Jaegwon Kim
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Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind gathers a number of Jaegwon Kim's classic papers together, thematically centered on emergentism, action explanation, and mental causation.

The first four papers center on emergentism. In 'The Layered World', Kim documents the emergentist presumption that the world is mereologically layered. That is, that microphysical particles constitute molecules, which in turn constitute whole cells, etc. (41ff). Kim argues that the world is too complex and variegated to presume that it fits into one perfectly layered model. He proposes instead that organized structures be classified as inhabiting sub-domains of physics (61). This flattening of the world also fits well with his presumption in favor of reductionism (63).

Against this backdrop, in 'Making Sense of Emergentism', Kim argues that the emergentist accepts the supervenience of emergent properties on base properties (12). Beyond this, they are unpredictable and unexplainable by reference to base properties alone (27). Emergent properties also possess downward causal ability (28). Kim argues, however, that the base property is causally sufficient, so the emergent property must lack efficacy (39). He proposes reductionism as a solution to this problem. 'Emergence: Core Issues and Ideas' is also an analysis of emergentism, but it is written seven years later. Thus, expectedly, Kim raises similar themes, but makes his points with even more force and clarity. Emergent properties supervene upon (68)—and hence are irreducible to (70)—base properties. But then, the base properties are causally sufficient to bring about an effect, so the emergent properties fail to possess downward causation (82).

In 'Supervenient and Yet Not Deducible', Kim emphasizes the oft repeated distinction between strong (ontological) emergentism and weak (epistemic) emergentism. Ontological emergence is characterized by both logical supervenience (100) and being 'not deducible' (90) from base properties. This leads to 'incoherence' (100): emergent properties logically supervene upon their base, while at the same time they are not logically deducible from their base.

The next cluster of papers deals with action explanation. In 'Reason and the First Person', Kim considers the nature of a primary reason. Rooted in Donald Davidson's work, a primary reason is a belief/desire pair that serves as the cause of an act. Kim argues that the nomological account of causation is insufficient, as a primary reason could then be simply predictive rather than causal (112). In its place, he suggests that our reasons for action involve setting a goal and choosing to undertake whatever is required

to achieve that goal (115). Kim uses this model to consider cases of mistaken self-ascriptions (117) and of the evaluation of the behavior of others (122).

This is followed by a new paper called 'Taking the Agent's Point of View Seriously in Action Explanation'. Here Kim outlines a number of popular models of action explanation. He argues, controversially, that causal explanation, which provides explanation through nomological regularity, is predominant in Donald Davidson's model of action explanation (125). Similarly, action explanation consists in 'nomic expectability' (132) for Carl Hempel. In contrast, Dray argues that action explanation appeals to the rationality of the agent (135). Kim modifies Dray's view to read: 'Why did I do X? Because I was in circumstances of kind C, and the appropriate thing to do in C was X' (139).

The next paper in the series on action explanation offers Kim's earliest formulation of his famous exclusion principle. In 'Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism and Explanatory Exclusion', the exclusion principle pertains to explanations. Kim begins with his principle of explanatory realism: explanation is grounded in some objective relation (149). This realist model is contrasted with the explanatory irrealism implied in Hempel's presumption that explanation involves predictions, deductions or some other internal characteristic. Kim predominantly views the objective relation as a causal relation between events (153). He then brings in the exclusion principle: 'there can be no more than a single complete and independent explanation of any one event' (159). However, since the explanatory relation is the objective causal relation, any description that refers to this causal relation between events will state the same explanation. Thus, mental and physical descriptions state the same explanation, so are not excluded (160). Notoriously, this model allows the epistemically vacuous description 'the event that caused the crash caused the crash' to be classified as an explanation.

'Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence' deals in more depth with a number of similar issues. Kim sets out to understand what our epistemic gain is when we have an explanation (170). He again rejects the Hempelian internalistic model in favour of a metaphysical approach whereby we have an explanation of an event when we understand the cause (or, other objective dependency relations) of the event (176). This is not yet entirely satisfying, since explanations must provide epistemic gain. Kim responds by noting that the world is a structured system of dependency relations. This simplifies our explanatory practice by reducing the number of assumptions we need to make about the world (185). It also unites our explanatory practice by reducing the number of properties and events in the world (184). Thus, since explanations have an objective basis, and since the world is simple and unified, our explanations will be simple and unified.

As documented above, Hempel's internal model of explanation is one of the primary targets of Kim's principle of explanatory realism. He accordingly deals in substantial depth with this model in 'Hempel, Explanation, Metaphysics'. While Kim rejects Hempel's internalism, he nonetheless uses his model of it to overcome an objection to his principle of explanatory realism, namely (as noted above) that if the

explanatory relation is an objective relation between events, then the epistemically vacuous explanation 'the event that caused the crash caused the crash' must counterintuitively count as an explanation. Kim argues that Hempel is correct in presuming that explanation is not extensional (204), so Kim's model of explanatory realism must be read: the objective relation between the causally/explanatorily relevant properties of the cause and effect grounds the explanation (204).

The anthology closes with a series of papers that deal with general issues in the field of mental causation. In 'Can Supervenience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism', Kim argues that Donald Davidson's anomalous monism faces the so-called quausal problem. Anomalous Monism states that mental events are physical events, though anomalous mental properties are distinct from causal-nomic physical properties (235). According to Kim, this model leads to epiphenomenalism, as events cause in virtue of their causal-nomic physical properties, leaving the mental properties irrelevant (237). This criticism relies on the controversial assumption that Davidson would accept the view that events cause things in virtue of their properties.

In 'Causation and Mental Causation', Kim defends the view, presumed in earlier papers, that causation is objective or generative, against the view that causation is a matter of nomological generalization and/or counterfactual dependence. Chief among his arguments is the suggestion that events can be nomologically and counterfactually related without being causally related. A series of moving shadows (250), or the symptoms of a disease (249), for example, seem both nomologically and counterfactually related without being causally related. Moreover, the generative model of causation, whereby a 'cause is something that produces, or generates, or brings about its effects' (255), is presumed in human agency (257).

In 'Two concepts of Realization' Kim helpfully outlines the history of the term 'realization' and deals with Sydney Shoemaker's realization-based solution to the mental causation problem. Shoemaker argues that mental properties have a subset of the causal powers of their realizing physical properties (271), thus although the properties are distinct, the physical property realizes the mental property on this occasion. Kim responds that Shoemaker's model leads to type reductionism, as mental properties are realized by physical properties (278).

After dismissing these contemporary solutions to the mental causation problem, Kim provides his most recent articulation of his functional solution in 'Reduction and Reductive Explanation'. On this model, mental properties are defined functionally, and then identified with their realizers (224). Thus, the explanation for why Jones is in pain begins with defining pain in functional terms, and then finding the neural cause of the pain. This also solves the mental causation problem, as the functionally defined pain is identified with the neural event.

Kim closes with a new paper entitled 'Why There are No Laws in the Special Sciences'. He provides three arguments demonstrating that there are no special science laws. First, he expands on the Davidsonian argument that strict psychological

generalizations by demonstrating that such laws are vulnerable to disruption (292). Second, following J. J. C. Smart, he argues that the special sciences do not aim to find laws (298). Finally, Kim repeats his oft expressed point that special science laws would be disjunctive laws, but disjunctive laws are unprojectible, so they cannot be genuine laws (307).

This collection of classic and original papers serves as a lucid introduction to both the themes mentioned above and to one of the most influential analytic philosophers of his generation. It also outlines a number of the novel and penetrating arguments raised by Jaegwon Kim over the years.

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