

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editor

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6G 2E5

Acting Editor (Sept. '84 / Sept. '85)

Allen A. Carlson
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta

Managing Editor

Ruth Richardson
Academic Printing & Publishing

Editeur associé

J. N. Kaufmann
Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières
C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec, Canada
G9A 5H7

The editors will consider for publication submitted reviews of publications that are strictly educational textbooks. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words in length, and should be sent to the appropriate editor.

Les éditeurs considéreront pour fin de publication des recensions d'ouvrages qui se présentent comme des manuels destinés à l'enseignement. Ces recensions ne doivent pas dépasser 1000 mots; elles devront être envoyées à l'éditeur respectif.

Subscription prices for a volume of six issues:

Institutions: \$68.00 (Canada)	US\$64.00 or CDN\$78.00 (Non-Canadian)
Individuals: \$34.00 (Canada)	US\$32.00 or CDN\$44.00 (Non-Canadian)
Students: \$16.00 (Canada)	US\$18.00 or CDN\$22.00 (Non-Canadian)

Prix de l'abonnement à un volume de six numéros:

Institutions: \$68.00 (Canada)	US\$64.00 or CDN\$78.00 (Hors-Canada)
Individus: \$34.00 (Canada)	US\$32.00 or CDN\$44.00 (Hors-Canada)
Etudiants: \$16.00 (Canada)	US\$18.00 or CDN\$22.00 (Hors-Canada)

Published ten issues yearly / dix par an numéros

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:

Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:



academic printing & publishing

P.O. Box 4834, South Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

©1985 Academic Printing and Publishing

Vol. V/1 January/janvier 1985

TABLE OF CONTENTS/TABLE DES MATIÈRES

Norman E. Bowie, ed, <i>Ethical Theory in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century</i> (Harry S. Silverstein)	1
Alexander Broadie, <i>George Lokert: Late-Scholastic Logician</i> (E.J. Ashworth)	3
Warren P. Fraleigh, <i>Right Actions in Sport: Ethics for Contestants</i> (Wesley E. Cooper)	5
Leigh S. Cauman, Isaac Levi, Charles D. Parsons and Robert Schwartz, eds., <i>How Many Questions?: Essays in Honour of Sidney Morgenbesser</i> (Cheryl Misak)	7
Giles Deleuze, <i>Nietzsche and Philosophy</i> (Jerry S. Clegg)	10
Hubert L. Dreyfus, ed., <i>Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science</i> (M.M. Van De Pitte)	11
I. Hacking, <i>Representing and Intervening: Introductory Essays in the Philosophy of Natural Science</i> (E. Levy)	14
George R. Lucas, Jr., <i>The Genesis of Modern Process Thought: a historical outline with bibliography</i> (Lewis S. Ford)	18
Edward Pols, <i>The Acts of Our Being</i> (Robert Hanna)	20
Jean-Dominique Robert, <i>Essai d'approches contemporaines de Dieu</i> (Joseph Tchao)	22
Stanley Rosen, <i>Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image</i> (John J. Cleary)	27
Stephen David Ross, <i>Perspective in Whitehead's Metaphysics</i> (Donald W. Sherburne)	30
Richard Schacht, <i>Nietzsche</i> (Philip J. Kain)	33
John H. Smith, ed., <i>Kierkegaard's Truth: The Disclosure of the Self</i> (Robert L. Perkins)	36
Robert Solomon, <i>In The Spirit of Hegel a Study of G.W.F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit</i> (William R. Schroeder)	39
R.F. Stalley, <i>An Introduction to Plato's Laws</i> (Richard D. Parry)	41
Michael E. Zimmerman, <i>Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity</i> (David A. Kolb)	43

SOUNDINGS

An *Interdisciplinary* Journal

Donald W. Sherburne, Editor



As an *interdisciplinary* journal, *Soundings* publishes essays which use one discipline to probe the materials of another; or which yoke two disciplines in order to provide a perspective that would otherwise be impossible to attain; or which, though based firmly in a discipline, focus that discipline upon our common human problems and communicate the resulting insights so that they are readable by, and of interest, to, scholars in other disciplines. *Soundings* seeks to challenge the fragmentation of learning inherent in the specialization which characterizes modern intellectual life and to illuminate those values which dignify human affairs.

Recent articles include:

LINDA SINGER

Nietzschean Mythologies: The Inversion of Value and the War Against Women

GEORGE M. SHURR AND
JOHN LACHS

On the Ethics of Advertising by the Professions

RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN

Nietzsche or Aristotle: Reflections on Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue*

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE

Bernstein's Distorting Mirrors: A Rejoinder

MARK TAYLOR

Deconstruction: What's the Difference?

CHARLES SCOTT

Violence and Psyche: A Reflection on Images and Freedom

JEFFREY STOUT

Moral Abominations

SUBSCRIPTION RATE: Individual, \$12; Institutional, \$18; Single copy, \$4.

Please send check or purchase order and your address to:

SOUNDINGS

P.O. Box 6309, Station B
Nashville, Tennessee 37235

Published quarterly by The Society for Values in Higher Education and Vanderbilt University.

NORMAN E. BOWIE, ed. *Ethical Theory in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1983. Pp. 158. US\$19.50. ISBN 0-915145-34-0.

The title of this book might lead one to expect a collection of articles on the 'frontiers' of ethics; in fact it simply contains papers by four prominent American ethicists, apparently delivered as lectures at the University of Delaware between 1977 and 1979, on topics for which they are well known — Charles Stevenson on emotivism, William Frankena on 'moral-point-of-view' theories, Richard Brandt on utilitarianism, and A.I. Melden on rights — with an introduction by Bowie which contains little more than a brief summary of the papers' main points. The book, indeed, is so far from representing the ethical avant-garde that it would be largely familiar, and entirely intelligible, to a moral philosopher who had just awakened from a twenty-year coma.

Misleading title aside, the book has sufficient merit, particularly in Frankena's contribution, to be a reasonable choice for academic libraries; but since the central argument of Stevenson's paper is quite weak, and since the contributions of both Brandt and Melden are little more than summaries of views presented with more detail and sophistication elsewhere, I think that most individual buyers could find better uses for their money.

Stevenson's 'Value-Judgments: Their Implicit Generality' attempts to show that 'our inclination to ascribe an implicit generality to our judgments' (13) can be explained within emotivist theory. His contention is that, given the emotivist function of value judgments, generality-rejecting judgments are pointless. But even if this contention is true it hardly supports any significant conclusion. For it not only fails to show that there is anything incoherent or mistaken about generality-rejecting *attitudes* (a point Stevenson recognizes); it even fails to show that there is anything incorrect about generality-rejecting *judgments*. For judgments which it is pointless, even counter-productive, to utter or write may nonetheless be true (cf. 'I am planning to kill Jones in such a way that no one will ever realize it was murder').

Frankena's 'Moral-Point-Of-View Theories' does an excellent job of explaining the essential elements of such theories, the differences between his theory and other moral-point-of-view theories (MPVT's), and the points of disagreement between MPVT's and such critics as Gewirth; in my view, as I indicated above, his paper is the best of the four. But it does not convince me that MPVT's represent a persuasive alternative to the views of 'skeptics, methodological relativists, and Stevensonian emotivists on the one hand' — views which Frankena takes to be unacceptably weak — and the views of those, such as Gewirth, 'who believe it possible to give either an intuitive or an inferential ... proof of basic moral judgments or principles ... on the other' (45) — views which Frankena believes to be indefensibly strong. For Frankena's concession that 'neither I nor any other MPV theorist can show that being moral ... is actually part of the rational life' (74) surely eliminates any significant distinction, so far as the problem of 'rational justification' is concerned, between MPVT's and, e.g., 'Stevensonian emotivism,' a difficulty which none of his other claims, in my opinion, succeeds in mitigating.

Brandt's 'Problems of Contemporary Utilitarianism: Real and Alleged' summarizes and defends his version of rule-utilitarianism, according to which '*right actions* are ones of a type permitted by the moral code *optimal* for the society of the agent, and ... an optimal code is one the total cost-benefit impact of the prevalence of which ... is to maximize welfare' (84). The paper does a reasonable job of presenting basic arguments and distinctions; however, its discussion of the crucial objection that utilitarianism conflicts with justice is surprisingly weak and superficial. In considering this objection Brandt mentions only economic justice and legal punishment (102) and discusses only the former. But surely justice concerns rights and freedoms which are more fundamental than the former and go far beyond the latter.

Finally, Melden's 'On Moral Rights' is, in my view, quite correct in claiming that the notion of rights is central to a proper understanding of the obligation to keep promises, and also in claiming that rights and their correlative obligations are paradigmatically involved 'in the instance of persons intimately related by love and affection' (115). However, while one can sympathize with Melden's rejection of Kant's absolute separation of morality from inclination, it is hard to accept his contention that 'the conscientious promiser could not adjust his own life to the interest ... of the promisee, out of his sense of the latter's right ... unless the latter's interests ... were a matter of genuine concern to him' (121). For this suggests, e.g., that, assuming 'ought' implies 'can,' a promiser who loses, or who never had, such 'genuine concern' has no obligation. The truth surely, as Kant insists, is that one who properly understands such an obligation will have a principled commitment to fulfill it which is independent of his fluctuating inclinations or 'concerns.'

HARRY S. SILVERSTEIN
Washington State University

ALEXANDER BROADIE. *George Lokert: Late-Scholastic Logician*. New York: Columbia University Press for Edinburgh University Press 1983. Pp. 252. US\$27.50. ISBN 0-85224-469-X.

George Lokert (c.1485-1547) was one of the many Scotsmen who studied and taught at the University of Paris in the early sixteenth century. He had a distinguished academic career, being at various times head of the college of the Sorbonne in Paris and rector of St. Andrew's University in Scotland, but in his later years he devoted himself principally to ecclesiastical affairs. He wrote a number of books on logic and natural philosophy; and the purpose of the present volume is to introduce the reader to Lokert's logical writings. Broadie provides us with a substantial introductory chapter which gives details of the academic and administrative careers of Lokert and of other Scotsmen such as John Major. There follow four chapters devoted respectively to terms, exponibilia, consequences and opposed propositions. There is a very brief (184-191) closing chapter on Lokert's place in medieval logic; and a substantial appendix of Latin texts drawn from both Major and Lokert, as well as two from Robert Caubraith.

Broadie had two goals in choosing Lokert as the subject of his study. First, he hoped to demonstrate to those interested in the intellectual history of Scotland that the early sixteenth century was as notable for its philosophers as for its poets. Second, he hoped to show that the work of early sixteenth century logicians dealt with problems which are still of interest to logicians today. So far as the first goal is concerned, Broadie's book can be regarded as a useful supplement to the various works of the intellectual historian John Durkan. Whether Broadie succeeds in his second goal is more debatable. Certainly his study has its merits. He has a sure grasp of both logic and Latin, and his exposition of Lokert's doctrines is lucid, accurate, and extremely detailed. His style of presentation calls for a good deal of concentration on the part of the reader, but anyone who perseveres will get a full picture of the contents of some parts of Lokert's writing. My reservations have to do with whether this style of presentation is adequate for the purpose of introducing readers to early sixteenth century logic.

Broadie seems to pride himself on not placing Lokert's logic in its historical context. He claims (189) that an investigation into Lokert's originality would not be worthwhile; and that he is treating Lokert 'primarily as a fine representative of a school of logicians whose doctrines are significant and worth developing today' (190). There is very little indication that Broadie is acquainted with other logicians. He makes a number of references to John Major (though without at any point specifying which of the many, often quite different, editions of Major's work he is citing), but the only other sixteenth century logicians of whom he makes use are Caubraith and Domingo de Soto. He quotes two long proofs from Caubraith, both of which have already been presented and examined in the secondary literature, though this is not footnoted; and he quotes one long proof from Soto, which again has

already been examined in the secondary literature. (Broadie even reproduces, without acknowledgement, my own inaccurate citation of Soto, fol.xc rather than fol.xc rb.) There are a number of reasons why I find this approach to Lokert unsatisfactory. First, my own experience is that sixteenth century logicians — like writers of all periods — make frequent oblique references to doctrines, arguments and examples common in the literature of their time, and that it is only by reading a number of sources that one can understand fully what these arguments and doctrines are, or what the significance of the examples is. Second, Lokert's works contain a mixture of doctrines which had long been standard and of genuine novelties, albeit not due to Lokert himself. For instance, both Lokert's definition of good consequence and his examples of propositional inferences have a long history, and his definition of signification comes from Peter of Ailly. On the other hand, the use of 'a' and 'b' as special quantifiers and the very writing of complete treatises devoted to terms or to the relations of opposition between propositions were strictly late fifteenth/early sixteenth century phenomena. It is difficult to appreciate what Lokert is doing unless one takes these historical factors into account.

Another disappointing feature of Broadie's book is his neglect of Lokert's most popular work, the *Scriptum in materiam noticiarum*, which was printed at least six times. A close study of this book throws much light on Lokert's views about the nature of the proposition, the function of syncategorematic terms, and the proposed structure of mental language, topics raised by Lokert's treatise on terms but not fully explored there. However, it must be noted once more that Lokert's arguments cannot be understood without close attention to the historical background. The stage had been set by the fourteenth century debate between Gregory of Rimini and Peter of Ailly; and Lokert's own remarks owe an immediate debt to the important and influential group of Spaniards at the University of Paris, notably Jeronimo Pardo and Antonio Coronel. It is particularly unfortunate that Broadie ignores this area of investigation, because in my own view those parts of sixteenth century logic which are most likely to attract the modern reader are those most closely connected with the philosophy of language.

It is hard to decide what audience this book can be recommended to. The historian of logic will be frustrated by the failure to relate Lokert to other logicians; and the novice will find the amount of detail very heavy going. I hope that Broadie will use his undoubted talents to offer us a more widely based study of sixteenth century Scottish logicians in the future.

E.J. ASHWORTH

University of Waterloo

WARREN P. FRALEIGH, *Right Actions in Sport: Ethics for Contestants*. Champaign: Human Kinetics Publishers 1984. Pp. 195. US\$19.95. ISBN 0-931250-55-2.

Concerned by the lack of 'articulated and comprehensive guides for morally right actions' in sport, Fraleigh offers here a 'systematic, comprehensive normative ethic that reveals which existing guides are substantiated and which are not.' (ix). He proceeds from a 'logic' which includes, first, the concept of a good sports contest.

