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These two volumes contain contributions dealing with disparate topics in metaethics. In presenting them jointly, it will be useful to guide the reader by organizing their contents according to a number of common themes (some articles obviously fall under more than one theme).

Expressivism. In ‘Truth, Beauty and Goodness’ (vol. 5) Simon Blackburn claims that the best course for non-realists, including expressivists, is to firmly avoid all metaethical talk of dependency of value on attitudes: ‘there is no external question of dependency’ (300). In partial contrast with the ‘semantic epicycles’ previously explored in his quasi-realism, here Blackburn pursues a frankly deflationist approach, which relies on certain parallelisms between ethical predicates and the predicate ‘true’ used as a device for generalization (as in ‘what John says is true’).

In ‘What Makes a Sentiment Moral?’ (vol. 5) Antti Kauppinen proposes a detailed answer to the title’s question: a moral sentiment is that which characteristically results from simulating certain non-moral reactive attitudes of an unbiased and informed participant (241). This account, interesting in itself, is claimed to provide expressivism with a plausible candidate for the state expressed in moral judgment, thus solving the so-called ‘moral attitude problem’. Kauppinen goes on to refine his account by discussing possible counterexamples (‘schmoralizers’, autistic people, ‘emotionless’ subjects).

Ralph Wedgwood criticizes expressivism for failing to provide a satisfactory justification of certain norms of warrant-preservation. In ‘When Do Goals Explain the Norms that Advance Them?’ (vol. 5) Jamie Dreier replies that such norms of inference are (or rather, can be thought of as) constitutive rules, and that as such they are not to be justified instrumentally by reference to substantive goals such as truth, which seem unavailable to expressivism.

Sharon Street’s ‘Mind-Independence without the Mystery’ (vol. 6) responds to Blackburn’s strategy through insisting on locating the central metaethical issues in the debate over mind-dependence. Anti-realists, in her view, should embrace mind-dependence of value as a general (first- or second-order) claim that best squares with an evolutionary account of the origin of value judgments: it is highly unlikely that our value concepts could have developed to track mind-independent evaluative truths. By accepting mind-dependence, however, she thinks the

whole quasi-realist and expressivist program would lose its *raison d'être* (and Street's own constructivist approach would emerge as superior).

In 'How Much Realism?' (vol. 6) Allan Gibbard, directly addressing Street's arguments, asks just what kind of realist picture quasi-realists should aspire to mimic (and justly be accused of mimicking *too well*). Not 'vast' realism, in Gibbard's opinion, which construes moral facts *just like* ordinary facts: for this would fall prey to evolution-based epistemological challenges such as Street's. Rather, quasi-realists should mimic 'tempered' realism, which, *inter alia*, 'denies that there could be basic normative facts beyond our power to know them' (44). Tempered realism leaves room for a form of mind-independence that can resist Street's challenge and that can be accounted for within a quasi-realist framework.

Realism. In 'How Objectivity Matters' (vol. 5) David Enoch offers an original argument for moral objectivism. There seems to be an asymmetry in the way we respond to conflicts of preferences and moral disagreements. Impartiality is morally required in the face of the former, but not in the face of the latter: in moral disagreement, we are at least sometimes permitted to 'stand our ground' (120). This point, in itself worthy of further attention, is used by Enoch against forms of speaker- or society-relative subjectivism (and, not without some strain, against expressivism). Given their assimilation of moral judgments to preferences, such views seem to have worse resources than objectivism to make sense of the moral asymmetry.

James Lenman's main concern in 'Humean Constructivism in Moral Theory' (vol. 5) is to mark a contrast between his own form of anti-realist constructivism and, in particular, Scanlon's 'realist' contractualism. Scanlon's emphasis on interpersonal justifiability, Lenman suggests, is better accounted for within a broadly Humean and expressivist big picture of normativity.

Naturalism. In 'Normativity, Necessity and Tense: A Recipe for Homebaked Normativity' (vol. 5) Stephen Finlay defends an analysis of a sort of instrumental statements ('if you are (going) to F, then you have to G') that aims to steer a midway between deniers of their genuine normativity and advocates of their irreducible normativity. Using the tools of grammatical analysis, Finlay reduces their content to the presence of two purely non-normative conditions: temporal ordering and 'prior necessity'. Recalcitrant irreducibilist intuitions are accommodated in terms of pragmatic 'extras' associated with instrumental statements.

