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WALTER BENJAMIN, *Charles Baudelaire. Un poète lyrique à l'apogée du capitalisme*. Préface et traduction de Jean Lacoste. Petite bibliothèque Payot, no 399. Paris: Payot 1982. 284 p. ISBN 2-228-33990-3.

Réjouissons-nous qu'un ouvrage d'une telle qualité soit livré — ce qui, hélas, est encore trop rarement le cas dans le monde de l'édition française — au grand public, grâce à une édition de poche peu coûteuse. Ainsi, tous ceux que passionnent *Les Fleurs du Mal* auront accès à une analyse sociologique d'une profondeur exceptionnelle.

Rappelons que les trois essais qui composent ce volume: *Le Paris du Second Empire chez Baudelaire*, *Sur quelques thèmes baudelairiens* et *Zentralpark* ont été publiés en allemand pour la première fois en 1969 par Rolf Tiedemann, et que deux de ces trois textes: *Le Paris du Second Empire chez Baudelaire* et *Zentralpark* sont inédits en français. Quant au chapitre: *Sur quelques thèmes baudelairiens*, il a déjà paru, en français, en 1971, dans le tome II des *Oeuvres* de Walter Benjamin sous le titre *Poésie et Révolution aux Lettres Nouvelles*.

Le titre du volume est bien celui projeté par Benjamin, mais ce dernier n'eut pas le temps de remanier ces trois ébauches. Dans une lettre d'avril 1938 à Horkheimer, il résume son intuition sur l'auteur des *Fleurs du Mal*: 'La signification tout à fait exceptionnelle de Baudelaire tient en ceci que, le premier ..., il a appréhendé ... la force productive de l'homme aliéné: il l'a reconnue et, par la réification, lui a donné plus de force.'

La première partie — écrite en 1938 — *Le Paris du Second Empire chez Baudelaire* se divise en trois sections: 1) *La Bobème* 2) *Le Flâneur* et 3) *La modernité*. L'influence déterminante d'un texte de Blanqui: *L'Eternité par les astres* se fait sentir tout au long d'une analyse qui développe les thèmes du nouveau, du retour du même, de l'allégorie, du *modern style*, de l'aura et du fétichisme.

Dans la *Bobème*, Benjamin rappelle l'extraordinaire impact de la presse en général, et du feuilleton en particulier, dans la première moitié du 19^e siècle, sur le 'marché littéraire,' et souligne l'apparition du caractère moderne de l'"information" qui, brève et abrupte "... commença à faire concurrence à l'exposé composé. L'information avait l'avantage de pouvoir être utilisée à des fins commerciales' (43). Les écrivains à succès: Dumas, Sue et Lamartine notam-

ment recevaient de somptueuses rémunérations et Baudelaire jeta très tôt sur ce monde de la marchandise un regard dépourvu de toute illusion. Le thème de la prostituée — omniprésent dans *Les Fleurs du Mal* — qu'illustre bien le sonnet 'La muse vénale' nous ramène sans cesse à celui de l'écrivain forcé lui aussi de vendre ses charmes.

C'est la foule qui constitue le thème principal du *Flâneur*, foule de la grande métropole moderne, qui fascine tous les écrivains de l'époque, de Poe à Hugo et qui s'offre comme:

'... le plus récent asile du réprouvé; c'est aussi la plus récente drogue de ceux qui sont délaissés. Le flâneur est un homme délaissé dans la foule. Il partage ainsi la situation de la marchandise. Il n'a pas conscience de cette situation particulière, mais elle n'en exerce pas moins son influence sur lui. Elle le plonge dans la félicité comme un stupéfiant qui peut le dédommager de bien des humiliations. L'ivresse à laquelle le flâneur s'abandonne, c'est celle de la marchandise que vient battre le flot des clients. (83)

Quant à la modernité, le héros en serait le vrai sujet, héros dont les illustrations les plus frappantes dans *Les Fleurs du Mal* sont le dandy et la lesbienne. Pourquoi le dandy? Parce que 'Le dandy est une création des Anglais, qui avaient alors un rôle dominant dans le commerce mondial' (138).

La lesbienne, elle, s'impose à l'imagination de Baudelaire à partir de deux types de considération: d'une part, la femme qui évoque la dureté et la virilité, constitue un idéal érotique qui lui est propre. Mais d'autre part, l'utilisation que la révolution industrielle fait des femmes accentue chez elles les traits masculins:

Le XIXe siècle commença à utiliser sans ménagement la femme dans le processus de production en dehors du foyer. Il le fit pour l'essentiel de façon primitive; il la mit dans des usines. En conséquence de quoi des traits masculins devaient, à la longue, apparaître chez elle. Car ils étaient exigés par le travail à l'usine, en particulier le travail mutilant. (134)

Sur quelques thèmes baudelairiens date de 1939 et approfondit certains éléments abordés dans le chapitre précédent. Le thème de la foule en particulier est amplement repris. Après avoir rappelé que: 'La foule — rien ne s'est présenté aux écrivains du XIXe siècle investi de plus de missions. Parmi les larges couches sociales qui prenaient l'habitude de la lecture, elle commença à se constituer en public' (164). Benjamin note que, si chez Hugo, la foule signifie: '... une clientèle, presqu'au sens antique du terme, la masse de son public.' Chez Baudelaire, au contraire, cette foule prend une signification intérieure, si intérieure' (...) qu'on ne doit pas s'attendre qu'il la dépeigne. Ce que chacun de nous a de plus essentiel,' ajoute-t-il, 'il est bien rare qu'il le traduise sous forme descriptive' (167).

Enfin la dernière partie: *Zentralpark. Fragments sur Baudelaire*, composée, comme le titre l'indique, de réflexions écrites entre juillet 1938 et février 1939, permet de rattacher *Le Paris du Second Empire chez Baudelaire* au Benjamin des *Thèses sur la philosophie de l'histoire de 1940*.

L'auteur note que si: 'Le personnage de Baudelaire entre de façon décisive dans la composition de sa gloire,' c'est que: 'Baudelaire était obligé de revenir à la dignité du poète dans une société qui n'avait plus aucune sorte de dignité à accorder. D'où la bouffonnerie de son attitude' (220-1).

En conclusion, on se souviendra que l'émigré allemand a écrit ce grand texte à la veille de la guerre, refus du désespoir qui s'empare de beaucoup d'âmes plus timides et affirmation de la dignité de l'homme à partir de ce qui se révèle, peut-être, la dernière grande œuvre lyrique européenne.

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ERNST BLOCH, *Experimentum Mundi: Question, catégories de l'élaboration, praxis*. Traduction et notes de Gérard Raulet, Collection 'Critique de la politique.' Paris: Payot 1981. 273p.

Paru en allemand en 1975 comme dernier volume des *Oeuvres Complètes* d'Ernst Bloch, l'ouvrage veut ordonner en un 'système ouvert' la pensée fondamentale de l'auteur: celle de l'«être comme utopie» (29). Nous y sommes conviés à porter un regard rétrospectif sur la totalité de son œuvre publiée, pour méditer cette 'chose unique' qui 'guide partout la démarche' et surmonte la diversité des objets, des thèmes et des intérêts successifs des écrits de Bloch: il y a un 'sens du monde'; le 'non-avoir' essentiel au désir et à la pratique qui a pour corollaire ontologique le dynamisme d'un 'non-encore-être.' Ce sens du monde, la nouveauté d'*Experimentum Mundi* par rapport aux textes antérieurs est d'en montrer la genèse continuée à chacune des étapes, des 'rotations/élévations,' où se lient à l'être la pensée et l'agir humains, scandant ainsi, conformément au concept moderne de la dialectique, les moments d'une Logique -logique réelle, dit Bloch, parce que logique du réel lui-même.

Dans un tel dessein, il était classique que le travail principal — comme, aussi, la majeure partie du livre — portât sur cette 'science fondamentale pour la philosophie' (153-4) qu'a toujours été la doctrine des catégories. Mais en même temps qu'il en répète la radicalité, car la catégorie abrite le questionnement le plus primitif, le plus élémentaire, de la proximité de la parole et des choses, Bloch en retrouve aussi la surdétermination historique. De fait, c'est par ce second aspect qu'il convient, selon lui, de commencer: si l'analyse

marxiste dévoile bien, ça et là, l' 'idéologie des catégories,' 'séquelles,' dans la théorie, 'de l'ère du maître et de l'esclave' (23), autorise-t-elle un exposé d'ensemble des 'catégories sans idéologie'? Au relativisme destructeur définissant nos modes de penser, y compris les plus fondamentaux, comme les simples reflets des diverses infrastructures historiques — relativisme qui, avant son énoncé par Mannheim, a peut-être été la pensée implicite de Marx lui-même, Bloch n'échappe que par la fiction d'une véritable 'ruse de la raison' (36) en discernant, à l'œuvre dans toute construction catégorielle, une 'fonction utopique' qui, se surajoutant à la 'fonction idéologique,' assure les superstructures d'un sens qui 'ex-cède le passé' (24). On remarquera cependant que cette intégration de la notion d'héritage dans une pensée qui se veut foncièrement révolutionnaire ne doit pas donner lieu à la restauration d'un complexe *ne varietur* de catégories originelles. Aussi le 'système' blochien renonce-t-il à la fixité doctrinale qui a toujours marqué les catégories jusqu'à Hegel. C'est le fait d'accompagner le processus' qui constitue la méthode, dit Bloch en privilégiant la dièrèse étymologique. C'est le réel lui-même qui fait mouvement: comme l'exprime le titre de l'ouvrage, la praxis, l'expérience que l'homme fait du monde, doit être comprise dans sa référence à l'expérience réelle que le monde fait de lui-même' (253). Déjà la Kategorienlehre de Hartmann, par sa dialectique de l'unité 'de la force et de la volonté' avec 'la loi ou l'idée,' l'avait pressenti: la catégorie met toujours en relation une existence avec une essence, une *quodditas* avec une *quidditas*, en termes blochiens le 'Que thélique, l'énergie du vouloir' avec le 'Quoi de la prédication logique' (75). Unité et équilibre instables car, de ce qui serait son achèvement la marche du monde n'est nullement assurée, même si seule la recherche de l'heureuse coïncidence du Quod et du Quid en fonde le dynamisme inlassable. Si les formes sont formes d'un contenu en devenir, il n'est donc pas de conscience philosophique qui, comme dans l'hégelianisme, en surmonterait théoriquement le processus. Bloch donne donc à une connaissance 'tout autre que contemplative' la tâche non seulement d' 'éclairer ce chemin que suit le monde' mais encore de 'le poursuivre' (60). A l'élaboration du but doit enfin succéder la mise en pratique, et l'auteur esquisse, après une méthodologie libérée de l'idéologie, les directions d'un agir désaliéné.

Le livre se compose de deux grandes parties. La première — la plus brève mais aussi la plus fondamentale — met en place tous les concepts indispensables pour l'intelligence du kategoréin, c'est-à-dire de l'acte par lequel se forme la catégorie et se rassemble l'unité d'un divers. L'importance accordée à la sortie hors de l'immédiateté du vécu conduit à faire précéder le moment proprement conceptuel d'un moment de préformation, introduisant jusque dans la doctrine du jugement la préséance de la pratique sur la théorie. — 'Le seuil de la logique se laisse le plus nettement repérer dans l'acte de la réalisation, lorsqu' une nouvelle forme d'être-là jaillit et se trouve promue dans ce jaillissement' (75). Points de jonction du 'thélique' et du 'logique,' les catégories unissent à un aspect 'énergétique' un aspect 'entéléchique' et s'identifient à des 'figures processuelles.'

C'est à l'étude de ce processus logique que travaille la longue deuxième

partie de l'ouvrage (chapitres 19 à 49). S'y succèdent 5 stades du mouvement de 'rotation/élévation,' correspondant à autant de groupes de catégories. Tout d'abord celles du 'cadrage' — ou catégories dimensionnelles: l'espace, travaillé par le tourment de l'extériorisation, et le temps, 'mode le plus authentique de l'être-là humain' (100). En rassemblant ensuite sous l'appellation de 'catégories de transmission' la causalité, la finalité et la 'substantialité latente,' l'auteur nous donne peut-être les pages les plus intéressantes d'*Experimentum Mundi*. L'affirmation du 'droit de la téléologie à une participation causale' (111) implique une lecture des penseurs qui, pour n'être pas encore des philosophes de l'histoire, offrent néanmoins les thématisations exemplaires — et incontournables — de l'inquiétude ou de l'animation du devenir mondain. Le rappel de la notion aristotélicienne de possibilité bilatérale et du principe leibnizien de raison eût toutefois gagné en clarté si Bloch, moins pressé de démontrer la compatibilité du finalisme de la 'latence' avec le maintien du matérialisme, avait distingué hasard, contingence, indétermination en fonction des domaines concernés: logique, ontologie, cosmologie, histoire. Le gain théorique de ce dernier livre par rapport aux textes similaires du *Principe Espérance* en eût été mieux marqué.

Après avoir opposé, au titre des 'catégories de manifestation,' l'ouverture de l'archéotype à la clôture de l'eidos (renouant ainsi avec la critique du structuralisme esquissée dès la première partie), l'ouvrage envisage enfin les responsabilités pratiques (chapitre 36: 'ce qu'il en est de l'homme'). Le quatrième moment — catégories de communication — trace un programme d'intervention dans les domaines de l'éthique, de l'esthétique et de la 'méta-religion,' délivrées respectivement 'de la propriété' (181-8), 'de l'illusion' (188-97) et 'de la superstition' (198-204). Le cinquième moment est de conclusion, qui réorganise les rapports de la théorie et de la pratique en intégrant celle-ci dans une mouvance quasi-cosmogonique: 'Le point zéro du Que cherche et expérimente à travers l'Expérience du monde son oméga — par conséquent celui du monde, réapparaissant dans le sujet sous l'aspect du bonheur, dans la société comme la solidarité de la dignité humaine et, dans le paysage extérieur d'un monde dont on ne retranchera nulle intériorité, comme le Foyer, la terre natale' (251).

Les réflexions qui forment la trame d'*Experimentum Mundi* sont l'objet, depuis déjà plusieurs années, d'un débat philosophique. Le traducteur très précis qu'est Gérard Raulet avait du reste assemblé et publié en 1976, dans la même collection, un recueil (*Utopie-marxisme selon Ernst Bloch*) dont plusieurs communications discutaient le dernier livre de Bloch. Le retour à Aristote, par delà un Avicenne médité très tôt, a été, à juste titre, le plus communément relevé. La reprise de l'exposé antique des catégories n'est pas neuve, ni même la critique de leur part 'idéologique,' implicite dans la remarque de l'inféodation des catégories aux schèmes du langage corrélative à la réhabilitation aristotélicienne de l'opinion. Est-ce à dire cependant, parlant du théoricien de la chrématistique, que leur fixité soit la même chose que leur caractère bourgeois? D'un ouvrage aussi surabondant, on attendrait une plus grande attention à l'histoire. Qui insiste précisément sur la médiation de la

représentation utopique dans l'agir humain est tenu d'exercer une vigilance redoublée à l'égard des simplifications militantes et des exégèses de circonstance dont le livre n'est pas exempt. Partout, le parti pris du 'réel' (en son acception plate et inanalysée) vient se subordonner l'éclair messianique qui en découvrait justement l'étroitesse, en sorte que nous n'échappons à une aliénation (religieuse, d'après Bloch) que pour en trouver une autre (politique, celle-là, et connue de tous). Or c'est là tout le propos de l'auteur: donner un sens réel au trésor de toutes les figures spirituelles de l'humanité, trésor auquel il n'aurait manqué que de se concrétiser pour devenir enfin mobilisable. Il advient parfois ici que l'effort blochien de réappropriation et de réorganisation se heurte à des unités de sens plus solides que lui. Bloch s'y montre davantage l'homme d'un talent que l'homme d'une question, plus soucieux des changements de signe des concepts que de la rationalité de leur articulation intrinsèque. Mais à chacun de décider de la part d'achèvement — même délibérément non-systématique, et de la part d'inachèvement — par défaut et non par art — dans le bilan de cette œuvre étendue.

AIMÉ-PIERRE ROSE

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NED BLOCK, ed., *Imagery*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1981. Pp. 261.
US\$ 15.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-02168-4); US\$ 7.50 (paper: 0-262-52072-9).