The sports contest is called good when it meets a set of dual standards. Initially a contest is good when it fulfills its nature as a sports contest to a high degree; it is outstanding *qua* contest. Then, a contest is good when it fulfills the substantive characteristics of the moral point of view. (ix)

And second, it includes the derivation of guides to athletic action from an account of the good sports contest. Thirdly and finally, Fraleigh's sports logic will include a mechanism for ensuring that 'we know how to use [the guides] correctly and how to overcome seeming incongruence or to resolve conflicts among the guides' (x). Effectively Fraleigh recommends one of four possible solutions to the problem of wrong conduct in sports. There is, first, the 'Draconian' solution of banning sports in which the problem is particularly severe, or of otherwise ensuring that such sports are not played. Second, there is the 'legalistic' solution, that of changing the rules that are constitutive of games, so as to reduce wrong conduct. Third, there is the 'developmental' strategy of moulding the moral character of players so that when they come to play in sports contests the problem of wrong conduct will be lessened. Fourth, there is the 'professional' approach of laying down a code or set of rules — specific to players, coaches, trainers and others involved in sports contests — which rules they are to observe, in addition to the constitutive rules of the game, so as to avoid wrong conduct.

Fraleigh adopts the professional approach. The focus of his concern is the agent involved in a sports contest, someone who raises the question 'What shall I do?', in hard cases that Fraleigh imagines him involved in, such as the case of the faked injury, the case of the intentional foul, &c. A third of the book is given over to laying out guides for this puzzled player (or coach, trainer, &c.), guides of equal opportunity for optimal performance, noninjurious action, nonharassment, and twenty-six others. For example, Guide III, the guide of nonharassment, commands that 'athletes, coaches, and athletic trainers shall avoid acts, or their encouragement, that are intended to insult or derogate the character, intelligence, physical appearance, ancestry, or the motor abilities of others in the sports contest' (118).

Fraleigh's rules can be viewed in two ways, as *critique* or as *cure*. As critique the rules serve to define the problem of wrong conduct in sport and provide a theoretical background for moral criticism of such conduct. From the critical perspective one appreciates Fraleigh's attempt to apply to sport the ethical theories of Hare, Baier, Rawls, Richards, and others. This project does

not presuppose a 'professional' strategy towards improving the conduct of participants in sports contests, and indeed presupposes no particular strategy at all. In contrast, the view of Fraleigh's rules as contributing to a cure for wrong conduct in sport *does* presuppose a 'professional' approach to wrong conduct in sport, and though Fraleigh seems to take this view of his rules, the implausibility of this approach is reason to read the book from the critical rather than the curative point of view. There is a naive intellectualism in the thought that participants in sporting contests are going to read, or otherwise have inculcated, the rules that Fraleigh recommends, and thereby improve the moral quality of their sporting conduct. I would think that improvement will come primarily through the 'legalistic' and 'developmental' strategies, but even to say this is to speculate too far in advance of the sorts of sociological and psychological information on which one would want to base an attack on the problem. It may be, as Fraleigh says, that 'the best kinds of reasons supporting one particular action over another are moral reasons', but 'best' here cannot mean 'most effective in regulating conduct,' for then the claim would certainly be false (14). If it were true, there would be no need for legal institutions and the characteristic reasons for compliance which they supply, having to do with the threat of punishment.

There is some inscrutability in the book — in the proposition, for example, that 'the purpose of the sports contest is the reason for its existence' (40). This purpose is an institutionalized one, i.e., the collective intended end of those participants who voluntarily enter into the institution of sport' (40). This purpose might 'come from' the individual who enters into the contest (the existential thesis), or it might come from God (the metaphysical thesis), or from the 'historic institutionalized structure of sport as it has developed over thousands of years by millions of individuals and by hundreds of societies' (the historical thesis) (40). Favoring the historical thesis, Fraleigh supposes that something like the following 'phenomenal description of what the sports contest is' has been 'embodied in our collective, historical consciousness,' to be revealed 'when human consciousness focuses upon the concept of the sports contest' (41).

A sports contest is a voluntary, agreed upon, human event in which one or more human participants opposes at least one human other to seek the mutual appraisal of the relative abilities of all participants to move mass in space and time by utilizing bodily moves which exhibit developed motor skill, physiological and psychological endurance and socially approved tactics and strategy. (41)

Viewing this as anything but a stipulation, I find it a very peculiar definition. Insofar as *my* human consciousness is able to 'focus' upon the concept of the sports contest, I do not find that a sports contest must exclude a match between me and (say) a Martian. Why must the participants be human? Of course Fraleigh might *stipulate* that a sports contest is to exclude non-human players, as he suggests in the Preface, where he also employs stipulation to hive off noncontest sports activities (like mountain climbing), contests be-

tween man and animal (like bullfighting), and contests between animals (like dog racing). But then it is improbable, to say the least, that this stipulated concept of a sports contest can somehow, all along, have been 'embodied in our collective, historical consciousness,' when to all appearances it is a departure from what was in my consciousness, and perhaps too in our 'collective, historical' one. It seems to me that clarity about stipulations (*as* stipulations) would involve considerable retreat from the grandiose historical-cum-phenomenological claims.

Seeking 'the mutual appraisal of the relative abilities of all participants' is one reason to enter into a sports contest, but surely not the only or the essential one (unless this point too is to be made by stipulation). Participants might be motivated by monetary considerations, or the wish to pass the time. Neither motive precludes a sports contest, or even a *good* sports contest. This is, perhaps, to betray commitment to the existential thesis, but the disrepair of the historical thesis leaves little choice.

It might be thought that the historical thesis could be distilled to the proposition that the rules of a sports contest ensure a testing of the relative abilities of the participants. The proposition seems (roughly) true, but the proposed distillation of the historical thesis is questionable, since Fraleigh wants to invoke the historical purpose of a contest as a touchstone for determining whether players are making use of the rules of the contest in a morally correct way, i.e., so as to participate in a good sports contest. For instance, he views this purpose as inconsistent with trying to tie a football game in order to achieve a national rating (49); yet this plan is well within the rules of the game. So the purpose of the contest must be something distinct from the testing of abilities that the contest's rules permit, and it must not be explained simply by reference to the intentions of the participants. It is reasonable to suppose that one knows what this purpose is: it is the 'spirit' of the game. But Fraleigh's notion of the purpose of a sports contest does not help to clarify this familiar idea, but on the contrary it creates gratuitous obscurities. For instance, the familiar idea allows one to say that there is a peculiar spirit of baseball, which is different from the spirit of golf. But 'the purpose of the sports contest' carries the theoretical burden of transcending such differences. It buckles under the weight.

WESLEY E. COOPER
The University of Alberta

LEIGH S. CAUMAN, ISAAC LEVI, CHARLES D. PARSONS and ROBERT SCHWARTZ, eds. *How Many Questions?: Essays in Honour of Sidney Morgenbesser*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1983. Pp. 508. US\$30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-915145-59-6); US\$15.00 (paper: ISBN 0-915 145-58-8).

The thirty papers collected in this tribute to Sidney Morgenbesser range from a physicist's impressions on how science differs from philosophy to Putnam's latest thoughts on truth. But this diversity is apt: given Morgenbesser's own range, the answer to 'how many questions?' would be some very large number indeed. Regretably, there are too many questions addressed in this volume to permit comment on even most of them in this brief review.

Some of the essays concern questions that Morgenbesser has previously written on. Henry Kyburg discusses Morgenbesser's and Isaac Levi's paper 'Belief and Disposition,' and Frederic Schick, in 'An Indifferent Ass' explores the issue of Buridan's Ass that Morgenbesser and Edna Ullmann-Margalit discuss in 'Picking and Choosing.' A few of the papers are helpfully related to their authors' longer works. Levi, in 'Doubt, Context, and Inquiry' shows how the epistemological program he detailed in *The Enterprise of Knowledge* both derives from Dewey and differs from him. Fred Sommers condenses the theme of his book, *The Logic of Natural Language*, which is that a kind of Aristotelean traditional term logic rivals and has advantages over modern predicate logic. And Arthur Danto, in 'Towards a Retentative Materialism,' sketches a theory of philosophical psychology he promises to develop further. He argues against the Churchlands' brand of eliminative materialism on the grounds that we cannot eliminate the notion of representation, for even eliminative materialists have to represent themselves as something — in this case as non-representers.

Putnam's paper on truth is a clear, non-technical overview of recent debates on truth, and an attempt at a refutation of all versions of disquotationalist or Tarskian theories of truth. The truth predicate defined by Tarski, Putnam claims, in no way captures our intuitive notion of truth; disquotationalist accounts crucially leave out speaker's use and understanding of the language (40). These accounts must be supplemented, he suggests, with the claim that our understanding of a language consists in knowledge of assertability conditions. He distinguishes three senses in which 'assertability' may be taken here, and argues that each yields what he takes to be an exhibit in a 'philosophical horror show' (53) — a Skinnerian brand of behaviorism, a self-refuting cultural relativism, and solipsism.

Robert Nozick, in 'Simplicity As Fall-out,' questions the connection between simplicity and truth; that is, he questions the legitimacy of the use of simplicity as a criterion for deciding between rival underdetermined hypotheses and theories. After showing how the standard arguments for the connection go wrong, he tries to reinstate simplicity, not as a criterion of rationality, but as a fall-out of the proper method of inquiry. Although Peirce is not mentioned, Nozick resurrects a version of the 'method of tenacity,' which Peirce flatly rejected as a way of fixing belief. Nozick adopts the method because Putnam and others have noted that, *ceteris paribus*, it is better to believe a hypothesis that has been proposed before the data has been gathered, rather than an ad hoc one. Nozick adds that we tend to think of simpler hypotheses (relative to our conceptual scheme) early on in inquiry, and then he characterizes good inquiry as follows. We collect data D2 in

order to select among proposed hypotheses which are compatible with the initial data D1, and tentatively believe the surviving hypothesis. Either (A) these initial hypotheses were the simplest possible compatible with the initial data (D1), or (B) they were not, in which case there are simpler hypotheses that fit D1 + D2. If (A), then we already believe the simplest hypothesis that fits D1 + D2. If (B), then we formulate further hypotheses and gather more data, and believe the surviving hypothesis. The situation is now either like (A), or we loop back to (B). He concludes that we fail to get the simplest hypothesis only if there is an infinite sequence of simpler hypotheses. If it is true that we tend to think of simple hypotheses early on, and if Nozick's method of tenacity works, then his conclusion that we may be inductively warranted in using simplicity as a criterion for underdetermined theories is an important one. However, I have difficulty in seeing how his proposed inquiry machine can function. It seems that we would be hard pressed to know whether (A) or (B) obtains; we lack a clear criterion for determining the simplest possible hypothesis. So we will never know when to formulate new hypotheses and gather more data. Simplicity might fall out of his tenacious method of inquiry, but is this the appropriate method?

Of the many other papers that merit attention, I can mention only a few. Noam Chomsky ('Some Conceptual Shifts') gives a brief history and evaluation of the research program of generative grammar, outlining what he takes the major shifts of focus to be. In two concise pieces, Nelson Goodman ('Fiction For Five Fingers') and Israel Scheffler ('Four Questions of Fiction') analyse the notion of fictive discourse. Goodman looks at fiction from the perspective of his carefully constructed theory of signs and art, and Scheffler adds to Goodman's claim — that fiction can be metaphorically true — the claim that it escapes the charge of meaninglessness. And Ernest Nagel, in 'On Three Arguments for Natural Law,' examines H.L.A. Hart's and John Rawls' arguments for basing positive law on natural rights.

The volume does have more than its share of typographical errors, and the errata sheet contains a missing bibliography for Chomsky's piece, and a note that two pages of James Walsh's 'Justice and the Virtues: A Medieval Problem' have been reversed. But whatever your philosophical concerns, there is sure to be something here that will interest you. And only Goodman's piece has been previously published. Philosophy aside, the book is worthwhile if only for Johnathan Lieberman's autobiographical sketch of Morgenbesser, which brings out both his endearing personal and engaging philosophical style. As any connoisseur of Morgenbesser-stories will attest, Lieberman has included some of the best. This introduction, along with a bibliography of Morgenbesser's published works, and a portrait on the cover make a fine tribute. Unity in the collection is provided by the fact that all of the contributors have been touched by Morgenbesser as teacher, student, or friend; distinctions which tend to blur in his case. For those fortunate enough to know him, the Festschrift will provide extra pleasure.

CHERYL MISAK
Balliol College, Oxford

GILLES DELEUZE. *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press 1983. Pp. xiv + 221. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-231-05668-0.

Hugh Tomlinson's translation of Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy* gives to English readers an opportunity to come to terms with a work that has already had an impact on European intellectual history. The book will find its widest audience among readers concerned with current radical thought. Deleuze writes as a critic of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, charging that neither offers a viable basis for a truly radical critique of history. This thesis is forcefully presented and promises to breathe yet more life into the debate between the economic and psychological determinists of our age.

Deleuze's book will find a narrower audience among students of Nietzsche. Of major interest to them will be its highly systemic treatment of Nietzschean doctrine. Everything in it, Deleuze claims, is organized along two axes of thought. One has to do with the notion of active and reactive forces. To this axis Deleuze attaches all of Nietzsche's doctrines on resentment, nihilism, and the reversal of values. The second axis has to do with the notion of willing, and to it Deleuze attaches what he sees to be the conceptually related doctrines of eternal return and the will to power. The two axes are joined by the principle that only active agents return.

This set of theses is worth reading for the case it makes for the unity of Nietzsche's position. Yet there is much in it that is dubious. It treats Nietzsche as an 'untimely philosopher' whose only predecessors were the pre-Socratics and Spinoza. The apparent motive for this a-historical approach is to protect Nietzsche from possible charges of having been contaminated by 'reactive forces' endemic to Western thought. The result is that Deleuze is blind to the point that there is far more of Plato than of Calicles in Nietzsche's work and far more of Plotinus, Augustine, Kant, and Schopenhauer than of Spinoza. He also exaggerates Nietzsche's view of the importance of psychology. He treats resentment as if it were a mental disease that has simply infected the race, failing to acknowledge that Nietzsche's explanations for our mental traits are characteristically political and social. Even the crucial distinction between 'active' and 'reactive' men is precarious. The 'reactive' man is for Deleuze the nihilist; the 'active' man in contrast affirms life. Yet Nietzsche says of the 'reactive' ascetic priest that he belongs to the really great *affirmative* forces of life. (*Genealogy of Morals*, III, 13) The treatment Deleuze gives to the doctrine of eternal return is also unsatisfying. He claims that doctrine has nothing to do with the cyclical return of identical states. Rather it is to be understood in terms of what happens during a single throw of a pair of dice. The world, with its waves and winds, is the backboard of chance against which the dice are thrown; they then fall back — return — onto the eternal sky whose constellations engrave forever the number thrown. None of Deleuze's reasons for rejecting a cyclical view of Nietzsche's doctrine is decisive. He cites no passages to show that Nietzsche himself rejected such a view, and he gives short shrift — one footnote only — to those he acknowledges as being ap-

parently incompatible with his reading. That reading is also obscure. Why, for instance, only those dice that affirm or are affirmed fall back is left unclear. It is, too, implausible, for it makes eternal return the product of the will to power. There are plentiful reasons to think otherwise, one being that for Nietzsche the thought of eternal return disciplines the will.

