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Editor / Directeur

Roger A. Shiner
Philosophy in Review
Department of Philosophy
Okanagan University College
3333 University Way
Kelowna, BC
Canada V1V 1V7
Tel: 250-762-5445 X7344
Fax: 250-764-6428
E-Mail: pir@ouc.bc.ca
URL: http://www.ouc.bc.ca/philosophy/Shiner/index%20new.html

Associate Editor / directeur adjoint

Robert Burch
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
4-115 Humanities Centre
Edmonton, AB
Canada T6G 2E5
Tel: 780-492-3307
Fax: 780-492-9160
E-mail: Robert.burch@ualberta.ca

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Theodor W. Adorno
Can One Live after Auschwitz? — A Philosophical Reader.
Ed. Rolf Tiedemann.
Trans. Rodney Livingstone and others.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2003.
Pp. 560.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3143-8);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3144-6).

This collection of papers and selections from Adorno's works has been translated into English in time for his centenary last year. The edition is also timely in the different sense that there has been a renewed interest in Adorno's philosophy in the last decade. For that reason, a comprehensive collection of readings, which is the aim of this edition, would be useful.

The initial signs do look promising. The collection is edited by Rolf Tiedemann, who is Adorno's literary executive and the former director of the Adorno Archive in Frankfurt. Moreover, among the selection there are a number of texts which either had not been published before (such as the 1962 essay version of the later published book *The Jargon of Authenticity*) or not translated into English (such as a transcript of a conversation with Elias Canetti). The book is usefully divided according to six themes, meant to represent the range of Adorno's thought. In the section 'Towards a New Categorical Imperative' two essays are collected about dealing with the past of Auschwitz ('The Meaning of Working with the Past' and 'Education after Auschwitz'). The section 'Damaged Life' contains selections from *Minima Moralia*. In 'Administered World, Reified Thought' one finds a selection from Adorno's writings on society ('Reflection on Class Theory', 'Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?: the Fundamental Question of the Present Structure of Society', 'Progress', 'Cultural Criticism and Society') as well as the already mentioned essay 'Jargon of Authenticity' and transcript of the conversation with Canetti. Some of Adorno's writings on literature ('Heine the Wound', 'Notes on Kafka', 'Commitment', 'Trying to Understand *Endgame*'), on music ('Beethoven's Late Style', 'Schubert', 'Wagner's Relevance Today', 'Mahler', 'Alban Berg') and on art more generally ('Art and the Arts') are compiled in the section 'Art, Memory of Suffering'. Finally, 'A Philosophy That Keeps Itself Alive' brings together Horkheimer's and Adorno's attempt on anti-Semitism ('Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment') and a selection from the transcripts of Adorno's 1965 lecture series *Metaphysics: Concept and Problem*.

However, the collection is less comprehensive than one might wish, containing no material from either the *Negative Dialectics* or the posthumously published *Aesthetic Theory*. In fact, the label 'philosophical reader' is somewhat misleading, since the collection contains mainly selections from Adorno's sociological, musical and cultural writings. That is not to say that these writings are not philosophical (as Tiedemann rightly points out in his

introduction, Adorno rejected any strict boundaries between disciplines; see p. xxvii), but it is surprising to find almost nothing from any of Adorno's expressly philosophical works. In this respect, the collection under review compares poorly with Brian O'Connor's recent *The Adorno Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell 2000), which contains a number of Adorno's philosophical essays starting from his inaugural lecture 'The Actuality of Philosophy'.

Although the selection is not commented on or justified, the following concerns might have been motivating Tiedemann. First, he was perhaps guided by including some less well-known and less easily available papers. Second, he seems to have prioritised accessibility of the texts, choosing essays from *Notes on Literature* over an extract from the fragmentary *Aesthetic Theory* or preferring the lecture transcripts to the essay 'Meditations on Metaphysics' from the *Negative Dialectic*. Yet by far the most important reason for the selection seems to have been Tiedemann's own emphasis on the importance of Auschwitz for Adorno's thought. This comes out clearly in his introduction.

Those who look to Tiedemann's introduction for a neutral presentation of Adorno's main trains of thought and a review of the different ways he has been interpreted will be largely disappointed. True to the tradition of Critical Theory, Tiedemann provides a text that is far from a disengaged summary. Tiedemann loosely structures his introduction around a main theme, namely that Adorno's philosophy is driven by his new categorical imperative that Auschwitz ought not repeat itself. He traces back how Adorno and his Frankfurt School colleagues lost faith in the proletariat and turned their attention to the fate of the Jews (xvii-ix). He argues, with constant reference to 'Elements of Anti-Semitism', how the analysis of what was happening to the Jews in the concentration and extermination camps modified Adorno's conception of philosophy (xx). Tiedemann suggests that the elimination of individuality in the camps served Adorno as an indication for what has gone wrong in thought as well, namely the destruction of the non-identical (xi). Moreover, Adorno linked the two, thinking aimed at identity and the suffering in the real world. As Tiedemann puts it: ' ... the selection process on the station platform in the extermination camps shed a "deathly-livid light" on the thinking habits of the logician who in all simplicity declared those habits to be purely mental' (xxi). This illuminates the sense in which Adorno's philosophy was marked by the new categorical imperative. Despite his fierce criticism of thought and thereby the philosophical tradition, philosophy had to be continued for the sake of the victims, for the hope of preventing further suffering and revoking the suffering of the past (xxvii).

Tiedemann's introduction is also far from disengaged in a further sense. The main theme is at places intermingled with critical comments on the current forms of remembering Auschwitz (xii), post-1989 Germany (xvi), post-metaphysical thought (xxiii-iv) and the New Left critics of Adorno in the 1970s (xiv). And the selection of texts has to be also seen in this context, i.e., against the backdrop of the new Germany and its intelligentsia asserting

itself. In this sense, Tiedemann's collection is meant as an intervention, though he does not say so explicitly.

In summary, if one is looking for a textbook, one perhaps fares better with O'Connor's edition. While the collection under review here offers some new material and translations as well as excellent editorial notes (the bulk of which are provided by the translator), it offers much less in terms of comprehensiveness and no basic summary of Adorno's works or a bibliography. However, if one wants to see what Adorno was able to say on the importance and difficulty of how one can (and should) live after Auschwitz, then one should turn to this collection. Adorno, who was no friend of scholarship for its own sake, might have preferred this approach to his work.

Fabian Freyenhagen
University of Sheffield

Heiner Bielefeldt
Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xiii + 202.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-521-81813-3.

Heiner Bielefeldt's *Symbolic Representation in Kant's Practical Philosophy* examines Kant's technical account of symbolic representation and the role of symbols in the practical philosophy. Bielefeldt sets the context for his account of symbolic representation by noting Kant's positive regard for the moral educator who aspires to 'Socratic Midwivery' (20). This pedagogical ideal, which involves a gentle leading to truth, is captured in Kant's 'modest language of symbolic representation' (188).

What, exactly, is this language of 'symbolic representation'? Bielefeldt does not aim for precise definition. It turns out that symbols 'show very different features', and symbolic representation 'serves different purposes in Kant's practical philosophy' (179). The only general characteristic is the '*indirectness* by which [the symbol] points to something that itself remains out of the reach of direct understanding' (33). Hence, in symbolic representation, the object is not taken in its direct or literal sense; rather, it is considered as a symbol that points indirectly to an idea that exceeds the limits of experience. As such, symbols answer reason's 'tendency to extend beyond the contingencies of the natural order' (30), but avoid the pitfalls associated with dogmatic claims to knowledge.

With this in view, Bielefeldt interprets the sparing, yet crucial, references to symbols in Kant's practical philosophy. He finds that where theoretical knowledge must be silent, symbols permit a tentative linking of the visible and invisible worlds. Hence, laws of nature are a 'type' of the moral law (51), social duties signify obligations of mutual respect (88), the order of rights is symbolic of 'the united lawgiving will of the people' (108), the beautiful points to nature's purposiveness (121), and, religious symbols are vehicles for reflection upon the notion of God (176). Through symbols, practical philosophy 'broadens the scope for the practical awareness of freedom whose inherent unconditionality has often been obscured by excessive claims of theoretical knowledge' (8). In other words, symbolic language allows for tentative exploration of normative questions without devolution into dogmatism or skepticism. This, Bielefeldt argues, has contemporary significance. In an age when claims to moral knowledge have largely been rejected, symbols may hold a clue to the sort of open-ended discourse that could sustain a modern ethical liberalism.

Bielefeldt's book has numerous merits. It provides a comprehensive and readable overview of Kant's discussion of symbolic representation. It offers a novel and interesting perspective on the broader role of symbolic representation in Kant's practical philosophy. Additionally, it sheds light on Kant's optimism regarding the practical philosophy. Hence, in many respects, Bielefeldt's contribution is worthwhile and illuminating.

I do think, however, that Bielefeldt makes an oversight in his presentation of Kant's technical account of symbolic representation. Bielefeldt's oversight relates to historical context. Specifically, for Kant and his German predecessors, there are two senses of symbolic knowledge. In one sense, symbolic knowledge signifies that which is thought by means of words. In another, symbolic knowledge refers to those representations, which, by means of their relations to objects, give a sign of something else. (Cf., C.A. Crusius, *The Way to the Certainty and Dependability of Human Knowledge*, Pt. I, Ch. IV, §184.) Kant is not interested in the first, non-technical sense of symbolic knowledge. However, he is interested in the second, technical sense. But there is an important difference between Kant and his predecessors when it comes to the latter. Kant, unlike his predecessors, rejects the symbolic/intuitive dichotomy. That is, he regards symbolic representation as a species of intuitive representation. As he remarks in Bk. II, Pt. II §59 of his *Critique of Judgment*, intuitive representation is either 'schematical' or 'symbolical'. Indeed, Kant often reminds us of the link between intuition and symbolic representation. In his *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*, he explains that a natural law may be a 'schema' or 'type' of the moral law only insofar as the natural law is one 'to which objects of sensuous intuition are subject' [V, 69]. He also reflects on the connections between intuition, schema, and symbol in his *Critique of Judgment*. There, he illustrates symbolic representation with reference to a hand mill and a monarchical state, where the symbolic representation of the state is based on the rule of reflection on the intuition of the hand mill [V, 352]. Hence, for Kant, what we know through intuition supplies a rule for

thinking an object, and this rule establishes the basis for analogy to what we do not know.

