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This is a valuable and distinctive work on a topic that is often mentioned but seldom discussed in any careful and systematic way. The editors intend it to be a collaborative work rather than an anthology. It contains fifteen essays by thirteen different contributors drawn from varying disciplines including philosophy, law, political science, and anthropology. The focus of the book is on the broader concepts of publicness and privateness rather than privacy and publicity, which are more narrowly concerned with control over information.

The book begins with a useful introductory essay by Benn and Gaus, in which the concepts of public and private are analyzed and their normative character described. The remaining essays are organized into three groupings: eight deal with the liberal conception of public and private; three offer critiques of that conception, from Hegelian, Marxist, and feminist perspectives; and three provide alternative conceptions of the public and private as found in non-liberal cultures. Among the alternatives discussed are one on primitive law in so-called 'stateless' societies, another on the 'extreme privacy' of social life in a Mexican Indian village, and a final one on classical Greek conceptions of the public and private. All of the essays are of excellent quality, and virtually all of them make some reference to the analytic framework of publicness and privateness set out by Benn and Gaus in their introductory essay. This does lend support to the editors' hope and claim of a truly collaborative work. Still the book does not give the impression of a highly organized and cohesive work. In part this is due to the wide range and complexity of the concepts under study.

In their general introduction, Benn and Gaus contend that the concepts of public and private are 'complex-structured.' By this they mean to deny that there is, in an interesting sense, some property or set of properties common to all things designated by the terms. The Wittgensteinian notion of a family resemblance is not suitable either, for it fails to capture the systematic character of the relations among the senses of public and private. The analytic

framework developed by Benn and Gaus differentiates three broad dimensions of publicness and privateness, which are 'probably universal' dimensions of social organization: access, agency, and interest. There are four sub-dimensions to access: physical access to places (e.g., a public beach, a private road); access to activities or intercourse (e.g., a public discussion, a private meeting); access to information (e.g., public records or private files); and access to resources (e.g., public oil reserves or private art collections). The dimension of agency relates to whether some agent is acting privately, on his own account, or publicly, as an official of the city or state. This will affect both one's standing as an agent, and also the significance of an action for others. The final dimension of interest is the one that is dominant in political rhetoric, particularly the appeal to the public interest.

The multi-dimensional character of the public-private distinction helps to account for the conceptual confusions that are frequently found when the distinction is applied to important features of the social life. Benn and Gaus cite property as an example, mentioning that disputes often revolve around the multidimensional public or private character of the property. The framing of disputes in these terms is significant because of the pervasiveness of the concepts in social life, and because of the primary normative character of the concepts. While such points seem largely correct and quite helpful in dispelling confusions, it is not clear that they make any substantive contributions to the resolution of disagreements involving the public and private. Consider the issues in the *Katz* case, in which the defendant Katz claimed that his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure (under the Fourth Amendment of the United States' Constitution) had been violated by government officials wiretapping his telephone conversations made from a phone booth. Katz maintained that his private conversation was monitored by law enforcement agents (public officials), in violation of certain constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights. The government countered that the phone conversations, which involved illegal gambling transactions, were made from a public telephone booth. The Supreme Court ruled in Katz's favor, holding that he had an 'expectation of privacy' upon entering the phone booth and closing the door behind him, and that the wiretap constituted an invasion of privacy. Both the multi-dimensionality and the normative character of the concepts of public and private are apparent in this case. Noting them helps sharpen the points of disagreement between the parties. But they provide little guidance in deciding between the competing claims.

The lead essay in Part One is another penetrating one by Benn and Gaus entitled 'The Liberal Conception of the Public and Private.' Philosophers will be particularly interested in this essay, as well as those by R. Gavison on information control, by Benn on public and private morality, and two by A. Ryan, including one on property and a fascinating one called 'Private Selves and Public Parts.' Benn and Gaus argue that there are two divergent models, the individualist and the organic, which are embedded in liberal societies. Each alone offers a systematic and coherent account of complex structures. However the two models are based on different and (possibly) incompatible

views of individuals in society. The individualist model takes the individual person as the most basic subject of privateness. Four levels of the public-private distinction on the individualist model are distinguished. At the heart of the model is the view that only individual persons can have public and private lives, since only persons are self-aware project-makers. On the model, groups are analyzable into aggregations of individual persons.

A major difficulty with the dominant individualist model is that it cannot account for some of the practices in liberal societies, specifically two: the value of participation in the public life so eloquently defended by Mill, and the claim of public interest, a notion which occupies an eminent place in liberal political rhetoric. Benn and Gaus take note of Bentham's dictum that the only real interests are individual interests, with its implication that the public interest is simply the mass of individual interests. While the inadequacy of Bentham's view as a basis for an account of the public interest is apparent, it is far from obvious that it is the only one available to the individualist model. Less extreme ones such as Kant's or Rawls' would face formidable difficulties, but not nearly as grave as those faced by Bentham's view.

The defects of the individualist model are the strengths of the organic model, an important but lesser strain in the liberal tradition, representing the influence of Rousseau and Hegel. Four modes (instead of levels) are distinguished within the organic model, each of which affirms in some way the unity and primacy of social wholes or groups to which individuals belong. The second mode contrasts the publicness of the state with the privateness of civil society. Benn and Gaus note the organic model's insistence on the necessity for the state or political association to supply the institutional structure that integrates and organizes the social whole. In one of the essays offering a critique of the liberal conception, there is an interesting discussion of Hegel's views on this by A. Walton, in which he argues that Hegel sought to counteract the de-emphasis of the state and political authority in the liberal individualist perspective. However, Walton also criticizes the classification of Hegel as an organicist by Benn and Gaus, for it overlooks Hegel's own view of his social theory as reconciling (and preserving) both the individualist and organic viewpoints.

C. Pateman's feminist critique of the liberal conception, though aimed ostensibly at the entire model, relates closely to the fourth mode of the organic model. Benn and Gaus present that mode as dividing social life into public and private spheres, with every individual participating in each. Pateman criticizes the liberal conception for denying to women any place in the public realm, since they were confined to the private domestic realm. Women were also denied a place in the public realm in ancient Greek culture, a realm more highly esteemed than the private realm of the household. So argued Hannah Arendt in a well-known discussion. A. Saxonhouse, in her essay in Part Three of the book on classical Greek conceptions of the public and private, carefully and plausibly criticizes Arendt's analysis. The essay is also of considerable philosophical interest because of her illuminating remarks on Plato and Aristotle.

A useful and complete index of persons and of subjects is provided. Each essay has extensive endnotes which provide a rich resource for those wishing to explore further the terrain of the public and the private, which is so admirably covered by the essays in this volume.

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JONATHAN BENNETT. *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company 1984. Pp. ix + 396. US\$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-915145-82-0); US\$13.75 (paper: ISBN 0-915145-83-9).

As Bennett enjoins others to do, he treats Spinoza as 'an energetic collaborator or antagonist' (1). Spinoza is put into a philosophical arena with Leibniz, Kant, Braithwaite, Prior, Quine, Strawson, Alston, and, conspicuously, Bennett; and little attention is paid to historical origins or subsequent influence. Many of Spinoza's views are severely criticized. Sometimes the criticism seems negative and dismissive: views in the last stretch of the *Ethics* (5p23ff.) are 'an unmitigated and seemingly unmotivated disaster' (357), 'unhealable' (363), contain an 'unbearable ... burden of error and confusion' (370), are 'jejune' (371), 'negligible' and 'worthless' (372), 'nonsense' (373), and 'valueless ... rubbish' (374). Other criticisms are more constructive. For instance, finding Spinoza's 'official' argument for parallelism 'unrescuable' (127ff.), Bennett proposes 'respectable reasons which Spinoza could have had and I think did have ...' and 'lines of thought to which Spinoza would be sympathetic' (131ff.); and after raising problems for Spinoza's notion of error (167ff.), he undertakes to 'present something deep and unitary which I think does explain Spinoza's holding that error is a lack — not merely thinking he is committed to this view, but thinking it to be right' (171). There are dangers in this approach. Bennett sometimes seems to slip from what Spinoza could (consistently) say to what he would say — with a suggestion that an inexplicit or 'unofficial' view can be justifiably attributed to him (131, 183, 197, 218-19, and especially 60ff.). But the freedom Bennett allows himself makes this an extremely exciting book. It teems with interesting interpretations that challenge accepted or usual ways of reading Spinoza, and anyone interested in Spinoza will profit greatly from this informed and insightful commentary.

An introductory chapter deals with the usual general questions: What is the place of the *Ethics* in Spinoza's corpus? Why is it called 'Ethics'? What is the method employed? Bennett contends here that, appearances to the contrary, Spinoza's method is 'hypothetico-deductive' (20ff.). It turns out, however, that qualifications about the supposed 'data' and certainty to be obtained put Spinoza's alleged hypothetico-deductive method at some distance from what is usually so called; it is, moreover, difficult to reconcile what Bennett says with Spinoza's suggestions about the relativity of what is axiomatic, as in 1p8s.

Chapters 2-8, roughly half of the remainder of the book, are about Parts 1 and 2 of the *Ethics*. In chapter 2, Bennett notes general features of Spinoza's thinking: 'rationalism,' 'theism,' 'naturalism,' 'conceptual minimalism,' and 'dualism.' More about the attribution of dualism farther on. In ch. 3 ('The One Substance Doctrine'), he maintains that Spinoza's official argument for monism is a 'poor thing' (70) and — perversely in my opinion — that 'Spinoza's arguments do not point accurately to the structure of his thought' (60). He also contends in ch. 3 that Spinoza does not commit himself in the *Ethics* to the view that there are more than two attributes (75ff.). Ch. 4 ('Extended Substance'), which is especially interesting, credits Spinoza with a 'field metaphysics' rather than a 'space plus contents metaphysics.' There is a fascinating (and controversial) discussion of Spinoza's notion of a vacuum (98ff.); and against Curley's interpretation of 'substance'/'mode,' Bennett argues for the truth, in part and with qualifications, of what Curley calls the 'Bayle-Joachim interpretation' (92ff.). The next chapter ('Necessity') offers a plausible explanation of why Spinoza is inclined both to affirm and to deny that there are 'contingent truths' in a contemporary sense of that expression. There is a reprise of ch. 2 in ch. 6 ('Thinking Substance'), where 'psycho-physical parallelism' seems to involve what is earlier called 'dualism.' More about this later. Bennett argues here against Curley's 'logical' interpretation of idea and thought (128ff.), and there is an interesting explanation of Spinoza's Panpsychism (135ff.) In 'Cognitive Psychology' (ch.7), Bennett tackles a number of very difficult problems about Spinoza's views of representation, belief, error, adequacy, reasoning, and self-knowledge. The pace is exceedingly fast and this pivotal chapter could well have been expanded. In ch. 8 ('Time') an interesting and plausible case is made for the unorthodox interpretation that eternity and duration are not incompatible, that eternity entails sempiternity, and that God can be said to have duration.

Chapter 9 ('Goals') serves as a bridge from the discussion of Parts 1 and 2 to that of Parts 3, 4, and 5. Commenting on the denial of divine purpose and final causes in nature in 1 Pref., Bennett proceeds to take statements about appetite and desire in the later Parts to support the thesis that Spinoza rules out teleological explanations of human behavior and denies that man can be said to act for an end. Somewhat surprisingly, he claims in the next chapter ('Self-Preservation') that 'Spinoza helps himself to a teleological doctrine of self-preservation ...' (245). There seems again to be an implied contrast of of-

ficial/unofficial and explicit/implicit views to explain the seeming inconsistency attributed to Spinoza.

Chapter 11 contains perceptive and helpful commentary on Spinoza's bewildering doctrine of 'affects' and their taxonomy. Ch. 12 ('Value') deals with Spinoza's contrast of the plain man's value judgments and the kind of judgments according to 'revisionary' ethics (4d1,2). Bennett's criticisms of the attempt to get a 'collaborative morality' out of 'utter egoism' are forthright and devastating (300ff.). At the beginning of ch. 13 ('Freedom'), a plausible case is made that there is a single concept of freedom, i.e., self-causedness, in Parts 1 and 4. Farther on, however, Bennett maintains that Spinoza 'is largely thinking in terms of what is internal or external to the will ...' (328) and by implication not self-causedness. More needs to be said here about how Spinoza manages to reconcile himself with himself on this important topic. In ch. 14 ('Psychotherapy') Bennett helpfully distinguishes and classifies various techniques Spinoza proposes for controlling and 'damping down' affects. His account is highly critical, and in its support he argues forcefully and at some length against Hampshire's more favorable view (347ff.). 'The Last Three Doctrines' of ch. 15 are in 5p23ff.: the eternity of part of the human mind, intuitive knowledge, and intellectual love of God. This is the section of the *Ethics* that Bennett deems a 'disaster.'

Here are some more extended remarks about 'property dualism' and 'psycho-physical parallelism' in chs 2 and 6. Observing in ch. 2 that Spinoza rejects Descartes's 'substance dualism,' Bennett maintains that he is none the less a dualist of a kind, i.e., a 'property dualist' (41ff.). Property dualism is introduced as the view that 'properties of things can be cleanly split into two groups, mental and physical, with no property belonging at once to both groups ...' (41). According to Bennett, 'modes are *properties* ...' (61, his italics), and it would follow on this interpretation that modes are split into two groups, mental and physical, and no mode can be in both groups. Property dualism is further explained here in terms of 'conceptual dualism,' the view that there are two sets of concepts, one for things considered as physical, the other for things considered as mental, and that concepts in one set cannot be reduced to concepts in the other (42ff.). Explaining property dualism in terms of conceptual dualism, Bennett assumes that conceptual dualism entails or involves property dualism (or perhaps that they are the same view). Such an assumption seems unwarranted. Supposing that Spinoza is a conceptual dualist, it is none the less open to him to say that one and the same property or mode can be conceived in two ways, under the attributes of thought and extension, or in other words that there are mental and physical concepts of a single property or mode. Indeed that seems to be the very view stated in 2p7s and 3p2s ('a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways ...'; 'Mind and body are one and the same thing, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension.').

At the beginning of ch. 6, Bennett characterizes Spinoza's 'parallelism' as (in part) the view that 'there is a one-one relation correlating mental items

with physical ones ...' (127) and there is a 'mental counterpart' or 'mental item corresponding to every physical item ...' (131). The term 'item,' not 'property,' is used here, but the view characterized in this way seems to entail or involve what is called 'property dualism' in ch. 2 (V. 133). Later in ch. 6, however, Bennett cites 2p7s and 3p2s and tells us that Spinoza offers a 'mode identity' thesis to explain the otherwise inexplicable correlations and correspondences posited in his psychophysical parallelism (140ff.). This is *prima facie* puzzling, for the mode identity thesis seems to be inconsistent with parallelism as characterized earlier, and it seems that Spinoza is being credited with an attempt to explain features of a certain view by another view that is inconsistent with it. Explaining his puzzling statement at 141 that, on Spinoza's mode identity thesis, 'between a physical particular and its mental correlate there is *not only a correlation but an identity* ...' (my italics), Bennett attempts to rescue Spinoza from this apparent inconsistency by attributing to him the view that 'if P1 is systematically linked with M1, then P1 is extension-and-F for some differentia F such that M1 is thought-and-F' (141). But this rescue attempt fails. What, on the proposed view, is the extended or physical mode supposed to be? If extension-and-F, there cannot be an identity between it and thought-and-F; if F, there cannot be a correlation between F and F. Apparently aware of a problem like this, Bennett concludes on p. 145 that '*concept* dualism is not threatened...' by the mode identity thesis but 'we do not get a *property* dualism' (his italics). Why, then, the attribution of property dualism in ch. 2 and the suggestion that property dualism is 'a fundamental aspect of [Spinoza's] cast of mind ...' (49).

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RADU J. BOGDAN, ed. *D. M. Armstrong*. Boston: D. Reidel 1984. pp. ix + 304. US\$55.00. ISBN 90-277-1657-9.

It is a pleasure to find a *Profile* dedicated to D.M. Armstrong, whose lucidity and intellectual integrity have made him one of the most influential of contemporary philosophers. The first part of the book consists of a fifty page autobiography. This is illuminating about Armstrong himself, about Australian intellectual life since 1950, and, to a lesser extent, about Oxford philosophy in the '50s. In the second part there are eight essays by other

philosophers, each of which deals fairly closely with Armstrong's views on a major topic. David Sanford deals with his theory of perception, especially with the relation of perception and belief. David Rosenthal writes about the causal theory of mind, and Stephen Stich about Armstrong on belief. William Lycan discusses Armstrong on knowledge, Bruce Aune and Martin Tweedale his theory of universals, and John Earman (and Tweedale) his account of natural law. Armstrong then makes a forty-five page reply. The final part of the book consists in a twenty-eight page bibliography which usefully summarizes the arguments of Armstrong's works.

Perhaps the most important interchange for immediately contemporary issues is that between Stich and Armstrong. Stich argues that the concept of belief, even when treated according to the causal analysis, will have no place in a scientific psychology. His argument, as restated by Armstrong, is as follows.

Stich constructs cases of belief which have the same "narrow causal profile" but which, he claims, are different beliefs. First, an American and an Englishman both have a belief which they express by saying that the salad vegetable chicory is often quite bitter. In fact, however, "chicory" refers to a different salad vegetable on different sides of the Atlantic. So they hold different beliefs, one true and one false. But the contact which the two men have with the two sorts of salad vegetable is so limited that the "narrow causal profile" of their respective beliefs is the same. Hence, Stich concludes, there is more to belief than narrow causal profile. (237-8)

Armstrong replies, entirely convincingly, that there is a perfectly good *de dicto* sense in which the Englishman and the American have exactly the same belief (though there is a *de re* sense in which they have different ones). This is so because, as well as their beliefs having the same causal profiles, they also think of the vegetable as no more than 'the salad vegetable called "chicory".' Armstrong succeeds in making it look as if scepticism about the reality of belief rests on very flimsy foundations.

A connected point emerges from Sanford's article. He argues, against the reduction of perception to belief, that much perception — e.g. that of the automatic driver — is sub-doxastic. I think there is something of a fashion amongst physicalists for saying that belief is too 'folk-psychological' a concept to be suitable for a cognitive treatment of perception, and this fashion is, sometimes at least, connected with scepticism about the scientific respectability of the concept of belief, preference being given to the more scientific sounding concept of 'information.' Armstrong's reply is that by 'belief' he only means that the cognitive state in question is intentional: 'they are acquisitions of information (misinformation) about the world ... But what, then is the distinction between acquiring information and acquiring beliefs?' (229) In so far as cognitive states are thought to possess intentionality (and how are they cognitive if they do not?) then their similarities will much outweigh the differences: indeed, scepticism about belief will amount to no more than the claim that scientific psychology will show that the content of people's actual beliefs is not exactly the same as we had prescientifically thought. The pro-

blem for someone wishing to eliminate belief is exhibited in Armstrong's comment 'I cannot bring myself to think (believe?) that there is no such thing as belief' (237). For, either the sceptic has a verb to substitute for 'think (believe?)' or he has not. If he has, it will ipso facto merely be a variant of the common notion; if not, he cannot express his own position.

The main concern of both Tweedale and Earman is whether the dispositional properties of objects — which are so important in our conception of them — can adequately be treated as functions of laws which belong only contingently to objects which possess certain categorical, non-dispositional properties. On the one hand, Tweedale wants to treat causal powers as *logically* required by intrinsic properties. On the other, Earman believes that the Mill-Lewis-Ramsay version of constant conjunction must suffice for an empiricist. Armstrong is in the middle, believing in necessitating laws which are contingently associated with the instantiation of certain universals. Tweedale has the (in my view sound) intuition that, if laws are real, yet simply imposed on intrinsic properties, they are a mystery and cry out for 'the deity of 17th and 18th century theologians, whose free but unchangeable will grounds the regularities of nature' (186). Earman, on the other hand, thinks that it is unempiricist to invoke a concept of necessitation which cannot be given empirical content. Armstrong replies to Earman that our experience of pressures gives it empirical content. His reply to Tweedale is, I think, less satisfactory. What sort of thing is a law, if it is not a generalisation arising out of the natural and internal propensities of objects? Armstrong says: 'I cannot make much sense of "the law breaking down"' (261). He cannot mean by this that if a generalisation breaks down we should not call it a law, for laws are not simply universal generalisations. But if he wants law to be a real necessitating agency, why could not one appear in the world at one date and disappear at another? It seems that laws are contingent entities that do not supervene on the intrinsic nature of physical particulars. Unless they are thought of as generalisations based on Divine activity, they appear to be neither intelligible abstract objects (like universals or numbers) nor grounded in concrete features of the physical or mental domains.

I have failed to discuss the other papers not because they are uninteresting, but because of space. All the contributions are rigorous and thorough. I think, however, it is a pity that all the contributors on the philosophy of mind seem to share a physicalist perspective, for that issue is at the heart of Armstrong's ideological thrust and it is difficult to show his most important and controversial contribution to philosophy without taking him to task on this issue. On the other hand, it is at least in part a tribute to Armstrong's intellectual power and influence that physicalism is nowadays the received opinion.

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LEA CAMPOS BORALEVI. *Bentham and the Oppressed*. New York: Walter de Gruyter 1984. Pp. x + 248. US\$35.20. ISBN 3-11-009974-8.

The recent revival of interest in Bentham has spurred research into his lesser known and previously unknown writings. This book is an example of such research. Boralevi's objective is to cast new light on Bentham's political theory by examining in detail his views on several disadvantaged groups, viz. women, sexual non-conformists including homosexuals, Jews, the indigent, native people of the colonies, slaves, and animals. Although she has unearthed new sources on these issues and therefore has contributed to the task of developing a comprehensive picture of Bentham's thought, she has not deepened our understanding of Bentham's philosophy. Her arguments are frequently sketchy and sometimes confusing. Throughout the book she repeatedly claims that Bentham's views on some oppressed group are perfectly consistent with his utilitarianism (cf. 5-6; 55; 92), while the 'Conclusion' argues that some of his views are based upon a surreptitious use of the concept of natural rights (cf. 186; 189). His utilitarianism itself is never analyzed in any greater depth than as the belief in the principle of the greatest good for the greatest numbers.

