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JOHN ANDERSON, *Education and Inquiry*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P. 1980; New York: Barnes and Noble 1980. xi + 228 pp. Cdn\$ 41.95. ISBN 0-631-12531-0; US\$ 26.00. ISBN 0-389-20075-1.

This work contains some of the most insightful, ruthlessly honest and compelling comments about the nature and purpose of education, particularly higher education, to be found in print. Unfortunately, there is every possibility that the reader may never get to them, for the first half of the book (itself worth the reading) gives little hint of the revelations to come.

The volume opens with three worthwhile essays by P.H. Partridge, John Mackie and Eugene Kamenka, each of whom had warm associations with Anderson in Australia. In fact, it might have been better for the 'introductory' essays to have been placed at the end of the book, for they are considerably less 'crusty,' rebellious and dynamic than are Anderson's own essays. Not only that, but the attempt to place Anderson's work in its historical and vocational context gives the reader a first impression that the man and his thoughts are as provincial and parochial as small town amateur theatre in a church basement. For example, Partridge remarks that 'It cannot be doubted that, as a result of some of the great controversies in which he has taken part, he has influenced the course of intellectual history in Sydney and perhaps further afield.'(8) Having never before given much thought to the intellectual history of Sydney, Australia, I was tempted to leave my record unblemished by placing the volume in the hands of a local historian. But having long been an admirer of Anderson's written work, I anticipated better things to come, and was handsomely rewarded in due course. However, to read that Anderson was 'as local as a magpie' (9), and that 'he was no great scholar' (7) did give cause for further hesitation. Anderson himself appears to have distinguished between scholarship and pedantry, placing himself with the former and not the latter. (168) One need only refer to his *Studies in Empirical Philosophy*, or the essay in the present volume entitled 'Lectures on the Educational Theories of Spencer and Dewey,' to become both impressed and convinced by his scholarship.

Even Anderson's first essay in this book might have been better located at or near the end, for while he provides a powerful defence of the teaching of

the Classics, the controversy seems dated, and likely to be of particular importance and appeal to a smaller audience than the remaining essays. It would have been better to begin with the essay 'Socrates as an Educator,' to place the lectures on Spencer and Dewey later on, and to lump together Anderson's other essays on education, and the application of the Socratic method, as he has articulated and identified it.

Socrates taught that the 'uncritical acceptance of tradition ... is no education at all.' (70) Criticism, or critical thinking is fundamental to education, but not tradition. Indeed, a suitable criterion of education is whether or not judgement is being developed, rather than discouraged. (122) Academic and educative freedom are essential ingredients in true education, and the liberty of democratic education exists 'in the struggle of diverse interests' such that 'the policy of reducing diversity is actually inimical to liberty.' (128) The field of education is 'a battlefield between liberality and illiberality — between cosmopolitanism and patriotism, between the treatment of the child as "heir of all the ages" and the treatment of him as job-fodder.' (156) Where education goes wrong so often is in trying to please its public, and in particular to conceive of the role of academics as servants of the State — as members of the growing civil service. Even Dewey, *the philosopher of democratic education*, Anderson labels a philistine, for he places 'social efficiency' ahead of social criticism.

In 'Education for Democracy?', Anderson warns that the criterion of social usefulness may well put a finish to the existence of genuine educative activity. He argues against the wave of interest in Australia (just after the second world war) to make the Universities more useful and relevant by making them more like 'technical institutions': 'If they [the Universities] adopt the criterion of social usefulness (in place of their own criterion of scholarship), they will very soon *be* technical institutions.' (168)

The outspokenness of Anderson the critic is delightfully evident in his marvellous review of the first in a series of pamphlets issued by the Australian Council for Educational Research aimed at 'educational reconstruction.' He objects to the pamphlet's author, J.D.G. Medley, who seems to invite a uniformity of educational practice and aim through State control by those who claim to know what education is, and reacts with the counter-suggestion that 'the greatest danger to [both democracy and education] ... is the spurious agreement involved in submission to the "expert", the official judge of "fitness" and "unfitness".' (166) Anderson goes so far as to refer to the 'educated elite' as 'Facists.' Then, having generally panned the pamphlet for its philosophic inadequacy, he concludes his review with the taunt that 'Meanwhile it pleases me to think that this pamphlet so far gives the game away that it will do the cause of "educational reconstruction" a great deal of harm.' (168)

More amusing still is the opening of Anderson's review of the second pamphlet in the series: 'The first pamphlet in this series was reviewed in the last issue of the Journal. Subsequent numbers have not been sent to us by the publishers.' (169) He then devastates this second attempt at educational

reform with even more vigour than the first: the pamphlet is 'besprinkled' with empty 'witticisms and catchwords,' and several examples are isolated for mirth and ridicule, one of which I can't resist repeating here:

Given a good teacher sitting on one end of a log and an eager student sitting on the other end, the central problem of education is solved: you have the germ of a university. (171)

Anderson rails at such claims as that 'Universities are instruments of Society,' and 'serve State enterprise,' and that the role of the University is to cater to 'the needs of society,' for their pretence at being both clear and decisive. He attacks the assumption that 'the doctrine of social unity,' which supposes that all individuals will and should desire the same things and choose the same way of life, as a main argument against democracy and the critical way of education. In fact, he calls it 'tyranny,' and contrasts it with 'pluralism,' whose educational methodology is 'controversy,' and whose practising academics will predictably be brought 'into conflict with the prevailing opinions and customary additudes.' (215)

On the morality of censorship, he argues that to censor 'in the name of morality' is to assume that one's 'conception of morality is one that all must accept.' (188) Pointedly, he observes that 'Censorship "manufactures the evidence" of social solidarity' and unity of interests and opinion. (191) Actually, the issue is better understood not as *the* defence of morality, 'but of the existence of conflicting moralities' — clear evidence that there are several contending moral points of view to be distinguished and considered.

Anderson is no less outspoken in his treatment of religion in education: 'It would be possible to deal with this subject as briefly as with the subject of snakes in Iceland — one could say: "There is no religion in education".' (203) What he means, and goes on to elaborate, is that religion as dogma has no educative role to play, for education is the critical and controversial examination of any and all subject-matter. Religion often requires the abandonment of 'the attitude of study.'

The final essay, 'The Place of the Academic in Modern Society,' contains a series of powerful and contemporary warnings for the universities:

The conception of a university as a business or job also forms part of the stock-in-trade of associations of university teachers. ... Such fatuities and such tradesmanlike conceptions are themselves a mark of academic decline, symbolized rather than caused, we may say, by the flourishing of associations of university teachers. (215)

Never has it been more important to 'scourge the errors of the age,' to 'act as critics of modern society,' and to resist the platitude that the State is an ethical force standing above 'the ethical goodness of original thought and activity.' (221)

'...Half of this volume consists of reflections on education and critical inquiry as profound and exciting as any yet penned. The other half is well worth reading.'

ROBERT E. CARTER
Trent University

'...the book is also important because it helps us to understand the importance of society...'.
Michael D. Bayles, *Morality and Population Policy*, University, Ala.: U. of Alabama Press 1980. Pp. x + 143. US\$ 13.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8173-0033-3); US\$ 7.50 (paper: ISBN 0-8173-0032-5).

This book will be of interest to both laymen and professional philosophers; it is directed towards moral problems related to population planning. For example, overpopulation may cause a decline in the quality of life for future generations; but, while governmental policies can reduce population growth, many of the most effective policies would require us to make sacrifices. The chief merit of Bayles' book is that it deals in considerable depth with both empirical and moral issues related to the justification of such policies. He considers such questions as whether compulsory sterilization is ever justifiable, whether it is sometimes legitimate to make the adoption of a birth control program a condition for economic aid; he also assesses the relative merits of helping overpopulated countries by allowing large-scale immigration from them as opposed to helping them improve the quality of life at home.

Bayles attempts to simplify the moral questions by setting up a hierarchy of social values. In his view security and welfare take precedence over freedom and equality, and these in turn take precedence over public interest. By 'welfare' he means a minimum standard of living determined in absolute terms rather than in terms of the level of expectations in a given society. A government is concerned with the public interest rather than with welfare when it attempts to improve the standard of living above this absolute minimum. Bayles gives a very broad account of freedom: 'anything under human control that limits one's performing an action restricts freedom.' (26) Thus

while a law against mugging restricts one freedom, it supports another, namely, the freedom to go about in relative safety. But on this broad account of freedom, security would seem to count as a part of freedom rather than as a distinct and more basic value than freedom as his hierarchy of social values would require.

Putting equality above public interest is also questionable. In an affluent society virtually everyone is above the absolute minimum welfare level. Therefore when a government tries to improve the standard of living of the lowest economic class in an affluent society it is concerned with the public interest rather than with minimum welfare, and since Bayles sets equality above public interest he would be forced to hold that it would be wrong for a government to improve the lot of the lowest economic class by rewarding greater productivity in the higher economic classes. But surely Rawls has shown that at the very least inequalities which provide incentives for greater productivity which benefit the lowest class can be justified.

Bayles holds two other questionable principles. The first, which I will call the priority principle, is that developed countries have a duty to make sacrifices for undeveloped ones when it is a matter of sacrificing lower priority values for higher priority values. For instance, developed countries have a duty to make sacrifices in the area of public interest for matters of minimum welfare in undeveloped countries.¹ And according to Bayles' second principle, 'the equivalent principle,' 'the present generation has a duty not to render it substantially unlikely that future generations can have an indefinitely sustainable quality of life as high as it has.' (21)

It is largely on the basis of these two principles plus his hierarchy of social values that Bayles argues that developed countries may justifiably exert pressure on undeveloped countries to restrict the freedom of their citizens to procreate. He thinks that it is sometimes justifiable to prevent or discourage people in undeveloped countries from having as many children as they wish if the alternative is for future generations in those countries to be thrust below the minimum welfare level. I agree with this conclusion though not with the two principles used to support it.

Underlying the priority and the equivalent principles is Bayles' view that 'correct moral principles are those which reasonable self-interested persons with limited benevolence have good reasons to accept.' (18) Limited benevolence is contrasted with 'altruism, a concern that others be better off than oneself.' (21) As peculiar as this definition of 'altruism' is, it has the merit of revealing his equally odd usage of 'limited benevolence.' For Bayles, such benevolence is a concern to help those who are worse off than oneself. But surely morality sometimes more than this. Suppose I see a fire starting in the house of a neighbour who is off on holiday. Suppose that I am about to leave the country for good and that the fire poses no threat to anyone but my neighbour. Surely I don't have to determine whether he is better off than I am to know that it would be wrong not to ring the alarm, and this is true even if I have to go to considerable trouble to do so. The question of whether sacrifices for other people are morally required isn't solely a mat-

ter of how well off they are in comparison with yourself but also a matter of how much you would lose if you make the sacrifice in comparison with what they would lose if you don't.

Bayles' equivalent principle, his view that we have an obligation not to make it unlikely that future generations will have a life inferior in quality to ours, is perhaps the most interesting, and certainly the most original, theory in his book; his main support for it, however, is unfortunately the principle of limited benevolence. He thinks that the equivalent principle applied to our 'duties' to future generations fills an important gap because neither contractarianism nor utilitarianism has been able to cope successfully with this question. He considers both average utilitarianism which tells us to maximize the happiness average, and total utilitarianism which tells us to maximize the happiness total. He reviews familiar objections to average utilitarianism, and centers on the proposition that it is a morally good thing to bring happy people into the world which follows from total utilitarianism. It is on this question — whether it is morally good rather than just morally permissible to bring happy people into the world, that some of the most interesting controversy in applied ethics now centers. Bayles thinks that it is not (and I think that it is) morally good, taking only their welfare into account, to bring happy people into the world, and he tries to refute an argument of mine² which goes roughly like this:

1. It is morally bad *per se* to add miserable people to the world.
2. Suppose that it is not morally good *per se* to add happy people to the world.
3. Then it is not morally permissible to add a group of people to the world (taking only the group's welfare into account) if some members of the group are miserable, no matter how many are happy.
4. But it is permissible to add such a group (taking only their welfare into account) if enough of them will be happy.
5. Therefore it is morally good *per se* to add happy people to the world.

It should be noted that every case of adding a person to the world is a case of making a possible person actual. Bayles assumes that I am trying to prove that it can be bad to make possible miserable persons actual as well as good to make possible happy persons actual, and thus faults me (133) for assuming a part of the conclusion in the first premiss, that it is bad to make a possible miserable person actual. But my argument is addressed to those who accept this premiss (as Bayles does himself) but who still insist that it isn't good to make a possible happy person actual. The point of my argument is that this asymmetry isn't compatible with the common moral belief expressed by the fourth premiss.

Bayles also objects that we can justify adding sizeable groups of people to the world without holding that it is morally good to add happy ones if we hold instead that people may be added only if, taken as a group, they have a quality of life above a certain level. But if we note that any sizeable group is bound to contain some unhappy members (for Bayles, people with a negative quality of life), it's clear that with this addition Bayles' principle is pretty much the same as my fourth premiss — namely, that it's only permissible to add a group containing some unhappy members to the world if enough members of the group will be happy; otherwise, the quality of life in the group would be too low. I'm quite ready to grant that his principle justifies adding people to the world, but it's the point of my argument to show that we can't justify such a principle when applied to large groups of people — as Bayles surely intends — without holding as well that it is in itself morally good to bring happy people into existence. Bayles hasn't undermined the argument; he has simply restated the fourth premiss in slightly different terms.