Bielefeldt's discussion of symbolic representation underplays the significance of the link between intuition and symbol. When Kant claims that human language is 'replete with such indirect exhibitions according to an analogy, where the expression does not contain the actual schema for the concept but contains merely a symbol for our reflection' [V, 352], Bielefeldt interprets Kant as contrasting schema and symbol in terms of grounding in intuition — where 'schema' implies restriction and 'symbol' does not (38). Correctly interpreted, symbols do not escape the constraints of intuition; rather, symbolic analogy can only build upon such constraints. Insofar as something beautiful is a symbol of the morally good, it is not only constrained by the idea of a good will, but also by sensuous intuition of the object. The oversight of the two senses of symbolic language is also significant, because Bielefeldt places emphasis on Kant's view that 'human beings find themselves in a world that is already structured by metaphors, analogies, and other forms of indirect representation' (180). Of course, in the non-technical sense of symbolic, this must be true, since all language is symbolic. But, whether the critical philosopher finds herself immersed in a world structured by symbols and metaphors is less clear. Kant rarely invokes the latter in his critical philosophy, and he even describes symbolic representation as 'an emergency measure' in his *Fortschritte* [62]. It is probably this same oversight that leads Bielefeldt to characterize Kant's 'ways of symbolic representation' as both 'strict' and 'playful', and hence, unsystematic and equivocal (179-81).

It is not entirely clear how much difference Bielefeldt's oversight makes. Most of what Bielefeldt says on the subject of symbolic representation seems plausible and interesting. Nonetheless, additional research would help to settle some outstanding questions. Ultimately, what is at issue is the plausibility of trying to render Kant's technical account of symbolic representation consistent with the broader interpretation of symbolic language in the practical philosophy. Whatever the final analysis, we should bear in mind Kant's reasons for rejecting the symbolic/ intuitive dichotomy; specifically, his desire to avoid the introduction of symbols where there is no basis for analogy to objects of intuition. Indeed, in the few places that symbolic representation does figure in the critical philosophy, Kant's primary concern is to establish the technical details that justify linking determinate representations with ideas of reason. This tells us that, in a few crucial places, Kant satisfied his methodological concern for unity by appeal to symbolic representation. It may also show, as Bielefeldt hopes, that normative discussions can remain faithful to the critical philosophy while escaping the 'excessive claims of theoretical knowledge' (8). Additional work on the details of such an account would put the matter beyond doubt.

Jennifer McRobert
University of Lethbridge

David Boonin
A Defense of Abortion.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xvi + 350.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81701-3);
US$26.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-52035-5).

Abortion is morally permissible, at least in typical cases: moreover, it can be shown to be so on grounds that the critic of abortion already accepts. This is Boonin's contention and he defends it with originality and rigour. An introductory chapter sets out Boonin's aims and methods. A final chapter considers some of the more obscure objections to abortion. The main body of the text, however, consists of a pain-staking examination of the following argument: (P1) The foetus has a right to life. (P2) If the foetus has a right to life, then abortion is morally impermissible. (3) Therefore, abortion is morally impermissible. Boonin maintains that this form of argument fails because both premisses are false. At least in typical cases, the aborted foetus does *not* have a right to life — and even if it did, nothing would follow about the impermissibility of abortion.

Why think that the foetus has a right to life? Boonin suggests that the most powerful argument for P1 is due to Donald Marquis. His (somewhat controversial) interpretation of Marquis' reasoning is as follows. Consider three individuals: (A) a happy adult, (B) a suicidal teenager, and (C) an adult in a temporary coma. It seems clear that all three have a right to life. To explain this, Marquis notes that each individual has a 'future-like-ours' — that is, a future that contains various distinctively human experiences. Moreover, they value this future — or else *will* come to value it at some later date. Their right to life, then, is a right not to be deprived of something of value. But when we apply this thought to the foetus, we arrive at a quick vindication of P1. The typical foetus has a future-like-ours, which soon enough it will come to value. So at least in typical cases, the foetus has a right to life.

Boonin takes this argument seriously and devotes much of Chapter Two to its refutation. His response to Marquis is to propose a modification to his view. Boonin suggests that an individual has a right to life if and only if (i) she has a future-like-ours and (ii) she presently has an *ideal dispositional desire* to preserve this future. Ideal desires are to be understood counterfactually; they are the desires that we would have had if our desires had been formed in ideal circumstances. Boonin argues that although this new principle yields the same result with regard to A, B and C, it implies something different in the case of the foetus. Here his reasoning is as follows. The ideal desires of a person depend upon their actual desires. Since a pre-conscious foetus has no actual desires, it has no ideal desires either. It therefore fails to meet clause (ii) and does not have a right to life. At what point does the foetus become conscious? In Chapter Three, Boonin argues that consciousness arises at the point at which the foetus begins to have organised electrical activity in its cerebral cortex; that is, at some point between twenty-five and thirty-two weeks into

gestation. Since virtually all abortions take place before the twentieth week, the typically aborted foetus does not have a right to life.

But what if it did? In Chapter Four, Boonin argues that even if P1 were true, nothing would follow about the impermissibility of abortion. That is, P2 of the rights-based argument is also false. His strategy here is to appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's familiar thought-experiment. Imagine that you awake one morning and find to your surprise that you are plugged into an ailing violinist; he must use your kidneys for nine months if he is to survive. Is it morally permissible to unplug yourself? Our intuitions say yes: even if the violinist has a right to life, it does not follows that he has a right to use your body in order to sustain this life. The same is true, argues Thomson, in the case of the foetus: even if the foetus has a right to life, it does not follow that abortion is morally impermissible. Boonin's aim, in Chapter Four, is to examine the numerous objections faced by this argument — objections based, for instance, on the notion of tacit consent, the distinction between killing and letting die and the different burdens presented by violinist and foetus. An appeal to a series of further thought experiments (including a novel version of the trolley-bus dilemma) leads Boonin to conclude that none of these objections succeed. If you think it is permissible to unplug yourself from the violinist, you must reject the second premiss of the rights-based argument.

Every chapter of Boonin's book deserves critical attention. Boonin's own account of the right to life, however, is particularly in need of scrutiny. Here is just one of the worries raised by his modified version of the future-like-ours principle. The notion of a dispositional desire seems acceptable enough. It seems plausible to maintain that when I am asleep I have a dispositional desire to continue living — just as I have a dispositional belief that the earth is round. And perhaps the same can be said of an individual in a temporary coma. But on what grounds do we attribute these dispositions? Here is a proposal: the dispositional desires of an individual depend at least in part upon her future occurrent desires. That is, we attribute a dispositional desire that P to the unconscious individual because at some point in the future she will consciously desire that P. (Note that this hypothesis explains why we would be much less willing to attribute dispositional beliefs or desires to a person in a *permanent* coma.) But if this is correct, Boonin's principle is in danger of yielding entirely the wrong result. The typical foetus will at some point entertain an occurrent desire to continue living. So it meets clause (ii) above and should be granted a right to life. Hardly a decisive objection — but it does suggest that Boonin owes us something that he does not provide, namely, a theory of dispositional desires that will block this conclusion.

None of Boonin's book is uncontroversial. But in no way does this detract from its merit. *In Defense of Abortion* is an excellent book, which offers an original and honest treatment of a difficult topic. It should be read by anyone interested in the ethics of abortion.

Anna Sherratt
National Autonomous University of Mexico

Alexander Broadie, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to
The Scottish Enlightenment.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xvi + 366.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80273-3);
US$23.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00323-7).

The study of the Scottish Enlightenment has expanded dramatically in recent years, not least through the work of many of the contributors to this collection of essays. By bringing together review essays on a wide range of topics, Alexander Broadie's work serves as an excellent introduction to current thought on the topic.

An initial problem for such a collection is to define its scope. Almost inevitably, questions have been raised about the coherence and distinctiveness of any such movement as the Scottish Enlightenment, and thus about its nature in terms of intellectual concerns and approaches, and to its time-scale. The term itself was not coined until 1900 (by William Robert Scott, and with particular reference to the influence of Hutcheson).

Broadie identifies three competing accounts of the Scottish Enlightenment that are to be found in subsequent scholarship. The earliest, initiated by Hugh Trevor-Roper, emphasised the centrality of the concerns of political economy. This may be broadened to include the social and moral sciences in general at the core of Scottish Enlightenment thought, and the collection devotes substantial chapters to anthropology, history, political theory, economics and law. The distinctiveness of the Scottish contribution to the Enlightenment thereby comes to be seen in terms of its contribution to the development of social thought. Smith's contribution to modern economics is obvious, but David Millar's work on class has similarly been seen as a founding work in the development of modern sociology, and Scottish debates about the stages of social development anticipate, not just the thought of nineteenth century thinkers like Marx and Comte, but also the contemporary social evolutionary theories of Luhmann and Habermas. Aaron Garrett's review of Scottish investigations of the 'original' of human nature, however, poses an intriguing insight, not only into the contemporary echoes and influences of the early Enlightenment, but also into its occasional strangeness. Research that combined an appeal to ancient historians and other classical writings, alongside modern ethnographic work, travellers' tales, and some first hand experience of feral children, struggled, with some genius, to make sense of the problem of the origin of human nature. James Burnett (Lord Monboddo) was not alone in seeing orang-utans as wild humans, who represented a historical stage prior to the Trojan wars. Female orang-utans apparently demonstrate modesty, and thus the mores of early human society.

A second interpretation argues for the centrality of the natural sciences. This is on the one hand a question of the influence that the development of the natural sciences, crucially under the Newtonians, has on technology,

medicine, agriculture and industry. On the other, a model of natural scientific method feeds into all the inquiries conducted, illustrated (perhaps most obviously) by Hume's 'science of man', by his attempt to reduce politics to a science, but also, as M. A. Stewart argues in his contribution, by inquiries by others into rational theology. Paul Wood's essay on 'Science in the Scottish Enlightenment' represents the overall position well, not least in the emphasis that it places on the role of science in public education, that began with George Sinclair's public lectures on mathematics and natural philosophy in Edinburgh as early as the 1670s. Shortly after Sir Robert Sibbald's efforts were instrumental in establishing a number of key public institutions, including the Royal Collage of Physicians in Edinburgh, and the Edinburgh Botanical Garden. However, this approach takes way a little of the distinctiveness of the Scottish Enlightenment. Perhaps what is most interesting is the way in which Scottish debates reflect the wider negotiation of the importance and nature of science, and in particular of Newtonianism (with Lord Kames and Mondboddo both opposing Newtonian metaphysics).