Any adequate theory of mental imagery needs to recognize and account for the various empirical facts about imagination that people have discovered by means of experimentation. For example, William James, writing in 1890 (*The Principles of Psychology* [New York: Dover 1950], II, 50), maintained that there was no single faculty of mind called 'The Imagination,' but rather, many 'imaginings.' According to him, this conclusion was justified by the scientifically discovered facts that (a) not every person has mental images; and (b) those that do, do not all use images in the same way. Most psychologists today do not accept this idea of James's as an important fact about the mind, since they see it as merely an artifact of the introspective, anecdotal method of studying imagery employed by those (principally Fechner) whose work James was reporting. In our own day, experimental studies of the imagination tend to avoid introspective reports, and rely rather on things like reaction times under carefully controlled experimental conditions. These latter studies

have *not* found that some people are, and others are not capable of forming mental images.

It is appropriate that Ned Block should have chosen a paper by Brown and Herrnstein, which summarizes results of such contemporary empirical work on the imagination, as the first selection in his recently published collection of essays. After that, Block includes four selections by philosophers (Dennett, Fodor, again Dennett, and Robert Schwartz) and, finally, three papers by psychologists (Kosslyn *et al.*, Pylyshyn, and again Kosslyn).

The fact that Block thus arranges to give psychologists the last word may be his way of hinting that in his view the topic of mental imagery — just as earlier with mathematics, physics, astronomy, etc. — is a case where philosophy, having done the pioneering spadework, is now being replaced by a factual, scientific treatment of the same issues. (This is certainly the opinion of many psychologists — Kosslyn for one.) Nevertheless, if this is what Block means to convey, I suggest he gives us a misleading picture. The reason is that the main issues presently dividing psychologists on the topic of imagining, at least as set forth in this volume, are not empirical, experimental ones, but quasi-philosophical disputes about how to interpret and explain various available results in the most general terms. Thus it is obviously too early to relegate philosophical speculations about imagery to the category of mere historical curiosities, because psychologists themselves are still much — in fact, mainly — involved with just this sort of speculations.

What, more precisely, are the quasi-philosophical disputes that concern imagery theorists today?

In the book's first paper by a philosopher, D.C. Dennett makes the claim (1969) that there are no such things as mental images, and therefore we should cease speaking as if there were. This claim is rejected by every subsequent contributor, including Dennett himself in a later essay (1979). In the latter context, Dennett now is willing to grant that mental images exist, provided one means by them either (i) internal representations and/or causes of behaviour or (ii) intentional objects of the same general sort as goals, decisions, wishes, etc. Block argues in his introduction that the basic issue towards which Dennett and others are feeling their way is not whether images exist, but whether images understood as internal representations really are 'image-like,' in the sense of picturing or depicting that for which they stand in an 'analogical' way, or alternatively, whether they represent in a symbolic, 'digital' way like words or numbers. Block suggests that this latter question is the fundamental issue which provides the organization for the whole collection of essays. According to him, Dennett, among philosophers, and Pylyshyn, among psychologists, opt for the latter alternative, viz. that imaging is (in Pylyshyn's words) merely 'a species of common-sense reasoning.' On the other hand, Block presents Fodor, among philosophers, and Kosslyn, among psychologists, as opting for the former view, according to which imagining is a form of literal picturing, in virtue of the fact that (as Kosslyn says) it presupposes and operates by means of an innately given 'pictorial medium.'

However, I shall argue that matters are not as simple as Block's neat

dichotomy would lead one to believe, and that more particularly, the question in the title of whether mental images depict or represent should *not* be taken as fundamentally important.

One thing which shows this is the fact that problems break out within each of the two general positions Block distinguishes, when their proponents attempt to work them out in detail; and these problems are serious enough to make it questionable whether anyone plausibly could accept either of the positions as an adequate or complete theory of mental imagery. For example, one main trouble with the view of Kosslyn et al. (as Pylyshyn is happy to point out) is that it has a tendency to be ad hoc. There are many sorts and classes of experimental results about mental imagery that theorists obviously would like to explain. But proposers of this latter theory sometimes attempt to 'account for' each of these by the simple expedient of positing an innate function or mechanism whose exclusive job it is to bring about the phenomenon in question. Thus, because people sometimes report examining the details of their images by a process of mentally 'coming closer' or 'zooming in' on them, Kosslyn et al. posit a ZOOM mechanism of mind by which imagers are able to do this. But a proposal of this sort is a case of the tail wagging the dog, just as surely as Moliere's famous 'soporific virtue,' and therefore is no real explanation. In particular, we wonder whether Kosslyn's proposed mechanism is really — as he claims — an internal operation performed on images, or whether it merely describes operations that one often performs on *things* of which he has images.

On the other side, a problem with Pylyshyn's view (as Kosslyn is happy to point out) is that it seems in many respects not to be a theory at all. That is, rather than trying to understand mental images in objective, scientific terms, Pylyshyn seems merely to be proposing that we rest content with familiar, common-sense ways of talking about imagining and (if this is different) mental images.

Another problem with Pylyshyn's account (which Kosslyn doesn't seem to notice) is the overly narrow and rigorous use of the word, 'knowledge,' that Pylyshyn seems to employ. According to him, the knowledge that underlies — and finally replaces — so-called mental imagery always takes the form of long lists of what Gilbert Ryle called 'knowledge-that' about the things which the images are of — i.e., knowledge expressible in words, sentences and other symbols. But Ryle — who also made this same sort of point about imagination years ago in *The Concept of Mind*, (and who may have been the inspiration for Pylyshyn's present position) — was not so myopic. He also distinguished 'knowledge-how,' which he claimed was irreducible in principle to knowledge-that. What difference would it make to Pylyshyn's view, if he gave some explicit role to knowledge-how (and perhaps still other sorts of knowledge also) in addition to knowledge-that?

When one of the various theorists represented in this book attempts to come to terms with problems like these, he typically does so by combining his chosen programme with elements from its supposed contrary. Thus, we find Kosslyn asserting (228, 230) that at least one aspect or element in mental im-

agery is pictorial and analogical; but there may be, and probably are, many other aspects of imaging that work in representational or symbolic ways. Again, Fodor ends by proposing (81) that mental images are not simply internal pictures, but always go together with, and must be understood and interpreted in terms of, a story, description, or commentary of some sort. On the other side, Pylyshyn recognizes analogical, knowledge-independent factors in imagining, in addition to symbolic, digital or knowledge-relative ones (cf. 161, 178, 180). All these points show, that the conflict between the two approaches in question is largely verbal rather than real or principled, because — as opposed to Block's assumption — there is no reason to believe that these approaches are mutually exclusive.

Standing behind this debate is the solid fact pointed out by Descartes in the *Meditations* that there is an obvious and important difference between (say) imagining a pentagon as having five sides and merely knowing that it has five sides, or alternatively, between imagining a pentagon and imagining a chiliagon (i.e., a regular thousand-sided figure). From the first, one can 'read off' information as if he were learning it anew, in a way that he cannot from the second. The issue of whether one explains the difference between these two sorts of mental acts in terms of knowledge, as Pylyshyn suggests, or in terms of innate analogical structures and functions, as Kosslyn recommends, strikes me as not particularly important. It is more important to discover exactly *what* the difference is. Thus I suggest that just as the question, 'Are there mental images?' now generally has come to seem an unimportant pseudo-problem, perhaps we should take a similar attitude to the proposed central question of Block's collection of essays. If someone asks: 'Do mental images depict or represent?', we should answer: '*Of course* they depict and/or represent.' In other words, we should not pretend that the alternatives here presented are necessarily exclusive, or that the distinction itself is either a clear or a fundamental one.

Of all the articles in the collection, perhaps only that of Robert Swartz steers us in the right direction, since it makes the (sketchy) proposal that we should try to specify what depiction and representation, applied to the context of mental images, *are*. My suspicion is that once we come to a sharper understanding about this, we will find that the two approaches to mental imagery distinguished by Block converge.

The psychologists and philosophers represented in this volume are too eager to explain. What they (and we) need at this point is more careful description of exactly what it is to imagine something. It would be wrong to attempt to draw a sharp distinction between describing and explaining. In particular, explanations need not be couched in terms of hidden mechanisms different from, and causally related to, the phenomenon to be explained. Rather, they can amount to nothing more than careful descriptions of relevantly crucial aspects of the phenomenon itself.

To summarize: Block's collection of articles gives a good overview of the present state of thinking — both philosophical and psychological — on the topic of mental imagery. But the question Block poses as a 'guiding principle'

to the debate seems misleadingly oversimple, since the two types of positions he distinguishes are not fundamentally opposed. Perhaps, eventually, they will turn out to be different aspects or poles of a (single) correct account of mental imagery.*

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* Thanks are due to Cidalia Paiva and I. Howard for help with earlier versions of this review.

JOHN P. BURKE, LAWRENCE CROCKER, and LYMAN LEGTERS, eds., *Marxism and the Good Society*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1981. Pp. ix + 225. US\$ 29.95. ISBN 0-521-23392-5.

The editors open with the claim that '... a vision of a good society is, if nothing else, at least the hidden agenda of all social criticism.' They challenge the claim that Marxism is an 'evaluatively neutral science,' though I believe they are a bit overly optimistic when they add that 'it is now nearly universally granted that (the social theory of Marx and Engels) is a critical one,' for scientific socialism is still alive (if not well) in North America and Western Europe as well as the Soviet Union. On the other hand, I agree with their position that '... as long as socialist regimes continue to invoke Marx's name, they necessarily render themselves subject to the norms contained within or implied by Marx's understanding of and endorsement of freedom, equality, justice, and human self-realization in a community.' This is certainly a problem for post-revolutionary societies which have not yet instantiated these norms.

The book is composed of ten essays originally presented at a colloquium on social theory held at the University of Washington by a number of very prominent authors in the area of Marxism. The papers range in quality from good to excellent, and are unified into a coherent totality by the central theme. There is also an interesting balance between theoretical treatment and investigation of case studies of post-revolutionary Yugoslavia, China, and the Soviet Union.

The first essay, 'Marxism and the Good Society' by Richard T. deGeorge, is encyclopedic in its coverage of the relevant basic issues. He distinguishes 'a'

good society from the impossible abstraction of 'the' good society. He then points out that Marxism suggests that humankind as a whole is moving toward the one society which embodies the optimum possible mix of need satisfaction, justice, and freedom. He lists which negative aspects of capitalism will not exist in communism: alienation, exploitation, oppression, etc; and the positive characteristics communism will have: emancipation, increased productivity, the all-round development of the individual, etc.

DeGeorge distinguishes three existing groups of Marxists: (1) scientific, (2) humanistic, and (3) critical. The scientific Marxists (Soviet Union) use the works of the mature Marx and emphasize laws of social development and dialectical materialism; with Lenin they accepted the possibility of socialism (and eventually of communism) in one country without the withering away of the state apparatus, police and army. They believe that the humanistic aspects of communism will follow upon economic development, the laws of which they are seeking but have not found. Humanist Marxists (eastern Europe) go to the early works of Marx for a vision of the just and unalienated 'good society' of eventual communism, and hold that the means must be humanistic to achieve a humanistic end, thus the individual is responsible for his deeds performed, supposedly, in the name of an anonymous, amoral history. The critical Marxists (western Europe and U.S.A.) are critical of both Capitalism and Soviet Marxism and do not accept that Marxism is 'scientific,' but they attempt to update Marx's critique of Capitalism, without having a clear idea of what the ultimate truly free society would be like or how to get there.

Lawrence Crocker contributes two articles, the first of which, 'Marx, Liberty, and Democracy,' posits two controversial premises: (1) that Utopian speculation is a permissible activity from a Marxist perspective, and (2) that Marx was a revolutionary, libertarian, democratic political activist. Marx held that 'the chief goal of a socialist revolution was to end domination and to bring about a society in which each individual has wide-ranging control of his or her life.'¹ Marx's central theme is emancipation from domination; not just the classical liberal abstract *negative* liberty from constraint which mainly applies to a wealthy few, but *positive* liberty of presence of alternatives which make possible universal self-realization and the 'all-round development of one's capacities' which could be made possible with a shift in the allocation of resources.

Crocker contributes another paper on Marković and the praxis school, which, as an example of Marxist humanism, shows that deGeorge's distinction between the humanists and critical Marxists is a rather fuzzy one: they agree on such central themes as that Marxism is a rejection of alienation, exploitation, oppression, and injustice in any type of society, bourgeois or socialist; and the aim of praxis is the realization of each human's potentialities to the fullest, which can be achieved in a just and free community.

Arthur Diquattro in 'Alienation and Justice in the Market' gives us another example of critical Marxism; his aim is to 'critically evaluate the Marxian ideas of justice and alienation by distinguishing between the class structure of

capitalism and the use of the market as a mode of resource allocation' and 'show that the social relations of production, and not the market mechanism, are primarily responsible for exploitation and alienated labor under capitalism.' Diquattro shows that Marx's 'antagonism to market arrangements' leads to a contradiction within Marx's system: without market mechanisms one needs central planning which clashes with worker's democracy. But since the market is not necessarily exploitative in a non-capitalist society, Diquattro argues that Marxian theory needs to be revised in favor of worker's control and socialist justice.

The last article I will be able to mention is 'Theory and Practice in the Mao Period' by Paul Sweezy, which brings up a crucial problem for Marxism today: after a revolution society must still be administered by experts and technicians who have more power and higher incomes than ordinary workers and peasants, and who enjoy a privileged position which they have a conscious or unconscious interest in maintaining and sharing with their children. This problem has been treated as part of a problematic of bureaucracy rather than class since 'class' is defined as part of the property system; but if the managerial stratum is interpreted as an incipient ruling and exploiting class, then a new class struggle must be launched against it. The revolution is not a final solution.

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JOHN V. CANFIELD, *Wittgenstein — Language and World*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press 1981. Pp. x + 230. US\$ 17.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87023-318-1); US\$ 7.50 (paper: ISBN 0-87023-319-X).

This book, after an introductory 'Overview' of Wittgenstein's thought, has two main parts, a longer one called 'Criteria' and a shorter one, 'Necessity,' which examines the modal status of grammatical propositions. For reasons of space this review will concentrate on the part on criteria.

Canfield tells us in his Preface: 'Criteria link language and the world. ... The position on criteria I present is not meant to be of exegetical interest only. ... I try to say what the relationship between language and the world is, in Wittgenstein, and in truth.'

On Canfield's theory, Wittgensteinian criteria answer the question 'How do you know?' (33). They are revealed by the paradigms by means of which

judgments are taught and justified ('That's what we call a "deer"'), (*ibid*). More specifically, 'a criterion determines truth conditions' (40). It 'is the final grounds, which hold by linguistic convention, for settling the truth of the judgment' (98). So criteria are *decisive*. If the criterion (C) for a given judgment (S) is met,* then the question as to the truth of S is settled, affirmatively, once and for all; and that it is so settled is a matter of 'convention' or 'definition.' 'If C is met then S is true' 'is a truth of depth grammar' (63).

So criteria are not to be regarded as evidence, even 'necessary evidence' — where this means that it is a necessary truth that C is evidence for S. On this, the 'non-inductivist' view (held, we are told, by most interpreters of Wittgenstein), criteria are not decisive; it is always possible that C is met and S is false. In a moment we will look at Canfield's chief objection to this view.

But if criteria are decisive, what are we to make of all the apparent counter-examples — though moaning and complaining he's not really in pain; despite the wet and cold and the visual impressions it's not in fact raining? Well, Canfield assures us, these items are not, in Wittgenstein or in truth, our criteria for pain or rain; they are only symptoms. For a simpler society, a society that knew neither guile nor rain-simulating devices, these would be the criteria; for us they are not. 'We can put our criterion for "He is in pain" as follows: if it is a case like this or this or this where paradigms are pointed to, and if these are instances of genuine (or non-pretense) behavior, then it is true the person is in pain' (114). And for rain: 'if things look like this, then unless there is artificially simulated rain (as in movie making), then it is rain.' (49). (The criteria for pretence [and presumably for rain-simulation] are themselves behavioral, we are reminded, so no hidden something is implied in these formulations.) The criterion absorbs the purported counter-example, which therefore ceases to be one. And so also for any counter-example we might propose.

Now this, while guaranteeing the decisiveness of criteria, seems only, as Canfield realizes, to open the gap in another place: how can we know that our criterion for pain (or rain) is ever met? Wouldn't we have to know the falsehood of countless hypotheticals? But Canfield invokes our good sense. What do you mean, perhaps it's an elaborate hoax, maybe he's a soviet mole: '(he) is no mole but my half brother. I have lived with him from early childhood' (121). We do not have to disprove every 'paranoid phantasy.' So someone's behavior here and now can, after all, given favorable circumstances, be a paradigm — of *guileless* pain behavior.

