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The Meaning of Illegitimacy

by Jenny Teichman

(Fellow and Director of Studies in Philosophy, New Hall, Cambridge)

The book sheds light on the concepts of illegitimacy by presenting legal, social, historical, economic and moral aspects of illegitimacy as a status.

The book is of interest to philosophers, lawyers and social scientists as a matter of professional concern, and indeed to any reflective individual who wishes to understand more deeply this aspect of social life.

(Reviewed in *Philosophical Review* April 1981)

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R.E. ALLEN, *Socrates and Legal Obligation*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1980. Pp. ix + 148. US\$ 17.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-0962-4); US\$ 8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-0965-9)

This book consists of translations of, and comments upon, Plato's *Apology* and *Crito*. I am not qualified to assess the quality of the translations, but we have the author's word for it that this is not a crippling shortcoming. 'Translations of the *Apology* and *Crito* have been included,' he says, 'not because the world is groaning for them — they have been well translated already — but as an aid to the reader and a control on interpretation.' (ix)

Professor Allen states his objective in the Introduction: 'If the account which follows succeeds in making the *Apology* better understood, and helps restore the *Crito* to its rightful place as a classic statement of the grounds of legal obligation, it will have served its purpose.' (viii) Discussion of the *Apology* is contained in four essays, two of which are much briefer and less important than the others. In 'The Historical Background of the Charges' Allen examines the meaning of the charge of impiety in ancient Athens and finds that it generally referred to violations of ritual observance rather than unorthodoxy in belief. He finds also that there is good reason to believe that the animus against Socrates amongst prominent democrats still ran strong at the time of his trial and hence that Socrates was on the mark when he concentrated attention on his 'first accusers.' And in 'The Issue of Historicity' Allen maintains that there is good evidence that the *Apology* reproduces the general substance of what Socrates said, and no good evidence that it does not.

The longest of the essays on the *Apology* is 'Irony and Rhetoric in Plato's *Apology*.' The thesis of this essay is that the *Apology* contains two levels of irony and two corresponding levels of rhetoric. The first level of irony is that in which 'Socrates disclaims ability to make a speech, and makes so able a speech that it is a masterpiece of rhetoric.' (6) The second level of irony is that in which Socrates, while making a masterful speech, demonstrates that he is incapable of making an appropriate speech. Knowing only that he knows nothing, Socrates is unable to defend himself against his accusers. The most he can do — and all he attempts to do — is show that his accusers cannot substantiate their charges. The discussion of irony is nicely argued, but the discussion of rhetoric is much less successful. The latter is built on a distin-

ction between 'base' rhetoric, 'aiming at gratification and pleasure, and indifferent to truth or the good of the soul'; and 'philosophical' rhetoric, 'aiming at truth and the good of the soul, and indifferent to gratification and pleasure.' (12) This distinction is clear enough, but before the cautious reader will be prepared to accept reasoning based upon it he will want to be convinced that it is indeed a distinction between two kinds of rhetoric rather than, say, a distinction between rhetoric and something else. As far as I can see, the author does not show — indeed, does not even try to show — that this is so.

In 'The Issue of Legality,' which is by far the most provocative of the essays on the *Apology*, Professor Allen casts doubt on the legality of the conviction of Socrates. His starting point is the plausible claim that law, or at least criminal law, involves two closely interconnected, broadly procedural, principles. The 'principles of procedural fairness' specifies that 'no free man ... shall be subject to penal liability without notice and an opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal.' And the 'principle of legality' prescribes that 'no free man shall be subject to penal liability imposed retroactively, nor except according to a clearly defined standard of wrong.' (22) Allen argues convincingly that the Athenian legal system violated these principles so severely that a person could be — and Socrates was — put on trial for his 'character' rather than his 'conduct.' And he concludes that 'Athenian law, because of its procedural inadequacies, fell short of lawfulness, that in operation it was too often a specimen of lawless law,' even though he affirms that 'Athenian law was surely law.' (32) The author acknowledges that 'there are those who claim to find in the notion of "lawless law" a contradiction in terms.' I find this gratifying, for I am one of them. Nevertheless, I believe that he is on to something true and important, namely that putative law may violate such principles as he states so seriously as to fail to be law at all. But of course no law perfectly satisfies these principles. Far more helpful, therefore, in my view, than talk about "lawless law" would have been an effort to chart the terrain around the border between law and non-law.

The three essays on the *Crito* argue — against both those who maintain that the dialogue merely exhibits Socrates' beauty of character and those who maintain that it contains nothing more than a set of loosely related considerations which are sufficient only to set at ease Crito's not-too-penetrating mind — that it presents a tight, crisp argument which adds up to 'a classic statement of the grounds of legal obligation.' This theory, according to Allen, is based on two main concepts, consent and wrongful injury. Consent plays a crucial role, in this interpretation, even though the theory is not, strictly speaking, a consent theory. It is not a consent theory, because the wrong that Socrates would commit by escaping is not violation of a promise or a contract with the Laws of Athens, but wrongful injury of them. Consent is a vital ingredient, however, for without it Socrates would not fall within the scope of the authority of Athenian law, and therefore would not be in a position to inflict wrongful injury upon it. Being bound by a valid implied agreement, however, Socrates is in a position to inflict wrongful injury. And this he would do by escaping, even if unjustly convicted and sentenced, for it is in

the nature of legal processes that errors are made. (Needless to say, it is important to bear in mind here that Socrates' credo prohibited inflicting injustice but not suffering it, so that one can be bound to suffer injustice but never to inflict it.) Thus, according to Allen, the *Crito* 'presents one argument with two interlocking premises. It is the premise of injury, however, not the premise of agreement, which is primary: for it is on the wrongfulness of doing injury or injustice that the weight of the argument rests.' (112)

I have sketched Professor Allen's argument very sparsely. He develops it forcefully and carefully, paying considerable attention to obvious and not-so-obvious objections. In my judgment, his analysis demolishes not only the view that the *Crito* is merely a profile of courage but also the more extreme versions of the view that the considerations presented in it are disparate and unintegrated. Nevertheless, his analysis neglects or deals insufficiently with too many considerations to be entirely convincing. For example, Socrates has the Laws of Athens place some emphasis on the fact that he could have emigrated if he had found his birthplace unsatisfactory. But what of polities from which emigration is illegal and persons who, for whatever reason, cannot emigrate? Are they exempt from legal obligation? The Laws differentiate between better (e.g., Sparta) and worse (e.g., Thessaly) polities. Is legal obligation of full force and effect in the latter? Can, indeed, legal obligation be considered satisfactorily in isolation from broader questions of political obligation? Professor Allen's argument rests heavily on the (undoubtedly correct) claim that legal obligations are not dissolved by any and every injustice in the legal process: human fallibility does not negate the rule of law. But what of extremely severe injustices, or persistent and widespread ones? And what, to return to a point made in connection with the *Apology*, of 'laws' which deeply offend against the principles of legality and procedural fairness? Without answers to these and related questions (e.g., about the openness of the Laws to persuasion), the claim that the *Crito* presents an integrated and coherent theory of legal obligation must be judged not proven.

Socrates and Legal Obligation does not, in my view, attain its lofty objective. But that objective is lofty indeed, and failure to attain it is consistent with lesser, but still important successes. The essays are well written, well organized, and well documented. They are provocative. And, most important, they do shed light on the *Apology* and the *Crito*. The inclusion of these essays within covers that also contain translations of the two dialogues creates an attractive package for courses in legal and political philosophy.

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ROBERT ALMEDER, *The Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P. 1980; Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield 1980. Pp. ix + 205. CN\$ 52.50. ISBN 0-631-12492-6; US\$ 27.50. ISBN 0-8476-6854-1.

Prof. Almeder's book is a thoughtful and argumentative study devoted to several cardinal doctrines of Peirce's philosophy. The first chapter (by far the longest, comprising half the book) is on Peirce's theory of knowledge. Four other chapters follow: Peirce's epistemological realism; his theory of perception; his idealism; his logical and scholastic realism and its relation to and divergence from the theories of Duns Scotus.

Almeder's focus throughout is on the later thought of Peirce (i.e., after 1890), and this is entirely justified for the author's intention is not to engage in a historical study of the development and shaping of Peirce's outlook. It is announced rather as a 'rational reconstruction' of Peirce's philosophy. The reconstruction is an attempt to formulate accurately, clarify, and argue for the coherence and merits of Peirce's views primarily on the theory of knowledge and epistemological realism. In each of the chapters Almeder deals with a large number of problems and contested issues; many of these are currently under debate and Almeder's discussion is made stimulating by reference to the work of contemporary philosophers in this connection. Considerable attention, for example, is given to Quine's criticisms of Peirce's theory of truth and meaning. Some of these reconstructions and arguments are novel and well worth serious consideration; some others have already received ample treatment and Almeder would have done better to cite the existing literature and to move on.

Beginning with an account of Peirce's later writings on the nature of inquiry, signs and meaning, Almeder proceeds to canvass such items as how Peirce can distinguish the firm acceptance of a belief and its truth; how the pragmatic maxim is not to be equated with the verifiability theory of meaning; Peirce's views on the analytic-synthetic distinction; his holism; his acceptance of abstract entities; how for Peirce to 'know *p*' does not entail *p* being true but (consistent with his fallibilism) means, roughly, *p* is accepted as warranted or with good reasons; the evolutionary and progressive character of systematic knowledge; whether in principle scientific inquiry can answer an infinite number of questions — and so on. I have mentioned only a few of the topics dealt with in the first chapter.

If a criticism is to be made, it is that Almeder tries to cover too much in too limited a space. The result is often alternately diffuse with assorted disputatious points of epistemology and sketchy analyses. There is also some laxity in the organization of these discussions and an infelicitous tendency to repetition. Thus, in a single paragraph (86-87) we encounter:

In other words, given (A), (B) and (C) we want to say that common sense propositions are true in the coherence sense of the term

simply because these propositions are not really doubted... Hence propositions of common sense are true in the coherence sense because they are not really doubted, but they are not *ipso facto* true in the correspondence sense. Thus, given (A), (B) and (C), we could read Peirce as saying that propositions of common sense are true in the coherence sense of truth because they are not really doubted but they are not *ipso facto* true in the correspondence sense of true.

Again, on p. 85 we are presented with a long quotation from Peirce (22 lines) only to meet the same quotation repeated entire (with two more lines added) on p. 89. Even the most ardent admirers of Peirce, subjected to this kind of merciless reiteration, will experience some flagging of interest.

There is a suggestive and possibly important line taken by Peirce that all reasoning is synthetic and proceeds by means of signs and that mathematical reasoning is essentially experimental — that is, experimenting with diagrams and drawing hypothetical consequences from them. This would seem a vital topic for Almeder on Peirce's theory of knowledge. However, what we are given (40) is:

...the apparently necessary character of mathematical and logical reasoning is due simply to the circumstances that the subject of the observation is a diagram of our own creation, a hypothetical state of affairs the conditions of whose being we know all about since we create it.

And again (48):

Hence the apparently necessary character of mathematical and logical reasoning is due simply to the circumstances that the subject of the observation and experiment is a diagram of our own creation, the conditions of whose being we know all about.

After each of these almost identical pronouncements Almeder concludes that the subject is a 'long story' into which he cannot venture. Peirce's suggestions are tantalizing but obscure (and so is Almeder above). Peirce was evidently working out an interpretation of logic and mathematics which eschewed the traditional ways of assigning them either a necessary and analytic meaning or that of a very general (and falsifiable) empirical content. Surely here is a subject in the theory of knowledge whose investigation and 'rational reconstruction' could be of very great value. And to pursue it would require a study of the splendid edition of Peirce's mathematical writings made available to us by Carolyn Eisele, alas, not even mentioned in Almeder's book.

Almeder has an interesting view of Peirce's theory of truth according to which truth is not an ideal limit of inquiry (as most commentators suppose). The limit is rather 'a probability value of 1 that the proposition is true.' (46)

This allows for the possibility (again conforming with Peirce's fallibilism) that the probability of the truth of a proposition can increasingly approximate to 1, making it *practically* sure to be true, although never *certainly* true (always allowing the possibility of revision of its truth value). Here again the presentation is sketchy. The idea is worked somewhat tortuously through critical discussions of other related topics (whether Peirce was right in believing that inquiry will continue indefinitely) and a spirited response to criticisms by Quine, Scheffler, and Russell. The truth issue comes to the fore in pp. 46, 59-62. But a clearer and more thorough account is wanted. Almeder suggests that a proposition in being subject to inquiry can be assigned a probability of truth — and the probability can come close to 1 with successive confirming instances. However I think there are problems. For one, each confirming instance is itself subject to fallibility and, presumably, its status as 'truly' a confirming instance is to be assigned a probability value which, with further inquiry, might approach 1. But then we require further inquiry and confirmation of the instance as confirmatory; and this in turn will require another order of successive confirming instances and so invites an endless regress. Further, it is not clear to me how Peirce's conception of probability as the limit of a relative frequency can work in Almeder's scheme where single propositions or hypotheses are assigned probability values. Finally, Peirce's general view of how we can increasingly refine the system of knowledge and gain ever more reliable and precise results seems to take as a model the process of computation (e.g., computing the value of π). But it is not at all obvious that the process of confirming a hypothesis by scientific inquiry to attain a final opinion, while it might make use of computations, is itself a computational process comparable to computing the value of π . Difficulties (perhaps confusions) of this sort arise in connection with what Almeder has to say on these matters, and one wishes he had taken more pains to clarify his discussion so as to resolve or dispel the readers' puzzlement.

Almeder's other chapters on Peirce's epistemological realism (and, as he puts it, the compatibility of Peirce's conceptual idealism and epistemological realism) and Peirce's theory of perception and his idealism are brief but informative. The final chapter on Peirce and Scotistic realism is less successful. A number of philosophically interesting issues on realism, universals, and Peirce's denial of 'absolute' individuals and his conception of the essence of a thing as relational and the sum of its habits for action are touched on. But Duns Scotus is not an easy author to tackle; and to discern just what in Scotus Peirce drew upon (or thought he was drawing upon) is formidable, although Almeder has some helpful suggestions. When we come to Peirce's categories of First, Second, and Thirdness, we are in a notoriously vexed subject matter. Almeder's discussion is often perceptive, but twenty pages hardly suffice for a clear statement of the points in question, let alone their solution.

I have mentioned some of the weaknesses in this uneven reconstruction and evaluation of the philosophy of Peirce. Let me hasten to add that none of them are fatal. The reader is deterred but not defeated. And it would be unjust not to draw attention to an important feature of this book. Many readers of

Peirce have been intrigued and impressed by his theory of inquiry, his arguments against Cartesianism, and his view of the nature and procedures of science. But they have been equally repelled by the obscurity of his 'scholastic realism,' his evolutionary metaphysics according to which the world began in a state of 'pure chance,' and matter is 'effete mind.' It is tempting, therefore, to envisage two Peirce's: one, the responsible and profound scientist-philosopher, the other, an undisciplined metaphysician given to idealistic and mystical enthusiasms. As we come to learn more about Peirce's thought, thanks to able scholars, we begin to see that the two-Peirce version will not stand scrutiny. The visionary speculations are not irresponsible or altogether odd when we follow the development of his thought and idiom scrupulously and from the inside. It is a merit of Almeder's book to indicate the unity and coherence of Peirce's theorizing and, on some specific issues the plausibility of what, on first encounter, seems at such variance with the normal course of professional philosophy. This reconstruction succeeds at least in assisting us to appreciate the extraordinary fertility of Peirce's thought, and that is commendable indeed. And if we are not entirely enlightened on what it professes to accomplish, neither are we left wholly in the dark.

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REINHARD BRANDT, ed., *John Locke, Symposium Wolfenbüttel 1979*. New York: Walter de Gruyter 1981. Pp. 234. US\$ 40. ISBN 3-11-008266-7.

In terms of its individual essays this collection contains much worthwhile material: some of the essays are excellent, none are without interest. The collection's weakness is the near-total absence of editorial control. I have in mind not so much the liberal though uneven sprinkling of typographical errors (four of them on p. 108 alone), but the fact that the only evidence of control consists in the alphabetical ordering of the essays. The resulting product calls to mind Locke's image of 'a rope of sand' or 'a rope of gold'

dust.' Neither image quite fits, for not all of it is gold though some of it certainly is, and the cohesion of the articles is stronger than either image, or the mere alphabetical arrangement, would indicate.

When the Foreword states that these are papers delivered at the first of a planned series of symposia on the philosophy of the Enlightenment, it should not arouse expectations of a particular thematic unity; the only explicit discussion of Locke and the Enlightenment is in the four-page Introduction (in German) by Reinhard Brandt. Brandt's insightful comments bear no relationship whatsoever to the following essays with the exception (and that only implicitly) of Edmund Leites' 'Locke's Liberal Theory of Parenthood,' in which we find a straightforwardly clear account of Locke's views on childrearing and an argument to the effect that Locke's insistence on the imposition of parental authority does not breed a generation of adults ready to submit to political dictatorship but, instead, mature persons who walk by the light of reason. Although there are no new insights in Leites' paper, it at least deals with a topic dear to the Enlightenment's heart. To say that there are no new insights may be too harsh for, with a flourish in its closing paragraphs, eighteenth-century sexual frigidity is blamed on bachelor Locke's seventeenth-century doctrines — a startling conclusion introduced on weak grounds. If it is correct then at least one tendency of Locke's educational theory goes against the grain of central Enlightenment thought; for most *philosophes* the sexual side of man was to be accentuated rather than repressed.

Although there is no overall thematic unity, the various papers do fall within certain classes. Many of them focus on epistemological issues. Here I would place those of Michael R. Ayers, Lorenz Krüger, G.A.J. Rogers, H.A. Schankula, Roger S. Woolhouse, and John W. Yolton. Some, namely those of John Dunn and Wolfgang von Leyden, are mainly in political theory. Others, John R. Milton's and Udo Thiel's, are best classified as 'metaphysical.' Some of these papers support or complement one another, others clearly conflict. Of the latter, take Brandt's and Schankula's. Whereas the first sentence of Brandt's 'Observations on the First Draft of the Essay concerning human understanding' states that 'The *First Draft* or *Draft A* is not ... the provisional sketch of a work complete in itself, but it is the first part or epistemological introduction of a work on "things themselves"' (where 'things themselves' are said to be, for example, 'miracles,' and 'the invisible God'), Schankula argues that *Draft A* contains all the major 'mature' opinions of the *Essay*. Brandt's thesis tends to get lost in the various other details of his paper, while Schankula carefully supports this part of his position. (This is not the most central part of Schankula's paper. His main contention is that '... Locke rejected Descartes' science and philosophy of science precisely because he rejected his epistemology; furthermore, that he rejected Descartes' epistemology precisely because he rejected his method and logic.') (174) It seems to me that the opposite to Schankula's thesis is more defensible: because Locke accepted Descartes' method therefore much of his epistemology shows a close affinity with Descartes', etc. Which of these does greater justice to Locke the reader

can judge for himself by juxtaposing Schankula's paper to chapter six of my *The Imposition of Method, a Study of Descartes and Locke*.)

That the symposiasts made no attempt to relate their papers to one another is more forgivable than the editor's failure to provide the kind of organization which would have enhanced the volume. But now, on to some of the gold dust and to some more of the sand — in alphabetical order, of course.

Michael Ayers concludes that Locke's doctrine of abstraction is 'an attempt to explain the universality, necessity, *a priori* cognizability and timelessness of the eternal truths without impugning the sensory character of what is before the mind' (12), by arguing that what Locke holds to be before the mind when it has 'abstracted' is a distinct token of the same precise type. One only wonders how this convincingly argued thesis fits with Locke's epistemic atomism.

John Dunn's central concern is '... how far it is possible in detail to illuminate the question of why intellectual agents have one set of purposes, wants and beliefs rather than another which they readily could have had (and more particularly to illuminate the question of why they choose to adopt one set of beliefs in preference to another which they explicitly consider).' (47) This is a question about ideology as a category of explanation. Dunn first presents a general discussion, next a particular illustration. The former is a sensitive deepening of insight into the role of ideology in making someone the person he ends up being. The latter, presented in terms of major doctrines of Locke's political and philosophical works, as well as in terms of his correspondence, leaves us with a sketch of an alternative view to that presented in Macpherson's *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*. It presents Locke as a person for whom the 'fundamental terms' of his theory were set by 'the simple frame of Puritan religious values ... within which he rethought the meaning of human existence throughout more than four decades of very active intellectual life.' (67) Once more of the details of this sketch are drawn I suspect the characterization of these 'fundamental terms' will be found to be too narrow, because the juxtaposition (on pp. 53, 57, 66) of 'a strongly felt religious individualism' and 'a potentially incompatible theory of knowledge' — as if individualism were absent from the latter — does less than justice to Locke's position.

Lorenz Krüger argues that although in some passages of the *Essay* Locke recognizes that 'intersubjective and active experience in everyday life is the appropriate standard for certainty of cognition' (87) nevertheless in general Locke has no place for either activity or intersubjectivity in his epistemology. Krüger attempts to illustrate the former in terms of passages in which Locke stresses the 'passivity' of perception, particularly of obtaining our simple ideas; the latter he does not attempt to illustrate from Locke's text but assumes to be the case from Locke's doctrines of the contingency between (private) idea and (public) language. On the former Krüger is clearly wrong, for Locke explicitly holds — as Krüger says Locke should but does not — that acquiring simple ideas involves both a given and an active process of analysis

or abstraction (see, e.g., the *Essay*, 2.12.1). As to the latter, Krüger is on firmer ground. One wonders, however, whether some form of the doctrine of intersubjectivity is implicit in Locke's concept of the universality of human reason?

When von Leyden ('L' before 'v' even when the book is not in German?) explores why Locke labels as 'strange' his own doctrine that in the state of nature the executive power of the law of nature lies in the hands of each individual person (a 'strange' doctrine because, given a person's self-love, punishment is apt to degenerate into indulgence or revenge depending on whether the offender is a friend or an enemy) he at the same time shows that it is less 'strange' than Hobbes' doctrine. This is because for Locke an individual has the right to punish once his judgment is determined by reason, while for Hobbes the right to punish belongs only to the sovereign, who has the right to punish as he pleases. In his closing pages von Leyden presents a brief but helpful discussion of Locke's doctrine of the individual's right to punish in terms of the equation which Locke attempted to establish 'between degrees of guilt and desert on the one hand, and those of deterrence and compensation on the other.'

Although J.R. Milton's name is not listed in the *Vorbemerkung* among those of the participants in the symposium he nevertheless provides a valuable discussion of the role of nominalism in Locke's thought, in part in terms of Locke's concepts of 'nominal' and 'real' essence. He concludes with a brief exploration of some of the philosophical problems into which Locke was led by the acceptance of nominalism.

One of the valuable points Rogers' discussion establishes is that when Locke speaks of a deductive system of ethics, of ethical principles deduced from self-evident premises, such premises need not, indeed cannot, be analytic. A related but more contentious point is that it is 'impossible to overestimate the primacy of Locke's theism for his whole account of the natural and moral order.' (156) This is contentious because it need not necessarily follow that just because, in Locke's words (quoted on p. 157), 'certain essential features of things are immutable, and [therefore] certain duties arise out of necessity and cannot be other than they are,' these things and their immutable nature are as they are because God willed them to be so. In other words, it is not demonstrated that Locke's view on law would need drastic emendation if the notion of a transcendent God were removed from his position. (The point that *Locke* says it would is not, of course, at issue.)

John W. Yolton's contribution provides further support for the position he has been arguing over a number of years, namely, that for Locke ideas are not entities which stand between the perceiver and the object perceived. With this article the cumulative picture is such that to continue to describe Locke as a representative realist would be an exhibition of stubbornness.

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GHYSLAIN CHARRON, *Freud et le problème de la culpabilité*. Ottawa: Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, (Collection Philosophica) 1980. 190 p. \$ 6.50. ISBN: 2-7603-1026-4

L'Auteur étudie un thème central de la pensée freudienne, celui du sentiment de culpabilité. Trois approches sont successivement menées, qui structurent l'ensemble du travail: les descriptions cliniques du sentiment de culpabilité, les diverses théories métapsychologiques construites pour l'expliquer, et une réflexion sur le statut épistémologique du discours freudien portant sur le phénomène considéré.

Certains traits importants du sentiment de culpabilité émergent progressivement de la description clinique. La névrose obsessionnelle, suivant l'analyse de l'Homme aux rats, s'explique par l'ambivalence des sentiments à l'égard du père. L'examen de la mélancolie ajoute un élément déterminant, celui de la régression de l'objet d'amour à l'identification, révélant par là que le choix d'objet s'était fait sur le mode narcissique. Le sentiment de culpabilité prend alors plus nettement sa place comme conséquence d'un conflit entre une instance accusatrice et le moi soumis. Enfin, le phénomène de la réaction thérapeutique négative met en évidence l'aspect inconscient du sentiment de culpabilité et se comprend par sa relation aux désirs masochistes.

L'étude métapsychologique du sentiment de culpabilité amène l'Auteur à exposer les thèses principales de Freud. Dans le progrès de la compréhension freudienne, les points fondamentaux sont le destin de l'affect, la relation entre le moi et le surmoi, le sens du sadisme et du masochisme, l'origine ontogénétique et phylogénétique du sentiment de culpabilité.

De façon particulière, l'Auteur insiste sur l'imprécision de certains concepts freudiens et tente de les clarifier. Tout d'abord, dans la série des termes, moi idéal du moi et surmoi, il montre que Freud n'a pas réussi à donner une signification univoque à ces concepts; il suggère de mettre les deux premiers termes en rapport avec le narcissisme, et le troisième avec l'instance critique, héritière du complexe d'Oedipe. Quant au moi, l'Auteur distingue, à la suite de J. Laplanche, deux sens freudiens du terme, le sens métaphorique et le sens métonymique, et il priviliege nettement le premier. Cependant, la formulation de l'Auteur semble indiquer que, pour lui, seul le moi métonymique est une instance psychique: 'Quant au moi, nous en avons distingué deux sens. Le moi instance ou moi métonymique et le moi totalité ou moi métaphorique.' (73; cf. 70). Pour Laplanche, au contraire — ce qui d'ailleurs paraît plus exact —, le moi métaphorique désigne clairement une instance psychique. Sur la question du sadisme et du masochisme, l'Auteur reprend encore une interprétation fondamentale de J. Laplanche sur l'étagage de la pulsion sexuelle sur les pulsions d'auto-conservation. Il eût été intéressant que l'Auteur continue l'application de cette thèse dans son interprétation de *Malaise dans la civilisation*.