A third approach — originally formulated by Richard Sher and one that has been explored in depth from within the field of eighteenth-century studies — mediates the first two by focussing on the Scottish 'literati'. Polite society or the republic of letters embraces the debates of Hume's 'middle station in life'. Discussions within this sphere covered both the natural sciences and the humanities. On the one hand, this is to recognise the extraordinarily broad range of topics to which Scottish intellectuals contributed, and on the other, that the Scottish Enlightenment is not a purely academic phenomenon. While the transformation and expansion of the Scottish universities was a crucial condition of the movement's development, the academic world was closely tied to commerce and public interests, not least through the development of clubs and societies, and the rise of popular journalism. The Scottish Enlightenment may thus be seen as part of an international republic of letters, distinguished as much by its vigour and range of interests as by anything else.

If the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers are part of an international republic, then one must also consider the mutual influences that existed between Scotland and the rest of the world. The key figures in the Scottish Enlightenment were typically men well acquainted with the continent, and perhaps better acquainted with Paris and Leiden than with London. However, influences from England (and not least that of Newtonianism) mixed with the thought of continental figures like Pierre Bayle and Antoine Lavoisier, the natural law theorists, as well as writers such as Montesquieu and Rousseau. Michel Malherbe and Samuel Fleischhacker trace the influence that the Scots have in continental Europe and America respectively. Hume's influence on Kant is well known, but it is none the less worth noting that substantial and often good quality translations of Scottish works were being made during the second half of the eighteenth century — with Hume's collected works been translated into German by 1756 (and into French by 1760), and Smith's *Wealth of Nations* into French in 1796.

Perhaps the most intriguing question lying behind the phenomenon of the Scottish Enlightenment is its very origins. How did a relatively poor country, with a largely agrarian economy (and large tracks of agriculturally unusable land at that), come to play such a rich and influential part in the Enlightenment? The relative poverty was compounded by religious conservativism (with the student Thomas Aikenhead being hanged for blasphemy as late as 1697) and political insecurity. In the period between the union of the English and Scottish crowns (in 1603) and the act of Union (that placed Scotland under the rule of the English parliament) in 1707, the very nature and future of Scotland as a state was in question. In addition, the Jacobite risings in the eighteenth century did nothing to stabilise the political situation. However, this poor beginning was, in several respects, the source of the Enlightenment. Roger Emerson, in outlining the context of the Scottish Enlightenment, argues that a relatively small class of landowners and merchants, as political patrons, became the dominant force in Scottish politics. The English largely left the Scots to govern themselves, and the political class, being aware of the continental Enlightenment, was small enough to bring about rapid change. The Act of Union served to place the Kirk in the hands of the Presbyterians, and supporters of the Presbyterians and the Hanoverians were readily promoted into significant positions. This occurred not least as the Universities in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Aberdeen and St. Andrews expanded, at first in the areas of the humanities, history and mathematics, and then in law, ecclesiastical history, medicine and the natural sciences. Crucially, such developments fed into the practical life of a modernising Scotland, and not least into improving its agriculture and industry.

Perhaps more important still is the political context of Scotland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, not least because that context encouraged the land owning and middle classes to reflect upon the nature of Scottish government. As Fania Oz-Salzberger notes, following J. G. A. Pocock, the Act of Union demanded new concepts (other than 'nation' and 'monarchy') through which to understand the sort of political society that Scotland was becoming. Much of the strength and distinctiveness of the Scottish Enlightenment might then still be seen to come out of this pressing engagement with political theory and political practice. The rejection of social contract theory, that characterises so much of this theorising, is a case in point, along with the struggle by the likes of Hume and Adam Ferguson, to reshape the republican tradition, overcoming the perceived weaknesses of the Machiavellian tradition, in order to take account of the role of modern commerce in integrating and defining society.

The contextual material in this collection can only help to shed further light on the individual thinkers that tend to be the stock in trade of anyone interested in the history of philosophy. It poses numerous questions and opens new lines for inquiry in considering how the key figures of this period, such as Hume and Smith, but also Hutcheson, Ferguson and Reid, should be interpreted with due reference to their historical, cultural and intellectual context. Their thought becomes ever richer in light of both the familiarity

of the social, political and moral problems they faced as issues of pressing immediacy, and of the occasional strangeness of their sources and responses.

Andrew Edgar
Cardiff University

Patricia Smith Churchland
Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2002. Pp. xii + 471.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-03301-1);
US$25.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-53200-X).

This is a book ahead of its time, which is both good and bad. It is the natural successor to Churchland's 1986 *Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge: MIT Press), and like it may be destined to become a classic. Churchland's life work has been to establish neurophilosophy as an academic discipline. Where her earlier book was the midwife's labor of bringing the topic kicking and screaming into this world, this book shows its growth since then, its smoother manners, and new dress for presentation to novitiate audiences. She intends this book to be 'an introductory, single-authored neurophilosophy text' (vii), which is apt, given its swift distillations of the relevant neuroscience and philosophy. Though I am not a newcomer to the topic, I found it a good read nonetheless, particularly for its tidy presentation of recent discoveries concerning neural transmission in later chapters, such as that neurons are not just passive devices which fire when inputs reach a threshold, that they encourage input from other neurons, that they alter the expression of their own genes and thereby their function and structure, ... and such like.

Saying this, I have likely sent the philosophical audience scurrying on to the next review. What philosophy can be found in the function of neurons, for gosh-sakes?! To be right up-front, I am a convinced materialist who takes the Delphic dictum, 'Know thyself!' to command an understanding of my brain — but that places me in a tight philosophical ghetto. Anyway, even I have to admit deep disappointment on the many occasions when Churchland, hard on the scent of philosophical game, breaks off in mid-trail with the observation that neuroscience has barely scratched the surface of the mysterious brain, along with the excuse that the study has numerous inherent difficulties, and the exhortation that philosophers nevertheless patiently persist in tracking neuroscientific research. That sort of disappointment is the bad thing about a book that is ahead of its time.

No one, I guess, is more disappointed than Churchland herself, who is famous for professing that philosophy's big problems — mind, knowledge, free will, morality (all addressed in this book, along with other topics) — will be answered *en passant* as the neuroscientific details are revealed. This sets her apart from (and even in opposition to) most of her fellow materialists, who usually shun the neural nitty-gritty in favor of empirical research at higher levels of the cognitive sciences, like functional or computational analyses of memory, learning, etc. (as in the case of Paul Churchland). But the notoriety of Pat Churchland's stress on the neuron really does her a disservice, for her interests and expertise are truly much broader both psychologically and philosophically. Though she is unique in bringing neuroscience into the philosophical fray, she is no narrow anatomist. Instead she aims to be a modern Aristotelian, taking an empirically informed point of view on the varied questions that human beings must face to make their way in the world — and like the master himself has much to tell us, much of it wise. We might only wish that Aristotle had a dash of the folksy wit that spices Churchland's writing, wherein we find that, 'Quine realized that the analytic/synthetic distinction was ... not a genuine two-bin dichotomy' (266), that 'the fit between natural language and formal logic was .... like putting an octopus to bed' (303), among other 'stories of conventional wisdom turned arse over teakettle' (ix).

When it comes to conventional philosophical wisdom taking a nosedive, the roughest scientific shoe-string tackle in recent decades was by the neuropsychologists Hanna and Antonio Damasio (A. R. Damasio, *Descartes' Error*, New York: Grossett/Putnam 1994), which Churchland discusses in her chapter on free will. Philosophers tend to assume that reason can direct action — after all, if it cannot, moral reasoning (hence moral philosophy) is pointless (it's not pointless, so by *modus tollens*, etc.). *How* reason directs action is scarcely addressed, though philosophers might presume it involves something like the practical syllogism (Aristotle) or self-command (Kant). Not so. Neurosciece reveals that reason can influence action only via the emotions.

The Damasios' paradigmatic case was the patient E.V.R. 'A brain tumor in the ventromedial region of E.V.R's frontal lobes had been surgically removed, leaving him with bilateral lesions' (222). Superficially, he seemed the same person after the surgery as before. Notably, his intelligence (IQ score of 140), knowledge, reasoning, verbal expression, and moral theories were unaffected by the operation. Unfortunately, all was not well. 'Once a steady, resourceful, and efficient accountant, E.V.R. now made a mess of his tasks, came in late, failed to finish easy jobs, and so forth. Once a reliable and loving family man, he allowed his personal life to become a shambles' (223). Further testing showed that while his reason — moral reasoning included — was normal, his emotions were now abnormal. 'For example, when shown horrifying or disgusting or erotic pictures, his galvanic skin response (GSR) was flat. (Normals, in contrast, show a huge response while viewing such pictures.)' (223).

A lot of research later, the following picture emerged: the human being's rational conviction that something ought (or ought not) be done, will not, in itself, have any effect on behavior. Instead, what ought to be done must arouse positive *feelings* (and what ought not to be done must arouse negative *feelings*). Reason directs actions via feelings, dim awareness of bodily parameters of such things as blood pressure and the state of the stomach (literally gut feelings). This is completely contrary to the usual supposition, both philosophical and popular, that reason is *opposed* to emotion, that reason and passion fight (like Plato's charioteer and his spirited horse) for control of the person. Instead passion is the slave of reason (contrary to Hume) whereby it produces its effects. So, neuroscience reveals that moral philosophy, and in particular the metaphysics of morals, must be reconceived. The normal neural mechanisms have been traced: forebrain (long term planning), anterior cingulate (impulse control), along with the neural mechanisms that control blood pressure, galvanic skin response, digestion, and so on, thereby showing the relevance of neuroscience to philosophy. Millions of us are to some extent afflicted with E.V.R's deficit. Fetal alcohol syndrome is a common cause. Unsurprisingly, sufferers are statistically over-represented in prisons. How to include, or exclude, sufferers from social, moral, and political life is an outstanding philosophical problem. Churchland adroitly kicks off the discussion by proposing a multi-dimensional measure of self control as a condition of moral responsibility.

Okay, neurophilosophy extends beyond mind into ethics. But that's it, surely. Not so. Churchland also includes self, self knowledge, epistemology, and religion. That's right, religion. It turns out that the sense of divine presence, of revelation, of cosmic significance, involves over-activation of the temporal lobe. This occurs naturally in some, or can be induced with oscillating magnetic fields. So, should we dismiss revelation as evidence of God's existence? Well, no, philosophical matters are never that simple. But, 'both skeptics and believers find it far-fetched to suppose that God would choose to manifest himself through ... temporal lobe siezures. And why would he manifest himself via a *simulated* temporal-lobe seizure?' (387). Good question.