Bayles also objects that both the total and the average view justify adding unhappy people to the world 'if they increase the happiness of those already existing by an amount greater than their net unhappiness.' (104) This Bayles takes to be a serious and obvious error. That it is an error implies that the unhappiness of a person we might add to the world counts more than the unhappiness of a person already existing. But if these two kinds of unhappiness were nearly equal in negative value, one wouldn't count the error as serious and obvious. It must be, then, that Bayles holds (a) that the unhappiness of the person we might add counts much more heavily than that of any existing person.

This odd weighting of the unhappiness of possible person is difficult to reconcile with two other theses of Bayles: (b) that although adding miserable people is bad, adding happy ones is morally neutral rather than good, and (c) that it is morally permissible for people in undeveloped countries to have at least some children. Consider the factors prospective parents must weigh before deciding to conceive. There is the unhappiness or happiness of the parents. There is the unhappiness or happiness of the child. (b) tells us that adding a happy child is morally neutral; so we can cross the child's happiness factor off the list. Now even if we suppose the parents would lose a considerable amount of happiness through being childless, they should not have a child. This follows from (a), that the child's unhappiness counts much more heavily than that of the parents, plus the empirical fact that the likelihood of having an unhappy child in undeveloped countries is great. In that case (c) is false: it is not permissible to have children in undeveloped countries.

So much for the specific bones I have to pick with Bayles. I should say that Bayles, like Locke, prizes common sense, though sometimes at the price of consistency. Though I am generally suspicious of attempts to set up hierarchies of kinds of value, particularly when they are meant to carry as much weight as Bayles places on his, I should also say that some of the defects in Bayles' hierarchy could be remedied with no damage to his main objectives. For instance, he could revise his overly broad account of freedom.

Finally, let me say that my overall response to Bayles' book is highly favorable. My presentation of some of his arguments may leave the impression that they are mostly bad. This is far from the truth. The good arguments are much more impressive taken together than in the form of the few samples space allows me. Although it is quite condensed, Bayles' book is clear and easy to read for both laymen and professional philosophers. It can be highly recommended to public policy makers, reminding them, of course, that Bayles does not claim that his views on population problems are either final or complete.

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1 He uses 'duty' for 'acts which it is wrong to do or omit independently of any voluntary act or institution.' (15) Thus, oddly enough, you do not acquire duties by taking a job as tutor or a nurse, but you do have a duty not to torture animals. These so-called duties are in fact the very things morality requires that are not commonly taken to be duties.

2 'Is it Wrong to Prevent the Existence of Future Generations,' in R.I. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds., *Obligations to Future Generations* (Philadelphia: Temple U.P. 1978) 136-7.

CHRISTIAN DELACAMPAGNE ET ROBERT MAGGIORI, dir. *Philosopher. Les interrogations contemporaines. Matériaux pour un enseignement*. Paris: Fayard 1980. 532 p.

Christian Delacampagne et Robert Maggiori se sont donné pour objectif, selon leur propre expression, de 'révitaliser l'enseignement de la philosophie.' Comment cela? En réunissant quarante-deux intellectuels éminents de diverses disciplines et obédiences pour traiter chacun selon ses orientations et sa spécialité, un thème du programme de philosophie des classes terminales des Lycées français. Ce programme couvre tous les domaines de la philosophie traditionnelle: philosophie de la connaissance, philosophie morale et politique, anthropologie philosophique, métaphysique. *Philosopher* se présente donc comme un ouvrage d'introduction à la philosophie. Cependant, la formule adoptée est originale. Il ne s'agit

ni d'un manuel de cours, ni d'un recueil de textes choisis devant illustrer le cours, mais d'un recueil d'articles de spécialistes destiné à initier le débutant aux interrogations contemporaines. Il ne s'agit pas non plus, comme dans les manuels classiques, de faire le point sur la question traitée en résumant les problématiques (dé) passées et en présentant les perspectives plus récentes avec mesure et neutralité. Les auteurs s'engagent, pensent et disent ce qu'ils pensent. Les vues exposées sont partielles, voire partiales. C'est le prix que le lecteur doit payer pour être confronté à des démarches intellectuelles vivantes.

L'ouvrage est divisé en neuf sections:

I — Questions de méthode (Yvon Belaval, Manuel de Diéguez)

II — Nature et Culture (Edgar Morin, Remo Guidieri)

III — L'homme et sa vie (Bernard This, Christian Descamps, Robert Maggioli, Roger Dadoun, Bernard Millet, Clément Rosset, Tzvetan Todorov, Georges Mounin, Pierre Kaufmann, René Major, Robert Castel, Roland Jaccard, Louis-Vincent Thomas, Roger Gentis)

IV — L'homme, les hommes et les institutions (Catherine Clément, Philippe Ariès, Pierre-François Moreau, Alain Touraine, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Henri Lefèvre, Yves Michaud)

V — L'homme et les valeurs (Jean-Marie Domenach, Vladimir Jankélévitch)

VI — Idéologie, connaissance et raison (Jacques Bouveresse, Gilles Granger, Jean-Toussaint Desanti, Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond, Albert Jacquard, Jean Duvignaud, François George)

VII — L'art (Sarah Kofman, Michel Thevoz)

VIII — La religion (Michel de Certeau, Jean Cardonnel)

IX — La philosophie (Jean-Pierre Vernant, Christian Delacampagne, Michèle Le Doeuff, François Châtelet)

Le regroupement des articles paraît à certains égards arbitraire. La section 'l'homme et sa vie' comprend des articles sur la psychanalyse et la folie que l'on aurait plutôt attendus dans la section 'idéologie, connaissance et raison' qui traite entre autres des sciences humaines, de l'irrationnel et du sens. On ne voit pas par ailleurs pourquoi une section particulière, 'l'homme et les valeurs,' est réservée à un article sur la justice et la liberté et un article sur la morale alors que la section précédente, 'l'homme, les hommes et les institutions,' traite déjà de problèmes connexes (famille, état, égalité ...). Il eut mieux valu regrouper ces deux sections en une seule, 'les hommes, les in-

stitutions et les valeurs,' ne serait-ce que pour éviter de suggérer que l'égalité n'est pas une valeur ou que le problème de la justice et de la liberté n'est pas aussi un problème social.

Les articles sont assez courts (une dizaine de pages environ) et tous sont d'une très haute tenue. Chaque article a été écrit pour les besoins de la cause: fournir, comme le précise le sous-titre de l'ouvrage, un matériel pour un enseignement. Etant donné ce projet général, la question qui se pose, outre celle de la valeur intrinsèque des différentes contributions est celle de leur valeur pédagogique. L'ouvrage s'adresse en principe à un large public de non-spécialistes et en priorité aux étudiants d'un cours d'introduction en philosophie. En réalité, *Philosopher* ne peut être utilisé avec profit par l'étudiant que lorsque la part la plus ingrate du travail de l'enseignant est achevée: l'initiation. Pour quelqu'un que la philosophie intéresse et qui a déjà un certain bagage philosophique, l'ouvrage est un guide stimulant. En revanche, le néophyte s'y perdrat. La raison en est que les auteurs, tout en ayant fait un effort pour se rendre accessibles, ont trop souvent oublié qu'ils devaient s'adresser à un public ignorant tout ou presque de l'entreprise philosophique et de son histoire. Ainsi, le premier article de Yvon Belaval intitulé 'la réflexion philosophique' est d'une austérité et d'une érudition qui donne tout de suite le ton, propre à en décourager plus d'un. Voulant caractériser la réflexion philosophique au travers de son histoire en prenant comme fil directeur le lien nature-philosophie-langage, Yvon Belaval fait remarquer par exemple qu'au XVIII^e siècle 'au *Cogito* constatif de Descartes, succède le *Ich denke* (je pense) constitutif. On ne rejette certes pas la logique aristotélicienne, inhérente au langage, mais ses analyses abstraites — ses relations externes — sont désormais insuffisantes pour les synthèses constitutives du *Ich denke*: (+ 1) + (-1), qui s'annulent *in abstractis*, s'additionnent positivement *in concretis* — le vaisseau revenant par la même route à son point de départ a parcouru double distance.' Tout l'article de Y. Belaval est écrit sur ce mode allusif. S'il n'est pas besoin de connaître précisément l'opusculle de Kant 'Essai pour introduire en philosophie le concept de grandeur négative' pour comprendre l'allusion, je déifie cependant quiconque ignorant tout d'Aristote, de Descartes et de Kant de saisir la portée de cette remarque. Un autre exemple frappant de l'inadéquation entre la teneur des articles et le public visé est l'article de Jacques Bouveresse 'qu'est-ce que la logique?'. Après avoir exorcisé la peur-fascination que la logique exerce sur les philosophes, l'Auteur cerne en quelques pages remarquables les deux grands problèmes métalogiques contemporains, celui de l'objet de cette discipline (vérité/déduction) et celui de sa nature (langage/calcul). Cependant, cet exposé si clair et pertinent soit-il ne peut être que parfaitement hermétique pour un non-logicien.

Ainsi, l'ouvrage qui devait s'adresser au maître et à l'élève pour une approche commune ne parle en fait qu'au maître, du moins au niveau d'un cours d'introduction. Les articles les plus accessibles aux non-initiés émanent en général de non-philosophes. C'est le cas par exemple de l'article de Le Roy Ladurie sur l'égalité: de celui de Michel Thevoz sur l'art, ou de celui de Levy-

Leblond sur la science. Paradoxalement, le seul article qui s'adresse explicitement à des étudiants débutant en philosophie permet de mieux comprendre la grande valeur pédagogique d'un ouvrage qui n'a pourtant guère de valeur didactique pour un cours d'introduction. Michèle Le Doeuff réfléchit sur l'enseignement philosophique dans les Lycées mais ce qu'elle en dit pourrait s'appliquer à n'importe quel cours d'introduction. Elle dénonce avec beaucoup de pertinence la situation de l'enseignement philosophique qui se veut simple apprentissage de l'esprit critique. Ainsi dit-elle 'nous touchons là au dernier paradoxe de l'enseignement philosophique: vous (les étudiants) n'avez pratiquement pas besoin de nous (les enseignants) pour apprendre ce jeu de la distance à l'égard de tout "part pris" ... Quelle vanité que de vouloir enseigner l'attitude critique à des élèves qui se sont déjà installés dans le scepticisme libéral. C'est de critique instruite, déplaçant les questions dont vous auriez besoin.' L'auteur fait en effet très justement remarquer que ce n'est pas parce qu' on s'abstient de prendre position que l'on n'entretient aucune croyance. Quand l'étudiant écrit par exemple 'l'individu qui, face à la société, cherche à ...', il adhère à une philosophie individualiste sans le savoir, même s'il s'est bien gardé de prendre parti pour l'individu 'face à la société.' C'est à ce dogmatisme insidieux qui se masque derrière un scepticisme superficiel qu'il faut s'attaquer. Mais pour cela pense Michèle Le Doeuff, il faut autre chose qu'une vague attitude critique, il faut aussi des connaissances. Ainsi dit-elle, 'si j'ai intitulé ma contribution "la philosophie renseignée," c'est parce que je soutiens qu'il n'y a pas à rougir de vouloir enseigner *de la philosophie* par opposition à la pudeur du "c'est seulement un enseignement philosophique." C'est aussi parce que seule une philosophie informée du travail de réflexion que les artistes, les savants, les historiens... mènent, informée des analyses critiques faites par ces disciplines qu'on appelle "sciences humaines," seule une philosophie qui n'a pas honte d'être *renseignée* peut quelque chose contre le scepticisme libéral qui est la philosophie spontanée dominante, et contre les présupposés de cette philosophie.'

Voici l'enseignement de la philosophie justifié, mais voici aussi l'entreprise de C. Delacampagne et R. Maggioli justifiée du même coup. *Philosopher* en effet nous *renseigne* tout autant qu'il nous *enseigne* par l'exemple une attitude. Son caractère pluridisciplinaire et actuel n'est pas à cet égard un atout négligeable. Tous les textes réunis ne sont peut-être pas directement assimilables par le débutant mais faut-il vraiment s'en plaindre? Seul le manuel insipide est directement assimilable, si assimilable qu'une fois assimilé il n'en reste rien.

L'intention des auteurs était de revitaliser l'enseignement de la philosophie. Mission accomplie, mais pas au niveau escompté puisque le cours d'introduction moyen ne peut guère à mon avis utiliser *Philosopher* comme instrument de travail. En revanche la lecture de l'ouvrage peut être stimulante pour le professeur et contribuer ainsi à revitaliser indirectement son enseignement. Par ailleurs, des cours plus avancés devraient y trouver une riche matière à réflexion. On peut alors regretter que l'ouvrage ne soit pas édité sous forme de fascicules. En effet, les cours plus avancés sont souvent

aussi des cours plus spécialisés. On n'y aborde pas en général tous les domaines de la recherche philosophique. Ajoutons encore qu'il n'y a pas assez de recueils d'articles publiés en français. Il y a là un réel manque de matériel pédagogique. *Philosopher* répond donc à un besoin impérieux. Il reste à espérer que l'ouvrage suscitera d'autres initiatives du même genre.

