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Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin

The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940.

Ed. Henri Lonitz. Trans. Nicholas Walker.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

1999. Pp. 383.

US\$39.95. ISBN 0-674-15427-4.

Walter Benjamin

The Arcades Project.

Trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

1999. Pp. ix + 1074.

US\$39.95. ISBN 0-674-04326-X.

Where does one begin with a book that was never written? Walter Benjamin's *Arcades Project* is one such unfinished 'work'. Comprised of thematized collections of citations, fragments and notes — 'convolutes' is the term Adorno gave them, and it is a term which nicely captures their subtle intricacies and complexities — Benjamin's thirteen-year research project (1927-1940) on the material history of nineteenth-century capitalist culture in Paris sprawls some 830 pages. Together with three early essay drafts, funding sketches and thematic statements by Benjamin, numerous illustrations, a translators' introduction, a critical essay by the German edition's editor, glossaries and indices, and an account of Benjamin's attempt at escape from Nazi occupation and eventual suicide on the borders of Spain and France in 1940, the recent English translation of *Passagen-Werk* comprises a formidable (1074 pages) monument of twentieth-century scholarship.

The Arcades Project is, however, a sprawling ruin, intimate yet unwieldy, vast and arcane. At times riveting, at others boring, it presents the arduous struggle by a remarkably sensitive philosophical mind to understand both the catastrophe of modernity through its nineteenth-century material history and the philosophical rigors of writing that history. In a letter to Adorno, Benjamin calls his *Passagen Werk* 'the theater of all my struggles and ideas.'

So, where to begin? *In medias res*, in the middle of things. When it comes to *The Arcades Project*, there can be no other origin than that; that is, of 'standing in the flow of becoming as a whirlpool ... its rhythm apparent only to the double insight.' These words by Benjamin about the concept of origin from his Habilitationsschrift, *Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels* (*The Origin of German Tragic Drama*), a book he did finish, apply aptly to the *Arcades Project* as well. For Benjamin, to stand in the flow is to stand in the middle of things — the stuff, the images, the debris, the material presences which concretize a modern dream of the future as yet unrealized; things whose small individual moments crystallize the total event of both past and future (N2,6; 462).

On one level the *Arcades*' method is simply that of looking, of ethnography, if you will. But Benjamin's looking is a thoroughly reflexive and studied

practice of looking at what is normally discounted by traditional, ideologically driven historiography. Benjamin, in contrast, took the debris of mass culture seriously. By documenting the materializing, productive presence of the arcades of nineteenth-century Paris, their dusty, glass covered shopping streets, shops filled with dolls, umbrellas, globes, and tortoise combs, advertisements and billboards, dresses, mirrors, photographs and novelties, he hoped to awaken modernity to its capitalist dream logic which, contrary to its own admission, 'reactivated mythic forces of dream filled sleep' (K1a,8; 391). Benjamin considered the Parisian arcades, the historical forerunners to our conspicuous malls and consumption, to be the 'original temples of commodity capital' (A2,2; 37).

He documented these 'ur-spaces' of modernity in a massive collection of citations and reflections on nineteenth-century industrial culture as it took shape in Paris. The convolutes thematically range over modern landscapes of fashion, modes of lighting, prostitutes, mirrors and the Seine to Baudelaire, Marx, boredom and the eternal return, the trace, theories of progress, dream cities and dreams of the future. The collection of categorized, fragmentary notes and citations are organized in terms of what Benjamin called a 'principle of montage' (N1,10; 458), comparable to Dziga Vertov and Sergei Eisenstein. Benjamin wrote that the effect of the juxtaposition and conjunction of seemingly disparate ideas and images latent in the collective subconscious would awaken the slumbering modern subject from the dream logic of capitalism. By rescuing the material enchantment of commodity culture for the purpose of social transformation (K1, 3-5; 389-90), this awakening would effect a revolutionary politics, whose dialectical imagology (what Buck-Morss calls a 'dialectics of seeing') would rupture the *mythique moderne* in a radical practice of history. This revolutionary history, oriented through the theories of Marx and Freud, would enable the critical signification transformative of liberatory consciousness (N5a,1; 467). It would dissolve the myths of the modern in a reflexive practice of historical freedom, 'a genuine liberation from an epoch' (h°,3; 883). Benjamin's 'doubled insight' takes place in the tension between the poles of concretization and dream, between the 'thingness' of culture and the dreams such things materialize. The 'dialectical image' in terms of which this tension unfolds becomes the central epistemological category of *The Arcades Project*, and reveals itself not only as a unique philosophical method, as complex and difficult as any dialectical effort since Hegel, but also one which radically reorients the work of historiography.

For Benjamin, history is no longer the work of the resolute gaze on a 'timeless truth' (N3,2; 463). He envisioned his *Passagen-Werk* as engaging a 'Copernican revolution in historical perception' (K1,2; F°,7; 388-9), one which would 'resolutely refuse' (N3,2) the timeless fixed point of what has been, and re-establish the political work of memory in a re-engagement of the present as always a 'first happening' of the past. The shock of the new is always already the shock of the past. This re-orientation of historical perspective, while still controversial, does not come out of the blue. Nietzsche, Foucault, Hayden White, Edith Wyschogrod and others have all contributed to current

non-foundational trends in contemporary scholarships of narrative, memory, trauma, a-thetic historiography and heterology. Benjamin's *Arcades Project* is significant in that it repeatedly attempts, contrary to many popular readings of Benjamin's aphoristics, to engage a thoroughly modern revolutionary politics of critical Marxist scholarship in the liberatory struggle to overcome fetishized commodity culture. His is not simply the celebration of fragmentation.

The influences and personal links within this liberatory intellectual and political effort are often revealingly exposed in the letters between Adorno and Benjamin. Central figures in and around the Frankfurt school — Horkheimer, Mannheim, Offenbach, Bloch, Ernst, Brecht, Fromm and Kracauer — all make appearances in the personally revealing, yet often rigorously philosophical letters. Adorno is repeatedly vicious in his condemnation of others' ideas, and the letters are certainly revealing with respect to his legendary and intimidating arrogance. The letters are, however, more often quite intimate and touching, as evidenced, for instance, in the evolution of address from the early years — 'Herr Benjamin' and 'Herr Wiesengrund' — to more congenial greetings of 'Dear Teddie' and 'My dear Walter'. The letters evidence a continuing dialogue between Benjamin and Adorno with respect to the former's project. Adorno frequently provides critique and counsel on Benjamin's theoretical directions, and at times was formative in major reworkings of central concepts in the *Passagen*. The letter of August 2-4th, 1935 is perhaps the most significant in this respect. In response to Adorno's critique of the 'dialectical image', Benjamin significantly re-tools the concept in the *exposé* of 1939. Adorno never wavers however in his confidence that Benjamin's *Arcades Project* is of the utmost philosophical importance. He writes in a letter to Benjamin dated May 20th, 1935 that the *Arcades* is not only the centre of Benjamin's philosophy, 'but as the decisive philosophical word which must find utterance today; as a *chef d'œuvre* like no other, and as so decisive in every sense, whether in the private sense or equally in that of public success, that any weakening of the innermost claims of this work, and any consequent repudiation of its own peculiar categories, would strike me as catastrophic and quite irreparably damaging.' The translation and publication of *Passagen-Werk* is a significant achievement, and one which is just beginning, in the English speaking world, to meet and fulfill Adorno's estimation of its philosophical importance.

Mark Jackson

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Giorgio Agamben

Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive.

Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen.

New York, NY: Zone Books 1999.

Pp. 176.

US\$25.00. ISBN 1-890951-16-1.

With his most recent publication, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, Agamben joins a crowding field of contemporary philosophers, theologians, psychologists, sociologists, ethicists and art, architecture and literary critics who take as their subject matter in some manner the Nazi genocide against the Jews (I have in mind, among others, Zygmunt Bauman, Edith Wyschogrod, Robert Jay Lifton, Richard Rubenstein, Tzvetan Todorov, Dominick LaCapra, James Young and Francois Lyotard). This proliferation is in addition to the still growing reservoir of historical studies, including the recent publication in English of a meticulously researched five volume Polish history of the Nazi death camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau. In his own preface, Agamben acknowledges this rich accumulation of secondary material, especially the historical studies. However, he states at the outset that less has been said regarding 'the ethical and political significance of the extermination, or even for a human understanding of what happened there — that is, for its contemporary relevance' (11). Though this statement seems to set aside the work of authors such as Bauman, Lifton, Todorov, Terence Des Pres, Christopher Browning, Theodor Adorno, Daniel Goldhagen and Hannah Arendt precisely in their attempt to understand the ethical and political significance of the Nazi genocide, it does seem to be the case that the mass of events we like to clump together as 'the Holocaust' continues to vex scholarship on a number of fronts. Agamben's book, focusing narrowly as it does on a specific set of juridical, hermeneutical and humanistic questions, functions as something of a philosophical microscope that minutely considers particulars as opposed to mapping a way into questions of 'ethical and political significance' and 'contemporary relevance'.

Remnants of Auschwitz does not, then, add much on the latter count. Agamben makes little or no attempt to carry forward his own insights into contemporary ethical and political discussions beyond the specific realm of the Nazi death camps. That said, this is an acute and perspicacious study. His specific concern is with the status of the survivor of the death camps as a *witness*. Starting with the survivor's common desire to 'tell his tale' (Agamben compares the late Italian survivor and author Primo Levi with Coleridge's 'Ancient Mariner'), he asks quite simply, to what precisely does the survivor testify? Clearly many survivors have been motivated by a need to testify in order to achieve justice, whether that be in a legal or in a moral/cultural 'court' of judgement. Agamben acknowledges this juridical function of testimony (as *testis*) in numerous trials of Nazis and their

collaborators. However, noting that the aim of the witness' testimony is often not *merely* to seek judgment, Agamben cautions that these trials themselves have 'helped to spread the idea that the problem of Auschwitz had been overcome,' in either a juridical or a historical sense. What is *left over* after the trials (or perhaps *in spite* of them) is the life-world of the camps themselves, what Agamben, quoting Levi, calls an '*impotentia judicandi*' or 'gray zone' in which 'all the metals of traditional ethics' lose their metaphysical solidity (21). This is at the center of Agamben's essay; in the preface, he writes that 'almost none of the ethical principles our age believed it could recognize as valid have stood the decisive test' of a demonstration in view of the camps (13).

Modestly (and wisely), Agamben eschews such a thorough testing and settles for hoping that 'this book makes it possible for certain words to be left behind and others to be understood in a different sense' (14). And thus the substance of this essay is Agamben's careful dissection of these certain words, among them: Holocaust, Shoah, testimony, witness, martyr, responsibility, the human and the inhuman, dignity, shame, Heidegger's *Sein zum Tode*, and the sacredness of death and life. But the real object of this book, the 'Mount Moriah' that Agamben circles like Kierkegaard's Abraham, is that most enigmatic member of the camps' communities, the so-called '*Musselman*' or 'Muslim', the individuals who populate numerous accounts of the camps and represented something of an army of the not-quite-alive. As Primo Levi writes (quoted by Agamben), they were 'an anonymous mass ... of non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead in them, already too empty to really suffer ... One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call their death death ... [I]f I could enclose all the evil of our time in one image, I would choose this image which is familiar to me: an emaciated man, with head drooped and shoulders curved, on whose face and in whose eyes not a trace of thought is to be seen' (44). Suffice it to say that this *Musselman*, thus characterized, serves as the touchstone for all of Agamben's considerations, the unsettling *nadir* of various ethical and humanistic categories. After the trial and its testimonies, Agamben suggests, remains the enfolded, mute witness of the less-than-human human, the human that survives after what is 'human' has been undone and that is something of the remnant 'witness' of Auschwitz.

Agamben relies too exclusively on Levi's published accounts of his life in the Auschwitz, allowing the lens of Levi's considerable talent to closely guide his own perception. In this sense, this essay is quite nearly just a commentary on Levi's *The Drowned and the Saved* and *Survival in Auschwitz*. And yet, in light of other, more hyperbolic theoretical treatments of the Nazi genocide (and likely due in part to Levi's own reticence), Agamben emerges from his commentary with a few very shrewd and important shards, avoiding (despite the 'experimental' premise of humanity *in extremis* that guides this book) the notion that the camps are the rock against which all thought, ethics, culture, etc. might founder. Instead, the camps and their most degraded inhabitants represent 'the apostrophe [in human being] from which human beings cannot

turn away' (54). Rather than obliterating relevant categories, Agamben works to reorient them around this witness outside the law.

Jonathan Lee Sherwood

Newburyport, MA

Jeffrey Bloechl, ed.

*The Face of the Other and the Trace of God:
Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.*
New York: Fordham University Press 2000.

Pp. xvi + 315.

US\$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8232-1965-8);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8232-1966-6).

The Face of the Other and the Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, edited by Jeffrey Bloechl, contains work by some of the most important philosophers active in the field of contemporary continental philosophy in North America and Western Europe. Generally speaking, the collection is geared toward readers who are broadly versed in the continental traditions of phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneutics, deconstruction and, specifically, in Levinas studies. While the essays are well-suited for fostering scholarship in these fields on both sides of the Atlantic at both the professional and graduate level, the collection is most likely beyond the interest and reach of a wider audience that would likely include, among others, many Anglo-American philosophers, applied ethicists, and undergraduates. This is cause for both disappointment and joy. For, on the one hand, while the question of ethics in contemporary culture is indeed a pressing one that demands the kind of new and daring thought shown by both the philosophy of Levinas and the ideas of the authors collected here, the scholarship is carried on, generally speaking, in a hyperborean style that fails to show that it is willing to speak plainly to the ethical concerns of those outside of the continental tradition, let alone to those outside of the academy. On the other hand, if the collection is approached with an interest in current continental and, specifically, Levinasian scholarship, then the reader will find the essays to be an immensely rich and rewarding 'must read' contribution to contemporary discussions concerning the complex topography of philosophy, ethics and religion.

The collection opens with a short introduction by Bloechl, and is subsequently divided into two main parts (Part I, Relations with Others, and Part II, The Question of God), with six articles per part. In the Introduction, Bloechl suggests the motivation and design of the book, referring to the need

to present in English important trends and developments in Levinas scholarship. To Bloechl's credit, he has singlehandedly presented the field with a generous gift, since five of the translations (from the French and Dutch) are his own. But the collection also fosters a new phase in Levinas scholarship that is beginning to dominate the horizon. In brief, this new phase is one in which Levinas specialists have begun to move beyond the task of understanding and criticizing Levinas's historically rich, methodologically and conceptually complex phenomenologically-based philosophy to that of creatively transforming it in ways that bear their own signature. Thus, far from being a prolegomena to Levinas studies, this collection presents the attempts of some of the worthiest in the field to shine their philosophical flashlights into the dark corners of Levinas's philosophy in order to bring to light for their readers issues that push the envelope with reliable and well respected voices.

Part I, Relations with Others, assembles articles that loosely cohere around the meaning of the ethical *per se* in the philosophy of Levinas, which is located in what he calls the face to face relation between the embodied experiencing I and the other person. Didier Frank's 'The Body of Difference' engages Levinas's confrontation with Martin Heidegger's fundamental ontology in terms of how Levinas's interpretation, as it is found in his first major work, *Totality and Infinity* (1961), is prefigured in his work prior to its publication, and then Frank points to ways in which Levinas's readings are vulnerable to criticism. Paul Moyaert's 'The Phenomenology of Eros: A Reading of *Totality and Infinity*, IV.B' attempts to interpret Levinas's work on *eros* in terms of its significance for ethics. Rudolf Bernet's 'The Encounter with the Stranger: Two Interpretations of the Vulnerability of the Skin' presents the reader with a lucid and patient analysis of the ethical significance of skin that goes beyond the views presented on the topic by either Husserl or Levinas. Robert Barnasconi's 'The Alterity of the Stranger and the Experience of the Alien' investigates how Levinas responds to his critics (Derrida, Ricœur, Jacques) concerning the difference between the experience of otherness with regard to, respectively, the strange and the alien, and then shows how the concerns of Bernard Waldenfels on the topic have pushed the envelop to its furthest point yet. Michael Newman's 'Sensibility, Trauma, and the Trace: Levinas from Phenomenology to the Immemorial' traces the various strands of Levinas's notion of the face to face relation to what Newman argues lies immemorially yet indispensably at its heart: God. Bloechl's 'Ethics as First Philosophy and Religion' nicely rounds out Part One, Relations with Others, by considering Levinas's philosophy in terms of its relation with other ethical, philosophical, and religious traditions.

Part II, The Question of God, contains essays that engage the major gestures of Levinas's philosophy insofar as his work moves away from the philosophical project of phenomenological foundationalism, through a phenomenologically inspired description of a non-foundational notion of the ethical *per se*, and toward a post-phenomenological and post-foundational notion of religion that verges on, as one of the authors tenders by the end of

the book, sheer enigmaism, pluralism and materialism. Roger Burggraeve's essay, 'The Bible Gives to Thought: Levinas on the Possibility and Proper Nature of Biblical Thinking', nicely opens Part II by contextualizing the person and thought of Emmanuel Levinas, which allows the reader to see more clearly the historical roots of the spiritual resonances of Levinas's work. Adriaan Peperzak's 'The Significance of Levinas's Work for Christian Thought' explores the significance of Levinas's ethical critique of metaphysics for Christianity by attempting to appropriate a post-foundational and non-totalitarian mysticism. Merold Westphal's essay 'Commanded Love and Divine Transcendence in Levinas and Kierkegaard' is closely allied with the post-foundational intentions of Peperzak but approaches the project from out of its philosophical-religious roots in the thought of Augustine and Kierkegaard through an appropriation of the notion of the immemorial. The essay by Jean-Luc Marion seeks to show that an immemorial philosophy, which goes beyond foundationalism, must properly be understood to be religious, for it no longer moves within the framework of philosophical questions and answers but rather within that of religious appeal and response. Rudi Visker's essay 'The Price of Being Dispossessed: Levinas's God and Freud's Trauma' moves in an opposite direction, suggesting that if indeed what emerges in philosophy's wake is a post-foundational religion, it is a religion decentered beyond the point of recognition from its classical forms into a sheer pluralism and materialism. Part II closes fittingly with John Caputo's '*Adieu — sans Dieu*: Derrida and Levinas', a commentary on Derrida's eulogy to Levinas that suggests, in deference to both Derrida and Levinas, that Levinas's philosophy has not only philosophical, ethical and religious dimensions, but significant political ramifications as well.

James A. Snyder
Duquesne University

E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks

The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and his Successors.

New York: Columbia University Press 1998.

Pp. x + 342.

US\$31.00. ISBN 0-231-10430-8.

Shu-hsien Liu

Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming.

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers 1998.

Pp. xii + 273.

US\$69.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-313-30154-9);

US\$25.95 (paper: ISBN 0-275-96317-9).

The Original Analects is definitely not *the* original *Analects*. It is first of all but an English translation of the Chinese text commonly attributed to Confucius. The original Chinese text is not printed in this volume. Second, it is more than a straight translation. It is a complete reconstruction of the work as we know it, with the chapters and verses rearranged according to the translators' theory of what the 'original' *Analects* should look like.

As a translation this is certainly an outstanding work. The translators should be congratulated for their commitment to authenticity. This is one of the very few translations that successfully keep literally very close to the original Chinese language and yet maintain a considerable degree of readability. An obvious example of that commitment to authenticity is their treatment of the word *ren*. The Chinese word *ren*, representing for many people the core concept of Confucianism, has always been a nightmare for translators. It has been rendered in countless different ways, as authoritative conduct (Ames & Rosemont), benevolence (Lau, Cai), goodness (Waley), humanity (Huang), humaneness (Dawson), perfect virtue (Legge) and so on. Some translators have used a mixture of English expressions (Leys, Legge). The Brookses choose not to translate it at all. *Ren* is simply retained intact in its Chinese form (as '*rvn*' in their transliteration). The reason given is that 'its meaning changes within the text, and the original term can better take on these various nuances' (13).

Authenticity of course is not always a good thing for all people. To the specialist reader or a reader who knows the Chinese language, *ren* is a familiar word and getting on with the text would not be a problem at all. The general reader with no knowledge of Chinese, however, will have to struggle with the totally meaningless '*rvn*' for about the whole length of the work. Being told that the meaning 'changes within the text' is little help indeed. It is important to note that Confucius did not invent the word. Together with other words now regarded as central to Confucian thought, such as *li* (ritual), *xiao* (filial piety), for which the Brookses duly provide English equivalents, *ren* appears in the *Analects* as a word already in use in the language of

Confucius's time. As there is no indication that *ren* was a technical term and the other core terms have been duly translated, it is not easy to see why *ren* is being treated as a special case.

Another feature of this translation that may baffle the general reader is the Brookses' system of transliteration. Chinese characters are conventionally represented phonetically in English by either the Wade-Giles system or the Pinyin system, the latter being the official system in use in mainland China. Both systems are well-established and most translations of the *Analects* use either of these systems. The Brookses' translation breaks with this convention and introduces a 'more intuitively obvious' system of its own. Whatever the true merits of this system, it is questionable how intuitively obviously pronounceable are words spelled 'rvn', 'dz', 'lw' or 'dzu' to the general reader, particularly to those who are already accustomed to the other established systems. The use of a system of diacritics over the vowels also takes some familiarising.