La troisième partie définit critiquement le statut du discours freudien. Dans une première étape, l'Auteur insiste sur la distinction entre les méthodes freudiennes et la méthode philosophique de Kant. Ce sont 'deux points de vue tout à fait distincts, irréductibles.' (123) La question n'est pas posée de savoir si, après Freud, le philosophe peut reprendre le problème de la culpabilité exactement comme Kant l'a posé.

Dans une seconde étape, l'Auteur aborde le difficile problème du caractère scientifique de la psychanalyse. Dans le traitement de ce problème, l'Auteur semble affirmer que les théories freudiennes sont finalement testées par la mise à l'épreuve des interprétations élaborées à partir d'elles. (131) Le véritable problème est donc celui de la testabilité des interprétations. Or, une interprétation ne tend pas à expliquer ni à déduire; en ce sens, la psychanalyse n'est pas une science de type nomologico-déductive. Elle se rapproche plutôt de l'histoire et, en ce sens, elle vise à 'reconstruire des figures singulières et des lignes de force, des événements et des structures qui rendent intelligible ce qui se donne *hic et nunc*.' (156) Dans la mesure où 'il s'avère impossible de construire, dans le cadre d'une théorie donnée, le modèle d'une individualité empirique déterminée, le chercheur va la considérer insuffisante; il va donc la remanier ou l'abandonner au profit d'une nouvelle théorie.' (149) Cependant, la psychanalyse se distingue de l'histoire par son aspect 'pratico-poétique': elle vise à transformer et le patient et le thérapeute. Le développement de cet aspect aurait peut-être obligé l'Auteur à préciser davantage la signification épistémologique créée par le fait que la psychanalyse n'est pas seulement interprétation, mais lutte contre des résistances.

Enfin, l'Auteur montre que Freud, pour rendre compte du caractère typique des fantasmes originaires, délaisse la science et élabore un 'mythe scientifique' et un 'roman historique.' Implicite dans sa pensée, opère un postulat réaliste: malgré ses hésitations, Freud ne reconnaît pas la suffisance du fantasme ou de la réalité psychique comme telle, de sorte qu'il ne cesse de chercher l'événement empirique qui est à sa source. C'est ce postulat qui l'amène à construire une histoire des origines qui n'est, en fait, qu'une transposition au niveau de l'espèce de ce que ses patients imaginent au niveau de leur histoire personnelle. Le mythe précède la pensée scientifique et lui survit. Ce qui signifie que, pour comprendre l'origine du sentiment de culpabilité, l'approche scientifique de Freud ne suffit pas, il faut s'en reporter aussi bien aux mythes et aux romans.

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S. MORRIS ENGEL, *The Study of Philosophy: An Introduction*. Toronto and New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1981. Pp. + 340.
CN\$ 23.45; US\$ 17.50. ISBN 0-03-047511-2

This work is one of the more interesting introductions to philosophy to come along in some time — interesting because it manages by means of a number of choice anecdotes to bring the major philosophers to life, and because it is the first introduction to deal at some length with Wittgenstein.

The book is not an anthology. It is entirely written, with the exception of a few lengthy quotations, by Engels. It is partly a history of philosophy and partly an introduction to the main problems of philosophy. It begins, in true historical fashion, with Thales and then moves on to some of the other pre-Socratics. Parmenides, Heraclitus and Democritus are presented as a triad. The rigid universe of Parmenides is the Thesis, the flux of Heraclitus is the Antithesis and the atomism of Democritus provides the Synthesis. Engels then moves on to present, in an impressive fashion, the last days of Socrates.

The next section deals with the art of reasoning. Here the reader is introduced to the traditional informal fallacies with the help of some exercises and — what in these days has become almost *de rigueur* — cartoons. This section would have been better if Engels had, as well as talking about the ways that we can go wrong in arguing, talked about the ways that we can go right.

Next we move on to Ethics. Engels begins quite correctly, with a striking moral dilemma. He then goes on to outline the ethical positions of Aristotle, Kant, the Utilitarians and the Emotivists. Finally, he returns to the original moral dilemma to see if any headway can be made. My only reservation about this section concerns the bit on the Emotive Theory. It's difficult to introduce beginners to the Emotive Theory unless they have had a good dose of Logical Positivism. Even though the reader is given a brief introduction to Logical Positivism it is not enough to carry the weight of the Emotive Theory. Engels would have done better had he presented (and refuted?) that moral theory which is close to the heart of every introductory student — moral relativism.

After the chapter on Ethics the reader is introduced first to Metaphysics (by way of Giordano Bruno and Sigmund Freud), and then to Epistemology. The chapter on Epistemology consists of a quick dash through Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant — all in 54 pages! Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant are treated well enough for introductory purposes, but one would not miss anything by skipping Spinoza and Leibniz. This chapter also includes a very interesting account of the experiences of blind people who have become sighted. This helps the reader to feel that perhaps the world is not quite as it appears to be.

Next we come to the chapter on Wittgenstein. Even though we must applaud Engels for attempting to introduce beginners to Wittgenstein I cannot help but feel that the chapter is to some extent a failure. Instead of presenting the beginner with one Wittgenstein, he presents the reader, not with two but with three Wittgensteins — the early, the middle and the latter. The early

Wittgenstein is the author of the *Tractatus*, the middle is the author of the *Blue and Brown Book* and the latter is the author of the *Investigations*. It is not clear to me that three Wittgenstein's are discernible (I cannot see more than two), but even if three are discernible I think that Engels should, for the sake of simplicity, have limited his discussion to one — perhaps the latter.

Engels looks for a unifying thread in Wittgenstein's thinking and finds it in 'the way that language holds us captive by generating certain pictures in our minds of the way things are or must be.' (286) No doubt Wittgenstein talks about pictures in the *Tractatus*, the *Blue and Brown Book*, and the *Investigations*, but he does not use the word 'picture' in the same way in each case. In the *Tractatus* the picture is the proposition which at the atomic level, given that the proposition is true, mirrors reality. In the *Blue and Brown Book* and the *Investigations*, when language slips out of gear, certain forms of expressions make us picture the world in a mistaken way. We think that the soul is a man within or that all explanations are causal explanations. Here 'picture' is operating differently.

If there is any unifying thread to be found it lies in Wittgenstein's belief that the source of all philosophical problems is language and that these problems can be dispelled either by linguistic analysis (*Tractatus*), or by looking at the rich variety of ways that certain words can be used and then comparing that with the ways they are used by philosophers (*Investigations*).

The Study of Philosophy closes with a not altogether unrelated section on Tragedy.

My main criticism of Engel's work is that although the philosophers come alive philosophy does not. The account of the life of each philosopher is well written and is rich with anecdotes, but very often the philosophical point that the philosopher was trying to make is presented in a brief and unconvincing way. For example, why did Parmenides believe that what is real does not change? Engels correctly tells the reader that according to Parmenides things cannot come into existence or pass out of existence, but he does not tell the readers why Parmenides held this view, and why it is such a tempting but mistaken view. Or if we turn to Engel's section on Leibniz we find Engels correctly telling the reader that according to Leibniz the world consists ultimately of simples, but he does not tell the reader why Leibniz claimed there had to be ultimate simples, nor why he believed that they had to be unextended. It is at junctures like these that philosophy becomes exciting.

Even though philosophy does not really come alive in Engel's book he does do an excellent job on the spadework. The more important philosophers and philosophical theories are presented with clarity, economy and precision. This would make it possible for an instructor to devote more time to philosophy. For this reason, and this reason alone, Engel's book could be pressed into service as an introductory text.

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STANLEY FISH, *Is There a Text in This Class?* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P. 1980. Pp. vii + 394. US\$17.50. ISBN 0-674-46725-6.

The spectre now haunting the world of literary theory comes with a beguiling variety of names: Deconstruction, Post-Structuralism, Hermeneutics, Reader-Response Theory, Affective Stylistics. None of these variations on a theme is exclusively literary in either its interests or presuppositions, nor do they reach anything like agreement among themselves even on a program for literary analysis or criticism, let alone on the metaphysics that would support such a program. What unites them, however, is a common (and to believe them, demotic) enemy: the related conceptions of literary meaning as a fixed and objective feature of discourse and of critical interpretation as the attempt to recover the meaning that is already 'there' in the text. These combatants do not quite repeat Nietzsche's fear that 'we have not yet gotten rid of God because we still believe in grammar'; but the opacity in much of their own writing suggests that they are not far removed from it.

In this sense, it is difficult to imagine writers with common theoretical intentions who are further apart in their *practice* than Stanley Fish is from Derrida, Ricoeur, or the 'Yale School' (Bloom, de Man, Hartman, Miller). In the event, Fish has probably been less influential as a theorist than the others; but (or perhaps, *thus*) he is also by far the most accessible of them: honestly polemical, explicit about his own intentions and method no less than about those in the positions he criticizes. As if to defy his own thesis about the defeasibility of meaning, *his* meaning has emerged forcibly and clearly. These features also characterize Fish's latest book which is a collection of essays and lectures written from 1970-1980. (Twelve of the sixteen chapters have been published previously; the other four were given as lectures in 1979.) Because of Fish's self-consciousness as a writer, *Is There a Text in This Class?* is more coherent than most such collections; Fish assures this by prefacing each chapter with a description of how it came to be written and how it stands in his present thinking. In the Introduction — titled 'How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Interpretation' — Fish adds to those other two authorial 'voices' a general resumé which also attempts to show how his position now is an advance on the ones he has previously held.

Unlike many autobiographers, Fish seems quite accurate in representing the facts of his history. His claim of *progress* in that theoretical development is another matter, however, and I shall suggest that the evolution he portrays as necessary is rather less than that. More importantly: the juncture at which he *now* locates himself (indicated by the book's sub-title: 'The Authority of Interpretive Communities') conceals many unasked questions which undermine, I believe, much of what he now takes to be its justification.

In his Introduction, Fish himself distinguishes three main stages in the development of his theory. The first of these was originally formulated in his

book, *Self-Consuming Artifacts* (1972); it is represented in the present volume by the 1970 essay titled 'Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics' and by four essays (Chs. 4, 5, 6, 7) of practical criticism, on the interpretation of Milton. Fish here takes up a critical theme that also has strong theoretical overtones: the claim that the act of reading is itself a significant feature of the 'meaning' of whatever is being read. He finds evidence for this thesis in writers as various as Bacon, Milton, Pater, and Whitehead — and both in single lines of literary works and in literary works as wholes. For example: In Milton's line (*Paradise Lost* I, 335), 'Nor did they not perceive the evil plight,'

The reader's progress through the line is halted and he is forced to come to terms with the intrusive (because unexpected) "not". In effect what the reader does, or is forced to do...is ask a question — did they or didn't they — and...the syntactical uncertainty remains unresolved. ...That experience is a temporal one, and in the course of it the two negatives combine not to produce an affirmative, but to prevent the reader from making the simple (declarative) sense which would be the goal of a logical analysis. To clean the line up is to take from it the most prominent and important effect — the suspension of the reader between the alternatives its syntax momentarily offers. (26)

The theoretical issue at stake here is not Fish's conclusion about the particular example or even the more general conclusion he draws about the class of such examples (he infers from undecidability in the text and the related 'suspension' of the reader, the self-consuming nature of the literary text). I believe that the latter claim in particular exaggerates both the will and the power of the literary artifact to make itself disappear into the process of interpretation; but there is nothing exaggerated in the assertion that the act of reading is integral to literary meaning, that the literary work is 'about' not only what it says it is about, but what the saying itself *is*. Fish is here at once disputing a theory of meaning and a theory of textuality, each of which relies, in his view, on an illusion of objectivity. The text as a physical object projects an illusion of 'self-sufficiency and completeness' that is then often carried over to the *understanding* of the text; analogously, the theory of meaning he contests also makes meaning palpable, affirming for all discourse a dogmatic belief 'in content, in extractable meaning, in the utterancy as a repository.' (52) Both of these claims, Fish argues, are mistaken, on both theoretical and practical grounds. Thus, too, Beardsley and Wimsatt's 'Affective Fallacy' turns out to be a Fallacy itself: if the activity of the reader is part of the meaning of what he is reading, how could the reader's 'affect' be excluded from that meaning?

The first point to be made about this starting place is that Fish employs it in his critical practice extraordinarily effectively. He would be a fine reader even without this instrument, but his practice makes clear how important to

the work of interpretation is an awareness of the *medium* of interpretation. This is not an original claim on Fish's part (he cites the precedent of Plato's discussion of writing and reading in the *Phaedrus*); but Fish enriches the thesis by his masterful analysis of specific and complex texts.

A second, more theoretically interesting issue is *what follows* from the connection asserted between reader and text or meaning. Fish's response to the latter question — the second 'phase' of his work — focuses on a theory of literary meaning, specifically on the claim that meaning is not an element or even an aspect of the (objective) text at all. The advance here is one of generalization. Fish has already argued that the act of reading is sometimes crucial and in every case essential to the determination of literary meaning. He now concludes that the act of reading is crucial in establishing *all* meaning (and by implication, all texts) — and that, *because* of this, not only is there nothing 'in' the text that controls the process, but that there is nothing 'in' the text at all. The latter claim obviously goes well beyond the earlier ones; Fish sometimes hedges on it, but finally seems to commit himself to it fully: 'It is not that literature exhibits certain formal properties that compel a certain kind of attention; rather, applying a certain kind of attention...results in the emergence into noticeability of the properties...' (10-11)

This conclusion could easily turn into a version of the 'aesthetic attitude' theory of art, and Fish attempts to avoid the simplemindedness of that view by linking the role of the observer to a speech-act theory account of the role of the writer; he thus looks to Austin and Searle for corroboration (this is his one systematic excursion into philosophical treatments of his themes), particularly in the essay (Ch. 9) on 'How To Do Things with Austin and Searle.' In that context, he relates his own theory of meaning to the concept of performatives or illocutionary acts, claiming the authority of Austin for placing those modes of utterance at the center of his own theory. This reading of Austin, although defensible, is hardly self-evident, and Fish's readiness to ignore the locutionary and perlocutionary functions of utterance later — and not much later — comes home to roost. He wishes here to emphasize the constitutive activity of the critical interpreter — and he purchases that emphasis, it seems to me, at considerable cost to an understanding of the 'act' that the writer himself is supposed to have performed before interpretation can even begin its work.

The consequences of this shift or 'decentering' of literary meaning are various. Thus, Fish derives from it an argument against the traditional distinction between literary and non-literary language: the answer to the question, 'How Ordinary Is Ordinary Language?' (Ch. 3) is that 'there is no such thing as ordinary language' (106) — since *all* language takes meaning from its individual and thus *extraordinary* contexts. Contrary to our more usual reckoning, in fact, '*literary* language may be the norm, and message-bearing language a device we carve out to perform the special but certainly not normative, task of imparting information.' (109) Again, Fish here offers objections also made elsewhere (for example, by Max Black) to the cognitive-emotive dichotomy alleged by such writers as I.A. Richards and A.J. Ayer; but

his grip on the actualities of literary discourse continues to give his analysis unusual force.

A second consequence of the elimination of objective meaning bears on the status of any particular claim of literary interpretation or evaluation: what standing, we might ask, does the critic's act have if it is the act itself rather than the object addressed by which it is measured? Fish here faces the prospect of a radical subjectivism, and certainly there never is for him meaning or value aside from the act of interpretation itself. On the other hand, Fish hopes to avoid the most extreme consequences of this position by the third step in his theoretical progression. This step introduces the concept of 'interpretive communities' which is intended, by going between the horns of the 'objective-subjective' dualism — to avert the charge of arbitrariness to which critical practice would be open if it were exclusively a function of the individual sensibility and yet to preserve the denial of an external referent for the literary work.

An interpretive community is not objective because as a bundle of interests, of particular purposes and goals, its perspective is interested rather than neutral; but by the very same reasoning, the meanings and texts produced by an interpretive community are not subjective because they do not proceed from an isolated individual but from a public and conventional point of view.(14)...The "you" who does the interpretive work that puts poems and assignments and lists into the world is a communal you and not an isolated individual.... The mental operations we can perform are limited by the institutions in which we are *already* embedded. (331)

The reader and his actions are neither solipsistic nor merely wilful, even if his success is to be measured by the power of persuasion. The critic's life as a critic depends on whether his readers see what he has to show them, not on a meaning to which they aspire in common — but he acts here as the member of a community, taking his initiative and even his understanding from social norms and conventions.

Fish makes no reference, in this last step, to the 'institutional theory' of art (as in the work of Arthur Danto and George Dickie) which it strongly resembles. That omission by itself is neither here nor there; more important is the fact that Fish leaves unaddressed the problems that his account shares with that theory. He does, albeit perfunctorily, suggest that the rules or commitments of an interpretive community make themselves immediately known to the individual interpreter within that community (there is something here akin to the mood of Wittgenstein's '*Lebensformen*'); and he opposes this contention to the assumption (by M.H. Abrams, for example) of an interpretive 'distance between one's receiving of an utterance and the determination of its meaning.' (318) But Fish writes much more casually in advancing these *present* commitments of his than in reviewing his past ones — and a number of crucial questions simply go by without notice. For example: if meanings or

even only the conventions of interpretation are immediately known within a single interpretive community, how do we account for critical disagreement? By claiming that there had always been *two* communities rather than one? Or again: if meaning is immediately accessible, what need should there be for the critic at all? And more simply: *how* and *why* do interpretive communities constitute themselves? For unless that history is a matter only of chance — an unlikely and certainly undemonstrated possibility — the interpretive communities seem bound to reflect patterns of human needs and interests, on the one hand, and of material (i.e., objective) conditions, on the other. Thus, the authority of interpretive communities, except as it might be immaculately conceived, takes us directly back to the world that Fish had brightly, hopefully left behind, one that is certainly active, but active in the way that facts and references are, not as self-consuming.

Kindred writers to Fish like Derrida and Foucault are willing to view interpretation straightforwardly as a matter of power and will exerted by the individual critic; thus, they do not require a social theory for explaining how *communities* of interpretation originate. But even they admit the challenge of showing *how* the will determines why it chooses to act as it does — and Fish, on whom the burden of explaining the movement of interpretation is much greater because of its social dimension, does not go even as far as they do. Like the pragmatists of American philosophy whom he in many ways resembles (I include here Rorty whose arguments against the philosophical ‘mirror of nature’ run parallel to Fish’s representational asceticism), Fish would undoubtedly respond to this objection that there is no point in questioning why we are where we are or say what we say — because what matters is *where* we are and *what* we say, not the conditions (material, institutional, metaphysical) that make those possible. This response, I believe, comes to little more than the assertion that Fish is himself uninterested in such issues — an assertion entirely compatible with the conclusion that the issues are logically presupposed even in the questions that *do* interest Fish and that the likeliest resolution of the issues points in quite a different direction from the one he follows. Fish’s answer to the question ‘Is There a Text in This Class?’ is that ‘there is and there isn’t.’ It seems to me that this is probably the correct answer — but that Fish has the ‘is’ and the ‘isn’t’ in the wrong places.

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EDGAR Z. FRIEDENBERG, *Deference to Authority: The Case of Canada*.
White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe 1980. Pp. 170. US\$ 8.95. ISBN 0-87332-167-7.

Friedenberg's thesis is that Canadian political, social, cultural, and economic life is characterised by an excess of deference to established authority; whereas, in the United States, there is the continual celebration of individuality and liberty (even though in many cases, the author admits, such celebration is belied by political and economic realities). Because Americans, unlike Canadians, believe that liberty is a matter of right rather than of privilege, they are not only more realistic in their attitudes toward social and political institutions, for they realise the name of the game is 'power'; they are also far more sure than we are of who they are and where they are going as a nation and people. By contrast, good grey Canadians, ever law-abiding and polite, fret about national identity, all the while kow-towing to authorities both domestic and foreign, who while exploiting us elicit our respect. In Friedenberg's view, we need not worry about who we are, for even when compared to the Americans we have a distinct national character: we are deferent, and we like being deferent; ours has been and remains a colonial mentality.

Friedenberg's remedy is that we adopt the predominant American attitude to authority, namely defiant scepticism. Our artists should become more iconoclastic and break with the official liberalism that produces fine NFB documentaries but uninspiring literature and theatre. Our journalists should adopt the American practice of muck-raking. Our legal and constitutional arrangements should be drastically revised on the American model — replacing unlimited parliamentary superiority with constitutionally entrenched rights, including rights limiting search, seizure, and censorship as well as rights eliminating governmental secrecy. Beyond this, Canadians should take control of their economy from both domestic and foreign élites.

Friedenberg is not very optimistic about any of this happening. For one thing we are too complacent. Our official liberalism effectively masks our unofficial authoritarianism, which freezes out all but a few from exercising real power. For another thing, that power has been used benevolently. On Friedenberg's view if Canada had had a succession of bad governments, we would long ago have wised up to our powerlessness. But even then, he points out, many of us in the middle rank of society — academics, artists, journalists, lawyers, and the like — have usually been co-opted by the establishment, even to the point of depending on official subsidies to support our protests against official policies. So even if substantive change is unlikely, Friedenberg intends to smarten us up so that we quit bellyachin' about Yankee domination and, to paraphrase Pogo, come to realise that we have met the enemy and they are us.

Now the 'Canada as colony' theme long been discussed by academics, journalists, and authors of Royal Commission Reports. And the evidence

Freidenberg cites in favour of his 'deference to authority' thesis is drawn in the main from these sources. Not only is the material presented familiar; so too is the manner in which it is presented — about the level of weekend supplement material. Indeed the whole book is qualitatively 'second hand journalism' — nothing new is reported, and no new light is shed on old matters. If you want to know more about Canadian deference to authority, skip Friedenberg's book and read his sources — including Peter Newman, Clement Wallace, the Gray Report, the MacGuigan Report (on prison reform), and back issues of *The Globe and Mail*.

So why was this book written, subsidized (by the Canadian Human Rights Foundation), and published (in the U.S.)? From the author's comments, the book seems to have been written out of his surprise that the country which welcomed him during the Vietnam War was not really so radical and avant-garde as he first believed. Now this misapprehension of Canada's character by an American emigré might have been interesting at least on a personal level if Friedenberg were more representative of American politics and culture at that time, or at least a more perceptive observer thereof. But the tale of a fifty year-old academic's entry into Canadian life and culture is not very absorbing, at least as it is written — for Friedenberg is no Joyce Carol Oates. And since the work lacks scholarly merit, one wonders who was intended as its audience: to tell friendly, but usually indifferent, Americans that we are less like them than they think, or to tell us to be more like Americans than we want?

Yet the issues discussed, for all their familiarity, are important and do deserve a better discussion than Friedenberg gives them. I will briefly touch upon three matters that I think are essential for understanding Canadian deference to authority and the issues it raises, which in my view Friedenberg either ignores or handles badly.

First, it seems to me that the sort of generally deferential attitude Friedenberg describes has to do not just with the factors he cites — our British colonial past and ethnocentrism, and our proximity to the U.S. — but also with the kind of country that Canada is today — a complex and fragmented multi-regional and multi-national state. In this context, deference may appear less like idolatry and more like the sort of civility that enables us to function moderately well as a nation, in particular by making élite accommodation possible. Could Canada survive if to our linguistic, regional, and constitutional division were added at the individual level disdain and contempt for those institutions that at least to some degree keep us together? It is in the not too distant past that even the U.S. felt threatened racial, generational, and class differences.

Second, can we keep those values that even Friedenberg admits are good in Canadian life, such as peace, order, and good government, if we reject those attitudes he criticises; may not 'the good' and 'the bad,' from Friedenberg's perspective, be more connected than he admits? Indeed, there is a fair amount of what strikes me as just plain carping, particularly about life-styles and social attitudes. Friedenberg complains that Canada isn't more like

California. But why should it be? The climate is different, and so are the people. If one doesn't like it, one can move from Halifax to Los Angeles.

Third, the central value Friedenberg extols is liberty. It is possible to ask heretically about the value of liberty. Even Friedenberg admits that liberty has its prerequisites, such as security and order, which sometimes conflict with liberty itself. But beyond that there are other values in life that some people, in particular Canadians, treasure — values that are more community than individually oriented. And one needn't be a George Grant to value an organic community. One might well think that at least in our context we fare better than we would by adopting American ideals, and indeed at least some of us have left the United States for Canada with that as our objective.

All in all, *Deference to Authority* is derivative and lacking in insight. This is unfortunate, for the topic deserves better treatment.

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WILLIAM A. GALSTON, *Justice and the Human Good*. Chicago: U. of Chicago Press 1980. Pp. x + 324. US\$ 25.00. ISBN 0-226-27963-4.

All serious theories of justice cluster around interpretations of the formal idea, treating like cases alike or giving each its due. Such interpretations are of two general kinds, both of which endeavor to provide material content for the criteria of sameness or dueness to which the formal idea appeals. First, some theories focus on the common sense working maxims of justice (for example, need, desert, and the like) which ordinary judgments of justice reflect; such theories both elaborate and analyze the complex strands of each maxim in itself, and sometimes suggest as well the relative weights which different maxims enjoy or should enjoy in reasonable judgments about justice. Second, theories of justice also sometimes provide deeper philosophical analyses of more ultimate principles which are alleged to explain the proper interpretation and weights of the common sense maxims; such theories are usefully classified as teleological or deontological. Teleological theories, like classical utilitarianism and Aristotelian perfec-

tionism, identify the common denominator of sameness (in terms of which like cases are judged alike) in terms of some good (pleasure, for utilitarianism; excellences, for perfectionism), and typically analyze the justice of various maxims in terms of whether they maximize the net sum of such goods. Deontological theories, like that of Kant, identify the common denominator not in terms of some abstract goods but in terms of the person suitably described, and assess maxims of justice in terms of the principles which free, rational, and equal persons would impose on themselves, whether or not any good is thus maximized over all. The best theories of justice work at both the level of common sense maxims and deeper philosophical explication, showing how theoretical reflection at both levels is mutually supporting and clarifying. Other theories, less excellent but still useful and illuminating, have special explicatory virtues at either the level of common sense criteria or philosophical principle, but fail usefully to explore with comparable ability both levels of analysis at once.