MARYVONNE ROTH

CEGEP de l'Outaouais

FREMONT, CHRISTIANE, *L'être et la relation, avec trente-cinq lettres de Leibniz au R.P. Des Bosses*, traduites et annotées par Christiane Fremont, préface de Michel Serres. Paris: Vrin 1981. 219 p.

La volumineuse correspondance entre Leibniz et le jésuite hollandais, Barthélémy Des Bosses (1663-1738), commence au début de 1706 et se poursuit jusqu'aux derniers mois de la vie de Leibniz, en 1716. L'édition de la Preussischen Deutschen Akademie n'a pas encore atteint cette période, mais on peut trouver cette correspondance dans l'édition Gerhardt. Elle comprend 138 pièces, dont 71 de Leibniz et 57 de Des Bosses. Plusieurs de ces lettres sont des billets de quelques lignes, utiles pour des détails biographiques, mais sans contenu doctrinal. D'autres sont des chroniques de l'actualité intellectuelle. D'autres, enfin, entrent dans le vif de la philosophie leibnizienne: ce sont les 35 lettres de Leibniz traduites et présentées par Christiane Fremont. Des Bosses est présent par des citations en note quand nécessaire.

Maurice Blondel parlait de cette correspondance comme de 'ce coin réputé obscur et mal famé de la philosophie leibnizienne.' Mal famé parce que les historiens soupçonnent la sincérité de Leibniz et mettent le 'vinculum substantiale' au compte d'une manœuvre diplomatique 'ad hominem,' sans lien véritable avec le fond de sa pensée. Mais pourquoi n'y aurait-il pas deux Leibniz également authentiques?

Leibniz qualifiait sa métaphysique de 'ludus ingenii,' si l'on en croit le témoignage de Pfaff et Wolf. Si on le prend au mot, rien n'empêche que ce 'jeu' ne représente les 'véritables sentiments' du philosophe, pour autant qu'il s'agit d'une simple analytique où sont pensées les relations logiques nécessaires d'un ordre des *possibles*. Ce jeu d'esprit est une vue d'ensemble et prend la forme d'une métaphysique idéaliste. Le système de l'har-

monie préétablie a comme objet les substances-monades en tant qu'essences possibles. Il fait l'économie de la causalité effective. Sa nécessité analytique n'est pas troublée par le diabolus de la synthèse a priori.

Par delà ce jeu théorique, il y a un deuxième Leibniz, car le principe de raison suffisante est à double fond: si l'essence possible est la raison suffisante des vues de l'entendement, le saut de l'essence à l'être n'est pas fondé dans une métaphysique des possibles. Ici règne une liberté morale, une synthèse a priori qui médiatise la nécessité des essences et la contingence de l'existence.

Leibniz sort de son jeu philosophique pour en disposer. Le système bascule et sa configuration immanente, qui était de soi idéaliste, devient une représentation subalternée pour une métaphysique réaliste. Blondel voyait dans les lettres à Des Bosses 'l'ébauche d'un réalisme supérieur.' Dans une monadologie des essences, qui contiennent tous leurs prédicats, la relation causale se remplaçait par une relation logique entre ces prédicats. Mais quand l'on passe du modèle théorique de l'harmonie préétablie aux affirmations d'*être*, la causalité refait surface comme principe synthétique, comme relation qui fonde ses termes. Le système des prédicats analytiques reste en place comme détermination de la possibilité: le réalisme final ne détruit pas l'idéalisme initial, mais le comprend. Si les monades à l'état possible n'avaient besoin ni de portes ni de fenêtres, les monades qui *sont* ne peuvent être, en effet, que dans l'interdépendance du réseau universel: la suffisance logique des monades ne se laisse pas traduire en suffisance d'*être*.

Comme essences, les monades sont des points métaphysiques, des mondes séparés et discontinus, pas réellement unis, mais seulement accordés. Quand ces monades sont représentées comme unies, cela tient à la vue théorique dans laquelle apparaît leur *congruence*, au sens mathématique, et non à leur interdépendance effective. Cette unité est la continuité *phénoménale* au sens leibnizien et la monadologie pourrait être un songe bien lié..., jusqu'à ce qu'on se demande quel est l'être de ce phénomène.

La question d'une relation fondatrice s'est posée pour l'union de l'âme et du corps, l'unité des substances composées et finalement l'unité du monde même en tant qu'il n'est pas un pur possible. Fremont en trouve déjà l'idée dans le *De rerum originatione radicali*, daté du 23 novembre 1697. Leibniz parle du 'Mundum seu aggregatum rerum finitarum,' ce qui est proprement une unité phénoménale, ou de perception. En plus de cette unité, est requise l'unité qui fonde l'existence: 'unum enim dominans Universi non tantum regit Mundum sed et fabricat seu facit.' Pas seulement une régulation logique, mais l'unité d'une constitution ontologique. Laquelle ne sera pas à son tour un élément de la série, car si l'unité d'une série mathématique est immanente à la série, si l'unité logique de la représentation est immanente à la monade simple, il n'en va pas de même pour l'unité entre monades en tant qu'elles sont, ni pour l'unité des substances qui seraient composées de plusieurs monades simples. S'il y a des substances composées, leur unité transcende les monades-éléments, car ce qui constitue cette unité n'appartient pas à ces éléments. Même raisonnement pour l'union de l'âme et du corps, puis pour le système

monadologique en entier. 'Non tantum in nullo singulorum, sed nec in toto aggregato serieque rerum inveniri potest sufficiens ratio existendi.'

Ainsi, l'unité des substances composées, par exemple l'unité âme-corps, n'a pas d'essence nécessaire qui pourrait être pensée dans un concept théorique. (On s'en serait douté après les efforts de Descartes dans la sixième méditation.) L'extériorité du 'vinculum substantiale' par rapport aux essences reproduit dans la créature la différence entre l'entendement du créateur et sa puissance. Par cette puissance qui lie, et qui peut aussi délier, *sur le plan de l'existence contingente*, sans que soient modifiées les monades simples, *sur le plan de leur essence nécessaire*, Leibniz se trouve à faire place pour des essences non nécessaires, car il y a des composés substantiels contingents dont la possibilité ne se trouve pas dans une nécessité d'entendement, mais seulement dans un libre fiat créateur. L'unité singulière âme-corps n'est pas quelque chose qui aurait son prototype éternel et incrémenté dans l'entendement divin, mais une existence sans modèle nécessaire suspendue à une élection gratuite. Au jeu de l'entendement hellénique nécessaire, qui régit l'ordre des essences en tant qu'unités logiques possibles, Leibniz ajoute la liberté créatrice biblique, qui régit l'ordre des existences où les substances logiques ne sont que des éléments dans des synthèses qui les lient en substances composées contingentes.

Le plus surprenant, c'est de voir comment cette pensée se précise, au fil de la correspondance, à l'occasion de questions sur l'Eucharistie. Des Bosses se demande si le dogme tridentin de la transsubstantiation est pensable dans la métaphysique leibnizienne. D'une part, le philosophe s'identifie aux protestants en disant que 'nous n'avons pas besoin de telles explications, nous qui rejetons la transsubstantiation.' (146) Mais en même temps il se pique au jeu et propose son 'vinculum substantiale' comme rendant compte de ce qu'affirme le dogme catholique. Si l'on admet qu'il puisse y avoir des substances dont l'unité n'est pas celle de la monade simple, mais au contraire celle d'une réunion de monades, de telles substances à *essence contingente* peuvent se remplacer sans que les simples ne soient dérangées dans leur essence nécessaire. Or les substances corporelles sont de cette sorte et l'on peut concevoir qu'en substituant un *vinculum* à l'autre, les éléments monadiques peuvent successivement appartenir à la synthèse de substances composées différentes. Le pain eucharistique ne change pas de monades-éléments, mais la transsubstantiation fait que ces monades passent sous le lien que la foi identifie comme 'corps du Christ.'

Si la transsubstantiation n'intéressait pas le protestant, elle inspirait le philosophe en tant qu'elle affirme comme réalisé ce qui pose et résout un problème central du système leibnizien. Dans la préface, Michel Serres enchaîne: 'Le mystère est la substantiation, la production de la substance par le lien, par le *vinculum*, le mystère est la création de l'Etre par la Relation. C'est la question métaphysique primitive. Et la seule Théologie peut advenir à son secours, non point celle de Dieu, Celui que nous croyions le centre du système, mais la Théologie de l'Incarnation, celle où le Verbe se fait chair.' (9) Mon seul commentaire: voilà qu'on s'en aperçoit enfin! Les francophones

curieux de la pensée leibnizienne seront reconnaissants à Christiane Fremont pour cette bonne traduction des fameuses lettres.

La petite bibliographie signale p. 216 l'ouvrage de Blondel, *Une énigme historique* (1930), mais omet son *De vinculo substantiali et de substantia composita apud Leibnitium* (1893), traduit par Claude Troisfontaines, avec une excellente introduction de 140 pages (Louvain, 1972). Ce sont deux ouvrages différents.

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ROY HARRIS, *The Language Makers*. Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell U.P. 1980.
Pp. 194. US\$ 19.50. ISBN 0-8014-1317-6.

Harris uses material from the histories of linguistics and philosophy to provide intriguing explanations of why, because of certain assumptions, linguists and philosophers see language in the way they do and ask the kinds of questions concerning language they do. The book is organized into eight chapters without headings, which read as eight reasonably well-integrated essays. The many issues discussed (past and recent issues in semantics, philosophy, syntax, phonology, and morphology) are related in complex ways, yet all focus on Harris' thesis that views about the nature of language are based upon historical and social conditions — conditions which determine assumptions concerning the nature of language.

Harris' historical-cultural approach is useful in getting a novel grip on semantic issues. He offers an explanation of how some assumptions concerning meanings could have been generated, an explanation relying on his view of the rôle of the dictionary and the cultural context in which the unilingual dictionary developed. With regard to cultural context, he suggests that it is no accident that the unilingual dictionary appeared in the sixteenth century at the same time as the growth of nationalism. Unlike earlier cross-linguistic glossaries which served the interests of trade and conquest, the unilingual dictionary served the interests of cultural identity by providing uniformity across a population (publicity), closing a language (cf. the *Académie Française*), and fixing it. The rôle of the dictionary in determining assum-

ptions concerning meaning is particularly closely related to its historical rôles of fixing and publicizing. Philosophers of language often discuss the semantic versions of fixing and publicizing in terms of the problem of *understanding* a language (*cf.* Dummett): one wants an account of what is involved in all members of a population having the ability to understand one another. (One account of this ability which is rejected by Harris is the truth-conditional account, about which more later.) An account of understanding would seem to require a notion of independence — the publicity and accessibility of 'meanings' to all members of a speech community. Harris' iconoclastic suggestion is that the dictionary gives us just this independence. It provides a public standard, uniform across a population and accessible to any reader. The scriptist bias of 'reader' does not disturb Harris; earlier in the book he rejects the odd insistence of linguists that speech should always be primary, writing secondary. Moreover, he finds the partially prescriptive role of the lexicographer in the production of definitions acceptable; in spite of a long linguistic and philosophical tradition, the lexicographer does not 'just describe.'

Pursuing the dictionary's role in determining views concerning language, Harris holds that its form and organization have, to a great degree, determined the course of linguistics. For instance, the lemma-interpretation form of a dictionary entry suggests the type/token distinction, closely related to the competence/performance and *language/parole* distinctions. Harris believes that by adopting these distinctions, the linguist has been forced to consider many of the central (and perhaps insoluble) problems of linguistics, those problems arising from the effort to construct necessary and sufficient conditions on a token's being of a particular type, and related problems of sign-identity, constituents, analysis, and performance. To take another example, the total organization of the dictionary suggests a focus upon words as central to semantics — a focus which is, to be sure, sometimes lost in the pursuit of a truth-conditional semantics or a semantics which relies too closely on a sentence-based transformational grammar, but a focus which is well-entrenched in any case. Of course, most of these distinctions and problems did not appear before the end of the nineteenth century, and the unilingual dictionary appeared in the sixteenth. Surprisingly, this temporal gap does not perturb Harris: he suggests that the relevant assumptions and distinctions had to await a theory — that of Saussure — and that it is these inherent assumptions and distinctions which explain this theory's immediate acceptance and power. The continued power of Saussurean theory, and the persistence of dictionary-based assumptions, seems assured for the moment if, as Harris suggests, current transformational linguistics is just a 'development and amplification' (166) of Saussure.

