation of this age as a postmodern one. What, after all, is POST-modern about postmodernism? Does the self-reflexivity of the work of some French intellectuals really rupture the language of modernism? By situating postmodernism almost exclusively with contemporary French culture, the authors pretend to have located and isolated what appears to be a catch-all for the dispersion of what is still a modernist aesthetic and a modernist culture.

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STEVEN W. LAYCOCK and JAMES G. HART, eds. *Essays in Phenomenological Theology*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1986. Pp. x + 219. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-164-8); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-165-6).

While this is an interesting and worthy book in many respects, it nevertheless raises difficult questions about the interconnection of the disciplines of phenomenology and theology. Briefly, if theology is a set of claims about divine truths that lie beyond the boundaries of experience, and phenomenology the determined insistence to describe only what lies within those boundaries, then can one even speak of an enterprise such as phenomenological theology? This is, furthermore, almost exclusively a book about claims regarding experience by figures such as Husserl, Hegel, Duméry, and others, as well as their interrelationship. There is little, perhaps in the strictest sense no, analysis of immediate, concrete, pre thematic experience, religious or otherwise. Is such a study, then, still itself phenomenological? Let us turn to a brief description of some of the essays contained in the volume in order to indicate the appropriateness of such questions.

After the editorial Introduction (by Laycock) two of the first four essays — those by John Findlay and Thomas Prufer — while undoubtedly theological in character are certainly not phenomenological. Prufer's ('Creation, Solitude, and Publicity') in a Neo-Thomist vein, asserts the necessity of God and the contingency of the world in the most concise and dogmatic terms possible, quite without reference to either primary or secondary experience at any level. Findlay ('Some Thoughts regarding the Holy Spirit') is concerned to demonstrate, largely through unpacking the ramifications of his own general-

ly Neoplatonic Absolute-theory, that there exists a 'Perfection at the center of things,' which exists necessarily, unites all proximate values, and functions in practical life as the entity normally referred to as the Holy Spirit. Whatever the merits of the argument, it is difficult, at least given the methodology employed, to justify its inclusion, or that by Prüfer, in this volume.

Even Iso Kern ('Trinity: Theological Reflections of a Phenomenologist') in an essay more evidently appropriate to inclusion in such an anthology, nevertheless is obviously uneasy about the conjunction of the two cognitive forms, as suggested by both the title of his paper and his concluding disclaimer: 'But phenomenology is not theology' though it may be 'phenomenologically motivated' (36). In the least technical but in many respects also the least derivative contribution to the collection Kern distinguishes and explicates the theological significance of three fundamental dimensions of man's existence: the natural, social, and egological.

The remaining five essays are all — significantly, and if one considers the matter, oddly — more concerned with the claims of certain philosophical phenomenologists regarding religion than with careful phenomenological examination of the theological implications of indubitably religious experience, as in, say, Augustine or Ramakrishna. Thus we have, to begin with, Charles Courtney's exposition of 'Henry Duméry's Phenomenology of Transcending,' and Robert R. Williams's *Phenomenology and Theology: Hegel's Alternative to Dogmatism and Idealism*. In the first Courtney provides a sketch of Duméry's phenomenologically inspired philosophy of religion, with particular attention to his interpretation of various forms of religious expression and the ways in which they specify the unique intention of the individual subject. Williams's essay responds in the most direct way to the underlying problem posed by the volume as a whole — whether we are not, after all, compelled to make a choice *between* theology and phenomenology — denies it, and attempts to find in the 'concrete theism' of Hegel precedent for a consistent and successful phenomenological theology. Hegel's analysis of experience legitimately leads to systematic theologizing, Williams contends, because unlike the solipsistic accounts provided by most transcendentalists, Hegel insists that 'the object of consciousness must be really transcendent and independent. It cannot be reducible to consciousness nor have merely subjective being' (79). For this reason phenomenological theology is the explication of a *social ontology*, a claim defended not only by Williams but by the editors of the book in the two succeeding essays. Williams worries, however, and properly so, whether a God of mere social transcendence can be satisfactorily identified with the God of classical theism, whose absolute independence of His creation lifted Him in principle even beyond the necessary apprehension of His being by His chosen community. Prüfer's earlier theological postulations successfully defended the objective fullness of the divine transcendence, but again, only at the cost of any phenomenological foundation.

While following out certain suggestions found in Husserl rather than Hegel, the essays by the two editors of the work, Laycock ('The Intersubjective Dimension of Husserl's Theology') and Hart ('A *Précis* of an Husserlian Philosophi-

cal Theology') nonetheless arrive at roughly the same destination, God as an intersubjective-social reality. Whereas Williams/Hegel stresses the present actuality of such a being, however, Laycock and Hart propose it more in the sense of the ultimate *telos* of all conscious activity. Neither Laycock nor Hart appear as aware as Williams of the grave dangers in such a view: that to reduce God via dependence upon his phenomenological apprehension to human subjectivity, whether monadic or collective, comes perilously close either to outright atheism or, at best, the religiosity of a Feuerbach ('theology is anthropology').

No one these days has noted this with more perspicuity than Paul Ricoeur, and Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida form the focus of the last essay in the collection by James Buchanan ('The Rhetorics of Appropriation/Transgression: Post-modernity and Religious Discourse'). In the Introduction Laycock roundly condemns Buchanan for endorsing the theme of his subjects that 'The death of the God of the ontotheological tradition marks also the death of language and the self' (195). While it may be true that the humanism of Feuerbach or the more radical deconstructivism of Ricoeur/Derrida may gravely undermine the edifice erected here by Laycock and Hart, they would be well advised to follow the lead of Williams in seeking to confront and think through the structural tensions Buchanan exposes, rather than blinding their eyes to such problems. Hart, particularly, is a gifted and ambitious system-builder (his essay alone makes up more than a third of the book), but unless and until 'phenomenological theology' comes to grips more realistically with its very legitimacy as an enterprise, it faces the danger that its pronouncements will tell us more about the theological predilections of its theoreticians than the dynamics and implications of nonthematic religious experience.

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PAUL K. MOSHER. *Empirical Knowledge*. Towata, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield 1986. Pp. vii + 288. US\$39.50. ISBN 0-8476-7492-4.

Empirical Knowledge is an anthology of recent papers in classical epistemology designed as a source for middle and upper level undergraduate courses as well as graduate courses. As a teacher of such courses myself, I have encountered some difficulty in finding suitable books of this kind. Now I have found one. The papers collected here are both substantial and up-to-date while

at the same time appropriate for the non-specialist audience to which the book is directed.

In a short review such as this, it is not possible to summarize even briefly the content of each offering — something the author himself does very well in his introductory essay — but it might be useful for prospective users for me simply to list the papers in the two categories in which they are presented.