Deleuze's work remains, nonetheless, an important study. It will not be the last word on Nietzsche. It is too protective and too implausible to go unchallenged. Still, in its critique of Marxist thought and in its systemic treatment of Nietzsche it has already helped to set the terms of the debates to come for both its audiences.

JERRY S. CLEGG

Mills College

HUBERT L. DREYFUS, ed. *Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive Science*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1982. Pp. vi + 360. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-262-04065-4.

Dreyfus has gathered an excellent selection of articles clarifying the nature of Husserlian phenomenology. His thesis in the introduction is that Husserl put the concept of intentionality at the centre of cognitive investigation, and his painstaking analysis of it and of related concepts in logic, linguistics, and psychology make him the father of current research in cognitive science and artificial intelligence.

Dagfinn Føllesdal opens the 'Historical Background' section with a lucid account of the way in which Husserl fleshed-out Brentano's theories of intentionality and perception. Husserl improved upon his master by drawing a much sharper distinction between what is, and what is not, reducible to a structure of consciousness.

Jerry Fodor (Dreyfus' state-of-the art cognitive scientist whose article closes the anthology) characterizes psychological theories in terms of this distinction, and he makes an absolute mind/not-mind distinction an axiom of his own theory. On his 'computational' (because a computer is an adequate analogue) model of mind, psychology is limited to the study of mental processes and their (mental) objects. This is in contrast to the majority view, a view characterized as the 'representational' theory of mind, in which psychology is conceived of as the study of organism/environment relations.

In the article following Føllesdal's, J.N. Mohanty ensures that Husserl rather than Frege is credited with the objectivist theory of consciousness. The theory is objectivist in that it, like Fodor's theory, is radically non-empirical. It takes no account of 'what there is' in the extra-mental world.

A very helpful article by Aron Gurwitsch opens the section on 'Basic Concepts and Theories.' He explains how constitutive phenomenology just *is* a theory of intentionality, and how Husserl's analysis of intentionality led to a re-thinking of the notions of subjectivity and objectivity.

Then follows Føllesdal's famous account of 'Husserl's Notion of Noema.' (The previous publication of this and of some other small portions of the text is nowhere acknowledged.) Føllesdal establishes a very strong relation between 'intentionality' and 'intensionality,' a necessary pre-condition for a formalist approach to cognitive psychology. He also indirectly helps us to understand the relationship between Husserl's theory of intentionality and the theory of intentionality which underpins John Searle's theory of speech acts. (Searle is Dreyfus' characteristic representationalist.) This he does by sketching the general relationship between noemata and linguistic meanings.

Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith *identify* Husserl's linguistic meanings (*Bedeutungen*) with noematic meanings (*Sinne*) in the next article, further clarifying the relation between 'intention' and 'intension.' This important article also gives us a deeper understanding of why phenomenology lends itself so nicely to an 'analytic' treatment.

A brief account by Føllesdal of 'Husserl's Theory of Perception' leads into a profound discussion by Dreyfus of the idea of the perceptual noema, a notion in Husserl's writing which is sufficiently ambiguous to lend support to either a representational or a computational cognitive theory. To Dreyfus' discomfit, Husserl in fact comes down on the computationalist's side. Although Dreyfus is dissatisfied with Gurwitsch's attempt to remedy this, to de-transcendentalize Husserl and to assure us that the mind traffics with reality, he does not offer an alternative account of his own.

There follows an article on temporal awareness by Izchak Miller illustrating how Husserlian intentionality works and indirectly inclining us further in Fodor's direction. Howsoever carefully we analyze the notion of a perceptual act, no feature emerges which will warrant affirming referential transparency. (Fodor of course is committed to referential opacity.)

In 'Husserl's Theory of the Pure Ego,' Douglas Heinsen argues that Husserl's 'pure ego' is a theoretical construct free of metaphysical bias. We see later that Fodor had similar reasons for opting for a cybernetic model of mind.

This non-metaphysical character of Husserl's model is further emphasized by Harrison Hall in 'Was Husserl a Realist or Idealist.' The answer is of course 'no.' He was an 'epistemological,' meaning 'methodological,' idealist. His methodological solipsism, like Jerry Fodor's, is a research strategy in the service of very definite and restricted aims. Hall's argument is not original — indeed it was urged against his own earlier work on Husserl's solipsism. But it is certainly correct and is crucial for a right understanding of phenomenology.

The section on 'Contemporary Relevance' begins with an ingenious argument by David Woodruff Smith that Husserl's doctrine of 'essentially occasional expressions' constitutes a precise theoretical foundation for David Kaplan's theory of demonstratives, and that it has strong affinities with the work of Keith Donnellan and Saul Kripke on names. Showing that and why Husserl's theory of meaning lacks room for a consideration of particulars supports a model of mind with referential opacity and hence with a concern for types, as in the computational model.

Ronald McIntyre, in 'Intending and Referring,' takes the contrary position. Whereas Smith read Husserl as moving beyond a theory of reference based on definite descriptions, McIntyre reads him as still very much tied to it. Husserl's views are *supplanted* by those of Donnellan, Kripke and Putnam rather than being similar to them. The problem here is that Smith bases his interpretation on the *Logical Investigations* which does not have anything like an Identifying Description theory, whereas McIntyre bases his on *Ideas* and even more so on Føllesdal's work which better lends itself to such a reading. But McIntyre jeopardizes his position by giving short shrift to Husserl's thoughts on 'indefinite,' 'confused,' 'vague,' etc. intending. In any case, if McIntyre is right in objecting that Husserl's model of intentionality cannot explain 'the actual involvement of consciousness with the existing reality in which it, in fact, lives' (231), his argument would count against Fodor as well. But is it legitimate to ask for an explanation of this sort?

In his article on possible worlds semantics, Mohanty clearly sides with Smith. Hintikka's semantics lacks explanatory power because it fails to illuminate the actual. It is, on Mohanty's view, an injustice for Hintikka to give a possible worlds semantics interpretation of Husserl. Hintikka's response: he has read Husserl aright and they concur on the nature of intentionality. Hintikka has the edge in the argument. Husserl did not characterize phenomenology as 'philosophy of possibility' for nothing. Mohanty has to make him out to be even more of a Kantian than he is to prevent the identification of intentionality and intensionality.

In the final section, 'Recent Parallels,' John Searle attacks with simplicity and vigour the view that intentionality is to be identified with intensionality. Intentional states are essentially representational. Moreover, to understand an intention is to know what its conditions of satisfaction are. The solution to the problem of meaning involves, *inter alia*, an account of how the mind intentionally transfers the 'condition of satisfaction of expressed psychological states to the external physical entity' (274). Not surprisingly, he does not work out the solution in this article.

Fodor's view, in 'Methodological Solipsism as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology,' is that it cannot be done. For contingent, pragmatic reasons, which he chronicles, we do not have the requisite information about extra-mental objects to make the representational model work. We are thus constrained to adopt the computational model, despite the fact that it has unsavoury features of its own.

While not mentioned, the parallelism between Fodor and Husserl is obvious. Fodor's systematic ascesis of reference to semantic properties of cognitive data corresponds in important respects to the phenomenological epoché. The resulting methodological solipsism is very like Husserl's own methodological solipsism, a term which is but a compacted synonym for his transcendental idealism.

There are problems with Fodor's position, especially with his superficial attention to the endemic evils of methodological solipsism. He believes Putnam invented the term, and seems ignorant of its precedents in Husserl, Dreisch, and Carnap. But he is likely right that a formalist model of mind is necessary for a scientific psychology, just as Husserl is possibly right in thinking that a transcendental theory of consciousness is necessary for a 'scientific' philosophy. If this brand of research in cognitive science continues to prosper, transcendental idealism might become fashionable again.

In sum, this is fascinating and controversial material. Dreyfus' argument for the relevance of Husserl's work is too well worked out to be ignored. He will not likely convince anyone that Husserl somehow *caused* what is going on at MIT these days, but he might persuade people to read the work of someone who devoted 50 years to intense philosophical analysis of similar problems.

M.M. VAN DE PITTE
The University of Alberta

I. HACKING. *Representing and Intervening: Introductory Essays in the Philosophy of Natural Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983. Pp. xv + 287. US\$11.95. ISBN 0-521-28246-2.

After identifying rationality and realism as the two main topics in the philosophy of science, Hacking says in his introduction that the remainder of the book addresses the latter. (But he also says that the two are so intertwined that 'To fix on one is not to exclude the other.' [2]) For Hacking there are two distinct parts to realism: one thesis concerns a stance towards the truth of theories; and the other, towards the existence of 'theoretical entities': 'Realism about theories says that theories aim at the truth, and sometimes get close to it. Realism about entities says that the objects mentioned in theories should really exist' (x). He is a realist with respect to entities, but not with

respect to theories. He 'suspects there can be no final argument for or against realism at the level of [theories]' (31).

These components of realism are the subjects of the main parts of the book: *Representing* is about the status of theories; and *Intervening* is about experimentation, a subject wrongly neglected by philosophers of science. Sandwiched between is a section entitled *Break*: it is described in the extremely handy analytical table of contents as 'an anthropological fantasy about ideas of reality and representation' (xii).

Here I focus on two topics, Hacking's 'entity realism' and his views about the disunity of science. In so doing I neglect other important issues. For example, his 'argument of the grid' is devastating to those such as van Fraassen who wish both to avoid being skeptics and to establish the limits of observability at the limits of human perception.

1. Entity Realism — Although *Representing* deals primarily with theories, some of Hacking's views about entities are revealed. There is an anecdote in which an experimental scientist is discussing an investigation of quarks, and remarks that the experimental effects can be enhanced if a portion of the apparatus is sprayed with electrons. Hacking reports that, 'From that day forth I've been a scientific realist [with respect to entities]. *So Far as I'm concerned, if you can spray them then they are real*' (23). The ability to employ 'theoretical' entities as tools or instruments in investigating other effects and processes should convince one that the 'theoretical entities' are indeed real.

One may be tempted to argue in this way: consider a biologist who claims to have isolated a sprayable factor that induces 'philosophical wisdom' — a PW factor; it doesn't follow that there is such an entity; what we need in addition is evidence that the entity has the properties and produces the causal effects hypothesised of it. But then our commitment to the existence of PW, and of course to electrons and all other 'theoretical entities,' appears to hinge on or at least be tied up with the truth of hypotheses and theories.

The problem is of course that we are dealing merely with a slogan. In the second half of the book, on *Intervening*, Hacking unpacks his claims; sprayability alone does not establish the existence of 'theoretical entities.' He too seems to be relying on the demonstrable causal efficacy of such entities and on our ability to predict correctly their behavior.

Does this mean, as our hypothetical objector suggests, that Hacking's entity realism actually requires a realistic stance towards the truth of theories? It seems to me that Hacking has to make concessions on this point.

In spite of this criticism, I believe that entity realism is on the right track. But I would recast the position somewhat by focussing on an often mentioned but seldom examined feature of science, namely its being a network. Virtually everyone uses the network imagery but few actually examine it. My point is that what anchors our commitment to the existence of an entity is the quantity and quality of its connections with other portions of our knowledge network.

Consider for example the status of the molecular structure of a prevalent chemical, pentachlorophenol, a powerful biocide used primarily as a wood preservative. The theoretical structure attributed to it — 5 chlorine atoms stuck on a phenol ring — plays a role in the detection, tracing, and analysis of the material. Toxicology, spectroscopy, immunology, biochemistry, and enzymology are some of the disciplines for which the 'theoretical' structure is directly relevant. It is of course true that there are alternative characterizations which could 'save the phenomena,' but vast portions of our conceptual scheme would have to be jettisoned, as well as innumerable 'theoretical' entities that have a far greater claim to reality than is conveyed by philosophically abstract and isolated contemplation of quarks and black holes would suggest.

II. *Disunity of Science* — Unlike the previous issue, *disunity* is not an announced topic and there is no section devoted explicitly to it. Still, Hacking presents three argument sketches suggesting that science is and/or should be disunified.

a) He says that there 'is at most a monotonic increase in knowledge': but he denies that an increase amounts to 'convergence.' The suggestion is that some have inferred convergence from increase. That does indeed seem wrong. On the other hand, increase is compatible with convergence so there is no argument here *for disunity*.

b) Hacking discusses an example — presented by Shapere — in which collecting neutrinos provides information about the interior of the sun:

The theory of the neutrino and its interactions is almost completely independent of speculations about the core of the sun. It is precisely the disunity of science that allows us to observe (deploying one massive batch of theoretical assumptions) another aspect of nature (about which we have an unconnected bunch of ideas). (183)

There are problems with this view. First, he is illegitimately assimilating 'independence' to 'disunity.' 'Independence' does not seem to entail disunity or, if it does, only a weak sort of disunity.

Second, it is not that clear just how independent these things are. Hacking himself has several fascinating sections on physical constants. He discusses, for example, least square adjustments, a method in which relationships among physical constants from disparate fields are exploited to get the best overall fit with measurements. In this approach one begins with 'independent' measurements but there is also an obvious and important sense in which there is unity: all the constants are related to one another and we go with the best overall fit. (This of course is not to deny the notorious difficulties encountered in finding a unified field theory.)

Third, what is characterized as disunity may really be science coming to grips with the demise of the isolated system. For several hundred years physical scientists have been able to fragment the universe into convenient

isolated systems and pursue their studies relatively independently. What we are seeing today, especially when we call upon scientists to give practical advice in the policy sphere — e.g., about the risks associated with pentachlorophenol — is that it is devilishly hard to knit those fragments together. I suppose this indicates a kind of disunity, but I'm not clear about the philosophical implications which should be drawn.

c) Finally, there is the problem of incompatible models. Hacking quotes a physics textbook in which three incompatible models are employed. He remarks: 'Three models, at most one of which could (in logic) be true of the physical world, are used indifferently and interchangeably in a particular problem' (216).

I again have three comments. Firstly, there are undoubtedly many cases in which incompatible models are employed. However for many of these we have little incentive to reconcile the disparities.

Secondly, in some instances where attempts have been made, results have been extremely important: the case of black body radiation and the advent of quantum theory is an obvious example. The issue here is at least partly methodological. One could still urge 'Seek unification' as the scientists' motto.