So much for the main thrust of Canfield's theory of criteria. Some of the views expressed may be unobjectionable, as far as they go. That criteria in Wittgenstein are somehow a function or part of the language game, that they are not brute data, seems right. And there may also be something right in the idea that criteria are not primarily evidence. But I think Canfield's argument against the evidence view reveals a substantial difficulty in his own account. His argument runs as follows. The non-inductivist's supposition that, though we judge S to be true on the basis of the criterion C, S might be false, is incoherent. For, on that supposition, there can be no satisfactory answer to the

question of what criterion governs the judgment Not-S:

Either the criterion governing not-S is the same as the criterion involved in the original judgment, or it is not. If it is the same criterion, then it must yield the same answer, namely S, and not not-S. If it is different, then it will not follow from not-S, as asserted on the basis of this new criterion, that the original judgment S made on the basis of a different criterion is false. (90-1)

This is to be expected if we know in advance that criteria determine truth conditions. If C gives the condition of the truth of S, then C is certainly incompatible with not-S. (Canfield is in fact saying more than this, for he claims that the non-inductivist cannot 'consistently with his own principles' [90] allow any criterion for not-S, which, if I understand it, imputes to the non-inductivist the view that criteria determine truth conditions).

Now consider, again, Canfield's own account. He wants to say, reasonably enough, that for people for whom pretence or rain-simulation do not exist, this (moaning, etc.) and that (wet and cold, etc.) are, without qualification, criteria of pain and of rain. In time people became devious, of course, and also made movie sets, so the criteria were changed to incorporate these developments. (And can't they change again? Is [deliberate] simulation the only pitfall?) But how, on Canfield's principles, is any such change possible? How could the first man to stumble on to a movie set have judged, in the face of his criterion for rain, that it was not raining? What would be his criterion for not-S such that it contradicts his original S? A theory according to which criteria are decisive must, it seems, recognize the possibility of adjustments which, on its own showing, are ruled out.

There is rather a lot of polemicizing in this book, and much that seems ad hoc. I would have welcomed more of an effort on the author's part to probe the issues and to connect them. He is, for example, very sketchy on the crucial relation of criterion to meaning. And the book conveys so little of Wittgenstein's attitude to philosophy — not just in that it presents the issues in a cut-and-dried fashion (which can be a relief) — but that it is too often too quick, too complacent; for example, in its frequent admonishings to the effect that this or that makes no sense, that it violates the logic of our language, has no role in the language game. As if there were no problem, and especially for Wittgenstein, about how it is that something that seems deeply significant has no sense at all. There is no getting around it, I think; if one does not recognize this problem, and work with it, calling such things senseless is bound to sound dogmatic, and to be unconvincing.

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* A criterion is 'met', as opposed to being merely 'manifested', only if the rule 'If C then S' is correct for the speakers of the language game at issue. (The idea, I take it, is that criteria are not just brute data, affecting our judgments out of the blue. For something to be our criterion it has to be the one we use.)

MARTIN DAVIES, *Meaning, Quantification, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical Logic*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981. Pp. xii + 282. Cdn\$ 56.25. US\$ 32.00. ISBN 0-7100-0759-0.

The author describes his book (p. ix) as 'not introductory in the (positive) sense that it would be readily intelligible to someone who had no prior acquaintance with philosophical logic,' but as 'introductory in the (negative) sense that nobody who has engaged upon serious research in philosophical logic will find much, or perhaps anything, that is new here.' This strikes me as too modest, and I suspect Davies is overly optimistic when he recommends the book as an introductory text for final-year undergraduate or first-year graduate students. Be that as it may, the book should be valuable for North American readers as an introduction to recent writings of British (primarily Oxford) philosophers on a variety of topics in philosophical logic and the philosophy of language. The three authors perhaps most often cited in the text are John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, and the late Gareth Evans (to whose memory the book is dedicated), with Kripke, Davidson, and Dummett close behind.

Rather than concern himself with 'lower-level' questions about the semantic contributions of particular words, Davies says he finds it natural to begin with 'higher-level' questions about 'the theoretical concepts which are crucially employed at the lower level; for example, the concepts of meaning, truth, and semantic structure' (ix). He begins in fact, in the first chapter, with a discussion of the concept of meaning, using the results achieved there, in the next chapter, to explain the concept of truth. In preferring this order of explanation Davies takes sides with 'Grice's Programme' by 'reversing an order of priorities which has been constitutive of what might be called "Davidson's Programme"' (x). This is promising, if it works, for if we know when a sentence *s* means *p* we then have its truth condition if we acknowledge that *s* is true iff *p* in case *s* means *p*.

So Davies starts by trying to construct a 'theory₁' of meaning, a theory, that is, which yields theorems of the form

$$s \text{ means in } L \text{ that } p$$

for each sentence *s* of language *L*. The ultimate aim is to come up with a 'theory₂' of meaning which provides an illuminating, philosophical analysis of the concept. Since there is a tendency to think of theories₁ of meaning as trivial, Davies takes time out (4 f.) to cite some of the important features of such a theory. I will mention only the fifth, which is on the face of it implausible and admittedly stipulative, but which has important consequences for Davies' project. Davies says a language *L* is to be seen as an 'unchangeable thing.' If in fact 'Es regnet' does mean in German that it is raining, then it is essential to the existence of German that the sentence mean just that. If the in-

habitants of a secluded hamlet in Bavaria meant something else by 'Es regnet' (e.g., that the beer lacks body) then, the location of their village and the rest of their language notwithstanding, these people wouldn't speak German. What is contingent is that the citizens of Germany speak German. And they wouldn't if they meant something else by 'Es regnet.'

Davies imposes a 'propositional attitude constraint' on any adequate theory₁ of meaning. His aim is to explain what it is for L to be the 'actual language' of a population G, i.e., given the 'fifth point' above, what it is for the meaning specifications (theorems) of a theory₁ to be just the meanings that speakers of L intend their utterances to have. Before kinds of speech acts (types of utterance) can be paired with the appropriate propositional attitudes, a theory of 'force' is needed, a theory which describes utterances as kinds of speech acts. Once all this is in place, Davies proposes a complex Gricean description of what it is for L to be the actual language of G.

If we now know, at least in rough outline, what it is for s to mean in L that p, it is then easy enough to say when s is true in L.

(T) From: s means in L that p

Infer: s is true in L iff p.

We can now see the advantage of choosing to explain truth in terms of meaning rather than vice versa. From (T) and the appropriate meaning theorem we have

'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white

and since (with 'iff' construed as material equivalence)

Snow is white iff the earth moves

we have

'Snow is white' is true iff the earth moves

which blatantly fails as a meaning specification. So the converse of (T) is false.

Since a sentence's meaning what it does in L is essential to the existence of L, Davies says (29) that we can assign strict truth conditions to the outputs of a theory₁ of truth. This has the happy, if somewhat arbitrary, consequence that we can accept ' "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white' while rejecting ' "Snow is white" is true iff the earth moves,' since only the former is true when 'iff' is given a modal reading. But we also want a theory₂ of truth that will give us a motivated explanation of why ' "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white' is right but its materially equivalent mates aren't. What we need for this, Davies says, is the right sort of 'canonical proof procedure': 'an effective strategy for producing, for each sentence of the [object language] in question,

a truth condition specifying biconditional whose right hand side is free of semantic vocabulary' (33). We can then test the adequacy of our theory₁ of truth for L by requiring that it, together with its canonical proof procedure, be 'interpretational for L,' which it is iff the result of replacing 'is true in L iff' by 'means in L that' in the theorems of the truth theory gives us precisely the set of correct meaning specifications for the sentences of L.

In the space remaining I will touch on a few of the many interesting issues Davies engages in. The first, which he attributes to McDowell (although its roots can likely be traced to Russell's logical atomism), is that the meanings of sentences containing genuine proper names are 'existence dependent' (see 96 f.). Assuming that 'Scott' functions as a genuine name, then I can't believe that Scott wrote *Waverley* unless Scott (tenselessly) exists. I can have a thought which I represent by the sentence 'Scott wrote *Waverley*' without Scott's existing. But the thought I have when I actually think that Scott wrote *Waverley* would not exist if Scott didn't. A consequence of this is that what a person says and thinks isn't entirely up to him. Mental effort alone won't enable him to think that Scott wrote *Waverley*. Nothing will, if Scott doesn't exist. If we grant this (and I think we should) it would seem to be 'a conclusion quite inconsistent with a description theory of thought' (107), according to which no sentence of the form 'S believes that α is F' entails the existence of anything other than the subject S. And this is as it should be if ' α ' is in fact a truncated description. But then it follows that names can't be short for descriptions in belief statements if the meanings of such statements are 'existence dependent' in the way they seem to be.

Davies introduces (102) the notion of a 'way-of-thinking' (WT) predicate in order to explain how Ralph might think that Hesperus appears in the evening but that Phosphorus doesn't. (As Davies points out, this is something like Frege's idea that the sense of a proper name is the 'mode of presentation' of the name's referent. And it is even more like what Hartry Field says in 'Logic, Meaning, and Conceptual Role' [390 f.].) The strategy of associating WT predicates with names is adopted in order to explain how the hapless Ralph can practice his inconsistency, and to explain this without endorsing either the description theory or the 'ordered-pair' theory of names. According to the latter, the content of a belief or statement that α is F is represented as an ordered pair whose left member is the object named and whose right member is the predicate (or property) asserted or believed of that object. On the ordered-pair conception, the belief that Hesperus is F has to be the same as the belief that Phosphorus is F if the singular terms are co-denotative genuine names. But perhaps an ordered-pair theorist can accommodate Ralph's confusion by allowing that people sometimes say or believe that p while falling short of full understanding of what they say or believe, i.e., without knowing what it is for it to be the case that p . If this is admitted, then Ralph might be able to believe that x is F and that x is not F without realizing that this is what he believes.

Let 'N' be the necessity operator and let it have a 'weak' interpretation when 'N($F\alpha$)' is true iff α is F in every possible world in which α exists; and let

'N' have a 'strong' reading when ' $N(F\alpha)$ ' is true iff α exists and is F in every possible world. On the weak construal we might be prepared to accept that Socrates is necessarily human. But not on the strong, unless we're prepared to hold that there couldn't possibly be a world without Socrates. The weak interpretation jibes well with our intuitions here. But it has its problems. On the weak reading, there is no way to represent the sentence 'Socrates exists necessarily' and have it come out false, since Socrates plainly exists in every world in which he exists. And neither interpretation seems to do full justice to our intuitions concerning the pair of sentences

- (1) Liza Minnelli was necessarily born of Judy Garland
- (2) Judy Garland necessarily gave birth to Liza Minnelli.

Some people are inclined to think that (1) is true, given that LM is in fact the daughter of JG, while no one, so far as I know, is disposed to accept (2). Let us agree, for the sake of the point to be made here, that (1) is true while (2) is false. But on the strong reading both sentences come out false, since both require that LM and JG have necessary existence. The weak reading fares no better. Granting that ' x was born of y ' and ' y gave birth to x ' express the same relation, there is no way, on the weak reading, to accept (1) while rejecting (2), since (1) then asserts that every world in which LM exists is a world in which JG exists and in which LM was born of JG, while (2) says that every world in which JG exists is a world in which LM exists and JG gave birth to LM. Davies suggests (on p. 219) that we look at a recommendation of David Wiggins according to which a modal adverb may be used univocally either as a sentence operator (given a strong reading) or as a predicate operator. If we treat the occurrences of 'necessarily' in (1) and (2) as predicate operators, we can then agree to (1) if we think that having the parents we do is essential to our existence, while at the same time rejecting (2) if we take the reasonable position that our parents might not have met, might not have had any children, or at least might not have had us.

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PIERRE HAUBTMANN, *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon — sa vie et sa pensée, 1809-1849*. Paris: éd. Beauchesne, Bibliothèque des archives de Philosophie, Nouvelle série 36, 1982. 1140 p. 228FF. ISBN 2-7010-1035-7.

Ce volumineux bouquin de 1140 pages est en fait la publication de la thèse de Doctorat-ès-Lettres de Monseigneur Pierre Haubtmann, défendue à la Sorbonne, le 4 mars 1961. Pierre Haubtmann est né en 1912 à Saint-Etienne et il est mort accidentellement en 1971, alors qu'il était Recteur de l'Institut Catholique de Paris. L'auteur a été aumônier National de l'Action Catholique Ouvrière, Professeur à l'Institut d'Etudes Sociales, fondateur du Secrétariat Général de l'Information et il assura ainsi pendant le Concile l'information religieuse pour les journalistes. C'est en 1942 qu'il découvre Proudhon et grâce à l'amitié qui l'a lié aux descendants de Proudhon, il eut accès ainsi à tous ses manuscrits inédits. Haubtmann a travaillé Proudhon pendant 20 ans: cette biographie critique en est l'œuvre principale, mais il faut aussi y ajouter sa thèse complémentaire de Doctorat-ès-Lettres — 'La philosophie sociale de Proudhon' — son 'Proudhon et la pensée allemande' — thèse de doctorat de l'Institut d'Etudes Sociales — et son 'P.-J. Proudhon, Genèse d'un athéiste' — thèse de doctorat en théologie; il faut encore citer les publications suivantes: 'Marx et Proudhon, leurs rapports personnels, 1844-1847,' les 'Carnets inédits de P.J. Proudhon' et 'Lettres à ma femme de P.J. Proudhon.' Ce livre est donc la publication posthume de l'ouvrage principal de Pierre Haubtmann, un grand spécialiste de la pensée de Proudhon.

Ce volume comporte un avant-propos, consacré à la vie et l'œuvre de Pierre Haubtmann, et en guise d'introduction la 'Présentation de thèse' faite par l'auteur, lors de la soutenance de sa thèse principale. Il est divisé en trente-deux chapitres, regroupés en quatre parties, selon les grandes périodes significatives de la vie de Proudhon. A la fin du livre, on trouve en appendice la reproduction des 'Annotations à la misère de la philosophie: réponse à la philosophie de la misère de M. Proudhon' de Karl Marx, publiées à Bruxelles en 1847; on trouve également une bibliographie, une table onomastique et une table des matières.

La première partie traite de 'l'enfance et la jeunesse' de Proudhon, 1809-1836. Il s'agit des quatre premiers chapitres qui couvrent respectivement son enfance à la campagne, ses années au collège d'Aubonne et ses années comme ouvrier d'imprimerie à la Maison Gauthier.

La deuxième partie, 'Maître-imprimeur, étudiant et auteur,' est consacrée aux influences qu'il a subies, au Procès du 3 février 1842, à ses trois mémoires sur la propriété et à son livre, 'De la création de l'ordre dans l'humanité, ou Principes d'organisation politique.' Cette partie est composée des chapitres V à XII et couvre la période de 1836-1843.

La troisième partie, intitulée 'L'avocat des Gauthier, 14 mai 1843-22 novembre 1847,' est divisée en trois sections: 'L'invasion allemande' (du chapitre XIII au chapitre XVII), 'La "Philosophie de la misère" et la "Misère de la philosophie"' (du chapitre XVIII au chapitre XX), enfin 'Le silence de Proudhon' (les chapitres XXI et XXII). Ces deux dernières sections traitent surtout des relations de Marx et Proudhon, suite à la publication de la 'Philosophie de la misère.'

Enfin, la quatrième partie qui va du chapitre XXIII au chapitre XXXII, intitulée 'Les grandes années, 1848-1858' (sic), analyse surtout les positions de

Proudhon dans la Révolution de 1848, puis sa condamnation et son emprisonnement en 1848.

Cet ouvrage sur la vie et l'œuvre de Proudhon sera incontestablement un instrument de référence essentiel à qui voudra étudier Proudhon. Cependant, il est à noter qu'il couvre seulement la période de la vie de Proudhon qui va de 1809 à 1849, par conséquent la période de sa vie qui va de 1850 à sa mort en 1865, n'est pas couverte.

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HOWARD JONES, ed. and trans., *Pierre Gassendi's Institutio Logica (1658): A Critical Edition with Translation and Introduction*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1981. Pp. lxviii + 172. US\$ 17.50. ISBN 90-232-1817-5.

Pierre Gassendi cut a large figure in the seventeenth century: his fame and influence, in metaphysics and even more in natural science, rivalled that of Descartes. Yet his work is not studied much today, especially by anglophone philosophers. The last book-length treatment of Gassendi in English, by G.S. Brett, was published nearly 75 years ago. As for texts, apart from the Objections to Descartes's *Meditations* in Haldane and Ross, the only English versions available have been the fragments, useful but limited, included in Craig Brush's *Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi* (New York 1972).