Discussion of the role of the dictionary appears primarily in chapters 6 and 7; earlier chapters offer a more general discussion of the nature of language and develop a tripartite classification of theories of language which figures again in the discussion of dictionary and semantics. As with the dictionary, Harris is concerned to trace his 'surrogationalism,' 'instrument-

talism,' and 'contractualism' to their historic-cultural sources, in these cases to the Greeks and aspects of Greek culture which produced them. Instrumentalism, which sees language as a tool (and for modern purposes is perhaps identifiable with the views of the later Wittgenstein and his followers) is held to proceed from the sophists who catered to the need to use language to argue one's case in court. Surrogationalism, which treats language as consisting of surrogates or representations of things or ideas, is traced to Plato's world of Forms, Socrates, and the 'logician' 's insistence on establishing validity or correctness independently of persuasiveness. Referential semantic theories seem to be Harris' candidates for modern analogues to Greek surrogationalism. Contractualism (with all the difficulties inherent in the notion of contract and rule) is traced — rather less plausibly — to Hellenistic trade practices and the classificational grammars needed to teach non-Greeks sufficient Greek for commerce. With his tripartite classification and his views on the semantic rôle of the dictionary, Harris makes a philosophically interesting but difficult move. He suggests that the dictionary's 'independence' supports contractualism as the core of semantics and reduces the plausibility of both surrogationalism (including truth-conditional semantics) and instrumentalism (including looking to intentions for meaning, *à la* Grice). (139-40) Meaning for him apparently does not need a foundation in things or in intentional action, as the dictionary (with the community it describes and engenders?) serves this function. Or at least, Harris appears to be making this claim concerning the foundation(s) of semantics: it is difficult to get entirely clear what the claim is.

Harris' bold conjecture is followed by a defense of structural semantics (which includes 'translational semantics' and theories of 'linguistic meaning') because structural semantics, apparently, best carries out the semantic assumptions built into dictionaries. The connection of structural semantics with dictionaries is not adequately articulated; perhaps, in addition to the view that structural semantics makes meaning 'independent' in the way dictionaries allow 'independent' definition (by not requiring reference outside the dictionary), Harris would also claim that the procedures the semantic theorist follows in identifying meanings are in fact the procedures embedded in the use of the dictionary. However he might seek to establish this connection, we should also be told more about the assumptions, procedures, and scope of 'structural semantics.' Is the structural semanticist committed to the notion of a linguistic role, for instance? If so, what is its status; how do we teach language users to produce expressions in conformity with it; is it a 'psychological' notion (as the conceptualist — as opposed to realist or nominalist — might have it)? In general, the philosopher is likely to be tantalized by this and the rest of Harris' claims and suggestions, but not satisfied.

The last chapter (Ch. 8) is disappointing. The bulk of the chapter is a discussion of the ape-language controversy, and while Harris makes the good points that what is at issue is what a 'real' language is and that nativists need not logically worry about a talking ape (185) (they need only give it the genetic endowment on which the nativist insists), his discussion of recent

nativist arguments is restricted to the impoverished stimulus argument (not the short-time, same-time, approximately-equivalent arguments which are the focus of recent discussions), and he presents uncritically only the positive side of the ape-learning data (not, e.g., the recent work of Terrace). Still, his survey is useful. The real disappointment of the chapter is the weak discussion in the last few pages of a general intellectual malaise, a malaise of which the ape-language controversy is supposed to be a symptom. For one thing, it is not clear that there is a malaise. More important, however, is that even if there is a malaise, one expects to be told just what it is. We are not: the threat that man's 'monopoly on language' could be lost is presented as a symptom, not the disease. One can also expect from a book which takes as its thesis the view that language must be seen as entangled in a socio-cultural web a serious effort to analyze this malaise, perhaps even to show where it leads. What we get instead is a brief list of present socio-cultural changes and problems (the move from print to television, the possibility of the destruction of man, large-scale power politics) and another list of demands Harris believes we make on language (community and communication requirements). The situations and the demands are merely adumbrated. No reason is given to explain why these features, rather than others, are chosen, and the features seem to be only loosely related to the arguments in the rest of the book.

Lacunae, frustrations, and weak conclusion aside, however, the book is provocative, and sometimes exciting.

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DAVID MILLIGAN, *Reasoning and the Explanation of Actions*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1980. Pp. ix + 194. US\$ 42.50. ISBN 0-391-01802-7.

In recent analytical philosophy there has been vigorous debate over the status of the reasons we act on, and the reasons we have for acting. David Milligan thinks further inquiries ought to be made. He formulates his own questions by reference to the speech in *Julius Caesar* where Brutus declares that he helped kill Caesar because he 'lov'd Rome more' than Caesar, and wanted to protect it from Caesar's growing tyranny. Milligan wonders:

Assuming that Brutus is not deceiving himself or others, how does his reason explain his action? What is the relation of his greater love for Rome to his ... murdering Caesar? Is it a causal relation? Or is there a contradiction in supposing that the reason Brutus gives could have caused his action? How is this kind of explanation related to other types ... — physiological, psychological or sociological? (ix)

Milligan approaches these issues by studying deliberation, which he sees

as a matter of weighing up reasons for and against different conclusions and deciding which one [which conclusion? which reason?] is best supported ... [T]hrough his evaluation of the relevant factors ... an agent determines what is to be a reason, a good reason, and finally a decisive reason. When Brutus murders Caesar as a result of his deliberation ... [he decides] that the welfare of Rome outweighs all other factors; he decides that it is a sufficient reason to determine his action. His desire for the welfare of Rome is not itself sufficient to result in his action. It is only through his evaluation of it that it becomes so. (x)

'Evaluation' is the main novelty of Milligan's work — the 'key' to both his analysis of acting for a reason and his replies to the above questions. But before we investigate his idea of evaluating — namely, determining 'what is to be a reason, a good reason, and ... a decisive reason' — we should glance at two of his other fundamental concepts. He labels our conative attitudes as 'feature wants' when an available course of action has a property 'which leads [us] to choose' that course of action. (24) Milligan says:

Features may ... relate to internal characteristics of the action...; to characteristics it has in virtue of the agent's attitude towards it, as for instance if ... he believes it to be his duty; or they may be concerned with the consequences of the action ... There is no limit to what may count as a feature ... (25)

Milligan divides up feature-wants. There are 'impulse-desires' which 'rise up in the agent uninvited and unguided'; they 'happen to an agent,' due to 'causes independent of [his] volition'; their action-producing 'strength is not under [his] control.' (7, 36) Other feature-wants 'may be determined by the agent himself and need not be caused by anything external to [his] deliberation'; moreover, he 'can choose whether or not to satisfy them.' (7) This sharp contrast fades when Milligan says 'an agent can form his own wants ... whether [they are] impulse-desires or feature-wants of his own making.' (102ff..) Nevertheless Milligan frequently suggests that our impulse-desires are caused, while our decision 'to have' other feature-wants is without causal antecedents. (7, 45, 96, 173ff.) Incidentally, he also believes that the process of evaluating one's wants is uncaused. He writes:

cases in which an agent appears to evaluate the weight [*sic*] he gives to various factors may be caused; [but] in such a case [he] does not truly evaluate ...

... [Perhaps] as a result of ... conditioning, an agent appears to evaluate a factor [as deserving] a certain weight ... But he does not give it that weight; it comes like some impulse-desires with a weight already attached ... and he cannot have evaluated [it]. (140ff.)

Unfortunately Milligan does not inform us what proves that our selection of some feature-wants and our evaluation of any 'factor' must be without causes.

This ties in with Milligan's fundamental — and rather unusual — concept of what it takes for a feature-want or a 'desire' to qualify as a reason. He stipulates that a 'desire cannot constitue [a] reason and ... be by itself the cause of [an] action'; in order for 'the desire ... to be come the agent's reason, it must be evaluated ... by [him]; he must deciee that [it] is to constitutue a reason.' (9)

Obviously the phenomenon of evaluation is crucial to Milligan's scheme. But what is it like to evaluate one's 'impulse-desires' and other conative proclivities? So far we have gleaned little beyond the negative — and somewhat dubious — contention that nothing causes us to engage in this undertaking, and the positive requirement that only feature-wants favorably evaluated by us will count as our reasons. Of course it is evident that evaluating must be a second-order pastime. (137; see 8, 112) That is: if we are going to evaluate, we must already have feature-wants — which assail us unbidden, or get created by us *ex nihilo*. There is another extremely significant implication which Milligan neither articulates nor defends: that our evaluations represent *us* — reflect what we genuinely prefer — in a way that our run-of-the-mill feature-wants do not. Milligan himself remarks that it is 'not uncommon to feel forced to do something against one's will by the strength of one's desire.' (35) No doubt Milligan would deny that an evaluation could operate similarly — sweep over us and force us willy-nilly to reject or to make 'reasons' of various impulse-desires and selected feature-wants that we are sheltering. Yet how realistic is it to assume that any evaluation we make of our desire is more authentically *ours* than the desire? In this post-Freudian era, aren't there alternative interpretations? Suppose I make a strongly unfavorable second-order judgment of some erotic, self-destructive or anti-social hankering I detect within myself. Before I say it does not represent what I really want, surely I ought to consider the psychoanalytical hypothesis that it mirrors a deeper part of me — the repressed id — and that my higher-level condemnation of it results from my socialization or superego?

These may be minor obscurities in Milligan's account of evaluation. But his reliance upon metaphorical description generates serious trouble. As several of my quotations indicate, Milligan repeatedly likens evaluating to estimating how heavy an object is. This continues throughout: 'the agent ... has to consider the relevant feature-wants and ... weigh them against each

'other' (8); some 'outweigh' their rivals (85); a person 'weights up ... advantages and disadvantages.' (96) A man 'wants to reduce,' though losing weight 'is not something to which he attaches much weight in making his decision' to exercise; his real reason is that he enjoys a workout. (111) This last example, of loading or attaching weight to an object, seems to diverge from the cases of measuring how heavy an item is. More is at stake, however. I doubt that either of these similes make clear what is to evaluate a want.

Here is the problem. I can pick up various rocks and compare how much effort I make to lift each one. If there is one I cannot lift, it must weigh more than those I managed to carry. For subtler comparisons, I might deploy an equal-arm balance or a scale. Analogous methods enable me to gauge how much weight I have attached to a mule. Does Milligan think that evaluating bears any resemblances to these weight-measuring activities? If so, he should tell us the similarities. I would make the same complaint about his occasional talk of an evaluator ascribing 'importance' to a feature-want (8ff.), deciding 'on the value which factors or actions are to have' (91), and proceeding 'to evaluate one want more highly than ... other wants.' (174) These are not improvements over Milligan's 'weight' talk. We have criteria for estimating a politician's 'importance' — offices held, seniority, committee assignments. An art dealer can assess the market value of an etching, and rate one 'more highly' than another. If Milligan believes there are analogues to these criteria when we evaluate our conative attitudes, he should reveal them.

Milligan's account of evaluating is not only vague. I suspect that it may also beget an infinite regress. As I've documented, he regularly says that evaluators *decide* which of their wants is going to become the reason they act on. Now *why* does an evaluator come down against some impulse-desire, and promote a competing feature-want to the status of a reason? Milligan himself asks: 'How is the reason for an action arrived at? ... What ... reasoning must [one] go through ... to form his reasons?' (5) An example of Milligan's pinpoints the regressive sort of reasoning about reasons that I'm wary of. A career advisor is trying to recommend the best available job to her client. Milligan imagines

she may decide that one job is more exciting, .. another ... more secure; excitement is a reason for choosing [one] ... security ... the second ...

There are two decisions to be made in relation to any [such] factor ... a decision ... about how different jobs rate in relation to that to that factor ... [and] a decision ... about the importance of the factor relative to other factors. (84; see 90ff.)

Why not a third decision on whatever standards she is appealing to when she rates excitement or security, or compares them? And so forth *ad infinitum*. If Milligan only describes us as acting for reasons in case we have evaluated our feature-wants, and if this evaluating is done for reasons — which must in turn be appraised — then we shall never complete all the steps required for acting upon reasons.

Milligan seems to anticipate this objection, but he confuses it with the separate complaint, touched on earlier, that our evaluating might have causes. Milligan's response is 'that [al]though an evaluation may be supported by [further] reasons it may not be, without thereby becoming arbitrary or having to be caused.' (139f. my italics) His illustration is an automobile driver who stops to help when she sees a pedestrian collapse. Milligan's heroine says

that she wanted to save unnecessary ... suffering, thus suggesting that this was the want she evaluated most highly. The question of what her reason was in making that evaluation seems absurd. It does not need [one], and the absence of [one] does not imply that she was caused to evaluate that way. (140)

Unluckily for Milligan, we usually do not have such apparently rock-bottom reasons; so most cases of acting for reasons will not be protected from the regress charge by Milligan's example. Moreover, couldn't the good samaritan motorist, without absurdity, engage in further deliberation? She might wonder: How much is the person suffering? Are trained people on the way? Is it fair to the innocent defendant I am representing in court today if I arrive late?

Despite these uncertainties over evaluation, Milligan leans heavily upon it when he answers his initial question about whether our reasons cause our deeds. I'll number a few of his statements: (1) A feature-want, together with appropriate beliefs, 'must be sufficient for [an agent], in the absence of competing feature-wants, to try' to act. (32) (2) His 'having [a feature want and a relevant belief] is not sufficient for the act.' (107ff., my italics) (3) '[T]here is a difference between certain factors — such as desires — causing an action and those factors bringing about the action, but mediated through ... deliberation.' (134) (4) '[I]t is not enough ... to say that the agent's desire is the cause of his action or that his evaluation of the desire is.' (139) (5) 'The want can only produce the action if the agent makes the want into a sufficiently important reason ... The only exception ... is when the want directly produces the action irrespective of his evaluation of it ... This gives us ground for refusing to say that the reason for an action is its cause.' (179)

Milligan never tells us if 'sufficient' means 'causally sufficient.' But if it does, then statement (1) and the 'exception' clause of (5) appear to contradict (2) on whether feature-wants together with beliefs may result in action. Statement (3) implies that evaluated feature-wants — reasons, in Milligan's lexicon — may engender action; but (4) and the conclusion of (5) suggest the opposite. Unclarities like this prevent Milligan's book from being much of a contribution to action theory.