The truly outstanding feature of this book is perhaps not its quality of translation. What is 'original' about *The Original Analects* is really the novel way in which the various parts of the ancient text are dated and re-arranged. The book, officially jointly authored by the Brookses, is said to be a product of the Warring States Project housed at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst since 1993. The Project is based on the long-term research of Bruce and Taeko Brooks into the dating and authenticity of the classical Chinese texts of the Warring States Period (5 BC to 3 BC). It is evident from the commentaries and appendices that considerable scholarship has gone into this translation of the *Analects*. Their dating method is basically textual. Linguistic characteristics such as choice of words, use of verbs, literary style, length and organisation of chapters, are identified, correlated and contrasted with those believed to be in use at various times in the warring states period and thereafter. Frequently the substance of the text is correlated also with contemporary events. The Brooks theory is that the *Analects* is not a single text but 'a series of texts of different dates, containing a few sayings that may go back to the historical Confucius, along with many others that were added in the next two centuries by his successors in what gradually became the Confucian school of Lu' (1). The so-called 'accretion theory' that the *Analects* text is a compilation of more than one text that had survived over time is not new. What is new is the claim that only a certain core of it, namely chapter 4, could be genuinely attributed to the historical Confucius. The rest of the text, according to the Brooks theory, although formally ascribed to Confucius, are but additions authored by later Confucians. This book of Confucius's sayings, in this view, thus becomes a 'history of early Confucianism'.

An example of how this method works may be seen in their treatment of the beginning sentences of chapter 1, 'The Master said, To learn and in due time rehearse it: is this not also pleasurable?' The Brookses date this at 294 BC, 185 years after chapter 4. They take this to be a reference to book learning by rote memorization and correlate it to the difficulties of the Confucian school at that time. The school had by that time lost court influence

permanently. The fifth head of the Kung Confucian school was allegedly in charge and shifted the emphasis of the school from a public service ethic to a 'citizen ethic' in a bid to salvage morale. The teachings of the school thus became increasingly formalised and rote learning of texts was indicated. Such a correlation is of course open to doubt. Does 'rehearse' (*xi*) bear the meaning of rote memorization? *Xi* (more often rendered as 'practice') may involve repetition, but not necessarily rote memorization. One must remember that the Confucian curriculum does not consist only of book learning, but also such other subjects as archery and music. One can easily understand how 'rehearsing' music or the art of archery can be pleasurable. It would be a little more difficult imaging the pleasure of rote memorization of texts.

Without going into a close examination of the merits of this theory, one could not help but to note that the working language of this project is English. There is nothing wrong with doing research in Chinese philosophy (or Greek philosophy) in English. But there is something odd about conducting the sort of textual or philological exercise on a Chinese text through the medium of such a radically different language. It should also be noted that although many may find the Brooks theory convincing, the Brookses themselves do not say that their dating is decisive. The general reader may wonder whether it is worth the entire reconstruction of a well-known and well-established text. The Brookses indeed could not ignore the conventional text order altogether. In spite of their own re-arrangement, they have kept the old numbering, so that the reader starts with chapter 4 and joins chapter 1 towards the end of the book. And for the convenience of those who want to refer to *the Analects* in its established form, the whole of chapters 1 to 4 are reprinted in their conventional sequence in an Appendix.

The general reader looking for a better understanding of Confucian thought may want to steer clear of all this scholarly confusion. A better approach might be to take initially an overall developmental view of the field before tackling the ancient texts. Liu's book *Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Ming* is certainly a suitable book for such an overview.

Shu-hsien Liu is a well-known scholar widely recognized as a representative of *contemporary* Neo-Confucianism, a loosely identified 'school' of Confucian scholarship associated with twentieth-century Chinese thinkers responding to the challenges presented by Western civilization. He has taught for many years at The Chinese University of Hong Kong and recently retired as Chair Professor of Chinese Philosophy. *Understanding Confucian Philosophy* is one of his lighter works. The book is a collection of new and old articles in English written over a period of twenty-five years. The writing style is non-technical and is reminiscent of Russell's *History of Western Philosophy*.

The general reader will find in the book a comprehensive introduction to Confucian thought and scholarship. Part I of the book consists of six chapters and covers classical Confucian philosophy. There is a chapter on the background and emergence of Confucian philosophy and another one on its

transformation since the Han Dynasty. There are separate chapters on Confucius, Mencius and the *Book of Changes*. Part II, consisting of another six chapters, is devoted to Sung-Ming Neo-Confucius Philosophy (post-tenth century AD). There is a chapter explaining the characteristics and contemporary relevance of this development of Confucianism under the influence and challenge of Buddhism and Neo-Taoism. Other chapters deal with prominent members of this school, notably Chu Hsi, Wang Yang-ming and Huang Tsung-hsi.

As Liu's affinity to contemporary Neo-Confucianism is apparent, one could not miss his openness and the breadth of his scope. This is not just a Chinese philosopher writing from a Chinese perspective. Liu was partly educated in the U.S.A. and is familiar with Western philosophy and sinology. In the chapter on Confucius, for example, parallels between the thoughts of Socrates and Confucius are noted. In the chapter on the *Book of Changes*, one finds references to A.C. Graham, Joseph Needham and Benjamin Schwartz, all well-known non-Chinese scholars of Chinese civilization and thought. In the chapter on Chu Hsi, one finds him discussing Thomas Metzger and Max Weber. Nor is this a book of the past. Liu makes extensive reference to contemporary research and writings by Chinese philosophers like Chi'en Mu, Mou Tsung-san, Chan Wing-tsit and Tu Wei-ming. Indeed this book could easily serve as a scholarly guide for further reading in Confucian philosophy. The only problem with using it as a reading guide is perhaps the absence of a table of Chinese names and publications. Mou Tsung-san's work, to which Liu makes extensive references, for example, is largely not available in English. A table setting out in Chinese characters all the concepts and terms used, Chinese proper names and a bibliography of Chinese publications would undoubtedly help further research by the interested reader.

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Hauke Brunkhorst

Adorno and Critical Theory.

Cardiff: University of Wales Press 1999.

Pp. vi + 194.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7083-1529-1);

US\$27.50 (paper: ISBN 0-7083-1528-3).

Despite its general sounding title, Hauke Brunkhorst's *Adorno and Critical Theory* is certainly not for the Adorno initiate nor the philosophy initiate. Rather than being an introduction to the work of the twentieth-century theorist, it is more a corrective to his thought, in two senses. The first corrective is to put Adorno forward as an important, original philosopher and not merely a critic, or pessimistic philosopher of history. The second is to mark Adorno's place within the tradition by distinguishing him from his philosophic origins and his contemporaries, particularly with respect to Heidegger.

Essentially, Brunkhorst's book is an invitation for the philosophical world to take (another) look at Adorno. It is less a critical treatment of Adorno's thought and more an addressing of Adorno's reception, particularly in the English speaking world, which has come, unfortunately, supposedly, as a result of judging his oeuvre from the point of view of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. So the critique Brunkhorst does offer is of *Dialectic*, which acts as the foundation for a discussion of the 'positive' or hopeful aspects of his later work and more developed thought. By shifting attention away from the overly interpreted philosophy of history to his aesthetic theory and the idea of experiential freedom, and showing these ideas to be distinct to Adorno, Brunkhorst is working to garner for Adorno a wider, and for him well-deserved audience.

The thesis that Adorno should be viewed as an original, pertinent and cautiously optimistic philosopher, critic of the subject and defender of the individual, who warrants our attention, is set out in the introduction with respect to Adorno being a philosopher of the non-identical. In the discussion of the non-identical and identity thinking, Brunkhorst distinguishes three different employments by Adorno. The first is conceptual, in that concepts do not fully grasp their objects, and for justice this gap demands 'second reflection'. The second is metaphysical, where there exists the possibility that all human knowledge is contingent, and third is of instrumental reason or that knowledge identified in the service of a subject who uses it to dominate. Although he admits that Adorno never offered this discernment, he argues that it is important for political reasons. Their separation permits the move away from total pessimism: 'Whereas identifying thinking in the first sense in unavoidable, it is avoidable in the second and third senses. To cancel identifying thinking as such (first sense) would mean to annihilate mankind ... But metaphysics and dominating forms of instrumental reason (the second and third senses of identifying thinking) are avoidable and therefore could

be objects of political and social change, be it revolutionary and reformatory' (4-5).

From here, *Adorno and Critical Theory* comprises four chapters and a brief conclusion. The first situates Adorno in terms of his intellectual biography, discussing his influences and relationships, and the oft-neglected importance of Kant, antinomies and the negative on his thought against that of Hegel and affirmative philosophy of history. With this he describes Adorno's fragmented totality: that modern society as a totality is not rational, and where it is rational it is not a totality, and that potential freedom is found in this fragmentation. In the subsequent three chapters, Brunkhorst follows the chronology of Adorno's work, looking at *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, *Negative Dialectics* and *Aesthetic Theory* respectively, seeing a development from his philosophy of history to aesthetic theory as a move from pessimism to methodological negativism.

Chapter Two is a discussion of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, not so much as Adorno's monumental or most well-known work, but as the work that has set the stage for Adorno's reception. Brunkhorst centres his attention upon Adorno and Horkheimer's famous and oft-treated diagnosis — that myth is already enlightenment and enlightenment returns to myth. By arguing in favour of the first claim, myth is enlightenment, and against the second, enlightenment is myth, he locates the source of pessimism. The latter claim should be taken for critique and not literally: 'Internal to the thesis that enlightenment returns as myth is a conservative bias of a philosophy of the history of decay. It is true only as a critique of instrumental rationality, not of modern reason as a whole' (8). Here we see the contrast of senses one and three of identity theory. Next he discusses and criticizes what has remained popular from Adorno's work and what has been forgotten.

In Chapter Three, Brunkhorst asserts that he 'will demonstrate that Adorno later [after *Dialectic*] left his path quite markedly.' This is a corrective in the sense that he outlines why, starting with *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno should be seen and read as an original thinker instead of his thought being overshadowed by or assimilated to others, particularly Heidegger. To accomplish this, he: 'trie[s] to position Adorno in a complex network of coalitions and oppositions within contemporary philosophical discourse' (8). Adorno's plus is thus etched out in a discussion of his similarities and differences not just with his 'arch rival' Heidegger, but also with other contemporaries who make up the post-analytical tradition from pragmatism to post-modernism.

Brunkhorst concentrates the last chapter on *Aesthetic Theory*, arguing that '[t]his is Adorno's unique contribution to the broad stream of post-metaphysical philosophy' (8). Away from the 'history of decay' and utopia, Adorno can be read as championing experimental understanding of freedom or authentic ways to experience contingencies of life, as opposed to rational control or domination. In doing so, '[t]he basic idea is to overcome and destroy each old and reified language of fixed meaning in order to find some new meaning, or to renew the original sense and force of the old metaphors and

vocabularies' (9), at the same time hoping rational identity will no longer be dominating. For Adorno, this possibility is prefigured in modern art.

For those readers wanting a nuanced, corrective treatment of Adorno's thought on the whole or specifically vis-à-vis the contemporary tradition and his contribution to it, this is a dense but excellent book. While *Adorno and Critical Theory* may not be highly critical of the philosopher outside of the scope previously discussed, its goal is to establish him on solid footing.

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Jacques Brunschwig and Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd, eds.

Greek Thought: A Guide to Classical Knowledge.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

2000. Pp. xv + 1024.

US\$49.95. ISBN 0-674-00261-X.

The Harvard Belknap Press has produced here a treat for readers with differing levels of classical interests and background. The colourful jacket and illustrations combine with the texts to make this an admirable gift for intellectually curious friends. This book represents a new blow against Anglo-centrism and self-isolation in ancient scholarship. The editors say they hope to 'symbolize the alliance between two major centres of research on the history of ancient thought, Cambridge and Paris' (xiv). They express a conviction 'that the differences between Anglo-Saxon and Latin worlds in traditions, methods in no way prevents contact, exchange, productive discussion The authors to whom we turned, British or American, Italian or French, have all contributed to the progress ... in the last several decades ... ' (xiv). Brunschwig and Lloyd originally published these essays in France in three languages (Flammarion, 1996). The Italian and French contributors are now translated into English by Catherine Porter's Cornell team to appear with the Anglophone essays, thanks to Harvard. Happily, the bibliographies show much attention to Germany.

Greek science and mathematics are covered as well as the major philosophers. Herodotus, Thucydides and Polybius are among the chosen historians, and essays appear on Plutarch and Xenophon. The breadth of the work justifies the title of *Greek Thought*. There are five major, well-fitting sections of this volume: Philosophy; Politics; The Pursuit of Knowledge; Major Figures; Currents of Thought. Entries vary in length from eight pages about

Antisthenes to thirty-one on Logic. Some pieces help the reader with their divisions by headings, some need a little more mapping. The smooth, intelligent translations preserve a continuous sense of accessibility. No footnotes clutter one's path.

The editors say of the whole book and the Greek spirit: 'Of foremost interest to us is the typically Hellenic aptitude for raising questions that are at once "second order" ... We look at the Greeks looking at themselves' (xi). This leads to the first essay's being 'The Philosopher' by Michael Frede of Göttingen, Princeton and now Oxford. Contemporary notions of philosophy make us easily 'overlook the fact that the ancient philosophers had a very different conception of their philosophical activity ... a philosopher would be somebody who, in what he does and how he lives, to an unusual degree is motivated by a concern for wisdom' (4). 'To be a philosopher is not something that, as a philosopher, one could pursue as a career, or as one of many interests' (5). But 'down to the end of the later part of the 5th century BCE there was not even a word for "philosopher" '. The resulting designation 'includes ... poets, statesmen and those we call philosophers. Wisdom is something that proves itself in a practical way' whatever the theoretical basis (6-7). Hence for later Christians a paradigmatic philosopher could easily be a monk concerned with ethics and spiritual flourishing. He concludes his piece: 'And it certainly would be a mistake to project our conception of philosophy as a rather academic enterprise of developing philosophical theories back on the ancients' (18).

Frede's challenging essay will also be of interest to those puzzled by laypersons' questions about what philosophy really is. But he seems to generalize from his life's company of classicists, historians and analysts, and to ignore what varied conceptions of philosophy and purpose the modern world does provide.

Some readers may browse in *Greek Thought* more for information, others more for balancing reminders and helpful reorganization of what they know already. David Furley comments on Democritus' materialism 'we must take it that there are infinite worlds ... The cause of creation and destruction is a "necessity" — that is to say it has to happen whenever it does [when random collisions of atoms] fall into appropriate patterns. There is (and this is crucial) no plan or design' (579). But Furley usefully reminds modern materialists of Democritus' profoundly ethical and political reflections, citing fragment 255 as what Havelock calls 'the most remarkable single utterance of a political theorist of Athens'. It runs: 'when those in power take it on themselves to be generous to the have-nots and to help them and to please them, then there is compassion and the growth of comradeship and mutual defence, and agreement among the citizens, and other good things beyond anyone's capacity to count' (583).

Furley, rather like Frede, pricks us to reflect on the relation between Democritus' ontology and his normative teachings. Julia Annas writes her 'Plato' with special grace, helping us to sort out wheat from chaff about Plato's and Socrates' lives and links, about the dating of dialogues and their clues

to Plato's philosophical evolution, about his problematic conclusions and lighter flights with questions (672 ff.). Pierre Pellegrin's 'Aristotle' reminds us of how to balance the Stagirite's blockage and inspiration of sciences: 'The theoretical frenzy provoked by the birth of physics in the seventeenth century did impose on Aristotelianism a theoretic purge of three centuries. The present era is auspicious for Aristotle's thought: many of today's scholars are rediscovering an Aristotelian inspiration at the foundations of their own theoretical enterprises' (574).

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A.J.M. Bundy, ed.

Selected Essays of Wilson Harris: The Unfinished Genesis of the Imagination.

New York: Routledge 2000. Pp. 256.

Cdn\$128.00: US\$85.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-19565-9);

Cdn\$37.99: US\$25.00

(paper: ISBN 0-415-19566-7).

One of the many benefits of the recent emergence of post-colonial theory in the humanities and social sciences is that a number of writers who previously had a smaller following can now hopefully be read by a wider audience. This is clearly the aim of A.J.M. Bundy, who has recently put together a collection of essays by Guyanese novelist Wilson Harris. Bundy's collection is an excellent text both for the beginner, and for those who are familiar with Harris and want to use him in their classrooms. As with many others in the field of post-colonial studies, Harris' work, while often associated with literature, has a broad appeal to anyone in the philosophical traditions investigating identity and human experience. In this regard, this work echoes and resonates with some of the work done in North America and the Caribbean on race and being by scholars such as Charles Mills, Sylvia Wynter, and Robert Bernasconi. In addition, it resonates with Caribbean philosophers and social scientists who have studied national liberation movements and the effects of colonization, such as Frantz Fanon, and more recently, David Scott.

While many of the essays have appeared elsewhere, the aim (and I might add, success) of the editor, was to offer the reader (both familiar and unfamiliar) a chance to have a number of essays handy in one volume. And, as Bundy states, the collection serves as a companion to the fiction, in order

that we may attain some insight into Harris' fictional imaginary. The essays span Harris' entire career, and as a result include some very current offerings. After reading the essays, it is clear that there is a lot to learn and benefit from by reading Harris' prose essays. In fact, in my case, they definitely have acted as a stimulant to read the fiction.

Harris, for those who don't know, is a prolific writer, having written over twenty novels from the period 1960 to the present. Throughout the collection, one of the things we are introduced to is the outstanding prose which has become synonymous with Harris and allowed him to be discussed in the same breath as novelists and poets such as Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Nuruddin Farah, Kamau Brathwaite and Derek Walcott. The collection offers a chance to witness a great writer at work. Harris' poetic capacity is, in a word, breathtaking. In that Harris writes his essays with the same imaginative demands as he places upon his fiction, its beauty is compelling. And his style, is, in effect, one of his most important intellectual weapons. For example, consider the opening essay of the volume, entitled 'The Music of Living Landscapes'. As if that title is not poesis enough for the reader, consider the following sentence, which, in many respects, sums up the author's intention (40): 'Is there a language akin to music threaded into the space and time which is prior to human discourse?' Harris' provocative question asks us to listen for other sounds, such as the *sound* of the landscape (earth, air, water, etc.) in order that it may tell us something valuable, which may have been forgotten within the context of a colonizing mindset, which alternatively denigrates or glorifies anything defined as natural.

This leading question reverberates throughout the book and allows him to explore in his central themes of memory, environment and imagination in various ways. Each concept is explored in radical and novel ways and many fruitful results emerge. For example, with respect to questions of race and identity, Harris is innovative in his approach to the first peoples of the Caribbean, whom he refers to as Amerindians. Harris' approach is different from most other writers from the Caribbean in that he is unwilling to simply write the world as African, Indian, and European. In fact, Harris' call to Caribbean writers is to imagine their worlds as much larger and more complex places. One of the ways to do so is to incorporate an understanding of the Amerindian legacy as one part in a process of the 'sleeping/awakening of the imagination' (171). Here, Harris can also be understood as suggesting that writing from the Caribbean and its diasporas must not be understood as a reflex action of Europe (in fact he says as much), but rather as existing as part of a world in its own right.

Harris continues this line of argument by demanding historians continue to do better by imagining a world and a historical time line which begins (and exists) far before the moments of European colonization and the beginning of slavery. Harris, in taking C.L.R. James and Elsa Goveia to task, suggests that: 'that there does not exist a philosophy of history in the Caribbean correlative to the arts of the imagination' (176). Harris' demand for the historian is the same one he places upon the writer, which is to suggest that

without imagination, their work is lamentably incomplete. In this vein, Harris offers a post-Manichean understanding of the division between arts and social sciences, which places him in conversation with Martinican writer/philosopher Edouard Glissant, specifically in his works *Poetics of Relation* and *Caribbean Discourse*. As such, Harris' criticism of James forces us to reconsider what some have argued is one of the most important aspects of James' work, which is James' representation of what Aldon Nielsen (1996: 176) calls the 'boomeranging instigation' of the Caribbean intellectual. Harris rejects boomeranging in favour of an approach which continues to resource the imagination and attempts to understand the Caribbean outside of the Europe-Other frame within which it is often understood. As such, his work parallels that of other writers who hail from the Caribbean, like Canada's Dionne Brand, who, when asked how it felt to be a minority writer, replied: 'I don't consider myself on any margin, on the margin of Canadian literature. I'm sitting right in the middle of Black literature, because that's who I read, that's who I respond to' (Dionne Brand, quoted in R. Walcott, 'De-celebrating Black Expressive Culture', in *Fuse*, Volume 22, Number 2, p. 12). In typical poetic style, Harris warns that an abandonment of this boomeranging philosophy is necessary, otherwise the Caribbean will 'continue to find (her)self embalmed in (her) deprivations — embalmed as derivative tool-making, fence-making animal. As such (her) dialectic will remain a frozen round of protest' (180).

Bundy's collection of essays is a fine one, and should be read by anyone considering questions of politics, aesthetics and their intersections. Bundy closes with one of Harris' most well-known essays, 'Unfinished Genesis of the Imagination'. This is an excellent choice with which to close, given that the notion of an unfinished genesis is clearly a stimulating oxymoron one is left with after having read the book.

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Joseph S. Catalano

Thinking Matter: Consciousness from Aristotle to Putnam and Sartre.

New York: Routledge 2000. Pp. vii + 224.

Cdn\$125.00: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-92664-5);

Cdn\$29.99: US\$19.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-92665-3).

I've often heard claims such as: 'There are really no such things as tables, since all there *really* is is collections of atoms.' This privileging of basic physics is an extreme metaphysical view that most of us reject; that being a table consists in being some particular collection of atoms does not thereby reduce the table to that collection. Nonetheless, when we want something explained we typically turn to science. What explains why Wheaties is the breakfast of champions is not that they are eaten for breakfast by large numbers of champions, but rather something about their nutritional value in making a strong healthy body (Fodor, *The Language of Thought*, 6-7). Joseph Catalano rejects privileging science in explanation and brings to light the consequences of consistently doing so. The position he develops, relational realism, is a non-reductive materialism that takes our bodies, the whole of our bodies, as determinants of objective properties in the world; there is colour in the world because there are fleshy eyes (2). Catalano's point is that quality does not reduce to quantity. Colours do not reduce to wavelengths of light, just as tables do not reduce to collections of atoms. Indeed, from the quantitative perspective colour disappears altogether. The difference between electromagnetic radiation having a frequency of 419nm and that having a frequency of 559nm is 140nm. The qualitative change from blue to red is lost.