Finally, Hacking's mention of the logical inconsistency of models and his 'Argentine fantasy' prompt some reflection. The 'Argentine fantasy' goes like this:

God did not write a Book of Nature of the sort that the old Europeans imagined. He wrote a Borgesian library, each book of which is as brief as possible, yet each book of which is inconsistent with every other. No book is redundant. For every book, there is some humanly accessible bit of Nature such that that book, and no other, makes possible the comprehension, prediction and influencing of what is going on. (219)

That fantasy and the remark about logically inconsistent models brings to my mind, *quantum logic*. But I will ignore my fantasy and note that we have moved from speaking about the disunity of science to talking about the disunity of the universe. Of course if there is an intelligible and discoverable sense in which the universe is disunified, then we would be foolish to seek unification in the old sense. However characterizing the disunity may well provide the foundations for a new unity. Thus, on one hand 'Seek unity' seems a good thing for scientists to do when their tutored intuitions suggest it is worth attempting. On the other hand study of discovered disunity seems advisable. I see no grounds for singing the praises of a New Disunification Church or Movement.

In the preface Hacking says that 'Introductory topics should be clear enough and serious enough to engage a mind to whom they are new, and also abrasive enough to strike sparks off those who have been thinking about

these things for years' (xv). He surely succeeds. Students new to the field will be engaged and older hands are certain to smolder.

E. LEVY

University of British Columbia

GEORGE R. LUCAS, Jr. *The Genesis of Modern Process Thought: a historical outline with bibliography*. ATLA Bibliography Series, No. 7. Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press and The American Theological Library Association 1983. Pp. 231. US\$18.50. ISBN 0-8018-1589-3.

Process philosophy can be variously defined. For the purposes of *Process Studies*, we define it both narrowly and stipulatively 'as applying primarily, though not exclusively, to the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and his intellectual associates, most notably Charles Hartshorne.' Lucas, with his descriptive and historical interests, needs a broader definition generalizing three characteristic features of the Whiteheadian approach. Process Philosophy '(1) stresses that events or occasions of experience form the primary ontology ...; (2) employs a modified form of teleological explanation that is both pluralistic and organic ...; and (3) discerns some sort of immanent pattern or principle of organization which is generally exhibited in all processes of change ...' (10). In charting affinities based on these characteristics, Lucas proposes Hegel as the first process thinker, though acknowledging him to be at the opposite extreme from Whitehead. With Hegel as its source and Whitehead its focus, process philosophy broadly construed embraces evolutionary cosmology, pragmatism, realism, and personalism.

The subtitle correctly indicates the limits of this study: it is an outline history of process philosophy broadly construed with a partially annotated bibliography of some 942 items. It is not primarily a bibliography of Whitehead and Hartshorne, though some 171 items are noted under this heading, while the closing Bibliography of bibliographical sources indicates where the appropriate bibliographies can be found. Nor is it a bibliography of process theology, tracing out its modes and styles. The study is designed for those who want to see process philosophy against a broader context, to find out where it might have come from, who want the literature of this broader movement, and some sort of guide to this literature. Thus the book is organized in terms of eight bibliographies, one each of each school represented, and

secondary bibliographies of cross-classifications. There is some duplication, since some items are mentioned under several headings. Some items (books or articles) are annotated, others not. These annotations may be purely descriptive, but they are often evaluative, sometimes provocative. Some can be misleading if thought to apply to the entire work cited, whereas Lucas is interested only in that part most pertinent to the issue at hand. (Thus #391 discusses only pp. 56-61 of my book, *The Lure of God*.)

The few pages introducing part IV on Pragmatism and Realism were particularly stimulating. Lucas shows the affinities between process Thinkers and the major pragmatists if we bracket the issue of pragmatic method, which is not particularly a process feature. The career of realism in reaction to idealism is sketched as it moves through critical realism to what A.E. Murphy calls 'objective relativism,' which he finds in Whitehead.

The varieties of idealism and 'English' Hegelianism (i.e., those British and American philosophers strongly influenced by Hegel) are stressed, for it is among the variety that process themes can be found. McTaggart and F.H. Bradley, often taken to define English Hegelianism, were hardly process thinkers.

The evolutionary cosmologists (from Lamarck to Alexander, Bergson, Teilhard de Chardin and others) bear in many ways the closest affinities with Whitehead, yet it is a very striking fact that Whitehead had very little to say about evolution, except in the short book, *The Function of Reason* (1929). I suspect there are two good reasons for this: (1) Whitehead was interested not so much in process as in the metaphysical (and unchanging) principles of process. These principles could not evolve, because whatever evolves would be of subordinate, contingent importance. (2) His most distinctive characteristics are derived from a metaphysical generalization from experience, known only first-hand in human experience, not from any induction and extrapolation from the findings of the natural and biological sciences.

In his concluding comments Lucas finds a 'heuristic fallacy' in process metaphysics. Since natural science finds it useful to reason as if there were purpose in biological explanation, process thinkers have extrapolated this into a role for purpose in the entire cosmos. I am not certain this 'heuristic fallacy' applies to Whitehead, because of (2) above. Empirical science, insofar as it is based on the purely objective factors of our experience, considers only that which is past. There is no purpose in the past, according to Whitehead's principles, because present purposes have been satisfied. This does not mean, however, that purpose is not part of immediate, present experience. It certainly is of our experience, and this element can be metaphysically generalized.

In sum, this a fine guide to the literature surrounding 'process rationalism,' Lucas' name for process philosophy taken narrowly. I find this designation unfortunate, for this slights Whitehead's intentions to be both rationalistic and empirical. It also excludes those who consider themselves as process empiricists. Bernard Meland is included under other categories, but

Bernard Loomer and William Dean are missing. To classify them as purely theologians draws the line much too narrowly.

Perhaps the best way to use this guide is to read through the introductory sections to get a sense of how Lucas organizes this literature, sample some of the annotations, then place on the shelf as a ready reference, available whenever one is ready to study some portion thereof.

LEWIS S. FORD

Old Dominion University

EDWARD POLS. *The Acts of Our Being*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press 1982. Pp. vii + 239. US\$20.00. ISBN 0-87023-354-8.

The modes of explanation utilized by recent and contemporary action-theory have always seemed oddly out of step with the full-blown phenomenon of human action. Pols's *The Acts of Our Being* seeks to dissolve this troubling mismatch of philosophic explicans and explicandum by turning the problem on its head. Pols's strategy is to make the 'prima facie rational agent' an explanatory *starting-point*. This deceptively simple manoeuvre has the effect of circumventing the usual dilemma of action-theory: how to conceive the long-familiar but enduringly puzzling nexus between 'mental' states or events (intentions) and 'physical' states or events (behavior). Pols is able to avoid this dilemma because he holds the prima facie rational agent to be *ontologically* prior to any supposed distinction between the mental and the physical. It can be seen from this that Pols's purpose is beyond edification or therapy; he has not only let the Wittgensteinian fly out of the bottle, but has taught the fly to see exactly *where* the bottle is situated.

As the structure of Pols's argument is important, it is well initially to follow him chapter by chapter. In the first chapter, entitled 'The Question of the Authenticity of Responsibility,' Pols shows that prima facie rational agents are presupposed by our ordinary ways of thinking and speaking; we simply assume from the start that we thoughtfully produce our own actions and remain in some sense responsible for them. Respect and other important moral phenomena are based on this root presupposition. Thus the prima facie rational agent has 'explanatory value' with respect to all of the phenomena which presuppose it. Indeed, the prima facie rational agent is the 'ontological

ground' of these phenomena simply because they can be made intelligible only on the basis of it (3).

The authenticity of the rational agent *consists* in our ordinary taking-seriously of the *prima facie* or macro-phenomenal features of actions. By contrast, most recent and contemporary work in the philosophy of action involves a reduction of the macro-phenomenal features of acts to 'infrastructures' or micro-phenomenal features such as the mathematically describable behavior of physical particles (18-19). In this regard Pils's tack is not to disregard the scientific micro-phenomena, but only to notice that the macro-phenomena lose their significance in the reduction to micro-phenomena. But the converse is not the case; the micro-phenomena may retain whatever *scientific* integrity they require while the *prima facie* rational agent is still taken to be the basic and irrefragable unit of philosophical analysis (22). Pils is thereby able both to 'save the appearances' (the macro-phenomena) while still allowing scientific investigation full play at the level of the infrastructures (although *only* at that level).

The second chapter, 'The Metaphysical Conditions of Ontic Responsibility,' points out that our moral, social, and legal senses of 'responsibility' presuppose a basic 'ontic responsibility' (26). Ontic responsibility is the ability of an agent to produce actions, to be able to have done otherwise than it has in fact done, and to act on the basis of reasons and not merely causes. It is important to note that ontic responsibility does not necessarily belong only to human beings. Thus like Kant, Pils is able to give an account of responsibility which is metaphysical and not merely anthropological. There are, Pils holds, at least nine metaphysical conditions of ontic responsibility. These delineate what is presupposed when we think of a *prima facie* agent as 'responsible' in the ordinary, concrete way.

The third chapter, 'The Foundation Question Reopened,' develops an interesting realist epistemology as a foundation for the metaphysical claims advanced in chapter two. Though Pils explicitly repudiates the idea that his epistemology is phenomenological, it nevertheless has much in common with a Husserlian or Heideggerian 'return to things themselves.' Pils describes an 'ineluctable circle' of *prima facie* knowledge of phenomena, and reflection on this knowledge. Pils especially contrasts his outlook with recent philosophy of language; for Pils, language is fundamentally posterior to an original pre-linguistic engagement with things. The fact that this pre-linguistic engagement is later expressible in language does not argue against its priority to language. Language is cognitively but not ontologically essential.

The fourth chapter, 'The Conditions Fulfilled: A Reflexive Vindication,' completes the essential cycle of the book's argument. It returns to the topic of action with the metaphysical and epistemological tools developed in the earlier chapters. Pils here analyzes an action in accordance with his principles, and shows how the *prima facie* rational action illustrates the various conditions of ontic responsibility. Here Pils is particularly careful to use as his exemplary action *his own writing of this book*. The choice is significant, for it highlights by contrast an important weakness in most analyses of action.

The 'actions' chosen as examples in much recent action-theory — such as flicking on a light switch, or raising an arm — are partial, rather abstract, and contextually obtuse. The mere raising of an arm is in an important sense *not* an action but rather the shard of an action. The paradigmatic cases of *prima facie* rational action are those occurring in an intersubjective, human, culturally significant setting. Such acts are 'foundational' in the sense that all of our experience arises out of them and can be interpreted only by reference to them (138-9).

The final chapters of the book, though by no means unimportant or uninteresting, belong to an epicycle of the book's central argument. There are perhaps various ways in which one could criticize *The Acts of Our Being*. There are weak joints, for instance, in the brevity and unclarity of Pols's epistemology (esp. 93-6); in his misunderstanding of phenomenology (61, 133); and in the rather abrupt introduction of transcendental Being (211-12). But these are relatively minor issues. What seems more important is a fundamental unclarity in the crucial notion of the *prima facie*. Pols distinguishes adequately between the *prima facie* and scientific understanding of phenomena. But he does not distinguish between the *commonsensical* and *philosophical* understanding of the *prima facie*. Husserl handles this rather well with a distinction between the 'natural' and 'transcendental' attitudes towards phenomena. For Husserl (in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic* at least) both of these attitudes are non-scientific. Pols is in danger of always being misunderstood by those who accept his distinction between the scientific viewpoint and the *prima facie*, but who will interpret the *prima facie* as merely equivalent to ordinary, commonsensical modes of thought and speech — and forever fail to see its role as an 'ontically significant appearance.' After all, if there had not been a long-standing confusion between the commonsensical and philosophical understanding of the *prima facie*, Pols's book would not have had to be written.

This criticism aside, however, it can be said that Pols's book is of very high quality. It lays bare what appear to be the basic issues in any philosophical account of human action. One can now only hope that it will enjoy the privilege of every good philosophical work: to be widely read and discussed.

ROBERT HANNA
Yale University

JEAN-DOMINIQUE ROBERT. *Essai d'approches contemporaines de Dieu*. Paris: Beauchesne, Bibliothèque des Archives de philosophie, Nouvelle série 38, 1982. 480 p. ISBN 2-7010-1051-9.

La tâche qui m'incombe est ardue. Comment, en effet, faire, en quelques pages, un compte rendu d'une œuvre immense et si dense, fruit de longues années de réflexion? Elle l'est d'autant plus que cet essai est précédé d'une pénétrante introduction de J. Ladrière, laquelle a présenté non seulement le caractère spécifique de la démarche et ses articulations majeures mais aussi son sens philosophique dans le monde contemporain face aux croyants et aux incroyants.

Le point de départ de cet essai est la situation créée par l'athéisme contemporain. Quelle est la différence entre l'athéisme contemporain et l'athéisme qui l'a précédé immédiatement?

Il faut d'abord dire que l'athéisme est essentiellement un phénomène post-chrétien engendré par le rôle prépondérant que le christianisme a joué au cours de l'histoire et dans la culture de l'Occident. 'Si la foi est le pari que Dieu est, l'athéisme est le pari inverse' (J.J. Natanson cité par l'auteur, 213). Si l'affirmation que Dieu est entendu au sens absolu, sa négation prend un sens encore plus absolu, sans parler de la passion qui les soutient l'une et l'autre. La culture et la pensée modernes aboutissent au XIXe siècle à cet antagonisme absolu: 'pour' ou 'contre Dieu.' En ce sens, l'athéisme en question était en réalité un anti-théisme. Pour quelqu'un qui provient d'une autre culture, même s'il est capable de vivre du dedans et de regarder du dehors la culture occidentale, cet antagonisme absolu lui paraît comme un phénomène étrange. Comment peut-on attacher tant de passion à ce 'quelque chose' qui dépasse de loin notre rationalité discursive, notre sentir et notre appareil langagier? 'Ce dont nous avons peut-être le plus besoin à présent — après une saine et indispensable phase de démystification générale —, c'est d'une démystification *de la démystification elle-même*, en vue de la 'désabsolutiser' à son tour, et de la *relativiser* comme il se doit' (35). Or, je constate que la 'désabsolutisation' et la 'relativisation' dont parle l'auteur se sont déjà opérées en cette fin du XXe siècle et cela par rien d'autre que ce que Heidegger appelle la technicité. Il suffit de voir que nous vivons dans un monde où la plupart des gens ne sont ni pour ni contre Dieu, ils ne s'en intéressent tout simplement pas. C'est maintenant que le terme 'a-thée' re-prend son plein sens étymologique, comme en témoigne un texte du théologien, H. Vorgrimler, cité par l'auteur: 'Comme hypothèse permettant d'expliquer le monde, pour la solution des situations catastrophiques et pour l'humanisation progressive de l'humanité, Dieu est inutile, et donc manifestement "inutilisable"' (247/8). J'aime bien cette expression 'inutile' et 'inutilisable.' Car la 'désabsolutisation' et la 'relativisation' opérées par la technicité entraînent comme conséquences non seulement la disparition du sens du divin et l'oubli de l'Etre (selon Heidegger) mais également la disparition progressive des dimensions du vrai, du bien et du beau. La seule dimension qui reste aujourd'hui est celle de l'utile et de l'efficacité.

