Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus philosophiques

As a rule, P.I.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, C.R.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

Table of Contents • Table des matières

Giorgio Agamben
Potentialities. Collected Essays in Philosophy.
Daniel Heller-Roazen, ed. & trans.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1999.
Pp. 302.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3277-9);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3278-7).

Giorgio Agamben is perhaps one of the most important philosophers and literary critics writing in Italy today, and, given the scarcity of philosopher-critics translated into English from Italian, one should certainly be thankful to Stanford University Press for translating this important thinker. In fact, it seems that the Press has a special predilection for Agamben, as this is the fourth of his works they have published so far. The editor and translator, Daniel Heller-Roazen, who has translated two previous works of Agamben, provides an excellent introduction to the essays in the volume. This introduction is happily entitled 'To Read What Was Never Written', after a sentence by Walter Benjamin that, in the editor's view, characterizes Agamben's critical practice: the identification of a messianic moment in philosophy in which the practice of the historian and the practice of the philologist, or, we could say, of the philosopher and the critic, cannot be told apart. It is here, at this moment, that the past is saved, not by being repeated, but in being transformed in something that never was, in being read as what was never written (1).

The essays in the volume cover a wide range of topics from Max Kommerell to Aby Warburg, from Hegel to Heidegger, from Foucault to Deleuze, but principally Walter Benjamin and a concern with language and history, which, as Heller-Roazen points out, translates into Agamben's preoccupation with 'potentialities'. The last essay of the volume, on 'Bartleby, or On Contingency' brings it all back home, reading in the Melville story and in its main character, who repeats *ad nauseam*: 'I would prefer not to,' an exemplification of the nature and essence of potentiality. One could say that, in this volume, Agamben's two distinctive traits, philosophical and critical, come together and demonstrate, one is tempted to add, their absolute potentiality.

However, the use of this term in this fashion in its resolution in actuality, is precisely *not* the way Agamben defines the term, which is defined, rather, as 'the potential not to'. In fact, in Agamben's version, that takes us back to Aristotle's definition of potentiality; potentiality as such is irreducible to actuality. For Aristotle, 'all potentiality is impotentiality of the same [potentiality] and with respect to the same [potentiality].' Every potentiality, according to Aristotle, must be a potential both to be and not to be. Otherwise, a potentiality that was only potential to be and was resolved only in actuality would no longer exist as potentiality as such. That is why Bartleby for Agamben achieves the status of potentiality. 'The "potential not to" is the cardinal secret of the Aristotelian doctrine of potentiality, which transforms

every potentiality in itself into impotentiality.' As the editor puts it: 'Something can be capable of something else only because it is originally capable of its own incapacity, and it is precisely the relation to an incapacity that, according to Agamben, constitutes the essence of all potentiality' (16). 'To be potential means: to be one's own lack, *to be in relation to one's own incapacity*.' Actuality is nothing but 'the full realization of the potential not to be (or do).' The passage to actuality is neither a destruction or elimination of potentiality, rather, 'the conservation of potentiality as such' (17). Actuality reveals itself to be simply a potential not to be (or do) turned back upon itself, 'capable of *not* not being and, in this way, of granting the existence of what is actual' (18). As the editor concludes by quoting Agamben from a previous work, *Homo Sacer*, 'potentiality and actuality are simply the two faces of the sovereign self-grounding of Being,' and that 'at the limit, pure potentiality and pure actuality are indistinguishable' (18, *Homo Sacer* 47).

Similarly, as the 'thing itself' also exists in language in the mode of potentiality, language must also have the form not of actual signification but of the mere capacity to signify, and at the same time a potential not to signify. The expressible, therefore, must be capable of expressing nothing and of assuring the autonomy of its own existence with respect to actual expression. 'Only because it can say nothing is language truly "sayable", and only in displacing speech from the register of affirmation and negation does language therefore announce itself in its pure potential to signify' (18-19). This potentiality of language is exemplified in Melville's Bartleby the Scrivener who replies to any demand with the phrase: 'I would prefer not to.' Agamben writes that: 'Bartleby is the extreme figure of the Nothing from which all creation derives; and, at the same time, he constitutes the most implacable vindication of this Nothing as pure, absolute potentiality' (19). Bartleby's reply expresses, for Agamben, both the potential to be (or do) and the potential not to be (or do), 'a zone in which language, emancipated from both position and negation, abstains from referring to anything as such' (19).

In fact, Bartleby is 'the extreme figure of the Nothing from which all creation derives' (253). 'He dwells so obstinately in the abyss of potentiality and does not seem to have the slightest intention of leaving it' (254). Consequently, will has no power over potentiality. Will cannot pass over to actuality and resolve the ambiguity of potentiality. This is the deep sense in which Bartleby must be understood. Agamben writes, 'Bartleby calls into question precisely this supremacy of the will over potentiality' (254). His potentiality does not remain unactualized; rather 'it exceeds will ... at every point' (255). Bartleby 'succeeds in being able (and not being able) absolutely without wanting it' (255). 'It is not a question of will, of wanting or not to leave the office, for instance, he simply would prefer not to' (255). 'The formula that he so obstinately repeats destroys all possibility of constructing a relation between being able and willing ... . It is the formula of potentiality' (255).

Agamben's work is as interesting as it is seductive. His notion of potentiality provides the fly a way out of the fly-bottle. Bartleby's formula points to

a conception of language that is purely potential, 'capable of expression precisely by virtue of actually saying nothing, it expresses itself in its pure potentiality, as expressible' (20). In the last instance, as the claim goes, this potentiality of language resolves the age-old question of referentiality as it leads eventually to the dissolution of the aporia of self-reference. Language's pure potential to signify is 'no longer meaning's self-reference, a sign's signification of itself; instead it is the materialization of a potentiality, the materialization of its own possibility' (20).

But, perhaps, it is precisely at the level of critical literary analysis, of the shift from the theory of potentiality to Bartleby, as the figure of potentiality, from philosophy to literary criticism, that one could possibly question Agamben's far-reaching claim. Bartleby's formula 'I would prefer not to', when viewed within the context of Melville's narrative, is not simply expressive of language in its potentiality; it is also very much disruptive of the narrative as a whole. Bartleby's formula, in its insistence on 'preferring not to', is nonetheless a performative act of language that puts into question the status of the law, with which Bartleby is being constantly confronted, and the coherence of Melville's narrative. Bartleby would seem to exemplify, rather, the Dead Letter that can only be displaced 'by a change in the administration' but not removed, just as the law office where he worked and refused to leave had to be relocated in order to be rid of Bartleby's dead weight. Just as Bartleby's presence will not be resolved or dissolved except by a relocation which proves to be futile because it only perpetuates the problem, the aporia of self-reference, claimed by Agamben, is never dissolved but only displaced by the performative act of language which endlessly postpones the materiality of the dead letter. Like reference, Bartleby can never be eliminated or dissolved, only endlessly displaced. Potentialities of language that allow one to read what was never written!

Agamben's *Potentialities* is an important collection of papers that merits to be closely studied and examined for its wide-ranging and provocative essays. Giorgio Agamben is one of the best philosophers writing in Italy today and his work deserves to be better known in North America.

Massimo Verdicchio
(*Department of Modern Languages and Cultural Studies*)
University of Alberta

Steven E. Aschheim, ed.
Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press 2001. Pp. xii + 428.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-520-22056-0);
US$22.50 (paper: ISBN 0-520-22057-9).

This book is the collection of the papers presented at the first-ever interna-
tional conference on Hannah Arendt in Israel, held in Jerusalem in December
1997. This occasion, and, even more so, the title of the book (playing on
Arendt's own *Eichmann in Jerusalem*), suggest immediacy and relevance.
By dealing with the entirety of Arendt's work, the editor hopes that 'within
this "Jerusalem" context we will not only fill important lacunae in Arendt
scholarship, but also help to illuminate, often in surprising and provocative
ways, the broader ramifications of her thought ... ' (xii). Indeed, few confer-
ences in political philosophy could have a more intriguing and politically
relevant setting.

The book is divided into five parts ('Hannah Arendt: Politics and Philoso-
phy', 'The Origins of Totalitarianism Reconsidered', 'Hannah Arendt and
Jewishness: Identity, History, and Zionism', 'Eichmann in Jerusalem', and
'Arendt and German Culture'), containing altogether twenty-two contribu-
tions by mostly well-known scholars and Arendt experts. As the structure
shows, the book is intended to cover all of the important fields of Arendt's life
and work. In this, the book fully succeeds.

The book also manages to bring out perhaps the most unexpected, and
indeed very provocative, topic of the relevance of Hannah Arendt. This is
Arendt on Israel. Even if Walter Laqueur devotes his amusing essay, the
best-written in this collection, to showing how wrong and opinionated Arendt
was on Israeli politics, he does not convince, since he starts from completely
wrong assumptions. At the end of his essay, Laqueur states: 'Should Hannah
Arendt have stuck to the realm of the abstract? This takes one back to the
question originally asked: Is political philosophy a discipline wholly separate
from the real world?' (62) In fact, Laqueur never asked this question to begin
with, nor does he consider Arendt from this perspective. But even if he had,
this would have been conceptually incorrect: a political philosopher in the
realm of politics is just another citizen or actor, not an expert.

The essays by Amnon Raz-Krakotykin, Moshe Zimmerman and Leora
Bilsky, on the other hand, give a very different picture. Here one can see how
pertinent Arendt's critique of nationalism and of a self-righteous view of
history was and still is. Raz-Krakotykin and Zimmerman both argue excel-
lently that Arendt is still one of the most important political writers about
Israel. As the former puts it, Arendt's writings on Jewish politics from the
1940s and 1950s remind us 'that the definition of Israel as the state of the
Jewish peoples excludes the Palestinian minority and maintains their infe-
rior status ... that the terms of the debate in Israel must be over the
separation of national identity from the image of the state in order to

establish it as the state of all its citizens. The definition of the state as a Jewish state and its acceptance as the triumphal conclusion of Jewish history prevent any solution based on the principles of equality and partnership. In order to promote such an attitude ... it is necessary to define Jewish collective identity in Palestine apart from the theological-messianic myth' (180).

This is exactly where, as Bilsky convincingly shows, the political importance of Arendt's Eichmann book still lies today. The question is not whether Arendt's version of the trial was correct (the history of this particular controversy is given in well-balanced form in the contributions by Michael R. Marrus, Yaacov Lozowick, Hans Mommsen and Richard I. Cohen), but rather that it was written from the universalist perspective, which 'allowed her to tell the story of the Jewish people in order to draw from it implications for international law ... her story exposed the weakness of an international system established on the protection of individuals' rights without providing real protections to groups' (246).

The rather obvious question here would be how Arendt's views on Israeli politics and Jewish identity are connected with her philosophy of action and idea of politics, and what the relevance of these today would be outside of Israel. This should have been the task of the rest of the contributors. Indeed, this is what the title of the book suggests. However, most of the other essays fail to consider Arendt's philosophical immediacy; they even relegate her to history. Since these contributions frame the core Jerusalem essays both at the beginning and at the end of the book, they also leave the volume out of focus. (One is inevitably reminded here of Arendt's fellow student and later colleague Leo Strauss, whose famous point was that all relevant matter is provocative, and thus that it is always hidden in the center of texts, the beginning and the end satisfying the censoriously minded.) Much of this is due to the approach chosen by the authors. Arendt's own strong misreadings are mostly taken at face value, and the arguments start from there (see particularly both essays by Dana Villa, Liliane Weissberg, Anson Rabinbach, Peter Bahr and Bernard Crick). Therefore, it is previous scholarship on Arendt that is — thoroughly — reexamined, rather than Arendt's own work; in this respect, our understanding of her work is not advanced.

The same fate often befalls Arendt's concepts. The banality of evil, natality, and action are considered through the lens of this kind of antiquarian scholarship as canonized facts and not as something to develop further, and so they become rather harmless. It is today's mass society where ethics and *ethos* as the basis of politics have lost any significance, and from here, the concept of banality of evil derives its immense relevance — yet Aschheim and others fail to take this up. Further, there is no mention of the possibility that natality and action could — especially as far as our self-understanding and, even more so, the necessity of renewed political institution-building are concerned — be among the most important concepts in the current debate on bioethics, and help us to understand and to deal with the ever-so-increasing problems of economic development and globalization (and their possible 'side-effects', such as radical nationalism and intolerance).

This leaves the reader with a strong feeling so common these days about conference collections: what we have here is not an edited book, but rather a proceedings volume. In this case, this is all the more the pity because at the center of the book, one finds indeed new, provocative and valuable contributions on Arendt and her relevance today.

Rainer Kattel
Universities of Marburg and Tartu

Keith Michael Baker and
Peter Hans Reill, eds.
What's Left of Enlightenment?
A Postmodern Question.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2001.
Pp. xii + 203.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4025-9);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4026-7).

Among the negative aspects of life under capitalism are sporadic, inexplicable shortages. Suddenly there is not enough gasoline or heating oil or lettuce; familiar consumer products just disappear from shelves. Although reasons may be adduced, the underlying causes generally remain unclear. Thus it seems to be with the Enlightenment. Even as historians of the eighteenth century, notably J.G.A. Pocock, have been insisting that there are several Enlightenments and have been adding the Scottish and the Dutch to the familiar English, French, German and American varieties, postmodern critics have pointed to the exhaustion of 'the Enlightenment project'. The essays collected here, which emerge from conferences at the William Andrews Clark Memorial Library / Center for Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Studies at UCLA and the Stanford Humanities Center, allay such anxieties, and suggest that the Enlightenment reserves should be more than adequate, if they can only be tapped for present needs.

It is of course difficult to discuss in detail each of the nine contributions to such a collected volume. Only two are by philosophers. Richard Rorty's 'The Continuity Between the Enlightenment and "Postmodernism"' is a brief statement of his convictions that 'the twentieth-century project of treating Nature and Reason as unneeded substitutes for God is continuous with Enlightenment anti-authoritarianism' and that 'abandoning Western rationalism has no discouraging political implications' (20). He also announces what will turn out to be a major theme of the volume, namely that 'reason is conceived dialogically. We treat it as just another name for willingness to

talk things over, hear the other side, try to reach peaceful consensus' (27). Both Dena Goodman in 'Difference: An Enlightenment Concept' and Lawrence Klein in 'Enlightenment as Conversation' ground their optimism about the ongoing vitality of the Enlightenment in their historical investigations of the institutions of civility where conversation was practised (the French salon, the English clubs and coffee houses). It is uplifting to attribute such political influence to polite conversation, but also a bit naïve, both socially and theoretically. Terrorists and their ilk obviously are not interested in civil discourse as a way to achieve their goals.

The hermeneutic limits of conversing are demarcated in a short yet incisive essay by the second philosopher, Hans Sluga, who focuses on Heidegger's assertion that 'thinking begins only when we have come to experience that reason, made master for centuries, is the most tenacious adversary of thinking' (53). Situated within the program of Heidegger's critique of *Vernunft*'s domination, this pronouncement highlights the paradox of modern philosophy's commitment to the sole task of reason. As Nietzsche foresaw and Heidegger experienced, reason when in power itself resists, indeed refuses, to engage in a dialogue with key dimensions of being human. Reinforced by calculating logic and by the visible successes of technology, reason has little use for thinking. When reason appears to have all the answers, the attempts to converse with it become soliloquies.

The other five contributions might loosely be termed essays in the history of ideas. David A. Hollinger provides a brief sketch of 'The Enlightenment and the Genealogy of Cultural Conflict in the United States', attempting to show how postmodernist theory as received in the USA became increasingly hostile to the Enlightenment. A dozen pages cannot suffice to account for the complexities involved, and it is surprising that Hollinger does not deal with the role of Christian fundamentalists, surely the greatest and perennial threat to Enlightenment ideals in the American republic.

The late Jonathan Kundsen's 'The Historicist Enlightenment' deals with the animosity of historicism in both the eighteenth century and in Weimar Germany to the postulates of Enlightenment thinking. The importance of German thinkers for the reception of the Enlightenment today is underscored by Johnson Kent Wright's discussion of Ernst Cassirer's classic account, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*. Michael Meranze comments on Foucault's reading of Kant's key text 'What is Enlightenment?' without quite grasping the radical political implications of either one. The most fundamental issue for both is not that of solidarity but of what Antonio Negri has elsewhere termed 'constituent power' (*Insurgencies* 1999).

A refreshing view is provided by Lorraine Daston's 'Enlightenment Fears, Fears of Enlightenment'. As a historian of science with a particularly strong background in epistemology, Daston focuses on the Enlightenment's dedication to facts, one which already absorbed much energy in the seventeenth century. The interest in 'matters of fact' and the quest for certain knowledge led to the enthronement of nature, and hence of natural science, in the eighteenth century. Polemically, Daston concludes that 'we will stop fearing

the Enlightenment when, in true Enlightenment fashion, we disenchant nature anew. That which is natural is neither inevitable, nor desirable' (128).

All in all, proponents of the Enlightenment and advocates of the effort 'to depart from our self-imposed lack of authority' (Kant) should approve of this carefully produced book (despite the ghastly cover). Postmodernists and other detractors will probably ignore it.

Arnd Bohm
(Department of English)
Carleton University

Darin Barney
Prometheus Wired. The Hope for Democracy in the Age of Network Technology.
Vancouver: UBC Press; Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2001. Pp. ix + 341.
Cdn$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7748-0796-2);
Cdn$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7748-0797-0).
US$29.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-03745-2);
US$19.00 (paper: ISBN 0-226-03746-0).

Hubert L. Dreyfus
On the Internet.
London - New York: Routledge 2001.
Pp. ix + 127.
Cdn$75.00: US$50.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-22806-9);
Cdn$19.95: US$12.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-22807-7).

It is well known that cyberspace, information and communication technologies (ICT), the internet, the web, network technology, whatever you call it, makes our lives better, easier, and safer; flattens hierarchies and thus makes people more independent; fosters democracy; improves social capital and the sense of community; allows for greater freedom for the individual person because of the possibility of re-defining oneself again and again, and so on. Unfortunately, all this is exactly as wrong as it is well-known, and the two books under review attempt to tell us why.

'When societal consideration of a new technology is limited to identifying technical problems and technical solutions, the general condition in which technology holds sway is reinforced rather than challenged. This, by and

large, has been the case with network technology' (Barney 233). Worse, it has become part of the general paradigm of today, and even modest critics of the net easily appear as luddites. Both Dreyfus and Barney counter this with the classic most appropriate philosophical maneuver: They take a step back and look at the issue from the perspective of what the human person can and should be, and then consider what network technology does.

Dreyfus's book, in short, is brilliant. His convincing argument is that the internet disembodies the human person and thus that all that happens there is, *s.v.v.*, not real. That the net transcends the body, often praised as a virtue, is in the end counter-productive. As Dreyfus argues, 'if our body goes, so does relevance, skill, reality, and meaning' (7). Especially convincing is his use of Merleau-Ponty here; this approach is exemplified in an argument about the difference between virtual distance instruction and education.

The key issue of participatory government and the net world is taken up in the aptly titled central chapter, 'Nihilism on the Information Highway: Anonymity vs. Commitment in the Present Age' (Dreyfus 73-89). This is a development of Kierkegaard's point (the Kierkegaard of *A Literary Review*, that is) that the public sphere is a dangerous thing, not necessarily a good one.

Surely, many a mainstream intellectual will have stopped breathing now — how can anyone question the goodness of the public sphere these days? 'As Burke had noted with joy, the press encouraged everyone to develop an opinion about everything. This is seen by Habermas as a triumph of democratization, but Kierkegaard saw that the public sphere was destined to become a detached world in which everyone had an opinion about and commented on all public matters without needing any first-hand experience and without having or wanting any responsibility' (Dreyfus 76). It might be pointed out here that Hannah Arendt's public sphere is completely different from this concept; so much, incidentally, for the identity of her concept and Habermas's. Some *polis* theory would have been nice here as well, but never mind. 'A commitment does not get a grip on me if I am always free to revoke it' (85), and there is no *polis* without commitment.

Dreyfus's claim that 'Kierkegaard would surely have seen in the Internet ... the hi-tech synthesis of the worst features of the newspaper and the coffeehouse' (78-9) would usually ring odd, but in this case the extrapolation is appropriate: There can indeed be little doubt that Kierkegaard would today say about cyber communities that ' "here ... are the two most dreadful calamities which really are the principle powers of impersonality — the Press and anonymity" ' (quoted in Dreyfus 78). And 'if we remain the kind of beings that Kierkegaard understood us to be, we will despair if all meaningful distinctions are levelled, and since meaningful distinctions require commitment and vulnerability, which require our embodied finitude, we should have no trouble in choosing between disembodied nihilism and embodied meaning' (Dreyfus 92).

Dreyfus's excellent critique of 'virtual community' and 'electronic republic' advocates, who suffer from a deep deficiency of thought on what a *polis* is

about and what are pure incidentals or mechanisms (103-6), should be mandatory reading for all dealing with e-governance. 'The Athenian agora is precisely the opposite of the public sphere, where anonymous electronic kibitzers from all over the world, who risk nothing, come together to announce and defend their opinions. As an extension to the deracinated public sphere, the electronic agora is a grave danger to real political community. ... it is ... a nowhere place for anonymous nowhere people' (104).