Jones's volume, therefore, is welcome. It contains a long introduction, an edited Latin text, and an English translation of one complete work. Gassendi wrote about logic at several times during his life; the *Institutio Logica* is both his most mature and his most systematic treatment of the subject. It was composed in the early 1650's as a part of the massive *Syntagma*, though it is a self-contained work. It was only published, however, in 1658, in the posthumous *Opera omnia*.

Gassendi, like Descartes, came early on to view the scholastico-aristotelian logic he had learned as a student as artificial and useless: his first published work was an elaborate attack upon the methods as well as the doctrines of the Aristotelians. For all of his strictures against received views, however, the *Institutio Logica* is a surprisingly traditional work. Its four main parts are devoted, respectively, to 'The Simple Imagination of Things' (which produces 'ideas'), 'The Proposition,' 'The Syllogism,' and 'Method.' The content of each part is set forth in a series of one-sentence 'Canons,' each

of which is elucidated in one or more following paragraphs. This division and this manner of presentation are dictated by Gassendi's conception of logic as 'the art of thinking properly' (*Ars bene cogitandi*), together with the doctrine that proper thinking comprises four operations: proper apprehension or conception, proper judgment, proper inference, and proper ordering of one's conclusions.

The novelty of Gassendi's treatment, such as it is, derives mainly from his effort to simplify and reorganize this traditional material. In discussing the categorical syllogism, for example, he redefines 'figure' and 'mood' in such wise that the number of distinct figures and moods is reduced from three and nineteen, respectively, to two and six; yet all the possible forms are accounted for. It is true that Gassendi's more distinctive epistemological and metaphysical doctrines — doctrines arrived at under the influence of Sextus and Epicurus rather than Aristotle — are sometimes brought into his exposition of logical matters: he says that we have to take care to form our ideas properly, for example, because our ideas originate via the senses, and the senses sometimes deceive us. But these doctrines have little effect on the substance of Gassendi's treatment of logic.

Jones's introduction is clear and informative. It consists in large part of detailed summaries of Gassendi's writings on logic and related matters other than the *Institutio Logica*. There is also a useful analysis of the *Institutio Logica* itself.

I am not in a position to judge Jones's editorial work. Suffice it to say that he has taken the trouble to collate the one printed text — that of the 1658 collected edition of Gassendi's writings — with the autograph manuscript that the 1658 editors themselves used. He has also incorporated corrections of errors that were listed in a 1727 Florentine reprint of the 1658 edition. One can only be grateful for this sort of scholarship, and applaud it.

As for the English translation, it appears to be generally sound. Jones has chosen, however, to translate more freely than literally. Purists may quarrel, for example, with his rendition of *intuitio* as 'focusing process' (pp. 1 and 80), or with his failure to use the same English term consistently for the same Latin term. There are, of course, different opinions as to the importance or even propriety of such consistency. Nonetheless it is odd to switch from 'idea' to 'concept' in translating *idea*, as Jones does on p. 105, especially when the passage in question refers back to one in which *idea* was rendered 'idea' (84). Furthermore, inconsistency may cause misunderstanding, or introduce confusion not present in the original text. Thus, in his translation of Canons VII and VIII of Part I, where Gassendi is discussing the *perfectio* of which ideas are capable, Jones first uses the English 'complete' for *perfectus* (90). But then in the next Canon, where Gassendi makes the perfection of a (general) idea a function in part of its 'completeness' (*Idea generalis tanto est perfectior, quanto est completior ...*), the translator is forced to switch to 'perfect' for *perfectus*, in order to have 'complete' available for *completus*. Surely it would have been better to have used 'perfect' for *perfectus* to start with!

Again, in Part IV, in his discussion of methods of teaching, Gassendi invokes the familiar distinction between the arts and the sciences as subjects of instruction. Teaching in the one case, he says, concerns something to be done (*de re operabili*), in the other, something to be viewed (*de re speculabili*) (Canon V, 74). In Jones's English, these different objects of teaching become 'the performance of an operation' and 'abstract investigation' (161), which is fair enough. But Gassendi refers to these objects again in the ensuing discussion, using the same expression in each case plus a more or less synonymous one by way of expansion: instruction in the arts is *de agibilibus, sive operabilibus rerum*, whereas that in the sciences is *speculabilium, contemplabiliumve ... rerum*; and here Jones calls the objects 'making or doing' and 'matters of observation and research.' Apart from the impropriety of 'observation' here (since it suggests an empirical or sensory as opposed to a rational procedure — a distinction Gassendi has drawn just above in Canon IV), the change of English expression obscures the connection between the two passages. The situation is complicated even further when Jones uses a form of the English 'observe' to translate a form of *contemplari* as well as forms of *speculari* (twice) in a single two-sentence stretch of text later on in the discussion of Canon VIII (77 and 164). In this same passage two additional occurrences of (forms of) *contemplari* are translated 'scrutinises' and 'contemplates,' respectively.

Despite such deficiencies in the translation, Jones's volume on the whole is a valuable addition to the resources available to the scholar of seventeenth-century philosophy.

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MICHAEL KING, *The Framework of Criminal Justice*. Totowa, NJ: Biblio Distribution Center (for Croom Helm) 1981. Pp. 159. US\$ 30.00. ISBN 0-7099-0430-4.

What is the rationale of the criminal justice system? As philosophers, we are inclined to think in terms of theories of punishment or treatment, of deterrence versus retribution and the like. We discuss what ought to be. Meanwhile, there is in existence a large, lumbering, costly system involving many participants, each having a particular professionally-biased view as to what

the system is supposed to accomplish. Given the conflicting perspectives of police officers, lawyers, judges, probation officers, correctional staff, and accused persons, it is not surprising that many well-intended reforms suffer a fate similar at a systems level to that of a new and challenging idea introduced into the mind of an individual suffering from what William James called 'old-fogyism.' The analogy is misleading, however, in that it suggests more coherence to the system than King's study would lead us to believe exists.

King believes that if theoreticians are to theorize responsibly, they should take the trouble to find out how their ideas are translated into practice. The book is aimed at providing both insights into the practice, and analytical tools for approaching study of the practice. It is based partly on the author's experience of 10 years as solicitor working in English Magistrate's courts. If he is right, no single model can describe the criminal justice system coherently. He provides us with six different models which are like caricatures, distortions helping us to understand the reality. I think it is helpful to see them as successive overlays of transparencies. As such, they help us to keep alive to the competing forces driving the machinery of justice one way or another. King makes no claim to originality with the models, which individually have been advanced by others. His contribution lies rather with his claim that all six are needed for adequate understanding.

I am not sure that the word 'model' is the best to use. It smacks of some social science pretentiousness, and two of the models are different in kind from the others. But he provides us with some valuable insights. The models are: crime control, due process, medical, bureaucratic, status passage and power.

Under crime control we find the usual theories of punishment. This model will likely dominate the thinking of enforcement officers who are bent on making sure that offenders are caught and convicted. These aims run counter to the second model, that of due process, which civil libertarians, lawyers, and other members of the public may wish to stress. Here the rules of evidence, right to counsel, restrictions on police interrogation and the like receive prominence.

The medical model covers aspects of the treatment-oriented approach to offenders. One finds this approach with probation officers, correctional officials (in public statements), and with many progressive thinkers.

The bureaucratic model is oriented toward cost-effectiveness, rapid processing of offenders through the system, rules, records and the like.

With these four models, there are numerous conflicts. The goals of crime control and economy compete with due process and treatment. It is much more convenient to have defendants plead guilty, and so police officers are not anxious to follow due process. When an accused is in detention, police have many psychological levers to encourage co-operation, including the length of detention. But these very levers, which may include psychological or other bullying, are also likely to run exactly counter to what one would prescribe on a treatment-oriented approach.

The two other models, status passage and power, are not so likely to

dominate the thinking of participants, but are useful analytical tools for observers of the system. If you assume that the system exists to ensure a lower social status to the offender, you can explain features of the system that are not so easily intelligible otherwise. Likewise with the neo-Marxist power model. There are features of the system which he thinks give some support to the idea that it exists to maintain the power of an elite, and that class conflict is at the basis of crime definition and enforcement.

Particularly worth noting are King's observations about legal aid, and his view of the professionals as operating with their own set of rules. Under legal aid the government pays, rather than the client, so the latter's status is lowered in relations with the lawyer. There is no check on quality. The client is too bewildered to complain about shoddy service, while the lawyer benefits from rapid turnover. Deals are made, plea-bargaining is rampant, and the immediate client may suffer for the sake of maintaining the lawyer's credibility within the system. The lawyer may be inclined to ingratiate himself with other regular participants, and may overlook irregularities in police questioning. According to two studies cited by King, some 75 per cent of defendants who asked to see a lawyer were not permitted to do so. (I am told by an experienced source at the Law Reform Commission that very roughly about 75-80 per cent of defendants in Canada plead guilty. There are currently no exact statistics on this proportion.)

King's study is based on Magistrates' Courts, and thus some of his observations are not directly transferable to the current situation in Canada. But the general framework and related problems are similar.

I conclude with some general worries about talking in terms of 'models' instead of what one puts forward as being the case. Such talk invites lack of rigour because criticism can be avoided by saying that they are 'only models.' Secondly, if we can understand the system only through models, and if the models are supposed to be caricatures of reality, how do we determine what is true and what is false in the caricature? Thirdly, effective reform requires spirited reformers with strong normative beliefs: yet the 'as if' approach hardly seems firm stuff on which to sustain a faith.

King's is a useful study, and if it encourages more attention by theoreticians to the messy business of human institutional workings, that will be all to the good. How else can one ensure that the latter are not operating like cancerous cells with their own logic and momentum, oblivious to their rationale or the social good they are supposed to be enhancing?

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DEREK LAYDER, *Structure, Interaction and Social Theory*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981. Pp. 155. Cdn\$ 35.75: US\$ 25.00.

This rather short volume tackles the large problem of what constitutes a viable general theory of social interaction. In the author's own words the thesis presented is that 'an adequate account must come to terms with the fact that "society" and its constituent elements are preconstituted and objective structures which constrain interaction, whilst recognizing that interaction itself has its own emergent properties and structures which are also influential in determining its course' (1). This thesis is advanced by means of a discussion and critique of how various other types of theory have approached the problem.

Layder identifies two basic types of approach. There is first of all the classic 'structural' orientation which has tended to focus its attention almost exclusively on the objective, external constraints upon interaction. Examples of this approach include sociological functionalism and most varieties of Marxism. Despite their serious differences on a host of other matters, Layder is correct in arguing that they share a fundamental bias — namely, both are impressed with the stubborn facticity and deterministic properties of objective social arrangements. Proponents of this approach typically downplay, or even discount altogether, the importance of studying individuals and their subjective constructions of reality. For structuralists, interacting individuals and their subjective states tend to be of sociological interest only to the extent that they may be seen to embody patterns of behaviour generated by structural factors.

In sharp contrast, social psychological approaches characteristically concentrate analytical attention upon the internal dynamics of interaction situations. The rationale informing this rejection of structuralism usually centers on the charge that the latter posits a mechanical theory of action whereby human beings are reduced to hapless creatures at the mercy of forces beyond their control or comprehension. Such an approach is said to rob human actors of their creative powers, thereby vitiating the importance of emergent and/or novel forms of interaction. This perspective is best exemplified in modern sociology by symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology. Both of these approaches center their analyses on the meanings and tacit understandings evolved by individual actors in the mundane settings of everyday life.

Layder thus underlines the persisting antinomy in sociological theory between 'structural' theories and 'action' theories. He argues quite persuasively that both of these approaches are insufficient to stand on their own as a general theory of interaction. Each is said to be limited by an ontology and epistemology that bar it from appreciating the essential insights of the other. As tools to aid us in the apprehension of social reality both are bound to yield 'lopsided' accounts which miss crucial elements in the relationship between

individuals and society. It should be noted that Layder is not simply repeating the hollow platitude to the effect that each of these approaches contains a kernel of truth. He is rather asserting that what needs to be acknowledged is the existence of an inherent dualism of analytically distinct 'ontological domains.' Accordingly, Layder contends that the structure — interaction duality is theoretically indispensable in sociology. This contention is at the heart of his critique of recent attempts (e.g., those by Giddens, Bourdieu) to dialectically synthesize the opposing theories. In his view these theoreticians have collapsed the dichotomy between structure and interaction by 'dissolving the ontological premises upon which they rest.' Layder finds this unacceptable because the dualism is not just a device born of theoretical partisanship but 'reflects a division in social reality itself.' Instead of a synthesis of the two approaches which is oblivious to the integrity of these differentiated features of social reality, Layder proposes the building of a theoretical bridge that would allow us to articulate the empirically variable relations between these different realms.

The author further argues that this bridging cannot be accomplished if social theory remains tied to an epistemology which is unable to underwrite the idea of social structure as preconstituted and constraining. In the nature of the case, at least as Layder sees it, this rules out any scheme informed by an empiricist conception of knowledge. Empiricism's requirement that theorizing must be restricted to things that are observable, testable and measurable is said to stand in the way of adopting a conception of structure that does not merely describe surface appearances but is able to explain the underlying generative mechanisms which give rise to certain observable manifestations. To his credit, Layder's misgivings with empiricism stop well short of eschewing the need for disciplined empirical investigation in the study of society.¹

All this is preliminary to the author's setting forth an alternative framework designed to address the deficiencies of previous efforts at theoretical synthesis. A companion chapter attempts to demonstrate the empirical utility of this proposed scheme by drawing upon the author's research on work and interaction amongst professional actors in contemporary Britain. These chapters struck me as somehow anti-climatic; in my judgment the model presented will probably prove forgettable because it fails to develop a deeper understanding of what is analytically most significant about social life. This is especially unfortunate inasmuch as it may detract from the salience of what should be of enduring value in this book — namely, Layder's compelling arguments concerning the necessity and feasibility of bridging the gulf between structural and psychological approaches in sociology.

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Interprète bien connu de Husserl et de Heidegger, Emmanuel Lévinas n'a jamais manqué de reconnaître sa dette envers ses maîtres, mais en même temps, il est le plus insatisfait des disciples. La source de cette insatisfaction n'est-elle pas le fonds hébraïque qui enractive le philosophe dans des profondeurs que n'atteint pas le discours immanentiste des maîtres? Lévinas avoue son souci de traduire le 'non-hellénisme de la bible en termes helléniques. ... Il n'y a rien à faire: la philosophie se parle en grec.' (137) Mais cette hellénisation tournerait à la réduction s'il était vrai que le sens était entièrement modelé par le langage. Lévinas devra donc contester cela. Il le fait dans un plaidoyer pour 'une intelligibilité plus ancienne que celle qui se manifeste comme compréhension de l'être embrassable et ainsi constituable par la conscience et qui règne comme monde. Signification par transcendence, plus ancienne que celle qui régit l'*esse*, même si, à son tour, elle se laisse montrer dans le langage qu'elle appelle et suscite pour entrer dans des propositions à forme ontologique et ontique.' (187) L'Auteur admet donc que ce palier de signification plus fondamental que la visée de l'*esse* ne peut se passer du discours ontologique. La différence, c'est que chez lui l'horizon intentionnel de ce discours ne prend pas son origine dans le moi, fût-il l'ego transcendantal, car alors se déployerait seulement une pensée qui cherche et se cherche à partir de soi. Plus radicalement, la pensée doit faire son ontologie à partir d'une limite où elle-même est cherchée et posée par le tout autre, d'abord, plus immédiatement, par cet autre qu'est le prochain, puis, ultimement, par le tout autre infini qui fonde l'horizon ontologique en le circonscrivant. Sur ce point, Lévinas invoque Descartes: le cogito connaît sa finitude immanente à partir de l'idée de l'infini qui est sa faille d'origine et la marque du Créateur dans la créature intellectuelle. De même que l'âme était plus connaissable que le corps, l'infini transcendant est plus connu que la finitude immanente. On soupçonne bien que dans ce contexte le vocable 'connaissance' prend un poids autre que celui qu'il a dans le contexte d'un savoir théorique immanent.