Voilà une situation dont l'auteur est parfaitement conscient. C'est pourquoi pour faire un essai d'approche contemporaine de Dieu, il faut d'abord retrouver les dimensions de l'expérience 'authentique' et dans l'intégralité de l'existence humaine. Je ne suis pas du tout étonné de l'insistance de

l'auteur sur l' 'expérience métaphysique originale' et sur l' 'expérience esthétique.' Car il s'agit de trouver un terrain propice à une 'spiritualité vivante.'

L'auteur a longuement analysé d'une manière critique l'ontothéologie de Heidegger (Partie I, ch. IV, II, III). Vu la longueur, je n'ai pas l'intention de faire un résumé de la problématique. Je voudrais simplement 'extrapoler' un concept cher à Heidegger, celui de la 'pré-compréhension.' On sait que pour ce dernier, la 'pré-compréhension' est liée à la structure même de l'être humain, à la 'Befindlichkeit' et au 'Entwurf,' c'est-à-dire à 'être-en-situation et au 'projet' de l'être humain, ce qui implique déjà la temporalité. Pour lui, la 'pré-compréhension' précède ainsi toute compréhension (Verstehen) considérée comme une forme du pouvoir-être (Seinkönnen) de l'être humain. Son disciple, H.G. Gadamer, en développant ces idées, va plus loin et aboutit à l'idée de 'Vorurteil' qu'on traduit en français par le terme 'préjugé' (*Vérité et méthode*, p. 103). Et si l'on considère le 'Vorurteil' comme condition même de la compréhension (Verstehen), on aboutit ainsi à un tout autre sens de la compréhension que Gadamer exprime par la phrase suivante: 'Le comprendre lui-même doit être considéré moins comme une action de la subjectivité que comme une insertion dans le procès (sic) de la transmission où se médient constamment le passé et le présent' (*Vérité et méthode*, p. 130). Cela implique non seulement la temporalité et l'historicité mais surtout la *tradition*. Envisagée de cette façon, la tradition ne représente pas simplement le passé d'une culture, elle contient un ensemble d'idées (concernant aussi bien la façon de penser et la pensée elle-même), si l'on préfère, un ensemble de 'pré-compréhensions' ou de 'préjugés,' qui se transmet, se met parfois en question et se renouvelle au cours de l'histoire, grâce à l'effort des individus. Façonné ainsi par la tradition, l'individu ne peut contribuer à l'œuvre de la transformation historique que dans une telle condition.

Or, toute tradition est liée à une culture. Ce qui veut dire que toute culture digne de ce nom possède un ensemble d'idées qui façonne les individus aussi bien dans leur expérience vécue que dans leur rationalité discursive et leur discours, et c'est de cette façon que les individus contribuent à la transformation culturelle. Précisément pour cette raison, ce qui paraît évident dans une culture, ne l'est pas pour autant dans une autre; ce qui va de soi dans l'une devient problématique dans l'autre. Je peux citer ici deux exemples: l'un concerne Dieu et le rapport entre l'homme et Dieu et l'autre concerne le langage. Pour le premier, les idées telles que transcendance et immanence de Dieu, création et créature, providence, Dieu-amour, salut personnel, dialogue avec Dieu personnel sous forme de 'je-tu' etc., sont sous-jacentes à tout engagement du refus ou de l'invocation. Et ces idées n'existaient pas, pour autant que je sache, ni dans l'Antiquité grecque ni dans la culture chinoise. Pour le second je cite la célèbre phrase par laquelle Wittgenstein a terminé le *Tractatus*: 'Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.' Cette phrase est devenue lapidaire pour la philosophie du langage occidentale, elle l'est moins si on l'envisage dans la tradition d'une autre culture. Car elle suppose deux types de 'pré-compréhension,' dont le premier concerne la

structure, la fonction et le domaine du langage et le second le fameux silence. Il est communément admis en Occident que le langage est un système de signes visibles qui expriment sémantiquement des significations. La différence qui existe entre la sémantique et le 'symbolique' dont l'auteur a fait une longue analyse réside, à mon sens, en ceci: c'est que dans le 'symbolique' l'aspect visible se rapporte à des significations et des valeurs que les signes linguistiques ne peuvent exprimer sémantiquement. Reste la question du fameux silence. Ce dernier est défini comme absence de l'aspect visible du langage ou du 'symbolique.' Comme telle, celle-ci ne peut rien exprimer ou signifier. Sinon, le meilleur discours ou la meilleure poésie serait une page blanche. Toutefois, on peut poser les questions suivantes: le silence peut-il jouer un rôle dans le langage esthétique? Est-il habilité à montrer, dans ce même langage, la présence réelle de l'invisible?

Si je fais cette longue mise au point concernant le rapport entre la tradition et la créativité, ce n'est pas pour critiquer un essai d'approche philosophique de Dieu qui s'inscrit d'emblée dans la tradition occidentale, du point de vue d'une autre culture; au contraire, c'est pour souligner deux aspects de cet essai auxquels son auteur n'a probablement même pas songé. L'auteur a souhaité que son cheminement philosophique puisse procurer au croyant 'un minimum de rationalité dans sa foi,' ce qui pourrait dépasser l'aporie du Dieu des philosophes et du Dieu d'Abraham et par là renouveler la conception du rapport entre la raison et la foi, et en même temps qu'il puisse montrer à l'incroyant qu' 'il n'est pas a priori déraisonnable ou 'non sens' de croire en Dieu.' Ce que je voudrais souligner c'est que 1) partant de l'expérience vécue de l'homme, dépassant sa finitude pour atteindre Dieu, cet essai rejoint (peut-être, sans que l'auteur s'en rende expressément compte) le terrain commun de tous ceux qui cherchent Dieu (naturellement une telle recherche peut revêtir des formes variées selon les cultures); 2) légitime et rationnellement fondé, cet essai peut aussi montrer les grandes articulations d'une religion particulière face aux autres dans le monde.

Expérience vécue, rationalité discursive et parole vivante, ces trois termes désignent à la fois le cadre d'approche philosophique de l'auteur et le cheminement de ce qu'il appelle 'une spiritualité vivante.' Qui dit cheminement, dit aussi étapes. Mais pour l'auteur il ne faut pas considérer ces étapes d'une manière mécanique, comme si une étape permet d'aboutir automatiquement à une autre, mais bien plutôt d'une manière dynamique, dans le sens que chaque étape comporte, de la part du sujet existentiel un 'libre choix' qui permet précisément d'entrevoir l'existence d'une autre étape. Voici comment l'auteur résume ce cheminement.

Le propre d'un cheminement authentique vers Dieu ..., c'est qu'il suppose et implique nécessairement l'*engagement* libre ... Le lecteur pourra dès lors se rendre compte de sa parenté avec les cheminements vers Dieu d'un Blondel et d'un Gabriel Marcel. Reconnaissons d'ailleurs ici la dette que nous avons à leur égard, même si la structure métaphysique explicite de notre approche de Dieu est, en tant que telle, directement inspirée par la pensée *thomassienne*. Elle est donc dominée ... par une vision de l'ESSE

comme 'acte-essentiellement dynamique,' par la perception équilibrée de la participation ... et par une théologie négative radicale qui vient dissiper les mirages et les brumes accumulés par certaines interprétations maladroites de l'analogie. (347)

Commençons par l'expérience vécue. Dominée par la technicité, celle-ci n'est pas toujours un terrain propice pour un cheminement vers Dieu. Des auteurs croyants (philosophes et théologiens) ont l'habitude de prendre comme point de départ le fait que l'homme a un 'besoin inné' de dépassement, il cherche un au-delà à son existence concrète dont il sent les limites. Il s'agit ici de la conscience de la finitude. On peut poser la question à savoir si le 'besoin inné' de dépassement nous fait sortir de la finitude. Cela ne me semble pas évident. Pour l'illustrer, il suffit de citer le cas de Nietzsche qui, partant du paradoxe que l'homme est à la fois marqué par la finitude et aspire à la plénitude, aboutit à l'idée de 'Selbstüberwindung' (dépassement constant de soi (Z.II)) et à la création par l'homme de 'Übermensch' (surhumain (Z.III)). C'est pourquoi l'auteur s'est efforcé d'abord de déterminer le terrain propice d'une 'spiritualité vivante.' Ce terrain, il le trouve non pas dans les caractères 'spontané,' 'immédiat' et 'quotidien' de l'expérience, mais dans la prise de conscience de l'existence intégrale comme 'don' et 'gratuité' (143) et par là comme 'dépendance' opérée dans cette dernière. (142)

Cette expérience de la gratuité de l'existence est donc à la naissance tant des approches spontanées de Dieu que dans les explicitations métaphysiques qui conduisent librement à Lui par des approches critiques et fondées, dans le sens fort du mot. Il y a là une communauté d'origine qu'il ne faut pas oublier. (143)

Le choix existentiel n'est jamais arbitraire, car il est en quelque sorte illuminé par la rationalité non pas discursive mais réflexivo-critique qui fait partie de l'existence intégrale. C'est précisément en raison de cette distanciation de soi à soi que l'engagement existentiel peut se faire dans le déchirement même de soi.

Si l'expérience vécue de l'existence intégrale implique déjà la rationalité réflexivo-critique, c'est là où l'on pose la question du sens de la vie que commence précisément la rationalité discursive ou la philosophie. Car le sens de la vie implique non seulement le questionnement mais aussi la recherche de l'origine, du fondement et de la finalité de la vie. Mais la philosophie qu'entend l'auteur n'est pas une simple affaire académique, ni, à proprement parler, une démonstration au sens où ce terme est employé dans les sciences dites formelles. S'appuyant sur la ressource conceptuelle, appelée la 'recherche métaphysique sous forme existentielle concrète' (176), elle veut exercer sa triple fonction critique: 1) mettre dans la clarté des concepts la genèse, la structure, la dynamique interne et la valeur de l'expérience vécue, 2) examiner le fondement de l'engagement existentiel et 3) surveiller la cohérence même de la démarche discursive. 'Dans une telle optique, le métaphysique

spontané et implicite se relie sans peine au métaphysique explicite, organisé de façon cohérente et critique.' (174)

La démarche philosophique pour aboutir à Dieu peut prendre plusieurs formes. Citons ici celle de s. Augustin et celle de s. Thomas. La première consiste à aboutir, par une disposition existentielle, à un Dieu-Lumière qui permet à l'homme de voir aussi bien la présence de Dieu en lui-même que dans les choses de l'univers comme 'bona,' 'vera' et 'pulchra.' La seconde, partant des choses existantes imparfaites, aboutit à 'ipsum esse subsistens,' moyennant la théologie négative et la participation et se fondant sur l'analogie de l'être. On aboutit ainsi à deux idées de Dieu: Dieu-Lumière et Dieu, Etre suprême.

Les philosophes croyants aiment bien discuter sur la question de savoir si la démarche philosophique permet d'aboutir à un Dieu personnel, à un Dieu-amour dans le dialogue 'je-tu,' c'est-à-dire à Dieu-Parole. L'auteur affirme que oui. La raison principale invoquée est que l'appel et la réponse qui constituent précisément le dialogue avec Dieu se trouve déjà dans l'expérience vécue et que la démarche philosophique ne fait que les expliciter. Quant à moi, tout en admettant le bien-fondé de l'argumentation de l'auteur, j'avoue que, ayant vécu à ma manière l'appel et la réponse, je suis toutefois étonné de cette familiarité que les chrétiens en Occident ont avec l'Absolu, car, comme l'a si bien exprimé M. Buber, le mot-principe 'je-tu' s'applique au rapport interhumain.

JOSEPH TCHAO

Université de Sherbrooke

STANLEY ROSEN. *Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1983. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-300-02964-0.

In a book that is both rich in analysis and stimulating in its conjectures, Stanley Rosen tackles the difficult task of giving a comprehensive interpretation of Plato's *Sophist* as a dramatic whole. Such an attempt is rare in these days when it is fashionable to pick out some interesting arguments from a Platonic dialogue for the purposes of more careful analysis, perhaps with the help of contemporary logic. Through a sort of methodological manifesto in his Prologue, Rosen makes it very clear that he considers such an 'analytic' approach to be mistaken. For instance, one basic error is to assume that a

predicationist logic that began with Aristotle can be applied without reservation to Plato's *Sophist*. Throughout his book, Rosen hammers away at this fundamental mistake (as he sees it), particularly when he takes on the leading analytic interpreters of Plato such as G.E.L. Owen and M. Frede. However, since he wants to be taken seriously by such people, Rosen does not want to be too closely associated with the Heideggerean school which he claims is not really interested in the dialogue form (5). In a brief footnote he makes an honorable exception of Hans-Georg Gadamer but, to my mind, he does not fully acknowledge his debt to the hermeneutical method of this outstanding representative of the heideggerean school. (Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Dialogue and Dialectic* [tr. P.C. Smith]. New Haven & London: Yale University Press 1980.) It seems to me that Gadamer has been doing for years what Rosen is now proposing to do under the newly-minted description of 'dramatic phenomenology' (12). When we get behind the jargon, what he is proposing is that we should consider the Platonic dialogue as a living drama of speech and deed, rather than as a transparent vehicle for technical arguments. This means that we should view the characters in a Platonic dialogue as being on the line, as it were, just as much as their arguments.