Is this book (primarily) philosophy (informed by neuroscience) or neuroscience (informed by philosophy)? Okay, I realize this is not a genuine two-bin dichotomy, but the question cannot be ignored forever. Churchland introduces the book in both modes, as 'the intersection of a greening neuroscience and a graying philosophy' (3). As we have seen, the book works nicely as philosophy. But it may prove more important as science. As philosophy, this book is very swift indeed with the positions it opposes, and this will leave philosophically sophisticated palates unsatisfied. Dualism, idealism, and Platonism, are caricatured, and though I find her sketches accurate, telling, and amusing — like good political cartoons — more painstaking treatments will be needed to settle (rather than raise) professional hackles. For students, I would supplement this text with adversarial readings.

On the other hand, her philosophical arguments, if professionally insensitive, are definitive, decisive, and clear — just what is needed to philosophi-

cally orient a new generation of neuroscientists. Cognitive scientists of a biological bent are already impressed and influenced by her work — she has a position at the Salk Institute, after all. Look for this book to show up in science curricula. If it takes root there — and if philosophers don't act first — neurophilosophy may find its econiche in the sciences, rather than the humanities. Churchland, I reckon, would not be entirely unhappy with this result. In his *Course of Elementary Instruction in Practical Biology* (London: MacMillan 1875), T. H. Huxley wove together the strands of zoology, botany, cell microscopy, organic chemistry, paleontology, and Darwin's new theory of evolution, in an introductory text that established the discipline it introduced. Grandiosity aside, maybe, just maybe, Churchland's latest may have a similar result. And that is the good thing about a book that is ahead of its time.

Jeffrey Foss
University of Victoria

Lorraine Code, ed.
Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 2003. Pp. ix + 407.
US$85.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-02243-4);
US$35.00 (paper: ISBN 0-271-02244-2).

In his lifetime, Hans-Georg Gadamer engaged in two famous debates with his critics. In the 1970s, Jürgen Habermas took Gadamer to task for the conservatism that Habermas took to be endemic to the latter's concept of tradition. Nearly a decade later, Jacques Derrida identified at the heart of Gadamer's dialogical account of understanding a will to domination that instrumentalizes and assimilates the conversational Other. From the point of view of feminist readers, two facts about these debates are striking. First, these difficulties are precisely the two largest obstacles standing between feminist theory and philosophical hermeneutics. Second, despite the relevance for feminism of the issues raised by the debates, neither gender nor feminism were invoked therein. Susan Hekman argues that 'what this reveals is that feminist concerns do not count in mainstream philosophy, and even in a sphere of philosophy — postmodernism — that is itself marginal, feminism is largely ignored' (183-4).

It is this exclusion of feminist perspectives from the philosophical canon that The Pennsylvania State University Press' 'Re-Reading the Canon' series

addresses. That Gadamer is the subject of the latest issue from this series is, as a number of this book's contributors point out, especially appropriate given his lifelong engagement of the question of how it is 'that we can relate productively to a tradition from which we are alienated' (quoted at p.39). There is an important sense in which, for Gadamer, any reading of the canon is necessarily a re-reading of the canon. That is, to understand at all is always to understand *differently*. A case in point is Gadamer's own revisionist re-reading of Plato's dialectic. Susan-Judith Hoffmann argues that, for Gadamer, 'there is no hidden systematic doctrine of ideas that underlies the truth of [Plato's] dialectical language' (86). Truth, for Plato, is not a static 'truth in itself' that is merely *represented* in the dialogues, but rather a fluid 'truth for us' that emerges in the dialogical play of question and answer. On Hoffmann's view, Gadamer's interpretation of Plato is paradigmatic of the work that needs to be done by feminists *vis-à-vis* the canon. We must acknowledge our dependence upon philosophical tradition inasmuch as it contributes to our hermeneutical foreunderstanding. However, where necessary, we must use this acknowledgement as the platform for a radical break with traditional understandings of the canon. In short, we must read in order to re-read.

It is to the credit of editor Lorraine Code's *Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg Gadamer* that the very best of the essays it collects engage Gadamer in exactly this way, bringing hermeneutical charity to their readings of Gadamer, while applying his ideas in ways that he would never have imagined. Thus, Georgia Warnke's 'Hermeneutics and Constructed Identities' offers Gadamerian interpretation as a possible solution to the tensions between constructivism and emancipatory feminism. The increasing recognition that 'women' is a constructed category has led to the questions, 'who is the subject for whom feminism struggles, and for what should it struggle?' (57-8). Reconceiving the category of 'women' hermeneutically, Warnke argues that, 'from an interpretive point of view, sometimes there are "women" and sometimes there are not' (75-6). As such, any questions concerning the purview of feminism can only be meaningful in light of the context in which they are asked.

Veronica Vasterling's 'Postmodern Hermeneutics? Toward a Critical Hermeneutics' enlists Gadamerian hermeneutics as a solution to the threat of relativism engendered by postmodern feminism. However, Vasterling shares Habermas' and Derrida's worries that Gadamer is insufficiently attentive to the issues of power and domination within understanding. Vasterling concludes that we need to retain Gadamer's emphases on language and context, while 'develop[ing] the critical dimension and potential for open dialogue' (178). Other stand-out essays in this collection include those by Linda Martín Alcoff, Silja Freudenberger, Grace Jantzen, Patricia Altenbernd Johnson and Meili Steele. What all of these essays — along with those by Hekman and Hoffmann — share is a willingness to give Gadamer a fair hearing without a dogmatic adherence to Gadamerian orthodoxy.

Unfortunately, this is a balance that a number of the collected essays are unable to strike. Most notably, Robin May Schott's anger at Gadamer for his silence regarding both gender/women and Nazism vitiates her chapter 'Gender, Nazism, and Hermeneutics'. While Schott opens with Habermasian questions concerning the role of material life in Gadamer's hermeneutics and the concealed power structures that play out in the question-answer dialectic, these are questions that Schott never takes up. Instead, she probes Gadamer's writings for mentions of women and of the Third Reich. That she finds few of either leads Schott to dismiss Gadamerian interpretive strategies as 'tools that are innocuous and complicitous with existing inequalities and injustices' (333). Schott is certainly right that we should be concerned about Gadamer's exclusion of female scholars such as Hannah Arendt from his accounts of academic life in Germany. However, she is simply mistaken when she claims that Gadamer stays mum about Nazism. Gadamer's *Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History: Applied Hermeneutics* (SUNY Press 1992), which Schott does not cite, is replete with evidence of his lifelong distress over the Third Reich and Heidegger's role in it. In failing to address this text, Schott presents a straw man account of Gadamer. This renders an injustice both to Gadamer and to the important issues with which Schott's essay opens.

Marie Fleming's 'Does the Other Have a Say?' is similarly uncharitable. Fleming rightly observes the importance of the act of application for Gadamerian interpretation. However, she complains that, for Gadamer, 'application, like interpretation, happens inevitably, without any sort of conscious direction and with no possibility that a person or group could be held accountable' (127). However, if application for Gadamer seems to happen inevitably, this is precisely because he is concerned with understanding as it has always already happened, and not with how we *ought* to understand. The locus for Gadamerian hermeneutical enquiry is not the moment before understanding is 'attempted' but the moment after it has succeeded. Where Fleming wants a normative hermeneutics with 'truth in itself', Gadamer provides a phenomenological hermeneutics with 'truth for us.' As such, there is a real sense in which not Gadamer's but Fleming's hermeneutics reflects masculinist ideals. Moreover, Fleming commits a real violence in her use of pronouns. Throughout, Fleming polemically refers to the Gadamerian interpreter as 'he' and to the dialogical Other as 'she', a strategy that begs the very question at issue.

Overall, this collection is very much a mixed bag. There are some very good essays here, and there are some that should not have been included. A number of the essays contain factual errors or highly questionable interpretations of Gadamer. As well, the book's organization does little to provide any continuity between the essays. A number of the works reprise arguments that occur elsewhere in the book, without contributing anything new. Others seem to be talking past each other. More judicious editing would have winnowed the contributions down to the ten best essays (versus the fifteen included here), and would have organized them such that contiguous essays serve as complements, provocations or responses to each other.

Despite these shortfalls, this volume is a welcome new perspective on a figure who has too seldom been engaged by women scholars. While the challenges this book poses fall short of those raised by Habermas and Derrida, this third encounter between Gadamer and feminism is nonetheless one that is long overdue.

Shannon Dea
University of Western Ontario

Brian Ellis
The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism.
Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 2002. Pp. v + 185.
Cdn/US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-2473-8);
Cdn$27.95: US$22.95
(paper: ISBN 0-7735-2474-6).

The modern philosophy of nature, dominated by mechanistic philosophy, has produced as one of its offspring the Humean view of the laws of nature. The proponents of the Humean view portray the physical world as consisting of passive things whose behavior is determined by the forces governed by externally imposed laws of nature. Embraced by the majority of western philosophers, starting with Descartes, Newton, Locke, and Kant, this view still dominates the contemporary philosophy. Hand-in-hand with seventeenth- and eighteenth-century empiricism and nineteenth-century instrumentalism, it reduces the aim of science to discovering regularities in nature, and summarizing and classifying experimentally and observationally discovered laws. Thus, the role of science is by no means to offer *explanations* of reality, nor does it tell us what the nature of things may be. Ellis' book is an attempt to expose the major weaknesses of this approach, which he names passivism, and to offer a metaphysical doctrine of the new essentialism as an alternative.

Ellis' justification for renouncing passivism derives mainly from its incapacity to grasp the results of twentieth-century natural science. He aims both to update the scientific image of the contemporary philosophy — overwhelmingly based on eighteenth-century science and its worldview — and provide an argument for the new essentialism as naturally arising from it. According to Ellis, the new essentialism originates from three distinct philosophical efforts. First among these is the critique of R. Harré and E. Madden of Hume's account of causation and their respective alternative doctrines, which as-

sumed the existence of genuine causal powers in nature. In addition, S. Kripke and H. Putnam provided new arguments for believing in essences, while several other philosophers (F. Dretske, M. Tooley, C. Sawyer, D. Armstrong, J. Carroll, S. Shoemaker) developed alternatives to Hume's theories of the laws of nature and properties. These movements, along with the underlying scientific realism, lead to what Ellis considers 'a comprehensive philosophy of nature' (7).