Part I: Justified belief

- W.P. Alston, Concepts of Epistemic Justification
R.M. Chisholm, The Myth of the Given
W.P. Alston, Two Types of Foundationalism
L. Bonjour, Can Empirical Knowledge have a Foundation?
L. Bonjour, The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge
E. Sosa, The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge
A.I. Goldman, What is Justified Belief?
J.L. Pollock, Reliability and Justified belief
D.B. Annis, A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification
W.V. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized

Part II: The Gettier Problem

- E. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
G. Harman, Knowledge and Explanation
R. Chisholm, Knowledge as Justified True Belief
R. Feldman, An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counterexamples
R. Shope, Knowledge and Falsity

In his introductory essay Mosher lays out some of the groundwork underlying recent discussions in epistemology. He initially draws a distinction between *radical foundationalism* and *moderate foundationalism*. The former characterizes the foundational beliefs as 'indubitable,' 'incorrigeable' or 'irreversible,' the latter characterizes them as deriving their justification from some source other than further beliefs ('noninferentially'). After dismissing the radical version, he goes on to cite three standard views about what the noninferential basis might be: (a) self-justification, (b) justification via non-belief experiences, (c) justification due to the reliable origin of a belief. He then presents the standard argument for weak foundationalism, viz., an argument showing that inferential justification must terminate in some noninferentially justified beliefs. This argument takes the form of an elimination of the main alternatives to foundationalism which Mosher takes to be *coherentism* (represented by Bonjour's second piece) and *contextualism* (represented by the Annis selection) with respect to their ability to handle the *regress problem*.

Mosher uses the occasion of his presentation of this argument to raise difficulties for coherentism and contextualism. He then presents two general

objections to foundationalism: (1) what he calls *the epistemic ascent argument* (discussed in Bonjour's first piece) and (2) what we might call *the veil of perception objection*. The former, first, assumes that any adequate theory of empirical evidence must show that such evidence makes the evidenced statement likely to be true and second assumes that the argument for this must be doxastically available to the knower thus showing, it is claimed, that the justificational force of the evidence rests on further beliefs, contrary to the foundationalist's main assumption. The second assumption of the argument amounts to a version of internalism and Mosher notes that a foundationalist might naturally reply to the epistemic ascent argument by denying internalism. Mosher then suggests some difficulties for this programme and concludes the section with mention of some of the traditional difficulties that subjectivist versions of 'type b' moderate foundationalism encounter (*the veil-of-perception objection*). In the next section Mosher gives a summary description of the articles.

Mosher's introduction is well written and non-polemical, giving the reader a good overview of various sides of the issues he is concerned with. His selection of articles includes none that should not be there, but has perhaps an over-representation of articles dealing with meta-epistemological concerns as opposed to clear and well-worked out *examples* of each position. In this respect his selection is a fair reflection of the balance of discussion in the current literature, but in light of the purposes of the book it might have been useful to have one or two more representatives of the first-order kind.

For example, I would probably have included Chapter III (and parts of II) of Pollock's *Knowledge and Justification* as a detailed development of various versions of perceptual foundationalism. Though Bonjour's piece on coherentism is also a sound choice, it is programmatic and perhaps focused a bit too much on generalities. A good representative treatment of Bayesian Coherence might have provided the 'nuts and bolts' to complement Bonjour's discussion. Indeed, if there is one area of the theory of epistemic justification that seemed to me not to be adequately represented here, this was it. The whole probabilistic approach, including the epistemic decision — theoretic approach of Lehrer and Levi has been simply ignored in these selections. While many classical epistemologists would no doubt like this approach to simply go away, it is important that students have some exposure to it in general survey courses.

One conception of the analysis of knowledge rests on the assumption that knowledge is justified true belief plus a 'fourth condition' needed to avoid Gettier problems. All of the articles in Part II are written from within this perspective. There is, however, another conception that defines knowledge not in terms of *justified belief* but rather in terms of *reliably induced belief*. (Such accounts are to be distinguished from reliability accounts of epistemic justification of the sort reflected in Goldman's article of Part I.) One of the possible merits of such an approach is that it naturally accounts for the Gettier cases. It might have been useful to include in Part II one or two selections representative of this approach, say Unger's 'An Analysis of Factual Knowledge' and

Dretske's 'Conclusive Reasons' or selections from the Epistemological portion of Nosick's *Philosophical Explanations*.

Let me say in conclusion that I have found this book to be well suited to its intended purpose and would recommend taking a look at it for anyone teaching a course in contemporary Epistemology.

THOMAS C. VINCI

G.E.L. OWEN. *Logic, Science and Dialectic: Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy*. Ed. Martha Nussbaum. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1986. Pp. xv + 394. US\$37.50. ISBN 0-8014-1726-0.

In 1982 G.E.L. Owen died at the age of 60. He had planned and edited his collected papers but with his death it was left to Prof. Martha Nussbaum to see the work through publication. This eagerly awaited work by one of the giants in the field of ancient philosophy contains all the essays completed for publication by Owen during his lifetime, along with two posthumous pieces, 'Philosophical Invective' and 'Aristotelian Mechanics,' both of which show Owen at the height of his powers and make his loss all the more acutely felt. The collection includes Owen's three essays on the Presocratics, four essays on Plato, and thirteen essays on Aristotle. Most of these essays, a number of which have been previously anthologized and widely commented upon, will be familiar to those in the field as milestones in ancient philosophical scholarship. Reading again such works as 'The Place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's Dialogues,' '*Tithenai ta phainomena*,' and 'A Proof in the *Peri Ideōn*' in the light of the last two decades of research reveals the dominant role Owen has had in the English-speaking world.

It would serve little purpose to attempt here any detailed exposition or criticism of Owen's always subtle and serpentine arguments. Nor is this the place to attempt an overall assessment of his contribution to ancient philosophical scholarship, although this definitive collection, enhanced by extensive indices, will facilitate such an assessment in due course. Rather, it will perhaps be more useful to sketch a few of the major themes in Owen's work which were developed and refined throughout his career and which are likely to be the focus of critical attention in the future.

Owen as Eleatic Exegete. In three early and widely influential papers, 'Eleatic Questions,' 'Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present,' and 'Zeno and the Mathematicians,' Owen sought to challenge a number of hoary legends

regarding the nature of Eleatic philosophy and its relation to contemporary and later Greek philosophy. In these essays he provides powerful philological and philosophical arguments to counter the claims that Parmenides is properly understood as continuing the tradition of Ionian and Italian cosmology and that Zeno is best understood as a critic and successor to the Pythagorean mathematical tradition. Both of these claims are far less plausible today than they were thirty years ago, owing principally to Owen's efforts. These papers deserve to be reread and not forgotten as models of erudition and philosophical sophistication. It is to be much regretted that Owen did not live to return to work on the Presocratics. Our knowledge of Eleatic philosophy, especially in its relation to Atomism and to Plato's Academy, is still so imperfect that we may assume that Owen's arguments will continue to be carefully scrutinized.

Owen as anti-unitarian. Platonic unitarians hold that Plato's views did not change substantially throughout the dialogues, although they differ on how explicit Plato is in the later dialogues regarding his central doctrines. Owen holds that Plato's *Parmenides* recounts the reasons for abandoning the theory of transcendent Forms and that dialogues written after the *Parmenides* must be understood to contain at least a revised ontology. Since the *Timaeus* apparently contains the discarded views, it must be dated prior to the *Parmenides*. Accordingly, since Aristotle's entrance into the Academy postdates the writing of the *Parmenides*, his early development must be understood in the light of the rejection of the theory of Forms by his master. These four hypotheses — that the *Parmenides* rejects Forms, that the *Timaeus* antedates the *Parmenides*, that the later dialogues reject Forms, and that Aristotle's early development must be understood accordingly — are connected such that doubt cast on any one reflects on the rest. On rereading all of the evidence adduced by Owen I would conclude that his case for the four hypotheses is finally not very compelling and requires too much distortion of the text. Owen's argument regarding the *Parmenides* is unpersuasive and his position prevents him from seeing ontological advancement in the *Timaeus* which presupposes the theory of Forms. Still, his arguments cannot safely be ignored.