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Justice and Liberty is a collection of essays on related topics in political and moral philosophy by Prof. D.D. Raphael of the University of London. All but one — an essay on the 'reverse discrimination' controversy in the U.S. — were previously published, the earliest in 1946, the most recent in 1979. Although there is a certain repetitiveness, as is inevitable in a collection of this sort, there is a unity of theme; most of the essays, historical or thematic, concern the concept of justice and the apparent conflict between the demands of liberty and of equality. Prof. Raphael develops his ideas on these topics in a number of articles from 1946 to 1977, in three review articles on Perelman (1979), Rawls (1974), and Dworkin (1979), and in a couple of pieces on 'justice and utility' (1972-73 and 1977).

While Raphael's general concern is with the concept of justice, his specific concerns are the problems created by the apparent conflict between equality and liberty. Raphael believes that 'In some sense every man has a moral right, or more properly a moral claim, to equality with other men' (1946, p. 1). But he also holds dear the liberal tradition and its value of liberty, as well as the Kantian imperative to treat all persons as ends in themselves. Throughout most of these essays, Raphael seeks to show how the apparent, and familiar, conflicts between justice (and equality) and liberty hide a deeper unity between the two. Both values stand up for the individual against the state or the collectivity, all appearances to the contrary. A secondary theme developed in these papers is that claims of justice are not derivable from considerations of utility, and that both justice and liberty stand opposed to utility, hence further evidence for the unity of these two values.

While some of the earlier essays in this collection are interesting given the hostility of most British philosophers to political theory at the time, political and moral theorists familiar with recent literature and debates will not find much here that will contribute to a better understanding or clearer resolution of the problems. Prof. Raphael's style, while 'analytical,' is some distance from the precision and clarity found today in the writings of Nozick, Gauthier, Harsanyi, Nagel, or even Rawls (whom Raphael takes to task for lack of clarity). For instance, much that is critical of utilitarianism is said without clearly distinguishing between the principle of utility, the consequentialism of the theory, and its hedonism or eudaimonism. Although I am far from a utilitarian, many of the criticisms of the theory do not seem to me especially effective unless these distinctions are made and a clear version of the principle stated. (See the second paragraph on p. 168 for an instance where these distinctions would be useful.) Contemporary utilitarians are not always vulnerable to general remarks about 'utility' and the value of the individual.

Many assumptions Prof. Raphael makes seem today as dated as the style. Consider: 'The Welfare State, once the programme of radicals, is now accep-

ted by all political parties in the countries of Western Europe' (1950-51, p. 64); 'In the United States, practically all reflective people agree that some kind of reverse discrimination in entry to higher education is justified...' ('Reverse Discrimination,' p. 154); or 'Would anyone say that the Welfare State is a *charity* organization, or deny that it is a more *just...* society than one in which the relief of basic needs is left to private generosity? Would anyone say that the provision of uneconomic transport services to remote, sparsely-populated areas of Britain is charitable rather than fair?' (1964, pp. 88-9). Anyone living in Thatcher's Great Britain or any philosopher familiar with the works of Nozick or Murray Rothbard should find these assumptions dubious. Contemporary philosophers may also be put off by the more familiar but equally dubious claims that 'Most of us find an immediate attraction in utilitarianism' (1972-73, p. 157) or 'Hume is by and large a utilitarian' (p. 158) and other beliefs of years past. More serious perhaps, readers searching for arguments in favor of Prof. Raphael's moral intuitions will be disappointed to find that 'The only sound argument for equalitarianism that I can find is based on the fact that nearly all human beings share with each other, but not with other animals, certain capacities and needs which are of the greatest importance to them. This fact justifies imputing a certain equality of rights to all human beings — as individuals.' ('Reverse Discrimination,' p. 150; see also 1950-51, pp. 45-51).

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CATHERINE ROBERTS, *Science, Animals and Evolution*. Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press 1980. Pp. xv + 221. US\$ 18.95. ISBN 0-313-21479-4.

Something happened to Catherine Roberts between the years 1966 and 1969. In 1967, Dr. Roberts, who had done research on yeast genetics for fifteen years, published *The Scientific Conscience* (*TSC*), a collection of her essays which had appeared from 1961 through 1966. *TSC* criticized scientists in general and biologists in particular for their all-consuming devotion to the advance of knowledge. Roberts preached that a 'true humanism' encompassed the well-being of all sentient creatures and she eloquently presented

the thesis that scientists who tortured animals were debasing science and degrading themselves. Although the book was passionate it was also suffused with arguments.

Now Roberts has gathered together her essays that appeared between 1969 and 1972. These, for the most part, have the same themes as *TSC*. But sometime during that interval between 1966 and 1969 it seems that Roberts was converted to a mystical religious outlook, and this mysticism saturates the present work. She is an angrier person and more certain than ever that she is on the side of the angels. (In *TSC* she explicitly states that she is on the side of the angels). Consequently she is more inclined to declaratory judgments and entirely devoid of any feel of what *argument*, in the good sense, is like. She offers papal edicts from above with a sprinkling of mumbo-jumbo and, altogether, it is entirely inconceivable that her book will impress those she most desires to convert — the biologists.

In a loose sense, the book may be said to be philosophical. Famous names in philosophy are trotted out and Roberts claims an allegiance to Platonism; moreover, she says that much of what she believes derives from that doctrine. Exactly how is left as an exercise for the reader. Roberts states that the divine is the center of the cosmos and that she 'thinks and acts accordingly.' Apparently, 'accordingly' in this case means that evolution is not a purposeless biological development but a 'spiritual ascent toward the divine' which through 'innumerable reincarnations,' eventually reaches the goal. It is hardly necessary for readers of this journal to have me perform a dissection on this passage. Unhappily, the passage is typical. Consider the following example: '[Biomedicine] should also admit the possibility that the numinous — this divine reality which imparts spiritual knowledge of itself to the soul — may be responsible for changes in somatic cells and tissues and in the accompanying mental operations and physical actions that reflect the soul's attainment of, and response to, such knowledge. Until the minds of anthropocentric scientists are open to this theocentric view, their research ... cannot enhance the spiritual insight of the healthy.' (45-46) Such passages are tributes to the positivist criterion of meaning and justify the exasperation of old-fashioned Carnapians. These passages follow hard upon trite remarks like 'The message of Socrates, Plato, Plotinus, and many others was basically an ethical one.' (24). Then, too, there are the remarks that only a sage could utter without feeling embarrassed: 'Man's most precious possession is spiritual, not material.' (44)

Interspersed among these insights are many curious sidebits. Thus in the midst of one of her sallies against biologists, she goes off on a long harangue about Abu'l-Qasinal-Qushayri, an eleventh century mystic, whose talk of the expansion and contraction of the soul she facilely interprets as a theory about the stages of manic-depressive psychosis.

There is a certain disjointedness because some of the chapters are re-worked essays and some have been left as they are. Almost everything she wrote is included regardless of its bearing upon what went before or is to come after. There is for example, a chapter on Quakers, presented as

originally published, and but for the presence of a few pet terms like 'evolution' and 'spiritual force' there is no connection between it and anything else in the book.

If there is a central thesis to *Science, Animals and Evolution* it is this: there are two kinds of humanism, anthropocentric and theocentric. The former appears to be orthodox humanism and it is what Roberts scathingly attacks. She prefers the other kind of 'humanism' which, so far as I can make out, differs from ordinary religions in that it does not accept any particular body of doctrines. Instead, Roberts preaches the 'spiritualization of biology' and what she also calls the 'mystical theory of evolution.' It turns out that evolution is divinely guided and Roberts worries that genetics, transplants, etc. are tampering with things best left to God. She values natural mystical states and so she devotes a chapter to attacking the idea that drug-induced states are a stepping-stone to spirituality. I am inclined to agree that drugs do not lead to spirituality but one wonders what exactly has been said against that idea in this chapter. Another chapter is a blast against transplants. Roberts appears to worry that people who are not really dead will have their vital organs transplanted into another. She seems to think we have no way ever to rule out the possibility that the donor is still aware. On the basis of her curious arguments, however, one shouldn't even dare to bury anyone. Perhaps she thinks there is something odd in the very concept *dead*. But given her view about souls and reincarnation it isn't clear why transplants are wrong even if the donor is still alive. Roberts 'supports' her antagonism toward transplantation with some drivel about its being the business of the living to help the dying to die in a way 'that is in keeping with death's beauty and grandeur.'

One chapter is essentially a review of Rosalind and Stanley Godlovitch's *Animals, Men and Morals*. This pro-animal book was also reviewed about ten years ago by Peter Singer and the review together with the book have been among the most influential works ushering in the era of animal liberation. Roberts thinks the hearts of the contributors to the anthology are in the right place but she thinks the book ultimately fails because 'the contributors lack the spiritual vision that extends to the ultimate reality beyond the two classes of beings with which they are concerned.' (80)

After the back-handed complimentary review, Roberts presents a direct, if not very forceful, plea for an end to all animal experiments. But Roberts opposes searching for alternatives to animal experiments! The idea seems to be this: the effort to reform scientists is doomed to failure, primarily because these people, and especially Robert White, are too corrupt. I fear Roberts has allowed her fervor to get the better of her. Given that biologists are not to experiment on animals and given that they are not to be permitted to use substitutes, what are they to do? Perhaps Roberts is happy to think they will do nothing but surely this is inconsistent with her vision of a spiritually oriented biology. Perhaps what Roberts want is for scientists first to become spiritual as a precondition of being permitted to engage in science. After all does she not say on p. 45 that they must recognize the divine reality not merely to be

more spiritual in their work but even to be able to make mundane progress? If so, why let them do anything until such time as they are true believers?

Roberts has an irritating tendency to begin long quotations with lead-ins like 'Years ago a very wise man wrote ...' and often you must turn to the notes at the back if you are, oddly, curious to find out who the wise man is. Among the wise persons on whom she relies for authority is Mme. Blavatsky, nineteenth century founder of the Theosophical Society. Roberts hardly seems to understand how damaging is the remark of Blavatsky that she so approvingly quotes '... the awful pangs of remorse that sooner or later will seize [the vivisector] will outweigh a thousand times the comparatively momentary pain of the dumb sufferers.' (188)

Roberts is also eager to find support for her mysticism in the work of Cleve Backster who claims to have established extra-sensory perception in plants. Moreover it seems that philodendra worry about the death of neighboring plants. All this is evidence of the 'spiritualization of nature' and Roberts accepts it without the slightest critical examination one might expect of a veteran biologist.

In the final analysis what is most wrong with this book is not that it won't achieve the aims Roberts sets herself but that, in its awfulness, it alienates those who might be expected to have some predisposition to finding favor with it. I am myself, for example, a vegetarian and a staunch opponent of animal experimentation and I do agree that conventional humanism is amiss in its relative unconcern with the good of animals. But Roberts' diatribe is uncompromising in its self-righteousness, and its preachiness. It will end up doing more harm than good.

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PHILIP SHUCHMAN, *Problems of Knowledge in Legal Scholarship*. Storrs, Ct.: U. of Connecticut School of Law Press 1979. Pp. 136. US\$ 8.95. ISBN 0-939328-00-3.

The thesis of this book is that legal scholarship has grave epistemological and ontological problems. Unfortunately, that thesis is never satisfactorily supported. Shuchman spends much time arguing that one can place no reliance on the statements, in reported cases, about exactly what happened to the

litigants that led up to the lawsuit. (He is primarily concerned with civil cases.) His reasons are the anomalies of evidentiary rules (which exclude what would otherwise be considered relevant evidence), the effects of adversary examination (which does not elicit the most reliable witness recollections), the time and expense of litigation, and the like. He points out that the so-called facts in reported cases are appellate court constructions based on a general trial verdict, legal instructions given to the jury, and, sometimes, the appellate court's reading of the trial record. From these points, he passes swiftly, through a set of assumptions never fully articulated, to charges that anyone who takes for granted the claims about litigants made in reported cases has unsatisfactory ontological and epistemological commitments. Toward the end of the book, he appears to draw some morals about the value and function of legal scholarship, based on further assumptions.

The major obstacle to his program is his assumptions. It certainly does not follow from the fact that someone believes a claim that is or may be false (e.g., a claim in a reported case that litigant A did so-and-so) that he has any ontological or epistemological commitments at all (except, perhaps, that litigant A exists). Shuchman thinks it does only because he assumes, along with Ayer (whom he sometimes cites), that (a) if a sentence is neither tautologous nor self-contradictory, it has truth value only if it can be empirically verified (or empirically falsified), and (b) if a sentence has no truth value, it has no cognitive meaning. To these assumptions, Shuchman adds the assumption (c) that a sentence is true only if it corresponds with reality, and a sort of reference theory that is never made clear. He restricts reference to true contingent sentences, and apparently thinks that a true contingent sentence must stand for some empirical entity. (20-1; what entity is never made clear.) The suggestion is that false contingent statements lack empirical reference.