Au lieu de nous représenter l'horizon intentionnel comme se déployant à partir de la conscience humaine, à partir du pouvoir de connaître, ce retournement le représente comme se constituant à partir de la limite posée par l'autre. Ce qui correspond d'ailleurs à l'expérience: la pensée, initialement, surgit comme un événement. Elle arrive et se reçoit à partir d'un rien de soi qui est le tout de l'autre. Cela invite à la concevoir comme réelle par une élection constituante venant de l'autre. 'Profondeur d'un subir que ne comprend aucune capacité, que ne soutient plus aucun fondement, où échoue tout processus d'investissement et où sautent les verrous qui ferment les arrières de l'intériorité.' (110) Quelque chose comme l'*intimior intimo meo* d'Augustin, quelque chose que Lévinas n'hésite pas à qualifier de 'non-intentionnel,' (260) puisqu'il est l'a priori même de l'intentionnalité. Dans la discussion avec Husserl, cela se traduit par la contestation d'un principe, qui

se trouvait déjà chez Brentano, selon lequel 'C'est le savoir en tant que conscience donatrice originaire sous toutes ses formes qui est l'ultime source de droit pour toute affirmation rationnelle.' (269)

Si Heidegger annonçait un dépassement de la métaphysique afin de rappeler l'être de son oubli, Lévinas invite au dépassement de la philosophie de l'être en tant qu'à son tour elle oublie quelque chose, à savoir cette constitution de l'intentionnalité à partir de ce qui la transcende, constitution qui ne peut certes pas entrer comme objet théorique dans l'horizon de la pensée, mais qui a du *sens*, au-delà de l'intentionnalité, à titre d'une *demande*, d'une pure demande pour laquelle la réponse ne peut se présenter dans l'immanence. Etant donnée la facticité de la venue au monde de la pensée, aucune présence de l'être dans l'immanence de l'horizon intentionnel ne peut éclairer cette origine qui est, au contraire, sa condition. Dans cette limite, il n'y a aucune possibilité de penser le *droit d'être*, mais seulement la possibilité de penser une représentation de soi, telle qu'elle peut trouver un contenu dans l'accumulation des prédictats tous également pris dans ce monde qui advenait avec l'avènement factice de la conscience. Le *soi* ne trouve là aucune justification de son être. Donc 'il faut rester attentif à une intrigue de sens autre qu'ontologique et où se met en question le droit même d'être.' (254)

Les articles, conférences et communications qui composent ce volume trouvent leur unité dans ce mouvement de pensée vers un sens transcendant au-delà du sens immanent à l'intentionnalité. Le titre illustre bien ce renversement: ce n'est pas l'idée qui conduit à Dieu, mais c'est plutôt Dieu 'qui vient à l'idée.' A moins d'être ainsi investie, visitée, constituée par le tout autre, l'idée n'a qu'un sens immanent et son dieu est une idole, puisqu'elle est l'a priori de son apparition comme réalité affirmée.

Du côté français, quelque chose bouge en théologie philosophique. Le livre de Lévinas a été suivi de près par deux autres ouvrages qu'il vaut la peine de lire en parallèle: *Dieu sans l'être* (Fayard) de Jean-Luc Marion et *Le Dieu commun* (Seuil) de Guy Lafon.

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MARY MARGARET MACKENZIE, *Plato on Punishment*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1981. Pp. x + 278. US\$ 24.50. ISBN 0-520-04169-0.

This well-conceived and ambitious book is much more than a detailed examination and critical evaluation of Plato's theory of punishment. The first

two parts of the book carefully build a philosophical and historical context for the discussion of Plato and gradually develop a paradoxical view of punishment: all philosophical attempts to justify punishment fail and yet our moral intuitions seem to require that we punish.

Part I, 'Theories of Punishment,' offers a careful analysis of the concept of punishment and its possible justifications as well as a critical evaluation of contemporary attempts at justification. Mackenzie's central contention here is that none of the major current philosophical theories of punishment provide a successful justification of the institution of punishment. After an initial analysis of the concept of punishment, she defines 'punishment' as 'Suffering deliberately inflicted by a penal authority upon a criminal for his crime, insofar as he is responsible for that crime' (12). Mackenzie then distinguishes three main types of penal theory (retributivist, utilitarian, and humanitarian) according to two factors: (1) the theory's view of the purpose of punishment and (2) the theory's view of the criminal as a means or as an end. Her detailed discussion of these theories effectively summarizes most of the major criticisms, rebuttals, and counter-criticisms advanced by recent advocates of competing theories of punishment against their opponents. Mackenzie's own position regarding retributivism is that its central concepts — desert, moral responsibility, and justice — are opaque or incoherent. At the same time, she holds that both utilitarianism and humanitarianism are subject to criticism insofar as they reject or ignore considerations of justice. A utilitarian theory unqualified by a principle of justice may fail to account for 'residual moral feelings,' thereby losing 'its persuasive force for those who believe that distribution is important' (49-50). Humanitarianism may 'beg the institution' by defending some analogue of punishment which 'ignores a real need in the community which could not be served by its reformative analogue' (223). Thus, held singly, the theories are objectionable on these and other grounds. Any attempt to conjoin the central principles of any two of the theories, however, while giving each equal priority, results in irresolvable conflicts. Given these difficulties, Mackenzie asks whether any theory of punishment can avoid these objections.

In Part II, 'The Classical Tradition,' the conceptual tools provided by the careful preliminary analysis of Part I are used effectively in Mackenzie's discussion of the evolution of punishment in Homeric and post-Homeric Greece. The discussion serves two important functions. *First*, it exemplifies Mackenzie's claim that the institution of punishment has deep cultural roots, that there are compelling reasons for adopting the practice. On Mackenzie's analysis of punishment, there are no punishments in the *Iliad*. But both the institution of punishment and justifications of punishment evolve as the *Iliad*'s de facto morality of the strong, which is tied to the dependencies of the communities of the Heroic Age, is gradually succeeded by moral values growing out of the different mutual dependencies of the polis — moral values which are instituted as a defense against victimization. The need for retributive justice grows naturally out of the concern of the weak with maintaining a just state of affairs. *Second*, the discussion locates some of the

antecedents of Plato's theory of punishment in 'the moral tradition of early and classical Greek literature' (67) and traces some of the problems he addresses to (a) the conflict between the 'morality of the victim' with its retributivist justice and the de facto morality of Homer's *Iliad* (exemplified by Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias*) and (b) the failure of a retributivist system of punishment to ensure fairness in the distribution of punishment, thus encouraging the opportunism and immoralism of the 'strong,' exemplified by Thrasymachus in the *Republic*.

Part III, 'Plato,' the core of the book, begins with chapters on Plato's moral foundations and moral psychology before dealing explicitly with Plato's position on punishment and concluding that he, too, is unable to resolve the difficulties endemic to theories of punishment. Mackenzie draws together various remarks on punishment found in Plato's dialogues (*Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Laws*) to develop an apparently consistent view of Plato's theory of punishment in relation to his whole moral theory and his tripartite psychology. Mackenzie argues that Plato's reformist theory of punishment, which has some utilitarian elements, is primarily humanitarian insofar as its major concern is with benefiting the 'curable' criminal by making him virtuous and executing the 'incurable' one for his own good. On Mackenzie's evaluation, Plato's theory is immune to many of the criticisms leveled against contemporary theories, but the price of this immunity, for Mackenzie, is a moral theory with an unacceptable metaphysical commitment. Furthermore, Plato is subject to the criticism that he 'begs the institution' by advocating a reformist analogue which is not the institution of punishment — one which fails to satisfy our moral intuitions about justice. Mackenzie maintains that Plato, too, feels the force of these intuitions and the retributivist tradition. She reads the eschatological myths of the *Republic*, *Gorgias*, and *Phaedo*, with their retributive punishments, as expressions of Plato's belief that ultimately 'justice does indeed prevail for all' even though the correct human penology is reformist and not retributive (230).

Mackenzie's overall endeavor is commendable and should stimulate controversial responses from philosophers of law as well as from scholars engaged in theorizing about the development of Greek morality and Plato's philosophy. One line of criticism that could be advanced against her reading of Plato is that she errs in holding Plato's theory of punishment to be consistently reformist and nonretributivist. In order to support this view Mackenzie must maintain that many of the statements made in Plato's discussion of laws dealing with homicide (*Laws* IX. 869e-874b) are not a part of Plato's theory of punishment but, like the content of the eschatological myths, simply an expression of Plato's belief that ultimately justice does prevail. As Mackenzie herself points out, however, according to passages such as those at IX.872e, 'Rewards and punishments will be determined by considerations of what the offender deserves' (229). This is certainly retributivist. Furthermore, the laws described by the stranger stipulate the penalties, including execution, which will be imposed on the guilty and designate the authorities who will impose the penalties: 'If a man be found guilty of such homicide, that is, of slaying

any of the aforesaid, the officers of the court with the magistrates shall put him to death and cast him out naked outside the city ...' (*Laws* IX.873b). Given Mackenzie's own definition of 'punishment,' this is certainly punishment. Mackenzie might respond that insofar as it is punishment, its justification is given earlier (*Laws* IX.863a) and is utilitarian and humanitarian. It seems to me, however, that this response already presupposes that Plato's theoretical position is consistently nonretributive and ignores, or attempts to explain away, many of the remarks made in the passages at issue, including the remark which concludes the discussion: 'This much then for ... the vengeance to be taken for death by violence' (*Laws* IX.874d). It may be that Plato is advocating two institutions — punishment for incurables and a reformist analogue for curables — and that part of the justification for the former is retributivist. In order to do justice to Mackenzie's work, however, the arguments against her view would have to be worked out with the same care and supported by the same kind of meticulous scholarship as those found in her book. Here, I can only suggest one possible line of argument.

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T.R. MARTLAND, *Religion as Art: An Interpretation*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 1981. Pp. vii + 220. US\$ 14.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-520-X); US\$ 10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-521-8).

This is an important, well researched and informative study of the worlds of art and religion. As the title suggests, it assimilates the latter to the former, that is, does not merely draw analogies between them. Martland conceives of both dynamically as ongoing activities or processes, whose basic function is neither descriptive nor aetiological, i.e. they neither illustrate nor explain given situations or problems. They are intrinsically creative, providing frames of perception and patterns of meaning, in terms of which men interpret their experiences and order their lives. Their most significant characteristics are novelty and the origination of new understanding. An example is Leonardo's *Last Supper* which gave new meaning to the empirical reality of the scene as comprehended up to that time (ch. I).

Art and religion stand in a dialectical relation to the heritage of the past. There is continuity as well as detachment. While their activities can only be

understood in the context of a tradition, they push in new directions, opening up hitherto unthought of dimensions. Martland seems to go too far, though, when he affirms that religion involves detachment from the initial motivating experience. While this may be true of art, it does not apply, e.g., to the revelation which Moses received at the burning bush or to Paul's vision on the road to Damascus.

Martland goes on to explicate creative advance in its relation to the given in Rudolf Otto's terms of *tremendum* and *fascinosum* respectively. But Otto held that while at a rationalized level fascination may attach to traditional values, it is an original aspect of the *tremendum* itself. Indeed it is a characteristic of an advance into untried regions that the values of the past have lost their fascination (ch. II, III).

Artistic and religious distancing from old understandings is thus intrinsic to 'creating or finding the yet-to-be.' This is borne out by the belief that anything so far revealed of god is less than God. In art it is implied in the suggestiveness of great works which hint at more than the artist has as yet been able to embody in visual form (ch. IV).

Martland exhibits the distinctly creative character of art and religion by contrasting them with craft and magic. The former disclose the hitherto unknown, while the latter neither distance from the known nor create the new. They master the given, use and exploit it. The artist and religious person are unaware whether their calling will take them. The magician and craftsman serve preconceived ends, which are neither rooted in, nor grow out of their activity. But perhaps we should not forget that the artist too must be a craftsman before he can follow his creative impulses (ch. V).

Since artists and religious persons act without a pre-ordained purpose or plan, what they are doing becomes only clear as their work progresses. 'They deliver their own meaning and content' which they impose on the culture of their time by imposing it on their own work, which thus coalesces with its fulfilment. As Heidegger pointed out, Hölderlin's elegy 'Homecoming' is not a poem about homecoming, the elegy itself is the homecoming (ch. VI).

Next Martland considers in which sense his twin activities are 'true-to' their appropriate circumstances, modeling his view on Austin's doctrine of performative utterances. Like him, he denies that sincerity or internal spiritual acts are relevant. Artistic and religious activities, he holds, are true to a many layered context which, however, becomes what it is because those acts reverberate into it, i.e., they themselves coalesce with that to which they are true. Moreover, they are true to the total (future) drift of the ever expanding present context. Obviously these cannot be normative criteria, for as author admits, a truth which is not yet finished is for ever receptive to the tomorrow (ch. VII).

Finally, how may we verify certain acts as artistic or religious rather than as products of craft and magic? We are offered several 'planks': (i) We must be willing to go along with them, i.e. practise a kind of empathy (which is a purely subjective condition). (ii) Verification must be in terms of their adequacy to the culture or tradition on hand (which is problematic since these

acts have themselves coalesced with the culture). Hence (iii) verification must come as a result of experiential sensitivity to, and participation in, the cumulative open-ended cultural process, enabling us to judge how far men within that culture are helped by those acts (ch. VIII).

In the last two chapters Martland has obviously not succeeded in formalizing his insights, and accordingly he confesses to the tentativeness and relativism of his schema. Has he in fact added to the generally held view that art will only prove itself with time? Religion is a different matter, though. Old Kingdom Egyptian sculpture, e.g. the scribe in the Paris Louvre, is still vital, but is ancient Egyptian religion? Religion may prove itself ever afresh in the here and now, and in this respect it is not as art is.

Next, I am convinced that the spirit of artists and religious persons *is* relevant. It is a necessary, though not sufficient condition of cultural achievement, and perhaps 'performative utterances' was an unfortunate model to choose when trying to account for man's creativeness. For once, they do not nearly commit us in the same measure. It follows that Martland's dynamic approach should not have been limited to activities, that is the outer dimension of human functioning. The contemplative, receptive side which underlies the birth of religious ideas as well as artistic creation, indeed the role of experience have gone all but unmentioned.

Nor is distancing from the past, especially in religion as radical as Martland lets it appear at times. There are two words for which I was on the look-out but could only find once or twice in incidental contexts: transformation and rediscovery. Notwithstanding these reservations, Martland's book deserves praise. It is competently argued, beautifully written and presents a wealth of valuable material.

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H.O. MOUNCE, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus: An Introduction*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981. Pp. viii + 136. Cdn\$ 41.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-12556-6); US\$ 19.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-54318-8); Cdn\$ 15.75 (paper: ISBN 0-631-12707-0); US\$ 7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-54319-6).

As the subtitle indicates, this short book was written as an *introduction to* Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. The author believes (rightly) that the previously

published commentaries are more suited to scholars, than to undergraduate students. Mounce set out to produce a book which would help the latter in 'finding their whereabouts' in Wittgenstein's difficult book. Hence, he says that his aim is 'simply to be useful rather than to produce a work of original scholarship' (Preface). After the Introduction, the rest of the book is devoted to twelve chapters (most of which are only six to nine pages long). The topics covered are: fact and thing; the proposition as a picture; the propositions of logic; the general form of a proposition; the equations of mathematics; generality; the laws of science; belief; solipsism; value; the propositions of philosophy; and the later view. There is also an appendix consisting of an analytical table of contents to the *Tractatus*. Mounce divides the *Tractatus* into 21 sections ranging from facts and states of affairs through what can be said and what can be only shown.

Since Mounce explicitly states that he has not set out to produce a contribution to Tractarian scholarship, it would of course be unfair to review it as if it were such a contribution. Hence I shall be mainly concerned with the question: Has Mounce achieved what he set out to do? Has he produced a book which will be accessible to undergraduates (and perhaps others) and which will help them to find their way about in the *Tractatus*?

Readers of the book should have no difficulty in understanding most of the book provided that they know modern, symbolic logic and have a minimal acquaintance with mathematics and science. However, the question remains: Will a (careful) reading of it provide an understanding of what is going on in the *Tractatus* sufficient for a student to be able to approach Wittgenstein's book on his/her own? I believe the answer is: Yes, for much of the *Tractatus*; but No, for a fairly large part of it. (Of course, part of the reason for the No answer stems from the differences in interpretation which occur among Wittgenstein scholars themselves.) Here are a few cases in which Mounce's discussion may cause problems.

In the Introduction, Mounce gives a brief but helpful account of Frege's logical system (though not with Frege's notation) and of Russell's philosophy of mathematics. He uses this material to clarify the distinction between the logical and the empirical which he claims provides the best entry into the *Tractatus*, and he ends the Introduction by clarifying some of Wittgenstein's views on logic and the philosophy of logic. I am not sure that this is the best way of getting into the *Tractatus*. But it certainly is one of several alternatives.

There is a different problem in the author's discussion of the picture theory. He makes several references to Wittgenstein's later philosophy. I have doubts that these are helpful unless the reader is familiar with Wittgenstein's later views. Perhaps Mounce assumes that the reader has such familiarity.

On the plus side, Mounce makes good use of analogies and models in explicating some of Wittgenstein's concepts and views. He also does very well in providing explications of some of Wittgenstein's main themes, including those which at first appear to be erroneous or peculiar. In this regard, Mounce's book is superior to other so-called introductions to the *Tractatus*. I

believe that any reader who makes an effort to throughly understand this little book will be equipped to make his/her way into the *Tractatus* and engage in his or her own interpretation of that vexing and amazing work.