Owen on focal meaning. In an early work, 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle' (1960), Owen coined the phrase 'focal meaning' to refer to the key Aristotelian concept of a special type of equivocality. In this early essay and elsewhere Owen employs this concept to chart Aristotle's philosophical development away from Plato and to analyze Aristotle's unique approach to problems confronting a scientific philosophy. Owen was of course not the first to recognize the centrality of this concept, yet it is in fact his work that has guided work in this area in the last two decades. In Owen's treatment of this concept, however, it has become increasingly clear that he was inclined to view its use primarily in logical and semantical contexts and to reject or ignore an ontological role for focal meaning in Aristotle. This is especially clear in a later work, 'Particular and General' (1978), where Owen refuses to accept at face value Aristotle's own words stating that being in the primary sense is form and that this is a conclusion in a theological science.

Owen's implicit assumption that the central books of the *Metaphysics* can be totally detached from the main program of a science of wisdom and treated independently is not well-founded. That Owen's view of what Aristotle is doing is perhaps anachronistic does not alter the acuteness of his analysis. It certainly does not alter the fact that Owen's single volume of essays represents an indisputably major contribution to the study of ancient philosophy.

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ADRIAN THEODOR PEPPERZAK. *System and History in Philosophy*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 1986. Pp. 172. US\$34.50. ISBN 0-88706-273-3.

The aim of this book by Professor Peperzak of the University of Nijmegen is to provide an understanding of the relation between what he calls 'thematic' philosophy ('thoughtful consideration of genuine problems on one's own, here and now' [13]) and the history of philosophy. This topic is at issue, Peperzak believes, because both the legitimacy of claims for independent thinking and the status of philosophy as a truth-oriented activity have so frequently and thoroughly been challenged. This book, then, is another of those philosophy books that takes as its main subject the supposed crisis in philosophy. As such, it will be of interest mainly to specialists rather than general readers, though it might also be useful in graduate education where what is needed is an informed alternative to the general direction of the post-modern, post-structuralist tendencies of recent European theorizing.

Between brief opening and closing chapters on the possibility of thematic philosophy and the nature of truth, respectively, the central two chapters deal with 'philosophy is learning' (chapter II) and 'philosophy as discussion' (chapter III). The former examines the role of the history of philosophy in learning philosophy and in becoming motivated to think on one's own. The predominant mode in Western philosophy, Peperzak thinks, is monologic. Nonetheless, real thinking requires a 'thoughtful and sober attitude toward already existing philosophies' (15). On the other hand, selection and interpretation are always informed by contemporary thought so that, ultimately, there is not a choice between historically important philosophies and contemporary thematic philosophy. The task, as Peperzak sees it, is to map out a course be-

tween the study of history as a sort of objective repetition on one side and using texts as mere stimuli for whatever one wishes on the other.

Much that is interesting in this second chapter (and the third as well) is contained in observations about what is required for adequate and relevant history of philosophy. For instance, there are suggestions about the nature of texts; the relation of authors, readers and texts; what is meant by an '*œuvre*'; the relevance of the milieu and time of authors; and what Peperzak calls 'constellations' of philosophies within periods and across times. The upshot is that there is no single synthesis to be had of philosophy and its history, but that lines of communication can be set up, provided we recognize that we (present-day thinkers) are setting them up.

If, however, we are setting up the relations among various ways of thinking, how can we be sure of our own motivations? That is a major preoccupation of the third chapter, which takes on the various reductivistic attempts (Marxists, psychoanalysts, structuralists, Nietzscheans, sociologists, and historians) while at the same time developing a view of 'philosophy as dialogue' in relation to other contemporary positions such as those of Heidegger, Levinas, Foucault, Derrida, and Rorty. Ultimately, Peperzak wants to limit the various 'unmaskings' of philosophy's motivations and reassert a commitment to 'the truth.'

Peperzak lays out a view of 'conversation' and extends it, by analogy, first to the nature of philosophy and then to the history of philosophy. If such an attempt is successful there should result a resilient ability to remain oriented to the truth while recognizing the dangers that have been pointed out in the various 'unmaskings' that attempt to question the status of the individual thinker. Philosophy, including its history, could then become a genuine dialogue, thus overcoming the limitations of the 'monologic' views that have typified Western thought. As a result, it should be legitimate to have a view that is pluralistic and recognizes the intersubjectivity of philosophy without losing sight of the ideal of truth (or mistaking truth for democratic consensus).

As numerous references to it make clear, it is 'the truth' as an orienting concept that Peperzak is most interested to defend, though he does not try to define it so much as to compose a form of discourse in which "'truth,' 'the truth,'" and even "'the truth itself'" have functioned as the horizon within which philosophical activity and its history have been thematized' (147).

Perhaps Peperzak is correct that the best defense of independent thinking against so many criticisms is such a reunderstood relationship between present thinking and history. Still, the account he gives may be found wanting by many readers. For one thing, it deals with such a large number of problems and attempts to connect with so many contemporary and recent thinkers that it is bound to be sketchy. Peperzak has a frustrating habit of raising numerous questions in series as he approaches a problem, only to leave most of the questions untouched, and too often he has to say something like: 'A full treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this essay, but' Moreover, the positions treated (Hegel, Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, Gadamer, Rorty, along with the various 'reductionisms') are alluded to more than they are cited, and specific

works or even the philosophers themselves are often not mentioned. Some may wonder whether Peperzak has made his own job easier by keeping the alternatives brief and general.

The topics considered, especially the relations of contemporary thought to historical views and the possibility of independent thinking in face of criticisms of its possibility, are important and lively matters of debate. Nonetheless, Peperzak's attempt is, as he says, 'metaphilosophy,' so there is here primarily an outline of the ways we might do things if we ever decided to do something. The result is a view long on conditional possibilities and short on specifics. Whether such a scheme could be used to really encourage a lively dialogue which would take account of all the personal, social, and historical factors Peperzak mentions here, or whether it would lead to defenses of abstract disengagement in the name of traditional conceptions of 'the truth,' it is difficult to tell.

I am not able to judge its accuracy, but, with a few exceptions, Mary Ellen Petrisko's translation from the Dutch seems readable enough. There are useful indices and a bibliography focusing mainly on entries relevant to the history of philosophy.

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DAVID PREMACK. *Gavagai! or the Future History of the Animal Language Controversy*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1986. Pp. xii + 164. US\$12.50.
ISBN 0-262-16099-4.

The rather unpromising title of David Premack's book seems to promise much — a prophecy as to the outcome of the Indian leg-wrestling match between Noam Chomsky and Washoe Chimpsky, along with something on Quine and translation. Moreover, Quine would seem not just to happen to be along, the 'or' of the title being neither inclusive nor exclusive, but the 'or' of identity. In the event, the connection isn't quite so tight.