On all these assumptions, it does follow that someone who believes a certain contingent claim to be true has an ontological commitment. He is committed to believing that there is a referent 'in external reality' (Shuchman's phrase). If the claim is false, on Shuchman's view there is no empirical referent, so one who believes a false claim to be true is committed to a false ontological belief. But why make any or all of Shuchman's assumptions? Assumptions (a) and (b) entail that they themselves have no truth value and no cognitive meaning. Shuchman's empirical referent theory will have difficulty with true counterfactuals. Moreover, I am not certain how, even on Shuchman's assumptions, it follows that someone who believes a certain factual claim to be true has unsatisfactory epistemological commitments. Perhaps Shuchman would say that anyone who believes a factual claim to be true is committed, on his assumptions, to believing it is empirically verifiable. Undoubtedly, Shuchman thinks his remarks about the rules of evidence, the adversary system, the expense of litigation, and so on, show that the factual claims in reported cases are most likely to be false, and so, empirically falsifiable rather than verifiable; but nothing of the sort follows from these remarks. A factual claim in a reported case may indeed be true, and empirically verifiable. But even if one is mistaken in believing it to be verifiable, I

doubt that counts as a problem with one's *epistemology*. One may hold any theory of knowledge, including one Shuchman deems correct.

The assumptions that Shuchman makes which are of interest to legal philosophers appear near the end of the book. By this point, Shuchman is concerned with more than the lack of accurate and complete history of the litigants' actions in reported cases. He is concerned, as well, that reported cases — which are only a small fraction of appellate cases — represent a skewed sample of actual litigation. But why is this fact damaging to legal scholarship? Sometimes, Shuchman points out, whole areas of rulings never make it into reported cases, as with IRS rulings; so a scholar dealing with this sort of law would be unwise to confine himself to reported cases in his research. Often, Shuchman points out, the socio-economic effects of adopting legal rules are not properly revealed by inspection of reported cases; and this can lead an academician astray when he makes recommendations about legal rule adoption. These are unobjectionable remarks, but Shuchman is not content with them. In a footnote (92), he assumes that the weight of a case depends entirely on how often similar issues are litigated and/or the case's law governs transactions; and this is, quite simply, an insupportable assumption. Apart from the fact that cases have weight only derivatively, borrowing their weight for the purposes of legal scholarship from the legal standards which they are seen to uphold, it is obvious that a trivial legal rule (e.g., a city ordinance) may be invoked often and a weighty rule (e.g., a constitutional provision) may be rarely invoked.

Skewed sampling and empirical inaccuracies may be connected to other assumptions Shuchman makes about the nature of legal scholarship, but if so, the connection is obscure. He assumes that legal theories, like scientific theories, explain data and help us 'understand empirical reality.' (79) He thinks, in addition, they are largely taxonomic. Perhaps he thinks the taxonomy is bound to be inadequate if one does not start with all the things (every legal case in a particular field of law) to be classified. However, Shuchman is wrong about the nature of legal theories. Their primary purpose is to justify certain legal decisions, not to explain them. (On some views, which Shuchman nowhere considers, the element of taxonomy is merely a by-product of a search for 'embedded' legal standards of great generality, capable of playing a justificatory role.) It is not at all obvious that a justificatory theory will be inadequate if it is fashioned to justify only a skewed sample of actual judicial decision-making. For it does not follow the theory cannot justify all decisions, nor does it follow that the theory cannot adequately capture 'the law.' (One reason why not: On some philosophical views, formal relations like coherence among parts of a justificatory theory may supply standards not directly upheld in any of the available reported cases, though upheld in some unreported decisions.)

Shuchman makes some remarks about the failure of theories to be empirically verifiable, which is what many philosophers would expect, given the normative nature of legal theories; and also about them being 'empty' and unconnected with social reality. One can only suppose he has not considered

the connection between a normative standard (such as a legal standard) and the social practice that it governs. He claims that empirical information missing from reported appellate cases — namely, accurate histories of litigants and the social context of the dispute — is 'legally relevant' (80-1); but it is not clear to what precise endeavor of the scholar's they are, in his opinion, relevant. (The construction of legal history? The discovery of the legal rules for which a case stands?) There is some evidence he thinks discovering legal rules is what will be hampered by missing empirical information. He talks, sometimes, of 'propositions' for which reported cases stand (presumably, rules of law) that it is the legal scholar's job to discuss; and he says that these propositions are inductively inferred from the reported cases (and, once, from the facts of the reported cases). What is missing is any attempt to think through exactly how a particular case can be said to stand for any legal rule. Once this is done, it will be seen that a legal rule cannot be inferred from a statement of the facts, alone; and it becomes doubtful that what actually happened — as opposed to what the appellate court, charged with applying the rule, thought happened — is relevant at all to establishing the rule involved.

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K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, *Nuclear Power and Public Policy: The Social and Ethical Problems of Fission Technology*. Hingham, Mass.: D. Reidel 1980. Pp. xvi + 176. US\$ 19.95 (cloth: ISBN 90-277-1054-6); US\$ 10.50 (paper: ISBN 90-277-1080-5).

Where in most university curricula would a student confront ethical, social and political issues involved in nuclear energy controversies? Scientists and engineers may address some of the technological problems, but they usually dismiss the other, 'soft' issues on the grounds that they are in the domain of ethics, social and political theory. And ethicists, social and political philosophers attend to foundational problems on the grounds that such applied ones are so deeply entangled with technical issues as to be un-

manageable, and that the philosophically significant aspects will eventually be shown to reduce to variants of the traditional foundational problems. Even if the philosophers' position is correct, it is obvious that works which bridge the gap between complex applied problems and basic issues in philosophy are needed. Shrader-Frechette's book is one such attempt. It is a good and useful volume, though uneven. The book demonstrates, among other things, that the bridge itself is of genuine philosophic interest.

The six chapters fall into three groups. I shall concentrate on the last group, but first a few comments about the earlier material. The author sets the stage with a brief, non-technical introduction to nuclear technology, and with an account of some of the relevant U.S. governmental legislation. One of the key laws regulating the nuclear industry is the Price-Anderson Act, which is an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The objective of both is to promote the private development of atomic energy. One of the most significant provisions of the Price-Anderson Act places a ceiling of \$560 million on public liability claims against nuclear licensees arising from any nuclear accident. Originally passed in 1957, the Price-Anderson Act's limitation on liability was to be removed in 1967 since by then, according to the Joint (Congressional) Committee on Atomic Energy, the 'problems of reactor safety will be to a great extent solved.' (11) However, both in 1965 and in 1975, the Act was extended for ten-year periods.

In the second group of chapters the author addresses some of the social, ethical and political issues arising in particular phases of the nuclear industry. The following are samples of the problems and views discussed. In Chapter 2 policies relating to reactor emissions are examined. Shrader-Frechette claims that 'perhaps the most basic ethical presupposition in current radiation regulations is that the economic and technological benefits gained by permitting some radioactivity to be dispersed in the environment are worth an increase in cancer and genetic damage.' (30) Furthermore, she claims that such a utilitarian starting point results in policies which violate principles of equal protection. In Chapter 3 the author argues that current approaches to nuclear waste disposal contravene the principle of equity according to which those enjoying benefits should suffer the costs. Shrader-Frechette points out that the problems of waste disposal are particularly severe — and increasing — because the type of reprocessing required by U.S. nuclear systems has so far proven to be technically and economically unfeasible. (Earlier the author alleges that present methods of disposal violate U.S. government regulations. (17)) Not only are future generations likely to bear a disproportionate share of costs arising from present waste storage, but also these classes of citizens are likely to be treated unfairly: persons living near disposal and storage sites; persons subjected to radiation for medical and other reasons, since radiation effects are cumulative; and children, since radiation effects are more severe among the young. In Chapter 4 Shrader-Frechette examines the projected consequences of a core melt catastrophe and argues that the liability ceiling in the Price-Anderson Act is extremely low. According to her calculations, which are based on government reports, the ceiling represents less than 5%

of the estimated damage which would result from a major accident. The author claims that the limitation on liability would likely result in violations of due process and of equal protection. (The Price-Anderson Act was declared unconstitutional on these grounds by a U.S. District Court, but the ruling was overturned by the Supreme Court. (90))

The third group of chapters addresses foundational and methodological issues which bear upon all areas of nuclear decision-making. In Chapter 5 Shrader-Frechette examines some features of the nuclear fuel cycle which are treated as 'externalities' in economic cost-benefit calculations and assesses the implications of regarding them as such. She considers two sorts of externalities, those which are uncompensated and those which are partially compensated. The primary example of the former is radioactive waste.

Examples of partially compensated externalities include the threat of catastrophic core meltdowns and low-level radiation. The situation regarding low-level radiation is complex but revealing.¹ A maximum permissible dose of whole body radiation (0.5 rem per year) is set by the government but in addition a nuclear installation is required to reduce *any* emissions if this reduction can be accomplished at less than \$1000 to avoid one man-rem of exposure to the public. Shrader-Frechette calculates that government regulations imply that the monetary worth of a child's life is approximately \$17,000; that is, it is regarded as being morally acceptable to inflict fatal injuries on anonymous victims if the cost of prevention exceeds \$17,000. The author considers it morally deplorable that a person's life is implicitly assigned such a low value. However, to her the 'truly great tragedy' in the case under consideration is that the loss of life would be uncompensated since the emissions involved are allowable.

Although some of her analyses of the social and ethical implications of treating features as externalities are convincing, Shrader-Frechette presents one argument, concerning low-level radiation, which could undermine a number of the conclusions she reaches. She says,

This situation of failing to compensate for certain types of externalities caused by low-level radiation, however, is not necessarily one in which government cost-benefit presuppositions must be said to be unethical. For one thing with so much cancer and genetic damage induced by various chemicals and by background and medical exposures to radiation, additional injuries (associated with the nuclear fuel cycle) might be hard to separate from naturally occurring health consequences of radiation. If this is so, then it would be impossible to compensate victims because they could not be identified. The important ethical question that needs to be asked, therefore, is not merely whether externalities resulting from radiation exposure below 0.5 rem/year can or ought to be compensated. The critical question is whether society derives substantial benefits from nuclear power to justify the creation of a political order in which, in principle, clear violations of the rights to life and to equal protection cannot be distinguished from the vagaries of ill health. (116-7).

The reason this argument could undermine many of Shrader-Frechette's ethical conclusions is that with the exception of the direct effects of a reactor

accident, virtually all of the effects stemming from the nuclear industry are probabilistic and many are below background. Thus in all of the latter cases, and many of the former, one could use the above argument to claim that putative causes cannot be indubitably linked with effects; victims cannot be compensated; and the actions are not unethical.

However, Shrader-Frechette's main contentions can be salvaged because the argument quoted above is fallacious. The flaw is that Shrader-Frechette, along with many other commentators (e.g. Bethe (1976)), wrongly assume that a perpetrator of a risk less than background can escape culpability. It is of course true that for a given individual who contracts fatal cancer our knowledge is now (and is perhaps in principle)² such that we cannot tell whether his cancer was caused by industrial radiation or by other factors, though if industrial radiation is less than background it is more likely that the effect is due to background. But this truth is a general feature of situations involving competing causes and irreducible probabilities. That is, even if the percentages were reversed we could not discriminate whether the cancer was due to industrial radiation or background. Returning to the original situation, although we cannot know, for a given individual, which cause is operative, we can say with assurance that for a large number of victims a certain proportion of the cancers are attributable to industrial radiation. Thus there seems to be no legitimate way for the perpetrator of the risk to escape partial responsibility to the group as a whole. In other words, while the magnitude of liability hinges upon comparisons between background and industrial radiation, (partial) liability itself does not. As far as I know, we do not have the legal machinery to effect compensation in low-probability cases (except perhaps through class action suits), but that is certainly no reason to deny ethical culpability.

In Chapter 6 the author analyzes, and shows ethically wanting, three arguments adduced for the acceptability of the risks of a major reactor accident. The particular arguments are drawn from the Rasmussen report (1975) and from Bethe (1976), but versions of them are ubiquitous. Two of these arguments are as follows: (a) society accepts risks whose consequences are more disastrous than nuclear accidents; and (b) the estimated numbers of cancer deaths and of genetic injuries resulting from a nuclear accident are but a small proportion of the number of injuries caused annually by other accidents.

Shrader-Frechette shows that (a) is a flawed argument by analogy. There are two types of comparisons which are often employed in the nuclear debate. Firstly, there are 'metrestick' comparisons whose function is simply to translate complex technical data into more familiar terms. Secondly, there are 'legitimizing' comparisons which are meant to be employed in arguments by analogy. Clearly, the conditions governing legitimizing comparisons are more stringent, for it must be shown that the ethical features of the situations being compared are on a par. The author shows that nuclear proponents do not demonstrate this parity; for example, they fail to distinguish between voluntarily-chosen and involuntarily-imposed risks. (The distinction between

metrestick and legitimating comparisons is not explicitly employed by Shrader-Frechette, but it is consistent with her analysis. For a discussion of this distinction see Copp and Levy (1981)).