As regards Barney's book, the chapter on technology is not so helpful: Plato, Aristotle, Marx, Heidegger, and the Canadian philosopher George Grant are introduced in a basic way, but with a focus on their view of technology. Some of them we only meet again after literally hundreds of pages. The sketches are quite good, although often too one-dimensional; they are also very slow reading. The 'networks' chapter that follows is perhaps the best part of the book. It provides an excellent write-up and interpretation of the development of ICT that is both interesting for philosophers not well versed in the history of technology and for techno-people not used to theorizing their field.

Disappointing is the long double-segment on the political economy of network technology. This is a Marxist critique, and its comparative orthodoxy makes it unhelpful. Although they surface in certain terms ('techno-economic paradigm'), more recent developments are not considered; one simply needs Schumpeter or Chris Freeman and Carlota Perez here; just Marx won't do if one has to tackle innovation-based economics, and Barney does not even see that this is the issue at hand. Barney also still struggles with postmodernism in these chapters, arguably yesteryear's fashion and as such a paper tiger.

What is interesting even in these parts is Barney's emphasis that the 'information society is a capitalist society'; that the net enforces, rather than undermines, the economic powers that be, however you call them; and that network technologies make 'the worker' worse off than before — something Dreyfus also says. Worth also keeping in mind is 'that promoters of universal access have chosen to conceal their commercial designs inside the Trojan horse of democratization, education, and an investment in social capital' (174).

Barney nicely demonstrates why the de-hierarchization that is promised to come with ICT is a chimera — more: not only is it not true, but often the opposite is (148-53). As one should know from organization theory (plus some Greek thought), it is not hierarchy as such that is the issue, but the *appropriateness* of the hierarchy for the organization's tasks. If the task requires an 'old-fashioned' pyramid, then a 'flat' hierarchy is counter-productive, because it cannot cope; it is also much worse to be in as a human person because the real power-structures are hidden and thus not easily subject to discourse and remedy.

What is strange is that Barney, just as Dreyfus, neglects the issues of privacy and net surveillance, as well as those of e-governance, e-government, and e-democracy; the digital gap or divide only enters marginally. Barney does notice, correctly, that 'recent research indicates that network technolo-

gies tend to reinforce existing patterns of democratic behaviour rather than mobilizing new actors and practices' (264).

Barney has an interesting chapter on democracy and network technology. His important point here is that in 'cyberspace, no rules are preferable even to good rules' (238). But since democracy is in no case 'natural' but a necessarily created system, opting for 'no rules over any rules' is not only un- but in fact anti-democratic. Barney is right to notice that those who say it's a good thing that government cannot control the net must have a strange view about their (usually democratically elected) government. In the end, these promoters of no-government web phantasies are not liberal but libertarian.

But it does not do to whine about ICT and its consequences; the question is how to cope with this issue. Friedrich Georg Jünger's work might be the best guide in this; unfortunately, he is not used by either author. Dreyfus, however, does conclude with a section which highlights the advantages and potentialities of the web. Still, the advantages are so strong and — like the cellphone — so seductive that even techno-critics will not be able to refuse their use, as long as they want to stay part of contemporary society. So, we cannot even try to escape the cyberworld.

What, then, can we do? As such, the creation for oneself of vantage points in time and/or space outside of the ICT world is the only hope for the individual — and that is quite easily possible for those who have a personality left — and the reaffirmation of the real *polis* the (much more difficult) one for structured human living-together. The problem is that as the Good Life in the Good State is an interdependent phenomenon, this is a tall order for today. Yet, Barney's and especially Dreyfus's book are very helpful works for the road toward that end.

Wolfgang Drechsler
(Faculty of Social Sciences)
University of Tartu, Estonia

Thora Ilin Bayer
Cassirer's Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms:
A Philosophical Commentary.
Introductory essay by Donald Phillip Verene.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 2001.
Pp. x + 210.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-300-08331-9.

This book resolves into two distinct, self-sufficient parts: Verene's historical essay, 'The Development of Cassirer's Philosophy' (1-37) and Bayer's philosophical interpretation of *The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms* (41-193). There is also a useful ten-page bibliography and a good six-page index.

Verene explains how a fourth book came to be added to Cassirer's familiar trilogy, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, which until 1995 consisted only of 1. *Language*, 2. *Mythical Thought*, and 3. *The Phenomenology of Knowledge*. In 1946 Cassirer's widow retrieved some papers that Cassirer had left behind in 1941 when he emigrated from Sweden to the United States. In 1972 Verene became the first scholar to examine them. He discerned that these manuscripts, if edited and posthumously published, would fill a frequently perceived gap in Cassirer's systematic thought, namely, its lack of a metaphysics. John Krois and Oswald Schwemmer brought out a German edition in 1995, Krois and Verene an English translation in 1996. The title, *Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen*, is Cassirer's.

Bayer's contribution is not really a commentary *per se*, but rather a sort of reflection on Cassirer's text. She follows Cassirer's arrangement: first 'Life and Spirit', written in 1927-28 as 'Spirit and Life' (*Geist und Leben*), simultaneously with *The Phenomenology of Knowledge*; then 'Basis Phenomena', written about 1940 and introducing an idea not elsewhere known to readers of Cassirer. A 'basis phenomenon' is, following Goethe's maxims 391-393, a primal *sine qua non* of existence. There are three: *life*, the dynamic, unique, monadic self; *action*, the calculative or purposeful intervention of the self into its environment, pushing its limits, encountering the other; and *work*, the self's creation of durable, objective cultural products, arts, or sciences out of its environment. They constitute a hierarchy (143) wherein the second is dependent on the first and the third is dependent on the second. Thus all three are just an aspect of the first, life (151). Together with the dialectical interaction between spirit and life, basis phenomena constitutes the fundamental concept of Cassirer's metaphysics and the ontological ground of symbolic forms. Insofar as symbolic forms are the works of spirit, Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms is ultimately a philosophy of work (190), the third basis phenomenon.

Life is the organic, subjective principle of unity (41). It is the unity of its own dialectic. It is not determined by either intellect or will, but by fate. It exercises no choice. It is pure, immediate, blind becoming. It creates no symbolic forms. Its dialectical partner, spirit, on the other hand, thinks, wills, deliberates, objectifies, chooses, judges, anticipates, and not only creates

symbolic forms, but consists of them. Spirit is the cultural, intellectual, dialectical principle of unity, but both it and its unity can be defined only in terms of life (44). Culture emerges from spirit in such a way that spirit eventually becomes culture. Where life is pre-conscious or subconscious, spirit is self-conscious, i.e., conscious of itself as living human spirit, or as human life itself. Life and spirit each follow their own dialectic, but their main dialectic is what they share, their reciprocal but not always cooperative interaction with each other (51). Life's purpose, of which it cannot be conscious, is only to persist in its own being, like Spinoza's *conatus*; but spirit's purpose, of which it could become conscious, is to grow, develop, and create. These two goals are sometimes at odds, but seldom hostile to each other.

Bayer makes Cassirer sound almost like Hegel when she writes that 'all symbolic forms are mediated through spirit's dialectical activity' (48), but closer examination of both her book and the primary text reveals significant differences between Cassirer's dialectic of spirit and Hegel's. For Cassirer, spirit proceeds along its dialectical path as an 'ebb and flow' (48) between its inner and its outer, as a 'doubling up' (48) back upon itself, both toward cultural creativity and away from it; while for Hegel, spirit forever oscillates between a succession of positive and negative phases as it makes a meandering, unsteady, but determined progress toward the absolute. For Cassirer, the goal or actualization of spirit is culture; for Hegel, absolute knowledge.

Bayer (129-52) discusses the complicated interrelationships among the three basis phenomena, and does not shirk from addressing paradoxes and apparent inconsistencies in Cassirer's exposition. Even though the first is logically prior to the second, and the second to the third, the first cannot exist without the second, nor the second without the third, for all three are 'equally primordial' (144) as original or elementary phenomenon (*Urphänomen*) (1996: 128). The dialectic of all three together is teleological (145). In Goethe's theory of knowledge the basis phenomena are inaccessible. Bayer explains (157-163) how Cassirer arbitrates in a Socratic way between this Goethean side, which he appears to favor, and the Cartesian and Kantian sides, which would argue that access to basic phenomena is possible under some circumstances.

The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms relies heavily upon Goethe, but for Cassirer, Goethe was not a systematic philosophical predecessor, but only a convenient literary starting point for the exposition of basis phenomena and a few other ideas. Among the genuine philosophers cited in *The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms*, Cassirer makes the most use of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Bergson, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Natorp, Simmel, Husserl, Uexküll, and Spengler. Some of these derivations are negative. None of this is lost on Bayer, but she also discusses, especially as regards basis phenomena, Cassirer's relations to Fichte, Schelling, Dilthey, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and — perhaps in deference to Verene — Vico, whom Cassirer mentions only once (1996: 103).

Bayer is Verene's protegée — not at all a bad thing to be if one wishes to become expert on Vico, Hegel, Cassirer, or any number of important specu-

lative philosophers. She has written a clear, accessible gloss on a rather complicated, elliptical, and allusive piece of thought. Any student of Cassirer seeking to grasp the new culmination of *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* would do well to compare her book to the primary text.

Eric v.d. Luft
SUNY Upstate Medical University

Oren Ben-Dor
Constitutional Limits and the Public Sphere.
Portland, OR: International Specialized Book
Services (for Hart Publishing, U.K.) 2000.
Pp. x + 336.
US$70.00. ISBN 1-84113-111-3.

Oren Ben-Dor develops a very ambitious project in *Constitutional Limits and the Public Sphere.* He not only attempts a scholarly reconstruction of Bentham's philosophical enterprise, most specifically Bentham's conception of constitutional limits, but he also attempts to separate the historical Bentham from currently accepted portraits offered by influential later scholars. Most important here is Ben-Dor's critique of Hart's interpretation. But his project is even larger than the aims delimited above. The historical reconstruction is then used to critique contemporary theories of constitutional limits and authority. Ultimately Ben-Dor aims at a nuanced revision of standard understandings of constitutional limits, political authority, and utilitarian justice.

The argument offered goes as follows. Bentham offers a theory of constitutional limits attached to utilitarianism and harm that allows for the socially dynamic nature of politics, the limits of communal understandings, as well as the diffuse origins of social, and legal, duty. First, it is argued that a political organization founded upon the principle of harm (the avoidance of harm) results from the adoption of utilitarianism. Harm, though, is not to be seen as a science-based or technocrat-measured and applied concept. To the contrary, harm is a concept that is to be understood as a central tool in a dynamic process of community-based discourse and interpretation. The principle of harm is therefore to be used by the given political society as a central tool in democratic deliberation. Through the use of the principle of harm a community engages in an interpretive social process, which includes public discourse and critical self-reflection, in the hope of arriving at a general conception of constitutional limits. This is because the actual content

of the harm principle is not to be seen as given, but rather as a social, a human, construct. To encourage this constructive discourse based upon avoidance of harm, limits on governmental and social control of speech are necessary. Instead of seeing constitutional limits being based upon natural rights or the like they are argued to be founded upon the principle of freedom of speech, avoidance of harm and the public's ultimate sovereignty. Bentham uses the admittedly fictitious entity of a Public Opinion Tribunal (POT) to characterize the public's position of sovereign. Ultimately constitutional government is limited by the public's (the POT's) understanding of harm. Because these limits are socially recognized, because citizens are both members of the POT and subjects to it, a political duty to obey, an obligation of the citizen, ensues. All this creates what could be thought of as a 'panoptic democracy' (243).

Ben-Dor argues that such a construction of Bentham's utilitarianism provides the most powerful basis for democratic and constitutional social criticism that allows for diversity of individual and social ideals. Basing discourse on the concept of harm allows for differing ideals of the good to be maintained as far as possible in political organization and restricts as far as possible the necessary domains where agreement has to be constructed between them. Further, in focusing upon the use of harm as a central principle in social discourse, even in the face of unavoidable disagreement, the issues will be clarified and limits and causes of the disagreement better understood. By accepting the concept of harm, and not any specific cultural conception of harm, as the starting point for political discussion it is claimed that agreements will be explicated and disagreements adjudicated in an optimal manner.

There are many virtues to this vision of constitutional limits. First, it makes available a manner in which Bentham can both argue against natural rights and yet maintain the importance of constitutional rights. Bentham is infamous for characterizing rights as 'nonsense upon stilts', but this seemingly universal rejection of rights discourse can be seen more narrowly as a critique of natural law theories of rights. These natural law theories are arguably not able to admit cultural perspective or allow for the dynamic quality of society. A theory of rights that is able to admit both perspective and change is therefore different enough to escape the major reasons that caused Bentham to dismiss natural rights theories as bunkum. Further, because harm is grounded empirically, the conservative and metaphysically problematic aspects of rights discourse are at least somewhat mitigated. This move therefore allows Bentham's theory to provide a more naturalistic and publicly justifiable conception of rights.

Second, this picture of constitutional authority can help explain philosophically controversial questions of authenticity and judicial review. For example, the positivist theory of law could be thought to have a hard time explaining the validity of a result of judicial review wherein a law is declared unconstitutional even though it passes all basic tests of legitimate legal authorship. Ben-Dor's picture of Bentham allows for a picture of constitu-

tional authority that is often decentered and always multi-leveled. Third, and perhaps more valuable for scholarship than actual political practice, if this construction of Bentham is warranted it saves Bentham's thought from the positivist-structured debates of Hart, Dworkin, etc. The need to become aware of the uncritical use of Hart-based tools of analysis in understanding Bentham's work is apparent. Therefore the premise animating this part of *Constitutional Limits and the Public Sphere* is welcome.

But there are questions that remain to be answered. How accurate is this reconstruction of Bentham's work? Ben-Dor's argument is complex and many times confusing. Often it seems that a single cite in Bentham's sizable corpus is used to justify a whole reconstruction of his thought. More evidence from Bentham's works would go a long way in supporting the argued for interpretation. Further, it often seems that the justified and vitally needed critique of a Hartian view of Bentham's thought is offered only to be replaced with a problematic view of Bentham as a philosophical precursor to Habermas. But seeing Bentham through eyes educated and constrained within the social discourse theory of Habermas is not necessarily any fairer to Bentham's own thought. Further, the constitutional centrality of the principle of harm is not nearly as clear as presupposed by the argument offered. Other options could be thought equally central to a socially dynamic discourse of constitutional limits. For instance, why not rest constitutional limits upon the centrality of moral or rational agency? T.H. Green argues very effectively that moral agency is the best principle upon which to constrain political activity. Another option is to rest constitutional limits upon a set of incommensurable aims. A version of this allowing for both discourse and social dynamism is offered by the Capabilities approach argued for by Martha Nussbaum. More argument is certainly necessary to explain why the harm concept is most useful in public discourse on the uses and limits of government.

So, the ambitious aims and arguments in the book are left somewhat incomplete. But *Constitutional Limits and the Public Sphere* is ultimately to be applauded for its ambition. Bentham's thought does need to be faced on its own terms — and this project is daunting. Further, Ben-Dor offers a very interesting and possibly important version of utilitarianism when taken on its own terms. This argument may very well represent an important one for understanding the relation that rights and constitutional limits have to utilitarian methods of justification.

Brian E. Butler
University of North Carolina, Asheville

David Boucher and **Paul Kelly, eds.**
Social Justice: From Hume to Walzer.
New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. x + 288.
Cdn$132.00: US$85.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-14997-5);
Cdn$38.99: US$27.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-14998-3).

Editors Boucher and Kelly, who endeavored to demonstrate the existence of a coherent historical tradition in their earlier collaboration *The Social Contract From Hobbes to Rawls* (London: Routledge 1995), seek instead with *Social Justice: From Hume to Walzer* (henceforth *SJ*) to highlight the fact, as they see it, that 'debates about social justice are often about very different things' (3). The fourteen essays collected in this volume support this claim, and represent original contributions to Anglo-American liberal theory, chiefly from scholars in the United Kingdom. And while many of the practical illustrations and political examples are drawn largely from British politics and the British public sphere, and consequently might be opaque to students outside the UK, this problem can be easily remedied with only minor supplemental instruction in the contemporary social problems that motivated, for example, the creation of the independent Commission on Social Justice in the early 1990s.

The essays can be grouped into three general thematic units: (i) engagement with historical sources; (ii) contemporary debates, problems, future directions; and (iii) moral foundations of social justice, with different units appealing to scholars and students. For instance, those scholars interested in theories of social justice beyond the 'Rawls-type theorizing' that has dominated the last thirty years of political theory are likely to find the historically oriented essays of (i) to be of primary interest, as most offer unconventional interpretations of both established and under-appreciated contributors to the social justice canon. For example, the general framework of Gauthier's mutual advantage contractarianism can be found in the re-printing of his still controversial 'David Hume, Contractarian', and his work has received a good deal of attention as a possible alternative to other rational agreement theories of justice. Joseph Femia's essay on Pareto's epistemological objections to social justice theorizing is a thought-provoking analysis of an economist usually overlooked as a political theorist. Additionally, Boucher's illuminating attempt to locate an implicit 'thin' universalism within the particularism of British Idealists such as Bosanquet and Green deserves particular mention as a valuable contribution to a continuing historical controversy that also has its contemporary relevance.

SJ also covers many of the substantive debates occupying contemporary discussion: international justice, racism, the responsibilities and rights of citizenship, environmental theory, and feminist concerns. Still, those teachers of undergraduate courses on social justice who are seeking a collection that gives equal time to the voices of both liberalism and its detractors might

do well to look elsewhere. Richard Bellamy's chapter-length treatment of the work of Michael Walzer, for example, represents a genuine attempt at even-handed engagement with a critic of the liberal language of distributive justice. And yet, given the considerable attention feminists (particularly radical feminists) have paid to the patriarchal blind spots of liberal theory in the last several decades, one wonders at the single selection of Carole Pateman's retrievalist reconstruction of Marshall's social democratic rights. As well presented and argued as her essay is, Pateman's work is hardly representative of such an influential and diverse tradition of social justice theorizing.

The editors describe the theoretical character of *SJ*, however, as neither a history of theories of social justice nor solely a study of the concept itself, but, rather, an attempt at a balance (3). This turns out to be overly optimistic as the majority of essays fall into unit (ii) (with unit (iii) consisting of just two opposing answers by Lord Plant and Minogue to the question 'Why social justice?'). In fact, the focus of the majority of contributors is on the conceptual issues surrounding current debates rather than historical interpretation and reconstruction. This may prove helpful for orienting undergraduate and non-analytic philosophy graduate students, but political and social philosophers will have seen much of this terrain before. While not necessarily a weakness, this broad editorial decision to opt for breadth of selection as opposed to depth should be acknowledged.

For example, Chris Brown's excellent chapter is structured around a survey of the tensions involved with any attempt to render a coherent theory of inter-national social justice, and his adept analyses of competing theories of global justice will obviously work well in both political philosophy and international relations courses. Still, many political theorists are likely to find his conclusions somewhat innocuous, since a great deal of contemporary research is already motivated by the recognition that neither Rawlsian cosmopolitanism nor some version of solidaritist realism provides the framework needed for bridging the 'conceptual gap between justice in a world of states and global social justice' (114). The same general complaint extends to the contributions of Vincent, Modood, and Rex Martin to current debates on environmental justice, equality and multiculturalism, and economic justice respectively. All the more striking is the total omission of any discussion of arguably the most influential contemporary theorist of social justice, Amartya Sen.

Still, with this work Boucher and Kelly have provided a pedagogically useful guide to liberalism's continuing engagement with questions of social justice. *SJ* successfully shows (with the noted qualifications) the vigor of alternative traditions while at the same time avoids underplaying the differences within the liberal tradition itself, neither reducing the tradition to simply the banal orthodoxy of rational choice theory nor to Rawlsian contractarian justifications of distributive justice.

Matthew R. Hachee
Michigan State University

Bryant's concise volume is a contribution to recent discussion about the status of natural kinds. She associates her position with Hilary Putnam's 'internal realism', departing from it in one respect: a viewpoint-relative version of the correspondence theory of truth replaces Putnam's standard of justification under ideal epistemic conditions — but this development is not systematically discussed (32-7). Her views about categorization draw insight from recent psychological investigations of category formation, and maintain that objects are sorted into categories on the basis of the explanatory utility of those categories rather than simply on the basis of discoverable similarities. Disputes about classification in the life sciences, drawn from both the nineteenth century and more recent times, illustrate her position. She considers the success of her theory in making sense of these disputes as a confirmation of it.