Though Catalano does not privilege science, neither does he reject it. Science is a legitimate perspective from which we can view the world, it is simply not the only one, and thus its ontology cannot be taken as given (by nature). Whatever exists does so in relation to some perspective and in this respect no perspective is ontologically privileged. However, there is an important respect in which our common sense perspective is primary, if not privileged. Catalano's starting point is the human body with its particular senses. 'The givens of the senses both reveal and make the world' (62). Insofar as the world is revealed, the world is also given, but what it is given as, our common sense world of trees and stars and water depends on how matter is arranged in relation to our bodies.

One might wonder whether *human* bodies have a special role to play in world making. Catalano suggests that much world making need not involve human bodies. 'The existence on Earth of any organism is probably sufficient to establish an internal relation with matter that accounts for most of the universe as we see it' (105). In this case, human world making merely augments that of Earthly organisms in virtue of our theories, instruments,

and historical practices being part of our world making. 'Stars come into being through the way matter arranges itself in relation to our organic existence, and through the way the world is filtered by our scientific instruments and theories' (85). 'All that a relational realism implies ... [is] that what we call "things" are matter differentiated in relation to the human fleshy body and, of course, the practices that we establish through our bodies' (97). What results in our extra-world making is that of the indefinitely many relations into which matter can be arranged, it is those salient to us that are ontologized, and our instruments, theories, and practices extend what is salient beyond what is merely sensed. However, if Catalano is to be consistent, the existence of other organisms that can ontologize the universe is simply how matter presents itself to human bodies. Therefore, human bodies and practices must play a special role in world making, at least from our common sense point of view. That there is *this* world depends on the given of human bodies.

How then is it that the fleshy body is a given? Catalano claims that the dualism resulting from this assumption is harmless. 'While the distinction between the flesh of the body and the wood of a tree, for example, is itself a type of dualism, I claim that it is philosophically harmless insofar as it is a dualism that remains materialistic and basically returns to us our common-sense world and clarifies our relation to it' (40). Catalano's aim is to demystify the world by not allowing logical space for a thing-in-itself. 'I thus regard my holding on to the notion of essences as demystifying. Essences revealed to common sense are modest and earthy things; they are just the way that matter should be in relation to a fleshy organism. Indeed, demystification is an important part of my project' (9). The subtitle of the book, *Consciousness from Aristotle to Putnam and Sartre*, reflects Catalano's demystification project, which he sees beginning with Aristotle's rejection of a Platonic realm of Forms for a union of form and matter. Catalano sees his own view as very close to Putnam's internal realism but with considerably more ontological bite. Internal relations of matter are constitutive of existence. And not only existence, but possibility, as understood through Sartre's ontologizing of negation, is a function of matter's relation to our bodies. Thus the mystery of things-in-themselves is eliminated; there are no things-in-themselves; what is actual or possible is so in relation to us.

It is crucial to keep Catalano's demystification project in mind to understand the structure of this book, for it begins with an intuitive and very brief description of relational realism, with no arguments for the view, followed by detailed discussions of many twentieth-century analytic philosophers, including Quine, David Lewis, Kripke, Goodman, Dennett, and the Churchlands. Only at the end is relational realism developed. The reader can feel a bit at sea if the point of exposing the remaining mystery in the analytic tradition is not appreciated, but the book's structure is not conducive to gleaning this point on an initial reading. However, a more substantive flaw with Catalano's demystification project results from bridging the gap between us and the world by taking our bodies as given. Far from being

harmless, the dualism of world and body uses the body as a skyhook, for the body can be given only insofar as matter is related to the body; thus its being presupposes its own existence. Moreover, since 'we cannot simply make up perspectives on the human body and the world; some just don't seem to work' (196), the body being a self-realizer seems as mysterious as Aristotle's unmoved mover.

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Jules L. Coleman, ed.

Readings in the Philosophy of Law.
New York: Garland Publishing 1999.
Pp. v + 680.
US\$58.00. ISBN 0-8153-3718-3.

Mark Tebbit

Philosophy of Law: An Introduction.
New York: Routledge 2000. Pp. xi + 196.
Cdn\$98.00: US\$65.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-13524-9);
Cdn\$31.99: US\$20.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-13525-7).

The best thing that can be said about Mark Tebbit's introduction to philosophy of law is probably the most important. It is that the book is notable for its general lucidity. *Philosophy of Law: An Introduction* provides a methodical and carefully reasoned account of an increasingly important field of philosophy.

The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with the question at the heart of any introduction to the subject: what makes a moral or social prescription law? Tebbit adopts a historical tone in reviewing the natural law and legal positivist traditions, which provide a familiar framework for a general discussion of foundational questions. This discussion focuses on the difference between morality and law and explores the positivist concept of legal validity.

The same theme is carried over into the second part of the book, which deals, rather vaguely, with the 'reach' of the law. Here, Tebbit reviews the more recent discussion of legal authority, our obligation to obey the law, and rights. The focus is on the distinction between moral and legal rights. Tebbit provides an account of the Hart-Devlin debate and canvasses the traditional

concerns regarding the limits of state power. This raises a question for liberals: can the state legitimately enter into the arena of personal morality and regulate the private lives of individuals?

It is notable that Tebbit leaves out more recent literature in discussing these issues. The book gets as far as Ronald Dworkin, but that is about it. There is no discussion of critical legal studies, the work in sociology of law, or the feminist challenge to more traditional legal orthodoxies. In the preface, Tebbit argues that the contemporary literature requires a separate discussion, but the book implicitly questions its larger significance.

The third and last part of the book takes a more practical look at some of the moral and legal issues which arise in the prosecution and enforcement of the criminal law. Tebbit specifically addresses the question of criminal responsibility and the authority of the state to punish an offender. His account of the criminal law includes a discussion of the common law defence of insanity and the English notion of diminished responsibility. This part of the book will provide welcome relief for introductory students, who will find some of the theory in the earlier parts of the book hard going.

There is a good discussion of the intricacies which arise in proving the *mens rea* for murder. 'The facts in *Smith v. DPP* were essentially that a man trying to drive away in a car containing stolen goods caused the death of a police officer who was clinging to the door of the car.' (144) The question was whether the driver, who had merely panicked, could be convicted of murder. In *Hyam v. DPP*, a woman had started a fire in the letterbox of a house, with the intention of frightening her lover's fiancée. Was this sufficient to provide the intention needed to convict her of murdering the two children who died in the resulting fire?

The book has some limitations. From a student's perspective, even a senior student, it may seem dense and forbidding. The typeface is small and occasionally faint, and may increase the trepidation with which students approach the subject. There is a box at the end of each chapter with a general study question, followed by more specific questions. Some of these questions are *de rigueur*: 'Do you agree that there is a general duty to obey the law?' (94) 'What is a right?' (111) 'Can punishment be justified?' (183) Other questions are more technical and may prove difficult for students with no training in law or philosophy.

Tebbit also provides a bibliography, and 'suggestions for further reading' after each chapter. The suggestions may be more helpful for instructors than students, though students who want to explore major questions will find that much of the work has already been done for them. Although the book refers to three or four American decisions, it considers a relatively narrow set of cases, and there are differences, in Canada and elsewhere, which Tebbit fails to canvass.

Readings in the Philosophy of Law, edited by Jules Coleman, is more in keeping with the pedagogy in North America, which generally relies on collections of readings. The book is short on editorial comment and explanations, and the introduction is a single page. Still, it is enough to explain

Coleman's approach, which divides the philosophy of law into two areas of inquiry. The first area explores the foundations of various bodies of substantive law; the second examines instrumental concepts, like rights and duties, which explain the nature of our legal obligations.

Coleman divides these areas of inquiry into five fields of study. *Readings in the Philosophy of Law*, he writes, contains a collection of 'classic articles' in jurisprudence, rights, constitutional law and its interpretation, criminal law and private law. The last field considers the law of private property. There are many ways in which the field can be divided, but this certainly covers the major controversies.

Like anyone who edits this kind of collection, Coleman is obliged to include some of the standard readings in the field. On the other hand, he has tried to include a few pieces which have not received the recognition they deserve. The readings are generally by established authors, however, and contemporary rather than current. These include well known selections from H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz, among others.

There are three selections from Hart, and, since other readings respond to his work, he owns a rather large piece of the territory covered by the collection. The piece by Raz seems significant, in retrospect, primarily because it acknowledges that the exercise of institutional authority may be inherently illegitimate. One of the more interesting choices is Herbert Wechsler's piece on 'Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law', which provides a good example of legal writing. There is also a lucid essay by Jean Hampton on the justification of punishment as a form of 'moral education'.

On the physical side, *Readings in the Philosophy of Law* is essentially a set of offprints, with a second set of page numbers, a table of contents and a set of acknowledgments. This mode of presentation has its advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it allows students to cite originals and will probably give them some sense of discovery. On the other hand, the book has a perfunctory look and something is lost in such a casual format. The printing is uneven, with some blotches, and the typeface of 'The Tragedy of the Commons' is so reduced that a reader may need assistance in reading it.

If one wanted to develop a critical test for reviewing textbooks, it would probably be whether the reviewer would be willing to use the book in the classroom. This introduces a subjective element into any evaluation and forces reviewers to express their own views. So I should confess that I use much the same approach as Tebbit and share his misgivings with respect to the recent literature.

Having entered that qualification, I can only recommend *Philosophy of Law: An Introduction*, which provides an admirable introduction to the area. It is true that there are few books to compare it with, since most of the textbooks in the area are collections of readings. This is regrettable in my view, since students have a great deal of difficulty with the differences in style and subject which one finds in most collections of readings.

Readings in the Philosophy of Law does not pass the same test. Although the editor has chosen a few unusual readings, including a somewhat dubious

contribution by himself, there is no obvious reason why one would recommend this book over the standard texts in the area. There is enough in the book to generate a stimulating discussion of some of the outstanding issues in the area, particularly among upper level students. But that is a collateral purpose, and a little like bringing in someone to discuss the foundations of a house, after someone else has laid the footings.

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Chris J. Cuomo and Kim Q. Hall, eds.

Whiteness: Feminist Philosophical Reflections.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1999.

Pp. 141.

US\$58.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-9294-9);

US\$18.00 (paper: ISBN 0-3476-9295-7).

Since anti-racist activists and intellectuals first 'discovered' the social construction of race, university teachers have been struggling to denaturalize race in the classroom. Despite a burgeoning body of theoretical work which explores the historical, social, and political aspects of the construction of races, students haven't stopped experiencing their racial identities as given, biological, and unquestionable. With white students especially, the idea that race is socially constructed often meets a defensive rather than thoughtful response. Chris Cuomo and Kim Hall's *Whiteness: Feminist Philosophical Reflections*, is a new classroom resource, in the honorable tradition of feminist consciousness raising, that can help students enter the discussion of the social construction of race through the accessible language of personal narrative.

Their work is a contribution to the emerging sub-genre of 'white studies', a field of investigation that takes the social construction of 'whiteness' as its object. Having learned from scholars of color that whiteness is more like something someone made up than like a real biological fact, critical white studies scholars have developed a variety of approaches to their field of inquiry. Some of these approaches seem to reduce 'whiteness' to just another (and equal) identity among identities, obscuring the connection between social, economic, and political power and race. Other approaches seem to unproblematically recenter whiteness, obscuring barely emerging voices of scholars of color. The editors of this project distance themselves from these approaches, and their scholarly contribution is in their effort to carve out an

anti-racist political space in which personal narratives of whiteness are a link to political commitment and action rather than an evasion of them.

The editors place their compact volume of ten essays in the context of an urgent anti-racist politics. Citing incidents of hate violence, and the depoliticization of 'ethnic studies' into a kind of pastiche of identities, they hope their work 'connects investigations of lived racial categories to the elimination of white supremacy' (3). The personal narratives are meant to be a way into this larger project, rather than an exercise in mere confessionalism. 'What we are after here is neither a melting pot nor an apolitical pastiche of interesting identities but a feminist, postcolonial, multicultural engagement with lived racial reality' (4).

Though I think the book will be most useful as a classroom resource, some of these 'philosophical reflections' raise and critically address notions about whiteness that are key to an emerging body of critical race theory. How much is 'white' an identity that we are assigned by the state, and how much is it a kind of habituation to privilege that we are raised with? What are the many varieties of whiteness and how is globalization homogenizing these? Is it meaningful to think of white people as 'privileged', or does this designation undermine an anti-racist politics? What is the impact on communities of color when some members pass as white? How much is racial identity something we can claim and how much is it something we're stuck with? Is race primarily a performative category, as many claim gender to be? All of these questions deserve careful scholarly attention, and the reflections on these questions in *Whiteness* will be an important resource for scholars who pursue them.

The narratives cover a remarkably broad range of the lived realities of whiteness. Several are written by women of color who are often mistaken for white, or whose light skin was valued by darker skinned family members, or whose family members passed as white (Linda Lopez McAlister, Linda M. Pierce, Judy Scales Trent). Other essays explore the experiences of those who are 'unproblematically' white, but understand whiteness to be a problem that demands serious personal and philosophical attention (Kim Q. Hall, Amy Edgington, Chris J. Cuomo). A particularly poignant contribution is a dialogue between Bat-Ami Bar On (an Israeli Jew) and Lisa Tessman (an American Jew) on a trip to Israel, where the centrality of the 'black-white binary' is itself destabilized — their dialogue leads them to an important distinction between the 'habits of whiteness' and white privilege. One essay engages specifically with questions of classroom pedagogy (Laurie Fuller). Alison Bailey, a white university professor, grapples with the dilemma of white privilege, which 'is both impossible to dispose of ... and impossible to take advantage of ... without perpetuating the systems of domination we wish to demolish' (86), and reframes the question as one of resources rather than mere privilege. Naomi Zack, departing from the personal narrative format, takes a critical look at the notions of 'race traitors', 'white privilege', 'white guilt', and 'white racial identity', which have been central to the burgeoning concern with 'whiteness'.

The book is organized thematically in three parts. The first, entitled 'Glancing Backward', is a place for personal childhood narratives, and provides examples of the kind of personal and familial memories that, when recuperated, can be the starting point for consciousness raising. The second, 'Performing Whiteness', gives an introduction to the postmodern notion of performativity as well as raising questions about the social nature and relative intransigence of racial identity. In the third section, 'Identity and Privilege', all of the authors grapple with the notion of white privilege.

What haunts this book (and this is explicitly acknowledged by the editors in their introduction) is what haunts the history of feminist method in general. Personal narrative or consciousness raising, has been a fundamental and necessary part of the feminist movement. The bedrock individualism and narcissism of American culture, however, has tended to push a focus on the personal over into a kind of 'confessional trope' (3), where baring one's soul substitutes for politics. The editors and many of the authors are at pains to distance themselves from this kind of navel-gazing, but the impact of the book will be the responsibility of its readers and those who use it in the classroom.

Whether this book inspires a kind of hyperpersonalized confessionalism, or 'feminist philosophical reflection' that leads to political engagement, will depend in large part on the astute teacher or scholar problematizing the U.S. American tendency toward confessionalism itself. *Whiteness* can serve as a very effective springboard for critical engagement, not only with the social construction of race, but with the political efficacy of the feminist method of consciousness raising. Questions arise about the material and historical conditions, the contexts and situations, in which consciousness raising is both inspired by and inspires active resistance to established power. Equally, questions will be raised about the conditions and contexts in which 'consciousness raising' turns into an individualized and depoliticized hyperpersonal process, where the only thing at stake is oneself. *Whiteness* will be a model, for students, of a kind of consciousness raising that is overtly struggling with the tendency to confess and feel better. At the same time their own consciousness raising experience, provoked by the narratives in the book, will engage them directly in the tension between personal reflection and political engagement.

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Don Dedrick

Naming the Rainbow: Colour Language, Colour Science, and Culture.

Dordrecht: Kluwer 1998. Pp. x + 215.

US\$97.00. ISBN 0-7923-5239-4.

If the so-called 'science wars' are futile shouting-matches between extremists, some of the more bewildering skirmishes have been contested in the realm of colour science and culture. Ethnographers, postmodernists, and Wittgensteinians stress the specificity of local colour-naming strategies, or the peculiarity of objects and emotions with which colours are associated, and may confess lingering attraction to Whorf's idea that cultures carve up an intrinsically unstructured colour space into quite arbitrary linguistic categories. Self-proclaimedly hard-headed biological and evolutionary psychologists, in contrast, argue that the pan-human physiology of colour perception determines our colour categorization, and constrains whatever minimal linguistic variability there is. Don Dedrick's wonderful study in the philosophy of cognitive science offers not only a careful survey of the relevant evidence in this stand-off, but also a persuasive set of tools for thinking the issues through quite differently, and for avoiding the dichotomous terms in which the debates have previously been couched. The book should be essential reading for colour scientists, and for philosophers interested in links between cognition and culture; and it offers useful advanced introductions to detailed technical literatures in psychophysics, colour linguistics, and cognitive anthropology.

Dedrick argues for a genuinely cognitive view of colour categorization. Both the universalists and the cultural relativists, he complains, deny any interesting autonomous role to cognition, seeing it as 'merely a conduit for biology, or for culture', so that what goes on in the mind is entirely determined by either subpersonal or social goings-on. Dedrick builds his own positive account of 'a general cognitive strategy for the construction of relatively stable reference classes in the chromatic domain' on top of an impressively detailed exposition and critique of 'the universalist tradition in colour naming research'. The first half of the book describes the historical, experimental, and conceptual development of this tradition since Berlin and Kay's landmark *Basic Color Terms* (1969). Dedrick offers us a primer on the relevant consensus in psychophysics (the opponent colours theory) and in the pre-cortical neurophysiology of colour vision. In each case, his selective treatment is motivated by the clear aim of seeking as sympathetic as possible an account of how an idealized version of the bold universalist hypothesis is meant to hang together.

Berlin and Kay argued, against the assumption of limitless cultural variability in colour categorization, that in fact different languages use a very limited number of 'basic colour terms', originally taken to be a maximum of eleven. Although different speakers of a language draw the boundaries of each colour category differently, they tend to agree on the 'best example' or

'focal point' of the category named by each basic term. Dedrick stresses the crucial importance of the next step in the retreat from relativism. Focal colours are still linguistically embedded, in that they are chosen relative to the basic terms of a language: a substantive universalism requires evidence for the non-linguistic salience of certain colours. This was provided by Eleanor Rosch's work with the Dani, who have just two basic colour terms. Rosch showed that certain colour categories, those which happened to have a 'focal' colour in a central location, could be more easily remembered than others, even without the existence of a word for those categories. The salience of such colour 'prototypes' thus transcends language. These results set the agenda for the universalist tradition in trying to map a remarkable set of regularities, both linguistic and psychological, onto the regularities being sought in psychophysics and physiology.

Dedrick brings a sophisticated, if largely implicit, philosophy of science to his narrative of colour science. He urges us to see the thirty years of universalist work since 1969 as a practical and dauntingly difficult research program, with internal divisions, crises, and anomalies large and small, rather than as monolithic imperialism. Though he isn't engaged in sociology of science, Dedrick's pragmatic take on theory-development does suggest how important would be a careful treatment of the intellectual and social context of those involved in the setting up and development of the impending 'world color survey'. It would also be useful to hear more on Dedrick's picture of the relation of colour science to cognitive science as a whole. In an excellent recent textbook, Stephen Palmer suggests that 'certain aspects of color perception are among the best-understood topics in vision science, perhaps in all of cognitive science', and takes colour to exemplify the power of the uniquely interdisciplinary method of cognitive science, because 'important pieces of the color puzzle have come from physics, psychology, physiology, computer science, linguistics, genetics, and anthropology'. Is colour in some way a more tractable domain than others in cognitive science, such as memory, emotion, or dreaming? Is it that at least the internal processes of colour vision are more invariant across individuals than those involved in other cognitive capacities? Is it that the data gathered by the marvellous tradition of anthropological enquiry into colour naming, back to W.H.R. Rivers and beyond, make it easier to formulate hypotheses about culture and cognition? Philosophers of cognitive science such as Barbara von Eckardt, Valerie Hardcastle, and Patricia Kitcher have begun to construct a general framework for understanding the developing or immature state of the interdisciplinary enterprise, and Dedrick's expert understanding of the history of colour science would equip him well to contribute to that project.

Dedrick makes it clear that the most optimistic reductive dreams of the universalists cannot be satisfied. Of most philosophical interest is his succinct critique of overhasty level-jumping. The Berlin/Kay tradition hoped to derive the semantic structures of colour categories direct from the neural response functions of cells in the lateral geniculate nucleus: but Dedrick argues both that there are many failures of fit even between psychophysics

and the 'gigantic tangle' of colour neurophysiology, and that there is no need to think of a simple and single hierarchy of levels, since many of the most interesting colour phenomena straddle disciplines and domains. He gives short shrift to the Berlin/Kay notion that there's a fixed developmental ordering of colour category stages, with more technologically complex cultures exhibiting a more advanced, fuller set of basic terms. Dedrick productively replaces teleological talk of the 'evolutionary' sequence of colour categories with inquiry instead into how weak or strong are the epigenetic constraints on the cultural expression of psychological regularities in colour naming practices.