Although one might expect that an argument for such a comprehensive metaphysical doctrine would be tediously technical even at the introductory level, Ellis' writing is surprisingly accessible. Without delving into painstaking detail, his first chapter explains the core of the essentialist doctrine, contrasting it with passivism. Although this core remains truthful to the ancient essentialist doctrine in arguing for the existence of natural kinds of substances and genuine properties as instantiated universals, Ellis' vision of the new essentialism grants the task of revealing the nature of things to scientific inquiry. Thus Ellis repeatedly demonstrates the ability of essentialism to grasp complex concepts of modern physics, chemistry, and biology. For example, he distinguishes between chemical element's essential properties of atomic number and common shell structure on the one hand, and the accidental, yet intrinsic, property of being in a certain state of excitation on the other (54). (Another interesting example, found on pp. 34, 78, refers to β-decay as an instance of a natural kind of a stochastic process.) Ellis gradually equips the reader with the necessary concepts along the way, defining, for example, the *natural kind* (Chapter 2) through the concept of the chemical element. This approach appears a smart choice, both in terms of pedagogy — it enables the reader to easily grasp the basic essentialist concept — and in terms of philosophical analysis. Ellis thus argues that the case of modern chemistry offers a clear example of a contemporary theory that should be understood in realist terms. He insists that a number of other theories in contemporary science suggest that we should refocus on the understanding of the physical world as populated by inherently active, causally powerful things, whose interactions reveal a genuinely dynamic structure of the world.

Ellis' discussion of dispositional properties in Chapters 3 and 4 stands out both as central to his project and as the most technical aspect of his overall argument. One of the most influential aspects of passivism is the Humean *supervenience thesis*, which states that *dispositional properties* supervene on the non-modal basic properties of elementary things in nature, and as such are irrelevant to describing the world. Carefully summarized arguments for the view of dispositional properties as intrinsic to things in nature, and indeed as the fundamental properties of physical theory lead to the view of physical theory as inherently modal. (It should be noted that the lack of appropriate references often leaves the reader to wonder about the origin of the arguments discussed.) An appendix consisting of two objections concerning dispositions and causal powers, offered by D. Armstrong — one of the most distinguished metaphysicians of the second half of twentieth-century

western philosophy — and Ellis' response, enables the reader to glimpse the highly technical nature of current metaphysics.

In Chapter 5, Ellis argues that the essentialist theory of the laws of nature, grounded on the notion of metaphysical necessity, displays advantages to Humean regularity theories, conventionalism, and an amalgam of natural necessitation and contingency theories. First, the essentialist theory can successfully account for the varieties and hierarchies of the laws of nature as they correspond to hierarchies and variations of natural kinds. Second, the necessity of the laws of nature is understood as a metaphysical necessity, whereas their abstract nature, a major obstacle to the Humean view, disappears in essentialism: essential properties are describable only as abstracted from external influences. Third, the laws of nature are true in virtue of natural kinds.

The adoption of the category of *necessary a posteriori* propositions, a view that counters widespread belief among nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers about the nature of propositions, forms the decisive step towards an anti-Humean theory of laws, as Ellis discusses in Chapter 6. The laws of nature, it is argued by essentialists, although discoverable by science, are metaphysically necessary. Statements such as 'Water is H_2O,' arising from empirical inquiry, are true in virtue of what the thing (water) is, and not of what it is called. The laws of nature are not merely true, but *necessarily true*.

Following Ellis' introduction of and arguments for the new essentialism, Chapters 7 and 8 discuss its consequences for philosophical and related disciplines. Ellis' metaphysical shift to 'realistic analysis' imposes a requirement of realism in logical analysis. Also, refocusing philosophical analysis from language to reality may help philosophers of mind successfully address the notorious problem of the relation between the mental and the physical, and provide a satisfying understanding of agency. Ellis also speculates on the possible impact that new essentialist metaphysic may have on physics, biology, social theory, and economics.

Despite his admirable sensitivity to the relevance of the results of natural science to metaphysical inquiry, Ellis' book does not address the possibility that the new essentialism may share the same fate with its opponent, namely passivism. The message of realistic analysis — driven by natural science, and in particular quantum physics — may be even starker than Ellis suggests: it may force us to renounce both substance and properties as they are rooted in the Aristotelian tradition of metaphysics.

Slobodan Perovic
York University

Pascal Engel
Truth.
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 2002. Pp. viii + 177.
Cdn$70.00; US$70.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-7735-2461-4);
Cdn$27.95; US$22.95
(paper: ISBN 0-7735-2462-2).

A long-standing and recently extremely heated debate about the nature of truth divides substantivists on one side and deflationists on the other. The former claim that truth is a genuine objective property of things like propositions, beliefs, sentences, statements or utterances. Thus, to say that an utterance of 'snow is white' is true will be rendered by a famous sort of substantivism — the conception of truth-as-correspondence — in terms of a specific relation between a mental and linguistic item (in the present case, the utterance) and reality. Deflationists in turn hold that truth is at most a logical or semantical device. Thus, disquotationalists maintain that the predicate 'true' is merely a device for semantic ascent; it allows us to switch from talk about the world to discourse about language. According to them, this is all that platitudes like 'sentence "*p*" is true if and only if *p*' reveal. But deflationists are also those views that endeavor to eliminate truth. For instance, redundancy theorists will insist that to say it is true that snow is white is just another way of saying that snow is white. It looks as if either substantivism or deflationism is true; no middle-term position seems to be possible. This is precisely what Pascal Engel is out to deny with his latest book — *Truth*; his main thesis is that a minimal variety of substantivism about truth can be successfully coupled with a minimal type of deflationism.

Truth consists of 5 chapters plus an introduction and a conclusion. The introduction serves to set up the topic of the book in the framework of the debate between substantivism and deflationism about truth; it also provides an illustration of this dispute with the usually substantivist analytic tradition versus the normally deflationist continental tradition. Engel, nonetheless, warns us that this is just a rough illustration since many recent analytic accounts are deflationist.

Chapter 1 contains a comprehensive schema of possible positions concerning truth: substantive and deflationist theories. Only the so-called classical substantive theories are discussed. Correspondence is taken up first. Various arguments against correspondence are reviewed including Frege-Gödel's slingshot; their discussion leads to the conclusion that truth-as-correspondence is a misguided idea. Coherence is taken up next. Again various objections are considered and again truth-as-coherence is deemed unsatisfactory. Contemplated are also endeavors to reduce truth to verifiability and their known difficulties: the facts that truth goes epistemic and that truth-as-verifiability forces the abandonment of the principle of bivalence. Pragmatism about truth comes next. Its identification of truth with utility proves,

as Engel correctly points out, too far-fetched. The last substantive account is the identity theory of truth. Like truth-as-correspondence-to-facts, the identity theory is shown to lead to the absurd conclusion that reality is either linguistic or mental.

Chapter 2 deals with deflationist accounts of truth. Disquotationalist and redundancy theories are examined and shown to be equally untenable, in both cases because of their failure to account for certain uses of the predicate 'true'. In this context, Alfred Tarski's definition of truth for a formal language is presented as neutral between substantivism and deflationism. Paul Horwich's minimalism is also criticized on the grounds that its truth deflationism requires an independent account of meaning that does not appeal to the concept of truth. Another line of criticism of deflationism as a whole maintains that besides being a device for assertion truth is also the aim of assertion. The chapter ends with an attempt to approximate analytical philosophers' deflationism with Richard Rorty's and Friedrich Nietzsche's views on truth.

Engel's own contribution to the debate about truth makes its appearance in Chapter 3. As his view shares an element of minimalism with Crispin Wright's account of truth, Engel starts with this latter. Wright's minimal anti-realism is shown to depart from deflationism in that within the former there is more to truth than the mere syntactical features of the deflated predicate 'true'; it is essential to minimal truth that it be governed by other norms distinct from the norms of assertion. Wright's view is also appealing because it holds that, apart from these other norms (for example, the norms of intersubjectivity and convergence) and the norm of assertion, truth does not hide any more substance. However, in spite of its advantages over deflationism, Wright's minimalism is not completely satisfactory because of its anti-realistic inclinations and of its oscillation between deflationism and substantivism. The same kind of non-stability is also shown to plague the thought of Hilary Putnam. Engel then presents his own minimalism (minimal realism), which, unlike minimal anti-realism, takes the norm of truth to be distinct from the norm of warranted assertibility. Within minimal realism, the twin norms of truth and assertion are closely linked to the norm of knowledge, and this latter entails a presumption in favor of realism (that is, in favor of the idea of aiming at verification-transcendent truth).

But minimal realism is perfectly consistent with there being domains where some kind of anti-realism is true as well as other domains where some sort of realism is true. In Chapter 4, Engel defends this kind of consistency by illustrating it in three disciplines — physics, ethics and mathematics. First, he presents the debate between realism and anti-realism in each of them: scientific realism versus instrumentalism, moral realism versus expressivism and mathematical platonism versus constructivism, respectively. Second, he argues that within minimal realism all these debates make perfectly good sense. Finally, he suggests that truth is a functional property that may be realized differently as one switches from discipline to discipline (for example, from physics to ethics or from the former to mathematics).

Chapter 5 expands on the claim that truth is normative and that its normativity is linked to the norms associated with knowledge and belief. The first section is dedicated to making a strong case for the view that truth's normativity supervenes upon the norms governing knowledge and belief. The question then in the second section is whether these norms are also practical or merely epistemic; on this, Engel sides with those who defend the latter. Section 3 is concerned with attempts to reduce the relevance of or even eliminate the norm of truth, namely: Rorty's, Horwich's and Stephen Stich's; according to Engel, they all fail. Lastly, a closer consideration of various forms of truth relativism shows that they also fail in their efforts to downgrade the centrality of a more robust concept of truth for our activities.

In the conclusion, Engel reaffirms his disagreement with the deflationist about truth; his minimal realism recognizes, while the deflationist does not, the irreducibly normative character of truth.

Sílvio Pinto
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana — Iztapalapa
pint@xanum.uam.mx

Robert J. Fogelin
A Defense of Hume on Miracles.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
2003. Pp. 94.
US$24.95. ISBN 0-691-11430-7.

In Parts I and II of 'Of Miracles' (section X of his *Enquiries*), Hume claims to have provided an argument to the effect that we should not believe that Jesus walked on water, or that Hindu statues drink milk. He claims that he has: 'discovered an argument ... which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures' (*Enquiries*, 86). Those who read Hume, then, should not believe that David Blaine can levitate. Even if one finds fault with Hume's argument, one has to admire his ambition, and the panache with which the argument is presented.