Bryant targets a view that she calls 'objectivism', or 'metaphysical realism', which she attributes to Kripke, and to Putnam during his scientific materialist phase in the 1970s. She accepts Hartry Field's three-point summary of the position. Objectivists hold that the world consists of some fixed set of mind-independent objects, that there can only be one true and complete description of the way this world is, and that truth involves some sort of correspondence between our signs and the things and classes of things which exist in nature (38). As she sees it, the objectivist considers scientific research to be a kind of applied special metaphysics aimed at aligning our referring terms and terms for classes, relations and functions with the objects, classes relations and functions that constitute the order in the world. Once the alignment is complete, the truths available in this perfect world-representation will include *de re* necessary truths, recognized empirically, and revelatory of the essences of things. Natural kinds will be distinguished by distinct essences that determine distinct behaviours, and the truth about the natural world will be accessible once the single complete set of those essences is specified.

If this position sounds Leibnizian, Bryant's view is best described as a pluralistic version of Locke. She notes that Locke believed that the real essences of things determined their behaviour, but that investigators could at most construct a nominal essence for them (20). Medin and Ortony, two psychologists of categorization whose work Bryant admires, maintain that when establishing categories we take certain properties, salient to our explanatory purposes, as essential to the members of the category (62-3). This tendency relies on a common belief (heuristically valuable, but unjustifiable)

that things have essences that make them what they are. Other characteristics of things are considered accidental, or as common enough and accessible enough to permit an initial categorization of an individual, but as inessential. The properties that are taken to be essential to a kind are selected because they are useful in explaining some of the regularities marking the behaviour of members of that kind.

This view appears congenial to objectivism. However, Bryant agrees with J.V. Canfield that any necessity adhering to the link between essential properties and the kind with which they are associated is purely *de dicto*, an effect of the linguistic activity undertaken (92-7). Just as the same object can play different roles in different activities, intended for different purposes, so a category term can change its role and its necessary connections to other terms as the use to which it is to be put changes. We can detect a commonality of meaning through some set of these changes whenever there is a stability of content in the terms employed. A sufficient invariance in links between a term and its associates will establish a level of conceptual stability for it.

Connecting the necessity involved in the relation between natural kind terms and their essential properties to the linguistic and cognitive activities of the users opens up the possibility that there is more than one way to classify a field of study into natural kinds. Bryant maintains that, while there is a world independent of theorizers about it, how that world is organized depends on the cognitive purposes of the theorizers (a matter of epistemology) as well as on the characteristics of the world (a matter of 'metaphysics'). Different cognitive aims do, and should lead to different categorizations of nature.

These conclusions fit a number of phenomena well: coexisting incompatible systems of classification in the life sciences, distinct, incompatible theories for distinct purposes in the physical sciences, continuity in meaning despite theoretical change in the history of the sciences. It appeals to anyone attracted to ontological pluralism. Still they are not quite full Putnamian internal realism. Putnam appears to think that the world has no structure apart from human *construction*. The best theory of the world possible will still be a human creation that has succeeded by human standards of verification.

On the other hand, Bryant apparently holds that the structure(s) of the world depend on human *selection*. Objects in some field of study are classified into natural kinds, on the basis of properties taken to be essential to membership in that kind, but the kinds and their connections to essential properties are determined partly by the theoretical aims of the classifiers. Kinds and essences, therefore, depend on what could be loosely called an epistemological frame. However, while the properties used to classify may depend on some epistemological frame, it is not the one under development by the classifier; they are a part of the material employed in that development. While kinds and essences are parts of an epistemological frame, the properties definitive of them are prior to it.

If there is a basic level of classification, there must be frame-independent properties employed to get categorization under way. Bryant seems to concede this, claiming commitment to a 'mind-independent world populated by real entities and real properties' (17). It is classification of these objects that requires a viewpoint. The extreme complexity of the world demands it: no single way of organizing information about any domain could describe its complexity, or account for the regularities to be found in it (111-16). This leaves an undiscussed metaphysical puzzle. How could the world manifest regularities which, taken together, are too complex in principle to admit a single unified account?

Thomas Mathien
University of Toronto

Theories of Art Today represents yet another attempt at answering the question: 'What is art?' or, put another way, 'What distinguishes art from nonart?' In his introduction, Noël Carroll claims that *Theories of Art Today* is not a revolutionary philosophical book as the mid-century skepticism concerning the possibility of defining art — which Carroll calls 'neo-Wittgensteinism' — has long been contested. *Theories of Art Today*, rather, 'continues a well-established discussion' dedicated to the definition of art. And Carroll adds that the book's contribution to this philosophical tradition is somewhat subtle: 'With the great benefit of hindsight, more precise distinctions are being drawn, subtler conceptions of the project of definition are being proposed, and more detailed arguments are afield. The progress in evidence in this volume is incremental rather than monumental. But it is to be hoped that in its own way, *Theories of Art Today* will provide the solid footing for the next step in the debate' (4). Theories of art that attempt to determine the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for calling something a work of art adopt one (or a combination) of the following approaches: cultural, historical, intentionalist, and institutional. The contributors of *Theories of Art Today*, some of whom are leading figures of the field, represent these various

approaches. Though most of their articles deserve attention, I only refer to some of them in this review.

Arthur C. Danto argued in *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (1981) that the distinction between works of art and ordinary objects could no longer be taken for granted because works of art in the latter half of the twentieth century are at times indiscernible from ordinary objects. Andy Warhol's *Brillo Box*, for example, looks just like the real Brillo boxes. Still, Danto identified two conditions he thought were sufficient to account for the difference between these two kinds of objects — irrespective of 'what meets the eye': 1) a work of art has to be about something and 2) it has to embody its meaning. The problem, however, is that the real Brillo Boxes satisfy the two conditions. Danto has since revised his definition of art. He mentions in 'Art and Meaning' a third condition: a work of art has to be capable of sustaining art criticism. Any object that is not the vehicle of an artistic statement, Danto contends, cannot satisfy this third condition. Marcia Eaton adopts a slightly modified formulation of Danto's last condition: a work of art must be worthy of (sustained) attention and interpretation. This formulation is meant to be less theory-bound than Danto's. The meaning of a work of art is not determined by the theories developed in the artworld, but by its intrinsic properties. One does not need to be an art critic to be 'grabbed' by a work of art and ask oneself questions such as: 'What's going on here?' 'What's the point?' 'Why is this here, rather than there?' (153). Eaton also argues that it helps to be reminded, through communal practices, actions, or institutions, that something is a work of art so as to engage in aesthetic experiences.

Not unlike other analytical philosophers of art who adopt the institutional approach, George Dickie holds that art is an open concept, and that it is impossible to determine its necessary and sufficient conditions (or properties). '[W]orks of art are art' not because they possess determinate properties but 'because of the position they occupy within an institutional context' (93). What this institutional (or cultural) context is or ought to be, however, is the subject of much debate. In 'The Institutional Theory of Art', Dickie retraces the genesis of his definition of art and points out that the common and widely accepted interpretation of his view is actually a misinterpretation, for it neglects the *later* version of his definition. Dickie's later definition specifies that artists (not society) are the creators of art, and that one person alone (rather than society or a sub-group of society) can confer the status of work of art to an object. Dickie adds, moreover, that we all acquire at an early age a basic understanding of what it means to be an artist and what a work of art is, so that anyone can be (at least in principle) a competent judge in cultural matters. Joseph Margolis defends an 'objective' approach to works of art in 'The Deviant Ontology of Artworks'. This is not to say that works of art are art because they possess some determinate objective predicates. The realism Margolis adheres to is of a 'constructive' kind: the 'predicative objectivity is not criterial but collective, consensually tolerant, grounded in the discursive practices of an enabling society, and subject to historical drift' (125).

Peg Zeglin Brand also emphasizes the cultural context in 'Glaring Omissions in Traditional Theories of Art', *but not the existing one*. Traditional theories of art claim to use universal and objective criteria to define and evaluate art. Yet these criteria are typically based on a narrow range of paradigms, that is, works from white male artists. The artworld is no less problematic. In its actual form, it is 'traditional, hierarchical, conservative, and founded on "white male terms" ' (189). What is needed is a radically transformed artworld: one that has a 'true spirit of openness,' and 'that values artworks *because* they diverge from the white, male viewpoint and traditional aesthetic norms of evaluation' (190).

In ' "But They Don't Have Our Concept of Art" ', Denis Dutton also attempts to enlarge the range of art paradigms. Dutton objects to the West's tendency to attribute a greater value to High Art than to craft traditions. He criticizes, too, anthropologists of art who, in an attitude no less ethnocentric than the one adopted by philosophers of art, exaggerate the differences between Western and non-Western works of art and adopt a rhetoric of cultural uniqueness. According to Dutton, there is a universal concept of art, and his definition of art (which has eight components) is meant to be general enough to encompass both Western and non-Western works of art.

Theories of Art Today has many positive features. This book represents the current debate on the definition of art by leading figures in the field, and is therefore required reading for anyone interested in this philosophical topic as well as anyone desiring to be introduced to it. Contrary to most edited volumes, moreover, this one has a genuine unity. All contributors attempt to provide a definition of art. Also, all contributors compare and contrast their own definition with the ones from other contributors (or philosophers of art). There is, as a result, a real dialogue going on in *Theories of Art Today*, and the reader is in an excellent position to make up her or his mind about the respective value of each definition. Still, if 'progress' is possible in defining art, and if analytical philosophers of art have made so much progress that they are now merely offering 'more precise distinctions' and 'more detailed arguments', as Carroll suggests in his introduction, one cannot help but wonder: *What next?*

Julie Custeau
University of Toronto

Jean-Pierre Changeux and **Paul Ricœur**
What Makes Us Think?:
A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue
about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain.
Trans. M.B. DeBevoise.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
2000. Pp. x + 335.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-691-00940-6.

What is it that makes you think? Is it you that thinks, or is it your brain that makes you think? If you think and if it is your brain that makes you think, are you then your brain? These are some of the fundamental problems of neuroscience and philosophy that Jean-Pierre Changeux and Paul Ricœur discuss in this volume of their dialogues.

Neurobiologist Changeux and philosopher Ricœur describe their discussion as a necessary encounter of science and philosophy. Successes of science have impressed the general public for centuries and the public has trusted science with enthusiasm. But not everyone embraces the successes of science with open arms, because we should also ask: Can science explain to us the nature of mind, morality, religion, and peace as well as philosophy does? Philosophy used to monopolize these topics and has left an enormous textual heritage. Can philosophy still shed more and better light on these problems? Ricœur believes that the answer is yes, but for Changeux the answer is no. Changeux is hopeful that neuroscience can provide us with sufficient explanatory powers for these topics; but Ricœur cautiously delineates the limits of neurobiological explanation. Ricœur claims, for instance, that scientific accounts cannot capture all the aspects of mental experience. He asks (60): 'Can mental experience be "identified" with the observed neuronal activity?' Changeux answers (60): 'For me this poses no problem in principle.' But Ricœur emphasizes that correlation should not be confused with identity (50-1): '[T]here is a certain relationship between the structure of the brain and the psyche, but it does not tell me what the relationship is.' Cerebral activities underlie all mental phenomena, and we can in principle find a physical basis for each mental phenomenon. But what does this prove? For Changeux, it proves pretty much everything we need in order to explain our mentality. Ricœur rebuts, however, that a mere confirmation of the mind-body correlation does not much help us understand our mentality that essentially includes consciousness, reflection, and intentionality.

Changeux and Ricœur further discuss the origin of morality. Changeux's accounts of morality heavily rely on the evolutionary theory in biology: individuals' moral virtues and behaviors contribute to the survival of the species they belong to. He says (189): '[A]ltruistic behaviors and compassion would no longer run contrary to nature; they would point *in the same direction*. They would prolong by nongenetic means, and with a much more rapid dynamic, a suspended genetic evolution.' However, Ricœur has an insightful rebuttal (193): 'Apart from our moral questioning ... nature does

not move in any direction.' In other words, evolution has no fixed direction with regard to morality. Changeux and others find the origin of morality in our natural history only with our retrospection. Ricœur also makes an interesting point (200): '[M]ust we know our brain better in order to better behave? This is an open question.' The two authors proceed to discuss the problems of ethical universality and cultural conflict focusing on the issue of religious struggles. Much of their discussion is centered on the following provocative proposition: Religion produces war. Although Changeux's neurobiology and Ricœur's philosophy do not bear any direct relation on this topic, readers will find their discussion interesting and informative.

This book covers a variety of topics, and the two authors agree and disagree demonstrating their impressively encyclopedic knowledge. Summing up the result of their encounter they write (ix): '[T]he philosopher found his devastating arguments undermined, the scientist his incontrovertible facts overturned.' However, this is not the impression one gets after reading their book. Their positions remain the same in every detail: Changeux and Ricœur reconfirm all the differences between their views that they started with. Readers will also notice that the language of this book does not maintain the colloquial style of the dialogues. Changeux is not difficult to read, but for non-philosophers Ricœur's philosophical points will not always be easy to follow.

Changeux and Ricœur are both French intellectuals. Changeux's neurobiology must not be very different from neurobiology of the rest of the world. But Ricœur's phenomenological approach to philosophical problems is very different than that of mainstream analytic philosophy in English-speaking societies. 'A necessary encounter of science and philosophy' in this book should accordingly be understood as an encounter of science and continental European philosophy. Unlike phenomenology and hermeneutics, analytic philosophy has always paid attention to the developments in science, and there have been numerous close encounters between analytic philosophy and science. If a philosopher in the analytic tradition had taken up Ricœur's position, she would have reached different conclusions with Changeux. Also, the theme of their discussion would have been characterized as the issue of the possibility of reduction in philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and others. And we are aware that there have been philosophers who support reductionism.

The two authors' dialogues are quite informative and interesting. One can read with excitement Changeux's account of some recent achievements in neuroscience; and his examples are always interesting. Ricœur also reports various views of phenomenology and hermeneutics that philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition may find interesting and refreshing. This book is worth reading.

Chang-Seong Hong
Minnesota State University Moorhead

David Cockburn
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.
New York: Palgrave Press 2001.
Pp. xviii + 157. US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN
0-333-78637-8); US$18.95 (paper: ISBN
0-333-96122-6).

The most distinctive feature of this clearly written and engaging book is that throughout its ten chapters, Cockburn simultaneously develops two independent projects. The first project, as the title suggests, is to introduce the novice to some of the traditional issues in the philosophy of mind. To this end, the book is structured around discussions of dualism, physicalism, the problem of other minds, mental causation, personal identity, free will, etc. But the book is not just an unbiased survey; Cockburn's second project is to develop his own Wittgensteinian views about the proper methods and subjects of philosophical inquiry. The two projects are interwoven so closely that newcomers to philosophy will probably not detect where Cockburn is describing the major positions in the various areas, and where he is defending his personal viewpoint.

Cockburn presents traditional philosophy of mind as being composed of two camps: Cartesian dualists and physicalists. Although we typically consider these camps to be strongly opposed, Cockburn argues that what they have in common is far more important. They both agree that 'the "mind" ... is something distinct from the bodily being that (brain surgeons aside!) others see or touch' (143). This common assumption has skewed studies in the philosophy of mind. Instead Cockburn urges us to focus on the '*human being*', which is 'that which moves the furniture, comforts my friends, and so on' (143). While Cartesians and physicalists become embroiled in problems concerning the exact nature of the relation of the mind to the external world, the human being approach suggests that we begin theorizing by taking the topic to be the total human being, who is part of 'the social world in which people judge that each other understand something, are in pain, are angry, or are in love' (41). Given this starting point, Cockburn suggests that most of the traditional issues of philosophy of mind disappear.

The reader — beginner or trained philosopher — is sure to wonder exactly how Cockburn's view opposes the two traditional camps. Cockburn's answer is the Wittgensteinian (and Humean) claim that 'all justifications must end somewhere' (101). True enough; but the kind of justification one is looking for often depends on the nature of one's project. For example, compare the point at which the justification of a numerical calculation ends in an engineer's proof with where it ends in the proof by a logician working on the foundations of mathematics. The logician can be thought of as doing a kind of metaphysics, seeking to understand at a very abstract level how the numbers work. In contrast, the engineer's standards are largely epistemological: she seeks only to show that her answer follows from what engineers all know about numbers. Like the logician, traditional philosophers of mind

are often doing a kind of metaphysics, seeking to understand mental phenomena at some very fundamental level. On the other hand, Cockburn's human being approach is more of a theory of ordinary epistemology, where answers to questions need only be shown to follow from what we all know (or what all of us do not question that we know, except for skeptics, eliminative materialists etc.). Cockburn focuses on our ordinary epistemic positions, where we require no special justification for holding that there is a physical world, or that other minds exist. From this standpoint, the traditional philosopher's quest for explanations and justifications are unnecessary, for reasons similar to why engineers often don't worry about the foundations of mathematics. But these considerations show only that traditional philosophical activity is undermined only when it is construed as a reconstruction of commonsense epistemology. But few if any traditional philosophers of mind are engaged in such an epistemological project. Instead of explaining what it would be to replace (or supplement) traditional theorizing with the human being approach, the book's chapters often have the following format: the Cartesian and physicalist views about topic X are presented and subjected to some standard criticisms; afterwards, the human being approach to the topic is presented (where the latter position is usually to deny the importance of the topic as philosophers have construed it). If the book is used in the classroom, fruitful discussion should arise about the relation of the human being approach to the two other camps.

Because of the radically different stance the human being approach takes to many philosophical issues, Cockburn's presentations of it frequently open the door to various side issues that are related to the philosophy of mind. For example, at the end of his discussion of other minds, Cockburn appeals to the utility of non-physical descriptions of an event in order to 'raise a doubt about the insistence that we do not, strictly speaking, *see* the joy in another's face, the anger in another's eyes, and so on' (53). Cockburn's idea is something like this: a purely physical description of an event might not clarify other important features of the event, such as that it was an event of Jones's voting for the motion. Since nonphysical vocabulary will be needed to capture these features of the event, perhaps it is similarly legitimate to say that one (literally) sees the joy in another's face. Cockburn's suggestion makes it natural to enrich a classroom discussion of other minds by raising questions about the kinds of theoretical vocabulary it is legitimate to assume in a given context. Does the fact that folk psychology and the special sciences often produce well-confirmed nomological generalizations thereby legitimate their vocabulary, or must these generalizations be reducible to generalizations in the language of physics? What if such a reduction is not possible? Even if the vocabulary of folk psychology and the special sciences is legitimated, does that thereby legitimate such expressions as 'x sees the joy in y's face' as a primitive predicate of philosophical research? While it is not obvious that Cockburn has successfully cast doubt on whether the notion of seeing joy in another's face needs no further analysis in the philosophical study of the

mind, such strong claims may encourage students to reflect on the nature of philosophy and of science.

Kent Johnson
(*Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science*)
University of California, Irvine

Randall Curren begins his argument with a carefully constructed and very readable account of Aristotle's views on the necessity of public education. For Aristotle, the highest good is a life of virtue, something that cannot be achieved without education and habituation. Education will ensure the stability of the state by producing within it the best possible version of the constitution and by ensuring voluntary and habitual compliance with laws and customs. Aristotle argues that education can promote equality and unity by encouraging self-restraint and moderation of desire, nurturing benevolence, and promoting friendship. In short, a stable, just constitution and happy, unified citizens are the result of the deliberate educative efforts of legislators.

Curren takes the Aristotelian model as broadly prescriptive for education today. Curren argues that Aristotle rightly regards the development of moral and intellectual virtues as crucially important, and civic education should, therefore, aim to produce the abilities and virtues 'conducive to mutual respect, social cooperation, good judgement and wise choices' (192). In any society, justice demands that every individual receive equal educational opportunities, care and socialization, making it imperative that the system be administered publicly. Aristotle, argues Curren, would not have supposed that upbringing and home instruction would spontaneously produce an education suitable to the constitution. No less today, the educational aims and forms of equality required by justice cannot be secured without government regulation of education. Thus Curren argues that present day efforts to secure state funding for separate schooling must be resisted, as separate schooling is 'inevitably unequal and deficient' (216).

For Aristotle, common schools were a means of creating unity within the polis and Curren sees that role as no less crucial today. Schools should promote goodwill, trust and friendship between children of all kinds to create a unified, stable society. Common schools are a public good, allowing children to participate in deliberation with others from a variety of backgrounds, and preparing them for future civic participation by giving them a 'foundation of previous experience in mutual trust, common action, and common success in collaboration with others' (197). Curren acknowledges that the variety of lives present in a pluralistic democracy make for a less unified society than Aristotle envisions, but argues that a 'more abstract sense of unity in pursuit of happiness could exist and would serve as a counterweight to the centrifugal forces exerted by the presence of competing conceptions of the good' (140). Curren concedes that common schools will serve to make children more alike and may 'undermine the capacity of families to pursue distinct versions of the good' (140). However, Curren sees plurality as an obstacle to mutual goodwill and commitment to the common good, thus making common schools more necessary than they would be in a more homogenous society. 'The danger lies not in us becoming too much like each other in our moral convictions but too different and inclined to demonize each other' (219).