The book's specific positive contribution is to offer a new, detailed, and persuasive account (in terms of relative similarities or isomorphisms) of the problem of 'composite' colour categories, for which no satisfactory universalist explanation has been offered. Here Dedrick draws inspired guidance from Bernard Harrison's neglected 1973 philosophical classic *Form and Content* (if your library, like mine, is trying to 'cull' all titles which haven't been borrowed for 10 years, you might want to think about going in search of this book right now). He argues that colour categories are constructed, rather than natural, nameables: non-linguistic perceptual saliencies interact with social practices in the difficult social process of abstracting out from colour samples to construct colour categories. This picture explains why there is less arbitrariness in colour categorization than the relativists thought, but also why there is more arbitrariness than was allowed in any universalist quest for exceptionless cross-cultural generalizations. There is a space between the genuine perceptual constraints on colour vision and the cultural exigencies which drive specific naming strategies. So the danger of any reduction of ethnography to neurophysiology is chimerical; while the alternative view that culture does just about everything is itself too reductive (Dedrick is harsh on particular relativist critics of universalism who fail to understand the restricted scope of universalist claims). It is interesting sociologically that not all those who have reached the requisite level of expert immersion in the multiple relevant fields and methods have automatically thus achieved a more balanced perspective on the big theoretical issues here: in fact, Dedrick's apparent preference for Popperian over Kuhnian philosophy of science might be questioned by pointing to the normalizing role of universalist assumptions in interpreting messy evidence.

It is definitely helpful thus to reject the idea that the culture-biology interface in colour science must be resolved in favour of one or the other. Dedrick is sympathetic to the methodological motivations of anthropological critics, while maintaining resolutely that there's room both for third-person and cross-cultural investigation, and for unique sociohistorical narratives of particular naming practices. He needs perhaps to give us some more specific examples of the kind of cultural exigencies which might usefully feature in cashing out the notion of epigenetic constraints if he wants us to buy his interdisciplinary dreams. The peaceful coexistence of neurophysiology and ethnography is far from their creative interaction. Many even more difficult

questions remain: to take just one example, are there any intercultural patterns in the spread and nature of intracultural individual differences in colour categorization? By spotlighting the irreducible role of cognitive processes between biology and culture, this brilliant synthesis and critique of the universalist tradition offers a genuine starting-point, as Dedrick hopes, for all future 'serious inquiry into the relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of colour classification'.

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Tom Digby, ed.

Men Doing Feminism.

New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. xiv + 359.

Cdn\$133.00: US\$80.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91625-9);

Cdn\$31.99: US\$23.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-91626-7).

Larry May

Masculinity and Morality.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1998.

Pp. x + 181.

US\$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3418-1);

US\$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8442-1).

It is difficult to jointly review two such different books. May's *Masculinity and Morality*, is a (primarily) single-authored text with a central thesis organizing the chapters, while Digby's *Men Doing Feminism* is an edited volume with each author contributing to a broadly conceived theme. May's book is fundamentally concerned with discourses and standards of morality in America as they impact and are influenced by male socialization, while Digby's text tackles the broader question of whether and how it is legitimate to claim that men can be feminists and/or produce feminist work.

Both texts contribute to a growing body of literature on gender that deals explicitly with the gendering of men, resisting the assumption that questions about gender are related exclusively to women and women's lives. More specifically, each text looks intently at men, masculinity and the role of socialization in the lives of men and women, with the implicit goal of developing a progressive male standpoint. Both make some valuable contributions not just to these discussions on masculinity, but also to broader

discussions; Larry May's text especially contributes to ethical theories of collective responsibility.

Several chapters in *Masculinity and Morality* have been previously published. Two of the essays are co-written and were previously published elsewhere: 'Sexuality and Confession' with James Bohman and 'Rape and Collective Responsibility' with Robert Strikwerda. Other chapters include: 'Anger, Desire and Moral Responsibility', 'Paternity and Commitment', 'Pornography and Pollution', 'Sexual Harassment and Solidarity', 'Socialization and Separatism', and 'A Progressive Male Standpoint'. Though explicitly about ethics, one can see that each chapter addresses a different aspect of male socialization in terms of its harmfulness to women and men as groups. In that sense, this book is equally a social commentary. May considers relevant work by feminists, psychologists, and social theorists in discussing the effects of this privilege on both women and men. Peppered with personal accounts, the book is clearly written and extremely readable.

In the first chapter, and throughout the text, May argues against examining violent male behavior by conventional appeals to anger, testosterone, and uncontrollable sexuality. In the second chapter he argues against the prevailing legal view of the rights of unwed fathers where rights generally follow from biological connection. He argues that paternity must be based on positive, nurturing behaviors, not the fact of procreation.

Perhaps the most fascinating chapter is 'Sexuality and Confession', where he argues 'the widespread practice of confessing about sexuality in the Catholic Church ... helps to legitimate coercively aggressive sexuality' (42). The discussion of confession very subtly addresses the way in which this institution both circumscribes permissible sexual behaviors and permits uncircumscribed sexuality.

In the chapter on pornography as group-based harm, May articulates a more compelling line of argument than much of the feminist work on pornography that he cites. While it does not alone cause harmful male behaviors, May makes a useful analogy to pollution, where pornography is part of the pollution contributing to a certain cultural permissiveness with male sexuality that is harmful to the establishment of healthy heterosexual relationships. What is most useful about this chapter is the way in which May gives a cautious reading of pornography that does not condemn it nor understand it as completely harmless. He strikes this same balance again in chapter 5 when he discusses rape and collective responsibility.

This sensitivity to the balance between individuals and groups, local control and systemic problems makes May's work both compelling and useful. In the chapter on harassment, May clearly lays out the way in which harassment works in two directions, both to separate women from the work environment and to initiate solidarity among men.

In all cases the onus for change is on men as individuals and as a group. This is refreshingly different from many writings on masculinity where the impetus for change seems to originate necessarily with women (compare

May's discussions of anger, uncontrollable male sexuality and rape with Richard Wrangham's discussion of the same in *Male Demons*).

There is a strong sense of shared responsibility in May's book. Men as a group share the responsibility of examining the sexism inherent in male socialization. This progressive male standpoint is grounded in taking responsibility but without emphasizing the guilt that has tended to go hand in hand with an anti-sexist male standpoint, which is discussed by Brod in the Digby collection. In the last chapter, May focuses on what the development of such a standpoint might mean and what social and moral significance that might have. This is reprinted as the last chapter in *Men Doing Feminism*.

Digby's *Men Doing Feminism*, another installment in Routledge's *Thinking Gender* series, opens with a foreword by Sandra Bartky. She writes that, though feminism did not speak to men directly, the many books by 'gender traitors', such as this one, attest to the fact that they have received the messages of Second Wave feminists. As a result she is hopeful. These essays rightly inspire such a sentiment. Being written by men and women, straights and gays, transsexuals, and people of different ethnic and racial backgrounds, these essays represent varied responses to the question of men doing feminism. Though less progressive than I had anticipated, this is a collection of essays by today's key writers on masculinity, which makes it an extremely valuable collection.

In the introduction to the text, Digby gives an account of the variety of responses he tends to receive upon his self-identification as feminist. This discussion nicely sets up the problematic for the collection. The book palpably reveals all the deep anxieties both men and women have about who can do feminism, especially, to what extent non-females can be feminists. The positive aspect of this is that the authors in this volume get out on the table all the anxieties about feminism and manhood while directly avoiding the most facile articulations that we often get, such as the assumptions that only women can be feminists or that in order to do feminism men must stop being men.

The collection is divided into two parts. The first, 'Feminist Theory from Men's Lives', contains essays by Susan Bordo, Patrick D. Hopkins, Michael S. Kimmel, Brian Pronger, Richard Schmitt, C. Jacob Hale, Thomas E. Wartenberg, and Michael Awkward which are astute examinations of personal experiences with feminism in men's lives. The second, 'Feminist Theory in Men's Lives', contains essays by Sandra Harding, Harry Brod, David J. Kahane, Joy James, Judith Kegan Gardiner, Gary Lemos, James P. Sterba, Henry S. Rubin, Lawrence Mordekhai Thomas, and Larry May. This half of the book delves into the heart of the relationship of men to their engagement with feminist theorizing.

These essays attempt to get clear about what is at stake for men in thinking about gender, in being or not being feminist, and what is at stake for women in men being or not being feminist. The difficulty I had with the volume as a whole is in part this very preoccupation. There is clearly a concern with whether or not men can truly be feminists, hence the frequent

use of the term 'pro-feminist men'. This preoccupation generally leads to an avoidance of discussing the problematic nature of the very categories 'women' and 'men' themselves.

The question of who the subject of feminism is or can be is a tricky one, which is taken on directly by Harding and by Brod. It seems to be without question that being a woman is not sufficient for one to assume the label feminist, but it is not so clear what is necessary; is being a woman necessary to being feminist? If so, then locutions such as 'pro-feminist' to label men might be more appropriate. James acknowledges her own tendency to biologize feminism, revealing honestly the angst of second wave feminists. But it is not just a worry over biology. Digby claims that the continuing dominance of men as a group over women as a group justifies the continued oppositionality of the gender binary (2). Brod and Harding, however, seem less troubled by the label feminist being applied to men.

The first three essays are an excellent introduction to the complicated nuances of men who are, are not and are almost feminists. Bordo's piece shares very personal experiences of a second wave feminist making a breakthrough with her eighty-year-old father. Hopkins and Kimmel take on the question of whether feminism is something that both men and women can do. Kimmel's conclusion that men consider themselves the Gentleman's Auxiliary of Feminism (67) is not very satisfactory in part because he never really sufficiently answers the question of why femaleness would be necessary to be able to claim to be a feminist. He does make valid points regarding the role of men who support feminism in teaching other men about feminism, however. These lines of thought are both supported and challenged in Hopkins' very thoughtful piece on how feminism has shaped his thinking.

Kahane's piece on male feminism being an oxymoron carries a more unsettling presumption regarding who can do feminism, though he has highlighted what I take to be troubling many of the authors in this collection. He rightly points out that for men to understand patterns of oppression is much more difficult because 'they have likely experienced [them] as positive and deserved' (222). It is from this that many of the authors suggest that women have a more unhindered access to feminist knowledge. How is an aspiring male feminist to negotiate this? Kahane admonishes the male feminist to live responsibly. It is on this point where the book ceases to provide insights and where one must turn back to May's text for answers.

Despite the sometimes problematic assumption of a categorical male standpoint, there are many rich insights throughout, insights which I would be delighted to see permeating curricula. For example, Wartenberg has a wonderful discussion of his change in attitude toward canonical texts (137) especially in relation to the context of relations of power, which he addresses in the epilogue to his piece. Jacob Hale's transgender piece most effectively muddies these waters since he explicitly attempts to dislodge the stability of the gender categories on which the collection is based. His piece is a highly sensitive examination of the question of voice and, more specifically, it is the most challenging to the book's project as a whole.

Men Doing Feminism has palpable angst, yet includes important insights into what it will have to mean for men to be feminists. There is a clear sense throughout that it can only strengthen feminism's claims if it includes male voices and the multiple positions which follow. But this, in all cases, demands the kind of positive affirmation of maleness that Brod's article calls for.

It seems inevitable that there is a certain amount of male consciousness-raising and call for taking responsibility in both texts. Masculinity studies is still in its early stages in comparison to feminism and women's studies. This confessional mode, as May points out, was characteristic of the early second wave feminist movement. The essays in both *Masculinity and Morality* and *Men Doing Feminism* do this in a more sophisticated way than we have yet seen. Both texts would be accessible and appropriate for introductory gender studies courses while maintaining the scholar's attention.

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Richard M. Gale
The Divided Self of William James.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.
Pp. x + 364.
US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521642-69-8.

Richard Gale is known for his writings on philosophy of religion and philosophy of time, but here he has indulged in a topic of long-standing interest, the philosophical writings of William James. His enthusiasm for James's writings is profound, but ultimately Gale finds James's work a tragic legacy, as in Gale's view Jamesian philosophy is incoherent, the result of a deep conflict suffered by its creator.

The Divided Self of William James is a detailed examination of James's entire body of work, and Gale explores the fundamental inconsistency therein by dividing his study into two parts. The first attempts a reconstruction of the Promethean Pragmatist (or James the optimistic constructor of systems), while the second, more briefly, recaps the thoughts of the Anti-Promethean Mystical James. While the former is the epitome of nineteenth-century American progressivism and enthusiasm, the latter is the echo of Yankee transcendentalism, Whitmanesque nature-love, and the Swedenborgian mysticism of James's own father, Henry James, Sr. These cultural influences are familiar to readers of James, and that may explain why they are more or less absent from Gale's account. Biographical material in general is also hard

to find herein, though Gale does draw frequently from extant sources. He may be forgiven for this lacuna given his stated intent to examine the philosophical system of James: Gale's accomplishment herein is a detailed 'stress testing' of Jamesian pragmatism, psychology, metaphysics, etc., taken as a package deal. The journey through the dual Jamesian selves behind him, Gale concludes his volume with a short essay on 'Dewey's Naturalization of James' which chronicles Dewey's appropriation of James's legacy. Gale seeks to correct the view of a naturalistic James that stands in opposition to his own study of the writings. This essay also appears in *The Cambridge Companion to William James*.

The Promethean section at eight chapters is by far the longest portion of the book, and here Gale reconstructs James's pluralistic (for Gale read: relativistic) metaphysical picture. He begins by examining what he calls the 'master syllogism' of James's philosophy (25). The argument takes as premises the claims (both well-argued by Gale) that we have a primary obligation to maximize our own desire satisfaction, and that belief is a form of action. The conclusion is a way of subsuming James's epistemology and metaphysics under this utilitarian rubric. If Gale's premises are taken (by James, or by us) to be true, then it seems one has a strong obligation to believe whatever leads to a maximal satisfaction of desires. From here Gale moves on to a detailed analysis of the implications of this conclusion, including chapters on the ethical and semantic dimensions of James's pragmatism. These are among the most useful sections of the book, as Gale's analysis is comprehensive, if not terribly charitable. Indeed, readers of James might well be shocked by Gale's characterization of James as a rather ruthless utilitarian, but his thorough scrutiny of James's collected works warrants taking Gale's views seriously.

After Gale's master syllogism is defended, he develops a sketch of James's 'Poo-bah-ism'. James, like that ingenuously shifting character in the *Mikado*, is alleged to conquer philosophical quandaries by changing hats. Gale thus portrays the Promethean James as a master relativizer, always giving a thumbs-up to a position and dodging inconsistencies by qualifying each answer via a form of perspectivism.

The crux of Gale's criticism of James — which subtly accompanies the exposition of the Promethean side of James — is that this philosophy is unlivable. To adhere to James's pluralism is to live a schizophrenic style of life (Gale uses this term frequently, e.g., 14, 198, 326). The mystical James is in some sense a response to this unsatisfactory result, though here Gale shows some confusion, as he claims both characters existed side by side throughout James's life, while also arguing that later James saw a turn away from Prometheanism toward mysticism (198).

The four chapters that comprise the mystical response to Gale's Promethean James include an analysis of the latter's view of personal identity and the self, and explore the shortcomings of James's metaphysical monism, his world of 'pure experience' as well as his writings on mysticism and paranormal psychology. Here James is seen through a lens of Buber and

Sartre, as Gale hopes the 'I-Thou' relation of the former and the *en-soi / pour-soi* distinction of the latter can help us make sense of James's comments in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* and *A Pluralistic Universe*. Here Gale explores many possible interpretations, including resolutions of dilemmas that would seem to harmonize with James's overall intent. Ultimately Gale admits defeat in this attempt, as he sees the mystical James as suffering from a craving for intimacy with the details of the world that runs up against a familiar failure of mysticism: ineffability. Thus the twin personalities of James each have their shortcomings, and Gale's exegesis leaves us with a picture of James as manifesting two selves that are not only incompatible, but individually undesirable as well.

The appendix on Dewey, while included here to support Gale's case for a decidedly unscientific James, is on its own a useful bit of philosophical history. Gale nicely chronicles Dewey's co-opting of James into his own philosophical project, and restores the balance to James by countering Dewey's selection of specific texts, and his questionable interpretation thereof. Gale suggests Dewey concentrated excessively on *The Principles of Psychology*, at the expense of understanding many of the comments therein in their wider metaphysical context. Gale's point is that Dewey's philosophy is 'naturalistic all the way on down' while Gale takes James's to be 'spooky all the way on up' (351), and thus Dewey's appropriation of the latter's ideas involves some fairly willful misinterpretation of important aspects of James's philosophy. Chief among those aspects was freedom of the will. Since Gale throughout his book sees belief in free will as incompatible with naturalism regarding the mind (Gale briefly argues that free will necessarily violates the Law of Conservation of Angular Momentum), it follows that James's voluntarism brands him as ultimately anti-naturalistic. This dubious argument aside, Gale's examination of Dewey's reading of James is well worth reading, and the same can be said for his book as a whole.

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Jill Gordon

Turning Toward Philosophy.

University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State

University Press 1999. Pp. x + 182.

US\$32.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01925-5);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01926-3).

The main thesis of *Turning Toward Philosophy* is that we can be attracted toward philosophy and self-examination through literary elements. Gordon persuades us that the power of Plato's dialogues, having many literary elements, is not to be found in the rational alone. By extension, her aim is to show us that the essence of philosophy in general is not exhausted by rational argument.

Gordon believes that the bifurcation of philosophy and literature arises out of the analytical conception of philosophy. By trying to blur the traditional distinction between philosophy and literature, Gordon challenges a view of philosophy in which the analytical perspective is of primary importance. In her project, isolating arguments and looking for consistency are placed second to trying to account for philosophy in a broader context. Regarding the broader context, her main question is how can philosophy affect one personally or how is philosophy more than a rational exercise.

In the dialogues, she shows us, Plato uses not only the persuasion of argument, but the persuasion of literature to turn us toward the life of philosophy. Plato creates meaningful texts that are not intended to merely present his philosophical view. The plots, character developments, irony and images are used to show the process of engaging in philosophy rather than to present a clear philosophical system. Gordon persuades us that a conception of philosophy that concentrates on consistency and a lack of ambiguity does not describe the full complexity and richness of the dialogues and she asks would Plato have written the dialogues in this way, had his intention been merely to convey his philosophical thought?

A convincing case is made that Plato used literary devices such as character development in order to involve the reader in more than just a cerebral and rational way. One of the ways in which she illumines this idea is by using the contemporary reader-response theory of Wolfgang Iser to examine what occurs when a person reads. This presents an interesting modern response to the dialogues. She asks the question how can the literary elements of the dialogues further the purpose of philosophy and shows that Plato's written works guide and provoke the reader to philosophical activity. Part of the success of including literary or dramatic elements in the dialogues comes from the fact that the literary elements do not directly provide answers, but rather induce an awareness of a possible philosophical process which can be emulated. Through this means, it is possible to arrive at an answer with one's own effort. In other words, the lack of a conclusive answer is more philosophically stimulating than an answer plainly presented.

There are many problems and questions that arise from Gordon's engaging work. Gordon says that one's conception of the literary need not exclude the philosophical or vice versa. Many would argue, however, that allowing the analytical concept of philosophy to be mixed with the literary is to lose clear distinctions and forceful arguments that are precisely what is valuable about philosophy. From this point of view, it would be asserted that blurring the distinction between philosophy and literature only serves to weaken philosophy.

Another question that arises is why are literary and dramatic devices more likely to have us examine ourselves and our beliefs, than Plato's philosophical thought more plainly presented? Gordon does make convincing suggestions about how the literary elements engage us and why Plato used them as he did, but the power of the literary to accomplish this remains elusive. Perhaps this is just another sign that once one travels into literary territory, argument and definition lose importance.

Gordon suggests at several points in her book that the literary appeals directly to the emotions and it is this side of ourselves that is important in the act of engaging with philosophy. Although Gordon argues plausibly that literary elements achieve these ends, there are no knock-down arguments that they do what she believes they do. An argument that could be mounted against Gordon's approach is similar to the one that Frege makes about metaphors, i.e., that metaphorical expression is the arbitrary and dispensable vehicle, while the thought expressed by the metaphor could as easily have been couched in literal terms. So too, had Plato decided against the inclusion of dramatic and literary elements, he might have achieved similar ends without these means. What argument can be offered that the dramatic and literary are the only or even the best means available to Plato to 'turn us toward philosophy?' Couldn't the arguments in themselves be a drawing force? She admits that it is possible that we can be turned toward philosophy by argument alone, but that it is unlikely that arguments would have the same compelling force that the dialogues complete with literary elements do have.

The assumption in Gordon's work is that literature is more universally appealing and literature makes the arguments of philosophy more engaging and accessible. Some, of course, would argue that literary elements are only a distraction from the essence of the dialogues. Gordon does discuss how the literary may be a distraction, but she does not speak at length about how literary elements may divert us from rather than turn us toward philosophy. This is because her argument is that literary elements in conjunction with philosophical arguments serve to draw us on to greater philosophical effort.

Anyone who wants to understand the dialogues from a perspective other than the purely analytical perspective will find this book useful. Insofar as philosophy is shown to be more than rational manipulation and is shown to have a claim on emotional and personal life, this work furthers a feminist perspective. For those interested in the question of Plato's relationship to poetry, this book contains convincing arguments that Plato was aware of the

deceptions and distractions of literature, but he was also aware of the power that literature can exert over a reader. This work presents an interesting use of contemporary literary theory for philosophical purposes. *Turning Toward Philosophy* is also a significant contribution to the debate on the relationship between philosophy and literature.

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Michael Halberstam

Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1999.

Pp. x + 290.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-300-07180-9.

Liberalism and totalitarianism appear antithetical in modern political thought, each the alleged 'nightmare' of the other. But relationships between the two have been noted often. Hobbes, a founder of liberalism, required absolutism to guarantee liberty. Some political theorists have interpreted totalitarianism as a pathological condition to which modern liberal democracy is distinctively susceptible. Herbert Marcuse (1934) argued liberalism and fascism were both ideologies serving different stages of capitalism. Others have maintained we must study liberalism and totalitarianism together to understand them.