In 'Non-naturalism: The Jackson Challenge' (vol. 5) Jussi Suikkanen tries to move forward the dialectic regarding Frank Jackson's argument for ethical naturalism. The argument is based on the identity of necessarily coinstantiated properties: if necessarily, *x* is right if and only if *x* is Δ (a disjunction of all the possible natural properties *x*'s rightness supervenes on), therefore being right is being Δ . The non-naturalist answers that rightness and Δ -ness, even if equivalent, are distinct because they have distinct higher-order properties (epistemic status, resultance, etc.). The burden, Suikkanen argues, is then on Jackson to defend an austere nominalistic view of properties, which is the only one to guarantee that necessarily coinstantiated properties must share higher-order properties.

Campbell Brown's 'A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism' (vol. 6) can be construed as a reply in spirit to Suikkanen. Brown attempts to

prove that supervenience entails that irreducible ethical properties would be redundant, in the (rather technical) sense of not doing any work in distinguishing possible worlds.

Knowledge. In ‘Moral Knowledge and Experience’ (vol. 6) Sarah McGrath argues that non-moral experience can have a crucial ‘sensitizing’ role in contributing to the reliability of our moral judgments and thus to moral knowledge, without thereby making moral knowledge a posteriori: the fact that I am reliable in judging that *p*, because I have had a sufficient amount of suitable sensitizing experiences, is no part of my evidence for *p*.

Error theory. Response-dependence theories generally react to Mackie’s error theory by holding that the objectivity of moral prescriptions need not involve any metaphysical extravagance. In ‘The Accidental Error Theorist’ (vol. 6) Richard Joyce shows that some such theories can still lead to error-theoretic results, insofar as there are grounds to think the relevant response-dependent property is actually not instantiated (e.g., *x* being disapproved by all ideal observers; *x* being disallowed by a set of principles no-one could reasonably reject; etc.). (This is a point Michael Smith has been making about his own ideal advisor view since *The Moral Problem*.)

In ‘Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism’ (vol. 6) Jonas Olson argues for conservationism, i.e. the idea that, if error theory is true, we are better advised to go on as if (almost) nothing happened, rather than adopt some form of fictionalism about morality. Olson instructively points out both the theoretical drawbacks of fictionalism (in making sense of disagreement and moral inferences) and the practical costs of engaging ‘fictionally’ with morality. He then defends the possibility, feasibility, and preferability of a two-level scenario whereby we can keep having occurrent beliefs that *x* is wrong alongside a disposition to believe, in ‘reflective and detached contexts’, that it is not the case that *x* is wrong.

Reason and reasons. In ‘Reason, Reasons, and Normativity’ (vol. 5) Joseph Raz addresses a number of foundational issues. What is reason? What mental capacities qualify as rational powers? For Raz, reason has everything to do with reasons: it is the *general* capacity to recognise and respond to reasons, as opposed to *reasoning*, which (when successful) is a particular way to get us to detect reasons. Neither reason nor reasoning, however, are as such *sources* of reasons. (Contrast with Markovits’s view below.) As to the second question, Raz suggests and explores the implications of an irrationality test: ‘if the exercise of a capacity can be non-derivatively irrational (that is irrational not because something else is irrational) then the capacity is one of our rational powers’ (8).

In ‘Instrumental Rationality’ (vol. 6) Ralph Wedgwood attempts to pin down exactly what is distinctive about the rationality of instrumental reasoning as opposed to general practical reasoning. Combining insights from Michael Bratman and a certain interpretation of decision theory, what is held to be crucial is the possibility of integrating one’s piecemeal rational decisions into a large-scale overall rational plan, so that ‘one’s intentions should *not* be such that one has a high conditional probability that if one has precisely those intentions, one will *not* execute all of one’s intentions’ (302).