Curren does much to highlight the importance of civic education and to demonstrate how complex a project it is to ensure a just and equitable education for all children. Not all of his conclusions, however, are likely to remain unchallenged, particularly when he enters the debate over school choice. Deferring to Aristotle in order to defend common schooling for our pluralistic democracy is somewhat suspect, as the diversity experienced in the Greek city state was largely one of social and economic differences. It may be easier to argue that such inequities should give way to equality of opportunity, than to argue that diverse cultural and religious groups must be open to assimilation for the sake of the common good. If, in fact, it is social and economic unity that Curren is particularly concerned about, insistence on common schooling may not be the only or even the best way of achieving that equity. While Curren assumes that separate schooling is a barrier to social equality this may in fact not be the case. The example Curren refers to does not seem particularly helpful in defending his case. Curren cites a 1967 report indicating that black children in segregated schools suffer serious harm and suggests that children in separate schools will face the same disparity of opportunity (216). But, while most separate schools are segregated on the basis of religion, many are quite diverse with respect to socio-economic status or race, and few are cut off from mainstream society in the way that Curren suggests. Separate schools may not be the significant barrier to social unity that Curren portrays them to be.

However, creating a unity of purpose and mutual goodwill is not Curren's only argument for common schooling. Curren suggests that most demands for separate schooling come from religious fundamentalists who want to shield their children from opposing views and 'do not want their children to think things through for themselves' (217). Curren regards parental at-

tempts to influence children's moral and religious identity as a hindrance to the development of the critical thinking skills necessary for autonomous moral judgements. I would like to make two comments in regard to this claim. First, Curren himself advocates moral education in particular virtues, arguing that while the inculcation of specific moral values is in tension with critical reasoning, it does not necessarily preclude it. If this is the case for public education in particular values, why could it not also be true for religious schooling? Second, I would challenge Curren's assumption that religious fundamentalists as a group are not interested in engaging in critical thinking. As Shelley Burtt argues, the long tradition of religious scholarship suggests otherwise. It should not be assumed that to reason from a religious perspective is somehow to abandon one's capacity for critical reflection. Separate schooling that is consistent with the instruction in moral virtues children receive at home may, in fact, give children the confidence necessary for serious reflection on their own version of the good and for exploration of new ideas.

Frances Kroeker
(*Education Policy Studies*)
University of Alberta

Antony Duff's first book on the normative theory of criminal procedure, *Trials and Punishments* (Cambridge U.P. 1986; henceforth *TP*), began by raising a deceptively simple issue: why is it that we do not allow a criminal trial to go forward if the defendant is deemed not fit to stand trial (*TP* 14ff.)? Duff's answer was that the trial process required the defendant to be a full participant in the proceedings, because only thus would due respect be paid to the defendant as a rational and autonomous human being worthy to be treated as an end, not a means. The first half of the book spelt out the implications of this Kantian principle for the process of detention and trial. The second half developed the implications of the principle for the justification of the punishment of convicted offenders. The thought, roughly, was that punishment should communicate to the criminal the nature of his crime, in

order to bring him to repentance, and that hard treatment may serve as a penance the appropriateness of which the criminal should be allowed to appreciate for himself. In the context of *TP*, this thought was developed fairly sketchily. The book spent most time on showing why consequentialist theories of punishment could not meet this Kantian demand, and considering but dismissing retributivist theories which distorted the demand. In addition, *TP* seemed to its critics more proud of, than embarrassed by, the distance between the theory stated and the realities of contemporary penal practice.

There was, therefore, clearly room for Duff to tell a much more rich and full positive story about exactly how acknowledgment of human autonomy and dignity could play itself out in a theory of punishment. *Punishment, Communication, and Community* (henceforth *PCC*) does not disappoint. It displays all the virtues which we have come to expect from Duff's writings on the foundations of the criminal law — originality and subtlety, exemplary clarity in command of analytical complexity, a prodigious grasp of the literature, and, pervasively and above all, an enlightened moral sensibility. *PCC*, nonetheless, differs from *TP* in two important ways. First, the normative foundation for the account of punishment is now, not so much the steel edge of Kantian personhood, as the warm cocoon of communitarian liberalism. Second, far more time is spent attending to the actualities of penal practice, and assessing how far different practices are and are not compatible with Duff's theory. Each of these is a welcome development.

The basic thesis of *PCC* is that 'criminal punishment should be understood and justified as a communicative, penitential process that aims to persuade offenders to recognize and repent the wrongs they have done, to reform themselves, and so to reconcile themselves with those they have wronged' (175). Chapters Three and Four form the central defence of this idea, and I will come to them shortly. The first two chapters Duff spends on preparing the ground. Chapter One surveys the standard theoretical approaches to punishment consequentialist, retributivist and abolitionist. Up to a point, this is familiar territory. However, Duff proceeds by considering only the latest versions of these theories in the literature, and, if one has not been active in the field oneself, many of these may well have been missed. The complexities of the theory of punishment have been more explored in the last two decades by academic lawyers and sociologists than by philosophers. The chapter is therefore a valuable 'bringing up to speed' for a wider philosophical audience, and can be recommended to students, instructors and anthologizers alike. Chapter Two lays out the 'communitarian' background which now forms the normative context for Duff's argument. The thought is that the liberal value of respect for the individual is respect for the individual within a community. This thought immediately puts some constraints on how the community may treat offenders — it may not punish them in ways which treat them as means to its own goals; it may not punish them by ways which amount to exclusion from community. But the thought also in principle justifies hard punishment for offenders, who have by their law-breaking actions repudiated the community of which they are a part. To be a member

of a community is in part to acknowledge the authority of that community's 'common law'.

Chapter Three, then, introduces the fundamental idea of punishment as 'communicative' (hence the label 'the communicative theory of punishment'). Punishment 'communicat[es] to offenders the censure that their crimes deserve' (79). Punishment is appropriately 'communicative', because it must be 'a *reciprocal* and *rational* engagement' (ibid., Duff's emphasis). Punishment should express censure, but in ways which display the rational reasons for the censure without adding new reasons in the form of deterrent coercion (85). Punishment as communication looks both back to the wrong committed and forward to the possibility of repentance and reform. Punishment as communication is inclusive, not exclusive — the offender is shown that they are still part of the community, even though they merit the community's censure for their actions (106). While the offender owes repentance to the community, the community owes offenders 'to treat them and address them as members of the normative political community' (113). We must 'attempt to persuade a responsible, autonomous agent to repent of his crime', rather than 'attempt to bully or manipulate him into submission' (122). So conceived, punishment is, Duff argues, 'consistent with, indeed expressive of, the defining values of a liberal political community' (129).

Chapter Four discusses 'communicative sentencing'. Already Duff has had some discussion of practical penal policy: in Chapter Three he considered various forms of probation and of community service orders as forms of communicative sentences (99-115). Here he looks at the issue of communicative sentencing more abstractly. Several important points are made. Some principle of proportionality between crime and sentence is needed, but it should be a 'negative' principle that is, one which establishes an appropriate limit to the sentence in both form and content, but which allows sentencing discretion for the individual case (131-41). Monetary punishments should be used far less than they actually are, because they have little communicative value (146-8). Imprisonment has great potential for misuse on liberal-communitarian assumptions, because of its exclusory character. It should be reserved only for the most serious crimes, and then only for far shorter periods than is presently the norm (150-1). Capital punishment, needless to say, cannot serve the communicative aims of repentance, reform and reconciliation (152-5). After a careful discussion, Duff does come to the uneasy conclusion that there may be a 'very small class' (174) of truly dangerous offenders for whom a long period of exclusive incarceration may be morally acceptable. But he emphasizes how small the class is, and in any case such individuals pose a difficulty for any theory of punishment with liberal premises, not just his theory. In the final chapter, Duff argues that requirements of legitimacy make it doubtful whether the criminal law is authoritative over people systematically marginalized by the state and its practices. He also notes that a communicative approach puts constraints on the technical language of the law, and that, even though an inclusive liberal community owes it to the victims of crime to punish crime, it owes also inclusory

treatment to those convicted of crimes. His final conclusion is that the communicative theory outlines falls far short of justifying our existing penal practices; in fact, it condemns most of them. But it does suggest some guidelines for what a morally justified penal system might look like.

I will make just two comments on the overall argument. First, Duff's opposition to consequentialist theories of punishment is unwavering, even to 'mixed' theories which allow for deterrent penalties for the recalcitrant (cf. 80-9). It is not for the liberal state to seek to coerce the citizen mind. Now, the justification of such a view is no problem given the Kantian-liberal premises of the earlier book *TP*. But it is not clear that the view must follow from the liberal-communitarian premises of *PCC*. Ronald Dworkin argued in his essay 'Principle, Policy, Procedure' (reprinted in *A Matter of Principle* [Harvard U.P. 1985]) that in relation to criminal justice citizens have a right to an accurate assessment of moral harm and to equal treatment given that assessment, but not necessarily to more than that. Dworkin is thinking of criminal procedure, not criminal punishment; but why should the two be different? We need to hear more about why liberal-communitarian premises require such a high level of respect for the individual, when it may not be required even by liberal-individualist premises. Second, Duff acknowledges almost as a throwaway — though a correct one — that 'criminal punishment on my account is a mode of communication that is imbued with emotion' (177). It seeks to induce remorse, and communicates indignation and anger. He notes the need therefore to avoid vindictive self-righteousness and other undesirable ventings of emotion, and argues his account succeeds in doing that. Fair enough, but there is a deeper issue. A criminal justice system, if it is to be a system of *justice*, must be even-handed and impartial. It's true that 'impartial' does not mean 'indifferent'; emotion and impartiality are not incompatible as such. But impartiality arguably implies at least a suspension, or a reigning in, of emotion in the process of judgment and execution of judgment. How is a 'mode of communication that is imbued with emotion' also to be one which is impartial and even-handed? We need to hear more.

Punishment, Communication, and Community is a fine book. There are innumerable arguments and insights at the level of detail which cannot be noted in a brief review. The communicative theory of punishment presents a profound moral challenge to theorist, policy-maker and practitioner alike to rethink and reconstruct contemporary penal practices to meet the highest standards of liberal political morality. Five stars out of five.

Roger A. Shiner
Okanagan University College

Jean-Pierre Dupuy
The Mechanization of the Mind:
On the Origins of Cognitive Science.
Trans. M.B. DeBevoise.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
2000. Pp. xiv + 210.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-691-02574-6.

Dupuy's book was first published in France in 1994 under the title of *Aux Origines des Sciences Cognitives*. Here, it has been translated by Malcolm DeBevoise. Dupuy examines the emergence and decline of the interdisciplinary science of cybernetics — a science of the goal-directedness of natural and artificial systems. At the heart of cybernetics were two convictions. One is that the mind/brain and other living systems operate like a machine. The other is that reference to physical laws and processes can explain how systems (including human and non-human animals) appear to be goal-directed in behavior.

Dupuy argues that these two convictions, together with various other complementary attitudes, served as nothing less than the historical conceptual origins of cognitive science. This helps to mean that many of the strengths and weaknesses of cognitive science derive from its origins in cybernetics, and that the mistakes of cybernetics help to reveal inherent limitations in cognitive science.

Dupuy provides an overview of the ideas and personalities of major figures in the history of cybernetics as these emerged at ten Josiah Macy Foundation conferences during the 1940s and early 1950s and surrounding activity. Central players include John von Neumann, Norbert Wiener, Warren McCulloch, and Walter Pitts. Dupuy offers a critical appraisal of the philosophical foundations of cybernetics and a comparison and contrast of these foundations with those of cognitive science. He focuses on classical or traditional cognitive science, which is a materialist but also computationalist, non-reductionist and non-neurobiological conception of the mind/brain, and combines this with an admiration for Heidegger, Thomas Nagel, John Searle and various other philosophers and theorists, for their explicit or implicit criticisms of cognitive science. He mentions influences that certain ideas in late stage cybernetics have had on post-classical cognitive science (connectionism and modeling in neural networks). However, the attention that Dupuy gives to these influences is slight as compared with his detailed discussion of the foundations of traditional cognitive science.

Dupuy describes various conceptual allegiances within cybernetics that, he argues, ultimately were responsible for its frustrated aspirations and decline in popularity. These include, among others, an emphasis on engineering and model building combined with admiration for natural biological systems, a disinterest in semantics combined with appreciation of logic and syntax, and a concern with human and social communication joined with doubts about the legitimacy of any science but physics. He claims that such

allegiances are infused with self-destructive tensions. Human social communication cannot be understood using the conceptual resources of physics. There is no syntax without semantics. Mother Nature is not a very intelligent model builder.

Dupuy charges that 'cognitive science ... is ashamed of its cybernetic heritage' (3). 'It was,' writes Dupuy, 'the realization that the history of cognitive science is the story of the rejection of parent by child that led me to undertake this study in the first place' (44). He also claims that cybernetics has an unhappy history. It is filled with passion and energy but also failure. Its 'advertised ambitions were enormous,' but it was a bitter disappointment as theory (15).

Does the book succeed? Dupuy's account of the historical roots of cognitive science in cybernetics appreciates the broad, multi-disciplinary character of cybernetics. Certainly this character has been admired by cognitive science. However his analysis of the history of cognitive science seems to me to face, without much explicit acknowledgment, at least one serious problem. This problem infects any history of ideas, but especially a history of cognitive science of Dupuy's sort. If there are ideas that historically help to form a theory or field, these may be difficult to individuate or identify. While one or more notions of cybernetics together with its spirit of interdisciplinary cooperation influenced cognitive science, the intellectual and social forces at work in the historical emergence of cognitive science were multi-form, and it is unclear, even today, precisely what the history of cognitive science really is. Much depends on what we understand the central ideas of cognitive science to be and on what standards are adopted for idea individuation.

Late developments in cybernetics, which Dupuy refers to as second-order cybernetics, have had a considerable influence on neural network models of cognition, which although not part of traditional cognitive science, which was non-neurobiological, are central to the subject today. However, oddly, Dupuy (as said above) has little to say about such influences or developments. One may also feel uneasy with Dupuy's charge that cognitive science has neglected its roots in cybernetics. More than one historian of cognitive science who is also a card carrying cognitive scientist (William Bechtel perhaps foremost) has appreciated those roots.

What about Dupuy's concern with the failure of cybernetics? Dupuy rightly faults cybernetics for its conceptual tensions and for not getting its personalities (the egos and social personality styles of its major figures) in communal order. Cybernetics had a desire to be interdisciplinary but it lacked a proper set of principles or directives for how to achieve this aim. It also lacked sufficiently committed and consistently forceful personalities and social institutions (universities and so on) that were willing to adopt or promote its particular interdisciplinary aspirations. It is not clear how to develop interdisciplinary fields. It is easy to underestimate the difficulty of integrating research methods from different fields. It is tempting to overestimate the degree to which the shared convictions of aspiring multi-disciplinarians are similarly understood and shared.

Dupuy's book is at its strongest, and here it is very strong, when he writes not about cognitive science but of cybernetics' own aspirations and failure. Dupuy therein produces a broad, humane, and historically informed understanding of how an interdisciplinary science can fail. As a document about foiled theoretical ambition, his book is filled with rich detail and impressive narrative scope and energy. When cybernetics is its focus, it is as an erudite and prudent warning against the temptations of premature interdisciplinary science.

George Graham
University of Alabama at Birmingham

Michel Foucault
Fearless Speech.
Joseph Pearson, ed.
Semiotext(e) 2001. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press 2001. Pp. 128.
US$11.95. ISBN 1-58435-011-3.

This edited transcription based on tape-recordings of six seminars given by Michel Foucault at the University of Berkeley in the fall of 1983 brings more clearly to light a pivotal theme in Foucault's later writings on ethics: the notion of *parrhēsia*, or 'one who speaks the truth'. Towards the end of his life, Foucault abruptly turned to the problematization of how we have fashioned ourselves as ethical subjects independently of wider scientific and moral codes and dominant modes of 'subjectivization'. The desiring subject was now at the root of Foucault's studies, and he sought, through a genealogical analysis of ancient Greek and Hellenist texts, to understand subject formation by exploring the Greek *technē tou biou*, or how one actually fashioned one's life as a work of art.

Concomitant with the notions of *technē tou biou* and *askēsis* (the 'real behavior' of individuals in their culture) was the practice of *parrhēsia*, or the type of relationship that exists between the speaker and what he says (owing to systematic oppression in ancient Greek society, women were deprived of the use of *parrhēsia*). In this series of lectures, provided by then auditor John Carvalho, Foucault explicates in more detail the practice of *parrhēsia* and its genesis in Greek society. The shortcoming of the book is the lack of a more substantial introduction on the part of the editor (less than a page) which would have aided readers by providing an overview of the significance of the concept of *parrhēsia* in Foucault's later writings. The transcript itself is

broken down into four chapters, dealing with *parrhēsia* in relation to the meaning of the word, its significance in the writings of Euripides, its role in democratic institutions, and its integral function in the care of the self, the subject of Foucault's ethics. He locates as key dimensions of *parrhēsia* frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty. But *parrhēsia* was not simply confined to the practice of ethical self-creation and the notion of a good citizen; it played, as Foucault notes, a significant role as a guideline for democracy in the political arena. Along with *demokratia*, *isēgoria* (the equal right of free speech), and *isonomia* (the equal participation of all citizens in the exercise of power), *parrhēsia* functioned as a requisite for public speech, both between citizens as individuals, and between citizens participating in Greek assemblies.

The origins of the practice of *parrhēsia* can be further located in the field of philosophy itself, and this is where Foucault's later conception of 'life as a work of art' and an 'aesthetics of existence' acquires significance. In one example, Socrates appears in the writings of Plato as exemplifying the role of the *parrhēsiastēs*, urging Athenians to take care of themselves through the cultivation of wisdom, truth, and the perfection of their souls. In the age of the Cynics, *parrhēsia* functioned to facilitate 'provocative dialogue' and 'critical preaching'. Such '*parrhēsiastic* games' were also essential for the establishment of a relationship to oneself (Foucault's principle ethical concern); self-sovereignty and self-possession are the themes around which Foucault charted the differences between Greek and Christian ethics in his later writings. He came to the conclusion that ethical behavior in Greek society was an *activity* about which something might be learned through a genealogical analysis of 'truth-telling'.

As editor Joseph Pearson notes, the transcription of these tape-recordings does not bear Foucault's own imprimatur; he had no hand in the editing of the text, and from this we can only conclude that the Berkeley seminars were the working out of a form of moral experience Foucault sought to understand in relation to a particular 'stylization of existence'. Readers unfamiliar with Foucault's studies on Greek ethics may find this discussion, with its technical emphasis on the concept of *parrhēsia*, a bit elliptical, if not obscure. One of the keys to understanding the concept is its inexorable connection with other ancient Greek practices, such as those discussed by Foucault in other, later writings and interviews. On the other hand, for those interested in Foucault's studies dealing with ethical self-formation, *Fearless Speech* provides added insight into a concept he deemed to be indispensable for an understanding of the history of subject self-constitution.

Joan M. Reynolds
(*Departments of Political Science and Sociology*)
University of Alberta

The problems posed to religious and philosophical belief by the fact of religious diversity have become one of the central concerns of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, and with good reason. Griffiths's book is an attempt to outline some of those problems and point to possible solutions.

After a Preface and Acknowledgments, the book proper begins with a short section defining key terms as they will be used in the book. Chapter one, entitled 'Religious Diversity', begins with an extended discussion of the difficulties of defining the word 'religion', including a helpful historical survey of understandings of religion. Griffiths settles on the following definition: 'A religion is a form of life that seems to those who belong to it to be comprehensive, incapable of abandonment, and of central importance' (xiv, 7). This definition admits of a broad reading, as Griffiths himself points out; it is possible for someone to be a religious White Sox fan, or a religious Marxist. He then discusses four issues raised by religious diversity: What can be said about the truth of religious claims? What epistemic claims can be made on the behalf of the various religions? What is to be done about the 'religious alien', the person who stands outside your own religion? What is to be made of the notion of salvation?

Chapter Two addresses the question of truth claims, beginning with a useful distinction between assent (which involves belief), and acceptance (which does not). There is also a nice discussion of different kinds of incompatibility, since not all incompatibilities are logical inconsistencies. Griffiths identifies two possible positions on the matter of truth-claims in different religions. Either the conflicting claims cannot all be true, or they are all on a par vis-à-vis truth value. Wittgenstein and Kant represent two ways of making the case that all religious claims are on a par. Griffiths finds serious problems with these approaches, as they seem to end in relativism. The remaining position admits of two kinds. One, which Griffiths calls 'exclusivism', is defined as the view that no other religion's claims are true. The other view, 'inclusivism', is defined as the view that, while other religions may have true teachings, they are wrong where they disagree with mine.

The third chapter addresses the knotty problem of the effects of religious diversity on our epistemic confidence in our own religious beliefs. Griffiths asks two questions: Does knowing about religious diversity reduce people's confidence in their own religion's teachings, and under what conditions is it reasonable to think that it should. He comes to the conclusion, guided by an excellent exposition of William Alston's arguments on the subject, that knowledge of religious diversity should not, in general, be reason to abandon one's home religion.