Halberstam's book initially advances this unobjectionable thesis, but a larger agenda looms. 'The thesis of this book is that the idea of totalitarianism is intricately related to the self-understanding of liberalism and the Enlightenment conception of emancipation from which liberalism has emerged as its major representative in the twentieth century. The idea of totalitarianism, as I hope to show, harbors within itself fundamental problems inherent in the modern Enlightenment tradition and, by implication, in the liberal idea of politics' (5). The Enlightenment gave us the modern project of emancipation but also, for Halberstam, totalitarianism. The 'idea' of totalitarianism contests liberalism's conception of political community and of the individual. Limitations of liberalism should be exposed by studying the 'idea' of totalitarianism not as liberalism views it — the sheer antithesis of liberalism — but rather as an outgrowth of modernity, following Hannah Arendt's critique of modernity.

Halberstam's book joins a contemporary chorus of diverse anti-liberalisms, his to save totalitarianism from being viewed solely through a liberal lens. Totalitarianism is the unacknowledged sibling of liberalism (analogy

mine), each orphans of the Enlightenment, rescue from which lies not in the politics of modernity, but in an ontological-aesthetic perspective deriving from Arendt and Heidegger. To *show* this philosophically would be a formidable task for a book of any length.

Most readers cannot find sympathy for the 'misunderstood' idea of totalitarianism — as neglected, misrepresented sibling of the more favored liberalism. Some anti-modernists and anti-liberals will be uncomfortable with Halberstam's critique of liberalism and modernism, filing a brief on behalf of totalitarianism, only to plead that custody for both wayward children of modernity be awarded to Arendtian-Heideggerian modes of thought. Readers familiar with ancient and modern political theory will find the prescribed remedy questionable — to employ the 'idea' of totalitarianism to hold up a mirror to liberalism in order to correct its self-deception, and to enlist Arendt to redeem liberalism. Liberalism failed us by overemphasizing the freedom and autonomy of the individual, uprooting us from our concrete culture and its 'world of shared meanings', thereby severing us from the traditional questions and interests of political philosophy. Totalitarianism promised to restore 'shared meanings' by acknowledging we live in a concrete world and a 'public space', in Arendtian idiom. Totalitarianism proved to be terror and deception (Arendt's much disputed account), offering no salvation for liberalism. But can Arendt's idiosyncratic thought liberate us from liberalism?

The longest (42-page) chapter, 'The Indeterminacy of Kant's Rational Reason', targets the weak philosophical heart of liberalism. Kant is implicated in the emancipatory project of the Enlightenment by having freed the human subject, epistemologically and ethically, from subordination to the given. Kant's (and liberalism's) subject is a center of rational autonomy whose self-activity organizes and orders the given phenomena to yield scientific knowledge, and this same autonomy makes it possible to *think* (but not *know*) of ourselves as ethical subjects. Kant's Copernican Revolution foregoes grounding knowledge and ethics in the empirical concrete world in order to recover that world as object of science and sphere of possible ethical action.

For Halberstam this signifies that Kant's philosophy is ultimately ungrounded, and, insofar as a Kantian perspective *was* constitutive of Rawlsian liberalism, liberalism is ungrounded. Kant maintained it necessary to deny reason to make room for faith, but because we cannot know things in themselves, nor ourselves (we can *think* ourselves free, rational, autonomous subjects), Halberstam attaches the 'loss of world' label to Kant. The totalitarian 'idea' exploits this 'world alienation' and the rift between representation and reality by providing a comprehensive world-view saturated with its own 'shared meanings'. The vulnerability of Kant's epistemology and ethics to effective criticism (the phenomenal/noumenal distinction infects both) has been recognized since Hegel. Accordingly, Rawlsian liberalism sidestepped Kantian metaphysics (and lately moral philosophy). Halberstam asserts liberalism is not thereby immunized against the totalitarian idea's threat. Instead, following Arendt, the pursuit of the idea of reflective judgment in the *Third Critique* can transcend the Kantian limits on reason in the

First and Second Critiques. This strategy, although unsanctioned by Kant, promises to improve upon liberalism.

Claimed deficiencies of liberalism are traced to Kant, but Kant is to be redeemed by wresting his notions of reflective judgment and a non-rational faculty of taste from his aesthetic theory, supplanting the liberal conception of the individual and society. In *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought* (270-1), Margaret Canovan criticized this 'highly selective, not to say perverse' interpretation of Kant: 'In her [Arendt's] lectures she purports to find in the *Critique of Judgment* Kant's "unwritten political philosophy", airily dismissing his more obviously political writings ' Halberstam mentions (141) only Canovan's milder criticism that Arendt 'did not make great efforts to communicate her ideas.' Because his appropriation of Arendtian criticism and use of Kant is central, Halberstam should explain why Canovan's criticism may be ignored. Those interested in a distinctive critique of liberalism witness instead a displacement of the political by the aesthetic, because Arendt modeled politics upon theater. 'Arendt conceives of the public sphere by analogy to the theater, which depends for its essence both on the actors and on the spectators' (142). Arendt's analogy explains her chosen expression for the political realm as 'the space of appearances', but neither analogy nor expression has escaped severe criticism.

What impairs this book, more than a flawed discussion of liberalism or taking license with Kant, is an unseemly philosophical detachment. Halberstam limits himself to observing affinities and influences (Arendt's preferred mode of political thinking), citing and quoting those with whom he takes issue or agrees without critical assessment.

The extensive (66-page) *Notes* section cites relevant literature, but Halberstam's failure to draw appropriate implications suggests perfunctory acquaintance. He cites Stephen Holmes' *Anatomy of Antiliberalism* (59; 231-2, notes 1-3), ignoring how Holmes' analysis undercuts his attempted critique of liberalism. He notes affinities between Arendt's view and fascist conceptions of the social order: 'In fact, the historical connection between the aesthetic approach and totalitarianism is rather uncomfortably close' (218, note 35; also 258, note 16), but leaves this bemused flirtation with fascism hanging. He admits repeatedly that Arendt's work has been heavily and widely criticized, but declines to engage her critics philosophically. He quotes Isaiah Berlin: 'She produces no arguments, no evidence of serious philosophical or historical thought. It is all a stream of metaphysical associations' (270, note 26). Yet Halberstam's confidence that Arendtian thought should supersede liberalism remains undiminished. Postmodernists reject many Enlightenment fruits, including liberalism. If liberalism collapses, is replaced, or transcended, Halberstam has not shown the road past liberalism passes through Arendtian-Heideggerian woods.

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R.J. Hollingdale

Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy.

Revised Edition.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1999.

Pp. xii + 270.

US\$27.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-64091-1);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00295-8).

Wolfgang Müller-Lauter

*Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions
and the Contradictions of His Philosophy.*

Trans. David J. Parent.

Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1999.

Pp. xviii + 247.

US\$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-252-02452-4);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-252-06758-4).

Few have done more to advance Nietzsche studies during the past thirty years than R.J. Hollingdale and Wolfgang Müller-Lauter. Translator of nine of Nietzsche's books and author of two monographs on Nietzsche's life and philosophy, Hollingdale has significantly shaped how English-speaking readers encounter Nietzsche's philosophy and the language in which it is conceived. Co-founding editor of *Nietzsche-Studien* and contributing editor to the Colli-Montinari edition of Nietzsche's works, Müller-Lauter has authored numerous books and articles that have become essential reading for every serious student of Nietzsche's philosophy, particularly his conception of will to power. Müller-Lauter's first book on Nietzsche critically engaged Heidegger's massive study, which emphasized Nietzsche's esoteric philosophy and offered an interpretation of will to power as the metaphysical doctrine organizing all of his work. The paths charted by Hollingdale and Müller-Lauter continue to serve as reliable guides for contemporary scholarship, and so it is fitting that the end of the twentieth century saw publication of revised and newly translated editions of their works.

The most striking aspect of the revised edition of Hollingdale's *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* is that thirty-five years after its initial publication it seems remarkably current. Despite the vast production of Nietzsche literature during the intervening years, Hollingdale's book is not a dated retracing of well-worn avenues of interpretation. Focused as an intellectual biography on 'the man', as indicated in the priority in the subtitle, Hollingdale writes clearly with a deep appreciation of not only Nietzsche's philosophy but also the relationship between Nietzsche's life and his works and how he came to the ideas that manifest in his writing. Hollingdale revised his text in minor ways throughout, wrote a new preface to the work, updated the bibliography, and appended a postscript of previously published material that situates the book in light of developments in Nietzsche scholarship since its original publication. Every library should have a copy. Those seeking a

clear and wide-reaching introduction to Nietzsche would do well to read the book. And undergraduate students striving to deepen their appreciation of major concerns in Nietzsche's work and to acquire a more subtle understanding of the enigmatic figure of Nietzsche would benefit greatly from Hollingdale's work.

Even Nietzsche specialists have reasons to take notice of the republication of Hollingdale's *Nietzsche*. His treatment of Nietzsche's views of Christianity and Wagner, and his discussion of the role of the appropriate uses of the *Nachlass*, although no longer novel, are still prevalent concerns in contemporary scholarship. Hollingdale's elaboration of Nietzsche's biography does not have the aim of looking to the biography to *explain* Nietzsche's philosophy. In fact, he does much to fight that temptation, one to which some nevertheless subsequently succumbed. Of special note is his account of Nietzsche's critique of Wagner, Wagnerism, and the 'problem' of which Wagner was emblematic. Those in search of an insightful and concise account of the latter need look no further than pages 209-16 for one of the best brief treatments of this aspect of Nietzsche's work. Similarly, Hollingdale takes extra care in disentangling Nietzsche's critique of Christianity from the all-too-convenient biography of Nietzsche's religious heritage.

In his final chapter Hollingdale offers an account of the death of Nietzsche that charts the passing of the human being and the birth of the Nietzsche figure who was the champion of the Reich and the patron of fascism. As is well known, Nietzsche's sister Elizabeth played the most important role in this process, orchestrating the editorial process for Nietzsche's literary remains, at times forging his correspondence, and facilitating interpretations of his work that were in direct conflict with what were obviously Nietzsche's own intentions. Hollingdale draws on German- and Italian-language biographies and periodical literature to provide an account of how Nietzsche's literary remains came to be organized. Particularly problematic for Nietzsche scholars is the fact that notes Nietzsche had discarded and had specifically requested to be destroyed were incorporated indiscriminately by Elizabeth in the enormous body of unpublished material Nietzsche left behind. This fact complexifies the dispute about the propriety of use of materials from Nietzsche's *Nachlass*, a debate that continues today. Hollingdale's own stance on the matter is quite clear: he advises extreme caution when drawing on materials from the *Nachlass* and that 'anything in the nachlass of the 1880's that cannot be paralleled in the published work is not valid as a statement of his considered view' (260). Such an approach stands in sharp contrast with the position taken by Heidegger, whose Nietzsche is constructed chiefly on *inferences* drawn from ideas expressed in the *Nachlass*. The evidence for the centrality of the will to power as the metaphysical idea driving all of Nietzsche's work cannot be sustained in the published writings of Nietzsche, and it was appearance to the contrary that Müller-Lauter set about to counter-balance.

Müller-Lauter's *Nietzsche* was first published in 1971. The new English translation includes two additional essays (Chapters 8 and 9), originally

published later and therefore not included in the German edition. The added material increases the size of the main text by more than thirty percent. Müller-Lauter freely draws from the *Nachlass* in building his interpretation of Nietzsche's conception(s) of will to power, but unlike Heidegger, Müller-Lauter aims to build his reading 'mov[ing] completely within the horizon of Nietzsche's philosophy' (123). By that he means moving completely within the horizon of the philosophy Nietzsche *actually wrote* and not the unsaid that was the basis of Heidegger's account. Although Müller-Lauter's practice appears to be at odds with Hollingdale's advice, their approaches are similar in other respects. In particular, both Hollingdale and Müller-Lauter see conflict and struggle at the core of Nietzsche's philosophy. Hollingdale reads that interest in published writings and publicly shared materials — such as one of the prefaces to unwritten books, 'Homer's Contest', which was presented to Cosima Wagner and circulated to others — while Müller-Lauter reads it in the idea of will to power, which he claims cannot be appreciated by consulting solely Nietzsche's published writings.

Müller-Lauter carefully scrutinizes Nietzsche's texts to resolve apparent contradictions, articulate Nietzsche's interest in contradiction, and illuminate opposing views that cannot be reconciled. Müller-Lauter's book should interest Nietzsche scholars not only for its extensive interpretation of one of Nietzsche's most problematic ideas — will to power — but also for its documentation of debates in German-language scholarship. This feature is particularly prominent in the added essay, 'Nietzsche's "Doctrine" of Will to Power' (Chapter 8), which alone is well worth the price of the book. It draws heavily on the arguments elaborated in the earlier material and meets subsequent criticisms, particularly those of Weischedel and Köster, and it engages previous Nietzsche scholarship, particularly the interpretations of Heidegger, Schlechta, Löwith, and Jaspers.

Of special note is Müller-Lauter's discussion of will to power as it relates to truth. Chapter Five, 'The Will to Truth and the Will to Power', draws helpful distinctions between truth as accordance with the perspectival character of will to power and paralyzing relativism in which no truth has any possible priority (esp. 67ff). Müller-Lauter characterizes 'new truth', conceived by Nietzsche, as 'assent to the concrete change of perspectives that serves the expansion of power' (71). Throughout his book, Müller-Lauter tackles some of the thorniest problems in reading Nietzsche. For example, he meets head-on the question of self-reference with regard to Nietzsche's views on perspectivism. As Müller-Lauter puts it, 'to what extent can Nietzsche claim that his interpretation of interpretive reality accurately capture [sic] its interpretive character?' (155) In other words, is Nietzsche's will to power absolutized as other doctrines found in the dogmatic philosophies Nietzsche criticizes? A partial answer offered by Müller-Lauter is that, 'The interpretation of the world as "will to power" would [...] under self-critical examination of this interpretation, be only a *fiction*. Yet in terms of Nietzsche's own truth-criterion [as that which enhances power] it would still be *truth*' (156). Later still in the same chapter, Müller-Lauter argues for the

distinction between holding a thesis with conviction and absolutizing it, claiming that Nietzsche does the former and hence 'does not exclude there being other interpretations that have not entered into human reality' (159). Emphasizing that interpretative reality is not something performed by something or someone, Müller-Lauter highlights how Nietzsche conceives of interpretation not as something we *do* but rather what we *are*. And it is *as* interpreting beings that we manifest will to power, not as metaphysical subjects or as beings participating in some sort of fundamental event. Will to power, read in this way, figures human beings as 'continually changing organization[s] of power-wills, which are internally organized power-wills' (160). In contrast with the boot-strapping existential-humanist Nietzsche, Müller-Lauter's Nietzsche understands human beings not as self-constituting power mongers but as power complexes that are ultimately not fully comprehensible and certainly not fully malleable: 'Man is so complex an organization of power that he can no longer find out what motivates him "deep down". He is interpretation, but he is interpreted. He is will to power, but — as "will of man" — a powerless will to power as regards his self-constitution (cf. *D[aybreak]* 120)' (160). Whether or not one finds his Nietzsche satisfactory, one must admit that Müller-Lauter significantly advances discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism, how it relates to and stems from his conception of will to power, and how other ideas such as the overman and the eternal return are related.

Also noteworthy is Müller-Lauter's discussion of the influence of contemporary scientific theory for Nietzsche. In particular, he discusses in careful detail when Nietzsche encountered Wilhelm Roux's 'experimental and causal-morphological research in evolution' (Chapter 9). This material is without doubt required reading for anyone interested in Nietzsche's reception of Darwin. The book should also prove useful to those investigating what is meant by 'will' and 'drive' in Nietzsche's work.

Translation of Müller-Lauter's *Nietzsche* was unquestionably a massive undertaking. Translator David J. Parent, who died suddenly just prior to the book's publication, rendered a text that is extraordinarily helpful for English-language readers, including coordination of existing translations not only of Nietzsche's works but also of those cited in Müller-Lauter's copious endnotes (which consume some sixty pages). Included among the notes are some provided by the translator, which interestingly engage how Müller-Lauter's insights bear on some English translations of Nietzsche's works. The only possible improvement to the book that would make it more useful to Nietzsche scholars is an index (a name-only index does appear in the German original). Both books are important documents in the history of Nietzsche scholarship. These new editions and translations should help them continue to make vital contributions to our understanding of Nietzsche and his relevance for contemporary philosophy.

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Anne Jaap Jacobson, ed.

Feminist Interpretations of David Hume.

University Park: Pennsylvania State

University Press 2000. Pp. xi + 323.

US\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01971-9);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01972-7).

In this latest addition to the Re-reading the Canon series (a series of collections each devoted to feminist interpretations of a single philosopher), we are offered thirteen essays on Hume's philosophy, covering his views on metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, religion, aesthetics politics, and history. They address all of his main works and many of his less discussed essays. This diverse collection is bound together by the theme of feminism, but how this theme works itself in varies considerably from essay to essay. There are, broadly, four different ways that feminism enters into the interpretations.

First, there are essays which show how current feminist theory can benefit from some Humean insights; they argue that if we read (or re-read) Hume in a particular way, we can address concerns or problems that feminist theorists face. Christine Swanton's 'Compassion as a virtue in Hume' is an example of this kind of feminist reading. Swanton looks carefully at Hume's discussion of compassion, sympathy and benevolence, and convincingly argues that his view has much in common with an ethics of care and can help diffuse the objection that such an ethics is overly demanding, causing individuals to be lost in the pain of others.

Second, there are essays which show how feminist theory can help Hume; they argue that he could escape some of his contradictions if he were to adopt some insights from feminist theory. This view is expressed, for example, in Jennifer A. Herdt's 'Superstition and the Timid Sex', the only essay on religion. Herdt offers a novel and well-argued interpretation, suggesting that in Hume's comment that the 'weak and timid sex is responsible for leading men into superstition', we can find the seeds of a feminist analysis and critique of the ways in which religion reinforces the socialization of women into prescribed sex roles (283). Hume's thought is in tension on this matter; he thought the socialization both necessary and dangerous, but, if we focus only on what he says about the danger, Herdt shows how a feminist critique can be gleaned from his writings.

Third, there are those essays that focus on the misogynistic aspects of Hume's philosophy, pointing out the limits of any feminist-friendly reading of Hume. These are the least interesting type and do not offer much of philosophical value. For example in 'The Metaphorics of Hume's Gendered Scepticism', Aaron A. Smuts argues that, for Hume, imagination and nature are both feminine. They seduce and deceive the male philosopher so that he cannot help but maintain beliefs that lack any rational foundation. The notion that, for Hume, nature is a 'bad woman' does not seem consistent with all the gratefulness he has for nature saving him from his skeptical moods.

Last, there are a number of essays which recognize concerns that are common to both Hume and feminists, and argue that Hume is a philosopher whose views are of particular importance to feminist thought. Many of the strongest essays are of this type. For example the first three essays, which are all concerned with Book One of the *Treatise*, argue that Hume's view of knowledge, reason and his conception of philosophy should be of particular interest to feminist philosophers. In 'Hume: The Reflective Women's Epistemologist?', Annette Baier points out that Hume recognizes, as do many feminists, that 'norms — including norms for knowledge acquisition — are social in their genesis as well as in their intended scope' (30). Hume's epistemology, she says, is 'fallibilist and cooperative' (31). In 'Hume on the Passion of Truth', Genevieve Lloyd explores Hume's version of the 'wholeness' of mind, where passions, imagination and intellect are unified instead of polarized as they are in more traditional masculine philosophy. In 'Reconceptualizing Reasoning and Writing the Philosophical Canon: The Case of David Hume', Anne Jaap Jacobson argues that, like many feminist philosophers, Hume questions the traditional ideal of philosophy which strives to conceive of concepts in a purely rational manner.

A number of the conclusions of these three essays are correct. Hume does think both passions and reason are essential components of humans; reason does not get exalted as it does among many (though not all) of Hume's predecessors. But we also find overstatements and overemphases in these essays. For example, Jacobson is right that Hume questioned the value of trying to find final answers to philosophical questions, but when she claims that Hume 'explicitly rejects the goal of arriving at consistent answers to the questions addressed' (61), she goes too far. Even though Hume does not claim his way of solving a problem is the last word on the matter, he did hope that his theories 'might stand the test of the most critical examination' (*Treatise* I.iv.7.14). So he still aimed for consistency and harmony in his philosophical theories.

Two of the most interesting essays are on Hume's moral philosophy, but in each feminism seems to enter in as an after-thought; one can imagine them standing on their own with the feminist parts subtracted. Joyce L. Jenkins and Rob Shaver's 'Mr. Hobbes Could Have Said No More' is a well-argued piece focusing on a troubling passage in Hume's second *Enquiry* where he says that, if there were a species of creatures intermingled with men who were greatly inferior in both mind and body, 'we should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures', but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them.

Jenkins and Shaver suggest that Hume's recommendation of humanity over justice is justified on broadly utilitarian grounds, that humanity would better serve the inferior party. The necessarily general and inflexible nature of justice could stand in the way of what would best serve these people. The superior could help the inferior more, they argue, if they could make use of the flexibility of humanity. It is hard to see what is the feminist part of this

interpretation. It comes in the second section which suggests that with a few insights from Mill, Hume need not see women as inferior creatures.

Jacqueline Taylor's 'Hume and the Reality of Value' is a careful discussion about Hume's metaethics, and rightfully criticizes those who view Hume as a non-cognitivist, pointing out that Hume's view is much more complex and more integrative, with moral features and sentiments as reciprocal and mutually guiding concepts (116). But it is unclear what work feminism is doing in Taylor's piece. Christopher Williams' 'False Delicacy', which focuses on Hume's essay 'Of the Standard of Taste', is an insightful discussion of aesthetic appreciation where again the feminism seems inessential.

