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L. LAVELLE, *L'existence des deux mondes*.

J.-F. COURTINE, *De la métaphore tragique*.

H. STRUYKER BOUDIER, *Le sadomasochisme. Remarques au sujet de la philosophie sartrienne des relations concrètes dans « L'être et le néant »*.

S. STRASSER, *Le syllogisme pratique et son importance pour les sciences humaines*.

R. FRANCK, *Encore une fois: la psychanalyse est-elle ou non scientifique?*

Comptes rendus: *Philosophie de l'Antiquité — Épistémologie et logique — Ouvrages d'ordre général*.

Chronique.

Chaque article est suivi d'un résumé en français et en anglais.

the writing "possible towards" or "towards" are analogous to the "philosophical" and "real" or "true" which Berki calls an "existing and resulting form of reality." His meditation starts out from his conception of "reality" but ends up with the realization that there is nothing so strong as the alternative formulation "nothingness" that contradicts the reality. Thus he comes to the conclusion that nothing can be regarded as "adequate to reality" as such. "A real" is not, after all, a question of "adequacy" but of "concreteness" — that is, of the concrete ability of "existing" to "exist". In other words, reality is not something that exists in itself, but rather it is something that exists in the concrete form of "existing".

R.N. BERKI, *On Political Realism*. Scarborough, Ont.: Van Norstrand Reinhold Ltd. 1981. Pp. vi + 282. Cdn\$53.95. ISBN 0-460-04367-6

Berki calls this interesting but frustrating book an 'essay,' but it might more aptly be described as a phenomenological meditation. Its subject is not to be identified with the 'political realism' of such writers as E.H. Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hans Morgenthau, who brought the term into widespread use earlier in the century. According to Berki, their 'realism' is partial and distorted, at best one moment in a larger and more synthetic whole that 'renders intelligible a relationship to political reality which is adequate to this reality.' The discovery and articulation of this larger conception is the main project of Berki's meditation.

The introductory chapter is an exploration of three views that the author identifies as 'everyday commonsensical understandings' of 'reality': the immediate, the necessary, and the true. To each idea, there corresponds a conception of political realism. These are, respectively, opportunism, *Realpolitik*, and naturalism. Berki argues that each of these represents a 'fallacy,' but he cannot mean this literally since he does not point out purely logical problems in the construction of any of these conceptions. Rather, they are distortions, one-sided or incomplete formulations which are nevertheless 'necessary aspects of the whole.'

There follows a discussion of the historical roots of political realism. According to Berki, its founders were Aristotle, Augustine, and Machiavelli. They represent 'the classical, Christian, and modern visions,' but their doctrines are also 'capable respectively of being construed as the philosophical underpinning of three basic ideological departures of the modern age' — conservatism, individualism, and radicalism. Berki finds all three doctrines to be flawed, and once again maintains that a fully adequate conception of political realism must rest on a synthesis. Not surprisingly, he chooses Hegel as the philosopher whose approach is best suited to discover it.

The substantive part of the discussion is presented in three chapters, devoted respectively to political understanding (Berki says it must be 'dialec-

tical' in recognizing the 'paradoxical' or 'self-contradictory' quality of political life), political necessity (which turns out to mean the 'inescapable' necessity of accepting the political ideals 'immanent' in 'Western advanced industrial civilization'), and political practice (it should follow the 'epochal guidelines' that constitute the 'prevailing moral opinion' of the present age). (Clearly, despite Berki's protestations, the reliance on Hegel is more than methodological). Taken together, these aspects are held to define 'the fundamental nature of political reality,' the 'complete' or 'fully adequate' whole of which the distorted conceptions identified earlier are merely parts.

The book concludes with chapters about conservative and radical versions of 'idealism' — respectively, 'the idealism of nostalgia' and 'the idealism of imagination' — which are contrasted with 'realism' as previously defined. Here, a large number of modern writers — Strauss, Arendt, Oakeshott, Hayek, Nozick, and Rawls (all 'conservatives'); Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Lukacs, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas, and Foucault (all 'radicals') — come under various kinds of attack for failing 'to achieve an adequate understanding of political reality.'

This book gives evidence of enormous erudition and of a mature political sensibility. However, as a work of philosophy, the book is unsatisfying, and as a work addressed to a broader audience of theoretically-inclined political scientists, it will be close to unintelligible. Perhaps because of the breadth of his subject, Berki often fails to develop his critical points with adequate analytical depth, and, in advancing his positive views, frequently substitutes Hegelian cant for careful argument. For example, I doubt that any serious conservative would be tempted to change his or her views by Berki's claim that liberal ideals are simply 'inescapable' (for this is simply untrue), or by his observation that they represent the considered moral opinion of most reflective people in 'advanced industrial civilization' (for this is not obviously relevant to the truth of the conservative's views, and Berki's confused attempt at moral epistemology does not show why it should be).

The problem of intelligibility is deeper. Part derives from the self-consciously Hegelian (and therefore, in this culture, exclusionary) paradigm that Berki adopts for his inquiry, and part from the opacity of his language. What, for example, is the reader to make of sentences like this: 'Justice is not just contrasted to injustice but it also refers to the same thing; freedom is not different from unfreedom but an expression of it; the ideal of equality and the contrasted objective relationship of inequality coalesce into one interpenetrating unity'? Only the most determined of readers will want to make their ways through such prose. That is too bad, since Berki's discussion, even when it does not convince, at least succeeds in making plain that political realism deserves more, and more sophisticated, philosophical attention than it has received.

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NICHOLAS DENYER. *Time, Action and Necessity: A Proof of Free Will*. London: Duckworth 1981. Pp. 103. £8.95. ISBN 0-7156-1530-0.

By its omissions a very short book could excuse more than a shortish review. Its arguments, after all, may be swift rather than concise. Within the limits that he deems appropriate, Denyer meets with some success in presenting determinism in an unfavourable light, but his critique tends to neglect the different sorts of response which foreseeably it might provoke. To some of his objections a further reply could easily be culled from the existing literature. To others it cries spontaneously from the page. I limit myself to an illustration of the latter sort.

Denyer's main objection to determinism rests upon the claim that to deliberate about what to do presupposes that what one decides is causally contingent. Consequently he takes issue with the entailment-claim that 'he would have done otherwise, if he had tried' entails 'he could have done otherwise,' apparently conceding as do so many (wrongly, I believe) that the conditional statement is compatible with determinism. While many have argued against the entailment-claim, Denyer's objection is at least novel. As his premise he states that a cautious person such as himself would not even dream of trying to emulate Houdini in one of his more perilous feats, unless he *knew* (my emphasis) for sure he would succeed. From this it follows that he would indeed have performed the feat if he had tried — but not, as he points out, that he could have done otherwise than not accomplish the feat. His premise, however, has gone too far. The most that can be granted is that, given his caution, he would not even try, etc. unless he were *certain*, etc. From that it would not follow that he would accomplish the feat if he tried.

I desist, however, from this line of attack for lack of space. Its refutation of determinism is not, after all, the book's salient feature. More distinctively it takes as its theme the maxim of Chrysippus that 'Those things that do not have causes why they will be cannot be such that they will be true,' and seeks to show that this maxim is consistent with determinism and indeterminism alike. For this purpose it represents a deterministic universe diagrammatically by parallel lines and its indeterministic counterpart by lines that branch from a common stem. Each line — in the latter case each branch and that from which it stems — represents a causally possible course of history. Hence in diagrammatic terms, assisted by Prior's logical notation, the Chrysippian maxim is to be represented as derived from the claim (C) that 'A proposition *Fnp* [sc. "It will be the case that in *n* units of time *p*"] is true at a point on a line if and only if *p* is true at a point on every line which passes through that point.' This claim holds whether there is only one line that passes through a point, as in the deterministic diagram, or several, as in its indeterministic counterpart. Denyer draws, however, the further consequence that where *p* is true at a point only on some lines that pass through the point in question, but not in all, i.e. where the universe is indeterministic, then *KNFnpNFnNp* (i.e. neither will it be the case in *n* units of time that *p* nor will it be the case in *n* units of time that not-*p*). This is a consequence that determinists must deny.

One difficulty in this which Denyer would seem to ignore is that translated into non-diagrammatic terms (C) would seem merely to state that 'A proposition *Fnp* is true at any instant if and only if *Fnp* is true at that instant for any possible course of history thereafter.' That would seem to make his explanation of what it is for *Fnp* to be true circular. An alternative would be to translate the diagrammatic terms reductively into tenseless temporal terms, but he shows no inclination to do that.

Another difficulty pertains to Denyer's Prior-inspired logical notation which represents the future tense in terms of a kind of truth-operator (i.e. 'It will be the case that'). This seems to prevent him from distinguishing the law of bivalence from the law of the excluded middle. Thus in claiming that *KNFnpNFnNp* is not in breach of the former he seems to think it enough to show that it is not in breach of the latter (68-9). On the other hand, he is prepared to say (70) that a proposition of this symbolic form 'can be read in a romantic way thus: there are no facts yet about how *p* would be then, whether true or false.' In other words, if we purge the reading from the 'romantic' suggestion that some facts might be false, it claims that there are some propositions about what will happen that are neither true nor false, and hence, surely, in breach of the law of bivalence.

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MICHAEL DEVITT, *Designation*. New York: Columbia University Press 1981. Pp. xiii + 311. US\$26.00 ISBN 0-231-05126-3.

In this ambitious book, Michael Devitt attempts to construct a general semantic theory of reference that covers the major types of singular terms in natural language. His chief concern is with proper names, for which he proposes a causal theory along lines suggested by Kripke and Donnellan. But in the detail, thoroughness, and scope of his treatment, Devitt has gone far beyond his precursors. He applies the causal-theoretic approach not only to names but to other types of singular terms as well, and he attempts to use the same approach to account for the reference, or intentionality, of thoughts. He demonstrates how the causal theory can be applied to the classical problems concerning the behavior of singular terms in identity statements, fictional discourse, modal contexts, and propositional-attitude contexts. Perhaps most important, Devitt makes a genuine attempt to place his work on reference within a broader theoretical framework, and to relate his own approach to

other perspectives in the philosophy of language, such as those of Davidson and Grice. The amount of hard thought and honest toil that has gone into this book is truly impressive.

The title of the book also expresses its basic concept, that of *designation*. Devitt explains this concept in terms of a type of causal chain that he calls a 'd-chain.' The idea is that an utterance, or token, of a term designates an object if and only if the object 'grounds,' or is the ultimate source of, a d-chain that eventuates in the utterance. Devitt never defines his notion of a d-chain. Instead he relies on examples to give us a grasp of what he has in mind. The difficulty is that it defies credulity to suppose that there is a single type of causal chain that connects each of the wide variety of terms in these examples with the objects they are said by Devitt to designate. What, for instance, is there in common between (1) a causal link between me and an utterance of 'I' that I produce and that designates me, and (2) a causal link between the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle and an utterance of mine of 'Aristotle' that designates him? It surely seems that these links (aside from their both being *causal* in some very broad sense) have nothing relevant in common at all. So when Devitt says that these links would both be 'd-chains,' it is not only difficult to grasp what he could possibly have in mind, but also difficult to believe that there is anything at all in reality that corresponds to his use of the expression 'd-chain.'

Leaving this difficulty aside, let us consider the more fundamental question of why Devitt thinks that his concept of designation is relevant to semantics. If it were true that any token semantically refers to an object if and only if the token designates that object, then the semantic relevance of designation would be clear. But this is not Devitt's view. He correctly notices that there are terms which can semantically refer to objects without designating them in the causal sense. An attributively used definite description, for instance, semantically refers to an object if and only if the description uniquely applies to that object (53). In the case of terms used this way, designation clearly has no semantic relevance. But if designation is not always semantically relevant, then the question arises of what makes it relevant, when it is.

At one point in his book, Devitt argues that there are two conventions in English for using definite descriptions. One is the convention that is followed in attributive uses. On the other convention, a description of the form 'the F' may be used demonstratively to mean, roughly, 'a designated F' (51). A token used this way semantically refers to an object if and only if the token both designates and applies to the object. Whether or not a token is used in one of these two different ways, Devitt says, depends on which of these two conventions is being followed by the speaker (53-4).

It is clear that on this view of definite descriptions (which I essentially agree with), a description's designating or failing to designate an object will be semantically relevant or not, depending on which convention is being followed by the speaker. The general lesson to be learned from this fact is that designation does not *automatically* have semantic relevance. It has semantic relevance only to the extent that there is a semantic convention or rule being

followed that *makes* it relevant. What is designated by a token corresponds for Devitt to what the speaker 'has in mind' or 'means' by the token (33). I would suggest that it also corresponds to what *the speaker refers to* with the token. But as Devitt seems to see at one point, what a speaker refers to, has in mind, or means by a token is semantically relevant only when the convention being followed by the speaker makes it so. Unfortunately, Devitt's actual practice throughout most of his book belies any awareness of this fundamental fact.

Devitt claims to give in his book 'a causal theory of names.' But the only features of names that Devitt mentions or describes are features of the d-chains that determine what names *designate*. In effect, Devitt gives a theory of designation in terms of d-chains and then applies this theory to names to show the various ways in which names can designate objects via d-chains. But applying a theory of designation to names is not at all the same thing as giving a theory of *names*. After all, on Devitt's own view, *many* semantically different kinds of terms can designate objects. Thus to be told that names sometimes designate objects via d-chains is not to be told anything that enables one to distinguish names from other kinds of terms in any semantically interesting way. To give a theory of proper names, one must state the sort of semantic convention or rule that people follow when they use words as names, and this statement must suffice to distinguish names semantically from other types of singular terms. But I can find no place in Devitt's book where he explicitly gives, or even suggests, such a statement.

Devitt assumes throughout his book that a name-token's designation is automatically a relevant semantic feature of that token. But since he fails to explain how designation figures in the conventions for using names, he fails to give us any good reason for thinking that a name's designation is ever semantically relevant. In fact Devitt describes cases in which (he says) the conventional referent of a name-token *fails* to be designated by the token (144). This certainly suggests that the conventions for using names do not require that names must designate their semantic referents. But if this is not required, then we have a good reason for thinking that designation is *not* a semantically relevant feature of names.

Devitt might well deny my charge that he has failed to describe the sort of convention that people follow in using proper names. For at various points in his book, he seems to (at least implicitly) *identify* the convention a speaker follows in using a name with the causal network of d-chains in which his utterance is imbedded (see p. 155, for instance). Since he has described such networks at some length, Devitt might say, he has also described the relevant type of convention. But this identification of conventions with causal networks seems wildly implausible to me. Indeed, it seems to rest on a confusion of two sorts of facts: (1) the fact that one's utterance of a term is imbedded in a causal network of a certain sort, and (2) the fact that in uttering the term, one is following a convention that *requires* one's utterance to be so imbedded. It seems to me that this confusion pervades Devitt's book and vitiates much of what he says.

The two sorts of facts (1) and (2) are obviously quite different. For instance, suppose that I, believing that Kurt Gödel was the sole discoverer of incompleteness, always use the description 'the discoverer of incompleteness' to refer to Gödel. Thus my uses of this description all designate Gödel, and we can suppose that these uses are all causally connected in a general network with others' uses of the same description that all similarly designate Gödel. Does this mean that whenever I utter the description 'the discoverer of incompleteness' I am always following a convention which *requires* that my uses of this description must designate Gödel? Not at all. In every use of this description I (and everyone else for that matter) might be following the attributive convention according to which a description semantically refers to whichever object uniquely satisfies it. Thus if incompleteness was not discovered by Gödel but by someone named Schmidt, then my uses of 'the discoverer of incompleteness' have all semantically referred to Schmidt, even though I have all along been (mistakenly) referring to Gödel with these same uses.

Since Devitt's (apparent) identification of conventions with causal networks is false, the fact that he describes such networks does not absolve him of my charge that he has failed to describe the sort of convention that people follow in using names.

Devitt would also deny my charge that, having failed to explain how designation figures in the convention for using names, he has also failed to give any reason for thinking that designation is a semantically relevant feature of names. For he apparently believes that what a name-token designates is always a semantic referent of the token, *whether or not the object designated is the token's conventional referent*. He in turn appears to believe this because he thinks that, regardless of what conventions a speaker is following in uttering a sentence containing a name, the name-token's designation is at any rate always relevant to determining the truth-value of *what the speaker meant* by the sentence (see pp. 86 and 144).

But this line of reasoning is seriously defective. I take it that an object is a semantic referent of a name-token only if the object is relevant to determining the *actual* truth-value of the sentence containing the token in question. But the actual truth-value of a sentence is always determined by its *actual* meaning, and not merely by what its speaker happens to mean by it. For instance, a speaker might mean something by a sentence, even though the sentence he utters is complete nonsense. What the speaker means by his utterance could well be true, but his utterance has no meaning at all, and therefore it has no truth-value either. Of course, if the sentence *bad* meant what its speaker meant by it, then the sentence *would* have been true. But this does not imply that the sentence actually was true in any sense.

So the fact that a term's designation is always relevant to the truth-value of what its speaker means does not imply that a term's designation is always relevant to the actual truth-value of the sentence uttered. Thus it also does not imply that a term's designation is always a semantic referent of the term. To suppose otherwise, as Devitt apparently does, one must accept the obviously

false view that what a speaker means by a sentence is always one of that sentence's actual meanings.

It still seems to me, then, that Devitt has failed to give us any good reason for thinking that what a name designates is ever a semantically relevant feature of the name.

The objections I have raised to Devitt's book concern some very fundamental and difficult issues in the philosophy of language. Such questions as those of the nature of linguistic conventions and of the relevance of such conventions to the semantic properties of expressions, lie at the very heart of semantics. The fact that Devitt has raised such fundamental questions and squarely faced them is an indication of the depth and seriousness of his thought on these matters. Certainly, Devitt's views on these and many other important issues that he discusses in his book deserve a much more extended treatment than I have been able to give here.

MICHAEL MCKINSEY

Wayne State University

B. FRYER, A. HUNT, D. McBARNET, and B. MOOREHOUSE, eds., *Law, State and Society*. Totowa, NJ: Biblio Distribution Center 1981 (for Croom Helm Ltd.). Pp. 234. US\$36.50. ISBN 0-7099-1004-5.

Eight of this series of nine essays published by the British Sociological Association were originally papers read at the Association's 1979 Conference on Law. The first essay, written by the editors, introduces the others.

It is unusual for conference papers published together to have a tight focus; these do, even while ranging from highly abstract sociological theory to concrete investigations of the relations between law, state and society. Their authors' common interest is legal sociology; their general topic is the 'effectivity of law' (18), more specifically the facilitating and legitimizing of industrial capitalism by the law and legal institutions (87), itself subdivided into (i) the coercion-consent dichotomy, (ii) the ideological dimension of law, (iii) legality and the form of law, and (iv) law and the state (10).

Granting the volume's coherence, the question arises, is the book worth reading? From a grammatical or stylistic standpoint the answer is no. Sociologists are accustomed to talking funny (British academics other than sociologists insist they usually think funny too), but I doubt even many of

them could get a handle on the following, meant to be descriptive of John Austin's definition of law as 'the command of the sovereign': after reading that 'it appears that the ascription of legal norms to an alleged absolute subject as their author is what constitutes their specific lawness,' the reader is told that if, then, 'the alleged absolute subject is an independent alien form of the self, the legal norm may be seen as an alien form of a suggestion or demand made by that self. This will be a dependently alien form, since it depends on the alleged absolute subject. On this view, just as the alien form of the self can be distinguished from the unalien form of the self, so the alien form can be distinguished from the unalien form of that self's suggestion or demand' (118).

If it be asked whether philosophers will find this book worthwhile even assuming their mastery of Hegel and Marx, the answer is, to a very limited extent. For, in the few places the essays do touch on philosophical matters, the treatments accorded them are frustrating. Thus in their essay, 'How the Law Rules: Variations on Some Themes in Karl Marx,' Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer argue that 'Workers movements have *had* to take the law very seriously indeed, because law — and its absence — has very material effects on workers' lives. Minimally, it is a defensive matter: rights, because they are not natural, have to be fought for and need to be *guarded*. Anyone inclined to doubt this might look ... at a number of recent pieces on picking juries and suspects' rights' (36-7). As it stands that set of statements is both confused and unphilosophical. It is unphilosophical because it is set forth without any hint of support; it is confused because the issue is not whether natural rights have to be guarded — of course they do. The issue is whether there are any.

David Sugarman in his 'Theory and Practice in Law and History: A Prologue to the Study of the Relationship Between Law and Economy from a Socio-Historical Perspective' gives the jurisprudentially-inclined reader more to chew on. He remarks (98) that the 'recent work of Thompson and Hirst ... raises questions as to what it is that makes something distinctively "Marxist"' Thompson's view that the rule of law is "an unqualified human good" ... and the controversy it has engendered, has posed important political questions such as the desirability ... of regarding law as a focus of political struggle.' Marxist philosophers will be interested in this debate; non-Marxists interested in legal philosophy will be interested in the thesis that law is 'an unqualified human good' and, even, might be led to see what the Marxists have to say about the matter. Sugarman gives his readers bibliographical help here.

Finally, and to return to Corrigan's and Sayer's 'How the Law Rules,' the jurisprudentially important assertion is made that the 'law, *per se* codes — and codes violently ... [T]he terms and rituals of law do violence to the majority [of people] in exactly the way ... "Standard" English [does]: they force people to express themselves in codes that rule out the core of what constitutes their lives. For individuality is not pure (or equal); it is their material differences that make people who they are ... [and] ... the paradigm of individuality which law sanctifies as the universal human essence (with its timeless "common sense") is in reality an idealisation of a (bourgeois) state of

being most of us *cannot* aspire to' (41). Unlike their unsupported thesis regarding the non-existence of natural rights, this latter one Corrigan and Sayer make about the alien character of law is heavily supported (especially pp. 30-4) and stands as the book's most serious challenge to the more conventional jurisprudence of Hart, Rawls, Dworkin and, especially, Lord Devlin.

Beyond these few matters taken up by Corrigan, Sayer and Sugarman there is little if anything of philosophical interest in *Law, State and Society*. True, the essay by Corrigan and Sayer, as well as Roger Cotterrel's 'The Development of Capitalism and the Formalization of Contract Law' and Iain Stewart's 'Sociology in Jurisprudence: the Problem of "Law" as Object of Knowledge' are written from a Marxist perspective, but unfortunately that perspective is nowhere argued for. It is ideologically assumed.

In sum, the authors of *Law, State and Society*, with the exception of Sugarman, all assume that what is wrong the common law is that it is an instrument of the ruling classes, that the law is an institution comprised essentially of technical devices designed to secure its users' status quo and which is from time to time 'just' only because the ruling classes do not want the 'lower classes' to catch on to their game (36, 96). It's enough to make Lord Devlin's jaw drop.

The readers of *Law, State and Society* will find that its essays shed light on the relations between law and the state and coercion and law, on the ideological dimension of law, and on the nature of legality itself only to the extent to which they themselves subscribe to the fundamental assumption that 'the problem of "discrepancies" or "disjunctions" between promises or claims held out for law and its actual effects' are unresolvable, so that the theoretician's 'central strategy as far as the law is concerned is to debunk it. That is, to expose the unequal reality underneath the rhetoric of [the law's] equality and to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the [legal] system' itself (D. Nelken, 'The "Gap Problem" in the Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Review,' *Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice*, Vol. I, 41, 54).

The Scandinavian realist, Karl Olivecrona, did a better job of this, certainly a philosophically more interesting one, some 40 years ago. And without the jargon.

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NICHOLAS F. GIER, *Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty*. (Albany, NY: State University of N.Y. Press 1981). Pp. xix + 268. US\$34.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-518-8); US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-519-6).

In the introduction to this book, Gier instructs us how to read a philosophical text, warning against a grave danger: 'Otherwise, one ends up reducing the philosopher in question to a caricature, one that fits our own preconceptions, but one that does not do justice to the philosopher himself' (3). Unfortunately, this volume reads like just such a caricature, since Gier blurs so many terminological and methodological distinctions. If we are to believe this text, Wittgenstein is a transcendental phenomenologist (146), an existential phenomenologist (107), a *Lebensphilosoph* (Ch. 3), a hermeneutic phenomenologist (225), a social behaviourist (152), a sociological neo-Kantian (41, 143), a historicist (189), and a radical contextualist and pluralist (229). Gier ends up placing Wittgenstein in all these categories by ignoring important distinctions. The method of this book consists mainly of weak arguments — such as the argument for Wittgenstein's acquaintance with Husserl's writings, which is wholly unconvincing, and does not go beyond Spiegelberg's very tentative discussion of the issue — and non-argumentative juxtaposing of quotations taken out of context. Gier continually tells us that a certain passage in Wittgenstein 'sounds like' or 'reminds us of' or 'calls to mind' certain passages of thinkers as diverse as Husserl, Kant, Spengler, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Arthur Danto, Michel Dufrenne, Dilthey, Merleau-Ponty, and Stefan George. While many of the cited quotations do indeed 'sound like' each other, a study of their differing philosophical and methodological *contexts* more often than not shows this *prima facie* similarity to break down. This line of criticism is all the more telling, since Gier devotes an entire chapter to showing that Wittgenstein is a holistic thinker. Not all holistic thinkers are alike: holisms differ, and it is here that the author's central thesis, that 'Wittgenstein's own phenomenology follows the development of 20th Century phenomenology in general: from a more Husserlian stage to a full life-world phenomenology' (5), fails to be convincing.

The problem with this type of 'argumentation' is that isolated lines may remind us of absolutely anything (and Wittgenstein's aphoristic style is notorious for inviting this treatment). The fact that Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists disagreed somewhat similarly with certain philosophers does not make Wittgenstein a phenomenologist.

This method of comparison leads Gier into making claims which seem at odds with each other (at least without further explanation). For instance, we are told that 'the respective methods of existential phenomenology and Wittgenstein are strictly descriptive...' (188), and then that Wittgenstein 'has not given up completely the critique of ordinary language that he proposed in his middle [supposedly purely Husserlian phenomenological] period ... So, despite Wittgenstein's dictum "look and see" (*PI*, sec. 66), we must also say "look, see and think"' (212). After thus establishing the non-descriptive and critical stance of Wittgenstein's thought, it is claimed that, 'Wittgenstein, at least from his grammatico-phenomenological standpoint, does not make any ultimate distinction between a science of reason and a science of causes' (223). This comes as a surprise, since the book earlier takes pains to stress that

Wittgenstein's view is one of 'pervasive acausalism and transcendentalism' (212 — cf. 31, 143, 145, 147). Even on the question of phenomenology, the book seems contradictory. We are told that at the time of the *Investigations* '... we see Wittgenstein holding a type of *Weltanschauungsphilosophie* ... a philosophy that simply was not phenomenology' (113), but then two pages later we are told that in the *Investigations* 'Wittgenstein's purposes were essentially phenomenological in the 20th Century sense' (115).

After noting that the term 'phenomenology' drops out of Wittgenstein's writing at the end of his middle period, Gier argues that Wittgenstein nonetheless continued to be a phenomenologist, but shifted from a more Husserlian form of phenomenology to a form more like the *Lebenswelt-phänomenologie* of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. In the concluding section of this work, it is laconically admitted that 'Wittgenstein's radical contextualism and pluralism' makes his 'phenomenological program ... therefore far less ambitious than the other phenomenologists' (229). Indeed, due to Wittgenstein's cultural relativism (227f), and his radical plurality of language-games — along with his rejection of a philosophical language-game (213f) — it would seem that Wittgenstein's philosophy simply cannot properly be called a 'phenomenology' at all. The only reason for calling Wittgenstein a phenomenologist remains to be a handful of remarks scattered through his middle period writings (primarily the *Philosophical Remarks*), remarks from which other quite different interpretations might be drawn in view of the whole of the Wittgensteinian corpus. The utter lack of any discussion of the phenomenological methodology, or of Wittgenstein's methodology (or notorious lack thereof) makes the interpretation of isolated quotations unconvincing. It is one thing to presuppose a familiarity with Wittgenstein and phenomenology (7); it is quite another thing to presuppose the framework necessary for assessing the major thesis of this book.

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LENN EVAN GOODMAN, *Monotheism: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Foundations of Theology and Ethics*. Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun and Co., Publishers, Inc. 1981. Pp. ix + 119. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-86598-068-3.

Monotheism contains three chapters in which Goodman addresses himself to the historical development in the concept of God, the existence of God as a necessary truth, and the bearing of an absolute and infinitely transcendent Be-

ing upon our lives. Considering the size of the book, too much ground is covered. A book could have been written on each of the last two chapters.

By canvassing Greek and Hebraic writers as well as the dialectical developments within each of these, Goodman aims in Chapter I to show 'the concept of God is that of a being of absolute or infinite perfection' (1). The absolute monism of Parmenides gives way through Plato and Aristotle to an elevated version of the divine (5) in two senses: (i) as the monadic source of the forms, and (ii) as the best that is in ourselves. The 'crucial' step in integration of the notion of divinity is the elimination of the experience of terror from the concept. Finally Goodman — echoing Maimonides' comment that God is not a person or a thing — concludes that God is infinite perfection whose transcendence of particularity is absolute (22).

Two points spring to mind upon reading the first chapter: (i) why does Goodman feel any necessity in trying to establish a dialectical development in the notion of God? and (ii) if God transcends particularity absolutely, how can Goodman talk about God as *a* being of absolute or infinite perfection? The transcendence of particularity would seem to imply universality, while God's existence as *a* being would imply its particularity. This latter conclusion is unfortunate, especially in light of philosophical difficulties encountered by others (Plato, Aquinas, Augustine) on this same point and astutely dealt with by Wolterstorff (*On Universals*) when he claims that God is neither a universal nor all universals.

In Chapter II Goodman tries to show that there are grounds on which the existence of God as an absolute being of infinite perfection may be affirmed as a necessary truth (74). Having looked at verificationism, Goodman heads right for the Ontological Argument where — following Quine — he claims that all judgments are synthetic (50) and that any proposition may be treated as necessary or contingent (51). Taking Kant to task, Goodman maintains Kant's position rests on two inconsistent claims: (i) all existential propositions are synthetic, and (ii) 'being' is not a real predicate (55-6). Goodman sees no way out for Kant but goes on to add in the spirit of Anselm 'if being is a perfection and God's perfection is absolute, then the being which God has must be necessary ...' (60). From the Ontological Argument the author moves to the Argument from Contingency where he presses for a strong form of rationalism: the belief that all things are intelligible (64). What drives Goodman to a monotheistic version of strong rationalism is the recognition of the remoteness of the possibility of a finite first principle and the desire to avoid arbitrarily dropping the principle of sufficient reason. What he is left with is an ultimate causal explanation which is self-contained, perfect and absolute (68).

Has Goodman demonstrated that there are grounds on which God's existence can be affirmed as a necessary truth? If by 'grounds' what is meant is 'good grounds,' the answer is, No. Briefly the reasons for this are: (i) notwithstanding his challenging remarks on Kant's position (and admittedly pro-Kantians need to rework this bit of Kant), one can still say with Schaffer (*Mind*, 1962) that by definition God's being is necessary but there is

nonetheless no such being, and (ii) Goodman has not demonstrated that strong rationalism must terminate in a being of infinite and absolute perfection rather than 'terminate' in an infinite regress, and further he has not demonstrated that a weak form of rationalism would imply the *arbitrary* abandonment of the principle of sufficient reason.

In Chapter III while exploring the relation between monotheism and ethics Goodman raises several questions dealing with their logical and ontic interdependence (81, 85). He then turns to the basis and adequacy of the idea of a universal moral law and ties this immediately to the concept of monotheism itself (92). The universal moral law as found in the command of reciprocity is made possible by monotheism but not apparently by classical liberalism involving as it does 'dubious naturalism' and invisible hand explanations (96, 98). Goodman then deals with the matters of how far the universal principle can be specified as well as how diverse circumstances bear on the universal principle. This leads him to consider moral obligations in the allocation of our energies and resources between ourselves and others; the moral law appears to dictate that in these areas at least we should be in a state of modulated equilibrium (106).

There are difficulties with Chapter III. While Goodman establishes considerable integration in going from monotheism to the moral law, few would agree with his hasty treatment of liberalism. Goodman all too frequently fails to distinguish classical liberalism in the spirit of Locke from enlightened liberalism in the spirit of Dewey. By so failing Goodman does not eliminate the possibility of Dewey-like ideals providing a framework within which the moral law can take root, but this he must do if he is to claim that the foundation of the command of human reciprocal love is the reciprocal love of God and man (99).

In summary, Goodman can be praised for having written an interesting book on the subject of Judaic and Christian religions. The biggest defect of *Monotheism* is that it covers too much ground, with the last chapter alone referring to such diverse topics as ritual and retribution. The footnotes in the book are extensive and worthy of close attention.

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M.D. GRMEK, R.S. COHEN and G. GIMINO, eds., *On Scientific Discovery*. Hingham, MA: D. Reidel 1981. Pp. vi + 326. US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 90-277-1122-4); US\$18.50 (paper: ISBN 90-277-1123-2).

This volume contains fourteen revised lectures presented at the International School for the History of Science at Erice, Sicily, 1977. The purpose of the

meeting was 'to produce a critical examination of the logical, psychological, cultural and social aspects of scientific discovery' (1). The papers are organized into two major groups: Part I: *General Problems*, Part II: *Case Studies*. I will highlight the main aspects of each contribution.

M.D. Grmek in his 'A Plea for Freeing the History of Scientific Discoveries from Myth,' intends to uncover a number of questionable methodological assumptions ('illusions' or 'myths') that vitiate the work of the historian of science nowadays. Some of the myths are: the belief that the actual genesis of ideas may be disregarded; 'the myth of the unity of the discoverer, of the place and time of the discovery'; 'the positivist myth of the straight road to truth'; 'the myth of Baconian induction' etc. Without necessarily agreeing with Grmek's analysis or criticism of each of his fifteen myths, it may be said that this paper is one of the most interesting from a philosophical point of view.

Of far less philosophical relevance is G. Radnitzky's essay, 'Progress and Rationality in Research (Science from the viewpoint of Popperian Methodology).' This paper, the lengthiest in the volume (60 pages), is devoted to the decision-making problems with which the researcher is confronted time and again: 'to decide which of two alternative research programs should be followed, whether it is worthwhile to conduct a certain experiment, etc., etc.' (43). Radnitzky finds the term 'methodology' to be a suitable label for the discipline that aims at systematizing decision-making in the area of scientific research (43).

I fail to perceive the main point of J. Agassi's paper, 'The Problems of Scientific Validation.' The best I can do is reproduce a passage where the author appears to formulate his 'thesis': 'Let me repeat my thesis: the problem of validation of science or of a scientific hypothesis seems to me to be an archaism sustained by the division of labor between philosophers and historians of science: each of them relies on the other to validate their concern with validation' (104). The historian of philosophy may be interested in Agassi's discussion of the second-scholastic Bellarmino, who is for Agassi 'the man who raised the problem of validation which I want to eliminate' (104).

J.D. North's paper, 'Science and Analogy,' establishes a most welcome connection between history of science and history of philosophy in the notion of analogy. It is encouraging to see, within the same context, such names as Cajetan and Newton.

M. Pera in his 'Inductive Method and Scientific Discovery' argues that 'induction is the method of scientific discovery and that the current objections against the inductive method are not correct' (141).

V. Somenzi in 'Scientific Discovery from the Viewpoint of Evolutionary Epistemology' opposes the 'metaphors' of Darwin and Butler ('an environment that "selects" among the diverse descendants of an individual or couple those endowed with characteristics which are advantageous for their conservation and reproduction,' and 'the organism which "solves the problem" of its own individual and species survival by bringing about heritable modifications in its own somatic structure or in its behavior' [167]) to recent

'evolutionary epistemology,' which starts off instead with a 'non-metaphorical identification between the individual processes ... and the collective processes of adaptation of a species to an environment' (168).

D.De Solla Price thinks it is time to 'put forward, albeit tentatively ... a comprehensive analytical theory of science' (179). By 'analytical' the author means *quantitative* in a rather strong sense. The 'analytical theory of science' develops from 'quantitative sociology of science, research on science indicators statistics, general bibliometrics, and citation analysis' (*ibid.*).

G. Gohau in 'Difficulties Inherent in a Pedagogy of Discovery in the Teaching of the Sciences,' explains and criticizes 'the method used in the French teaching system since the end of the war, and known by the name of the technique of rediscovery.' He claims that 'in being satisfied with turning upside down the traditional method, ... the pedagogy of "rediscovery" has thought itself capable of reforming science teaching without the expense of methodological and epistemological reflection. The result is disappointing.' (208).

V. Cappelletti's 'Discovery and Vocation' examines autobiographies and biographies of scientists and observes that 'in many cases vocation lies behind the scientific discovery' (224).

Some of the five papers of Part II focus on very specialized topics. J. Roger in 'Two Scientific Discoveries' studies the discoveries of the ovarian vesicles and spermatozoa. L. Belloni's paper, 'The Discovery of Duodenal An-cylostoma and of its Pathogenic Power,' reports on aspects of the history of medicine in Italy related to the construction of the tunnels through the Alps. S.D'Agostino writes on 'Weber and Maxwell on the Discovery of the Velocity of Light in Nineteenth Century Electrodynamics.' Of more general philosophical interest are the two remaining papers.

R. Toellner's contribution, 'Logical and Psychological Aspects of the Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood,' includes remarks on the nature of the history of science. According to Toellner, 'modern history of science' (as opposed to 'traditional' history of science) is interested not merely in facts but 'in which historical contexts facts could emerge as new facts' (240). Modern history of science looks into the 'historical prerequisites' of discoveries (*ibid.*). H.E. Gruber writes on 'Cognitive Psychology, Scientific Creativity, and the Case Study Method.' Gruber points out that psychologists and historians of science have oversimplified the study of creative scientific thought, but in different ways. Psychologists have focused their attention on processes rather than contents, historians of science have given 'maximal attention to the *contents* of thought, and almost none to the *process*' (296).

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W.K.C. GUTHRIE, *A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume VI. Aristotle: An Encounter*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1981. Pp. xvi + 456. US\$68.50. ISBN 0-521-23573-1.

The spirit of this volume is aptly phrased in its sub-title. The book is a lively, empathic and responsive 'encounter' with the Aristotle who pulsates through the centuries. Emotional reaction is hard to avoid at the thought that it is the terminal literary production of an outstanding scholar devoted from his early years to a sensitive appreciation of Greek philosophy. There is also the fear that exacting criticism may be inhibited by recollection of the severe stroke suffered by the author before the completion of the intended work, presumably hampering his energies in the final revision. However, the intrinsic excellence of the work as it stands is amply sufficient to allay these qualms. The book rests firmly on its basic merits. It imposes itself tellingly regardless of personal feelings.

The picture projected is that of 'the last of the ancient and the first of the modern philosophers' (ix). Its contours took shape in the flame immediately struck by a kindred spark in the days of Guthrie's undergraduate acquaintance with Aristotle: 'Here at last was a Greek who reflected my own thoughts in plain and comprehensible terms, a mind that worked on the same lines and bridged the gap of millenia between us' (3). This vital encounter, developed through a lifetime, is what the book wishes to communicate to present day students. An earlier volume in the series had been criticized as 'too learned for the beginner and too elementary for the expert' (x). Guthrie took this to mean that he was really hitting the target aimed at, the capacity of the student. The present volume bears out the accuracy of that aim.

Guthrie wisely declines a genetic approach to Aristotle, on the ground that 'if we wish to share the thoughts of a great philosopher, and his writings as they stand offer a coherent and intelligible account, there are more profitable ways of spending our lives than by picking them to pieces in a search for change and development in his thought' (6). Better or more urbane advice could hardly be offered to the approaching student. It might also be brought, *salva reverentia*, to the attention of some experts. It is found even more strongly phrased: 'The attempt at dissection may be positively harmful by casting unnecessary obscurity over what, if read in a straightforward and receptive way, is lucid, comprehensible, and philosophically interesting' (6). However, Jaeger's work and the stimulation it has given Aristotelian studies are appreciatively discussed, and the issues at stake in the modern development theories are clearly explained (3-17).

Aristotle's life and 'philosophical pilgrimage' are then critically and interestingly surveyed (18-45). Next, his writings are assessed in detail (49-88), with care in avoiding extreme positions. The mentality in which Aristotle approaches philosophy is luminously portrayed (89-99), under the fundamental and acute hypothesis that 'the internal tendencies of a philosopher's own ideas are themselves a product of existing philosophy and the impact on it of

his own personality and cast of mind' (89). With regard to content, Guthrie looks upon Aristotle's philosophy as 'in essentials so closely knit that its parts seem mutually explanatory' (100).

The Stagirite's theoretical philosophy is examined at considerable length (101-300). Bluntly, as Guthrie interprets it, 'the philosopher's object is to explain reality' (101). It is discussed under the notions of form, teleology, potentiality and actuality, nature, knowledge and its divisions, logic and demonstration, being, substance, the universal, the causes, chance, God, soul, sensation and thought. Aristotle's mathematical ability had been considered (45-8). Merlan's solution for the plurality of the unmoved movers is accepted (271-2), with mention (p. 271, n. 2) of the proviso that matter multiplies form within the same species but does not account for specific differences among the forms themselves. Modern issues are kept in mind, for example some that result from the work of Planck, Darwin and Butterfield (111, n. 1).

The practical philosophy is covered much more rapidly (331-98). The problem of the three *Ethics* is presented, with attention to the studies of Dirlmeier and Kenny, but with prudent abstention from dogmatic conclusions. Discussed in particular are the nature of moral science, *pbrōnēsis* (practical wisdom), virtue, the voluntary, *akrasia*, pleasure and friendship, ending with a short note on *theōria* as the acme of human happiness. Aristotle's other division of knowledge, namely the 'productive' (131) type, is not probed in detail. Guthrie (xi) mentions however that he would have treated the *Poetics* had he been well. Presumably the same may hold for the *Rhetoric*. The book has a well-organized bibliography (401-24), an index of passages cited (425-36), a comprehensive general index of topics and names (437-51), and an index of Greek words (452-6).

Universal acceptance of Guthrie's views would of course be too much to expect. Exasperating to some, highly praiseworthy to others, is the capacity of Aristotle's writings to inspire interpretations that vary widely across the philosophical spectrum. The fact seems to be that only Aristotle's intellect is able to encompass Aristotle's thought in its fullness. As with transport of liquid nitrogen, conveyance through the thought of others has to allow for continued escape and loss under penalty of bursting the container. Pushing in one direction according to one's own mentality must in order to be consistent let other equally authentic trends escape. Guthrie according to his own response to the Aristotelian writings looks upon their philosophy as a 'system' (100). Yet the internal coherence of the Stagirite's thought can hardly be required to conform to the notion of a 'system' lacking loose ends, as understood today. There are too many loose ends that have to be left as they are. Guthrie likewise considers 'ontology' to be an apt name for the Aristotelian primary philosophy, without taking account of the serious arguments to the contrary. He makes note of the lack of historical foundation for the editorial explanation of the term 'metaphysics,' but does not take sides on the question (64-5, n. 2). His justification of the notion 'secondary substances' in the *Categories* is quite weak: 'Aristotle therefore grants them the title of secondary substances, deriving a sort of being from the primary.'

This he does with obvious reluctance, because from the ontological or metaphysical point of view he is unwilling to admit that they are substances at all' (143-4). These and similar stands fit nicely enough into a coherent interpretation of Aristotle, but an interpretation which from the viewpoints of other scholars will not cover all the data.

The complacently restrictive attitude is likewise found in the area of practical philosophy. Criticism of Aristotle's 'attempt to squeeze the springs of action into the framework of scientific reasoning' (350) seems to forget that demonstration and science for Aristotle have also premises that hold only 'for the most part' (*APo.*, I 30, 87b22-25; *Metaph.*, E 2, 1027a20-21). Further, the force of Jaeger's explanation of the treatises as school *logoi* is neglected: 'The bulk of the writings which have come down to us are manuscripts for lectures (perhaps in a few cases even notes of pupils) or the notebooks of a scientific researcher' (13). Schwegler's still important commentary on the *Metaphysics* is not included in the bibliography, nor is Siwek's text of the *De Anima* even though Trendelenburg's Latin commentary finds a place there. Rather surprisingly in a book meant for Anglophone students, Apostle's translations of Aristotle are not listed. For the *Protrepticus*, only Düring's works are given (405), though with awareness (76, nn. 1-2) of an opposite side in the devastating critique by Rabinowitz.

Presumably through an error in editing, the statement occurs: 'A scholiast on bk [sic] A of the *Metaphysics* says it was commonly believed to be by a pupil called Pasicles' (50). It would seem that *alpha elatton* is meant, and that the reference is to the much misunderstood comment of the 10th century scholiast. The attribution of *alpha meizon* by some to Pasicles is recorded rather by Asclepius (*In Metaph.*, 4.20-22). Recent scholarship has shown convincingly enough that Asclepius correctly relays the ancient tradition. The point has its importance at the present moment in rehabilitating *alpha elatton* as an instrument for interpreting the *Metaphysics*, in the wake of intense recent research. There is reason to insist that the situation be reported correctly in a work meant to be a scholarly introduction to Aristotle. Similarly readers with concentration in the biological and the logical treatises, and in other particular areas, will see omissions and minor flaws.

The foregoing observations do not at all infringe upon the standing of Guthrie's volume as to date the best general introduction for a beginner to Aristotle. It is a carefully meditated, vitally assimilated, and exceptionally effective presentation of the Stagirite's philosophy. It is the Aristotle of a twentieth century mind, neatly tailored and attractively groomed for the contemporary philosophical reader. It is a model of impeccable courtesy in its dealing with the views of other writers. The description 'admirably judicious and restrained' (77, n. 3), used by the author to characterize an article by the late Suzanne Mansion, may be aptly applied to Guthrie's own book. It is not meant to supplant, and does not supplant, Zeller or Ross or Düring as a reference book for Aristotle. But almost inevitably today a student gets his introduction to Aristotle through a rethinking of the Stagirite's philosophy by some other writer. In this regard Guthrie's welcome addition to the literature

is unrivaled. One need not hesitate to say that now it is *the* book by which a present-day student should be introduced to the writings of 'the teacher of those who know.'

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L'héritage de Kant. Mélanges philosophiques offerts au P. Marcel Régnier, Bibliothèque des Archives de philosophie, nouvelle série 34, Paris: Beauchesne 1982, pp. xix + 487. ISBN 2-7010-1029-2.

Ce *Festschrift* est offert au père Marcel Régnier, diligent et cordial directeur des *Archives de Philosophie*, par vingt-cinq de ses élèves et de ses amis. Au nombre des amis, il faut sans doute compter certains ennemis des amis, selon le mot amusé de R. Spaemann repris par le père Xavier Tilliette dans un *Eloge* (1 à 16) qu'il faut compter parmi les modèles du genre. *L'héritage de Kant* se divise en sept sections: I *Kant*; II *Kant et Fichte*; III *Schelling et Hegel*; IV *Kant et Heidegger*; V *Heidegger*; VI *Méditations post-kantiennes*; VII *Varia*. Le premier soussigné a assuré le compte-rendu des sections IV et V, le second celui des autres sections. Deux articles en traduction française (de Klaus Hammacher: 'La dialectique en transition: de Kant à Fichte' et celui, remarquable, de Dieter Henrich, 'Altérité et absoluité de l'Esprit. Sept pas sur le chemin de Schelling à Hegel') seront à coup sûr publiés bientôt dans l'original allemand auquel il convient de renvoyer.

La section I comporte quatre articles. Dans 'Libres remarques sur le schématisme transcendantal,' Yvon Belaval insiste sur l'originalité de la doctrine du schématisme grâce à laquelle Kant parvient à rompre avec l'empirisme. Fondement de la sensibilité et de l'entendement plutôt qu'intermédiaire entre eux, l'imagination cesse avec Kant d'être une simple faculté d'images. 'Kant et la philosophie biologique' d'Alexis Philonenko porte sur l'analytique de la faculté de juger téléologique. L'auteur cherche d'une part à tracer la frontière entre a) finalité interne et finalité externe, b) organisme et vivant et d'autre part à recueillir chez Kant l'écho de Linné et de Blumenbach. On ressent plus intensément après l'avoir lu le besoin d'une monographie française sur la faculté de juger téléologique dont les quatre chapitres se suggèrent d'eux-mêmes: *Naturzweck*, *Zweck der Natur*, *letzter*

Zweck der Natur, Endzweck. Adolf Schurr, spécialiste d'Anselme, rattache la réfutation kantienne de l'argument ontologique à la thèse selon laquelle '*notre nature est telle que l'intuition ne peut jamais être que sensible*' (A51, B75). Thèse qu'à son avis la *Critique* contredit *actu exercito* en saisissant le *je pense* comme condition de toute représentation. 'La critique kantienne et le renouveau de la métaphysique' de Joseph Moreau retiendra particulièrement l'attention. Les deux étapes contemporaines du dépassement de l'idéalisme cartésien: la phénoménologie transcendante et l'ontologie fondamentale, y sont retrouvées déjà dans la *Critique de la raison pure*, la première dans le chapitre sur les *Paralogismes*, la seconde dans la célèbre *Réfutation de l'idéalisme* (50). On ne pratique jamais trop la philosophie classique!

Dans 'Kants Lehre von den 'Grundsätzen des Verstandes' und Fichtes grundsätzliche Kritik derselben,' le réputé *Fichteforscher* Reinhard Lauth explique les transformations subies par la théorie kantienne des principes de l'entendement pur lorsqu'avec Fichte les catégories n'ont plus à être appliquées comme *en un second temps* à des objets indépendamment desquels elles avaient été déduites *en un premier temps*. On lira avec plaisir la claire présentation fournie à cette occasion des axiomes, des anticipations, des analogies et des postulats kantiens (122 à 128). Mais de la section sur Fichte, on appréciera surtout *Existenz zwischen Sein und Nichts*. Joachim Widmann, coéditeur avec Lauth d'une version de la *Wissenschaftslehre* donnée par Fichte en 1804, y lève le voile sur une version manuscrite de 1805. On sait que Fichte, tel un mathématicien en peine d'une démonstration plus élégante, a toujours cherché pour sa *Doctrine de la science* un ordre d'exposition plus direct. Formé de professeurs de l'Université d'Erlangen, son auditoire de 1805 lui a, semble-t-il, enfin permis d'emprunter la 'voie royale' (138). Si celle-ci s'ouvre avec la question: 'Qu'est-ce que l'existence? ', elle conduit néanmoins à une dissolution de l'individu dans l'universel inacceptable par l'existentialisme (147-8).

Outre le texte de Dieter Henrich déjà mentionné, la section sur Hegel comprend de Manfred Buhr, 'Die Frage der Identität ist die Frage nach der Geschichte,' et du père Joseph Gauvin, 'L'as des as bégéliens' au témoignage du père Tilliette (14), ' "Gestaltungen" dans la *Phénoménologie de l'esprit*.' Selon Buhr, il faut savoir gré à Hegel d'avoir 'sursumé' dans la dialectique de l'histoire les efforts tour à tour kantiens (le schématisme), fichtéens (le *je comme Tathandlung*), schellingiens (l'art comme réconciliation) de synthèse des non-identiques. Etourdi, le lecteur à son tour saura gré au père Gauvin de s'en être tenu à la *Phénoménologie de l'esprit*, mieux de proposer de manière rafraîchissante une hypothèse infirmable, du moins discutable et ce, à la lumière précise des dix occurrences qu'on y retrouve de 'Gestaltungen.'

Section IV, entitled *Kant and Heidegger*, contains four articles, two in French and two in German. Primary among the common themes here is Heidegger's restoration of ontology after its apparent banishment at the hands of Kant. François Evian, 'Impératif catégorique et problématique de l'être. Rosmini entre Kant et Heidegger,' sees in the 19th century Italian philosopher A. Rosmini a bridge between Kant and Heidegger. Rosmini's

focus on the practical philosophy takes him beyond epistemology (and ethics) to ontology, and specifically to a conception in which man's being is central. Thus, as in Heidegger, there is a turn to philosophical anthropology, but not to subjectivism or existentialism. Man does not effect or 'bring about' Being, but he does reveal it. Like Evian, J.B. Lotz, 'Die apriorischen Erkenntnisbedingungen bei Kant im Lichte der Offenbarkeit des Seins bei Heidegger,' sees Heidegger's revival of ontology as his most important advance over Kant. However, he seems to conceive this as a simple return to realism, as a rediscovery of Being behind the appearances (i.e. das Seiende, l'étant). He then goes on to criticize Heidegger's insistence on the finitude of Being. For Lotz, beings are finite, but refer to an infinite Being as their foundation. In the end Heidegger failed to get beyond Kant's attachment to finitude. Tom Rockmore, 'Le Kant de Heidegger,' focuses directly on Heidegger's reading of Kant in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, and like the others, is concerned with the move from epistemology to ontology. He does not believe, however, that Heidegger is justified in transforming Kant's doctrine into an ontological one: Heidegger overlooks completely the central importance of the Copernican Revolution and the epistemological or transcendental character of all Kant's inquiries, including even his anthropology. Rockmore concedes, however, that philosophy may advance when a great thinker misreads his predecessors. Joseph Simon, 'Zum Verhältnis von Denken und Zeit bei Kant und Heidegger,' at first seems to suggest that Heidegger, in opposing any move beyond temporality, fails to appreciate the importance, stressed by Kant, of the subject's lifting himself out of subjective time to rejoin an objective temporal order. But the transtemporal claim (Anspruch) of thought does not imply the atemporality of the thinker, nor does it guarantee an ultimate unity for all knowledge nor even a progress toward such unity. It is in this sense that Heidegger's insistence on finitude must be understood.

Section V, entitled simply 'Heidegger', contains articles by two of the best known authors in this collection, H.G. Gadamer and Otto Pöggeler. Gadamer, 'Die religiöse Dimension in Heidegger,' raises again the controversial question of whether Heidegger's thought is compatible with and can contribute to theology. Gadamer believes that it is and can, but gives here a rather unsatisfactory explanation of how this is so. He claims that the 'deepest motives' for Heidegger's thought lay in his early dissatisfaction with theology, and he traces the history of Heidegger's various pronouncements on religion and his encounters with theologians. He considers the view that *Sein und Zeit* provides a set of formal structures (guilt, conscience, etc.) which can be filled in with religious content. He believes that Heidegger regarded this as a failed attempt and proceeds to discuss the philosopher's later work, especially his encounters with Nietzsche and Hölderlin. But in the end we seem to be left with some formal similarities — forgetfulness of Being and loss of the Holy — together with the injunction that, in theology as in philosophy, we must get beyond the old ways of thinking.

Pöggeler's article, 'Heidegger und das Problem der Zeit,' is very ambitious: it tries to present in panorama the development of Heidegger's

thoughts on time and compare them with certain French conceptions, notably those of Bergson and Lévinas. The first task takes up most of the author's effort and the second is treated only briefly. There is a certain irony in the fact that Heidegger, who like Bergson began with the concern not to spatialize time, and even went so far as to try to derive space from time, ends by favoring certain spatial metaphors: heaven and earth, the fourfold, *Ort* and *Gegend*. Pöggeler speaks (elsewhere) of Heidegger's '*topology of Being*'.

La sixième section comprend cinq textes. 'Jenseits der Transcendentalphilosophie' d'Helmut Kuhn sert d'introduction à son livre de 1981 intitulé *Der Weg vom Bewusstein zum Sein*. Heinz Kimmerle nous présente en vingt pages une sorte de 'Von Kant bis Derrida' en passant par Hegel, Marx et Heidegger, 'Wege der Kritik an der Metaphysik.' Comme son titre l'indique, 'Zum Begriff des Menschen als "daseiende Transzendentalität" d'Erich Heintel est un essai d'anthropologie philosophique.

Les deux derniers textes, 'Pour une métaphysique de la relation' de Pierre-Jean Labarrière et 'Réflexions sur Eric Weil' de Livio Sichirollo forment un sous-groupe puisque le premier s'inscrit aussi dans le sillage de la pensée d'Eric Weil. La 'relation' dont Labarrière esquisse la métaphysique doit s'interpréter en première approche comme 'discussion raisonnable' (377-8). Le texte de Sichirollo ne tient pas pour sa part toutes les promesses de son sous-titre 'Kant après Hegel (et Weber).' Je lui dois d'avoir appris (suis-je honnêtement le seul) l'importance de Weber pour Eric Weil. Mais je ne comprends toujours pas ce que signifie l'expression de 'kantien post-hégélien' dont on use pour caractériser Eric Weil et parfois Ricœur. Un kantien anti-hégélien ne ferait sans doute pas l'affaire tout post-hégélien qu'il fût. Mais justement je m'imagine mal un kantien conséquent autrement qu'anti-hégélien! Que reste-t-il? S'agit-il alors d'un hégélien coupable? D'un kantien qui a des raisons que la raison ne connaît pas?

La dernière section s'ouvre par 'The elusive self' de H.D. Lewis, étude sur le soi chez Dilthey, Marcel et Sartre, et se ferme par 'Ueber die Einheit der Philosophie. Plädoyer für eine geschichtsbewusste Philosophiegeschichte' de Hans-Jörg Sandkühler. Cette histoire de la philosophie pratiquée avec toute la conscience de l'histoire désirable s'inspirera du matérialisme historique. Quoi de plus naturel! Les deux textes intermédiaires, 'Heinrich Heine und die Religion nach der Aufklärung' de Hermann Lübbe et 'Compréhension et passion' de Pierre Fruchon ne manquent pas d'intérêt. Le premier se penche sur la philosophie de la religion du dernier Heine. Selon celui-ci, pour 'a priori contingentes' qu'elles demeurent, les religions juive ou chrétienne s'avèrent 'a posteriori nécessaires' (430). De l'homme religieux et de son critique marxiste, c'est le second qui, 'aveuglé à la vie' (429), a perdu en effet le sens de la réalité (428). L'article de Fruchon intéressera platoniciens et kantiens. La traduction du père Régnier (1961) avait déjà attiré et retenu l'attention des kantiens d'expression française sur le *Kantbuch* de Gerhard Krueger *Philosophie und Moral in der kantischen Kritik* (1931). Le *Platobuch* de Krueger: *Einsicht und Leidenschaft* (1939) demeure cependant moins connu. L'existence m'en avait été signalée il y a quelques années par l'éloge que lui

consacre Gadamer dans *Philosophische Lehrjahre* (Klostermann, 1977, 227-8). Or il semble bien que le secret du *Kantbuch* se dévoile dans le *Platobuch*.

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JOHN KRIGE, *Science, Revolution and Discontinuity*. Pp. 231. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1981. US\$30.00. ISBN 0-391-02094-3.

Does science proceed in 'revolutionary' fits and starts or does it progress up a smooth slope? This book argues in favour of change through discontinuity: scientific revolutions are total alterations of world-view. It criticizes the idea that science progresses smoothly and incrementally. More particularly, despite the discontinuity involved, revolutions are held to be rationally intelligible rather than the outcome of mysterious acts of creative imagination.

Chapter 1 makes a distinction between two views of revolution: the 'liberal' view and the 'Marxist' or radical view. The liberal view is that while revolutions involve sea-changes of ideas they yet take place against a background of and preserve continuity with previous ideas. The radical view is that revolutions involve totally rejecting and replacing the previous system of ideas (18-19). The liberal view imposes a choice: scientific change is either incremental modification of established views or rationally unintelligible lurches forward. The radical view opposes both incremental continuity and abrupt change: revolution is a protracted and rationally intelligible process of struggling to dismantle established ideas and replace them with utterly new ones.

Popper's promising view that science is revolution in permanence is discussed first (ch. 2). However, Popper turns out to be a liberal rather than a radical revolutionary, or possibly both. Krige senses a contradiction between Popper's view of revolution, so total that it reaches down to change even 'the language in which our myths and theories are formulated' (46), and his continuist metaphor that knowledge grows by breaching then repairing a pre-existing 'horizon of expectations.' Krige reasons that Popper's true allegiances are continuist because his demand that new theories pass crucial tests places the onus on the new to prove its mettle rather than on the

established view (56). ‘Popper’s conception of rational behaviour strongly encourages an even hostile scepticism to novelty’ (63). And because we try to refute new ideas, advance means modification of earlier knowledge: ‘“the rational procedure”, as Popper puts it, “is to correct and to revolutionize it, but not sweep it away”’ (64).

Popper’s follower Lakatos (ch. 3) is concerned to pin down how science avoids sweeping everything away while changing a great deal. But Lakatos’ version of Popper’s fallibilism eliminates revolutions. His so-called Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes is a ‘sophisticated falsificationist’ response to Kuhn’s argument that there are scientific revolutions but they don’t conform to the falsificationist logic of conjectures and refutations. Kuhn sees revolutions as breaks in continuity whereas Lakatos is impressed by the persistence of ideas. Lakatos’ solution is to divide research programmes into a tenacious ‘hard core’ and a changeable ‘protective belt.’ But this MSRP is a theory not of revolutionary change but of change within normal science (81). How do (revolutionary) changes in the ‘hard core’ come about? Lakatos’ slipshodness (82) and sleight-of-hand (84) allow him to vacillate between two models: rival programmes (nothing in common) and successor programmes (hard core in common). He concentrates his attention on the latter and so shows himself a continuist (83). He lauds the proliferation of new programmes but cannot render this process rational because it ‘just happens’ — albeit slowly. ‘Crucial’ experiments between proliferating research programmes are not decisive because there is always hope of rehabilitating a degenerating research programme. So (non-rational) social or psychological pressures are needed to explain an RP’s survival.

But what of Lakatos’ idea that an RP progresses if it predicts novel facts? Well, Lakatos accepted Zahar’s modification of his criterion of novelty from predicting a fact forbidden by the rival programme to predicting a fact that does not belong to the problem-situation which governed the construction of the hypothesis (95-6). Lakatos’ MSRP is thus rendered inconsistent and he and Zahar co-author ‘one of the most incoherent and intellectually irresponsible accounts of the Copernican revolution that one is ever likely to come across’ (98). Lakatos’ modified philosophy takes us half way to the omni-tolerance of anything goes, so Feyerabend was right to hail Lakatos as a fellow anarchist.

Krige characterizes Popper and Lakatos’ view of science as that of spectators rather than participants. They concern themselves with a logic of science written in terms of ‘a particular theory of rationality’ (92) and not with the actual behaviour of scientists. Their theory of rationality applies only in the ‘context of justification’ where ideas are measured by the canons of logic. Actual scientists operate in a ‘context of discovery’ where social, psychological and other non-rational (i.e. non-logical) factors rule (92). Popper and Lakatos view the study of scientific method as ‘an essentially normative one and, as such, logically independent of a social-psychological study which explains scientist’s actual beliefs and actions’ (92). But ‘any rigid dichotomy between logic and psychology is incoherent’ (94) because ‘to describe two propositions as inconsistent with each other is to imply that it

would be unreasonable or inconsistent *to believe or to accept* both of them. In other words what reason evaluates is ... people's beliefs' (93-4). Logic evaluates beliefs and so explains behaviour. So contexts of discovery (behaviour) and justification (logic) are not rigidly separable.

Turning to Feyerabend (ch. 4), Krige poses the problem, how can a rationalist like Galileo be a hero to the self-proclaimed dadaist Feyerabend? Krige admires Feyerabend for his espousal of total revolution. Yet Feyerabend argues for proliferation of points of view to test the strengths of *existing* theories. Feyerabend is against universal methodological rules, universal rationality and explains scientists' behaviour by reference to aims and situations. He argues that neither the context of discovery nor the context of justification can be rational by Popper and Lakatos' universal standards, for two reasons: because standards change over time and also because non-logical factors like inclination and interest are decisive. In his analysis of the way Galileo argues about the ball falling from the tower and the view through the telescope Feyerabend finds persuasion techniques rather than logical reasoning being deployed. The pretence of rationality merely disguises advocacy of the interest of a particular person or group. Feyerabend's alternative is to suggest that science benefits when its practitioners engage in a playful battle of wits. Yet he too treats the production of new ideas as irrational and so retains the distinction context of discovery/context of justification.

Krige's critique centres on the Popper-Lakatos-Feyerabend conception that new ideas are mysteriously produced by historically disengaged creative individuals. Criticism is defended by them as a way of finding the strengths of *existing* views and of proliferating parallel views. Anything goes comes down to everything stays. But the radical revolutionary wants to combine the notion of an open future with rejection of the current establishment. This may be rational. Kuhn and Feyerabend desert the possibility that it may be rational to reject a point of view and replace it with something better, as Galileo insisted Copernicus was compared to Ptolemy and Aristotle. Galileo believed in *reality* (160). Aristotelianism is grounded in the ideas of natural place, potentiality as privation (163) and the sharp division between the terrestrial and the celestial spheres such that the earth *cannot* move. So Galileo's opposition to Aristotelianism was total: not an act of poetic intuition, not a gestalt switch, not personal inclination but [rational] intellectual effort by:

some of the deepest and mightiest minds ever produced by mankind ... [who] had, to begin with, to re-shape and to re-form our intellect itself; to give to it a series of new concepts, to evolve a new approach to being, a new concept of nature, a new concept of science, in other words, a new philosophy. (Koyré, quoted at 173)

Chapter 6 expounds further Krige's view of revolution as radical and discontinuous yet gradual by counterposing a discontinuous reconstruction of Galileo's thought relying on Koyré, to a continuist account inspired by

Duhem and Shapere. Galileo was part of a tradition yet he inaugurated a slow, revolutionary and ultimately discontinuous change. Shapere's continuism is a mistake that blurs problems

and creates a spurious sense of logical development although the transition from Peripatetic mechanics to classical physics was neither achieved by a single person, nor in a flash, it was discontinuous in the sense that it involved the complete replacement of one structure of thought by another. (180)

Shapere thinks the alternative to continuity is relativism. Krige thinks the discovery/justification dichotomy plus the irrationalism of Kuhn and Feyerabend is the problem.

[Those who travelled from impetus to inertia in the seventeenth century] did not have to choose between two ready made systems of thought; they rejected one and dismantled it, simultaneously constructing another. (199)

Not a mysterious change of world view but rational argument was involved. Against Kuhn and Feyerabend, Krige holds that reasoning can be an effective motor of scientific change (200). Galileo tried to argue himself out of the Aristotelian world view, 'despite his immense efforts, he never managed to disentangle himself completely from it.'

This book is a vigorous defence of the role of reason in the progress of science and an attack on the irrationalism (both proclaimed and denied) of several contemporary philosophers who to varying degrees extol or deny this irrationalism. As such a defence, it is welcome, especially as its 'Marxist' viewpoint does not intrude in a way that will put off non-Marxists. Still, one cannot be altogether certain where the author stands in relation to those he discusses. Feyerabend seems to have impressed him when seen in the flesh (106-7), but to have proved disappointing in print. Lakatos seems to have been exciting on first reading, but unclear on close study and hence overrated (70). Popper, whose views are discussed in a chapter with the resonant title 'The Poverty of Popperism,' actually has views very close to Krige's. Indeed Krige has not explained why Popper should dissent from his main thesis about revolutions being total. Also, Krige's rescue of Galileo from Feyerabend's portrait of him as a master of agitprop should find widespread favour. In objecting to acts of creative intuition as no substitute for rational criticism of the existing order Krige is tilting at windmills. His attempt to show how a pre-existing world view and its difficulties constitute a problem-situation and an agenda for science is an excellent example of the method Popper calls 'logic of the situation.'

Two criticisms seem worth making one internal and minor, the other external and major. First, the minor one. On p. 191 Krige rhetorically cites John Dunn's attack on 'bloodless' history: 'Men, breathing, excreting, hating, mocking, never step inside it.' Yet when we get to Galileo it is Feyerabend's Galileo who is nearest to 'breathing, excreting' etc., not Krige's. Krige's Galileo is the sober and logical dissector of Aristotle and Ptolemy who speaks

through Salviati. What is the connection of 'Men, breathing' etc. to Galileo's simple, logical arguments about the deficiencies of the old world order?

Krige has allowed his distaste for the rigid distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification to run away with him. No-one who uses it need do so 'rigidly,' and those who try to do without it, like Krige, cannot sustain *that* kind of rigidity. This is my major and external criticism. Popper's idea was to sharply separate, for analytical purposes, the logic of knowledge (the methods and results of examining a new idea logically) from the psychology of knowledge (the processes involved in the stimulation and release of an inspiration) and to consign the entirely legitimate inquiry into the latter to empirical psychology.

In his very weak attempt to argue that logic is involved with the empirical psychology of beliefs Krige displays his own (and his mentor Edgley's) middleheadedness about logic. The questions of how an idea occurs to someone, or what problems it solves, or how carefully it has been reasoned through do not affect the question of its truth: that must be decided independently. We are not interested in the truth of people's beliefs, we are interested in the truth of what it is they believe. That question is not decided by logic any more than it is by straw vote. The role of logic is this. As we search for ways to test the truth (and falsity) of some idea, logic provides us with means of drawing out its implications in a truth-preserving manner. 'Logic' tells us nothing about beliefs and it is a gross mistake to say it proscribes believing inconsistent propositions. If we know logic we know that two inconsistent propositions cannot both be true, and we also know that if they are conjoined the product is logically false. Nothing follows from this about what we should or should not believe. It is not the place of logic to question whether we should hold false beliefs. That is a different debate.

These flaws detract very little from a provocative and lucid book.

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GEOFFREY MADELL, *The Identity of the Self*. New York: Columbia University Press 1981 (for Edinburgh University Press). Pp. vii + 148. US\$17.00 ISBN 0-85224-422-3.

This little book, beautifully printed on pages half the normal size, reads as if the author was challenged to reduce a 500-page manuscript to one less than a

third that long, and succeeded magnificently. Jam-packed with argumentation, you can learn more from a page of this book than from a whole chapter of weightier tomes devoted to the problem of personal identity. And since it is written from a minority position on the problem, namely the view of Reid and Butler, revived by McTaggart, that personal identity is both strict and unanalyzable, it represents a sustained attack on the majority view, held by almost everybody these days, that it is possible to give an empirical account of the identity of persons in terms of bodies, brains, or objective continuities of experience underlying the memories of psychological continuants we call persons.

It may indeed seem, Madell argues, that persons *qua* embodied living human beings are no more difficult to identify and re-identify than particular rocks or trees. But that is only when we look at them from the outside, i.e. in a third-person perspective. As soon as we look at ourselves from the inside, i.e. in a first-person perspective, there emerges a radical disparity between such physical parameters, which we can always imagine to be quite different from what we believe them to be, and the unquestionable certainty we feel about who we are. In the deathless words of Peter Sellers in one of his character roles, '*In India we don't think who we are, we know who we are!*' And in fact, Madell concludes at the end of the book, this position, that the self is known to us intuitively without qualification, wholly rather than by degree, so that no reductive analysis into empirical components is possible, also accords with our ordinary, non-philosophical view of personal identity and indeed underpins a wide range of moral and social attitudes we have towards persons, such as praising or blaming.

I shall not try here to do critical justice to Madell's formidable battery of arguments. One may perhaps justly suspect that his position is only a problem masquerading as a solution, for its strengths seem to rest solely on the weaknesses of rival, empirical approaches. And surely it does not follow from my being able, like Kafka, to imagine waking up as a giant cockroach that I ever could in fact experience this state. After all, I can imagine lots of logically possible things that have no relation to reality, such as elephants flying by their ears.

What indeed are the empirical requirements of sustaining a self-concept? What often goes unnoticed is that philosophers who ponder the concept of self are without exception not brain-damaged people. The empirical dependency of this concept on intact neural tissue shows itself, not in philosophical debate, but on neurological wards where, due to selective brain damage, the ordinary, non-philosophical view of one's personal identity has undergone drastic alteration. A few well-known examples from the literature may help to reinforce this observation.

There is a man in Boston, 'H.M.', who if he still lives is now in his mid-fifties but does not know that. He does not know it because he underwent a bilateral hippocampectomy for seizure control in his youth, with the effect that ever since he has suffered from an anterograde amnesia that does not allow him to lay down recent memories or recall them from storage for

longer than two minutes. In addition he suffers from a retrograde amnesia for the three years preceding the operation. Thus when he awakens in the morning he thinks he is a youth of twenty about to go to work as a motor-winder in a factory. One can imagine his disappointment upon looking into a mirror and seeing an older man staring back at him. True, he knows who he is, but thirty-five years of his life are not available at all as part of his personal history.

The ordinary, non-philosophical view of personal identity includes as one of its components possession of a particular human body as one's own — all of it. But with lesions to the parietal lobe of the right cerebral hemisphere, there is a sudden disowning of the left body half. This phenomenon, hemi-inattention or unilateral neglect, is not a psychotic manifestation. If as a result of the stroke the left arm or leg is partially paralyzed, the patient denies any handicap, simply because that is not *his* arm or leg. In fact he may not wear a slipper on the left foot, chews food only on the right side of his mouth, sits only on the right buttock, shaves only the right side of his face, and will not talk to you if you approach him from his left side. Fully half the body image of the self is gone forever.

One could multiply examples, such as the split-brain patient finding that when he tries to read a newspaper during the ads in a television programme, his left hand throws the newspaper to the floor (the right cerebral hemisphere controlling the left hand in unguarded moments cannot read a newspaper). But suffice it to say that there are empirical conditions for generating and sustaining a self-concept, conditions that can be summed up as the integrity of higher levels of neural organization. A theory of personal identity which simply ignores such facts may still contain a great deal of philosophical insight, as Madell's fine little book surely does, but if it is to be rooted in reality as well as shrewd argument, it must be shown to be consistent with them.

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MORRISS HENRY PARTEE, *Plato's Poetics: The Authority of Beauty*. Salt Lake City : University of Utah Press 1981. Pp. xii + 223. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-87480-197-4.

This study of Plato's poetics has, in the words of its author, a two-fold task: 'to establish which, if any, of Plato's scattered comments represent his own

serious thought,' and secondly, 'to delineate Plato's effort to reconcile his magnificent poetic power and love of poetry with his commitment to unyielding philosophical integrity' (x). Although these might appear to be separate challenges, their mutual dependence is evident as soon as one recognizes the highly problematic character of the primary task. What criteria should be employed to determine which comments represent an author's serious thought — particularly if he writes, not treatises, but dramatic dialogues? How, furthermore, should these criteria be defended? These are questions which are not explicitly taken up in this book, but without which no light can be shed on the substantive issue it raises.

The book begins, reasonably, with a chapter entitled 'The Quest for Unity amid Multiplicity': the problem is not simply the apparent inconsistency of the discussions of poetry in various dialogues, but furthermore, the questionable unity of the set of themes involved in any of these discussions. Despite Partee's claim that 'Plato takes a consistent underlying stance toward poetry and its criticism,' he suggests that Plato may not have resolved in his own mind the problems involved, thus rendering any attempt to provide a 'definitive inquiry into his poetics' a matter of 'pompous nonsense' (xi-xii). The alleged lack of systematicity in Plato's thought is mirrored — not to say exaggerated — in the chapters of this book (several versions or parts of which have appeared as independent articles): on inspiration, the literal interpretation of poetry, the autonomy of the soul, imitation, language, and the written word. We are told, for example, that 'Plato is not thinking about the nature of poetry when he discusses inspiration' (22); yet surely the ironic praise of the poet's 'divine inspiration,' reflected in his inability to 'give an account' of the works he produces, is intended to shed light on the nature and status of poetry. Partee justifiably resists the temptation to construct an account of Platonic poetics by imposing an external unity on the complex multiplicity of themes and positions which appear in the dialogues; but one must, just for that reason, consider the philosophic significance which may be intentionally indicated by 'this disunity, or apparent disunity.'

Partee begins on the right track by observing that Plato's central discussion of aesthetics appears in the context of social and political considerations; so, of course, does almost every topic taken up in the dialogues — cosmology, for example — and if not, the absence of the political context is itself a problem for interpretation. While the treatment of poetry in the political context is hardly an arbitrary choice, one wonders, nevertheless, what distortions might result from that perspective. We could be more precise, Socrates warns in the *Republic*, if we were to pursue a 'longer and further path,' rather than basing our analysis of the structure of the soul on the model of the class-structure of the city (435d); the critical evaluation of poetry, then, which is based, at least in part, on this admittedly limited analysis of the soul, must be subject to the same possibility of perspectival distortion.

It is clear from these considerations that one cannot formulate 'Plato's attitude toward aesthetics,' as Partee admits, without confronting what he calls

the 'inherent ambiguity' of the dialogue form. But what exactly are the presuppositions and implications of that form? The absence of such reflection in this book is indicated by the constant reference to what *Plato* says: e.g. (with no reference to any particular passage) 'Plato himself asserts — without much explanation or proof — the identity of the true poet with the philosopher' (5). Given the dramatic form of the dialogue, however, Plato never asserts a single word in his own name, but only presents the speeches of various interlocutors, none of which can be automatically assumed to express *the Platonic* position. Partee concludes from the variety of 'concrete situations of the dialogues' that Plato himself is shown to be 'confused, contradictory, or unjustly polemical' (204); he does not explore the possibility that these contradictions, or apparent contradictions, are themselves intended by Plato to be spurs for the reader's task of interpretation. That task cannot consist, then, in determining which comments represent Plato's serious thought, for the latter could be determined only by reflecting on the relations among the speeches in the dialogues, the structure imposed upon them, the choice of interlocutors who express them — assuming the author to be responsible for constructing the representation of the whole.

These hermeneutic principles provide the frame for confronting the question raised by this book: why, in Partee's words, 'philosophical integrity' should be thought to be jeopardized by poetry. The subtitle of the book — the authority of beauty — provides a clue: the critical stance required for thinking is weakened by the charm of poetic language (see Socrates' image at *Rep.* 60lb). Yet the danger to critical thinking is shown to arise, not from poetry as such, but from the written word in general, which does not know when to speak and when to remain silent, but addresses a passive audience deprived of the opportunity for dialogic exchange (see *Phaedrus* 275d). Partee rightly sees this parallel between the Socratic critique of poetry and of writing: but to interpret this critique one must recognize that each is presented within a written work — one which knows when to speak and when to remain silent and thus exempts itself from the very danger against which it issues a warning.

In the course of condemning the potential danger of the written word, on grounds analogous to his condemnation of the power of poetry, Socrates argues for the superiority of 'dialectics,' that form of thinking and speaking represented in the Platonic dialogue, which the dialogue itself, as a form of writing, attempts to reenact. It is only this standard which renders intelligible the attack against the threat of poetry. But Partee cannot acknowledge this standard, for it is 'human language' in general, he maintains, which is an obstacle to thinking, 'an inferior teacher to the true and wordless poetry of knowledge' (199). The belief that 'Reality lies beyond language, not within' (173) — which Partee ascribes to Plato — constitutes the unacknowledged unifying theme of this book, and it is this (undemonstrated and indeed indemonstrable) thesis which is, I suspect, the chief source of its obscurities and confusions.

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INO ROSSI, ed., *Structural Sociology*, New York: Columbia University Press 1982. Pp. 363. US\$35.00. ISBN 0-831-04846-7.

Voici un autre recueil d'essais, cette fois-ci consacré à la sociologie 'structurale.' Il n'est pas difficile d'expliquer la prolifération croissante de ce genre d'ouvrages: à mi-chemin entre la revue scientifique et le texte d'auteur, le recueil permet de ramasser dans un seul volume des travaux apparentés de plusieurs chercheurs autrement dispersés dans nombre de revues différentes. Après la mise en place et la généralisation de l'usage de banques d'articles scientifiques et philosophiques, l'intérêt de ces recueils devient cependant presque purement didactique. Il n'y a là rien de reprochable, bien au contraire, mais cette fonction nouvellement dominante ne fait qu'accroître la responsabilité de l'éditeur. Cette responsabilité s'exerce sur deux plans décisifs: celui de la qualité des textes et celui de leur unité. Car, il va sans dire, un recueil ne se justifie que par l'unité de sa problématique ou de sa perspective. Or, si unité il y a dans *Structural Sociology*, il faut bien dire qu'elle est plutôt lâche. Le premier parcours de la table des matières suffit déjà à éveiller sinon des soupçons au moins des inquiétudes: que peut bien faire Talcott Parsons dans un recueil consacré explicitement non à la notion de structure en sciences sociales mais bel et bien au 'structuralisme français' —que dans la préface l'éditeur s'empresse à juste titre de distinguer, surtout, du structuro-fonctionnalisme—? Ou, encore, cette distinction faite, quel lien imaginer entre Maurice Godelier —un autre collaborateur du recueil— et le même Talcott Parsons? Certes, l'éditeur nous prévient dans le premier chapitre que les essais qui composent le recueil s'organisent sous deux catégories: ceux qui acceptent la perspective de ce structuralisme et l'utilisent dans la recherche concrète, empiriquement orientée (Condon et Wieting, Lemert et Nielsen, Lidz, Godelier et Gimenez), et ceux qui feraient usage de concepts structuraux sans pour autant endosser cette perspective structuraliste (Parsons, Stinchcombe, Katz, Ekeh et Eisenstadt). Mais c'est alors dans l'organisation même du recueil que l'idée plutôt paradoxale est avancée qu'un concept (théorique) peut être utilisé sans que soit endossée la perspective théorique qui le soutient ou le nourrit. La conséquence est patente: l'ouvrage ne recueille qu'un ensemble assez disparate d'essais que l'éditeur unifie de gré ou de force dans quatre parties: I. Perspectives inspirées par Lévi-Strauss, 1. L'étude de la structure sociale (où l'on trouve Parsons et Stinchcombe!), II. Perspectives inspirées par Lévi-Strauss, 2: l'étude de la dynamique sociale (où les auteurs, au moins, se réclament du structuralisme lévi-sraussien); III. La structure de l'ordre moral: perspectives chomskienne et piagetienne (où l'on peut se demander jusqu'à quel point Chomsky et Piaget partagent la perspective dite du structuralisme français, et même s'ils y représentent des courants disciplinaires apparentés d'une manière précise); enfin, IV. La perspective marxiste structurale (où, comme l'indique le titre même de la section, il n'est pas seulement question d'une option épistémologique mais aussi de l'adoption d'une théorie substantive particulière). A ces quatre parties, par ailleurs, s'en ajoutent deux autres,

l'une conçue comme introduction et qui porte sur le 'structuralisme relationnel' —une autre manière pour l'éditeur de distinguer le structuralisme français—, l'autre comme épilogue et qui, curieusement pour un épilogue, consiste dans une discussion —fort intéressante au demeurant— de la littérature existante sur la présomption d'obéissance ou d'acquiescement en tant que type normal de relation entre les infirmières et les médecins dans le contexte des institutions hospitalières...

Reste la question de l'intérêt et de la qualité des essais. A cet égard, la disparité des points de vue se double d'une hétérogénéité qualitative. Certains essais, suivant le style d'une sociologie empiriste dont le structuralisme 'relationnel' voudrait pourtant se démarquer à tout prix, tentent de justifier 'structurellement' des hypothèses dont le sérieux est aussi peu acceptable que leur objectivité. Ainsi celle de Fred E. Katz voulant que, 'dit brièvement, les ouvriers ont, certes, un bas degré d'autonomie dans leurs tâches et dans leur participation dans les affaires administratives de l'usine mais, par contre, ont un degré élevé d'autonomie qui leur permet de participer dans l'usine même à une version tronquée de leur vie "extérieure" (105). Ce que montreraient entre autres choses, les conversations quotidiennes des adultes mâles autour de leurs exploits sexuels (103). Tandis que les *managers* disposeraient d'autonomie dans la formulation et l'interprétation de la politique de l'organisation mais au prix d'un bas degré d'autonomie en dehors d'elle. Ce que montreraient non seulement la paperasse que l'administrateur apporte avec lui à la maison pour travailler le soir mais même ... etc. (106). Ou bien, pour ne retenir qu'un autre exemple, la tentative de Peter P. Ekeh de prouver l'hypothèse suivant laquelle une civilisation 'complexe' exige de résoudre ses crises avec l'extérieur par l'emploi de la puissance et de la force, et ses crises internes au moyen de son ordre normatif et de ses valeurs —comme le montrerait la politique américaine, bien entendu (139).

D'autres essais, comme celui qui constitue l'épilogue et auquel nous nous sommes déjà référés, celui de Godelier portant sur la reproduction des systèmes socio-économiques, ou encore la discussion de Condon et Wieting du jugement moral et qui débouche sur une analyse de la théorie de la justice de Rawls, présentent un intérêt certain. L'essai de Parsons ('Action, symboles et contrôle cybernétique') qui, supposons-nous, constitue une de ses dernières contributions, bien que fort peu original (et la même remarque devrait être faite à l'égard de l'essai de Godelier) ne manque pas d'inciter à la réflexion —ne serait-ce que sur l'étonnante vitalité de l'analogie mécaniste en sociologie. En résumé, il s'agit d'un recueil à prendre avec des pinces surtout s'il est destiné à un usage pédagogique.

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JOHN SALLIS, ed., *Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure, Language; A Collection of Essays*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1981. Pp. 173. US\$15.00. ISBN 0-391-02382-9.

Les lecteurs (rices) de Merleau-Ponty se plairont sans doute à apprécier les mérites du choix de textes que nous présente John Sallis. Non seulement le recueil témoigne-t-il de la vivacité des études merleau-pontiennes, mais en plus il offre, pour la première fois au lecteur de langue anglaise (qui peut déjà lire presque tout Merleau-Ponty dans la langue de Shakespeare), la traduction de deux textes de Merleau-Ponty: 'Projet de travail sur la nature de la perception' (1933), et 'La nature de la perception' (1934) (Ces deux textes parurent d'abord dans l'ouvrage de T. Geraets: *Vers une nouvelle philosophie transcendante; La genèse de la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty jusqu'à la Phénoménologie de la perception*, [La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff 1971].) Le premier de ces deux textes est une demande de bourse d'études, et le second, une demande de renouvellement. Comme le remarque, dans sa préface, le traducteur Forrest Williams, le renouvellement ne fut pas accordé au candidat. Ces deux textes contiennent pourtant en germes les principaux jalons de ce qui allait devenir l'une des philosophies les plus novatrices du siècle; l'ouvrage de M. Geraets, *Vers une nouvelle philosophie transcendante*, et le recueil de M. Sallis soulignent, en effet, l'unité profonde de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty, et confirment du même coup une étonnante fidélité du philosophe vis-à-vis les principaux thèmes qui, dès le début, nourrissent sa pensée. C'est la traduction de ces deux textes que M. Sallis place au tout début de son recueil. Il nous propose ensuite la lecture de huit nouveaux essais sur la pensée du philosophe. Je voudrais maintenant toucher quelques mots sur chacun de ces essais, en respectant l'ordre dans lequel M. Sallis a choisi de nous les présenter.

Vient en premier lieu 'Perception and Structure in Merleau-Ponty' de Bernhard Waldenfels, qui compte déjà, en plus d'une traduction allemande de *La structure du comportement*, plusieurs commentaires sur l'œuvre de Merleau-Ponty. Waldenfels retrace l'évolution des notions de perception et structure à travers les trois grandes œuvres de Merleau-Ponty: *La structure du comportement*, *Phénoménologie de la perception* et *Le Visible et l'Invisible*. À travers les hésitations d'une pensée qui ne craignit jamais les remises en question radicales, passant de la *Gestalt* envisagée 'du point de vue du spectateur étranger' à la *Gestalt* envisagée 'du point de vue de l'expérience,' Waldenfels tente de nous faire voir comment la notion de structure (ou de 'forme') se trouve finalement résituée dans l'être (avec une majuscule), à la 'jointure' où les catégories traditionnelles du sujet et de l'objet, de la conscience et de l'être, de l'*ego* et de l'*alter ego*, viennent finalement se brouiller. Dans cette 'ontologie de la différence,' c'est la notion de 'chair' (empruntée à Husserl), conçue comme un 'élément' (au sens pré-socratique) qui occupe la première place.

Le texte suivant, 'The Meaning and Development of Merleau-Ponty's Con-

cept of Structure,' est de James M. Edie, qui traduisit 'Le primat de la perception et ses conséquences philosophiques,' 'L'Oeil et l'esprit,' et d'autres articles, et fut aussi co-traducteur de *l'Eloge de la philosophie*. Contrairement à la plupart des commentateurs, M. Edie distingue non pas *trois*, mais *quatre* phases ou périodes dans le développement du concept de structure chez Merleau-Ponty. Ce sont les phases 1) gestaltiste, 2) dialectique, 3) structuraliste, et enfin 4) 'post-structuraliste' (en un sens, précise l'auteur, qui soit proprement merleau-pontien, et non 'derridien'). L'auteur insiste particulièrement sur la période dite 'structuraliste,' en remarquant qu'entre 1949 et 1953, l'intérêt du philosophe alla presque exclusivement au langage et à la linguistique structurale. Lu à la suite du texte de Waldenfels, qui présente la thèse 'classique' des trois périodes, celui de Edie offre l'intérêt d'ouvrir une controverse sur le développement d'un aspect de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty. Cependant, l'étiquette 'dialectique,' épingle par l'auteur sur la deuxième 'phase,' ne me semble pas être un choix très heureux.

Cette dernière conclusion est fortement suggerée par la lecture du troisième texte du recueil, une excellente étude de Jacques Taminiaux, intitulée: 'From Dialectic to Hyperdialectic.' Taminiaux montre en effet que l'intérêt de Merleau-Ponty pour la dialectique commença très tôt et que même *La structure du comportement* n'échappe pas à l'influence de la pensée dialectique. Taminiaux examine en particulier les positions de Merleau-Ponty vis-à-vis les grands penseurs 'dialecticiens,' nommément Hegel et Marx. Le texte de Taminiaux est le seul du recueil à prendre en considération la pensée politique de Merleau-Ponty, et particulièrement sa conception du marxisme exposée dans *Humanisme et Terreur* et *Les aventures de la dialectique*. Il met aussi clairement en évidence le fait que la pensée dialectique, telle qu'elle s'est développée en France autour de Sartre et Merleau-Ponty, n'implique pas une synthèse finale, une *Aufhebung* résolvant les contradictions antérieures. Il nous montre enfin un Merleau-Ponty très critique à l'endroit de la dialectique, cherchant à la dépasser ultimement par une hyperdialectique.

Tony O'Connor présente, dans 'Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of Unconscious,' les positions de Merleau-Ponty vis-à-vis la notion d'inconscient. Ce qui étonne un peu, dans ce très court texte (10 pages), c'est que le nom de Freud n'y figure qu'une seule fois; pourtant, il eût été intéressant d'apprendre en quelle estime Merleau-Ponty tenait la notion freudienne d'inconscient (Merleau-Ponty, on le sait, fut très tôt en contact avec l'œuvre de Freud). O'Connor s'intéresse plutôt à la critique que fait Merleau-Ponty de la conception husserlienne de l'inconscient. Cela ne manque pas d'intérêt, mais je ne crois pas qu'il ait pleinement rendu justice à Husserl dans le débat, en suggérant que pour ce dernier, 'the unconscious must be a pure passivity, completely non-intentional' (80). C'est l'expression 'non-intentional' qu'utilise O'Connor qui me semble inappropriée, du moins dans la mesure où c'est le 'dernier Husserl' qui est concerné.

Avec son étude: 'Merleau-Ponty's Examination of Gestalt Psychology,' Lester Embree aborde très utilement un thème peu exploré: l'évaluation que fait Merleau-Ponty de la psychologie de la forme dans ses deux célèbres thèses

de doctorat. Embree tente de faire ressortir ce qui reste de la psychologie de la forme (par exemple, la critique de l'hypothèse de constance), une fois dégagée de sa gangue 'naturaliste,' et réinterprétée dans le cadre d'une phénoménologie d'inspiration husserlienne. Embree montre de plus quel rôle joue le concept de *motivation* dans cette réinterprétation de la psychologie de la forme.

Hugh J. Silverman (traducteur de *La conscience et l'acquisition du langage*, un cours professé à la Sorbonne en 1949-50) examine l'évolution de la philosophie du langage de Merleau-Ponty dans 'Merleau-Ponty and the Interrogation of Language.' D'après l'auteur, on peut distinguer quatre 'formulations' du problème du langage dans la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty: 1) celle du 'langage du corps' — formulation de 1945; 2) celle de la 'philosophie et de la psychologie de la communication,' qu'on pourrait aussi qualifier de 'structuraliste,' et qui couvre la période allant de 1946 à 1952; 3) celle du 'langage indirect,' caractérisée par un intérêt accru pour la poésie, la musique, la littérature, et surtout la peinture, et aussi par l'opposition entre les 'langages indirects' et une langue 'pure,' 'universelle,' construite à des fins scientifiques, opposition susceptible d'intéresser les 'philosophes du langage ordinaire'; et finalement 4) celle du 'langage de la visibilité' (1958-61), formulation exposée dans *Le Visible et l'Invisible*, et qui poursuit les efforts faits en vue d'une philosophie du style commencée sous la période précédente.

Dans 'Pretexts: Language, Perception, and the Cogito in Merleau-Ponty's Thought,' Stephen Watson développe une problématique très intéressante. Dans la *Phénoménologie de la perception*, le langage apparaît comme la 'traduction' d'un 'texte original,' d'un 'pré-texte,' d'un cogito 'tacite' ou 'silencieux,' comme expression d'un monde 'antéprédicatif,' fondée sur une 'présence de soi à soi,' qui fait que le langage justement 'veut dire quelque chose pour nous.' En cela, la *Phénoménologie de la perception* est en accord avec les 'phénoménologies classiques.' Puis, Watson nous montre un Merleau-Ponty prenant de plus en plus ses distances vis-à-vis la 'philosophie de la conscience.' Ce recul devient presque reniement dans *Le Visible et l'Invisible*, où il est reconnu que le langage ne peut être établi sur une 'infrastructure perceptuelle.' L'originaire,' le pré-texte de la *Phénoménologie de la perception*, éclate alors en une pluralité de dimensions, le 'retour aux choses elles-mêmes' doit être réinterprété, l'*Ursprungsklärung*, la recherche d'une 'fondation originale' (*Ur-stiftung*), prend alors plusieurs directions. Watson nous rappelle cependant l'importance du thème de la *foi perceptive* dans le dernier grand ouvrage du philosophe, indiquant par là la reprise d'un thème déjà présent dans *Phénoménologie de la perception*. Watson retrace ainsi l'évolution de Merleau-Ponty, de la phénoménologie classique, jusqu'à ses derniers travaux, signes avant-coureurs des développements entrepris par les phénoménologues de la dernière génération.

Le recueil de M. Sallis se termine par un magnifique petit commentaire d'un texte de Merleau-Ponty, par un ami de Merleau-Ponty: 'Eye and Mind,' de Mikel Dufrenne. Ce dernier prend pour thème le titre du célèbre texte de Merleau-Ponty ('L'Oeil et l'esprit'). En fait, il ne s'agit pas tant d'une exégèse

de ce texte que d'un commentaire portant sur l'œuvre entière du philosophe. Sartre disait en effet, à propos de 'L'Oeil et l'esprit,' qu'il disait tout, pourvu qu'on sache correctement le déchiffrer. En particulier, Dufrenne fait grand cas de l'attachement de Merleau-Ponty à la peinture, et plus spécifiquement, à l'œuvre de Cézanne.

En résumé, le recueil de M. Sallis contient plusieurs instruments fort utiles pour l'interprétation de l'œuvre de Merleau-Ponty; et bien que centré sur les notions de perception, structure et langage, il comprend aussi des textes, comme ceux de Taminiaux, O'Connor et Dufrenne, qui abordent d'autres aspects de l'œuvre du philosophe (dialectique, politique, philosophie de l'inconscient, esthétique).

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MEREDITH ANNE SKURA, *The Literary Use of The Psychoanalytic Process*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1981. Pp. viii + 280. US\$20.00. ISBN 0-300-02380-4.

Almost no one outside the profession of psychoanalysis, and few enough within it, still believe that Freudian psychology is a causal science. M.A. Skura's argument for the usefulness of psychoanalytic ideas to literary criticism also departs from the older, causal and reductionist view. The psychoanalyst of Skura's book is looking

... not for a particular sort of unconscious content behind the conscious content of his patient's words, but only for the *relations between ideas* that are revealed by *different modes of consciousness*, ... [not for] a particular sort of thing that is wish-fulfilling (like sex) behind a particular sort of thing that is defensive (like morality) but rather for the way in which ideas of whatever kind *express general psychic conflict*. (210; all emphases added.)

In consequence, the interest of psychoanalysis to literary critics becomes in this book somewhat more heuristic than substantive. Its importance lies, not in psychoanalytic 'explanations' that claim to infer the unconscious motives of an author's works, but in the kinds of models by which it may expand our comprehension of literature. Skura finds five such models for literary critics in psychonalysis: the case history, the fantasy, the dream, the patient-analyst rhetorical exchange, and (the most promising) the entire psychoanalytic process. Skura not only brings together these models in detailed discussions of important literary works (including *Clarissa*, *The Old Curiosity Shop*, and

those quintessential examples, *Oedipus Rex* and *Hamlet*), but offers a painstaking rethinking of these five dimensions and the texts she examines. Citing at the outset both E.D. Hirsch's observation that 'meaning is an affair of consciousness' and S. Ferenczi's dictum that consciousness must be plumbed for its full meaning, she always edges psychoanalytic theory away from the traditional 'basement' view of psychic conflict, and towards the principle of conflicting modes of representation manifested in consciousness. Thus, a study of case history, dream, etc. can primarily give literary critics a keener sense of the interplay of different modes of awareness and how it shapes contents, function, representation, and rhetorical strategy (11), and how holistic insight emerges, as in the patient-analyst process, through the disorganizing and reorganizing of materials.

Skura's method of argument may be illustrated by reference to her discussion of dreams in relation to both psychoanalysis and texts. On the one hand, Freud taught that dreams are disguised fulfilments of repressed wishes, demanding a symbolic reading for which the literal (manifest) surface is a mere indication. On the other hand, according to Skura, although Freud did hold fast to the wish-fulfilment formula, he so complicated the notion of wish that wish-fulfilment seems to imply less and less a simple dichotomy between a misleading surface effect and an underlying causal wish, and connotes more and more a psychic conflict between two different manners of representation which are 'vying for control of the manifest dream' (135). Such conflicts of modes of representation, by turns infantile and adult, primitive and sophisticated, 'overdetermine' the text, opening it to multiple readings, like the famous duck-rabbit drawing of Gestalt psychology (141). 'The dream's indirections not only disguise wishes but sometimes express something otherwise inexpressible' (147). On this account, of course, the lesson of psychoanalysis for literary critics is that, insofar as texts resemble dreams, the text as surface is not a mere index to wholly imperceptible, inferable states. It is rather a surface to be studied for the interplay of different modes of representation which it negotiates. By this version of psychic conflict, Skura rescues psychoanalytic literary criticism from the traditional charge of sacrificing the surface of meanings and images, which is aesthetically powerful and all-important to writer and public, to invisible causes. Along these lines, the most useful model for literary critics is the psychoanalytic process taken as a whole, because it explicitly emphasises the organising power of insight and self-consciousness, and new ways of looking at things. The full course of psychoanalytic treatment is a kind of semantic laboratory, if I understand the author correctly, for discovering in minute detail how stereotyped interpretations, just as in literary texts, break down and re-form, as meanings, perspectives, and rules of interpretations shift and change (202). In her concluding chapter, 'Literature as Psychoanalytic Process: Surprise and Self-Consciousness,' Skura offers an extended application of the lessons which she draws from psychoanalysis to the text of one of Shakespeare's most difficult plays to interpret satisfactorily, *Measure for Measure*. With her overall principle in hand, that psychic conflict is expressed in a tension be-

tween different ways and stages of representing things, she undertakes to emulate the 'psychoanalytic virtues' she sees in the psychoanalyst: attention to different aspects of the text, 'tactlessness,' openness to counter-intuitive meanings, and abiding self-consciousness about the very process of interpretation itself (243).

Because any penetrating discussion of psychology and of literature is inevitably philosophical, Skura's reexamination of their connections is philosophically significant as well as interesting to critics. It is also a fascinating demonstration of her great abilities as a literary critic and of her wide acquaintance with the field of psychoanalysis. Her discussions of writings by Richardson, Dickens, Conrad, Sophocles, Shakespeare and others are illuminating, and in the notoriously difficult case of *Measure for Measure*, delightfully surprising. About such a rewarding, perceptive, and well-written book I am reluctant to raise a serious doubt, if the doubt were not, in a way, finally more a compliment to the author's own critical abilities than a reservation about them.

My doubt concerns the importance of psychoanalytic theory and practice to literary criticism, given the account of psychoanalysis provided by the author. Recastings of Freud are nowadays so numerous and increasingly so radical, especially in the French school, that Skura's comparable exegeses, and the 'newer approach' (187) to which she consistently appeals, are hardly scandalous. But, when her interpretation of Freud is said and done, I wonder how much she really needs psychoanalysis at all to support her rich and penetrating treatments of literary texts. For one thing, the Freud of these pages is in large measure — though not entirely, to be sure — much closer to a postwar, almost anti-Freudian school of therapy, than to even the most liberal Freud — so close, in fact, that I kept expecting its name to be pronounced. The 'psychoanalysis' of this book is remarkably similar to the major revision of psychoanalytic theory and practice set forth by the late Dr. Frederick S. Perls in his *Ego, Hunger and Aggression* (1947) and *Gestalt Therapy* (1951). Perls was a Viennese-trained analyst who recast psychoanalysis along lines suggested by the general Gestalt psychology of Wertheimer, Gelb and Goldstein, Koffka, and Koehler, all of whom had been immensely influential in his intellectual milieu. His redefinitions and new emphases were exactly those that Skura's 'newer approach' sees in Freud: the importance of the 'surface' of experience, its expressive character, the disorganization and reorganization of figure and ground, the 'click' of surprise, the primacy of the how (or manner) over the what (or content), the healing power of insight, and the simultaneous preservation and destruction of the Freudian principle of unconscious conflict through the notion of rigid and competing gestalts or constellations of meanings. Thus, the following, quite characteristic passage from Skura would fit comfortably in any work of Gestalt psychological theory:

Analysis is effective because of this gradual loosening of larger patterns and relationships, which makes newer and freer ones possible. The most im-

portant fact about psychoanalysis — and perhaps the most often misunderstood — is that analysts are not looking for specific things but for ways of seeing things. They are not looking for something hidden but for new aspects of what was already there; they are not looking for the past but for all the ways in which the past affects the present, without being recognized as doing so. (209; original emphasis.)

Now, Gestalt psychology, with which these ideas are most intimately associated, has long been recognized to be especially congenial to artists and critics, who spoke a similar language before the advent of the gestalt school. (Indeed, that is precisely why academic psychologists who affect scientific poses and the associated reductionist and causal vocabulary — including some psychoanalysts — have rounded so fiercely upon these 'too literary' Gestalt psychologists.)

But even if we grant, as may be the case, that Skura's view of Freudian analysis can be justified by psychoanalytic practice, we may wonder whether the 'psychoanalytic virtues' cited above (referring to p. 243) require any *continued* involvement with psychoanalytic theory. Perhaps the modern awareness of different modes of consciousness, of semantic ambiguity, of the ubiquity of the oneiric, in contemporary literary criticism, put to such good use by Skura, would not have developed — or at least, not so soon — had it not been for the impact of Freudian psychoanalysis on a diversity of humanistic disciplines. However, as Skura's own argument shows, the first influence of psychoanalysis on literary criticism was in many ways unfortunate in its predictable and formulaic reductions of individual texts to its monotonous repertoire of unconscious wishes and defenses. The 'newer approach' to which Skura appeals, on the other hand, plays so well into postwar literary criticism as to render its 'virtues' almost indistinguishable from those of the critics. Freud has indeed made us aware of the gaps and opacities in the supposedly transparent self-consciousness of pre-Freudian epistemology; of the power and reach of the pruriently 'expressed' sexuality of our Victorian forebears; of the rhetorical dimensions of even the most objective-sounding utterances; and of the great importance of 'accidental' or 'peripheral' meanings. But these are highly *general* lessons (as Skura herself suggests on p. 275) about human thought, and psychoanalysis seems, in hindsight, chiefly the occasion for our having learned and espoused them. Do critics such as Skura still need to look for additional critical guidance from psychoanalytic theory and practice? Certainly, far more excitingly and persuasively than any other psychoanalytically-oriented critic I have yet read, Skura has made sensible use of these general lessons — whether genuinely Freudian or rather more Perlsian — and has integrated them creatively into the literary theory and criticism of this insightful and rewarding book. But I am left by her book with far higher expectations for her continued critical output than for the continued usefulness of more psychoanalytic education to further developments in literary criticism.

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HERMAN TENNESSEN, *Problems of Knowledge*. Assen: Van Gorcum 1982.
Pp. viii + 78. Dfl 17.90. ISBN 90-232-1764-4.

There are two guiding principles to Tennessen's book. The first is that there is no such 'thing' as knowledge that can be studied, discovered or analyzed. Whenever, therefore, someone claims to tell us what knowledge is, he is merely recommending a way of talking. Second, there is no incorrigible knowledge. Of course, given the first principle, the second cannot be taken as a discovery on his part. Rather, it is to be taken as a recommendation.

He defends his recommendation as follows. First, the most likely candidate for incorrigible knowledge is formal knowledge. But that won't do — not because claims about formal systems are corrigible, but because most do not deserve to be called knowledge. Any claim that deserves the name, he says, must have enough audacity to be possibly false. The law of contradiction, for example, is merely a first principle, and first principles are not known. Similarly, theorems are mere paraphrases of first principles and add nothing to them. Therefore, they too are not known. There may be some audacious claims about formal systems (his example is Riemann's conjecture about the counting of prime numbers, but I suppose that Goldbach's conjecture would do equally well), but they remain unproved and their reliability is a function of empirical work with computers and the like. Other purported examples of incorrigible knowledge, such as first person reports of current sense experience, are, he argues, corrigible.

Given the above considerations, Tennessen further recommends that any paraphrase of 'I know that x ' rule out the possibility of incorrigible knowledge. Thus, he suggests the following: 'Given an explanatory system, E, within a global(oid) conceptual framework, F, what counts as "evidence" within E, according to the language implied by F, is such that evidence recorded as "strengthening x " at least presently outbalances evidence classified as "weakening x "' (33).

Two points should be noted about this recommendation. First, there is no reference to truth. It is a failing of justified true belief theories, Tennessen claims, that the justification and truth conditions cannot be applied independently. I have no access to truth apart from evidence. Second, evidence is relativized to conceptual framework, explanatory system and language. This point reflects Tennessen's acceptance of the Kuhnian position that people operating within different paradigms do not see the same things. Thus, what is evidence from within one theoretical context is not from within another.

I find his recommendations unappealing. Generally, one evaluates such recommendations on the basis of theoretical advantages and disadvantages, and I am not sure what is to be gained by severing the connection between knowledge and truth. To the extent that knowledge has been of interest to philosophers, it has largely been because of its connection to reliable attainment of truth. Hence, the continuing interest in justified true belief accounts and their causal and counterfactual variants.

Moreover, Tennessen's own justifications are unconvincing. First, even though I cannot apply the justification and truth conditions independently in my own case, I can do so when appraising knowledge claims of others. Second, even if we grant that there is no incorrigible knowledge (as I am willing to do for reasons other than Tennessen's), I do not see why a paraphrase of 'I know that x ' must rule it out. Such a paraphrase makes incorrigible knowledge a conceptual impossibility, which is hardly to be welcomed. Third, I don't even think that Tennessen's paraphrase does rule it out. Certainly, someone who utters it does not commit himself to having incorrigible knowledge. (Nor, for that matter, does someone who utters a justified true belief paraphrase.) Still, one can utter it and consistently claim that, as a matter of fact, there can be no 'weakening evidence' from within any acceptable theoretical context. Fourth, even if we adopt the Kuhnian line (which is, of course, controversial), we need not incorporate it in a paraphrase of 'I know that x '.

The remainder of the book is largely devoted to the problem of induction. Tennessen does not attempt to solve the problem. Rather, he devotes his energies to arguing that it is a problem. His opponents are the ordinary-language philosophers, whose views have been refuted many times before, and various proponents of the pragmatic justification of induction, whose views have also been widely discussed.

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ERIC WEIL, *Philosophie et réalité; derniers essais et conférences*. Paris: Beauchesne 1982. 402 p. ISBN 2-7010-1047-0.

La publication des 'derniers essais et conférences' (les tomes I et II des *Essais et conférences* ayant paru en 1970-71) a coïncidé avec le colloque Eric Weil qui s'est tenu les 21 et 22 mai 1982, au Centre 'Les Fontaines' de Chantilly. L'initiative du P.M. Régnier, directeur des *Archives de philosophie* et de G. Kirscher du *Centre Eric Weil* de l'Université de Lille III a porté fruit: le colloque a attiré une bonne centaine de participants français et étrangers. L'œuvre de Weil, largement traduite en italien, connaît un intérêt grandissant là-bas, si l'on en juge par la forte délégation venue de ce pays.

Le volume comporte une riche bibliographie revue et mise à jour par G. Kirscher, L. Sichirollo et P. Vendetti qui réjouira les lecteurs de Weil.

Le fait qu'un grand nombre d'articles se réfèrent plus ou moins explicitement à Hegel ne doit pas nous cacher que Weil récuse carrément sa prétention théomorphe au Savoir absolu. Dans sa très importante conférence à la Société française de philosophie (26 janvier 1963), Weil déclare tout uniment:

Je ne sais pas ce que c'est que l'absolu ... Nous pouvons présupposer que le monde est structuré mais nous ne pouvons jamais dire une fois pour toutes qu'elle est la structure ... Il y a une idée du savoir absolu, mais il n'y a pas de savoir absolu, c'est-à-dire la philosophie reste toujours philosopher ... Le discours cohérent si je peux citer un auteur tout à fait passé de mode, un certain Emmanuel Kant, c'est une idée.

C'est choisir Kant contre Hegel: 'Ce que je maintiens ce n'est pas l'écorce mais la substance de la pensée kantienne.' (51). Mais une telle conclusion est sans doute trop abrupte pour être exacte. Forcé de se déclarer, Weil s'est déjà défini comme 'un kantien post-hégélien.' Il faut donc nuancer. Weil n'est pas loin de penser que le vrai Hegel, 'tel qu'en lui-même l'éternité le change' n'a pas été aussi hégélien qu'il le prétendait. En effet, le rêve démesuré, illusoire, du Discours cohérent de la totalité est demeuré à l'état d'essentialité idéale, non effectuée. La réalité de l'œuvre accuse un déficit infini par rapport à l'infini inépuisable de l'idée. En dépit de ses critiques, Kant subsiste chez Hegel même, 'nié mais ni écarté ni résolu ... En fait, quand il travaille sur le concret, je crois qu'il ne maintient pas du tout la prétention du savoir absolu. Le savoir absolu est un savoir de la structure et non pas du structuré. Le structuré est inépuisable. Il l'appelle *schlechte Wirklichkeit*, mais parce qu'il l'appelle *schlechte*, il n'en est pas moins réel' (50). Bien plus, comme on le voit dans les derniers articles publiés à Berlin, Hegel ne cache pas son admiration pour Kant et déplore qu'il n'a pas été suffisamment compris... Les noces non-consommées de l'idéalisme absolu mais célébrées dans un langage d'une décourageante abstraction obstruent la reconnaissance de son réalisme.

Dans l'ordre politique, en particulier, l'exaltation de l'Etat moderne comme la raison incarnée dans l'histoire, *Selbstzweck*, ne l'empêche aucunement de prendre la pleine mesure de son inachèvement. Raison par rapport à la volonté arbitraire et passionnée de l'individu, l'Etat est lui-même comme un grand individu en lutte avec ses congénères. Les épais nuages de la guerre roulent sans cesse au dessus des intérêts conflictuels *des Etats*. En tant qu'individus quasi-naturels, les Etats n'échappent non plus aux coups de l'accidentel et du fortuit. A l'intérieur même de l'Etat moderne-raisonnable, le 'mécanisme social' suscite inévitablement des groupes qui, souffrant un 'tort infini,' en viennent à rêver d'une société totalement autre où ils auraient enfin le sentiment d'être reconnus dans leur dignité ... Pour eux, la révolution peut devenir à leurs yeux, l'impératif catégorique. Tout *Sollen* n'est donc pas évacué: 'dans l'Etat de la société moderne subsiste une tâche aussi urgente que difficile, tâche que *doit* résoudre la réflexion d'un gouvernement qui *doit* penser l'universalité raisonnable de cette réalité empirique et *doit* lui imposer — car ce n'est pas chose faite — cette rationalité' (162).

Mais il y a un devoir-être spécifique de l'Etat qui ne saurait être confondu avec la morale, par exemple, sans dérégler l'une et l'autre. La confusion débouche sur les pires fanatismes; la séparation exile la morale dans l'intériorité abstraite, impuissante de 'la belle âme'; elle dégrade la politique dans un 'réalisme' également 'abstrait', sans principe, sans limite, coupé de sa distinction raisonnable. La juste dialectique, subtile, extraordinairement fragile, des deux domaines définit le thème même de la conférence *Politique et morale* (chap. XIII). L'Esprit objectif n'est pas le terme de l'odyssée de l'Esprit; la réalisation de la liberté raisonnable ne s'épuise pas dans l'Etat dont les gouvernements concrets ne sont d'ailleurs jamais que des expressions imparfaites. L'ordre politique ne forme que 'le soubassement indispensable à la réalisation de l'Esprit absolu' (158). Au-delà s'épanouit l'art, la religion et la philosophie. Le politique doit créer les conditions *extérieures* du déploiement des activités non-politiques, chacune selon son essence propre. Weil transpose dans son langage, admirable: l'organisation politique est 'cet universel extérieur qui permet à toutes les particularités de vivre et de s'épanouir.'

... Si la politique a un sens — et il dépend de nous qu'elle en ait —, il ne se trouvera que dans la création des conditions extérieures nécessaires à l'existence de la liberté universelle des individus dans leurs particularités pour eux sensées. La politique ne peut pas donner davantage: le sens n'est pas de son domaine, mais seulement les conditions du sens. Par là, elle n'est pas méprisable, elle est grande; car il ne suffit pas ici de bonne volonté, il faut vouloir et réussir, dans la réalité, avec, pour, et parfois contre les hommes, tels qu'ils sont, avec leurs aspirations les plus hautes et leurs intérêts les plus bas.

Absolute dans son ordre, la politique demeure relative; la politique n'est pas tout; tout n'est pas politique.

La démesure du Système clos et totalement englobant condamnée comme prétention est cependant reprise comme idée. Weil se montre encore fidèle à Kant par son sens aigu du 'fait de la raison,' cette présence immédiate, bien que non développée, de la règle fondamentale' (272). Le principe de la moralité a été bien dégagé: on ne doit pas se lasser de répéter avec lui 'le système axiomatique de toute morale qui veut se justifier, au lieu d'être simplement suivie.' Mais curieusement, Weil montre quelque réserve vis-à-vis le thème du mal radical qui avait déjà scandalisé si fort ses amis de l'Aufklärung: Goethe, Herder, Schiller. On aurait pu croire que Weil renchérisse, lui aussi, dans leur sens. Tout au contraire, il reproche à Kant de ne pas être allé assez loin dans l'approfondissement de la méchanceté humaine. Certes, l'homme, même méchant, reste un homme; Dieu merci, il n'est pas encore le Diable. Mais de même qu'il y a quelque chose de divin dans l'homme qui passe l'homme, de même il y a un gouffre de violence en lui où il n'ose se reconnaître en l'appelant diabolique. Ce que d'autres hommes ont fait, comment pourrais-je prétendre que j'en serais, moi, radicalement incapable? Dans le seconde édition des *Problèmes kantiens* (1970), Weil avait

consacré une profonde étude à l'exploration du mal humain. Il y revient en 1976 dans *Faudra-t-il parler de nouveau de morale?*

Ce que Kant n'a pas vu — non, ce qu'il a bien vu en discernant dans l'homme un mal radical, mais dont il a repoussé la conséquence dernière —, c'est que l'homme peut vivre dans le refus de toute morale justifiée ou justifiable (il serait un peu puéril d'objecter que même les brigands vivent selon un système de règles: la question n'est pas du fait, mais de la justification), que, étant libre, il peut opter contre la liberté, pour le désir, pour la violence, qu'il peut refuser la règle et les concepts d'universalité et d'universalisation. Sa volonté peut se faire, selon l'expression de Kant, de ce que Kant déclare impossible, à savoir diabolique. L'homme l'a fait plus d'une fois, et non seulement aux époques qui ont précédé toute réflexion philosophique: les violents existent parmi nous, nous le savons, mais, comme Kant, nous préférerons ne pas y penser quand nous parlons de morale; et nous savons également que, sur le plan du calcul, de la technique, de l'organisation, les violents ne sont pas toujours des barbares. La discussion morale a-t-elle un sens aussi longtemps que les violents (de la force et de la ruse) jouent leur jeu au sein de nos communautés, même en se servant de nos communautés?

La fait est que les violents risquent toujours d'entraîner les hommes raisonnables dans le cycle infernal agression-répression. Se retrancher dans la position 'morale,' mais abstraite d'une non-violence qui accepte d'une manière conséquente le sacrifice, c'est encore se faire le complice de la violence puisque la non-résistance laisse le champ libre aux violents. A la limite, l'universalisation d'une telle maxime implique l'effacement de tout être moral et par suite de la morale elle-même. En revanche, répondre par la résistance armée de la puissance publique c'est d'une certaine manière imiter ceux qui sont voués à la violence, accepter le terrain qu'ils ont choisi. User des moyens de la violence n'est-ce pas bientôt la combattre par des méthodes indignes? L'état se trouve donc acculé à un étrange paradoxe: pour remplir sa tâche de limitation de la violence il doit, lui aussi, recourir à une certaine violence, la violence résiduelle de la contrainte mesurée par la loi. La discipline raisonnable de la loi s'effectue ultimement par la médiation de son contraire. La réalisation de la raison dans l'histoire passe par la lutte d'une raison particulière, 'la raison d'Etat parlant par la bouche des chefs.' Comment ne pas en convenir? Nous entrons dans une zone trouble où la raison emprunte à la violence pour la refouler dans des bornes étroites, minimales, cependant que la force se met au service de la protection d'un espace public ordonné, sensé.

Comme il l'a montré dans son extraordinaire introduction, à la *Logique de la philosophie*: sur le plan transcendental, la possibilité de la violence pure a été écartée, dès l'origine, la philosophie a gagné mais dans la réalité de l'histoire rien n'est définitivement acquis, le philosophe doit lutter sans cesse avec son autre.

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