How one should respond to the religious alien is the subject of Chapter Four. Griffiths finds three possible responses: Toleration, Separation, and Conversion. In his discussion of toleration, Griffiths includes a long analysis and critical review of Locke's work on the subject. Some religious groups seek to live apart from others; such separation constitutes another possible strategy for dealing with religious diversity. Finally, one can seek to bring the religious alien into one's own communion.

Chapter Five discusses the question of salvation, which Griffiths defines as 'your proper end, or fulfillment of your purpose' (xv, 138). On this matter, it is possible to believe that more than one religion offers a way to salvation, a view which he calls 'pluralism', or to believe that only your own religion provides the way to salvation, a view he calls 'restrictivism'. There follows a Guide to Further Reading, and an index.

Griffiths's book is deeply flawed and likely to be deeply unsatisfying to those who are concerned about the problems of religious diversity. First of all, he begins with a definition of religion that is entirely too broad. He admits that it has some breadth when he talks about religious Marxists and White Sox fans, but he seems to be unaware of how that breadth changes the problem. The claim that there is religious diversity can be understood, on this definition, as the claim that different people care deeply about different things. Many who are concerned about religious diversity want an account which includes the 'World Religions' but leaves out Marxism, Capitalism, and other belief systems. They are concerned to know precisely what distinguishes religions properly-so-called from these other things people may invest with importance.

Some of the positions and distinctions outlined by Griffiths turn out to be unhelpfully drawn. By distinguishing between theorists who think religions are all on a par with regard to truth and those who think they can't all be true, Griffiths leaves me wondering where those theorists belong who think all religious claims are false. They seem to fall in both groups. Likewise, defining salvation as one's proper end has the perverse consequence that Confucianism and Taoism each have an idea of salvation, since they each have an idea of what a human being should be like. Griffiths defines conversion as 'domestication', which leads him to say that '[c]onversion can never be complete' (120). This is so because complete conversion would mean making the alien into a copy of yourself. This claim is puzzling; as soon as I have made you believe the necessary tenets of my religion, my conversion of you is complete. I don't need to make you a Buffalo Bills fan as well. It is also left unclear why conversion is a different strategy from toleration; the fact that I wish to convert you does not motivate me to stop your practice of your religion while you remain unconverted.

The most serious problems are the more substantive ones. Chapter Three confuses several separate issues. One of the questions it asks is overtly psychological, when the rest of the chapter is about epistemology. On epistemological topics, Griffiths frequently commits level confusions. His second question in Chapter Three is under what conditions it is reasonable to think

that religious diversity should reduce our epistemic confidence in our own religions. But isn't the next question, after 'Does it do so?' is 'Should it do so?', not the higher-order question, 'Under what conditions is it reasonable to think it should do so?'

On the whole, the book deals with some difficult problems in a way that is bound to frustrate anyone who hopes for some help in thinking about them.

Mark Owen Webb
Texas Tech University

Toward the end of his life, the eminent utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgwick was assiduously working to create what would become the British Academy, and it was therefore altogether fitting for the Academy to commemorate the centenary of his death with a prestigious conference. The papers, by Stefan Collini, John Skorupski and Ross Harrison, with comments by Jonathan Rée, Onora O'Neill and Roger Crisp respectively, are presented in expanded versions in this elegant (if indexless) volume. They range widely, though as editor Harrison explains, the book presumes that 'study of a philosopher of practice should study both the thought and the practice, so that the history and the philosophy illuminate each other' (3).

Skorupski's 'Three Methods and a Dualism' is a tough-minded analytical piece that draws rather heavily on the sophisticated moral theory and psychology that he has developed in such works as *Ethical Explorations*. Whereas Sidgwick had famously and frustratedly concluded his *Methods of Ethics* by allowing that practical reason appears to end up in a draw between rational egoism and utilitarianism, neither being more rational than the other, Skorupski holds that practical reason is complex, but not schizoid. On his reconstruction, the 'utilitarian' side of the dualism becomes a 'philosophical utilitarianism' that basically amounts to impartialism. *Pure* practical reason, he argues, is not divided, but is this unitary impartialism — 'the good of any being is agent-neutrally good' (81). However, there are less pure regions of practical reason, involving such things as 'reasonable feelings', and these can also provide reasons for action, some of what are egoistic. Conflicts

thus arise on many fronts, but they are not within the house of pure practical reason, which does indeed indicate what one has 'most reason' to do, demanding as that may be (74).

O'Neill's response is baffling. She scarcely addresses Skorupski's arguments at all, offering instead a different — and massively erroneous — reading of Sidgwick as reducing practical reason to 'universal generalisation and instrumental rationality' (88).

Harrison's 'The Sanctions of Utilitarianism' is a welcome review of a topic of crucial importance to Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick — the use of external and internal sanctions to bring about the greatest good. He has a keen sense of how for Sidgwick 'self-sacrifice is not involved in the best of all possible worlds' and it 'is better for me if I can move from a world with a certain amount of good for me to a world in which there is more good for me and the same good for others. Not just better in itself, but better for me in a relativised way' (112). Harrison has a warmer appreciation than Skorupski of Sidgwick's genuine horror at the thought of a universe so perverse as to make duty and interest diverge, but, as Crisp acutely points out, he is less receptive to Sidgwick's pessimism about the potential of worldly or external sanctions to effect a Benthamite artificial harmony of interests. As Sidgwick acidly remarked in an essay on 'Bentham and Benthamism', 'unless a little more sociality is allowed to an average human being, the problem of combining these egoists into an organisation … is like the old task of making ropes of sand.' Sidgwick advocated cultivating the 'spirit of justice', impartiality, though it cannot be said that he was terribly optimistic about such internal sanctions either, since he was not terribly optimistic about anything.

Something of Sidgwick's practical political temperament comes through in Collini's more historical essay, 'My Roles and Their Duties: Sidgwick as Philosopher, Professor, and Public Moralist'. Collini struggles hard to place Sidgwick as a type, someone who was a bit too modern to be a good Millian 'public moralist', and he certainly deserves credit for having explored such things as Sidgwick's work for various Government Commissions, a task that very few have taken on. Ultimately, he allows that Sidgwick 'may have been an early example of a type which became more familiar by the mid-twentieth century: the socially well-connected don, one whose social experience gave him both the confidence and means of access to contribute directly and indirectly to the policy-making process, largely by-passing general public debate' (48).

This seems broadly accurate, and it is important to recognize that Sidgwick was very well-connected indeed. As Harrison allows, 'someone who had one brother-in-law who became Prime Minister and another who became Archbishop of Canterbury could never be claimed to be an outsider' (6). But this only makes it all the more disconcerting that Collini should trail off into a long, silly complaint about Sidgwick's 'boringness' instead of spelling out the more sinister side of his influence. He treats all of Sidgwick's machinations so gingerly that words like 'orientalism' and 'racism' are never so much as hinted at (Rée's response does nothing whatsoever to correct for this).

Thus, he discusses Sidgwick's long involvement with his student then brother-in-law Arthur Balfour without raising the matter of Balfour's repressive policies in Ireland — policies that he actively discussed with Sidgwick and that earned him the nickname 'Bloody Balfour'. And he remarks on Sidgwick's close collaboration with the scholar statesman James Bryce without indicating that among their shared interests was the 'problem' of 'race debasement' should a 'superior' and 'inferior' race mix. Sidgwick's racism, though not nearly as virulent as that of many of his contemporaries, was, alas, quite real. He was a friend, colleague, and supporter of the likes of Charles Henry Pearson, who went from Cambridge to a career as an educator and politician in Australia, where his work contributed to racist fears about the 'Yellow Peril'. And this is not to mention his involvement with such colleagues as Henry Sumner Maine and John Seeley, architects of British imperial policy in India.

Thus, weirdly enough, one might say of this book what Collini says of Sidgwick's ambivalent public involvement, 'on some occasions feeling the obligation to take up the polemical cudgels against various forms of half-truth, but more frequently wishing rather to limit than to stimulate public debate, preferring to act within carefully selected groups or even behind closed doors' (48). And after all, if one wants to make the study of Sidgwick less 'boring', one need only turn to his involvement with such figures as John Addington Symonds, the English follower of Walt Whitman and pioneer of gay studies who sought a homogenic cultural renaissance. This was a philosophical and political development of the first importance, but like so much else, it is conspicuously absent from this book.

Bart Schultz
University of Chicago

Lawrence J. Hatab
Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers Inc. 2000. Pp. xvi + 221.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-9682-0);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-9683-9).

Heidegger's conception of human existence (*Dasein*) from *Being and Time* has served as the foundation for philosophical, literary, psychological, and anthropological theories of self. Although *BT* was published in 1929, the ramifications of Heidegger's unique vision are still being felt today. One good example of this is Lawrence Hatab's *Ethics and Finitude*. Hatab's work is

the first book-length treatment of the implications of Heidegger's thought for the field of contemporary ethics and social/political philosophy. Although there have been efforts to build an ethic into *BT*, many of these have focused mainly on single Heideggerian themes such as authenticity, being-with (*Mitsein*), or care (*Sorge*). Hatab's book is the first to comprehensively investigate the potential moral implications of Heidegger's project as a whole. What this work lacks in depth, it makes up for in the breadth of vision necessary to provide a holistic interpretation of the moral relevance of *BT*.

One traditional problem with secondary literature on Heidegger is the alienation experienced by the non-specialist who may be interested, but not familiar with the somewhat jargon-filled technical aspects of Heidegger explication. Hubert Dreyfus and Michael Zimmerman are great examples of American philosophers who have overcome the challenges presented by Heidegger's technical terminology, providing clear and useful explanations of his ideas to the non-specialist. Hatab can now be added to this list. The first two chapters of *Ethics and Finitude* are exegetical, examining the structure and content of *BT*. This is not to say that they are in any way irrelevant. The reader familiar with Heidegger may be able to breeze through, just picking up Hatab's unique but accurate emphasis on key aspects. However, for the reader unfamiliar or rusty with *BT*, these chapters are some of the clearest and best written explications of the general themes of *BT* available. Chapters one and two are useful for anyone who needs a quick refresher, or is generally interested in understanding the content of Heidegger's early thought.

Chapter three begins the practical aspects of applying Heidegger in the context of contemporary moral philosophy. Hatab does not present Heidegger as alternative to moral theory. Instead, his effort seems to be directed towards taking advantage of the reader's existing intuitions in regards to the traditional weaknesses of moral theory, often showing how a richer conception of human existence changes the nature of the apparent dilemma. This chapter works toward changing the conception of the moral agent from 'rational calculator' to an individual who is always-already concerned with moral living. In this way, ethics can be understood less as governor of an ego-driven agent, and more as a fundamental characteristic of human existence that is to a greater or lesser extent revealed and concealed as a way of life.

This broad approach to ethics demands a wide field of questioning where morality is concerned. In this regard, Hatab sees moral philosophy as having five tasks: The first is to transcend the notion that ethics is simply a matter of formulating and following rules. Moral life requires a deeper foundation of meaning and value — in its richest sense, of virtue. The second task is the examination of the significance of norms and rules as we inherit them in our social spheres. The final three tasks involve questioning the moral norms of our culture and in lieu of providing a rational foundation for them, accounting for their natural acquisition in both a revelatory existential sense, and a formative sense. Hatab is deeply concerned with Heidegger's significance to

moral education and in this regard is contributing to one of the most interesting and important streams in contemporary ethics. There is a definite push in moral philosophy not to provide reasons for being good, but to examine how people learn to be good and how values become enduring elements of character. Hatab believes that the Heideggerian conception of self has a clear place in re-constructing a non-subjective yet non-foundational account of the moral self.

Because Hatab is writing with current moral philosophy well in mind, the fourth and fifth chapters deal with Aristotle and virtue ethics. Hatab considers Heidegger's moral inclinations to be most similar to those articulated by traditional and contemporary virtue ethicists. He also believes that Heidegger has a close affinity with this way of thinking about morality given his deep indebtedness to Aristotle and the holistic conception of human well-being found in virtue ethics. Hatab believes that virtue ethics can be enriched through the removal of antiquated accounts of human nature and essence, these being replaced with Heidegger's more robust ontology. The aspects of happiness and desire that drive the virtue account also seem more appealing as they are understood in the context of authenticity and inauthenticity rather than objectively valuable, etc. One of the key conceptions that underlies Heidegger's account of being-in-the-world is that of *Dasein* being necessarily understood in relation to an environment. This embodiment challenges many of the so called 'rational' accounts of morality, which give too much emphasis to the moral agent as a calculating subject overseeing an objective world. In chapter seven, Hatab shows how the liberal tradition in political philosophy suffers as a result of this reification of the subject. In an interesting critique of contemporary political philosophy, Hatab argues that a richer human ontology can respect and preserve important aspects of the liberal tradition, particularly freedom, and still portray the deep and necessary interconnectedness of human beings in the social sphere.

Chapter six is the most important chapter in the book and philosophically the most creative. Here Hatab describes the role of empathy (compassion) in Heidegger's thought, but also contributes original insight into what is becoming a central question in ethics. Hatab attempts to construct a picture of empathy as 'ethical attunement' towards another. This attunement is understood as an existing capacity of human existence which can be either nurtured or concealed. It is difficult to account philosophically for 'being empathetic' in terms of traditional conceptions of moral agency. Hatab provides an excellent historical discussion of the problem and suggests an innovative description of how empathy may be encouraged in a moral context while at the same time accounting for the necessary role of prescriptive principles. This chapter is well worth reading on its own.

Brendan Leier
University of Alberta

James C. Klagge, ed.
Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Pp. 272.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80397-7);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00868-9).

This important collection of new essays explores problems of philosophical biography with a particular focus on Wittgenstein (W): 'To understand somebody's thought, why is it necessary to understand *them*?' This question of the relationship between biography and philosophy is broached by Ray Monk and James Conant. In 'Philosophical Biography: The Very Idea', Ray Monk distinguishes between the assessment and the understanding of a philosophical work. The former has to do with arguments and is perhaps necessary but insufficient for the latter, which also involves attending to the tone of voice of the writer, as well as accumulating personal facts that allow us to see what is said in a proper light. For instance, in writing *The Duty of Genius*, a penetrating biography of W, Monk's aim was to enrich our understanding of W's work by bringing to light the connections between W's spiritual/cultural concerns and his philosophy. This way W's voice is not misheard and we can read the work in the spirit in which it was intended. On the other hand, James Conant's claim is that there is no general answer to the question whether we should read the lives of the great philosophers or just their work — it depends on the particular philosopher. In 'Philosophy and Biography' Conant rejects the extreme views of reductionism and compartmentalism. The former urges that the key to understanding an author's work is to be found in the external events of his life, while the latter insists that to understand the work is to attend exclusively to what lies within the work. According to Conant, both give a distorted picture not only of W's life but also of his thought, since W's thought includes an understanding of what it is to lead a philosophical life. In his case, a veto on philosophical biography would impoverish our understanding of his philosophy.

What influence did W's idiosyncratic psychology and his training as an engineer have on his philosophy? In 'W and the Mind's Eye' Kelly Hamilton argues that W's engineering mindset, with its emphasis on models and diagrams, shaped his understanding of the nature of language and thought in the Tractatus. If we keep in mind that the ability to see basic elements in their various possible configurations would have been second nature to W the engineer, then we can better appreciate the impulse behind the picture theory of meaning. In 'Deep Disquietudes: Reflections on W as Antiphilosopher', Louis Sass aims to situate W's philosophical and metaphilosophical concerns in the context of his schizoid traits. According to Sass, W, early and late, was driven to express and deny such traits as feeling divided within himself, not being at home in the world or with others, experiencing life as if he were an observer from another planet. Sass claims that W was against

all philosophizing, including his own antiphilosophizing — and explains this as an expression of his self-loathing and self-criticism.

How to read W's diaries and correspondence is the question explored in turn by Alfred Nordmann and Joachim Schulte. In 'The Sleepy Philosopher' Nordmann offers two possible ways to read them. The first sees the diaries as a source to help with interpretive questions about W's philosophical texts. Nordmann rejects this on the ground that there is no need for a key or a hermeneutic strategy to unlock hidden philosophical meaning, since W himself said that in his philosophy 'nothing is hidden'. Nordmann recommends that we read W's diaries as self-contained texts with literary merit of their own. This reading takes literally W's repeated assertion that his remarks are 'clear as crystal' and that he does not present doctrines or theses. In 'Letters from a Philosopher' Joachim Schulte examines W's correspondence for possible benefits for understanding his philosophical works. He concludes that W's letters and postcards may help us with exegetical questions such as the genesis of his work, the dating of manuscripts, and what was superseded or discarded. Furthermore, since W strove to keep various aspects of his life in agreement, and thought that what is fit to say in one context may be unfit to utter in another, his correspondence may complement our reading of the philosophical texts.

In 'W and Reason' Hans-Johann Glock examines rationalist and irrationalist interpretations of W. He argues that W's philosophical position combines a Kantian project of avoiding confusion and nonsense with an unKantian anti-intellectualism derived from Schopenhauer and Spengler. Even W's anti-intellectualism is not a denial of reason but a critique of scientism in our culture.

The last two contributions take up the complex question whether W thought of himself as a Jew, and if so, what bearing does this have on his philosophy. Even though W reproached himself for having minimized his Jewish ancestry and identified himself as a Jewish thinker, Brian McGuinness sees these as confessional over-reactions, since no one in fin de siècle Vienna would have thought of the W family that way. In 'W and the Idea of Jewishness' McGuinness, the author of another masterly biography entitled 'Young Ludwig', argues that 'in the end, W did not think of himself as Jewish, nor need we do so. The concept is an attractive one, although, or because, a confused one.' In his outstanding essay, David Stern sets himself the task of clarification. In 'Was W a Jew' he distinguishes different senses of 'Jewishness' as well as the diverse contexts, cultural, social, personal, in which the term can be used. In light of this he reflects on the role of Jewishness in W's life and cautions us about turning the study of a philosopher's life into vicarious autobiography. His conclusion is that 'there is no doubt that W was of Jewish descent and it is equally clear that he was not a practicing Jew. Furthermore, insofar as he thought of himself as Jewish, he did so in terms of the anti-Semitic prejudices of his time. It would have been good if he could have untangled those prejudices, but he did not do so,' even though the anti-essentialism of the later philosophy offers the resources to do so.

Here are a few immediate reactions. I welcome this group of fine essays which collectively probe a basic assumption in analytical philosophy that biography is irrelevant to philosophy, and that the idea of abstracting the intellectual content of philosophy from the lives of philosophers and their social/cultural world is unproblematic. Such an examination has the potential of enriching philosophy.

Now for a bit of griping. First, the reductivist/compartmentalist dichotomy is a useful tool of criticism, albeit the former is thriving in Sass (despite protestations to the contrary), and the latter seems discernible in Nordmann and Schulte. Second, there is a tendency in some of the authors to be selectively literal. If we are to take literally W's assertions that there is nothing hidden in his philosophy or that his remarks are 'crystal clear', why not extend the same privilege to such remarks as 'Working in philosophy ... is really more a working on oneself', and 'The movement of thought in my philosophy should be discernible also in the history of my mind, of its moral concepts & in the understanding of my situation'?

In closing, I leave you with James Klagge's remarks on W's philosophical communication and longing for community: 'Through our ongoing attempts to understand W and his movements of thought, we seek to accept the offering of himself that he so painfully made through those many pages of notebooks and hours of lecturing. The papers in this volume, and the work they provoke, are part of that incipient community.'

Béla Szabados
University of Regina

This interesting analysis of how certainty is produced concludes that there is no such thing as absolute, universal, ahistorical, certainty. Instead, Lin's thesis is that certainty is a relative phenomenon, dependent upon the socio-historical and cultural conditions in which consensus on specific issues emerges. All of Lin's arguments are so constructed as to persuade us of the truth of this thesis which, in itself, presents an interesting philosophical conundrum, namely, that the very thesis proposed with such convincing

certainty must itself be subject to Lin's own epistemological criterion. However, if that is the case, one might wonder what value, if any, the book's thesis and conclusion could have! Relativity has its own pitfalls, and it is sometimes forgotten that statements purporting to be certain and definitive about the relativity of certainty and truth are themselves logically contradictory, which undermines the very arguments and conclusions presented. This is the case here, though that should not deter any potential readers from studying Lin's arguments and conclusions.

Lin's approach also reminds us of Frege's warnings against accepting any description of the origins of an idea for a definition of it, or an account of the mental or physical conditions on which we become conscious of a proposition, for a proof of it. Frege's distinction between psychological and logical/epistemological truth remains important as a salutary reminder of the obfuscation that can occur when this distinction is blurred or forgotten, as Lin's study demonstrates. However, he is not alone in this, though it does indicate a major flaw that runs like a fracture through this otherwise fascinating book.