What is best in this collection is that it focuses attention on some of the often neglected aspects of Hume's philosophy. Given that feminists are concerned with exposing and investigating what is overlooked, this uncovering may be what is most centrally feminist about the book. It also succeeds, as Jacobson urges in her introduction, in encouraging readers to ask more questions, to continue the discussion and to find new and creative ways of reading Hume.

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T.K. Johansen
Aristotle on the Sense-Organs.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xvi + 304.
US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521-58338-1.

Despite its unassuming title, this book offers more than just an examination of Aristotle's teachings on the five senses. It is a contribution to the long-running controversy over Aristotle's theory of perception, in defense of Myles Burnyeat's interpretation, according to which there is no material process that underlies or realizes perceiving; perception is instead an exclusively formal change in material organs. Johansen claims that his examination is neutral on this question, but that such neutrality in fact supports Burnyeat in the end (14). But Johansen is being coy: on several key exegetical points, as we shall see, it is plain where his allegiances lie.

Johansen thoroughly surveys the evidence for sight, hearing, the contact senses, and smell, along with a chapter on the medium of vision and a concluding chapter on the nature of perceptual change in general. There is wonderful detail here about the variations in animals such as the crocodile,

the elephant, and mollusks, as well as finer points of physiology such as 'nose-covers'; and there is an excellent and innovative discussion of the difference between odors and flavors. But the overall picture is fairly straightforward. On Aristotle's account, the sense organs (qua sense organs) are simple in structure, composed of a single homoeomerous material, usually an element; and this is determined through hypothetical necessity by the function of each organ, namely, to receive sensible qualities along a given range. This framework is fundamentally inhospitable, Johansen argues, to a contemporary functionalist perspective, which takes mental events to be realized in certain material processes. Aristotle makes no mention of mechanisms or 'moving parts' that could realize the change.

But such evidence hardly precludes material change in general, especially one where a sensible quality comes to be literally instantiated in the matter of the organ. At most it would furnish an argument from silence. Sometimes Johansen hedges accordingly: for example, given his theoretical predilections, Aristotle 'has *no incentive*' to describe the matter further; or, even if a material change occurs, it is '*not in terms of such an affection that vision is explained*'; or, perception is '*not necessarily*' constituted by a material change (41, 93, 106-7, 115, 253). But at critical junctures, Johansen favors a much stronger position, that such changes are *excluded* by Aristotle (11-12, 126, 136, 270, 282), which is what Burnyeat's interpretation in fact requires.

It is not clear what is supposed to justify this stronger claim. In *DA* II 5, Aristotle distinguishes between simple alteration and the exercise of a capacity, and characterizes perception as a realization. But this does not show that alteration does not occur. When I distinguish between color and shape and characterize square as a shape, I do not thereby exclude there being colored squares. Aristotle's own example is that of a builder building (417b9). Johansen argues that in exercising his capacity, the builder 'cannot really be said to change by doing so, for he is not acquiring any new attributes' (269). But clearly the builder cannot exercise this capacity seated with arms folded: exercising his building capacity is not only *compatible* with changes like hammering and sawing; he exercises this capacity precisely *by* effecting such changes. To distinguish exercising a capacity from altering, therefore, does not preclude the latter.

There is evidence, moreover, to suggest that Aristotle recognizes both types of change in perception. At *GA* 779b34-780a8, the eye is said to be affected by visible objects 'qua moist and qua transparent.' To his credit, Johansen acknowledges the challenge this text poses to Burnyeat's interpretation. But in order to bring them in line, he is forced to construe the 'and' as 'or rather', resulting in the gloss, 'the change of this part qua transparent *but not* qua liquid' (106), inverting its obvious sense: 'x and y' has become 'not x but y'. Such a reading is far from 'neutral'. Indeed, it is clear that the argument against Burnyeat's view could practically rest on this text alone.

It is entirely reasonable to acknowledge that Aristotle prefers teleological explanations in terms of hypothetical necessity wherever possible and generally pursues a top-down strategy. Functionalist interpreters never claimed

otherwise — after all, it is part of their point. But it is wrong to think that such an emphasis or orientation is *incompatible* with materially sufficient conditions, as Johansen alleges (34). No serious argument for exclusion is provided.

Johansen's most stimulating and novel discussions, interestingly, do not concern this debate or indeed perception, strictly speaking, at all. For on his view perception does not actually occur in the peripheral organs. Each functions solely as a kind of medium, an internal, portable one; the act of perceiving occurs only in the heart, the central organ (67, 83, 91, 116, 146-7, 156-7, 199, 203-4). Unfortunately, Johansen does not discuss the heart at any length. But he has a great deal to say about how a medium works; and obviously this is critical to his interpretation as a whole.

The key function of the medium is to separate the object from the organ (133), since we cannot perceive what we are in direct contact with. The medium cannot perform its function, therefore, by serving itself as a more immediate object, since it *is* in direct contact (118-20; cf. 192). To Johansen's mind, this rules out the medium having any change of its own; the only change is that of the object *through* the medium (133-4). But it is impossible for a visible object to affect the transparent medium, unless vision is *also* produced (135-6). In the absence of a perceiver, then, there will be no effect on the medium. Johansen denies that such 'mediation' is a mere Cambridge change (136-8), though: it is meant to be a real change (*kinēsis*), whether alteration or locomotion. It differs only in that it is a 'phenomenal' change; 'the medium takes on the quality of the sense-object *only insofar* as the quality appears to a perceiver' (146).

Such an account is not without its difficulties. It is hard to shake the impression that what we have here is a mere Cambridge change in all but name. (What happens, for example, if the sole perceiver in the vicinity of a lightning strike perishes before the sound reaches him?) It is also hard to reconcile this account with a text like *DA* 424b14-16. Does the uncovered onion in the refrigerator *only* scent the air if someone puts their nose in? Yet if a medium can be made perceptible, even though no one ever perceives it — as Johansen sometimes seems to admit (273-5) — how can we avoid saying that there is a change in the medium itself?

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David Farrell Krell

The Purest of Bastards.

University Park: Pennsylvania State

University Press 2000. Pp. xii + 237.

US\$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01991-3);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01992-1).

David Krell's main task in *The Purest of Bastards* is to analyze the curious relation between negativity and affirmation in the thought of Jacques Derrida. 'In the United States and in England,' he claims, 'the name Jacques Derrida has for so many years been associated with *deconstruction*, and *deconstruction* with *nihilism*, that it may seem strange to insist on the affirmative character of his thought' (xi). Krell attempts to show the ways in which the works of mourning and aspects of a radical (almost Nietzschean) affirmation are present throughout the whole of Derrida's corpus, starting with some of his earliest texts like 'Voice and Phenomenon' through to his more recent work. Krell's study covers a large range of texts in Derrida's oeuvre, and though one might suspect that an attempt to deal with the 'concept' of mourning in Derrida *as such* would run into the difficulty of having too much ground to cover, the strength of Krell's study lies in its ability to focus on specific texts and passages and to carefully explicate the way in which the intertwining of mourning and affirmation is at work there. Krell explicitly avoids texts like 'Memoirs for Paul deMan', 'Adieu to Emmanuelle Levinas' or even 'Specters of Marx', where the 'concept' of mourning is explicitly taken up by Derrida, and concentrates instead on texts that have received less commentary, or parts of the corpus which do not seem *directly* relevant to the question of the relation between mourning and affirmation. Krell's book is thus a study which appears to be directed towards readers at least partially familiar with the work of mourning in Derrida, and the extension of the analysis of this work into other parts of the oeuvre gives the study the quality of being simultaneously far-reaching and detailed in its analysis. If at certain points the far-reaching nature of the study tends to overwhelm its detail, Krell nearly always proves capable of returning to the explication of a particular passage which clarifies his point. The result is a study which, while introductory, nevertheless engages effectively with the texts it discusses and develops analyses of them which are evocative and worthy of further development.

Krell's first two chapters analyze Derrida's treatment of aesthetic experience in its relation to mourning. The first chapter engages Derrida's essay 'Parergon' from *Truth in Painting* and argues that his reading of the Kantian notion of 'disinterestedness' in the analytic of the beautiful of the *Third Critique* leads to an understanding of aesthetic experience as one of loss. Since judgment for Kant, in order to be aesthetic, must not be directed towards the object's existence, Derrida argues, according to Krell, 'that a stunningly beautiful object or person, in its purest and most radiant presence to us, shining within the aura of being itself, is actually *lost* to us and is at

some terrible remove, always already in an awful *inexistence*' (7). The beautiful is essentially, from the outset, the loss of itself; it appears as the beautiful only to the extent that it withdraws as the beautiful. Krell's focus here is on Derrida's argument regarding the role of the *frame* in the *Third Critique*. Through a careful analysis of Derrida's reading of Kant's apparently marginal use of examples, Krell argues that a mourning of the loss of the frame becomes central to the *Third Critique* even as it is marginalized in the text itself. Krell states 'The fact that all three *Critiques* fit into one another like Babas boxes, and that the question of the frame is no sooner raised than dispensed with or reduced to secondary importance, may of course be tangential, marginal, off the mark. Or it may be the only essential *Critical* question' (45). The implication of such a statement is vast. Given the role of the *Third Critique* within the Critical System itself (as a 'bridge' between the realm of the *First* and *Second Critiques*) Krell's explication of Derrida's analysis suggests that an experience of mourning lies at the very heart of the Critical system. This significant hypothesis is achieved through a close analysis of an essay which focuses on a specific section of Kant's *Third Critique*, and while it might appear hasty at first glance, Krell's analysis suggests a clear and convincing way one might proceed to develop a re-reading of the Critical architectonic along the lines he lays out.

One of Krell's objectives, in fact, appears not to be to *prove* that Derrida 'is right' (he is in fact critical in a few places) but primarily to make the case that the intertwining of the 'concepts' of mourning and affirmation are at work in Derrida *throughout* his corpus. Krell, thus, leaves the sphere of the aesthetic after an analysis of Derrida's later 'Memoirs of the Blind' in chapter two to return to one of Derrida's *early* works 'Speech and Phenomena'. Again, Krell does not simply advance or repeat Derrida's analysis of Husserl but, through a careful exegesis of Derrida's arguments concerning the voice and its relation to pure idealization in Husserl, argues simultaneously for a reading that insists on a notion of mourning which is at work there, and for a reading that questions the apparently necessary relation between voice and idealization. These analyses are, again, more implicative than extensively developed, but the initial details that Krell lays out give clear directions for further development. Though Krell's approach can sometimes lead him into an overly general argument, as when in the seventh chapter he suggests connections between Derrida's work of mourning and eight other authors ranging from Empedocles to Merleau-Ponty, the 'vignette' quality of these explications become less offensive when one engages them as spurs to thought for readers already familiar with some of the themes and arguments Krell is engaging with. Krell himself insists, suggesting directions for *future* projects, that he offers them as 'long distance questions to Derrida, some of which may be worth pursuing, and as local questions to my readers, whom in general I wish to ask: Does one or another of these connections bear any relation at all to the work we have been doing — or *want* to be doing in the most perfect of futures — in contemporary European thought?' (130) It is the future-projected nature of the questions that Krell raises and the often

detailed analyses which he offers as initiatory provocations that are this book's greatest merit.

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Emmanuel Levinas

Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-Other.

Trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav.

New York: Columbia University Press 1998.

Pp. xiii+256.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-231-07910-9);

US\$17.50 (paper: ISBN 0-231-07911-7).

'*Entre nous*' translates into English as 'between us', and this title locates Emmanuel Levinas' central concern as the relation to the other and questioning of the extent to which the one and the other can legitimately be contained in an 'us'. The subtitle reveals Levinas' more specific focus in this collection of writings, which is the relation between ethics and rationality. This volume, which first appeared in France in 1991, consists of twenty essays and interviews dated between 1951 and 1988; they speak to the evolution and full range of Levinas' ideas, and form an important complement to his two major works, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (1961) and *Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence* (1974). *Entre Nous* thus provides readers with significant insights into Levinas' roots in the phenomenological tradition and the many appropriations of his work in contemporary Continental philosophy. Its fluid translation maintains a strong continuity with earlier translations of central terms.

Levinas' principal focus is most commonly described as ethics, but it is difficult to specify the significance of that term for him, and his relation to more mainstream ethical theory. The work that the term 'the ethical' does in Levinas' project can perhaps best be understood through his evocation of the face. In speaking of the face, Levinas explicitly does not mean the physical features of the face, or the expression on a face, or the face as the mirror of the soul. Instead, the face signifies vulnerability — in its very corporeality or 'sensibility', as Levinas tends to write — and, simultaneously, the command 'You shall not kill'. The authority of the face is the fundamental ethical experience, in his account: the prohibition on murder does not refer only or even primarily to physical destruction (one can certainly look into someone's face and kill him or her) but what Levinas calls 'the reduction of the other to

the same' (185) — an annihilation of alterity or otherness itself. Much of his work is therefore preoccupied with the manner in which the exigency of the ethical encounter is muted or domesticated in the discourses of the humanities and social sciences. Many of the essays in *Entre Nous* concern the relationship between ethical subjectivity (in Levinas' sense) and rationality, the faculty generally privileged as the nucleus of an autonomous subject. In the interview entitled 'Dialogue on Thinking-of-the-Other', Levinas warns that 'we shouldn't let ourselves be overly impressed by the false maturity of the moderns who do not see a place for ethics — which they denounce as moralism — in reasonable discourse' (201-2).

Levinas seeks to recuperate an alternative to the philosophical tradition in Judaic or prophetic thought, but his concern with religion ultimately can be traced back to the ethical encounter of the face-to-face. He describes the face as 'the way the word of God reverberates': a reference to the infinite that resists comprehension as a concept (110). Indeed his work stands at the intersection of three axes — religion, philosophy and politics — but his interest in all three derives from their provenance in the ethical, which in *Entre Nous* will be defined as 'the human possibility of giving the other priority over oneself. ... This is the beginning of philosophy, this is the rational, the intelligible' (109). Thus when Levinas speaks of religion, he means less the institutions, practices and beliefs of organized worship than 'the original juncture of circumstances in which the infinite comes to the mind' (219). His concern with politics also follows from his understanding of the ethical encounter: it is a politics based on the sociality of 'a relationship to the other person as other, and not initially a relationship to the *other* already apperceived as the same through a reason that is universal from the start' (164). Yet in order to substantiate the content of that ethical encounter, Levinas must draw out its implications in the more concrete arenas of political justice, religious worship, and philosophical reasoning. In his reconception of the divine, the ethical and the human, Levinas has influenced many threads of contemporary Continental thought, including Derridean deconstruction, Lyotard's reworking of the political, and Irigaray's concern with gender and alterity.

Although *Entre Nous* forms a crucial complement to Levinas' previously published work, it does not function well as an introductory point of access to his thought, in part because the essays address diverse themes without establishing strong connections between topics. For instance, Levinas makes reference not only to Heidegger and Husserl, major figures in his intellectual lineage, but also to Aristotle, Lévy-Bruhl, Bergson, Marcel, Plato, Hegel, Plotinus, Kierkegaard, Kant, and Merleau-Ponty. The array of issues reflects a proliferation and amplification of the dominant themes of Levinas' work: the relation between philosophy and religion, the problem of time, the disruption of a sharp boundary between interiority and exteriority, justice, the face, and embodiment.

Among the most interesting sections of *Entre Nous* are three interviews, in which Levinas' language tends to be clearer than in his formal writings,

as well as the preface to German edition of *Totality and Infinity*, in which Levinas comments on the relation between this earlier work and *Otherwise than Being*, and the essay 'Diachrony and Representation', which is a central text on the ethical violence of intentionality. The complexity of Levinas' thought on the Holocaust has come under much scrutiny in recent years, and several essays, particularly 'Useless Suffering', shed light on how Levinas understands this event, and how it has influenced his thought. In addition, 'Philosophy and Awakening' provides a useful consideration of his complex commitments to the phenomenological tradition.

In the preface, Levinas claims, 'What motivates these pages is not some urgent need to return to ethics for the purpose of developing *ab ovo* a code in which the structures and rules for good private conduct, public policy, and peace between nations would be set forth, however fundamental the ethical values implied in these chapters may appear to be. The main intent here is to try to see ethics in relation to the rationality of the knowledge that is immanent in being, and that is primordial in the philosophical tradition of the West ...' (xi). Readers of Levinas' work will recognize this intent, which stretches between a radical reconception of ethics and a close reading of the history of philosophy, as a uniting theme in the diversity of his interests.

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Jon Mandle

What's Left of Liberalism? An Interpretation and Defense of Justice as Fairness.

Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2000.

Pp. xi + 323.

US\$77.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7391-0103-X);

US\$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7391-0104-8).

One advantage in approaching real-world normative questions from the perspective of an ideal theory is that it allows us to both recommend a course of action as the right one under the circumstances, and at the same time to regret the non-ideality of the circumstances themselves. Jon Mandle's recovery of John Rawls's political philosophy for the left requires a similar split-level judgment: it is a necessary and thus important book to which I will enthusiastically direct students and colleagues in the future. At the same time, one of the largest factors contributing to its value is the unfortunate state of interpretation and reception of Rawls's liberalism by thinkers on the left.

Mandle devotes roughly the first half of his book to a detailed and clear exposition of Rawls's theory. In the course of this exposition, he highlights the ways in which Rawls's arguments have been misconstrued by his interpreters on both the left and the right. The result is a remarkably thorough guide to both the intricate details of Rawls's rather complex and multi-leveled theory, and also many of the important elements of the vast secondary literature. Students who are approaching Rawls for the first time as well as those who have wrestled with his ideas for many years will find these chapters helpful both in their clarity of presentation and their capacity to pinpoint precisely where misreadings of Rawls's work get a foothold, and where they go wrong. One of the particular strengths of this part of the book is Mandle's insistence that much of the misinterpretation of Rawls with which he charges the left comes not so much from misunderstanding the details of Rawls's arguments (although he points to ample evidence of these mistakes as well), but rather from a failure to appreciate how all the parts fit together. Thus, for instance, a common misunderstanding of Rawls's theory results from placing far too much emphasis on the argument from the original position. By placing that argument within the context of the larger project, Mandle convincingly refutes a spate of criticisms leveled at Rawls for relying on an overly narrow or exclusive conception of human nature, or for failing to appreciate the role of concerns and motivations not captured by economic conceptions of rationality. In fact, Mandle devotes half of his discussion of Rawls to what he describes as issues of 'framework', taking care to set out the basic structure of Rawls's theory before turning to the arguments in favor of Rawls's specific principles.

The virtues that make these chapters particularly valuable, also contribute to an ultimate weakness in the book as a whole, however. Mandle is a clear writer and a careful reader. His expositions of other people's work are accurate and attentive to both the details of their arguments and the overall sweep of their positions. Unfortunately, however, this attention to the work of others, whether that of Rawls, his critics or his defenders, is not supplemented by any substantially new interpretations or insights. Mandle's defenses of Rawls's positions rely not only on what Rawls has said, but on the work of others who have defended and interpreted him with the same sympathy and care. What makes this book more important than a mere summary of recent debates would be is, then, the regrettable state of Rawls interpretation on the left, rather than any original illumination provided by the author.

The sense that this book does not rise above a clear summary of recent debates in political philosophy grows stronger in the second half of the book, where Mandle turns his attention to communitarian and post-structuralist-inspired views. He presents these constellations of theories as the two main theoretical options which the left has embraced when it should have been embracing justice as fairness. This ground has been amply and well discussed before. Plenty of thinkers on the left, whatever their view of the radical potential of justice as fairness, have noticed and commented on the similari-

ties between communitarian and conservative thought, and the difficulty of crafting a positive political vision out of the thought of Foucault and Derrida. Thus, while the second half of the book is just as clear and careful as the first half, it is perhaps less needed.

It is perhaps also of less significance because of the terrain it covers. If Mandle's book is approached not, as its subtitle suggests, solely as a book about Rawls's version of liberalism, but rather as a survey of the dominant approaches to political philosophy which have a legitimate claim to the allegiance of the left, then it needs to be asked whether communitarianism and post-structuralism as articulated by Derrida and Foucault deserve such pride of place. Mandle does not discuss feminism, critical race theory, radical democratic theory, or what Iris Marion Young calls a politics of difference, but they seem to have just as strong a claim on leftist sympathies as the views which are discussed. This failure of attention is unfortunate for two reasons. First and foremost, these are areas of vibrant and interesting philosophical activity at the moment, and thus terrain about which readers on the left looking around for sources of inspiration and philosophical affiliation should be informed. Second, leaving these approaches, all of which have been critical of liberalism in general and Rawls in particular, out of the discussion, serves to leave these criticisms unanswered, and thus to support the conclusion that Rawls cannot answer them. Such a conclusion would, I think, be a mistake, and I am sure it is not a conclusion that Mandle himself would want such readers to reach. Perhaps, then, what is called for is a sequel. Should Mandle choose to take on such a project, political philosophers on the left will have even more for which to thank him.

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Henry Pietersma

Phenomenological Epistemology.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 2000. Pp. x + 204.

Cdn\$95.00: US\$45.00. ISBN 0-19-513190-8.

Pietersma describes his book as both historical and systematic (vii). He proposes to offer illuminating and accurate interpretations of the views of three prominent phenomenologists — Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty — on the central epistemological issues of knowledge, truth, and evidence. At the same time, he offers a systematic and critical analysis of central themes in traditional epistemology and metaphysics. Pietersma argues that all three of his chosen authors are, despite some of their claims

to the contrary, transcendentalists in the Kantian tradition. This interpretation, which many will find controversial or even heterodox, is put in relief by contrasting transcendentalism with 'classical realism'. This contrast, which Pietersma insightfully exploits throughout, is perhaps the dominant theme of his book. In the end the question emerges: is transcendentalism really a more satisfactory answer to the great traditional problems of epistemology than realism? Pietersma rightly claims that Kant rejected realism for transcendentalism in order to avoid scepticism, which he regarded as the inevitable consequence of realism. Pietersma's argument is that Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, despite important differences between them, all followed Kant because they agreed with him that realism was no longer a viable alternative. Moreover, they all persisted in this belief to the end. Most would agree with this view with respect to Husserl, but Pietersma argues persuasively that, despite the efforts of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to reverse 'the transcendental turn', both failed to do so.