In Chapter 1, Fogelin presents his interpretation of Hume. First, his argument should not be seen as one that is a priori, a claim that many have advanced (perhaps surprisingly, given Hume's naturalistic approach and his claim that no matters of fact can be established a priori). The a priori interpretation is taken to follow from the definition of what it is to be a miracle (and, it is an argument that is alleged to be wholly contained in Part I of 'Of Miracles'). A miracle is defined as a violation of the laws of nature; and, Hume is said to have taken the laws of nature to be exceptionless

regularities that are supported by our 'uniform experience'. Since a law of nature is exceptionless — by definition — there cannot, then, be miraculous occurrences, occurrences that purportedly provide exceptions to such laws.

Fogelin, though, argues forcibly that Hume is not driven by a priori reasoning; Hume's is an empirical argument. In Part I, Hume establishes the appropriate standards for assessing testimony, and these are then applied to the special case of miracles: one should weigh up the testimony in favour of a law of nature being exceptionless, against the testimony in favour of a particular claim that such a law has been contravened. Crucially, Fogelin claims that Hume's argument allows for the possibility of the latter outweighing the former. Key here is the 'eight days of darkness' passage (*Enquiries,* 99) in which it is suggested that there could be widespread, consistent and ostensibly reliable reports concerning the occurrence of such a phenomenon over the whole Earth. Hume claims that if there were such testimony, then we may indeed be justified in accepting that such a miraculous event had occurred.

Part II, then, is crucial to Hume's overall argument: here he presents empirical evidence to show that there has never been a report of a religious miracle that has lived up to the standards required of it (those described in Part I). He claims that history shows that there has never been a sufficient number of reliable witnesses attesting to a miracle; that man's yearning for surprise and wonder is a source of gullibility; that reports of miracles are usually 'observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations' (and thus, controversially, they should not be looked on favourably); and, that many such reports are met with contradictory claims provided by other religions. What historical records show is a 'consistent pattern of ignorance, deceit and credulity' (31). Hume, then, could perhaps be criticised for a poor assessment of the historical evidence, but not for begging the question by ruling out miracles on a priori grounds.

In Chapter 2, Fogelin focuses on two recent interpretations of Hume. He argues that Johnson's *Hume, Holism, and Miracles* (1999) is a 'gross misreading,' in that (as discussed above) Hume's argument is taken as a priori. Fogelin rejects this claim by developing his own empirical interpretation of Hume. Earman's *Hume's Abject Failure: The argument From Analogy* (2000) is also taken to be a misreading, although, one that is more 'subtle'. Correspondence from Hume suggests that he takes the probability of a law of nature being upheld as 1, and, therefore, that the probability of a miracle is zero ('The proof against a miracle ... is full and certain when taken alone, because it implies no doubt' [45]). Fogelin persuasively argues that this is not Hume's considered opinion, and that here he is merely speaking loosely. We often say that we are 'certain', even when we would admit that we have not completely ruled out the possibility that we are mistaken. More tellingly, in the *Treatise* and the *Enquiries* it is clear that this is not Hume's view: he explicitly argues that the course of nature may change, and that all inductive 'proofs' are open to revision. Oddly, Earman himself concedes that his interpretation is counter to the central themes of Hume's texts.

Earman is also criticised for his ad hominem attacks on Hume's reputation and for 'beat[ing] an endless tattoo of ... invective' (41). A sense of the high feeling surrounding the debate concerning miracles is given. Actually, Hume himself can hardly be said to have presented his argument neutrally: 'And whoever is moved by *faith* to assent to [the Christian religion], is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding' (*Enquiries*, 101). Fogelin rather mischievously concludes: 'Is Earman's argument against Hume's treatment of miracles, then, a failure? I think it is. Is it an abject failure? It is enough to say it is a failure' (53).

In Chapter 3, we turn to 'The place of "Of Miracles" in Hume's Philosophy', and, specifically, to the issue of how his treatment of miracles is of a piece with his naturalistic approach. Hume does not see testimony as in any way more problematic than our other sources of belief. All beliefs for Hume are acquired through custom, and such custom can be seen as rooted in certain psychological laws, laws that can be empirically investigated.

Appendix 1 considers Hume's curious remark that he has 'discovered an argument of a like nature' to that provided by Dr. Tillotson (the Archbishop of Canterbury) against transubstantiation. Fogelin admits that he cannot get to the bottom of this remark. The only common feature of these arguments appears to be that their subject matter is that of testimony concerning controversial phenomena. Hume's 'Of Miracles' is also usefully attached as Appendix 2.

This book, then, provides a subtle reading of Hume; it is both engaging and well argued; and, it makes a useful addition to the recent literature concerning both Hume's argument and testimony in general.

Dan O'Brien
University of Birmingham

Aaron V. Garrett
Meaning in Spinoza's Method.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xii + 240.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-521-82611-X.

This study arose from a series of methodological puzzles which Garrett encountered, but did not resolve, in dealing with Spinoza in his doctoral thesis (directed by Yirmiyahu Yovel). These include not only the structure of the method in the *Ethics*, but also the source of Spinoza's definitions, and the reason for the proliferation of alternative proofs, scholia, and digressions in that work.

A brief introductory chapter, which centers on the 'worm in the bloodstream' analogy in Letter 32, deals with the general structure of Spinoza's naturalism and (following Edwin Curley) his notion of a law of nature. This is followed by a brief summary of the fundamental concepts underlying Spinoza's system: the three kinds of knowledge, adequate ideas, causality, and the several notions of infinity. The third chapter offers an equally brief analysis of Spinoza's unfinished *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*, of which Garrett argues the *Ethics* is a consistent methodological extension. Here Garrett sides generally with Stuart Hampshire's view that Spinoza is offering an emendative therapy in both the early work and in the *Ethics*, while conceding that some elements of Jonathan Bennett's critique of this interpretation are damning. The theme of emendation, however, connects Spinoza's approach directly to the Jewish thinkers whose method Garrett later examines, and brings his reading close to that of recent French commentators (Gueroult, Matheron) on many points.

The fourth through sixth chapters constitute the core of Garrett's analysis of method. The first of these is devoted to the distinction between analysis and synthesis, where Garrett argues against a formalist interpretation of synthesis and relies rather heavily upon Lodewijk Meyer's preface to the *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy*. In the following chapter he argues that Spinoza's notion of method arises in part from his sympathy with Gersonides' critique of Maimonides' scriptural hermeneutics. The sixth chapter (on definitions) argues further against a formalist reading of the *Ethics* by suggesting that definitions in Spinoza are by nature 'open-ended', and that their meaning is made more precise via the propositions (theorems) which are derived from them, rather than (as in contemporary axiomatics) the theorems being simply logical consequences of the definitions and axioms. This claim strikes me as particularly useful as a strategy for deciphering some of the more obscure definitions and axioms which open parts of the *Ethics*. It does succeed nicely in explaining Spinoza's habit in earlier drafts of the *Ethics* of treating axioms, definitions, and theorems interchangeably; and his occasional remarks that a particular theorem could be regarded also as an axiom.

Garrett's reading, however, does face some hurdles. One, raised by Curley, is the charge that Spinoza misinterprets (or perhaps revises) Descartes' understanding of the synthetic method. This is based on the puzzling fact that, while the *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy* claims to be a new presentation of cartesian thought following the synthetic method, Descartes himself claimed that his own *Principles of Philosophy* in fact followed this method. The problem here is that Spinoza appears to differ from his contemporaries with respect to the synthetic method itself, and the extent to which Meyer's summary of the method in the preface actually reflects Spinoza's intent has been questioned by a number of commentators. Garrett's discussion of Hobbes and of his possible influence on Spinoza (103-115) is quite enlightening, but his decision (117) to 'refer to the author of the Preface [of the *Principles of Cartesian Philosophy*] as Meyer/Spinoza' appears questionable in light of Spinoza's own correspondence with Meyer.

The concluding chapter, on the eternity of mind, serves as a conclusion, since Garrett here brings his analysis of method to bear upon a central problem in the interpretation of Spinoza. Following Alexandre Matheron's interpretation of the third kind of knowledge, Garrett's reading of spinozistic eternity is epistemic in nature, and thus avoids any conflict with Spinoza's insistence upon mind-body identity. It faces, without resolving, a number of texts in *Ethics* 5 which appear to lead the reader to an ontological (or even temporal) view of eternity, but this may well be the fate of any interpretation of this thorny problem. Garrett's reference to the combined series of texts (195) as 'a mess' echoes Bennett's verdict, though he succeeds in bringing some light into the darkness.

In general this study provides a solid overview of many problems connected with Spinoza's method. Since it covers so much ground, Garrett often fails to defend controversial claims, but always provides the reader with references to alternative interpretations; and he does indicate at points that he is often staking positions rather than fully defending them. I was somewhat troubled by his identification, early in the book, of the *mos geometricus* with Spinoza's 'method'. There is some warrant for reading '*mos*' as 'style' rather than 'method': Spinoza does have the terms '*methodus*' and '*via*' at his disposal, and uses them frequently in the letters. This is an issue which Garrett does not discuss. While assuredly not the last word on the question of method, his study certainly provides many useful insights and suggestions for further research and development.

Lee Rice
Marquette University

Neil Gascoigne
Scepticism.
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002. Pp. vi + 218.
Cdn$70.00; US$70.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-7735-2476-2);
Cdn$27.95; US$22.95
(paper: ISBN 0-7735-2477-0).

This book is intended primarily for undergraduates, and aims to outline the major themes of philosophical scepticism. In this regard the book is successful, and Gascoigne does an impressive job of dealing with a wide variety of topics without bogging down the reader. Although the work is not historical in theme, Gascoigne manages to familiarise the reader with all the central historical figures in a casual and informative manner.

Unusually perhaps, the first chapter is concerned not with the ancient origins of sceptical arguments but rather with the contemporary problem of the analysis of knowledge. The book appears to be directed towards those students who may also be undertaking their first epistemology courses. The reader is immediately confronted with a large variety of epistemological topics, such as the 'standard' analysis of knowledge, Gettier counter-examples, coherentism and foundationalism, externalism and internalism, etc. This approach of outlining the centrality of sceptical arguments to the current trends in the theory of knowledge might be thought to be better suited to a later chapter; however, Gascoigne is surprisingly successful and the first chapter sets the scene well for the different themes explored later on.

Gascoigne focuses, correctly I think, on the so-called 'Agrippan' sceptic. This sceptic is one who is primarily concerned with the sources and forms of the justification of our beliefs, and attempts to undermine our confidence in those beliefs by raising the threat of an infinite regress of justification. This is important for two reasons: first, it presents the sceptic in arguably his most powerful guise, and second, it allows the student to follow more easily the connections between the sceptical preoccupations of historical figures and contemporary concerns with the role of justification in regard to our knowledge claims.