Derek Parfit argues that subjectivists about normative reasons cannot account for our reasons, *now*, to want to avoid *future* agony. Agony is a state we will desire not to be in, but how

can the reason-giving force of future concerns transfer to the present? In ‘Parfit’s Case against Subjectivism’ (vol. 6) David Sobel replies by building a reasons transfer principle into a *procedural* account of ideal deliberation: ‘If one will later have a reason to get O, then one has a reason to facilitate the later getting of O’ (63). In the course of making his argument Sobel also draws helpful distinctions between his subjectivism and Bernard Williams’s internalism about reasons.

In dialectical opposition to Sobel, ‘Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare’ (vol. 6) by Chris Heathwood defends a value-based theory of reasons by showing that, even when our desires constitute certain desirable states (pleasure, welfare), it is not those desires *per se* that provide our reasons to promote them. One of Heathwood’s arguments (but a crucial one, if a subjectivist view like Sobel’s can indeed explain reasons grounded in future desires) is that ‘these desires are merely a *component* of the reason-providing state’ (98).

In ‘Why be an Internalist about Reasons?’ (vol. 6) Julia Markovits mounts a cumulative case for internalism, squarely understood as the reduction of normative reasons to standards of procedural rationality. Her central arguments against externalism are that (1) internalism offers an ‘account of what goes wrong when we fail to be motivated to act as we have reason to act’ (267) on which any rational agent could agree, because independent of the assertion of *substantive* values: we are simply procedurally irrational; and (2) internalism better explains why normative reasons only apply to reasoning creatures.

Value analysis. In ‘Value and the Right Kind of Reason’ (vol. 5) Mark Schroeder adds his own contribution to the pile of proposed solutions to the wrong kind of reasons problem for fitting-attitude analyses of value. Right kind of reasons for A-ing have to do with correctness conditions for activity A, and these in turn have to do with ‘reasons which are shared by necessarily every able person engaging in A, because they are engaged in A’ (39). Regardless of the many explanatory benefits claimed by Schroeder for his account, the crucial contention is that not only tying knots or playing chess, but also the attitudes mentioned in the analysis (desire, admiration, etc.) count as ‘activities’ that give rise to reasons shared by anyone engaging in them (and that demonic incentives for admiration cannot figure among such reasons).

In ‘Categorizing Goods’ (vol. 5), after presenting a typology of different forms of goodness (which, remarkably, does not rely on any fitting-attitude kind of story), Julie Tannenbaum arrives at the interesting conclusion that moral philosophy should not assume that there is any one good (1) that is good *only* for its own sake, (2) whose source of goodness is *only* intrinsic, and (3) whose goodness cannot ever be defeated. (Classical candidates include Aristotle’s *eudaimonia* and Kant’s good will.)

How can an action be what you ought or have most reason to do, and yet are not required to do? In ‘Passing the Deontic Buck’ (vol. 6) Matt Bedke argues that requirements and permissions are to be understood in terms of (right kind of) reasons to require (or permit) the relevant action. The balance of such reasons does not necessarily coincide with the balance of reasons to do the action. Thus logical space is opened up for, e.g., supererogatory and optional acts.

Motivation and action. How do Humeans explain action based on belief in a reason? In 'Humean Theories of Motivation' (vol. 5) Melissa Barry draws useful distinctions among traditional, Michael Smith's, and David Velleman's 'Humean' views of rational motivation, concluding that their proposed explanations oscillate between the implausible and the incoherent, depending on how the contribution of desire is understood.

In his rich 'Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency' (vol. 6) Paul Katsafanas argues that, despite appearances, reflection and deliberation are no guarantees of 'active' as opposed to 'passive' agency. As common experience and psychological experiments show, reflecting on one's motives is hardly a foolproof way to distance oneself from those very same motives, since motives can and do shape reflection itself. Instead, Katsafanas proposes that we are active when better knowledge about our motives would not undermine our own approval of our actions (245).

The quality of the contributions is for the most part very high. Some try harder than others to advance arguments that are both original and interesting, and they generally succeed. Some rephrase in new and fruitful terms the relevant debates and positions. Some bring technical instruments to bear on the issues, which is in the nature of an interdisciplinary subject such as meta-ethics. On the whole, the vast majority of the articles in both volumes deserve careful studying by researchers working in meta-ethics and more generally interested in the nature of normativity.

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