

# Canadian Philosophical Reviews

## Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS / TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Vol. VII no. 1 January / janvier 1987

William Berkson and John Wettersten, <i>Learning from Error: Karl Popper's Psychology of Learning</i> (Sheldon Richmond) . . . . .	1
Stephen E. Boër and William G. Lycan, <i>Knowing Who</i> (Robert M. Martin) . . . . .	3
Edwin Curley, ed. and trans., <i>The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. I</i> (James C. Morrison) . . . . .	5
David J. Depew and Bruce H. Weber, eds., <i>Evolution at a Crossroads: The New Biology and the New Philosophy of Science</i> (Kent E. Holsinger) . . . . .	7
Biancamaria Fontana, <i>Retbinking the Politics of Commercial Society: The 'Edinburgh Review' 1802-1832</i> (Jeremy Rayner) . . . . .	9
John C. Gilmour, <i>Picturing the World</i> (Susan L. Feagin) . . . . .	16
K. Okruhlik and J. R. Brown, eds., <i>The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz</i> (Catherine Wilson) . . . . .	11
Elizabeth Prior, <i>Dispositions</i> (Fred Wilson) . . . . .	14
Thomas Puttfarcken, <i>Roger de Piles' Theory of Art</i> (Susan L. Feagin) . . . . .	16
John Rajchman and Cornel West, eds., <i>Post-Analytic Philosophy</i> (Gary E. Overvold) . . . . .	20
Nicholas Rescher, ed., <i>Current Issues in Teleology</i> (Michael Bradie) . . . . .	22
Raphael Sassower, <i>Philosophy of Economics: A Critique of Demarcation</i> (J. T. Stevenson) . . . . .	24
Hugh J. Silverman and Don Ihde, eds., <i>Hermeneutics and Deconstruction</i> (Joel Weinsheimer) . . . . .	26
Jocelyne Simard, <i>Sentir, se sentir, consentir</i> (Suzanne Foisy) . . . . .	29
Quentin Skinner, ed., <i>The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences</i> (H. T. Wilson) . . . . .	31



# Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Stephen P. Turner, <i>The Search for a Methodology of Social Science: Durkheim, Weber and the Nineteenth-Century Problem of Cause, Probability and Action</i> (Ian Hacking) . . . . .	33
Donald VanDeVeer, <i>Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds of Benevolence</i> (Douglas N. Husak) . . . . .	36
Ashok Vohra, <i>Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind</i> (David Cockburn) . . . . .	39
Merold Westphal, <i>God, Guilt, and Death</i> (Ken A. Bryson) . . . . .	41
A. L. Wigan, <i>The Duality of the Mind: Proved by the Structure, Functions, and Diseases of the Brain and by the Phenomena of Mental Derangement, and Shown to be Essential to Moral Responsibility</i> (ed. J. E. Bogan) (David L. Thompson) . . . . .	43

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 Jocelyn Linnekin, *Smith, Smith, so sorry, consent* (Suzanne Forsyth) . . . . .

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WILLIAM BERKSON and JOHN WETTERSTEN. *Learning from Error: Karl Popper's Psychology of Learning*. La Salle, IL: Open Court 1984. Pp. xiii + 155. US\$14.95. ISBN 912050-74-8.

This book is an important contribution to the interpretation of Popper in the context of the problem of the inter-relationship of the philosophy of science and psychology. It is important because it is the only contribution to date and it pioneers further exploration of a new intellectual space.

The authors offer a reconstruction of Popper's epistemology that they argue recovers Popper's original intentions and improves his own construction of his work. This reconstruction takes Popper's theory of learning from error as a conjecture about the psychology of learning. Had Popper presented this conjecture as a psychological theory, they argue, this would have served to advance both cognitive psychology and the philosophy of science, as well as Popper's own epistemology.

At one level, this thesis is very difficult to evaluate. Popper's work might well have been ignored or misunderstood in psychology, and ignored or even more misunderstood in the philosophy of science than it has been. Hindsight is as difficult as present sight is constricted. But the authors also overlook the relevance to their thesis of some current research (e.g., that of Roger Schank) in the field of artificial intelligence. Schank and his collaborators are attempting to construct computer simulations of intelligent activity based on the concept of the error-driven nature of learning, and thus are developing empirically and practically testable applications of an implicitly Popperian psychology. This work is relevant to the thesis of this book in two respects.

First, one might wonder whether, in the light of Schank's research, Popper's logic of discovery, as a theory of learning, would have been rendered merely an interesting philosophical precursor to scientific psychology? Moreover, AI research and computer simulation now provide the regulatory and technical framework for the establishment of an empirical basis for falsifying Popper's theory. When AI systems of natural understanding and learning are sufficiently developed so that the AI community agrees, according to their own standards of system satisfaction of design objectives and require-



ments, that the simulations fully realize the alternative theories of human learning, we have arrived at a crucial experiment for deciding among the alternative theories. Specifically, if a system that fully satisfies the design requirements for simulating a mind whose memory and learning is error-driven fails to simulate human intelligence, then Popper's logic of discovery as a psychology of learning would be false. Insofar as this procedure for scientific evaluation was unavailable to Popper, one might venture that for Popper to have presented his logic of discovery as a psychology of learning would have been premature.

Second, even if we agree that the empirical falsification of Popper's logic of discovery as a psychology of learning would not refute that logic as a methodology and theory of objective knowledge, one might still ask: Is Popper's epistemology as a logic of discovery (as opposed specifically to its empirically testable dimension à la the work of Schank), an adequate epistemology? The authors overlook this question. They argue that by merging the logic of discovery with the psychology of learning, Popper's concerns about falsifiability, (empirical) testability, the demarcation of science from pseudo- and non-science, the nature and growth of objective knowledge, and so forth, would have dropped by the wayside. The 'and so forth' covers Popper's distinctive battle against naturalistic epistemology.

But should Popper be re-interpreted as a natural epistemologist? Should we reject Popper's attempt to explore the nature and function of Objective Mind as independent of minds? The authors reject Popper's theory that the logic of Objective Mind is the psychology of minds writ large, though at the same time, they reject the notion that epistemology is nothing but natural or social science, and admit that Popper has made some important contributions to methodology as a distinctive discipline (36-7). However, they do not say whether there is anything else distinctive for epistemology as a discipline beyond methodology. The aim of methodology, they say, is 'to produce and distinguish better and worse techniques and rules for individual decisions, to analyze and improve the social organization of science ...' (149). They also acknowledge that Popper's work in problem-solving might offer some insights for cognitive psychologists. The crucial question they perhaps skirt is: Can epistemologists and philosophers of science do anything other than study methodology, critically assess psychology, and provide useful hints for psychologists?

Although as a matter of preference, I like open-door policies among disciplines, I think that philosophy and psychology, at this point, have unique problem situations — if not unique worlds (i.e., Mind and minds). The logic of the problem-situation for psychology is explaining how individuals have, acquire and enrich their mental representations. What Popper has explored, as part of his attempt to avoid psychology and his program of studying Objective Mind, are the crucial problems of how the logic of a problem-situation transcends current understanding, and how the solutions to problems have logical consequences unseen by their discoverers. Only because Popper avoided psychology and explored the logical structure of Objective Mind, can we now clearly see where the research of cognitive psychology has relevance to episte-

mology, i.e., in describing how minds represent the logical contents of theories, stories, explanations, and problems, and conversely, how minds misrepresent those logical contents.

I should end by noting that I have not commented on the concise historical over-views of cognitive psychology and methodology; and how the authors use them as context for their argument. In sum: I like the book. It is important as a pioneer study, in the following respect. Though its main thrust aborts, it gets us to a place where there is much to be explored.

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STEPHEN E. BOËR and WILLIAM G. LYCAN. *Knowing Who*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1986. Pp. xiv × 213. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-262-02228-1.

The problem here is: What is *knowing who someone is*? Different sorts of test might suffice to show that A knows who B is: perhaps A might be able to provide some sort of individuating description of B ('B is the oldest philosopher of religion at Moose Jaw University') or proper name ('B is Gilbert Sturdley') or even a demonstrative pronoun ('There B is' or 'That's him.'). Although any of these answers might satisfy the questioner, the authors argue that because the second or third sort of answer to 'Who is B' might open the way to a further question ('But who is Gilbert Sturdley/that?'), whereas in certain cases the first sort provides a satisfactory answer, only the first sort reveals directly the sort of knowledge one centrally has when one knows who B is. This is to say: Knowing who B is is knowing that B is P, where 'P' is a predicate. Now, clearly not just any predicate will do. The exact number of hairs on B's head may uniquely identify him, but knowing that B is the person with that number of hairs on his head might not constitute knowing who B is. Certain sorts of predicate are important ones for this purpose. And what kind of information is important may vary with context; it is 'teleological' depending on the purposes of the identifier and on the *functions* of 'knowledge who.' In general, then, knowing who B is is knowing some salient individuating contingent facts about that person which enable us to label or demonstrate that person.

The first part of this book consists of the development, explanation, and justification of a complex theory of 'knowing who' containing an involved formal semantics for knowing and for the 'aboutness' of mental states in general, and for knowing who in particular.



The authors' views are 'representationalist' in that they take it that the analysis of such mental states includes the positing of internal representations (sometimes called 'sentences' in 'mentalese' with liberal use of scare-quotes). They want to distinguish between the *semantics* of such internal representations — i.e., their external truth-conditions — and their *conceptual role* — their motivational, evidential, and inferential powers. Their complicated analysis is applied to solve Quine's puzzles about *de re* belief, and Kripke's puzzle. (So-called because of Kripke's London/Londres example, though they use a case in which we imagine that someone says 'Cicero was bald and Tully was not.' Why not call this Frege's puzzle?)

The authors' account of self-knowledge in Chapter 6 is quite interesting. The common view that one knows one's self in a special, immediate, and complete way runs counter to the authors' view that self-knowledge is just like knowing some external who: inferentially, and mediated by the knowledge of empirical facts. Contemporary authors have sometimes argued that there is a special and irreducible sort of thing called knowing *de se*. Suppose that Fred's pants are on fire; he sees himself in a mirror and, neither feeling the heat nor recognizing that it is himself that he sees, comes to believe that *that* person's pants are on fire. Since *that* person is himself, he believes of himself that his pants are on fire; but he does not jump in the lake until he feels the heat. But what is the different belief Fred gets when he feels the heat? He *already* believes *de re* of himself that his pants are on fire in the same way anyone else might have; it must be, it is claimed, some sort of belief of a sort that *only Fred* could have about Fred (belief '*de se*'). But Boër and Lycan argue that the new belief is of the same semantic sort as the old one: both have, as a truth-condition, that Fred's pants are on fire. They differ in conceptual role. Clearly anyone might have a belief of the same semantic sort; but, the authors argue, anyone else could have a token of the same conceptual-role-type also: a belief that the believer's pants were on fire. Sally has a token of this type when she believes *her* pants are on fire. We can, then, see Fred's *de se* belief as a token of two types: a semantic type, or a functional type. Neither is mysterious. Others can have tokens of the same type.

Chapter 7 is a surprising application of the authors' theories to ethics. Considered here are various ways of understanding the 'impartiality' sometimes thought to be a presupposition of ethical thinking: We are, to paraphrase the golden rule, to act as if we were who the other is. The authors' theories are brought to bear interestingly on the problem of how to understand this counterfactual. What is it to put yourself in her shoes? What do you take over of hers, besides her shoes, and what do you carry from yourself? Boër and Lycan try to shed light on these questions by using their earlier distinctions: The teleology of interest-relevant categorization again provides the sort of characteristics that transfer or remain in these counterfactual transfers. A further application of their theories is a criticism of the popular view that true love or respect for others is a relation to the other's pure *self* — as it were, to a pure individual essence, rather than to the other insofar as one knows the other as the bearer of some important property.

This book is interesting, wide ranging, and central to lively current controversies at the heart of the philosophies of language and of psychology. It is, in places, difficult to read, relying heavily on sometimes daunting formalisms; yet overall its argument can be understood by anyone willing to pay attention, and it is worth the effort.

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EDWIN CURLEY, ed. and trans. *The Collected Works of Spinoza, Vol. I*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1985. Pp. xx + 727. US\$45.00. ISBN 0-691-07222-1.

This first volume contains new translations of the *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect*, the *Short Treatise* (KV), *Descartes' 'Principles of Philosophy'* and *Metaphysical Thoughts*, the *Ethics* (E), and the early Letters (Ep) (from August 1661 to September 1665, #1-#29). (This corresponds to Vol. I, except for the Hebrew Grammar, Vol. II and part of Vol. IV of *Spinoza Opera*, ed. C. Gebhardt, 4 vols. [Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925].) In addition to new translations of complete texts, it contains a General Preface, Prefaces to each work, a Glossary-Index of English, Latin, and Dutch terms, an Index of Proper Names, Biblical and Talmudic references, and a Reference List of works cited by the editor. There are also extensive footnotes to each work. A comparison of the translation with the original text is facilitated by marginal references to Gebhardt by volume, page, and line.

In his general Preface, Curley states that his aim was 'to make available a truly satisfactory edition, in translation, of Spinoza's work' (ix). Such an edition, he claims, must have six features. (1) It should provide 'good translations' which are accurate and readable. (2) It should be based on 'a good critical edition of the original texts.' (3) It should be 'as comprehensive as possible.' (4) It is 'extremely desirable that all the translations be by the same hand.' (5) The texts should be placed in chronological order. (6) It ought to provide the standard scholarly aids (ix-xii). In the limited space available, I shall try to give the reader a general idea of what Curley has done to satisfy these conditions.