The Chapter on women reveals the feminist side of Bentham's thought. Boralevi shows that he believed that the interests of women deserved equal consideration with those of men and that their inferiority was an effect of their subjection not its cause, and argues that he probably influenced J.S. Mill. She also argues that Bentham did not believe exclusively in formal equality but was rather willing to take into account women's differences to justify special rules, although the special rules she cites include rather trivial things such as taking special measures to preserve female dignity and modesty when they act as witnesses in court proceedings. Lastly, she reveals that Bentham believed that abortion was permissible, but while she claims that this is based on his conviction that women's interests had to be considered equally, she also notes that his acceptance of abortion was limited to times when under-population was not a problem.

Boralevi has also dealt extensively with Bentham's writings on the issue of homosexuality and other forms of sexual non-conformity, which he did not publish during his life because he was afraid for his reputation and which were suppressed by Bowring who edited the first collection of his works. These materials include an attempt to explain why there was prejudice against homosexuals, as well as an attack on the standard arguments of the day — both religious and secular — against homosexuality. While this is historically interesting, the arguments themselves seem rather quaint and, notwithstanding Boralevi's contrary contention, far removed from current debate, except for the seemingly eternal religious arguments.

In the chapter on Jews Boralevi spends too much time analyzing Bentham's views on usury, which are only tangentially related to the issue of religious tolerance via his argument that one reason usury was frowned upon

was because people associated it with a religious group that they despised. The exploration of his views in favour of tolerance is rather shallow, but is interestingly set off against evidence of his personal aversion toward Jews. She concludes with an argument that Bentham was influenced by Montesquieu on this issue. But this is based on rather slim evidence, consisting primarily of certain similarities in the arguments used by each and the fact that the same anecdotes appear in both.

The discussion of Bentham's treatment of the indigent and slaves is the most interesting in the book from the point of view of deepening our understanding of his philosophy. Boralevi argues that although Bentham's proposals for reform of the Poor Law were the most far reaching of their day, they were ultimately based on his belief that poor relief was necessary to maintain 'security' or stability by keeping the poor from taking matters into their own hands. Similarly his inclination to argue that slavery was wrong was tempered by a concern not to disturb all at once the property rights of the slave owner. The chapter on indigency also returns to the issue of population control and includes an interesting discussion of the effect which Malthus had on Bentham's thinking.

The chapter entitled 'Native People of the Colonies' is confusing because it has very little to do with indigenous peoples and more with British colonists and when Bentham thought colonies should be established and whether a colony should be granted independence once it became a viable political entity. The only native people mentioned are those of India whom Bentham thought unready to govern themselves because their religious beliefs prevented them from understanding utility.

Finally, the discussion of the treatment of animals claims Bentham as a founder of the prevention of cruelty to animals movement. He argued that the interests of animals had to be taken into account merely because they could suffer, but that this did not require a prohibition on killing animals for food provided they suffered no more pain than by a natural death.

The book concludes with an overview of Bentham's analysis of oppression which is interesting but would have been much better placed at the beginning and integrated into the discussion of the various categories of oppression. Boralevi argues that Bentham had a psychological explanation of the prejudices that lead to oppression and a political explanation of how those in power use these prejudices to prevent the people from understanding what utility requires. These were accompanied by the belief that education was the solution to the first problem and institutional reform was needed to remedy the second. Again, while some new and interesting material has been uncovered here, the philosophical analysis is weak. The book also includes an appendix containing passages from several previously unpublished manuscripts which will no doubt be of interest to Bentham scholars.

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GUY BOUCHARD, LAURENT GIROUX, GILBERT LECLERC. *L'utopie aujourd'hui*. Montréal/Sherbrooke: Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal/Les Editions de l'Université de Sherbrooke 1985. Pp. 272. Cdn23.50\$. ISBN 2-7606-0720-8.

'Nous avons vécu en utopie: hélas!' (9) — 'Nous n'avons, hélas! jamais vécu en eutopie' (10). Dans son introduction à cet intéressant ouvrage collectif, Guy Bouchard cherche surtout à nous mettre sur la piste de l'attitude contemporaine ambivalente, voire hostile au sujet de l'utopie: d'une part, la pensée utopiste traditionnelle présente l'Etat comme le moteur du paradis terrestre et, d'autre part, lorsque l'Etat a effectivement détenu cette position prédominante, on a plutôt eu affaire à l'inverse. En même temps, nous avons besoin de 'réver' à l'utopie, car ce rêve nous sert de repère au moment du choix existentiel: il en va, en effet, de notre être même.

Pour lutter contre un présent destructeur ou abêtissant, il nous faut des images de l'avenir à la fois positives, comme buts à atteindre, et négatives, comme enfers à conjurer, et c'est cela, précisément, que nous offre l'utopie (12).

Dans la première partie de l'ouvrage, Laurent Giroux interroge la possibilité de dépasser l'idéologie de la société technologique et les structures étatiques qui y correspondent. Ce texte, fort dense et parfois elliptique, aurait pu à lui tout seul constituer un ouvrage d'envergure. Giroux commence par un survol de l'évolution de la notion et de l'idéal d'utopie dans quatre 'zones culturelles' (20) différentes: la Grèce, par Platon; l'Allemagne, par Kant; les Etats-Unis, par Marcuse, Ernest Callenbach et Marilyn Ferguson; et la France, par Furter et Raulet et leur colloque interdisciplinaire sur 'Les stratégies de l'utopie.' Giroux s'arrête le plus longuement aux propos de Raulet, pour qui toute utopie comporte une structure totalisante, donc risquant 'la clôture' (59), danger que l'on peut contourner en inscrivant la synthèse dans l'histoire. Même s'il trouve intéressante l'argumentation de Raulet, Giroux la trouve en même temps circulaire et contradictoire et en conclut à une 'illusion marxisante' (63), se demandant s'il ne faudrait pas imputer la clôture au principe unificateur du modèle plutôt qu'à son caractère de totalité (64).

Par la suite, à travers une synthèse réussie de la problématique de Heidegger, Giroux nous en présente la position comme la plus radicale (74). Le projet de Descartes a conduit à la mathématisation du monde, qui conduit à son tour au 'vide de l'abandon de l'être' (68). Alors que l'artisan attend de la nature ce qu'elle peut offrir, la technologie moderne la provoque et la constraint, modifiant ainsi radicalement le rapport à l'être et à la nature. Pour Heidegger par contre, seule la 'prise de conscience ... planétaire du projet fermé caractéristique de la modernité' (73) pourrait permettre de déconstruire la modernité: réduits à de simples 'fonctionnaires de la technique' (*ibid.*, citation de *Holzwege*), il nous reste une issue: 'lorsque nous nous ouvrons proprement à l'essence de la technique, nous nous trouvons

inespérément dans une exigence libératrice' (74, citation de *L'essence de la technique*).

Comment 'échaper à l'utopie pure sans retomber dans les filets de la domination'? (74) Giroux voit trois possibilités: la théorie de l'agir communicationnel de Habermas, doublée de la société conviviale d'Illich (80); une recherche des possibilités réelles de la technologie de se dégager du pouvoir (81); un retour à un équivalent de l'Ecotopie (*ibid.*).

Gilbert Leclerc nous livre comme seconde partie de l'ouvrage un texte d'une grande limpideté analysant 'L'éducation permanente comme modèle utopique'. Il s'agira d'abord pour lui, s'inspirant de la notion de 'type idéal' de Max Weber, de construire une définition type d'abord de l'utopie, puis de l'éducation permanente. L'utopie:

Un projet imaginaire d'une réalité globalement autre ayant pour but de transformer radicalement la réalité existante (94, souligné dans le texte).

L'éducation permanente:

Transformer en profondeur le système éducatif existant et la société toute entière pour donner à l'éducation sa pleine dimension dans le temps, dans l'espace et dans chaque sujet qui s'éduque, et la meilleure intégration et continuité possible de tous ces aspects entre eux (106, souligné dans le texte).

Confrontant ces deux définitions, Leclerc conclut que l'éducation permanente a bien la nature d'un projet utopique, car 'A partir du moment où l'on parle de société ou de cité éducative, on envisage déjà une transformation radicale de la société existante' (109). Après avoir présenté les fonctions onirique, critique, éthique et mobilisatrice de l'utopie (111 ss), Leclerc rappelle les échecs historiques de l'utopie, qui en font également le dilemme: ou bien la pureté, qui mène à la marginalisation sinon à la disparition, ou bien l'incarnation dans la société, ce qui implique la renonciation 'à une bonne part' du rêve (125). En même temps, l'utopie échoue et réussit à la fois: elle ne tient jamais sa promesse, mais elle génère de nouveaux modèles (126). Il faut donc, en somme, concevoir l'utopie éducative comme 'un modèle idéal capable de guider et d'inspirer l'action, mais en prenant bien garde de vouloir l'incarner tel quel dans l'histoire' (129).

Comme troisième partie de l'ouvrage, Guy Bouchard nous présente 'Eutopie, dystopie, para-utopie et péri-utopie.' Il commence par un survol fourni et représentatif de la littérature utopique théorique et de création — le territoire de l'utopie. Il établit la définition de l'utopie comme 'une fiction qui met l'accent sur le thème socio-politique' (184) et fait deux distinctions intéressantes: l'une entre eutopie et dystopie — le meilleur et le pire des mondes — et l'autre entre para-utopie et péri-utopie — les œuvres non fictives traitant du thème socio-politique idéalisé, par opposition aux œuvres fictives traitant du thème socio-politique sans toutefois l'idéaliser (185). Faisant ensuite 'Escale en dystopie', Bouchard fait état, tableau à l'appui, 'd'une baisse notable de la production utopique au cours des dernières décennies'

(190). Il y a certes eu quelques eutopies célèbres mais, dit-il, tout n'y va pas pour le mieux, ce qui l'amène aux dystopies, dont il nous en présente cinq. Sa présentation succincte mais instructive lui permet ensuite de poser la question de la signification et des rôles de l'utopie. La science-fiction s'offre comme une des rares formes littéraires pouvant traiter directement des grandes questions philosophiques, ce qui 's'applique encore plus radicalement à l'utopie, qui est essentiellement idéique' (204). L'utopie a d'autre part le rôle multiple de présenter l'équivalent littéraire du concept philosophique d'Etat rationnel (*ibid.*), d'éveiller la conscience politique (205), voire d'inciter à l'action (206). Mais il y a une antinomie: l'ordre parfait exclut toute forme de liberté, ou: la liberté conduit au désordre. Bouchard lève l'antinomie par le renvoi à Callenbach, pour qui l'utopie 'peut ... s'accommoder d'un certain désordre' (210); Bouchard reprend: 'l'utopie doit être assumée par chacun, et quotidiennement' (*ibid.*). Enfin, Bouchard fait voir comment l'utopie repose par nécessité sur une hypothèse anthropologique, sur une vision de l'humain à son meilleur (213 ss), vision bien évidemment sans cesse à recommencer et à améliorer.

Enfin, dans une conclusion séparée (les trois auteurs ne concluent pas comme tel et il faut espérer qu'ils le feront ultérieurement), Guy Bouchard nous parle de l'hétéropolitique de l'histoire. Après un rappel d'une série de passages pénibles d'A. Comte (231 ss), Bouchard note, dix-sept auteurs à l'appui, que l'utopie, contestant le présent, ne peut tourner le dos à l'histoire (234). Si la révolte consiste en 'le refus global d'une situation socio-politique intolérable' (237), il s'agit alors de distinguer les diverses formes de révolte pour en arriver à 'la spécificité de l'utopie dans son rapport à l'histoire' (*ibid.*). Cette spécificité se concrétise en un tableau (240) étalant toutes les réactions possibles à la situation socio-politique et développant en particulier l'éventail des réactions possibles à une situation socio-politique jugée intolérable. Bouchard simplifie ensuite en un nouveau tableau (262), ayant montré comment certaines formes de révolte se muent ou se résorbent en d'autres, au point où il peut conclure que la grande opposition entre les formes de révolte se trouve entre l'utopie, traitant d'un futur, et l'Age d'Or, regrettant un passé. Il y a une multitude de chemins menant de l'hétéropolis (la cité autre) à la cité réelle et tous ces chemins 'témoignent du rôle historique de l'imagination' (264). Mais l'approche du réel exige la médiation 'non seulement de l'idéologie, mais aussi de l'homme ou de la femme d'action' (265). D'où le dilemme de la pensée hétéropolitique, 'celui de la révolution par les armes opposée à la métamorphose des mentalités' (*ibid.*). 'Pour être concrète, l'utopie doit coïncider avec la tendance ..., mais la tendance est dans les êtres humains. C'est pourquoi l'histoire n'a pas d'autre sens que celui qu'ils lui donnent' (267).

Signalons pour terminer qu'une bonne bibliographie accompagne chacun des trois textes et la conclusion.

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MURRAY CODE. *Order and Organism: Steps to a Whiteheadian Philosophy of Mathematics and the Natural Sciences*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1985. Pp. 265. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-951-5); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-952-3).

There is general agreement that mathematics has been fundamental to modern physical sciences since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is, however, not well enough recognized that the enormous advances in the last two hundred years, both in mathematics and in the physical sciences, have brought a special urgency to the issue of the nature and status of mathematics.

Murray Code is a mathematician who became interested in the issue of the nature and status of mathematics. It is a topic of immense complexity and difficulty, and one which has received very inadequate systematic attention. In this century the thinker who has achieved the deepest penetration into the immensity and extent of the issues and problems facing us here is Whitehead. He was a mathematician, but one with a decidedly philosophical bent, and with an early deep interest in the issue of the nature and status of mathematics. Much to Code's credit he decided on an investigation of Whitehead on this topic — a daunting investigation since it involved, not only a detailed study of the entire Whiteheadian corpus, but also a comprehensive mastery of philosophy. For an appreciation of what is involved in this issue of the nature and status of mathematics, it has to be seen in historical perspective.

Arising with the Renaissance resuscitation of mathematics in the West, the doctrine became widely accepted that the universe is a mathematical structure, and therefore to be understood by mathematics. Mathematics secured truth and certainty, and real knowledge of the physical universe, because the object of mathematics, that with which mathematics, and geometry in particular, is concerned, is the universe. In the new seventeenth-century theory, the physical universe was conceived as matter in motion, and physical science was a mechanics, i.e. an applied mathematics investigating the laws of that motion. The philosophical basis for physical science as knowledge; i.e. as true, was provided by Descartes with his doctrine of the axioms of mathematics having the status of innate ideas implanted by God in minds in their creation. Thus mathematical thought is knowledge of the mathematical structure of the physical.

The tenability of this entire doctrine, however, was brought into most serious question with the development, in the early nineteenth century, of non-Euclidean geometry. For it destroyed the assumption or theory that nature or the physical is unambiguously the object of geometry. Evidently, the entire issue of the nature and status of mathematics stood in need of urgent reconsideration.

In this situation the Kantian doctrine of mathematics as a construct of the mind — which replaced the Cartesian — was seized upon by mathematicians as constituting a new basis. Weierstrass, in the early nineteenth century, pro-

claimed that mathematics is a free creation of the human mind, a doctrine which became widely accepted, and continuing to be maintained explicitly and firmly a century later by Einstein. This is the basis of the currently widely held view of mathematics as a 'tool.' But this position leaves completely obscure on what rational ground this entirely subjective mathematics is to be accepted as applying to nature at all, let alone revealing the very essence of the physical — for Kant it had applied to a *phenomenal* nature, one created by the mind. From Einstein on the applicability of mathematics to, and its furnishing the truth about, nature has been accepted partly on trust — an implicit survival of the antecedent doctrine — and partly as empirically justified — despite the most serious epistemological difficulties which have emerged concerning the problem of empirical verification.

Whitehead, after many years spent on the attempt to ground mathematics in the general premises of all reasoning, recognized that the problem is a much more profoundly philosophical one, the full complexity of which it took him decades to comprehend, involving the development of an entire metaphysical system of great originality. For, from the standpoint of mathematics, it is important to distinguish the objects of pure mathematics from those of applied mathematics, and doing so necessitates the specification of their respective ontological status. Whitehead saw that the genuine knowledge of the physical through mathematics requires, on the one hand, that physical entities in themselves manifest mathematical characters; and on the other, that the subjects of mathematico-scientific propositions be the physical entities themselves. This epistemological requirement evidently necessitates a metaphysical basis. What is requisite is a metaphysics in terms of which this is consistently and coherently possible.

The outcome of Code's investigation is a most interesting book, one which is of considerable value, from many points of view. Whitehead is by no means an easy writer to comprehend, and most people simply abandon the attempt in the face of so much complexity. One of the considerable merits of this book is that it achieves a remarkable clarification of Whitehead's philosophy of mathematics and of the natural sciences. This book should thus be specially valuable to mathematicians and natural scientists in bringing an understanding of the relevance of Whitehead's thought to their concerns.

But this is not a book intended only for scientific specialists. It has an admirable lucidity making it readily accessible to a much wider readership of the philosophically interested. A further merit of this book is that it is not to be viewed as merely an exposition of Whitehead. It is very much wider; it is an inquiry in its own right into the philosophy of mathematics and of the natural sciences. The reason that Code has been able to achieve this double accomplishment lies in his method of exposition, which is to concentrate on the *problems* at issue, delineating and investigating them, and presenting Whitehead's theories as among the possible solutions to the problems involved in the philosophy of mathematics and of the natural sciences. These fields interpenetrate, for the problems involved in them are interdependent.

Code's book merits a wide readership, especially at the present time in

which the positivist approach in these fields, which has dominated since early in this century, is coming to be recognized as fundamentally flawed. Further, this book also constitutes a valuable addition to Whitehead scholarship, for it fills a notable gap, more particularly with respect to Whitehead's philosophy of mathematics, which has so far been sadly neglected, for it is far from being negligible with respect to his thought as a whole. His metaphysics as well as his philosophy of the natural sciences are not adequately comprehensible without it.

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All in all the 31 essays leave something to be desired, but they are nevertheless an interesting and valuable contribution to the study of Whitehead's philosophy.

ROBERT S. COHEN, RICHARD M. MARTIN, AND MEROLD WESTPHAL, eds. *Studies in the Philosophy of J.N. Findlay*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1985. Pp. xv + 478. US\$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-795-4); US\$23.50 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-794-6).

Findlay's hopes for himself are surely expressed in Charles Hartshorne's tribute (229) — 'I see in Findlay that rare phenomenon, a writer who seems to escape from the provincialism of his part of the world and the snobbery of his century so that for him something like the entire panorama of human thinking about God and man ... is a present and vivid reality.'

The main line of Findlay's later works has been a struggle to re-establish the relevance of central Platonic and neo-Platonic ideas. Yet his assessment of Wittgenstein, his 'rehabilitation' of Hegel, his understanding of Meinong, his contributions to one of the tougher kinds of analytic philosophy popular in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s and, most recently, his reconsiderations of Kant, are all rightly taken seriously. Even his encounter with Wittgenstein in a Cambridge milk-bar (recounted again in this book) merits a footnote in the recent history of philosophy.

A study of this volume, however, might suggest that it is his growing preoccupation with the idea of Salvation which led him both to be less concerned with the reform of 'this world' than he might have been, and even to be inclined to accept aspects of this world like colonialism which can be regarded as forms of tutelage. (In the autobiography with which this volume begins Findlay here repeats — 49-50 — his very conservative reading of Hegel's master-slave problem in the *Phenomenology*: on Findlay's view the progress

of the slave toward freedom depends not on constant dialectical tension and alternation of roles but on an early absolute 'self-identity' which would seem to stop the dialectic dead. He specifically cites European colonialism in Africa as a good example and regrets that it ended too soon.)

Findlay's pre-occupation with salvation had its origins in his childhood associations with Theosophy as did his love of certain Neoplatonic concepts, but these interests remained mainly dormant for many years. Erazim Kohák here suggests that we need to reconsider salvation 'as a philosophical category.' It is the need for this category, he thinks, which explains Findlay's interest in the relation of the Kantian categories to 'lived life.' Unfortunately, no one in this volume tackles head-on Findlay's view of the question (forbidden at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century) as to whether or not salvation is by philosophy. Many people have supposed that Findlay thinks that, in some sense, indeed, it could be.

W.H. Walsh is glad to see the Absolute back in business, but he believes that Findlay errs in thinking that the concept of the Absolute can provide a complete explanation for the world without entailing determinism. In his reply Findlay takes the position of Duns Scotus and others, that at some level what can be determined is A-or-B-or-C, and that so long as any one of the alternants occurs, the situation is explained by the entailment of the complete set of them; but the complexity of this fundamental notion is left unexplored.

Findlay says he accepts (so far as he understands it) Peter Bertocci's notion of the Absolute as an interlocking set of selves, a view which seems to resemble what Broad called McTaggart's mutual admiration society. In McTaggart, the idea was meant to give an account of how it is that we can attain unity with the Absolute and still maintain a measure of personal identity; but the problem has always been, somehow, to maintain the commanding, ordering power of a single Absolute (important to some of Findlay's other notions) while allowing the necessary plurality. McTaggart was willing to allow more substitutions — determining correspondence for omniscience, for instance — which Findlay and Bertocci have usually been more chary of, and we are left with problems which the essays do not answer.

H.D. Lewis and Edward Casey attack related aspects of these questions in their essays on the distinctness of persons and Findlay's philosophy of mind. Each essay is valuable in itself. Findlay replies, briefly and mildly, to each in a way which brings out his commitment to a neo-Platonism which seems to come constantly closer to Plotinus himself.

Charles Hartshorne and Findlay do show how each influenced the other's view of the possibility of proof of the existence of God and this explains, in some measure, how Findlay got from the formal disproof of the existence of God to close friendship with the Absolute. But Findlay has said that 'atheism is the purest form of protestantism' and suggested that he was an atheist on moral grounds. Whether or not the Absolute is as morally objectionable as the old God depends on how one solves the question of the one and the many, and, again, we don't seem to make much progress here.