The flavour of (b) can be conveyed by Bethe's conclusion that 'A reactor accident clearly would not be the end of the world... It is less serious than most minor wars' (1976, 26). Shrader-Frechette deftly disposes of one of the key premises of the argument by means of this parody:

Since U.S. burial of its radioactive wastes within one mile outside the established territorial waters of Great Britain would cause less than an 1.66% increase in cancer deaths per year, this risk ought to be taken.(148)

Having applauded the author's handling of these arguments, I must add a pair of criticisms. In the first place, Shrader-Frechette claims that there is a common failing in the arguments; each commits a version of the 'naturalistic fallacy.' Neither this claim nor the discussion of the naturalistic fallacy is particularly helpful or enlightening. Her criticisms of the arguments are aided not a whit by her somewhat simplistic foray into ethical theory. In the second place, in Chapter 6 and elsewhere, the author is critical of utilitarian approaches, including at least some features of cost-benefit analysis. For example, in Chapter 6 she says that, '... to the extent that energy-policy decision-making is utilitarian, it shares the major weaknesses of this ethical theory.' (149) However, these remarks amount to little more than pot-shots. Furthermore, Shrader-Frechette herself adopts the terminology and some of the presuppositions of the theory she criticises. (See, for example, the last sentence of the quotation above, from pp. 116-7). It seems to me that if Shrader-Frechette were to discuss some ethical theory it would have been far better to begin to sort out the acceptable from the unacceptable aspects of utilitarian approaches.

Still, this is an informative and useful volume which deserves to be widely-read and discussed. It could, and should, be used in a variety of courses in philosophy as well as in other disciplines.

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1 Estimates of the effects of low-level radiation are extremely controversial. See for example United States (1981).

2 Usually the limitation mentioned here is thought to be epistemological; that is, it is difficult or inconvenient (or impossible) to know all the relevant parameters. However, according to some interpretations of quantum theory, the probabilities encountered in the atomic domain may be irremovable because there are no further parameters to know; the world is genuinely, irreducibly probabilistic. There is a burgeoning literature on probabilistic causality and probabilistic explanation. (See for example *Synthese* 48: 2-3 (1981).)

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C.L. TEN, *Mill on Liberty*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford U.P. 1980. Pp. x + 195. CN\$ 36.75: US\$ 31.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-824643-9); CN\$ 17.50: US\$ 14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-824644-7).

J.S. Mill's essay *On Liberty*, like his *Utilitarianism*, is one of those texts which promises perpetual employment for commentators and critics. Already it has generated an enormous secondary literature, some of it quite bizarre and most of it unfriendly to Mill's trenchant defence of individual liberty. C.L. Ten's book is another contribution to this literature. Refreshingly, it is not bizarre and it is, for the most part at least, supportive of Mill.

Ten attempts to support two theses about Mill's liberalism: (a) it can be successfully defended against the attacks of Mill's principal opponents; (b) it is inconsistent with Mill's utilitarian morality. The first topic leads Ten into an examination of Mill's positions on the enforcement of morals, paternalism, and freedom of expression, and into collision with such critics as Lord Devlin, Fitzjames Stephen, and Maurice Cranston. For one who espouses Mill's liberalism these chapters are the most satisfying in the book. Ten carefully classifies Mill's main arguments in favour of his conclusions and the main arguments of his critics against them. He then defends the former against the latter. The discussion is a useful summary of the current state of the art regarding these important issues. But it is also more. In this age of resurgent conservatism liberal values are once more under fire from groups as diverse as

religious fundamentalists and radical feminists. Now is the time for philosophers who share these values to reaffirm their soundness and their importance. It is not the least achievement of this book that its author has done his part toward ensuring the survival of liberalism through the present dark age.

Philosophers who are familiar with, and friendly toward, Mill may be more interested in Ten's discussion of the consistency of Mill's moral and political views. The consistency issue in turn divides into two distinct questions: whether Mill was a consistent liberal and whether his liberalism was consistent with his utilitarianism. On the former question Ten's treatment is once more sensible and persuasive. He is particularly effective in his rebuttal of Maurice Cowling's perverse and silly contention that Mill was not really a liberal at all — not even in *On Liberty* — and of Gertrude Himmelfarb's more interesting but nonetheless mistaken 'two Mills' thesis. Here again Ten's book is a useful guide to current interpretations of Mill, and a valuable corrective to their wilder peregrinations.

Ten devotes the first half of the book to the other, and more difficult, consistency question. It is here that the book is philosophically most interesting, but also least satisfying. Ten's contention that Mill's liberalism cannot be supported by Mill's utilitarianism may be regarded as the orthodox view among contemporary commentators. But the orthodox view is here mistaken, and Ten's defence of it is unconvincing.

The consistency problem turns on the absoluteness of Mill's 'one very simple principle' governing the use of coercion by a society collectively against its individual members. That principle prohibits, without exception, coercive interference in purely self-regarding conduct. Utilitarians are committed to favouring activities which are utility-maximizing. But surely there are *some* cases in which coercive interference in self-regarding conduct will maximize utility. How then can there be a utilitarian defence of an absolute prohibition against such interference?

Ten believes that such a defence is possible only if utilitarians decline to include certain harms — those suffered by individuals solely in virtue of their dislike or disapproval of the activities of others — in their calculations of general utility. He further believes that Mill supports his 'one very simple principle' through just such a filtering of utilities. But it is inconsistent for a utilitarian to exclude any sources of happiness or unhappiness. Hence, Mill's principle cannot be given a (consistent) utilitarian defence.

It is inconsistent for a utilitarian to exclude any utilities solely in virtue of the activity from which they result or the manner in which they arise. But Mill does not do so. Nowhere in *Utilitarianism* does Mill allow that offence or injury to feelings, whether based upon personal taste or moral conviction concerning the activities of others, are to be excluded from the utilitarian calculus. Quite the contrary, Mill is emphatic that *all* pleasures and pains are to be included, no matter what or whose they are. (Mill's distinction between quantity and quality entails that pleasures and pains equal in degree may not count equally, but there is here no ground for excluding altogether an entire

class of utilities.) Ten bases his attribution to Mill of the exclusion thesis on a single passage from *On Liberty* in which Mill asserts that 'there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it.' Ten interprets Mill as saying that the feeling of the offended party in this situation may simply be disregarded. But Mill says no such thing. Instead he claims that the two feelings are not equal. This might mean that the former feeling is more intense than the latter (a view also espoused by Bentham), or that coercively protecting the former is legitimate (because utility-maximizing) while coercively protecting the latter is not. On the first interpretation Mill is providing an empirical premise for an argument to his 'one very simple principle' while on the second he is reaffirming the utilitarian support for that principle. In neither case is he discounting, let alone excluding, an entire class of utilities.

Ten imposes his interpretation on Mill in part because he believes that a consistent utilitarian foundation will not support a principle as absolute as Mill's. Mill *must* therefore exclude this class of utilities in order to defend his liberalism. Whether this is so or not is too large a matter to settle here. But it is worth reminding ourselves that utilitarians are not debarred from supporting absolute rules limiting government activity where there are sufficiently important utilities involved and where governments cannot be trusted to discern the appropriate exceptions. In the case of individual liberty Mill believed that the stakes were particularly high because of the value of individuality (a view reinforced by the quality/quantity distinction of *Utilitarianism*) and that the majority, who control government, were precisely the wrong group to decide on legitimate qualifications. He therefore argued that an absolute principle would produce more utility (all utilities included) than any qualified principle. And it is not obvious that he was mistaken.

Ten's attribution to Mill of the exclusion thesis is hasty and ill-grounded. The same may be said for the other respects in which he considers Mill to be an inconsistent utilitarian: Mill's notion of harm to others, his alleged inclusion of a distribution requirement in the maximization of utility, and his supposed failure to distinguish happiness and individuality. In all of these respects Ten treats Mill as departing from the classical Benthamite version of a utilitarian moral theory. Not one of these claims receives an adequate defence — indeed most are initially supported by a paragraph or two of argument and thereafter considered as established. These issues are now too complex and controversial to be settled so perfunctorily.

If Ten's contributions to one important set of controversies are disappointing, this fact should not obscure what has been well done in this book. Even where his own interpretations are inadequately supported, Ten scrupulously examines the views of his major rivals. Thus the book is throughout an accessible introduction to the principal secondary literature concerning *On Liberty*. Unfortunately, however, its achievements are marred by the omission of a subject index and of a thorough proofreading. It is also annoying to find a serious scholar continuing to refer to a popular edition of

Mill's essay when the University of Toronto Press *Collected Works* now include the authoritative edition. The *Collected Works* were undertaken in part so that Mill's commentators might have a reliable common reference point. They cannot achieve this aim if they are ignored.

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ZAK VAN STRAATEN, ed. *Philosophical Subjects: Essays presented to P.F. Strawson*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford U.P. 1980. Pp. vi + 302. Cdn\$ 46.95; US\$ 37.50. ISBN 0-19-824603-X.

This collection of essays, written on the occasion of Peter Strawson's 60th. birthday, covers topics in ethics, philosophical psychology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of language, taking up various themes from Strawson's writings. The quality and the range of this collection bears witness to the magnitude of Strawson's influence on contemporary philosophy.

Strawson's replies cover some essays more thoroughly than others. His choices are undoubtedly dictated not by his estimate of quality but by what he finds of immediate interest or demanding disagreement.

Limitations of space impose eclecticism on this review as well; the unevenness of my coverage is dictated not by my estimate of relative quality but by the limitations of my competence and interests.

Ayer and Jonathan Bennett take up Strawson's claim that a certain range of attitudes ('reactive attitudes') such as admiration, gratitude, approval, blame, and resentment presuppose the ascription of freedom or responsibility to their objects, be these ourselves or others. This freedom makes no sense either on a deterministic view since according to it in all cases we could not have acted otherwise, or on an indeterministic view since according to it some human actions have no causes. Strawson rejects the 'mysterious' view of self-determination, and concludes that ascribing freedom to humans is basically a practical question. He opts for the affirmative on the ground that without it we would lose the 'reactive attitudes' and lead greatly impoverished emotional lives.

Ayer and Bennett agree with the main claims. Ayer adds some

clarifications of determinism (5-6) while Bennett adds interesting material on emotions (23-24) and discusses the difficulties of defining 'reactive attitude.'

All three authors seem to assume that the more we find out about humans, the more support there will be for a deterministic view. (Strawson adds, however, that he finds the idea of fully explaining intentional action and feeling in terms of the exact sciences a 'practical absurdity.' (264)) As the late John L. Austin used to say, however, it might be that the more we find out about certain types of human actions, the more freedom we will be able to ascribe to ourselves in that area. Progress in the social and biological sciences does not prejudice the matter a priori in either direction.

Bennett says that without the 'reactive attitudes' we treat a person merely as 'a case' (21) and Strawson thinks (261) that the surrender of these attitudes would leave us 'more exclusively ratiocinative creatures than before.'

It seems to me that one could have 'cold admiration,' i.e. admiration for qualities in persons rather than for persons (of the sort Plato suggests), even without the maintaining of freedom. There seem to be also quite a few emotions that do not fall into Strawson's class, such as love, care, compassion, kindness, gentleness, sympathy, and respect. This is not to say that we should abandon the idea of freedom, but merely to suggest that the emotional life of a person not sharing in this conviction might be quite rich. The grounds for many of these emotions might be mutuality, the ground for respect be the fact that the other person can have feelings, and the difference between humans and animals be the difference in complexity of their thoughts and emotions. This 'non-Kantian' conception would not separate human ethics from animal ethics quite as sharply. Such an alternative is not considered by the authors.

Does friendship require 'reactive attitudes'? These attitudes seem to center on various aspects of evaluation. Do friendship or love or some of their components such as selectivity, or expectations of reliability require such activities? One of the virtues of the essays is that it forces one to wrestle with such questions.

The question of which interactions presuppose freedom affects also the very interesting essay by Ishiguro in which she argues that the application of the concept of a person is not a matter of some observable criteria (such as bodily continuity, memory responses, etc.) but a matter of what interactions we can enter into with various entities on the basis of these having certain capacities and dispositions. Ishiguro spells out this 'practical notion of a person'; I find this one of the most rewarding sections of the book. Her essay, together with the essays by Ayer and Bennett, with Strawson's replies, provide an excellent foundation for seminars on friendship and human interactions.

The issue of freedom might also affect the issues that Pears discusses. He argues against identification of intentions with unconditional value judgements in favor of some project, on the ground that this view cannot deal adequately with cases of extreme *akrasia*, and he shows also that intentions cannot be identified with mere future beliefs about the carrying out of a

project on the ground that this identification cannot do justice to the causal role that intention plays in generating actions. If ascribing intentions also presuppose freedom, then that would strengthen Pears' case for his own view that intentions are dispositions, since the having of beliefs does not carry this presupposition.

In the only essay that is purely within ethics John Searle criticizes traditional conceptions of 'prima facie obligation' and offers his own formulation that emphasizes the fact that some obligations in some contexts can be outweighed by others. He also defends his derivation of 'ought' from 'is' against Hintikka's criticisms, and in the course of this argues convincingly that genuine irreconcilable moral conflicts are parts of human life. The deontic logicians' perfect worlds are inappropriate idealizations to use in explaining human moral experience.

Five of the essays are devoted to the philosophy of language. L.J. Cohen's essay defends the linguistic theory of proper names according to which names are individuated by their phonological form and achieve unique reference only in use, when they behave like indexicals. Cohen attacks the 'idiosyncratic view,' held by most logicians and philosophers, according to which names are individuated by their unique references, and if a name has more than one reference then it is treated homonymously.