The Prefaces to individual works give information about the historical background of the work, its relation to other works by Spinoza and other philosophers, the state of the text in the light of recent scholarship, and some of the main interpretive and philosophical issues. The Glossary-Index lists terms



that are important or troublesome to the translator. It consists of three sections. The first (English-Latin-Dutch) lists the English terms used in the translation; in many cases Curley briefly discusses alternative renderings and defends his own choice. The second section (Latin-Dutch-English) lists Latin terms with their Dutch and English equivalents. The third section (Dutch-Latin-English) gives Dutch terms from works written in Dutch or extant only in Dutch. In both the second and third sections references to Gebhardt are given for each term. The footnotes give information about textual variations, terminological problems, controversies among editors and commentators, glosses on terms and statements, references to works by Spinoza and others, and literary references. (There are 283 footnotes to the E alone.)

Curley's translations are based on Gebhardt's edition. Gebhardt was the first editor who systematically compared the *Opera Posthuma* and the *Nagelate Schriften* (NS). In recent years some of Gebhardt's texts have been superseded by publications of the Wereldbibliotheek, which has issued new editions of the Ep and KV (cf. pp. ix-xi). Curley has consulted these and compared them with Gebhardt's text. He occasionally departs from Gebhardt: he does not always adhere to Gebhardt's capitalization, he sometimes changes punctuation and paragraphs, and he uses brackets for doubtful passages (cf. pp. xiv-v).

As for the translations themselves, Curley's do not differ greatly from earlier ones. For example, he adheres to the standard practice of rendering Spinoza's Latin terms by English cognates or derivatives ('substance' for *substantia*, 'express' for *exprimere*, etc.). My general impression, from a comparison of selected passages, is that his versions are at least as accurate and readable as any of the others, and in some cases preferable. However, I am not always convinced that his choices are the best ones. For example, Curley translates *malus* by both 'bad' and 'evil.' 'Evil' is inaccurate, I think, because of its alien religious connotations, and the use of two English terms for one Latin term misleadingly implies that Spinoza has two different concepts. (Curley's reasons for using 'evil' — that Spinoza's definition of *malus* is 'deflationary' — is more a matter of interpretation than translation [cf. p. 636 s.v.].) 'Bad' seems preferable in all cases. Also, 'joy' and 'sadness' seem both too narrow and too strong for *laetitia* and *tristitia*. 'Pleasure' and 'pain' are the more usual renderings and express better Spinoza's basic idea that these affects are transitions to greater or lesser perfection (cf. EIIIP11Sch). Curley translates both *ideatum* and *objectum* by 'object.' But in some passages these terms seem to express quite different notions. For example, in EIA6 *ideatum* refers to the relationship between a true idea and what it is about, whereas in EIIP13 *objectum* refers to the relationship between an individual's mind and body. Finally, Curley's practice of adding articles, though often unavoidable, is sometimes risky, since it makes Spinoza's meaning more precise than it is. For example, in EID4 Curley renders *de substantia* by 'of a substance.' (Cf. pp. 408-9, note 2.) It seems better in these cases for the translator to allow the interpreter to decide the issue; accuracy demands that the original text, when vague, be left so.

As a whole, however, Curley's edition has been compiled with great care, thoroughness, and skill. We now have, at long last, the first part of a superb English edition of Spinoza's writings, with reliable, uniform translations and an extremely useful scholarly apparatus. All of this makes Curley's edition indispensable to students of Spinoza and modern philosophy. As an added feature, the book itself is well designed, carefully printed, and handsome in appearance.

JAMES C. MORRISON

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DAVID J. DEPEW and BRUCE H. WEBER, eds. *Evolution at a Crossroads: The New Biology and the New Philosophy of Science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1985. Pp. xiv + 267. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-262-04079-4.

Ernst Mayr has complained for many years that the philosophy of science is really the philosophy of the physical sciences. In his contribution to this volume, which results from a symposium held at California State University, Fullerton in 1983, he demonstrates once again how different the life sciences are from the physical sciences and argues that philosophers must account for this difference. Most of the contributors to this volume agree.

Marjorie Grene sketches a 'new philosophy of science' based on the assertion that scientific inquiries 'are only modifications of the kinds of inquiries all of us ... make about the world around us' (3). The result is an emphasis on science as a process whose historical and social context is an essential feature of its existence. Science is no longer viewed as an abstract logical structure.

Only one of the contributions to this volume falls clearly outside the broad outlines of this new philosophy of science. In contrast to many current philosophers of science, Francisco Ayala is of the opinion that theory reduction has occurred repeatedly in the history of science, and his concern is whether macroevolution is reducible to microevolution. He concludes that (1) microevolutionary processes operate in the taxa in which macroevolutionary processes are observed, (2) microevolutionary processes are sufficient to account for the macroevolutionary phenomena observed in higher taxa, and (3) theories concerning evolutionary trends and other macroevolutionary patterns cannot be derived from knowledge of microevolutionary processes given our present state of knowledge. Thus, Ayala is willing to admit the epistemological autonomy of macroevolution but unwilling to admit the possibility that



there are processes that operate on higher taxa, e.g., differential rates of speciation and extinction. By failing even to consider this possibility he is led to deny the importance of hierarchy and fails to address the most fundamental claim for the autonomy of macroevolution.

The remaining contributions fit more comfortably into the new philosophy of science. Richard Burian's lucid discussion of how our understanding of the gene has changed since the early part of this century should be of particular interest to philosophers interested in the problems of conceptual change in science. His emphasis on the practice of science and his demonstration that 'it is possible for scientists to exercise strong controls to ensure that they are referring to the same entity or entities in spite of very large differences in viewpoint, terminology, concepts, and theoretical commitments' (26) indicate how useful a study of the life sciences can be in addressing the problem of incommensurability and, by extension, how useful such studies are likely to be in other contexts in the philosophy of science.

Logical empiricism is emphatically absent from Robert Brandon's critique of genic selectionism. Instead of considering the abstract logical structure of adaptation explanations, Brandon uses an approach 'based on the logic of the questions to be answered' (86). He notes that adaptation explanations, unlike other evolutionary explanations, are answers to what-for questions and he concludes, contrary to proponents of genic selection, that adaptations are for the good of interactors, not replicators. Dyke's approach to understanding explanation, on the other hand, concentrates on the pervasiveness of closure conditions, i.e., the specification of the alternatives to be considered when offering an explanation. He points out that selection of the general features that we choose to use in an explanation involves a deep theoretical commitment. By choosing to regard certain features of a situation as relevant and to ignore others we have limited the types of explanations that can be offered.

This observation is echoed in Gunther Stent's discussion of the role of hermeneutics in the analysis of complex biological systems. The circuit diagram Stent and his colleagues produced for the neural network involved in generating the rhythmic contraction-distension pattern of the leech swimming response did not include all neurons that displayed an activity rhythm during swimming. When questioned why all neurons were not included, he replied that a theory of oscillatory networks had shown that not all of the neurons were necessary. The response was laughter. Most neurobiologists reject this approach and simulate their networks on a computer. Stent argues for the superiority of his approach because it allows him to understand and interpret the phenomena he sees.

Stuart Kauffman's paper may be of more interest to biologists than philosophers, but the philosophical implications are important. His analysis of the properties of gene regulatory networks suggests that there may be features of organismal construction that are a property simply of the way regulatory networks are put together. The implication is that because of the self-organizing, self-regulating properties of biological systems they may, in some sense, determine their own evolution. John Campbell's paper argues a

similar line, suggesting that not only phenotypic features of organisms can evolve but that the way in which an organism evolves can itself evolve. He proposes the existence of 'evolutionary drivers' — structures that enhance the ability of the species to evolve — and argues that 'when matter is appropriately organized, it becomes sensitive to causes arising from the future instead of just the past' (154). The existence of genetic variation that can control the response to changing selection pressures, e.g., modifiers of mutation rates and recombination rates, has been extensively documented; the case for a causal influence of the future on the present is less convincing.

The editors provide an interpretive overview and argue that the insights contributed by the authors in this volume show that a logical empiricist view of science is no longer tenable. Many of the specific propositions the contributors to this volume put forth can be argued, but it is difficult to dispute the general theme that pervades it. The logical empiricist view of science grew from a narrow attention to the logical structure of the physical sciences. The life sciences and the social sciences were either ignored or denigrated as non-scientific when they did not match the canons of deductive-nomological approaches to scientific explanation. When proper attention is paid to the life sciences a much richer understanding of the nature of science is possible, and the result will be liberating not only for biologists, but for all other scientists and non-scientists as well.

KENT E. HOLSINGER

*Ecology and Evolutionary Biology*  
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BIANCAMARIA FONTANA. *Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: The 'Edinburgh Review' 1802-1832*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. viii + 256. US\$34.50. ISBN 0-521-30335-4.

Whatever became of the Scottish Enlightenment? In one sense we all know the answer. It has become one of the academic growth industries of recent years, producing a steady flow of books, articles and conferences which shows no signs of letting up. But there is a more serious side to the question, one which provides 'the main historical issue' addressed by Fontana: 'What in fact became of the heritage of 18th-century Scottish social theory after the 1790s, when the centre of intellectual and political debate for Scottish intellectuals shifted gradually from Scotland to London, and the debate itself came to be



voiced by a British rather than a merely local, periodical press' (2)? The resulting study is a richly textured reconstruction of the intellectual and political travels of a trio of Scottish intellectuals — Francis Jeffrey, Francis Horner and Henry Brougham — who, together with the Englishman Sydney Smith, founded the *Edinburgh Review* in 1802. Pupils of Dugald Stewart, who had succeeded Adam Ferguson as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh in 1785 and was himself the pupil of Thomas Reid, successor to Adam Smith in the same Chair at Glasgow, the Reviewers were thus trained in the Scottish analysis of commercial society with its Smithian centrepiece, the elusive but critical connection between commerce and liberty.

Like so many of their contemporaries, their hopes of holding political office or even of successful professional careers were blighted by the reaction to events in France, and their energies were diverted to journalism and to the more difficult arena of oppositional politics at Westminster. Though phrasing it more politely, Fontana shows how, as provincials on the make in the national capital, the more politically active of the Reviewers were compelled to shift and compromise in their day-to-day political alignments. The real identity of the *Review*, Fontana argues, was intellectual rather than political. It consisted in a shared sense that 'political economy' as they had come to understand it in Edinburgh, could unlock the secrets of commercial society, and that the popular dissemination of its methods and findings was essential if the political classes were to sustain rather than impede the growing prosperity of Britain. Out of office themselves during the long years of Tory government, the *Review* was the chosen vehicle for their project.

Much of the philosophical interest of the book lies in its careful analysis of the confrontation of a 'system of ideas' with the complex realities of political and economic life. In this sense it both complements and greatly extends Donald Winch's analysis of the Reviewers in *That Noble Science of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983, chapter 1). Fontana argues that the Reviewers' response to the gaps that events in France exposed in Stewart's ideas or that the war and post-war economy showed up in the *Wealth of Nations* was essentially evasive. It consisted in fragmenting the systematic approach of their predecessors and calling for the development of separate sciences of politics, political economy and history. The chapter on political economy as a social science is particularly good, stressing the conceptual problems of the Reviewers' continued commitment to a 'philosophical' political economy and rejecting simplistic ideas of 'paradigm shift' in economic thought at this time. While the Reviewers' approach effectively responded to the early critics of 'system' like Burke, and made the *Review* a vehicle for attacks on the philosophic radicals (culminating, of course, in Macaulay's famous demolition of James Mill), Fontana rightly points out that it entailed a damaging failure to confront the specific methodological problems raised by the idea of separate social sciences. Modern philosophers who remain sceptical of such projects will find much useful material in these pages. Explanatory success or failure was much less important to the Reviewers than their 'commitment

to a belief in the political and human resources of modern society and its capacity to resolve the principal difficulties which it initially faced' (145).

Far less satisfactory is Fontana's treatment of a second question which supposedly animates the work as a whole: the extent to which 'political economy' really was a comprehensive political ideology, 'a consistent apology for the individualist and utilitarian values of the "bourgeoisie"' (9). While a good sense of the very complex ideological links and the internal fragmentation of political economy certainly does emerge, the question itself is an odd one and it is hardly surprising that it vanishes after the introduction. Ideological arguments of this kind are not to be settled by displays of historical erudition and the real puzzle is why the question should be asked at all. This book began life as a thesis for the Cambridge Ph.D. In spite of this handicap it is clearly, even stylishly, written throughout. It is thus a pity that the time-worn thesis device of flogging a dead horse was not edited out before publication. In all other respects it is an exemplary study, challenging the reader to confront central problems in the philosophy of the social sciences located in a detailed historical context.

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K. OKRUHLIK and J.R. BROWN, eds. *The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz*. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel 1985. Pp. 342. US\$49.50. ISBN 90-277-2145-9.

The present collection documents a shift in the orientation of current Leibniz scholarship away from the approach initiated by Russell at the beginning of the century and attempts to locate Leibniz's place with respect to the construction of modern physics in the 17th century, and to the problems in the analysis of space, time, causation, matter, and natural law which this entailed. No longer is it possible to maintain, as Russell did, that Leibniz's logic is the key to understanding his metaphysics.