William Galston's ambitious *Justice and the Human Good* works in the grand style of attempting both approaches, but its excellence lies, I believe, in its analyses of common sense criteria and their applications; its philosophical analysis of basic principle is, by comparison, confused and unconvincing.

Galston's philosophical theory focuses on a self-consciously Aristotelian attempt to root justice in a naturalistic account of certain basic goods (including existence, developed existence, and happiness), in express contrast to Kantian and neo-Kantian (Gewirth, Rawls) emphases on the rational freedom of the person. (97-9, 114, 128) For Galston, the basic goods are goods simpliciter without any necessary connection to the interests of persons as such; thus, animals, who are capable of these goods, are included in the moral calculus. Thus, freedom or autonomy, as a mark of persons as such, is accorded no essential weight as a good. Indeed, since we have an independent idea of basic goods prior to any consent of persons and since the right turns on the better realization of these goods, Galston denies that there can be any moral right to do the wrong thing (51, 98-9, 127); in general, rights, as forms of constraint on the pursuit of such goods, are regarded as suspect. (127-41)

Questions of distributive justice (Galston puts aside retributive justice) are analyzed in terms of claims of rightful possession to those things which realize the underlying basic goods. The urgency of the underlying goods importantly shapes the weightings of the associated claims of rightful possession; existence, for example, has a greater weight than development or happiness; and, needs have a priority over claims of desert (contribution and incentives). But, there is an unbridged and unexplained gap between Galston's account of the basic goods and the form and substance of his account of the principles of just claims of rightful possession. Thus, Galston insists that the principles require that prior protection be accorded the existence and needs of all and expressly disavows any form of teleological maximization whereby the existence or needs of some may be sacrificed to realize a larger aggregate sum of goods; such teleological principles fail, Galston argues, to take seriously the separateness of persons. But, this latter

claim appears, in terms of the moral foundations of Galston's theory in a conception of basic goods, wholly inexplicable. The structure of Galston's philosophical theory is teleological: the common units of account of the moral calculus are certain basic goods, and the natural mode of assessing such goods is aggregation. Since Galston's account of the basic goods is Aristotelian in spirit, presumably more excellent forms of flourishing should be accorded greater weight by the aggregative calculus, which would have a tendency neither to a minimum for all nor to equality but to, if anything, whatever forms of inequality and subordination would lead to the highest forms of intellectual and artisitic flourishing. Galston draws none of these consequences, which, as earlier remarked, he regards as inconsistent with the disaggregative implications of the separateness of persons. But, his foundational theory of basic goods disentitles him to rely on this intuition about the person, for his denial of the central place of rational freedom in the moral calculus and express criticism of theories which give freedom its proper emphasis (Gewirth, Rawls) debars him from giving the expression to this intuition which he clearly wishes decisively to accord it.

In order properly to account for this intuition, Galston would have to take as basic not abstract goods, but a certain conception of free, rational, and equal persons and the principles which persons, so understood, would impose on themselves. Notions of the good appear, in this account, not as abstract goods independent of the person, but as goods derivative from the more fundamental description of the aims of free, rational, and equal persons. Of course, this approach would have led Galston to question some of his substantive moral claims, for example, about animals, or, more centrally, about rights in general, and the right to do the wrong thing in particular. For example, it is a central feature of moral conceptions which take as fundamental treating free and rational persons equally that, when a person's actions do not directly violate the rights of others, the person has the right to make even moral mistakes, being, for example, less generous or admirable or kind than relevant moral principles call for; in contrast, Galston's focus on realizing goods blinds him to the important loss in respect for persons which failure to respect this right invariably works. While such an approach would have required Galston to qualify certain of his substantive conclusions, it would have had the considerable advantage of supplying a natural derivation for the substantive principles of justice (including guaranteeing everyone's minimal existence and need claims) at which he arrives. As it is, we are left with a rather confused quasi-teleological argument in which the weights accorded the various goods do not naturally follow from Galston's explicit premisses but depend on independent moral considerations of respect for persons which Galston crucially assumes but cannot, on his own grounds, explain; this is painfully clear in his notion of relational goods. I recognize that there is a natural intellectual appeal in forms of ideal utilitarianism which, accepting a plurality of various goods with different weights, appears generously pluralistic and flexible. But, the temptation to this move should be resisted if the account merely redescribes our judgments and appears wholly unable

coherently to supply the kind of structural explication that we justly expect from a philosophical theory of justice.

The importance of philosophy to practical living cannot, however, be exhausted by the inquiry into the basic issues of philosophical theory just discussed; it is, in short, quite possible to do important work in the analysis of more concrete issues of justice and normative ethics without adequately tackling or even dealing with such issues. Since the level of self-critical reflection on issues of justice in our public culture is so appallingly bad, philosophers can perform inestimably important political and social functions simply by addressing controversial public issues in articulate and philosophically self-conscious ways without dealing with foundational issues in which, in any event, the public is not as naturally interested. Galston's book is a valuable and important contribution to the emerging dialogue of philosophers with public issues; his lengthy account of various maxims of justice, their weightings, and their applications to various fact situations is uniformly intelligent, well-argued, probing, and humane. His account, for example, of the concept of needs, and the priority of justice claims of needs over those of desert (contribution and incentives), is excellent; his examination of desert, while not wholly convincing, is interesting and provocative. But, the main analytic virtues of Galston's book come with his investigation of his ideas in various concrete contexts. His attempt to supplement Rawls's theory of the justice of distribution of production with a theory of the justice of work for production is novel, original, and important, introducing a range of problems not usually discussed. The considerations of both intergenerational and international distributive justice are useful and illuminating; with respect to the latter, Galston's discussions of immigration and emigration policy are original, forceful, and persuasive. His advocacy of the Aristotelian idea of proportional justice is powerfully deployed in criticism of our conventional intuitions about the propriety of winner-take-all prizes or sharp discontinuities in rewards in general.

In terms of approach, Galston develops his arguments by negative criticism of existing positions in the literature, which lends his argument a rather excessively academic tone. On the other hand, Galston's range of critical response is unusually broad, including responses to Sartre and Habermas. He is catholic in his references and interests, eloquent in the defense of moral philosophy as a tool of organizing and articulating our aims for a just society, powerful in his practical realization of what philosophy can mean in transforming our conceptions of controversial public issues. He writes well and with real philosophical talent and a moving sense of justice.

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Y. GEFROY, P. ACCOLLA, A.A. SCHÜTZENBERGER, *Vidéo, Formation et thérapie*. Paris: EPI 1980.

L'ouvrage se propose de cerner la portée de la technologie audio-visuelle à l'intérieur d'une démarche thérapeutique. Plus particulièrement, les auteurs s'intéressent aux rapports qu'établit la télévision en circuit fermé entre un individu et ses images.

La plupart des approches thérapeutiques utilisent sous une forme ou une autre la notion de reflet. L'individu projette sa conception de lui à l'extérieur (la plupart du temps par le langage) et reçoit une réponse de son entourage (le thérapeute ou le groupe). La vidéo utilise aussi ce reflet (les auteurs parlent de rétroaction) et ajoute la dimension de la confrontation où l'individu est placé en présence de son propre comportement comme le perçoit le milieu. L'individu est alors en mesure de vérifier si sa conception intérieure et, partant, subjective, de son moi est conforme à l'image que les autres ont de lui. Le reflet devient alors une vue objective du comportement et des attitudes d'un individu moins douteuse que le reflet émis par autrui parce que ne laissant que fort peu de place à une remise en cause de la réalité telle que vue sur l'écran.

Un autre point d'intérêt est le phénomène de la différence entre l'image vidéo et l'image du miroir. En effet, le reflet sur l'écran n'est pas inversé c'est-à-dire que l'individu placé devant son image vidéo se voit exactement tel que les autres le perçoivent. L'individu apparaît donc 'tel que les autres le voient et non tel que le miroir le montre.' (158) En outre, l'image vidéo est accompagnée de la voix externalisée ce qui n'est pas le cas face au miroir.

Ce livre présente donc une approche thérapeutique fort puissante qui permet à l'individu de mieux appréhender son visage, son image corporelle et ses gestes. La vidéo permet aussi de revoir à plusieurs reprises une séquence particulièrement chargée de sens. Le style est clair mais le contenu est trop centré sur la technologie et manque un peu de réflexion sur l'aspect pratique. La vidéo est présentée comme un moyen presque parfait sans beaucoup de failles apparentes.

Un grand absent de ce livre: le thérapeute. Les auteurs n'ont pas jugé bon d'apporter leur réflexion au niveau du support humain nécessaire si ce n'est que par une trop brève discussion du rôle du caméraman. Or, le thérapeute demeure une personne-ressource essentielle qui peut et doit orienter l'individu ou le groupe sur des voies privilégiées qui mènent à la résolution des problèmes ou à la compréhension d'une chaîne d'actions ou d'une attitude. L'impact de la vidéo est important; les auteurs sur ce point sont convaincants. Mais le reflet de soi ne peut être utilisé seul. Certains sont même traumatisés face à leur image. Quel est le rôle du thérapeute ou de l'animateur? C'est un point que les auteurs n'abordent pas, ce qui est malheureux. Le lecteur aurait grandement gagné à profiter de l'expérience des auteurs comme animateurs de groupes utilisant la vidéo.

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JÜRGEN HABERMAS, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd. 1979. Pp. xxiv & 239. £4.95. ISBN 0-435-82390-6.

Those who have not read Habermas before should do so, but they should not start with this book. Those who have read Habermas should read this book, but they should expect some disappointments. *CES* is a collection of five essays on disparate topics. It comprises 'What is Universal Pragmatics?', 'Moral Development and Ego Identity,' 'Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures,' 'Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism,' and 'Legitimation Problems in the Modern State.' There is a useful introduction by the outstanding interpreter of Habermas in the English language, Thomas McCarthy, who is also responsible for the translation, which is about as clear as Habermas' writing style permits. (Happily, McCarthy does not belong to the school of translation which requires more or less random insertion of bracketed phrases from the original text. Is this practice simply a nervous tic, indicating that the translator doubts whether he is up to the task? Or is it intended as a reassuring signal to the reader that he, the translator, has not fallen asleep and is indeed lurking alertly behind the translation?)

Habermas is now the foremost exponent of critical theory, which is associated with the Frankfurt School and the works of Adorno, Fromm, Horkheimer and Marcuse. It is inspired by Marx, and especially by his early writings, but it does not shirk from significant departures from, and criticisms of, the master: it is neo-Marxist. Its meta-theory of the social sciences owes a great deal to methodological implications drawn from Freud. It would not be too great an exaggeration to say that Marx is viewed by Habermas as a Freudian analyst for nineteenth century Europe. Emancipation is the goal (from psychological disturbances for Freud, from outmoded social relations for Marx), achieved through a historical diagnosis (childhood trauma, emerging productive forces) which reveals possibilities for greater freedom now (mature adult autonomy, a legitimate political order). Critical theory is psychoanalysis writ large. In the opening remarks of 'Moral Development of Ego Identity,' originally an address to the *Institut für Sozialforschung* in Frankfurt, Habermas notes that 'the members of the original institute have always felt themselves one with psychoanalysis in the intention of breaking the power of the past over the present.' (69) This affinity is especially close because 'an autonomous ego and an emancipated society reciprocally require one another.' (71) It is closer yet when Habermas announces in 'Historical Materialism and the Development of Normative Structures' his belief in important structural similarities between the development of a human individual and the development of the human race. These similarities will be a guide to discussing, without relativism or chauvinism, the question of legitimacy of political domination in various historical periods, since

progressively higher levels of justification will be allowed, corresponding to 'ontogenetic stages of moral consciousness.' And Habermas' so-called 'linguistic turn' in recent years, represented in *CES* by 'Universal Pragmatics,' may be understood as motivated by the idea that 'psychoanalysis is a form of language analysis' (70), having an ideal of a patient achieving the potential for unconstrained, pathologically undistorted communication. When writ large, this is the idea that critical theory's contribution to the emancipation of society is 'a form of language analysis' too, the ideal being a society of undistorted communication among citizens.

It is with a great deal of interest therefore that one turns to 'What is Universal Pragmatics?'. But if one hopes to find out whether Habermas will succeed in constructing the theory of an ideal speech situation — an Archimedean point for defining truth, autonomy, legitimacy, etc. — then one will be disappointed that he takes only a few small steps in this direction. The essay is not well crafted; one misses the literary quality of *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Habermas announces that universal pragmatics will take the theory of speech acts as its point of departure, but before he gets around to departing therefrom the reader must wade through a discussion of Chomsky's work. One of his aims here, it seems, is to argue the credentials of pragmatics as a formal science in its own right. But the essay would have been more coherent if Habermas had lifted the discussion of Chomsky in favor of a longer journey from his point of departure. The treatment of speech act theory is useful.

The kicker in the second essay, 'Moral Development and Ego Identity,' is Habermas' maintaining that Kohlberg's elucidation of the stages of moral consciousness leaves out the highest stage. Kohlberg's last stage is conscientious application of universal principles; Habermas' is preparedness to follow a 'procedure of redeeming normative validity claims discursively,' i.e., to submit one's moral views to the test of argumentation with others. One reaches this final stage only after resolving the crisis of calling into question the conventional wisdom. The 60's generation would seem to score higher than the youth of the 70's. Burke, of course, will have none of it.

The theme of maturation through crisis continues in 'Historical Materialism and the Development of Moral Structures,' where it is joined by the theme of homology between these crises and crises in the historical development of societies. Habermas returns here to his important distinction between labor and interaction, which has proved its value in earlier studies. Labor expresses a leading human interest in controlling the environment, while interaction, especially through language, expresses an equally basic interest in coming to an understanding with others. The charge of overlooking the latter interest is common to Habermas' critique of both Marxism and positivism.

Thus Habermas, citing anthropological findings, will say in the fourth essay, 'Toward Reconstruction of Historical Materialism,' that 'the Marxian concept of social labor is suitable for delimiting the mode of life of the hominids from that of the primates; but it does not capture the specifically

human reproduction of life.' (135) For this we need to begin with the 'moralization of motives for action' in the family, which is to say that we must begin to explore the category of interaction. Despite such criticisms of Marxism, Habermas wants to speak of his projects as one of 'reconstructing' historical materialism rather than, say, demolishing it. Making it easier for him to see things this way is his reading of Marx as asserting 'the dependency of the superstructure on the base ... only for the critical phase in which a society passes into a new developmental level.' (143) At the exegetical level I find more plausible the relatively orthodox interpretations of Marx such as Gerald Cohen's in *Marx's Philosophy of History*. (There would be profit for both Habermas and Cohen if each would read the other.)

We have noted the alleged homology between individual and societal moral development. In 'Legitimation Problems in the Modern State' Habermas draws out the idea that corresponding to the highest stage of individual moral development (putting moral beliefs to the test of argumentation) is a stage of societal development at which morality is not characterized by its content (e.g., ten commandments) but rather by its form, i.e., its being arrived at by certain procedures of justification. He is prepared to make the notion of form more concrete than this: 'The idea of an agreement that comes to pass among all parties, as free and equal, determines the procedural type of legitimacy of modern times. (By contrast, the classical type of legitimacy was determined by the idea of teachable knowledge of an ordered world).' (185) Rawls and his forebears are, in effect, credited with speaking for modern times. Whether this is so or not, my major reservation about Habermas' notion of the highest stage of societal moral development is that it apparently has only as much philosophical weight as is conferred by the analogy to individual moral development, for which cognitive developmental psychology has allegedly reconstructed ontogenetic stages of moral consciousness in the way Habermas' analogy requires. He says that these findings are 'well corroborated,' but for now I am still sceptical.

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GILA J. HAYIM, *The Existential Sociology of Jean-Paul Sartre*. Amherst, Mass.: U. of Massachusetts Press 1980. Pp. xviii + 157. US\$ 13.50. ISBN 0-87023-298-3.

Hayim's book sets itself rather limited aims and fulfils these very competently. 'I am not aware of a single work which treats *Being and Nothingness* and the *Critique* simultaneously and in relation to sociological perspectives and interest. My work is a modest attempt to do just that.' (xv) The book is almost exclusively explication of Sartre's theories of individuality and sociality from *Being and Nothingness* (*BN*) and the *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (*CDR*), with emphasis upon the continuity of thought. Her presentation of Sartre's positions is clear, well-organized, informed, and sensitive, and she discusses all of the major issues. Like many other commentators, Hayim denies that any radical shift occurred in Sartre's thought between his two major theoretical works. Rather than draw constant comparisons between the two works, she interprets *CDR* as a continuation into the realm of social structures of the basic existential theory of consciousness and action from *BN*. This is an informative approach which rightly emphasizes the importance of individual *praxis* guided by projects in Sartre's later thought, although it does not bring out the details of the differences between the earlier and the later theories. In general this book provides a fine outline of the structures of the dialectical relationship between individuality and sociality throughout Sartre's thought. Its deficiencies result from its virtues: it does not explore the wealth of complicating details in Sartre's philosophy, and it makes no attempt to defend or to criticize the specifics of Sartre's philosophy.

The major theme of the book is the advantage of a '*verstehen*' sociology, which conceives individual agents' intentions and understanding of the world to be the basis for social structures, over a 'positivistic' sociology, which conceives objective (independent of anyone's thought) structures to define and to determine individual members of a society. Hayim approves of Sartre's philosophy, because throughout its development, human affairs have always been understood from the internal perspective of an agent. The notion of a project, an individual's transcending of given conditions towards a presently non-existent goal, remains central. 'For Sartre, as for Weber, the world harbors no meaning except that which has been created by human agents in accordance with their ends. Human action is not governed by the laws of nature ...' (9)

The role of matter in affecting projects and its role in mediating relations between individuals is what changes in Sartre's philosophy from *BN* to *CDR*. *Praxis* objectified in matter develops an inertia of its own that exerts a counter-thrust upon *praxis*. Individual action in a society is a '*praxis*-process,' a dialectical interaction of action shaping the material world and social structures with the necessities imposed upon action by these objective structures.

Mainstream 'positivist' sociologists investigate only the quasi-causal relations between objective structures and individual behavior.

To comprehend process, one refers to supra-individual qualities which are artificially produced in pure exteriority such as charts and diagrams. Process makes every group into an object, and every member in the group into a being outside himself, that is to say, the group becomes a reality toward which the person is always an outsider. Process refers to laws as revealed in pure exteriority. (114)

Such sociologists fail to recognize both how processes are in dialectical relation with current projects and *praxis*, and how they are based upon former human *praxis*, which originally created the material and social structures. Lacking this internal perspective (which is required because the sociological knower is himself engaged in a *praxis* within a society), 'positivist' sociology is never adequately enlightening.

A quantification of human social reality is a mystification of the actual situation. It is done for the purpose of making the real object comprehensible from the outside.... The meaning of social action inevitably escapes the outsider-researcher. (108)

For human social reality to be intelligible, the relations of material and social structures to individual *praxis* (guided by projects) have to be elucidated.

But since our starting point is individual *praxis*, we must carefully follow up every one of those threads of Ariadne which lead from this *praxis* to the various forms of human ensembles; and in each case we shall have to determine the structures of these ensembles, their real mode of formation out of their elements, and finally their totalizing action upon the elements which formed them. (CDR, 65)¹

Hayim summarizes clearly Sartre's analyses of *praxis* objectifying itself in worked matter (the practico-inert) and of the various types of social relation that develop through individuals' relations with the practico-inert and with the group structures which develop an inertia of their own. She provides useful accounts of the basic structures of the series, wherein individuals are related to each other only through each having a relation with the practico-inert (Sartre's famous example of this is the bus queue), of the group in fusion, where individuals are united by each having the same goal that is achievable only through group power and by each serving as the third person who mediates the relations of all other group members, and of the various forms of group (the pledge group, the organized group, and the institutionalized

group) in which individual freedom is progressively sacrificed for group cohesion and specialization of function. The structures of a group and the pressures within it through which it can transform itself into another type of group are made clear, and Hayim shows how the abstract structures of power, authority, and leadership are instantiated in the different types of group.

All of these analyses concern the way in which individual free *praxis* is limited and defined in social existence. In *BN* there is already a dialectical relation between the freedom of the project (which 'objectifies itself' in action designed to bring about the projected end) and the objectification of a person by 'the look' of the Other. Hayim explicates the structures of freedom and of Being-for-other from *BN* very accurately (aside from her mistaken claim that the self present in a person's experience through his being an object for the Other is originally 'an object for reflective consciousness,' (40)) notes the conflict between radical freedom and Being-for-other, and relates the dialectic of Being-for-other to Hegel's analysis of the master-slave dialectic. She perceptively notes that the dialectic of freedom with Being-for-others in *BN* is an important link between it and *CDR*. However, given her preoccupation with straightforward explication, she fails to analyze the features of this link. Had she examined either of the following two issues (or many others), her work would have been more philosophically significant.

(1) It is unclear even in *BN* exactly how a dialectical relationship between the freedom of projecting ends and the objectification of being defined by the Other works. Sartre never adequately explains how a person's experience of himself before the Other as having a continuing nature can interact with his continuing projection of ends. His primary focus in *BN* is on the ontology of the free conscious agent; being an object for the Other is developed ontologically only as a static moment (like facticity) of the free activity of nihilation developing into the future. A person's objectness for the Other is a given component from which free consciousness distances itself; this objectness has no dynamic thrust of its own. It is not clear, therefore, how Being-for-other can affect the specific ends projected.

The dialectical relationship between individual free *praxis* and the various types of necessities defining this *praxis* is central to *CDR*. What needs to be made more clear, however, is how individual freedom can be even a party to the dialectical interaction. Hayim suggests that Sartre maintains his conception of existential freedom from *BN*; what needs to be explored is how such freedom could exist in dialectical interaction with necessity. This issue is important, not just for grasping continuities and differences in Sartre's thought, but also for interpreting the type of freedom that individuals have. The type of freedom that individuals *qua* individuals can assert, as contrasted with the type of freedom that only groups can assert, needs analysis.

(2) In *BN* Sartre explores the conflict between individual freedom and sociality at the level of one-one interpersonal relations (except for his analyses of the 'Us-object' and 'We-subject,' which Hayim mysteriously ignores). A free acting consciousness is made into an object by 'the look' of

the Other; it is the Other's *being conscious* of me as a definite type of person that defines my objectness and provides me with a nature. In *CDR* Sartre's focus shifts to large scale social relations and to individuals being defined by the practico-inert and by social structures built-up through various relations to the practico-inert. Being defined and made into an object is not primarily a matter of 'the look,' although this general paradigm continues in Sartre's consideration of the role of the Third in mediating the relationship between two or more individuals.

An exploration of the relationship between these two paradigms for making individual freedom into an object would be very enlightening. Unfortunately, Hayim doesn't either provisionally distinguish them or consider whether they are really distinct or mutually implicative in Sartre's later thought. Sartre's attempts to mediate them both through emphasizing more strongly than in *BN* (where this idea appears as 'transcending the possibilities of the Other') that *being conscious* of another consciousness includes acting with respect to it and through the notion of totalization deserve more detailed analysis and critique.

Hayim's book is designed to introduce Sartre's theories to social scientists and to others (including many philosophers) who are not already familiar with them. Since it does not discuss other interpretations of Sartre or attempt to provide independent assessment of the legitimacy of Sartre's theories, it does not really advance philosophical scholarship. Still, it is an informative expository work.

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1 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, trans. by Alan Sheridan-Smith (London: NLB 1976)

JONATHAN LEAR, *Aristotle and Logical Theory*. New York: Cambridge U.P. 1980. Pp. xi + 123. US\$ 17.50. ISBN 0-521-23031-4.

According to the jacket material and preface this brief monograph is intended to show that Aristotle's discussions can contribute to contemporary debates in philosophy of logic. An exposition of Aristotle's logical programme

is combined with a contemporary essay on philosophy of logic. But more is provided, viz. a new interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic which is in sharp disagreement with the now classic Lukasiewicz interpretation and which also disagrees, to a lesser extent, with more recent interpretations.

The book is derived from the author's doctoral thesis supervised by Saul Kripke and it makes use of ideas of Timothy Smiley to whom it is dedicated. It does not, of course, defend Aristotle's logic in opposition to modern symbolic logics; but rather, it defends Aristotle's programme and framework.

Lear (ix and 13) emphasizes the fact that a logical system need not be comprehensive and sophisticated to be philosophically and logically useful. He observes that philosophers and logicians use a formal system not to carry out actual proofs but to illustrate logical phenomena and to gain insight into the nature of logical consequence, inference, compactness, etc. Lear's view is that Aristotle had a self-contained and accurate logical system which is an apt vehicle for contemporary discussion of philosophy of logic.

The preface claims that the book assumes 'no background knowledge of Aristotle' and 'minimal acquaintance with logic' so that it 'will be accessible to someone who is primarily interested in Aristotle.' (ix, x) Neither claim is correct. In regard to Aristotelian logic, the reader will find no explanation of 'extremes,' 'contradicities,' 'figures,' 'subaltern moods,' 'conversions,' 'principles' and other technical terms. To follow the discussion the reader should know the assertoric part of *Prior Analytics* as well as parts of *De Interpretatione* and *Posterior Analytics*, and it would help to be familiar with a contemporary exposition of Aristotle's assertoric logic. In the areas of logic and philosophy of logic the book presupposes familiarity with the semantic concept of truth in a model, the distinction between semantics and syntax, Tarski's semantic analysis of consequence, recursive functions, Church's thesis, independence proofs, infinitary deductions, König's lemma, Gödel's theorems, etc.

Though generally admiring of Aristotle, Lear sometimes makes harsh, misleading, or exaggerated criticisms. He suggests that Aristotle wanted to use only direct deductions but was 'forced' to use indirect deductions, which Lear regards as a 'deviant' method. (6, 8) Lear says that this enables Aristotle, 'by hook or by crook,' to reduce the unobvious syllogisms to the obvious. Thus he seems to suggest that Aristotle's system is an *ad hoc* result of some sort of unseemly compromise. On p. 12 Lear says that it is 'now easy to criticize [Aristotle's] assumption' that every proposition has one of the four categorical forms without noting Aristotle's own observations, e.g. that 'Every non-S is a P' is not equivalent to any categorical proposition (20a35ff.). On p. 49 Lear refers to 'Aristotle's *refusal* to recognize subaltern moods' (italics added), whereas the text (e.g. 53a4ff.) make the nonrecognition more of an oversight (and there is no evidence whatever of a refusal).