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JEAN-CLAUDE MULLER, *Du bon usage du sexe et du mariage. Structures matrimoniales du haut plateau nigérien*. Québec: Serge Fleury; Paris: Editions l'Harmattan 1982. 283 p. ISBN 2-85802-252-6.

Ce livre étudie les structures matrimoniales d'une vingtaine de populations situées sur le haut plateau nigérien dans les environs de la ville de Jos. Les populations voisines des groupes envisagés ont très probablement les mêmes caractéristiques mais l'étude de Muller ne fait que le suggérer, invitant d'autres chercheurs à se pencher sur cette question. Chacune des populations qu'il passe en revue observe des règles de mariage telles que les alliances se différencient plutôt que se redoubler: si une femme contracte une alliance dans un groupe auquel le sien s'est déjà allié, on s'assure qu'elle contracte aussi d'autres alliances ailleurs. Chaque population réalise par ces règles un réseau de liens internes qui assure sa propre unification alors que, par ailleurs, elle n'est unie que de façon très lâche par des chefs, des aînés ou des rituels communs. De plus, chaque population paraît avoir pensé son système d'alliances matrimoniales en opposition à ceux que pratiquent ses différents voisins. Ainsi chacune se différencie des autres et se donne des moeurs singulières qui lui permettent de dénoncer les moeurs scandaleuses pratiquées par les autres. Chacune s'identifie en s'unissant matrimonialement autrement que les voisins. Chacune à sa manière combine différentes formes d'union parmi lesquelles on trouve le simple échange de soeurs et des mariages hyper-complexes, le mariage préférentiel ou exclusif et des mariages multiples, des mariages secondaires s'ajoutant à un mariage primaire, des relations pré-maritales ou des unions extra-maritales coexistant avec un mariage primaire et des mariages secondaires. En se donnant une combinaison particulière, chaque population arrive à se passer de l'ordre, du drapeau et des frontières qu'assurerait un Etat: elle réussit à se singulariser vis-à-vis de l'extérieur et tisse les liens qui assurent sa cohésion interne.

Ces sociétés se sont opposées sur certains points et s'imitent sur d'autres. Plus exactement, les oppositions se font à partir d'une combinatoire com-

mune. Chaque société est le reflet transformé des autres (20). Les différences entre elles ne sont pas seulement effectives, elles paraissent fabriquées logiquement, recherchées comme principe d'identification selon des voies que l'analyse structuraliste peut mettre à jour. Ces différences jouent sur plusieurs termes qui touchent aux fondements mêmes de l'organisation sociale. Par exemple, la filiation et l'appartenance à un groupe de descendance suivent des règles qui varient d'une société à l'autre. Mais dans toutes, l'attribution des enfants à tel ou tel lignage est la conséquence d'un système d'échange qui met en jeu les enfants comme leurs mères, le prix de la fiancée comme les autres prestations en vue d'acquérir des droits sur les femmes et leurs enfants. Ce n'est donc pas la référence à un ancêtre unilinéaire qui compte mais la distribution des enfants, selon des règles précises et propres à chaque population, entre le père de la mère, le géniteur ou un des maris statutaires particuliers de la mère. Par ailleurs, dans toutes les populations étudiées, les notions d'endogamie et d'exogamie doivent être envisagées en fonction des différentes unions. Les structures matrimoniales sont réglées moins par des prescriptions ou des interdits portant sur tel ou tel conjoint potentiel que par un schème global de réciprocité entre diverses unités échangistes. Et ces unités ne sont pas les mêmes s'il s'agit d'unions prémaritales, de mariages primaires ou de mariages secondaires. Ce schème vise à unir des groupes différents par les différents types d'union. Si une femme a plusieurs maris, ce schème assure que ceux-ci viennent de groupes différents. Les co'-épouses d'un homme doivent aussi provenir de groupes différents.

Les indigènes spéculent sur leurs différences et sur leurs structures matrimoniales: ils se comparent aux voisins et doivent bien comprendre la complexité de leurs propres structures. Ils ont donc déjà commencé le travail de l'anthropologue. Et ils mettent en question plusieurs idées bien établies de l'anthropologie sociale. On vient de le voir pour les notions de filiation, d'endogamie et d'exogamie. L'opposition entre structures matrimoniales élémentaires et complexes et entre échanges prescrits et aléatoires est aussi trop simple pour rendre compte des pratiques (et des spéculations) rencontrées sur le haut plateau nigérian. Dans certaines populations de ce haut plateau, les femmes sont obligées de circuler entre différents maris alors que les enfants appartiennent aux maris. Ce qui avait paru une impossibilité à certains anthropologues se fait: la femme emporte avec elle l'enfant d'un premier mari chez un second tant que l'enfant a encore besoin d'elle. Les hommes s'accommodent de cette situation. L'étude de J.C. Muller signale à l'occasion les tensions psychiques que crée le partage des épouses et des maris. Ces tensions ne sont pas les mêmes pour les deux sexes. Il arrive qu'elles donnent lieu à certaines manifestations psychosomatiques reconnues. Généralement une ritualisation poussée des comportements entre amants rivaux réussit à amortir la rivalité. Cependant, l'extrême mobilité des conjoints crée un climat d'incertitude émotionnelle difficile à supporter pour les hommes et pour les femmes.

Comprendre que tous ces usages hétéroclites du sexe et du mariage font du sens et correspondent à un 'bon usage' n'est possible qu'en se plaçant à un

point de vue à la fois structuraliste et comparatiste. Car il s'agit de structures qui ne font de sens qu'en les rapportant les unes aux autres. Ces structures 'se pensent les unes les autres dans une interrelation dialectique qui n'est qu'une détermination idéologique par l'Autre ...' (271).

On peut en effet parler de détermination idéologique. Chaque population vise à se différencier pour se différencier. Elle se singularise, par exemple, en matière de travaux réservés ou refusés aux femmes, en matière de prix de la fiancée ou de prestations sur les champs du beau-père, prestations qui peuvent être très lourdes et impliquer des travaux collectifs. On trouve donc ici une détermination de rapports de production très importants pour des raisons qui ne sont qu'idéologiques. Il faut noter que les droits sur une épouse ou sur ses enfants ne varient pas en fonction des prestations ou du prix exigés du fiancé. D'autre part, les singularités de chaque culture reposent sur une écologie et un mode de production fort semblables sur tout le haut plateau. Ce ne sont donc ni l'écologie ni le mode de production qui rendent compte de ces singularités. Ce n'est pas davantage 'un désir de la part des aînés de contrôler leurs cadets dépendants par l'extorsion d'un surtravail — ce qui est pratiquement le seul aspect retenu comme pertinent et digne d'attention par certains auteurs néo-marxistes —.' 'Elles sont l'expression directe du jeu superstructurel d'échanger les femmes d'une manière différente des groupes voisins' (163).

Les sociétés pré-industrielles semblent n'être déterminées qu'en un sens négatif par le mode de production. Celui-ci n'autorise pas n'importe quelle forme culturelle mais ne détermine pas telle ou telle forme particulière. L'utilité dans ces sociétés n'est pas définie dans une perspective comptabilisable de biens commercialisables. C'est bien ce qui se passe sur le haut plateau nigérian où les populations sont à la fois très démunies et capables de produire des surplus importants qu'elles affectent à 'faire du social': fabriquer de la bière, la boire en fêtant, se réunir entre soi et surtout se différencier des autres. Pour ce faire, on se donne des contraintes singulières.

La méthode suivie par l'auteur et imposée par son objet est aride. Il s'agit d'envisager chaque population, de recenser en détail ses pratiques matrimoniales, la façon dont les enfants sont attribués à tel ou tel lignage, la façon dont les droits sur une femme sont acquis. Il s'agit ensuite de comparer tous ces éléments avec ce que l'on trouve dans chacune des populations voisines. Les oppositions ne s'établissent jamais de façon prévisible, si bien qu'on ne sait pas où les chercher. On pourrait parler d'une combinatoire d'éléments sur lesquels se jouent les oppositions mais les éléments en jeu ne sont pas toujours les mêmes quand on passe d'une paire de sociétés à une autre paire. Chaque société correspond à une structure matrimoniale particulière et celle-ci prend tout son sens quand on la rapporte aux structures des sociétés voisines. Toutes ces structures se différencient donc au sein d'une métastructure mais celle-ci demeure ouverte et partiellement inexplorée. D'abord, les sociétés étudiées par l'auteur ne sont pas les seules à entrer dans la ronde des oppositions différentes. La métastructure n'est donc connue que par le biais des sociétés étudiées. Ensuite, les différentes

sociétés — tout comme l'anthropologue — n'ont pas fini de spéculer sur leurs oppositions. Elles peuvent en fabriquer de nouvelles ou en souligner de nouvelles. Et la distinction entre souligner et fabriquer n'est pas toujours tranchée. Il y a un facteur d'indétermination fondamental dans cette affaire: les indigènes fabriquent de la différence à partir d'éléments imaginés ou attribués à tort aux autres. Enfin, les oppositions jouent sur des éléments qui changent quand on se déplace dans la région. La métastructure n'est donc plus la même quand on se place à différents points de la région puisque c'est à des points de vue différents que se jouent les oppositions.

A plusieurs reprises, chaque fois qu'il peut répondre, Muller s'interroge sur l'ordre historique dans lequel les différentes populations qu'il étudie se sont établies là où elles se trouvent. A la lumière des oppositions qu'elles entretiennent, l'auteur peut parfois conclure que les structures de telle population ont été pensées à partir des structures de tels voisins, ces structures-ci jouant le rôle de donnée initiale à partir de laquelle ces structures-là ont été imaginées. Il y a dans cet exercice un grand intérêt théorique: il s'agit de saisir la genèse dans le temps d'une structure culturelle et de la métastructure au sein de laquelle s'identifient différentes structures culturelles.

Le titre du livre de Muller est à la fois juste, habilement suggestif et ironiquement trompeur. Tous ceux qu'il aguichera ne seront pas préparés aux plaisirs qu'il recèle.

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ANTHONY O'HEAR, *Education, Society and Human Nature: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981. Pp. xi + 173. Cdn\$ 34.95; US\$ 25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7100-0747-7): Cdn\$ 11.95; US\$ 9.75 (paper: ISBN 0-7100-0748-5).

Anthony O'Hear's *Education, Society and Human Nature* is subtitled *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* and would certainly rate as one of the best available, but it could very appropriately be subtitled as an introduction to philosophy in general. Commensurate with his claim that 'an introduction to the philosophy of education can hardly avoid being at the same time an introduction to philosophy itself' (x), O'Hear bases the various chapters upon arguments taken from such established philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Wittgenstein, Popper, Murdoch, Hamlyn, Quine, Dewey,

Mill and Marx, and the issues discussed span epistemology, ethics, social/political philosophy, and philosophy of mind and of religion. The book is not a mere survey, however; it is the elaboration and defense of O'Hear's own theory, supportive of a certain kind of general education in schools.

O'Hear develops his themes dialectically, drawing on the claims of established philosophers as working hypotheses to be critically examined. He invariably casts each subsidiary discussion in the form of a complete argument, and gives a fine demonstration of incisive philosophic reasoning which is yet devoid of uncharitable over-simplification of the arguments he is attempting to modify or refute. Especially noteworthy is his skilful employment throughout of anticipatory sketches and concluding summaries, making it unusually easy to keep one's bearings.

The book is deliberately presented as embodying a conception of philosophy of education which goes beyond the mere exploration of the 'logical geography' of educational discourse, since under such a limitation 'we may still have done nothing towards deciding which concept of education is desirable and why, and this is surely a question of the utmost philosophic importance' (3). There is thus a challenge here, and undoubtedly a healthy one, to the influential 'analytic' school of educational philosophy as represented by, for example, Scheffler and Peters. Nevertheless, where appropriate to his purposes, O'Hear demonstrates that as a logical geographer his hand is as steady as any.

The concept of education which O'Hear develops is one suited to the special needs of a citizenry of an 'open,' 'pluralistic' society. He is thus involved in a defense of open societies and, relatedly, a critique of attempts to found a general concept of education upon a concept of knowledge alone — as in Hirst's justification of his 'liberal' education. O'Hear labels his own concept 'liberal education,' distinguishes it from those of Peters and Hirst, and thoroughly examines the standard critiques of liberal and academic education — that it is unnatural, elitist, irreligious, undemocratic, socially divisive and irrelevant to real-life issues. Rousseau, Marx, Dewey, Young, Freire and Illich are among those who fare badly under this searchlight.

The study of physical science, mathematics, history, geography, social and behavioral sciences, a foreign language, literature and the arts, religions and ethics is rigorously supported as necessary for *general* education in a pluralist society, in order to fit people 'to make their own choices on as wide and informed basis as possible' (49), thereby 'ensuring that tyranny and exploitation are avoided' (65).

Especially interesting is O'Hear's discussion of the reason why happiness and self-fulfilment logically cannot be accepted as general aims in education (ch. 2), his rejection of relativism with regard to the truth of competing theories (ch. 3), the critique of Popper's thesis that there is a unity of method between natural science and explanations of human action (ch. 4), and the analysis of confusions in Jencks' and Dworkin's discussions of equal educational opportunity (ch. 6).

Considering how crucial it is in a discussion pertaining to education, it is unfortunate that in the section on understanding (ch. 3) the distinction between the meaning of 'understanding' and its publicly available expression is drawn but not maintained. There is a frequent slide into an identification of meaning with expression which makes logically impossible the later (important) conclusion that *novel* application rather than routine is the correct indication of understanding. If understanding is *identical* with behavior the idea of generating novel behavior *from* one's understanding is incoherent, and rote learning is indistinguishable from understanding. The emphasis on the public expression of understanding in this section could also be greatly enriched with a balancing discussion of Polanyi's arguments for the irrevocably personal, private aspect of all knowing (*Personal Knowledge* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962]) and their significant educational implications (R.T. Allen, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 12 [1978] 167-77). Helpful too here, considering the *academic* orientation of O'Hear's concept, would be an examination of the way in which understanding easily degenerates to 'inert ideas' when the educator does not have a concept of knowing in which truth goes beyond the satisfaction of established public criteria. Relatedly, O'Hear's critique of Bantock's thesis (ch. 6) that only middle and upper class students can benefit from academic studies would be more powerful if there were some mention of pedagogical principles relevant to the maintenance of a high level of interest in learning, especially where that learning is fairly abstract. After all, even the most appealing concept of education will not go far beyond the category of interesting speculations as long as a strong suspicion that it simply cannot be implemented is alive.

Nonetheless, the strengths of the book far outweigh its weaknesses. It is quite excellent and provocative literature for general philosophy and philosophy of education instructors, and offers a challenging scholarly thesis for philosophers and for educational theorists in the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, political science and history.

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THEODORE PLANTINGA, *Historical Understanding in the Thought of Wilhelm Dilthey*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1981. Pp. x + 205.
Cdn\$ 20.00. ISBN 0-8020-5475-7.

In his 'Introduction,' Plantinga explains that his chief concern is to 'get at Dilthey's message for Western civilization' by focussing upon his 'post-1900

doctrine of understanding,' especially in connection with his views on historical knowledge. However, he thinks that 'much of the Dilthey literature is misleading and inadequate, and ... there is at present no reliable guide to the main outlines of his thought' (4). Hence, he feels he must travel a 'circuitous route'; that is, he must himself 'sketch the historical framework (the development of Dilthey's thought) and the systematic framework (his views on other, related topics) that together shed a revealing light on a number of statements from various writings' about the doctrine of understanding (5). The result is that, strictly speaking, only Ch. VI is devoted to the topic in Plantinga's title. Chs. I-V offer a wide-ranging discussion of Dilthey's general interests and outlook; and Chs. VII-VIII attempt a general evaluation of his final philosophical position.