In the Preface, Lin states that he will criticise the view that certainty can be looked at in an abstract way outside the socio-historical context in which it is produced. Instead, he will demonstrate that certainty is a social metaphor and, as such, the consequence of various socio-historical and cultural forces that must be given primacy of place in such a discussion. The Enlightenment discourse of modern Western thought, German Idealism and traditional Chinese philosophy constitute the material explored, and Lin's method revolves around describing the patterns of productive activity, the social interaction and power structures that constitute the formative elements in arriving at certainty. In a way, he is pursuing a Humean agenda, both in the denial of the kind of rationalistic certainty espoused by Descartes and his Enlightenment followers, and in emphasising environmental conditioning as a major determinant in the production of indubitability. The deep structure of philosophical thought, according to Lin, is ultimately accessible to sociological and historical analysis which, in turn, demonstrate that knowledge is ultimately and essentially subject to the dimension of change. Both Preface and Introduction should be read more than once since they outline, in essence, Lin's whole project, and this is also true of the Conclusion.

Chapter 1 sets out various definitions of certainty, and makes it quite clear that the backdrop of Lin's explorations here is the Cartesian one, where Descartes' frame of reference serves as the context of discussion. The references to the latter thinker are numerous and significant, and they suggest that it is Descartes' understanding of certainty that Lin is essentially unhappy with. However, it must also be said that Descartes' almost obsessive need for a very clear form of subjective self-conscious certainty represents only one account of the search for truth, albeit a highly influential one that has dogged the footsteps of philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists and many others down to the present day. This has been in some ways advantageous to Western thought in, for example, its emphasis on the importance of human subjectivity. However, it has also paradoxically undermined the

possibility of certainty in that the post-Cartesian reaction has enthroned relativity as the determining overall perspective of human thought. This has inevitably resulted in scepticism which has further damaged the credibility of knowledge.

The book also covers the Chinese version of certainty, with its absence of the kind of basic contradictions and dichotomies found in Western thought. Areas include the way in which certainty manifests itself in the Chinese mode of production, for example in agriculture, Chinese social structure and interaction, and intersubjective validity in a socio-ideological context. Lin observes how certainty functions as a cultural demand for stability and as a way of eliminating doubt as a serious threat.

Despite the contentious thesis, this is a valuable text for philosophers and anyone working in the human sciences, not excluding those other scientists, such as physicists, biologists and mathematicians, who might have much to say about its contents. It is densely written and an asset to epistemological literature.

Patrick Quinn
All Hallows College, Dublin
Ireland

Mattias Martinson
Perseverance without Doctrine:
Adorno, Self-Critique and the Ends
of Academic Theology.
New York: Peter Lang 2000. Pp. 391.
US$52.95. ISBN 3-631-36427-X.

Martinson sets out to argue that theology is an academic discipline like any other. That is, it is concerned with rigorous analytical debate. As such, it does not require a particular faith stance; in particular, academic theology need not be Christian. While this may be viewed as a contentious claim by some, it is a view with which many contemporary theologians are sympathetic. In fact, Martinson refers (38) to Daphne Hampson, who has argued that the position of women within Christianity has forced her to abandon explicitly Christian theology, but not necessarily theology itself. On the one hand, then, Martinson's aim seems worthwhile, although theologians will seek to ensure that theology retains its place alongside religious studies and is not replaced by it. On the other hand, Martinson's use of Adorno to define non-Christian academic theology is intriguing and unusual, since, of the Frankfurt School, Habermas is more likely to be used for this purpose.

From the outset, the book is densely packed with references to primarily continental scholars. Comprehension of the text requires substantial prior knowledge of their work and repeated close readings. This is not a book for bedside reading or for non-academics; however, it is a book that gives academics in philosophy and theology much with which to grapple. Substantial footnotes aid comprehension in some places, but have the overall effect of distracting the reader from the flow of the body text; similarly, the large number of syntactical errors in the earlier sections of the book add further distraction from content.

Nevertheless, the early sections of the book represent a thorough and in-depth study of Adorno's works, distinguishing and detailing the shifts that took place between Adorno's early, mid and late periods. This is a valuable enterprise since, as Martinson states, 'Irrespective of their highly eccentric and harsh character, the texts from this "mid-period" are still held to be among the most original and notable of the whole century they represent' (144). Consequently, the task that Martinson has set himself is a formidable one. In addition to the esteem in which Adorno is held by some, his work is characteristically negative in content and, while it speaks explicitly about the form and method of philosophy, it is not overly concerned with theology. Even so, Martinson's aim is to redirect Adorno's negativity towards theology and to redirect it so as to say something positive about theology as an academic discipline.

This tour de force proceeds from an intense study of Adorno's 'dialectic' and his lament over the intellectual climate. It is only after paying careful attention to over two-hundred pages of weighty Adorno scholarship that the promised reference to academic theology appears. By this stage, the reader may find themselves rather weary and perhaps sensing a meaning in the 'perseverance' of the title that the author did not intend. Yet, it is worth persevering to discover the extent of Martinson's enterprise and, despite the complicated nature of the earlier sections of the book, their study is warranted as an essential, if lengthy, prelude to what follows.

In the latter part of the book, it emerges that it is Adorno's self-critical hermeneutics that will serve as a backdrop for the argument that academic theology need not be Christian. In Martinson's words, Adorno's self-critique amounts to the 'praxis of persistence and perseverance without doctrine' (197). According to Martinson, Adorno presents theology with two unsatisfactory options. Either religious doctrines can be altered to suit the contemporary situation, or the authority of the doctrines can be dogmatically asserted. In the former case, religious doctrines will become relative and hence lose their original authority; in the latter case, fundamentalism will ensue. Despite these problems, Martinson suggests that the integrity of theology can be maintained by an open awareness of its 'loss of object' (200). In other words, rather than giving an account of religious truths, theology is to be reworked in terms of secular categories.

Even so, Martinson is keen to make the point that he is not robbing theology of its Christian heritage; he is merely claiming that dogmatic

theology is not academic theology. In support of this proposal, he details the ideas of several modern theologians, giving exposition and possible criticism of their varied positions. Eventually, it emerges that Martinson looks more favourably on non-foundationalist approaches to theology, such as that represented by liberation theology and its emphasis on praxis, than he does on foundationalist approaches; he is, however, ultimately dissatisfied with both. While foundationalism assumes its own superiority, non-foundationalism ends up talking about foundational matters in spite of intentions to the contrary.

He argues that specifically Christian theology puts a limit on what he terms 'communicative praxis' (349), and yet he also supports the historical right to declare the Christian perspective. Consequently, he suggests a conditional formula that will ensure the legitimacy of academic theology as an autonomous discipline. For example, he states '*if* we assume that the Christian idea of God is worthy of consideration for this or that reason, *then* this or that model of the Trinity turns out to be highly plausible' (351). He does not wish to leave theology here, however, since such legitimacy is at the mercy of society. In addition, Martinson makes the stronger claim that academic theology assists human beings in their life struggles. Nevertheless, he insists that it can only do so by avoiding foundations and dogma, by persevering without doctrine, despite the risks of groundlessness and potential barrenness so entailed.

In short, Martinson is arguing that academic theology can only retain its autonomy, in the current secular climate, if it is open to theologies other than Christian ones. Whether Adorno is the most adequate resource for supporting this claim remains debatable, even though Martinson's attempts in this regard are commendable. Furthermore, underlying Martinson's assertion is the opinion that the autonomy of academic theology is under threat; this is not especially contentious, but it is a view that needs more explication. Martinson's conclusion is an interesting one, although a tension remains between his defence of theology and his avoidance of defining it. As a result, the reader may yearn for more work in this area, especially where the relationship between religious studies and theology is an issue.

Esther McIntosh
(*School of Theology and Religious Studies*)
University of Leeds

Materna develops a sophisticated logical theory of concepts. Two strands, one historical, the other systematic, come together in the book. He argues that while Frege's concepts are just characteristic functions, Bolzano's concepts are much richer, first and foremost because they are sharply distinguished from objects, include not just universal but also singular and empty concepts, are structured and are hyperintensionally individuated. Materna needs such a rich notion of concept, since he intends to explicate linguistic meaning in terms of concepts. He relies on the little-known, but powerful semantics of Pavel Tichy's Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), as set out in the latter's *The Foundations of Frege's Logic* (De Gruyter 1988), which provides the logical framework and conceptions required.

The key element of TIL are so-called constructions, which are neither mentalistic processes nor constructivist judgements, but (simple or complex) logical objects. Philosophically, constructions are construed as procedures or itineraries emphatically not containing as constituents their products or destinations (if any). The four central constructions are variables and trivializations, which are simple constructions establishing contact to objects or other constructions, and compositions and closures, which are complex constructions operating on what the simple constructions construct. Compositions are procedures for obtaining the value of a function at an argument, while closures are procedures for defining a mapping from such-and-such objects to such-and-such objects. The logic has been taken over from Church's lambda-calculi, but is given an objectual reinterpretation. The universe of TIL is organized in a ramified type hierarchy. Its four basic types are individuals, truth-values, reals doubling as times, and possible worlds. As in standard possible-world semantics, intensions are functions defined on worlds and times. What is much less standard is that (terms for) variables ranging over worlds and times are fed directly into the syntax resulting in explicit intensionalization. Materna succinctly sets these foundations out. In keeping with Tichy's 'neo-Fregeanism', Materna adopts the trio expression-construction-denotation, which needs to be a flexible framework, since, thanks to the ramified hierarchy, also constructions can be constructed. It is thus possible to avail oneself of terms which express constructions of constructions and therefore denote (lower-order) constructions. In sum, it becomes possible to *mention* constructions, and not just *use* them. We use constructions all the time, and do so in order to attribute a property to the object(s) they construct. But sometimes it becomes necessary to bring up a construction itself for attribution, as is common in logical and mathematical discourse.

Materna takes over this machinery and uses it to his own ends. Since the complex constructions are structured, they take as constituents constructions of particular objects as 'gap-fillers' and hold them together in a complex. The answer given to the question of 'propositional unity' is that the primitive logical operations (procedures) of functional abstraction (i.e., closure) hold objects together as functions and arguments. The structuredness of constructions essentially explains their hyperintensional individuation. However, while structure and hyperintensionality are required for, e.g., doxastic logic, Materna makes the crucial observation that closures are just too finely individuated. He introduces the key notion of 'quasi-identity' obtaining among constructions under well-defined circumstances. He then defines a set of quasi-identical constructions as a *concept*, introducing a degree of granularity that slots in well above necessary equivalence and just below the fineness of closures, which are about as finely individuated as syntactic items are.

Materna states, via several definitions, what the content ('intension') and the 'extension' of a concept is. Its content is, roughly, the set of all the simple constructions (already defined) that are constituents of its quasi-identical constructions. The extension of a concept is the object it identifies, if any. E.g., the content of the concepts 3^5 and 5^3 is {exponential function, 3, 5}, while the 'extension' is, respectively, 243 and 125. Thus, the concept of equilateral triangle identifies the set of equilateral triangles, and the concept of equiangular triangle identifies the set of equiangular triangles. The set is the same, but the concepts are distinct. Further, unlike any theory that attempts, in vain, to capture structure in terms of n-tuples, a concept's content, or even a sequence thereof, does not exhaust what there is to a concept, since it must also be specified how those elements hook up with each other.

However, Materna's theory of concepts has a tension built into it, as he himself acknowledges, which is that he argues against set-theoretical conceptions of concepts, yet finds himself identifying a concept with a *set* of quasi-identical constructions. He suggests various remedies, but the issue demands a more principled solution than the book offers (cf. §§5.4-5).

Several readers are bound to find that Materna's concepts, though well-defined, are about to vanish into thin air, since they are irreducible to either their 'extension' or 'intension'. In this respect Materna's theory finds itself on one end of the spectrum of concept theories, due to its platonism and high level of abstraction. What is of more general relevance to the analytic community, however, is that the book makes out a case, and successfully so, for re-establishing concept theory as a self-contained enterprise.

Bjørn Jespersen
University of Leyden

Andrew R. Murphy
Conscience and Community:
Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent
in Early Modern England and America.
University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press 2001. Pp. xxii + 337.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-271-02105-5.

The wars and conflicts that divided early modern Europe gave rise to intense debates regarding the nature of religious toleration. Yet many contemporary philosophers, assured of the normative superiority of a pro-toleration position, show little interest in the fascinating give and take of the sixteenth and seventeenth century arguments. According to Andrew R. Murphy, this is apparent in 'the widespread obsession with the thought of one thinker, John Locke' (xiv). Locke's assessment of Roman Catholics and atheists is regrettable, but his central strategy of separating church and state in order to affirm equal liberty of conscience becomes a defining feature of political liberalism. 1689's *Letter on Toleration*, therefore, can be taken as the philosophical *starting point* for any enlightened, post-Reformation account of toleration. Indeed John Rawls has self-consciously identified his own variety of liberalism as the logical extension and culmination of the principle of religious toleration.

One of the achievements of *Conscience and Community* is to reveal the startling weaknesses of Rawls's historical presuppositions. Yet Murphy does not write as a debunker but as an 'intellectual historian' in Richard Rorty's admiring sense of the term. In two American (the Massachusetts Bay and early Pennsylvania colonies) and two English (Cromwell's Protectorate and the Glorious Revolution) case studies, Murphy provides a richly detailed inside view of what it was like to be an intellectual participant in the politics of the time. Familiar figures such as Hobbes and Locke engage in the debates but they are the philosophical tip of an iceberg of adversaries including Roger Williams, John Winthrop, William Laud, Gerrard Winstanley, Samuel Rutherford, George Keith and William Penn, not to mention the likes of John Milton, Oliver Cromwell and James II. Retrospectively, these people can certainly be sorted according to their support of *one principle* — toleration. But the live issue, Murphy argues, was the difficulty of reconciling the *two values* of conscience and community.

In that context, it is a 'myth' that 'religious toleration is a self-evident and unqualified good' (11). A hundred years before Voltaire, for instance, it was not unreasonable for leaders of the Massachusetts Bay colony to dispute the claim that toleration enhances social stability and economic prosperity. After all, they faced an advocate of toleration, Roger Williams, who insisted on a radical separation of civil and spiritual realms to facilitate the practice of a mystic spiritualism that could not admit to the legitimacy of any conventional legal or moral laws. The colony was haunted by the Anabaptist revolt at Muenster. And by prosecuting Williams's follower,

Anne Hutchinson, it was attempting to preserve order in the face of fanatics who 'would countenance no moderation when issues of salvation were at stake' (64). A more complicated version of a similar story took place in early Pennsylvania where William Penn's Quakers presided over tremendous religious diversity but appealed to standard anti-toleration arguments in acting against the anarchistic tendencies of George Keith. Especially in America, many of the key protagonists in the 'anti-toleration' forces appear far more broad-minded and concerned for the common good than promoters of toleration.

This strengthens Murphy's case against another myth, namely, that the champions of tolerance were rationalists skeptical of religion. For the thinkers in the period he covers were invariably deeply religious (and very Christian). Theological appeals and scriptural interpretation were potent weapons in a fight where each of the various players claimed 'the truth' and all the others were said to be 'in error'. Even proponents of epistemological skepticism were partisans of one sect or another. Skeptics 'often undermined claims of infallibility and hierarchy and argued in favor of tolerating religious dissenters' (106), but the political implications of skepticism were not necessarily 'liberal'. There was a strange consistency, for example, between Cromwell's Hobbesian claim to possess authority by virtue of his capacity to preserve order and his policy of greatly extending religious toleration. Indeed, Cromwell exemplifies just how thoroughly the emergence of toleration was shaped by myriad political variables of little interest to twenty-first-century liberals. Hence most English Dissenters desired freedom for *congregations to practice* their beliefs not liberty of *individuals to believe*. That was why 'comprehension' was a strong policy option to toleration for Stuart kings after the Restoration.

Locke's *Letter on Toleration*, therefore, is not a dispassionate piece of philosophy. Murphy notes that it offers no 'new or unprecedented arguments,' but is best read as 'a synthesis of existing argument in a highly effective polemical form' (149) by a philosophical Christian. A 'principle' of toleration might be distilled from the *Letter*. Still, its lasting value lies in the practical means — secured by the very different American and English laws and institutions influenced by Locke — which enable citizens to live according to their consciences within the stable communities. Murphy sees the early development of liberalism with the eye of a Stephen J. Gould. He is wary of any talk of principles that can be extended and applied with little regard for brute historical contingencies and social heterogeneity. In contrast, he argues, John Rawls presupposes a Hegelian view of history in which there is a 'progressive flowering of a preordained progress in the direction of a Rawlsian liberal consensus' (287).

Conscience and Community opens up several angles for re-examining Rawls's self-image. For example, Rawls conceives 'neutralism' or the exclusion of 'comprehensive doctrines' of the good from political debates, as necessary to extend toleration. Those positions depend heavily on the distinction between belief and action, and the privileging of social stability.

Paradoxically, however, the latter were used in similar ways in the *anti-toleration* arguments of the Massachusetts Bay leaders. Rawls also believes that the principle of toleration originally protecting individual rights of conscience is easily generalized to 'identity politics'. Hence the right to have the religious beliefs one chooses is morally similar to one's right to be gay or lesbian. Yet tolerationists were concerned with extending legal and political protections against persecution to achieve a *modus vivendi*. And such moral minimalism, Murphy argues, is far different from a gay rights advocate's insistence upon respect and affirmation for a person's life-experience. Compared to Murphy's 'intellectual history' — which cannot be praised enough — this substantive argument needs to be elaborated. Still, it should motivate philosophers to look more critically upon Rawls's definition of '*modus vivendi* as purely interest-based ... armed stalemate' and to consider the significance of the fact that his 'standards are never justified by any historical referent' (284).

Roderick Nicholls
University College of Cape Breton

Frederick Neuhouser's *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory* is a welcome addition to the English language literature on Hegel's political philosophy. Neuhouser's approach is to read Hegel's *corpus* through an analysis of Hegel's idea of social freedom. In so doing, he bridges the Anglo-American tradition of political theory, which has tended to read the *Philosophy of Right* in isolation from the rest of Hegel's work, and the Continental tradition, which has tended to focus on Hegel's speculative system, neglecting his attention to questions of politics. By reading the speculative system through Hegel's more overt political problematic, Neuhouser manages to render Hegel's political thought clearly for those unfamiliar with his work. Locating Hegel's conception of freedom in the context of the conversation initiated by Kant, Spinoza and especially Rousseau, Neuhouser does not simply 'translate' Hegel for political theory (a daunting enough task) but offers a spirited defense of the kind of freedom Hegel imagined for the rational social order.

Neuhouser points out that for Rousseau and for Hegel both, the (rational) state is both the enabling condition *for* freedom, and the vehicle *of* freedom. In this sense, the freedom Neuhouser finds — and endorses — in Hegel's and

Rousseau's thought alike, is the freedom of the individual will to will the free collective will. As Neuhouser tells it, Hegel's philosophy can help us think through the idea that a social order can be understood as self-determined, and therefore free, when it exhibits the rational structure of the Concept. This, of course, is to submit the social order itself to the standards of Hegel's logic, a logic that suggests that every philosophical opposition must be both part and whole, forming a self-sufficient entity. Moreover, Neuhouser suggests that what Hegel imagined by freedom is not, as many of Hegel's critics have suggested, merely a hymn of praise to the Prussian state — a view that suggests Hegel offers no normative ground on which citizens might critique their political institutions. Rather, by reading Hegel's analysis of the institutions of modern life through his logical system, Neuhouser reveals a standard of critique in Hegel's thought that continues to be relevant to contemporary participants engaged in debates concerning democratic citizenship. On this view, Hegel's famous notion of *sittlichkeit* — or ethical life — is rendered interesting to non-Hegel specialists as a theory of social life.

As Neuhouser points out, for Hegel, the task of *sittlichkeit*, (the organic community) is to accommodate both our public, rational lives as citizens, and our private and particular lives as members of civil society and families. On this view, the modern state is the ongoing sublation of the apparent contradictions of modern life; it reconciles our ethical obligations to the larger community, such that our particular, individual existences are most thoroughly validated in the context of our universal, collective lives. On this basis, Neuhouser reminds us, Hegel makes the case for the ethicity of the modern state — in, among others, *The Philosophy of Right* and the *Philosophy of History*. As a thoroughly rational institution, the state manages to bridge the subjective freedoms of family life and modern commerce with the objective freedoms of the law. In this way, Neuhouser responds to the problem of why Hegel considered it necessary to conceive of social freedom as a unity of objective, rational law on the one hand, and the subjective disposition of social participants on the other. On Neuhouser's reading, Hegel thus emerges as a lively participant in the question of the kind of freedom modern individuals can achieve through the state.

The greatest limitation of this approach is that it tends to flatten out Hegel's thought. Neuhouser renders the complexity of Hegel's metaphysics — his profound dialecticity — in a way that somewhat distorts the enormous ambition of his philosophical project. Despite Neuhouser's claim to have attended to the questions arising out of the continental tradition, therefore, the question of what it is that Hegel's thought covers over or leaves out — the question which has preoccupied the continental tradition from Heidegger to Derrida — is insufficiently addressed.