Propositions versus Syllogisms

Lear attributes to Aristotle a logic whose propositions are of the four categorical types: *Axy* (Every x is a y), *Ixy* (Some x is a y), *Exy* (No x is a y) and *Oxy* (Some x is not a y), where x and y are constants indicating non-empty sets. On this point he explicitly acknowledges agreement with Smiley (1973) and Corcoran (1974) and his opposition to Lukasiewicz (1951) and Patzig (1968) who take Aristotle's propositions to be truth-functional combinations of atomic formulas of the above four kinds where the terms are free variables tacitly quantified universally. (x, 8, 9) Thus, according to Lear, Aristotle's logic has no truth-functional connectives and no quantifiers and, consequently, the syllogisms must be complexes of propositions, not universally quantified truth-functional conditionals as claimed by Lukasiewicz and others. As part of his argument Lear insightfully refers twice (1, 9) to Aristotle's statement that every proof *is* a syllogism and he points to the absurdity of the idea of taking proofs to be single propositions.

These points fit with Lear's emphasis that Aristotle's logic was intended to have epistemic significance and in particular that some syllogisms were not things *in need of proof* (as Lukasiewicz and others claimed) but were things that *provided* 'proof.' Cf. Lukasiewicz (1951) 43; Lear, 1, 5, 10; Smiley (1973) 139; Corcoran (1974) 92, 93. In other words, some syllogisms, viz. the *perfected* syllogisms (10) are actually step-by-step deductions of conclusions from premises and have the epistemic role of 'making evident' that the conclusions 'follow of necessity' from their respective premise-sets. In case the premises of a perfected syllogism are known to be true the syllogism *is* a proof of the conclusion (10, 78). It is this class of syllogisms that Aristotle referred to in the above quote and it is this class of syllogisms that Lukasiewicz ignores totally.

In fairness to Lukasiewicz it should be mentioned that Aristotle has no special technical term to refer to *perfected* syllogisms generally. For Aristotle a *perfect* syllogism is an argument (premise-set plus conclusion) which is obviously valid, i.e. known valid without intermediate reasoning. In an *imperfect* syllogism the conclusion follows (there is no such thing as an invalid syllogism) but in order to *see* that the conclusion follows intermediate steps of reasoning are necessary. The process, which we now call *deduction*, of adding intermediate steps is called *perfected* an *imperfect* syllogism. The imperfection is epistemic. In cases where the conclusion does not follow he says that there will be no syllogism. See Smiley (1973) 139, 141. Nevertheless Aristotle does have two terms whose extensions are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the perfected syllogisms, viz. *ostensive* (direct) and *per impossibile* (indirect). Every Aristotelian deduction (perfected syllogism) is either *ostensive* or *per impossibile* and every *ostensive* or *per impossibile* syllogism is perfected (taking perfect syllogisms as trivially perfected ostensive syllogisms).

In his analysis Lear makes the observations that Aristotle takes 'following of necessity' as a non-epistemic primitive concept which Aristotle never

analyses, defines or reduces and that the process of perfecting is an epistemic *method* for recognizing 'following of necessity.' Thus Aristotle has distinguished consequence (non-epistemic) from deducibility (epistemic). See Lear 2, 7, 8, 13, 59, 61.

The Syllogistic: Ostensive and Per Impossibile Syllogisms

In several places Lear refers to Aristotle's 'formal system' as 'the syllogistic' (ix, 26, 34, esp. 16) and he says that Aristotle had 'a mathematically precise system of formal inferences.' (11) The question to be treated here is what does Lear take the syllogistic to be?

If it is not evident that a given conclusion follows from given premises *then* one attempts to make this evident by somehow chaining together evident inferences so that in the end an ostensive or *per impossibile* syllogism has been constructed. It remains to say (1) what these evident inferences are and (2) how they are chained together to make ostensive and *per impossibile* syllogisms.

There is no doubt, aside from terminology, that Aristotle took as his evident inferences (or rules of inference) the four unweakened first figure syllogisms,

Aba, Acb	/ Aca
Aba, Icb	/ Ica
Eba, Acb	/ Eca
Eba, Icb	/ Oca

and the following three conversions,

Eab	/ Eba
Iab	/ Iba
Aab	/ Iba.

To describe Aristotle's deduction system, or process of perfection of imperfect syllogisms, it remains only to say how the evident inferences are chained together to make perfected syllogisms (or, in modern terms, to say how the rules of inference are used to construct deductions). Lear says (x) that he has 'used *the* natural deduction formalization of Aristotle's logic given by Smiley and Corcoran' (italics added). But in this connection there are two difficulties. Firstly, no *single* system is given both by Smiley and by Corcoran and the differences, though minor when contrasting the Lukasiewicz system, are significant in regard to exposition of Aristotle's programme. Secondly, Lear makes important claims which conflict with both.

According to Corcoran (1972, 1974) there are two *kinds* of deductions, direct (ostensive) and indirect (*per impossibile*). A *direct* deduction of a conclusion from premises is obtained by listing some or all of the premises and

then interpolating subsequent lines according to the seven evident inferences, repetitions allowed *ad lib*, until the conclusion has been reached. An *indirect* deduction of a conclusion from premises is got by listing some or all of the premises *plus* the contradictory opposite of the conclusion and then interpolating subsequent lines as above until one reaches the contradictory opposite of a proposition already set down (either a premise or some later line). The crucial points to notice here are (1) that an indirect deduction normally does not *contain* its conclusion and (2) that in a single deduction the 'reductio strategy' can be used but once and the one use begins at the very outset. There is no such thing as using the 'reductio strategy' in the middle of a deduction in order to get an intermediate conclusion which is to be combined with other intermediate conclusions.

Smiley (1973) 140 presents a formal system of deductions'... intended to match as closely as possible Aristotle's own ...syllogistic.' Smiley's rules of inference are chosen from the first figure unweakened syllogisms and the conversions. Smiley has no special class of indirect deductions and no reductio rule but indirect reasoning is nevertheless countenanced. Indirect reasoning is accomplished by means of a special method for chaining two deductions (which may already involve indirect reasoning): deduction of *p* from *X* and *c̄* concatenated with a deduction of *pb̄* from *Y* forms a new deduction of *c* from *X, Y*. Smiley stresses the fact that treating syllogisms as deductions is separate from whether his system matches Aristotle's.

Although he does not say so explicitly, he seems to take the Aristotelian distinction between *per impossibile* and ostensive syllogisms to correspond to his own distinction between deductions involving one or more of the 'reductio chainings' and those not involving any 'reductio chainings' (Smiley (1973) 142). This would mean that Smiley is attributing to Aristotle's syllogistic deductions involving arbitrarily many 'reductio chainings.' Corcoran ((1973) 213 and (1974) 117) admits that this may well be the case but adds that he could find no positive evidence for it in the Aristotelian text. Smiley takes indirect reasoning to be accomplished in the syllogistic by a special method of chaining deductions whereas Corcoran takes it to be accomplished by a special category of deductions. But they are in complete agreement on the proposition that the syllogistic method of perfection involves indirect reasoning.

Three of the claims that Lear makes about the syllogistic are in conflict with both Corcoran and Smiley. Lear says (i) that any conclusion derivable from given premises indirectly is also derivable directly, (ii) that the syllogistic does not 'fully formalize' indirect deductions (i.e. the syllogistic does not contain indirect deductions) and (iii) that *per impossibile* syllogisms are *not* perfected and indeed that they are imperfect and imperfectible.

(i) The Redundancy of Indirect Deductions: Given that the direct deductions in the syllogistic are made up using the unweakened first figure syllogisms and the conversions, none of the standard two premise arguments having a negative particular premise (*Oxy*) are directly deducible. The reason is that none of the seven rules have a negative particular premise. Lear knows

this. (5, 6) Nevertheless, he repeatedly asserts, without giving reasons, that 'any conclusion that can be derived by a *per impossibile* syllogism can also be derived from the same premises by a direct syllogism.' (9, also, 49, 50, 51, 53)

Lear *might* be attributing *two* deductive systems to Aristotle: one having direct and indirect deductions using the above seven rules (8), the other having only direct deductions but using as rules *all* of the two premise syllogisms and the three conversions (9, 94). The idea is that the first (lower level) system is used to derive all of the rules used in the second. A closely related idea is mentioned in Corcoran (1974) 121. But there is nothing explicit in the Lear text to substantiate this suggestion. Needless to say it conflicts with both the Corcoran and the Smiley interpretations.

Even using *all* of the two-premise syllogisms as rules it is still not possible to directly derive either the subaltern or the converse-by-limitation from the negative universal (*Exy/Oxy* and *Exy/Oyx*). Lear says nothing about taking either of these as rules, and once these have been taken as rules so that, in effect, all one-premise and two-premise syllogisms are rules, it still remains to prove that all three-premise syllogisms are directly deducible. It may be the case that with this expanded system indirect deductions are redundant but Lear shows no awareness that this needs proof.

(ii) The Absence of Indirect Deductions: Not only does Lear believe that indirect deductions are redundant but he also seems to think that they are not among the formal deductions of the syllogistic. In the first place, it is obvious that the indirect deductions can involve any or all of the seven rules for direct deductions and therefore could be said to be 'partly formalizable' in the syllogistic regardless of whether the syllogistic actually countenances indirect deductions. This is not the issue. The issue is whether the syllogistic contains a category of indirect deductions. On p. 34 Lear says not. Lear admits, of course, that Aristotle discusses *per impossibile* and other 'hypothetical syllogisms' but, using the term 'syllogistic' to indicate the formal system (11), Lear is claiming that none of the hypothetical syllogisms are part of the formal system.

In this issue Lear has reasons. On p. 38 he makes the point that an indirect deduction is a suppositional natural-deductive type entity in which the role of a supposition is formally distinguished from that of a premise. (In an indirect *proof* the premises are all known to be true but the contradictory of the conclusion, which is the supposition, is not only not known to be true but is *proved* false by the proof). On p. 39 he says: 'Aristotle's syllogistic, like the formal systems of Frege, Russell, and Hilbert, makes no provision for the explicit recognition of suppositions.' Given these premises it follows not only that the syllogistic does not *contain* indirect deductions but even more, viz., that the syllogistic *could not* contain indirect deductions. (52, 53)

In view of the fact that both the Corcoran and the Smiley versions of the syllogistic involve indirect reasoning the second premise (that the syllogistic makes no provision for recognizing suppositions) appears to be a case of begging the question. Smiley has Aristotle marking suppositions by means of a special method of chaining. Corcoran has Aristotle marking suppositions

through the use of a special category of deductions. Lear has given no reasons for thinking that Corcoran or Smiley is wrong (though one must be) and Lear's preface suggests that he accepts both. Lear gives no indication of realizing his conflict with Corcoran and Smiley.

(iii) The Imperfection of *Per Impossibile* Syllogisms. On p. 52 Lear indicates his belief that *per impossibile* syllogisms are imperfect and that they are not perfectible. Saying that a *per impossibile* syllogism is imperfect is saying that it does not make evident the fact that the conclusion follows from its premises and saying that it is not perfectible is to say that there is no way to make this fact evident. The former point is closely related to that discussed under (ii) above. The latter is virtually incoherent because the question of whether a syllogism is perfectible depends only on the premises and the conclusion. Besides, Lear says on p. 8 that *reductio ad absurdum* is a method of perfection.

Final Remarks

This book is unnecessarily difficult to read. The individual chapters are not well-organized. The English prose is vague, convoluted, and hard to decipher. Lear's own semi-technical terms are often not explained and where distinctions are explained they are not consistently observed. Technical notation and terminology of advanced mathematical logic is not clearly and consistently used, e.g. sometimes 'completeness' includes 'soundness' and sometimes not, notation for infinite ordinals is misused in a baffling way, the terms 'theory' and 'logic' are not kept straight, at one place 'consistency' is used for 'completeness,' etc. The reader must form his own opinion concerning whether those are slip-of-the-pen. The absence of a subject index is a constant obstacle to careful study of the book and footnoted references often omit pagination.

The reviewers cannot recommend this book to persons not well-versed both in Aristotelian logic and in mathematical logic. But the book does raise several important points often overlooked by specialists. Among these are: (1) that the Fregean view of logic as the study of logical truth is certainly not Aristotelian and is probably not true, (2) that a sensible and useful logic need not contain variables and truth-functions, (3) that logic is really part of epistemology since a major feature of deduction is epistemic, (4) that the traditional distinction between deductions and proofs is philosophically important not only for such advanced endeavors as foundations of mathematics but also for such mundane projects as classification of fallacies.

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PAUL-MARCEL LEMAIRE, *Les signes sauvages. Une philosophie du langage ordinaire*. Ottawa: Editions de l'Université Saint-Paul, Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, (Collection Philosophica) 1980. 264 p. CN\$ 9.75. ISBN: 2-7603-1027-2

L'ouvrage, ainsi que le précise d'emblée l'introduction, 'veut être un effort de réhabilitation du langage ordinaire d'aujourd'hui, non pas pour l'exalter ni dénier les risques mortels qui le menacent, mais pour mettre au jour ses virtualités' et pour 'tenter de jeter un pont entre ce langage et celui de la philosophie, car le salut de ces deux langages nous semble solidaire dans le temps présent.' (11) Refusant de se donner au départ des adversaires à réfuter, l'Auteur n'en récuse pas moins les conceptions behavioriste et intentionaliste (Searle) du 'comportement langagier,' pour se ranger sous la bannière de la phénoménologie. Qu'est-ce, d'un point de vue phénoménologique, que le langage ordinaire? L'introduction en esquisse la physionomie générale: c'est un langage historique, qui ne peut être cerné que par rapport à une époque de l'histoire, un style de civilisation, une culture donnée; il repose sur une appropriation qui permet le libre usage de la langue, mais un libre usage qui ne se réduit pas à la domination d'un 'objet' par des 'sujets,' et qui fait appel à l'expérience globale du langage dans l'ensemble des comportements humains;

c'est un langage 'vivant,' évoluant en 'synchronie dynamique' dans la culture actuelle. Le langage ordinaire ne se réduit ni au langage habituel, ni au langage quotidien, ni au discours public; mais comme il implique appropriation fondamentale du langage et position dans le temps, on peut le définir 'comme un langage constitutif ap-proprié et syn-chrone.' (23) Foncièrement ambigu, puisque d'une part on ne peut le déceler que dans les divers langages particularisés devant lesquels il s'efface mais que d'autre part il tend à se donner sa propre figure linguistique, il doit sans cesse conquérir son existence.

Cette première esquisse est approfondie dans les trois parties du volume, consacrées respectivement aux configurations de surface, à deux témoins du langage ordinaire, et aux stratégies profondes.

Dans la première, il s'agit d'examiner le langage en acte pour découvrir 'comment il se donne un style, comment il affronte le monde de l'audio-visuel, quels processus de sémantisation il met en oeuvre, comment il traite l'imaginaire et la thématique, quel type de cohérence il édifie.' (191) Après avoir posé que 'les analyses anthropologique, sémiotique et linguistique s'avèrent impuissantes à saisir toute la vie et tout le sens du langage ordinaire' (38), l'Auteur caractérise celui-ci comme première situation de l'homme dans le langage, comme 'pouvoir premier de parler,' puis il en dévoile les trois dimensions, à savoir l'intercommunion, l'expression et la communication, laissant ainsi entrevoir la 'forme' de ce langage, qui est 'un style particulier d'usage de la parole' (43); cette forme peut être rapprochée de trois séries de réseaux référentiels: les réseaux symboliques collectifs, les réseaux verbaux collectifs et les réseaux verbaux particuliers, — auxquels correspondent trois niveaux stylistiques: le niveau gestuel collectif, le niveau grammatical et le niveau particularisé; le langage ordinaire n'est donc pas monolithique, et l'on peut distinguer en lui divers types de parole: la parole rationalisante de la logicité linéaire férue de langage objectif, la parole fonctionnelle dont se contente le behaviorisme, et la parole initiatique, qui est à comprendre 'comme accomplissant l'insertion dans une communauté à travers l'interlocution et l'intersubjectivité, comme introduisant aux faits primitifs de l'usage langagier, à la dynamique même du parler' (49), et qui 'constitue la forme primordiale du langage.' (50) Ayant ainsi 'décrit le langage ordinaire comme une intégration discursive inachevée d'une série de niveaux stylistiques et d'une série de réseaux référentiels' (56), l'Auteur entreprend de le situer par rapport au 'monde de l'audio-visuel'; devant le défi que pose aujourd'hui l'image au langage, il ne s'agit pas de décréter la mort ou l'inefficacité grandissante de celui-ci, ni d'en faire un jouet autonome, mais de dévoiler sa situation nouvelle en manifestant l'influence réciproque du langage et de l'image, celui-là étant relativisé par celle-ci. En se plaçant ensuite au niveau de la 'production langagière,' l'Auteur convient 'd'appeler Ensemble large A' la configuration référentielle qui décrit, au moins partiellement, la situation culturelle d'une société à une époque donnée; le 'sous-ensemble B' trahit la situation d'un milieu social particulier (ses intérêts, sa mentalité, ses idées, ses préjugés), tandis que le 'sous-ensemble C' manifeste la situation propre à un colloque particulier et qui intègre les relations existant entre les in-

terlocuteurs, le 'sujet de conversation,' et les événements qui le sous-tendent' (80); il s'agit dès lors de montrer que ces diverses situations apparaissent dans le langage à travers des processus de sémantisation, c'est-à-dire 'des mouvements (des poussées) du parler lui-même par lesquels il s'ouvre au sens' (81), puis de lier ces processus au rôle de la perception ('la perception devient pleinement perception, à la fois externe et interne, lorsqu'elle baigne dans le langage' (86) et de marquer leur rapport au style en faisant le lien entre les niveaux stylistiques mis en place dans le premier chapitre et l'ensemble A et les sous-ensemble B et C, puis en expliquant pourquoi il y a des figures de style dans le langage ordinaire, quel rôle joue l'inconscient dans leur formation et ce qu'elles nous apprennent sur le comportement à l'égard du monde. Le quatrième chapitre, après avoir insisté sur la complexité et la diversification de l'imaginaire du langage ordinaire, entreprend, à partir des réponses à trois questions fournies par un nombre indéterminé de répondants, de montrer 'comment les champs imaginaires et les thèmes conceptuels s'affirment et se constituent avec la médiation du langage ordinaire.' (106) Contre l'empirisme logique et la sémantique structurale, le dernier chapitre de la première partie soutient que le langage ordinaire a sa propre cohérence: 'Il y a une cohérence du langage ordinaire qui peut être incohérence logique mais co-adhérence à la vie de la parole et à l'expérience pluriforme.' (139)

Le seconde partie de l'ouvrage présente les conceptions du langage de Wittgenstein et de Chomsky, ainsi que l'attitude de l'Auteur à leur égard. Nous nous y attarderons d'autant moins qu'ou bien elle constitue une simple expansion du chapitre précédent, puisque, des quatre modèles logiques applicables au langage ordinaire, deux sont précisément ceux de Wittgenstein et de Chomsky (127); ou bien n'est qu'une addition tardive, puisque la première division de la démarche (38) ne mentionne que la configuration apparente et les structurations profondes, et que l'introduction de la troisième partie (191) enchaîne directement sur la problématique de la première partie.

Consacrée, donc, aux stratégies profondes, la troisième partie ne prétend pas pour autant 'réduire la complexité des faits linguistiques à un système logique qui rendrait compte, par le jeu de quelques lois ou catégories, de toute l'élaboration du sens dans le langage' (192); 'rechercher ici la profondeur ne sera rien d'autre que mettre en valeur la vie sinuose des signes linguistiques dans l'univers psychologique, pour essayer de voir comment les "existentiels de mon histoire personnelle," la vie imaginaire, le désir, l'action, et au-dessus de tout la recherche du sens, rejoignent dans le langage ordinaire, la réalité du monde et de l'histoire.' (192) Cette mise en valeur est réalisée en trois chapitres. Le premier, consacré à la 'dynamique des signes sauvages,' établit d'abord que le mouvement du sens est préalable aux significations identifiables, puis recherche les coordonnées de ce mouvement; la notion-clé de cette démarche est celle de 'scène signifiante,' que l'Auteur substitue à celle de représentation et qui désigne, 'dans le langage, l'instance génétique qui abrite et englobe la visée signifiante, les possibilités linguistiques d'une langue donnée et, enfin, les données à la fois complexes et partiels [sic!] de la perception *bic et nunc*' (195); ces trois sources, précise l'Auteur, agissent interac-

tivement pour préparer à ce qui est à dire un milieu d'exprimabilité qui s'inscrit dans l'horizon de 'l'idéal du dire.' Le second chapitre dévoile successivement les stratégies de l'imagination, du désir et de l'action dans la mise en œuvre du langage ordinaire. Après avoir montré que le sens résulte d'une part du jeu des facteurs inhérents au langage ordinaire lorsqu'ils s'affrontent à l'idéal du dire, d'autre part des stratégies des instances sous-jacentes (imagination, désir, action), il reste à se demander 'comment ce mouvement du sens s'oriente dans le langage, s'il atteint ou n'atteint pas son achèvement et comment il se réfracte sur l'ensemble du comportement humain' (229); s'inspirant de Pascal, l'Auteur développe d'abord la notion 'd'utopie du sens,' sans laquelle on ne saurait rendre compte du double sens dans le langage, 'c'est-à-dire de l'apparition de significations précises sur le fond d'un espace indéfinissable de sens' (237); puis il montre comment cette utopie apparaît à travers la transgression des signes linguistiques en discernant 'trois modes de transgression dans le langage ordinaire': 'comme symbolisme référentiel, il se transgresse vers les choses elles-mêmes; comme miroir de la culture contemporaine, il se transgresse dans l'utopie; comme pratique initiatique, il ouvre l'échange dialogal au monde lui-même' (247); cette triple transgression débouche finalement sur l'apparition de l'infini dans le langage ordinaire et sur son rapport avec la mort.

On saura gré à l'Auteur d'avoir abordé, du langage, un aspect trop souvent et trop facilement occulté. Particulièrement remarquables sont l'effort de synthèse personnelle et la sensibilité à certains facteurs comme l'insertion du langage ordinaire dans une culture donnée avec laquelle il est en interaction, son rapport aux media audio-visuels, son rôle propre, qui est moins d'information que d'expression. S'il est un problème majeur que soulève cependant un tel ouvrage, il est d'abord d'ordre méthodologique: comment le philosophe peut-il parler de la parole, et de la parole ordinaire? Pour combler l'écart institué par Saussure entre langue et parole, quatre voies maîtresses se présentent. La première consiste à étendre la recherche du système au-delà de la phrase et, comme le fait l'analyse du discours, à décrire différents types de formations discursives. La seconde consiste à élaborer une philosophie du langage parallèle à la physique, à la psychologie, à l'ethnologie, à la sociologie... du langage, c'est-à-dire une philosophie du langage offrant, de celui-ci, une vue complémentaire. La troisième, plus ambitieuse, tenterait d'effectuer la synthèse des différentes disciplines qui se préoccupent du langage. Quant à la quatrième, animée de la même ambition que la précédente, elle s'en distinguerait pourtant par sa tentative de se substituer aux disciplines existantes (quitte à les utiliser au besoin) pour reconstituer, de l'intérieur, par empathie, l'ensemble de la démarche: mais ne risque-t-on pas alors que la quête du langage ordinaire se transforme, par recours aux 'évidences,' par argumentation reposant trop souvent sur la qualification (ce qui est vivant, spontané, dynamique, concret, ondoyant, divers, vrai, authentique *vs* ce qui est inerte, mort, pétrifié, automatique), par simple affirmation de ce que les gens 'ordinaires' sont censés éprouver, et par hiérarchisation

privilégiant la parole dite initiatique, — en découverte de quelque langage plutôt extraordinaire?

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DAVID J. LEVY, *Realism: An Essay in Interpretation and Social Reality*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1981. US\$ 17.50. ISBN 0-391-02300-4

David J. Levy argues that an objective science of society has come to rest on a proper conception of social reality. Such a conception in turn determines the procedures and the logic of inquiry of social science. However, none of the two major intellectual traditions in social science, positivism and historical idealism (the latter for Levy also includes Marxism) which Max Weber attempted to reconcile in his methodological programme of *Verstehen*, provide an adequate conception of social reality. Accordingly, Weber's views on interpretative sociology are defective. A proper interpretation of social reality has come to rely on a philosophical anthropology. It would combine an analysis of the subjective with an account of the objective material (natural) and cognitive setting on which the former is based, that is, 'social reality is ineradicably founded in natural reality, the reality of natures, which means the nature of man and the nature of everything he encounters.' (26) But the essay itself does not discuss or develop such a philosophical anthropology, nor does the author refer to the pioneering writings of Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen, except indirectly, as a result of Levy's reference to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann and their writings on the social construction of reality. Instead, the essay re-examines, relying to a considerable extent on the work of Eric Voegelin, a range of epistemological and methodological issues in light of the paramount importance the author assigns to certain ontological conceptions or, 'a truer conception of social reality as an embodiment of man's creative response to the pressures of existence.' (59)

Levy initially focuses on Paul Ricoeur's claim for the exemplary status of textual interpretation in the human sciences, for every social action is, like a text, a restricted domain open to diverse interpretations. And as long as interpretation is linked to ontological considerations, the possibility of diversity does not imply relativism. The existence of common, constant and therefore a-historical features of the world as experienced reality, is, in other words, assurance that 'subjectivism and relativism need not be the last words.' (45) Next, the author takes up the important topic of the possible tension between common sense and the social scientific account of common sense interpretations; Levy argues that such tension is linked to the different commitments of theoretical and common sense discourse although he does not consider the possibility that the price for such distinctiveness may well be the irrelevance of theoretical to practical discourse.

In the longest chapter of the book, Levy tries to establish that Marxism and various strands of historical materialism, especially critical theory, are really variants of a kind of covert historical idealism whose arguments in opposition to philosophical ontology are unjustified.