Somewhat surprisingly, Plantinga does not explicitly discuss what 'framework' he thinks can be a 'reliable guide to the main outlines' of Dilthey's thought until the middle of Ch. III. There, he makes plain that he favors a developmental view. On the question of periodization, however, he is somewhat unclear. On the one hand, he has an explicit thesis, viz., that Dilthey's career may be divided into three successive phases. Each phase is conceived as a somewhat different 'response' to an overall 'self-imposed task' which Plantinga describes as one of 'plumbing the depths of "life"' and — on the basis of an understanding of life — constructing an epistemological foundation for the *Geisteswissenschaften*' (59). The author acknowledges that, in addition to the concern for the human sciences and their foundation, there is a second 'stream of thought' in Dilthey's writings, viz., a concern for art and literature. Nevertheless, he correlates each period primarily with a major epistemological work, viz., the *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1983), the *Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie* (1894), and *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften* (1910), respectively (55, 60). Using this threefold division, Plantinga sets himself apart from others who defend Dilthey's late ('hermen-eutical') doctrine of understanding simply by contrasting it with an earlier ('psychological') one. According to Plantinga, that contrast makes too much of Dilthey's sometime attraction to psychology. The truth is, Dilthey's late conception of understanding is actually the result of his effort 'to realize the implications of a set of ideas that he had acquired early in his life,' i.e., before he took up that 'quest for a new psychology, which really represents a *cul-de-sac* in his career, [and] apparently stood in his way' (63).

On the other hand, in the same paragraph where Plantinga introduces this explicit and epistemologically gauged developmental thesis, he also makes another quite different and more 'biographical' suggestion. Applying to Dilthey himself a remark he once made about other historically significant persons, Plantinga describes Dilthey's life as having 'two clearly separate halves.' During the first half, Dilthey 'gained an orientation in the intellectual and cultural world of his time and explored its problems. This led him to his conception' of that self-imposed task mentioned above. Plantinga does not say when he thinks the second half of Dilthey's life begins. Nor does he ex-

plain how these biographical 'halves' correlate with the three epistemological 'phases' of his explicit thesis. The result is a nest of problems involving, among other things, the alleged importance of Dilthey's *Einleitung* as an 'early' work.

For example, in Ch. I's section on Dilthey's 'initial approach' to history and historical knowledge, where that approach is characterized as 'nothing special, ... in tune with that of other admirers of historical science during that era' (12), even epistemologically 'optimistic and confident' (14) and thus primarily just 'pragmatic and flexible' on questions of method, the *Einleitung* is mentioned only once in passing — in order to indicate that it does not share this initial approach (13).

Then, too, Plantinga says that Dilthey's outlook in his pre-1900 writings on art and literature not only 'reflects — at least implicitly — his post-1900 position' but also shows that 'he apparently applied what he had learned in his intensive study of artistic expression' in formulating his late epistemology (61). Further, Plantinga seems to regard the aesthetic writings' 'implicitly post-1900' outlook as having already crystallized between 1860 and 1880. He thinks, e.g., that when the late Dilthey makes expressions of life (*Lebensäußerungen*) the 'principle objects' of the human sciences (49, 65f), this idea is clearly anticipated in the early aesthetic writings (62n, 86ff) — but not in the *Einleitung* (30, 41f). At the very least, then, Plantinga here sees the 'second stream' of Dilthey's thought running relatively unpolluted through a period of 'infatuation with psychology' and ultimately becoming an independent source of revisionary ideas when the affair is over. Hence, interpretive questions aside (Plantinga cites Rudolf A. Makkreel's *Dilthey: Philosopher of Human Studies* [Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975] without mentioning that Makkreel uses precisely the aesthetic writings to make the opposite case [59n]), it is again early writings other than the *Einleitung* which are determined to be crucial in tracing Dilthey's development.

However, if Plantinga often labels but rarely treats the *Einleitung* as a key early work and thus slights his own explicit thesis, he may actually gain more than he loses. Suppose he is right to consult instead the pre-1880 historical and aesthetic studies for some of the best information about Dilthey's early ideas? In other words, are the ideas and explorations of Dilthey's first fifty years perhaps not as well-served as many have assumed by being construed primarily in terms of their contributions to an 'epistemological' project? In the past twenty years, as more of his early writings have finally become available, the whole issue of Dilthey's original motives and basic inspiration has received extensive reconsideration, especially among German writers. Plantinga does not seem to have consulted them; but we could, I think, put him in their company by asking him, apropos of his own presentation, this loaded question: Would Dilthey sanction a line of interpretation which makes one of an author's explicit projects (e.g., the grounding of the human sciences) a more important measure of his development than the orienting and exploratory studies (e.g., initial efforts to 'plumb the depths' of art and human history) which led to that project?

In the end, however, one cannot really be sure how Plantinga would answer. Ch. III's epistemological and biological conceptions of Dilthey's development are not coordinated; and the book as a whole is not organized around either one of them. Indeed, in other chapters the development of Dilthey's ideas is often not stressed at all, and quotations are frequently used without regard to dates. As a result, too many complex issues are given too cursory a treatment. For example, in discussing Dilthey's conviction that human beings are in some fundamental sense 'historical,' Plantinga quotes him in a single paragraph as saying that man is an 'essentially historical being' [1860], that 'man's historical nature is his higher nature' [1889], and that 'what man is only his history tells him' [1903] (132). Whether all these phrases can or do express precisely the same sentiment is not considered. Nor is it asked in what sense the avowedly anti-metaphysical Dilthey (78ff) could propose any concept of man's 'essence' or 'nature,' let alone rely on it more in his 'earlier' (*sic*) than in his 'later' efforts to ground the possibility of understanding (91, 110f).

Perhaps a greater familiarity with recent scholarship would have made Plantinga more sensitive to interpretive problems such as these — as perhaps it would also have tempered his judgments, e.g., that 'much' of the Dilthey literature is 'misleading and inadequate,' or that the question of Dilthey's development has been 'largely ignored' (46, 58). (On this latter point, the only citation is to a doctoral dissertation from 1926.) On the other hand, Plantinga's conviction that neither Dilthey's formative period nor his final views can be properly assessed by interpretations which divide his career into 'psychological' and 'hermeneutical' periods seems clearly on the right track. Then, too, and perhaps because he not infrequently lets a 'biographical eye' catch Dilthey still *moving toward*, and so not yet fully *in possession of*, a (supposedly epistemological) conception of his life's work, Plantinga passes up many opportunities which others have taken to make, say, Kantian critique, or reaction to positivism, or a new psychology — or, in general, some popular preoccupation of Dilthey's day or ours — the final measure of that urge to 'plumb the depths of life' which he discerns at the center of Dilthey's philosophizing. And to the extent that Plantinga interprets Dilthey's 'early ideas and plans' in terms of this central urge, he is appropriately intent upon understanding Dilthey, as Dilthey puts it, 'in his own terms.'

However, this sound instinct is unfortunately not in evidence in Plantinga's concluding pages, where he comes to regard Dilthey's 'philosophy of life' as an 'unfulfilled promise' because it failed to 'draw total or universal conclusions about "life"' (151). Granted, it may be easy to believe that Dilthey 'chose to leave his major philosophical doctrine (i.e., that of understanding) without a proper foundation rather than risk the dangers of unwarranted speculation' (160), if one thinks of Dilthey as pursuing 'doctrines' while fearing 'speculation.' But it becomes hard to accept this when one recognizes that Dilthey more often refers to himself as having, not a 'philosophy,' but a reflective 'standpoint' — one which he increasingly (and Plantinga never) calls the 'standpoint of life.' From this standpoint, it is not

the 'unwarranted speculation,' i.e., the universalizing pretensions and unverifiability, of metaphysics which Dilthey finds most objectionable. Rather, it is its tendency (shared, incidentally, by natural science) to reach for an overall comprehension and conceptual closure on experienced, inexhaustibly meaningful (*unergründlich*) life — and, thus, its failure to 'understand' — which he rejects.

Plantinga is therefore much closer to the truth, I think, when he quotes Dilthey (again, from a work antedating the *Einleitung*) as advocating 'a standpoint of experience, of an unfettered empirical approach in opposition even to empiricism (79).' Like his 'radical empiricist' contemporary, William James, Dilthey was just too good a student of life, in practice, ever to regard his methodological exploration as 'completeable.' The problem is that, in principle, completeability is precisely what projects like 'the epistemology of the human sciences' or a 'critique of historical reason' still imply. To understand Dilthey in his own terms is to 'see' this double fact. Perhaps to understand him 'better' is to take the prospects of theoretical completeness even less seriously than he did — and thus to finish turning his late 'doctrine' of understanding into the 'activity' of hermeneutics.

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HELEN ROBERTS, ed., *Doing Feminist Research*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981. Pp. xi + 207. Cdn\$ 14.95; US\$ 9.50. ISBN 0-7100-0772-8.

This book is a collection of eight original essays by feminist sociologists who believe that sociological research should be done by feminists or from a feminist perspective. It is a polemical, but sensitive, search by eight women and one man for a feminist methodology in the social sciences. It is unconventional, often anecdotal, yet replete with scholarly references to the sociological literature. While *Doing Feminist Research* lacks sustained and careful philosophical analysis and argumentation, it vigorously attempts to drum home the thesis that a feminist orientation in sociological research is both legitimate and necessary. What constitutes a feminist orientation varies subtly from article to article, but the largest common denominator is perhaps the notion of taking into explicit consideration the experience of women qua

women, whether as subjects or as researchers, as interviewees or interviewer, as any part of the sociological research process. This entails considering women (and men) not just statistically but from a broader purview. The articles range from the experiences of a women anthropologist married to a Jat in the Punjab to occupational mobility in the banking industry.

Philosophers not used to the impressionistic and personal style of much feminist writing will have to be prepared to learn what is arguably a new mode of inquiry. Philosophers used to painstaking argument should also be prepared for the enviable ease with which, from the premises given, these researchers reach their conclusions. Not that these researchers are less careful than others characteristically are in their discipline; rather it is that philosophical literature of contemporary analytic quality can boast (or bemoan) an especially finely cultivated species of exact reasoning that is not prominent in even the best work in other fields where exactness of detail or deductive certitude may not be prized over creativity, or originality, or correctness of suggestion. Whatever one's view of the canonization of rigor, one cannot question the intrinsic interest, to humankind and to women especially, of the theses developed and explored in this book.

Take, for example, the essay by Ann Oakley, best known of the contributors, who achieved prominence some years ago for a remarkably provocative book *The Sociology of Housework* (1974). Oakley here contributes a piece on interviewing women. Oakley believes that standard interviewing, and textbook descriptions of it, are based on a so-called 'masculine model of sociology and society' (31). Part of what Oakley intends to suggest is that the hierarchical interviewer pretends objectivity towards an interviewee, who is treated as a passive datum without the right to pose reciprocal questions. Of course Oakley is suggesting that to act on this model is unethical. She contends that we learn this mode of sexist, mechanistic, hierarchical interaction in our culture which, being patriarchal, continually reinforces it in devious ways. One devious way is simply the textbook belief in 'objective interviewing,' which Oakley subjects to searing criticism. Oakley suggests further that a feminist methodology would not resort to such objectification but would welcome personal involvement as a condition under which people can come to genuinely know one another. Philosophers will appreciate the ethical inquiry here and will perhaps wish to pursue it further. There is also here, in the notion of a feminist inquiry providing the only grounds for genuine personal knowledge, a theoretic concept that could plausibly ground a notion of a feminist epistemology. This topic is of current interest to many feminist philosophers of science, among others.

There are not merely interesting theses in this volume. There are throughout some suggestive philosophical underpinnings assumed. For example, philosophically-oriented readers will note on almost every page of this volume the deft and easy interplay of normative with descriptive accounts. None of the authors here argues for a conflation but each assumes a reduction or intricate connection. The philosophical reader of this collection will be challenged to find the argument which will bridge this Humean gap.

Also presupposed by each writer in the collection is a controversial and complexly ambiguous conceptualization of the sexes. These writers rightly wish to get on to other interesting substantive theses. But the philosophically reflective or insecure may wish to pause here. Take, for example, the description, by the Australian contributor Dale Spender, of standards as 'male' and 'female.' This postulated genderization is familiar and well-accepted but not without its philosophical peculiarities. Consider some of the other interesting gender-specific features of the world pictured by these writers. There is, for example, talk of male rationality and of a masculine view of social reality. These notions are especially prominent in the contributions of the editor in her prefatory remarks. While there has been philosophical work on genderization by Allison Jaggar, Jane English, and others, I believe there needs to be a more critical theoretic underpinning. All the gender-based distinctions should be criticized anew in light of recent feminist work, philosophical and sociological, on androgyny. I am thinking especially of conceptualizations of androgyny which do not mix the 'masculine' and the 'feminine' but attempt to deny and surpass any normative conceptualization of sex-role differentiation. Presumed gender-distinctions may prove to be part of a confused and antiquated conceptual apparatus.

Of particular interest to academic philosophers is the last piece in the volume by Dale Spender, herself an editor, on the processes that determine who gets published. She makes the point that unpublished research does not, in a fundamental sense, exist. Spender's ontology is probably shared by many hard-working philosophers with a thin *curriculum vitae*. Spender notes the tendency among many reviewers, most of whom are male, to accept work which promises to be popular or which reinforces the reviewer's own scheme of things. So, she believes, reviewers and editors, who choose even among blind submissions, may be more subtly prejudiced than we have realized. Spender also points out that convention favors the publication of results only if they are 'successful,' and that this practice may keep some important negative results on sex differences from coming to light. One such result, she believes, is that there may be no difference between the sexes in linguistic performances. That negative result would, of course, be a positive finding when one realizes that the finding that women are 'even' in some area is not normally a negative or neutral result, it is a definite advance over the older conceptualization which places women behind males.

The voices in this collection are not stridently polemical but they are provocatively and clearly feminist. They voice a deep conviction in the necessity of a particular political and ethical approach. These convictions deserve philosophical attention and the kind of sustained argumentation that has been the hallmark of contemporary analysts. As a contribution to the philosophical conversation of our generation, this collection continues a much needed discussion of the nature of research and the questions of gender.

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DAVID RUBINSTEIN, *Marx and Wittgenstein: Social Praxis and Social Explanation*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981. Pp. vii + 231. Cdn\$ 46.95; US\$ 25.00. ISBN 0-7100-0688-8.

K.T. Fann once challenged members of an audience to propose any two philosophers in the history of thought, and then boasted that he could easily find points of comparison. Fann's point is an important one: superficial comparisons among philosophers are as easy to establish, but substantive ones with significant philosophical implications are much harder to come by. Over the last twenty years Wittgenstein has been related to — with varying degrees of success — the Buddha, Tolstoy, Kant, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Frege, Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, the pragmatists, and now Marx and Hegel. Any scholar who attempts such work should have at least some strong methodological parallels in hand as well as some thorough work (if relevant) in the history of ideas.

In his book *Marx and Wittgenstein*, David Rubinstein partially succeeds in the area of methodology, but he does not even begin to do the necessary work in the history of ideas. Rubenstein criticizes Janik and Toulmin (*Wittgenstein's Vienna* [Simon & Schuster 1973]) for focusing too much on Wittgenstein's Kantian background and not tracing Wittgenstein's Hegelian roots. I believe that Janik and Toulmin are essentially correct in staying within the Kantian tradition — this, after all, is where we can establish with some confidence Wittgenstein's reading (Schopenhauer, Hertz, Boltzmann, Spengler) and other influences such as Brouwer (for sure) and probably Spranger, Simmel, and Dilthey. In *Wittgenstein and Phenomenology* (SUNY Press 1981), I have traced these connections carefully and have come to the conclusion that in addition to a transcendental method, these neo-Kantian thinkers (sometimes called 'life-philosophers') provided Wittgenstein with the most important concept in his later philosophy — 'forms of life.'

The onus is clearly on Rubenstein to do the textual work for explicit Hegelian influences. His only argument is a tenuous one at best: that Wittgenstein was influenced by Frank Ramsey who in turn was indebted to C.S. Pierce, a 'student of Hegelian thought.' Among others, W.W. Bartley (*Wittgenstein* [Lippincott 1973]) also suggest that Wittgenstein is essentially an Hegelian thinker, but he offers fewer arguments than Rubenstein does. I am not saying that they are wrong; the case simply has not yet been made.

Rubenstein contends that a concept of 'objective spirit' is implicit in Wittgenstein's rejection of the private language thesis. Such a notion is indeed Hegelian in origin, but it is found in the 'life-philosophers' mentioned above, a much more likely source for the idea. But even in this form the concept carried far too much speculative baggage for Wittgenstein. Rubenstein makes a gallant attempt to resurrect the concept of 'objective spirit' for the social sciences in a way palatable to contemporary sensibilities. But such a formulation, even if successful, would have only vague, ancestral ties to Hegel.

Rubinstein's format does not lend itself to successful comparative philosophy. He tries to establish intellectual ties to Hegel late in the book instead of at the beginning; and instead of interweaving the discussions of Marx and Wittgenstein, he separates them into self-contained expositions which sometimes have very different focus and direction. He once admits wisely that 'the focus of Wittgenstein's attention is substantially quite unlike Marx's.'