In general, I think that Rosen is making a daring effort to reconcile the so-called 'analytical' and 'phenomenological' approaches to reading a Platonic dialogue. It may sound like the formula for a confused hermeneutic but Rosen is enough of a Hegelian to believe that such an *Aufhebung* is possible. Thus, while devoting much of his attention to the arguments in the dialogue, he never loses sight of the characters who make the arguments. Indeed, his careful study of the dramatic difference between the characters in the *Sophist* leads Rosen to the startling claim that the Stranger intends to indict Socrates on the charge of sophistry. But Plato does not have the same intention, according to Rosen, because the technical arguments presented by the Stranger can be seen to fail. Now this is a rather controversial claim on Rosen's part, since it is very difficult to prove that Plato shares his view or that such technical failure would constitute a subtle defence of Socrates. In order to make this claim stick, Rosen must establish that the Stranger's technical arguments actually do fail and that this failure is planned by Plato so as to exonerate Socrates. Personally, I think that Rosen's claim becomes more intelligible if one looks at the chapter on 'The Whole' in his previous book entitled *The Limits of Analysis* (New York: Basic Books 1980). Here he cites a passage from the *Sophist* (233c10 ff.) to show Plato's awareness of the need to grasp the whole (or the original) as a context for dialectical analysis. For instance, if one 'hunts' the sophist by using only the technical method of division, as the Stranger does, then one is bound to fail for lack of an intuition of the true original of which the sophist is the changing image.

Since Rosen's book on the *Sophist* is primarily a commentary, the leading criterion for its critical assessment should be whether he makes that dialogue more intelligible to the general reader, as well as to the academic specialist. Quite honestly, I think that the generalist may find the book difficult to get through, since it contains much strange terminology and it seems to be ad-

dressed to an academic audience. For instance, there is an excessive amount of space devoted to the contemporary secondary literature on Plato. But, on the other hand, if one persists with the book, one will find much that is valuable and enlightening. Rosen shows us how to read a Platonic dialogue with attention, not just to the arguments, but to the dramatic context. He suggests, for instance, that Plato's self-conscious change in style from the Socratic *elenchus* of the earlier dialogues to the long speeches of the later dialogues must be taken to reflect the character of the main speaker rather than any radical change in Plato's approach to philosophy. If one should ask about the significance of the many divisions and definitions designed to capture the sophist, Rosen's answer (126) is that these illustrate his many-sided and elusive character. Thus they succeed on the level of 'dramatic phenomenology,' although on the technical level they fail to produce a single and consistent definition of the essence of sophistry. Rosen claims that this failure is deliberate on the part of Plato (who must therefore be distinguished from the Stranger) who wants to show the astute reader the limits of any technical method. For instance, the method of diairesis cannot account for the distinction between production and acquisition (which is crucial for refuting the sophist) because, lacking an insight into 'the Whole,' it is incapable of distinguishing between original and image. Hence this technical method is impotent in the face of the sophist who demands an account of images. This question mounts a challenge, on both the ontological and political levels, which cannot be adequately met by a pure technician like the Stranger. At bottom, therefore, the problem of the sophist is political rather than technical, according to Rosen, because it is a problem of life which demands 'thinking' (in Heidegger's sense) instead of a neat logical solution.

In spite of the Heideggerean appearance of this claim, I think that Rosen is basically making a Straussian move when he assumes that politics is more fundamental than ontology. The difficulty, however, is that it is not so clear that Plato would agree with Leo Strauss. Rosen amasses a fair amount of circumstantial evidence from the *Sophist* dialogue which might indicate that Plato was a Straussian. I have already mentioned the putative failure of the Stranger to produce, through the method of division, a single and precise definition of the sophist. But Rosen also suggests that he fails to provide an exact analysis of the nature of images. Now this is really tricky because it is difficult to know whether or not such failure is a conscious stratagem on the part of Plato. For instance, Rosen argues (189 ff.) that there is a subtle shift in the Stranger's account of the relationship between original and image; cf. *Soph.* 239e5-240b1. The shift from a picture model to a discursive model Rosen takes to be a rejection of the likeness thesis in favor of what he calls 'the duplication thesis.' But, for him, this amounts to a departure from 'classical Platonism' towards old-fashioned Aristotelianism. This is a good example of Rosen's very plausible style of interpretation but it is not without its own problems. For instance, we might ask, if the Stranger shows no sign that he is aware of making a radical shift in doctrine, how can we show that Plato himself is aware of it?

This raises a more general question about Rosen's interpretation; i.e., if Plato consistently undercuts the conclusions of the Stranger, what is the point of the whole technical exercise that occupies much of the *Sophist*? Rosen suggests (308) that Plato was experimenting with a technical solution to the problems of non-being and falsehood, while at the same time indicating that such a resolution is not feasible. Unfortunately, due to severe space limitations, I cannot deal in any detail with Rosen's analyses of these technical solutions, except to mention one of his more 'dramatic' conclusions. In the scene which is called 'the battle of the giants' (titomachia), Rosen thinks he detects a slight leaning on the part of the Stranger towards the conception of being espoused by the enlightened materialists (i.e., being is defined in terms of power) against the notion of incorporeal being that is supported by the so-called 'friends of the Forms.' Along with this, Rosen thinks he finds a subtle shift in terminology from *οὐλοία* (as more abstract being) to *τὸ δὴν* (as more concrete being). As a result, he concludes, there are two distinct ontologies at work in the *Sophist*, which are neither recognized nor reconciled by the Stranger. But is this what Plato intended or is it merely the result of Rosen's own hermeneutical method? In order to answer this question for himself, the reader must consider the whole dramatic context in which the arguments of the Stranger are presented. For instance, if we can find clear traces of a certain ironic distance in Plato's presentation of the Stranger and his arguments, then we cannot take the latter simply as a mouthpiece for the supreme artist who wrote the dialogue. Whatever we decide about Rosen's rather extravagant claims, he will at least have succeeded in forcing us to pay attention to the dramatic and literary aspects of the dialogue. It can never again be treated as an 'interesting' collection of technical arguments to be plundered at will so as to add to our modern collections.

JOHN J. CLEARY

Boston College

STEPHEN DAVID ROSS. *Perspective in Whitehead's Metaphysics*. Albany: State University of New York Press 1983. Pp. xiii + 295. US\$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-657-5); US\$19.50 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-658-3).

Aristotle believed that among his ten categories of being there was a certain primacy enjoyed by the category of substance. Substances exist, he held, in

the most fundamental way — existence in each of the other nine categories presupposes substance, and whereas existence in the other nine categories is predicated of substances, substances are not predicated of one another, but exist in and of themselves. Alfred North Whitehead, and the process philosophers who are so indebted to his metaphysical speculations, hold that the dominance throughout the history of Western philosophy of some form or other of a notion of substance, inspired by Aristotle, has been the source of many of the woes that have plagued Western thought. In particular, Whitehead was convinced that if, in the ontological domain, we conceive of primary substances as 'neither asserted of a subject nor present in a subject' (Whitehead is here quoting W.D. Ross on Aristotle), then in the domain of epistemology we can never give a coherent account of human knowing, for a substantial being who is a knower can never 'be present' to a substantial being that it might wish to know. At best, a substantial knower can entertain certain modifying attributes and hope that, thanks to a pre-established harmony, or a non-deceiving God, or some such, the attributes currently characterizing his or her substantial being also characterize the substantial being of the object about which knowledge is sought.

Whitehead's move, the move of process philosophy, is to make a major metaphysical shift. One way of getting a grip on the character of this shift is to ask what would happen if one took Aristotle's metaphysics and gave the category of relation the primary role that Aristotle gave to the category of substance. Among the adjustments required by such an ontological displacement would be an account of 'substances' which would permit, nay require, that one 'substance,' now called an 'actual entity' by Whitehead, be 'present in' another. Whitehead's 'principle of relativity' (his fourth Category of Explanation) implants this shift at the heart of Whitehead's system — this principle asserts that every entity is an element in the concrescence of other entities, which is Whitehead's way of saying that far from a substance *not* being present in a substance, as Aristotle maintained, in his (Whitehead's) philosophy 'an actual entity *is* present in other actual entities' (*Process and Reality*, Corrected Edition, 50). Working out the details of this ontological displacement is a monumental task, the task of *Process and Reality* — in this same passage (*PR* 50) Whitehead maintains that his philosophy 'is mainly devoted to the task of making clear the notion of "being present in another entity." ' If Whitehead has succeeded in this task, and many believe that he has, then he has undermined the substance assumptions with which Descartes generated the insoluble epistemological problems that have frustrated modern philosophy for three hundred years.

Now we are in a position to understand the radical thrust of Stephen David Ross's new book *Perspective in Whitehead's Metaphysics*. Ross does not think Whitehead went far enough in his revolt against substance; Ross advances the case for pushing the revolt against substance even further. His method for doing this is to offer a reinterpretation of Whitehead's principle of relativity. Ross suggests that Whitehead makes claims that open up the possibility of a 'perspectival theory of relatedness.' Sometimes one gets the

impression that Ross believes that Whitehead really understood relatedness as a perspectival theory in Ross's sense; sometimes Ross, more accurately, acknowledges his own strong interpretive bias: 'Even here, however, Whitehead appears to regard an entity as *taking* a perspective more than *being* a perspective. The reason may well be that he does not regard perspective as a technical category, so he does not develop its precise characteristics and pervasiveness' (1). Indeed Whitehead does not — on both counts! — and herein lies the weakness of Ross's book if it is taken as an analysis of Whitehead's metaphysics.

Taking a perspective vs *being* a perspective: there is the issue in as far as we are dealing with the matter of interpreting what Whitehead himself claims. Let me explain. Ross argues that three principles in particular are very important in Whitehead's system: 1) the principle of perspective (i.e., the principle of relativity), 2) the principle of experience (i.e., the things that are are 'drops' of experience), and 3) the cosmological principle (i.e., the universe is unified and complete). The structure of Ross's book is to look at many of the technical topics that arise in Whitehead's philosophical discussions (causation, freedom, knowledge, subjective aim, extension, God, etc.) and to point out that in the context of an analysis of each of these topics the first principle (perspective) proves to be in conflict with the other two. He concludes that the 'major and enduring contribution' of Whitehead's philosophy 'is embodied primarily in the principle of perspective' (265) and he proposes, in effect, elevating that principle to a dominant position and downplaying (in his 'modest' perspectivism) or virtually eliminating (in his 'thoroughgoing' perspectivism) those principles which are in conflict with it.

The plausibility of this whole undertaking rests upon the '*taking* a perspective vs *being* a perspective' distinction which Ross himself has articulated. If one works through Whitehead's writings and interprets Whitehead's principle of relativity as the principle of perspectivity in the sense of *being* a perspective (or, as Ross more accurately states his metaphysical first principle, '*being is* perspectivity' — 1), then the principle of perspectivity does clash with most everything in Whitehead's system, and all sorts of radical readjustment is called for. If, however, one interprets the principle of perspectivity in the sense of *taking* a perspective ('a being *takes* a perspective' rather than '*being is* perspectivity'), then most, certainly, of the incompatibilities and conflicts Ross finds in Whitehead's writings are pseudo-incompatibilities and pseudo-conflicts that melt away like the dew under the rays of the morning sun when viewed in Whitehead's own terms. In my judgment (and as Ross virtually acknowledges in the passage, quoted above, on '*taking*' vs '*being*' a perspective), Whitehead's system possesses nothing like the principle of perspective as Ross understands that principle, so the whole analysis, at one level, the level of giving an account of Whitehead's metaphysics, is wide of the mark.

At another level, however, the book repays the very considerable effort required to wade through it — it is dense, technical, and intimidating in the extent to which the argument involves reference to the enormous secondary

literature which has grown up around process philosophy. If the book is understood not as an explication of Whitehead but as a neo-Whiteheadian investigation that explores the consequences of radically rethinking most of Whitehead's notions, then the book can be seen for the sophisticated, innovative, challenging study of metaphysical principles which it is. It is not, however, enough to characterize this study as neo-Whiteheadian. Early in his career Ross worked closely with Justus Buchler. Buchler's mode of philosophizing is built around what is called the principle of ontological parity (no natural complex is any more real, ultimate, natural, or genuine than any other), a principle which is put in sharp contrast to a rival principle which Buchler repudiates, the principle of ontological priority (some complexes are more or less real, ultimate, etc. than others). In considering Whitehead's doctrine that actual entities 'are the ultimate and final realities' (a doctrine which Buchler would regard as exemplifying the principle of ontological priority), Ross reacts sharply in a way which reveals his deep indebtedness to Buchler: 'Ontological priority is arbitrary and indefensible. It is a consequence of the cosmological principle, and forces us to reject that principle' (268). It is in connection with this commitment to ontological parity that Ross makes his fundamental metaphysical decision, the decision to go beyond Aristotle's doctrine of substance, beyond Whitehead's principle of relativity, to the ontological parity involved in his Buchlerian perspectivism. Consequently, it might be more accurate to describe *Perspective in Whitehead's Metaphysics* as neo-Buchlerian rather than neo-Whiteheadian. But neo-whatever, the book is meaty, challenging, and well-informed; process thinkers need to be aware of it and will be challenged by it to define their degree of acceptance and/or rejection of its assumptions and analyses.

DONALD W. SHERBURNE
Vanderbilt University

RICHARD SCHACHT. *Nietzsche*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul and Don Mills Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. xxii + 546. Cdn\$52.75. ISBN 0-7100-9191-5.

I agree with the basic conviction that underlies this study, namely, that while Nietzsche is 'not a systematic thinker, his thought is fundamentally coherent ...' Schacht rejects the approach that would saddle Nietzsche 'with numerous

basic inconsistencies.' His book also deals comprehensively with the full range of Nietzsche's thought. There are chapters covering Nietzsche's views on truth and knowledge, his critique of metaphysics, his doctrines of will to power and eternal recurrence, his philosophical anthropology, his theory of values and morals, and his aesthetics. I will discuss only the chapter on truth and knowledge, which, however, is fundamental in that it regulates the interpretation of the rest of Nietzsche's thought.

Commentators on Nietzsche usually tend in one of two directions. Some think that for Nietzsche there are truths and that knowledge of them is possible. Others think that for Nietzsche there are no truths and that knowledge is impossible. Schacht aligns himself with the first tendency, but his attention to the texts and his analysis of them is far more sophisticated and detailed than has usually been the case. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced that the first tendency is the correct one.

In Schacht's view, we must distinguish three levels of truth analysis in Nietzsche's thought. At the first level, propositions can be 'true' only from a particular perspective. Since Nietzsche conceives the world as chaos — a sheer flux of coming to be and passing away — no proposition can be true in the sense that it corresponds to reality. For interpretation to be possible, our perspectives must simplify reality and impose order on it. Propositions thus obtain 'only for us.' They cannot 'obtain independently of the "perspective" within which we happen to be operating.' They 'cannot be applied to the way the world is apart from our schematization of it ...' And so, 'such "truths" turn out to be "errors."'

Nietzsche's second level of truth analysis focuses upon the function which truth determinations serve in our lives — their pragmatic value or instrumental significance. What is important here is that truth determinations simplify the chaos and bewildering profusion of phenomena; they reduce reality to a semblance of order which allows us to control our world and exploit it. This makes possible a form of communication without which we could not exist as social beings. It facilitates the processing of our experience and makes possible effective action. Yet again, such 'truths' — necessary as they are — do not correspond to reality. So far, I am in agreement with Schacht.