In the concluding, brief programmatic chapters of the essay, the author suggests that Eric Voegelin's phenomenological theory of symbolization usefully specifies, combines and is conscious of those dual but inseparable aspects of social reality which Levy identifies as essential to a genuine science of man. Such a science should make use of both understanding and explanation as largely complementary approaches to an interpretation of the social world. For the understanding of social reality means according to Levy 'to see the way in which it belongs to the pre-existing enveloping reality of the universe.' (127)

Levy's emphasis on the necessity to discover the ontological exigencies of social action (which are after all beyond the control of man) and the understanding/explanation of these forces perhaps seriously underestimates or even overlooks the costs of such premises for social science. For such reductionist views fail to take into consideration that there are social rather than ontological limits to a boundless proliferation of accounts of social action (and social activity) and to the tendency to progressively eliminate accounts which are formulated in a contingent sense if their premises seem to allow for much more fixed explanations. Instructive in this regard are the claims of sociobiology, a case Levy surprisingly does not consider at all but which amounts, as the author himself warns, to a short cut which 'would to be ignore the creative dimension of human activity.' (61) Altogether, however, Levy's essay which generally emphasizes the links between philosophy and sociology is a refreshing re-examination of various contentious issues in the philosophy of the social sciences which does not merely pit entrenched position against entrenched position.

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JOHN LOSEE, *A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*. 2nd. edn. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford U.P. Pp. 248. CN\$ 9.50; US\$ 5.95. ISBN 0-19-289143-X.

For a long time philosophy of science was dominated by logical empiricism, which sought to understand the nature of science by combining Hume's epistemology with the *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead. The 'logical' character of such an approach refers to the metalevel of the procedure being followed by the philosopher of science, while the 'empiricism' refers to the object level of what the scientist himself is doing. That is, the logical empiricist is 'logical' in the sense that he aims at the kind of precision found in formal logic and uses tools (like truth-functional connectives and quantifiers) developed therein, and he is an 'empiricist' insofar as he holds that it is observation that gives meaning to scientific terms and warrant to scientific theories. Although there is no intrinsic opposition between such logicism and such empiricism, it is an historical fact that logical empiricists tended to have a 'reconstructionist' attitude toward actual science and a prescriptivist tendency in their own work. Recent critics have claimed that the other side of this reconstructionist coin is the thesis that scientists are not being too 'logical' in their activities, that the other side of this prescriptivism is that logical empiricists are being apriorist in theirs, and that consequently either they are not being 'scientific' or actual science does not behave the way they claim it does. Through such criticism we have seen the establishment of a new philosophy of science which emphasizes the historical approach. This is to be welcomed since at its most fundamental level the new approach is merely a greater sensitivity to the realities of actual, historical science. The present book is also welcome insofar as it contributes to such an approach.

However, when one mentions the historical approach to the philosophy of science, some of the first names that general philosophers think of are Hanson, Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos. Thus one hears of such theses as that observation is theory-laden, that scientific theories are not and ought not to be rejected in the light of mere empirical refutation, and that the replacement of one scientific theory by another cannot be rationally justified. Although it would be wrong not to recognize the value and importance of the above pioneers, it is equally wrong to think that all there is to the historical philosophy of science is a mixture of such relativism and apriorism and debates for and against. One merit of the present book is that it is a historical introduction to the philosophy of science in the sense of being an introductory history of theories about the aims, methods of discovery, methods of justification, and epistemological structure of science.

The specifics of the subject matter are as follows. The time spanned ranges from Aristotle to the post World War II period. There is an approximately even balance among the views of self-reflective scientists (e.g., Galileo,

Newton), of general systematic philosophers (e.g., Plato, Hume, Kant), and of science-oriented philosophers (such as Francis Bacon, William Whewell, and Pierre Duhem). As might be expected, the list of problems touched upon is very comprehensive: induction, causation, the role of mathematics, the nature of a deductive system, necessary truth, the hypothetical explanation of observations, experimentation, primary versus secondary qualities, the relationship between science and metaphysics, scepticism, teleological explanations, the cognitive status and the structure of scientific theories, context of discovery versus context of justification, patterns of scientific progress, models and analogies, conventionalism, positivism, falsificationism, operationalism, the analysis of explanation, and the relationship between the history and the philosophy of science. The book is chronologically arranged, clearly written, and expository in style; criticisms of the presented views are reported, but without evaluation by the author. There is a good bibliography arranged by chapter. The difference between the present edition and the first concerns recent philosophy of science, which had not been included earlier. What has been added is a 50-page, 3-chapter account of the views of Percy William Bridgman, Ernest Nagel, Paul Feyerabend, Nelson Goodman, Stephen Toulmin, Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, and Larry Laudan. The work reads like a textbook, and as such it may very well be the best available introduction of its kind.

Having discussed the book's philosophical, scholarly, and pedagogical merits, I now wish to present some minor reservations. A general criticism would be that, although the book represents a qualitative jump forward vis-à-vis logical empiricism, it is still not historical enough in the sense that it neglects the history of science too much. Although historical examples abound, the various epistemological and methodological views are compared and contrasted more with one another than with the scientific practice which they are meant to enlighten and guide. To be sure, this is less true of the initial chapters and periods than of the latter, and moreover this kind of interrelation is not easily done. Nevertheless, the general impression conveyed by the book is that the primary interest is the abstract ideas and problems, and that scientific developments are used as mere illustrations; the alternatives are to make the latter primary and the former secondary, or to make both equally important by concentrating on the interaction. The difficulty with Losee's choice is not only the scholarly one that a relatively imaginary history is thereby created, but also that the student will frequently be unable fully to understand the various philosophical ideas because of their lack of concrete content.

A second difficulty stems from the comprehensiveness of the survey. Such comprehensive histories have been available for a long time in other fields like the history of philosophy and the history of science, in which fields there is also already a tradition of criticism on the grounds that such comprehensive histories are bound to be superficial and full of specific inaccuracies. Such criticisms can be countered, I believe, by arguing that these historical surveys have a place, that this place is primarily a pedagogical one, and that

the best of them manage somehow to be accurate enough in most instances. Losee's work has this kind of accuracy, but on at least one occasion where I happen to be knowledgeable, his account could be questioned. For example, in discussing Galileo's struggle for Copernicanism, Losee correctly reports Bellarmine's claim that to explain phenomena by means of hypotheses (i.e., 'to save the appearances') is not the same as to prove the physical truth of these hypotheses; however, he ignores Galileo's equally important principle that one ought to prefer the hypothesis which explains more phenomena more adequately. Moreover, in discussing Galileo's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Losee incorrectly attributes to him the definition of primary quality as one which is quantitatively measurable, and the demarcation criterion that the difference between a scientific and a non-scientific statement is whether or not it is about primary qualities so defined. And in his account of Galileo's experimentation, Losee interprets as 'ambivalence' (56) something which is simply judiciousness, namely the fact that on some occasions Galileo attached great importance to experiments while on other occasions he regarded other matters as more important.

Finally, there is a difficulty stemming from the fact the present book is a second edition, meant to expand the first by adding an account of developments in the philosophy of science after World War II. Hence, although the first edition could not have been so faulted, one wishes that the second would have contained a fuller and more coherent account of the new historically oriented philosophy of science. I have already said that we do have explicit accounts of the views of Feyerabend, Toulmin, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan; and I can add now that Goodman's 'new riddle of induction' is discussed as providing a logicist justification for the historical approach (insofar as the projectability of predicates, like 'green' but unlike 'grue,' depends on their past fruitfulness). However, one does not get from Losee's account much of a feeling of what are the new problems, the positive ideas, and the constructive alternatives; the discussion is carried out too much from the older point of view. This applies even to the last chapter, which is entitled 'Alternatives to Orthodoxy,' since Losee includes therein what might be called orthodox criticisms of the alternatives. Although in one sense this is admirably objective, by the end of the discussion of these criticisms one is left with the impression that no new ground has been broken.

In spite of these reservations, this is a useful work of some originality, useful both as a textbook and for occasional consultation by the philosopher.

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J. MACADAM, M. NEUMANN, G. LAFRANCE, éds. *Etudes Rousseau-Trent/Trent Rousseau Papers*. Ottawa: Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa (Collection Philosophica) 1980. 312 p. CN\$ 7.50. ISBN: 2-7603-1025-6

Il s'agit du recueil des communications du Congrès Rousseau qui se tient du 21 au 25 juin 1978 à l'Université Trent de Peterborough en Ontario à l'occasion du bicentenaire de la mort de Rousseau. Ces communications me paraissent, pour la plupart, fort intéressantes. Je présenterai un bref aperçu de chacune. On verra que quelques-unes se complètent bien et que le recueil n'est pas qu'une addition de textes disparates du fait notamment d'un plan adopté par les éditeurs, plan que je reprends ci-dessous.

I *Rousseau et son temps.*

SIMONE GAYARD-FABRE: Jean-Jacques Rousseau ou les prémisses d'une révolution. (11-22)

Rousseau voit-il l'origine du droit dans la loi positive ou dans la loi naturelle? Selon l'auteur, Rousseau opère une révolution copernicienne de la philosophie du droit et de l'État telle que la question ne se pose plus de la même façon après lui. Que dans l'état civil, les droits soient fixés par la loi, cela signifie qu'ils sont stabilisés et sanctionnés. A l'encontre des thèses jurisnaturalistes, il n'y a de droit, selon Rousseau, que par la reconnaissance de la loi positive. Mais à l'encontre des thèses positivistes, la loi ne fait que valider et garantir les virtualités d'un droit naturel, celui-ci étant privé d'effectivité tant qu'il n'est pas sanctionné par la loi.

JEAN M. FAMY: Rousseau disciple des encyclopédistes dans la 'Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard.' (23-30)

L'auteur se propose détudier brièvement les oppositions et les convergences entre Rousseau et les encyclopédistes. Il s'attarde surtout aux convergences mais remarque qu'elles ne sont que tactiques, accessoires ou dépendantes des modes intellectuelles de l'époque, alors que les oppositions sont fondamentales entre 'le hérault de la religion du coeur et les tenants de la stricte raison.' (30)

PIERRE-PAUL CLÉMENT: Quelques aspects de la vie et de l'oeuvre de J.J. Rousseau s'oublier — se surveiller — fixer par l'écriture. (31-38)

L'auteur remarque le soin et le temps mis par Rousseau à copier ses propres manuscrits, transformant par l'écriture les produits de son imagination en '*objet* parfait, durable, incorruptible.' (35) Rassembler le disparate,achever l'inachevé, reprendre dans un discours défini l'informe du vécu, retenir ce qui fuit, voilà ce qui meut Rousseau qu'il calligraphie ses mémoires ou constitue des herbiers avec les plantes cueillies au cours de ses promenades. Il était divisé, déchiré mais il a voulu surmonter les tensions qu'il reconnaissait pour écrire une oeuvre universelle. On peut regretter que cet article soit aussi bref.

TERENCE MARSHALL: Rousseau and the Enlightenment. (39-67)

Rousseau a bien compris l'insuffisance de l'intérêt individuel éclairé par la raison en tant que fondement d'une morale républicaine. Pour éduquer les hommes à une telle morale, toutes les vérités ne sont pas bonnes à dire. Aussi Rousseau préconise-t-il une forme de prudence et de finesse qui ressemble parfois à de la dissimulation. Ce qu'il vise d'abord, c'est former des moeurs et des traditions qui favorisent ce qu'il entend par liberté civique. L'auteur conclut en faisant remarquer combien Rousseau, dans certains de ses écrits, a pu se livrer sans réserve.

II *La politique de la rédemption.*

DAVID GAUTHIER: The Politics of Redemption. (71-98)

Cet article m'apparaît le plus important de ce recueil par la qualité de son argument philosophique. Il traite des moyens imaginés par Rousseau pour racheter les hommes de la chute originelle que constitue la civilisation.

Ce n'est que par artifice qu'il est possible de maintenir les hommes dans un état de liberté dont ils s'éloignent presque partout. Le législateur doit leur faire violence pour les délivrer des chaînes qu'ils se donnent en accroissant leurs moyens mais aussi leurs besoins. Dans l'état de nature, ils se contentaient de peu, leurs désirs ne dépassaient pas leurs capacités, ils ne dépendaient pas d'autrui. Or c'est là, selon l'auteur, la définition rousseauiste de la liberté: équilibre entre le vouloir et le pouvoir, indépendance vis-à-vis des autres. Les hommes auraient pu augmenter leurs capacités ou refréner leurs désirs pour que ceux-ci et celles-là s'équilibrent à nouveau dans l'état de civilisation. Mais dans cet état, les hommes en viennent à dépendre de l'approbation d'autrui; ils en perdent toute liberté. On ne peut contraindre autrui à penser du bien de soi. Or c'est ce que voudrait l'amour-propre source de tous les maux. L'homme social en arrive à ne tenir son identité que de ses congénères. En lui-même, il n'est que néant. (80) Pour le guérir, Rousseau lui propose la maîtrise de soi.

Le sauvage vivait en harmonie naturelle avec ses passions et ses désirs. L'homme vertueux doit recréer cette harmonie consciemment, par la maîtrise de ses désirs agrandis par le progrès de la civilisation. Alors que Hobbes voulait régler la concurrence pour des biens rares dans l'état de nature, Rousseau vise à sauver les hommes civilisés, entraînés par l'amour-propre à se montrer supérieurs les uns aux autres. Il vise à instituer des moeurs telles que les effets de cet amour-propre soient bénéfiques plutôt que destructeurs. Il suffit de l'élargir et de l'éduquer pour en faire l'amour de nos concitoyens, une fierté civique. Alors il deviendra l'instrument de justice et de salut alors qu'il avait été l'instrument de notre déchéance.

Au lieu d'une vanité mesquine et individualiste, Rousseau veut instituer un grand orgueil tourné vers la puissance et l'indépendance de la patrie. Celle-ci et ceux qui s'identifient à elle, peuvent devenir auto-suffisants alors que les individus isolés demeurent dans la dépendance.

Rousseau fait appel à un *deus ex machina* pour guider les hommes et instituer les moeurs qui les rendront vertueux. Toute la liberté à laquelle ils pourront prétendre, ils la tiendront du gouverneur qui les aura habitués à vivre selon de justes bornes. En un sens la liberté humaine n'est qu'apparence. Elle dépend de la fidélité à un ordre social et moral et intérieurisé. Mais l'homme ne se satisfait pas de cet ordre et Rousseau le reconnaît.

Cet article témoigne d'une connaissance aimante des textes et réussit à présenter de manière systématique la pensée morale et politique de Rousseau.

ROGER D. MASTERS: Nothing Fails Like Success: Development and History in Rousseau's Political Teaching. (99-118)

Il s'agit ici du pessimisme de Rousseau: l'homme naturellement bon se corrompt avec la civilisation, une bonne constitution ne peut que retarder les effets de la corruption, une bonne éducation ne peut que les réduire, le meilleur des régimes politiques ne peut que dégénérer et ses succès mêmes entraîneront sa déchéance. L'auteur insiste particulièrement sur la distinction que Rousseau fait entre droit (ou idéal) et fait (ou réalité). Ainsi, le Contrat social énoncerait l'idéal au regard duquel on doit juger la réalité, toujours décevante, évoluant dans un sens contraire à l'idéal. 'La volonté générale' serait un principe de droit politique qui permet de juger 'la volonté de tous.' Il n'y a donc pas de contradiction entre les textes traitant de l'idéal et les textes traitant des hommes tels qu'ils sont et évoluent historiquement.

JIM MACADAM: Rousseau's Criticism of Hobbesian Egoism. (119-131)

L'auteur commence par distinguer chez Rousseau trois formes d'intérêt égoïste: il y a ce qui m'intéresse subjectivement, il y a ce qui est objectivement dans mon intérêt, il y a enfin l'intérêt que je porte à l'estime que les autres auraient pour moi et qui m'entraîne parfois à agir à l'encontre de ce qui est effectivement dans mon intérêt ou de ce qui m'intéresse spontanément. Ces trois notions — la dernière correspond à l'amour-propre — se retrouvent grossièrement chez Hobbes. Pour Rousseau cependant, l'état de nature n'est pas un état de guerre. Ce n'est qu'avec le développement des relations sociales que l'amour-propre, l'envie et la concurrence pour les 'positions sociales' apparaissent. Les deux premières formes de l'intérêt égoïste, seules présentes dans l'état de nature, n'entraînent pas de conflit.

La 'fureur de se distinguer' n'est cependant pas une fatalité irrémédiable. Il y a moyen de réformer les moeurs afin que les hommes soient capables de volonté générale et dépassent toutes formes d'égoïsme pour se soucier du développement de la nature humaine. C'est ce que Kant a reconnu dans l'œuvre de Rousseau.

III *Les non-rachetés.*

NANNERL O. KEOHANE: 'But for Her Sex...': the Domestication of Sophie. (135-145)

Selon le Discours sur l'origine des inégalités, c'est la vie sociale qui infériorise la femme. Dans l'état de nature, ses capacités ne se distinguent guère de celles de l'homme. C'est pour s'assurer de l'attachement de celui-ci et maintenir une famille, qu'elle doit plaire et se soumettre. La domestication de la femme est fonction de la reproduction, de l'épanouissement et de la vie publique de l'homme. Sophie est formée à l'assujettissement tandis qu'Émile est formé en vue d'une autonomie relative.

LYNDA LANGE: Woman and 'The General Will.' (147-157)

A l'article précédent, celui-ci apporte la précision suivante: l'infériorité de la femme est pensée selon le modèle de l'infériorité du désir vis-à-vis de la raison. La femme est préposée par Rousseau à la gestion des besoins affectifs afin que l'homme soit capable de la volonté générale, elle se voue à sa famille afin qu'il puisse s'occuper de la vie publique. Cet article, comme le précédent, tire au clair les préjugés sexistes d'une oeuvre où l'égalité est un idéal proclamé. Une question se dégage de ces deux articles: si l'autonomie relative de l'homme repose sur l'assujettissement de la femme, que vaut cette autonomie?

IV Rousseau et l'actualité politique.

HOWARD R. CELL: Breaking Rousseau's Chains. (161-171)

L'auteur critique l'interprétation qu'Althusser et Levine ont donnée du Contrat social. Il aborde la question des associations partielles: certaines promeuvent la volonté générale, il n'est donc pas nécessaire de les interdire toutes, on peut en dire autant des intérêts privés. Dans le Contrat social, faut-il remarquer, des individus s'entendent pour gagner la liberté civile mais ils ne se soumettent pas à la communauté, celle-ci n'est pas une partie contractante, elle résulte du contrat qui se passe entre individus.

ANDREW LEVINE: On the General Will: Reply to Howard Cell. (173-179)

L'auteur commence par dissocier sa lecture de Rousseau de celle que fait Althusser. Il distingue ensuite la raison selon Hobbes, raison pratique purement instrumentale, et la raison selon Kant et Rousseau, raison pratique qui détermine des fins, qui s'auto-détermine. Il est difficile de saisir la conception kantienne tant la conception de Hobbes prédomine et, dit A. Levine, c'est le piège où est tombé H. Cell. Celui-ci n'aurait pas compris ce que signifie la suprématie de la volonté générale. Elle est la condition d'un ordre moral et politique forçant les hommes à être libres. Bien plus que l'harmonie contingente des intérêts privés, elle vise ce qui s'impose universellement, elle instaure la liberté comme autonomie, l'association morale entre les hommes et l'État qui sanctionne l'une et l'autre. Cet État correspond à une république des fins d'où la lutte des classes est exclue. Il y a là sans doute un utopisme politique invisible mais il y a surtout une description saisissante de l'expérience morale. Rousseau annonce Kant, il ne peut être interprété selon Hobbes, pourrait-on conclure.

CARL G. HEDMAN: Rousseau on Self-Interest, Compassion and Moral Progress. (181-198)

Rousseau distingue l'amour de soi de l'amour-propre. Le premier peut être élargi par la pitié et seule cette dernière notion explique que la justice puisse encore être désirée par des hommes qu'une société injuste a corrompus. L'auteur suggère que l'entreprise de Rawls, en vue de fonder la justice sur l'intérêt personnel des différentes parties du contrat social, présuppose un sens de la compassion similaire à celui dont parle Rousseau.

LYNNE LAYTON: Rousseau's Political and Cultural Revolution. (199-210)

Pour réformer la société, il faut des hommes éduqués mais pour qu'ils soient éduqués, il faudrait que la société soit déjà réformée. A ce dilemme s'en ajoute un autre: le gouverneur, le législateur, Wolmar correspondent à une avant-garde révolutionnaire. Mais d'où sortent-ils? Comment le commun des mortels pourra-t-il les reconnaître et les juger pour ce qu'ils sont? Enfin, il semble que Rousseau veuille conditionner les moeurs pour que les hommes soient libres. Tantôt il compte sur l'autonomie souveraine d'un instituteur des moeurs et tantôt il n'espère rien de plus que la docilité de bons élèves. L'auteur remarque que toutes ces contradictions soulevées par Rousseau demeurent actuelles et n'ont jamais été résolues.

V Epilogue.

MICHAEL NEUMANN: Rousseau as Moralist. An Afterword to the Bicentennial Congress. (213-221)

L'auteur insiste sur trois thèmes. D'abord, l'histoire de l'humanité telle que Rousseau la présente, ne vaut que comme exposé moral au sujet du juste et de l'injuste. Ensuite, la justice correspond à la recherche par tous du bien commun. Enfin, Rousseau aurait voulu établir une société où l'État serait le seul juge du bien commun. Mais cet État n'aurait pratiquement pas à intervenir, il correspondrait au vouloir des citoyens.

JEAN EHRARD: Impressions finales. (p. 223-225)

Je partage les impressions de Jean Ehrard, Les communications qui précèdent ont envisagé la philosophie de Rousseau et ont tâché d'en établir le système. Mais, ajoute l'auteur, ces communications n'ont guère insisté sur les déchirements de l'homme et les contradictions de son oeuvre. Or ces déchirements et contradictions sont aussi pleins de sens.

Le recueil se termine par une traduction anglaise de deux comédies: Narcisse de Rousseau et le Dispute de Marivaux. Alan Orenstein a préfacé et fait cette traduction.

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JIM MACADAM, MICHAEL NEUMANN AND GUY LAFRANCE, eds. *Trent Rousseau Papers/Etudes Rousseau-Trent*. Ottawa: U. of Ottawa Press. Pp. 312. CN\$ 7.50. ISBN 2-7603-1025-6

As a general remark let me say that all the papers in this collection, *Trent Rousseau Papers*, are highly readable, exceptionally well written, clear and uniformly interesting. As one might expect, I have certain reservations on several points but there was not a single paper that did not advance my understanding of Rousseau. While no finite number of articles can exhaust the richness of Rousseau's thought, this collection does cover a wide range of topics.

Rousseau's relation to the Enlightenment is many-sided and mostly antagonistic. Two major areas of contention concern attitudes toward religion and reason. With regard to the former, Prof. J. Fahmy catalogues the similarities and differences between Rousseau and the *philosophes*. While Rousseau had no regard for revelation and institutionalized religions, he was deeply religious in his own fashion and this was bound to put him at odds with his atheistic contemporaries. His attitude toward reason is another source of conflict with his fellow thinkers. But Rousseau's attitude toward reason is such a highly complex affair that even where he shared assumptions with his contemporaries, he drew contrary conclusions.

This roughly is the interesting thesis put forward by Prof. T. Marshall. Both Rousseau and the Enlightenment believed that by its very nature science is incapable of attaining the absolute truth. The provisional character of science generates a spirit of doubt that is quite salutary within the legitimate scope of science. But this same spirit when it permeates politics and morality is fatally destructive. When doubt is allied with atheistic materialism, a free republic in Rousseau's eyes becomes impossible. Rousseau's pessimistic view of civil man never allowed him to entertain the comforting illusion that the pursuit of enlightened self-interest would eventuate in a happy and just society. On the contrary, he foresaw that the pursuit of self-interest would inevitably result in progressively greater and greater economic inequality, and the deadening of those patriotic sentiments without which rampant selfishness cannot be transcended. Rousseau, more clearly than others, realized that man's natural regard for himself was, if uncompensated, incompatible with the exigencies of a just society. Patriotism, for Rousseau, is as necessary as it is unnatural, and it is not to be fostered by a spirit of doubt. It is against this background that his praise of ignorance is best viewed.

Rousseau's pessimism is further explored by Prof. D. Gauthier. Once *amour-propre* invades the human breast, only the most drastic devices can transform it into a sentiment of cooperation. Unless this new sentiment pervades society as a whole, the individual remains unredeemed in his subjectivity. The necessity of the Legislator is an index of Rousseau's despair. Where is such an improbable person to be found and, even more to the point, where

does history locate a people fit for legislation? The ultimate fate of Julie and Emile reinforces the point: '...Rousseau, despite himself, finally knew that we must live, unredeemed.'

All too often Rousseau's *amour-propre* is taken as a unitary concept and equated with unrelieved selfishness. Prof. J. MacAdam sees it otherwise. Self-esteem (his translation) may be what interests an individual, what is in the interest of an individual or an individual's interest in being valued by another. It is insofar as an individual acts according to the last meaning that he lives outside of himself and, thus, fails to achieve his full potential as a moral agent. There is no doubt that Rousseau offers the morally autonomous individual as the ideal but there is considerable justified doubt whether or not he believed such an ideal was attainable on any but a minuscule scale, a scale far less than is required to sustain a legitimate polity. Rousseau, far more than most of his contemporaries, realized the all-important role institutional arrangements play in individual character formation. Why, then, could not society be so structured as to provide individual development beyond egocentrism? Justifiably or not, the fact is that Rousseau held a view of human nature such that no social order could for long overcome man's innate selfishness. That is, Rousseau's sense of the ideal and his sense of reality were irreconcilably in conflict. I agree with MacAdam that his sense of reality is not justified.

All papers in this collection that address the question agree that there is a deeply pessimistic side to Rousseau's thought. It is also clear that in his account of conscience, Rousseau insists that reason alone is an insufficient foundation of morality. There must be an emotive supplement. Prof. C. Hedman argues that a just society can never be based exclusively on self-interest. A necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for the pursuit of justice is an enriched sense of compassion. It is not clear just how strong this natural sentiment is for Rousseau but it is a last hope, the development of which is the only change of relieving his pessimism.