A second positive feature of Gascoigne's approach is his early highlighting of the importance of our different attitudes towards scepticism. He distinguishes between the *heroic*, *rejectionist* and *sceptical* attitudes towards scepticism (26). The *heroic* attitude is broadly continuous with the justificationist trend in epistemology, and attempts to secure an anti-sceptical victory through the establishment of adequately justified true belief. The *rejectionist* approach is, unsurprisingly, associated with a nonjustificationist or externalist approach to knowledge. The claim here is roughly that the sceptic's challenge is inextricably tied to the demand for an articulated adequate justification condition and that once this demand is abandoned, so too is the threat of scepticism. The third attitude is the so-called *sceptical* response, which involves the 'therapeutic' resolution of the sceptic's claims through a partial or 'mitigated' acceptance of them. It appears that the theme of anti-sceptical arguments increasingly concerns the coherence of the sceptic's stance and the epistemological commitments involved with it. For this reason, introducing to students the option of refusing to accept the demands of the sceptic (whether it is on the grounds of irrelevance, incoherence or conditional acceptance) is a wise move.

In Chapter 2, Gascoigne turns to the origins of scepticism. The major figures (Socrates, Pyrrho, Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus) as well as the groups traditionally concerned with sceptical arguments (Pyrrhonist and Academic Sceptics, Epicureanism and Stoicism) are all well represented here. Gascoigne outlines the importance of the 'tropes' or 'modes' of scepticism as well as its implicit notion of adopting a 'theoretical standpoint' from which to evaluate our claims to knowledge. Chapter 3 examines the familiar territory of Cartesian scepticism and doubt regarding the existence of the external

world. Hume's causal anti-realism and inductive scepticism are also outlined, as is his account of our belief in the continuous and uninterrupted existence of external objects, as laid out in the section on scepticism with regard to the senses in the *Treatise*.

Chapter 4 examines some specific anti-sceptical strategies, the most prominent of these being Kant's. Gascoigne examines the project of transcendental idealism and the role of transcendental arguments as a means to combating Humean attacks on knowledge. The discussion then moves confidently from such 'transcendental' strategies to the more contemporary linguistic strategies (epitomized by the work of Carnap and Quine). In the fifth and best chapter of the book, Gascoigne examines the significant shift of approach to scepticism that occurred in the twentieth century with the work of Moore, Austin, Wittgenstein and Strawson (especially in his later work). Also analyzed briefly is Michael Williams' contextualist dismissal of the sceptic's claims. The final chapter is concerned with the internalist/externalist debate in current epistemology. Gascoigne turns to some of the more noticeable proponents of externalist accounts of knowledge, with Goldman, Dretske and Nozick playing the central roles. It is shown how scepticism motivates the proponents of externalism and internalism equally, in that it is the sceptical challenge that brings to the fore the different intuitive desiderata of an adequate account of knowledge. Gascoigne concludes with some consideration of Davidson's works and their role in demonstrating the seriousness with which we are compelled to consider scepticism.

This book is an excellent introduction both to sceptical problems and the strategies for their resolution. Gascoigne does not offer any positive account of his own as to the best route to take in an attempt to refute (or resolve or dismiss) scepticism, although he does scrupulously point out the shortcomings of most of the major contenders. An impressively broad range of philosophical subjects is covered, from the debate between Pyrrhonist and Academic sceptics to Austin on other minds, and from Kripke on rule-following to the issue of closure under known entailment. The fact that the student is introduced to such an array of philosophical topics is indicative of the centrality of sceptical doubt to our philosophical investigations. Gascoigne demonstrates this in a manner that is confident, clear and concise.

John J. Callanan
University College Dublin

Berys Gaut and **Paisley Livingston, eds.**
The Creation of Art:
New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. vii + 295.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-521-81234-8.

The premise of this collection of essays, the editors write in their substantial and helpful introduction, is that 'the issues surrounding the creation of art deserve far more sustained attention than they have generally earned within the field of contemporary aesthetics' (26). The issues to which Gaut and Livingston refer are many and various. The most basic of these is the analysis of the concept of creativity. Several of the essays investigate what we mean when we characterise an artwork or an artist as creative. Others explore the explanation of creativity. Philosophers cannot, qua philosophers, explain why some individual was a highly creative artist, but they can usefully ask about the form of such an explanation. Still other essays explore the implications of the fact that artworks result from acts of creativity. I am happy to report that in this volume one can witness philosophical progress. Such progress always comes in fits and starts, but taken as a whole the essays in this volume contribute noticeably to our understanding of creativity.

When I say that philosophy progress is made in this volume I have one development particularly in mind. Philosophers have historically thought of creativity in rather romantic terms. The traditional view is that the great creative artists are iconoclastic individuals of genius. Paul Guyer's erudite contribution to the volume traces the development of this traditional view in Kant's conception of genius as exemplary originality. A similar conception of genius is attributed to Mill. Kant's conception is contrasted with the earlier one, held by Jean-Baptiste Du Bois and Alexander Gerard. According to the earlier conception, the person of genius does well what others do less well. The pre-Kantian genius is not necessarily a great innovator. Rather he excels within a tradition. The progress to which I refer is the gradual erosion of the Kantian picture of creativity.

Explaining the creation of valuable art by an appeal to genius was always a little like explaining soporific properties by an appeal to the dormitive power. In any case, the Kantian view of genius and creativity begins to unravel in Ted Cohen's contribution to this volume. Cohen does not reject Kant's view, but he notes an odd consequence of his position. According to Kant, Newton (absurdly) does not count as a genius since his work can be explicated in terms of concepts. That is, one can trace the reasons Newton has for adopting his theories. His position can be explicated, in large part, because it is part of a tradition of scientific inquiry. As Newton famously said, 'If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.' If Newton was creative, despite his dependence on his predecessors, perhaps artists can be as well.

The contributions by Noël Carroll, Stein Haugom Olsen and David Novitz each casts a little additional doubt on the Kantian picture of genius and

creativity. Novitz explicitly rejects the Kantian model. 'According to Kant,' he notes, 'genius "is the exemplary originality of a subject's natural endowment in the *free* use of his cognitive powers".' He continues, saying that some have moved from this position to the view that 'creativity resides solely in the cognitive or psychological capacities of the individual' (188). This is a flawed conception of creativity according to Novitz. A full explanation of creativity must, he maintains, begin with a biological investigation. An explanation in terms of biological function will, however, be incomplete. It will be important to investigate the social factors that make creativity possible. Surely this is right. One cannot help but be struck by how often creative innovation in the arts (and other fields of endeavour) emerges in a variety of quarters simultaneously. This simultaneity calls out for a social explanation.

Olsen begins his contribution with a meditation on Trollope's account of how he wrote his novels. Trollope, the systematic, methodical workman is the very antithesis of the Kantian genius. And yet he seems to be an important creative artist. Ibsen, another altogether conventional man, has an even more incontrovertible claim to this status. At the same time, the great innovators are not necessarily the greatest artists. As Olsen notes, the great innovators in the history of the English novel are Dafoe, Fielding and Richardson. Few would suggest, however, that they were as successful in the creation of art as Austen, Dickens and George Eliot, who inherited and worked within a tradition. Working within a tradition does not appear to be inimical to the creation of valuable art.

Carroll picks up and develops this theme, writing that 'tradition is and must be an important ingredient in artistic creativity' (211). He notes that if artworks were completely novel, audiences would be unable to understand and appreciate them. The creative artist is the one who recombines 'elements of the tradition in an especially deft, original, or insightful way' (228). Perhaps the best illustration of this point is found in the person and work of J.S. Bach. Bach was a quite conventional composer, content to work within the tradition he inherited, but nevertheless he was a supremely creative artist.

Although these authors convincingly argue that tradition is crucial to creativity, the individual artist clearly plays a role in the creation of art. The Kantian view of genius and creativity was not completely mistaken. Gaut's contribution to the collection gives a brilliant analysis of the concept of creativity and its relationship to the concept of imagination. At the same time he sheds light on the artist's role in creative activity. Gaut analyses a creative act as 'one that is the making of a saliently new and valuable thing by flair' (151). (The reference to flair, a concept that could use some elucidation, is added to rule out mechanical or chance productions.). While one may be creative without employing the imagination and imagine without being creative, Gaut argues that the imagination is 'suited of its nature' to the service of creativity. Typically, he writes, 'the creative person has a strong, powerful imagination, capable of imagining more widely and deeply that most' (157). According to Gaut, in the development of metaphors we see the

creative imagination at work: the imagination enables the artist to see things in new ways. Notice that what Gaut says about creativity is perfectly consistent with the views of contributors who insist on the importance of a tradition to creativity.

Livingston's essay explores some of the implications of the proposition that works of art are created. He begins with a sensitive analysis of the concept of a pentimento and continues with interesting suggestions about how to extend the concept beyond painting to other art forms, including literature, music and cinema. According to Livingston, pentimenti are the product of, and reveal to audiences, the changing intentions of artists. He argues that, if pentimenti are relevant to the interpretation and evaluation of artworks, we are committed to a version of actualist intentionalism. Of course, the real trick is to persuade anti-intententionalists and hypothetical intentionalists of the truth of the antecedent of this conditional.

The remaining contributions to this collection are by Peter Lamarque, Patrick Maynard, Jerrold Levinson and George Wilson. Levinson's essay is in effect a critical notice of Jon Elster's *Ulysses Unbound* (2000), a book that explores many of the themes addressed in *The Creation of Art*. Levinson offers a number of perceptive comments and his essay can be recommended to all students of Elster's book. The remaining essays are only tangentially related to the main themes of the collection under review. Lamarque's contributes an essay on the ontology of fictional characters. He offers an alternative to both the eliminativist theories of Russell, Goodman and Walton (according to which fictional characters do not exist) and Meinongian theories (according to which fictional characters exist eternally). On Lamarque's view, fictional characters exist and are created. Maynard develops a sophisticated way of conceptualising and describing drawings. This amounts to a theory of how 'a depictive element works in a picture' (77). According to Maynard, the marks of which a drawing is composed are seen as intentionally made (or created) for some depictive reason. Wilson offers a nuanced reading of the last films Josef von Sternberg made with Marlene Dietrich. He argues that apparently mundane films can creatively riff on tired cinematic conventions. Maynard's essay nicely complements the essay on the relation between tradition and creativity.