Some essays merely establish a record, though one which will be useful to future historians of philosophy: David Carr recounts the common view that Husserl was not an idealist and that his seeming idealism was only methodological or, at most, strategic. Findlay responds that Husserl would commit intellectual suicide if he adopted his methodology without becoming at least a crypto-Berkeleyan. The exchange puts each position clearly, but the argument is not advanced. Raymond Plant's account of Wittgenstein's views — a candidate for a prize as the most boring account ever of that seldom-boring philosopher — lays down impeccably the orthodox reading of Wittgenstein of ten or fifteen years ago and tries to fit Findlay's encounters with Wittgenstein into it. But if this 'profoundly anti-metaphysical' (later) Wittgenstein was the real one, why was he even interested enough to take Findlay to the milk-bar?

All in all the 21 essays leave something of the impression of the blind men who examined the elephant — each of them has a point but one wishes that they had all gone off for a couple of weeks, exchanged notes, and then each tried to imagine what single creature could be the object of their reports. They leave us in no doubt, though, that Findlay is a very large philosopher. Findlay fans will welcome this work, but, after one serious reading, my hard-cover copy is battered and falling apart. The State of New York is surely capable of better binding than this.

servir et d'interpréter la loi.

LESLIE ARMOUR

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LAURENT COHEN-TANUGI. *Le Droit sans l'Etat. Sur la démocratie en France et en Amérique*. Préface de Stanley Hoffmann. Paris: Presses universitaires de France (Recherches politiques). 1985. Pp. xii et 206. 90 FF. ISBN 2-13-039046-3.

Selon Cohen-Tanugi la société des Etats-Unis règle bien des problèmes qui, en France, relèvent du gouvernement ou de l'Assemblée nationale, par les tribunaux ou des règlements hors cours, c'est-à-dire des ententes à l'amiable préparées par des avocats et tenant compte de ce que serait la décision judiciaire dont le règlement hors cours veut faire l'économie. Les hommes de loi imaginent des solutions aux problèmes qui leur sont posés en développant, parfois audacieusement, un patrimoine légal qui s'enrichit tous les jours

du fait de ce développement jurisprudentiel plus que du fait du législateur. La société américaine s'administrerait donc selon le droit qui s'est développé en son sein, recourant aux hommes de loi pour interpréter ce droit. Cohen-Tanugi insiste, d'une part, sur l'autonomie de la société civile, sur la cohérence et la créativité de la jurisprudence aux Etats-Unis et, d'autre part, sur l'incohérence et l'arbitraire des interventions étatiques, sur les carences du droit et la dépendance vis-à-vis de l'arbitrage du gouvernement en France. (Pour une vue rapide de la question, voir l'entretien de l'*Express* avec l'auteur, pp. 42-8, no du 24-1-86.)

A propos de l'autonomie du pouvoir judiciaire, il y a en France un débat séculaire qui, durant l'Ancien régime, opposait le Roi et les parlements; après la Révolution, opposait les majorités parlementaires et les tribunaux; aujourd'hui oppose parfois la gauche et la droite. C'est un débat que relance Cohen-Tanugi en prenant parti pour les tribunaux. Son livre mérite une appréciation et une critiques sérieuses. Il est bien plus qu'un pamphlet de droite proaméricain. (Christian De Brie, dans un article intitulé 'L'exemplarité militante des Etats-Unis' (*Le monde diplomatique*, février 1986, p. 2) fait une critique simpliste de ce livre.)

Je commencerai par en esquisser le plan. Ensuite, je lui donnerai une brève réplique en me mettant sur le terrain choisi par l'auteur, celui du droit: je parlerai des limites que doit s'imposer le pouvoir judiciaire pour jouer son rôle.

Le premier chapitre oppose deux modes de régulation sociale: l'autorégulation par les lois ou les coutumes, et les interventions autoritaires du gouvernement ou du législateur. Dans le second chapitre, on compare les énarques français aux *lawyers* américains, les règles générales a priori aux jugements qui s'adaptent aux circonstances et s'inspirent de l'ensemble du corpus juridique. Dans le troisième chapitre, il s'agit de l'évolution, différente en France et aux Etats-Unis, de la rivalité entre juridique et politique. En France, 'la fiction rousseauïste, sous couvert de sacrifier la loi, aboutit paradoxalement à un effacement du droit et de la loi suprême de l'Etat qu'est la Constitution' (70); l'élection semble une garantie de démocratie mais non l'indépendance et la compétence des juges. (A ce sujet, voir J. Julliard, *La Faute à Rousseau. Essai sur les conséquences historiques de l'idée de souveraineté populaire*, Le Seuil, Paris, 1985.) Alors que les Américains se fient à la loi et au pouvoir judiciaire, les Français ont traditionnellement refusé le 'gouvernement des juges' pour accorder tout pouvoir aux représentants du peuple. Le cinquième chapitre envisage deux modèles de démocratie: l'un basé sur le respect des lois, l'autre basé sur l'Etat, émanation de la volonté populaire. Ensuite, ce même chapitre aborde quatre questions: la spécificité des agences gouvernementales qui organisent la négociation entre intérêts concurrents d'un même secteur, pour établir un *modus vivendi* qui serve l'intérêt public; la concertation entre l'Etat et les intérêts privés du fait du lobbying; la supériorité des résistances et des victoires judiciaires sur les démonstrations de rue; l'accès à l'information gouvernementale comme condition de la démocratie. Dans le dernier chapitre, l'auteur montre que le droit

américain s'adapte à l'expansion internationale des affaires et que l'apparente rivalité qui règne entre les différentes instances du pouvoir fédéral n'est pas un handicap.

Ce livre pose une série de questions cruciales qui suscitent la réflexion, mais quand l'auteur préconise moins d'Etat et plus de droit dans nos sociétés, il me semble oublier au moins les points suivants:

1. Les agences gouvernementales qui réglementent des pans entiers de la société américaine n'ont pas toujours reçu des élus un mandat suffisamment clair. Elles doivent résoudre des problèmes politiques parce qu'elles doivent appliquer une loi trop vague. Et l'empirisme en ces matières consiste le plus souvent à suivre les préjugés les plus forts ou des plus forts. On pourrait en dire autant des tribunaux qui doivent statuer sur la signification trop vague des droits de la personne.

2. Les tribunaux, au nom même de la justice, doivent appliquer le droit, l'expliquer au besoin, mais non le créer. C'est en imposant la loi qu'ils assurent un ordre cohérent et prévisible. Ce n'est pas là toute la justice mais c'est la tâche du judiciaire. Les juges ne sont pas nommés pour trancher les questions politiques que veulent éviter les élus, pour choisir entre les valeurs qui se font concurrence dans une société pluraliste. Leur métier est de conserver et d'interpréter la loi.

En appliquant rationnellement les règles de droit dans les cas particuliers qui leur sont soumis, les tribunaux mettent ces règles à l'épreuve, ils les confrontent à l'expérience concrète et singulière, ils révèlent ce qu'elles ont d'in satisfaisant, de déraisonnable, d'injuste éventuellement. Mais le rôle des tribunaux n'est pas de redresser les lois injustes ou de refuser de les imposer. Les limitations mêmes de leur rôle font place au législateur.

3. Les tribunaux n'ont pas à administrer ou à favoriser les négociations entre les parties. Si les avocats américains le font, c'est leur affaire. Les tribunaux disent les droits et les obligations des parties qui viennent devant eux. Cette tâche est étroite mais c'est une condition nécessaire à la justice telle qu'on la conçoit dans les sociétés libérales.

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JOHN COTTINGHAM, ROBERT STOOHOFF and DUGALD MURDOCH, trans. *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985. Vol. I: US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-24594-X); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-28808-8); Vol. II: US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-24595-8); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-28807-X).

With some nostalgia I take my leave from *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, published by Cambridge University Press. For seventy-five years this two-volume work has been the most comprehensive selection of Descartes' works in English. It has served many generations of graduate students. My own copy, rebound and overflowing with marginal comments, gives me the comfortable experience of the bookshelves in my study: I know where to lay my hands on just about anything I need. But since CUP has now published all it contains, and a good deal more besides, in a translation which in many instances is superior and in very few inferior to HR's, I shall place it on my shelves and leave it here. The old workhouse is retired, and I shall teach students to plow the field of Descartes' mind with a new and improved breed: *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vols. I and II, translated by Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch. Cottingham translated some two-thirds of the material; of the remainder Stoothoff translated two-thirds and Murdoch the rest. Despite these various hands involved, the final product is not one of which Descartes would have to say that 'there is not ... so much perfection' in it because it is 'produced by various different craftsmen' instead of by 'one man' (CSM1, 116). The translation is uniformly smooth and in the main highly accurate, no doubt in part because 'All the members of the team have ... scrutinized each other's work ...' (x).

The first volume contains the *Early Writings**, the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, parts of *The World** and of the *Treatise of Man**, the *Discourse on the Method* and parts of the *Optics**, the *Principles of Philosophy* (Part One in its entirety and selected articles from Parts Two, Three and Four), *Comments on a Certain Broadsheet* (better known as *Notes directed against a certain Programme*), which is the HR translation of the title, a rendering which, given the original — *Notae in Programma quoddam* — the translators would have done well to adopt), extracts of *Description of the Human Body**, and *The Passions of the Soul*. The second volume contains the *Meditations*, *Objections and Replies*, and *The Search for Truth*. The five works in the first volume marked '*' have no counterpart in HR.

The principle used for inclusion is that the works must be 'philosophical' or must be 'scientific writings ... which are likely to be of interest to students of philosophy and allied disciplines' (viii). One stated principle for exclusion of works which fall into one or the other of these categories is that the work in question 'is already available in English.' This principle has been used erratically. There are, for example, readily available complete English editions of both the *Treatise of Man* and the *Optics*, and hence there is on this ground

no reason for their inclusion. But given their inclusion, there is no longer a good basis to exclude all of Descartes' letters, even though there is Kenny's 'excellent selection' (viii). And since a judicious selection of a number of letters would have contained more material of philosophical importance than one finds in at least four of the titles included, their exclusion is regrettable. Also puzzling is the inclusion of the *Optics*. For if only one of the *Discourse's* 'essays' is to be included, the *Geometry* would seem to be a better choice for two reasons: its present English edition (Olscamp: New York 1965) is more flawed in translation than is the *Optics*, and of the two the *Geometry* is the more exciting 'illustration' of Descartes' method.

Dwelling on points like these would degenerate into curmudgeonly complaints. There is much to be praised. The translations are all from Descartes' original works; hence they contain none of the infelicitous passages one finds in the HR translations of the *Meditations* and the *Principles*, passages in which the combination of French and Latin editions sometimes obscures Descartes' meaning. At the end of each volume there is a useful index, each about three times as comprehensive as that in HR. In the margins of each volume there are cross-references to the page number in the relevant volume of the standard edition of Descartes' works by Adam and Tannery. The complete *Meditations*, *Objections and Replies*, and *The Search for Truth* all finally appear in a single volume.

Now for the translation. Since the publisher seems to intend to replace HR with CSM, it is only fair to make comparisons between the two also in this respect. Some comments on specific passages will give further grounds for my preference of the new over the old edition.

Often translators have obscured the fact that Descartes was generally precise about his use of *methodus* or *méthode*; he seldomly used that word unless he referred to his general method. Words like *via*, *façon*, *moyen* he consistently used to refer to procedures which, though often related to the general method, are not identical with it. CSM is almost always alert to this nuance; see, for example, its rendering in vol. I of *via* (15), *moyens* (140), *façon* (330, 367). HR is oblivious to Descartes' practice in this respect; in each of the corresponding passages it has 'method.' Unfortunately there are two lapses on this point in CSM. In vol. II, pp. 110-11, it three times incorrectly and gratuitously inserts 'method' in its translation; and twice it there translates *via* by 'method' in sentences where even HR hit it correctly with 'procedure.' A similar mistake occurs in the first volume, in the translation of the title of Discourse Ten of the *Optics*. Although in both cases English idiom makes the mistakes easy to commit, Descartes' practice makes them inexcusable.

The greatest improvement in *The Passions* is the translation of *volonté*. In spite of its correct translation of Article 80 ('... by the word will [volonté] I do not here intend to talk of desire [desir] ...') HR capriciously renders *volonté* as 'desire' (Articles 18, 44, 55) or 'wish' (twice in Article 106); in all these instances CSM has 'volition.'

CSM's rendering of the heading of *Principles* II, 1, makes explicit an im-

portant philosophical point: 'The arguments that lead to the certain knowledge of the existence [*existentialia*] of material things.' HR omits 'of the existence.'

In the *Meditations*, CSM's correct translation makes it clear from the outset that the evil genius is meant to be God-against-us rather than some interloping minor devil: '... some malicious demon of the utmost power and cunning [*summe potentem & callidum*]' (15). HR's '... some evil genius not less powerful than deceitful' obscures this point.

As transition to a few negative comments about the translation, I note that CSM presents the famous statement from the *Discourse* about mastery over nature as '...and thus make ourselves, as it were, the lords and masters of nature' (142). Except for J. Collins (Oxford, 1971) translators have tended to disregard the *comme*. One wonders whether CSM's rendering is a pedantically precise translation which lessens the reader's opportunity to be struck by the force of the blow Descartes here aimed at the medieval tradition of 'knowledge for the sake of contemplation.'

In the *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, CSM's translation of the heading of Rule Four is as weak as HR's: 'We need a method ...'. Just *needing* something does not mean that one cannot do without it. But as Descartes says in this Rule, ...'it is far better never to contemplate investigating the truth ... than to do so without a method.' This seems to make the method more necessary than just needful — as is confirmed by what Descartes writes in this heading: '*Necessaria est Methodus* ...'. More puzzling is the translation of Rule Nine: 'We must concentrate our mind's eye totally upon the most insignificant and easiest matters ... [*res minimas & maxime faciles*].' As foundational, these *res minima* are most significant rather than most insignificant; these most significant items are epistemically *the smallest*.

In the *Discourse* an important epistemological point is obscured in the translation of the third rule (120) when *la connaissance des plus composez* becomes 'knowledge of the most complex.' There is a crucial difference between 'complexity' and 'compoundedness': the former tends to be characterized by obscurity, the latter ought to be clear and distinct.

The word *praejudicium*, *préjugement*, occurs throughout Descartes' works. CSM renders it consistently as 'preconceived opinion' (e.g., II, 5, 8, 15, 25, 47, 97, 270-1). What is wrong with the word 'prejudice' or, even, 'prejudgement'? Either of these two would make Descartes' text clearer, the latter especially in the passages which explicitly juxtapose *praejudicium* and *judicium*, *préjugement* and *jugement* (e.g., II, 15, 271).

There are lesser points about which one might quibble. As the translators (quoting Descartes) have it, *naturae nostrae infirmitas est agnoscenda* (x). Whatever the weaknesses of their natures, it has marred their translation very little indeed. I, for one, adopt it gratefully.

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JACQUES DERRIDA, VINCENT DESCOMBES, GARBIS KORTIAN, PHILIPPE LACOUE-LABARTHE, JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD et JEAN-LUC NANCY. *La faculté de juger*. Paris: Editions de Minuit (Collection 'Critique') 1985. Pp. 237. 140 FF. ISBN 2-7073-1016-6.

La publication des actes d'un colloque s'inscrit dans un genre littéraire bien précis, genre qui risque très souvent de s'attirer la défaire du public, pour ne rien dire des recenseurs. En effet, ce type d'entreprise donne ordinairement lieu à un assemblage de textes hétéroclites, surtout quand le thème officiel est aussi vague que celui auquel nous avons ici affaire: 'Comment juger?'. Il est vrai que l'unité de la thématique est redoublée par la référence à Jean-François Lyotard, à qui cette décade de Cerisy-la-Salle de 1982 était consacrée. Il est vrai également que le rédacteur, en l'occurrence Jean-François Lyotard lui-même, n'a retenu que six des quarante-trois communications qui ont été prononcées à cette occasion. Peut-être cela constitue-t-il un garant de qualité, mais certainement pas a priori une garantie d'unité. Chacune des conférences reproduites renvoie bien plutôt aux positions et aux partis pris de son auteur. Donc pas question ici de s'attendre à retrouver dans ce collectif un travail exégétique minutieux sur l'œuvre déjà considérable de Lyotard. Mais en revanche, pas question non plus d'y découvrir complaisance et esprit de chapelle. Dans chaque cas, Lyotard est abordé d'un point de vue autonome. Ainsi Jean-Luc Nancy ('Dies irae') intègre son sujet dans la trame de ses études kantiennes. Vincent Descombes ('Considérations transcendantes') se place du point de vue d'une sémantique qui doit beaucoup à la philosophie analytique, tel que cela devait devenir évident avec la parution en 1983 de sa *Grammaire d'objets en tous genres*. Dans la conférence de Jacques Derrida ('Préjugés, devant la loi'), il est naturellement question de texte, de littérature et de différence, de même que dans la conférence de Garbis Kortian ('Le droit de la philosophie dans la controverse politique'), il faut s'attendre à voir Lyotard commenté sous l'angle de la théorie du discours philosophique en rapport avec l'idéalisme allemand. Quant à Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe ('Où en étions-nous?'), il aborde son sujet, Jean-François Lyotard, à partir de ses travaux sur la mimésis, alors que Jean-François Lyotard ('Judicieux dans le différend') ne pouvait faire autrement qu'être lui-même, de sorte qu'on assiste dans sa conférence au passage de *La condition postmoderne* (1979) à ce qui allait devenir, et qui déjà ici s'annonce comme, *Le différend* (1983).

En un mot, il aurait été pratiquement impossible de retracer un fil conducteur dans ce débat si le thème 'Comment juger?' n'avait pas heureusement suggéré à tous ces auteurs une référence à Kant et à la faculté de juger (qui deviendra le titre du recueil). C'est le cas, au premier chef, de Lyotard qui amorce sa discussion sur des prémisses carrément kantiennes. Nancy et Kortian font de même, alors qu'on retrouve tant chez Descombes, chez Derrida que chez Lacoue-Labarthe des allusions essentielles à Kant.

Ce qui intéresse Lyotard dans le kantisme, c'est le gouffre qui se creuse dans la troisième antinomie entre la nature et la liberté, entre le déterminisme

et la causalité inconditionnée, dans la mesure où déjà la *Critique de la raison pure* souligne l'irréconcilierabilité de la philosophie théorique et de la philosophie pratique. Désavouant l'effort de Kant dans la troisième critique en vue de rassembler les pièces du système, Lyotard affirme, en vertu de sa conception de la pragmatique du langage, que l'énoncé théorique (descriptif) n'a rien de commun avec un impératif pratique (prescriptif). On a affaire ici à deux 'régimes de phrases' (212) absolument différents, et à proprement parler incommensurables. Sera judicieux celui qui, par-delà toute tentative de conciliation, respectera l'hétérogénéité et la multiplicité des 'jeux de langage.' 'Or c'est au sujet de cette diversité que le jugement doit s'exercer. C'est elle qu'il doit discerner et considérer. C'est l'abîme qu'il y a entre ces phrases, leur incommensurabilité, qu'il doit reconnaître et faire respecter' (222). A l'encontre des grands récits conciliateurs, donc totalitaires, de la philosophie moderne, Lyotard entend donner sa chance à chaque régime de phrases.

Jean-Luc Nancy revient précisément contre le discrédit jeté par Lyotard (229) sur l'idée téléologique kantienne, dans la mesure où l'idée d'une fin n'est pas si unificatrice, pas si répressive qu'on serait porté à le croire (13). Dans une suite d'analyses très fines, Nancy montre que l'idée kantienne n'est pas un critère fixe et coercitif donné a priori, mais qu'au contraire l'idée comme règle s'engendre dans chaque nouveau jugement (34), dans un jugement toujours contextuel, laissant par là une place à la contingence et à la diversité.

Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe prend pour point de départ le même interdit proféré par Lyotard à l'endroit de toute tentative visant à jeter des ponts dans cet 'archipel de régimes de phrases' (212) que représentent les trois sphères kantiennes: la théorie, l'éthique et l'esthétique. En effet, se référant à la reprise par Habermas de la trichotomie kantienne (168-9), Lyotard s'oppose à ce que l'on prône une osmose entre le jugement de goût et les jugements cognitifs et moraux dans le but de reconstruire l'unité systématique de la raison. Or Lacoue-Labarthe s'interroge sur les traces qu'a dû laisser chez le penseur de la condition postmoderne la reprise du renversement nietzschéen du platonisme: volonté de puissance et subjectivité. Lyotard n'est à vrai dire pas aussi radical qu'il le prétend, car aux yeux de Lacoue-Labarthe, il 'sauve beaucoup de philosophie' (174), entre autres toute la pragmatique contemporaine, une pragmatique reprise comme telle, comme allant de soi.

Vincent Descombes s'emploie aussi à faire sauter la séparation néo-kantienne stricte entre l'être et le devoir (56) qui prédétermine encore la pragmatique communicationnelle contemporaine. Kortian montrera plus loin comment cette distinction obéit à un réflexe épistémologisant (157). En fait, du point de vue de la sémantique, les adjectifs 'vrai' et 'bon' s'avèrent être des transcendants au sens médiéval du terme, de sorte qu'ils sont 'dépourvus de sens prédictif univoque' (60). Ce qui entraîne la ruine de la distinction descriptif/prescriptif. Ici l'allusion à Lyotard est plus qu'implicite (58), et elle remet en cause l'hétérogénéité des jeux de langage (217, 219) sur laquelle se fonde toute la construction du différend.

Kortian poursuit du reste le mouvement en interprétant cette fois la pragmatique du langage mise de l'avant par Austin et Searle et reprise par

Lyotard, comme une simple variante de la maxime kantienne nous enjoignant à 'penser en [nous] mettant à la place de tout autre.' Or il s'avère que cette maxime de la faculté de juger, aussi appelée maxime de la 'pensée élargie,' s'accompagne dans le paragraphe 40 de la *Critique du jugement* de deux autres maximes non moins importantes: 'penser par soi-même,' et 'toujours penser en accord avec soi-même' (141). La première énonce le précepte d'autonomie de l'*Aufklärung*, nous demandant de nous servir de notre entendement, tandis que la deuxième est la maxime de la raison, ou encore de la pensée conséquente, qui caractérise en propre l'argument transcendental et la vérité philosophique. Il semble aussi que Lyotard, en prenant au sérieux l'irréductibilité de l'altérité, se place dans l'impossibilité d'en saisir la nature. 'Lyotard pose ce problème du jugement, fidèle à la pensée kantienne de la pensée *élargie*, en se plaçant du point de vue de l'autre à partir d'un point de vue universel. Que cet autre soit dans son essence un *préjugement*, c'est ce que nous apprend le déploiement de l'argument transcendental de la forme de la pensée conséquente de la vérité philosophique. Ce préjugement et son expérience n'est rien d'autre que la loi de la liberté et de sa vérité qui est la vérité du même et qui ne peut se déployer que dans le langage' (163).