Another aspect of Rousseau's pessimism concerns priorities: '...the effect would have to become the cause,...and men, before laws existed, would have to be as the laws themselves should make them.' (S.C. II, 7) This question of priority is one of the concerns of Prof. L. Layton, as is the question of whether Rousseau is a revolutionary or a conservative. Layton claims that Rousseau abstracts from economic relations, and in a sense this is as true as it is misleading. The sovereign can only speak in the language of law, and law for Rousseau is a very special instrument. Unlike what we would admit as law, sovereign law must oblige everyone either actually or potentially, and at one time or another. The economic consequence of these constraints is that no polity can be legitimate whose economy is based on a specialized division of labor. Rousseau would undoubtedly berate Capitalism but in terms of his principles of right any modern economy or any projected probable economy fails to meet the conditions of legitimacy. Significant technological progress fragments an economy and inevitably gives rise to a proliferation of associations whose corporate wills can never be synthesized in a general will. Rousseau is revolutionary enough in his scathing critique of bourgeois society

but it must not be forgotten that there are at least two conditions that must be met before a revolution is justified. The existing regime must be certifiably corrupt and there must be a reasonable hope that a *legitimate* polity can be established. The all but impossible conditions he sets for legitimacy in combination with his pessimistic perception of human nature convinced Rousseau that, given contemporary circumstances, revolution cannot establish legitimacy and in all probability would make life more miserable. Thus, Rousseau's Conservative posture.

On first reading the *Social Contract* it is not immediately apparent that Rousseau is using the term 'government' equivocally. The government of a legitimate state is a magistracy in contrast to a government that legislates. Because he had no realistic hope of legitimacy, just about all his treatment of government concerned government in the modern sense. Thus, the signs of a good government turn out to be evaluating criteria that have little to do with legitimacy. Rousseau, in other words, has a set of standards by which illegitimate governments may be judged — i.e., given the historical facts, all governments. Prof. R. Masters apparently overlooked this second evaluating device which, roughly, measures economic justice. He argues that the *Social Contract* is not a-historical but serves as a yardstick for measuring the rights and wrongs of historical fact. Measured by the principles of right, however, all governments turn out to be despotisms because in no state are the people sovereign. When Rousseau speaks of the usurpation of sovereignty, if he is not speaking a-historically, he is speaking contrary to historical fact.

Prof. H. Cell has attempted to answer certain objections to the *Social Contract* posed by Althusser and Levine. From a purely analytical as opposed to an historical point of view I think he succeeds. It is extremely difficult to imagine how the corporate will of a stamp club, for example, would pose a threat to the general will. Cell is quite correct in holding that the contract is not between individuals and the community. To say that each individual alienates his will is simply to say that each individual agrees to abide by the terms of a contract that is far more complicated and detailed than is usually realized. A community is an effect of these common pledges and, therefore, is not a part of the contract. One minor objection: The terms 'subject' and 'citizen' are not extensional equivalents. Every citizen is a subject but, as Profs. N. Keohane and L. Lange rightfully complain, not every subject is a citizen. Both professors correctly conclude the obvious: Rousseau is indeed a sexist and a rather blatant one at that. For Rousseau women are subjects but not citizens.

To believe that Prof. Cell has successfully answered certain specific objections is not necessarily to accept his account of the general will. In fact I fully agree with Prof. A. Levine that any Hobbesian approach to the general will is bound to fail. His paper raises a series of important questions that spatial considerations force me to pass by. I would only point out, however, that it is highly misleading to say without qualification that, '...Rousseau construes freedom as autonomy.' Rousseau construes *moral* freedom as autonomy but this freedom has no direct *political* significance.

An individual is politically free insofar as he obeys the law no matter what his motives. Thus, no one can be forced to be morally free but, given Rousseau's three types of freedom, there is nothing strange except the expression in forcing a man to be politically free. A law may morally oblige a subject but no law can realistically prescribe the motive of obedience. The relation between positive law and morality is not an easy thing to sort out, but Prof. S. Gayard-Fabre gives us a lucid analysis of this relation as found in Rousseau.

In our attempt to make a thinker relevant too many of us stretch a concept beyond its elastic limit. Just about every paper in this collection makes reference to Rousseau's general will. It is important to distinguish two moments in the general will. One moment is a part of the social contract and it details those social ends without which community is impossible. These social ideals are literally a common good because they are voluntarily accepted by all parties of the contract. These ends are not a question of truth: A Hottentot's way of life is not false because it differs from ours. When it convenes the sovereign does not debate ends because if ends were changed, the original social contract would thereby be abrogated. All the sovereign is entitled to decide are the means of sustaining, advancing and reinforcing those ends already unanimously approved. Given such constraints it is obvious that Rousseau's general will is irrelevant to a modern society whose economy is based upon a complex and specialized division of labor and where there is insufficient consensus as to social end to constitute a community. A classless society is a necessary condition of legitimacy but when accompanied by a division of labor it is not a sufficient condition.

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EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO and DAVID C. THOMASMA. *A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford U.P. 1981. Pp. 342. CN\$ 25.95; US\$ 19.95. ISBN 0-19-502790-6.

The aim of this book is to initiate the development of a systematic philosophy of medicine, in which the emphasis is on metaphysical, ontological, and moral questions rather than logical or epistemological ones.

There are two main stages in the enterprise: first, identifying the characteristics of medicine that render it a distinctive human activity, and second, tracing the implications of these characteristics for medical practice and medical morality. The focus is wider than medicine, however. What is attempted is a philosophical foundation for the healing relationship that applies to all health professionals, including nurses, pharmacists, dentists, psychologists, social workers, optometrists, podiatrists, and allied health workers.

The book has three sections. Section I outlines the principal features of a philosophy of medicine. The first chapter surveys historical accounts of the relationship between medicine and philosophy and claims that the winds of both are propitious for a new engagement. The second chapter discusses philosophical method, which is seen as dialectical, eclectic, and tailored to particular problems and issues. In terms of substance, the method draws heavily on the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, with a strong dose of phenomenology added. Chapter 3 takes up the nature of medicine. The modes, or distinctive features, of medicine, which is neither an art nor a science, are found in the clinical interaction. From four modes — responsibility, trust, decision orientation and etiology — a description of medicine emerges: 'Medicine is the cognitive art of applying science and persuasion through a complex human interaction in which a mutually satisfactory state of well-being is sought, and in which the uniqueness of values and disease, and the kind of institution in which care is delivered, determine the nature of the judgments made.' (69) The form of medicine, that is, what distinguishes it from other human activities, in particular other helping human activities, is found in the body. The distinctive characteristic of medicine is that it works with and through the body — 'it is a craftsmanship that involves healing the body with the body.' (73) This, of course, sets medicine off from helping professions such as law, education, and religion, but it creates some problems for the medical status of psychiatry. Chapter 4 contains a 'critique' of medicine. The undertaking resembles Kant's critiques, although the authors claim that their critical philosophy is closer to Dewey. The 'critical question' is 'how theoretical knowledge can be applied to concrete, individual body-persons with therapeutic results.' (84) Various historical and contemporary views are considered, and the question is pursued further in Chapter 5, where the focus is 'systematic' rather than 'descriptive.' In this chapter current research in philosophy of medicine is surveyed to introduce the need for a 'practical ontology.' The conditions of possibility of clinical interaction are set forth and lead to an account of the 'structure' of medicine. The final chapter in this section discusses the anatomy of clinical judgments. Three main points are made. First, different explanations are needed for the different questions, kinds of evidence, and modes of reasoning involved in the process of making a clinical judgment. Second, the end or goal of clinical reasoning, namely, selecting a right action for the patient, guides the entire process. Third, three questions need to be distinguished: the diagnostic and classificatory question, 'What can be wrong?'; the therapeutic question,

'What can be done?'; and the explicitly evaluative question, 'What should be done for this patient?'

Sections II and III trace the ethical implications of this philosophy of medicine. Section II is restricted to questions of individual ethics. Chapter 7 considers the 'discretionary space' of a physician. The question raised is: what degree of freedom should society accord its experts, in this particular case the physician? Chapter 8 relates this philosophy of medicine to medical ethics. The approach taken is that medical ethics should not be viewed as the application of a general normative theory such as Kantianism, utilitarianism, or natural law, to the moral problems that arise in medicine, but rather that medical ethics should be derived from the nature of medicine and the ontology and axiology implicit in medicine. The pursuit of a philosophical basis for medical morality continues in Chapter 9. The key notion turns out to be the 'act of profession' that every health professional makes. This 'act of profession' grounds the moral obligations that a physician has to a patient and that a patient, in turn, has to a physician.

Section III considers questions of social ethics. Chapter 10 asks whether there is an obligation on the part of health professionals and society to make primary care universally accessible. Chapter 11 examines moral issues that arise in institutional and collective settings. In particular, the moral dimensions of the health care team-patient relationship, as opposed to the physician-patient relationship, are addressed. Potential conflicts between medical morality and the ideology of cost containment are discussed in Chapter 12.

Many aspects of the overall enterprise in this book are commendable. The philosophy of medicine that emerges is embedded in the empirical. It is developed from an examination of the realities of medical practice and is checked against these realities. The same strategy is adopted for medical morality. The bankrupt approach of trying to apply antecedently existing normative theories to concrete moral problems is firmly rejected. The inherent moral nature of medicine is emphasized, the value and moral questions that pervade clinical decision-making are recognized, and the introduction of larger liberal arts and humanities components into medical education is recommended. Important questions about institutional dimensions of morality are raised. Much more thought needs to be given to how a team approach affects the moral positions of both the health care professional and the patient.

Unfortunately, there are serious flaws in the book. The central issue in Section I, the 'critical question' of the relationship between medical practice and medical theory is ambiguous. When the issue is stated generally, for example, as 'a search for an explanation of the way the abstract is applied to individuals and extracted from them' (100), several interpretations are possible, and these are reflected in the historical positions discussed. First, it could be a strict logical or epistemological issue, that is, how can general laws be applied to specific, concrete phenomena in the natural world. Put this way, the issue is reminiscent of the controversy over whether the social

sciences can legitimately qualify as sciences. Because they deal with human beings and not inanimate phenomena, the social sciences cannot adopt a deductive-nomological approach to explanation and must rely on something like a factor theory approach, which makes prediction impossible. The emphasis on the uniqueness of patients and the impossibility of accurate predictions in medicine suggest this interpretation. A second interpretation is that what needs to be explained is the 'successful' clinical interaction, that is, the conditions required for healing or curing to occur. The views of Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas suggest this interpretation. A third interpretation is that the issue concerns the logic of discovery in medicine. The views of Bernard and Foucault suggest this interpretation. Still another possibility is that the issue is the tired, old one of whether medicine is an art or science, which recurs throughout the book. A failure to distinguish these questions, however, vitiates the core chapters of Section I.

In Sections II and III the key moral notion is the 'act of profession.' Institutions such as hospitals, as well as individual health care professionals, make acts of profession:

... a hospital, by the very fact of its existence in a community, makes a declaration; that is, it professes to concentrate and make available those resources which a person can call upon when he is ill. Implicit in that profession is the promise to assist the sick person to regain what he has lost — his health — at least to the maximum degree possible. Thus the profession of the hospital is analogous to the profession of individual health care providers ...
(250-251)

Conceding that it is plausible to talk about acts of profession that are implicit or made by an institution, the moral foundations of these acts remain obscure. Again, a number of interpretations are possible and suggested in the book. The obligations created may be promissory. Or they may be based on consequentialist considerations, for example, the fulfilment or disappointment of expectations generated by acts of profession. Or there may be special requirements that, if not met, render such acts 'inauthentic.' So both the existence and the moral force of 'acts of profession' require a more elaborate defense.

Other moral issues are not dealt with satisfactorily. Perhaps the central moral problem in medicine is the locus of decision-making in the physician-patient relationship. The traditional authoritarian, paternalistic model is rejected, as well as more recent contractual and covenantal models. The obligations that devolve on both physician and patient are stressed instead, but this does not answer the question of who should be making what decisions. The physician is directed to 'share' his authority and decision-making with the patient, and the notion of morally valid 'con-sent,' which involves feeling and knowing together, is said to place 'the actual locus of decision making somewhere between physician and patient, and not really

with one or the other.' (215) This, unfortunately, is a non-answer. Responsibility for making a decision cannot be apportioned or dissolved as these metaphors suggest. In addition, much importance is attached to the patient's vulnerability, with its associated impairment of moral agency. Yet physicians are instructed to reduce the inequality in information between patients and themselves in order to obtain morally valid consents that express the moral agency of patients. How is it possible for patients to exercise a capacity they lack because of their vulnerability? Moreover, the manipulation of consent is morally permitted in certain circumstances. Thus the general scope to be accorded to patient autonomy, self-determination, or moral agency remains unclear. The important issues of resolving value conflicts between physician and patient and the moral permissibility of persuading and manipulating patients are raised but not addressed at length.

Two other puzzles deserve mention. As noted above, the philosophical foundations developed in this book are intended to apply to all health professionals. But the philosophy of the healing relationship is founded on the clinical judgment, which is unique to medicine. The clinical interaction between patients and many health professionals is not the same as the clinical interaction between patients and physicians. That many health professionals talk about 'clients' rather than 'patients' in itself suggests relevant disanalogies. Nurses and pharmacists, to choose two examples, do not go through the process of answering diagnostic and therapeutic questions and then deciding which treatment should be used. Their clinical interactions begin after these questions have been answered by physicians. So how can a philosophical account developed from a unique facet of medicine encompass all of the health professions? In addition, curing or healing is seen as the goal of the physician-patient relationship. This is likely to amaze physicians, given that most of the diseases they see are either self-limiting or resistant to therapy. This objection is appreciated, and occasionally caring is allowed to be a proper role for a physician. But at other times the authors seem to be inconsistent. At one point they dismiss the problems raised by cancer chemotherapy as beyond the scope of the book (49), but later they say the choice of palliative cancer chemotherapy is 'paradigmatically for all therapeutic decisions.' (131)

Neither physicians nor philosophers are likely to be happy with this book. Too many issues either are not resolved or are given answers so tentative and well qualified that they are uninteresting. Too often what happens is that an issue is approached by surveying what others have had to say about it and then dropped, either outright or by relegating further discussion to a later chapter. This, unfortunately, is what happens with the 'critical question' in Section I. Moreover, despite the valiant and persistent efforts of the authors, the book does not cohere. The chapter on discretionary space and the chapters in Section III are notable in this respect. Given that seven of the twelve chapters were written or published previously, this problem may have been insurmountable. Physicians will find little of practical relevance in the book, except perhaps for ten rules for clinical prudence. (136-143) Philosophers

looking for clear, precise statements of issues, rigorous arguments, and well-supported conclusions will be disappointed. When an argument can be spotted in the midst of a slew of assertions, it is convoluted and obscure. Often the only sign that an argument is being offered is a 'hence,' 'thus,' or 'therefore,' and these seem to be scattered haphazardly throughout the text. Claims are said to 'imply' or 'lead to' a consequence, without a hint of a rational transition. In sum, the book is woefully short on arguments, and the ones that do exist turn out to be enthymemes dressed up with phenomenological jargon.

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SANDRA B. ROSENTHAL and PATRICK L. BOURGEOIS, *Pragmatism and Phenomenology: A Philosophic Encounter*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1980. Pp. 193. US\$ 22.00. ISBN 90-6032-179-0.

While creative dialogue between pragmatism and phenomenology would be of great philosophic value, it does not occur in this book. Although the authors state that such an encounter need not lead to an assimilation of systems, but rather a clarification of positions and deepening of insights, they do not fulfil their intention. The stage is set for this outcome by presenting the phenomenological movement in light of Merleau-Ponty.

The scene is opened with pragmatism and phenomenology at a philosophical crossroad. While these movements have proceeded along separate paths historically, the future direction of each may be influenced by this meeting. In order for such an encounter to be fruitful a prior understanding of their respective pathways in the context of the history of philosophy is necessary. 'Frequently, creative assimilation replaces that kind of creative dialogue which must be built upon a respect for the uniqueness and integrity of a distinct and different position while yet recognizing converging interests

and points of contact in responding to enduring philosophic problems. A real philosophic encounter is an occasion not for the melting down of one framework to another, but rather for two traditions to be fed in such a way as to clarify for themselves their own positions and deepen their own insights.¹ (3-4)

Granted the distinctness of these movements, Rosenthal and Bourgeois fail to account for how pragmatism and phenomenology arrive at this crossroad. It is however, the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty that underlies their meeting. In allegedly occupying a ground which incorporates elements from both pragmatism and phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty holds an affinity with both movements. Therefore, in dismissing other phenomenological positions in favor of the one Merleau-Ponty appropriates, Rosenthal and Bourgeois place the encounter between pragmatism and phenomenology within the framework of Merleau-Ponty.

Since the dialogue is intended for an audience of both pragmatists and phenomenologists, the book is structured in two parallel sections which could almost be independent essays. Each position is presented in a way that benefits readers from either tradition by providing a framework of the philosophy at hand while offering insights from the other position. The sequence of presentation is totally arbitrary and either section may be read first. The discussion of each position moves from common ground to emerging differences, but a certain redundancy is engendered. Furthermore, the differences that do emerge between the two traditions always become less radical from the perspective of Merleau-Ponty. While Rosenthal and Bourgeois state that they do not intend a merely introductory exposition of each position, they do in fact vacillate between a superficial consideration and a more sophisticated treatment of the positions. When presenting the position of American pragmatism they draw from Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, G.H. Mead, and C.I. Lewis. In presenting the phenomenological position however, the emphasis is, as mentioned, on Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Husserl, Heidegger, ad Sartre is accepted without presenting the later positions in their own rights, or, more significantly, without adequately indicating the differences among their positions.

Rosenthal and Bourgeois conclude that the movements of pragmatism and phenomenology can each grow from an encounter. The insights of phenomenology can help pragmatism develop into a unified system and the insights of pragmatism can broaden the path of phenomenology to include explanatory structures which can be used to explore more speculative issues. It is in their clarification of terminology however, that these authors offer the most insight. By presenting systematic clarification of diverse terminology Rosenthal and Bourgeois obviate certain misconceptions. They are most successful in illustrating how ambiguous and equivocal terms have resulted in confusion. Such terminology has led pragmatists to be interpreted as idealists, realists, logical positivists, language analysts, or 'really phenomenologists.' Developing an established terminology is the most impressive accomplish-

ment of this text. For it is only in light of an established terminology that we can understand the relation of philosophical positions. Clarification of terminology points to empiricism (realism) and rationalism (intellectualism) as positions which pragmatism and phenomenology mutually reject.

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STEPHEN DAVID ROSS, *Transition to an Ordinal Metaphysics*. Albany, N.Y.: S.U.N.Y. Press 1980. Pp. 162. US\$ 29.00 (Cloth: ISBN 0-87395-434-3); US\$ 9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-435-1).

At the risk of annoying many people the book's cover identifies it as 'the only current systematic and metaphysical effort to resolve the difficulties that have made metaphysics suspect through most of the twentieth century.' Ross tells us that even Joseph Buchler, to whose *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes* he is much indebted, is insufficiently systematic and radical. To cure the ills of metaphysics one needs to accept without reservation that things never fit in a neat fashion into traditional philosophical slots. The world is so inexhaustibly complex that 'properly speaking, there is no "world".' Certainly there is no world order and no most comprehensive perspective from which a human being could be viewed. All orders are constituents of other orders; orders are indefinitely and inexhaustibly analyzable in terms of one another; there are no unstructured simples out of which a world (if only there were one) could be built; apparently opposed categories always apply to things in complementary ways; there is no final description or explanation of anything. To appreciate this is to make the transition to an Ordinal Metaphysics.

One would expect a book saying such things to be at least interesting. Traditional oppositions of the kind Ross mentions — materialism versus idealism, monism versus pluralism, realism versus conceptualism — can be hard to construct; traditional metaphysical theories of an all-encompassing type can look over-enthusiastic or naive. So, despite the watery abstractions of the Introduction (for instance, '*Relatively speaking*, in a particular respect, each pair of ordinal categories represents a functional expression of the complementarity of what is determinate and what is indeterminate relative to a

particular order') the hungry reader may continue in the hope of getting real food later. For Permanence and Change, Atoms, Forms, Substances, Process, Efficient Causation, Causal Determinism, Indeterminism, Freedom, Relatedness, Unity, Appearance and Reality, Being, Ontological Relativity and other dishes are on the menu.

It turns out that the approach to these matters is always the same. A traditional problem is presented. Some traditional efforts to solve it are mentioned, and some of their difficulties. Then it is said that the solution lies in recognizing that traditional categories are too crude. Appreciate that they must complement one another, the situation being inexhaustibly complex, and your problem disappears.

Take chapter One. Problem: How is it that Change occurs while there is also some degree of Permanence? Should we perhaps explain The Changing in terms of the Permanent, as Plato and Parmenides do? Well, there are difficulties with this. For example, in his *Parmenides* Plato himself emphasizes 'that forms cannot "explain" resemblances among changing particulars without initiating an infinite regress.' Solution: 'The assumption that the world is a single order of events or things is rejected by an ordinal ontology. Not only is there an indefinite plurality of orders, but each may be viewed — each "is" — in an indefinite number and variety of ways, only some of which are relevant to change and becoming, to spatiotemporal events... The age-old intuition that change is ultimate and fundamental in our understanding of things is acknowledged but replaced by the view that deviance and variation are fundamental modes of ordinal constituency — though not more fundamental than, and necessarily complemented by, stability and typicality.' So: 'It follows that nothing can be unchanging in all respects or changing in all respects.' Problem vanished. Or perhaps not, because inexhaustible complexity gives us a 'sense' in which 'there is no ultimate or final explanation of either permanence or change.'

Chapter Two, 'Causation and Freedom,' asks how anything ever gives rise to anything else and especially how humans could give rise to their successive states indeterministically without lapsing into mere randomness. Solution: 'I will now postulate that every being is constituted by actualities and possibilities. This is a central principle of an ordinal metaphysics, and expresses one facet of the complementary and functional interrelationship of metaphysical categories essential to ordinality... It is sufficient as a ground for both novelty and human freedom that there are always possibilities for any actuality... What, then, is human freedom? It is grounded in the rich complexity of experience establishing a wealth of relevant possibilities in every human context. Human actions are determined by circumstances, but indeterminateness remains as complexity and plurality of possibility... Yet is this plurality a form of responsibility, or is it merely another arbitrary departure? Responsibility is not caprice but methodic determination... A man faced with a difficult moral decision does not act capriciously or arbitrarily, but considers the evidence, deliberates rationally, looks ahead to consequences, and reviews his deepest loyalties.' But how such pronouncements get rid of our

problem is not entirely clear, is it? For surely the problem just is that of how a man can do all these things without doing so either deterministically or merely randomly or with some unhappy mixture of determinism and randomness.

Chapters Three and Four deal with 'the complementarity of unity and relation': 'all being is relational in an ordinal theory, but not relational alone.' This supposedly solves a host of problems, but it is again hard to see just how, or even just which problems are being solved. From here onwards, in effect, the book becomes still more painfully abstract. If the paperback edition is intended for undergraduate classes, which I very much hope is not the case, then it might be interesting to find out how many students would be able to follow this sort of thing: 'The integrity of an order A is comprised of those of its constituents which define its unitary function as a constituent of another order B . Integrity is thus a ternary relation among A , its constituents, and constituents of B . And it is this ternary relation which establishes the meaning and relevance of the scope of an order to its integrity. Identity, however, is based on a gross integrity relative to many constituent integrities. What is required is a tetradic relation, wherein the identity rests on an integrity which includes other integrities. In other words, let A be an order with different integrities A_i in different ordinal locations O_i . The constituents C_{ij} of each integrity differ somewhat from the constituents of the other integrities. Now there may be a gross integrity of A relative to some other order O which includes each of the other superaltern orders O_i . Thus, we have order O , constituent orders O_i , their constituents among which are located integrities of A , and constituents of these integrities. What is required is a family relation among the different orders and constituents — but a family defined in terms of and relative to order O . Identity here is a relation among integrities of a single order — gross integrities and constituent integrities.' All this is thrown at the reader *before* the chapter on Ordinality, which is where Ross finally settles down to attempting to explain in detail what is meant by 'an order.'

As the book struggles onwards, complementarity is detected everywhere and room is made for everything that anyone could be tempted to place in an ontology, including — p. 84 — round squares and — p. 95 — the nobody that the messenger met on the road. Nothing is any more real or unreal than anything else; 'the primary — perhaps entire — meaning of "not to be,"' is not to be a constituent of one order, and to be a constituent of another order.' 'Unless indeterminateness is naturalized as in an ordinal theory, expressed as one of the functional dimensions of ordinality, it will haunt us as an unintelligible surd,' Ross writes. Yet it can seem that it is his effort to naturalize indeterminateness, to bring it into the world (or rather, into what might hope to be a world if only indeterminateness were excluded from it), which is unintelligible. It leads, I think, to his saying nothing in the most systematic and radical of ways.

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PETER A. SCHOULS, *The Imposition of Method: A Study of Descartes and Locke*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Clarendon Press 1980. Pp. x + 271. CN\$ 45.50; US\$ 37.50. ISBN 0-19-824613-7.

This is a demanding, able and illuminating book. The disagreement between Descartes and Locke as to whether scepticism is worth refuting, and whether our innate dispositions hold the key to that refutation, has been too much oversimplified and overemphasized by generations of hack commentators. A book which plays down this by now rather tedious disagreement, and takes seriously the fact that it was Descartes who woke Locke from his dogmatic slumbers, is much to be welcomed. Professor Schouls argues that, although it led them in superficially different directions, Descartes and Locke shared pretty well a common methodology, alike in their philosophical and their non-philosophical work, when they addressed issues of general as against particular knowledge. This methodology goes with a particular conception of rational human nature which was fully articulated in the seventeenth century and has influenced philosophy, for better or worse, ever since. Its characteristic terms are 'analysis' and 'synthesis,' 'resolution' and 'composition,' 'simple' and 'complex' (natures, notions, judgments, etc.), and the language of foundationalism. The broader historical theme here — the general overview of intellectual developments in the seventeenth century and after — is presented too cursorily to carry conviction. Most of the book, however, consists of intensive analysis of familiar texts from a relatively new standpoint, and I shall confine my comments to this.