The truths found at the third level of analysis are still taken to be perspectival truths. Knowing, for Nietzsche, is always an interpreting in which our relation to what is interpreted affects the interpretation. We can never be pure spectators. But, for Nietzsche, some truth determinations have a superior epistemic status. We can interpret things in a manner more appropriate to them. For Schacht, Nietzsche 'allows the possibility of "truth" construed in terms of the aptness of characterizations of states of affairs in the world, thereby preserving something of the basic idea underlying the correspondence account of truth.' Schacht seems to think that we find Nietzsche aiming at such aptness or correspondence in his theories of will to power, eternal recurrence, and morals. I cannot agree that Nietzsche is concerned with aptness or correspondence even at this third order level, and I am not persuaded by Schacht's attempt to demonstrate this.

For Nietzsche, much as for Kant, all experience is constituted by us and *for us*. This requires categories of the understanding and a unified ego. But unlike Kant, Nietzsche holds that since appearance is constituted by us and *for us* it is illusion — a falsification of reality. Even our notion of the ego as a simple unified entity is the result of interpretation and projection, which, while necessary for ordered experience, is nevertheless a falsification. And if there is really no unified subject, then, as for Kant, there can be no unified object — there can be no entities, facts, or events. All are interpretations — mere illusions.

Nevertheless, it *is* clear that Nietzsche prefers some interpretations to others. He does accord some a superior status. But in my reading of Nietzsche this is not because they are more apt, more true — they are not true. How, then, can one illusion be better than another? Nietzsche, it seems to me, simply prefers the illusions which serve to make the overman possible — a person subordinate to nothing, not even truth, who has the strength to posit his own values, his own 'truths,' on no authority but his own. The highest form of existence for Nietzsche, much as for the traditional God of Christianity, involves being the source of one's own 'truth' without depending upon something independent of us as the ground of truth. To accept that there is *nothing* but interpretation, to accept that even the belief that my interpretation is higher than others is nothing but another interpretation, such is the highest form of existence. Anything else would be to subordinate oneself to a higher authority and standard. Even Nietzsche's theories of will to power, eternal recurrence, and values are truths of this sort. They do not correspond to reality. They are illusions which make the overman possible. That can be their only justification.

In his *Afterward*, Schacht quotes Nietzsche:

Alas, what are you after all, my written and painted thoughts! It was not long ago that you were still so colorful, young, and malicious, full of thorns and secret spices — you made me sneeze and laugh — and now? You have already taken off your novelty, and some of you are ready, I fear, to become truths: they already look so immortal, so pathetically decent, so dull!

Indeed, something of this is true of Schacht's book. For all his careful analysis, detailed textual research, and impressive distinctions, Schacht's treatment of truth and knowledge dulls the radical and exciting edge of Nietzsche's thought and turns him into a very orthodox and decent thinker.

PHILIP J. KAIN

Stanford University

JOHN H. SMITH, ed. *Kierkegaard's Truth: The Disclosure of the Self* (Volume 5, Psychiatry and the Humanities). New Haven: Yale University Press 1982. Pp. xvii + 438. US\$36.50. ISBN 0-300-02621-8.

This distinguished collection of essays boxes the compass of the psychological, social, historical and conceptual issues pertinent to Kierkegaard's disclosure of the self. The book was published under the auspices of the Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities of the Washington School of Psychiatry. The dozen contributors are a spectrum of old and newly minted scholars: Paul B. Armstrong, James Collins, Harold A. Durfee, Paul L. Holmer, William Kerrigan, Bruce H. Krimmse, Louis H. Mackey, Vincent A. McCarthy, W.W. Meissner, Paul Ricoeur, Mark C. Taylor and Michael Theunissen.

For a collection of such essays there is a remarkably consistent high quality, and this is a notable achievement among inter-disciplinary efforts. Smith's five page introduction is among the best five pages I have read on Kierkegaard. He argues Kierkegaard's present importance for psychiatry today on the basis of psychiatry's 'newly gained understanding of primitive development and especially in connection with the understanding of the place of trust, on the one hand, and of guilt and the precursors of guilt, on the other, in the genealogy of the self.' Smith discusses this dialectic of trust and guilt through Kierkegaard's own struggle with his exceptionality and the process through which he came to understand the universality of exceptionality and came to understand the task of becoming the justified exception. Kierkegaard's authorship and journals are the visible manifestations available to us of his personal, philosophic and religious struggle. A very penetrating five pages.

Space will not permit a tough-minded discussion on each of the articles, but at the risk of imprecision I will state what I take to be some of the basic themes of each author and finally comment briefly on the book as a whole.

Holmer's essay continues his project of setting out 'the logic of' which has been a hallmark of his career. His recent *The Grammar of Faith* (San Francisco: Harper and Row 1978) was an application of his wit and philosophic acuity to the clarification of the concept of faith. Here Holmer analyzes the logic or grammar of the self. The foundation of this essay is Kierkegaard's diagnosis that we have forgotten what it is to exist, and this forgetfulness lies at the root of much of our intellectual, moral and psychological sickness. This same forgetfulness lies also at the heart of the confusions of 'psychology.' The quotation marks are necessary because psychology is so many things that it is nothing very specific. Holmer addresses this issue acutely.

Armstrong addresses the concept of reading, a rather novel approach to Kierkegaard, in order to bring to bear the theory of reading on a reading of *Fear and Trembling*. He argues that disorientation and reorientation are the basic literary strategies of *Fear and Trembling* and that Kierkegaard has used these strategies to raise again the question of authority and the reader's struggle with authority in our efforts to determine ourselves.

Collins confines his essay largely to the two autobiographical volumes of *Journals and Papers*, edited and translated by Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1978) and to *Letters and Documents*, translated by Hendrik Rosenmeier (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978). He concentrates on only one theme, the images Kierkegaard uses to talk about the self. The images Kierkegaard uses to come to self-knowledge are slowly spread out to influence his general concept of the self.

Durfee's essay argues that Kierkegaard's philosophy points toward the radical deconstruction of western philosophy and to the new foundations for the philosophic enterprise itself. This shift would, Durfee argues, also demand a shift in the foundations of psychological theory in general but especially in the theory of the self.

Kerrigan raises the questions of the relation of Freud and Kierkegaard to a high level of debate. He attempts to show accommodation of existentialism and its chosen enemy, the metapsychology of the ego and the super-ego' (120). Again, as in Armstrong's essay, the vehicle of explanation is *Fear and Trembling*? How could it be otherwise? Whether planned or not there is a considerable opposition between some of the essays of the volume. Pertinent at this point is the considerable differences separating Holmer and Kerrigan.

Krimmse's vehicle is *Sickness unto Death* and is concerned with the effects of society on the individual in his process of self-determination. The focus on the political and social structures is a healthy balance to those essays in the volume which ignore the social and political context of the self's struggle or accuse Kierkegaard of ignoring the social dimension of the person.

Mackey's essay focuses on the *Philosophical Fragments*, especially chapters one and three. He emphasizes a French structuralist view of language and attempts to explicate how the book is most literally an 'indirect communication.' Whereas Kierkegaard spoke of the limit of reason, Mackey discusses the limit of language. A very interesting extension.

McCarthy's essay centers on the moods of Kierkegaard, his depths and his attempts to show how his own moods are taken up and expressed both in terms derived from and in a critique of the psychological theories in German romanticism and in Hegel's philosophy. His psychology, or perhaps better, 'philosophical anthropology' is an effort to expand and universalize the terminology and insights of the dominant philosophical anthropologies of his time. There are severe limitations on his psychological thought, and McCarthy is not reticent in pointing these out along with the narrow religious perspective. His 'psychology' is as much a fragment as his philosophy.

Meissner sketches the place of the ego in the history of psychoanalytic thought around the issue whether psychoanalysis should be/is a natural science or a humanistic psychology. His essay uses Kierkegaard's own struggle between system and subject to address some issues in the critique of metapsychology. He discusses the shifting concept of the self in modern psychoanalysis through this appeal to Kierkegaard's concept of subjectivity.

Ricoeur's essay is a combination of two previously published French essays which were successfully recast for this volume. Ricoeur first explicates the main texts of *Sickness unto Death* and the *Concept of Anxiety* concerning evil and then applies those results to the question of how we philosophize after Kierkegaard.

Taylor reads Kierkegaard's view of the self through Hegel and vice versa, finding some common purposes as well as clear differences. Taylor's exercise focuses on the concept of spiritlessness which Kierkegaard and Hegel both address though, to be sure, in very different ways. Taylor finds that Kierkegaard's thought needs to be supplemented by insights from Hegel.

Theunissen works in a most forthright way to show the new interpenetration of psychoanalysis and Kierkegaard. He avoids the trap of anachronism which would ascribe concepts of later psychoanalysis to Kierkegaard. Theunissen addresses the history of the self in psychoanalytical theory and the relevance of Kierkegaard to the recent shift in our ideas of normality and abnormality.

The previously promised critical remarks must indeed be few. First, several of our authors did not even approach a dialogue with psychoanalysis, for their discussions remained within the confines of the exegesis of Kierkegaard's thought or in the confines of the comparative study of Kierkegaard and some aspect of the philosophic tradition, usually Hegel. Second, regarding Kierkegaard's intellectual background, the accounts are still to be settled with Hegel, for our several authors take quite different positions with reference to the complex of Kierkegaard-Hegel issues. Third, the psychoanalytic thought mirrored in the book tends to be rather consistently in the humanistic school (as one would expect from the origin of the book). However, one wonders whether some psychiatrists who are much more 'scientifically' oriented, and thus more negatively critical of Kierkegaard, would not add a dash of hot pepper to future discussion. Fourth, several of the authors are quite at odds about the singularity and/or universality of Kierkegaard's views of the self.

Finally, there are several references in the book to Kierkegaard's analogy of reflection to the tapeworm, a woman in his time having been reported as having had a tapeworm two-hundred feet long. As gross or humorous as that is, this book has added to the length of the worm. But it is written by professors for professors and as a result has real (and by the reviewer, appreciated) merits.

ROBERT L. PERKINS
Stetson University

ROBERT SOLOMON. *In The Spirit of Hegel a Study of G.W.F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. New York: Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. 612. U.S.\$29.95. ISBN 0-19-503169-5.

Robert Solomon has written a valuable, challenging, and pedagogically useful commentary on Hegel's *Phenomenology*. He has assimilated the important work on Hegel done in the past decade, has carefully considered the significance of each section in Hegel's text, and has produced a book destined to be a leading secondary resource for students and teachers of Hegel's important work. Solomon's book is lengthy; yet his clear, jargonless style makes reading it a pleasure. It is divided into two large halves: the first provides a wealth of useful background information; the second offers a detailed section by section commentary on the *Phenomenology*.

The historical and intellectual background contains surveys of the dominant social and political problems of Hegel's day, of the development of German idealism — especially those features of the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling to which Hegel reacted directly, and of Hegel's writings prior to the *Phenomenology* — including the theological writings, the *Difference and Faith and Knowledge* essays, and the Jena lectures. Here Solomon also presents the broad outlines of his interpretation together with an introduction to Hegel's terminology (which he summarizes and amplifies in an excellent glossary), a discussion of the purpose and structure of the book, and an analysis of Hegel's famous Preface.

The second half opens with a discussion of Hegel's 'Introduction' and closes with some brief remarks on 'Absolute Knowledge.' Solomon reorganizes the other chapters into four broad topics: an ontology and epistemology ('Consciousness' and 'Reason A'), a theory of self-consciousness ('Self Consciousness'), an ethics and social philosophy ('Reason B and C' and 'Spirit'), and reflections on religion ('Religion'). This structure provides thematic coherence to the *Phenomenology*, a convenience for first-time readers. Moreover, Solomon always considers the significance of the actual order of the sections; so he loses nothing by adopting this structure.

The broad contours of Solomon's interpretation can be summarized as follows: Solomon's Hegel is thoroughly humanist, anti-skeptical, and against rigid dichotomies. He is aware of the ways that mind and world and self and other mutually constitute one another, and impressed with the importance of *Sittlichkeit* (custom, tradition, practices) for practical morality. Yet Solomon thinks Hegel is a divided philosopher who is unable to fully integrate and resolve his tensions. He identifies two Hegels: an absolute idealist one and an historicist one, the former seeking some final truth and system and trying to actualize the Enlightenment sense of a common humanity, the latter aware of the contextual nature of all truths, the centrality of particular cultural contexts in assessing values, and the irreducible differences among existing cultures. Solomon thinks Hegel's *Phenomenology* is less coherent and more loosely structured than most commentators; for example, he thinks Hegel

could as easily have begun the book with the chapter on Self-consciousness as with the one on Consciousness. He discerns a very rough, abstract order in the movement of the book, but he does not think there is any precise logic or pattern to the development. Solomon clearly favors the historicist Hegel over the absolute idealist one; this always colors his interpretation. Consequently, he minimizes the significance of the final chapter on Absolute Knowledge.

Both parts of Solomon's book have important strengths. The entire first half will be useful to first time readers of the *Phenomenology*, no matter what level of sophistication. It is presented in a lively manner, and it is thorough and careful enough to provide a decent substitute for actually reading Hegel's predecessors and early works. Moreover, Solomon regularly refers back to this material, often finding clues to the interpretation of difficult sections of the *Phenomenology* in Hegel's early writings and discovering less than obvious foils to Hegel's arguments in his immediate predecessors. The summary of Hegel's early writings is invaluable because some of the essays are out of print and others are available only in very expensive editions. Instead of spending three to four weeks on preliminaries, courses on the *Phenomenology* that use Solomon's book can now simply move directly into the text with perhaps a week's discussion of the background.

The second half contains some remarkable readings of specific sections. I found Solomon's interpretations of the 'inverted world' and the 'beautiful soul' sections especially acute. Solomon's readings are careful without being ponderous, attentive to subtleties without losing perspective. Solomon's greatest strengths are his ability to suggest past and contemporary applications for virtually all the chapters and his authorial standpoint, which is distant enough from Hegel to allow criticisms of Hegel's actual arguments, but sympathetic enough to offer reformulations of many of those arguments that may better establish Hegel's desired conclusions. Even if one disagrees with his interpretation, one is grateful for a clear and coherent reading against which to react. On the whole, I think Solomon's efforts are more illuminating than Hyppolite's, though in some cases, e.g., in his reading of the master-slave and the spiritual animal kingdom sections, I had some disagreements.