In the Introduction the 'animal language controversy' of the title is sized down to 'the animal language inquiry,' but immediately balloons out again (not inappropriately) to 'What is language? On the basis of what properties do we identify a system as language?' (4). Thus Premack says that 'In one sense the animal language inquiry had more to gain from epistemology and

philosophy of language than from linguistics' (7). But it is ultimately neither philosophy nor linguistics that Premack trades in, but psychology, and therein lie both the strengths and weaknesses of his book.

In Premack's view, 'The problems we face in attempting to teach language to a nonhuman species bear a considerable resemblance to those facing Quine's linguist, who attempts to translate a language radically different from his own' (89). The general problem is not, however, that of the inscrutability of reference, but the inscrutability or otherwise of other minds, especially when they belong to other types of animals. 'I am concerned with the implications of Quine's position for the study of comparative intelligence, for what we can establish about the mind of the "other one"' (102).

According to Premack, another's behaviour need not leave our insight into his/her/its mind nearly so underdetermined as Quine's thesis suggests. Famously, for Quine the native who is stimulated to utter 'gavagai' in the presence of a rabbit may be stimulated by the rabbit, or its undetached parts, or its stages, or its brief temporal segments, or even by a Goodmanian fusion of all rabbits. Premack agrees, but disagrees that there is nothing further that the anthropologist can do to determine which of these is provoking the 'gavagai' response. Premack dreams up some necessarily rather wacky ways that e.g. 'all and sundry rabbit parts,' or 'the fusion of all rabbits,' might be represented on the video screen, and then supposes that the linguistic responses to the videos will determine the precise 'stimulus meaning' of 'gavagai.' Whether or not one is convinced that this undermines a Quinean pessimism about other minds and meanings, Premack's *forté* is devising exercises meant to reveal something about the minds of other animals, particularly the ape, *Sara*.

Though Premack's animal tests are ingenious, what he takes them to reveal is often depressingly crude and gratuitous. I don't mean that he holds apes to have dirty minds, but that his characterization of an ape's mind is often the standard hodge podge of implausible mental acts and entities that 'cognitive scientists' go in for. One doesn't have to be a Skinnerian to balk at the idea of a test where 'The animal was required to picture or imagine the color of the lemon as well as the color associated with the small, grey plastic word that named yellow and to match these two internal representations. (Note that when the white (painted) lemon was matched to the name "yellow," the color yellow was not present.) The test posed no problem for any of the three animals tested...' (73). One wonders: Is he sure? 'Internal' or 'mental representations' are episodes of imagination and are for Premack the very stuff of any mind. Now the problem with the above passage is not that no sense can be made of the supposition that an animal imagines something — animal experience is whatever it is. But no sense can be made of the supposition that an animal imagines some particular thing regardless of whether or how an animal behaves, and the behaviour which Premack cites hardly gives ground for the peculiar mental goings on he ascribes to his apes. If he didn't start with the dubious notion of 'mental representations' (and of comparing them!) would he ever find behavioural evidence for it? Premack asserts that, 'By analogy, if pictures of your family were cut into pieces, you could prove your good

mental representation of your family by your ability to match different pieces of the same individual (the little finger of your spouse with his/her ear, eye, nose, hair, etc.)' (66). But if I do know my spouse I might well do this test with no imagining or 'mental representation' at all — I consult the *pieces*, not my imagination. And as Wittgenstein might ask, if I need a mental representation to identify a picture of my wife, how do I identify my mental representation?

The subject matter of psychology can only be experience and behaviour. From a first-person perspective these are phenomenologically the same thing, and from a third-person perspective they are logically joined at the hip. This again is not behaviourism, but it is an anti-realist challenge to a Cartesian realism which sees only an external, contingent connection between experience and behaviour. Thus Premack sticks his neck out: 'Every intrinsic or innate competence has, I assume, an indigenous disposition for expression, one that is proportional to the magnitude or development of the competence' (10). Proportional indeed. And just as experiences and innate competences are logically tied to their expression in behaviour, so are any neurophysiological structures insofar as they are alleged to 'realize' various intelligent capacities. Premack supposes that theoretically we could 'add syntactic categories to the ape — actually discover their neurological basis and, by delicate brain surgery, implant them in the ape' (144). Though one may have doubts about the casual materialist assumptions here (Premack happily refers many times to one of the least useful ideas since that of 'dormative properties,' viz., 'the language acquisition device'), the point he goes on to make is a good one, to the effect that the capacity for possessing syntactic categories is not all that is necessary for acquiring language. But then he goes further to suggest the following: 'In fact, for all we presently know, the ape may already have syntactic categories but cannot give evidence of having them because the surgery that it really needs is one that would implant an upgraded inductive capacity' (144). The thought of an ape having the concepts of noun phrase and verb phrase, with no possible way of exercising these concepts, is not in fact a genuine thought (and merely to imagine exercising them [!] is not to exercise them).

Premack has some telling criticisms both of those who would too readily ascribe linguistic ability to other animals, as well as of those who would too readily deny it to them, and in the end even rather self-effacingly closes the book with a *Tractatus*-like ladder-kicking as regards the obsession with language in the social sciences. For all that, much of his speculative psychology could do with some *Investigations*-like critique.

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JOHN ROEMER, ed. *Analytical Marxism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986. Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme 1986. Pp. viii + 313. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-30025-8); US\$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-31731-2).

One should not have to abandon standards of rigour in any discipline in order to take a Marxist approach to it. It is this belief which seems to unify the contributors to *Analytical Marxism* more than any other. Yet as the editor concedes, the eight contributors to this book have no monopoly on this view. The book, then, does not claim to present the whole of analytical Marxism within its covers but only 'a sample of the work being done by many writers around the world and in many disciplines' (6).

Is it a good sample? Most of the contributors have recently written important books in the field, and their articles in this volume give easy access to their work. On the other hand, the selection of articles collected here is in some ways idiosyncratic. The fact that six of them come from two authors will be misinterpreted by some readers as a sign that there is a dearth of analytical Marxists. Moreover, some important figures fail to receive acknowledgement even in the bibliography, not to mention the 303 pages that precede it.

Three of the essays deal directly with normative issues. G.A. Cohen considers the Marxist argument that workers in a capitalist economy are *forced* to sell their labour-power because they have nothing else to exchange for the necessities of life. Cohen finds two arguments here. In fact (a) workers have some opportunities to escape satisfactorily from wage-labour, but (b) these are far too few to go around. While (a) entails that workers are *individually free* to escape their class position, (b) entails that they are *collectively unfree* to do so. The important notion of collective unfreedom is unpacked and defended with no little subtlety, yet its relevance in arguments on behalf of socialism remains moot. In spite of their social ownership of the means of production, workers will remain collectively unfree to become managers, for instance; on the other hand, socialist workers will be free as a collective agent to increase everyone's claim on leisure time, which at least reduces the amount of labour-power they are forced to sell.

Socialists have also objected to capitalism on grounds that the wage-labour exchange is unfair. Marx's skepticism of some of these arguments is seconded here by John Roemer and Allen Wood. Marx criticized some equal-exchange schemes for being equal 'in form' only, but unequal 'in content.' Wood's main problem is to show that this critique does not rely upon egalitarian principles. Roemer allows that exploitation might be normatively interesting if it were inseparable from workplace domination, from alienation, or from unequal ownership of the means of production. Hypothetical economies are invested to show that exploitation is separable from all three.