The discussion of Descartes falls into two parts. Chapters 2 and 3 have to do with his view of reason and its relation to his conception of method, concentrating on the *Regulae*, *Discourse* and *Geometry*. Chapters 4 and 5 then seek to show, by a close paragraph-by-paragraph study of *Meditations I-III*, how that work exemplifies the method laid down, and how Descartes exploits this to generate a rational support for reason without circularity. Reason or understanding is a power or function of the mind, distinct from its powers of imagination, memory and sense, and it embraces both *intuitus* and *deductio*. Where a *deductio* is immediate, it can be the object of a higher-order *intuitus*; where it is not immediate and depends on a chain of connecting links, it normally rests on memory. The primary *intuitus* here is either of simple natures (Schouls tends to call them simple *ideas*) which are unanalyzable and indefinable, or logical and other first principles which are known *per se* or non-derivatively; and *deductio* involves compounds as conclusions from such elements. Schouls also has another use for the language of simples and compounds, for which I cannot find the documentation: he says the secondary *intuitus* of immediate inferences has a compound object, not in the sense that the conclusion is compound but in the sense that the whole inference has component propositions. His thesis then is that the primary *intuitus*, with its objects known *per se*, is unimpugnable in

Descartes, and that questions about the validation and constructive use of reason have to do with the knowledge of compound and derivative matters, and have to be answered from the unimpugnable base.

This general framework determines the nature of Cartesian method, which in turn determines the nature, scope and objects of Descartes' science. Reason, having no resources but *intuitus* and *deductio*, can only move by a methodical order among the simples and complexes of an appropriate subject matter, and continue the cycle of resolution and composition until that whole subject is 'clear and distinct' — a catchphrase that has to be understood by reference to the method. This general method (*méthode*), which is illustrated from mathematics but is 'mathematical' only in the etymological sense that it is characteristic of any *mathesis*, is supplemented with ancillary techniques (*moyens*) that make it applicable to specific subject matters — techniques of hypothesis or assumption, doubt, and observation or experiment. So when we turn to the *Meditations* there is a crucial distinction between analysis as *méthode* and systematic doubt as *moyen*. Analysis operates both destructively and constructively. It employs assumption and doubt to question *deductio* or composition, until *intuitus* uncovers the incorrigible point which both confirms the efficacy of the analytic method and leads on to the constructive extension of reason.

Schouls pursues these themes in methodical detail, in all of which he seems to me to be much more right than wrong. His general picture of Cartesian strategy is surely correct, as is his view that, once the right pieces are in the right places, the Cartesian Circle evaporates; and the distinction between *méthode* and *moyens* is especially illuminating. But some things still baffle me, and some may baffle others. (a) The distinction as he draws it in chapter 2 between primary and secondary *intuitus* seems to mess up Descartes' argument rather than helping it. The simple natures which are the objects of *intuitus* can be conceptual simples or propositional simples or inferential simples. If immediate inferences are not simples of their own kind, the *Cogito* would not have been the object of *intuitus*. That simple inferences may contain as elements items (i.e. propositions) which are not inferences, just as simple propositions may contain as elements items which are not propositions, does not make them composite; what holds such items together in the mind is not 'composition,' in Descartes' terms, but 'comparison.' But do the component items have to be simples of *their* kind? Apparently not: the existence of God is for Descartes known by *intuitus*, not *deductio*, as Schouls rightly stresses; and yet the concept of God is composite. Schouls is right to hold in chapter 5 that composition is nevertheless not used in the argument over God's existence, but some of the threads here still need more unravelling. (b) Schouls insists on referring to the use of purely intellectual assumptions or hypotheses in chapter 3 as *imagination*. This is not Descartes' normal use of the term 'imagination,' and not what Descartes is normally talking about in those explicit references to imagination which Schouls quotes hereabouts. What Schouls has to say is perfectly fair, of supposition or assumption. But Descartes did also think that the sensory imagination had a

major role to play in the development, if not of the universal method, at least of any particular science, including mathematics, and room needs to be found for this in the exposition. Reason rules, but it does not rule without the stimulus, real or imaginary, of the ancillary faculties. (c) In chapter 5, Schouls thinks it helps to re-cast the *Cogito* in terms of an impersonal or third-personal 'thinking-going-on.' I cannot see what it helps. This is not the Russell/Ayer thesis that Descartes should have confined himself to a *Cogitatur*, since the 'I' recurs as it must throughout Schouls' exposition. Later in the same chapter, in dealing with God's existence, Schouls presents a feebler argument than Descartes intended. He says that Descartes' false explanations for the idea of God (that it was due to himself, etc.) are rejected because, as hypotheses, they are open to doubt. That would not show that they aren't true! What Descartes was trying to show is that the attempt to impugn the existence of God, by explaining away the idea we have, backfires just as much as the attempt to impugn one's own existence does. (d) While Schouls' reconstruction of Descartes' method may be formally correct, it does not always help Descartes to make sense. The reader needs more assistance in just understanding (e.g.) the list of simple natures (which looks at first an awful rag-bag), or the sense of 'know' in which the disparate objects of *intuitus* could all alike be known, or the sense to the claim that there are propositions which are both certain and non-judgmental. Quoting Descartes' own archaic accounts of *intuitus* and *deductio* does not, I think, compensate for the damage done by retaining the inappropriate English terms 'intuition' and 'deduction' throughout.

Turning in chapter 6 to Locke's *Essay*, Schouls points to Cartesian parallels both for Locke's psychological atomism and for its application in the accounts of intuitive and demonstrative knowledge. The discussion of both is somewhat selective, but generally very sound. I can fault it only on matters of form, not substance. (a) Only one sort of resolution of experience, not any sort, is called by Locke 'abstraction,' so Schouls is wrong to complain that this word 'seems to lead a double life.' (170) There is for Locke resolution, but not abstraction, involved in picking out individuals; there is abstraction in picking them as representative of a kind. (b) But no sort of resolution at all is called 'decompounding' or 'decomposition' — a terminological misconception that runs through the book. Schouls more than once says this meaning is 'explicit' at *Essay* 3.11.9, but it is not even implicit there, where the one decompounded idea in sight is the *multiply compound* idea of justice ('such a treatment of the Person or Goods of another as is according to Law'). (c) Schouls is content to point out clear analogies between the printed texts of Descartes and Locke, while barely noticing the historical question of how far Locke actually studied or consciously modelled his work on Cartesian method. Yet there is abundant evidence that Descartes' work was a talking point for scientists, philosophers and theologians in England (and of course Holland) from the mid-seventeenth century, while at least on the Continent manuscript as well as printed texts circulated widely, giving him the type of influence there that Wittgenstein had on another generation elsewhere. It is

known that Locke's unpublished notebooks contain sundry notes on Descartes; I do not know if any of them can be traced to the *Regulae* (which was not printed till after the *Essay*), but am surprised that Schouls is so uninterested in the question. The similarities between Locke's methodology and Descartes', especially the coincidences between *Essay* IV and the *Regulae* (which are more than can be put down simply to their common Aristotelian inheritance), are stronger than the differences (e.g. that Descartes represented his method through geometrical analogies, Locke through chemical ones). The differences look bigger than they are because Descartes' presentation of his method is fairly perfunctory compared with the extensive literature in which he applied it; whereas Locke went to exceptional lengths in setting up the machinery, as Schouls properly points out, but dealt only summarily with its application. This may be partly because the same method which Descartes saw as opening up great new vistas, Locke saw rather as circumscribing firm limits; but it is also clear that Locke presumed in his readers a thorough knowledge of the new philosophical currents.

The selectivity in Schouls' analysis of the *Essay* would be of no great moment except that it leads him way off target in chapter 7, which is the one flop in the book. That Locke meant the methodology of the *Essay* to carry through to every subject of knowledge is not particularly problematic: the message is clear enough in his own 'discourse on method,' the educational tract *Of the Conduct of the Understanding*, though Schouls is of course right to want to see how theory is translated into practice. But on the *Second Treatise* Schouls tries too hard. Many of the trappings and trimmings of the chapter are interesting enough; but he has got it into his head, quite wrongly, that all the salient ideas in 'morals' have to be mixed modes, and that the pivotal idea of an 'individual' in political theory is therefore an idea of a mixes mode and its genesis is to be explained accordingly. The idea of an individual, as a 'rational corporeal being,' neither is nor could be a mixed mode; it is a perfectly humdrum idea of a substance (and to that extent subject to the same procedures of resolution and composition as any other complex idea), and must be so to give Locke's political science the objective foundation by which he could defeat the other 'opinions in fashion.' Mixed modes are important in morals only because morals have to do with *action* and the names of the different kinds of actions are names of mixed modes (typically, modes of movement). But when those actions are redefined in reference to law, the decompounded idea that results is a complex idea of relation (*Essay* 2.28), and it is this part of the *Essay* machinery, which Schouls strangely ignores, which has the greatest relevance to political theory. Similarly when substances are subservient to — or set over — the law, the resulting decompounded idea is again an idea of relation, so that Schouls is equally wrong to classify the idea of a ruler as a mixed mode. (174)

Among a small number of faults of expression, the worst are nonsensical uses of the term 'parameter' on pp. 232-3 and 'lay open' in garbled quotations from Locke on p. 235. The indexes are rather weak and not fully accurate. There are a good many more minor misprints than the Oxford Press would

once have let through and on the jacket flap they cannot now even get their own name right. All of which grumbles I have deliberately got out of my system before concluding with the observation that the eighth and last chapter, on 'Locke's theological works' (strictly, his biblical criticism, since most other theology Locke looked on as being above reason) knocked me for six. It is a remarkable *tour de force*, showing how Locke first establishes the credentials of his source, then analyses a biblical epistle on the same principles as any other subject of knowledge. Absolutely riveting.

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DALE SPENDER, *Man Made Language*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P.; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1980. Pp. 250. CN\$ 18.75; US\$ 11.50. ISBN 0-7100-0675-6.

Man Made Language begins with a critique of language/sex research as it has been done by linguists. Dale Spender believes that much of this research goes wrong because it is based on the sexist assumption that women's use of English must be somehow faulty or inferior to men's and that, as a consequence of this assumption, studies which fail to find sex differences in language use tend to be discounted, while those sex differences that are discovered tend to be evaluated in favour of men's greater linguistic competence. She cites Robin Lakoff's *Language and Woman's Place* as an example of this sort of research, and although Lakoff sometimes writes as though she thinks that women's use of language is objectively inferior to men's, it should be noted that she also wrote this about men's and women's conversational styles:

There is no particular reason to suppose that there is extra virtue inherent in the men's way: if people think so, it is because men in this culture tend to impose their value judgments on everyone, so

that the men's way of doing things becomes the 'good way', and women's way the bad way.¹

It is one thing to claim that women are handicapped by our tendencies to use forms of expression which can be shown to be inferior ways of communicating by any reasonable standards. It is another thing to claim that in our society, where men have far more power than women to decide what is valuable and reward it with respect, attention, money and power, women, who tend to use language in ways men wrongly consider inferior to their own, will be handicapped in our efforts to obtain these rewards. Spender, like Lakoff, contributes to the confusion between these two claims. At some points she speaks of the claim that women's language is inferior as an unproven empirical assumption, and at other points she speaks of it as a sexist judgment of value. However, unlike Lakoff, Spender makes it clear that she rejects the first claim as a working hypothesis, and not because she makes the mistake of thinking that it would imply some inevitable inferiority of women (she fully realizes that women may be taught to use linguistic forms which handicap us), but because she is suspicious of claims to having 'objective' or 'reasonable' standards of language use. One of the themes of this book is that, because of women's relative silence in the creation of language and culture, the values and standards which would reflect both male and female experience have yet to emerge, and it is therefore a good methodological principle not to accept present standards without careful examination.

Spender's other major criticism of language/sex research is that it is split into two disconnected areas of study — sexism in language and sex differences in language use — when research should be looking for the connection between the two. The connection, she thinks, is that English was and is created and controlled primarily by men; this accounts for the various sexist characteristics of the language and for a number of important sex differences in language use which are not usually studied by linguists (see below). Spender describes this connecting hypothesis as the substance of the book, and I think it is its greatest strength. In presenting evidence for it (which she admits is mostly circumstantial), she draws together a wide range of phenomena, from her extensive knowledge of academic research and from women's own reports of their experiences, and shows it to us in a plausible new perspective.

The author discusses several areas of sexism in English, including the semantic derogation of women, whereby words and phrases acquire negative connotations when they are associated with females, and the alleged gender-neutral uses of 'he' and 'man.' The evidence for semantic derogation of women will be controversial, because there is often room for disagreement about connotations. As Carolyn Korsmeyer has written: 'Language analysis of this sort is rather like scanning an aerial photograph for evidence of ruined cities beneath, and occasionally one may mistake a ditch for a canal.'² Nevertheless, Spender gives us a good collection of examples to work on, including the decline of 'whore,' 'harlot,' and 'wench' from their original meanings.

The discussion of the alleged gender-neutral uses of 'he' and 'man' includes a brief history of the practice, which Spender attributes to the sexism of prescriptive grammarians, and some of the strongest arguments that can be brought against it³, including current evidence of its psychological effects.

The sex differences in language use which Spender takes most seriously are differences in how often, where and to whom men and women express their thoughts and experiences and how differently their communications are received. Spender hypothesizes that men expect and demand silence and listening from women in order to preserve their own versions of reality, including the myths of male superiority. She offers this as an explanation for these facts among others: that although research finds consistently that men talk much more than women in mixed-sex conversations (and alone into researchers' tape recorders), most people believe that women are more talkative than men (Spender suggests they are comparing women's talk to a standard of silence); that there are very few places or sanctioned opportunities for women to talk to one another; that most men respond with fear and/or anger to women's consciousness-raising groups; that men ridicule women's speech and writing much more than men's, regardless of its style or content; and that it was always made difficult, when not actually taboo, for women to write for the public in English-speaking countries.

Like most feminists, Spender thinks that sexual inequality, in this case inequality in relation to language, has bad consequences for men as well as women. Our language was not created to express women's experience as well as men's, and therefore the concepts it uses do not represent the full range of human experience. While this limits women's ability to express experiences that are common among us and have them recognized as normal human experiences (instead of idiosyncratic or insane), it also gives men at best an incomplete understanding of the world. The latter point is well illustrated by examples, including a good short critique of the cultural blindness of mainstream sociology.

Spender's concern that we not accept men's point of view as the human point of view is, I think, well founded. It is worth pointing out, as Spender does, that this concern does not imply that biological differences between the sexes determine that our experiences will be very different; one would expect men and women generally to have different experiences just because we are generally in different social, political, economic and cultural situations. Unfortunately, Spender goes on to declare that in order to accommodate the diversity of women's and men's experience, we will have to reject the belief that there is only one reality and discard the concepts of right and wrong. (102-5) But we do not need the idea that there is more than one reality in order to deal with the fact that our experiences are different yet equally real experiences. We need only recognize that we are different people in different positions. The idea that there is more than one reality — one for men and another for women? — one for each individual? — leaves us with the classic problem of what, if any, connection there is among them. This is a bad position to be in, both philosophically and politically. Moreover, feminists

need the concepts of right and wrong as much as anyone; for example, we need them just to point out that men are not always right and women are not always wrong.

The passages on accepting more than one reality and discarding right and wrong will seem just silly to many philosophers, but I treat them seriously because they are part of a growing trend in some feminist intellectual circles to reject traditional concepts, distinctions and systems of thought without examining the consequences of doing without them.⁴ If women throw out the baby with the bathwater, we shall only have to give birth to it again.

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1 Robin Lakoff, *Language and Woman's Place* (New York: Harper and Row 1975) 74.

2 Carolyn Korsmeyer, 'The Hidden Joke: Generic Uses of Masculine Terminology', in Vetterling-Braggin, ed., *Sexist Language* (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams 1981) 120.

3 See also Janice Moulton, 'The Myth of the Neutral "Man"', in Vetterling-Braggin, *op. cit.*

4 This trend is probably strongest among French feminists, but it is significant in North America. See, for example, Mary Daly, *Gyn-ecology* (Boston: Beacon Press 1978).

STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, *Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism*. Philadelphia: Temple U.P. 1980. Pp. 352. US\$ 18.95. ISBN 0-87722-188-X.

The author, an associate professor of American Studies at Brandeis, maintains that 'Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, along with its extension and amendment in *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, adds up to the most convincing single effort to grasp the meaning of the German and Russian regimes of the 1930s and 1940s.' (ix) Though flawed in many ways, her work 'em-

bodied the struggle of the civilized intelligence to comprehend an historical disaster ...' (24)

Into the Dark has much to offer. Partial anticipations of Arendt's theory are located among such diverse individuals as Montesquieu, Joseph Conrad, Gustave LeBon, Karl Kraus and Carlton Hayes. Critical reactions to her work are copiously paraphrased and evaluated. Subsequent scholarship on the two regimes is resourcefully mined to help test her theory against realities that are to this day difficult to fathom without her own analysis as conceptual guide. And although there is, surprisingly, no coherent summary of Arendt's theory of totalitarianism, Whitfield does provide some trenchant summary statements. Arendt had diagnosed totalitarianism as a unique combination of unbridled terror with an ideology bereft of rational, ideational and moral content — truly a new form of government, or better, a truly new formlessness. It was not statism, not nationalism, not fascism. It was not in any recognizable sense legal government at all, and in this lay part of its originality. Regarding the eerie dynamism of the two regimes, Whitfield observes: 'both presented themselves essentially as *movements*, unrestrained by norms or limits or their own principles.' (66)

Like her favorite philosopher Immanuel Kant a native of Koenigsberg, Arendt experienced in the twentieth century what Kant could hardly have dreamed of two centuries earlier.

For Arendt "radical evil" was literally the establishment of hell on earth, not because of the power of self-interest, but because of the loss of both self-interest and communal bonds. There can be no standards of judgment where there is no common sense, no shared grasp of reality, no congruence. Arendt managed to evoke the connection between social dislocation and psychological homelessness, between the loss of meaning and the logic of an idea, between feelings of emptiness and isolation and the willingness to make the world into a desert. (102)

Neither of them philosophers by profession, both Arendt and Whitfield were compelled by their subject matter to attempt philosophical formulation. 'What totalitarianism sought to crush was more than body and spirit, more even than the lives of multitudes. It tried to extirpate the possibility of creating something new in the world Its manifest intention, Arendt warned, was "to destroy the essence of man".' (126-7)

With respect to the Jewish people, her inquiry concerned 'the historical process that began with the social problem of whether the Jews were fit to enter the salons and ended with the political conclusion that the Jews were unfit to inhabit the earth.' (114) Whitfield realizes that penetrating such darkness is not easy.

In what was known as the civilized world, more outrage was registered when forty-five Jews were killed in Kishinev in 1903, or

when the nurse Edith Cavell was executed in Belgium in 1914, than than when eleven million Jews and non-Jews were killed by the Nazis in the camps, ghettos and ravines of Europe. Koestler screamed in vain because there were too many to be saved. After the war there were too many to be remembered. (123)

Understandably, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* didn't make things any easier. Focusing this time on monstrousness in the form of mediocrity, Arendt 'was sufficiently original to be misunderstood. She never said that banality is itself evil, nor that there is an Eichmann in everyone.' (214) Indeed Eichmann seemed unique in 'his moral obtuseness and stupefying alienation from reality.' (229) Whitfield does well to examine both books jointly, and his summary appraisal of the second strikes me as exceptionally balanced.

The eccentricities, the censorious thunderbolts, even the errors on Arendt's part were in the service of a densely serious and reflective approach to modern politics, so that — however badly punctured — the book simply could not be made to disappear. (243)

While scholarly works like *Judenrat* and *The War Against the Jews* have revised Arendt's evaluation of Jewish cooperation with Nazi authorities, no interpretation of Eichmann himself has yet displaced Arendt's extraordinary portrayal. (247)

Unlike some of her less thoughtful critics, Whitfield knows better than to try to catch Arendt in 'contradictions' that turn out instead to constitute her 'sophisticated refusal to yield to black-and-white simplicities.' (245) But there are lapses. Arendt is charged with neglecting the characters of the rulers.

The fact that both political systems ceased to be totalitarian with the passing of the dictators should have indicated how essential their personalities were to the maintenance of totalitarian domination ... the rulers of post-Stalinist Russia could dismantle the totalitatrian system without jettisoning the Communist ideology ... In Germany the process was even more rapid, if truncated ... While the establishment of full-fledged despotism may be imaginable without having to posit the necessity of a despot, such a distinction cannot be historically validated. (60)

A strange argument, this. Totalitarianism in Germany was 'truncated' by Allied occupation, while in post-Stalinist Russia an entrenched bureaucracy has been far readier to jettison the ideology than to dismantle the system. For what semblance of detotalitarianization has taken place, Arendt herself had offered a more plausible explanation than the death of Stalin. A totalitarian system is in jeopardy when *any* status quo becomes real, even one imposed from without. The much maligned Kennan-Dulles 'containment' policy un-

deniably impeded the 'historical march' that feeds the ruling elite's illusion of omnipotence, even while slowing the system's inner dynamic, its incessant liquefaction of stability in all forms.

There was indeed something Quixotic in Arendt's confrontation of the modern age with her sharp 'Periclean' distinction between political and socioeconomic questions. But it is not true that she 'stigmatized' Marxism 'for having injected economics into politics' (86); she knew that the modern age itself had done that. The point of her distinction is missed altogether in this absurd sentence: 'But it reflected little credit upon the sublimity of her conception of politics to dismiss the social significance of deprivation, to ignore the inescapable problem of economics, to prefer that the collective efforts of humanity not encompass solutions to the pressing needs of the impoverished.' (88) Contrary to Whitfield's claims, her fondness for the Greek *polis* did not keep Arendt from pointing out the injustice of its 'material base' in slavery, or from pondering at length the reasons for its fragility and ephemerality. (137) Nor did she 'associate private interests with selfish withdrawal and abandonment of common sense' (164); Whitfield has forgotten that their normal and natural pursuit sustains common sense and impedes massification.

It is claimed that Arendt 'never formulated the differences and similarities between totalitarianism and mass society with the precision essential to sound political sociology.' (90) For 'Most of Western Europe and the United States fit the general definitions of mass society — they indeed provoked the theory. Yet in historical terms Germany was the aberration, the only large industrial order which ripened into a totalitarian state.' (97) This is backwards. Characteristically, Arendt had little use for 'general definitions of mass society'; what she did provide was a carefully articulated concept of *massification* — a process whose unequaled rampancy in post-Depression German afforded the 'advanced' world's best soil for totalitarianization. Arendt is accused of having 'adopted inconsistent positions' on the philosophical question of whether there is such a thing as human nature. (129) Why? Because on the one hand she needed the concept to define totalitarianism, and celebrated its reaffirmation by the Hungarians in 1956; yet on the other hand she insisted that we don't have an essence or nature like things do, and defining it would, as she said, 'be like jumping over our own shadows.' But, Whitfield concludes, we cannot hope to resist totalitarianization, not to mention lesser evils, without 'some essential idea of what it means to be human,' which 'is not subject to empirical tests.' (131) Is this what we are to understand by 'sound political sociology'? One hopes not, for it is triply confused. Arendt's quite traditional conception of human nature consistently emphasized spontaneity, initiative, and irreducible individual uniqueness. Since these phenomena are not quantifiable, measurable, and predictable, they are indeed, on one fashionable interpretation, 'not subject to empirical tests.' They are nonetheless experienced, individually and in common — and it is this that the Hungarian Revolution (and later the Czech and now the Polish) empirically confirms, thereby not only refuting a variety

of a priori doctrines whose common denominator is political cynicism, but also the narrow notion of 'empirical' to which the author — fortunately only inconsistently — here succumbs.

As an intellectual historian, Whitfield pays careful attention to Arendt's quest for the origins of totalitarianism in such modern phenomena as racism, pan-Germanism, imperialism, and bureaucracy. This enables him to show that, unlike airy hypotheses tracing totalitarianism to Plato (Karl Popper), to medieval millennialism (Norman Cohn), to Gnostic heresies (Eric Voegelin), or to Rousseau (Bertrand Russell), Arendt's theory was 'rooted in social experience and historical specificity.' (260) Wisely, she rejected all efforts to ground Nazism and Stalinism in ' "the language of the humanities and the history of ideas." ... Though Arendt laid bare the mentality that had motivated and absolved atrocities, she knew that the primary importance of totalitarianism was not as idea but as event. The most horrifying and mysterious aspect of it was simply that it happened ...' Thus the dilemma of those who survive the event: 'The need to make totalitarianism intelligible risks trivialization in our 'normal' world; the awareness that such suffering is finally incomprehensible endangers the need to remember.' (261) Arendt and Whitfield work best together in trying to resolve that dilemma on this side of oblivion.

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LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. Volume I. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, eds. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P. 1980; Chicago: U. of Chicago Press 1980. Pp. vii + 218: German and English on facing pages. CN\$ 53.65. ISBN 0-631-12541-8: US\$ 35.00. ISBN 0-226-90433-4.

Volume II. G.H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, eds. Trans. C.G. Luckhardt and M.A.E. Aue. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P. 1980; Chicago: U. of Chicago Press 1980. Pp. vii + 143: German and English on facing pages. CN\$ 43.90. ISBN 0-631-12551-5: US\$ 27.50. ISBN 0-226-90434-2.

People interested in Wittgenstein who still find him pretty bewildering, as I do for the most part, will always be keen for more of his writings, keen enough in many cases to pay the appalling price of these volumes. They will hope that a new title will not add greatly to the number of things that are mystifying (the *Remarks on Colour* notwithstanding), but will handle familiar Wittgensteinian topics in new ways, thereby sometimes making an obscure point clearer, and may sometimes even spell out with unmistakable clarity what lay behind some of the more impenetrable obscurities of previous writings.

Like most of what has been published since *Zettel*, these volumes are not likely to relieve that kind of hunger very much. There is no place where Wittgenstein could seriously be described as having let his hair down, but there are numerous places where something becomes rather clearer than it was heretofore, and quite a few passages which at least add to the textual evidence as to what Wittgenstein was up to in earlier discussions of this or that topic.