Now it seems that some proper names are parts of natural languages while others — typically family names — are not. Furthermore, names may be syntactically and phonologically parts of a natural language but semantically not; hence we do not translate these from language to language. For the ones that we do translate, the Fregean account seems to work quite well. The remainder do not form a homogeneous class; some come in systems some do not, some have purely descriptive content others do not, some behave like indexicals while others do not. It is not clear that one simple semantic account will fit all of these. Certainly from the linguistic point of view proper names do not form a natural class. It is the dubious analogy between proper names and logical constants that is responsible for the exaggerated importance that proper names have had for recent philosophy of language.

Quine's essay searches for criteria of ontological commitment in natural language and finds these in certain uses of pronouns. Quine sees objective reference in natural languages depending on the use of pronouns in abstracting relative clauses and their interactions with quantifiers (165); the designative use of singular terms hinges on this. (168) Even so, Quine maintains that '... a fenced ontology is just not implicit in ordinary language' (170); hence the need for regimentation.

As I have maintained for some time, pronouns are misnamed. They are pro-anything; we can use them to refer back to verbs, adjectival phrases, sentences, etc. Quine is tightening the criteria by singling out the interaction between quantification and noun phrases that is closer than the interaction between quantification and other parts of speech in English. It would be interesting to see if this fact is language invariant.

Quine's comments about natural languages being 'theory-neutral' makes

one wonder just how far ontological disagreements can be tolerated between people speaking the same natural language.

While Quine presents the conception of formal logic according to which the referential and descriptive roles should be segregated and assigned to different elements, in his reply Strawson argues that given the main uses of ordinary language it is important that the same element should have both functions (290-2). In a conversational setting there is shared background information and ontological agreement. Identifying reference relies on that. In formal logic the background is provided, quite differently, by decisions about the domains in interpretations. As I see it, there are no rights and wrongs in this matter; but this difference in the purposes and thus structure of formal logic and natural language points to one of the key difficulties in trying to map in any close way one unto the other.

Geach's essay deals mainly with predication and negation. He contrasts dualistic with tripartite analyses of predication and construes Strawson as subscribing to the latter. But in his reply Strawson points out that though he sees three roles or functions, he thinks that only two elements are involved. The one-to-one correspondence in role and element that Geach as a logician assumes and Strawson's insistence of the lack of isomorphism here brings us again to the issue I just mentioned in connection with Quine's essay; namely that different principles will guide an analysis of language use from the ones guiding the formal analysis of the expressive power of a language.

In taking up Strawson's analysis of negation Geach argues — successfully, it seems to me — that incompatibility is not prior to negation (180-1), but agrees with Strawson that it makes no sense to negate names for particulars. He does think, however, that this point does not provide foundational support for explaining the subject-predicate distinction.

I am afraid that even these restatements of the arguments for the impossibility of negating names for particulars leaves me unconvinced. It is true that 'not-red' and 'not John' represent different kinds of negatives; the latter referring either to all particulars that do not overlap with John, or to the ones that do not overlap completely with him. It is also true that ranges of predicates like colour terms form sets of incompatibles differently from the way in which 'John,' 'Karen,' 'Joan,' etc. form a set of incompatibles from the point of view of questions like: 'Who left the door unlocked?' But I have yet to see a noncircular *way of explaining* the differences.

McDowell and Wiggins write on general features of theories of meaning. In their exchange Strawson and McDowell agree that interest in communicational intentions is compatible with interest in formal semantic analysis, but disagree on the details of how to analyze communicational intention. In his reply Strawson points out (285-6) that underlying the disagreements there are two different conceptions of ordinary language use. Strawson and Grice start with creatures who have fully developed intentions and view language as a kind of invention by such, while McDowell starts with the transmission of information among not fully conscious creatures and builds up fully conscious communication from that level.

The interesting points in Wiggins' essay include his view that ethical statements have truth value, that merely knowing truth-conditions cannot exhaust what it is to understand a language, and that the so-called principle of charity according to which we should assume in radical translation that many or most of the informant's statements are true, needs to be replaced with something more realistic and contextual that Wiggins calls the principle of humanity. (199)

Wiggins identifies five marks of truth; the norm of speakers asserting what they believe, the norm of convergence among believers towards truth, the independence of assertibility from whether speakers recognize this property, the grounding of assertibility on justifiability, and the principle of compositionality (if s' is assertible and so is s'' then the conjunction is also assertible).

Wiggins and Strawson think that such a theory of truth will be an essential part of an over-all theory of meaning. I would juxtapose this grandiose scheme and the approach that would model the empirical sciences and would study in isolation and under abstraction different aspects of linguistic competence.

J.L. Mackie's essay, 'The Transcendental "I"' examines whether 'I' is a genuine referring expression, and whether it has empirical content. The views of Kant, Descartes, Strawson, Anscombe, and Vendler are examined, and Mackie presents a view of his own as well. Detailed examination of this undoubtedly valuable paper lies beyond the range of my competence.

The very interesting essay by the late Gareth Evans deals with Strawson's imaginative work on 'the world of sounds.' At stake is the Kantian thesis that spatiality is a necessary condition for our conceptions of the sensible world. Strawson argued earlier that a person with purely auditory sensations could not obtain either the concept of space or that of the objective sensible world as we have it. Evans finds fault with Strawson's arguments but substitutes two of his own.

In the course of the discussions the concepts of space (109), identity, reidentification, continuity, and the grounds for making sense of the reality of unperceived sounds or visual data are examined. Evans argues that the issue of objectivity should be separated from that of identity and reidentification. We can have objectivity and continuity even in a world that instantiates only feature-placing universals. Continuity across sensory gaps is the crucial notion for objectivity (84), and 'to defend the Kantian thesis, the idea of space must be shown to be implicitly involved in the very idea of existence unperceived ...' (87) He thinks that the arguments marshalled so far do not succeed in showing that.

In his reply Strawson argues that the issue is not one of the priority of one sense over another, but the fact that a creature with only sensory input — regardless of which or how many senses — and without theoretical concepts, could not have the notion of an independent material substance causally underlying the secondary qualities.

Because of limitations of space, it is impossible to even begin to comment

on all of the interesting issues here. It should suffice to say that I regard this exchange as an ideal text for a graduate metaphysics seminar. But my admiration for it still leaves me in doubt with regards to the point of the larger enterprise. It is apparently agreed that it is not possible to have the concept of objectivity, even with the experience of space, unless the agent is capable of having non-empirical concepts. Is then the question whether having certain experiences drive us to the notion of an objective world? The answer to this question must be negative, since solipsism cannot be shown to be incoherent. Maybe there is a remnant of empiricism seeping into this splendid metaphysical exchange, and there is a lingering feeling that we could specify the concepts from which we can abstract the notion of objectivity; I am convinced, however, that no such abstraction is possible.

To sum up, if we can believe the contributors, Strawson never got anything completely right, but got an amazing number of central insights across all of the main fields of philosophy almost right. Few philosophers share this honor with him. Unlike so many philosophers of our times, Strawson succeeded in not inundating his philosophy with one fashionable formalism or another, and in not aiming at the kind of pseudo-perfection and precision in argumentation that prevents so many philosophers from presenting us with new and important ways of seeing the world. There is a unity in Strawson's way of philosophizing which he maintained regardless of the tide and ebb of fashions. I remember Oxford seminars of his at which I could barely get a seat, and others at which I was one of three participants left at the end. I do not think that these fluctuations made any difference to Strawson. He maintained his vision of philosophy and used it to make important contributions that have ties both to analytic philosophy and to the traditional concerns that humans expect philosophy to have. For this we can all be deeply grateful to him.

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LEONE VIVANTE, *Essays on Art and Ontology*. Salt Lake City: U. of Utah Press 1980. Pp. xvi + 137. US\$ 15.00. ISBN 0-87480-100-1.

This is not a book which is likely to find a large audience among philosophers or philosophically-oriented aestheticians. To some, its talk of

'Being' and its rejection of 'determinism' in favor of an essential indeterminism will suggest existentialist analysis, particularly Heidegger. But this is misleading. Leone Vivante is no existentialist. According to the brief biographical sketch by his son, Vivante had little relation to academic philosophy or criticism. He intentionally kept himself apart from its presumed aridity. It must be said that this book suffers from that isolation. It addresses basic problems of the philosophy of mind, particularly the relation of mind and external reality and relates them to art and aesthetic perception. But its language is unsystematic, and it suffers from a failure to consider even minimally what has been accomplished in contemporary philosophical analysis. This would be forgivable if the book did not presume to work with a technical philosophical vocabulary. As it is, the result is not very satisfactory.

The substance of Vivante's essays represents yet another attempt to reverse the traditional categories of metaphysical speculation. For Vivante, psychic rather than physical reality has ontological priority. Beginning with this interior reality, Vivante describes it by inverting traditional terminology. The infinite, not the finite, is immediately accessible. Indeterminate moments rather than determinate sequence constitute the real. Possibility and potentiality rather than actuality describe being. 'Potentiality' Vivante describes as 'actually experienced reality.' (130) It demonstrates particularly well the reversal he has in mind. Since such actually experienced moments cannot be fixed, they represent to him a kind of open, psychically extended realm. He speaks of this potentiality as a force, though it is not a physical field or a relation of things but an origin, a source of the ontologically new which in some sense defies the conservation of matter and energy and entropy to replenish the universe. (Vivante quotes Fred Hoyle on the continuous creation of the universe with approval — cf. p. 65.) Thus while potentiality and the ontologically new are founded in psychic reality, Vivante's interpretation is not fundamentally introspective. The categories which he seeks to generate are impersonal and largely free from psychological interpretations.

Art and the aesthetic enter Vivante's scheme as the primary manifestation of the ontologically new. Indeterminism finds its fundamental expression in art. Art is creative; it cannot be fitted into the deterministic moulds of explanation, prediction, and relation to other things.

A work of art ... is an immediate actualization and revelation of an inextricable nucleus of values absolutely inherent in a present origin or in an intimate activity or in form (understood as a formative principle): it is form in its value of creativity, of oneness, in its value of infinite transparency in itself and by itself (potentiality) as well as in the strength of the powerful characterization intrinsic to its originality (value of universality). (97)

Art is interior and intimate. It defies the exteriority of determinism which is not capable of intelligence. (43)

Art is fundamental to Vivante's scheme because it encompasses value. The realm of indeterminism is a realm of value; no division between fact and value

can exist where 'fact' is immediate, infinite and potential rather than dead reality. Art is the sensible form of that value and the artist is its priest. Vivante quotes Keats to illustrate that 'it is particularly the poet who recognizes in the originary new the mode of values and the aspects inherent in the positivity-originality of being in their germinally present relationships.' (84) Art and the artist are ideal forms unlimited by actual practice. Vivante is interested in Art as part of a mind-body relation more than art works or working artists.

Vivante does not argue for or demonstrate his position. His technique is to pile up clauses and associated words until the association replaces any actual denotation in the sentences. At times, this can be effective. One has a sense that the relation of mind and body is indeed being confronted here. We are not asked to perceive details but to feel a problem. But any attempt to extract from this procedure a coherent argument is bound to be misleading. Vivante's language lacks reference and coherence. Perhaps he might claim that this is necessary to overcome our deterministic biases, but in fact he is as dependent on the very system he rejects as any traditional philosopher. Without the negatives — what mind and art are not — we would be totally unable to grasp any of the barrage of abstractions which Vivante presents as concrete nouns. As it is, I doubt that any consistent formulation of Vivante's position is possible on the basis of these essays.

It is possible to place this work roughly if not exactly. It depends on the kind of dialectical tension formidably represented by Plotinus and Nietzsche. For example, Vivante writes, 'For "originality," "creativity," "freedom," and finally, all the words of the spirit not to be empty words, we must face the difficult concept of a negative absolutely inherent in positivity.' (31) But unlike Plotinus, the dialectic does not arise from a consistent logical force, and unlike Nietzsche, who never loses the negative, the dialectic is subverted into its own quasi-positivity. Vivante is closer to the romantics, about whom he has written, in finding an inexplicable 'something' at the heart of creativity. (What else are we to make of a '*primary plasma*' ... 'at one and the same time thought ... and capacity for external relations'? (104) Perhaps the closest analogy would be to Goethe's biological writings — a kind of quasi-scientific romanticism which appears now as an odd footnote to the development of modern biology.

It is difficult not to simply reject this book out of hand. Its language is imprecise and sometimes silly. (We are told that art 'attains a *virginity* that is ultimate essence.' (135) One would have thought that virginity was something with which a being starts; it can hardly be attained!) It commits blatantly and self-consciously all of the fallacies against which contemporary conceptual analysis has warned us. (Just what could 'ultimate essence' mean here — aside from being redundant?) As an analysis of art, it has little concrete to say. If we should not reject the book immediately, it is only because that would be to give in to its dialectical strategy. It presumes rejection by 'determinist' philosophy. In fact, the arguments such as they are require the very ontology they reject. Without discrete things, the negations of this dialectic would be wholly unintelligible. In the final analysis, it is this

parasitic dependence on a traditional positivist science and not just the frustrating incoherence of its language which reveals the failure of Vivante's enterprise.

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