Five other articles concern methodology, two of these responding to Cohen's functionalism. At issue are claims like: 'Capitalist enterprises came to dominate economy E because they accelerated development of technology

T.' Cohen contends: (a) explanatory claims of this type are central to the Marxist theory of history, (b) they can be analysed only as functional explanations, and (c) some functional explanations are legitimate, though (d) proof of legitimacy may depend on some further explanatory model — Darwinian, Lamarckian, or intentional.

Robert Brenner argues that such an explanation of the rise of capitalism, in particular, cannot succeed unless some pre-capitalists already attempt to act like capitalists, and there is no mechanism which generates such attempts from changes in technology. This argument is unconvincing, since no such mechanism is needed: if a feasible series of step-wise variations in a pre-capitalist enterprise can yield a capitalist enterprise, then someone, somewhere, will try them, and if any step succeeds then someone, somewhere will imitate it. (This point would surely have been made by Philippe van Parijs, whose *Evolutionary Explanation in the Social Sciences* (1981), one of the best recent books in philosophy of social science, gives an account of the Marxist philosophy of history that is often cited by analytical Marxist. Absence of his work from this anthology is regrettable.) Objecting largely to the prevalence of bad functional explanations unsupported by any mechanisms, John Elster advocates Marxist game theoretic analysis instead, and he gives an even-handed account of its possibilities and limitations.

The remaining articles are demonstrations of the new Marxist model-building, and the most striking of these is John Roemer's summary of his *General Theory of Exploitation and Class* (1982). Measuring goods by the labour needed to produce them, Marx found exploitation to occur whenever the bundle one receives for consumption is exceeded in labour-value by the bundle one produces, the surplus product/labour going to the capitalist, the feudal lord, the rentier, etc. Using input-output matrices capable of modelling exploitation in all such ownership regimes, Roemer shows that (a) exploitation does not have to be measured in labour equivalents and (b) exploitation can occur without any exchange of labour at all. Once the knot tying exploitation to labour is cut, any commodity can be exploited. Why, then, should one cling to a *labour* theory of exploitation, as Roemer does? There are no economic reasons, nor does exploitation either explain or diagnose workplace domination or alienation. A labour theory of exploitation is needed to explain the occurrence of class struggle, says Roemer (102), though the explanation is not sketched in sufficient detail here to make this claim stick.

But this does not detract from Roemer's main point: the necessary and sufficient condition for exploitation is not labour, but unequal distribution of productive assets. Exploitation is neither to be explained nor to be judged in terms of what the exploited possess — be it labour or linseed oil — but in terms of what the exploiters possess — the lion's share of the means of production. Erik Olin Wright adds that when skills and organizational control are included among productive assets, some sections of the middle class join the ranks of exploiters.

This book will prove enormously useful to readers who want to see what people like Cohen, Elster, Roemer, Wood and the analytic utopian Adam

Przeworski are up to — before (or instead of) tackling the many books that have come from analytical Marxists in the past ten years. For the same reason, *Analytical Marxism* should certainly be added to reading lists for courses in Marxist philosophy.

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FRANK SCHALOW. *Imagination and Existence. Heidegger's Retrieval of Kant's Ethics*. Lanham MD: University Press of America 1986. Pp. xiii + 178. US\$24.75 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-5114-9); US\$11.75 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-5115-7).

Since Kant first employed the term '*Grundlegung*' to describe the task of providing ethics with a single first principle or ultimate 'ground,' the essentially Cartesian project of foundation laying has become for many virtually synonymous with philosophical enquiry. This is substantially true of the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl as well as the epistemology of the neo-Kantian schools, i.e. the two dominant forces in German philosophical life when Heidegger published his 1929 Kant interpretation, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. The intent of that work, as Heidegger was to point out much later, lay not in making a fresh contribution to Kant scholarship, but in the attempt 'to seek in Kant an advocate for the question of Being' which had been posed in *Being and Time* and which his contemporaries had utterly failed to grasp (see the Preface to the fourth German edition).

If we are to judge by Mr. Schalow's book, which attempts to find 'a more concrete foundation for Kant's ethic' (ix) in Heidegger's ontology of human existence, the spell of foundationalism (in the sense indicated) is by no means broken. Schalow attempts to show that Heidegger's concrete analysis of the finitude of the self, of man's sensuous, temporal nature, uncovers a deeper-lying dimension of the moral agent which ultimately 'supports Kant's [rather than another type of] ethics' (x), thus making it possible to 'reconstruct' (*passim*) Kant's ethics on a more concrete foundation. The imagination of Schalow's engaging title is the transcendental imagination; existence is the finite, temporal mode of being of man. The relation of the two, on which Heidegger insisted, is central to the stated objective of the book: 'to define the relation between practical reason and the imagination in terms of temporality' (22).

According to Schalow, Heidegger's analysis of the self explains how it is

that the self is subject to unconditioned moral commands, without positing, as Kant did, a trans-finite, intelligible order. This, Schalow claims, serves to 'vindicate Heidegger' (22) in the face of criticisms levelled at his early Kant book by Ernst Cassirer. In a 1929 review in *Kant-Studien*, Cassirer argued that one must either 'define practical reason in terms of the individual's finitude and deny the a priori necessity of moral commands ... or uphold the a priori necessity of moral commands and define practical reason independently of the individual's finitude' (22). Schalow sets out to show not merely that this is a false dilemma, but 'that the unconditioned commands of morality hold precisely because of the limitations imposed upon us by our temporal natures' (xi; emphasis added). The argument is systematic in intent but largely exegetical in method, drawing heavily on Heidegger while consciously transforming his thought.

On the face of it, this highly eclectic work promises to furnish something of interest for each of three types of readership: Heidegger scholars, Kant scholars, and ethical theorists — at least those ethical theorists who have set themselves the task of 'reconstructing moral philosophy' (2) by erecting an 'existential ethics' on the foundation laid by Heidegger (Cf. Heidegger's demurrs on this point in the *Letter on Humanism*). This last restriction is significant, since anyone for whom the problems of ethics pose themselves in terms of the traditional types of normative theory (consequentialism, deontologism, utilitarianism, contractarianism, natural law etc.) is almost certain to be disappointed in this book, which hardly recognises the existence of such an ethical debate. Ultimately, it is perhaps *only* the reader of the third category who is likely to find this book at all palatable. As for the interpretations of Kant, where they do not merely rehearse already familiar doctrines (good will, duty, categorical and hypothetical imperatives, respect for the law and for persons, autonomy etc.) and criticisms ('formalism'), they make a practice of the type of 'violence' with which scholars from Cassirer on have consistently reproached Heidegger. Kant's basic principles are to be 'recast ... with the aim of making explicit his account of man' (26), of what it means to be human; the need to make Kant's account of the hero the '*leading idea*' (26, 44) of his moral philosophy will point to the relevance of Heidegger's account of the 'resolve' of 'authentic existence' in 'salvaging' Kant's central 'message' (25, 43). (Heidegger, of course, responded to the charge of violence by propounding a distinction between 'historical philology' and a 'dialogue between thinkers,' a defense which is not available to everyone.)