A good deal of the material here — perhaps a quarter of it — we have seen before, chiefly in Part II of *Philosophical Investigations* and in *Zettel*, both of which works Wittgenstein culled largely from the typescripts and manuscripts that comprise these volumes. Scholars will be provided with years of sometimes fruitful work tracing out, for passages in *Zettel* or *Philosophical Investigations*, the surrounding material in the present volumes that was left behind, and also the ways in which a passage, when transposed, was given a new and sometimes rather different place.

A very impressive aspect of the volumes is the way we see Wittgenstein returning again and again to the same questions, apparently anxious to leave no stone unturned in uncovering possible sources of confusion or finding more effective ways of resolving difficulties. This effort leads him into all kinds of curious backwaters, some of which seem so utterly remote from the concerns of authors of average contemporary journal articles, that one sometimes has an anxious feeling that perhaps the man was becoming quite daft. Yet with a bit of imagination it is nearly always possible to see something important and genuinely puzzling in even the remotest of such backwaters. I am not always optimistic however as to how soon I would persuade single-minded devotees of divergent schools of thought that this was so.

To further convey the character of these volumes I think I cannot do better than to quote and comment on a sampling of the passages that have interested me particularly. Apart from bringing together scattered remarks on the same topics, I have not been able to devise any orderly plan for the presentation of this material.

1. *Words as signals.*

II.263. 'Did you think as you read the sentence?' — 'Yes, I did think as I read it. Every word was important to me.'

'I was thinking very intensely.' A signal.

Did nothing go on in the process? Yes, all sorts of things.
But the signal did not refer to *them*.
And yet the signal referred to the time of speaking.

It is not obvious and is not explained here what Wittgenstein meant in calling something a signal, but we do at least learn that 'signals,' while (sometimes?) referring to a point in time, do not refer to what happened at that time.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, §180, Wittgenstein calls the words 'Now I know how to go on' a signal, rather than a description of a mental state, and adds that we judge whether the signal was rightly employed by what the speaker goes on to do; but he does not enlarge on the idea, and we still only have the thought that there is something true of the speaker *now*, and that its being true does not consist in something happening.

The conception of a signal appears again in *Zettel* 601 (= 1.852):

'I am pulling as hard as I can.' How do I know that? Does the feeling in my muscles tell me so? The words are a signal; and they have a function.

But then, don't I *experience* anything? Do I experience something then? Some specific? A specific feeling of straining and not-being-able-to-do-any-more, of reaching the limit; Of course, but these expressions say no more than 'I am pulling as hard as I can.' (1.852 is translated slightly differently, but is the same in the German.)

Here the suggestion perhaps is, first, that we are not *saying* what kind of feeling we have, but rather something about what can be expected of us; and second, that it is not the feeling that shows us what can be expected of us. There is no feeling such that, when we have it, we know we can do no more.

I.875 again speaks of a signal, but contributes nothing new. I.691 is quite helpful, however:

.... I want to say: " 'Now I understand.' is a *signal*, not a *description*." And what is effected by my saying that? Well, it directs attention to the origin of such a signal; there comes into the foreground the question "How does someone learn the words 'Now I understand it!' and how, e.g., the description of a mental image?" For the word 'signal' points towards the proceeding that is being signalled.

If we ask how *do* we learn the words 'Now I understand it,' and how, the description of a mental state, an answer to the first part of the question might be: by being taught something like arithmetic, shown solutions to various problems and what makes them correct, and shown mistakes we can make and what makes them mistakes, and so on. So it is not a piece of introspection, but rather the exercise of an acquired expertise, to adjudge oneself to

have the solution and hence say one understands. Here an inner process may indeed occur, but the thinking is about the problem, not about oneself. If one has been an apt student, one's judgment as to whether one has the solution will generally be correct, but not because part of what one has learned is what it feels like to have the solution. We are not told 'When you have such and such a feeling, your solution will be correct.' *That* would be the description of a mental state. The 'proceeding that is being signalled' is the exercise of one's acquired aptitude in setting forth the arithmetical solution.

If this is moderately clear, it is still quite difficult to see 'I was thinking very intensely as I read the sentence' (II.263) as a signal, since it is not clear that in saying this we are generating any expectations as to what we will do. It might be that the difference we have seen between exercising an aptitude and describing a process is what Wittgenstein wants to stress here. In saying we were thinking we are not saying what was happening, but what we were endeavouring. Different kinds of thing are signalled in different cases, and to find out what a particular expression signals, we reflect on how we learn to use it. In the case of 'to think' we are left with a sketch for a project, but little development.

2. Describing from memory.

1.360. [When a person 'describes his image'] must I assume he reads off this description ...from something? What is there to be said for this? — Well, perhaps he *says* "I see him before me!" and then he represents him. But if, instead of this expression, I had taught him to say "Now I know what he looks like" or "Now I can say what he looks like" — then the dangerous picture would be eliminated. (Tennis without a ball.)[?]

II.144. Couldn't there be people who could describe a person's features in minute detail from memory, who even say that they now suddenly know what he looks like — but who would emphatically deny, when they were asked, that at the moment they in any way 'saw' the person 'before them' (or anything like that)? People who would find the expression "I see him before me" totally inappropriate?

This seems to me to be a very important question. Or even: the important question is whether this question makes sense.

Wittgenstein doesn't answer either of these important questions, but I have little doubt that he not only thinks there could be such people, but that most of us come close to being like that: that although we do quite often picture things as we describe them, we do not read off the description from the picture. Our descriptions may often be more detailed than our pictures, and

we may know that a picture that is before our mind is inaccurate, without comparing it with another one that we know to be a better likeness.

He believes, that is to say, that we do not need something presently before the mind to guide us what to say in such cases, but that we 'just know' what he looks like, how such and such a conversation went, and so on.

I do not find the suggestion in I.360 that it is (partly?) the fact that we have such expressions as 'I see him before me' that persuades us otherwise, very convincing; but certainly had we only had expressions like 'I know what he looks like' of 'I can say what he looks like,' there would be less pressure just from the stock expressions of our language, to think that the equipment for describing something from memory must include a mental image.

I suppose the way II.144 is meant to affect our thinking is by inviting us to take the radical step of actually doubting something that we may have been comfortably taking to be unquestionable. Although Wittgenstein does not provide us with any reason to think that there might be people like he describes, if we are just shaken free enough of our old habits to entertain the hypothesis, we soon enough find it quite credible. After all, can we not normally say what someone said without presently 're-hearing' him say it?

3. Expressions of Emotion.

I.133. If I direct my attention to my bodily feelings (when depressed), I notice a slight headache, a slight discomfort in the region of the stomach, perhaps a certain tiredness. But do I mean that, when I say I am severely depressed?

I.728. ... What is it that is so frightful about fear? The trembling, the quick breathing, the feeling in the facial muscles? — When you say "This fear, this uncertainty is frightful!" — might you go on "If only I didn't have this feeling in my stomach"?

These passages make useful contributions to showing that what is so sad about depression, or what is so awful about fear, is not the experience of depression or fear. Here one yearns for an answer to the question what is so sad or so awful, and Wittgenstein does not oblige us, but clearly what would be so saddening or terrifying would be the *burden* of the thoughts one was having, or the burden of the explanation one could give of one's depression or fear, — the fact, for example, that one saw one's life as joyless, or the fact that (one believed) the plane was going to crash.

4. The Soul.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 178, Wittgenstein says 'My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul.' He is sometimes taken to mean by the second of these sentences either that he *knows* it, or anyway that he treats it as something it makes no sense to doubt. In I.586 we read:

Then it is misleading to speak of a man's soul, or of his spirit? So little misleading, that it is quite intelligible if I say "My soul is tired, not just my mind."

This suggests that, far from taking it to be incontrovertible that men have souls, he is simply noting and accepting the usefulness of certain figures of speech, like 'Hard work is good for the soul,' i.e. it is character-building, or 'His soul is in pain,' i.e. he is grieving. One can say 'He has a soul, you know' to a person who is cruelly ridiculing someone, as a reminder that he too can be hurt by these jeers; and the point of saying that this is not the expression of an *opinion* may be that to call it an opinion too strongly suggests a literal rather than a figurative interpretation of such a remark. We don't, at least in the first instance, cast figurative remarks as matters of opinion. 'I believe he is a pig' is odd, but 'I believe he is greedy' could be said, in a case in which one had only hearsay knowledge of his greed.

On p. 174 of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein also says 'The human body is the best picture of the human soul.' It is far from clear what he means by this, but it helps a little when we read I.690:

Am I saying something like, "and the soul itself is merely something about the body"? No. (I am not that hard up for categories.)

The soul is not the body or any part of the body, but it is not something non-bodily either. If those were taken to exhaust the possibilities, one could indeed be described as hard up for categories.

What other possibilities are there? — Well, the kind we have seen, where 'soul' is a word used figuratively, in talking about feelings, sensitivities, taste and character.

5. Dreaming.

Norman Malcolm might be disconcerted by the following:

I.369. And does that mean that it is *nonsense* ever to ask the question whether the *dream* really went on in the night, or whether the dream is a memory phenomenon of the awakened? That depends on *what* we intend, i.e. *what* use we are making of this question. For if we form the picture of dreaming, that a picture comes before the mind of the sleeper (as it would be presented in a painting), then naturally it makes sense to ask this question. One is asking: is it like *this*, or like *this* — and to each "this" there corresponds a different picture.

If having a dream is taken certainly to consist in having images come before the mind while asleep, we can ask whether just that is what happened, but a negative answer to that question would not entail that nothing happened

while he slept, such as to lead him to say he kissed her in the rose garden. The point is reminiscent of *Philosophical Investigations* §§305-6:

... The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the "inner process." What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember." ...

306. Why should I deny that there is a mental process? But "There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering ..." means nothing more than: "I have just remembered ...". To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that anyone ever remembers anything.

§306 is confusing, but taken together with the quoted part of §305 it fairly clearly means that one can deny the mental process without denying that remembering occurs if one declines to identify the two; and similarly in I.369 Wittgenstein will be saying that one can deny that pictures came before the mind of a sleeper without denying that he dreamt, if one does not say that dreaming *is* having pictures come before the mind.

That leaves undecided the question whether he thought that dreaming is having *something* happen during sleep, and if so what. In *Zettel* 530 there is the story of a tribe unacquainted with dreams who come to understand our narrations of dreams, and Wittgenstein says:

... [It cannot] be said that for these people the verb "to dream" could mean nothing but: to tell a dream. For the stranger would of course use both expressions, ... and people of that tribe would not be allowed to confuse "I dreamt ..." with "I told the dream ...".

This may show that Wittgenstein does not question whether dreaming is having something happen while asleep, (although it does not show this conclusively, — there might be yet another grammatical illusion involved here,) — but I know of no place where he addresses himself to the question *what* happens, that is, what sort of phenomenon dreams are.

Among the other passages I found particularly illuminating were: on thinking, II.265 and 604; on believing, I.407, 715 and 823; and on intending, I.185, 597, 598 and 831. There are striking, but not necessarily illuminating remarks on various topics in I.37, 55, 208, 251, 254, 361, 529, 658, 701, 721 and 747. The puzzlement of I.747 is relieved by II.153. II.630, on the subject of forms of life, is bewildering and worrisome. My prize for provocativeness goes to II.643: '... 'But surely everyone will always be interested in *his* inner life!' Nonsense. Would I know that pain etc. etc. is something inner if I weren't told so?'

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YIRMIAHU YOVEL, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980. Pp. xv + 325. US\$ 18.50. ISBN 0-691-07225-6

Professor Yovel's objective is to demonstrate that a 'critical philosophy of history' (x) is a pervasive and indeed 'indispensable' (22) though often unnoticed component of Kant's philosophy. Yovel never says quite what 'critical philosophy of history' means, but if we may use the standard dichotomy then, since there is clearly no 'analytical' philosophy of history in Kant, that is, an investigation of the conceptual foundations of the science or discipline of writing about past events, what Yovel is ascribing to Kant must be instead some form of 'speculative' philosophy of history, that is, a philosophical argument of some sort that there is a necessary pattern to the events of history themselves, though one derived from critical rather than dogmatic principles. For though Yovel concludes that Kant's philosophy of history is ultimately incoherent (e.g. x, 22), containing an 'historical antinomy' or unbridgeable gap 'between the history of reason and empirical history' (21), he also claims that this is a genuine antinomy, deriving from incompatible principles which are yet equally rational and 'equally necessary to Kant.' (22) Yet in fact Yovel fails to show that Kant has any critical argument at all for the thesis that some complex pattern of rational development *must* manifest itself in the actual events of empirical history. Both to explain and mitigate it, Yovel compares the incoherence of Kant's philosophy of history to the kind of incoherence which is supposed to be introduced into his theory of knowledge by a concept of things in themselves which is both necessary to give sense to the concept of appearance and yet incompatible with it (5, 23); but whereas Kant offers considerations clearly intended as critical arguments for the necessity but unknowability of things in themselves, Yovel does not show that Kant's *belief* that the temporally extended patterns of development demanded by pure theoretical and practical reason will manifest themselves in the actual events of human history is anything more than a deep-seated *opinion*. Thus, though Yovel does show that an historical perspective is far more characteristic of Kant's writing than we may always recognize, he fails to show that Kant actually has a speculative *philosophy* of history.

Of course, I cannot argue for this conclusion in any detail here; I can only outline Yovel's exposition of Kant's purported philosophy of history, describe his own account of its incoherence, and then say why I think that his criticisms of Kant's opinions miss the mark.

Part of Yovel's thesis that the philosophy of history is indispensable to the critical philosophy as a whole is that it is not to be found only in the several essays with an explicitly historical topic, but that it is also inherent in Kant's systematic works, and in fact six of the seven chapters which Yovel devotes to his 'reconstruction' (x) of Kant's philosophy of history concern sources other than these minor essays. The first two chapters expound the philosophy of history implied by Kant's practical philosophy. In the first of

these, Yovel explains the multiple meanings of Kant's conception of the highest good, arguing that this conception comprises not just the case in which perfect virtue and perfect happiness coincide in the case of an individual agent, but also the case in which they should coincide for society or mankind as a whole. He then argues that although his own highest good in the first of these senses cannot be a direct object of will for any individual, the highest good in the second of these senses can be; it thus furnishes a goal of action valid for every agent which is historical because it 'should be realized progressively by human praxis' (91n.) and also because, due to the alienness of nature to the moral law, it can *only* be realized progressively. (72-3) This highest good is thus the regulative idea of history. (72) In his second chapter, Yovel then argues that it is this conception of the highest good rather than the postulation of God which is practical reason's chief contribution to Kant's philosophy of history. For since on Kant's view God's role is not to intervene directly in the course of history on behalf of the highest good but only to guarantee the underlying unity of reason and nature which makes human action on behalf of the highest good possible (94-6), the postulation of God does not provide any more information about the structure of history than has already been provided by the concept of the highest good itself. In other terms, of the three stages of '*foundation, propagation, and completion*' of the 'ethical community,' the first and third stages, postulating as they do direct divine intervention, are not *historical* stages at all, and the only 'actual' or historical stage is that of the '*propagation and enlargement of the ethical community*' which only the regulative idea of the intersubjectively distributed highest good and not the concept of God itself structures. (111)

The third and fourth chapters are devoted to the historical implications of Kant's teleology. The third chapter considers the view expounded in such explicitly historical essays as the *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* of 1784 and the *Conjectural Beginnings of Human History* of 1786 that in such apparently non- or counter-progressive events as devastations, revolutions, and wars there is actually at work a 'cunning of nature' which is externally working toward the same objective of the highest good that constitutes the internal objective of human moral action, though because 'man is not an infinite but a finite rational being...he must suffer a long historical process before his freedom can fully realize itself and overcome the opposition of nature.' (145) Yovel hastens to claim that these essays, in spite of their actual composition subsequent to 1781, are dogmatic and 'pre-critical' (154-5); but he believes that this problem is rectified by what is described in the fourth chapter, namely the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*'s reinterpretation of the thesis of a 'hidden plan of nature' as a '*reflective judgment*' (141) with the same status as the concepts of beauty, purposiveness and systematicity in aesthetics, biology, and empirical natural science in general. (162-4) His conclusion is thus that even the critical Kant believes that there is 'a pattern in the organization of historical events that cannot be explained exclusively in mechanistic terms, since it presupposes even if only reflectively the concept of intent or purpose.' (167-8)

In his last three expository chapters, Yovel turns from the progressive manifestation of rationality in the actual events of human history to the manifestation of such a pattern in the history of speculation on the human situation — that is, in the history of religion, science, and philosophy itself. Here what he claims is that according to Kant 'As the history of religion is a latent totality, governed by the implied religion of reason, so the history of philosophy [and science] is a latent totality, governed by the pure architectonic or system of reason of which it is the distorted manifestation.' (202) The fifth chapter describes the *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*'s depiction of 'the history of reason [as] manifested in the empirical history of religion' from merely juridical Judaism to a Protestantism which depends on almost nothing more 'than the pure moral interest of reason.' (208-9) The sixth chapter then turns to the history of philosophy, arguing that according to Kant 'the history of philosophy is the historicized form of the architectonic of reason' but a history which must have the form of 'a concealed and distorted totality' just because each actual philosopher expresses it 'from his own standpoint and in terms of his own cultural context.' (236) Finally, the seventh chapter argues that Kant's conception of the method of philosophy as analytic rather than synthetic means that the explication of even his own system of philosophy must also be historical as contrasted to geometrical (262-4); Yovel then concludes with the claim that Kant extends this dependence of its own history into a general theory of scientific development, according to which even mathematics, logic, and physics could only appear or develop at specific points in human history and after specific sorts of conceptual revolutions. (265-7)

Yovel follows his exposition of it with an Epilogue that brings two main objections against Kant's philosophy of history. He expresses these objections as two forms of what he calls the 'historical antinomy.' On the narrower form of this antinomy, the very idea of a history of reason is contradictory because reason itself must be atemporal and therefore ahistorical: 'Time is constitutive only in the phenomenal world, while the proper sphere of reason is noumenal, lying behind all temporalized experience.' (282-3) In its broader form, the historical antinomy does not contain an actual contradiction, but just the incoherence generally characteristic of Kant's dualism between *nature* and reason. The problem here is simply that since 'no satisfactory bridge is available between reason and the empirical world' (272), that the histories individually inherent in reason and nature (including human nature) should coincide or 'be united in a single process' (272) can only be contingent. That nature should 'produce of itself the same kind of [e.g.] legal institution that reason, too, would have recommended...must be seen as a happy chance, a mere coincidence that the system cannot explain.' (278) In the end Yovel argues that only a dialectical conception of reason as embedded in the very changes of the empirical world can provide a philosophical foundation for a rational structuring of history, though of course such a logic must be applied only to a collective but empirical humanity and not to 'the Hegelian absolute spirit.' (306)

It seems to me, however, that while Yovel overstates the problem caused by Kant's theory of time, he underestimates the difficulty produced by Kant's dualism of nature and reason. That patterns of reason must be incapable of displaying temporal form at all follows only from a pre-critical conception of reason as a faculty for positive knowledge of an atemporal noumenal realm; on Kant's critical conception of the role of reason, however, all that follows is that reason's demand for unconditioned and infinite syntheses can never be *completed* in any finite, determinate time, but not that the very *form* of temporality — which is itself capable of infinite extension — is intrinsically incompatible with rationality. Yovel's first antinomy confuses constraints on the determination of temporal relations with constraints on the form of time itself. What Yovel's second antinomy does not make clear, however, is that if nature and reason are really as separate as Kant believes then there is not just no guarantee that their separate histories should be congruent or isomorphic, but no ground at all why reason, though it *could* manifest itself in history, *should* have a history of progressive development of its own. That there should be some gap between nature and the demands of reason at any point in human history might seem to be a consequence of Kant's philosophical views, but that this gap should be progressively narrowed seems just to be his opinion and not the consequence of anything in the critical philosophy.

This difficulty arises with regard to both practical and theoretical reason, thus causing problems for the first and third main parts of Yovel's argument. We can consider the case of practical reason first. It is true, indeed trivially true, that the objective of the highest good furnishes an historical goal for human action, just because any action for the attainment of a not yet realized

This difficulty arises with regard to both practical and theoretical reason, thus causing problems for the first and third main parts of Yovel's argument. We can consider the case of practical reason first. It is true, indeed trivially true, that the objective of the highest good furnishes an historical goal for human action, just because any action for the attainment of a not yet realized goal has a temporal dimension. Any such action is the initiation of a chain of events at some time t_1 aimed at the realization of some state of affairs at a distinct and later t_2 . However, that the history of human action must show any more pattern than this, in particular that it must manifest a progressive narrowing of the gap between the actuality of human nature and the ideal of human duty, hardly follows from the fact that the imperative of practical reason sets an objective for action in human history. This is so because of the following dilemma raised by Kant's dualism. Suppose that the fact which is supposed to account for there needing to be any change at all in the degree to which practical reason is manifest in human action, namely that there is a gap between the demands that morality makes and the actual inclinations to action that humans have been given by nature and nurture at any particular time, is itself either necessary or contingent. If it is necessary, then while the gap between the ideal and actual in human conduct might have to manifest itself over an extended period of time, there would be no reason why the gap must ever be closed or even progress toward closure, and thus no reason why

human history should show even an asymptotic advance toward ideal morality. If, on the contrary, the gap between duty and inclination in human conduct is itself just contingent, then it will be contingent that anything less than ideal morality has been attained at any particular point in human history and obviously equally contingent that this moral shortfall should be ameliorated at all, *a fortiori* that human history should be progressively rational. In other words, if a gap between human nature and human duty is a necessary feature of the critical philosophy, then it is hard to see how this philosophy can ground a speculative philosophy of history; but if such a gap is not a necessary part of this philosophy, then it is also hard to see how it could actually entail any thesis about the shape of human history beyond the trivial one that humans *have* a history. Yovel himself, I might add, never directly discusses the modality of Kant's separation between duty and inclination, but indirectly suggests that any gap between them is only contingent, serving as a *ratio cognoscendi* but not *ratio essendi* of morality. (54n.) It is thus hard indeed to see why he thinks that Kant's practical philosophy should entail anything more about history than that the human actions which take place in it do have a moral goal.

Basically the same objection arises with regard to the hypothesis that theoretical reason has a necessarily progressive history marked by conceptual revolutions occurring in a necessary sequence. Consider the history of natural science. In this case, Kant's fundamental theory of knowledge may indeed make it trivially true that science must have some history, just because empirical knowledge requires empirical intuitions as well as pure and empirical concepts, and the former can only be gathered in the course of time. But while this might be enough to entail that *if* science progresses at all it can only do so gradually, it cannot itself entail that science must progress. For it is also Kant's view that the only real scientific (and philosophical) revolutions are *conceptual* revolutions, grounded not in any particular increment of empirical data but in a purely conceptual revision of the way in which a given body of data is addressed (a 'Copernican revolution'), and is hard to see what necessity there could be that such revolutions ever occur, let alone occur in any particular order.

Thus, while it is obvious that both practical and theoretical reason set goals of moral and cognitive completeness which can only be advanced in time and thus in history, it seems to me that Yovel has failed to adduce any arguments for Kant's idea that reason itself must demonstrate a pattern of advance toward these goals, whether or not this pattern is congruent with that of empirical history. To use Kant's own terms, one might say that he has shown that Kant has *faith* in the rationality of history but no *knowledge* of it. This is my main objection to Yovel's claim in the first and third parts of his book that a philosophy of history is an 'indispensable' part of the critical philosophy. Before concluding, I will also express a reservation about the argument of the book's second part, that Kant's teleological conception of the cunning of nature can be rescued by assimilating it to the idea of a reflective judgment. My concern here is that Yovel is excessively sanguine about

Kant's in fact deeply problematic conception of reflective judgment itself. In some instances, a principle of reflective judgment seems to be simply a qualified postulation that an objective of understanding or reason is satisfied even when it does not appear to be, which adds nothing to our conception of the objective but serves the essentially motivational function of getting us to continue working toward it in spite of the frustration offered by the apparent facts. This might well be a suitable model for asserting a principle of the rationality of human history in the face of wars and devastations; unfortunately, this conception of reflective judgment appears to be gratuitous, for when an objective of human action is intrinsically desirable — as that of the highest good certainly is — the only additional motivation we should need to strive for it even in the face of setbacks is the absence of any reason to believe that its realization is impossible, not the postulation that it is inevitable. Now, there are also cases in which the principles of reflective judgment are not just gratuitous postulations; thus, it is Kant's theory that the reflective representation of purposiveness in natural organisms may enable us to discover *mechanistic* explanations of their behavior that might otherwise go unnoticed, and that the reflective representation of systematicity in natural science may both enable us to discover particular laws that, again, might otherwise go unnoticed and also serve to provide some semblance of necessity for individual laws of nature (the necessity of occurring at a certain point in a larger system) that is both demanded by the very idea of a natural law and yet not lent to individual laws by the only law that is absolutely *a priori*, namely the general law of causation itself (see *Critique of Judgment*, Introduction section V). But these cases do not provide an apt model for a reflective principle of teleology in history, because this principle does not offer genuine assistance in the satisfaction of any independent cognitive objective with regard to history — at best it seems to provide a pseudo-theoretical framework for facts which, when observed, are observed without it (167). Thus, it seems that the only kind of reflective principle to which Yovel can compare the idea of a rational history is the gratuitous kind.

These criticisms are not meant to suggest that there is not much useful material in *Kant and the Philosophy of History*; in fact, Professor Yovel's discussions of the highest good, the practical postulation of God, and the philosophy of religion in Kant could be separated from the argument of the book as a whole to provide helpful introductions to their subjects. But I do believe that Professor Yovel has failed to prove his point.

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Bibliographies of Famous Philosophers. Hardbound bibliographies have been published on Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, Alfred North-Whitehead, and Henri Bergson. Forthcoming bibliographies include works on Martin Heidegger, George Santayana, and a revised Sartre bibliography.

Dialog. A computerized search service which provides custom bibliographies with abstracts on any logical combination of philosophical topics.

Mailing Labels of approximately 10,000 philosophers in the United States and Canada are available as well as addresses by specialty, i.e., Ethics, Aesthetics, etc.

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