The opening article by François Duchesneau investigates Leibniz's physical theories from the *Hypothesis Physica Nova*, which first brought him to the attention of the Royal Society. Duchesneau considers Leibniz's attempt to explain, by geometrico-physical postulates, real world motions, especially the problematic case of uniform circular motion, the difficulties he encoun-



tered, and his recourse to 'metaphysical' principles to supplement those of physics. These early texts are important for the light they shed on Leibniz's views on the radical incompleteness of physics, and on the early prototypes of the consciousness-laden metaphysical point — later the monad. Regrettably, the editors did not rework the article's English more thoroughly, making difficult material even more difficult.

Ian Hacking contributes a pointed, highly discussable paper on the problem of the reality of forces and the selection of physical hypotheses. Leibniz often insisted that although motion was relative to the observer and hence a 'phenomenon' (as were, by extension, space and time), force could be 'assigned unambiguously' and so qualified as real: but not *all* forces — not, in particular, Newton's centrifugal, centripetal, and gravitational forces — by contrast with *vis viva*. Hacking offers a criterion for 'reality,' stated in terms of invariance within all frames of reference, which he suggests Leibniz anticipated, without actually possessing.

Hacking's is one of several papers purporting to discuss Leibniz's scientific realism; he claims that 'Leibnizian doctrines go hand in hand with what in recent times we call the underdetermination of theory by phenomena.' William Seager, in 'Leibniz and Scientific Realism,' argues however that Leibniz's principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles together with his views on the 'subtlety of nature' indicate that an inner hidden structure *must* differentiate between rival theories, and that a fully unified science of nature is on this basis possible. A third article, by Richard Arthur, deals with the problem of the real, the phenomenal and the well-founded. How, he asks, can a monadic theory succeed in generating objects located in space and time? He goes on to discuss what he calls Leibniz's 'most complete account of his mature theory of time' in the *Initia Rerum Mathematica* of c. 1715, before taking us back to the better-known statements of the Clarke and de Volder correspondences.

Robert Butts has written an interesting paper. Claiming that 'Leibniz's metaphysics is at root a form of gnostic emanationism,' that bodies are, for him, not wholly unreal but 'infinitesimally real,' and that Leibniz's philosophy of science is 'instrumentalist' or 'antirealist,' Butts tries nevertheless to explain why Leibniz subscribes to such a strong version of the clockwork universe. But Leibniz's 'angels,' whose intellects find mechanical and only mechanical explanation acceptable, seem to me to be identical with Boyle's 'methodological angels' and thus devoid of any neo-Platonic ancestry, and Butts's claim that Leibniz's science, his 'alchemy,' 'would be the obstetrics of the world of the body' raises more questions that it can answer. But the paper rightly calls for attention to Leibniz's strong susceptibility to neo-Platonic trends and his links to the Protestant mystical tradition.

Several papers attempt to examine Leibniz's philosophy of science in its own terms: Okruhlik succeeds in giving a general orientation to Leibniz's conception of natural law, concentrating on the problem of the necessity and *a priori* deducibility of laws existing at various levels of generality. McRae looks at Leibniz's distinction between laws and miracles (including the 'continuous miracles': mind-body regulation à la Malebranche, gravity à la Newton) and



makes some unexpected extensions, arguing, for instance, that the laws of optics must hold true in all possible worlds. Mittelstrass contributes a valuable comparative study (the only one in the volume) which tackles the problem of Leibniz's and Kant's differing accounts of the structure, organization, and 'construction' of mathematical and philosophical knowledge. Mittelstrass presents in vivid terms what to my mind is the central methodological problem for Leibniz interpretation: How are Leibniz's ideas about the systematic unity of knowledge, his plan for an analytical encyclopedia showing the internal logical relations of all concepts compatible with the form of the *Monadology* which has seemed to many commentators — not the least of them Kant — to represent a projection beyond the outermost bounds of knowledge?

Only one paper, Graeme Hunter's, goes back to the text of the *Monadology* to reconsider the doctrines of relations, representation, and expression in a non-Russellian light. Daniel Garber goes further (perhaps) with the *Monadology*, presenting a theory described by the editors as 'perhaps revolutionary.' Garber's claim is that the *Monadology* is a work of old age: after losing his scientific creativity after the greater period of the 1690s, Leibniz displayed a pattern supposedly common in elderly scientists and converted to mysticism. In his earlier period, argues Garber, Leibniz conceived the laws of physics as governing 'a real world of quasi-Aristotelian substances' (q.v. organisms); in his later period, the real world becomes a community of spirits lying outside of space and time, with the laws of physics applicable merely to 'phenomena.' Revolutionary — but is it right? Why, then, in his supposedly 'realistic' period, does Leibniz write (in a set of notes ascribed to 1685-90) that 'Corporeal things are but shadows which flow away, glimpses, shapes, truly dreams ...?' But apart from the general thesis, which I do not find convincing, Garber's article is to be praised for its careful and noteworthy 'Aristotelian' reading of the *Discourse on Metaphysics*.

The book contains, in summary, a good mixture of generous speculation and safe scholarship, and some of the papers will clearly stimulate new lines of research. It is not, however, the definitive volume on Leibniz's natural philosophy. Many topics which belonged to 'natural philosophy' in the 17th century but which no longer belong to our 'physics' — such as the theory of organisms, natural kinds, and the problems of teleology, sensation and perception, and the status of hypotheses in science — are not discussed. Correspondingly, bold claims about Leibniz's 'realism' or 'anti-realism' seemed inspired by the topicality of the present realism controversy rather than by any careful study of the often-conflicting Leibnizian texts and their contexts. This at first appears to be a way of taking history seriously, but in fact it is just the opposite. Finally, the book would have profited from a once-over by a proof-reader with a knowledge of foreign languages (and, in some cases, English).

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ELIZABETH PRIOR. *Dispositions*. (Scots Philosophical Monographs, No. 7). Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University press 1985. Pp. 176. US\$17.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-08-032418-5); US\$11.50 (paper: ISBN 0-08-032419-3).

This book discusses, both historically and systematically, the analysis and ontology of dispositions. It argues that every disposition has a base, but that, contrary to some, the disposition is not to be identified with its base and is rather a second-order functional property.

Now, there is in fact a distinction, which no amount of argument can eliminate, between *dispositions* like solubility and *manifest or categorical properties* like dissolving. We see things dissolving, but not their solubility; sometimes our observings of dissolvings are non-veridical, but still we don't see solubility, not even non-veridically. However one eventually cashes it out, this makes for a distinction, but it also makes dispositions philosophically problematic in a way in which categorical properties are not. And dispositions are puzzling in other ways. Since Molière's satire of 'dormative powers' and Hume's philosophical analysis, the scientifically minded are inclined to reject the Aristotelian and rationalist doctrine that dispositions, as such, explain. Yet dispositions are tied into causal discourse — if something is soluble then its being in water will cause it to dissolve — and into subjunctive conditional discourse — if something is soluble then if it were in water it would dissolve.

Carnap discovered that if you explain 'solubility' as 'if in water then dissolves,' then the relevant sense of 'if-then' is not that of the horseshoe of material implication. This should not have been surprising, but a lot of ink was spilled trying to define dispositions, with many missing the obvious move that ties dispositions to causal laws — with which they are implicated anyway. We count ' $x$  is in water  $\supset x$  dissolves' as defining a disposition predicate only in case that there are generalizations like

(\*) For any sample  $x$  of sugar, if  $x$  is in water  $\supset x$  dissolves

which are (a) also laws and (b) in which the predicate appears. A Humean will offer a contextualist analysis of why a generalization like (\*) is a law; others will offer possible-world accounts; and in either case the tie-in with counterfactual discourse is made.

Without being explicit on the sort of account of (causal) laws that she would adopt, this is, on the whole, the solution for which Elizabeth Prior opts in this monograph published by the Scots Philosophical Club. I say 'on the whole' because Prior never in fact quite makes up her mind. For sometimes she speaks along the lines of an Aristotelian, in suggesting that the counterfactual conditional associated with the disposition needs a fact or entity to ground its truth, and that the disposition is that entity. Most of the time, however, her argument proceeds on straight-forward empiricist assumptions about disposition concepts being predicates that appear in causal laws, and that the counterfac-



tual implications are carried not by the disposition as such but by the law with which it is associated. On the other hand, it is never entirely clear, and one must say that the level of clarity often falls short of what one would expect of a monograph that is already the revised (improved?) successor of a thesis. One consequence, for example, of the unclarity about whether she is for or against Aristotle is that the historical discussions of such figures as Aristotle and Hobbes never really focus on the issues that divide (do we go with Molière and Hobbes in denying, or with Aristotle in affirming, that dispositions are unanalyzable powers which, as such, have explanatory force?); these discussions therefore remain at a level of superficiality that is difficult to excuse.

Prior argues that since not every individual is soluble, there must be a property of individuals such that whenever things *of that sort* are in water they dissolve. Since no disposition is true of every object, there must be a *relevant sort* for every disposition; this is its *basis*, and much of the essay revolves around characterizing this basis. The argument here is a simple application of Mill's Methods. It allows that there might be disjunctive bases; and, indeed, Prior insists upon this, arguing that the same disposition, e.g., solubility, can have many different sorts of bases in different sorts of objects. But if ' $P \vee Q$ ' can be the causal basis licensed by the causal argument, then so can the logically equivalent ' $\sim P \supset Q$ ,' which is dispositional provided only that it appears in law-statements — which it will, since its relevance is justified by Mill's Methods. Prior asserts that all bases are categorical, but in the end offers as argument only the absence of contrary evidence; alas, there is the contrary evidence just presented, and, while it is there in the text, Prior does not notice it. At the same time, she also misses the central point that if a disposition-term is to be predicated of an object in the absence of its manifestation, then this must be done by means of (i) a law, and (ii) categorical = observable properties of the object. If one attempts, as Prior does, to distinguish between categorical and dispositional properties in terms of the latter being tied in with counterfactuals, then one runs afoul of the point of D.H. Mellor that even categorical properties are tied in with counterfactuals (e.g., the categorical property of triangularity is tied in with the counterfactual that if the corners were counted they would be three). Prior attempts to reply to Mellor in a passage published previously; the latter publication was accompanied by a reply by Mellor, which is, however, brashly ignored. It is not a tie to counterfactuals that distinguishes dispositions from categorical properties, but rather a distinction between what one cannot and can observe; but Prior, for whatever reasons, neither pursues nor even recognizes this point.

Prior's argument that every disposition has a categorical basis is an application of Mill's Methods. She does not, however, recognize the presuppositions of that argument. In particular, as we all know about those Methods, they presuppose for their success that the Principle of Determinism is true. Prior is vaguely aware of this, but totally misses the need also for the Principle of Limited Variety. Having argued that dispositions have a categorical basis by appeal, in effect, to the Principle of Determinism, she then argues that this basis cannot be identified with the disposition itself; rather, dispositions



are complex functional properties defined by means of quantification over other properties. Schematically,  $x$  is soluble if and only if:

(\*\*\*)  $(\exists f) [x \text{ is } f \ \& \ (y) (y \text{ is } f \supset (y \text{ is in water} \supset y \text{ dissolves}))]$

where this will count as defining a disposition only in case that the generalization in the definiens is a law. In making this proposal, Prior is taking up a suggestion made previously by L. Addis ('Dispositions, Explanation, and Behavior,' *Inquiry*, 24 [1981] 205-7), but it is in any case unsatisfactory. For it is a tautology that an  $f$  of the sort required by (\*\*\*) exists. (\*\*\*) can be made non-trivial only if a conjunct is added to the effect that

$f$  is  $\mathcal{F}$

Where  $\mathcal{F}$  is some generic constraint. This is, of course, precisely the sort of constraint required by the Principle of Limited Variety, so one is not surprised that Prior misses the need for it.

There are many other gaps in the argument, and throughout the discussions fall well short of the standard set by, say, Harré and Madden's *Causal Powers*. Moreover, it is necessary to remark upon the extraordinary abundance of typographical errors. A not very apt performance by the author, by the supervisor of the doctoral thesis from which the book evolved, by the proof-reader, and by the members of the Scots Philosophical Club who edit the series in which the volume appears.

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THOMAS PUTTFARKEN. *Roger de Piles' Theory of Art*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1985. Pp. xii + 144. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-300-03356-7.

JOHN C. GILMOUR. *Picturing the World*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1986. Pp. xi + 214. US\$29.50. ISBN 0-88706-092-7.

Roger de Piles' writings on the theory and criticism of painting span a period of about forty years, from roughly 1670 to 1709, the year of his death. These writings contain discussions of many issues relevant to the theory of painting, and art in general: representation and imitation, the possibility of correct

perspective, how the process of perceiving a work of art compares with the process of perceiving the world, and the relation between subject matter and surface qualities of the picture plane. Puttfarken has produced a carefully and economically written book analyzing de Piles' ideas on topics which continue to challenge anyone interested in the process of perceiving and appreciating paintings as works of art.