Yet this limitation is also the book's greatest strength; Hegel's infamously baroque philosophical system is here admitted to the liberal political tradition of social contract. Placing the problem of 'will' at the centre of Hegel's thought, Neuhouser foregrounds the important links between the Rousseauian notion of the general will and Hegel's conception of freedom. While

the strong links between Rousseau's social contract and Hegel's basic communitarianism have been well rehearsed, this book renders that link in terms that do more justice to Hegel's logical and metaphysical commitments than we have seen before. This book is thus an excellent resource for those approaching Hegel's political writings for the first time; there is a clear need for a reading of Hegel that brings his work to bear on contemporary questions about democratic theory.

Catherine Kellogg
(*Department of Political Science*)
University of Alberta

W.H. Newton-Smith, ed.
A Companion to the Philosophy of Science.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
2000. Pp. xvi + 576.
US$110.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-17024-3);
US$34.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-23020-3).

A Companion to the Philosophy of Science is published in the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series. It is a compilation of 81 articles by 58 scholars, many of them distinguished in the field, including Fred Suppe, Ron Giere, John Dupre, Mary Hesse, and Gary Gutting. 20 articles discuss particular thinkers, either scientists or philosophers of science, who have had a profound impact on the field. Included are, for example, articles on Einstein, Galileo, Mach, Kuhn, Mill, Quine, and Hume. The remaining 61 articles deal with particular topics of interest to contemporary philosophers of science ranging from 'Axiomatization' and 'Biology', to 'The Unity of Science' and 'Verisimilitude'. The articles are typically three to ten pages long.

Taking the biennial PSA programs to be representative of what philosophers of science are up to these days, the articles in the volume do a good job of representing the field in its current state. For example, there are articles on 'Incommensurability', 'Pragmatic Factors in Theory Acceptance', 'Models and Analogies', and 'Space, Time, and Relativity'. Indeed, I was surprised to see that there was no article on either 'Bayes' or 'Bayesianism', but Colin Howson did author the article on 'Evidence and Confirmation'. I have been told by one contributing author, and Newton-Smith in fact confirms this (page xv), that the volume has been a long time in preparation. In fact, three contributors had died before the volume was produced, and

at least one other has died since. The articles, though, are still very much up-to-date.

The volume is nicely produced, with large easy-to-read type, and, though there are some spelling mistakes, they are few in number. As a good reference book should, this volume has extensive cross-referencing between the various articles. Further, each article is accompanied by a bibliography, many of which are excellent, though some articles do make reference to works that do not appear in their bibliographies. There is also a very good index.

Most of the articles make enjoyable and engaging reading. I especially enjoyed reading Ernan McMullin's article 'Values in Science', Kathleen Okruhlik's article 'Feminist Accounts of Science', J.D. Trout's article on the Paradoxes of Confirmation, and Dudley Shapere's article 'Scientific Change'. McMullin does a wonderful job of identifying the variety of ways in which values affect science, distinguishing between the values or goals of science, the ethos of science, the value judgements that are an inevitable part of doing science, and the impact of nonepistemic values on science. Indeed, too often these distinctions are not recognized with the result that many philosophers have lost sight of what is at stake in the various debates surrounding the impact of values on science. Okruhlik's article is structured around two key objectives. First, she reminds us of the heterogeneity of feminist accounts of science. The subtleties that distinguish various feminist approaches to the philosophy of science, she argues, are too often overlooked. Second, Okruhlik forcefully argues that the concerns raised by feminists theorizing about science should matter to philosophers of science in general. Trout's article deserves praise for different reasons. His is a clear and concise presentation of the paradoxes of confirmation, the standard concerns, but they are presented in a manner that is wholly accessible to undergraduates. Shapere's article provides the historical background on the issue of scientific change, the relevance of the discovery/justification distinction for the issue, Kuhn's impact on the debate, and reactions to it, and concerns surrounding the notion of scientific progress. Like Trout's article, Shapere's is noteworthy for its clarity, accessibility, and thoroughness.

As one might expect, in a compilation of this sort and size, some of the articles are weak. Oddly, it is Wesley Salmon's article on 'Logical Empiricism', and John Watkins's article on 'Popper' that are amongst the weakest. Both articles drift from topic to topic without adequate sign-posting, leaving the reader wondering what will be discussed next. But, these articles are the exception, for most of the other articles are straightforward and clearly written.

The main concern that I have with this volume is that it does not seem suited to either of the audiences for which it is allegedly intended. We are told on page ii of the *Companion* that the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy 'provide the ideal basis for course use, representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists'. Indeed, many undergraduates taking a course in philosophy of science look for a good reference book to supplement what they are learning from their instructors. But, too

many articles in this volume are just too difficult to be of much use to the typical, or even the really bright, undergraduate. In this category, Sober's article on 'Simplicity' and Suppe's on 'Theory Identity' stand out. Consequently, most students would be better off reading primary sources. And, specialists are unlikely to find anything new in the articles pertaining to their areas of research. As I read the articles in this volume I was reminded of the Cambridge Companion series. These, too, are allegedly intended for a broad readership. Though they have generally failed in this regard, a number of the volumes in that series have become valuable new scholarly contributions in their own right, and are thus suited to a specialist audience. *The Cambridge Companion to Bacon* is a good example of this. But, Newton-Smith's *Companion* doesn't fit into this niche either. Consequently, though I read many of the articles with pleasure, the *Companion* does not seem to be suited to either of the target audiences. Indeed, on the back cover, Peter Machamer suggests that *A Companion to Philosophy of Science* 'will be especially useful for those in *other fields* who wish to gain some quick, authoritative knowledge of what's going on in philosophy of science today' (emphasis added). Though this is probably true, I doubt that this was Newton-Smith's intention in producing the volume.

K. Brad Wray
University of Alberta

Christopher Norris
Quantum Theory and the Flight From Realism:
Philosophical Responses to Quantum Mechanics.
New York: Routledge 2000. Pp. ix + 266.
Cdn$128.00: US$85.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-22321-0);
Cdn$38.99: US$25.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-22322-9).

This book is part of Routledge's *Critical Realism: Interventions* series, which is in aid of developing the movement based primarily in the UK known as *Critical* (or *Transcendental*) Realism. The guru of Critical Realism (and first-listed editor of the series) is Roy Bhaskar, author of several influential books including *A Realist Theory of Science*.

Norris is openly a scientific realist, though in *Quantum Theory* he makes a genuine effort to present the debates about quantum mechanics (QM) impartially. His approach is not primarily to criticize non-realist positions, though he does take some lively pot-shots at Goodman and other anti-real-

ists. Rather, his main purpose is to argue that the commonly held perception that QM cannot be reconciled with a realist ontology is based upon an erroneous interpretation of QM.

Nicely captured in the book is the sense that physics has been in a state of Kuhnian crisis ever since the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) thought experiment backfired by apparently showing that 'QM required the existence of faster-than-light interaction between widely separated particles' (14). Furthermore, as physics is implicitly the ideal upon which philosophies of science are based and the test case against which they are tried, the philosophy of science has likewise been in a state of crisis for much of the last century — a crisis that could endure, if Norris is right, until there is a conceptual framework that can explain the phenomena in a non-instrumentalist manner.

A substantial chunk of the book is taken up with a critique of David Deutsch, a vigorous defender of the *multiverse* explanation for quantum phenomena. Deutsch is an unabashed realist about the wave function, but he holds that the branching of the universe with each collapse of the wave packet is almost self-evidently the only explanation for quantum interference phenomena. Norris insists that there is already a conceptual framework that can account for quantum data without having to swallow such a wild ontology, namely the pilot-wave theories of David Bohm and Louis de Broglie; and he accepts the view of James Cushing, who has argued at great length that Bohm's views were marginalized largely for political reasons. Unfortunately, the major features of Bohm's theory are merely alluded to rather than explained by Norris, and the reader must rely on the authority of Cushing and Peter Holland, whom Norris quotes extensively, that Bohm's theory does what Norris says it does.

For Norris, the choice between the realisms of Deutsch and Bohm is the choice between accepting the bizarre branching of the universe at every interaction and accepting non-local causation. However, the latter is a modest price to pay in order to defend our realist intuitions, according to Norris. In support of this view he quotes Bohm's (debatable) statement that 'the actual nonlocality demanded by nature turns out to be a fairly benign variety; we cannot signal with it and it does not so entangle the world as to prevent us from doing science as we have traditionally known it' (96).

A central theme of the book is what Norris claims to be a conflation of epistemological and ontological considerations in the EPR paper and the extensive literature on it. Norris is convinced that much of the confusion stems from EPR's own vacillations between epistemological and ontological terminology, thus allowing Bohr and his followers the beachhead through which they apparently razed any hope of a realist interpretation of QM. Norris contends that, if we could disentangle the epistemological and ontological strands of reasoning — specifically, if we can avoid the mistake of treating *uncertainty* as if it were a *physical property* (203-4) — then quantum paradoxes (he uses the example of Wheeler's backwards causation over light years [252-7]) will be, in principle at least, resolvable.

Unfortunately, Norris seriously misunderstands some threads of the EPR debate. He says, ' ... according to Bohr, the EPR thought experiment had in fact come up with the strongest evidence yet for ... acknowledging the existence of remote simultaneous (faster-than-light) particle interaction' (12). This claim must have Bohr spinning in his grave; for the last thing Bohr ever wanted to suggest is that there is any sort of causal interaction underpinning the non-local correlations of QM. Norris also shows only a sketchy understanding of the basis of the Bell Inequalities and Bell's Theorem. And there is no mention at all of the Kochen-Specker Theorem, the central 'no-go' result of QM. ('No-go' theorems put up roadblocks to underpinning QM with a 'hidden variables' theory — or, more precisely, a Boolean substrate.)

Norris's central contention is that QM has been in a state of Kuhnian flux because of a fixation on the Copenhagen Interpretation, which, like a Dawkinsian meme, subverts exploration of other interpretations from the outset, and encourages a lazy acceptance of the status quo. Norris is optimistic that if thinkers would only be willing to reject orthodox interpretations of the data, and examine the data itself, then they would see that quantum uncertainties are a product of limitations in our ability to observe and measure, not any sort of inherent indefiniteness in the physical reality itself.

Norris's book is a very clear and engaging introduction to the tensions between realism and QM, and it could be especially helpful for first-time readers in this difficult field who are willing to take some of Norris's pronouncements on the physics with a grain of salt. Norris is on home ground in his discussions of philosophers such as Putnam, van Fraassen, and Dummett. However, we are not confident that Norris has a sufficient grasp of the technical aspects of the foundations of QM, in particular the 'no-go' theorems that undermine realism. It is not merely a complacent lack of effort or political indoctrination that prevents physicists from defining a realist underpinning for quantum statistics, though complacency and indoctrination do abound. Readers who wish to go more deeply into this topic will benefit from Jeffrey Bub's *Interpreting the Quantum World* (Cambridge 1997), which explains in accurate detail why it is so terribly difficult to maintain anything like old-fashioned scientific realism in a quantum world.

Kent A. Peacock
Scott Jones
University of Lethbridge

Samuel Scheffler's new book *Boundaries and Allegiances* is a collection of eleven of his essays. All of the essays but one were written in the 1990s, the exception being the final essay which was written a few years earlier. The essays have appeared in various journals such as *Ethics* and *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, or as contributions in edited volumes, such as 'Liberalism, Nationalism, and Egalitarianism', the fourth essay of the book, appearing in *The Morality of Nationalism*, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (Oxford University Press 1997). This book, which brings together advanced philosophical work of the first rank, will appeal to both political philosophers and graduate students working on liberalism and problems of justice. Moreover, political philosophers with quite different research interests will be able to benefit from the book: those who work strictly on issues of distributive justice as well as those working on issues like nationalism or global justice.

The essays have in common a concern with responsibility, and the normative principles underlying debates about its just distribution in modern societies. They are all concerned with 'questions about how, at a time when people's lives are structured by social arrangements and institutions of ever-increasing size, complexity, and scope, we can best conceive of the responsibilities of individual agents and the significance of individual commitments and allegiances' (2).

The first essay, 'Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Liberalism', is an elegant prelude to the subsequent essays. The essay focuses on the notion of desert and explores in this light the relation between liberal political theory and liberalism in American political life. Essays 2-7 build on this discussion and focus on the moral standing of individual responsibility in the face of conflicting tendencies of global integration and communal differentiation. Essay 2 is concerned with the universalistic and particularistic pressures that challenge the basic assumptions of what Scheffler calls common-sense morality. Common-sense (or ordinary) morality operates with a restrictive conception of responsibility. It assumes that individuals have special responsibilities for those with whom they have a special relationship, but less or no special responsibilities for others. But is this a good guide to conceptualize responsibility in theories of justice? This is the question that most of the essays in the volume address.

The next essay, in an attempt to come to a better understanding of our obligations to different categories of people, carries the discussion on responsibility a step further. Two objections, voluntarist and distributive, are typically raised against the formulation in ordinary morality of these obliga-

tions. The voluntarist objection views special obligations as legitimate only when they arise from choices or agreements. The distributive objection regards special obligations as unfairly privileging those who are participants of special relationships over others. The first objection stems from an ideal of freedom, and the second from a principle of equality. The fourth essay finds parallel links between these two objections and two tensions within liberalism. One tension is from a globalist perspective. It is between the view that people everywhere are of equal worth on the one hand and the tendency to give priority to the needs and interests of those with whom we have a special relationship over others on the other. The other one is from a particularist perspective and it is between free choice as the source of responsibilities on the one hand and an organic tie between members of a society as the source of responsibilities non-reducible to the outcomes of choices on the other. The fifth essay examines the implications of the special responsibilities debate for global justice. Although the distributive objection does not delegitimate special responsibilities, the essay argues, the tension between the idea of special responsibility tied to our specific allegiances and the idea of global justice rooted in the principle of the equal worth of persons is more problematic than we often suppose (95).

'Relationships and Responsibilities', the sixth essay, is an excellent piece of normative reflection that offers an account of the basis of special responsibilities. Scheffler convincingly argues that responsibilities arising from special personal relationships cannot be reduced to obligations deriving from agreements. By attaching a non-instrumental value to some of our relationships with particular persons, the essay shows that there is an inherent link between valuing a relationship and special responsibilities. If we are in a relationship we have reasons to value, then our being in that relationship gives rise to special responsibilities. From this analysis, Scheffler moves to a discussion of cosmopolitanism in the next essay, 'Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism' and argues, in light of the argument about special responsibilities of the previous essay, that even moderate formulations of cosmopolitanism face certain difficulties.

Essays 8 and 9 focus on John Rawls's political liberalism and the relation of Rawlsian liberalism with utilitarianism. Essay 10 revisits the notion of desert and its role in liberal thought: Rawls's skepticism about the role of desert is restricted to distributive justice, and does not generalize to retributive justice. In so far as the basis of a claim of desert relies on a feature of a deserving person, the notion of desert is an individualistic notion. However, distributive justice is holistic. Scheffler concludes that we have reasons to think, with Rawls, that desert should not be generalized to distributive justice.

The final essay is in many respects atypical. For one thing, it was written a few years earlier than other essays in the volume. Moreover, it is a critique of a general approach to ethics and political philosophy, rather than being a discussion of a specific issue of responsibility. Yet rather than this chronological and thematic irregularity being disruptive, the piece punctuates the

series of essays rather well. It provides a sober and convincing criticism of the revived admiration of virtue-based ethics of the ancient Greeks, a trend that suggests that we have lost something important by adopting the basic premises of modern philosophy. The general character of the essay helps the reader situate the specific discussions of the previous essays about responsibility in a larger context of modern moral thought. In short, this is an excellent collection most political philosophers working in the Anglo-American tradition will find most valuable.

Idil Boran
Hoover Chair in Economic and Social Ethics
University of Louvain

Peter A. Schouls
Descartes and the Possibility of Science.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2000.
Pp. xii + 171.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-8014-3775-X.

The conception and spirit of Schouls's book is captured by a passage in which Schouls speaks on Descartes's behalf:

> Once mind and body have been separated, the mind can without any help from the body develop metaphysics, mathematics and theoretical physics, that is, a system of absolute rules required as foundation for developing true judgments about the essential nature of the human body and of external objects. ... These rules, being absolute, hold for any possible world, including the world in which I find myself; but in their generality they do not tell me enough about the particularity which pertains to *my* body and *my* world. What I want to know is how to construct efficient labor-saving devices, how to avert or cure illness and perhaps even prevent aging, how to forestall or dispel the anxiety which clings to my daily acts and even penetrates my sleep. I want a mechanics, medicine, and morals for *my* world. That too can be attained, but only subsequent to the separation of mind and body. For once, during this period of separation, I have developed my purely rational foundations in metaphysics, mathematics, and theoretical physics, I am again free to make use of the "union" and "intermingling" of mind and body. I am then free "to think with the body," that is, to use corporeal imagination and sensation to construct models and conduct experiments on this purely rational foundation. I am then in

the position to increase my mastery over nature and so work at the continued actualization of my freedom through development of the applied sciences. (41-2)

Schouls's thesis is that the project of manipulating the world to improve humanity's state by developing and applying science (ix) is predicated on Descartes's use of intellectual imagination in science, and that this is an innovation based on the philosopher's radical conception of human freedom. It is freedom that is the essence of human being, and realizing this allows us to achieve a radically unified reading of the central argument of the *Meditations*.

As someone whose work is discussed in the book and who is convinced that imagination and free will have to be understood at the heart of Descartes's philosophizing, I strongly applaud Schouls's intentions and agree with many of his ultimate assertions. But how he gets there leaves much to be desired.

What is 'intellectual imagination'? Surprisingly, one is hard pressed to find any characterization that goes beyond the functional definition that it is needed for making hypotheses (the most developed form is on p. 146: intellectual imagination is 'the mental power which introduces new material in the form of hypotheses to fit with whatever is already known'). Schouls is not thinking just of the type of hypothesis that Descartes uses in his scientific writings. *Corporeal* imagination does just fine for those purposes, 'the mode of imagining bound up with images,' the mode that (according to Schouls citing Alan White) most philosophers have identified as imagination pure and simple (47). But Descartes knew that imagination was necessary even in the very act of establishing his metaphysics and the fundamentals of his science: not corporeal imagination, but an imagination totally ' "divested" of whatever is corporeal' (59), that is, intellectual imagination. And so, for example, even the hypotheses about God that are entertained in the *Meditations* are a product not of intellect but of intellectual imagination (102).

Since in *Descartes's Imagination* (Cambridge 1996) I emphasized that the early Descartes had distinguished an intellectual from a corporeal use of imagination and then proceeded to argue that this distinction was a model for the use of imagination in his mature writings I am perfectly prepared to accept that intellectual imagination is crucial, but not entirely on Schouls's terms. He gives no historical background, nor does he devote much effort to presenting and interpreting the specific passages from which Descartes's conceptions of imagination can be educed. Schouls's agenda is largely a priori: Descartes is a rationalist and one of the inventors of the modern scientific project, he presents his thought in 'doctrines' and 'teachings'. For anyone who demurs or thinks that Descartes's understanding of imagination and the other psychological powers developed and shifted over time this is painful.

Schouls is certainly right in emphasizing something John Schuster pointed out twenty-five years ago, that reason in Descartes is surprisingly passive, and in contrasting this with will, the ultimately active human power for Descartes. So from the last chapter, 'Human Nature and the Possibility

of Science', the reader might expect the conclusion that will is the foundation of imagination. Astonishingly, there is scarcely a whisper of this possibility, though something might be casually inferred by his reference to 'the primacy of free will ... in the introduction of the omnipotent deceiver, which ... is the ultimate tool enabling us to doubt all our beliefs' (160), especially if that is read against an earlier assertion (142) that doubt leads to inquiry and inquiry depends on disciplined imagination for its success. By the end of the book one is longing for an explicit untangling of all the psychological powers introduced, but the task is never even begun. Is there a difference between reason and intellect? What is the distinction between these two and intellectual imagination? And why does Schouls not discuss in the conclusion Descartes's most articulate discussion of the systematic interrelations of the fundamental psychological powers, the one that occurs early in *The Passions of the Soul*? This omission is significant not least because *The Passions* makes imagination a function chiefly of will — something Schouls mentions but treats as confused in a much earlier discussion (56-8).

The issue can be reduced to two pairs of questions. Does intellectual imagination exist, and does it exist in the form Schouls envisions? Is the possibility of science embedded in human nature, and does Schouls adequately explicate this? The answer to the first question of each pair is yes, but to the second no.

Dennis L. Sepper
University of Dallas

Alan D. Schrift, ed.
Why Nietzsche Still?
Reflections on Drama, Culture, and Politics.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press 2000. Pp. xv + 309.
US$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-520-21851-5); US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-520-21852-3).

Contributors: David B. Allison, Debra B. Bergoffen, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, Daniel W. Conway, John Burt Foster, Jr., Duncan Large, Alphonso Lingus, Jeffrey T. Nealon, David Owen, Paul Patton, Aaron Ridley, Alan D. Schrift, Gary Shapiro, Rebecca Stringer, and Dana R. Villa.