Treatments of Husserl's epistemology are not uncommon, but many readers will be surprised to find Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty treated as serious epistemologists. For, as Pietersma himself notes, both are 'on record as having rejected epistemology' (viii). But this rejection is misleading since, as Pietersma shows, what it really amounts to is not a complete neglect of questions about knowledge and truth, but rather the claim that 'the cognitive attitude' is founded in something more basic.

Realism holds that we can know the being and nature of things as they are independently of the mind. Concepts 'are born from insight into the nature of things' (14). For transcendentalism, following Kant, concepts are an 'addition' to 'what is given.' 'Only conceptualization can transform the given into an object' (15). The being of objects is thus accessible only through a 'conceptual framework' supplied by the knower. Indeed, the being of things *is* ultimately the transcendental framework through which beings (entities) become accessible and known. For Husserl, this universal framework is transcendental subjectivity (consciousness). For Heidegger, it is 'the ontological difference,' i.e., the 'access-giving framework' is being, which is not itself a being (entity, object) among others. For Merleau-Ponty, 'the transcendental place' which makes beings accessible is the embodied percipient (26).

In his Introduction, Pietersma sets out the distinctive character of a phenomenological epistemology by contrasting it with 'externalism'. Briefly, the difference consists in taking opposed standpoints with respect to the knower and knowledge. A phenomenological analysis of knowledge takes the 'first person' standpoint of the knower as primary. Phenomenological reflection 'approaches cognitive experience from within.' Here the central questions are: why is a given belief held, how was it arrived at, what is the background or context of the belief? (4) For the externalist, the third-person standpoint of someone other than the knower is primary. What is central is therefore the 'appraisal' of the belief's truth and the evidence for its truth (5).

In his chapter on Heidegger, Pietersma expounds the contrast between his and Husserl's transcendentalism in terms of their disagreement about

'the place of the transcendental' (87-9). Heidegger's *Being and Time* presents ontology as phenomenology, i.e., as a second-order inquiry into the first-order experience of being. Heidegger accepts transcendentalism but replaces Husserl's transcendental consciousness — which implies the primacy of theoretical cognition — with the being-in-the world of *Dasein* — 'the practical attitude'. Being as present-at-hand is 'founded' on being as ready-to-hand (96-7).

In his Conclusion, Pietersma claims that the realism that his three protagonists rejected is traceable back (at least in the eyes of Husserl) to Locke's 'subjectivist theory of knowledge' (169). Since this theory was thought to be a form of representationalism, scepticism was inevitable: we know only our own ideas, not things (beings). Kant had argued that 'transcendental realism', via Berkeley and Hume, had led to scepticism ('empirical idealism'). Transcendental idealism defeated scepticism by grounding empirical realism. But the cost of this victory was an even deeper concession to the sceptic: things in themselves are unknowable. Thus, Kant rejected the realist doctrine that we can know 'mind-independent entities' by rejecting the realist doctrine of being that made such scepticism intelligible and possible in the first place (171). If Pietersma is right, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, whatever their differences, all remained committed to this basic Kantian stance.

In the light of these results, Pietersma's invites the reader to reconsider whether classical realism is possible without scepticism. Perhaps the transcendental turn is not needed: perhaps we *do* have cognitive access to being as it is in itself. Where does this leave us? Transcendentalism affirms that realism implies scepticism; the realist denies this and affirms that transcendentalism comes at too great a cost — being itself is unknowable. This raises the following question: is phenomenological epistemology — the first-person stand-point of the cognitive subject — *itself* necessarily committed to transcendentalism? On Pietersma's own account of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, this seems to be so. But then a phenomenological epistemology is not possible from a realist standpoint. If we forsake transcendentalism for classical realism and affirm the possibility of knowledge of what is, then it seems that we must reject the phenomenological approach to epistemology. But it is doubtful that Pietersma himself would accept this consequence. One suspects that he is deeply committed to the project of a phenomenological approach to epistemology, and that he would argue for the compatibility, or even complementarity, of phenomenology and realism (7-8). But a defense of this position would be the subject of another book.

Pietersma shows a thorough acquaintance with his three chosen authors. He is also thoroughly acquainted with the language, techniques, and doctrines of analytic philosophy. This enables him to speak to both phenomenologists and analytical epistemologists. Members of both schools will find much of value in his book. It is written in a straightforward, clear style, and raises issues of major importance and current interest. Finally, it should be noted that Pietersma illuminates the thinkers and themes he treats by linking

them to the great philosophers of the past and placing them in their proper historical context. Finally, the central focus of the book — transcendentalism vs. realism — seems just right, for this is the basic issue at stake.

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Andrew Pyle, ed.

Key Philosophers in Conversation: The Cogito Interviews.

New York: Routledge 1999. Pp. 288.

Cdn\$98.00: US\$65.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-18036-8);

Cdn\$31.99: US\$20.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-18037-6).

Andrew Pyle, a former editor of the British journal *Cogito*, has selected some twenty interviews that appeared in that journal between 1987 and 1996. Those included in the present volume are Nancy Cartwright, John Cottingham, Richard Dawkins, Dan Dennett, Michael Dummett, Jean Hampton, David Gauthier, Stephan Körner, Alasdair MacIntyre, Hugh Mellor, Adam Morton, Martha Nussbaum, Derek Parfit, Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, Roger Scruton, Richard Sorabji, Peter Strawson, Mary Warnock, and Bernard Williams. (The names of the interviewers are deliberately not given.) *Cogito's* 'mission' is 'to bring good quality philosophy to a non-specialized readership,' and the interview format lends itself well to such an objective.

This book professes to provide 'an excellent introduction to philosophy in the English speaking world at the end of the twentieth century.' But there is some hyperbole in describing the volume in this way. What is striking, in fact, is the homogeneity of background and narrowness of the general research areas of the subjects. Half of the subjects work in the area of philosophy of mind or philosophy of language; another half dozen write in what might broadly be described as ethics and social philosophy. Of the twenty, some ten are graduates of Oxford; four of Harvard. There is, admittedly, diversity in the particular specialties of the authors interviewed. But there is no representation of the large number of contemporary philosophers trained or working in other than what might be called the 'analytic tradition' — say, in phenomenology and post-modern thought, feminist thought, classical systematic metaphysics, idealism, Asian thought, and so on.

It is also unclear what the criteria for selection for this volume have been. Influence on the discipline? While some of the authors included have made a significant contribution to twentieth-century philosophy, many have not. The quality and depth of the interview? Unfortunately, only a little over half of the interviews pursue the sorts of questions the thoughtful and tenacious reader might pose. Some are rather dated (e.g., that with Putnam — though he has since been interviewed again in *Cogito* in 1997), some are too brief to engage substantive issues (e.g., Mellor), and some (e.g., Mary Warnock) remain almost entirely at the biographical or historical level.

These concerns aside, many readers will find something of interest in the volume. The interviews with Sorabji and Cottingham attest to important work being done in the history of philosophy; Sorabji's in particular reminds us of the relevance of ancient philosophy in discussions of modern problems, especially in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind. The interview with Jean Hampton raises the question of where her reflections on the theory of retribution might have led, had she not passed away at the age of 41 in 1996. The interviews with Williams and Nussbaum are very well done, and the interviewers have managed to encourage their subjects to draw connections in their rather wide-ranging corpus. And those with Strawson, Körner, and Quine have a strong historical value, providing the reader with anecdotes about philosophical activity in the United States and England in the mid twentieth century.

Another useful feature of this volume is that, in several instances, the interviewers have led their subjects to express their views with conciseness and clarity, or enabled them to respond to major challenges to their work. Thus, MacIntyre provides an interesting summary of some of the different senses of his key concept of 'tradition', and Nussbaum provides a clear account of how one might go about arguing about ends.

Finally, many of these interviews provide readers with a 'feel' for their subjects. One gets a sense of how the authors' moral and social concerns are reflected in their work (even if that work seems far removed from popular debates), and also of how authors who have tended to focus on one sub-speciality see the discipline of philosophy as a whole, or how they benefit from contact with other fields. Interestingly, many of the subjects emphasize the value of literature and arts in their own lives, and indicate that they are resources for their 'philosophical investigations'. Often, this suggests a greater breadth than one might otherwise have anticipated from their writings.

This is not the kind of book that would make many philosophers go out and read more by those interviewed, and there are many gaps. Still, it is a book that one can browse through, and pick up information on *some* of the philosophy done in English in the last century — or recommend to advanced students for brief and clear introductions of that work.

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Sándor Radnóti

The Fake: Forgery and its Place in Art.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1999.

Pp. x + 244.

US\$60.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-9205-1);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-9206-X).

This is the first monograph in recent memory devoted entirely to the status of forgery in art, and while there have been a great many chapters on forgery in books on larger topics, not to mention scholarly articles tackling the subject, this dedicated treatment is long overdue. Fortunately for those interested in philosophical issues about forgery, this book is subtle, detailed and exceedingly well-researched. The translation, while a bit awkward in places, proves only a minor distraction.

Radnóti limits himself in this monograph to forgery in the plastic arts, which is regrettable, but understandable given the complexities of what will follow. And though he has removed literary forgery from the menu, his first chapter is an explanation of the concept of art forgery via comparison with the picaresque novel, both of which emerged as cultural phenomena during the sixteenth century. Radnóti's point is to underscore how our model for the forger is the rogue, rather than the hero of classic literature, and this might account for our fascination with the deed. This cultural diagnosis aside, part of the motivation for the separation of literary from painterly forgeries is the author's desire to remove the vexing matter of the forger's intentions from the diagnosis of a forgery. As Radnóti shows with considerable detail, given the rich tradition of copying, collaboration, mimicry and *homage*, the task of discerning a clear intent to deceive one's audience inevitably hamstring those who would unmask the forgery. (In the case of literary forgeries, intention will prove to be the sole yardstick of forgery, and the author will outline the implications of this.)

This work displays a great richness of forgery anecdotes, which sometimes obscures the philosophical points. It seems that every time a conclusion is reached, another story is introduced which undermines it, recasts it, or at the very least distracts. Radnóti's ideas are widely separated due to the mass of historical episodes reported. Radnóti nevertheless deserves praise for his great command of the literature (philosophical and historical), which includes stories from the Americas as well as Europe. He also displays a solid grasp of the anglophone literature in philosophy. He takes pains to consider unusual forgeries outside the realm of high art, such as medieval crafts, and it is this desire to be comprehensive that unfortunately erodes the clarity of his argumentation.

In his second chapter, 'Originality', Radnóti distinguishes between 'copies' and 'variations', not to mention forged duplicates and so-called 'forged originals' (original paintings attributed to past masters), and considers originality *vis à vis* historicity, authenticity and other related concepts. He then goes on to consider forgery as a way of criticizing the supreme value placed on

originality in modern art, and he considers this gesture of protest in a wide variety of forms, including recent *avant-garde* attempts. This is a welcome change from the frequent concentration on reactionary forgers like van Meegeren: Radnóti considers forgery not only as a weapon of nostalgia, but as part of the modern series of 'anti-art' gestures stemming from Duchamp. One of the best features of this volume is the attention to detail Radnóti shows in disentangling the many kinds of copies, falsifications, etc., which surround the forgery *per se*. Many authors have been too quick to offer characterizations of this enigmatic and elusive concept, and it is refreshing and laudable to see Radnóti take his time. His attitude toward forgery can be discerned from his characterization of the modern view of art. 'For us,' he argues, 'beauty and historical authenticity *together constitute* the artistic value' (54, italics in the original). In adopting this position, Radnóti is able to at once say why art forgery is inimical to artistic value (it constitutes an assault on one of its components), and why certain forgeries (legitimately) please viewers from time to time. Forgeries efface the very history they draw upon, and succeed by satisfying their audience's aesthetic expectations. In addressing this alleged dichotomy between pleasure and historical knowledge, Radnóti is speaking to scholars on both sides of the Atlantic divide. Much of this chapter is a meditation on the roles authenticity and originality play in modern art, using forgery to probe modern artistic values and mores.

Radnóti devotes a long chapter to the anglophone debate over forgeries that are indiscernible from artworks, the so-called 'perfect fakes'. (This chapter, as well as the exceptional bibliography concluding the volume, distinguishes this as one of the most comprehensive treatments of the topic yet.) Here special attention is paid to Nelson Goodman and Mark Sagoff, as well as Danto and Wollheim. Radnóti is critical of those thinkers who remove talk of forgery from its context within a tradition of art, and this concern with historicity, along with his desire to reconstruct 'the possible existential points of view of the forger' (130), can be said to represent his outlook as a whole. Every forgery is treated as a historical event (or series of events), in essence as a story best understood through (and thus after) the forgery's being revealed as such. Abstract treatments of forgery at an instant in time are criticized, as are those that explain forgery independently of post-renaissance art history. The analysis of the way in which the forgery is unmasked, and the subsequent writing of the whole history of the controversy, figures into almost every case Radnóti considers.

Radnóti's fifth chapter is a digression into the history of literary forgeries and counterfeiting (particularly documents), and though this goes against his earlier restrictions, the discursion is aimed at buttressing his main argument. To reinforce the idea that forgery is a particularly modern, particularly painterly phenomenon, Radnóti shows how in ancient and medieval times the necessary theoretical frameworks were not available to scrutinizers of the time, nor was western culture in much of a position to care about forgery. Thus cases of apparent literary forgery (which abound in the pre-Renaissance record) exist as a temptation for us to impose modern values

on a pre-modern historical event. From our point of view, Radnóti argues that the history of such ancient forgery candidates is too murky for clear judgement. Specific to literary forgeries, Radnóti offers some insight into why unmasking of such works actually augments the author's reputation: being so closely akin to other literary devices surrounding fictionalization, the false portrayal of the origin of a work of literature is not as threatening to the history of art as a forged painting. He surprisingly devotes a great deal of energy to pondering literary forgeries, at one point describing forgery as 'a borderline case of fiction' (187). Radnóti digresses into an exposition of his philosophy of literature, and this is interesting, though not terribly helpful.

Radnóti's overall position is a moderate one: unlike Danto or Sagoff he is unwilling to relegate forgery to the realm of 'non-art', but he does recognize its essentially parasitical nature, which does set it apart from original works which he (uncontroversially) claims form the paradigm of art for modernity. Forgery is well-situated here within a history of the plastic arts from the Renaissance to the twentieth century, and the paradoxes forgeries occasionally provoke in the artworld are made considerably clearer by his presenting a rich background for understanding both what forgeries are, and why they are attempted. His own views are somewhat camouflaged by this background, though this problem is superable.

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James Risser, ed.

Heidegger Toward the Turn:

Essays on the Work of the 1930's.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1999. Pp. xii + 364.

US\$75.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4301-9);

US\$20.75 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4302-7).

In recent years a great deal of Heidegger scholarship has concentrated upon the years between the publication of *Being and Time* and the end of World War II. This has been, in part, because of the recent appearance of much of Heidegger's previously unpublished work from the 1930's in the *Gesamtausgabe*, and also, in part, because of the renewed interest in Heidegger's political engagements during this period. This collection of essays edited by Risser follows this trend in scholarship and thus provides a useful resource for researchers interested in topics discussed by Heidegger during the 1930's. It is also valuable for scholars interested in the relation between Heidegger's

thought and his active involvement in National Socialism since several of the collected essays evaluate Heidegger's thought in light of his political engagements.

Before discussing the contents of this volume, it should be pointed out that the title could be misleading to potential readers. These essays do not give a thematic treatment of the so-called 'turn' in Heidegger's thought, and some of the essays are not concerned with works of the 1930's. A more accurate time frame would be 1927-47, the twenty-one year period between the publication of *Being and Time* and the appearance of the 'Letter on Humanism'. Risser explains in his introduction that this temporal period is described by the phrase 'toward the turn', for, although the essays he selected do not explicitly discuss Heidegger's turn, they do discuss works written during a period when Heidegger was re-evaluating the philosophical approach undertaken in his earlier writing. While this explains the title's reference to the 'turn', Risser's reference to the 1930's is still confusing.

Risser has divided the text thematically into seven sections (On Truth, Metaphysics and the History of Being, The Work of Art, Reading Hölderlin, Ethics, Reading the *Beitrag*, and Thinking the 'Da' of Dasein), each of which contains two or three essays. Six essays have been previously published, including work by John D. Caputo and David Farrell Krell. The essays by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Michel Haar are reprinted but appear in new translations in this volume, and Reiner Schürmann's contribution is a later version of a previously published essay. Although it is not acknowledged as such, Charles E. Scott's essay is substantially unchanged from its previous publication as pp. 101-11 of his monograph *The Question of Ethics*.

The essays in this collection are all of high quality, but there are significant gaps in subject area. Each of the topics under consideration are worthy of a volume for themselves, yet several issues that Heidegger dealt with at great length during the '30's (i.e., Heidegger's critiques of logic, or his interpretations of Nietzsche) are largely ignored and would be worthy of further discussion. This criticism may be unfair since Heidegger wrote on such a wide variety of subjects during this period making it very difficult for any single volume to do them all justice.

Anthology editors often opt for one of two extremes when selecting essays — one can go for breadth, and try to cover as much ground as possible, or one can go for depth, and try to cover a single topic in extremely close detail. Risser tries to use both of these strategies, but there is a problem with this approach. This collection is too specific in its time frame to serve as a general introduction to Heidegger's thought — no introduction could avoid significant discussions of *Being and Time* and Heidegger's later writings on technology and on language — yet is too broad in topic to be indispensable to specialists engaged in study of any of the topics covered.

Despite Risser's attempts to limit the boundaries of inquiry, the breadth of the subject matter addressed in this volume causes each essay to serve as an introduction to a subject area. Several of these essays are excellent in this regard — particularly strong are essays concerning Heidegger's writings on

art (contributions by Robert Bernasconi and Françoise Dastur), on Hölderlin's poetry (Gadamer, Véronique M. Foti and Wilhelm S. Wurzer), on Greek philosophy (Dennis J. Schmidt) and on Heidegger's political philosophy (Caputo and Will McNeill) — but the result is that the essays talk past one another rather than debate with each other.

This is not to diminish the overall quality of this anthology. It is a very good introduction to some of the philosophical issues Heidegger grappled with during the period between the publication of *Being and Time* and the 'Letter on Humanism', and of the influence these issues had on the rest of Heidegger's life and thought.

I recommend this anthology both to those doing research on some facet of Heidegger's thought during this era, as well as to those already acquainted with some aspects of Heidegger's thought and who are curious about his development through this period.

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Brigitte Sassen, ed.

*Kant's Early Critics: The Empiricist
Critique of the Theoretical Philosophy.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2000.

Pp. ix + 331.

US\$54.95. ISBN 0-521-78167-1.

The story of the reception of Kant's critical philosophy in the years following the publication of the first *Critique* and the *Prolegomena* is a fascinating one. Recently it has been told in detail by Frederick C. Beiser in *The Fate of Reason* (Harvard 1987). However, very little of the relevant primary material has been translated into English. Much of it is buried in obscure journals and rare books. Even the reprints in the Aetas Kantiana series are often hard to find. Sassen's volume makes many of the most important and interesting of these writings accessible to English readers. She rightly notes in her Introduction that there were basically 'three trends' in the early reception of Kant's first *Critique*. The first was the largely hostile and critical reaction of the empiricists (followers of Locke and Hume) and the *Popularphilosophen*. Several years later (early 1790's) the defenders of the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy attacked Kant's criticisms of dogmatic rationalism. This trend is thoroughly treated by Henry E. Allison in *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy* (Johns Hopkins 1975). Sassen wisely chose to focus on the first trend, the empiricist

criticism. It is less known and, in some ways, more important, for, as she herself states, it 'set the tone' for all later criticism. The third 'forward looking' trend consists of various attempts — by Rheinhold, Beck, Fichte and others — to develop Kantianism in different ways (1-3). Beiser has dealt with the leading figures in this movement (Chapter Six treats the empiricist reaction, but except for Jacobi little has been translated). Although Sassen and Beiser overlap to some extent, her book is an original and important contribution. Sassen (unlike Beiser) provides translations of crucial texts and biographical sketches of the leading figures. As well, her fifty-page Introduction is more extensive than Beiser's chapter on the empiricists. Their points of view are also quite different. Beiser focuses on the irrationalist challenges to the Enlightenment in general and Kant in particular, whereas Sassen focuses on the empiricist criticisms of the first *Critique*.

The translated selections rightly begin with the early and highly influential Feder/Garve and Garve reviews. The charge of Berkeleyan idealism (especially in the former) aroused Kant's indignation and was largely responsible for many of the changes in the second edition. All the other excerpts are, I believe, published for the first time in English. The selections include reviews, journal articles, and parts of books. All are judiciously chosen and contain a wealth of valuable and interesting material. Many of the authors found Kant obscure and paradoxical, and most reacted to Kant's philosophy in much the same way as later scholars and critics. It is especially fascinating to see that the standard interpretations, complaints, and criticisms of Kant in the nineteenth century and in recent years emerged in the earliest writings on the *Critique*. The formulations often vary, but the substantive points have persisted. For example, common targets were Kant's doctrine of space and time, the deduction of the categories, and Kant's a priorism and idealism. Thus, the decision to classify the translations under several categories — Transcendental Aesthetic, Idealism, Categories, Empiricism vs. Purism — was propitious, since these capture quite well the central issues. Two other good ideas are the brief biographies of the protagonists (many little known) and the interesting appendix on the major journals of the time and the role they played in the intellectual and philosophical life of the time.