One of de Piles' major objectives was to liberate the theory of painting from the theory of literature. He sought to do this by analyzing our interest in and pleasure from painting in visual terms, independently of its subject matter. Nevertheless, he accepted the definition of painting as the imitation of visible objects. This created a problem: he wanted to argue that there was a pleasure produced by distinctively visual means, yet he could not employ the twentieth century notion of 'pure form' (even if he had had it) because pure form is external to his definition of painting as imitation. Instead, he pointed out that lines, colors, shapes, and shading are the means of depicting individual objects within a painting. They also, by virtue of their relationships with each other, create a unity of the painting as a whole. This 'unity of the object' (*Oeconomie du Tout-ensemble*, or *disposition*) is opposed to the 'unity of the subject (matter)' which was touted as the most important part of painting by his predecessors in the French Academy. De Piles argued that a painting's *disposition* pleases the eye by allowing it to exercise its inclination to identify what it sees so *easily*. Thus, a painting with pictorial unity gives pleasure to the eye by ensuring that it will fulfill its function which is to identify the subject of the painting.

However, a painting should not merely produce pleasure, but it should also grab the viewer's attention and interest at a single glance, producing what de Piles calls 'enthusiasm.' The painting overwhelms us at first sight, and arouses our interest so that we will subsequently exercise our understanding in contemplating the subject matter. This further contemplation takes mental preparation, time, and effort, but is sparked by the enthusiasm produced, by purely visual means, even in the unprepared passive spectator.

De Piles was concerned with the complicated relationships between the characteristics of objects a painting represents, qualities of the painting itself, and the effect of the latter on the perceiver. Like other seventeenth century philosophers, he wrestled with the distinction between qualities that are 'in the object' and those that are 'in us.' Properly speaking, imitation is a quality of the work and illusion is its effect on us, but Puttfarken tends to conflate the two (63, 119). Harmony and enthusiasm are likewise sometimes treated as qualities of the work and sometimes as effects on us (119-20). Enthusiasm, like pleasure, is supposed to be produced by the work's *disposition*, which is the medium for communicating the painter's enthusiasm to the spectator. But how *disposition* produces this effect in addition to producing mere pleasure is not examined. I suspect de Piles did not have such an explanation, which would indicate a major theoretical gap which is glossed over in order to emphasize the sophistication his ideas do have. Moreover, Puttfarken surprisingly claims that the paradoxical fact that we receive pleasure from tragedy was



not perceived as paradoxical to thinkers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because any paradox was removed by their concept of illusion (52). This makes it mysterious why Hume and others felt the problem sufficiently vexing to write about it. But these are relatively minor quibbles with a book intended for, and useful to, those with a serious interest in the theory of painting.

Gilmour's book is also about painting, but intended more for the student than for the serious scholar. Gilmour espouses views not only on perception, but also on truth, objectivity, expressing emotion, and the relationships between painting, language and culture.

Chapter one contains a proposal for a 'non-absolutist' or 'relativist' conception of truth: artistic creativity and imagination, whose insights are multiple and conflicting, provide knowledge of reality just as science does. Chapters two and three discuss how painting expresses emotions and explore analogies between art and language. Gilmour criticizes 'objectivist' accounts of feelings as private momentary eruptions whose nature is completely revealed to consciousness, and defends the view that they are dialectical outgrowths of the artist's understanding of self and culture.

Merleau-Ponty and Roman Jakobson (on language), Clifford Geertz (on culture), and Hans Georg Gadamer and John Dewey provide philosophical ammunition for chapters four through six. We interpret the world from a perspective within the space we seek to understand. The character of our experience is due to language and other forms we have to express it. Artists' experiences and acts have no meaning independently of their own past, and an artwork has no meaning independently of art historical tradition. Hence, a work's expressive power derives from our collective life. To identify the style of a work is to diagnose what cultural structures serve as its sources. Diagnosis is necessary, since artworks contain meanings which are not exhibited on their surfaces.

Chapters seven and eight again focus on truth. An individual's fragmentary experience of cultural practices provides access to the world, rather than a barrier to understanding it. Art, likewise, discloses totality through the ambiguous and the fragmentary. There is never a single, 'true' interpretative framework for analyzing art, self, or culture. Invoking Nietzsche, Gilmour argues that we are all creators, just as we (as members of a community) make (not discover) morality.

This is a very frustrating book. Gilmour has a great deal of interest to say about painting and about philosophy. Much of his discussion would be stimulating, and useful, not only to students but to professional philosophers as well. But the book's virtues tend to get smothered by the broader metaphysical agenda. Gilmour tries to make artworks themselves raise questions about the nature of reality, when in fact it is his views about the nature of truth, reality, and objectivity which color his views about the nature of art. Creativity, imagination, and interpretation appear to be the real subject matter of the book, and not truth, reality, and knowledge. Emphasis on the latter even leads Gilmour to court inconsistency when he asserts that science and art make differ-



ent contributions to understanding (12, 159), since it has been his primary mission to break down the dichotomy between them.

Gilmour wants to make the point that there is no reality, or truth, apart from our attempt to understand it. But I find myself continually asking what it *is* that we are attempting to understand. Gilmour in fact invites us to think this way when he says that experience is fragmentary (implying that there *is* some totality of which this is a fragment), or (following Ricoeur) that truth is the *ideal* of all thought, an ideal which can only be partially fulfilled (158-9). He thus seems to presuppose the existence of some 'objective truth,' the very supposition which he criticizes others (such as Gombrich) for making.

Another drawback to the book is that Gilmour gives his philosophical opposition such short shrift. In chapter three, for instance, he comes out strongly against formalism, without ever telling us what version of formalism he is objecting to. 'Objectivist,' or perhaps what would better be called 'realist' theories of truth, meaning, perception, and emotion are all given the most simplistic of descriptions. There isn't a 'realist' account of emotions going today which takes emotions to be private momentary experiences. Gilmour's own account of emotion as a dialectical process of clarification fails to distinguish between what an emotion *is* and what contributes to one's developing awareness of it. Expressions like the 'becoming of feeling' make it look like the emotion *changes* as artists examine themselves and their culture through working with the materials of art, but expressions like the 'clarification of feeling' make it look like the emotion stays the same but the artist's understanding of it changes. But what contributes to one's understanding of the emotion (say, knowledge of oneself and one's cultural heritage) does not necessarily change the emotion itself, i.e., *what* one seeks to understand.

Gilmour's attempt to dissolve traditional dichotomies between the subjective and objective, reason and feeling, creativity and truth, representation and expression has the disconcerting effect of making the second of each of these pairs of concepts disappear into what it is ordinarily contrasted with. This is all part of the dialectic, no doubt, but syntheses tend to generate new dichotomies, for reasons Gilmour well understands: things are understood in relation to their contrasts. Maybe we can retain the concept of truth while jettisoning the distinction between the true and the false (167), but what then is truth to be contrasted with? Certainly not creativity, since one of his major theses is that creativity and imagination give access to truth just as science does. We can never know what things are until we are able to distinguish them clearly from what they are *not*, and this Gilmour does not do.

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JOHN RAJCHMAN and CORNEL WEST, eds. *Post-Analytic Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press 1985. Pp. xxx + 275. US\$35.00. ISBN 0-231-06066-1.

American philosophy is in transition. In the last decade a number of the most influential philosophers began to do philosophy differently and when the standard bearers change, the discipline changes. *Post-Analytic Philosophy* is an anthology designed to describe and document this truly significant development, and, as such, it is itself significant. But how, beyond this, it is important is a more complicated issue.

According to the text, the configuration of American philosophy is changing, and the overall effect is a movement toward diversity and away from an earlier uniformity of logical positivism and analytic philosophy. This has happened because some eminent analytic philosophers have moved on to more indeterminant styles, because some styles which previously were given marginal regard have become central, because topics which previously were ignored have become important, and because themes and topics are being reassembled in new disciplines, a phenomenon the anthropologist Clifford Geertz called blurred genres.

No single text could adequately capture such amorphous change. In attempting so much, it is no surprise that this book falls short. Its list of authors is controversial; that one would expect. But more pertinantly, a number of the articles do not illustrate the theme well and a few of them are fairly marginal pieces of work.

The primary merit of the book and what makes it worth considering is the preface. Absent the preface and the articles included would not, on their own, give the reader any clear idea of what the book represents. So we must turn to Rajchman's discussion to learn the character of the change and, hence, the meaning of the articles. Though not explicitly endorsed, this analysis is a Rortyan portrayal of the contemporary philosophical and intellectual scene.

According to the preface, the most widely agreed upon feature of the change is negative: the older orthodoxy, analytic philosophy, is spent. Its key assumptions, the 'dogmas of empiricism' were debunked by Quine and Davidson, and its programme, what Danto calls the Analytic of Concepts, is bankrupt. In Putnam's diagnosis, it failed because it had no measure of success; it had no notion of what would count as a solution to a problem. This negative conclusion has consensus. But what has or is in process of replacing the old orthodoxy? The first section of the text, the 'Introduction,' contains articles by Rorty, Putnam, Thomas Nagel, and Bernstein. They are meant not only to illustrate the negative claim but also to exhibit features of the new style. But again, because the articles are so heterogeneous, we must rely on Rajchman's preface to determine what they are supposed to illustrate by way of the new.

The specialized, professionalized quality of American philosophy is being left behind. In its place is a proliferation and merger of types of inquiry and this has led to new lines of thought. In Rorty's view, which the editor guard-



edly shares, 'academic neo-Kantian epistemologically-centered philosophy' is bankrupt and with that goes its demarcations of the disciplines. But no new parceling has occurred. Instead problems and methods rapidly come and go and about all that continues is a style that resembles a 'generalized legalistic expertise' (skill with cases, arguments, claims, cross examination, etc.). Thus the idea that there is a perennial philosophy, that philosophy consists of a set of enduring 'problems,' is rejected. While some eminences still subscribe to that view, many contemporaries see those 'problems' as the products of ideas and obsessions of a given historical era, as by-products of historical agenda. In the preface's view, there must be a rethinking of the disciplines and the question becomes 'what are the successor subjects.' The anthology answers this question in its second, third and fourth sections.

The remaining three sections of the text, illustrating the new concentrations are: 'Literary Culture,' 'Science,' and 'Moral Theory.' These areas give double testimony to change, since, in addition to a new style, the first especially and to a lesser extent the third, are areas where the older orthodoxy either did no writing or assigned the topic lesser importance. The second is different not because it is 'Science' but because science is now differently conceived.

Of these chapters, 'the Literary Theory' section makes the best case that new areas are emerging and that the style of philosophy is changing. Instead of the 'problems of philosophy,' Cavell and Danto show the broader high culture as grist for reflection. The third article, Harold Bloom's, is marginal to the book's theme.

The article by Kuhn in the 'Science' section illustrates current interest in the history of science and the one by Hacking shows the presence of historicist influences on the interpretation of science. The third article, Davidson's 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,' is regarded as an instigator of the change to post-analytic philosophy.

The 'Moral Theory' section is a bit of a puzzle. Both the book's dust cover and the preface refer to this section as 'political theory.' Perhaps the double designation says something about the 'successor subject'; perhaps it is bad editing. In any case, the articles by Rawls and Scanlon are typical efforts; Sheldon Wolin's alone is unconventional. Given that this section deals with ethics, it is a major omission to have nothing here on 'applied ethics.' The vast amount of current work there meets all the conditions of the book's thesis of change.

The last entry in the book is an afterword from the co-editor, Cornel West. Though provocative, it is somewhat discordant with the theme of the book. It assails what it sees as the ideological conservatism of Rorty and, more generally, of what it calls the philosophy of the North Atlantic civilization.

If the book's strength is its theme, its execution is a mixed success. Many of the articles selected are on target. But some show nothing new, some are lesser efforts of pertinent authors, some authors are less pertinent to the theme and some authors and areas clearly pertinent have been omitted. In fairness, though, the book's weaknesses are, in many ways, a product of its very difficult aim. It is inherently problematic to present anything as diffuse as a shift to



a new practice, especially when it is in process and the landmarks are not yet that clear. Perhaps the text is best seen as an entry in the Rortyeian project of 'continuing the conversation.'

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NICHOLAS RESCHER, ed. *Current Issues in Teleology*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1986. Pp. x + 135. US\$9.25. ISBN 08191-5199-8.

The twelve papers in this volume are from a 1984 conference on 'Teleology in Natural Science.' As might be expected, the quality of the papers is uneven. The papers deal with teleological issues in biology (7), psychology (2) and cosmology (2). A final paper assesses the extent to which teleological analyses avoid the problem of reverse causation. Michael Boylan's paper, 'Monadic and Systemic Teleology,' distinguishes between monadic teleological accounts which explain the behavior of X in terms of the purpose of X and systemic teleological accounts which explain the behavior of X in terms of X's place within a larger system. These latter accounts, Boylan argues, show that there is no conflict between necessity and teleology in explaining the operation of interacting hierarchical systems. William Bechtel's paper, 'Functional Analyses and Hierarchical Organization,' is a stimulating analysis of the difference between teleological or organizational accounts of function and localizational reductive accounts, e.g., by Cummins. The former is a multilevel approach, where components of system become teleological insofar as they serve functions within the larger system. The latter approach ignores the hierarchical organization of nature. The alleged advantage of multilevel analyses is that they afford a clear distinction between functional processes, which help the system deal with its environment, and other causal processes which do not. Jonathan Jacobs ('Teleological Form and Explanation') argues that biological entities have teleological constitutions. Each organism is a member of a natural kind and its ontogenetic development is to be understood in terms of its realizing its natural essence. Unlike the other papers in this volume, Jacob's paper focuses on the fact that individual organisms with life histories are teleological entities independently of their evolutionary histories. Michael Ruse ('Teleology and the Biological Sciences') sees the modern role of teleology in biological science as stemming from Darwin's attempt to explain the apparent design in nature by appealing to natural selection. Questions of teleol-



ogy arise when one asks what the function or purpose a part or process plays. In biology, the name of the game is survival and reproduction. Parts and processes have functions insofar as they have been shaped by natural selection towards those ends. Without committing himself to the excesses of pan-selectionism, which sees design and function everywhere in nature, Ruse argues that the teleological mode of thought is here to stay. Alex Rosenberg ('Intention and Action Among the Macromolecules') defends the use of intentional language in biochemistry (e.g., 'selfish' genes) as both natural and unavoidable. It is natural because the behavior of macromolecules has enough structural overlap with the behavior of intentional agents to warrant the extension of intentional descriptions to molecules. As causal attributions, the situation is more complicated. Intentional descriptions of macromolecular behaviors are nonliteral because, unlike intentional descriptions of human behavior, the former can be replaced, without loss of content, by non-intentional descriptions. But they are not metaphorical either. Rather, they involve subtle implicit redefinitions of the intentional terms rather like Dawkins' explicit redefinition of the term 'selfish' to apply to genes. Rosenberg sees great virtue in Dawkins' move and also in the implicit moves being made by the biochemists insofar as such redefinitions augur well for the prospects of molecular explanations of mental phenomena (themselves suitably redescribed in terms of the redefined intentional vocabulary). Rosenberg is defending a version of eliminative materialism. Intentional phenomena, commonly understood, are like phlogiston and caloric, not to be understood in terms of physical processes but rather as something to be abandoned as science advances. Rosenberg's endorsement of this view represents an article of faith about the future development of biochemistry and physiological psychology. He sees a faster convergence of molecular biology and psychology than do I. Kristen Shrader-Frechette's paper, 'Organismic Biology and Ecosystems Ecology: Description or Explanation,' addresses the problem of how to understand the role of species and organisms in the light of their alleged contribution to the ecosystem. She seeks to determine when such holistic approaches are heuristically fruitful and when they are merely obscurantist metaphysics. It is not clear that a general answer to this question is possible. Her methodological suggestions are quite tame. 'Organic Teleology,' by Mohan Matthen and Edwin Levy, deals with teleological descriptions and explanations of the working of the immune system. Merely causal accounts leave out the functional characterization. For this one needs teleological accounts which are intentional. The immune system should be construed as making 'decisions' based on 'evidence.' All such systems are prone to error. When the immune system 'mistakenly' attacks cells of the host body, this is due to the inevitable fallibility of the immune system and does not indicate a malfunction or maladaptation. These intentional characterizations are justified because evolution can give 'meaning' to biological states, in general, and immune system states, in particular. The articles by George Gale ('Whither Cosmology: Anthropic, Anthropocentric, Teleological?') and John Leslie ('The Scientific Weight of Anthropic and Teleological Principles') deal with the anthropic principle as used in modern cosmology. The princi-



ple comes in several versions, but the basic idea is that the universe is as it is because we human observers are here to observe it. Gale distinguishes between a weak version, which is non-explanatory and stronger versions, which are explanatory but are also, for the most part, anthropocentric and teleological and, thus, out of step with modern trends in physical science. Leslie thinks both the weak and the strong versions are important, although both are best stated as tautologies. The idea is that the anthropic principles place constraints on when and where observers can appear in the universe. He enunciates a super-weak version: if the origin of life requires very improbable events, then such events have occurred. None of these principles seems particularly important or explanatory. Suppose all observing life forms are carbon based. Can we then explain *why* the universe contains carbon by appealing to the fact that observing life forms exist? Well, yes, but ... Lester Embree ('Teleology in Human-Scientific and Natural-Scientific Psychology and Psychotechnics') uses a phenomenological approach to distinguish four species of teleology with respect to the psychology of organisms. Finally, Lowell Nissen ('Natural Functions and Reverse Causation') examines the views of Wright, Woodfield and Ruse and concludes that none has successfully dealt with the spectre of reverse causation in teleological accounts.

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RAPHAEL SASSOWER. *Philosophy of Economics: A Critique of Demarcation*. Lantham MD: University Press of America 1985. Pp. xx + 217. US\$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-5041-X); US\$11.75 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-5042-8).

The demarcation problem is a standard one in the philosophy of science. Given that there is a difference between science and nonscience, according to what criteria can we draw the line between the two? Then, given the criteria, which disciplines, subjects or areas of endeavour fall within the ambit of science?

The so-called 'social sciences' have traditionally been an object of study within the demarcation problem: Are they really sciences or not? Until fairly recently, strangely enough, economics has not been a major focus of this debate. Was this because economics — the most robust, highly developed, quantified and structured of the 'social sciences' — seemed unproblematically scientific, in contrast with sociology, anthropology or history? Whatever the reason for this neglect, the philosophy of economics is now a growth indus-

try and is receiving some of the same treatment formerly lavished on the philosophy of physics.

One of the seminal articles in recent discussions was Milton Friedman's 'The Methodology of Positive Economics.' The heart of Friedman's claim was that neo-classical economics is empirically testable at, and — a more dubious claim — only at, the level of its theorems; and therefore is a positive science. The debate has moved on from Friedman's quasi-positivistic framework to a more Lakatosian one in which it is the empirical testability of the whole research program of neo-classical economics, rather than its particular theorems and postulates, that is in question. As a base note continuo against these sharper notes, is the rumble of the Marxist tympanists beating out their criticisms of neo-classical economics as bourgeois, ideological, pseudo-science.

It is into this general context that Sassower has inserted himself. In the five main chapters of the book, he examines six conditions that, severally, might be considered as *sufficient* conditions for something's being a science: quantification, the use of models, prediction, graphical representation, a reliance on psychology and a connection with politics. The book also contains a Preface, Introduction, Summary, Conclusion, two Appendices (one on the history of definitions of 'political economy,' and the other on the controversy about whether there is a continuity between Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* and his *Wealth of Nations*, a Bibliography and two Indices (of names and of subjects).

I am sorry to say that the book does not make an important contribution to its field. It reads as if it were a not particularly noteworthy doctoral thesis.

For instance, it no doubt shows an acquaintance with the literature in the field, indeed a familiarity with a wide range of historical material in philosophy and economics. This knowledge is exhibited chapter by chapter where, in each case, there is a preliminary section giving some historical background and other sections discussing the methodological views of some economist or other. Thus Hobbes and Spinoza are discussed as background in Chapter 1 on quantification; Keynes' theory is introduced in Chapter 2 on models; and so on.

Some of these insertions seem idiosyncratic — which would have been all right provided they were brilliant, insightful or productively provocative, as these on the whole are not. For example, Chapter 3 'Predictions,' which deals with a central question, that of empirical testability, starts with a discussion of biblical prophecy, then wanders into theories of probability. I found the background discussion for Chapter 4, 'Graphical Representation,' informative, particularly on Otto Neurath's ISOTYPE method, which was unfamiliar to me. But on the whole the discussions are too brief and sketchy to be of help to the truly uninformed, and will appear to those who regard themselves as the *cognoscenti* as exegetically jejeune. There are references in the Bibliography and Preface to the work of Hahn and Hollis, Blaug, Dyke, Hausman, Boland and Caldwell, but this body of work, at the leading edge of the field, is not given any proper discussion.

My chief objection, however, is to the argument of the book — and that in two respects.



First, the structure of the general argument. Each of the criteria is considered separately as a possible sufficient condition for economics being scientific, rather than as one *necessary* condition or as one of a *set* of conditions that are jointly sufficient. This often makes Sassower's self-assigned task like shooting ducks on a pond. How plausible is it that being capable of graphical representation, or being capable of use for political purposes, is *sufficient* for something's being a science?

Sassower does not claim that economics is *not* a science, nor does he deny that some *combination* of the conditions he examines might comprise a set of conditions constituting a sufficient criterion (169-170). Thus the interesting and difficult questions are simply not addressed.

Second, I object to the quality of the argument, taken retail rather than wholesale. For example, this quotation adequately reflects the gist of the argument against testability as a sufficient criterion — a central, traditional and plausible claim. 'This view fails to acknowledge the tentative nature of economic predictions, and that some economic predictions are self-affecting. Lastly, this view fails to take into account the political (and moral) use (or abuse) that can be made of economic predictions in the name of science' (97). We might as well argue: physics makes tentative (probabilistic) predictions and is capable of political or moral abuse, since it can be used in the production of atomic weapons; therefore its predictive power is not sufficient to make it a science. (Except for a footnote, the second, and possibly important, point about self-affecting predictions is not even discussed.)

Between the lines, Sassower seems to be groping toward the view that there is no sharp line between normative and positive economics. Were that this *apercu* were adequately developed.

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HUGH J. SILVERMAN and DON IHDE, eds. *Hermeneutics and Deconstruction*. Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, 10. Albany: State University of New York Press 1985. Pp. xi + 309. US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-979-5); US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-980-9).

According to Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, 'Mr. Elphinston talked of a new book that was much admired, and asked Dr. Johnson if he had read it. Johnson: "I have looked into it." "What, (said Elphinston) have you not read it through?"

Johnson, offended at being thus pressed, and so obliged to own his cursory mode of reading answered tartly, "No, Sir, do *you* read books *through*?" This is a legitimate question to ask of any book, but especially with respect to collections of previously unpublished essays by diverse hands, one might well wonder, does anyone read them through? Not very often, I imagine — but that does not settle the question of their value.

*Hermeneutics and Deconstruction* possesses the geographical features typical of its kind. What Silverman and Ihde have assembled is not a 'proceedings,' since they have gathered papers not from one but three meetings of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (1981-83), and then too they have selected only papers relevant to the topic announced in their title. Yet, despite this laudable selectivity, *Hermeneutics and Deconstruction* exhibits the peaks and valleys that usually make reading through such compilations a rollercoaster ride of satisfaction and disappointment. Most of the contributors appear to have substantially revised and fleshed out their oral papers before going into print; others evidently did not.

Fortunately, none of the authors took the opportunity to pit hermeneutics — SuperBowl style — against deconstruction. Although in his Introduction Hugh Silverman (ix) suggests that 'these two different ways of philosophy are, to a large extent, mutually exclusive,' it might be somewhat more accurate to say that they are mutually exclusive only to a small extent. Perhaps, indeed, since each is subject to the other, deconstruction and hermeneutics are, to the maximum extent, mutually inclusive. Happily, in any case, the temptation to confront, say, Gadamer and Derrida, as twin Manichaean deities, is here resisted.

The twenty essays in the collection are distributed in seven subdivisions, including two specifically on hermeneutics and three oriented to Derrida and deconstruction. The fourth section, on 'Narrative Discourse and History,' contains two good pieces by Carr and Blanchard, but they seem somewhat tangential and isolated. Part I includes two of the best essays, by Bernd Magnus and Thomas Seeböhm writing on 'The End of Philosophy.' Since the very topic encourages fuzziness, it is particularly refreshing when Magnus, for example, begins in a very simple and therefore very difficult way: 'There are many senses in which philosophy may be said to be brought to an end, and may even be said not to exist at all any longer; and it would help to get clear on some of these senses' (2).

Of course, 'getting clear' on the meaning of the end of philosophy, as Magnus reminds us, is itself one way of doing philosophy — and therefore of resurrecting it in the very act of inspecting its bier. But, too, for that very reason, it is a dubious resurrection, for the value of (analytic or Cartesian) clarity, however obvious to some, cannot be presumed universal. That is, it cannot be assumed that dividing the light from the darkness will remain a value after the end of philosophy.

The fact is that the reader of *Hermeneutics and Deconstruction*, as of other books on these topics, must be prepared to endure a great deal of smog. Some of it, I am convinced, is salutary and invigorating. But there is always the task



of separating the smoke that hints of fire from the fogs and mists that are mere vapors of the brain. In 'Hermeneutics and the History of Being,' Werner Marx very helpfully explicates one of Heidegger's more opaque logisms, *Seinsgeschichte*. This essay cannot be accused of clarity, but then a really clear exposition of this idea might well be suspected of being reductively simplistic. So too Rodolphe Gasche's essay 'Quasi-Metaphoricity and the Question of Being' is especially to be recommended since it possesses the kind of density that rewards attention.

Not all of the pieces in the collection can claim this merit. Gayle Ormiston (258) specifically alludes to her doubts about the virtue of Cartesian clarity in her essay 'Binding Withdrawal.' Yet, however laudable the attempt, she does not succeed in superseding clarity and distinctness but manages only to disguise them in an objectionably precious, posturing, self-preening prose. Having appropriated Derrida's most glaring tics and mannerism, Ormiston's essay exemplifies the truth of Oscar Wilde's remark that 'imitation can be made the sincerest form of insult.'

Nancy Holland's 'close reading' of Derrida on Heidegger avoids this fault, as do the other pieces by John Caputo and Thomas Sheehan in this first-rate section, titled 'Heidegger's Critique of Derrida.' Each of these essays evidences the respect for Derrida that he surely deserves, while tempering any impulse to adulation with the acknowledgement that Heidegger continues to exert his force in and even against deconstruction.

I have not attempted to mention all the contributions that deserve reading in this collection (those by Michael Murray and Joseph Margolis, for example). Certainly there are more than enough to them to merit publication and purchase of the volume. I must, finally, however, add a word of regret that the book was not more carefully proofread. The contents page lists Gasche's essay in Part V though it occurs in Part VI of the body; and distracting typos swarm through the book like ants, sometimes two and three to a page. Nevertheless, *Hermeneutics and Deconstruction* is undoubtedly well worth reading, though perhaps not quite reading through.

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JOCELYNE SIMARD. *Sentir, se sentir, consentir*. (Coll. 'Propositions philosophiques') Montréal: Ed. de l'Hegagone, 1985. 98 pp. 10.95\$Cdn. ISBN 2-89006-235-X.

'Sentir,' un peu comme si nous pouvions emprunter la traversée des apparences, pour trouver un peu de sens. Cela ne semble guère rimer avec connaître aujourd'hui. Mais attention ! Cela peut désigner toute autre chose. Pour comprendre ce qu'est sentir et notre nature d'êtres jouissants et souffrants, il faudrait retourner au discours amoureux de la divine *sophia*. Il ne suffit pas, bien sûr, de désigner la sensibilité comme dans les dictionnaires de philosophie moderne. Non, nous ne sommes pas passifs lorsque quelque chose nous affecte. Selon la thèse de l'auteure, sentir c'est 'être' la sensation ou le sentiment. Mais c'est toujours aussi 'se' sentir, 'faire l'expérience de soi' et de la subjectivité de l'être. Comme l'avait bien dit Aristote, l'acte unique et commun du sensible et du sentant est le lieu de notre surgissement. Ressentir quelque chose, plus précisément, c'est pouvoir 'tout sentir' (C. Castanéda), c'est l'acte d'un 'courant d'être,' un contact corps-monde, une 'structure ontologique fondamentale' dans laquelle il faut s'engager tout entier (S. Weil, J. Wahl et M. Henry). Cette expérience du transcendant rejoint un peu le concept de *kouan* du Taoïsme et du Zen. De plus, il faut dire que la réalité du monde provient de ce que nous en éprouvons. L'affectivité est donc l'essence de la sensibilité (M. Henry, A. Nin et F. Aliqué).

'Se sentir,' un peu comme ce qui a trait à ce que nous voudrions que la vie soit et qu'elle ne peut être sans nous. Se sentir constitue l'affectivité. L'accession au sentiment du soi est en effet ressentie comme un bien quasi inatteignable, mais auquel nul ne peut renoncer sans mourir (M. Heidegger et K. Jung). Nous sommes toujours, ironise l'auteure, des 'être-en-chômage-de soi,' et nous n'avons de nos jours comme seule 'assurance ontologique' que la sécurité d'emploi. Mais se sentir vraiment, c'est 'se découvrir en situation,' et, ce n'est que lorsque nous sommes affectés (ouverts au monde) que notre soi parvient à s'affirmer, à 'être' le sentiment. L'affectivité est donc aussi le pouvoir de révélation de soi (M. Henry). Cependant, cette quête de soi n'est rien sans une quête du Soi, sans la présence de ce désir qui à la fois nous attire et que nous choisissons de suivre de plein gré, sans ce 'Centre de gravité,' ce grand frisson, que nous appelons Dieu.

'Consentir,' un peu comme l'élément qui dialectise sentir et se sentir, connaître et être affecté. Oui, en ce sens, sentir peut aussi rimer avec connaître. Car la connaissance est un 'consentement,' un consentement à prendre sous invitation la route abrupte mais réconfortante du désir de l'Être. Se tourner vers l'autre par exemple, afin d'être pris et compris comme on aurait besoin d'être pris et compris et de se laisser prendre et comprendre. Voilà un peu 'consentir.' Phénoménologues et existentialistes l'ont bien compris. Les œuvres des artistes, poètes, philosophes et mystiques, en sont empreintes. C'est une attitude de 'non-connaissance,' celle de la réceptivité active du Zen, ou celle de la prière, qui seule permet d'accéder à la connaissance authentique conçue



première 'rencontre' de notre désir et de l'objet recherché (M. -M. Davy, J. Wahl et G. Lane). Il n'en fallait pas plus pour que nous devenions essentiels. Consentir, à la limite, c'est se sentir, c'est 'toucher-être-touché' avec tous nos sens et tout notre être.

Dans un avant-propos efficace qui condense les propos de l'ouvrage, J. Simard lance une série de questions toutes plus inquiétantes et fascinantes les unes que les autres. Questions auxquelles ni la philosophie rigoureuse qui abhorre les 'frissons essentiels' dont il est question ici, ni l'ouvrage, ne trouveront de réponses précises pour qui n'est pas 'consentant.' L'un de ses objectifs est de vérifier s'il suffit de désigner académiquement la sensibilité comme 'faculté' de jouir et de souffrir pour saisir l'être humain comme être sensible. Si sentir n'est pas consentir, alors il faudra se résigner à vivre pour vivre. Et pour ce faire, les pensées des autres nous relaient souvent dans l'élaboration discursive de ce que nous ressentons. A travers des échappées autobiographiques et des exemples intéressants, l'auteure sait bien faire danser son propre texte avec celui de l'autre, qui déjà, quitte son étrangeté (M. Henry, M. Heidegger). L'auteure se détache finalement des références du début du siècle (Pradines, Foulquie, Lagneau, etc), remet les dictionnaires au tiroir, va chercher une rencontre dans l'écriture. Existentialisme, ontologie et orientalisme viennent alors entretenir la ferveur sporadiquement.

Il faut remarquer cependant que le premier chapitre nous présente un travail tout à fait scolaire. Il nous semble de plus qu'il aurait été pertinent de faire allusion à l'esthétique transcendante ou à l'esthétique tout court en regard du sujet. Au niveau de l'organisation de l'ouvrage, le 'Consentir' qui titre la dernière partie (et le dernier chapitre) ne semble pas couvrir à lui seul (synthétiquement) l'absence de conclusion dans un livre qui présentait un avant-propos assez substantiel. Enfin, le tout se termine sur une bonne bibliographie, bien qu'une lecture attentive nous révèle des titres en bas de page qui n'y figurent pas.

Mais cela dit, il faut tenir compte du propos qui, sans s'adresser aux spécialistes, ne vise pas tellement plus à vulgariser la philosophie qu'à communiquer des états d'âme. Sans prétention, pour qui veut contourner le Temple du Savoir tout en bénéficiant de ses envolées conceptuelles, et à condition, bien sûr, d'aimer le sujet, les fluidités de l'orientalisme (J. Simard a séjourné en Inde) et les frissons du mysticisme, cet ouvrage peut offrir une bonne occasion de faire apprécier la philosophie à des étudiants de niveau collégial (d'autant qu'il n'épuise pas les concepts, n'est pas ennuyeux et évite l'aberration de certaines vulgarisations). De plus, à l'écoute des émois fondamentaux, dénonçant l'aliénation par les savoirs et par le langage, prônant un retour au sensible et à la sagesse, c'est un essai qui s'apparente, à certains égards, aux derniers ouvrages de M. Serres.

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QUENTIN SKINNER, ed. *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. viii + 215. US\$29.50. ISBN 0-521-31808-4.

The back cover states that this collection of essays introduces 'the most influential developments in social and political thought over the past quarter of a century.' This is a more modest assertion than one might think, and on the whole one that is correct, because this collection is largely introductory in nature, with some exceptions which are mentioned later on. The further claim that 'during this period empiricist assumptions and the positivist ideal of the unification of the sciences have been undermined' as a result of the impact of the 'grand theorists' discussed in this collection, is another matter altogether, and one open to question, I think.

This collection covers a great deal of ground, and includes essays on Gadamer, Derrida, Foucault, Kuhn, Rawls, Habermas, Althusser, Levi-Strauss and the 'Annales historians,' most prominently Fernand Braudel, along with other 'structuralists.'

Skinner's introduction begins by citing C. Wright Mills' attack on 'grand theory' in *The Sociological Imagination* (1959, but not cited in the bibliography), then trades on it by claiming that 'Mills was mistaken in his thoroughgoing criticism and hostility towards the construction of abstract and normative theories of human nature and conduct,' when this is not really what Mills was doing at all. Mills' criticism of Parsons as the (then) archetypal grand theorist of the social (or human) sciences was matched by an equal disdain on his part for 'abstracted empiricism,' combined with an attack on the discipline of sociology, its methods, its pretensions and its influence on the university and other large organizations. Skinner seems to think it necessary to polish the tarnished image of grand theory, on the grounds that this is what the individuals collected in the text all have in common. It is certainly premature to suggest, as Skinner does, that the effect of these thinkers has been to generate or oversee 'upheavals and transformations that have served to restructure the human sciences over the past quarter of a century.'

The effort to force these individuals under one umbrella leads to severe difficulties of continuity from essay to essay, but this is to be expected given the fact that the authors of these essays are themselves persons with intellectual positions or preferences, as well as more general values or views (e.g., Outhwaite, Barnes, Giddens, Clark, *et al.*). This is not an unimportant point to bear in mind when assessing the contributions to this volume. What has happened here is that grand theory has been resuscitated in order to house this admittedly influential body of diverse thought, but at the cost of excessive reliance on a vague, ambiguous and largely unarticulated notion of 'positivism.'

The idea that the human sciences have been restructured over the past twenty-five years unfortunately mistakes the frosting for the cake. During this period the methodical and disciplined empiricism of the social, behavioural and administrative-managerial disciplines has made itself indispensable on a



week to week basis to large organizations in the public and private sectors of advanced industrial societies, while providing only the *appearance* of change within a university setting where these techniques are so totally taken for granted as to be central to the practical redefinition of everyday life experience found in all such formally organized activities.

Outhwaite's essay on Gadamer is excellent, directed as it is to showing what precisely the nature of Gadamer's task is, namely the analysis and explication of 'processes which precede and underlie interpretative methods.' He points out that Gadamer's defense of tradition against Habermas is not uncritical, as is often claimed, in particular by Habermas, and suggests that social scientists can no longer afford 'to pass over the hermeneutic foundations of their practice, nor consign them to the domain of an optional *verstehende* sociology.'

Hoy focusses on Derrida's grammatology as a radical hermeneutics, but surely means something quite different from Outhwaite's view of Gadamer's work as both critical and hermeneutic in nature. His concern is with Derrida's refutation of 'history' as such and the consequences of this claim, along with others, for the reading and analysis of texts. *All* understanding is interpretative, and there is really no independent world of objects at all. Foucault's objection that such nihilism ignores the difference in quality and significance between interpretations is also discussed, and establishes some sort of limitation on this endless process of unmasking 'rhetoric.'

Philips's essay on Foucault addresses his reformulation of what it means to study the past. That there is 'no constant human subject to history,' and therefore no fixed human nature or condition, leaves Foucault open to criticism. This abandonment of the human subject, Philips suggests, ignores Foucault's own stake in the matters being studied, and his view of human nature and possibility as it takes shape even in an attempt (like his) to disavow such concerns. Foucault's abandonment of the subject deprives him of the very critical dimension with which to make sense of the past.

Ryan's essay on Rawls focuses on his critique of liberalism, in particular his theory of justice, enroute to suggesting that Rawls, in common with others discussed in this volume, has 'returned to Grand Theory' after all. The radical individualism that seems so reconstructive when held against Nixon looks very tame indeed when the contractual approach to social and political arrangements it espouses is exposed for what it is. Ryan's claim that Rawls must concern himself with fighting off those in the centre as well as Nozick and those of a rightist persuasion is difficult to accept from a close and careful reading of *A Theory of Justice*.

The essays by Barnes on Kuhn, Giddens on Habermas, Boon on Levi-Strauss and Clark on Braudel and the *Annales* historians also endeavour to be critical by showing how and why their respective authors attack positivism and resuscitate grand theory in the process. The idea that such unmasking is the essence of criticism fails as critique precisely because of its dependence on the very limitations of what is criticized, while suggesting in the process that their

joint collection under the title of grand theory may indeed be appropriate after all.

There are many strong points in what are admittedly a group of largely introductory essays, but Skinner's effort to tie them together under the rubric of a critique of positivism in the name of grand theory only serves to underscore the difference, established by Adorno, between criticism and critique when all is said and done. These caveats aside, the book is nevertheless well worth having because of the individuals and issues which its contributors address and discuss.

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STEPHEN P. TURNER. *The Search for a Methodology of Social Science: Durkheim, Weber and the Nineteenth-Century Problem of Cause, Probability and Action* (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 92). Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1986. Pp. 251. US\$39.50. ISBN 90-277-2067-3.

The topic of this book is as important as it is neglected: the un-hegelian, un-nietzschean philosophy of the nineteenth century. August Comte, J.S. Mill and William Whewell figure heavily. Most students on this continent cannot now even pronounce the last mentioned name (avoid wee-well; try *Hugh'll* as in 'Hugh'll barbecue the hamburgers tonight'). Naturally the co-founders of sociology, listed in the subtitle, are prominent. Or are they the founders of our two sociologies? They disagreed strongly on method. Very roughly speaking Durkheim's heirs are the American numerical sociologists while Weber's are 'continental.' Historians of sociology tend to downplay the fact that both writers were, in nineteenth century terms, philosophers, and drew richly both from the philosophical canon and from its disputes. Other major characters of this book are less familiar to philosophers: Adolphe Quetelet, the century's greatest propagandist for a new kind of law of nature, statistical law, as well as the founder of endless societies and congresses far beyond his native Belgium; and J. von Kries, whose attempts at an entirely new conception of objective probabilities, founded both on metaphysics and physics, set the pace for much subsequent German work in topics ranging from jurisprudence to the new sociology.



Some of the book is patterned on Larry Laudan's excellent early essays on nineteenth century debates about the method of hypothesis (what Pierce for a while called abduction) versus probability as the key to scientific methodology. These have been collected in Laudan's 1981 *Science and Hypothesis: Historical Essays on Scientific Methodology*. Aside from that, there is surprisingly little written about the methodology of the era from a present-day perspective. Turner has added a great deal more about probability, and has connected that with the methodological debates on how sociology should be. The problem was defined right from the beginning, in the world of Condorcet, the great moderate revolutionary, educational reformer, feminist, author of constitutions and student of voting theory, denounced in 1793 and dead in a village jail in 1794. Condorcet both taught that probability mathematics would be the way to understand social phenomena, and also produced as his final work, written in hiding, an historical and historicist account of the development of human knowledge. These two programmes went their separate ways. With the new statistical bureaux set in place during the Napoleonic wars, Europe was deluged with numbers, fertilizing the ground for those who thought that social reform could proceed by utilitarian data analysis of the sort parodied by Dickens in *Hard Times*. At the same time the new rather conservative historicism presented an entirely different way to understand social organization.

Students and admirers of Laplace — who had been led into probability theory by Condorcet — created the first wave of dissension. Comte, remembered now simply as a 'positivist' (and who did indeed invent the word) produced an elaborate and almost interminable historical account of human knowledge. He was entirely opposed both to the collection of statistical facts and certainly to the notion of statistical laws and statistical explanations of social behaviour. He had a losing terminological battle. He called his new science of society 'social mechanics,' then 'social physics.' In each case, at about the same time, Quetelet adopted the same nomenclature for the statistical study of society. Finally in desperation, Comte hit on the barbarous neologism 'sociology,' hoping no one would steal so ugly a word. He lost again.

The issue was about the very nature of social facts and the nature of causality and explanation in the social realm. In the end Turner is with Weber over Durkheim, with the 'German' rather than the 'American' approach. He is covering a vast chunk of the history of ideas. It is one of more than chronological interest, because the chief point at issue continues to be very much with us. Students of society still come across as Durkheimians or Weberians. There is of course vastly more to that than a debate about statistical law. Durkheim wrote for a readership obsessed with what it called degeneracy, which meant in part the low French birth rate. He was designing a measure of social pathology, while Weber was a confident member of an ascending state.

Inevitably Turner leaves out a lot. Some key players just evaporate. The immensely influential philosopher of logic and probability, Augustus de Morgan, has vanished from the scene, as has Ferdinand LePlay, the French sociologist who insisted that only numbers of particular facts about an individual,

given in minute detail — how many cabbages consumed in a year, how many candles — can convey the type of a social class. What we do have from Turner is a highly intelligent putting together of some philosophical and some historical strands in the greatest debate about society. The role of Mill in particular is especially well done. His philosophy of science, probably written independently of Comte's *Cours*, is a balanced version of many of Comte's ideas. His views about causality were the bench marks for all discussion after the 1850s. I do not know that Turner is entirely correct in his implication that Durkheim and Weber were wearing Millian spectacles, but it is good to be told what the spectacles were like.

Turner employs the (Author, Date) system of references, which is not what one wants. One wants to know when original works were written. Since Turner makes some play with changes effected in Mill's *Logic* as it went through its successive editions, '(Mill, 1974)' is hardly a help for those of us who have not yet felt able to afford the comprehensive University of Toronto edition. A better copy-editor would have saved us from certain infelicities such as, 'When his student Maurice Halbwachs returned to questions like the social causes of suicide after his death, the logical machinery Durkheim constructed was discreetly abandoned.' The book will remain as a fresh approach to a central part of our intellectual history. I may take the opportunity to mention two other works that are less directly philosophy, but which are exemplary studies of the same period: Theodore M. Porter, *The Rise of Statistical Thinking 1820-1900* (Princeton, 1986) and Steven M. Stigler, *The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty before 1900* (Chicago, 1986). These books are complementary, Stigler doing the mathematics and Porter doing the more conceptual history. For information about the bit players, and also about major figures such as Quetelet, these books are the best we have.

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DONALD VANDEVEER. *Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds of Benevolence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1986. Pp. 488. US\$40.00. ISBN 0-631-90060-8.

Suppose farmer John accidentally injures himself while chopping wood. His wife Alice recognizes that John's wound is severe, and tries to persuade him to go to the nearby hospital for treatment. John, though (otherwise) competent and rational, is adamantly opposed. He interprets his astrological horoscope in the local newspaper to recommend against medical assistance this month. Alice appreciates that the risk of infection is greatly increased by such a delay, and reasonably fears that John's leg will have to be amputated if he is not treated soon. After having failed to convince John, she ponders whether she should resort to deceit or coercion to procure care for him. What is Alice morally permitted or obligated to do in this situation?

Alice's predicament, unfortunately, is not merely the product of a fertile philosophical imagination. All too frequently stubborn individuals refuse life-saving treatment for preposterous reasons. (These examples are discussed in John Kleinig, *Paternalism* [Rowman & Allanheld 1983].) In *Dept. of Human Services v. Northern* (563 S.W. 2d 167 [Tn. App., 1978]), a patient refused to consent to the amputation of gangrenous feet because she believed (falsely) that their black color was caused by soot or dirt rather than by infection. In *In re Maida Yetter* (62 Pa.D. & C. 2d 619 [C.P. Northhampton County, 1973]), a sixty year old patient refused to consent to a breast biopsy because (a) her aunt had undergone a similar operation fifteen years earlier and had died, though from unrelated causes, and (b) she feared a biopsy would preclude her ability to bear children.

If Alice were to consult the writings of moral philosophers for guidance, she would discover that they do not speak with one voice. My intuitions allow paternalistic interference in such a case, and I am sympathetic to principles that justify this result. But many philosophers do not share my intuitions, and defend principles that purport to explain why Alice is not permitted to coerce or deceive John for his own good. Donald VanDeVeer is one such philosopher who opposes Alice's intervention.

VanDeVeer's approach to paternalism is thorough and well-informed. He begins by presupposing a 'basic principle assert[ing] that competent persons have a right to direct their own lives' (58). This principle 'play[s] a crucial role in deciding the justifiability of *all* cases of paternalistic interference with competent persons' (58). It motivates VanDeVeer's commitment to what he calls the 'Principle of Autonomy-Respecting Paternalism' (PARP), which identifies the conditions under which paternalistic interventions towards generally competent persons are permissible. I quote PARP in full:

A's paternalistic interference, X, with a generally competent subject, S, is justified (morally permissible) if and only if

1. A's doing X involves no presumptive wrong toward S or others.

or 2. A's doing X does not wrong those others than A or S

and

either 1. S has given currently operative valid consent to A to do X

or 2. S would validly consent to A's doing X

if

a) S were aware of the relevant circumstances

and b) S's normal capacities for deliberation and choice were not impaired. (88)

VanDeVeer expends much effort to clarify a number of the central terms contained in this principle, e.g., 'presumptive wrong,' 'currently operative valid consent,' 'aware of the relevant circumstances,' 'impaired capacities,' etc. None of these terms, however, is construed with sufficient breadth to allow Alice to coerce John for his own good. After exhausting fair, open means to dissuade him, Alice must permit John to make foolish, even tragic choices (so long as non-paternalistic rationales for intervention are insufficient).

Persons who favor paternalistic interferences beyond those allowed by PARP are accused of a miscellany of related errors. They are said to attach insufficient weight to the importance of the moral autonomy of rational agents. They are alleged to regard persons as mere 'utility receptacles,' and to deny a fundamental 'moral equality' between competent individuals. Finally, they are indicted for exhibiting 'disrespect for persons.'

According to VanDeVeer, the chief competitor to PARP is the 'Unreasonable Harm Prevention Principle' (UPP), which allows paternalistic interferences under the following conditions:

A's paternalistic interference, X, with S, is justified if:

1. S's choice to do Y is seriously unreasonable.
2. S's doing Y is likely to make S significantly worse off than if S refrains, and
3. A's doing X will prevent S from doing Y, and
4. S is likely to be significantly better off if A does X than if S did Y, and
5. A's Xing involves no wrong to others. (124-5)

UPP, quite clearly, would allow Alice to coerce or deceive John.

VanDeVeer provides two distinct grounds for pronouncing UPP inferior



to PARP. First, UPP fails to protect the values (autonomy, respect, equality, etc.) that underlie PARP. Second, UPP is said to open the door too widely to 'quite invasive paternalistic interventions' (126). VanDeVeer supports his case with the rhetorical question: 'Why should the fact that S will be better off for it be thought a sufficient reason to impose our judgment?' (111)

Readers who favor paternalistic interference with John's decision are likely to regard these grounds as indecisive, and perhaps question-begging. If autonomy, equality, respect, et al. are construed to require that Alice allow Tom to suffer the consequences of his own foolishness, perhaps there should be room in moral theory for infringements of autonomy, disrespect, and inequality. More likely, however, those who do not share VanDeVeer's intuitions will retort that he has misconstrued what autonomy, equality, and respect actually require.

I believe that VanDeVeer is correct that UPP allows more paternalism than is intuitively defensible. It is doubtful that Jehovah's Witnesses should be required to undergo life-saving blood transfusions, regardless of how unreasonable their beliefs may be. But such examples do not show that 'appeals to doing good' should be rejected altogether. Instead, they indicate that additional conditions must be added to UPP before it is acceptable. What might these conditions be?

I believe that the outline of a satisfactory answer to this difficult question has been sketched by John Kleinig in his recent book *Paternalism*. Kleinig presents a rationale that (probably) allows Alice to interfere with John while avoiding many of the difficulties with UPP. Kleinig calls this rationale 'the argument from personal integrity.' He writes, 'Where our conduct or choices place our more permanent, stable, and central projects in jeopardy, and where what comes to expression in this conduct or these choices manifests aspects of our personality that do not rank highly in our constellation of desires, dispositions, etc., benevolent interference will constitute no violation of integrity. Indeed, if anything, it helps to preserve it' (68). Kleinig's approach differentiates between blood transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses and surgery for farmer John. The integrity of the Jehovah's Witness would be seriously compromised if he were forced to violate his fundamental and stable beliefs. Alice is in a favorable position to appreciate whether John's commitment to his horoscope is comparable. Most likely, John's ability to continue farming is far more important to him than his adherence to astrology. Thus paternalistic intervention to preserve this ability is warranted in this case. 'Respect for choice' is interpreted by Kleinig to permit interference with a person's present preference, if it is incompatible with his larger pursuits, ideals, beliefs, and plans.

Admittedly, Kleinig's approach is susceptible to far greater abuse than is VanDeVeer's. It is notoriously difficult to decide whether and to what extent a person's preferences are stable, fundamental, and important in the context of his overall life plans. Surely VanDeVeer's position has the virtue of simplicity. But it is unfortunate that VanDeVeer did not have the opportunity to read Kleinig's book before going to press. It might have encouraged him to

reconsider his defense of PARP by familiarizing him with a more plausible alternative than UPP.

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ASHOK VOHRA. *Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind*. La Salle, IL: Open Court 1986. Pp. ii + 116. US\$26.95. ISBN 0-8126-9031-1.

In his first chapter Vohra addresses the question 'What are the immediate objects of perception?' Much of the chapter is devoted to criticisms of familiar defences of the answer 'sense data.' The discussion suffers from two defects, both of which are displayed in the following passage: 'Again, our sense impressions reflect or fail to reflect the nature of physical reality. For example, there is no distinction between "looks blue" and "is blue," "feels hot" and "is hot," "looks extended" and "is extended"' (15). Throughout the book the relation between consecutive remarks is often unclear. Furthermore, remarks that seem obviously false are presented as truths that will not be questioned. ('I cannot doubt whether there is a pen in my pocket if I have it in my pocket' [42]. 'If a sincerely made statement using the expression "remember" is made and turns out to be false, then we can conclude that the speaker does not know the meaning or usage of the word "remember"' [90].)

In ch. 2 Vohra argues that the suggestion that sensations are private is an expression of two confused ideas. The idea that no one can know what sensations another is having rests on the mistaken supposition that 'there is a genuine use of the verb "to know" as an expression of certainty' about one's own sensations (39). The idea that it can be said that no one can feel another's sensations rests on the confusion of thinking that the 'my' in 'my pains' is the 'possessive of ownership' (46-51). Vohra's attack on these suppositions, which owes a heavy (though unacknowledged) debt to John Cook's paper 'Wittgenstein on Privacy' (*Philosophical Review*, vol LXXIV [1965]), does not carry total conviction. It is, perhaps, noteworthy that he himself contradicts the conclusions of both arguments at a number of points in the book. (See in particular p. 14 and p. 106.) The second half of the chapter focuses on the notion of private ostensive definition and the private language argument. That the treatment is not an unqualified success should come as no great surprise. It is extraordinarily difficult to say anything very helpful about these strands



of Wittgenstein's thought in isolation from a much more general discussion of his philosophy.