Those of us for whom Friedrich Nietzsche is a continuing presence (if not a constant one) are liable to find themselves a tad unnerved by the title of this volume. Why *not* Nietzsche, anytime? Preceding the main text of Alan D. Schrift's Introduction to a collection of essays by a distinguished group of philosophers, political theorists, and critics is a quotation that both explains and answers the question well enough. What Nietzsche 'had to go through

alone and misunderstood,' Herman Hesse writes in his memorable preface to *Steppenwolf*, 'thousands suffer today.' When Nietzsche wrote, nihilism was only a knock on the door. It took a nature as sensitive as his fully to appreciate the explosive potential of 'this uncanniest of guests'. But after a century of artistic, moral, technological, social, and political revolutions, only a hermit could be unaware of the way in which, to use Nietzsche's phrase, 'the highest values devalue themselves.' Nietzsche's idiosyncrasies have become grimly relevant to many more than 'thousands' of today's spiritual walking wounded. He still matters, quite simply, because so do the problems he so relentlessly exposed.

Even so, that Nietzsche's problems still claim us is no reason why his approach to them should — unless, perhaps, Nietzsche remains somehow ahead of us in formulating their nature or resolution. Making this case is the burden of *Why Nietzsche Still?*, whose essays are devoted to drama, to the relationship between culture and the political, and to 'cultural dramatics'.

The latter refers to the use of Nietzsche's dramatic images in order to analyze and criticize contemporary cultural 'dramas', i.e., conflicts and clashes over values. It was Gilles Deleuze, in *Nietzsche et la philosophie* (1962), who drew attention to what he characterized as Nietzsche's 'method of dramatization', although none of the contributors to *Why Nietzsche Still?* acknowledges him in this context. The method is essential to Nietzsche because for him assertions about the nature of human life are meaningful in terms of the role they play *in* human life, for example, in the psychological life of one who makes such an assertion. The assertion that something or someone is *evil*, for example, must be understood in terms of the 'perspective on life' of the asserter. Thus in *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (1887) Nietzsche illuminates the meaning of that value judgment by appealing to the perspective of the 'slave', or one who both fears and desires power but does not exercise it. By putting typical value judgments in the mouths of typical characters, Nietzsche shows how such judgments function in the context of human passions and relationships.

The key terms of art here are 'will to power' (considered for the most part as desire), 'perspectivism', 'interpretation', and their cognates. Within the framework of these considerations, the volume's 15 essays explore such themes as Oedipus, Nietzsche and psychoanalysis, Nietzsche's self-presentation, Nietzsche's Shakespeare, the psychology and physiology of music, Nietzsche and the visual, millennialism in Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Freud, and bad conscience, Nietzsche's use of dramatic types, the limits of will to power, Nietzsche's reflections on the actor, Nietzsche and the 'culture wars', the fruitfulness of conflict between theory and practice, and contrasting approaches to agonism in Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt.

The strength of this collection is also its weakness, for the insistence that Nietzsche be 'pertinent' — to contemporary ideological projects, one gathers — necessitates that contributors ignore, play down, or exclude some of the most provocative aspects of his *œuvre*. The point of the volume 'is not to offer the true account of the true Nietzsche ... but to construct a post-Nietzschean-

ism one is willing to endorse and enact' (Schrift, quoting William E. Connolly). For this reason, Nietzsche's fascination with biological interpretations of culture, which could be made to resonate vividly with much of contemporary neuroscience and sociobiology, is seen almost without exception as an embarrassment that must be refuted or interpreted away. His longings for a new *Rangordnung* are kept at arm's length. And there is next to nothing on what Nietzsche himself considered his most important thought, that of eternal recurrence — presumably because it leads to metaphysical and spiritual dimensions that are not easy to relate to ideological or political concerns. For these matters the reader must turn to earlier studies such as those of Martin Heidegger or Karl Jaspers, or more recently to Rüdiger Safranski's *Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography* (2002) or John Lippitt and Jim Urpeth's anthology *Nietzsche and the Divine* (2001). Within its self-chosen limits, however, *Why Nietzsche Still?* is a superb conspectus of current thinking about Nietzsche's legacy.

Frederick M. Dolan
(Department of Rhetoric)
University of California at Berkeley

If, like me, you find most philosophical commentaries on the work of such thinkers as Derrida, Deleuze and Levinas scarcely less obscure and jargon-saturated than the originals, then this is the book for you. Peter Sedgwick has given us a remarkably lucid account of the major trends in the history of European thought, from the early seventeenth century to the late twentieth. To complain that a project like this is in any way vitiated by presupposing something like a unified tradition of European thought in this period would be peevish and far too fashionable. In fact, what makes this book really valuable is that it allows philosophers to teach the history of 'modern' philosophy from a significantly different perspective than the one generally found in the anthologies. If it is inevitable in writing the history of philosophy to think in terms of thematically unified traditions, then at the very least we require alternative narratives like this one.

Sedgwick begins with an account of the philosophical projects of Descartes, Hume and Kant. He then 'maps the terrain' of philosophical themes that follows. These themes are, predictably, the nature of reason, of experience and of subjectivity. It is impressive to see Sedgwick then weave these themes through the writings of thinkers as otherwise diverse as Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno, Horkheimer, Deleuze and Guatarri, Sartre, Levinas, Althusser, Foucault, and Lyotard. So what we come away with is a picture of a tradition that *is* indeed unified around a cluster of fundamental problems. Moreover, Sedgwick shows clearly that this historical trajectory is dominated by an overwhelming tendency: it moves from a strictly metaphysical account of the central themes to one which is increasingly historicized, the result of which movement is a focus on the ethical and political dimensions of the key problems.

What strikes me as most impressive about Sedgwick's analysis, however, is not so much the tightly constructed exegesis of various thinkers, but the pithy critical comments he provides. Here are two examples. The first concerns Derrida. In the 'Afterword' to *Limited Inc.*, Derrida emphasizes the value of non-identity in his characterization of 'différance'. He argues that *différance* should not be thought of as being identical either with determinacy or with absolute indeterminacy, since, as Sedgwick points out, this would 'in either case render it [*différance*] subject to the dominion of a logic of identity' (223). However, if the play of difference is nevertheless mediated by contextual forces, as Derrida maintains it is, then these forces are the conditions of possibility for the play of difference. This, according to Sedgwick, means that 'identity becomes the precondition of non-identity's being postulated at all', and, since Derrida does not work this tension out, his account of difference remains 'an abstract and unmediated idealism' (224).

The second example comes toward the end of the book in the form of a criticism of postmodern thought. This criticism is inspired by Habermas's theory of communicative action. Lyotard attacks Habermas for 'orienting our treatment of the problem of legitimation in the direction of a search for a universal consensus' (279). Since this is simply a description of what Habermas is up to, it hardly counts as a criticism. Sedgwick implies here that there is something important about the notion that communication presupposes a universal ideal of rational speech, but Lyotard simply does not engage this possibility (280).

But one suspects that Sedgwick himself does not ultimately take the neo-Enlightenment position of Habermas seriously enough. The book has a two-page Afterword entitled, 'Hell Fire!'. The title is taken from an exclamation made by Wittgenstein, as reported by the Welsh writer Eirian Davies. According to Davies, while he and Wittgenstein were out walking one day during the Second World War, Wittgenstein was accosted and arrested by three Home Guard officers. Wittgenstein was at a loss how to respond, and simply shouted, 'Hell Fire!'. Davies reports that language and reason were, in the face of this assault, impotent. In assessing this mini-morality play, Sedgwick invokes the language of Lyotard: 'we could say that what we have

here is an instance of the incommensurability of heterogeneous genres of discourse.' Wittgenstein's expletive and the reactions of the soldiers 'offer an intimation of the limits of rational discourse' (295). Finally, however, none of this means that we should not do philosophy: '[o]n the contrary, it makes the activity of philosophizing all the more interesting' (296). That is, apparently, the last word: philosophy is interesting, if impotent.

The complacency with which Sedgwick interprets the meeting of reason and brutality in Davies's story is stark. If this is the sum of what philosophical postmodernity can teach us about ethics and politics, then our hopes for rational discourse and a generally humane world may indeed rest with Habermas *et al.*

Byron Williston
University of South Florida

David Snelling
Philosophy, Psychoanalysis and the Origins of Meaning: Pre-Reflective Intentionality in the Psychoanalytic View of the Mind.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company
2001. Pp. viii + 217.
US$69.95. ISBN 0-7546-1629-0.

David Snelling's goal in this book is to construct a theory of the human subject which explains why an individual finds the world meaningful. Ultimately it is a critique of the various conceptions of the constituents and functioning of the human mind or so-called 'mental apparatus' through the lens of the philosophies of, among others, Freud, Klein, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Hegel. Snelling compares the reflective intentionality of the conscious mind — which 'commonsense psychology' calls an individual's personal motive — with Freud's psychoanalytic perspective of an unconscious or non-reflective intentionality which he holds to be at the root of every motive. He wonders how it is possible to explain the meaning of behaviors which Freud claims are caused by unconscious mental content without resorting to either the mentalistic or mechanistic explanations offered by Freud. Snelling inquires into exactly what roles are played by both the mind and body when the world external to the individual shifts from being perceived as mere phenomena to having meaning. In this way Snelling aims not to denounce Freud's theory of the unconscious but to defend it with more rigorous theoretical justification than Freud's own.

Snelling begins with the argument that Freud's use of the term 'instinct' in relation to certain human actions cannot adequately bridge the gap between a causal physicalist vocabulary and an intentional mentalist one, that is, between an externally caused and an internally generated motive. Talk of instincts cannot explain the intention that can always be articulated after the fact (regardless of the behaviour) as giving meaning to even the most seemingly instinctual acts. It is this meaningful intentionality, based on an interpretation of the world, that is problematic for Freud's theory of instinct because his theory requires a kind of primitive sensing or feeling of meaning that cannot be explained in terms of intention. This leads Snelling to examine what he considers to be the most profitable elements in Melanie Klein's theory in reconciling Freudian instinct with intention: 'unconscious phantasy' and 'internal object relations' which are, according to Klein, interpretive elements or processes that are necessarily constitutive of mind and existing from birth.

From there Snelling discusses how Wittgenstein's linguistic and Heidegger's phenomenological perspectives on the intelligibility of the world offer theoretical support to Klein's theory in explaining human understanding as immediately experiential rather than cognitive. He writes that human beings 'live in a pre-theoretical and pre-reflective engagement with a non-determinative background of meaning in which things "show up" as meaningful according to the nature of the engagements' (80). This conception of meaning as 'emergent' relies neither on an intentional mental activity nor on the problematic notion of instinct. He gives the example offered by Hubert Dreyfus of the tool which 'becomes "invisible" as a separate object, to become an extension of the active body' (61), and later those of a skilled athlete, a wine expert, and a connoisseur of painting, to illustrate how meaning in general, just as in these specific situations, emerges from existing background knowledge which is in the moment, non-reflective, and non-rule-following, and yet understood. Meaning then rests on a foundation of experience which cannot be reduced further by either psychological or philosophical analysis. But the social nature of human beings brings Snelling to observe that an individual cannot survive with an exclusively inner experience of unconscious meaning. The inner world of meaning must (and does) allow itself to be progressively modified by socially constructed meaning. Meaning therefore shifts from being an either/or dichotomy of either subjective and internally generated or subject-independent and externally generated to an holistic both/and. This 'spontaneous eruption of meaning' results in the 'enworlded' view of psychoanalysis that Snelling then connects to Hegel's theory of the embodied soul and Wilfred Bion's theory of thinking.

Snelling's main argument is for the feasibility of a holistic model of meaning in which it is not only innate but where it also 'depends on the thing's embeddedness in an entire background of socially-shared meaning' (187). His focus is almost exclusively on the philosophical consequences of various psychoanalytic theories of mind. I say 'almost' because a serious problem arises when he ties the cogency of psychoanalytic theory to clinical success.

For example, he writes, 'Freudian theory can gain support from Kleinian theory where it agrees with it because Kleinian theory diverges from Freudian theory in certain respects, producing different theoretical conclusions and clinical results in ways which are regular and predictable' (39). While it may be true that the two theories regularly result in predictably different *theoretical* conclusions, Snelling ought to have questioned the wisdom of believing that a theory of mind is a causal factor in clinical treatment outcomes. Snelling has fallen into the ubiquitous theoretician's trap of taking at face value the assumption that a difference in theories produces a difference in clinical results. In comparing Klein with Freud two things must be kept in mind: first, Klein was a woman while Freud was a man; and second, Klein's theories and her practice came a number of years after Freud at a time when clinical protocol allowed therapists to show compassion to their patients. Clinical research data has shown that the most significant influences on treatment outcomes and success rates are not at all the therapist's theoretical stance, but a number of other factors such as the gender of the therapist and the nature of the patient/therapist relationship. This is not a minor point. Freud's pseudo-scientific, aloof, and paternalistic approach to his suffering patients no doubt produced outcomes that were regular and predictable, but this does not mean those outcomes were necessarily the result of his theory of mind. The same can be said (and has been said) of all other psychotherapeutic theoreticians when it comes to empirically assessing the results of their practice.

Peter B. Raabe
(Faculty of Continuing Studies)
Simon Fraser University

The tension between the dual movements of increasing integration along lines of technology, capital and commodities, and increasing fragmentation along lines of culture, identity and community is a fundamental attribute of globalization. In a world where technology and commodities continue to expand their reach and where, simultaneously, sectarian communities retreat into fundamentalism, it is vital to examine the effects of these dual movements on individual and collective behavior. Alain Touraine's book provides a provocative assessment of the possibility of our living together in a world 'divided into at least two continents that are drifting further and further apart' (3). While Touraine offers a potential solution to the real dangers of a divided world, it is not entirely clear how that solution can be put into practice, particularly under the global institutional circumstances in which we presently find ourselves. Touraine approaches this problem by first positing a conception of the individual as a social actor justified in terms of freedom and responsibility, and then exploring the implications of the changing relationships between individuals, communities, and states.

The first part of the book is devoted to the definition of the project of the Subject. Against neo-republicanism, postmodernism, and communitarianism, Touraine argues convincingly that equal personal freedom is the basic principle of a robust, modern democracy (250). The project of the Subject emerges as a response to what Touraine calls 'demodernization'. Modernity, Touraine says, was characterized by the attempt to unify the market economy and individualism by means of the institutions of the constitutional state. Late modernity, however, has witnessed the growing autonomy of economic forces and the declining ability of political institutions to ensure that social demands are met. Under globalization, social organization and technological and economic production have become polarized. As a result, culture and economy — 'the world of instrumental reason and that of collective meaning' (25) — are being dissociated. Demodernization is precisely this separation of culture and economy, of personal freedom and collective efficacy.

Demodernization exhibits the two primary features of 'de-institutionalization', or the disintegration of those legal and political norms which constitute public morality; and 'desocialization', or the decline of those behavioral values which shape personalities and social roles. As a whole, then, demodernization produces a break between the world of the system and the lifeworld, and ultimately erodes the conditions for creating a coherent per-

sonal life. Hence, Touraine envisions the project of the Subject as a way of protecting personal life from the contradictory forces of the market and identity-based communities. Only through a personal life project, understood as the formation of a life (his)story by the situated individual, can instrumentality and identity be reconciled. Neither universal consciousness nor essential soul, 'the Subject' thus refers to the individual's desire and attempts to transform lived experiences into the construction of the self as actor. The Subject produces itself through the individual's desire for individuation, which marks the process of creating meaning by an individual who recognizes and asserts herself as an agent. In this way, the Subject is more than an assertion of freedom, it is the coming into existence of a free individual.

The production of the Subject, Touraine notes, necessarily occurs in the social field and individuals are, to a large extent, defined by the social relations in which they are involved. Having provided a defense of 'subjectivation', Touraine proceeds in the second part of the book to defend the possibility of living together in the contemporary world based on the link between personal experience and collective action forged by the individual as agent. What is at stake here is the reconstruction of social life, a mediation of the personal and collective realms.

Touraine charts a path for this reconstruction guided by two principles: first, that the transformation of the individual into the Subject requires recognition that Others are also Subjects striving for individuation; second, that the project of the Subject requires institutional safeguards for freedom and individual rights. The first principle grounds a shared ethics of reciprocity and intercultural communication, while the second fosters a diversity of democratic social, historical, and cultural movements. Taken together, they serve to cultivate concrete forms of solidarity among Subjects that transcend mere generalized tolerance. Subjects in solidarity fight growing social inequalities and exclusions, ensure equal opportunities for all, strengthen social and political controls on the economy, respect cultural diversity, and guarantee equal social and cultural rights for all. As Touraine emphasizes throughout the second section, poverty and the lack of (personally transformative) education have a direct impact on the democratic disposition of the individual and society. The freedom of the Subject, he asserts, must become our 'new principle of social integration' (242).

Touraine's diagnosis of demodernization and his proposals for a politics of the Subject are intriguing but vulnerable to a number of objections prompted by some of his theoretical generalizations. First, Touraine's dismissal of universalism and the 'ethics of duty' as 'a thing of the past' (61) neglects the increasingly prominent role of human rights within foreign policy and international law since the end of the Second World War. One could plausibly argue that something of a 'revolution' in humanitarian morality has occurred in the past 50 years which strengthened rather than weakened a transnational culture of shared values, and facilitated a gradual growth in freedom and democratization across the globe. Second, even if we grant that globalization represents an epoch in human history characterized

by the dominance of the global market, it remains unclear whether this epoch also marks the demise of the state. Many scholars of globalization have suggested, conversely, that although the state is evolving it is certainly not disappearing. To think otherwise is to ignore continuing patterns of state power in a world where the Westphalian inheritance is still dominant. Third, it may be questioned whether the global economy is reducible to an alien mass culture starkly dissociated from social and political institutions. Indeed, one might claim that a key trait of globalization is that corporate actors, in addition to pursuing their traditional aim of seeking profits, have increasingly provided leadership and creativity in issues of global public policy. While this activity is surely far from being entirely positive (nor does it obviate the need for public institutions), it has extended the cooperative efforts of the corporate sector deeper into the public realm.

Despite these concerns about his conclusions, Touraine has provided us with a suggestive and intelligent look at the complex forces of globalization, offering us much to grapple with and learn from.

Patrick Hayden
Northwestern State University

Slavoj Zizek
On Belief.
New York: Routledge 2001. Pp. 170.
Cdn$75.00: US$50.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-25531-7);
Cdn$19.95: US$12.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-25532-5).

Not elongating in the grandiose scope of his preceding pursuits (such as *The Ticklish Subject* [1998] or *The Sublime Object of Ideology* [1989]) Slavoj Zizek's *On Belief* is a prescient work from the Senior Researcher at the University of Ljubljana discussing the political materiality of metaphysical grammars in the West. Although its length might suggest that it is an appendix to his recently published *The Fragile Absolute* (1999), its clear reworking of past ideas into immanently engaging formats makes this volume valuable to those familiar with Zizek's work, as well as to those discovering him for the first time. As might be expected, the usual suspects are here — St. Paul, Hegel, Marx, Freud and Lacan — their proxies again masterfully maneuvered into coherent, when not outright ingenious, cultural controversies about autonomy, the crises of subjectivity in the Humanities, and the aporia of Western belief. Like brilliant Eastern European philoso-

phers before him, Zizek's contemporary importance proceeds from his extremely acute clinical analyses of cultural materiality, which is to say that he finds a way to legitimize canonical philosophy in today's culturally obsessed Humanities. Also, Zizek's normative dictates about identity creation, metaphysics, and the politics of trauma are here dramatized more fully than in any previous short volume.

As the title might suggest, Zizek's discussion concerns the socio-cultural grammars that birth, as well as complicate, the practice of believing in metaphysical objects. Predictably, he discusses a conundrum of issues while reading Gnosticism, Christianity, Judaism, Marxism and Psychoanalysis through various modes of popular culture, be it Jordan's *The End of the Affair*, Wagner's *Ring*, or Derrida's work on friendship and Levinas. The book is split into three different sections. The first section moves the reader through the archaic desires manipulating one towards digital fantasy and virtual reality while the second section provides a crash course in the analogical relations between Freud's conceptions of anal objects in his *Totem and Taboo*, and the Christian Will-To-Believe as demarcated through the First and Second Testaments. The third section apprehends the Judaism-Christian relationship as precedent to the most material of ideologies in the twentieth century, namely Christian capitalism and atheistic Marxist/Leninism.

In being a manifesto celebrating the potentialities of cultural expression, and actual (rather than Real) ethical engagement in debates about the validity of belief, *On Belief* is required reading for any individual interested in philosophically engaging the politics of violence and religion. By looking closely at the neo-Kantian ethos driving individuals to treat metaphysical objects as ethical entities, Zizek's work necessitates from us interrogations beyond our banal, albeit safe, typical regimen of religious belief in Western life. Thus, his short work is an essential reading for many students in the Humanities who have had to carefully review the ontology of violence and religion in wake of what happened in New York in September 2001.

William Alejandro Martin
(Department of English)
McMaster University

articles

book reviews   *philosophical abstracts*   *announcements*