Enfin Jacques Derrida, peut-être parce qu'il est l'auteur qui dans ce recueil discute le plus longuement la question de son rapport à Jean-François Lyotard et au thème choisi pour le colloque, sera finalement celui dont la position vis-à-vis de Lyotard demeure (délibérément?) la plus énigmatique (99). Bien entendu, Derrida se refuse ici à toute concession à l'anecdotique et au biographique. Il prétend qu'il se sent interpellé par la question de Lyotard 'Comment juger?' et propose en guise d'illustration l'interprétation du texte de Kafka 'Devant la loi.' C'est sans doute sa réponse à la thèse de Lyotard selon laquelle il faut juger, mais sans critère, sans loi. La lecture du texte de Kafka montre que de toute manière la loi n'est jamais accessible à l'homme, qu'elle se ferme sur elle-même, tout comme du reste le texte de Kafka, qui ne livre pas son mystère. 'Le récit "Devant la loi" ne raconterait ou ne décrirait que lui-même en tant que texte. Il ne ferait que cela ou ferait aussi cela. Non pas dans une réflexion spéculaire assurée de quelque transparence sui-référentielle, et j'insiste sur ce point, mais dans l'illisibilité du texte, si l'on veut bien entendre par là l'impossibilité où nous sommes aussi d'accéder à son propre sens, au contenu peut-être inconsistant qu'il garde jalousement en réserve. Le texte se garde, comme la loi. Il ne parle que de lui-même, mais alors de sa non-identité à soi. Il n'arrive ni ne laisse arriver à lui-même. Il est la loi, faite à loi et laisse le lecteur devant la loi' (128).

Le lecteur trouvera dans ce recueil multiple et dense une vue d'ensemble d'un volet important de ce qui se fait en France de nos jours, côté philosophie. Il ne s'agit pas d'une philosophie à l'unisson, et même si Lyotard a placé son texte, par politesse ou par stratégie, à la fin du recueil, cela ne veut en rien dire qu'il a le dernier mot.

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ILHAM DILMAN. *Freud and the Mind*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1984. Pp. vii + 204. Cdn\$37.50; US\$24.95. ISBN 0-631-13529-4.

Dilman's initial article on Freud: 'Is the Unconscious a Theoretical Construct?' (his answer was 'no') appeared in *The Monist* 56 (1972). His argument struck me then as fresh and provocative, a new and fruitful turning in Freud interpretation. Then after too long a hiatus his commentary on Freud's conception of human nature appeared in 1983. Now, only a single year later the second volume of his projected Freud trilogy has finally fulfilled the promise of his germinal 1972 article. Not only does it offer a more comprehensive answer to the initial question, but it fills out complementary aspects of Dilman's original project that he only vaguely suggested in 1972.

His Freud is far more the insightful observer of the human condition, far less the speculative theoretician than in many more scholarly treatments. Dilman does not see his enterprise as either an academic interpretation of Freud (too bound to the surface of Freud's language) or still another popular account of Freud (too lacking in depth). Not deterred by Freud's own scientific pretensions that seem to invite reading the unconscious as a theoretical concept, Dilman's own controversial reading of Freud probes beneath the surface of Freud's language to uncover the force of his ideas — ideas bound up principally with his conception of the human mind and the limits of individual autonomy. To accomplish this he leads his readers through a reworking of Freud's concept of the unconscious mind, emphasizing Freud's contention that not only is it possible to be *deceived* by one's own mind, but also to actively participate in this deception.

Setting aside much of the technical jargon customarily employed in such reinterpretation, Dilman relies largely on examples drawn from commonplace experiences and literary situations, seeking thereby to expose the 'latent' content of Freud's thought which, he contends, is hiding in disguise beneath its 'manifest' surface appearance. His aim in adopting this technique, borrowed from Freud himself, is to show how these dissociated aspects of one's self participate in blocking the route to freedom and self-knowledge and how analysis of these barriers can lead to the integration of the self that Dilman calls 'self-knowledge.'

His account of self-knowledge is the most original and imaginative part of his book and will serve to illustrate the distinctive features of his method. Borrowing again the imagery Freud adopted from Leonardo da Vinci (128), he compares the ways the painter and the sculptor work to the difference between coming to know what one wants and coming to recognize 'repressed' desires and appetites. Analytic therapy brings to the surface desires already present. In this way it is comparable to how the sculptor chips away from the rough stone the surface concealing the statue beneath it. Though this process of 'making the unconscious conscious' facilitates self-knowledge it cannot itself, Dilman insists, provide the growth and enlargement of the self that

constitutes the *content* of self-knowledge. To characterize this content Dilman draws upon the concepts of autonomy and authenticity. His account here is suggestive, but its merit lies more in the direction toward which his inquiry tends than in the rigor with which these concepts are elucidated. That his book cries out for more careful analysis of such elusive concepts is a testimony to Dilman's success in accomplishing his main purpose — clearing away the clutter around the surface of psychoanalytic language to lay bare the conceptual framework beneath.

In such work Dilman is at his best. Where Freud succumbs to 'the craving for generalization,' lapses into empty theorizing or leaps over logical barriers, Dilman pulls and tugs at his distinctions until philosophical tidiness is restored. What emerges from this philosophical laundering is a picture of Freud fitted comfortably to the context of recent Anglo-American philosophical discourse. His debt to the later Wittgenstein and his disciples is obvious. In fact, the entire volume could be understood as the conflicted disciple's struggle to resolve a divided loyalty, to dissolve the animosity between two much loved fathers and unite them around a common endeavor. As his loyal follower, Dilman shares Wittgenstein's own ambivalent response to his fellow Viennese thinker: his philosophical revulsion over Freud's extravagant speculative leaps and his fascination with Freud's deeply searching intellect. By drawing those leaps back within bounds respected by the philosophical intellect, he seeks to reduce the ambivalence further and further. From Freud, Dilman has learned to probe beneath the surface of things, to look for meanings in what is hidden, and he turns Freud's own method on Freud, himself. His book suggests, though it does not state, a commonality between Freud's way of seeing and Wittgenstein's method of cutting through the surface of a concept to expose the work it actually does.

Unfortunately, not only is Dilman's conception of autonomy underdeveloped, but it fails to catch the full range of situations that Freud saw as impeding autonomy. Freud frequently alluded, for instance, to social and cultural constraints on women as a group that obstructed their self-realization as autonomous agents. For instance, in his 1908 essay: "'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness,' he observes that the sexual suppression imposed on women is far more severe than is demanded of men, and owing to it 'women are intimidated from all mental effort' (*Col. Pap. V*, 94.). Dilman not only disregards social and cultural factors obstructing the growth of autonomy, he fails even to recognize the existence of a second sex except in occasional references to a pregnant mother, a nagging wife or a 'weak' fictional character. In all other contexts he uses the masculine pronoun exclusively, frequently incorporating in his illustrations such locutions as 'a man might think ...' or 'a man's existence as a man requires ...'. Though meant to convey gender neutrality, such stylistic devices conceal the distinctive features of women's experiences. His own account of the conditions that shackle human life (185) and impede the development of autonomy is bounded by the partiality of this gender specific perspective. Hopefully, in *Insight*

and Therapy, the proposed third volume of his trilogy, Dilman will also have discovered such hidden assumptions beneath the surface of his own language.

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PETER A. FRENCH, THEODORE E. UEHLING, JR., and HOWARD K. WETTSTEIN, eds. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy IX 1984: Causation and Causal Theories*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984. Pp. 624. US\$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1349-4); US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1352-4).

This is a collection of 31 articles on numerous issues and problems pertaining to the nature of causality, and on the application of the idea of causality in a number of problem areas. Approximately half of the articles deal with diverse topics relevant to understanding causation in general. The others propose or assess 'causal theories' of knowledge, reference, meaning, perception, and identity; and there are several essays on the mind-body problem. Obviously, it is impossible to review critically each of the 31 articles, on such a wide variety of topics, in the space available. Thus, in what follows I shall merely try to convey the specific topics and, in most cases, the general positions advanced by the authors.

In the first essay of the volume, Hilary Putnam argues that adopting an associationist account of understanding (roughly, 'understanding our words is a matter of grasping their "conceptual roles in the language"' [3]) should force us to reject metaphysical realist, 'non-Humean' theories of causation. In the next essay, however, Hector-Neri Castañeda focuses on the idea of *production* and dubs as *causity* 'that, in general, which is characteristically transferred from the causal network to the effectual network' (22-3). Peter Unger proposes, from a rationalist point of view, that the postulation of an 'enormous infinite variety ... of mutually isolated concrete worlds' should be taken seriously and would have the effect of making ours '*the least arbitrary universe entire*' (30).

David H. Sanford next explores the relation between temporal direction and causal direction, investigating in particular the ideas of 'fixity' and 'sufficing.' Alexander Rosenberg then assesses several ontological views on the nature of dispositions. The supervenience view about the relation between causal relations and causal laws is subjected to numerous criticisms in Michael

Tooley's essay. Evan Fales explores 'the extent to which a necessitarian theory of causation can bring the problem of induction closer to solution' (113). D.S. Shwayder puts together components of Hume's and Kant's theories of causation, concluding that, 'What Kant lacked Hume supplied, and conversely' (146).

The next three essays are on the role of statistical probability in the theory of causality. Patrick Suppes addresses a number of problems and issues that arise in theories of probabilistic causality. John Dupre argues that one of the most central assumptions of recent theories of probabilistic causality ('contextual unanimity') should be abandoned. John L. Pollock advances a theory that ties together his versions of the ideas of nomic probability, acceptance, and projectibility.

Two essays then focus on causation and explanation. Ernan McMullin evaluates the theories of what he distinguishes as (roughly) *deductive-nomological* explanations — which cite observed, lawlike patterns and regularities — and *theoretical* explanations — which cite 'underlying' entities and processes. And Peter Achinstein argues for the legitimacy of a kind of noncausal explanation.

Brian Skyrms then urges that while different theories of causality may go well with each other at the ordinary macrolevel, the progress of science has provided contexts that tell the different theories apart; empirical science thus contains lessons for the metaphysics of causation. Jaegwon Kim develops a thesis that, roughly, macrocausation is 'epiphenomenal' in the sense that macrocauses and macroeffects are joint effects of underlying micro common causes.

The remaining articles, for the most part, are concerned with the application of causal ideas in working on problems not specifically related to the understanding of causality. Ernest Sosa, George Bealer, and Laird Addis address aspects of the mind-body problem, including the issues and ideas of interaction, parallelism, functionalism, and supervenience. The essays of Arthur Collins and Zeno Vendler are investigations into the proper role of causation in theories of agency, actions, and the explanation of actions.

Michael Devitt explores the relation between the theory of thoughts in the philosophy of mind and the theory of the ascription of thoughts in the philosophy of language. Edward Erwin's essay is a critique of a use of a technique called 'meta-analysis' in assessing the effects of psychotherapy. A new, syntactically motivated, theory of indicative conditionals is proposed by William G. Lycan.

There follow three articles on the causal theory of reference. Penelope Maddy suggests that a causal theory of reference can provide the beginnings of a solution to a problem of reference derived from Wittgenstein's rule-following problem. Joseph Almog formulates and discusses a causal theory of meaning intended to be neutral between direct and Fregean theories of reference. Michael McKinsey's essay is a critique of the causal theory of reference, focusing on proper names; and he proposes a description theoretical solution to the paradox of names.

The next three essays focus on theories of knowledge. Fred Dretske and Berent Enç formulate and discuss a definite causal theory of knowledge, explicit on the nature and role of the relevant causal condition; and they note that this problem has an interesting consequence for the problem of relevant alternatives in epistemology. Colin McGinn advances a theory of knowledge intended to provide a kind of unity to various kinds of knowledge — knowledge how, knowledge that, who, which, etc. — that is based on the idea of 'knowing one thing from another,' which he suggests is the underlying notion. James Van Cleve argues that both the main traditional view of knowledge (justified true belief plus other ideas) and the more contemporary reliabilist view '[make] it possible to ascertain the reliability of induction through induction itself' (555).

Brian P. McLaughlin argues against causal theories of perception (of physical objects) by arguing that there are cases of 'a perceptual difference without a relevant causal difference' (585). In the final piece, Chris Swoyer advocates a causal account of objects' identities through time.

Thus, the contributions fall into a wide range of areas in philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of action. The volume has in it something for everyone; I found many of the essays absolutely fascinating, nearly all of them well worth the reading, and all of them informative.

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PETER GLASSMAN. *J.S. Mill: The Evolution of a Genius*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press 1985. Pp. 240. US\$18.00.

Glassman claims that Mill was a life long neurotic with a damaged imagination, subliminal rages, the personality of a slave, and next to no sense of selfhood. A catastrophic regimen of repression, designed and administered by his father, was the source of these psychic calamities. It produced, according to Glassman, a reverse Oedipal complex in Mill that left him hating his mother and having ever afterwards to defy and to deify simultaneously his father, whose symbolic phallus he understood himself to be.

Glassman uses stylistic features of Mill's prose to support the provocative claim that the actual, though disguised, concerns of everything from *Civiliza-*

tion to the *Autobiography* were with the hard problem of how to be a dutiful yet defiant son. *Civilization*, for example, is about how to unite with while separating oneself from a father. *Bentham* deals with the struggles endemic to leaving infancy and assuming adulthood. The *Autobiography* is a kind of manual on how to murder a detested mother by ignoring her. It is also an exercise in rejecting and revising remembered experience so as to build a tension laden conception of oneself as a person in one's own right who, nonetheless, owes everything to an exalted father. Mill, according to Glassman, seldom if ever chooses between opposed claims and conflicting loyalties. He tries to assimilate, soothe, and synthesize. He could, given his damaged psyche, do nothing else. The great symptomatic manifestation of this trait is his spirited defense of women's rights — a defense that shows how strong his need was to deny all differentiations, even sexual ones.

The hidden content of Mill's work warrants, in Glassman's opinion, the view that Mill used writing as a form of therapy. He tried to cure himself with pen and ink. He failed, of course, for he remained a neurotically dependent person throughout his life. Yet his failure was not an abject one. Indeed, it should be seen as harboring major triumphs. Given Mill's grotesque, repressed childhood, one should expect him to have become a bitter enemy of civilization and a pinched, narcissistic, cruel adult. Instead, he cherished civilization and became by way of his writings an inquisitive, generous, and hopeful human being. The unstated but strongly suggested thesis of Glassman's study is that in Mill one may see the realism of Freud's optimistic assessment of our ability to begin life as repressed, irrational, defiant savages and yet attain to an adulthood marked by reasonableness, sociability, and a high regard for the values of a cultural order that has largely replaced the nature we were born to. Mill, for Glassman, was 'a hero of civilization.'

Throughout his study Glassman is careful to stress that he is offering an addition to, not a displacement of, other views of Mill and his work. This attitude explains sufficiently well why Glassman never quarrels with anyone, not even Mill's biographers. In explaining that omission, however, it must interfere with any effort to explain the significance of the study itself. Indeed, it prevents a clear identification of what that significance, if any, might be. Significant interpretations exclude rival ones and advance arguments. Glassman considers no controversy about either Mill or his doctrines. Thus his book is likely to leave all debate on its subject intact. Its claims provoke but neither guide nor settle. If they are ignored it will not be because, as Glassman asserts, they are disturbing and threatening, but because they resemble the sounds of a forensic engine in idle. Their prime interest must be to those captivated by the thought that a person's syntax and vocabulary may be as psychologically revealing as his handwriting or his choice of ties.

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M.M. GOLDSMITH. *Private Vices, Public Benefits: Bernard Mandeville's Social and Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. x + 183. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-521-30036-3.

Goldsmit begins his analysis of Bernard Mandeville's social and political thought with an account of 'the ideology of private and public virtue' that was fashionable in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This ideology, in the form in which it was presented by Richard Steele in the persona of Isaac Bickerstaffe in *The Tatler* — a fusion of the private Christian virtues and the more public virtues celebrated by the civic humanists — was the target of Mandeville's mordant wit. In his attack upon it Mandeville wishes to show that what has often been thought to be vicious — pride, luxury and vanity — has in fact had many beneficial consequences, and that what has often been thought to be virtuous, if practised on a sufficiently large scale, would return men to a simple life, to poverty and primitive conditions. What has often been regarded as vicious, the pursuit of pleasure and the determination to enjoy luxury, is, according to Mandeville, essential to the development of a commercial society, to a sophisticated culture, and indeed to civilization. The locus classicus for the exploitation of the celebrated paradox, 'private vices, public benefits' is to be found in *The fable of the bees* which was first published in 1714. Goldsmith goes to a great deal of trouble in investigating the extent to which the doctrine embodied in that work is anticipated in earlier writings, notably *The grumbling hive, of knaves turned honest* which appeared in 1705 and in several contributions to *The Female Tatler* in the period 1709-1710.

Had Mandeville's attack upon the coherence of private and public morality been merely a piece of irreverent mockery designed to show the hypocrisy and to prick the pomposities of the self-appointed censors of conduct, it would not have aroused the interest that it did. Underlying the mockery is the disturbing thesis that civilization is the product not of righteousness but of a near-universal hedonism, and that its continuation depends not upon the practice of virtue but upon the self-interested pursuit of pleasure. Goldsmith's presentation of Mandeville's argument is, although scholarly, too generous and indulgent. He does not to my mind take sufficient notice of the grave handicap to Mandeville's own cause of his excessive use of irony, his immoderate love of paradox and overstatement. To labour the obvious, while it is plausible to hold that some vices, notably the heedless pursuit of pleasure, have had some beneficial consequences, it is highly implausible to suggest that the toleration of others, say cruelty or bestiality, can be justified in this way. If all our vices could be shown to have and to be justified by beneficial consequences, they would hardly, as Hume pointed out, have been thought to be vices. Mandeville's love of overstatement is doubly unfortunate because it has too easily brought him the contempt of his critics, and because it has prevented due attention being given to the truly challenging strands in his thought.

Accompanying his thesis on private vices there is as Goldsmith elucidates an ingenious theory of the development of social institutions. According to Mandeville, although men are not, pace Grotius, naturally sociable, they are by nature malleable: they can be induced to accept the disciplines of society by 'skilful politicians' — a convenient shorthand for the gradual adaptation of social and political institutions — who know how to work upon their pride, and their desire for esteem. Mandeville avoids the account of the origin of society given by the social contract theorists; he also avoids the thesis beloved of the civic humanists that societies are the creation of a legislating hero, a Moses or a Solon. But again the presentation of the case is marred by overstatement. Here we have the celebrated apophthegm, 'the moral virtues are the Political Offspring which Flattery begot upon Pride.' Social institutions, according to Mandeville, are produced by tricks played by knaves upon fools. It is little wonder that William Law thought that Mandeville had been sent by the devil to do us harm.

Goldsmith examines with care and precision Mandeville's attachment to Whig traditions. As one of Dutch extraction and a staunch supporter of William III and the Hanoverian succession, it might have been expected that Mandeville would prove to be a thoroughgoing Whig. He was certainly anti-Jacobite, anti-clerical and a passionate defender of the British Constitution, but to many measures which he might have been expected to support he remained surprisingly indifferent — the Septennial Bill, the Peerage Bill, and British foreign policy in Hanover. According to Goldsmith, this disdainful indifference is to be explained, in part at least, by Mandeville's feeling that not too much either for good or for ill was to be expected from the day-to-day activities of politicians. The nation's salvation lies not so much in the virtues of her statesmen as in the good fortune of possessing a constitution in the operation of which the excesses of the politicians are curbed and even transmuted into public benefits.

Perhaps the most interesting and valuable part of Goldsmith's monograph is his discussion of the contribution Mandeville made to the development of the ideological supports of capitalism. This contribution did not lie in any addition to economic theory, nor in the analysis of the relevant social and political structures, but in the development of what Goldsmith calls 'the spirit of capitalism.' Against the prevailing ideology, Mandeville strove to make respectable those dispositions upon which the success of capitalism depends — in the consumer, the endless pursuit of pleasure, comfort and luxury, and in the entrepreneur the endless, almost ascetic, cultivation of avarice. To accomplish this task Mandeville had to attack not only the prevailing system of values, but assumption that there is for all just one single system of values to be pursued.

Despite Goldsmith's tendency to allow his partiality to Mandeville's achievements to blind him to his faults — the excessive use of irony and the self-destructive use of paradox — the reader of this monograph will be in-

debted to Goldsmith's skill in rescuing those of Mandeville's concerns which continue to deserve close study and investigation.

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AGNES HELLER, ed. *Lukács Revalued*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1983. Pp. vi + 204. Cdn\$62.50; US\$35.00. ISBN 0-631-13159-0.

It is difficult to sum up or evaluate a work whose content is so disparate and yet entitled *Lukács Revalued*. A revaluation should follow some *Leitmotiv* and this work has none. The following five articles have been earlier published in *Telos: Life and the Soul* (György Márkus); *Lukács and Bloch* (Sándor Radnóti); *Lukács in Weimar* (Ferenc Fehér); *Lukács and Husserl* (Mihály Vajda) and *Notes on Lukács' Ontology* by Fehér, Heller, Márkus and Vajda.

The titles — except the *Notes* — clearly indicate that their purpose was mainly to inform. If we want to judge Lukács' life and work we have to use some criteria. Hence there remain three essays only that fall directly into the category of *revaluation* — *Notes on Lukács' Ontology*, *Lukács' Ontology: a Metacritical letter* by Gáspár Tamás and *Lukács' Later Philosophy* by Á. Heller.