The chapter on 'Mind and Body' has a very short section on Marx and a much longer, quite competent, discussion on Wittgenstein. Despite some general parallels between the two on this topic, Marx's naturalism and Wittgenstein's transcendentalism make for significant differences. Even though both appear to have some similar views on language, Wittgenstein would have certainly rejected Marx's crude instrumentalist notion of the origins of language. To his credit, however, Rubinstein does a brilliant job of explaining and defending Wittgenstein's attack on private language and shows how this dovetails with similar implications in Marx.

Rubinstein is correct in showing that Wittgenstein rejects the Kantian notion of eternal, immutable categories and subjects the concepts of human understanding to culture and history. But it is misleading to say that this represents 'historicist' thinking in any strict Hegelian way. Wittgenstein's historicism is much indebted to Oswald Spengler, who rejected Hegel's idea of the progressive evolution of a universal spirit. Interestingly enough, Spengler's historicism is one in which historical relativism is eliminated as far as the spectator is concerned. For the peoples of Spengler's great civilizations, their views were the only true ones. There are many logics, but, as Fritz Mauthner put it, 'it is against logic, against the feel of language, to construct a plural for the word logic.'

Rubinstein succeeds in proving that Marx and Wittgenstein do indeed share some significant methodological ground on the question of holism and internal relations. Rubinstein is at his best when he describes the liabilities of a social science which fails to take the surroundings (Wittgenstein's *Umgebung*) into consideration. But Rubinstein falls short in giving a satisfactory account of Wittgenstein's view of internal relations. In my book I argue that Wittgenstein rejects the traditional view of internal relations as found in Hegel, Bradley, and Blanshard. Wittgenstein's own view of internal relations is intimately connected with his belief in a 'material' *a priori* which has closest parallels to phenomenology, especially Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger.

Rubinstein believes that it is a mistake to associate Wittgenstein too closely with phenomenology. He is correct only with regard to those phenomenologists who still retain a Cartesian starting point, and everything which follows from it. Rubinstein seems to be unaware of the non-Cartesian phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. In these thinkers the Cartesian distinction between the 'inner' and the 'outer' is dissolved by Heidegger's concept of 'being-in-the-world.' In my book I maintain that Heidegger's *Umsicht* and *Umwelt* are comparable to Wittgenstein's *Umgebung*; and Heidegger's 'existentials' are parallel to Wittgenstein's forms of life. I also argue that Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein converge on the

question of a 'social' behaviorism. Rubinstein's arguments against behaviorism are well done and he is of course correct in showing that Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist in any of the traditional senses.

I have concentrated so far on one major aspect of Rubinstein's book: the comparison of Marx and Wittgenstein. The principle thesis of the book, and some of its best parts, go beyond this. Rubinstein wants to synthesize the insights of Marx and Wittgenstein in order to give a new theoretical foundation for the social sciences. Rubinstein does an excellent job in showing the deficiencies of what he calls 'objectivism' and 'subjectivism.' I was first skeptical of such broad categories, but the author makes sufficient qualifications to make the distinction work. He argues persuasively that both schools of thought have assumed the Cartesian standpoint and have thereby assumed that private mental states are where we must start (subjectivism) or what we must eliminate or capture by means of objective instrumentation (objectivism, positivism).

Rubinstein is right in concluding that Wittgenstein would reject Dilthey's distinction between the *Geisteswissenschaften* and the *Naturwissenschaften*, because the natural sciences are just as 'hermeneutical' as the human sciences. I believe, however, that Rubinstein seriously misinterprets Wittgenstein when he proposes that 'philosophy must be superseded by a kind of social studies' (135). Rubinstein realizes the risk in this claim and moves to safer ground by saying that Wittgenstein's philosophy will inform a new 'sociology of knowledge' (138). As a transcendental philosopher, Wittgenstein is interested in the 'possibilities of phenomena' (*PI*, #90) not the phenomena themselves. This leads to a firm, Kantian distinction between facts and forms, between the empirical sciences and a philosophy of the forms of life.

Despite his failure to make the Marx-Wittgenstein comparison convincing, Rubinstein's book is a valuable one. He understands the basic points of Wittgenstein's philosophy well, as well as any commentator I know. Marxist scholars will have to judge whether he has done as well with Marx; and specialists in the social sciences will have to assess his criticisms of the leading schools. I personally found his discussion of Marx illuminating and his critique of the schools convincing. The real strengths of the book lie where Rubinstein leaves straight exposition and makes critical judgments about the positions involved. Here Rubinstein is always insightful and sometimes quite original. His use of examples, especially those drawn from child behavior, are particularly successful.

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PAUL VEYNE, *Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes? Essai sur l'imagination constitutive*. Coll. 'Des Travaux.' Publié avec le concours du Centre National des Lettres. Paris: Editions du Seuil 1983, 163 p. 55FF. ISBN 2-02-006367-0.

Le lecteur attentif aura noté au passage quelques phrases clef de l'étude de Paul Veyne qui lui paraîtront en définir le propos et les paramètres essentiels. 'Le programme de vérité historique dont relève le présent livre ne consistait pas à dire comment la raison progresse ..., mais à faire réflexion sur la constitution de la vérité à travers les siècles' (127). 'Sur l'exemple de la croyance des Grecs pour leurs mythes, je m'étais ... proposé d'étudier la pluralité des modalités de croyance Il a fallu reconnaître qu'au lieu de parler de croyances, on devait bel et bien parler de vérités. Et que les vérités étaient elles-mêmes des imaginations. Nous ne nous faisons pas une fausse idée des choses: c'est la vérité des choses qui, à travers les siècles, est drôlement constituée' (11). L'auteur s'intéresse, en apparence, à un double objet dont on ne peut manquer de saisir, en réalité, les liens de continuité: 'A la seule lecture du titre, quiconque a la moindre culture historique aura répondu d'avance: "Mais bien sûr qu'ils y croyaient, à leurs mythes!" Nous avons simplement voulu faire en sorte que ce qui était évident de "ils" le soit aussi de nous et dégager les implications de cette vérité première' (138). On trouve donc, en premier lieu, une enquête minutieuse, et fort instructive, à même les textes, sur les attitudes diverses que les Anciens ont eues vis-à-vis du mythe et de la mythologie: crédulité naïve, scepticisme prudent, partiel ou plus ou moins global, allié à un respect des 'faits' culturels, etc. En somme, il n'est plus très juste de résumer la question en quelques conclusions un peu simplistes: la foule, dans son ensemble, est toujours demeurée fort superstitieuse et crédule, tandis qu'une minorité de penseurs ont fait preuve d'un scepticisme déjà 'moderne.' 'Les Grecs croient et ne croient pas à leurs mythes; ils y croient, mais ils s'en servent et ils cessent d'y croire là où ils n'y ont plus intérêt' (94). Et l'intérêt le plus constant est d'ordre sociologique: 'les modalités de croyance renvoient aux modes de possession de la vérité,' qui déterminent eux-mêmes la répartition sociale des pouvoirs. Non seulement la crédulité populaire représente un atout avantageux dont l'élite éclairée peut tirer parti, mais le mythe lui-même fait figure de 'vérité' respectable quand il devient tradition constitutive d'un peuple, quitte à être interprété par les 'experts' —qui y croient aussi, mais sous couleurs politiques, aïtiologiques, rhétoriques ou philologiques. En cela, les Grecs n'ont pas fait moins bien ni mieux que les modernes. Le premier volet de l'étude de Veyne conduit ainsi, tout naturellement semble-t-il, à une analyse de la perception — ancienne et moderne — des rapports entre vérité et fausseté, histoire et fiction. Au-delà de Marx et Freud, l'auteur opte pour un point de vue nietzschéen renouvelé, qui pousse à ses ultimes retranchements l'antique débat sophistique entre Physis et Nomos, ou la dialectique contemporaine entre nature et culture. Selon Veyne, la conclusion qui s'impose de la façon la plus cohérente ne saurait échapper à l'esprit lucide: il ne s'agit plus de choisir entre vérité et

fausseté, mais entre culture et croyance en *une* vérité qui ne peut jamais être universelle ni transcendentale. 'La vérité est que la vérité varie' (127). Il ne s'agit plus de chercher *la* vérité, mais de reconnaître l'existence d'une pluralité de 'programmes de vérité' plus ou moins analogues, que l'imagination constituante des individus n'a pas cessé de créer à travers les siècles: 'Les vérités, celle de l'*Iliade* et celle d'Einstein, sont filles de l'imagination et non pas de la lumière naturelle' (34). Une telle position, Veyne l'admet, n'est pas très confortable, 'mais on s'y habitue rapidement. Et pour cause: la valeur de vérité est inutile, elle fait toujours double emploi; la vérité est le nom que nous donnons à nos options, dont nous ne démordrions pas; si nous en démordrions, nous les dirions décidément fausses, tant nous respectons la vérité' (137). En réalité, pour être dans le vrai (si l'on peut dire!), 'il suffit de donner, à l'imagination constituante des hommes, ce pouvoir divin de constituer, c'est-à-dire de créer sans modèle préalable' (*ibid.*). J'espère bien laisser sur sa faim le lecteur éventuel, i.e. lui donner l'envie de parcourir lui-même les chapitres provoquants de cet essai et d'en évaluer à leur mérite les composantes et la thèse fondamentale. L'ouvrage est d'ailleurs fort bien rédigé, sauf à signaler quelques coquilles qui auront échappé à l'oeil vigilant de l'auteur ou de l'éditeur: '*pœtas, pœti*' pour 'poetas, poeti' (notes 1,6), 'niniaturisée' (54), 'parce qu'à' pour 'parce que cette histoire' (71), 'certaines mystères' (147), 'Thoerie' pour 'Theorie' (note 201), et dans la Table des Matières: 'vêtité' pour 'vérité', 'altiologique' pour 'aitiologique'. D'autre part, je n'ai pas vérifié l'exactitude de toutes les références fournies par l'auteur, mais je reste perplexe quand il prête à Aristote l'opinion selon laquelle l'institution des repas en commun rassemblait 'tous les citoyens, tous les jours, ..., la cité offrant le spectacle d'un réfectoire monacal' (133). On se demande pareillement comment Veyne n'a pas saisi la portée du *Lysis* 205 CD (cf. note 49), où Platon se moque sans équivoque possible de la généalogie mythique de Lysis, et 'des histoires toutes pareilles à celles que racontent les vieilles, sans parler ... d'une foule d'autres semblables calembredaines' (Trad. Robin, *Oeuvres complètes*, La Pléiade, tome 1, et voir Veyne, note 56).

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LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, *Culture and Value*, ed. G.H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. Peter Winch. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981. Pp. xi + 181. Cdn.\$34.95: ISBN 0-631-12752-6; US\$20.00: ISBN 0-226-90432-6.

'A lot of froth, but a few *fine* thoughts,' Wittgenstein writes of a certain Lenau (53). A reverse judgment applies to this book: some froth, but a good many fine thoughts, for example this one:

Even to have expressed a thought boldly and clearly is already to have gained a great deal. (75)

The book is a selection, mostly of short passages, from Wittgenstein's unpublished notebooks and typescripts. The editor combed these sources for material of general intellectual interest. The result is a fascinating, wide ranging book that is, in part, accessible to a large audience. To give an idea of its scope, it contains comments on the following men, among others: Bach, Barth, Bacon, Wilhelm Busch, Charlemagne, Christ, Frege, Freud, Hitler, St. John of the Cross, Mahler, and Max Stirner. Shakespeare and Spengler are among those discussed the most. The topics taken up are correspondingly various. Religion is prominent among them (here religion for Wittgenstein is Christianity). Being Jewish is another main topic. Music is a major subject, in particular the character of various musicians' work, and of individual pieces, and also the idea of understanding music. Some other themes, drawn from just a few pages, are: the effect of dogma; the value of philosophical training; religious similes; predestination; why logic is hell; the Gospels versus the Epistles; his mode of thinking; the 'unclarity' of the scriptures; levels of devoutness; madness; self-deception; envy; genius and character; idle thoughts; resting on your laurels; Schopenhauer's lack of depth; poetry as truth; philosophy and ethnology; great art.

Wittgenstein, with his concern for his reputation, and his high standards, would never have published this book. Many of its remarks are only drafts. Indeed, he is seen here in the process of writing and rewriting; there are several repetitions with variation, where he is looking for the best way to express an idea. Many passages he would have rejected as obviously false, exaggerated, crabbed, or otherwise flawed. Finally, some of the remarks can only be understood against the background of his later philosophy; and he was not one to encourage the misreadings that will be fostered by presenting them shorn of that context.

As Von Wright says, however, it was not up to him to attempt to pick out the cream of the remarks, or even to eliminate the near repetitions. Readers will be grateful to him and his collaborator Heikki Nyman, and to the translator, for a valuable, intriguing work.

Given its nature, *Culture and Value* will be judged against the works of the great aphoristic writers. Some of its best passages are close in style and spirit to remarks of Kafka contained in his diaries and stories. Other passages are strongly reminiscent of Kierkegaard. The following, for example, in its intellectualism, courting of paradox, and concern with the religious, seems to echo something of both writers.

... If we want to warn someone of a terrible danger, do we go about it by telling him a riddle whose solution will be the warning? — But who is to say that the Scripture really is unclear? Isn't it possible that it was essential in this case to 'tell a riddle'? And that, on the other hand, giving a more direct warning would necessarily have had the *wrong* effect? God has *four* people recount the life of his incarnate Son, in each case differently and with inconsistencies — but might we not say: It is important that this narrative should not be more than quite averagely historically plausible *just so that* this should not be taken as the essential, decisive thing? So that the *letter* should not be believed more strongly than is proper and the *spirit* may receive its due. I.e. what you are supposed to see cannot be communicated even by the best and most accurate historian; and *therefore* a mediocre account suffices, is even to be preferred . . . (31)

But in general the writing in this book lacks the moral passion of Kierkegaard, and the subtlety and aesthetic-religious depth of Kafka. Nor does the book on the whole measure up to other masterpieces of aphoristic writing such as those by Lichtenberg and La Roucheaucauld. But it is almost in the same league, and that is high praise indeed. Moreover, parts of *Culture and Value* are unique; it is at its best when it presupposes Wittgenstein's later philosophy, a work of genius in a quite different tradition from these writers.

There are two kinds of remark that presuppose the later philosophy. sometimes *Culture and Value* expresses in new ways themes known from the *Philosophical Investigations* and other posthumous works. Some of these formulations are very fine indeed.

A second kind of connection to the later philosophy gives the book its main value, in my opinion. The two points of connection are science and religion. *Culture and Value* contains a number of passages that point to ties between the *Investigations'* critique of human understanding and these two fundamental topics.

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HAROLD COWARD and DONALD E. LARSEN, eds., *Ethical Issues in the Allocation of Health Care Resources*. Calgary Institute for the Humanities Calgary: University of Calgary 1983. Pp. v + 110. Cdn\$ 7.95. ISBN 0-88953-036-X.

Health care administrators are frequently involved in making decisions about the allocation of health care resources. These decisions have significant

ethical implications; yet, seldom do the ethical aspects of these decisions receive adequate attention.

This book is offered as a document for the study of ethical issues in health care resource allocation. It derives from papers and case studies from a community seminar, sponsored by the Calgary Institute for Humanities. The Seminar was organized specifically to facilitate dialogue among senior health executives on the ethical implications of their decision-making.

The right to health care is the focus of the first half of the book. In introducing the first case study, Wilbur Bowker underscores the medical advances contributing to increased ethical concerns in macro and micro level decision-making. Following a case-discussion of the problems of long-term care patients in acute care hospitals, Bowker provides a thorough review of legal rights and duties in health care emphasizing that, under Canadian law, neither physicians nor hospital administrators are under a legal duty to accept or admit a given person as a patient. He points out that the assertion of rights to health care is not necessarily recognized by law, but that federal and provincial legislation make health care accessible. He urges a balance of rights and responsibilities.

Justice in the allocation of health care resources is the focus of the second half of the book. Benjamin Freedman introduces the second case study, outlining various approaches to ethical decision-making about the allocation of health care resources. A case study questions the proper proportion of the health care budget to be justly allocated to physicians and nurses, and questions the ethics of withdrawal of services in disputes over income or working conditions. Freedman then provides a scholarly discussion on approaches to justice in the allocation and distribution of health care resources, comparing and critiquing the theoretical positions of Paul Ramsay, James Childress, and Joseph Fletcher. He argues for a middle-ground position that takes into account the responsibilities and expertise of providers of health care at all levels.

Given the paucity of literature on the allocation of health care resources, this small book adds to the limited literature available. Its main strength rests on the contributions of Bowker and Freedman, whose papers are thereby made more readily accessible to health executives, the target audience.

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