Ch. 3 deals with self-knowledge. The Cartesian picture of 'the mind' is set up and criticised in very Rylean terms. Vohra suggests, however, that Ryle's alternative to the Cartesian picture of self-knowledge must be rejected in favour of what he takes to be Wittgenstein's view. 'I agree with Wittgenstein and hold that such psychological states as being in pain, being sad and being happy are the formal features of our lives, and the first person expressions embodying them such as "I am in pain," "I am sad," "I am happy" do not need any reasoning' (80). Some will have difficulty seeing what this means and how it relates to the Cartesian view which has been rejected. The claim, in opposition to that view, that self-knowledge 'is gained by and through the knowledge of the world, or the total form of life' (68), while suggestive, will not, as it stands, be very helpful to someone who is not already pretty immersed in Wittgenstein. There may also be worries about how Vohra's view fits with his earlier insistence that 'we are sometimes not conscious that we are irritated, excited, annoyed or frustrated' (71). Vohra is right to insist that first/third person asymmetries in the ascription of 'mental states' are vital. Wittgenstein, however, would surely identify as one of the central sources of trouble in this area the idea that there is any completely general story to be told about self-ascription.

The second half of the chapter defends the claim that 'one does not employ any criterion for asserting first person identity judgements' (88). The generality of Vohra's claim is again worrying. It would have been helpful if he had said something about how this claim ties in with his endorsement of the bodily criterion of personal identity in ch. 4. (Vohra's defence of the latter is, incidentally, made more difficult than it need be by his conflation of 'bodily identity' and 'bodily appearance'.)

The final chapter is devoted to our knowledge of others. The argument from analogy is rejected. In a very brief discussion of Wittgenstein's approach, Vohra suggests that we are trained to regard certain kinds of behaviour as grounds for ascribing pain and illustrates this point with the analogy of a chicken sexer: 'When asked "Why does he regard the two-day-old chick to be a cock when it grows up?" ... he is apt to reply (and that is the correct reply too) by saying, "I have received the proper training." ... So by virtue of the training we have received we know that the other walking and talking figures which have bodies similar to mine, have minds' (106). The analogy is extremely unfortunate. Vohra quotes with approval Wittgenstein's remark: 'My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul.' It is, however, fairly clear that he has not fully grasped the radical nature of Wittgenstein's critique of the tradition at this point.

At least part of the problem with this book lies in the form of expression of the ideas. There are many grammatical infelicities, some of which cause trouble. There has also been considerable carelessness in the transcribing of quotations and the giving of references for them. (At least five instances of one or the other on p. 66 alone.) Why the publisher did not see fit to rectify the first problem and how their readers failed to spot the second is beyond

me. Finally, the title of the book is desperately misleading. Outside the Introduction and ch. 2 Wittgenstein is referred to on 6 pages, and the spirit of the book is in many ways much closer to Ryle than to Wittgenstein. We know why a publisher might accept, or encourage, such a title. The book might, however, have been considerably better had Vohra set himself a different goal.

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MEROLD WESTPHAL, *God, Guilt, and Death*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1984. Pp. xiv + 305. US\$27.50. ISBN 0-253-32586-2.

Westphal's book grew out of his lectures on 'phenomenology of religion' at Yale and at the Purchase campus of S.U.N.Y. during the early seventies. The lectures came to revolve around the central themes of God, guilt, and death.

The first chapter of the book contains a study of the method. The goal of the book is to conduct a phenomenological inquiry into religious life. Westphal does not personally think it necessary to be wedded to any particular philosophical tradition but he makes use of the methodology developed by Merleau-Ponty in the Preface to *The Phenomenology of Perception* and by Ricoeur in *The Symbolism of Evil*. The single issue before Westphal is to examine what it means to be religious. This is stated several times in the book. The work is factual rather than normative. There is no attempt to distinguish between states of unbelief and states of belief. There is no attempt to examine the truth value of religious beliefs. Westphal uses all of these as the inductive basis for his study. It is a process of describing the elements of beliefs and unbeliefs alike as they appear to consciousness in order to lay bare the essence of being religious. Westphal says that some readers may prefer to return to this chapter after reading several of the nonmethodological chapters.

The theme of the second chapter is central to the book. It revolves around the 'ambivalence' that is experienced in face of the sacred. The experience of the sacred is such that we are simultaneously attracted and repelled by it. It is best expressed as a movement of reason on a dialectical tension of opposites. The religious life is seen to pulsate on these opposites. The positive attraction of the sacred is also a reminder of our lack of power as we find ourselves to be dependent and suddenly less real than before. Chapter three traces the resolution of this ambivalence into 'spiritual inertia' and resentment. 'Spiritual inertia' is a metaphor that is used by Westphal to denote the 'dying



to immediacy' which the sacred seems to demand of us (52). Resentment is in turn grounded in 'my perceived lack of power.' This section contains an interesting phenomenological study of envy as well as resentment (65).

Chapters four and five are studies of the existential meaning of guilt and death respectively, while chapter six examines the believing soul's encounter with these phenomena. What makes it seem worthwhile to struggle against the negativities of inertia, envy and resentment which the sacred invariably evokes? Westphal's answer to this question is to establish a connection between guilt-death and salvation. He begins first of all by weaving a network of existential relationships between guilt and death. These phenomena are to be explained together as they are found to be intimately related. They arise for the believer as the consequence of sin. But their relevance to the life of the unbeliever is no less evident. Westphal uses Heidegger to bring to light the fundamental character of the individual (*Dasein*) as essentially a project towards death. Tolstoy's story of Ivan Ilich is quoted with approval by Westphal in even more detail to argue this point. Westphal's main feat, however, is to establish a connection between guilt-death and salvation. Guilt-death, he says, is the single most important concern of the religious life. The whole of religious thought from its earliest beginnings to its latest developments arises as the result of the concern over guilt and death. Salvation emerges as the solution to human weakness through belief in the sacred. Up to this point Westphal has been describing the negativities of ambivalence. Chapters seven and eight now discuss the sacred from the point of view of its appeal. The religious life is examined first as a means to an end, and secondly as an end in itself. In the former, the individual enters into a relationship with the sacred for personal gain, whereas in the latter 'useless self-transcendence' elevates the relationship into a selfless love of the sacred for the sake of the sacred.

Chapters nine through eleven provide inductive data for the appeal of salvation as specified. The author draws widely from the texts and rituals of Biblical, Indian, African, Confucian, Egyptian, Greek and Roman traditions to support his thesis. He examines the forms of salvation in a threefold typology which he terms Exilic, Mimetic and Covenantal. These are three variations on the central theme of religion as a means for dealing with guilt and death.

Pages 253-98 contain the author's Notes, while the Index appears on pages 299-305.

Westphal does not claim to offer a strict proof for the universality of the concern over guilt and death in the religious life, but he describes principles of mind that future research cannot ignore. His work is well researched, well written and stimulating. It contains a veritable wealth of thought provoking insights into how we think when we are religious. There remains, however, one key difficulty with the book, namely the reductivist role assigned to salvation.

Guilt and death are presented as being the only concerns of the religious life, while salvation arises as the solution to these problems. But salvation figures as little more than what might be termed a new pleasure principle. We are asked to imagine that religious thought grew out of a willingness to ex-

change certain unwanted goods such as guilt and death for a desirable good such as salvation. Once a deal was struck it was honored through one of the Exilic, Mimetic or Covenantal agreements.

Although Westphal does not set out to do away with religious beliefs as such, he does not provide reasonable ground to suppose that they can go on much longer. If religious beliefs are to go on, we might expect that the human mind will modify its essence. There is no evidence that it has in the past. In the light of Westphal's excellent work, then, we wonder about the limits of the method. It does not seem to be suited to the task at hand.

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A.L. WIGAN. *The Duality of the Mind: Proved by the Structure, Functions, and Diseases of the Brain and by the Phenomena of Mental Derangement, and Shown to be Essential to Moral Responsibility*. Edited with a Foreword by Joseph E. Bogen. (Malibu, CA: Joseph Simon 1985. Pp. xxi + 346. US\$30.00. ISBN 0-934710-11-2. (Republication of original [London: Longmans 1884].)

By the early nineteenth century, the anatomical similarity of the two hemispheres of the brain had led to the assumption that their functions were identical but that both halves were required to support a mind. The physician Wigan, however, found a number of intellectually capable people who, on autopsy, were discovered to have only one hemisphere, so he concluded that each of the two 'brains' (he rejects 'hemisphere' as a theoretically misleading word) can, and does, support a complete mind capable of independent and simultaneous thought and volition. Normally, the two minds cooperate to produce a single consciousness, just as the two eyes form one image. Both brains are capable of rational, as of irrational thought; they are not naturally distinguished as to the quality of their functions, but since the two are seldom of the same strength they can integrate their activity only by one 'brain' dominating the other. Wigan very tentatively suggests that it is the left brain which dominates in right-handed people (249).

When one brain operates abnormally, the other brain struggles to control it, and if it is completely successful no symptoms appear, since the healthy brain can perform all cerebral functions. Wigan explains a vast array of symptoms on the basis of unsuccessful control over the 'insane' brain (I translate into modern labels): cyclic mental disorders, dual volition, double and alter-



nating personalities, dissociated consciousness, somnambulism, automatic writing, the feeling of being possessed, compulsive and obsessive phenomena, consciously recognised hallucinations, spectral appearances of others and oneself, *déjà vu*, inner conflict of many kinds, the wish to keep on dreaming, day-dreams, ambivalence about religious belief, workaholism and depravity in mid-life crises, sense of irreality. In all of these cases the unhealthy brain either periodically takes control of the body, or is observed by the healthy brain as if it were 'other.' It is Wigan's contention that this rich collection of clinical phenomena can all be given a scientific, materialistic explanation by appeal to the duality of brain anatomy.

True insanity occurs when both brains are diseased, stripping the individual of all moral freedom. Yet Wigan believes that even among human beings with one healthy brain a large proportion of criminal and morally evil actions are due to this brain being unable to control its unhealthy companion, and so the person should not be condemned. Indeed much of Wigan's book is a plea for a more humane approach to insane and deviant behaviour. In place of punishment and restraint he proposes preventive pedagogy, medical treatment and sympathetic therapy, proposals which still ring true today.

Wigan's defense of the dual mind thesis is open to criticism on a number of fronts.

Philosophically, Wigan is caught in a dilemma (though there is no explicit philosophical discussion in the book). According to the Cartesian conception, the mind must be an absolute unity. Conflict, conscious delusion, dissociation, ambivalence and so on, as found in clinical experience, seem to violate this unity. Rather than surrender the doctrine of the unity of the mind, Wigan adopts the stand that there are two minds in each human body. Since he also believes that each mind requires a complete brain, he assumes two brains in each skull, accepting a little convenient help from anatomy. Once Freud, James and others propose theories in which the unity of the mind is relinquished, the logical need to associate any two conflicting forces with two separate brains vanishes, and many alternative explanations for Wigan's novel clinical findings become plausible.

Scientifically, Wigan's theory of the two brains is on the level of a lucky guess. His best evidence, that based on the few cases in which 'intelligence' was preserved despite the lack of one hemisphere (Chapter 6), is undermined by his ignorance of the lateralization of functions, not discovered until 20 years later. In each of the cases he presents as confirming his thesis, he accordingly neglects to mention which side of the brain was inoperative. Since we can assume in retrospect that it was the minor hemisphere ('intelligence' was probably judged by speech), the most his cases actually prove is that one can present oneself intelligently to the world with only a dominant hemisphere. This conclusion would have been historically original and important, but it is obscured by his belief that he has proven that any healthy hemisphere can support a mind. He has in fact offered no evidence that someone with only a minor hemisphere has a mind, much less that a normal person has two minds.

Most of his other evidence is even less plausible: much of it is entirely ir-

relevant to his dual mind/brain hypothesis, and proves at most that there can be inner conflicts in the mind. While he describes many psychological dualities very vividly and occasionally originally, the linking of the two aspects to different hemispheres is entirely speculative. What we now know about the similarities and differences of the two hemispheres, thanks to Broca, and Sperry, makes it clear that practically none of the cases explained by Wigan as due to inter-hemispheric conflict can be attributed to that cause. According to modern theories, the minor hemisphere specializes in visual recognition, spatial orientation, musical and poetic ability whereas the major is propositional, analytic, digital. None of Wigan's dichotomies reflect these distinctions. Fundamentally, Wigan's theory is based on a false analogy between psychological dualities discovered in clinical symptoms and the dual anatomy of the brain. That the theory turns out to be partially true is almost entirely chance.

Stylistically, Wigan's work is repetitive and disorganized. His standard of evidence is low even for 1844. His logic is atrocious: most of his arguments are either invalid or irrelevant. He is at his best during his pleas for human treatment of criminals and the insane.

Bogen, a neurologist who supports the contemporary brain/mind dualist approach, has republished this work as an anticipation of his own theory, and he presents Wigan as a 'radical innovator' whose ideas were mistakenly neglected by history (one thinks of Mendel). I think rather that Wigan's book illustrates the fact that for every modern true notion (or false one for that matter), a thorough search of history will reveal someone who, if only by pure chance, anticipated it. Is the theory that atoms have different sizes to be attributed to a neglected Democritus?

Whether humans have two minds may still be an open question. Wigan's work however has little to offer on a philosophical or scientific level towards a response. Given its slight historical influence, its republication is largely of antiquarian interest.

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