My main reservations concern Solomon's willingness to minimize Hegel's absolute idealist side and his resultant willingness to discount Hegel's assertions about the logic or structure of the book. I think more could be said both about the general structure of the book and the results of Absolute Knowledge, but I think that the strength of Solomon's interpretation requires that it be given substantial attention in the literature. As with any book that attempts this task, there are moments when the discussion is less than inspired — often because Hegel is not always inspiring. But I had this sense far less frequently when reading Solomon than when reading any of the other commentaries that have appeared in the last decade.

I heartily recommend the book to students and teachers of Hegel. I intend to use the book as a regular secondary resource in my course on Hegel's *Phenomenology*. Solomon's book should help the next generation of

philosophers to see the value of reading Hegel and to better achieve serious dialogue with his thought.

WILLIAM R. SCHROEDER

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

R.F. STALLEY. *An Introduction to Plato's Laws*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1983. Pp. x + 208. US\$18.50. ISBN 0-915145-84-7.

This work fills a conspicuous gap in Platonic scholarship in English. A book-length commentary, it does for the *Laws*, in many ways, what Cross and Woozley and Annas do for the *Republic*. It is not a mere summary of the argument, interspersed with occasional reflections. Rather it divides the *Laws* into topics (e.g., Virtue, Pleasure and the Good Life) and devotes a chapter to each. These topics are sometimes adjacent to one another in the dialogue; sometimes not. Stalley then assesses, in a sympathetic but still critical fashion, the positions Plato's Athenian Stranger takes on these issues. The assessment depends upon an analysis of arguments and issues which can be fairly described as preliminary. Usually acute, the analysis provides the new-learner of the *Laws* the introduction necessary for further exploration. If the new-learner does not want further exploration, she will still have an honest first reading of the text.

In general, there is nothing programmatic about the interpretation. Issues are taken up, sometimes compared with Plato's earlier writings, other times with contemporary thought, and evaluated. And in general, this procedure serves the purpose. But there is one overarching issue which does not fare so well under this regimen: the relation between the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

This is an issue of lively interest for any student of Plato. After all, it is only human to speculate about the effect of Plato's Syracusan expedition on his political thought. The guardians of the *Republic* were to rule by their rational grasp of the Good itself and the Just itself; in the *Laws* rulers are subordinate to law, which somehow embodies reason. Do these striking differences between the *Republic* and the *Laws* show an idealist turned pessimist? One school of interpretation says that Plato has given up on reason and its direct access to the Forms. The other that he is writing in a more practical vein, for a non-philosophical audience. Between these two positions Stalley attempts to maintain a judicious balance (10). Nevertheless, he notes in a number of

places the changed attitude toward reason and its role. 'The *Laws*, in keeping with its more practical focus, treats right belief as an acceptable alternative to reason' (47). 'His various treatments of the Socratic paradoxes do seem to show an increasing doubt about the power of the rational soul to control its irrational elements' (57). In the *Republic*, the 'Forms belong to an "intelligible" world, not to the visible world of everyday experience ... Nothing in the *Laws* suggests this kind of separation of Forms and particulars' (135).

Yet, in dealing with what appears to be Plato's most explicit comparison of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, the emphasis of interpretation seems to be different. At 739a-e, Plato says that in the best state there will be community of property (presumably, the *Republic* is meant); the state being proposed in the *Laws* is second best because there will not be community of property; the best state is still a model for the second best. Stalley interprets the contrast by making the *Republic* 'a picture of how men would live if they were capable of organizing their lives with total rationality. In practice no human community has this capacity ...' (94). Then, Stalley seems to say that it is because the *Republic* is the embodiment of rationality that it ought to be imitated. If this means that the constitution framers in the *Laws* imitate the rationality of the *Republic*, it is hard to understand how rationality — as it is understood in the *Republic* — can be imitated by a constitution framer who understands reason the way Stalley characterizes it in the passages previously cited.

Presumably, Stalley is attempting to keep an even-handed approach to the two views of the relation between the *Republic* and the *Laws*. But without taking sides, or even taking the commentary to inappropriate levels of analysis, he might have developed a clear and consistent method for handling the occurrences of this large and important theme.

While Stalley's handling of individual issues is usually illuminating and helpful, one in particular raises some questions, i.e., his treatment of responsibility and punishment. Plato himself states the issue at 860e. While continuing to maintain that no one is voluntarily unjust he seems to concede the propriety of the usual practice of punishing (what most people call) voluntary crime more severely than involuntary crime (860e-861e). But if no crime is voluntary, the practice is inadmissible. Plato apparently wishes to preserve common intuitions about punishment but to continue to reject the possibility of voluntary injustice. Thus he distinguishes between harm, which is intentional or unintentional action resulting in damage to a victim, and unjust action, which proceeds from an unjust or diseased soul (862a-e). The judge seeks restitution for injury and prescribes treatment — e.g., more or less severe punishment — for injustice. Stalley says that Plato does not, however, simply substitute the new injury/injustice distinction for the old involuntary/voluntary distinction. 'Rather, he talks as though acts of injustice must be voluntary while mere harms may be involuntary. He attacks the very idea that an involuntary act should be called unjust (862a). In his penal code, too, he insists on the distinction between those illegal acts which are voluntary and those which are not' (153).

There are two claims here: one about the immediate context of Plato's new distinction and one about the subsequent passages which elaborate the penal code. It is true that in subsequent passages Plato uses 'voluntary' in a sense which is inconsistent with his position about voluntary injustice in the present passage. But it is hard to see what point is being made about the immediate context. No textual evidence is offered for the claim that acts of injustice must be voluntary, unless 862a implies such a claim. But 862a says that involuntary injuries are not unjust; it is unclear how this claim could imply such a strong claim about voluntary unjust acts. Perhaps, Stalley envisions situations in which the agent's depraved disposition leads him to choose, in some sense, to do an injury. In that sense the unjust act of injuring would be voluntary, although it would not be voluntary in the sense important for Plato; it would not represent what the agent really wants.

Because Stalley does not explain himself clearly on this point we are left not fully sure of the meaning of the claim that Plato talks as though unjust acts must be voluntary. Is it that Plato explicitly contradicts himself at some point (perhaps at 862d)? Or is it that what Plato says about unjust injuries (perhaps at 862b-d) implies that unjust acts are voluntary? It is true that Stalley advances an argument, reconstructed from Plato's text, that implies that there are unjust acts which are voluntary (154). But it is not clear from the text that Plato accepts this argument. It is, accordingly, difficult to assess the alternative solutions that Stalley offers. We do not really know what the problem is.

Nevertheless, the two criticisms just cited should not overshadow the fundamental value of Stalley's book. The *Laws* is unexplored territory for many because it is loosely organized, confusing in detail, and uneven in philosophical import. Stalley has given us a study which overcomes these obstacles and opens up this work to those other than the dedicated Plato scholar. Through his commentary we can appreciate the continuity of the *Laws* not only with Plato's earlier work but with subsequent thought and thereby enjoy its rich philosophical treasure.

RICHARD D. PARRY
Agnes Scott College

MICHAEL E. ZIMMERMAN. *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity*. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press 1981. Pp. xxx + 331. US\$19.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8214-0570-5, 82-83616); US\$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8214-0601-9, 82-83624).

Zimmerman distinguishes two concepts of authenticity in Heidegger; he argues that Heidegger changes from urging the resolute facing of death and finitude, to commending 'releasement,' being appropriated by the play of presence and absence that lets anything be. Zimmerman is sympathetic to the latter notion and presents it as resolving problems with the earlier. The book takes seriously Heidegger's demand that philosophy affect individuals' lives; it echoes Heidegger's hortatory tone, but Zimmerman maintains critical distance, ending major sections with probing questions.

The book is organized chronologically and makes good use of biographical material, tracing Heidegger's early religious concerns, his development as a thinker and teacher, his involvement with the Nazis, his later solitary thinking. Zimmerman claims that Heidegger's early religious thinking was later transformed but remained always influential in his thought, no longer religious nor theistic, but still an approach and set of concerns that were 'spiritual' in the broad sense. The Nazi period Zimmerman sees as a shipwreck which forced Heidegger to rethink his ideas about authenticity. This claim is put forward persuasively but is, of course, hard to prove conclusively. The Nazi period itself is treated clearly and fairly, without any polemical attempt to minimize or maximize its import. The positive reasons for Heidegger's support of Hitler are examined, as well as the blindness and confusions involved.

Zimmerman discusses *Being and Time* at length in order to make comprehensible the notion of authenticity as resoluteness. He does this well, though on occasion, particularly in dealing with temporality, the discussion becomes quite compressed. The analysis of *Being and Time* is well focused and is illumined by quotations from Heidegger's lectures showing his concern for individual and social authenticity. These quotes, and material from the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, nicely buttress Zimmerman's case that the notion of authenticity at this period contained a heavy component of heroic willing which, besides its philosophical weaknesses, provided support for Heidegger's sympathy for the Nazi movement as he understood it. This voluntaristic component Zimmerman sees largely abandoned after Heidegger's prolonged meditations on Nietzsche in the late thirties. Zimmerman's brief but thought-provoking treatment of Heidegger's lectures on Schelling helps trace this change.

The later chapters of the book deal with Heidegger's treatment of modern nihilism and technology, and the corresponding concept of *Gelassenheit* or 'releasement,' which may be taken as a reworking of the notion of authenticity. Here as elsewhere in the book Zimmerman does an excellent job of showing how Heidegger's conception of temporality undercuts many of our problems and attitudes toward the self.

Throughout the book Zimmerman draws parallels with other philosophers and theologians, notably Kierkegaard and Nietzsche but also many others. Heidegger's ideas about the passage to authenticity are also juxtaposed with mythic patterns of heroic life. The parallels are sometimes briefly done, but they are illuminating. At the end of the book an extended com-

parison with Zen Buddhism furnishes a final clarification and point of critique. Zimmerman wonders if despite his move away from a too voluntaristic notion of authenticity Heidegger might remain even in his later thought too anthropocentric and too centered on human, particularly Western, history.

Zimmerman works with several basic dualities. Inauthenticity correlates with selfishness due to self-objectification or self-reification. Authenticity correlates with letting ourselves be an articulation of presence and absence that is part of some larger process. Inauthenticity covers over the true nature of self and world by inventing a fixed being and essence for each; authenticity accepts and faces their true nature as groundless play. These contrasts hold for both the earlier and later versions of authenticity. The two versions are themselves related by another duality, drawn from theology: salvation by works versus salvation by grace. Where the resolute man heroically tears away the veil of convention and faces his life in a willed appropriation of his finite possibilities in the play of temporality and fate, the released man allows himself as an open process of temporality to be appropriated into the possibilities opened by the cosmic play of presence and absence.

Zimmerman's Heidegger seems at times too much a metaphysician arguing for a process view of self and cosmos against opposed substantialist views. Zimmerman is certainly right that for the late Heidegger we must renounce the technological delusion of being masters of the fields of meaning within which we move and have our being, that we must let ourselves be as appropriated, as gifted by something to which we belong. But is this a 'cosmic play'? Zimmerman chains together Heidegger's *Ereignis* and *Logos*, as words for what appropriates us, with the notion of the *Tao* (which Heidegger did tentatively suggest as having some probable similarity to what he was doing), and the Buddhist notion of *Shunyata* or void. All of these do inhabit similar regions, but can they all be identified as the clearing or void space within which the manifest can be encountered? Heidegger says in his essay on *Logos* that *Lethe*, the concealing aspect of the process of un-concealment which lets beings be manifest, can be thought of as a kind of reservoir on which the process of un-concealment can draw. Zimmerman wants to link this to the notion of a creative emptiness in Taoist and Buddhist thought. He also entertains the suggestion made by Fritjof Capra about Taoism that this void (*Lethe*) might be identified with the basic physical field discussed by some scientists. While Zimmerman is careful to distinguish Heidegger's play of presence and absence from the causal interactions talked about in science, the examples Zimmerman uses do make it seem that Heidegger is talking about some cosmic process.

It seems dangerous to picture Heidegger as giving us The True Picture of the self and the world, telling us just what the 'transcendent' is that we must rediscover our relationship to. Heidegger seems mostly interested in talking of the process of un-concealment as the condition for any talk about the cosmos, a condition which is not itself a cosmic item or an object of experience, and which can be encountered only through a deeper way of living our appropriation into the technological world which is our present fate, not

by escaping it into some correct vision of the world. Zimmerman's Heidegger is less the transcendental thinker than this, less historicist, less the Derridean critic showing us the interior finitude of any mode of truth, and more the phenomenologist taking us back to the primal experience of ourselves and the world which has been covered over by our everyday mode of thought and conduct.

But is it Zimmerman or Heidegger I am criticizing? Heidegger does say the things Zimmerman quotes. He does talk at times of getting to the real way that we are human, the deep way things are things and the world 'worlds' itself. He does talk about *Gelassenheit*, about living appropriated to the play of presence and absence, without a why, free from the principle of sufficient reason yet rooted as a tree is rooted in the soil. My complaint is not so much that Zimmerman has misrepresented Heidegger but that Zimmerman has let Heidegger off too easily from the task of reconciling this kind of talk with the more 'transcendental' talk of conditions for any finite opening of language and truth. Perhaps this tension (between Husserl and Kant?) is not fully resolved in Heidegger's thought. My own hunch is that its resolution moves somewhat in the direction of Derrida. In this respect, if there is a parallel to be drawn with Zen it might be more with its Madhyamika-inspired hostility to any world picture than with its Taoist-inspired picture of the whole.

Though offering an interpretation of Heidegger, Zimmerman's book consciously participates in a larger dialogue about modern selfhood, technology and man's place in nature. The book deserves praise for its challenging presentation of Heidegger's ideas, and because it is a thoughtful and independent contribution to that larger dialogue.

DAVID A. KOLB

Bates College

SUSTAINING SUBSCRIPTIONS

Any person or institution wishing to give substantial support to C.P.R./R.C.C.P. may become a Sustaining Subscriber by payment of \$75.00 or more per volume. The following have purchased Sustaining Subscriptions, and C.P.R./R.C.C.P. is extremely grateful for their support:

Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta
Department of Philosophy, University of Lethbridge
Department of Philosophy, University of New
Brunswick
Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto
Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria
Department of Philosophy, University of
Western Ontario

ABONNEMENTS DE SOUTIEN

Toute personne ou institution qui désire contribuer substantiellement à C.P.R./R.C.C.P. peut obtenir un abonnement de soutien en payant \$75.00 ou plus pour un volume. Les institutions suivantes ont pris un abonnement de soutien, et C.P.R./R.C.C.P. leur en est très reconnaissant:

Département de Philosophie, Université d'Ottawa
Département de Philosophie,
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières