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P.G. BROWN, C. JOHNSON, and P. VERNIER, eds., *Income Support: Conceptual and Policy Issues.* Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield 1981. Pp. xiii + 378. US$27.50. ISBN 0-8476-6969-6.

This is an interesting collection of 18 papers on the philosophy, economics, sociology and history of income support in the USA. It would provide a good basis for an advanced seminar in social and political philosophy, and I'm looking forward to trying it out. 'The primary purpose of the volume is to examine basic moral and conceptual issues underlying recent welfare reform efforts as well as any future attempts to appraise or modify income support policies in this country' (vii).

There are 4 sections in the book.

> The first, "Moral Authority and Proper Goals of the State," addresses the issues of why the state should be concerned with income distribution at all, the limits on state intervention in personal life, and the relative responsibilities of the federal government and the several states. The second section concerns how we should decide among the various objectives of income support policy, e.g., equity, adequacy, efficiency, and creation of work incentives — objectives which cannot be simultaneously maximized. The third considers the question of whether there are welfare rights, how they could or could not be justified, and how they should be understood. The fourth discusses the nature of the present policy debate and locates it with reference to past, current, and prospective trends. (x)

The first section begins with a paper by R.B. Brandt describing utilitarianism as it is found in Brandt and J.S. Mill, with its emphasis on full employment and work requirements for able-bodied people on welfare. The second paper, by G. Brennan and D. Friedman, gives a libertarian critique of income redistribution or welfare. They begin with the Lockean assumption that people own their own bodies and fruits of their own labour. Then they argue that government transfers are either voluntary or not; if not then they amount to theft and if so then they amount to charity. In either case no one would have a right to such transfers. They also argue that there should be such transfers only if they could be made fairly, which they doubt. They also oppose equalizing incomes because of an alleged loss of incentive to produce and they oppose government largesse because it tends to create some behaviour designed merely to get a piece of the pie.

G. Dworkin has a nice analytic discussion of paternalism in this section,

including five sorts of justifications. This is followed by a paper describing and appraising the responsibilities of state and federal governments in providing welfare, by T.A. Ault.

The second section begins with a paper by J.T. Allen giving 5 objectives of income support policy and explanations of horizontal equity (treat equals equally) and vertical equity (treat unequals unequally). She cites evidence showing that there is little American sympathy for equality of outcomes, but quite a bit for equality of opportunity. She mentions 3 principles of vertical equity which collectively imply that government transfers shouldn't change the status quo much. Interested readers may consult A.C. Michalos, *Economics, Religion and Morality* (North American Social Report, Volume 5, [Reidel 1982]) for a detailed account of how little Canadian and American transfer payments change income distributions.

D. Lindeman considers problems related to determining equal needs in the interests of horizontal equity. C. Johnson also provides reasons to do little in the way of welfare on the ground that, roughly, not everyone can be responsible for everyone; not everyone has the authority or power to look after everyone. Moreover he doesn't seem to find the American system of distribution faulty enough to consider a massive overhaul.

N. Daniels gives a critique of Allen's essay and challenges the American distribution system more than any of the other authors. He is about the only author to see the inequity of having an economic system that allows many people to work full time and still live in poverty, then to put ceilings on welfare which keeps those physically unable to work also in poverty. No one in the book mentioned dual labour market theory and its consequences for people in the secondary sphere. Again, interested readers may consult Michalos, op. cit.

M.H. Phillips gave the most thorough (sociologically, economically and philosophically) discussion of the impact of Aid to Families with Dependent Children on family life. She listed several myths and some important empirical studies. For example, there are studies showing that the effects of AFDC on family dissolution are small, that those with lowest values of income support tend to have highest rates of marital break-up, that AFDC has little impact on tendencies for mothers to marry or remarry and that it has little impact on illegitimacy rates.

B.R. Bergmann discusses techniques that have traditionally been used to reduce the numbers of fatherless children, and problems involved in trying to get child support payments from separated spouses.

The third section begins with a discussion of the nature of rights by P. Vernier. The author describes the history of American views of welfare and explains how arguments for various levels of welfare change with the changing levels. A. Buchanan shows how welfare rights might be derived from a libertarian theory of rights. The discussion includes an analysis showing that equal rights do not imply equal effectiveness in exercising those rights. Requiring the former does not entail requiring the latter, though in some cases the latter may be required.

B. Brody presents a libertarian theory of rights to welfare. Again beginning with Locke's view he holds that people distributively own products of their labour and collectively own natural resources. Developers of the latter pay rent for using them and that rent goes into a social insurance pool. People who failed to use natural resources are entitled to divide the pool in time of need. The point of requiring able-bodied recipients to work is that it draws fewer funds from the pool and leaves more to be divided among those who can't work.

A.I. Melden provides an analysis of various kinds of rights, including human rights. He persuasively argues that there is a current tendency to draw upon rights talk to defend all sorts of moral claims that don't involve rights at all.

The fourth section has a paper by W. Vasey on the history of welfare legislation since 1601, by R.J. Fersh on the reform proposals of the 95th Congress, by H. Aaron on the consensus around welfare reform in the USA and by J.A. Rotherham on future demographic and likely welfare trends.

Only one author (Brody) mentioned the possibility of taxing wealth as opposed to income, and he would only be interested in taxing the resource based wealth. Only one author (Daniels) seemed to be politically oriented toward the left. Still, provided that one keeps an open mind, has some sense of where these papers are coming from and some sense of the limitations of their perspective, they are worthwhile.

ALEX C. MICHALOS
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JEAN BRUN, *Les masques du désir*. Paris: Buchet/Chastel 1981. 264 p.

Si l'on veut comprendre pourquoi la science et la technique ne sont pas qu'instruments de libération mais aussi armes de mort, il faut, estime l'auteur, repérer le désir qui anime ces entreprises. L'analyse des mythes grecs nous ouvre la porte sur ce désir qui s'avance masqué sous la raison technicienne. Les mythes qui ont précédé la science et qu'on a cru abolis par elle sont plutôt les moteurs de celle-ci. La technique rend opératoires ces mythes.

La première partie de l'ouvrage intituléee *Désir et technique* esquisse une histoire de la domestication du feu, de la construction des divers moteurs (à

vapeur, à explosion, électrique) et nous livre un passionnant aperçu des usages du magnétisme et de l'électricité. L'A. nous fait voir des liens insoupçonnés entre les mythes sur les quatre éléments et l'invention de la roue, du moulin à eau, du moulin à vent, des moteurs, de l'automobile et de l'avion. Nous découvrons que l'usage quotidien d'outils de plus en plus sophistiqués nous a rendus aveugles aux rêves qui les ont fait naître. Qu'on pense à cette fabuleuse histoire qui commence avec la pierre d'aimant, dite pierre de Magnésie, dont les propriétés avaient déjà frappé les Grecs. Le désir d'agir sur la nature et sur autrui a trouvé dans l'aimant le modèle qui allait susciter tant de spéculations astronomiques et astrologiques. La science ou les techniques de l'électromagnétisme, les recherches sur le magnétisme animal, le somnambulisme et l'hypnotisme, la théorie de la gravitation universelle de Newton considérent les corps célestes comme de grands aimants, voilà autant de thèmes qui ont marqué de façon indélébile la culture occidentale. Le souci de l'A. est ici de nous montrer comment l'épopée de la technique prolonge les mythes.

La deuxième partie du livre (*L'ombre des automates)* avance l'idée que la construction des androïdes ou des robots n'est pas seulement une recherche de plus grande efficacité technique. L'homme n'aurait pas renoncé à son désir ancien de fabriquer des êtres animés. On sait qu'on attribuait ce pouvoir à Héphaïstos, maître du feu, et surtout à Dédale, inventeur de tous les outils. Les démarches techniciennes, qui vont des statues vivantes de Dédale aux recherches actuelles sur les robots et sur les machines à penser, sont, selon l'A., portées par le souhait de créer un semblable sans recourir au sexe reproducteur. Le désir de l'homme ne serait satisfait que s'il parvenait à se faire horloger suprême, bref à produire des êtres artificiels capables d'une véritable auto-organisation, libres de prendre des initiatives, c'est-à-dire d'inaugurer des séries causales. Le rêve sous-jacent est d'abolir la séparation entre l'organique et le mécanique. Dans un premier temps, on a eu recours à des machines pour expliquer l'anatomo-physiologie du corps humain: le coeur est une pompe, les reins des filtres, les articulations des jointures, etc. Dans un second temps, on a vu dans la machine un véritable corps vivant. On parle alors d'oreille électronique, de cerveau et de mémoire électroniques. A la limite, le désir de l'homme serait de parvenir à faire de l'automate non seulement un être qui lui ressemble mais son semblable. Comme le Pygmalion du mythe qui tombe amoureux de la Galatée qui est sortie de ses mains, l'homme chercherait à s'accoupler à la machine dont il est le fabricant. L'A. s'en prend à ces nouveaux Pygmalion, à ces nouveaux Dédale qui produisent des sexes mécaniques. Le mythe raconte que Dédale avait fabriqué la vache artificielle à l'intérieur de laquelle se glissa Pasiphaé pour que le taureau blanc, dont elle était amoureuse, s'accouple à elle. J. Brun souligne que ce n'est pas par hasard que le mythe originaire sur la naissance de la technique met celle-ci en relation avec le désir, plus précisément avec un désir qui se rapporte à un sexe non-humain. Il critique la technique pour avoir incité l'homme à transgresser sa Condition. Il oppose deux moments de l'histoire: jusqu'à Kant, le Désir s'était manifesté comme une soif de conquête et de possession, la technique lui permettant de se mouvoir de plus en plus vite; puis le Désir a voulu briser

les cadres mêmes à l'intérieur desquels il s'exerçait, on s'est alors attaqué à l'idée de Nature. Nietzsche et Marx ôtent à la transcendance son caractère théologique, il la sécularise en la métamorphosant en autotranscendance.

Dans la dernière partie (*Les chasses du désir).* l'A. prend à partie Nietzsche et ceux qu'il tient pour ses descendants. Les pages passionnées où il dénonce 'le dionysisme orgiastique, l'esthétisme et le ludisme' ne me semblent pas les meilleures de l'ouvrage. Le drame viendrait de ce qu'on a cherché à 'éliminer toute substance au profit de la relation.' Nietzsche n'est pas ici le seul coupable. En effet, la *Gestalttheorie,* l'Idée hégélienne qu' 'être reconnu,' la phénoménologie enfin porteraient leur part de responsabilité dans ce triomphe de la relation sur la substance. Et l'A. de conclure: 'Sur ce terrain ainsi préparé pour une désubstantialisation radicale, le recours aux drogues est venu déclencher ce que l'on pourrait appeler un nietzschéisme chimique' (168). Il consacre une cinquantaine de pages à ce qu'il appelle le 'grand jeu technique' et les 'transes techniques.' Il se refère à beaucoup d'ouvrages traitant des halluciongènes: ceux de Gilbert-Lecomte, R. Daumal, A. Artaud, H. Hesse, A. Huxley, H. Michaux, T. Leary, A. Watts, et j'en passe. J'avoue que cette partie m'a beaucoup moins intéressé. On y trouve des raccourcis et des énumérations qui m'ont plus irrité qu'éclairé. Il arrive que la ferveur dénonciatrice l'emporte sur l'analyse. Ce qui donne des phrases comme celle-ci: ' ... le Désir a fini par atteindre une taille qu'il n'avait encore jamais connue. Il s'est, en outre, revêtu des flamboyants habits d'Arlequin taillés dans des tissus fabriqués par: la dialectique, l'avènement du Surhomme ou d'un mutant, le matérialisme historique, la psychanalyse, l'anarchie, le *Rock and Roll,* le reichisme, la marginalité, le sexe, la violence, le Zen, le maoïsme, l'homosexualité, le tantrisme, la marijuana, la bande dessinée, le karaté, le psychédélisme, les graffiti, la révolution, l'existentialisme, le L.S.D., le marquis de Sade, la liberté, Marcuse, le *pop*, la dénonciation de l'orthographe, la fête, l'écologie, le yoga, la sécularisation, les réformes universitaires, le nouveau roman, l'auto-gestion, la pornographie, la liberté d'expression, les communautés, l'anti-psychiatrie, la contre-culture, les méthodes actives et la guérilla urbaine (210-11).

En guise de conclusion, Brun nous rappelle sa thèse essentielle: sous la forme de mythes on trouve chez les Grecs la formulation de tout ce que la technique s'efforcera de réaliser à travers l'histoire de l'Occident. Si la technique nous fascine, c'est parce que, comme les mythes qu'elle prolonge, elle vise à satisfaire le désir de 'rompre les digues' de notre être. L'A. tient ferme que l'homme ne peut transgresser sa Condition. Il nous met en garde contre la Technique désirante car comme le Grand Inquisiteur, elle a ouvert 'la porte au Christ pour qu'il s'en aille sans retour.' Il oppose la *Révélation* à l'expérience du dévoilement. Il cite ce passage de la *Genèse* où l'Eternel dit: 'Il n'est pas bon que l'homme soit seul' et en conclut au primat de l'être sur la relation. Le désir, lui, n'aurait cessé de proclamer le primat de la relation sur l'être.

Je dois avouer que bien des affirmations de ce livre ne m'ont pas convaincu. J'ai trouvé captivante la première partie qui est une histoire de la technique interprétée à la lumière des mythes. Mais à partir du moment où l'ouvrage tourne

au réquisitoire, l'A. semble vouloir nous enfermer dans une sorte de manichéisme: d'un côté le Bien, c'est-à-dire la Nature, plus précisément la soumission à la Nature et donc à Dieu, le primat de la substance sur la relation etc.; de l'autre côté, le Mal, c'est-à-dire le Désir, l'auto-transcendance, le primat de la relation sur la substance.

GHYSLAIN CHARRON
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CATHERINE CLÉMENT, *Vies et légendes de Jacques Lacan.* Paris: Grasset 1982. ISBN: 2-246-25461-2

Comme tout parisien en éxil, je neu peux entendre les voix de Piaf ou de Léo Ferré sans qu'une étrange émotion ne m'étreigne qui me fait horreur lorsque j'y repense mais à laquelle je m'abandonne sans retenue lorsqu'elle surgit et m'impose quelques instants d'apitoiement larmoyant sur mon sort: c'est le mal du pays! la plus stéréotypée et la plus sournoise des formes du nationalisme donc du racisme. Néanmoins...!

Quelques écrits ont la même vertu que ces voix. Ils conjoignent l'acuité du sens critique, l'intelligence du propos, une ironie légère qui fait grincer tout le texte qu'elle perfuse, ponctuée d'humour, et une sorte de sentimentalisme nostalgique, voire les élans d'un coeur amoureux, dans une maîtrise superbe d'une langue où l'argot faubourien côtoie sans problème la langue noble de la philosophie et des sciences sous les éclairs fulgurants de quelques 'bonheurs d'expression'. Ces écritures sont parisiennes et, comme telles, inimitables en leur style tout imprégné d'histoire. Ce sera l'écriture de Régine Robin, elle aussi exilée, de François-Olivier Rousseau tout comme ce fut celle de Michelet. C'est également l'écriture de Catherine Clément.

Vies et Légendes de Jacques Lacan: quel titre étrange pour contribuer à construire le mythe d'un homme qui, à la parution du livre, n'était pas encore tout à fait mort mais s'était déja transmuté pour certains en 'un shaman, un sorcier habité par la poésie et l'inspiration,' un prophète voire, mieux encore, un phoenix, l'oiseau de feu qui, 'fou d'amour, fou de transfert, fou de vérité et de Logos inscrits au fer rouge de la passion,' ne meurt que pour mieux renaître de ses cendres! C'est lui-même qui, au cours d'un long voyage qui remonte le Nil, met le feu à son propre père, qu'il transporte sur son dos d'oiseau. Il frotte alors ses ailes et s'embrase avec lui, sur un bûcher fait de sa propre merde, qui, comme le corps des saintes chrétiennes, embaume: 'le phoenix ne chie que cannelle.'

Belle métaphore de Lacan, sans doute plus vivante pour Catherine Clément que pour d'autres, mais qui donc serait capable de parler de Lacan en d'autres termes que métaphoriques sans tomber dans les formes les plus dégradantes d'un journalisme à ragots comme ce numéro d'*Actuel* qui fut consacré à Lacan et le présente hagard, gesticulant de façon démente, la bouche hurlante?

Lacan fut éffectivement un personnage d'éxception qui suscitait d'emblée l'horreur et la fascination. A l'éxception d'une fois je n'ai jamais approché Lacan de trop près pour ces raisons-là, précisément: trop grande et dévastatrice était son emprise réelle. A l'époque où Catherine Clément l'aimait je n'étais pas prêt et préférai me moyer dans la foule anonyme du séminaire. Le plus grand mérite du livre de Catherine Clément est précisément de n'avoir pas dissimulé que tout rapport à Lacan n'aura pu se dire que sous les espèces d'une histoire d'amour à la fois passionnée et nostalgique, un peu ridicule, peut-être, vue de loin, comme dans les chansons de Piaf et de Ferré.

Qu'il soit mort sur ses déjections: son Ecole dissoute, ses disciples et ses 'poubellications' qu'on s'arrache aujourd'hui à grands coups de billets de banque comme on s'est arraché son silence, ne fait qu'ouvrir — si l'on aime le mythe du Phoenix — la question du retour à Lacan. Car comment lire Lacan entraînant dans les flammes un 'Père Freud' à purifier, autrement qu'il nous a enseigné à lire Freud? Dans un premier temps il s'agira de lire Lacan Freud à la main afin de prendre toute la mesure de la rigueur de sa lecture de Freud. Dans un temps à venir il nous appartiendra peut-être de formaliser le mouvement de cette formalisation interminable du texte freudien: la construction sans fin du discours psychanalytique.

Catherine Clément, en tissant le mythe de Lacan shaman-prophète-oiseau de feu, en dessine les figures amoureuses sur la trame de son histoire. Une histoire tout entière placée sous le signe de la tradition discontinuiste inaugurée par Bachelard puis Alexandre Koyré, une histoire ponctuée de noeuds créatifs qui sont autant de crises ou de rupture essentielles d'où émergent des trouvailles cruciales, et séparéees entre elles par des plages, des 'ventres' plus paisibles ou les données s'accumulent et le savoir se constitue.

Cette histoire se lit dans deux sens qui s'entrecroisent: l'un est celui-là même de l'histoire du mouvement psychanalytique. L'histoire des rapports de Lacan avec cette Association Internationale de Psychanalyse, aujourd'hui complètement noyautée par les américains, qui devait par deux fois l'exclure (1953, 1964) et tenter, vainement, de l'interdire de parole. Il faut bien reconnaître que par un juste retour des choses cette Association paye aujourd'hui de sa stérilité ses excommunications imprudentes. Il n'aura pas été en effet possible de faire taire celui-là même qui devait replacer au centre de la psychanalyse ce qui en constitue le ressort essentiel: la parole, dans le seul champ qui lui soit propre: le langage. Contre l'entreprise de réductionnisme behavioriste et médical du mouvement psychanalytique officiel, Lacan a montré que si la psychanalyse devait être une science, selon le voeu cent fois réitéré de Freud, elle ne saurait être autre chose qu'une science du sujet et de l'inconscient: une science du sujet humain qui n'est sujet qu'en tant qu'il parle

et est parlé. Nous entrons ici dans le second niveau de l'histoire de Lacan: l'histoire de sa pensée. Une pensée authentique, donc rare, qui eut sur les intellectuels des 'sixties' — dont Catherine Clément alors étudiante à l'Ecole Normale Supérieure, bastion des intellos de gauche — un impact immense.

Une pensée qui semble naître de la rencontre, dans les années trente, d'un jeune bourgeois extrêmement cultivé, étudiant en médecine (la culture et les études de médecine n'étaient pas alors incompatibles comme elles semblent bien l'être aujourd'hui) et des femmes folles. Ces femmes seront tout d'abourd des cas cliniques: Marcelle et ses écrits inspirés, Aimée, dont il fera le sujet central de sa thèse de médecine sur la paranoïa, mais aussi des criminelles mystérieuses et tragiquement célèbres: les soeurs Papin. Catherine Clément raconte merveilleusement la passion de Lacan pour les femmes et le mystère de leur jouissance, des paranoïaques de ses débuts aux mystiques de sa maturité et de sa vieillesse: Sainte Thérèse, Haldewich d'Anvers. La question de leur jouissance ne cesse de le hanter, sans qu'il puisse jamais y répondre. A y regarder d'un peu près, Lacan ne parle pas pour les femmes ni à leur place, il parle aux femmes sans cesser de les provoquer, de les interpeller, de les aimer, saintes ou criminelles, fasciné par cette *odor di femina* qui sous-tend toujours pour lui leurs extases ou leurs crimes, jamais coupables.

Ce sont elles qui l'ont amené au seuil de la psychanalyse dans laquelle il devait entrer 'avec une balayette qui s'appelle le stade du miroir.' Ce stade (1936) — que l'on trouve déja dans les écrits de Freud dès 1895 — si essentiel pour la compréhension de la coupure instaurée par la psychanalyse en son commencement qui tient toute entière dans la conception entièrement nouvelle, inouïe, qu'elle élabore du sujet et du clivage radical qu'y opère son avènement dans le champ du langage à la fonction de la parole. (1954).

A partir de ce noeud théorique, Catherine Clément dessine le parcours théorique de Lacan jusqu'au moment où elle le quitte (vers 1972). Elle repère les appels successifs à des modèles qui permettent à Lacan de donner une certaine rigueur conceptuelle, formelle, aux énoncés de Freud: le modèle linguistique, puis le modèle logique, les graphes etc... Modèle qu'il tord, qu'il infléchit selon les exigences propres au travail de théorisation du discours psychanalytique. On oublie trop souvent, par paresse, ce que Freud lui-même doit à la logique d'Aristote dont on peut très bien repérer les linéaments dans les formes diverses de son argumentation, ainsi d'ailleurs qu'à celle de Kant. Ce cheminement amène Lacan à presqu' inventer une logique spécifique qu'on nommera intuitioniste. Cette quête des modèles les plus pertinents l'amènera à parcourir — comme le fit Freud en son temps et comme il ne cessa, en vain, d'implorer les psychanalystes de le faire — tous les champs cruciaux de la culture de son temps: la philosophie, l'anthropologie et l'ethnologie, l'histoire, la littérature et les arts, la biologie (beaucoup plus que la médecine toujours ambigüe quant à son statut scientifique), mais aussi et surtout ces sciences qui ont été, et sont encore, la condition même de la profonde révolution scientifique du vingtième siècle: les mathématiques.

Dans son élaboration des structures les plus secrètes, les plus intimes du sujet, Lacan fait appel, dans la tradition de l'épistémologie Bachelardienne

promue par la révolution des sciences physiques au début de ce siècle, à des formulations de plus en plus abstraites qui lui permettent de se soustraire au terrorisme des faits, de l'observation supposément objective dont on sait bien qu'elle constitue l'obstacle le plus redoutable au développement de l'esprit scientifique. On oublie trop de prendre la leçon de la physique qui ne doit son plein essor qu'après avoir posé qu'à la base de tout phénomène physique il y a une équation. (L'expression est de Bachelard, 1936, et non de Lacan comme font semblant de le croire les incultes de la psychanalyse). Essor qui devait finalement la rapprocher des sciences dites de l'homme et sociales. Le souci scientiste n'a jamais quitté Freud, et l'on peut dire aujourd'hui qu'il est la condition même de l'existence de la psychanalyse. Non que la psychanalyse soit scientiste — absolument pas — mais parce que c'est dans les béances et les manques théoriques du scientisme de la fin du dix-neuvième siècle qu'elle est née.

1972. L'appel aux mathématiques (topologie, théorie des noeuds etc) comme modèle possible en rebutent beaucoup, dont Catherine Clément, qui n'y comprennent pas grand-chose et peut-être n'y veulent rien comprendre ou n'y voient que le geste d'un geai vieillissant qui se serait imprudemment paré des plumes de Bourbaki. D'aucuns vont même, aujourd'hui que Lacan est mort, jusqu'à jeter l'anathème des mathèmes: 'il croit aux mathèmes!' dit-on pour discréditer comme on dit 'il est communiste,' sans se rendre compte que ce faisant on ne fait rien d'autre qu'afficher son inculture (fut-ce au nom d'une paysannerie supposée) ou son appartenance idéologique au Capital.

Tant qu'elle ramène le dire lacanien à des formes simples de la pensée, Catherine Clément est à son aise. Lorsqu'elle y échoue, elle se détourne: 'il est vieux, il délire, je ne l'aime plus.' Mais ce geste final du détournement n'est pas sans se répercuter sur le regard clarificateur, classificateur qu'elle a jeté sur les développements théoriques antérieurs et dont elle a pensé, non sans une certaine justesse, pouvoir rétablir la cohérence. Pourtant elle-même le dit: le style de Lacan ne se prête pas à la clarification.

Et si, justement, tout comme dans le texte freudien, c'étaient les obscurités, les contradictions, les trous, les lacunes, les manques théoriques, les ruptures, les béances ... qui constituaient ce qu'il y a d'essentiellement analytique dans le discours lacanien? On pourrait dire — et c'est la critique que j'adresserai au livre de Catherine Clément — que tout comme pour Jacques Alain Miller (à qui d'ailleurs son livre est dédié) lorsqu'il corrige le texte du séminaire, qu'il tranche comme le fit Anna Freud sur certains textes de son père, que cette clarification n'est rien d'autre que l'effacement du travail de l'inconscient et de sa mise en acte pourtant toujours cruciale dans tout discours psychanalytique. En tentant de rendre à Lacan une cohérence, je prétends que Catherine Clément contribue à l'effacement de ce qu'il y a de spécifiquement analytique dans ce discours; mais j'ajouterai toutefois qu'en échouant à ce faire, elle laisse entrouverte la béance sans laquelle nul inconscient ne saurait advenir.

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BRIAN EASLEA, *Science and Sexual Oppression.* Toronto: McGraw Hill Ryerson 1981. Pp. xiv + 314. Cdn$28.95. ISBN 0-297-77894-3.

For some time now it has been fashionable to charge science with various sins, especially racism, sexism, and irrationality. Brian Easlea's *Science and Sexual Oppression* melds these sins into one. He charges that sexism is at the root of an irrationality which science has manifested since the seventeenth century 'in practice, in knowledge claims ..., and in aims and in applications' (66).

Science and Rationality. Since science is commonly held to be the paradigm of rationality, the last charge is the most intriguing. It all depends, of course, on your canons of rationality: so the first step is the tricky one. The conception of rationality on which this thesis is based in derived from Marcuse. It is not exactly crisp: ' "rational" is a mode of thought and action which is geared to reduce ignorance, destruction, brutality, and oppression' (quoted on p. 2 from H. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* [Routledge 1962] 142). This definition is not fit for much work. At what level of abstraction is it to be applied? Are we to use it in assessing such activities as *seeking knowledge,* or *funding gene splicing experiments,* or is it designed for specific policies such as *letting undergraduates use the Bunsen burners?* Secondly, what is it for something to be 'geared' to an end? The work is nicely poised between suggestions of intention and result. Good intentions presumably are not enough; but how long must one wait for results to count? No accounting is final. Most seriously, the inclusiveness of the list of ills to be reduced poses the problem all over again. For suppose it could be shown that Scientific Method is indeed geared to the reduction of ignorance. If, as seems obvious, the fight against ignorance is not always compatible with the fight against other human ills, then the problem concerns their *relative value:* is *any* degree of ignorance, for example, preferable to *any* degree of oppression?

The Psychological Roots of Sexism. Curiously enough the sogginess of Easlea's Marcusean premise matters little as one reads the book. For he details an abundance of sexist irrationalities so gross that fine points of definition can be forgotten. The standard Marxist explanation for oppression, in terms of scarcity, comes to seem quite insufficient. For the *sadistic* violence of history (9), only a psychoanalytic sort of explanation will do: a kind of feminist inversion of Freudian penis envy:

> "Masculine" men seek power over each other, over women and over nature not *solely* because of harsh material conditions (and ensuing social conflict) but *also* because they seek through that power to underwrite and demonstrate an elusive masculinity. (250)

Hence the male cult of 'hardness,' challenge, conquest. Certainly no other kind of explanation seems likely to account for the appalling cruelty and misogyny that have been perpetrated in the name of science. The remedy is

that offered recently by Dinnerstein and Chodorow: full participation of males in parenting, making psychologically possible an 'egalitarian, peaceful, gentle progress in basic harmony with ... the natural world' (278).

The Sexism of Science. This thesis clearly applies more widely than to science. Its documentation in the book is abundant and suitably depressing, though not altogether new.[1] But let us focus now on science. The claims are, it will be recalled, that science is sexist in *practice,* in its *knowledge claims,* and in its *applications.* The first and the last are obvious enough, and demonstrated with force particularly in Chapter 5, 'Biology, Medicine and "Viriculture" in Nineteenth-Century Britain.' It is the second that is most controversial.

Enough examples exist, alas, of sexist claims by scientists in biology or psychology. The immunity to facts of sexist (and racist) science is astonishing. To pick but one example: In the mid-nineteenth century, Easlea tells us, 'it was believed that the seat of intellect lay in the frontal lobes,' and it so happened that males were found to have bigger frontal lobes. When more research on brain volume gave the opposite result, an eminent professor was able to save the important part of the old view. Contrary to what was previously supposed, he explained, 'the parietal region is really the more important' for intelligence (145).

One attitude that remains constant through complete reversals of 'scientific' doctrine is the fear of female sexuality, with the savage repression that it motivates. When women are held to be 'by nature insatiable' they are burned for witchcraft, and when they are held to be 'normally' unsusceptible to sexual pleasure they are mutilated by physicians to protect them against deviations from that norm. Such is the sexism of science in 'application.'

Can Physics be Sexist? It takes only moderate cynicism to expect that when observations about sex and gender are within the province of a science, it will be used to bolster antecedent prejudice. But what of the case of physics? Easlea's argument here is at its most precarious. The theory of gravitation has nothing explicitly to do with sex. It might therefore seem immune. Nevertheless, Easlea argues as follows:

> When we remember that Newton viewed the existence of gravitational attraction as a manifestation of God's direct agency in nature, and that God was God the Father, then inevitably the male-female relation enters into the interpretation of gravitational theory. (67)

At first sight this seems thin. Is God the Father really required by the semantics of gravitational theory? Or is it an extra-scientific item that has crept into the theory's *informal description?* For my purpose the answer is not important: its interest lies in illustrating how difficult it is to disentangle the personal craziness of a scientist from the craziness of a scientific *claim.* Part of the difficulty stems from the inevitable prevalence of metaphor in science. Is God the Father a *mere* metaphor in Newton? To answer that, how relevant is it to discover what he himself would have answered? For those whose inclination is to think science a Good Thing, it is easy to idealize it and to blame

particular scientists for its failings. What's wrong with Newton, on that view, is not his science. On the contrary, it is that he was *insufficiently* scientific. Easlea would reject the implied conception of an abstract science, separable from the practice of scientists. We must see the failings of individual scientists as partly determined by the society in which they worked, with its economic structures, climate of thought, and scientific institutions.

Teleology and the Ideology of Nature. According to the argument as so far expounded, sexist science is merely the science of sexist men and institutions. How can the much stronger thesis which I mentioned be made out? The claim that sexism is a *root* of irrationality in science as such is argued in terms of a contrast between two fundamentally different attitudes toward Nature. The 'masculinist' one, illustrated by Bernal and Nietzsche, by the Nazi and fascist tradition, and by 'scientific' Marxism, stresses power over nature. Its imagery is often at once violent and sexual: 'conquest,' 'force,' 'enslavement,' even 'rape.' the second is the 'feminist' attitude, illustrated not only by feminist writers but also by Marcuse, Fourier, Edward Carpenter and other 'Utopian Socialists.' It stresses sensual enjoyment and harmony with Nature. It is the stress on power which irrationally distorts the ends of science; and it results from the psychological roots that form the heart of sexism.

In conjunction with such a radical negative thesis, one would expect a clear conception of an alternative, non-sexist science. In this regard Easlea is disappointing. He does give us a picture of a feminist Utopia, based on gentleness, the rejection of 'challenge' as an end of life, and mutual knowledge based on intimacy rather than objectification (230 & *passim*). But it is not clear how this is to be applied in the study of the natural world. Easlea deplores, in the chapter on 'Uncreative Matter and Evolutionary Theory,' the emphasis placed by the modern scientific tradition on *mechanism.* Sometimes, particularly in the context of his discussion of Biology, he adopts the view that only the conception of some instrinsic teleology can do justice to the complexity of life. To my mind these are the most dubious doctrines of the book. One difficulty is that it's not at all easy to say what Nature consists of where the lives of human beings are concerned. Another is that no one has ever been able to articulate any theory that could plausibly replace Darwinian Natural Selection. As far as teleology is concerned the issue of reduction is now a dead one. *Of course* teleological levels of description are important for various purposes; but *of course* that doesn't mean that mechanism is false. On this point Easlea's view is philosophically underdeveloped, and at least as it appears in the book, naive.

Fascism, Socialism, and Sexism. One of the book's most impressive arguments is the one that is gradually built up in Easlea's repeated demonstrations that 'masculinism' is characteristically tied to anti-feminism and misogyny. Logically this doesn't seem inevitable: why after all shouldn't one value challenge and self-improvement, at the same time as 'the pleasures of sensuous contemplation of ... natural phenomena, the desirability of increasing gentleness in all human relations, and of minimizing as far as possible

human exploitation of animals'? (219) Why should a new sensibility not link the taste for an intellectually adventurous life, in something like the balance of 'excitement and tranquillity' that defined happiness for John Stuart Mill, with complete equality of the sexes?

Why not indeed? The absence of any such tradition strongly supports Easlea's main thesis, and the evidence he adduces for an exclusive ideological dichotomy is impressive. One case in point is what he calls 'hard-line' English socialism, which he shows to have been almost as *actively* antifeminist and misogynistic as fascism (223).

If Freud was right, then the repression needed to fuel civilization will inevitably also produce masculinist aggressivity. Easlea's view, by contrast, is that 'obstacles, challenges and dangers are neither necessary, nor desirable, for civilized living' (262). Which view is right? This looks like a psychological question, but it is not one that can be readily decided. What we are really talking about are opposed ideals of life. And Easlea's book is an impressive contribution to the task of exposing the puerility of the 'masculinist' utopia.

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1 See Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 1978); Dorothy Dinnerstein, *The Mermaid and the Minotaur* (New York: Harper and Row 1976); Mary Daly, *Gyn-Ecology: the Metaethics of Radical Feminism* (Boston: Beacon Press 1978). Easlea makes a good deal of use of Chodorow, mentions Dinnerstein, (on p. 284; she fails to appear in the Index, however) but does not cite *Gyn-Ecology*.

CRAWFORD ELDER, *Appropriating Hegel.* New York: Pergamon Press 1981 (for Aberdeen University Press; Scots Philosophical Monograph, number 3). Pp. xx + 65. US$12.00. ISBN 0-08-025729-1.

This small book has a bold project. Elder wants to use the total structure of Hegel's argument (especially the argument of the *Logic,* but not without fairly frequent references to arguments in the 'real philosophy') to show why the solution of the mind-body problem must be found in 'a non-dualist philosophy of mind which also avoids reductivism' (ix) — i.e. in a form of idealism:

> The position which Hegel advances is that these concepts [i.e., the concepts of material objects and their behaviour] are, for strictly conceptual reasons, indispensable for any sound conceptual scheme, but also that, in any sound conceptual scheme, use of them is necessarily flanked by use of the concepts of rationality and intentional agency. (x)

Elder does a remarkably good job, in a very short compass, of isolating and explicating a chain of conceptual transitions in the *Logic* which supports this position. I believe his interpretation of Hegel to be essentially correct; and I think he is to be congratulated on finding illuminating illustrations and paradigms for Hegel's argument at many points in his bird's-eye view of an immensely difficult book. But whether anyone interested in contemporary philosophy of mind who does not already have Hegelian sympathies will be persuaded to study the argument in detail by Elder's little book, or convinced if he does study it that Elder's summary is indeed what Hegel means, must be doubted. The most that can be hoped for as a result of this short essay is that others who *are* already sympathetic will begin to study and explicate Hegel's *Logic* in more detail, and will apply their explications to all the problems of contemporary conceptual analysis, but especially to this one. For if what Elder (and I) believe about Hegel is correct, this *is* the focal problem for the application of the Hegelian *Logic* in the field of the 'philosophy of mind.'

Elder himself reveals very early the reason why those who are not already sympathetic are unlikely to follow his lead. Hegel's 'logical' position he says, 'is that there is, in a sense, only *one* concept which soundly can be used at all' (xiv-xv). Ordinary thinkers are hardly to be blamed if they view this *logical* monism with 'misgivings.' Elder himself would not have inserted that 'in a sense' if he were not himself uncomfortable; so it must be obvious to him that it is precisely that philosophical 'sense' of Hegel's monism that needs explication. He has, perhaps, done as well as anyone could to explicate it in seventy pages. Yet he calmly ignores what *appears* in Hegel to be a transition from logical to *ontological* monism at the end of the *Logic*. He quotes the passage at length in which Hegel asserts that 'the absolute Idea alone is *being*, imperishable *life, self-knowing truth,* and is *all truth'* (38); and he even underlines the echoing of Aristotle's definition of the life of God. But he does not tell us how to interpret such talk in relation to our finite struggle to produce a coherent conceptual map of our own communal consciousness and activity. This is what he should have tried to do.

Instead his own last chapter is the least satisfactory part of the book. The argument of the *Logic* has provided him with a powerful argument against reductivist forms of materialism. So he now produces his own argument to show that all supposedly 'non-eliminative' forms of materialism 'must coincide in one crucial contention, with eliminative materialism' (42); then he relieves Hegel of the suspicion of being a dualist himself, by seeking to show that he was not a vitalist. At least I *think* that that is the point of this part of his argument; but I confess that I cannot see why it matters whether Hegel himself was a vitalist or not. Lamb has shown by a convincing analysis of 'Reason as Observation' in the *Phenomenology* that he was not (see *Hegel:*

From Foundation to System [The Hague: M. Nijhoff 1980] ch. VII); but if he had been, he would only have been empirically mistaken — as he was about the elements for example — and perhaps inconsistent with his own *Logic* (if Elder and I are right about that). But given the *flexibility* of the dialectic and the importance of the concept of 'Life' in the *Logic* I would hesitate to convict Hegel of this supposed inconsistency, until I had successfully exorcized 'God' as a supreme *personality*. If Hegel can properly get Aristotle's God out of his *Logic* I am willing to give him a mysterious vital force too — but then I shall have to throw the *Logic* away as useless for *my* purposes.

Hegel, if Elder and I are right, was a 'non-eliminative idealist.' But he wanted to eliminate *transcendent* entities. So once we have shown that the 'one usable concept' is the *categoreal system* by which the human *community* makes its experience of its world and its history *intelligible* to itself — that there must be just *one* such concept because it names the intelligibility of human experience as a system — it should be evident that the project of Marxist science, the project of a *non-eliminative* materialism, *must* be valid. It will only be the Hegelian *ideal* truth looked at the other way up — from the side of the world or 'nature' instead of that of the self or 'history.' This is (as I see it) why naturalism will always be a valid programmatic base for scientific research. (I am only speaking of the logical viability of explanatory programmes; I do not mean to suggest that the materialist account could be directly inferred from the idealist one, or vice-versa.)

Thus Elder himself is mistaken if he thinks that he can show Fodor, that upon Fodor's terms, non-eliminative materialism is logically incoherent. He may succeed with Fodor personally; or Fodor may just try again. But either way (with or without Fodor) the struggle for a behavioural psychology will go on. The function of Hegel's *Logic* is not to eliminate the materialist programme, but rather to show why it is bound to continue; and the value of insight into the nature of dialectical transitions in logic is that it not only saves us from the folly of trying to eliminate materialism, but shows us what a non-eliminative materialism will have to be like. Hegel's logic, like Wittgenstein's, does not *solve* problems of this kind; it *dissolves* them.

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OSWALD HANFLING, *Logical Positivism.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; New York: Columbia University Press 1981. Pp. viii + 181. Cdn$48.95; US$20.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-10861-0; 0-231-05386-X); Cdn$19.25 (paper: ISBN 0-631-12853-0).

In 1967, writing in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* John Passmore proclaimed what everybody knew, that 'Logical Positivism was dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes.' In his new book on Logical Positivism, Oswald Hanfling agrees with Passmore's verdict, but oddly enough, doesn't tell us why he thinks another book on this topic is worth writing. Clearly, his intention is not to revive the dead or to announce a Second Coming; on the contrary he is devastatingly critical of the Positivist program. Neither does he provide us with new documentary material nor even with, what is surely needed, a careful historical account of how this movement developed and its subsequent influence on contemporary philosophy. Given the extensive examination to which Postivist doctrines were subjected in the pre- and post-World War II period, both by the Positivists themselves, indefatigable propagandists as they were, and by their critics, it might seem that nothing new or interesting could now be added to those earlier debates. In a certain sense that judgment remains true after one has read Hanfling's monograph. Almost nothing of the original Positivist program turns out to be defensible, and even where there might be sentimentally vague attachments to their original ideas, Hanfling's corrosive analysis disposes of them. Yet, there is a sense in which his book provides a new understanding of Logical Positivism. Using more contemporary modes of analysis, especially those deriving from the later Wittgenstein and more generally from ordinary language philosophers, Hanfling explores the main tenets of the Positivist schema in deeper and more subtle ways than were possible in the 30's and 40's enlightening us about the kinds of mistakes they made and why. Some Positivists, for example, held that one cannot today verify a statement about an event tomorrow. Hanfling's response to this is to show that if this claim is to go through the phrase 'verify that X will occur' must be taken to mean 'find it logically impossible that X will not occur.' But this is not what 'verify that X will occur' normally means. One can verify that an eclipse of the moon will take place on a given date next month by consulting an almanac, but that does not entail that its non-occurrence is logically impossible. Or again, one can verify, by inquiring at the station, that one's train will leave at 7:30 a.m. tomorrow. Of course, circumstances may arise, such as strikes, washouts, etc. which would prevent the train from leaving at that time, but this does not imply that one had used the term 'verify' incorrectly. On the contrary, he says, 'it would be wrong not to use it' (62-3).

The bending of ordinary speech is a common phenomenon in the writings of the Positivists, just as it was in the work of the metaphysicians they so vigorously denounced; but it was less obvious. Hanfling's analyses of numerous cases of such bendings show the extent to which, unwittingly, conceptual and metaphysical concerns pleached together as the Positivists began to move beyond their programmatic statements and to grapple with philosophical problems in real detail. In this sense his reading of their work is the most subtle we now have.

Still, if one is to play the ordinary language game, one should be more sensitive to the nuances of ordinary speech than Hanfling is. If A vaguely recalls

having read or heard that there will be an eclipse of the moon next month, and if there will be, then he can *verify* that what he has read or heard is true by consulting an almanac. But if A has solid grounds for believing that such an event will take place, but not sufficient grounds to make him feel certain that it will, then he can *confirm* (not verify) that what he believes is true by consulting the almanac. If A knows that such an event will take place but finds that B disagrees, then A can *demonstrate* that it will by showing B the Almanac. In this last case A is neither confirming nor verifying what he knows. Each of these cases represents a way of *settling* something for someone, but each of them is to be described by a different idiom. And beyond these, further descriptions, depending on context and circumstance, are possible. Hanfling thinks that some Positivists have held that in principle it is never possible to verify such statements; and he seems, in opposition, to hold that in principle one always can. The fact is that neither extreme is correct.

Hanfling's book is, on the whole, free of serious factual or logical errors; but there are places where it might have been improved.

It begins with an historical introduction that is both too brief and lamentably pedestrian. Logical Positivism had an interesting and complicated history, whose ancestral and contemporary influences are well worth tracking. Moreover, although there were certain core theses to which many, perhaps most, Positivists subscribed, there were disagreements about how some of them were to be interpreted. There was thus a complicated dynamic, reflecting both internal and external forces which Hanfling fails to acknowledge, let alone explore. His failure to do so affects, I believe, the organizational structure of the chapters that follow. There is no simple line that hooks them together. Sometimes the historical perspective is dominant, sometimes it is an emphasis upon a particular man, or upon particular doctrines. Had Hanfling either stressed the specific intellectual developments of the main figures in the movement, or alternatively, the essential doctrines that most Positivists espoused and how they changed under various conceptual pressures, the book would have had a clearer organizational format.

Moreover, the bibliography contains numerous references to books and articles that are of only minimal importance for understanding Logical Positivism, and leaves out references to seminal works by such writers as J. Joergensen, C.W. Morris, and R. Von Mises, inter alia. A much better, if dated, bibliography is to be found in Ayer's collection of 1959, *Logical Positivism.*

There are, in addition, some minor mistakes. Hanfling informs us (125) that in *Genesis* it is stated that god created the fish of the sea, and told them (with other creatures) to be fruitful and to multiply. From this religious (metaphysical) statement, he claims, the factual statement that there are fish in the sea is deducible. But from the statement (even if true) that God created all creatures and told them to multiply, it does not follow that any given species exists now — dinosaurs being a counter-example. Such lapses, I emphasize, are minor and do not substantially mar an elegantly and carefully written book.

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R.F. HOLLAND, *Against Empiricism.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; New York: Barnes & Noble 1980. Pp. vii + 248. Cdn$43.75; US$26.00. ISBN 0-631-12311-3; 0-389-20053-0.

This book is a collection of essays which lack the thematic unity — or even the coherence — which the title may suggest. The essays vary greatly in philosophical interest and quality, as well as in subject matter, and a short review can deal with their contents only selectively.

First, the 'empiricism' which Holland is 'against' is a crude version of the view which holds that human knowledge is constituted of private, disconnected psychic atoms. As he allows, this doctrine is pretty much a dead horse, useful only for dissection in elementary philosophy courses. But, he avers, the philosophic descendants of the doctrine run wild, trampling philosophy under foot (or hoof). The descendants — or consequences — are phenomenalism and predictivism in epistemology, and attitudism and consequentialism in ethics. Leaving aside the fact that the acceptance of phenomenalism among contemporary epistemologists is only marginally greater than that of the flat earth hypothesis among astronomers, Holland's claim is hard to credit. He points out in Chapter 2 ('Epistemology and Education') that classical empiricism is unable to account for intentional relations, and in Chapter 14 ('The Link Between Cause and Effect') that it fails to give an adequate account of causal relations. But then predictivism, consequentialism, and attitudism can hardly be the consequences of empiricism, since the first two presuppose causal, and the third presupposes intentional relations. Incidentally, Holland provides little *argument* against these views, although he does manifest a negative *attitude* towards them!

The nature of the ethical doctrine which Holland favors, 'ethical absolutism,' is left totally unclear, as is the manner of its application. Since Holland insists that the nature of absolute goodness is (necessarily) a 'mystery,' he should not be surprised if his readers have difficulty with the concept. But worse: on pp. 237ff. (discussing the Problem of Evil) Holland maintains that moral reasons develop and exist only within a moral community (and hence that God, not being a member of such a community is exempt from moral criticism). Now, that what is a moral reason varies from community to community sounds suspiciously like moral relativism. If, moreover, moral reasons are viewed simply as those features of actions which provide the basis for the actions' moral evaluation, then were it the case, as Holland claims, (239) that there are *no reasons* for 'the highest actions we know,' it would follow either that these actions are without features (!) or that the relevant features lack sufficient generality to count as *reasons.* But *this* suggests abandoning parity of reasoning in ethical matters, opening a clear path for an extreme attitudism which is undistinguishable from nihilism.

As to the application of Holland's absolutism to particular cases, it doesn't appear helpful. Thus, in discussing (138ff.) Bernard Williams' case of the person confronted with the choice of killing one person (who will be killed

anyway) thereby saving nineteen others, Holland suggests that we ask what a saint would do in the situation. (He insists — three times — that saintly acts are essentially unpredictable!) Is this always the relevant question in case of moral perplexity? Saints are notoriously self-sacrificing, and it's not conceivable that everyone should always be so. ('God put us on earth to help others, but what the others are doing here, God only knows.') Anyway, an unkind critic might suggest that what a saint would do, in the Williams case, is to perform one of the miracles requisite for canonization.

We noted above Holland's claim that God needs to have no reasons for his acts. Largely on this basis, Holland claims that there is no genuine Problem of Evil: attempts to show the incompatibility of the existence of evil and the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being involve the unwarranted attribution of reasons to the deity. Since without this attribution the two propositions asserting existence are compatible, there is no problem. This clearly won't do, if only because in attributing goodness to God we are surely implying *something* about the justifiablity of his actions. But there's no room here to criticize Holland's argument; rather, I want to contrast the standards he employs in it with those he uses in his discussion of miracles (169ff.). In the latter case, he maintains that the *possibility* of the transformation of water into wine should lead us to abandon the logical principle *ab esse ad posse valet consequentia.* His argument here is peculiar. First, employing the standards used in dissolving the Problem of Evil, we should say that the propositions that a vessel contains water at one moment and that it contains wine a moment later are consistent, and *hence* that we have no problem! Second, Holland says that we must abandon the *ab esse* principle because the water-wine transformation represents a 'conceptual impossibility,' i.e., that it can't be fitted into our (current) conceptual schema. But if the transformation is thought of as a *miracle,* this is simply not so: the schema which incorporates miracles allows for such a transformation as an exercise of divine will. In any case, we must assume the possibility of the transformation to set the story going: either this assumption leads to a contradiction (it seems not to), in which case we have no '*esse*,' or else we do have a '*posse.*'

In this discussion of miracles, incidentally, Holland employs the notion of *empirical certainty* like the most unreconstructed of empiricists. But a clearer case which belies Holland's claim to be 'against empiricism' involves his discussion of Sempiternity (188ff.) in which he claims that the term 'forever,' applied to physical objects, is unintelligible. (Once again, the double standard: in discussing Schlick's claim that we have 'no clear concept of causality,' Holland remarks that Schlick 'goes on discussing it in a way that shows he is in no difficulty at all with the handling of the concept' [213f.]. Similarly with Holland's discussion of 'forever'!) The claim is that to assert that something will last forever is to make a prediction, and that 'you cannot sensibly speak of a prediction for which there is no possibility in principle of a verification' (200). Now, first, not all assertions employing 'forever' are predictions, nor, of course, are all utterances using that term assertions. But, second, and more important, what we face here, pace Holland, is simply an

application of the old *Empiricist* criterion of meaning. Holland attempts to distance himself from that criterion by claiming that verification and meaning are tied together only in case of *predictions,* although the suggested relationship between tense and meaning would be hard to justify. Holland seems to suppose that verificationists tied meaning to verification generally because they (arbitrarily?) viewed empirical claims as predictions. But this has the matter backwards. Because they tied meaning to verification, they were *led* to take empirical claims as predictive hypotheses. But whether or not Holland is a closet empiricist, many of the familiar criticisms levelled at verificationism are applicable to Holland's critique of sempiternity.

These essays are interesting and controversial. One could easily write a longer comment on each than I am allowed for all. Whether it would be worthwhile to do so, I must leave to the reader to judge.

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GEORGES KALINOWSKI, *L'impossible métaphysique.* Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1981. (Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie, nouvelle série #33), ISBN: 2-7010-1027-6. Ce volume comporte en annexe 3 lettres inédites d'Etienne Gilson.

Le titre choisi par Kalinowski pour coiffer son ouvrage, *L'impossible métaphysique,* est teinté d'une forte nuance d'ironie. En fait, l'auteur entend prouver exactement le contraire: la métaphysique est bel et bien possible, elle est même réelle si l'on considère que l'homme est non seulement un *animal rationale,* mais au plus profond de lui-même un *animal metaphysicum.* Le titre fait donc uniquement référence au discrédit qui pèse sur la métaphysique depuis les Temps Modernes, depuis qu'elle n'est plus considérée comme un savoir au plein sens du terme, mais au mieux comme une croyance rationnelle. Aussi la tâche de réhabilitation qu'entreprend Kalinowski comporte-t-elle deux volets: une première partie du livre consiste en une critique des principaux arguments soulevés à l'encontre de la métaphysique-savoir, à cet égard cinq chapitres sont réservés respectivement à Hume, Kant, aux néo-positivistes, aux marxistes et à Heidegger; la deuxième partie, plus positive cette fois, est consacrée à la présentation systématique des éléments fondamentaux de la métaphysique, et ce en vertu d'un net souci méthodologique.

Même si l'ensemble du livre prend explicitement l'allure d'une esquisse, Kalinowski ne se réserve pas moins tout le dernier chapitre pour exposer la méthodologie qu'il a mise en oeuvre et qui constitue en quelque sorte sa théorie du discours métaphysique. A vrai dire, ce n'est pas le contenu de la métaphysique qui fait problème; depuis Aristote et saint Thomas il se présente comme un acquis définitif (140, 241). Le malaise éprouvé de nos jours à l'endroit de la métaphysique réside plutôt dans un problème de mise en forme. A la lumière de la percée réalisée au XXe siècle dans le domaine de la théorie de la science — que l'on songe à la métalogique ou encore à la métamathématique — l'auteur n'hésite pas à nous proposer une 'métamétaphysique' (231), tout animé qu'il est d'un 'souci de rigueur méthodologique à la mesure de notre temps' (8, cf. 140, 241). D'ailleurs Georges Kalinowski n'en est pas à ses premières armes en ce qui a trait à la mise à profit de la logique contemporaine dans divers champs d'application, surtout si l'on se souvient qu'il fut l'un des initiateurs de la logique déontique en France, et ce à la suite de nombreux travaux en sciences juridiques ainsi que dans le domaine des sciences normatives en général. Naturellement le discours métaphysique ne peut être rapproché sans plus du discours mathématique ou logique; la métaphysique en effet ne peut être assimilée à un système strictement déductif, de même qu'elle répugne de par sa nature même à une formalisation intégrale. Néanmoins, il est possible d'y repérer un certain nombre de propositions premières, jouant ici le rôle d'axiomes, qui puissent donner lieu à des arguments formels, notamment par la mise en oeuvre non pas tant de l'inférence déductive que de l'inférence dite 'réductive' (déf., voir 149-52), plus propre à la métaphysique. On retrouvera donc un usage abondant de ce genre de procédé logique dans la deuxième partie, dogmatique, de l'oeuvre.

Au demeurant, la logique est déjà mise à contribution au sein de la partie critique du livre dans la mesure précisément où bon nombre des arguments invoqués contre les opposants à la métaphysique-savoir sont de nature logique. Ainsi, l'essentiel du reproche adressé à Kant porte sur le statut même des propositions synthétiques a priori, problème décisif aux yeux de Kant pour l'avenir de la métaphysique. Kalinowski commence par montrer que le parallélisme établi par Kant entre d'une part la métaphysique, et de l'autre les mathématiques et la physique pure, ne tient pas. En effet, ces deux dernières comportent des propositions 'analytiques' et non pas 'synthétiques' a priori, et ceci pour la bonne raison que l'opération arithmétique 7 + 5 = 12 peut facilement être transposée dans un schème du type X = X (43), de la même façon que les principes premiers de la physique, depuis les progrès récents de la théorie des systèmes hypothético-déductifs (44), peuvent aisément être interprétés comme des propositions analytiques en vertu d'une conception élargie de l'analyticité, encore inconnue de Kant. Les propositions synthétiques a priori sont donc un faux problème, en métaphysique comme ailleurs, et pour autant qu'elles réfèrent à une 'connaissance' a priori, donc anticipée, elles sont une contradictio in adiecto (48). Dans le cas du matérialisme dialectique, l'argument est également de nature logique; en fait, il ateint non seulement Marx, Engels et Lénine, mais aussi le père de la méthode dialectique lui-

même, à savoir Hegel. L'argument est le suivant: Hegel, de même que ses successeurs, est incapable d'établir la véritable distinction entre des éléments contraires et des éléments contradictoires, si bien que lorsqu'il repère une prétendue contradiction dans la réalité, il n'a affaire à vrai dire qu'à l'union des contraires, ce qui ne pose de difficulté pour personne puisque, dans ce dernier cas, le principe de la non-contradiction n'est pas violé (99-104). Même le chapitre consacré à Heidegger comporte, entre autres, un argument d'ordre logique dans la mesure où l'on reproche à l'auteur de l' *Introduction à la métaphysique* de ne pas faire la distinction, pourtant capitale ici, entre l'utilisation du verbe 'être' dans sa dimension prédicative — comme copule —, et 'être' dans sa dimension existentielle (124).

Curieusement, cette critique adressée à Heidegger se trouve déjà dans le célèbre article de Carnap *'Ueberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache,' (Erkenntnis,* 2 [1932]) auquel Kalinowski accorde une place d'importance dans son chapitre sur les néo-positivistes. Ce chapitre occupe d'ailleurs une position spéciale dans la première partie, non seulement parce que, comme dans le chapitre sur Hume, il n'y est pas fait usage d'arguments logiques, mais parce que notre auteur partage dans une large mesure la critique adressée par Carnap à la métaphysique. Carnap s'en prend, faut-il le rappeler, à certains énoncés particulièrement spéculatifs de Hegel et de Heidegger pour les tourner en dérision; Kalinowski, pour sa part, renchérit en introduisant des exemples encore plus probants chez ces auteurs, et se permet d'y ajouter, de son propre chef, certains exemples pris chez Sartre et chez Foucault. Si Kalinowski accepte de faire un bout de chemin en compagnie de Carnap, c'est que ce dernier devient pour lui l'occasion d'écarter — un peu facilement peut-être — certains penseurs modernes et contemporains. Après quoi, il lui suffit de prendre ses distances en affirmant que la métaphysique est un discours cognitif tout aussi bien que les sciences naturelles, et que ce dicsours était déjà pleinement constitué bien avant la déchéance des Temps Modernes (73).

L'affinité relative que l'on vient de relever entre Carnap et Kalinowski pourrait très bien tenir dans l'expression qui sert à caractériser le Cercle de Vienne: 'empirisme logique.' En fait on retrouve les deux éléments de cette désignation dans les deux règles méthodologiques centrales de la métamétaphysique de Kalinowski (cf. 121, 147):

R5 Le métaphysicien est en droit d'admettre comme thèse métaphysique toute proposition empiriquement évidente. (239)

R8 Le métaphysicien est en droit d'admettre comme thèse métaphysique la conclusion d'une inférence réductive, à prémisse métaphysique, ... (240)

Dans le cas de R 8, il s'agit de faire sauter la restriction carnapienne à l'endroit des inférences transcendantes, et une métaphysique à fondement empirique devient alors possible. Cette progression qui va de la donnée sensible immédiate aux êtres les plus éloignés apparait d'ailleurs très clairement dans les titres des trois premiers chapitres de la deuxième partie:

1— Les êtres donnés dans notre expérience (i.e. l'univers)

2— L'homme

3— L'ultime raison d'être des êtres donnés dans notre expérience. (i.e. Dieu)

De là, l'auteur enchaîne avec un court chapitre sur l'ontologie, pour enfin conclure avec le chapitre sur la méthodologie déjà mentionné.

La lourde hypothèque que fait peser la partie critique du livre sur l'exposé dogmatique de la métaphysique dans la seconde partie rend l'appréciation objective de cette dernière particulièrement difficile. En effet, le caractère superficiel et parfois même carrément tendancieux de certaines réfutations dans la première partie fait surgir chez le lecteur de nombreuses interrogations. Aussi le chapitre sur l'ontologie nous conduit à déplorer l'absence d'une véritable discussion, en temps et lieu, avec Kant, dans la mesure où celui-ci ne s'est pas uniquement occupé de métaphysique spéciale, mais également d'ontologie. La *Critique de la raison pure* voulait livrer celle-ci à un traitement 'scientifique,' ce terme n'ayant rien à voir avec le préjugé néo-kantien cherchant à réduire Kant au rôle de père de l'épistémologie moderne. Mais Kalinowski, dans son chapitre sur l'ontologie, ne prend pas acte de tout ceci, pas plus que de l'héritage de la modernité en général, pressé qu'il est de marquer des points. A cet égard, on déplore également un manque de fréquentation assidue de Hegel, notamment ces passages où celui-ci dénonce la pensée abstraite à l'œuvre tant dans la certitude sensible que dans la logique formelle.

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FRANÇOIS LARUELLE, *Le principe de minorité.* Paris: Aubier Montaigne 1981. Collection 'Analyse et Raisons.' 200 p. ISBN 2-7007-0228-X.

L'Auteur dit qu'il cherche une théorie de l'essence des multiplicités qui pourrait servir de matrice pour répondre à des questions comme, 'peut-on définir des parties avant le Tout et indépendamment du Tout? des différences avant leur répétition et indépendamment de l'Idée, du Logos, de l'Etre? des minorités avant l'Etat et indépendamment de l'Etat? peut-on penser des événements avant leur mise en histoire, des sujets avant les objets et dépourvus d'objectivité? un temps sans temporalité? des singularités ou des

multiplicités avant tout universel ou indépendamment d'un universel? etc.' Ne devrait-on pas ensuite tenter de comprendre la production même de ce genre de questions?

Voilà pour la mise en forme académique. Elle est toutefois bien secondaire dans un texte aussi proche de son souffle originaire. L'entendement parle, certes, mais ce n'est pas un discours d'entendement, car les termes conceptuels sont posés, supprimés et conservés dans un mouvement de raison faisant valoir ses exigences idéales. Discours d'idées, donc, plus que de concepts, et par là philosophie plus que savoir. La pensée se concentre entière à chaque moment de l'écriture et le bourgeonnement verbal sourd de l'unité du désir de raison.

Or la raison comme désir, c'est encore une fois Kant, et Laruelle le reconnaît. Le premier retour à Kant (Cohen, Natorp) avait capté le désir de raison au profit de la possession du monde, car le pouvoir transcendantal néo-kantien se donnait pour tout horizon 'le tout de l'étant objectivé à la manière d'une science.' Le second retour (Lagneau, Nabert, Krüger) laisse le désir de raison renverser les totalités théoriques, surtout quand elles réduisent tout l'étant à sa compréhension politique et font abstraction de la personne éthique. Le troisième retour (Nietzsche, Heidegger) prend dans le pouvoir transcendantal la possibilité d'une dissolution de l'étant, dissolution du fondement de l'éthique chez Nietzsche ou dissolution des objectivités théoriques abstraites chez Heidegger.

Ces reprises du kantisme sont appelées 'destructions,' terme violent et inexact. Parce que la philosophie transcendantale est un mouvement de transcendance vers l'absolu, elle contient un pouvoir de refus toujours renouvelé. Ce pouvoir revient sur ses œuvres, les emporte et les dépasse comme autant de figures historiques dans lesquelles, à la fois, il se reconnaît et ne peut se contenir. Au fond, rien n'est détruit, mais rien n'est adéquat.

L'Auteur, à son tour, propose un retour. Que veut-il contourner? L'intérêt rationnel pour le 'tout', pour l'unité systématique compréhensive, fait que le voyage discursif, (ce tout différencié dans lequel la raison pense avoir raison de penser l'être comme 'même' que soi), oublie sa situation historique et s'absolutise, puisqu'il se définit par sa référence à l'absolu. La raison se pense là où elle n'est pas: la tendance répétitive de la pensée gréco-occidentale a été de prendre sa relation à l'absolu, (qui lui est immanente), pour la présence de l'absolu même dans la raison. Le sujet rationnel se pose, fût-ce en détachant sa finitude de l'absolu, puisque relation à lui, mais l'absolu rentre ainsi dans sa définition. Laruelle veut sortir de ce relationisme où l'absolu déteint sur tout et il annonce les débuts philosophiques du sujet 'minoritaire,' où l'absolu *demeure* dans son absoluité.

La minorité, dans son essence, écarte les rapports à l'idée, au monde, à l'histoire, même à la raison. Elle n'est ni fini, ni infini. Elle se pose au-delà même de l'être, pour autant qu'être implique une relation à la pensée, pour laquelle l'être est l'essence de la manifestation. La minorité implique la dispersion pure, la multiplicité sans attaches, car si la réalité des minoritaires ne contient aucun rapport, ceux-ci sont une diaspora absolue. On n'imaginera

pas non plus une dispersion d'atomes empiriques, car cette image les enveloppe dans un continuum espace-temps, donc dans des rapports. La dispersion minoritaire, parce qu'essentielle, est transcendantale, doit se produire a priori, ou bien n'est pas. De même que ce qui unit a priori, (le pouvoir synthétique), est transcendantal, ainsi le dispersif pur, le pouvoir de se séparer des rapports synthétiques, est lui aussi transcendantal.

Si l'on suit Laruelle au bout de son parcours négatif, on peut se demander quelle différence il peut y avoir entre son réel mineur et l'idée de liberté, car le désir qui respire dans le texte, c'est bien l'exigence de l'inconditionnel. La minorité tant désirée est ce par quoi le réel résiste à sa réduction au *même* du système, c'est-à-dire au réseau déterministe des rapports entre éléments dans un tout. Elle sera cette limite inconditionnelle à partir de laquelle le système est possible, le fondement hors-système pour lequel il y a un système et qui n'est pas réel par le système. Et comme Laruelle semble penser que tout système est système de l'être, (probablement par une amalgamation de l'être et de l'étant), il plaide pour une philosophie de l'Un et reproche à Kant de rabattre le plan de l'Un sur le plan de l'être.

Puis mon réflexe kantien se réveille et je me demande si le principe de minorité n'est pas une simple idée de la raison pure, une règle possible pour la pensée, peut-être un principe pratique, mais pas une vérité théorique, un savoir. A quoi Laruelle répondrait qu'il ne s'embarasse pas de ma question, puisqu'il s'agit d'une persuasion mystique. Le dernier mot de ce livre est 'désir.' Ce désir retourne à son silence. Mais s'il peut se taire, c'est qu'il est pouvoir de parler. Je ne sais pas si l'Auteur sera gêné d'être qualifié de métaphysicien, (terme élogieux dans mon esprit), mais c'est ainsi que je le comprends, car son discours origine d'un inconditionnel, d'un silence métadiscursif, d'un désir qui est la possibilité de toute parole, d'une volonté d'échapper au système des étants, puis son discours reconduit au silence.

Quel intérêt y a-t-il à cet entre-deux-silences? Il y a l'intérêt que le désir se reconnaît comme raison, et que la raison découvre qu'elle est désir. Je ne voudrais pas faire entrer de force l'Auteur dans la reprise éthique du kantisme, dont il se désolidarise verbalement, mais je ne comprends pas encore en quoi il y échappe. Car la minorité qui s'affirme ici avec autant de force, n'est encore qu'une idée de raison, une possibilité, une exigence de liberté dont on peut seulement *espérer* qu'elle est réellement fondée, espérance qui ne se maintient vivante que dans la tension du devoir-être, et qui prend le risque de l'hétéronomie. François Laruelle invoque la mystique. Ce que je ne peux refuser absolument, mais ce dont je me méfie comme d'une solution peut-être seulement imaginaire, comme si nous pouvions lever nos pattes hors de l'existence historique parce que nous nous imaginons ainsi.

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FRANK LENTRICCHIA, *After the New Criticism.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1980. Pp. xiv + 350. US$6.95 (paper). ISBN 0-226-47198-5.

After the New Criticism is dominated by two very important, closely connected aims, one of which is achieved and one of which is not.

Lentricchia's first aim is to show how as a matter of historical fact various leading American critics — Frye, Stevens, Krieger, Hirsch, and Bloom, among others — various European critics and philosophers influential in America — Poulet, Gadamer, Heidegger, and Sartre — and various transmitters of European philosophical movements into American critical life — Culler, Hillis Miller, and de Man — have perpetuated the most important practice-governing assumptions of the New Critics. In the face of the logical positivists' arrogations of cognitive significance exclusively to the sentences of the sciences, the New Critics attempted to 'essentialize literary discourse' (xiii), that is, to understand literary discourse as a unique kind of language — in Brooks' succinct formulation, the language of paradox — with a unique kind of cognitive significance. Both works of literature and works of literary criticism were assumed to be about subjects and to be the outcomes of labors alike largely uninfluenced by economic, social, and political forces agreed to be subjects of special sciences. Adopting this assumption served to protect literary criticism in particular against dismissal as insignificant and against reduction to a social science. Lentricchia finds that even when they have explicitly attacked the manners of reading of their New Critical or more generally Kantian forebears, Frye, Stevens, Sartre, de Man, et alii have retained the crucial assumption that literary works are about subjects which cannot be understood scientifically.

That Lentricchia convincingly and helpfully depicts these figures in this way is beyond serious dispute. It is true that these figures largely argued with one another about what the subjects of literary and literary critical discourse are and how nonscientifically to grasp them, while agreeing that literary and literary critical activity are not scientific activities. Lentricchia situates and rehearses these intracritical arguments, very often by juxtaposition making parituclar critical stances more intelligible than their authors had made them. Very few readers will be masters of all the works Lentricchia discusses; very few will fail to discover helpful ways to think of figures they are acquainted with and new connections between these figures and figures as yet unknown. It is, for example, surely instructive to see Sartre, Stevens, Kermode, Vaihinger, Frost, and the early Nietzsche classed together as *conservative fictionalists* on the ground that they are each ready to tell stories about the nature of consciousness while retaining a willingness self-consciously to step outside their storytelling and to regard their stories as not necessarily true. Frye, Stevens, and Poulet are well located as the successively dominant transitional figures in the period between the hegemonies of the New Critics and the current Yale Critics.

Lentricchia's second aim is to show that it is a *mistake* to regard either the production or the understanding of literary works to require any special

literary or critical competence, no matter how conceived. What is needed in order actually to show that literary works are cognitively significant or informative is historical competence, that is, an ability to grasp connections among literary works and the historical circumstances in which they were created, for it is these circumstances about which literary works inform us, if they inform us of anything. Literary works do not inform us of the natures of such things as human consciousness as such or original human desire because, according to Lentricchia, there are no such things. Consciousness and desire are epiphenomena of historical forces and processes. Lentricchia's heroes are those European philosophers — Barthes, the later Foucault, Derrida, and the later Nietzsche — who have claimed that literary, social, and political forms of expression and organization have occasionally suddenly changed radically, in such a way that the new forms and the old ones cannot coherently be understood as expressions of an underlying unchanging human nature. According to Lentricchia, to deny the insights of these thinkers into the historical contingency, mutability, and multivocality of literary, social, and political forms is to turn anti-historical and aestheticist, to repress an awareness of the agency of history in shaping forms of expression and organization in favor of the pleasures of idle fantasies about human nature. Schiller, Coleridge, Emerson, Yeats, Frost, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Stevens, Kermode, Poulet, Culler, Hartman, Hillis Miller, de Man, and, to a lesser extent, Bloom, Barthes, and Derrida, among others, are classed as aestheticists, together with Kant, who is said to have fathered them all. Only the later Foucault has managed not to deny that particular consciousnesses and literary works are 'intertextual functions of semiological systems' (175) themselves subject to historical forces, and criticism should take its lead from Foucault's work.

There are at least four serious flaws in this picture of the natures of consciousness and criticism.

1) Lentricchia misunderstands Kant and the plausible defense of the insusceptibility of aesthetic experience to scientific investigation which is to be found in *The Critique of Judgment.* Lentricchia takes Kant to have held that aesthetic judgments are arbitrary (cf. 150, where he seems to endorse Gadamer's reading of Kant) and that aesthetic experience is of no cognitive value. In fact, Kant held only that aesthetic judgments are subjective in a quite special sense; they are about objects only in relation to human faculties, not about primary properties of objects. Aesthetic judgments have intersubjective truth conditions, even though they are not conclusively verifiable. According to Kant, '*a* is beautiful' (the paradigm aesthetic judgment) is true if and only if everyone would feel aesthetic pleasure in contemplating it, moreover if and only if anyone feels aesthetic pleasure in contemplating it, for genuine aesthetic pleasures are always universal. Thus aesthetic experience is, for Kant, clearly cognitively significant. It tells us something about the propensities of objects to produce pleasure and about the propensities of human beings to feel it. There are subtleties in Kant's account of the importance and interest of beautiful objects which Lentricchia simply ignores.

2) Lentricchia holds that 'the fiction-reality antithesis cannot be mediated without at the same time destroying the antithesis itself (58).' This claim is unclear. It seems to mean that it is *inconsistent* (Lentricchia goes on to talk of 'internal contradictions' [59]) to acknowledge, as conservative fictionalists did, that fictions are not literally true of historical states of affairs while at the same time attempting to explain why fictions are interesting to real people. Contrary to Lentricchia's claim, no inconsistency obviously troubles such a project.

3) Lentricchia seems to suppose that consciousness and desire would have to be ultimate atoms or irreducible substances in order to be in any sense real and fit subjects of literary works. That is like supposing that particular trees are not real because they are not chemically primitive and do not exist forever. But just as trees are among the real things botany is properly about, so consciousness and desire are among the real things literature is properly about.

4) Historical criticism of the sort Lentricchia calls for is unimaginable, as Lentricchia's practice itself shows. Such criticism would, unlike thematic, aesthetic, anti-historical criticism, avoid introducing transhistorical antitheses. Yet Lentricchia, in the course of making quite good sense of the works of critics influential in America between 1957 and 1970, suggests that all modes of criticism, without regard to the circumstances of their production, are necessarily either historicist or aestheticist. Lentricchia fastens on human beings in general an unavoidable 'historical guilt' (209) stemming from the fact that, without qualification, 'we will continue to commit the crime' (210) of supposing that works of literature are not about historical circumstances only and are valuable otherwise than as a result of them.

It is likely that we will continue to suppose this, and *After the New Criticism* contains compelling insights about the manuevers critics have made to uphold and develop this supposition. What Lentricchia in general fails to see is that it might be true.

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NEIL MacCORMICK, *H.L.A. Hart.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1981. Pp. viii + 184. US$18.50. ISBN 0-8047-1107-0.

'Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory,' under the general editorship of William Twining, is a new series intended to 'provide short, authoritative, reflective

introductions to significant thinkers' in legal theory. MacCormick's book, the first in this series, succeeds admirably as a critical introduction to both Hart's legal and his moral theory. MacCormick, himself a legal thinker of importance, provides not only an introductory explanation, but also a 'constructive critique of Hart's jurisprudence' (20), and he accomplishes this by attempting to demonstrate how Hart's legal theory may be further developed and amended to respond to his major critics. Thus, while MacCormick does not hesitate to present a number of his own criticisms of Hart, nevertheless his book may be viewed as a susbstantial contribution to the defense of Hartian legal theory. This review will focus on sketching several of the more important ways in which MacCormick attempts to further Hart's legal thinking.

MacCormick announces that his 'argument is that the Hartian *method* of analysis is a good one and that its more rigorous application removes certain difficulties in the conclusions he has hitherto stated' (28), and that his 'thesis in this book is that the most distinctive and valuable element in Hart's work as a jurist lies in the way in which he has addressed the explanation of laws as social rules and the explanation of social rules' (29). MacCormick terms Hart's method of explaining social rules a hermeneutic approach, for it 'seeks to explain human actions, practices, etc. through an interpretation of the meaning they have for those who take part in the actions, practices etc.' (29).

In *The Concept of Law,* the proper context for the hermeneutic method is Hart's elucidation of the notion of the acceptance of a social rule. Hart argues that the root cause of the failure of an Austinian model of law as orders backed by threats is that the ideas of orders, habitual obedience, and threats cannot yield the idea of a rule. The idea of habitual obedience to the Austinian sovereign, Hart contends, does not imply the existence of a *normative* rule according to which the sovereign has the *right* to be obeyed. Hart maintains that for the sovereign to have the right to be obeyed, there must be a general practice of acceptance of a social rule. Hart proposes that where there is acceptance, rather than mere habitual obedience, there is social criticism against deviation from a social rule, deviation is regarded as a good reason for criticism, and there is an internal aspect of rules, which involves a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behavior as a common standard, and this attitude is displayed in criticisms and demands for conformity in terms of normative terminology.

Corresponding to the internal aspect of rules is an external aspect, so that one may adopt either an internal point of view or an external point of view from which one merely observes but does not accept social rules. But this raises a problem for the legal theorist: if the theorist takes the external point of view, he fails to understand the viewpoint of those who accept the rules; if he adopts the internal point of view, he becomes committed to the rules and loses his objectivity. MacCormick's development of the hermeneutic point of view is an attempt to dissolve this dilemma. Thus, MacCormick proposes to distinguish between a cognitive and a volitional element in the critical reflective attitude of the internal point of view: the cognitive element covers the notion of a *pattern* of behavior, and is the reflective aspect of the critical

reflective attitude; the volitional element concerns the expression of a wish or preference that an act, or abstention from acting, be done, and is the critical aspect. Consequently, someone might adopt the cognitive, reflective attitude of the internal point of view, but take no position for or against a rule by withholding judgment. But if there are these two distinguishable aspects of the critical reflective attitude, then Hart's distinction between the internal and external points of view is faulty. Hence, MacCormick distinguishes between three points of view: (1) an extreme external point of view from which one merely records observable behavior; (2) a non-extreme external point of view or hermeneutic point of view which contains only the reflective attitude of the internal point of view, and which is the viewpoint of the legal theorist; and (3) the internal point of view which has both cognitive and volitional elements. The addition of a hermeneutic point of view is an important amendment to Hart's analysis of social rules, and it will no doubt be compared to John Finnis' rejection of Hart's internal point of view and argument for the *moral* viewpoint of practical reasonableness (see his *Natural Law and Natural Rights* [Oxford: Clarendon Press 1980] 11-18 [reviewed in Vol. II, no. 4 (August 1982) of this journal (Ed.)]).

In a well-known critique, Ronald Dworkin attempted to show that Hart's version of legal positivism is a model of rules that misrepresents the fact that law is also comprised of principles and policies, and that the presence of principles in legal reasoning reveals that the positivist doctrine of judicial discretion is mistaken (see his *Taking Rights Seriously,* 2nd. edn. [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1978] 14-45). While agreeing that Hart places far too much emphasis on rules in *The Concept of Law,* MacCormick attempts to show, through an extended analysis of Hart's distinction between positive morality and critical morality, that Hart's legal theory can accommodate principles, values, and other non-rule standards. Indeed, MacCormick also maintains that Dworkin's criticism of Hart's defense of judicial discretion is a 'decided oddity,' because there can be no stronger discretion than the judge's discretion 'to do as seems right and proper consistently with legal principles, legal values and other relevant legal standards' (129-30).

In an incisive chapter on secondary rules, MacCormick examines several serious objections to Hart's characterization of a legal system as a union of primary and secondary rules. MacCormick acknowledges that not all secondary rules are power-conferring rules and that the rule of recognition is itself concerned with duties, not powers. Furthermore, MacCormick argues that the judicial role is inconceivable without the rule of recognition, for the rule of recognition does not determine the legal *validity* of a rule, but determines 'what are valid *as grounds for judicial decisions*' (115). MacCormick's development of the notion of the judicial role, and his extension of Hart's thinking to it, should be regarded as important contributions to legal theory.

Finally, MacCormick's book ends with an examination of Hart's views on the moral relevance of law. MacCormick argues that because of Hart's distinction between positive and critical morality, and because of 'the Hartian principle in favour of moral liberty and moral pluralism within the coercive legal

ordering of a contemporary state, the law is always and necessarily morally relevant. For it is always subject to moral criticism' (155). In contrast, MacCormick suggests, the natural law tradition presumes that whatever is law is right, and therefore obviates the need for a moral critique of law. Indeed, MacCormick contends that hence 'Hart is a positivist because he is a critical moralist' (160). But this also means, in MacCormick's view, that Hart is incorrect that law stands in a merely contingent relationship with morality. These, along with several other views, will spark controversy, but that just shows that MacCormick's *H.L.A. Hart* is also a philosophical book.

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GARETH B. MATTHEWS, *Philosophy and the Young Child.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1980. Pp. viii + 115. US$10.00. ISBN 0-674-66605-4.

Gareth Matthews has written an engaging, thought-provoking book about the philosophical aptitudes of young children. It can be read with benefit by philosophers and by anyone who wishes to understand and encourage intellectual curiosity and imaginativeness in children. It ought to be read by child psychologists and others who claim to have an accurate understanding of cognitive intellectual development in children, because Matthews argues persuasively that the most distinguished theorists in this area of child learning seriously underestimate children's capabilities.

Philosophers commonly find that high-school students are more receptive to philosophical modes of thinking than are many university students. They show greater flexibility of mind, more readiness to suspend commonsense beliefs and entertain novel possibilities. Matthews argues that much younger children, aged from three and a half to nine or ten years, are even more receptive to philosophical thinking, and that they try to resolve their perplexities by reasoning in many of the *same* ways that professional philosophers do (admittedly with greater subtlety and sophistication).

By means of a series of telling examples of conversations with and amongst children, in which puzzlement is expressed and verbal games are played, Matthews shows that children entertain perplexities about the distinction between appearance and reality, the nature of time and infinity, the relations between mind and body, language and the world, and the different kinds of necessity, possibility and impossibility. They also reason out their perplexities by the use of hypothetical and analogical reasoning, deductive inference, and the appraisal of different kinds of evidence. While some childhood perplexities can be attributed to incomplete conceptual understan-

ding or an insufficient knowledge base, others are truly philosophical in character. The natural curiosity of children can and does range freely over the uncertainties attaching to our concepts and to our claims about what exists and what we know; it is untrammelled by the cares and social constraints of later life, which tend to discourage reflection, however philosophically legitimate, which is insufficiently practical or commonsensical or realistic, e.g. reflection about what is scientifically established and so beyond question.

Matthews uses these examples of children's conceptual thought as a foil against which to appraise the accounts of cognitive development and concept formation in children presented by psychologists such as Jean Piaget. Piaget does not emerge from this comparison very well. Piaget is shown to make use of a dubious methodology for his avowed objectives, and his conversations with children display more concern to 'locate' them at some point in a theoretically fixed pattern of conceptual development, than to explore the actual conceptual awareness possessed by these children. Piaget's own theory of what constitutes progressively more adequate conceptual frameworks is itself philosophically uninformed and insensitive, yet this theory is imposed on children in a way that is often presumptuous and dismissive of their philosophical capabilities. Some of these conversations show children rightly resisting the leading questions and forced alternatives presented by Piaget, yet their demurrals are interpreted by him as showing incomplete conceptual grasp or a more primitive stage of understanding. The thrust of Matthews' appraisal here is reminiscent of J.L. Austin's discussion of *Regina v. Finney* in 'A Plea for Excuses,' which shows Finney to be a 'master of the Queen's English' by contrast with the learned legal counsel who represent him.

Matthews persuades us that the place to look for sensitivity to children's natural philosophizing tendencies is not in the field of child psychology but in that of children's literature. Using illustrations from such writers as A.A. Milne, L. Frank Baum and Arnold Lobel, Matthews argues that what children find delightful about these stories is often their whimsical, humorous treatment of conceptual puzzles. Baum's creation of the 'Extra-Responsive, Thought-Creating, Perfect-Talking MECHANICAL MAN' who 'Thinks, Speaks, Acts, and Does Everything but Live' is an excellent case in point. Such writers celebrate the imaginative sensibilities of children and respect their ability to be aware of different possible ways of thinking about the world. Matthews maintains, correctly I believe, that children's refreshing freedom from conventionality in thinking about the world is also shown in their often strikingly innovative and evocative uses of language, and that these abilities should not be regarded as things that it is desirable or natural 'to grow out of.'

If there is a weakness in this book, it arises from an excess of enthusiasm by Matthews for his subject matter. He sometimes reads more into a child's remark or a fictional episode than the evidence appears to warrant. A remark can *raise* all sorts of interesting philosophical possibilities without being uttered with any of those possibilities in mind, even dimly or tentatively in mind. What makes literary fantasies and whimsies delightful to children is often what *isn't said* (is left undetermined) as much as what *is* said; the writer's

appeal to children may lie in that lightness of touch which leaves jokes at the level of jokes and sillinesses, without exploring what makes them so. The interest of literary examples as philosophical jumping-off points is not, then, necessarily the same as what interests children about these examples. Sometimes it may be, but sometimes philosophy only begins where the child's enjoyment is already complete.

Such overenthusiasm is easily forgiven. Matthews is surely right in urging that children's philosophical curiosity manifests natural capacities for creative thinking and expression that should be respected and encouraged.

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W.H. NEWTON-SMITH, *The Structure of Time.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980. Pp. xii + 262. Cdn$41.25; US$30.00. ISBN 0-7100-0362-5.

This book addresses two basic questions. One is whether (1) moments and periods of time are real and ontologically independent of the things which are said to be *in* time, namely events, or whether (1′) the former are linguistically reducible to the latter and to the temporal relations which they bear. The other is whether (2) the topological structure of time (i.e., of the system of moments and time-periods bearing temporal relations to one another) is known a priori or (2′) is instead a matter for empirical discovery. In fact, Newton-Smith treats the two issues as a package deal, identifying an affirmative answer to (1) and (2) collectively as the 'Platonist' position, while affirmative answers to (1′) and (2′) compose the 'Reductionist' claim. Having laid out these basic views in Chapter I, in the rest of the book he pursues their arguments and consequences, along with certain ancillary issues. Chapter II discusses the Aristotelian thesis that there can be no duration unless change is taking place, while Chapters III through VI treat different aspects of temporal topology: as open or closed, beginning or non-beginning, etc. Chapter VII turns to the metrical nature of time, notably in regard to the thesis of metrical conventionalism. This is followed by a chapter on Special Relativity and one on the directionality or asymmetry of time. The final chapter (X) reviews earlier arguments and develops a new issue: roughly, whether or not underdetermination of a given theory of time by the possible empirical data allows for a realist view of the temporal nature of the world.

Newton-Smith's basic form of reasoning in the book is what he calls 'argument by fantasy': imagining a possible world, generally far different from the one we know, in which it would be at least plausible to posit a certain nature for temporality. On the basis of such arguments he claims to disprove both (1) and (2′), thereby disposing of both Platonism and Reductionism as he has characterized them. Though much of what he says in the process is unexceptionable, certain of his key ideas are either mistaken or not adequately supported. For one particularly significant example, in pursuing the question of the ontic status of substantival time he only considers one kind of reduction: the identificatory variety, as opposed to the eliminative one. To explain briefly, the latter denies the existence (or rather the linguistic commitment to the existence) of the entity in question while the former affirms it, merely identifying the entity with what is prima facie something else. In the one case, sentences implying the reality of the entity to be reduced are considered literally false, though having counterparts which capture their 'essential' content; in the other, they are literally true though perhaps misleading. Specifically, Newton-Smith would define a moment of time as a set of events: the set of events normally said to be or to occur *at* that moment. The special problem this raises is that of the reduction of 'empty' time (or space): there is nothing 'there' to identify the moments with. But no such difficulty arises, I believe, for the other variety of reduction. For example, saying that there is empty time between events *e* and *f* is replaced by saying that *e* and *f* are temporally distant from one another, and that there are no other events between them. Since so much of the book hinges on whether the reduction is possible, it is surprising that the author doesn't at least argue against this other approach. He even sees some value in the alternative idea that positions in time are actual *or possible* sets of events. As one of those who reject belief in *bare* possibilities — possibilities not grounded in actualities — I would dismiss such suggestions as blatant cheating. But in any event the requisite actualities are present in this case, namely the actual events and the relations they bear, so that the appeal to possiblilia is gratuitous at best.

A second undefended assumption which influences the book's conclusions in regard to this question is the idea that the only entities available for identifying times with are changes, events in the narrowest sense of the term. Newton-Smith ignores both cases of being such-and-such (e.g., John's being ill) and cases of remaining thus-and-so (e.g., John's remaining ill) in favor of cases of changing (e.g., John's becoming ill) as the only relevant contents of time. If what I would call 'states of affairs' are counted, then as long as any continuants exist there will be only 'full' time, so that even under identificatory reductionism the Reductionist faces no problems. And perhaps even if nothing exists this is so: if there being nothing at all in existence counts as a state of affairs then empty time is conceptually impossible, whatever may be said of time without change. In any case, this presupposition about the contents of time is what makes relevant the doctrine that there can be no time without change. In particular, the idea is that it is impossible (conceptually impossible, that is, not just contrary to the laws of nature) for

all change in the universe to cease for a finite period and later start up again. Or, to speak in a way that doesn't mention substantival time, it is that there must be change between any two non-contiguous changes; if there is not then they are contiguous after all. Using an argument adapted from Sidney Shoemaker, Newton-Smith concludes that this tradition is false. (The argument involves a fantasy world in which every object disappears for a predictable length of time, giving grounds to believe that periodically everything does so at once for a set period. By my lights, he complicates things unnecessarily by assuming that causation must still be in operation in this otherwise bizarre world.) Then given that there may be times with which no changes can be identified, he further concludes that time must be real and independent of its contents. I am quite willing to accept both the fantasy and duration without change, but this conclusion can be challenged on the two different grounds already cited.

The author later raises a second objection to Reductionism, and this one seems to me even more flatly mistaken. The reasoning is that the notion of topologically open time with perfectly repeating historical cycles is fully intelligible (he holds that there is no good reason to accept the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles), but that the Reductionist is forced to deny this fact:

> For if he holds that t_0 is distinct from t_1, even though the state of the universe at t_0 is not qualitatively distinguishable from the state of the universe at t_1, he is committed to the view that there can be a difference between times without there being a corresponding difference between the sets of events occurring at the different times. This is a fatal blow to his general thesis that times are certain sorts of sets of events. Neither can he appeal to the numerical distinctness of the event sets in question while allowing their qualitative similarity, for that distinction can only be made if it is conceded that there is a numerical difference in he times. (74)

But why he thinks events can't have their own numerical identities he doesn't say. I for one cannot think of any reason that wouldn't apply equally well to times, qualitatively identical to one another as they are.

In spite of flaws like these, the book contains much material that is solid and clearly presented. Of special interest, though space does not permit its discussion here, are Newton-Smith's views concerning the epistemology and ontology of scientific theories, and how they relate to the theory of time in particular. There is much food for thought here for the reader who is interested in the topic.

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RICHARD NISBETT and LEE ROSS, *Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment* Scarborough, Ont. and Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1980. Pp. xvi + 334. Cdn$22.45; US$17.95. ISBN 0-13-445130-9.

Nisbett and Ross are social psychologists, and this book is a discussion of recent findings and new hypotheses concerning the bases and dynamics of our choices, our evaluations, our judgments — and our *self-perceptions* of the bases of those choices, evaluations, and judgments. How good are we in detecting co-variation amongst events? What factors influence making a judgment about a candidate for a job, and how aware are we of them? What factors determine the assessment of causation? How good are we at picking out the correct causal factors? How good are we at identifying the causes of our own behaviour?

In a variety of carefully controlled and carefully designed studies, it has emerged that, for example, preconceptions and expectations rather than data often guide judgments about whether events co-vary; that theories and beliefs are often unrevised and even entrenched in the face of blatantly disconfirming evidence; that in looking to discover the cause of an event, salience and resemblance criteria count more than Mill's Methods; that our own explanations for why we made a certain choice or judgment are sometimes confabulatory, and are based on general theories about human behaviour rather than on introspectively apprehended data. One might hope that these shortcomings are to be found only amongst the dim or the chronically foolish or the unwashed or the undergraduates, but at any rate, not in oneself and the similarly stationed. But that hope is, as one ruefully finds out, quite vain.

There are so many superbly designed and stunning experiments that it is agonizingly difficult to select some to give the flavour, but, because the page opened here (94), consider the following example. A widespread conviction amongst clinical psychologists is that the draw-a-person test (DAP) reliably correlates drawn features with personality symptoms. So, for example, a subject who is suspicious depicts his sketched person as having excessively large (or excessively small) eyes, and one whose drawing has a prominent mouth is likely to be a dependent type, and so on. Alas for the DAP test, objective studies show it to be entirely without validity, yet many clinicians still use the test and persist in seeing it as valid, despite the fact that they could not have had co-variational evidence. Why? As a result of studies by the Chapmans (93ff.) it became apparent that this is a case where co-variation judgment is driven by theory, not data. They presented undergraduates with DAP drawings from patients, then they *randomly* attached a symptom description to each drawing. They then asked the subjects to report any observable correlations between symptoms and drawn features. Though there were no systematic relationships, the students perceived a strong correlation between suspiciousness and large eyes in the sketch, between dependency and mouth size, and so on. Even when the test was rigged so that dependency was

negatively correlated with prominently drawn mouths (etc.), a *positive* correlation was perceived by the subjects. What colours the perception for both clinicians and the untutored is the widely shared folk theory which is rife with such assumed correlations (see Chapter 5).

Our judgments about causal factors turn out to be susceptible to a range of irrelevant influences, including salience of the object or event, resemblance of an object to an effect, and sundry linguistic factors (Chapter 6). For example, Sue is more apt to be identified as the causal agent in her preference for a restaurant if subjects are told that Sue likes the restaurant than if told that the restaurant is liked by Sue (127). Or again: when subjects behave in a room with mirrors, they attribute more of their behaviour to themselves and less to their environment than when without mirrors (126); solo members (e.g. the only black) of a panel are perceived as more influential than other members (125); being told that one will meet the candidate for a job positvely affects how one rates the candidates (213). And there are many, many more fascinating — and alarming — studies.

Some philosophers are wont to adopt a ho-hum attitude to all this, archly advising that it is terribly old hat that humans are not as rational as they ought to be, and that fallacious reasoning is routinely and casually observable in any freshmen class. Mill and Bacon, it may be added, have already wrung their hands in classical fashion on the want of rationality in humankind. But the work of Nisbett and Ross should not be dismissed by pococurante posturing. To begin with, the results discussed are obtained by careful experimental procedures, and this is essential. To be sure, everyone has had a student convinced of the efficacy of prayer owing to the gift of a bicycle prayed for, but it is important to know how frequently humans in general make such errors and what categories the errors fall into. Anecdotal evidence and catch-as-catch can sampling is not good enough here. Additionally, data is needed in order to determine what factors can be manipulated and whether people get it wrong even when they are told. This brings me to the second point. What the social psychologists hypothesize is that the errors in reasoning are not random misses. Rather, they can be shown to be *systematic* — to follow specific, characteristic patterns. Moreover, it appears that what is seen as an error of reasoning may also consist in adherence to a specifiable heuristic or primitive principle. Investigating what these heuristics are, how they can be altered, how they can be modified to yield more sophisticated principles, what their limits are, how we manage to survive so well despite the limitations of the heuristics, are exactly what ought to interest philosophers.

Thirdly, the book is important to philosophers because it generates a healthy scepticism about the a priori approach to normative matters, about the view the rationality can be characterized independently of an empirically-based understanding of how organisms work. Despite the free use in philosophy of such epithets as 'irrational' or 'illogical,' we do not have anything remotely approaching a comprehensive theory of what it is for an organism to be rational, or of the principles which should guide an organism's construction and acceptance of theories about the empirical

world. It is important to see that the primitive heuristics and the more sophisticated principles we tender as improvements are part of the same ongoing business, and that from within a yet wider perspective, the sophisticated principles may be seen as flawed and narrow. Liberated from the thrall of a static Platonic realm sequestering the Eternally True and the Eternally Right, we begin to glimpse the possibility of the normative enjoying a development and an evolution, even as the descriptive so evidently does.

Every philosopher should read this book.*

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* Of related interest, and published since *Human Inference,* see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1982), 'The Psychology of Preferences,' *Scientific American,* Vol 246, no.1:160-173; Stephen Stich and Richard Nisbett, "Justification and the Psychology of Human Reasoning", *Philosophy of Science,* 47 (1980) 188-202; L. Jonathan Cohen, 'Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?', *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences,* 4 (1981) 317-75.

J. ROLAND PENNOCK and JOHN W. CHAPMAN, eds., *Human Rights: Nomos XXIII.* New York: New York University Press 1981. Pp. xvi + 303. US$19.50. ISBN 0-8147-6578-5.

The volume is divided into three parts, on the nature, justification, and scope of human rights, and is introduced with a historical-thematic essay by Pennock. While the papers range over a wide variety of topics, from a reinterpretation of Mill on liberty (by John Gray) to a consideration of the human rights recognized by international law (by Louis Henkin), many, perhaps even most, papers reflect a renewed interest in foundations, that is, in justifying claims that there are rights, and in saying which rights there are. The contributors are more or less agreed that rights are not mere human creations, but exist prior to and independent of human recognition or incorporation into a legal system. Thus, the volume manifests a resurgence of a natural as opposed to a positive or conventionalistic conception of rights.

Two main themes dominate the collection. With regard to the justification of rights, Gewirth's recent theory occupies the center of attention, primarily in the form of his contribution 'The Basis and Content of Human Rights,' a synopsis of his more fully stated argument in *Reason and Morality.*

The other main theme is the egalitarian/social-welfare conception of rights found in many of the papers.

A novel feature of Gewirth's theory is its starting point in 'the normative structure of action.' The idea is that a rational, conatively normal agent, because he realizes that certain conditions, principally freedom and well-being, are necessary to his survival, lays claim to those conditions in a right claim: '[The agent claims] that he has rights to freedom and well-being because these rights are due to him from within his own standpoint as a prospective purposive agent, since he needs these goods in order to act either at all or with the general possibility of success' (128).

Gewirth's derivation of rights is attacked by Richard B. Friedman, Arval A. Morris, Martin Golding, and Susan Moller Okin. Friedman contends (1) that Gewirth has not shown that the agent must in fact make a right claim at all, (2) that such a claim would not in any case have to be based on the agent's needs, and (3) that to have a need, even of the basic necessities of life, is not the same as to have a right to those necessities, nor is it to justify a claim to be entitled to those necessities by right.'

Golding complains further that since Gewirth's agent is a prudential amoralist, no claim of right or due logically can be forthcoming from him: the agent, according to Golding, 'neither asserts nor denies any rights-claims, nor does he ever have to assert or deny them. He cannot assert or deny them, because the terminology of "rights" is not part of his vocabulary' (173). With Friedman, Golding denies that an agent's need, or claim of need, entails a right or claim of right: ' "I need X" no more logically implies "I have a right to X" than does "I want X" imply it' (166).

Gewirth's reply, if any, to these and other criticisms, is not published in this volume, leaving the reader in doubt that his ambitious undertaking has succeeded.

As already mentioned, the other strong theme evident in these papers is an egalitarian/social-welfare conception of rights. Although the specific rights claimed or mentioned by contributors range from Locke's minimalist ' "right to be left free to live (or, if one is unlucky, to die)" ' (Okin, 248, quoting D.D. Raphael), to the grandly inflated right ' "to a tobacco-free job," "the right to sunshine," and "the right to a sex-break" ' (Pennock, 26, n. 36, quoting Nan Berger), many contributors (John Charvet, Gewirth, Okin, and others) assert welfare rights requiring the redistribution of wealth toward an egalitarian ideal.

The egalitarian/social-welfare position is subjected to an extended criticial examination in Anthony T. Kronman's brilliant, subtly-argued paper 'Talent Pooling.' Kronman finds this concept advanced in Rawls's *A Theory of Justice.* According to Rawls, 'the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be' (*A Theory of Justice,* 101).

The motive behind talent pooling is to equalize the unequal advantages which accrue to people as the outcome of the 'natural lottery.' Kronman,

though regarding talent pooling as 'surely one of the least intuitive features of Rawls's theory of justice' (58), does his best to make the notion plausible, and ingeniously defends it against a host of practical and moral objections. There is, for example, the problem of defining what constitutes anyone's fair share of the common asset pool to begin with: 'It will not do,' he says, 'simply to maintain people at the same (money) income level, since the well endowed can do more with their dollars than those who are poorly endowed' (66). Again, what are the shares of the acutely disadvantaged? 'If applied uncompromisingly, the principle of talent pooling would require that enormous resources be devoted to the care and education of the most severely handicapped individuals, leaving little for the better-endowed members of society' (67).

Most interesting, however, are the problems involving the measurement of income received by those whose talents generate the wealth to be distributed. First, what types of income are to be considered? A concert pianist, for example, receives far more than monetary income in return for his playing, and in fact money may be the least valuable, to him, of the rewards he reaps from performing. But how, if at all, can these other returns be measured and taxed? Second, suppose certain very talented individuals refuse to utilize their talents. 'If Jones's musical talent really belongs to the community as a whole, then it is just as clearly an act of theft for Jones to refuse to perform as it would be for him to perform, and refuse to share the proceeds' (68). But would it be morally right to force him to perform, or to force the talented to use their talents? Third, won't the very existence of a talent pooling scheme motivate people to conceal their talents, thus decreasing the size of the pool from which benefits are to be drawn? If, in order to combat this, the talent tax is reduced below the level at which it ought, for fair distribution of assets, to be set, won't this be contrary to the moral imperative which required the redistribution to begin with?

Despite Kronman's resourcefulness in answering these and other difficult objections, he in the end rejects talent pooling on moral grounds, saying that it violates rights to personal integrity: 'talent pooling assumes that a person's attributes are not really his own and do not form a part of his moral personality properly so called' (76). This, however, seems to me to fall victim to the same difficulty which Kronman attributes to Nozick's similar objection to collective assets, namely that the objection assumes the very thing in question, that an individual's personal integrity ought to be respected, and not violated for the sake of other values. The final and fatal objection to talent pooling, then, must await a successful demonstration that individuals do in fact possess the rights to personal integrity which talent pooling is claimed to transgress.

The other contributors to the volume are Frithjof Bergmann, Jan Narveson, Kurt Baier, and William N. Nelson. As may be gained from this overview, the contributions provide good examples of the state-of-the-art in current rights theory.

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PETER REMNANT and JONATHAN BENNETT, ed. and trans., *G.W. Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1981. Pp. xcvi + 528. US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-23147-7); US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-29836-9).

The new translation of G.W. Leibniz's *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* by Remnant and Bennett (henceforward 'R/B') is eminently successful in presenting the 'significant and interesting treatment of many philosophical topics' (xvi), which the *New Essays* contain, in a clear, elegant English style. As one of the important achievements of early Enlightenment letters, the *Nouveaux essais* is deserving of the careful translation and annotation which it has received from its translators and of the immaculate editing and format by the Cambridge University Press.

The textual editing which faced the translators was formidable. Leibniz had little confidence in his English and therefore based his comments on Locke on the French translation of the latter's *Essay* by Pierre Coste, which appeared in 1700. The 'mistakes and liberties' of Coste (xii) the translators have rectified for the reader, referring in each case to the standard Nidditch edition of Locke's *Essay*. Such scholarly details have been handled as elegantly as possible, with the result that the text is always readable as well as accurate.

The pagination of R/B follows that of the 'Akademieausgabe'[1] — the only critical edition of the *Nouveaux essais*. The critical apparatus of this edition is selectively reproduced in R/B.

Another praiseworthy feature of this translation is its explanatory notes. These can be broken down roughly into biographical, historical, philosophical and philological. The first two categories I have found uniformly excellent and they will provide the reader with an invaluable reference work with which to approach other writings of Leibniz as well. Of the other two categories of notes, predictably, one must be somewhat more critical, and I shall return to that later. A final word of praise is due for the 'List of Examples, Anecdotes and Illustrations' with which the book ends. Anyone who has spent an afternoon trying to find where the most poorly indexed of the great philosophers discussed such-and-such will be grateful for this. This work then is a valuable addition to Leibniz studies and a genuine improvement over its predecessor (trans. A.C. Langley, New York, 1896), which is nonetheless dismissed by these translators with unjustified harshness and contempt (xiii).

Notwithstanding its many merits, the R/B translation is not without its own problems. In general terms the principal defect of this translation is the near-phobia which the translators seem to have for the true English cognates (and sometimes also for traditional, scholarly translations) of French words. This leads them into interpretative flights as unnecessary as undesirable. I shall discuss several obvious examples briefly and simply list some of the others.

One puzzling case is the translators' insistence on translating 'clair,' as in 'idée claire,' as 'vivid,' despite the established tradition of rendering 'clair' as 'clear' and despite the fact that they themselves feel obliged to change in Bk II, xxix, where Locke uses 'clear'. On p. 123 we find 'répugnance' translated as 'reluctance', together with a translators' note that, though they might have rendered it as 'impossibility,' the text has an 'anthropomorphic' tenor. The thought of translating 'répugnance' by 'repugnance,' and leaving decisions on the degree of anthropomorphism to the reader, does not seem to occur to the translators. Further undesirables are 'symbol' for 'caractère' (passim), 'essential' for 'très nécessaire' (201), 'heedlessness' for 'inadvertance' (this despite Locke's use of 'inadvertancy' [217]), 'sequence' for 'consécution' (coming down on the wrong side of the process/product ambiguity [50, 73]), 'illumination' for 'lumière [naturelle]' (91) and 'connection' for 'liaison' (358). This last deserves further comment. Leibniz (loc. cit.) is using 'liaison' as equisignificant with 'relation.' But 'connection,' in the Latin writings (see e.g. Couturat[2], 434), designates only a subset of relations, namely those which are called relations of 'concours' at loc. cit. of the *Nouveaux essais*. Thus this translation succeeds only in obscuring Leibniz's intention to talk about relations in general at this point.

I mentioned above that some of the notes on philosophical matters are also open to question. As deserving of great scrutiny prior to a second edition, I would cite those on 'blind thoughts,' 'denomination' and 'awareness.' I shall limit myself to discussing the last of these.

The translators choose to render the cluster of French words stemming from the radical of 'appercevoir' by the corresponding English cluster involving 'aware,' rather than to avail themselves of the technical English cognates of 'appercevoir' ('apperceive', etc.), which have been favoured by and large by scholars. Although their eccentricity is duly noted, the translators excuse it by appeal to the dubious benefit of 'staying within the English language' (xxvii), while the only loss is made out to be that of 'dramatic contrast' as between 'perception' and 'apperception.'

In fact, however, one of the major distinctions of the *Nouveaux essais* may well be blurred here. It is authoritatively argued that the nominalization of 'appercevoir' was a technical term introduced by Leibniz in the *Nouveaux essais* (see McRae,[3] 31/2; Kulstad,[4] 31). This will hardly be captured by the English 'awareness.'

More importantly, the English 'aware' and its various forms are almost sure to prejudice the delicate question of the exact epistemological status of apperception (for a review of the issues involved, see Kulstad). For example, in the ordinary English signification of 'aware,' it is undeniable that animals are aware of certain things, but it is far from obvious that animals have the wherewithal for 'apperception' in Leibniz's technical sense.

To conclude, then, the R/B translation in its present form (or perhaps the abridged version of it, which I understand to be in the works) recommends itself unconditionally for use as an undergraduate introduction to Leibniz's thought. Indeed I hope it may in time replace the perennial *Monadology* and

Discourse on Metaphysics, which seem more to confuse than enlighten initiates. It is also to be recommended as a reference work for advanced students using the French original (whose difficulty the translators exaggerate [xiii]). In its present form, it is not possible to recommend it without reservation to the middle range of students, who wish to do exact technical work, but lack a reading knowledge of French. However, the second edition, for which the translators invite critical contributions (xxii), could well turn out to be a model translation.

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1 G.W. Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe* Reihe 6, Bd. 6 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1962)

2 G.W. Leibniz, *Opuscules et fragments inédits,* ed. L. Couturat (Hildesheim: Olms 1966: reprint of Paris 1903)

3 R.F. McRae, *Leibniz: Perception, Apperception and Thought* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1976)

4 M. Kulstad, 'Leibniz, Animals and Apperception,' *Studia Leibnitiana* **13** (1981) 25-60

HUGH J. SILVERMAN and FREDERICK A. ELLISTON, eds. *Jean-Paul Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to his Philosophy.* Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press 1980. Pp. xii + 275. US$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-391-01634-2); US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-391-01635-0).

This collection of twelve previously unpublished papers plus an interview with Sartre has as its task 'to interpret Sartre's philosophy at the turn of the decade.' The rationale for yet another book on Sartre is that no other book 'brings together various contemporary styles of philosophizing in a systematic and comprehensive way.' The book is geared to scholars, students and general readers. The twelve papers are divided into three headings — existential phenomenological themes, philosophical problems and comparisons and contrasts.

The twelve papers are as follows: a discussion of phenomenological reduction by Thomas Busch; a discussion of bad faith by Phyllis Morris; a

discussion of the body by Xavier Monasterio; and a discussion of freedom by John Atwell — these four comprise the section on existential phenomenological themes and is a 'synchronic' reading. The second set of articles includes a discussion of the self by Hugh Silverman; a discussion of the imaginary by Thomas Flynn; a discussion of art by Eugene Kaelin; and a discussion of history by Garth Gillan — the four a diachronic-synchronic study. The last set includes four comparisons and contrasts: one with Husserl by Frederick Elliston; one with Heidegger by Michel Haar; one with Marx by Ingbert Knecht; and one with Merleau-Ponty by Mikel Dufrenne.

All of the papers are fairly technical in nature and assume a fairly detailed knowledge not only of Sartre but also of the major figures of recent continental philosophy. This review cannot discuss each paper in detail, but a few comments about two of the best papers (by Silverman and Dufrenne) give some perspective on the positive contribution of the volume.

Silverman displays a sympathetic, critical, and broad understanding of Sartre in general and Sartre's views on self in particular. He is more interested in constructive discussion, e.g., when he discusses Sartre's and Heidegger's view of language. He does not fall into the trap of destructive criticism as does Haar who claims that Sartre and Heidegger 'are radically opposed in every respect' (168). Not only is Haar's claim overstated; it is not substantiated in his paper. Silverman's approach is aided by his awareness of and direct reference to Sartre's literary works. Too often critics of Sartre pay little or no attention to the plays, novels, and short stories that span a good part of Sartre's life.

Silverman discusses the relationship between Sartre's changing views of the self and his changing view of language. This discussion is historical in nature eliciting Sartre's views in three 'episteme' (similar to Kuhn's notion of paradigm): an early view, a middle view as seen in *Saint Genet,* and later view as seen in *The Words.* The conclusion of this discussion is 'Sartre's words *on* the self have become words *of* the self' (104).

Dufrenne's paper has as its topic a comparison of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, but his discussion provides a rationale for the critique of the entire book — a critique perhaps invited by the editors themselves because they put the Dufrenne paper last.

Dufrenne speculates on the apparent opposition to Sartre that thrives among specialists (209). Perhaps Sartre is opposed because of his militancy, his practice of becoming *engagé*, his political involvement. Specialists make us, force us, to choose, we must take sides. Either Sartre or Merleau-Ponty, but not both/and. Obviously Sartre is not Merleau-Ponty, but both were 'profoundly ethical — that is political.' It is Dufrenne's own attitude toward his topic rather than his conclusions that make his article so good. But his conclusions are also important:

> Thus, what separates Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is a tactical problem. But their divergence expresses the difference between two beings-in-the world, one who is more abrupt, more willful, more concerned with disengaging

> himself from his context; the other who is more reserved, more subtle, more prudent. (211)

What Dufrenne asks his reader to do is to think about the philosophical enterprise itself. He ends his paper with the following claim:

> Even if their approaches, despite all appearances, do not diverge radically, their emphases are different. Must we say that this difference is insignificant? No, philosophy is not a competitive game between doctrines, a trial case upon which fashion provisionally passes its verdict. It is not a question of determining who is right and who is wrong, as if some sovereign could decide — God's judgment or that of history. Yet this difference can govern choices. We must not choose as if we were choosing between two consumer goods. Rather, this difference is at very least a matter of orienting our sympathies. (218)

Unfortunately a good number of the essays in this volume seem to be engaged in a competitive game between doctrines and not concerned with orienting our sympathies.

The interview with Sartre at the end of the book is edited and fairly technical but like most of Sartre's interviews, well done and worth reading.

The editors include a lengthy bibliography, a chronology of Sartre's life, but there is no index. Scholars will find the volume both rewarding and disappointing. Students will find it difficult in places; the general reader will not understand most of it.

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D. van DALEN, ed., *Brouwer's Cambridge lectures on intuitionism.* New York: Cambridge University Press 1981. Pp. xii + 109. US$22.50. ISBN 0-521-23441-7.

This sad little book recalls vividly the pathetic spectacle of the original lectures, a couple of which the reviewer attended some 35 years ago. Even for a beginner in logic the lack of movement in Brouwer's thought, on the mathematics of the continuum in terms of choice sequences, was depressing. The most obvious novelty, compared to his publications in *Math. Annalen* in the mid-twenties, was a torrent of even more bizarre and stilted terminology than in the original German papers. Most significantly, the lectures do not

benefit from the obviously relevant logical work in the thirties; neither for improving Brouwer's own ideas nor by using them to enrich logic. For specialists: even before the lectures Kleene had stressed relations to recursion theory in print. More pertinent still is the notion of cut-free proof discovered by Gentzen in the early thirties. Applied to Σ_1^0 - theorems with parameters for choice sequences, it gives a very satisfactory formal version of Brouwer's idea of a 'fully analyzed proof' of well-foundedness, taking the mystery out of the business about the so-called bar theorem. For a less parochial, not purely logical view of Brouwer's topic, progress in algebraic topology in the thirties would also be relevant. Brouwer's neglect of the literature was certainly in harmony with his idea that he was 'revolutionizing' the subject, not simply commenting on a particular aspect.

Two of the would-be revolutionary tactics which are more prominent in the lectures than in the twenties concern formal counter examples: (i) a more frequent use of so-called fleeing properties, and (ii) references to the 'creative subject,' so to speak, 'the' idealized mathematician. The counter examples (to classical analysis) are purely formal since the meaning of the logical operations and the ranges of the quantifiers used by Brouwer are different.

As to (i), the idea involved is familiar enough from — unquestionably relevant — continuity requirements which ensure that small uncertainties in the data, defined by fleeing properties, do not spoil the outcome of deductions or operations. (There is a positive side to this matter which will be taken up below.)

As to (ii), it would indeed be a bad *philosophical* error to reject out of hand the very mention of the creative subject (as a topic for mathematical theory, without recourse to quantitative 'empirical' study). The error would be the failure to see the place of idealizations in the arsenal of scientific methods; plausible, but not very successful ones like ideal fluids, and spectacular ones like Einstein's observer viewing the world while travelling with the speed of light. In fact, Gödel's second incompleteness theorem tells us something not altogether trivial about creative subjects who — freely! — decide to confine themselves to proofs formalized in some system or are discovered to do so, perhaps unconsciously. (There is still plenty of room for using creativity or ingenuity when *selecting* sensible theorems and efficient proofs *among* all legitimate ones.) But equally it would be a scientific, if not philosophical, error to be paralyzed by awe before such limited successes; not to ask oneself just how much we can expect from (the mere concept of) the creative subject without a realistic look at the actual possibilities of the mathematical imagination. Ignoring this principal limitation of the concept the editor complains on page ix that Brouwer uses it only for weak, not strong counter examples!

Experience has shown that just those people who have the kind of logical sensibility needed to see and develop fruitful points of the lectures under review, are simply put off by Brouwer's own assessment of their place in the scheme of things; for example, the pretentious — and hence simple-minded, not merely simple! — inventory of inner experience on p. 90, beginning with

'twoity, giving rise [first] to invariable unity, and [then] to threeity.' This sort of jargon recalls the less convincing products of the Wisdom of the East. Brouwer tells us here about as much about the processes of mathematical reasoning as does, say, the Kamasutra, with its elephant women and rabbit men, about the processes of evolution by sexual selection.

The pity of it all is that the theory of choice sequences answers a perfectly good question, implicit already in Aristotle's *Met* Γ 7, 1012a 21-4. Is there anything like ordinary logic which applies to propositions about incompletely defined terms? The theory gives an elegant positive answer. Of course, elegance is no guarantee for relevance. It is a separate question whether, scientifically, we do better by *paraphrasing* the incompletely defined terms; here: by means of continuity requirements. But within the logical tradition Aristotle's question has, rather obviously, a permanent place. *Remark:* In the broad sense of the word, it would be a philosophical error to overlook the parallel between Aristotle's question and such algebraic questions as: For which dimensions do we have anything like ordinary algebra? (with the famous answer involving the magic numbers 1, 2, 4, 8). Here again, a paraphrase (of vectors in terms of coordinates) is possible. The philosophical discovery is that, contrary to first impressions, both questions admit natural and precise formulations at all (and convincing answers).

For the record, readers are warned that the editor's historical interpretations on pp. vii-ix, with their air of judicious scholarship, are no more perceptive than most of currently popular history of mathematics; in particular, not even perceptive enough to see the exceptional degree of sensibility needed to comment at all significantly on such exceptional talents as Brouwer. What can sometimes be done seems to me very well illustrated by the end of the first paragraph on p. 53 in vol. 15 of the *Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society*. There M.H.A. Newman, who incidentally knew his subject well, answered — without asking — the question why Brouwer did not pursue n-dimensional topology after he had opened up that area. Newman noted that the kind of tools objectively needed for further progress in higher dimensions were consistently neglected in Brouwer's own work even where they were available. Knowing as little as we do about mathematical temperaments, one can hardly be sure that Brouwer's neglect was a basic element of his temperament. It's just a simple historical fact which had struck Newman. And he was able to use it to help us remember a significant mathematical fact about the character of n-dimensional topology. The beauty of this literary device is, to me, that it allows us to think imaginatively about matters of temperament without tempting us into 'theories' out of all proportion to the data. Of course, we want to think about those matters. After all, they are of wider interest than topology or choice sequences.

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ALLEN W. WOOD, *Karl Marx.* Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1981. Pp. xviii + 282. Cdn$50.75; US$35.00. ISBN 0-7100-0672-1.

This book appears in the 'Arguments of the Philosophers' series. But was Marx a philosopher? While acknowledging that he is more accurately called a social scientist and revolutionary, Wood contends that 'the scope and aims of Marx's thought are philosophical' and that his social theory is 'sufficiently basic in conception and sweeping in scope to be called a philosophical theory of history.'

Wood examines five Marxian themes: alienation, historical materialism, morality, philosophical materialism, and the dialectical method. On the whole he is supportive of Marx. He is always lucid and interesting. I think he is right more often than not, and that he has written a very valuable book.

Marx initially intends the concept of alienation to be explanatory; in this role Wood finds it unpromising. But in later writings Marx treats it as a diagnostic concept which picks out an evil of modern society — not a fundamental evil but one among others. Alienation consists in the failure or inability of persons to actualize their essential human powers. The lives of alienated people, though they may not realize it, are empty of meaning. A nonalienated life is one of fulfilment: it involves the actualization of potentialities objectively present in the human essence. Wood suggests that a self-actualized life may be identified with happiness, as it was by Aristotle, and concludes that Marx has an objective conception of human happiness.

Historical materialism as construed by Wood is not a purely technological theory. While it aims to explain production relations in terms of productive powers, it holds that productive powers explain production relations only if they are considered in connection with the social and historical circumstances in which they originated. The explanations proposed by historical materialism are typically teleological or functional (here Wood follows G.A. Cohen) and teleological explanations are in general not deterministic.

Wood disagrees with Cohen, however, in his account of a Marxian class. For Cohen historical materialism requires that a class be defined exclusively in structural terms, as so many persons standing in a certain relation to the means of production; whereas for Wood individuals who occupy the same economic role (e.g. workers) only become a class when a social movement arises that represents their common interests. One of Wood's reasons for denying that Marx has a structural definition of class seems to be that production relations alone do not tell us which ways of categorizing people allow us to identify groups important for understanding major social change. This is true, but no objection to a structural definition of class. We can define classes in terms of production relations while admitting that we cannot identify class-defining production relations independently of judgments about which production relations will prove historically decisive.

Wood completes his discussion of historical materialism by distinguishing three senses of 'ideology' in Marx and Engels. One of these is 'ideological illusion,' which for Engels is consciousness that is ignorant of its social significance. But, Wood objects, it is misleading to call such consciousness illusion. He is right: ignorance is not error. But his account of this sense of 'ideology' is inaccurate. An ideologist, according to Engels, believes that his 'thought material' is produced solely by reasoning when in truth it is derived ultimately from extra-rational social facts: this is a mistake about the *source* of his thought, not ignorance of its social significance. (Of course such ignorance may also be characteristic of ideologists.) According to Wood, an explanation of the social significance of an ideologist's thought will be teleological. True. But an explanation of how the ideologist comes by his thought material will be *causal* — at least this is strongly suggested by Engels' charge that the ideologist is unaware of the 'real motive forces impelling him.'

Wood argues that morality for Marx is ideological illusion. Does this embarrass Marx's critique of capitalism? No, because — and this is perhaps Wood's most distinctive claim — the critique is not a moral one: it is based on the view that capitalism frustrates a number of *non*moral goods, such as self-actualization, security, community, and freedom. It isn't clear whether Wood thinks (mistakenly) that if these goods are nonmoral, a condemnation of capitalism for frustrating them must also be nonmoral. But he does think that Marx prefers nonmoral social criticism to moral. For judgments about nonmoral goods can be based on objective potentialities, needs, and interests of humans, whereas the only basis for moral norms is their serviceability to a mode of production or to the interests of a class. Given this contrast, furthermore, Marx is able to hold that 'the nonmoral good can systematically override the moral good in certain situations.' He indicates that he holds this view when he advocates the abolition of capitalism despite regarding the system as just.

What Wood says about Marx on justice summarizes two articles he has written on the subject. For Marx the capitalist's appropriation of surplus value is perfectly just because it conforms to the only standards of justice appropriate for assessing it, namely those that sanction practices corresponding to the capitalist mode of production.

Not only standards of justice but moral standards in general are 'morally valid' in Marx's view if they correspond to the prevailing mode of production, even if they do not promote the good of humanity: so 'Marx is not a utilitarian.'

Wood devotes two chapters to Marx's philosophical materialism. Its basic tenet he calls naturalism — the view that the natural world is the sole reality and consists only of matter. The naturalist is an atheist; Marx's Paris manuscripts offer two arguments against theism, and Wood's analysis of these is first rate. Naturalism also implies nominalism and a materialist theory of mind. Wood argues effectively against a host of commentators that common-sense realism — roughly, the thesis that material objects are in-

dependent of consciousness — is a further part of Marx's naturalism. He thinks that for Marx skepticism about the existence of material objects is provoked by a Feuerbachian 'contemplative' attitude, which isolates thinking from practice. Wood also takes Marx to hold some version of the correspondence theory of truth, and argues convincingly that Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach does not show otherwise.

The most impressive part of the book is the last. Following an admirable account of the Hegelian dialectic, Wood contends that Marx adopts Hegel's vision of reality as structured organically and characterized by inherent tendencies to development. Furthermore Marx's economic theory exemplifies a species of Hegelian dialectic that treats dialectical stages as a 'hierarchy of successively more adequate viewpoints on a subject matter.' This means that the 'Hegelianism of *Capital* is in the basic conception and structure of the theory.' Wood ends his remarks on dialectic in *Capital* with some apt observations on Marx's law of value. For Marx it is a 'natural law' that labour is distributed according to social need: the law of value is simply the 'form of appearance' through which this law asserts itself in commodity production. The law of value is not intended as a general theory of prices. And it is neither necessary nor sufficient to confirm the idea that capital exploits labour.

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GERNOT U. GABEL, *Canadian Theses on German Philosophy 1925-1975*. Cologne: Edition Gemini 1982. Pp. 47. DM12.00. ISBN 3-922331-12-2.

This little book is the sixth in the series 'Bibliographien zur Philosophie' published by Edition Gemini. It is essentially a list of 432 dissertations on some topic of German philosophy arranged alphabetically by author's name, with a useful subject index appended at the end. International bibliographies have apparently omitted Canadian theses in philosophy for years. The present booklet is intended to fill this gap. Theses on German philosophy are very much on the increase at Canadian universities. The decade 1966-1975 saw 296 dissertations, which is more than double the number in the four decades 1925-1965. Given that trend this booklet is a timely contribution to philosophical research material.

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