The violence extends even to the interpretation of Heidegger, for in order to 'reconstruct Kant's ethics' Schalow has to 'expand' or 'amplify' (22) Heidegger's Kant interpretation, all the while claiming that this 'corresponds to the basic aim of Heidegger's phenomenology' (19), which 'can be viewed as a direct continuation of the task which Kant described as a "metaphysics of morals"' (89). A good deal is made of the importance for Heidegger of Scheler's criticism of Kant's ethics. (But then a good deal is made of the influence of virtually every other important figure in 19th and 20th century continental thought: Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Brentano, Dilthey, Husserl, Bultmann and so on.) Schel-

er's alleged influence, together with allusions to discussions of Kant's moral philosophy in recent volumes in the *Gesamtausgabe*, is taken to show that the major preoccupation of 'Heidegger's phenomenology' really was Kant's ethics, notwithstanding the fact that a scant four pages of the Kant book deal with the second *Critique*.

Now there's little doubt that Kant's ethical writings were of much greater relevance to the first phase of Heidegger's thought than the early Kant book alone might suggest. This is worthy of careful investigation. On the other hand, there's no warrant whatever for Schalow's jejune attempt to 'bridge the gap between Heidegger's concept of *Dasein* and Kant's concept of the person' (89). Everything Heidegger has written on the nature of metaphysics and transcendental subjectivity in particular tells against such an attempt. As it is, Heidegger's notion of 'anticipatory resoluteness' is not so much interpreted as reinterpreted, i.e. expressly 'redefined' (88) for the task which Schalow has set it. And so too with the analysis of other key concepts, e.g. conscience. The consequence is that neither the Heidegger nor the Kant scholar is apt to find much that is to his liking in this book, while the historian of philosophy and the ethicist (with the exception mentioned already) will fare little better.

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JEAN THEAU. *Certitudes et questions de la raison philosophique*. Coll. Philosophica, no 29, Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa 1985. 540 p.

Ce livre veut exposer 'la certitude la plus parfaite sur ce qui est' (13), sans chercher à fonder la science positive, considérée comme une source de connaissance valable en soi et toujours pénétrée de métaphysique, fût-elle incertaine ou fallacieuse. L'A. son entreprise sur quatre certitudes premières: l'homme et la nature existent antérieurement à la connaissance de la seconde par le premier; il existe une communication directe entre le sujet connaissant d'une part, et les autres sujets et la nature d'autre part; la pensée jouit d'une indépendance partielle par rapport au monde et au corps qu'elle habite, et elle est capable de régler ses actes de façon à bâtir une connaissance adéquate des objets; exister et vivre est un bien pour une conscience libre de vivre ou non, l'être est une valeur.

Pensée et être extramental ne sont pas identiques, mais les deux sont de l'être, de sorte qu'il y a une affinité entre les deux, une possibilité pour la

première de connaître adéquatement le second: la question de la vérité ne doit donc pas être posée en premier. La métaphysique porte sur l'être en soi, présupposé par le phénomène, qui est 'appréhension, par la conscience et la pensée, de l'être en soi dans sa substance active' (71). En conséquence, il faut selon l'A. restaurer la notion de substance entendue au sens aristotélicien d'*ousia*; ce qui existe en soi et non dans un autre. La substantialité est le cœur de l'être, et on peut donc pratiquement identifier être et substance.

Une théorie des catégories ne doit pas commencer par une ontologie générale, mais être plutôt constituée d'abord de catégories plus particulières valables pour certains groupes d'êtres: ce sont des concepts de second ordre, de nature théorique et non pratique. Rejetant les déductions kantiennes, métaphysique aussi bien que transcendante, des catégories, l'A. déclare que l'idée d'objet (*ens commune*) est la catégorie première, condition de toutes les autres et posée *a priori*: notre pensée tend à s'opposer un objet, à concevoir un objet dont la nature ne nous est pas immédiatement évidente, parce qu'indépendante de l'acte d'intellection; on ne peut donc déduire, à partir de l'idée générale d'objet, ce que sont les objets existants. L'objet est contingent, puisque posé par un acte qui aurait pu ne pas être posé, et ainsi l'idée du non-être est produite. Ces deux premières catégories, *ens commune* et non-être, engendrent les principes de non-contradiction, d'identité et du tiers exclu. D'une réflexion sur ce qui précède, notamment sur l'*ens commune*, l'A. tire les catégories d'existence (l'être indépendant d'une position part la pensée), d'essence, de cause (inspirée par une réflexion sur la puissance d'agir de l'essence), puis celles d'être contingent et d'être nécessaire, d'un et de multiple. Ces catégories sont *a priori* en ce sens qu'elles sont dérivées, par réflexion, de l'*ens commune*.

Les catégories de vrai, faux, beau, laid, bon et mauvais sont aussi admises comme maximalement universelles. Elles sont dérivées en partie de l'être *a priori*, et aussi de l'expérience. Des premières catégories confuses déjà énumérées, combinées avec une expérience du nombre, du temps et de l'espace, sont ensuite tirées les catégories fondamentales des mathématiques, vues ici comme une science d'objets, contrairement à la logique. Les notions d'espace, de temps, de nombre sont, affirme l'A., des *a priori* empiriques, acquis par une réflexion sur les structures absolument universelles et stables de l'expérience. '*A priori*' veut dire ici que nous pouvons constituer une définition claire de ces objets, bien que la liste de toutes les propriétés déductibles de cette définition ne nous soit pas immédiatement évidente.

La nature même des concepts mathématiques nous permet de faire des synthèses *a priori*. Les catégories mathématiques ont comme premier caractère l'idéalité: elles sont construites en idéalisant l'expérience, une expérience stable qui nous porte à croire que l'espace et le temps existent indépendamment des objets physiques. Contrairement à Kant, l'A. estime que les catégories d'espace et de temps appartiennent à la raison, et conçoit ainsi leur genèse: le nombre vient en premier, le temps en second et l'espace en troisième lieu, les trois ayant la même structure. Le concept d'espace vient de l'expérience des corps à trois dimensions, et l'espace absolu et mathématique découle de

notre capacité à faire abstraction de toutes les qualités sauf l'existence, l'aptitude au mouvement, la distance, les dimensions et la direction. On construit ainsi *a priori* l'espace géométrique, qui est aussi un espace métrique, idempotent et infini, distinct de l'espace physique.

Tiré par analyse de la succession des événements, le temps mathématique est aussi idempotent et infini, et il est pure succession, abstraction faite des événements qui pourraient prendre place dans cette succession. Il faut distinguer ce temps mathématique de la durée au sens bergsonien, et du temps monadique, i. e. le temps où le présent a une épaisseur. Mathématiquement premier et épistémologiquement dernier, le nombre a des rapports avec la logique: un et multiple sont des catégories logiques, nous dit l'A., qui prend acte de l'échec du logicisme et le rejette, de même que la notion de nombre comme classe de classes. La classe n'est pas selon lui une notion purement logique; et comme celle de nombre, elle néglige l'individualité des individus, les nivelle. Le nombre abstrait est la classes de toutes les classes équinumériques (195). L'A. dénonce ce qu'il estime être un cercle vicieux et une pétition de principe chez Frege et Russell, dans leur définition du nombre et de la classe.

De l'*ens communis* on est passé aux catégories mathématiques *a priori*, dérivées d'aspects généraux de l'expérience. De là on passe aux catégories physiques, inséparables de l'expérience des objets empiriquement donnés. La première catégorie est ici celle de substance, non au sens de support des qualités observables, mais à celui de fondement (*Grund*), de chose qui existe indépendamment de la pensée et perdure. Une analyse *a priori* (analyse du concept dans sa généralité) plus approfondie révèle que les accidents sont 'ce qui résulte des variations dans les relations effectives entre substances' (232) alors que la substance 'fonde ces relations et leurs variations' (*ibid.*). Plus encore, la substance 'est ce qui persévère dans l'être, donc ce qui a en soi ce qui lui permet de persévéérer ainsi selon sa propre forme, c'est-à-dire d'en assurer l'existence, ce par rapport à quoi par conséquent toute causalité se trouve en entière dépendance, logiquement et ontologiquement, puisque seul l'être peut produire de l'être' (234) et la substance est cause de l'existence ou du changement d'autres substances, ou cause de modifications en elle-même. L'analyse *a posteriori* des substances s'intéresse à leur pluralité numérique et à leur division en types spécifiques. La matière est la première spécification empirique de la substance. Elle est première dans l'expérience, spatialisée, pauvre en contenu, infinie au sens de Pascal. Elle est aussi atomique, et l'A. s'interroge ici sur l'indivisibilité et la destructibilité de l'atome, sur son aptitude à être transformée en énergie (253). Selon l'A., la matière n'est pas fondamentalement la masse, mais l'énergie en laquelle elle est transformable (254-5). Elle est extranéation, position hors du néant, 'énergie qui se contracte au lieu de se diffuser' (256). L'A. aboutit à un hylémorphisme modifié, où la matière est étendue, puissance non pure, énergie réalisée sous diverses formes, extranéation.

Passant ensuite aux catégories de vie et de substance vivante, l'A. affirme contre le behaviorisme l'existence et la valeur de notre expérience interne de la vie, disant qu'ainsi nous saissons l'*esse* et le *quod* de la vie, pas son *quid*.

ou son *quomodo*. Il admet cependant que l'observation externe est ici source d'observation plus précise que l'expérience interne, et qu'il faut la privilégier (263-4) à cause du danger de confusion entre conscience et vie, et de projection de soi dans les autres. Les fonctions vitales sont gouvernées, nous dit l'A., par des lois qui ne sont pas exprimables en fonctions mathématiques comme en mécanique, ni par des relations arithmétiques comme c'est le cas des lois chimiques découlant de la structure atomique des corps. Les lois biologiques sont des règles et leur expression par des formules mathématiques n'est pas essentielle. Ces lois sont d'ailleurs télologiques, la finalité étant une question de détermination et de liaison des causes efficientes, et pas nécessairement liée à une conscience du but. Chez les vivants, elle est la réalisation d'une fin par combinaison de moyens, de causes liées entre elles, cette fin étant la préservation de l'intégrité des systèmes. Le hasard des mécanistes n'est qu'une rencontre de causes non organisées en un système, et le temps des mécanistes est inefficace sans cause qui y agisse.

Le vitalisme, en tant que recours à un principe vital matériel et spécifique, échappant aux sciences physiques, est rejeté mais l'A. affirme renouer avec la notion de forme substantielle au sens d'agencement des éléments physico-chimiques en synthèse organique, d'agencement des composés organiques, de raison d'être et de logique du vivant. La conscience de soi est évidente, et il y a coupure entre la conscience et ce qui ne l'est pas, cette coupure n'étant pas le dualisme corps-âme. Il s'agit de deux façons de voir le vivant, du dehors ou du dedans, mais nous avons toujours un seul individu, une seule substance. La conscience ne peut cependant pas être réduite au corps, à la matérialité du vivant (286).

C'est plutôt à l'enseigne de Kant et surtout de Hegel que l'A. a bordé le problème de l'existence de Dieu. Rejetant la thèse matérialiste, il prétend s'élever d'une analyse métaphysique du fini vers l'infini, rejetant comme inopérante la preuve à partir de la contingence, car le contingent ne requiert pas de cause (378). L'argument de l'A. est le suivant: l'infini est nécessairement distinct du fini, et l'existence de l'infini est nécessaire pour faire exister le fini qui peut radicalement ne pas être, dont l'existence n'est pas nécessaire. Cette preuve ressemble à celle par la contingence d'Aristote et de Thomas d'Aquin par sa structure, mais pas par son contenu, nous dit l'A., mais elle résiste aux attaques de Kant contre la preuve par la contingence (389). La dépendance du fini par rapport à l'infini est pour lui une thèse bien établie (391).

Après quelques remarques sur les fondements de la connaissance religieuse, le rôle de la philosophie dans la religion (395-7) et les principaux attributs de Dieu (pensée, volonté libre et omniprésence immatérielle), l'A. s'arrête au problème du mal: la vie humaine ne peut atteindre le bonheur total ou la bonté en raison des maux physiques et moraux inévitables, mais aussi parce que notre connaissance n'est jamais parfaite, et que la connaissance acquise cesse d'être une valeur. Mais c'est concevable en Dieu.

L'A. affirme une nature humaine à la fois biologique et spirituelle, morale et religieuse, qui intègre la liberté, la capacité auto-transformatrice de l'homme. Cependant, une preuve de l'existence d'une âme spirituelle et survivant à la

mort biologique pose selon lui de grandes difficultés. Il accepte le point de départ de Descartes dans le *Cogito*, sans pour autant accepter que l'existence des corps n'est pas évidente; mais il n'endosse pas comme si facile la démarche qui va du Cogito à la spiritualité de l'âme. Il admet comme aussi valables l'une que l'autre l'expérience externe de l'existence des corps et l'expérience interne de la pensée et de la conscience, et formule une preuve de l'existence de l'âme comme nécessaire pour opérer la corrélation entre la programmation génétique et l'activité tissulaire. Elle est immatérielle et forme du corps (450-1). L'A. ajoute une conjecture sur la formation des âmes: chaque gamète a une âme, les deux formant une âme unique après l'union des gamètes. Immatérialité précise-t-il, n'est pas nécessairement immobilité et simplicité.

A propos des relations entre l'âme et le corps, l'A. admet que la conscience doit au cerveau et au système nerveux son éveil et sa capacité d'attention à la vie, liée qu'elle est à la perception et à la motricité volontaire; mais elle n'a besoin de lui, dans l'ordre de la pensée, 'que pour insérer ses pensées de toutes formes, souvenirs, idées, jugements, raisonnements, sentiments, volontés, etc.' (466) dans la réalité matérielle.

Au plan pratique, les fins dernières de l'homme sont la liberté et le bien de l'humain. Une morale laïque est possible, ses axes étant la recherche de la vertu, du bonheur et de la justice. La première est 'le développement équilibré des capacités de tout genre qui sont en l'homme, pourvu que ces capacités soient dirigées par une volonté raisonnable à produire des actes bons, du moins dans leur principe' (475); le second est 'le contentement ou ... la joie qu'on a à être, à vivre, à penser, à agir, à aimer, lequel contentement est dans l'ordre moral un absolu positif' (476); et la justice consiste en ceci que 'mes actions, dans la mesure où elles concernent autrui, de même que les actions d'autrui, dans la mesure où elles concernent les autres et moi-même, se trouvent immédiatement soumises, au regard de la raison, à une loi de réciprocité' (478).

Après nous avoir fait part de ses raisons conjecturales en faveur de l'immortalité de l'âme (482 et 485), l'A. soutient, à propos du rapport de l'homme à la nature en tant que médiatisé par la technique, quelques thèses que nous livrons ici en vrac: la vie intellectuelle est trop dominée par l'industrie; la machine asservit le travailleur autant qu'elle le libère; nous ne sommes pas une société de consommation, mais bien de production qui n'a cependant pas réglé le problème de la faim dans le monde; il faut remettre à l'honneur la consommation ayant pour but de satisfaire des besoins primaires et essentiels, redonner à l'agriculture son rôle essentiel et régler la production sur la consommation, et non l'inverse. Il faut aussi se débarrasser à jamais de deux mythes: d'abord qu'il faut augmenter indéfiniment l'appareil de production, ce qui est à l'origine de l'inflation et de la stagflation; ensuite, que l'homme en arrivera un jour à une maîtrise absolue de la nature, alors que nous n'en maîtrisons actuellement qu'une très petite partie, que nous sommes encore impuissants à prévoir et maîtriser certains cataclysmes naturels, et que l'immensité du monde nous défie de pouvoir un jour le dominer en entier.

Suivent quelques autres thèses, ici encore livrées en vrac, sur la vie politique et sociale. Les idéaux égalitaires du capitalisme libéral, de l'anarchisme

et du marxisme ne se sont pas réalisés pour deux raisons: on s'est d'abord trompé sur les rapports du politique et de l'économique, et ensuite sur les moyens de corriger les effets néfastes de la concentration du capital amenée par l'industrialisation; le politique doit dominer l'économique tout en le respectant; et mettre fin à l'inégalité par la lutte des classes présuppose une trop grande confiance dans la dialectique hégélienne de la contradiction, et aussi dans la propriété collective des moyens de production: ces deux facteurs n'engendrent pas une démocratie égalitaire, mais la dictature. Quelques urgences politico-sociales: contrôler le rythme de l'expansion industrielle, réaliser une distribution égalitaire des biens, faire respecter la justice. Des réflexions sur les rapports entre l'intellectuel et le politique terminent le volume: l'analyse sérieuse des idées suppose un certain recul par rapport à la vie politique et à l'engagement politique; l'attitude contraire nous mène à dogmatisme et incapacité d'évoluer, et la pensée doit rester indépendante de l'action, bien que pas coupée ou isolée d'elle.

Ce volume, on le voit, traite de tous les problèmes classiques de la philosophie, et l'auteur s'efforce visiblement de jeter un pont entre des doctrines plus anciennes et d'autres plus récentes pour en faire la synthèse, pour enrichir le trésor des vérités acquises. Il est rédigé avec rigueur et minutie, et même le lecteur le plus opposé aux thèses de l'A. y trouvera ample matière à réflexion, et donc une occasion de critique, de précision et d'approfondissement de ses propres opinions.

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THOMAS G. WEST and GRACE STARRY WEST, trans. and annot. *Plato: Char-mides*. Indianapolis: Hackett 1986. Pp. vii + 56. US\$3.25. ISBN 0-87220-010-8.

In their brief introduction to this annotated version of *Char-mides*, the Wests confess to a naïve doctrine of literal translation: 'We translate word for word wherever possible, and we follow as best as we can the sentence structure of the Greek. In most important cases, we try to use a single English word for each recurrent Greek one.' This means giving up from the start any attempt at rendering the irony, wit and flexibility of Platonic prose, which can only be reflected, if at all, in equivalent English structures. If the translator does not attempt equivalence, he produces what used to be called a crib, useful mainly for those who are struggling with a parallel Greek text.

Even on a word by word level, literalness is a treacherous concept. For example, we are informed (15 n.5) that the adverb *atechnōs* means 'literally "without skill or art."' In this instance we are confusing meaning with etymology. If semantics are a concern, then *atechnōs* with an accent on the last syllable always means 'simply.' Conversely, the same word with an accent on the penultimate syllable always means 'without skill or art.'

Such a matter may seem of trivial importance, but when it concerns *sophrosyne*, the main subject of discussion in the dialogue, the confusion between meaning and etymology is of major importance. Following Liddel and Scott's *Greek Lexicon* s.v. *sopbron*, *sophrosyne* is rendered throughout as 'sound-mindedness.' This is an etymological rendering, but it would be foolish to assume that a fourth century B.C. reader of the *Charmides* would be influenced by etymology alone (and Plato's own etymology at *Cratylus* 411e refers to the 'salvation of good sense' rather than 'sound thinking') and not by the sum total of connotations from Homer to his own time. Here the major study by Helen North entitled *Sophrosyne* and subtitled *self-knowledge and self restraint* (Ithaca 1966) comes to our aid — or should do (the work is unaccountably left out of the authors' select bibliography, as is the book length study on *Charmides* by Bernd Witte, *Die Wissenschaft vom Guten und Bösen*, Berlin 1970). In this case transliteration might be preferable to translation, for, as Benjamin Jowett noted in the preface to his version (*The Dialogues of Plato*, 3rd edition, Oxford 1892, vol. I, p. 3): 'The subject of the *Charmides* is Temperance or *sophrosyne*, a peculiarly Greek notion, which may also be rendered Moderation, Modesty, Discretion, Wisdom, without completely exhausting by all these terms the various associations of the word.' In this sea of shifting connotations, Jowett's 'Temperance' (or, more particularly, 'chastity, sexual restraint') is paramount at the beginning (157a-158d). But to understand *sophrosyne* in this dialogue, literalness of any sort is an impediment. Here Helen North is worth quoting: 'In the *Charmides* Socrates demonstrates the true nature of *sophrosyne* more memorably — for most readers — through his *ethos* than through his dialectic... Plato calls attention to the *eros* of Socrates at the very moment when Charmides enters the palaestra (155d); he uses this means to contrast the "outer" with the "inner" and to introduce the first reference [in Plato's work] to passion as a wild beast. The fact that Socrates' *eros* is actually directed towards the intellect of Charmides, rather than towards his physical beauty, is a constant reminder of *sophrosyne* in the popular sense of self-control' (154).

Another word picked out for what one might call fossilized treatment is the adjective/adverb *kalos/kalōs*. In Athens of the fifth century a *kalos* could mean an attractive boy who was the object of homosexual desire (see K.J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, London 1978). It can also have connotations of nobility and glory. Adverbially, however, it usually means no more than 'well,' 'excellently.' It is, of course, impossible to determine the extent of the play on *kalōs* words in the dialogue. To this reader, at least, an extension of the light banter on adjectival *kalos* to adverbial *kalos* has a pedantic effect that is alien to the original.

If *kalos* is a key word, are there not other key words which interpreters employ or will employ in their attempts to unlock the meaning of the work? Of course there are and will be, and all that a translation can do is pick and choose. Provided this is understood, the Wests' version will have some limited utility as one that is accurate in detail though misleading in general effect.

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