We could start the reading of the book by this last essay. What is the central issue in this article? Of course, what else could it be than Lukács' autocriticism, the repudiation of his earlier convictions, namely the ideas that made him famous in the late 20s and 30s and the book which contained them — *History and Class Consciousness*? Heller introduces herself to the readers as someone who was close to Lukács in his everyday life, therefore who can quote what has never appeared in print. For all of us the most important question is how true it is that there was a 'decisive break within Lukács' theoretical oeuvre,' namely, 'his repudiation of *History and Class Consciousness* (177).' What follows is rather disturbing for the reader: 'Very much in contrast with other, later acts of self-criticism, Lukács' repudiation of *History and Class Consciousness* was sincerely meant' (177; italics ours). Heller continues: 'Lukács often remarked to us, his disciples, how crucial the reading of the *Paris Manuscripts* was for his self-criticism: the discovery of the concept of human species and of the central role in Marx, of "species

essence" (*Gattungswesen*) was a great intellectual shock for him. "Class" cannot take the place of "species" (177-8). It is hard to understand Heller's change of heart; I mean, there is a serious discrepancy between this article's view of Lukács' 'turning' and the blame of his inconsistencies listed in the *Notes on Lukács' Ontology*. Indeed, there, the disciples are alarmed by Lukács' 'turning' and condemn him for abandoning his earlier position on Alienation although it should be the normal outcome of his repudiation of *History and Class Consciousness*. Hence, the disciples note that according to the new version of the *Ontology* an individual can overcome his alienation by his own effort (150-1). This is only one example to illustrate that Lukács' disciples did not understand their master. Indeed, the *Ontology*, in spite of its length and style, is a breakthrough in Marxist thought, namely in the repudiation of the old teaching that consciousness is only an epiphenomenon. Having failed to understand the main thrust of the *Ontology*, the disciples make a vicious, disorderly attack on their master. Written in haste and with the undisguised intention to hurt, one wonders what the real purpose of their authors was.

If the *Notes* lack unity, the confusion and disorder of Gáspár Tamás' reply to these *Notes — Lukács' Ontology: a Metacritical Letter* is so great that it is impossible to sum up its content. However, I shall pinpoint the source of confusion: the misunderstanding of what ontology meant for Lukács, hence the indiscriminate use of the term Being. First, what form of Being is translated by this term? *On, Esse, ens, Sein, Seiende?* And which *Sein*? Hegel's, Heidegger's, Lukács'? This appalling oversimplification explains the pseudoscholarship of Tamás and his incursion into Medieval Philosophy, Saint Anselm's *Proslogion*. All this has no relevance to Lukács' Being. If Lukács had something in common with a traditional school of ontology, then it was Aristotle's and, of course, Hegel's. We know that originally Lukács tried to adopt Hartmann's method, but it lacked the notions his *Ontology* absolutely needed, namely, genesis and teleology. It is clear that Tamás sides with the 'philosophy of praxis' and finally with the Frankfort School's critique of consumption. Thus he concludes: 'all these, the entire Leftist tradition, are opposed to the question of Being, the recursive ontology, the tradition of Saint Anselm' (157). The whole letter is a series of misquotations from the history of philosophy, from Aristotle to Kant and Heidegger.

In sum, the content of this book does not fulfill the readers' expectation — the revaluation of Lukács.

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CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, ed. *Minds, Machines and Evolution: Philosophical Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. xi + 177. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-521-26547-9.

Evolution is what put minds into (some) machines. If, as philosophers, we seek to understand the nature of mind, then we could do worse than reflect on this simple proposition. If it is true, then whatever constrains the nature of evolutionary products in general will have constrained the nature of the mind. And whatever problems are inherent in the enterprise of getting a machine to think, they will be the very problems which the mind is 'designed' to solve. Artificial Intelligence and evolutionary theory are thus the natural bedfellows of the philosophy of mind and psychology. *Minds, Machines, and Evolution* brings together eight pieces which range from pure analysis of the concepts of evolutionary theory (Sober's 'Force and Disposition in Evolutionary Theory' and Hull's 'Historical Entities and Historical Narratives') to philosophical speculation about the *use* of machine studies to throw light on the nature of the human and animal mind (especially the pieces by Boden, Wilks and Dennett — see below).

One basic yet puzzling feature of mind is consciousness, and it has often been thought that concepts drawn from computer science may help us to get a better grip on this elusive phenomenon. Wilks' paper 'Machines and Consciousness' is firmly entrenched in this tradition. Where it differs from most is in its novel use of relations of access between different levels of program as a (partial) model of consciousness. Thus where most writers allude to relations of accessibility between modules performing different tasks, Wilks concentrates instead on the opacity of lower levels of program operations to high level probing. The compiled contents of a Lisp sub-function (e.g. lift-right-leg, lift-left-leg etc.) may be unavailable for inspection by a top-level function (go-shopping) even if its execution initiates the actions of the sub-function itself (120). This is meant to give us an angle on the peculiar selectivity of the contents of consciousness. The exact details of the sub-commands involved in walking are not suitable objects for our constant awareness. Wilks suggests a 'quasi-evolutionary' explanation of this, viz., that it would not be *possible* to attend to everything at once (121). It is interesting to conjecture that consciousness as we know it may therefore be a feature only of systems with *limited resources*. Or, to put it another way, God may not be conscious after all!

A central concern shared by at least three of the contributors, Hookway (vii), Dennett (146) and Boden (166), is the need to find principled *constraints* on the contents of computational models of minds (both human and animal). This concern is most powerfully expressed in Dennett's strictures against the invention of 'cognitive wheels.' A 'cognitive wheel' in Dennett's usage is to be 'any design proposal in cognitive theory ... that is profoundly unbiological, however wizardly and elegant it is as a bit of technology' (147). Just as nature did not invent anything like the automobile wheel as a means of

mammalian locomotion, effective though it is in the right (flat) environment, so too, according to Dennett, it may have no truck with many of the neat and efficient algorithms discerned within AI. If we want to model the mind, we must try to think how *nature* would solve the problems involved. This is good advice but, as Dennett himself is well aware (147), it is worse than useless unless we have some idea of *how* natural solutions are likely to be constrained. It is at this point that a genuine and important link-up of minds, machines and evolution seems to be in the air. For perhaps evolutionary conjecture concerning human needs and the nature of the selective process could be used to discern some of the basic features to be expected of mind as a natural product and thus to guide work in the machine modelling of human psychology. Tennant in his excellent and provocative contribution 'Intentionality, Syntactic Structure and the Evolution of Language' adopts this kind of investigative strategy with regard to *language*. He asks what features we should expect to find in language given its (putative) status as an evolutionary product (87-91). He then constrains his speculations by noting the tendency of evolution to proceed by 'the accidental combination of already existing stable sub-assemblies (into) ... new stable assemblies of higher complexity' (87). This constraint turns out to favour the evolution of a Montague grammar over the more traditional Chomskian alternative (91). But what Tennant here does for language must also be done for general cognition and thought. Until it is (i.e. until the biological/evolutionary constraints on forms of cognition are made explicit) the threat of cognitive wheels will continue to plague cognitive science.

The volume begins with Hookway's 'Naturalism, Fallibilism and Evolutionary Epistemology.' This surveys the general relationship between naturalism (roughly, the *use* of human knowledge in giving an account of human knowledge) and fallibilism (roughly, the view that no part of our knowledge is certain). My only criticism of this piece concerns the short closing section entitled 'Evolutionary Epistemology' (13-15). Hookway is critical of 'evolutionary epistemology,' but he fails to distinguish two distinct doctrines which share this label. The first is the account of the succession of scientific theories as involving processes analogous to those of biological evolution (a sense associated with the work of Karl Popper). The second is an account of human knowledge which is informed by evolutionary insights into the natural origins of the knowing mind (this sense may be associated with the work of Konrad Lorenz). It is only the former project, and not the latter, which is the proper object of Hookway's criticisms. Donald Campbell, whose work Hookway cites, is interested in evolutionary epistemology in *both* senses. But as philosophers it is wise to keep them firmly distinguished.

The volume's tail-gunner is M. Boden, whose wide ranging discussion 'Animal intelligence from an AI viewpoint' does an excellent job of clarifying how AI can help us understand the nature of animal intelligence. But what is also needed, as remarked earlier, is a clear examination of the ways in which biological, evolutionary and ethological data can in turn help us understand how to construct a machine model of mind. As ever, there is still a long, long

way to go. But a fine collection nevertheless and one which I would recommend to anyone interested in the design of a mind, be it human, animal or artificial!

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MICHAEL INWOOD, ed. *Hegel*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1985. Cdn\$12.50; US\$7.95. ISBN 0-19-875066-8.

For several generations of students, the *Oxford Readings in Philosophy* series has made welcome provision of important course materials in a cheap and handy form. Teachers, too, have cause to be grateful that readings for classes and course-work can be given in the expectation that problems of access should not be severe for topics covered by these volumes.

I guess there are few courses on Locke, Leibniz and Kant, to take as examples other philosophers whose work has been studied in this series, which range widely over the major areas of the given author's interest. Yet this volume has that kind of grand scope. There are essays on the importance of understanding Hegel's system as a response to the problems posed specifically in his early writings on religion (W.H. Walsh), on the epistemology and metaphysics of the *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopaedia* (Robert C. Solomon, Ivan Soll, Richard E. Aquila and Terry Pinkard), on Hegel's philosophy of science (Gerd Buchdahl), on his philosophical anthropology (H.B. Acton), on freedom, history and aesthetics (G.H.R. Parkinson, George Dennis O'Brien and Dieter Heinrich).

Of course, if one has a quite general interest in Hegel's work, the book is a boon, but the target of the present collection is something of a puzzle and it is not clarified by Inwood's introduction which concentrates on the problems (and associated solutions) of Hegel interpretation. So let me do some further work on behalf of the publishers. Those who have read just a little of Hegel's writings might well believe that more serious study can only be motivated by the private charms of the esoteric, such is the forbidding difficulty of all but the shortest extracts in both the original and translation. This would be a mistake. Most philosophers are less dispelled by metaphysical extravagances than they are attracted by cogent argumentation, interpretive insight and

pointed criticism, plausible and commonsensical treatments of the philosophical problems which concern them. These qualities are readily observed in Hegel's writings and prompt further study. It has thus been something of a mystery to Hegel scholars that his works have not been more widely known and referred to. The price paid for ignorance of this major philosopher has been redundancy where Hegel's commonplaces are independently 'rediscovered' and error or shallowness where objections which ought to have been anticipated are not considered. Philosophical debate is often more serious and more profitable where Hegel is drawn into the dispute. Twenty years ago anyone making this claim would have been whistling in the wind, but a recent renaissance in Hegel criticism has alerted a wider audience to the value of reading Hegel.

Inwood's collection both attests and reinforces this tendency. It makes available major contributions to the secondary literature, which provide further incentive to explore the originals for those interested in the philosophical domains outlined above. It is a 'come-on,' a carrot to dangle before those (teachers and students alike) who, knowing well the arguments of Plato or Aristotle, Descartes, Locke or Kant, Russell or Wittgenstein, might be wondering if Hegel contributed interestingly to the problem in hand.

Having constructed a purpose which this book might serve, let me take the further, impertinent, privilege of reviewing its success in this light. The paper by W.H. Walsh makes a good start. He warns us off an over-hasty (if old-fashioned) dismissal of speculative metaphysics by a case-study of Hegel which shows the seriousness of the religious and social pre-occupations which motivated his work. Critics of Kant throw up their arms in despair when faced with the problem of our knowledge of the world of *noumena* and too often forget the constructive efforts of Kant's successors to make sense of this doctrine. Solomon's paper argues that Hegel's epistemology is an attempt to repair Kant's 'ontological neglect' by remaining stolidly true to a tradition of methodological solipsism which originates in Descartes' celebration of the knowledge of the fact of his consciousness. Given that 'absolute truth' is spirit's or consciousness's self-knowledge (not yours, mine or Hegel's in particular), solipsism is an odd but suggestive way of characterising Hegel's first-person *plural* perspective. Is solipsism so threatening if it is the fate of the common consciousness?

Ivan Soll's paper is a review of Charles Taylor's *Hegel* which concentrates on Taylor's reading of the *Phenomenology*, chapter A.1 'Sense-Certainty,' and suggests that weaknesses of interpretation at this point vitiate in some measure Taylor's account of Hegel's basic themes. Soll's reading is endorsed by the editor as 'in the main, almost certainly correct,' but I would recommend readers to pursue the issue for themselves. They will discover that Soll is on occasion plainly wrong — viz. his claim that, 'in this passage, there is no mention of any kind of concepts that might specify the scope of what one means by "here"' (63) when, earlier in the paragraph referred to, Hegel has claimed that 'the Here pointed out ... is ... a Before and Behind, and Above

and Below, a Right and Left' (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. Miller [Oxford 1977] §108).

Richard E. Aquila's paper is as fine as anything in the collection. Aquila argues, ingeniously, that Hegel's conclusion 'that what anything really is is essentially an end or a goal' may be drawn on the basis of his account of the nature of predication. Such a conclusion is required by our understanding of 'the proper relation between the subject and predicate in a judgement and between a thing and what that thing *is* in reality' (83). Aquila's paper prompts a further challenge which readers may take up — the task of confronting modern theories of reference with Hegel's doctrine that there are no essentially *de re* thoughts, that the bare immediate individual is not a possible object of thought or, derivatively, of reference.

I have taken the papers so far discussed in the order of their appearance. Would that I had space enough to discuss the others! Pinkard exhibits Hegel's *logic* as a reconstruction of our conceptual scheme according to a logic which is immanent within it. Buchdahl alerts us to the necessity of the *kind of* philosophy of natural science that Hegel attempts, which insists on the intelligibility of the foundations of the best science. Acton introduces the curious reader to the range and wisdom of Hegel's theory of human nature, relating his philosophical psychology to his study of men in multitudes — the world of objective Mind described in the *Philosophy of Right*. These themes are carried further by Parkinson's essay which outlines briefly but cogently the connection in Hegel's writings between freedom of will in action and social freedom — a useful antidote to the Millian presupposition that these different issues require independent study. O'Brien claims that a familiar distinction between critical and speculative history cannot be fruitfully applied within the philosophy of history and notably not in the special case of Hegel. This thesis is buttressed by a suspect reading of Hegel's discussion of the 'Varieties of Historical Writing' as a structure of dialectical triads. The value of Hegel's work in aesthetics has long been recognised. Non-aestheticians who are puzzled by this, indeed anyone with an interest in art as a historical or cultural phenomenon, are recommended to read Heinrich's contribution.

Tackle this material in your own way, but if you want a brief guide to sensible strategies, read, lastly, Inwood's introduction.

DUDLEY KNOWLES

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FRANCIS JACQUES. *L'espace logique de l'interlocution: Dialogiques II*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France (Collection 'Philosophie d'aujourd'hui') 1985. 244 FF. ISBN 2-13-038856-6. Pp. 640, index, bibliographie.

On peut regrouper les douze chapitres de ce livre en deux parties. La première (chapitres 1 à 7) prétend développer une conception générale du dialogue et de la communication qui servira dans la deuxième (chapitres 8 à 12) à renouveler la problématique de la philosophie transcendante.

L'idée centrale de Jacques semble être qu'il ne faut pas concevoir le dialogue sur le modèle de la théorie mathématique de la communication, comme un échange d'informations entre un locuteur et un allocutaire qui précéderaient la relation dialogique dans laquelle ils seraient engagés. Au contraire le propre du dialogue authentique est non pas que les participants s'échangent des paroles ou des messages, mais qu'ils contribuent conjointement à la constitution d'un discours commun unique. Il faut parler non pas de ce que *je te dis* ou de ce que *tu me dis*, mais de ce qui *se dit entre nous*. En termes un peu moins sybillins, Jacques est assez explicite sur le fait que le sens aussi bien que la référence des expressions qui sont produites dans le cadre d'un dialogue sont fonctions non pas des croyances du locuteur (car on aurait alors affaire à un monologue) mais des croyances communes au locuteur et à l'allocutaire. En ce sens, l'allocutaire contribue lui aussi à déterminer le sens et la référence des énoncés d'un dialogue.

Cette façon de poser le problème du sens, en plaçant la fonction communicative du langage au premier plan, me paraît juste et profonde, et n'est pas sans rappeler, à beaucoup d'égards, le programme Gricéen d'analyse de la signification. Je songe ici moins aux travaux de Grice lui-même qu'à ceux qu'ils ont inspiré à Lewis, Schiffer et Bennett, où l'on trouve des analyses pertinentes de la notion de croyance commune (ou mutuelle). Mais Jacques reproche à Grice de rester prisonnier d'un modèle interactionnel de la communication où le locuteur cherche à transmettre une pensée déjà constituée indépendamment de la relation interlocutive. A l'inverse, on pourrait reprocher à Jacques de ne pas tenter de montrer comment s'effectue la production conjointe du sens à partir des performances individuelles des participants, ni même comment elle est possible. Mais cette objection est sans doute mal placée puisque Jacques accorde à l'espace interlocutif le statut transcendental d'une dimension *sui generis* irréductible.

La thèse que je viens d'évoquer concernant le dialogisme est introduite, développée et commentée principalement dans les quatre premiers chapitres. Les trois autres chapitres de cette première partie abordent des questions subsidiaires et mieux circonscrites. Au chapitre 5, Jacques souligne que l'idéographie frégeenne n'est pas une langue de communication, mais que son étude peut néanmoins aider à faire ressortir, par défaut, les traits originaux des langues naturelles et de la relation interlocutive. Il examine au chapitre 6 la théorie davidsonienne de l'interprétation pour conclure qu'elle ne tient pas compte du caractère original des situations concrètes d'interlocution et

qu'elle refoule dans la métathéorie quantité d'assomptions concernant la situation communicative. Jacques s'en prend ici apparemment à la thèse de Davidson selon laquelle une théorie de l'interprétation doit chercher à maximiser l'accord, au niveau des croyances, entre le locuteur et l'interprète. Selon Jacques, on ne peut pas présupposer une communauté de croyances, il faut aussi expliquer comment une telle communauté peut être constituée par la communication. Mais il s'agit à mon avis d'une mauvaise querelle, car je ne sache pas qu'un interprète davidsonien doive assumer un ensemble de croyances communes pour déterminer les conditions de vérité des énoncés d'un locuteur donné.

Jacques soutient au chapitre 7 que tout discours a implicitement une structure interrogative. Son intuition semble être, ici, qu'une énonciation n'est pertinente que dans la mesure où elle répond ou contribue à déterminer la forme d'une question implicitement admise par les interlocuteurs. Jacques fait ici grand cas d'une distinction assez familière entre questions formelles (ou internes) et questions informelles (ou externes). Les premières sont des questions qui imposent d'emblée la forme des réponses possibles, tandis qu'on ne pourrait répondre aux deuxièmes (dont les questions philosophiques et métathéoriques sont le paradigme) sans les avoir préalablement transformées et remplacées par d'autres (formelles celles-là).

Dans la deuxième partie de l'ouvrage, Jacques entreprend de placer le dialogisme au fondement de la connaissance, dans l'esprit d'une philosophie critique. Il s'interroge d'abord, au chapitre 8, sur les conditions *a priori* de la communication. Il y aurait selon lui trois groupes de stratégies communicatives visant à assurer 'la mise en communauté progressive de l'énonciation pour un certain énoncé de phrase' (337). Ces stratégies ne sont pas identifiées, mais on nous dit qu'elles sont commandées par une 'triple conjecture' selon laquelle: 1) les interlocuteurs doivent être aptes à assurer et préserver leur identité personnelle dans toutes les positions de l'acte de communication, 2) ils doivent être capables de faire des conjectures sur ce que profère leur partenaire en contexte interlocutif, et 3) ils doivent être capables d'intérioriser un tiers médiateur, c'est-à-dire admettre une loi d'échange initiale (337-41).

Au chapitre 9, Jacques avance l'hypothèse que 'si l'on pouvait analyser le discours où s'enregistre la pratique culturelle *constitutive*, entendez le dialogue où s'instituent des significations nouvelles, où s'élabore notre référence médiate au réel ... on serait capable de rejoindre les conditions catégoriales de la signification et de la vérité' (391). Il s'agit en effet ni plus ni moins que de trouver dans l'analyse de la raison communicative les conditions de possibilité de la science. Il identifie ensuite trois voies d'accès à une telle philosophie transcendantale du dialogue, à savoir: 1) la tradition phénoménologique et la problématique de l'intersubjectivité transcendantale, 2) les recherches logico-sémantiques sur le problème de la référence et 3) le relativisme épistémologique issu des recherches de Kuhn sur la nature des révolutions scientifiques.

Jacques insiste particulièrement sur cette troisième source en indiquant,

au chapitre 11, comment une critique de la raison communicative permettrait de rétablir la commensurabilité des paradigmes et des programmes de recherche, et donc d'éviter le relativisme catégorial sans pour autant tomber dans l'universalisme. La rationalité de l'histoire des sciences se trouverait ainsi dans le fait que les partisans de théories rivales sont toujours en mesure d'entrer en dialogue et de tenter d'élaborer un discours commun. Le problème du langage de la science ne pourrait donc être posé sans mettre en jeu la langue de communication, ce qui amène finalement Jacques à conclure (chapitre 12) que 'la critique générale de la connaissance doit devenir une critique du pouvoir de communiquer en général par des signes' (522). Il est difficile, aujourd'hui (du moins pour qui est prêt à admettre la possibilité et la pertinence d'une critique de la connaissance), d'être en désaccord avec cette conclusion, mais il est tout aussi difficile de se contenter d'une pareille déclaration d'intention. Or il faut bien admettre qu'à l'issu de ces 640 pages le lecteur n'a rien de bien substantiel à se mettre sous la dent, ce qui explique, d'ailleurs l'exceptionnelle brièveté de la présente recension.

Jacques est sans doute le premier philosophe français à suivre les traces de Apel et Habermas et à se référer abondamment à la philosophie analytique anglo-saxonne pour étayer une philosophie de type critico-teutonique. Le deuxième trait caractéristique de Jacques est d'écrire dans une langue soporifique, obscure et précieuse où il est extrêmement difficile de s'orienter. Il reste qu'il a parfois des intuitions intéressantes, qui gagneraient beaucoup à être formulées plus sobrement et de façon plus concise.

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BEREL LANG, ed. *The Death of Art*. New York: Haven Publications 1984. Pp. ix + 275. US\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-930586-31-2); US\$15.00 (paper: ISBN 0-930586-21-2).

While philosophy of history has lately had heydays, the philosophy of art history has largely drawn short straws. *The Death of Art* anthology has, misleadingly titled, the latter theme and as its thesis the end of art history. Its lead essayist Arthur Danto has had a long affair with history, which — unfortunately — is not a rare urge among either philosophers or aestheticians: to carry hay on Historism's bonfire attracts all who wish to draw the bottom line

themselves. Some years ago Danto sought to choke us with the claim he asserted to be itself the final artwork in the history of art (*Theoria* 1973). Now he burns to rechoke us by reiterating art history has ended. As a dead fly may jerk its members, artists however still gesture on in 'post-historical times,' — and (t)his essay is, hence, one such gesticulation.

Danto, it is now clear, has always had trouble with making anything of art. He vigilantly stood by what he calls 'New York painting' (as well as countless imaginary items he neither could discern from them, nor his eyes descry), and some had great expectations of *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Harvard UP 1981), which, however, only ended up making mysticism, Dionysian at that, of art. Apparently as disappointed with this transportation as most others, he deems art to end. Hence, the resignation of art history. However, artworks' histories do not art history make: victims of the plot do. But that's not the end of it. As spider eats her mate 'after,' art history must end too. With dinner music to the refrain (remember that?) 'I love you too much to ever start liking you. So let the story have an end.' So now in pp.29-31 Danto narrates art history ended (as some editorializers can in 3 pages detail you morality ain't what it used to be). And what an end end.

Of course a narrative will, unless its details are ineptly chosen, end the way you make it, and Danto's fable, footworked a bit in representation and expression theories' unends — a fable which excludes half the world's art and occludes the rest — prepares us for the moment of truth, the kiss of death; godfarthered memory of art remains. There were, after all, only so many geistly climaxes in the retrospective *Bildungsroman* by and bye Begel.

The format of lead-essay plus a set of commentaries is good; it provides strong focus, allows comprehensive critical diversity (but requires undergrads to keep up geist for an entire book, and these art-ends don't agree with art students' stomachs). With the commentaries, however, editor Lang hasn't been too lucky. The contributions are no match for the lead in vigor & imago. They are each and all quick first to point out Danto's uneven selection and singular emphasis; then to line up pretty stereotypically posing barest sketches of alternative unends for art on end. Richard Kuhns holds, in psychoanalytic pickle, that even if ended, art's a means to cultural indoctrination, a necessary coercion in growing up processes. Joyce Brodsky holds artworks are a set of archaeological relics, serving abiding social needs for decoration, self-expression, and entertainment. David Konstan, in the sort of neo-Marxist pengesticulation, reinserts art, a vehicle of nostalgia for community identity, into history. Norman Miller requires that artists explain [sic!] social change, knowledge diffusion, in their work. C. Butler showers Danto with counterinstances borne by 'creativity and originality' rather than 'historical development' informed by the theme of selectivity of evidence and theory. R.A. Pois wishes to überBegel Danto. Anita Silvers twists a long discussion of art histories' 'incommensurability' to the end of art histories out of Danto's hand. Then, again, perhaps luck is frivolous and contributors unpardonable as it rather is that their lead provides no substance. Still, they never ask the straight questions. Danto reiterates, a postulate I myself per-

sonally am fed up seeing him endlessly repeat, as a matter of (dis)course in reviving *AI* (not, as you might think, acronym for arty intelligence, but for Absolute Idealism), 'the historical importance of art ... lies in the fact that it makes philosophy of art possible and important,' because it's 'something which depends more and more upon theory [what theory?] for its existence as art,' 'it ends with the advent of its own philosophy,' — or is it reversely? No matter, the end in any case coincides with self-consciousness. It always does once you Byb, (Begele your brains). I don't know what Danto's claim that 'it is known what art is and means' means. He says, 'it is pure thought about itself, remaining solely as the object of its own theoretical consciousness.' That's just it: 'it' beats me. I don't know what in the world art is? Nor what's 'existence as'? It owns philosophy? Why would pure thought about itself be art? Why would it be history's end? And what does it know? Why doesn't it tell us? Why doesn't Danto? Is self-consciousness theoretical consciousness? Are theories selves? Seeories Thelves? Shelf them: Boomsday propheteers and other weary escapist cheer the final climax. We gotta hand it to him: Make me import ant, art, whatever, and p(H)i...st, story you have! Right up its own end. Bang. Symbolic, classical, holy aufgehoben, ain't that romantic?

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HYWEL D. LEWIS. *Freedom and Alienation*. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press 1985. Pp. x + 159. £10.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7073-0447-4); £6.75 (paper: ISBN 0-7073-0468-7).

This book is primarily about the nature and limits of free choice. Lewis begins in Chapter 1 with a summary of his views, defended in earlier works (*The Elusive Mind* [1970] and *The Elusive Self* [1982]), on the mind-body question: we are essentially nonphysical selves, distinct from our bodies, and our thoughts, perceptions, intentions — our mental life generally — likewise cannot be identified with any physical events. Then he gets down to his official topic. Determinism is Lewis' enemy. If determinism is true, our actions are not of our own making, and this not only reduces the significance of our lives (62-3), but also forces us to give up or radically revise many of our moral concepts and practices (65), and Lewis gives centre stage to those of punishment and responsibility. Determinists can indeed, as Lewis acknowledges, continue to hold people responsible for their actions and punish them. They can

hold them responsible just in the event it is apt to punish them, and it is apt to punish them just in the event that punishment will result in desirable changes to behaviour (27-8). But in Lewis' view, this is to put things exactly backwards: we can properly punish people only if they are responsible, and can hold them responsible only if they are in a special sense free (29-30). More particularly, holding someone responsible presupposes that the person's action can be assessed as having or lacking moral worth (33); that requires the action result from a choice which is not fixed by prior events (37); and that requires the choice not be caused (37). Thus it is the existence of some contra-causal freedom in our lives that Lewis needs and wants to defend.

Lewis is sensitive that there are problems in defending this, and singles out two for special attention. (1) If our actions were uncaused, they would be totally unpredictable, but this is not the case: there is an obvious continuity of character and conduct (37-8). (2) If an action were not totally caused by our character, it would result at least in part from chance, and so would not be *our* action and thus we could not be held responsible for it (38, 42). To meet (1), Lewis restricts the sphere of contra-causal freedom to choices between duty and desire (38-41). There, for Lewis, our actions are genuinely unpredictable; but all our other actions (which number the vast majority) are fully determined, and so the predictability of life is accounted for. To meet (2), Lewis claims we have an awareness of a self which is other than any passing mental states, patterns of mental states, or dispositions to have certain mental states, and which is capable of making an ultimately open and undetermined choice which is nonetheless not random (42-3).

These replies are not entirely satisfactory. With respect to Lewis' reply to (2), many will claim, with Hume, not to find any such abiding self when they peer within. And his reply to (1) comes up against the fact that there is neither any greater sense of freedom nor unpredictability in moral choices than in nonmoral ones, and so the claim that we have contra-causal freedom where, but only where, duty and desire conflict appears arbitrary and unconvincing. It would also be, if his answer to (2) were right, unnecessary as well. If some abiding self can produce actions which are not fully caused but yet not random in the moral sphere, why cannot it do this in the nonmoral? And if it can, why should freedom be limited to choices between duty and desire?

Lewis makes free use of intuition in defending his theses. We know by intuition that mental events are nonphysical (1), that there is an abiding non-physical self which is the subject of mental states and capable of making an open and undetermined choice (42-3), and that we have freedom of choice when duty and desire conflict (58). Lewis is well aware that appeals to intuition are now not much in favour. He cautions against too facile an invocation of it, but nonetheless insists that it is inescapable: at some point 'we just have to ask one another whether we do not find that things seem to be in a certain fashion' (vii). But even granting this, we may well wonder whether Lewis has not made just the facile invocations of intuition he warns against. What phenomenological property do mental states such as thinking, perceiving, and intending have in virtue of which we can confidently pronounce them

nonphysical? Is there really some impression from which Lewis' conception of the self is derived? And, most importantly for the central topic of the book, may not the freedom we feel when faced with a choice between duty and desire be an illusion? This is an especially acute problem for Lewis inasmuch as he claims the freedom we feel in other choices to be just such an illusion, and some reason now has to be provided why the two cases should be treated differently; but what this could be is not obvious.

Lewis thus leaves the main claims in his defense of freedom of choice inadequately supported. Those who share his views may be cheered to have such distinguished company, but those who want reasons to hold them will have to look elsewhere. It is also not clear why Lewis begins his defense of freedom with an endorsement of dualism. The threat to freedom comes from determinism, not materialism, and it is no easier for a dualist to deny determinism than a materialist. But even if it were, that would not help Lewis, for in his view the self is determined in most of its actions, and it is no easier to say that something nonphysical which is typically subject to the rule of causal law is sometimes exempt from that rule than it is to say the same of something physical.

Lewis' book began its life as part of the Gifford Lectures 1966-68, and continues to bear evidence of those origins. His writing has a looseness of structure and argument which makes it more suitable to be heard than read. It also has vaguely the tone of a sermon throughout, and sometimes, especially towards the end where Lewis discusses guilt and alienation (Chapter VII), solitude (Chapter VIII), God (Chapter IX), and salvation (Chapter X), the content as well.

This book is a provocative and sustained argument for ALISTER BROWNE
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ANDRÉ LIEBICH. *Le libéralisme classique*. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec 1985. Pp. 625. ISBN 2-7605-0345-3.

Il s'agit d'un recueil de textes destinés à des étudiants de niveau universitaire. On y trouve des extraits du *Léviathan* de Hobbes et du *Deuxième Traité du gouvernement civil* de Locke sous le titre 'Les Libéraux anglais du XVII^e siècle'; des extraits de *L'Esprit des lois* de Montesquieu et du *Contrat social* de Rousseau sous le titre 'Les Libéraux français du XVIII^e siècle'; des extraits

d'écrits divers de Jefferson et de discours politiques de Robespierre sous le titre 'Les Révolutionnaires libéraux'; des extraits de *La Richesse des nations* de Smith et des *Principes d'économie politique et de l'impôt* de Ricardo sous le titre 'Les Économistes libéraux'; des extraits des *Principes d'économie politique* et de *La Liberté* de J.S. Mill, et de la *Démocratie en Amérique* de Tocqueville sous le titre 'Les Révisionnistes libéraux'; des extraits divers d'un certain L.A. Dessaules et d'un certain P.E. Trudeau sous le titre 'Les Libéraux québécois'; des extraits des *Essais de persuasion* de Keynes et de *La Liberté de choix* de Milton et Rosa Friedman sous le titre 'Les Néo-libéraux.' Le volume se termine par quelques célèbres déclarations ou chartes des droits, par un tableau chronologique et une bibliographie.

La présentation de ce recueil est soignée. Les introductions d'A. Liebich — que j'appellerai l'auteur — aux différents auteurs et aux différents textes, sont brèves et suivent toujours le même plan. Les textes cités n'occupent qu'une partie de la largeur des pages et, dans la marge, l'auteur a indiqué quels étaient les thèmes traités. Il est donc aisément de retrouver un passage particulier à partir de ces indications. De nombreuses illustrations appropriées agrémentent les textes.

Ceux-ci sont généralement bien choisis. Je les ai lus avec plaisir. A première vue, on est frappé par la maturité des textes politiques et économiques anglais quand on les compare aux textes français de la même époque. Etait-ce l'intention de l'auteur de montrer cet écart sur lequel il y aurait beaucoup à dire? Tocqueville cependant ainsi que J.S. Mill paraissent les plus modernes des penseurs rassemblés dans le recueil. Les Friedman ne sont pas cités de façon équitable, me semble-t-il. Pour démontrer les insuffisances de leurs positions, il n'était pas nécessaire de les présenter de façon aussi sommaire.

J'aurais deux critiques très différentes à adresser à l'auteur de ce recueil. Premièrement, les références des textes cités ne sont pas assez précises, de telle sorte qu'il est difficile, voire impossible, de situer ces derniers dans leur contexte respectif. C'est d'autant plus grave que l'étudiant auquel ces textes sont destinés n'a pas eu en main les œuvres originales et ne se rend pas compte de la dimension ou de l'ampleur de celles-ci.

Ma deuxième critique vise les introductions de l'auteur. Elles sont si brèves qu'elles en sont parfois simplistes. Je donnerai à cet égard deux exemples particulièrement flagrants: Pourquoi rassembler sous le même titre, 'Les Néo-libéraux,' Keynes et les Friedman? Ils renouvellent le libéralisme en des sens opposés et l'auteur ne le souligne guère: le premier prépare l'alliance du capitalisme et de la social-démocratie, les seconds dénoncent cette alliance et veulent en revenir à un libéralisme pur et dur. Monsieur Liebich le sait sans doute mais pourquoi associe-t-il deux courants de pensée divergents? Le deuxième exemple porte sur l'association entre Renaissance, protestantisme et libéralisme (23-4). A ce propos, l'auteur parle de Luther. Mais Luther n'a absolument rien d'un libéral ni d'un renaissant. Il est tourné vers le Moyen-Âge. Certes le calvinisme se développe dans un sens favorable au libéralisme, mais le mot protestantisme est ici un fourre-tout trompeur.

Alors que les études historiques sur les idées et les mentalités s'affinent de plus en plus, que les ambivalences d'un Luther, d'un Thomas More ou d'un Hobbes sont de mieux en mieux connues, il faut enseigner à des masses d'étudiants qui n'ont guère fréquenté les livres. Il faut produire à leur intention des aperçus sommaires et des recueils de textes, des fonds de recherche sont alloués à cette production et des professeurs s'y emploient. J'aurais mauvaise grâce à dénigrer ce genre de travail combien nécessaire. Mais je veux insister sur les insuffisances et les dangers inhérents au genre.

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NICHOLAS MAXWELL. *From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution In The Aims And Methods of Science*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1984. Pp. vi + 298. Cdn\$55.75; US\$24.95. ISBN 0-631-13602-9.

This book is a provocative and sustained argument for a 'revolution,' a call for 'a sweeping, holistic change in the overall aims and methods of institutionalized inquiry and education, from knowledge to wisdom' (190). Nothing special or specific is meant by 'knowledge' here; unlike most philosophy of science, this is not primarily a work in epistemology. But by 'wisdom' Maxwell means specifically the know-how (if we may employ the Rylean distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that) 'to realize what is of value,' which is equivalent in meaning to the conjunction, 'to become aware of what is of value' and 'to make real or actual what is of value potentially' (66, 66n.). The question of *what* is of value he handles in a neo-Aristotelian, programmatic fashion, in terms of what is *ultimately* of value: 'health, happiness, friendship, love, justice, co-operative work, and so on' (156). One thesis is that the actual details of the 'sweeping, holistic change' are yet to be specified, just as the details of what is of value will have to evolve from the very enterprise Maxwell calls for. 'What is of value is to be discovered' (120), though Maxwell rejects value relativism and value subjectivism (which imply an intolerable and false value skepticism) in favor of value objectivism (especially Ch. 10).

To philosophers who (like me) have long desired a general return to the pursuit of *sophia*, and that the pursuit regain its rightful place with respect to

the pursuit of *episteme*, *theoria*, and *scientia*, this book offers a lot of good arguments and useful observations.

Maxwell casts the issue as a contest in which the 'Philosophy of Wisdom' vanquishes the 'Philosophy of Knowledge' — usually fairly. Nevertheless, some of Maxwell's arguments are bad, and philosophers of wisdom may well fear using them lest they discredit the pursuit of wisdom itself. The bad arguments can be traced to the dubious half of the pair of theses into which Maxwell resolves his position. The plausible, exciting half is a positive thesis in favor of the Philosophy of Wisdom. The dubious half is a negative thesis against the Philosophy of Knowledge. Maxwell wants not only to initiate (or reinstate) an important form of research and education aimed at wisdom and thus ultimately at the realization of value, but to *supplant* the old form by the new — it is *revolution*, not improvement, that he preaches.

Let us consider a sample from the bad arguments first, just to get them out of the way. Maxwell's target is 'Standard Empiricism' (SE), which he takes to be the present dominant species of the Philosophy of Knowledge. Many of his charges against SE (which is not on the cutting edge of scientific epistemology, anyway) are trumped-up, propagandistic. For instance, a numbingly typical list of today's ills is given (41-2):

the failure of modern science...to be of value...[etc.]...the scandal of the priorities of world scientific research...[etc.]...nuclear bombs, intercontinental missiles, the means for chemical and biological warfare...[etc.]...depletion of natural resources, pollution, rapid extinction of plants and animals, and the destruction of their natural habitat...made possible by science and technology.

He elaborates for a page or so and then concludes (43),

Once inquiry irrationally dissociates problems of knowledge from problems of living, as demanded by the philosophy of knowledge, almost inevitably the pursuit of knowledge will come to suffer from the kind of humanitarian defects indicated above.

The irrational dissociation 'demanded' is supposedly the effect of value-neutrality. Value-neutrality is that typical part of philosophies of knowledge, including SE, intended to characterize the essential objectivity of knowledge, and which may be adumbrated thus: values must not determine what we take to be true. The value-neutrality thesis is overblown by Maxwell in a variety of formulations, such as that 'Feeling, desires...[etc.]...ideological views, [and] moral considerations must not be allowed, in any way, to influence academic thought within the intellectual domain' (16; compare 17, 19, 21, 201). As though SE banished studies in medical ethics and international law from the intellectual domain! As though SE forbade having or discussing research goals (since to have a goal is to value it)! As though the problems of the world today were due to such a slip in epistemology! Even if SE made such proclamations (which it does not, though it may slander value judgements by calling them non-cognitive), and even if people obeyed them (which they generally do

not), why should we blame such obedience on SE, rather than on either a faulty philosophy of wisdom or a lack of wisdom?

By contrast, Maxwell offers solid and convincing arguments for the exciting and important thesis that rational research and debate among professionals concerning values and their realization is both possible and ought to be undertaken. He considers a large number of objections to this thesis, objections which show he is alive to its full import, and which he nicely rebuts. Examples: that pursuit of knowledge would be undermined, that values are non-cognitive and/or cannot be disputed, that methods of research and debate are unavailable and/or impossible, that academics ought not to be the ones to carry on the research and debate, that they could never agree, that no such group of specialists could influence the affairs of the world or would be allowed to, that academics have no political power, that they would lose their political/economic independence, that what is needed to ameliorate world problems is not research, debate, or wisdom, but the power to put into practice known solutions, that the determination of facts must be prior to the realization of value in either sense, and so on. Maxwell's responses cannot fairly be sketched in this short space, but are clear and effective. However, just to gain parity with the presentation above of faults in his critique of SE, I will risk a naked outline of one rebuttal, namely of the objection that determination of facts must be prior to realization of value (171-81): even if true, 'this would still not undermine a central contention of this book' (171), that pursuit of wisdom ought to be professionally undertaken by the academic community; history teaches that know-how and technology often come before theory and science (Galileo's telescope preceded an adequate optics) and often make them possible; the Popperian method of conjectures and refutations can be used in the pursuit of wisdom just as well as in the pursuit of knowledge; and 'the ability to act successfully in the world' both evolved before and is a methodological prerequisite of 'explicit propositional knowledge' (179, 174-81).

Maxwell not only promotes the pursuit of wisdom, but offers a particular philosophy of wisdom: Aim Oriented Empiricism (AOE). Unhappily, AOE seems, at least to me, wrong in part, particularly in its account of the place of consciousness, and the place of value, in the material universe, in its concept of a *sui generis* 'person-to-person understanding,' and in its offered solutions to the outstanding problems of SE (which are, perhaps unfairly, taken by Maxwell as a 'refutation' of SE, rather than as its contribution to scientific epistemology, Ch. 9). Happily, disagreeing about AOE amounts to espousing a different philosophy of wisdom, and so does not in any way darken Maxwell's case for the professional pursuit of wisdom itself, the commitment to which is the heart of the Philosophy of Wisdom as such.

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DOROTHY NELKIN. *Science as Intellectual Property: Who Controls Scientific Research*. Cambridge, ON: Collier Macmillan Publishing Co; New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. 1984. Pp. xii + 130. Cdn\$24.95; US\$15.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-02-949080-4). Cdn\$10.95; US\$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-02-949090-1).

What we taste, we taste alone, says Augustine, because we consume that portion which we taste. But truth is open to all; it cannot be the exclusive possession of anyone (*On the Free Will*, Ch. VII-XII). Or can it? Nelkin argues that in recent years, proprietary claims in science have increased dramatically in ways that threaten the shared pursuit and free dissemination of knowledge. Moreover, these claims are discordant and contested by rival parties, thereby generating a series of dilemmas that need sorting out. Nelkin groups these in five categories, each treated in a chapter of examples and 'negotiations' between parties in the form of contracts, policies, laws, court challenges, and public advocacy. She does not resolve these but rather dramatizes the divisions, the genuineness of the dilemmas, and the need for the principal parties — scientists, government, industry, public interest groups and universities — to develop a new social contract regarding the scientific enterprise. Each chapter is peppered with questions requiring resolution in that new contract. Any such contract, she thinks, will be dated and local, pertaining to present U.S. society.

What dilemmas must be faced? Chapter titles identify them: Proprietary Secrecy Versus Open Communication in Science, Public Access Versus Professional Control, Rights of Access Versus Obligations of Confidentiality, Whistleblowing Versus Proprietary Rights, and National Security Versus Scientific Freedom. The U.S. context is clear, since two chapters deal with implications of the Freedom of Information Act and case histories throughout pertain exclusively to the U.S. The book is sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, on whose Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility the author serves.

The dilemmas are not entirely new, but Nelkin sees a marked redefinition and intensification of conflict in the last decade in the U.S. compared with the post-war years, when science was 'the only set of institutions for which tax funds are appropriated almost on faith and under concordats which protect the autonomy, if not the cloistered calm, of the laboratory' (90-1). That marriage of shared assumptions and mutual trust is over, having disintegrated from a variety of pressures. These include an increasingly knowledge-based economy, with science closely linked to prosperity and welfare and subject to competing claims from different factions. A far greater proportion of research funds derives from government agencies, the military, and commercial interests. Distinctions between applied and basic research are eroding (e.g. frontier work in gene splicing has launched professors and universities into commercial ventures). Scientific autonomy in knowledge control is challenged from opposite directions by the Freedom of Information Act (1966, 1974), which expands information flow (creating problems of its own), and the

restrictive Reagan administration policies of tightened security classifications, sanctions against whistleblowers, and export controls on technology. Costly and specialized technology changes professional relationships within the scientific community by contributing to 'a social process of collectivization and instrumentalization in science' (94). And the scientist's public roles multiply to include advice, consultation, expert testimony, administration, bureaucratic functions, public advocacy, social criticism, popularization and education.

Although the book is largely an exercise in the sociology of science, it does contain several judgments and recommendations. Nelkin is critical of inconsistencies of principle within the scientific community, which often decries government imposed secrecy, while practicing the same for professional or commercial gain. The scientific community needs to adopt a consistent and responsible position on secrecy and information control. She also criticizes various parties for grounding claims on moral rights: rights to control research results, to privacy, to confidentiality, to information, etc., which she sees as uncompromising positions that sound separately reasonable but are jointly incompatible. A more productive stance is to recognize that basic social and political values may make conflicting demands requiring negotiated accommodation, and that 'the concept of rights must be understood not as morally imperative but as socially defined; delimited by time, place, and situation; and correlated with responsibility' (100-1). Accommodation requires compromise and consensus on such matters as the nature and requirements for protection of 'legitimate' or 'good' research, 'national security,' and 'technological progress.' Nelkin thinks that following a route of accommodation will make it possible 'to redefine those norms of communication and disclosure that were established when science was a different social enterprise' in a manner suited to all parties (102).

Readers may wish to consider to what extent the book's analysis can be extrapolated beyond U.S. society. The supplanting of basic research funding by mission-oriented and commercial funding has not gone as far in Canada but is a growing reality. We have no Freedom of Information Act but are sometimes affected by the U.S. Act when Canadian researchers are under contract to U.S. agencies. (Remember the L.S.D. experiments?) It is worthwhile for the sake of our own policy formation to raise the author's questions about Canada. Ethicists may be disappointed that this slim volume does not go further in prescriptive analysis to resolve the dilemmas posed. How can one say that the actual compromises that are negotiated on questions of proprietary rights and secrecy are the most desirable apart from a prescriptive analysis? Her concept of negotiation may confuse two different processes: the jockeying of separate interests, each of which is trying to maximize its separate gain within an existing moral framework of contract observance, and the weighing of multiple considerations, including rival interests, in order to establish a new moral framework for their coordination. Nevertheless, posing

the issues well may go half the distance to their resolution, and we can thank Nelkin for doing so in a vivid and concrete way.

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JOSEPH OWEN. *Human Destiny: Some Problems for Catholic Philosophy*. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 1985. Pp. 120 US\$16.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8132-0604-9); US\$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8132-0605-7).

Approaching the question of human destiny from the perspective of a Thomistic thinker Owens argues, from an analysis of Aristotle, Aquinas, and contemporary philosophical pluralism, that theoretical contemplation is an essential aspect of the question of human destiny and that it can function as a non-ideological focus for fruitful dialogue in a radically pluralistic philosophical milieu.

Noting the difference between an Aristotelian conception which limits human destiny to this world and a Thomistic conception which extends it to a transcendent Beatific Vision, Owens shows that such doctrines are not mutually hostile. In the chapter on Aristotelian human destiny, which merits reading for its exegetical value, Owens interprets the *Nicomachean Ethics* in the light of Kant's third question, 'What may I hope for?' Owens shows how the basic norm for interpreting Aristotle is the technique of focal meaning, namely, a form of universal predication in which a nature is found solely as a nature in a primary instance, and in all other instances through reference to the primary instance (21). Thus for Aristotle the supreme human good is found in theoretical contemplation. All other things and human desires are deemed good in reference to theoretical contemplation which can be freely chosen as the object of human destiny.

In the second chapter on Aquinas' existential metaphysics Owens shows how a supernatural notion of human destiny can be understood as the primary instance of focal meaning. However, because of its religious character Owens identifies, among others, the following philosophical issues confronting Aquinas: the endlessness of human nature in itself (34); the freedom of human choice under the infinitely efficacious choice on the part of the Creator (35); the question of whether one's own activity can play the

entire role in the attainment of human destiny (40); the worth and dignity of the individual apart from the activity of thinking; the question of an immediate personal relationship to God (41).

In chapter three, focal meaning is considered as paramount for serious dialogue on human destiny in today's pluralistic philosophical milieu. Because of this pluralism, Catholic philosophers face some challenging philosophical questions such as: Can they stand aloof and judge all those who do not accept a transcendent notion as deprived of a human destiny? Owens responds that 'the notion that they are cut off from true human destiny here on earth is instinctively repellent' (53). However, how do atheists, for example, participate in human destiny? How can human life be carried on harmoniously when views on its purpose differ fundamentally (54)? Is there something common among philosophers and how can this be used as a basis for co-operative undertakings without jeopardy to the essentials of each position? How can pluralism be used to facilitate a dialogue among believers, and between them and non-believers in order to allow intelligence and reason to guide it (66)? Finally, what levels of philosophical tolerance would be necessary to allow for human freedom, diversity of opinion, and meaningful philosophical dialogue (72)?

The answer to these questions and the philosophical point of convergence for Aristotelian, Thomistic, and contemporary philosophical pluralism is to use the technique of focal meaning by positing theoretical contemplation as the primary instance which gives meaning to a plurality of views on human destiny. This approach keeps the basic tenets of Aristotelianism intact but leaves open the possibility of deepening the meaning of contemplation, of its being freely chosen as the object of human destiny, and the possibility of its being transposed into another philosophical setting. For Aquinas, theoretical contemplation allows for a transcendent fulfilment but it leaves ample room for, invites, and advances philosophical discourse.

Therefore, for Owens, the technique of focal meaning is central. Philosophically, it facilitates the resolution of the questions confronting the Catholic philosopher when theoretical contemplation is identified with a supernatural religious destiny. The technique philosophically legitimates and facilitates the rational development of the conception of human destiny as consisting essentially in theoretical contemplation. The technique can avoid the problem of unilateral claims to truth by raising the basic philosophical question in which all philosophers can participate, namely, of showing how contemplation can satisfy to the full all human desire. In other words, it enables all philosophers to engage in the proper estimation of intellect as life (78).

In this brief work Owens lucidly makes his point, challenges, and invites both Catholic and other thinkers to meaningful dialogue. It is unfortunate that he did not pursue the development of his theme through a developed reflection on the insightful questions he raises and through a direct analysis of philosophical positions not sympathetic to his own. But this is what Owens probably wanted to avoid in order that a true dialogue may follow. It is a fit-

ting challenge from a world class scholar and philosopher whose life and works have been dedicated to uncompromising fidelity to textual accuracy and to the pursuit of philosophical truth wherever it can be discovered.

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J. DOUGLAS RABB. *John Locke on Reflection: A Phenomenology Lost*. Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America 1985. Pp. viii + 177. US\$21.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-4888-1); US\$9.50 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-4889-X).

P.T. Geach has likened Locke's *Essay* to a mail-order catalogue: 'you buy what suits you' (*Logic Matters* 247). Rabb has placed a curious order, though in his view, naturally, what he purchases from the catalogue serves to undermine the irreverent Geachian kind of attitude that makes the *Essay* the classic that people love to hate.

In his introduction, Rabb declares: 'The basic thesis I wish to establish is that Locke's notion of reflection more closely resembles the reflexive awareness of contemporary phenomenology than it does our so called modern concept of introspection' (1). The distinction between the notions of reflexive awareness and introspection is an interesting and important one, and so one might think, at first blush, that if Rabb could establish his thesis, that would be interesting, and, at least for Locke studies, important. But at second blush one realizes that Rabb's thesis cannot be established in any significant sense, and he himself almost gives this away in his introduction. He writes that it is 'more accurate to say that it is Locke's notion of reflection which resembles reflexive awareness, and not the ideas of reflection themselves. This subtle distinction should be kept in mind for it is not always possible to describe Locke's resemblance to phenomenology as accurately as I would like' (4-5). One wonders why? What could possibly hinder Rabb from describing Locke's resemblance to phenomenology as accurately as Rabb would like? Only Locke's fundamental dissimilarity to phenomenology.

The subtle distinction that Rabb refers to isn't so very subtle. The distinction between Locke's notion of 'reflection' and his notion of 'the ideas of reflection' is that the ideas of reflection are, of course, the 'ideas' one gets from that 'source of ideas' Locke calls 'REFLECTION.' Locke's notion of

reflection is his notion of that source of ideas. The other source he calls 'SEN-SATION.' Now as regards reflection versus ideas of reflection, it is crucial for Rabb to keep the distinction in mind, and compare Locke to the phenomenologists only as regards his 'notion of reflection,' because the ideas of reflection which reflection is said to yield, as well as the ideas of sensation, are things no phenomenologist would admit to. Why? Because there *are* no such things as 'ideas' in Locke's sense or senses of the word. In other words, even if Locke, in reflecting, is exercising his reflexive awareness of his own consciousness, he gets things completely, indeed absurdly wrong. This is why, at the very best, Locke's alleged resemblance to phenomenology can't amount to much. But does it even amount to as much as Rabb would like to submit?

By 'the reflexive awareness of phenomenology' Rabb means the explicit awareness that, if one chooses, one may have of one's own conscious states and activities. For example, in looking at something, one is of course implicitly aware that one is looking at something, but is explicitly aware only of *what* one is looking at — one doesn't bother about one's looking. But one *can* — reflexively. By considering what it is like to look at things, i.e. by 'reflexion,' one can explicitly know what looking at things is like. Bats implicitly know what it's like to be a bat, but never explicitly. They can't do phenomenology, but we can.

As Rabb is concerned to point out, such a notion of reflexive awareness is not to be confused with the various antics that go under the name 'introspection.' Our reflexive awareness is not a kind of observation ('introspection' as opposed to 'extrospection'), and what we are thereby aware of are not any kind of (inner) objects, but simply the *ways* in which we can be aware of 'outer' objects — the only kind of objects there are. An analysis of experience which exploits our reflexive awareness is 'reflexive analysis' or phenomenology. Rabb takes as his exemplars of this type of phenomenology Sartre, and more especially Fraser Cowley in his book *A Critique of British Empiricism*. The primary negative thesis of Sartre and Cowley concerns not so much introspection as the alleged objects of introspection. As Rabb says, 'We must never ... reify consciousness or hypostatize pains, perceptions and images as the 'contents' of consciousness. To do so is to be guilty of what Cowley, following Sartre, calls the "illusion of immanence"' (27-8).

Is Locke guilty of this? As sin. He is virtually the Eve, or at least Adam, of this sin, if not the serpent itself. But Rabb denies (93) that Locke reifies ideas, thereby succumbing to the illusion of immanence. However, though admittedly a ragbag of items take their places as 'ideas' throughout the *Essay*, at no point do ideas fail to be reified: reification is the *raison d'être* of a Lockean idea. Locke's idea of an idea is an idea of a thing — a mental inner object. Locke does not even think this controversial as he blandly introduces his concept of an idea at the beginning of the *Essay*: 'I have used [the term *Idea*] to express whatever is meant by *Pphantasm*, *Notion*, *Species*, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking ... I presume it will be easily granted me, that there are such *Ideas* in Men's Minds ...' (I.ii.8). This is

above all a *picture*, that no doubt is or was easily granted by many, but not because it is correct. It is a picture or model of the mind and its materials. It is not a metaphor, but a picture — a wrong picture. As Locke develops it in Book II of the *Essay* in his account of how ideas 'come into the mind' and how the mind operates — especially in his accounts of perception and memory — there can be no question about his reifying ideas. This is something Locke is quite consistent in.

How could Rabb suppose otherwise? Primarily by leaving out any serious discussion of Locke's idea of an idea. Instead Rabb believes that if he can show that Locke holds that we are reflexively aware of our own consciousness, and not indirectly aware of our consciousness by directly introspecting ideas about our consciousness, then Locke does not have ideas as intra-mental objects. But of course once Locke introduces ideas as the materials or contents of the mind, in place of everyday ordinary objects, it makes little difference whether we are directly or indirectly aware of *them* — the reification is done. Rabb is also careful to speak of 'ideas' in the epistemological mode whereby we 'acquire' them or 'arrive at' them — quite contrary to Locke's mechanico-psychological account where ideas arrive and rearrive at *us*.

In the course of his book Rabb attempts to establish other claims to buttress his portrayal of Locke as a forerunner of Sartre and Cowley. On Rabb's account it is really the introspecting, reifying Hume, not Locke, who has 'fallen into the illusion of immanence' (51). But in fact Hume does not fall in, he jumps in feet first, eyes open — and why not with Locke beckoning, insisting that the water's fine? Rabb quibbles with Cowley's debunking of the notion and corresponding talk of mental images and imagery in an analysis of imagination, on the following grounds: 'The reason I would maintain some reference to mental imagery is, quite simply, that such reference facilitates phenomenological description' (38). This is wrong. There can be no question of 'facilitating' phenomenological description at the expense of getting it right. Rather, Rabb needs to keep images respectable in order to keep Locke's account of experience a phenomenologically serious contender. But this is a futile hope. If, as Rabb says, 'the entire classification of ideas in Locke's *Essay* is, in actual fact, an exercise in reflexive analysis ... in other words a "reflexive description and analysis of our experience in the world"' (57), then there are only two possibilities: either Locke misdescribed his experience, or he was one strange bird.

If Locke's philosophy of mind is a phenomenology lost, it is one well lost. The real contribution of Rabb's book lies not in sending us to Locke's *Essay* with a new perspective, but in directing us to Sartre, and more especially to the gem of analysis which is Cowley's *Critique of British Empiricism*.

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JAMES P. SCANLON. *Marxism in the U.S.S.R. A Critical Survey of Current Soviet Thought*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1985. Pp. 362. US\$35.00. ISBN 0-8014-1649-3.

Scanlon's book is the first attempt 'to describe and assess the present state of Soviet Marxism-Leninism as an overall philosophical system' (11) since the 1960s. The eight chapters divide equally between Soviet dialectical and historical materialism, the first four treating conceptions of the nature of philosophy, materialism, objective dialectics (the dialectical character of reality) and subjective dialectics (the dialectics of cognition, the status of logic, epistemology etc.), while the remainder discuss philosophy of history, scientific communism, ethics and aesthetics. S.'s usual ploy is to open each with a summary of the orthodoxy in a domain, proceed to analyse more advanced discussions where disputes emerge between Soviet specialists, and conclude with a critical evaluation of the debate 'in its own terms, without importing principles or standards from other intellectual systems' (252).

Thus S. offers us a rare chance to review what of lasting import has happened in Soviet philosophy since Stalin, and he seems to share the popular opinion that there has been change for the better. His central thesis is that 'the intellectual culture of the U.S.S.R. is somewhat richer and more vital than is often supposed and that, behind its facade of dogmatic unanimity, Soviet Marxism-Leninism is marked by fundamental searching and dispute' (9), harbouring 'a plurality of intellectual interests and convictions' (326). However, the picture of Soviet philosophy S. draws does not warrant a very optimistic response to this conclusion. He presents a philosophical community predominantly preoccupied with the interpretation and elaboration of a largely incoherent dogma, where the principal stimulus to a pluralism of views is not the logic of philosophical argument, but that in the attempt to accommodate the dogma to reality its terms become either so vacuous that philosophers may hold a variety of positions while maintaining verbal allegiance to orthodoxy, or so inconsistent that doctrinal diversity results when different philosophers opt for different sides of a contradictory position. S.'s exposition of Soviet disputes is intelligent and sympathetic, but to establish that Soviet thinkers do not all endorse the same monolithic dogma because 'ambiguities, misunderstandings, and other impediments to unanimity will arise in any intellectual community' (9) and because 'Orwellian devices of thought control' have not been applied thoroughly and effectively in the U.S.S.R. (331-5), is not yet to show they are engaged in cogent philosophical enquiry. Soviet philosophy is shown to have curiosity, rather than philosophical, value.

For example, S. paints a particularly depressing portrait of work in objective dialectics, where one might expect a distinctive Soviet contribution. He argues that here, as in other domains, central notions have undergone 'development by dilution,' i.e. to make their theses conform to reality, Soviet philosophers weaken them to the degree that they are consistent with every

eventuality, securing immunity from empirical refutation at the price of vacuity (327-8). Thus, dialectics is reduced to a series of truisms (the world changes, things are interconnected ...), the law of the transformation of quantity into quality is made compatible with indefinite periods of quantitative change, 'qualitative leaps' are allowed to be 'gradual,' the 'struggle of opposites' may occur without a struggle, etc. Now the suggestion is that behind these banalities lurk 'substantive disagreements' (141). But if S. is right that the terms of objective dialectics are so empty that 'no claims are being made' (141), it is hard to see how there *could* be substantive disagreement. Certainly, S. does show there to be extensive discussions of two interesting and distinctive theses: (i) that a materialist reworking of Hegelian dialectical categories is possible, and (ii) that sense can be made of 'objectively existing contradictions.' But his analysis implies their defense is hopeless, and we are left to reflect that the most constructive result of Soviet discussion in objective dialectics is that brighter philosophers have come to see it as a lost cause.

Is this a reliable picture of Soviet philosophy? Much Soviet philosophy is undoubtedly bad: the interesting question is whether S.'s approach is best equipped to bring out the good. I have three reservations. The first challenges the *kind* of work S. has written, the others ask whether it is the best that can be done for a work of this kind. (a) S. employs the survey-style of presentation favoured by the majority of commentators on Soviet philosophy, introducing us to debates through concise summaries of contrasting positions. To be sure, the reader acquires a panoramic view of the geography of the area, but however skillful S.'s summaries, what seems to fade from the picture is the real motivation philosophers have for holding their different opinions. We lose the inner logic of the debate, how it looks *from inside*. But this inner logic is precisely what we must capture if we are to determine the genuine interest in Soviet philosophical thought. This problem is compounded by the spell Soviet orthodoxy inevitably casts over the discussion. Its influence is so pervasive, it can appear that some philosophers hold one position just because it is orthodox, while their opponents adopt another just because it is not. But this can obscure the philosophical grounds for holding either position (*why should* anyone want to say that there are 'objectively existing contradictions'?). (b) For S., a philosopher is orthodox if he defends the views given in Soviet textbooks. However, a Soviet philosopher might also be considered orthodox if he is an establishment figure, exercising control over the direction of official Soviet philosophy (Meliukhin, represented by S. as 'antidogmatic' for his non-textbook views [70], is considered part of the orthodoxy for this reason). More interestingly, also deemed orthodox are those who appear to embody the contemporary movement of Soviet ideology, whose views (although diverging from the textbooks) are in some way sponsored by Soviet officialdom (the positivistic school of thinkers, whom S. dubs 'more independently minded' [131] might be thought orthodox in this sense). Furthermore, others attack the textbooks from a supposed standpoint of orthodoxy, arguing that such texts do damage to Marxism. Thus if we are to include a position's being orthodox or 'establishment' among the reasons why

a philosopher may or may not believe it, we may need a more sophisticated conception of orthodoxy than S.'s. (c) S. ignores some important pieces of work. V.A. Lektorsky on epistemology would have enlivened the chapter on subjective dialectics and S.'s discussion of materialism should have included E.V. Ilyenkov's views on ideality. Also omitted is the philosophical psychology of F.T. Mikhailov, Ilyenkov, and others influenced by Vygotsky. These thinkers make inspired use of the concept of activity, giving 'practice' a much more interesting role than 'the application of scientific procedures of empirical confirmation against the background assumption of realism' (181).

In the light of these reservations I am not convinced that S.'s presentation is the best that can be done for Soviet historical materialism. Although I suspect that the glum account he offers of Soviet historical materialism is accurate (especially on the miserable field of scientific communism), a more constructive picture of other areas may be available. But notwithstanding this, S.'s scholarly work is a valuable addition to the literature. It is comprehensive (though it lacks a discussion of Soviet criticisms of 'bourgeois' philosophy) and well written. Although similar in methods and conclusions to earlier writings (e.g. by Bochenski, De George and others), it has the considerable virtue of bringing discussion up to date. It is therefore essential reading for anyone in the field.

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MICHAEL SLOTE. *Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism*. Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1985. Pp. ix + 157. Cdn\$37.50; US\$24.95. ISBN 0-7102-0309-8.

This is one of the best contributions to the contemporary debate on (act-)consequentialism. It is clear, careful, argued throughout, and original. It exhibits a considerable degree of sensitivity to argument, and it is altogether free of the kind of point-scoring and exaggeration that mars so much critical work. It is, in short, a thoroughly professional piece of work, and highly readable into the bargain.

Slothe's arguments are too detailed and interwoven to attempt any assessment of them here, and the fact that they are deployed, not in aid of some grand design of his own, but essentially to prove weaknesses in common-sense morality and (act-)consequentialism makes it difficult even to group

them together into something called Slote's position. His aim is to present some difficulties in common-sense morality and (act-)consequentialism that 'must be faced before we can evaluate the relative merits' of these theories; his criticisms are 'intended to encourage, rather than preclude, the further, more adequate development' of them. Slote himself points the way to development in the case of (act-)consequentialism, through the introduction of satisficing forms of the theory. The problem here is that it is difficult to distill these critical and developmental phases of the book into a few sentences.

For present purposes, we may group the book's seven chapters into two lots: chapters I, II, and VII compare common-sense morality and (act-)consequentialism with regard to certain issues and point up divergences between them over those issues; chapters III-VI continue the comparison of the two theories, but the primary focus is upon the exploration and partial development of consequentialist moral theory. The first lot will be of interest even to those who care nothing about the fate of (act-)consequentialism, since Slote is able to show how the issues discussed pose difficulties for common-sense morality.

According to act-consequentialism, the right act is always that act which has best overall consequences, i.e., which is optimific. A concern with optimificity does not permit one to pursue one's own projects and commitments, however, unless doing so is optimific; ordinary morality, on the other hand, does seem to permit us to pursue our non-optimific projects and commitments. It is in this regard that Bernard Williams and others have suggested that the requirements to produce best overall consequences seems to preclude our devoting ourselves to our own (non-optimific) plans and purposes and in this sense to represent an assault upon our integrity. In chapter I, Slote notices what Williams seems to have overlooked, namely, that ordinary morality allows us to sacrifice our own projects and commitments or to prefer the lesser good of another to our own greater good. In other words, ordinary morality allows us to sacrifice the very things that Williams cites as the explanation for why act-consequentialism will not do, and Slote goes on to show why these agent-sacrificing permissions are hard to justify in ordinary moral terms. In chapter II, he indicates how Williams' concern to permit the agent to pursue his own non-optimific projects radically underestimates the extent of such projects and cannot provide a rationale for sacrificing non-actual, possible projects. In chapter VII, Slote shows how moral luck, another issue associated with Williams, poses greater difficulties for common-sense morality than for act-consequentialism. The discussion here is intriguing, for though Slote is surely correct when he observes that the idea of moral luck affronts our ordinary moral intuitions, he is surely equally correct in observing that ordinary morality does allow future events and consequences a hand in determining the rightness of our acts. Since we 'think much worse of someone who has killed an innocent victim than of someone who accidentally fails to kill an intended innocent victim,' as reflected in our blaming the actual murderer more than the unsuccessful one, it would seem that ordinary

morality, far from severing rightness from future events and consequences, actually allows them a role in determining rightness. In a sense, these three, absorbing chapters can be read as forming a kind of debate with Williams and others.

Chapters III-VI take up consequentialist moral theory. Slote's apparent aim is, by introducing a new form of act-consequentialism, to go some of the way towards removing those difficulties the theory encounters through its emphasis upon optimality. Slote calls this new form 'satisficing act-consequentialism,' and its central feature is that it allows a non-optimistic act to count as right, if its consequences are good enough. He develops and tries to justify this view in chapter III. Then, he turns to some of its implications in chapter IV (that its principles may be moral without being action-guiding) and in chapter V (that perhaps it should be expressed in comparative form, i.e., not in terms of right and wrong but in terms of one act being better than another if it has better consequences). Finally, he argues in chapter VI, in an intricate series of steps, that the consequentialist moral stance favours, not act-consequentialism or motive-consequentialism, but some more comprehensive view. The sting at the end of this chapter, however, is pronounced: given these more comprehensive views, Slote tries to show that consequentialists will have to work hard to prevent their consequentialism from degenerating into the sort of concern with outcomes that falls short of being a morality.

The crucial part of this lot of chapters comes in a few pages in chapter III. Slote's tactic is to try to justify the idea of a satisficing act-consequentialism by (i) defending the notion of rational satisficing (38-44) and (ii) showing that ordinary morality allows for satisficing in the area of benevolence (45-8). At bottom, what has to happen in these pages is that we accept the general idea of moral satisficing, since that is supposed both to help make plausible the idea of a satisficing form of act-consequentialism and to make that idea more appealing. We have to agree, that is, that moral satisficing is acceptable, that less than the best is good enough; and I am just not sure that Slote's examples are compelling or varied enough to carry the day. At least, I can think of all kinds of permutations on the ones he gives that make me unhappy with the idea of moral satisficing. But it is perhaps unfair to suggest this without the space to elaborate.

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ZENO VENDLER. *The Matter of Mind*. Don Mills, ON & New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. vi + 136. Cdn\$37.50; US\$19.95. ISBN 0-19-824431-2.

The Matter of Mind is short, rich, and perplexing. In 136 pages, Prof. Vendler discusses and provides solutions to the problems of other minds, the nature of the mind, the nature of action, free will, and knowledge of self. Two features of his argument stand out. He provides an extended and welcome discussion of the role of imagination in these problems. And he introduces a refurbished Kantian transcendental ego to solve them.

We can suppose that machines think, if by thinking we mean something which can be exhaustively characterized in formal terms — where it does not much matter what thinks, so long as the relevant formal features are maintained. Imagining is different. Imagination's characteristic features are owed to what Vendler calls 'sensation, feeling, and sentiment.' These states (processes?) constitute the real matter of mind, or at least the matter of imagination. I can think of, but not imagine, the Taj Mahal without giving it shape; and to do a proper job of imagining, I probably should give it color too — 'picture' it, by endowing it with properties which are (Vendler claims) essentially 'subjective,' or mind dependent. These properties essential to imagining are the properties which we find in sensing and feeling, and they cannot be found with machines. A machine could, in principle, 'think,' but it could not sense, and thus could not imagine. Except for his insistence on their 'subjectivity,' Vendler's point is like Sellars' in insisting that the 'qualitative character' of sensation is lost wherever one tries — as with functional-state identity theories — to identify sensations with certain 'formal' states. Vendler is not particularly interested in what it is to imagine the Taj Mahal, however. He wants to make sense of imagining being another person, and here the imagination plays a special role. I can *only* imagine what it is to be another person, for to take another's point of view at a time, I must experience as s/he does at that time, and experience involves essentially sensation, feeling, and sentiment.

While Vendler holds these states to be essentially 'subjective' and to constitute distinctively subjective experience, they are not essentially private, owned by me, or 'mine,' else I could not imagine being another person — or another organism of some other sort, such as a cat, or even a bat. Sensations, feelings, and sentiments are 'transferrable.' Fancying (imagining) having the sensations, feelings, and sentiments of someone else requires that I (whatever that may be) actually do have them — not as mine, but as another's. Having them as another's is fancying being another. When I so imagine or fancy, I have them in such a way that they correlate, not with the physical circumstances of my body, but with the physical circumstances at some time of another's. Imagining being Richard Nixon several years ago, for instance, I imagine several experiences: sitting in the Oval Office behind his desk, speaking with his mouth, feeling his (Richard Nixon's) fingers toying with the con-

trols of a tape recorder, wondering wistfully about my place in history. I do the same with one of Nagel's bats, Hamlet, or perhaps even Rufus (Tomi Ungerer's fictional bat). I also do it with me, for I represent myself in imagination (95, 109). Imagining or experiencing an experience as mine, Vendler says, is experiencing which differs from experiencing as another by virtue of being a different state (correlated with a different body, and a different history), but also — crucially — by virtue of the fact that mine is 'given.' My experiences do not differ in content from those of others, only in 'access.' They are 'indexically' picked out. There are two issues here, the nature of the connection between certain physical states and certain mental states or experiences, and the nature of the 'tie' which makes certain experiences mine. The two issues interrelate in complex ways, but for Vendler, they are quite distinct.

Let us look at the connection between the physical and the mental. The argument for the mental character of sensations, feelings, and sentiments relies on Kripke in *Naming and Necessity*: pain cannot be identical with the firing of C-fibers, because the identity is not necessary. It was perfectly possible (we are told) for God to have made pain correlate with the firing of other fibers. So mental states are not physical states. (A 'disappearance' theorist of sensation would complain and disagree; I will not pursue this topic.) But we do not want too loose a connection between the physical and the mental. In fact, Vendler insists on such a close connection that in this regard he is indistinguishable from the most rabid (non-disappearance) identity theorist. Sensations, feelings, and sentiments are mind-dependent or subjective, but still they correlate so closely with physical features of the organism's body that — Vendler holds — it is impossible to have anything like a 'reversed spectrum,' a mind which blue-senses where another red-senses. Moreover, when I imagine being Nixon, when I do so the sensations I imagine Nixon as having are matched with physical states of my body (96). Can one really say this and insist that experiences are non-physical, as well as 'subjective' or mind-dependent? Consider the argument that the connection between the mental sensation and the physical state cannot be necessary. It is difficult to see how Vendler can maintain such a close correlation between the mental and the physical without raising doubts about his Kripke-based argument, and doubts then about the mind-dependence or subjectivity of these states. Typical of someone drawn to transcendental argument, however, he turns the close relationship into an advantage, and says (96) that it is in fact a consequence of his transcendental approach: there must be such a close correlation, for otherwise it would not be possible to genuinely transfer sensations. We could not otherwise know which sensations to imagine. Transfer is possible only if mental states are so closely connected with the physical that for any relevant (sensation-correlated) localized physical state, we are able to find a distinct mental state. Thus, so long as it is acknowledged that experiences are mental, and not physical, we can allow the connection to be as close as anyone could desire.

Emphasizing the close connection between the mental and the physical

would, I think, at least change the tenor of some things Vendler says about the nature of imagining. If the issue is whether we really can sense as another organism does — as a bat or a bird, for instance — we get serious answers, not by speaking cheerfully of ‘projecting’ human experiences onto the physical circumstances of an organism, but by investigating the degree to which the machinery of sensation found in our bodies parallels that found in the bodies of other organisms. While we have no reason to doubt whether birds have color-sensations, we do have reason to doubt that they are sufficiently like ours that we should talk without further ado of imagining being a bird — much less a bat. For, given the greater complexity of some birds’ color-processing equipment — at least at the retinal level — we should suspect that their color-relevant sensing is different. Taking a strong mental-physical connection seriously, it seems that the limits of what we can imagine where one imagines being an organism of a particular type are determined largely by the neurophysiologist and biologist. The reasonable assurance we have that we can adopt Nixon’s point of view is based on the fact that Nixon is a member of the same species. We experience as others do because of our like physical structures, and our experiences are guides to the experiences of others to the extent that we are members of the same species. But this kind of criticism would not deter Vendler long. The close connection between the mental and the physical raises difficulties only if it is taken to be sufficient for identity — which, Vendler claims, it never is.

Might the close connection be sufficient for making an experience essentially ‘mine’? Perhaps it could: if there is such a close correlation, is not the mental state located with the physical, and does this not constitute a ‘tie’ which makes an experience mine? For the close correlation seems necessarily to locate an experience, and include it in a history of one body — call it mine — and not another’s — call it Nixon’s. Vendler’s response might go like this: even if a mental state were ‘located’ in this way, it would not make it mine, and this fact is obscured by the facile ‘call it mine.’ Vendler accepts with equanimity some very close correlations between the mental and the physical and denies that this tells us anything about what it is for an experience to be mine. So far as the physical world is concerned, that I have these experiences, or that I imagine, is irrelevant. This — I take it — is what Vendler’s view that what is mine is indexically fixed amounts to. There is no physical characteristic which constitutes an experience, or even a physical state, as mine — which ‘singles it out’ in the relevant way and ties it to me. Parallel things can be said about ‘now’ and ‘this.’

The only way to make sense of ‘ownership’ is to say that the ultimate ‘subject’ is a transcendental ego. Transcendental egos are notoriously empty or content-free, however; how could the transcendental ego single out these experiences as mine? Indexically, we are told; no further explanation can be given, and none is needed. The emptiness of the transcendental ego is even turned into an advantage. Consider imagining being Richard Nixon. When it is done, who does it? Only the transcendental ego can have the relevant experiences, or rather imagine them; if I think of myself as a transcendental ego,

it makes sense to say that *I* imagine being Richard Nixon, even to the extent of having nothing left of 'myself.' In order for me to do this, I must 'represent' R.N.'s experiences, and this I do by having them as they would be had by Nixon — they are 'projections' of what a person in those circumstances would experience. Vendler says,

I have to grant that the act of imagination representing the mind of [R.N.], or whomever, belongs to my mind, i.e., Z.V.'s mind. And, in this sense, it is that mind which performs the transference. In another sense, however, in the transcendental sense, it is the contentless "I" which is the agent of this act, just as much as it is the subject of all the experiences which make up Z.V.'s mind. After all, ... this mind's being mine is a matter of access, and not of content. Now, whether I imagine a tree, a sea-battle, or being [R.N.], the representation evoked will appear in the temporal framework, and against the background, of this particular mind ... [A]s there are pictures within pictures (think of Vermeer), so there can be representations of other subjects, not merely of objects, within the unity of one's own consciousness. In seeing a picture within a picture, one shifts perspective from the encompassing picture to the encompassed; in performing transference, one shifts the focus of the "I" from the encompassing self to the encompassed. But the eye of sight, and the "I" of consciousness, remain the same.(108)

A person as transcendental ego represents the inner lives of others, and also represents his or her own inner life, even now. (The difference is one of access, not content.) The representer must, then, be something without specific content. When I imagine being R.N., then, why do I not *become* R.N.? Vendler insists that *I could* be R.N. (113). One answer is that the transcendental ego is not in time, so it cannot be now J.M., now R.N. Another answer is that 'in a sense' the representing is a part of my (J.M.'s) mental history: an R.N. representation is a part of a J.M. representation. But why can there not be someone who so radically imagines being R.N. that nothing of his or her own self (as J.M.) remains? Nothing in Vendler's argument rules out such an extraordinary result, unless he can say that some part of 'myself' must remain in any such representing. But he gives no reason for thinking that it must, and even says the opposite (106); so the use of the transcendental ego to explain transference in this way seems to allow that I can in imagining being Nixon, be Nixon. I think something has gone wrong.

Besides leading to difficult consequences, Vendler's discussion of imagination is much too limited. Dreaming is intuitively closely related to imagining, though it is not clear, unlike imagining, that it is something which I do. Again, when (as I say when awake) I dreamt that I was R.N., was this the same as imagining being R.N., or similar to it? In dreaming, am I representing; and must I always be representing myself too? Which I or self dreams? Is a dream a part of my mental history? How is the indexical 'my dream' to be dealt with? Is it fair to say that the 'transcendental ego' represents when it dreams? If what makes an image a representation of something is that it refers to it, does reference occur in dreams? Is a dream to be treated as accessible *via* the physical, in the way other forms of inner life (sensations, feelings, and

sentiments) are? Vendler's argument offers no obvious answers to any of these questions.

Vendler discusses the concept of action at the end of his book. There is useful material here which is independent of his transcendental ego — some good arguments against treating reasons as causes, for instance. The interesting solution to the free will problem, however, and several of Vendler's views on action depend very heavily upon his puzzling transcendental ego. I do not think we can take them seriously until we are convinced that there is no alternative to the mystery of the transcendental ego — something so mysterious that Vendler adopts the *via negativa* to tell us what it is.

To develop an alternative to Vendler's solutions one would need to deal with all the many topics Vendler discusses: reference, representation, ownership, location, self, and imagination. He obviously recognizes the scope of the task, and deserves praise for making a systematic effort, if too sketchy. The book has several typographical errors, none serious.

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JOHN W. YOLTON. *Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984. Pp. xiv + 238. US\$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1160-2); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1161-0).

JOHN W. YOLTON. *Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984. Pp. x + 248. US\$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1162-9); US\$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1163-7).

Locke, in his *Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing all Things in God*, wondered of Malebranche's conjecture 'whether this hypothesis, when examin'd, and the parts of it put together, can be thought to cure our ignorance, or is intelligible and satisfactory to one who would not deceive himself, take words for things, and think he knows what he knows not.' The quotation identified two of the cardinal sins, perhaps for Locke the two cardinal sins, to which philosophers are most susceptible: the tendency to regard all substantives as substantial and the more general vice of assuming knowledge when we have only something less. It is with major questions

relating to the ontological implications of our language as conceived by philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that these two books are concerned. The questions are, in the one, whether matter might think, and in the other, the status of ideas, are they things which come between us and the world or not? These issues, though separable, are clearly related, so although we have two books they can with profit be read together. They do, however, raise different issues and will be debated in rather different ways by historians of philosophy. For, in the main, the former topic raises no major matters of contention, whilst the coverage of the latter challenges widely accepted interpretations in ways which are likely to lead to a considerable literature in the journals. For this reason this review will concentrate on the issue of perceptual acquaintance, and rather less attention will be given to the debate on whether matter might think.

Perceptual Acquaintance begins from some remarks of Reid in his *Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man* (1785) in which he claims that the mainstream of perceptual theory from Plato on had subscribed to a 'Veil of Perception': that the immediate objects of perception are 'only shadows of an external world.' The majority of commentators have followed Reid's representationalist interpretation, though, as Yolton acknowledges, Reid was hardly the first to read Locke and others in this way. It is nevertheless, Yolton claims, largely a mistaken view so far as it relates to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the book challenges the standard account and offers another to replace it.

The claims are set out in four main theses: (1) Reid's interpretation of Descartes, Arnauld, Locke and others is mistaken in its representationalism and subsequent scepticism. This interpretation more nearly fits Malebranche and his few British followers for whom ideas are objects intervening between us and the world. (2) If ideas are not objects, then Locke et al. can be read as direct realists. (3) A barrier to this reading has been the assumption that cognitive directness requires a literal joining of mind and object — 'no cognition at a distance' — but this position rests on a mistake about the nature of direct realism. (4) When this is appreciated we see that the named philosophers were really producing a cognitive psychology — 'It is the role of meaning in perceptual acquaintance that has been overlooked in the standard discussions and histories of the way of ideas.' (16).

Descartes is the first philosopher considered. There can be no doubting the radical nature of the Yolton reading: Descartes holds that 'there can be no causal relation between such diverse substances' as mind and body (22); cognition is just the relation of sign to thing signified and ideas and perception are the same, 'the being of objects in the understanding is just their being understood, apprehended, cognized, or perceived' (39).

There is ingenious argument to support this reading. But is it ultimately convincing? Much textual evidence points in another direction. Descartes talks of ideas being 'in the mind'; those things which are immediately perceived, our ideas, he says in the Fifth Set of Replies, 'often come to us from

bodies.' Why indeed should Descartes doubt the existence of an external world at all if perception is immediate?

Yet when we return to the text, passages previously read only one way, in the light of the Yolton reading, now acquire a different hue — not every passage by any means, but sufficient to raise a doubt. Ideas, Descartes tells us, are 'the form of any given thought ... they give form to the mind itself' (Second Set of Replies), they are 'modes of my thought' (Meditation Three), though often sources of knowledge as well. There is a real question as to exactly how 'thingy' Descartes's ideas really are.

It is, though, a doubt that remains. Yolton's argument, whilst important for raising the issue of interpretation, does not ultimately convince. The textual evidence for the causal theory cannot be set aside so easily, the spacial metaphor of ideas in the mind is so pervasive that the identification of these with the act of understanding or perceiving never quite rings true.

What, then, is going on? I would suggest that Yolton has hit on something important about Descartes' account of perception which might be put like this. The introduction of the terminology of ideas was the product of several differing pressures. Among these was the new account of perception which from Kepler on encouraged the *camera obscura* model, and which itself invited the veil of perception metaphors. And there was the pressure from the new science of matter which in Descartes and others produced the conclusion that there is some lack of resemblance between what we see and the way the world is. Against these were less overt but real countervailing forces which resisted the reification of ideas: the recognition, or half-recognition, that ideas could not be substances, that whatever else they might be they could not exist apart from mind.

On the Yolton view, in which Descartes is read as quite consciously committed to the rejection of reification, one would expect this to be accompanied by an explicit theory of meaning, for on it the idea just is the sign of that which is signified. It is, then, instructive that Yolton has to construct the Cartesian account of meaning from the very few places in which it is mentioned, rather than finding it thrust at us in the text. This lack of detailed theory is just what you would expect to find if Descartes had not fully penetrated the implications of the new talk of ideas.

From Descartes Yolton turns to Malebranche whose occasionalism is unproblematic. He is committed to objects of perception immediately present to the mind and these, of course, are ideas. Malebranche reified ideas with a vengeance. In contrast, Arnauld had no such temptations. For he rejects the Malebranche account in total: ideas are not distinct from perceptions, and when we see the sun, we in that act have an idea, but not as some thing existing apart from the perception.

Although Yolton gives interesting attention to several minor philosophers in England who held to the 'present to the mind' doctrine the next major figure discussed is Locke. Locke, Yolton claims, identifies ideas with perceptions, rejects totally their reification, and attacks Malebranche and Norris precisely on this point.

Should we accept the Yolton account? There can be no doubting Locke's rejection of the supposed justifications for reification, and Yolton is undoubtedly correct to draw our attention to the relevant passages. But do they sustain the full conclusion that Yolton requires? Or is the position somewhat the same as with the Cartesian passages? Yolton quotes Locke as saying of ideas 'we know nothing at all but only that they are perceptions in the mind' (94). And there are many similar remarks.

Do these conclusively establish that Locke rejected ideas as real entities? Or is it only that he rejects the much weaker claim that we cannot *know* they are real entities, a move typical of Locke and entirely in keeping with the passage quoted at the beginning of this review?

Although it will no doubt be disputed, the text appears often to support the Yolton reading. Thus it is for Locke apparently not just a matter of ignorance, but of unintelligibility, that ideas might be either modes of mind or independent substances. (On this see especially *An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion Etc.*, Section 18.) And yet, one cannot but help reflect that, if this really was his position, why did he not come out with it unambiguously in the *Essay* where it belonged?

If we set aside such doubts for the moment, and grant the Yolton thesis, and grant too, pace Yolton, that the earlier claim is correct that at best Descartes was unclear on the matter, then it suggests that the debate between Arnauld and Malebranche is even more important than Yolton allows, for it marks the watershed between the realist and non-realist account of ideas.

The volume continues with interesting discussion of perceptual theory through the eighteenth century with special reference to Berkeley and Hume: for the former objects become ideas in the mind and therefore there is no denying their reality; and for the latter there are strong, but perhaps not conclusive, grounds for an idealist understanding of objects. The book concludes with a chapter on sense and meaning which brings together issues in this area which have simmered close to the surface throughout the discussion.

Thinking Matter, whilst covering a similar period to *Perceptual Acquaintance*, does not offer an account which is likely to be regarded as nearly so controversial. Although both Spinoza and Hobbes had raised the spectre of materialism, Yolton sees the crucial text for the eighteenth century as Locke's remark in Book Four of the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* that God can if he pleases superadd to matter a faculty of thinking. There can be no doubt that this suggestion was one that was seen as a very real threat to religion by such contrasting figures as Stillingfleet and Leibniz. Yolton traces the fortunes of the suggestion through thinkers great and small in a story which adds a useful chapter to the history of philosophy in Britain from Cudworth to Priestley. Perhaps the final words should go to the latter. In his opinion, he wrote, 'there is just the same reason to conclude the brain *thinks* as that it is *white* and *soft*'.

Both books, which cover an enormous number of primary sources, are

remarkable for their accuracy. I only spotted one mistake: it was Samuel, not John, Clarke who wrote the notes for the English translation of Rohault's *System of Natural Philosophy*.

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