I have checked selected passages from the translations and found nothing of importance to criticize. The translations seem exemplary. They read well in English and are mercifully free from the convolutions, neologisms, and obscurities English readers of Kant have often had to endure.

In conclusion, I would like to make two particular points, both of which are important and emerge clearly in the book. Only one writer (Pistorius) refers explicitly to Kant's alleged Copernican Revolution in philosophy. And only Pistorius, Selle, and Teidemann explicitly refer to metaphysics, despite the fact that Kant himself says that the problem of how metaphysics can become a science is *the* central problem of the *Critique* (cf. A xi-xii, B xxii, B 22-3). (This too prefigures later interpretations!) It is most fitting that Sassen's book has been published by Cambridge University Press, for it serves as an extremely useful companion volume to the new (and superb)

Cambridge edition of Kant's writings. (Sassen wisely follows the typological and terminological conventions of the Cambridge edition.) It is highly recommended to all Kant scholars as well as those interested in the culminating phase of early modern philosophy and German idealism.

Finally, I should acknowledge a debt of gratitude. In my translation of Johann Schultz's *Erläuterungen* (1794) (*Exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* [Ottawa 1995]), I omitted mentioning an important review by Schultz due to my ignorance of the identity of the author. The review and the identity of its author are included in Sassen's book.

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Avrum Stroll

Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy.

New York: Columbia University Press 2000.

Pp. 302.

US\$32.50. ISBN 0-231-11220-3.

This is a thoughtful and thought-provoking book. A practitioner's history of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century, the book visits some of the movement's central figures and schools. G.E. Moore, the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, and W.V. Quine each occupy a chapter, while Bertrand Russell and the younger Wittgenstein appear as advocates of logical atomism, and J.L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle share the spotlight in a chapter on 'The Golden Age of Oxford Philosophy'. The book also contains an examination of logical positivism, in which the work of Rudolf Carnap finds pride of place, as well as a less historical chapter on the direct reference theories of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Saul Kripke, and Hilary Putnam. The first and last chapters visit broader questions of the difficulties in framing analytic philosophy's history and in predicting its future philosophical prospects. The first chapter introduces the leading metaphor of the book, which likens the history of philosophy to 'the solera system' in the production of sherry. In the solera system, new sherry is added to undepleted casks of old sherry, on the understanding that the aged sherry will 'educate' and 'improve' the new sherry, while the new will 'refresh' the old (5). Thus, Stroll invites us to see analytic philosophy as a twentieth-century top-up of old philosophical traditions — educated and improved by the older traditions, while refreshing and reinvigorating them.

Stroll is a noted analytic philosopher whose approach to philosophy is informed by the work of Moore, the later Wittgenstein and the Oxford

ordinary language philosophers. It is not surprising, then, that the most sparkling of the historical chapters deal with these figures. Stroll's accounts of Moore's 'A Defense of Common Sense' and Austin's 'A Plea for Excuses' give a sense of how playful and yet how deep this sort of philosophy was. Stroll's remarks (168-72) on Austin's discussion of the various ways in which we ask to be excused from responsibility for our actions, for example, illustrate the richness both of Austin's approach to moral questions and of our moral lives. Stroll's book could be used with profit in an advanced class on late Wittgenstein or ordinary language philosophy, areas for which pedagogically useful secondary literature is difficult to find.

The chapters that deal with more technical and scientific projects in analytic philosophy — logicism, logical atomism, and logical positivism — are less compelling. At times the exposition is so compressed — as when Gödel's Theorems are discussed in two paragraphs (16) — that a reader who is not already well-versed in the material will not understand what the technical results really are or why they are significant. Moreover, Stroll's antiformalistic philosophical attitudes prevent him from fully expressing the scientific and philosophical sensibilities of Russell, Carnap, or Quine. Philosophically, historically, and technically more adequate accounts of these projects are to be found in other work, for example, Alberto Coffa's *The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1991) and Michael Friedman's *Reconsidering Logical Positivism* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1999).

While elegant, intelligent, and affectionate, Stroll's book is, ultimately, anxious. The anxiety at the heart of Stroll's history of analytic philosophy appears at the outset of the book (1):

The rapidity with which major movements suddenly appear, flourish, lose their momentum, become senescent, and eventually vanish marks the history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Examples include idealism in its absolutist and subjectivist variants, sense-data theory, logical atomism, neutral monism, and logical positivism. These defunct "isms," and their living congeners, such as "reductionism," "pragmatism," and "naturalism," form the subject matter of this study ...

The guiding images for Stroll's history are aging, decline, and disappearance — images that the book returns to at the end when Stroll (267-70) considers the view that analytic philosophy, indeed, *all* philosophy, is finished. Although he argues against that view, the discursive frame of the narrative suggests an aging philosophical project retailing its more youthful days in order to discern whether its life was anything more than a colossal waste of time. Consider the guiding questions of the final chapter (246): 'Have we learned anything important from a whole century of logical analysis, or has it been a period of scholastic quibbling over this or that myopic refinement? And are any of the figures discussed [in the book] of first-rate importance — comparable to Descartes, Hume, or Kant, for example?' The first seems less naturally a question of intellectual history — compare, have we learned

anything important from a whole century of physical chemistry (cultural anthropology, literary theory)? — and more naturally a question of how one has lived one's life — compare, have I done anything important in my seventy years on earth?

Stroll's second question is, given his historical concerns, more interesting, since it points to another salient anxiety in his book, as well as the book's most striking omission and its most regrettable missed opportunity. Stroll clearly is worried that analytic philosophy may have failed to produce great philosophers; he explicitly argues (247-55) that Wittgenstein is the *only* great analytic philosopher. The most salient occasioning cause of anxiety regarding the greatness of analytic philosophers is, I take it, the fact that the most important philosophers in the world today are either Continental philosophers (Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas) or 'post-analytic' philosophers (Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor). Yet, Continental philosophy and post-analytic philosophy appear *nowhere* in the book. A reader of Stroll's book discovers not a single word on Henri Bergson, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Jean-Paul Sartre, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Derrida, Habermas and others who have provided culturally significant alternatives to the project of analytic philosophy.

This lack is made more regrettable by a missed thematic opportunity: Stroll misses how deeply the scientific vision of philosophy offered by early analytic philosophy was *opposed* to the cult of the great philosopher. Rudolf Carnap gave just one expression of this attitude when he wrote in the preface to his (1928) *Der logische Aufbau der Welt*:

In philosophy we witness the spectacle (which must be depressing to a person of scientific orientation) that one after another and side-by-side a multiplicity of incompatible philosophical systems is erected. If we allot to the individual in philosophical work as in the special sciences only a partial task, then we can look with more confidence into the future: in slow careful construction insight after insight will be won. Each collaborator contributes only what he can endorse and justify before the whole body of his co-workers.

Unless we see this opposition to the very idea of the great philosopher as a genuine commitment of early analytic philosophers, the twentieth-century 'democratization of [analytic] philosophy' — the lack of towering figures whose work spans all branches of philosophy and the consequent distribution of philosophical authority across a wider community — *must* 'remain obscure' (269).

Stroll's concern with philosophical greatness offends against a continuing epistemic and social theme of analytic philosophy: analytic philosophy locates the source of philosophy's loss of credibility in the nineteenth century in the figure of the great individual philosophical genius. It would be a triumph of the scientific ideology of the analytic movement if there were no great analytic philosophers. This is the reason why Ludwig Wittgenstein remains the most agonized and agonizing figure in the history of analytic

philosophy. Wittgenstein is too great comfortably to be an analytic philosopher *and* too great not to claim for analytic philosophy; his greatness at once bolsters and undermines the authority of the analytic project. I miss the *agony* of Wittgenstein in Stroll's portrait of his place in analytic philosophy.

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Martin Tweedale

Scotus vs. Ockham:

A Medieval Dispute over Universals,

Studies in the History of Philosophy 50A, 2 vols.
Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press 1999.

Vol. I: iv + 392, Vol. II: 393-915.

US\$109.95. ISBN 0-77348-156-7.

In these volumes, philosophical readers have presented to them all the essential material needed for pursuing one of the most refined and sophisticated discussions of universals in the history of philosophy. Tweedale has assembled all of the key texts from Scotus's mature writings on the topics of metaphysical distinction and universals and individuation, translated them into readable English that manages to capture most of the technical precision of the originals, and provided each of the texts with its own extensive and in-depth commentary. Tweedale's achievement is remarkable and his volume should be a welcome aid to readers of Scotus and Ockham, both advanced specialists and struggling neophytes.

In the first volume of the work, after presenting the necessary biographical information on Scotus and Ockham and the pertinent bibliographical data regarding the texts translated, Tweedale adroitly sketches in the tradition of speculative inquiry, largely Aristotelian, within which the two medieval philosopher-theologians worked. The balance of the first volume is comprised of two sets of translations: a group of carefully chosen texts bearing upon Scotus's theory of ontological distinctions; a second group of texts treating the problems of universals and individuation followed by Ockham's critique of some of those same texts in his own writings. The translations are accurate but readable and provide some sense of the Scholastic terminology with which the originals are replete by the use of technical phrases to render the corresponding Latin ones; to help orient the reader to this vocabulary, the most important terms are listed in the index at the end of the second volume along with their Latin equivalents.

The second volume is also composed of two parts. The first part is a masterful essay on Scotus's and Ockham's teachings on universals and individuals, while the second part contains the detailed commentaries of Tweedale on the texts found in the first volume. Let me start with the second part. The comments are of various kinds. Some are simply textual hints about how to understand the elements of the medieval authors' arguments and will prove especially useful for those reading such texts for the first time. Most of the comments, however, are truly philosophical, delineating for the reader the ultimate point of the argumentation, entertaining possible objections and rejoinders to the statements found in the texts, and, occasionally, advancing Tweedale's own judgements about the value of the arguments presented. What is truly impressive about the philosophical aspects of the commentaries is the way in which differences and similarities are frequently noted regarding the way that Scholastic philosophers such as Scotus and Ockham viewed the relation between ontology and logic and the way that contemporary analytic philosophers do, preoccupied as they often are with unexamined assumptions inherited from Frege and Russell. Anyone interested in reexamining the presuppositions of discussions of universals in contemporary metaphysics should find Tweedale's remarks in the commentary sections extremely illuminating.

The first part of the second volume contains Tweedale's overview of the dispute between Scotus and Ockham. Though he is somewhat hesitant to suggest whether the reader should read this essay before or after working his way through the translation and accompanying commentary — opting in the end for the former, I would recommend doing both. Tweedale aptly describes the considerable amount of agreement between Scotus and Ockham: they each endorse realism in the present-day sense (i.e., reality exists prior to and independent of human conception and reflection); they each subscribe to the notion that there is one classification scheme into which the items we encounter in our experience fit; and they each think that an ontology should be as well managed as possible, never positing more entities than are genuinely needed to explain things as we find them. The disagreement comes at the level of what basically needs to be explained. For Scotus, commonness is a feature of the world that needs to be explained and cannot be adequately accounted for by appeals to mere similarity, even of the maximal sort. Instead, some kind of sameness or identity with its attendant transitivity needs to be accommodated within a properly metaphysical approach to reality. Conversely, Ockham's basic insight is that each and everything that is real is, at bottom, singular through and through. The only thing that needs explaining is the ability of individual human beings to think of things commonly (or as he prefers to say, indifferently) and that, the Venerable Inceptor holds, can be readily portrayed within the framework of a much more modest ontology than Scotus advances.

Overall, the volumes are extremely well done, but naturally there are some limitations. For one, as Tweedale points out, Ockham's theories are being viewed more from the standpoint of his critique of Scotus than that of

the development and unfolding of his own ontology. The reader may, as a result, not have as clear an idea as he should of Ockham's sophisticated account of mental language and how appeals to mental language allow Ockham to circumvent altogether many of the moves Scotus finds necessary. Such a limitation is unavoidable, perhaps, given the vast amount of material already included: the reader is directed in the bibliography to other primary and secondary literature that would help correct the narrow slant perforce taken on Ockham.

In sum, I highly recommend these two volumes, despite their length and formidable appearance at first sight. They contain much of interest and benefit for readers at all levels and types, whether historians of philosophy or practitioners of contemporary metaphysics. Any library interested in keeping up its collection in the history of philosophy, especially if its faculty's orientation is towards contemporary philosophy, would do well to order a copy.

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Douglas Walton

One-Sided Arguments:

A Dialectical Analysis of Bias.

Albany: State University of New York Press
1999. Pp. xix + 295.

US\$62.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-4267-5);

US\$20.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-4268-3).

'The bludgeon for the platform; the rapier for a personal dispute; the entangling net and unexpected trident for the Courts of Law; and a jug of clear spring water for an anxious perplexed conclave.' Winston Churchill's praise for the dialectical skills of a distinguished contemporary might be taken as a key to Douglas Walton's analysis of argumentation. It is central to Walton's work that the legitimacy of an argument should be assessed in the context of its use: what is appropriate in a dispute may be inappropriate in a conclave, and so forth. Walton's taxonomy of argument differs from Churchill's; he distinguishes six principal types of dialogue in which arguments may be found: persuasion, negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information-seeking, and 'eristic' or quarrelsome dialogues. These basic types of dialogue hybridize into mixed forms by which other familiar contexts may be represented: for example, courtroom debate mixes persuasion and eristic dialogues. In an impressive sequence of books, Walton has analyzed a wide variety of fall-

cious or otherwise illicit argumentation as the deployment of strategies which are sometimes admissible in contexts in which they are inadmissible. In this book he seeks to apply his model to biased arguments.

After introductory chapters sketching this framework and exploring previous logical analyses of bias, Walton proceeds to define a biased argument as one-sided (76). Disputants in two-sided, or balanced, argument continuously and judiciously weigh their opponents' reasoning against their own, whereas bald advocacy suffices for one-sided, or biased, argument, which lacks any such fair-minded consideration of opposing positions. Biased argument can be legitimate, in contexts where partisan advocacy is acceptable and expected. It becomes inappropriate if used in contexts requiring balanced argument, or if attempts are made to shift or confuse the nature of the context. As Walton recognizes, the application of this account to the practical appraisal of argumentation involves two difficult tasks: distinguishing biased from balanced argument, and assessing whether the sort of argument in use is legitimated by its context. The bulk of the book is addressed to these issues. Walton identifies ten 'defeasible warning indicators' (91) suggestive of biased argument, paying the most attention to the role of biased language. Four successive chapters assess whether biased argument can be legitimate in various different dialectic contexts, including advertising, political lobbying, and legal and scientific discourses. These case studies address issues of great public interest in an accessible manner, although they contain less originality than Walton's theoretical model. This works best when he uncovers hidden shifts of context, as in 'infomercials' and 'witch hunts'; he has less to say about bias which occurs without such shifts.

Walton's account of biased language is particularly interesting. In a scholarly chapter, he navigates adroitly through the complexity of earlier treatments, concentrating on 'loaded terms' and 'persuasive definitions' (PD). Loaded terms, such as 'freedom fighter', are chosen for associations favourable to their user's position. PD changes the meaning of a term while leaving its positive or negative associations intact: one of Walton's examples paraphrases (without attribution) Dworkin and McKinnon's 'model law' definition of pornography as involving the 'subordination of women through pictures and/or words' (125). Walton argues that both moves can be legitimate in dialectical contexts that permit advocacy, especially if response in kind is accepted — they are cudgels for the platform. However, arguments can be bad in two ways: they can confuse others and they can confuse the arguer. Walton addresses the first: interlocutors will not be thrown by explicit PD if they have a right of reply, or if they endorse the argument it conceals. But PD can still be misleading: rigidification of contentious identities into fundamental definitions is commonplace in science — but as the result of protracted consensus building. PD is parasitical on this process: it forecloses argument about doubtful identities by disguising them as definitions. A hidden argument is difficult to criticize — but also easy to ignore, and can allow PD to backfire against its user. A PD intended to stretch strong associations to extra cases may backfire by weakening the associations of *all*

the cases. Similarly, a critic of the 'model law' might argue that women cannot be subordinated by words and pictures, so by this definition there is just no such thing as pornography. Whatever is wrong with PD would seem to remain, even in contexts where Walton thinks that it should be harmless.

Informal logic needs books like this. It advances the debate in a neglected area of an expanding programme, and the paperback edition provides for an expanding audience. One drawback is the publisher's uneven editing; might it be poetic justice that one of their typos mangles a remark about *logging* into a criticism of 'those who gain financially from *logic*' (205)?

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James Williams

Lyotard & the Political.

New York: Routledge 2000. Pp. vii + 153.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-18348-0);

US\$20.99 (paper: ISBN 0-415-18349-9).

Lyotard is best known for *The Postmodern Condition*, a late monograph commissioned by the Quebec government, and for his focus on the philosophy of the sublime. But this is a partial picture. The merit of Williams' book is that he paints his picture on a bigger canvas, returning Lyotard to his roots, first, as someone motivated by 'the political', and second, as a philosopher of desire and resistance.

If Williams addresses Lyotard and 'the political', and not simply Lyotard and politics, it is not only a function of producing a book for the series 'Thinking the Political'. The fact is Lyotard was no fan of institutional politics, including the left-leaning sort that he eventually abandoned. Lyotard's mature analyses are rather motivated by the problem of 'testifying' to events (e.g., Auschwitz) that defy resolution or synthesis: namely, the absolute, irreconcilable difference that Lyotard calls the 'differend'. From this theoretical perspective, 'politics' is just the name for a masking or, better, for a process of (yet again) violating Others according to some given programme or system. Of course, such a conclusion makes Lyotard an easy target for critics of postmodernism who see nihilism lurking in the shadows.

Lyotard & the Political is a sympathetic response to these critics. On the one hand, Williams admires Lyotard's philosophical commitment to the irreconcilable complexities of any conflict. On the other, he argues that 'too

much methodological weight [has been given] to the differend and to the politics of dissensus' (36) — that is, to the later Lyotard. Williams prefers the descriptive style of Lyotard's early essays (1956-63) collected as *La Guerre des Algériens*. For although he concedes that Lyotard was always attentive to difference, even to the 'Algerian differend', Williams argues that the early Lyotard was much more concerned with class and revolution, in a method owing to the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu and others, than with the 'politics of the differend' and its potentially interminable testimony. By contrast, 'the central question [of the late Lyotard] becomes how best to be revolutionary with capitalism' (29), a conclusion, Williams adds, that some find 'difficult and revolting.'

Williams thus insists on preserving the difference between Lyotard's early and late works. In effect, he challenges the postmodernist Lyotard with the (loosely put) modernist Lyotard — the Lyotard sympathetic to the politics of revolution, if not resolution.

Williams recounts Lyotard's turn away from his early politics in the context of post-1968 theorizing in France. At this time Lyotard and others were desperately reinventing themselves in sometimes experimental works tackling, among other things, the philosophy of the subject, power, and resistance. Defending Freud from American ego psychologists and Nietzsche from Heidegger became major preoccupations during this anti-establishment period of crisis. Lyotard's particular contribution, *Libidinal Economies*, is a wild romp about the primacy of irrational, destabilizing libidinal energies in every rationalized economy — including capitalism.

Williams is careful to both rationalize and criticize these efforts. In the former mode, he gleams from the book a 'pattern of topics', the crux of which is a creative attempt to undermine totalizing, and therefore nihilistic, systems (including theories). In the latter mode, he questions Lyotard's ability to distance himself from the nihilism he rejects. The central problem is Lyotard's passivity toward power structures, based on his claim that affect underlies all behaviour, revolutionary or not, and that behaviour as such is unpredictable, heterogeneous, and fickle. So much, it would seem, for simple resistance. Williams, however, finds affirmation in the libidinal economics, unpacking what he calls a politics of 'active passivity': the system is indirectly challenged by unruly desires, energies, or intensities. Thus nihilism is (however narrowly) averted by a creative process as understood by such diverse influences as Freud, William Burroughs, and David Bowie.

While the middle and late Lyotard share a concern for events lying beyond representation, Williams also emphasizes their differences: the middle period intensifies energies and flees judgement, while the later work testifies to difference and reserves judgement 'for a privileged realm' (96). Indeed, in place of the stark 'cruelty' of the libidinal philosophy, the goal of Lyotard's late work, best captured in *The Differend*, was to establish the 'capacity to judge without criteria.' To this end Lyotard turned to Kant's understanding of judgement and art (the realm of feeling), as developed in the third *Critique*

— but, naturally, without endorsing Kant's corresponding belief in knowledge, obligation, and community (101-10).

Williams strongly rejects this approach. For insofar as the later Lyotard relies upon sublime feeling to testify to incommensurable difference, he cannot ever know which differences are truly absolute. Moreover, he cannot assume that the singular and fleeting experience of a sublime event is a good basis for a generalized politics — not least of all because one's personal testimony of the sublime is not easily, if ever, transmissible to another (116-18). The harsh consolation that we are all helpless in the face of the differend is, for Williams, nihilism. That Lyotard's last ironical, nostalgic works, such as *Postmodern Fables*, apply the lessons of the philosophy of the differend doesn't really help in this unhappy verdict.

Lyotard & the Political is a brave book, written against the grain of scholarship that privileges Lyotard's late work. Essentially Williams pursues his own differend by testifying to the politics of the wild middle period — the ignored libidinal economics that sits uneasily between the early essays on Algeria and the later postmodernist philosophy. Yet Williams does not simply revel in, or repeat, the wildness. Instead he offers wise insights and judicious conclusions. Of course, once upon a time this would have been a backhanded compliment: we might have judged this work a too wise, judicious, and rational testimony. But as everyone knows, the cost of this cheap judgement is perpetual embarrassment. As a critical yet loving interpreter of Lyotard, Williams manages to have his cake and eat it, too.

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