When I picked up this volume I was sceptical about the ability of philosophers to contribute to the understanding of creativity. I feared that the book would only fill the proverbial much needed gap in the literature. This fear was unfounded. It is a collection of essays of unusually and uniformly high quality that advances our understanding of creativity in the arts. The progress to which I referred in the paragraph of this review is, however, a gradual return to the pre-Kantian view of the origin of valuable works of art. So, after all, perhaps we do not see philosophical progress, but rather a regress.

James O. Young
University of Victoria

Carl Gillett and **Barry Loewer, eds.**
Physicalism and Its Discontents.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.
Pp. x + 369.
US$70.00. ISBN 0-521-80175-3.

Whether one is a physicalist or a discontent (malcontent?) depends very much on how the doctrine of physicalism is construed. If physicalism were merely the denial of Cartesian substance dualism, then few contemporary philosophers would reject it. However, modern discussion focuses on the issue of property dualism, along with the issues of reductionism, mental causation, qualia, and the unity of science. It is entirely possible for two self-professed physicalists to disagree about what the doctrine is and why one ought to hold it. This volume goes some way toward laying out the conceptual space. It contains seventeen previously unpublished papers, and is divided, somewhat unsatisfactorily, into three sections. Part I, 'Physicalism', consists of eight papers favourably disposed toward physicalism, while Part II, 'Physicalist Discontents', contains four papers sceptical of it. Part III, 'Physicalism and Consciousness: A Continuing Dialectic' is itself divided into two sections, 'Arguments for Pessimism' (three papers) and 'Optimistic Rejoinders' (two papers). Unfortunately, with an exception in Part III, the papers do not engage each other explicitly, and the order of presentation is such that the nature of the conceptions of physicalism under dispute and the controversies that motivate or bedevil them, is less than perspicuous, despite the rough accuracy of the pro vs. con division. Dividing the book into smaller, more focused sub-sections and changing the order would have been useful. On the other hand, as things are, most of the papers can be read independently of each other, though they assume significant background; this book is wonderful to sample, whether or not one goes on to read it in its entirety.

In lieu of a substantive introductory piece by the editors, the most instructive place to begin is Jaegwon Kim's paper in Part III, 'Mental Causation and Consciousness: The Two Mind-Body Problems for the Physicalist'. Kim eloquently sketches the reasons why giving an account of the mind that allows the mental to be causally efficacious is so important. Modern philosophers must navigate between the Scylla of eliminativism and the Charybdis of epiphenomenalism; anybody who is willing to steer toward either has seriously underestimated the peril s/he is facing. (In fact, Kim thinks that Charybdis hands its victims over to Scylla, but that is another story.) Kim argues that in order for the mental to cause the physical, the mental must be reducible to the physical. If the mental is merely supervenient on the physical, a mental property-instance is in competition with its subvenient base for causal efficacy. It would be intellectually suspect to accept systematic over-determination in the case of the mental, and, in any case, doing so would violate 'the principle of causal closure': roughly, the causal chain leading up to a physical event has only other physical events as links. Happily for physicalists charting a middle course, reduction is possible,

according to Kim, if the mental is picked out functionally. Unhappily, only intentional states are contenders. Qualia or phenomenal states cannot be individuated extrinsically, so their causal efficacy remains suspect on this understanding of physicalism.

Another touchstone piece, also in Part III, is Colin McGinn's 'How Not to Solve the Mind-Body Problem', in which he argues, on Kripke-type grounds, that physicalism requires the analytic truth of physical-mental identity claims, and, hence, requires a radical re-conceptualisation of the mental. The currently popular strategy of having a dualism of concepts explain the apparent conceivability of zombies (physical duplicates of us that lack qualia) will not do. The view McGinn is attacking is called 'New Wave Materialism' (see below) and 'Type-B Materialism' by Chalmers.

Next in Part III is the only instance of a genuine dialectic. Terence Horgan and John Tienson, in 'Deconstructing New Wave Materialism', are, like McGinn, dismissive of the appeal to dual concepts, arguing that concepts pick out properties as they are, and mental properties do not pick out properties as physical. Brian McLaughlin optimistically rejoins, in 'In Defense of New Wave Materialism', that failing to conceive of something as p is not tantamount to conceiving it as $\sim p$, so the New Wave (dual concept) option is still open. Part III ends with Andrew Melnyk, in 'Physicalism Unfalsified: Chalmers' Inconclusive Conceivability Argument', responding to Chalmers (1996) use of two-dimensional semantics to argue for the possibility of zombies and, hence, the falsity of physicalism. Melnyk argues that we do not have the requisite knowledge of primary and secondary intensions for Chalmers' argument against physicalism to go through.

Part I begins with David Papineau's historical overview 'The Rise of Physicalism,' in which he argues that physicalism's current favoured status is the result of empirical findings that support the completeness of physics and became available only recently. Barry Loewer, following Frank Jackson's recent work, offers, in 'From Physics to Physicalism,' a construal of physicalism that he claims, contra Kim, avoids reductionism and allows for mental causation. Pitting him against Kim in the order of presentation would make for a livelier presentation. (Even better would have been a response by Kim.) Next, D. Gene Witmer, in 'Sufficiency Claims and Physicalism: A Formulation', provides a variety of understandings of 'supervenience', and argues that the explanatory dimension of physicalism requires that supervenience be appropriately supplemented, but that the details need not form part of the doctrine. Sydney Shoemaker, in 'Realization and Mental Causation', argues, explicitly against George Bealer ('Self-Consciousness', *Philosophical Review* 106 [1997] 69-117) and echoing Stephen Yablo ('Mental Causation', *Philosophical Review* 101 [1992] 245-80), that the relationship between realizer and realized ought to be modelled on that between determinate and determinable, which would remove the possibility of overdetermination. Georges Rey, in 'Physicalism and Psychology: A Plea for a Substantive Philosophy of Mind', argues that, contra Davidson et al, a suitably rigorised psychology would not be insulated from natural sciences because it would not require a

normative framework. Howard Robinson, in 'Davidson and Nonreductive Materialism: A Tale of Two Cultures', argues that two senses of 'reduction' have been conflated, and, on one reading, Davidson's claims are uninteresting, and on the other, they are false. Noa Latham, in 'Substance Physicalism', traces the reasons for the near-universal rejection of substance dualism, and Stephen Leeds, in 'Possibility: Physical and Metaphysical', endeavours to defend physicalism against Kripke-type objections. This article would have been better placed with McGinn's.

Part II begins with Scott Sturgeon's acronym-laden 'The Roots of Reductionism', in which he argues that a folk bias has erroneously led us to expect the relationship between micro and macro to permit of reduction. From here, he attacks Kim's appeal to over-determination (which is another reason to place Kim's article nearer the beginning). Tim Crane, in 'The Significance of Emergence', agrees with recent work by Kim that non-reductive physicalism and emergence share the same metaphysical commitments, but disagrees that this bodes ill for non-reductive physicalism. He recommends that non-reductive physicalism adopt the epistemological humility of emergence. Carl Gillett, in 'The Methodological Role of Physicalism: A Minimal Skepticism', argues that physicalists who defend the theory, methodologically construed, on claims about the history and success of scientific practice must weaken it considerably. Finally (in Part II), Gary Gates, in 'Physicalism, Empiricism, and Positivism', argues that the history of the term 'physicalism' reveals a substantive divide between Neurath and Carnap, linked to the untenability of their project of joining Comtean positivism and Lockean empiricism. It is not clear that Gates is 'discontent' with contemporary physicalism.

In sum, the book is intended for an audience well-versed in the issues, and contains some excellent papers. It could perhaps have been organised differently, and more dialectic would have been good, but it is a fine source of some cutting-edge work in a rapidly changing field.

Jillian Scott McIntosh
University of Western Ontario

Hans-Johann Glock
Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xvi + 311.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-521-82180-0.

The recent deaths of W.V. Quine and Donald Davidson make this book timely, if something like it was not overdue already. Glock is known for his contributions to Wittgenstein-scholarship, but that work gives him a natural affinity for and a critical perspective on the concerns of Quine and Davidson. He gives us an Introduction and nine chapters, beginning with an overview that portrays our protagonists as *'logical pragmatists'* (22) — inheritors of Viennese positivism and American pragmatism — whose great philosophical interest lies in the fact that each presents a *'philosophical anthropology'* (37) — an overarching account of our distinctively human capacities.

Chapter 2 focuses on Quine's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment, reviving debates about whether quantification should be interpreted objectually or substitutionally (neither, says Glock — we should think of quantifiers as binding predicate-variables [58]), and arguing that Quine's criterion presupposes intensional notions (such as, what *must* exist to make one's best theory true) that are ruled out by his later arguments for the indeterminacy of translation (52). Glock endorses the efforts of those who would circumvent the debate between Platonists and (Quinean) nominalists (who deny the existence of abstract objects generally) by adopting a kind of deflationism. 'What has to correspond to our abstract terms is not a system of dubious entities, but an *intelligible use*' (69).

Chapter 3 queries Quine's qualms about analyticity, apriority and modal logic, identifying holism as Quine's strongest argument against analyticity and apriority (77). Glock argues that Quine fails to undermine apriority because he conflates the revision of a proposition with respect to its truth-value with the revision of a proposition with respect to its meaning (87). And he argues that although Quine's criticisms of modal logic are unconvincing, Quine is right to hold that 'There is no such thing as "metaphysical necessity" ' (96). 'For there are no facts about who is who or what is what in possible worlds independently of our conventions of individuation' (101). Glock defends a 'linguistic account of analyticity' (81), pointing out that Quine is himself committed to such a view in *Roots of Reference* and *Pursuit of Truth*. On this view analytic truths are not 'truths following from meanings, conventions or definitions' (81) — the targets of Quine's criticisms. I think that defenders of Quine should accept this general sort of point. But Gilbert Harman and, more recently, Richmond Campbell have argued that the distinction between revising truth-values and revising meanings, as employed in this context, equally entails a commitment to language-independent meanings of the sort Quine successfully targets in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'. That contention deserves a response.

In Chapter 4, Glock turns to Quine's and Davidson's views on truth. His key criticisms here are that their Tarskian starting point is even more limited than either acknowledges (insofar as Tarski tells us only '*under what conditions*' (117) a sentence is true, not '*what it is*' for a sentence to be true) and that truth is not properly predicated of token-sentences, but only of what such sentences are used to say. Nonetheless, Glock argues, logical pragmatism is right to reject correspondence-theories of truth (at least versions that posit an ontology of facts — other versions are not canvassed) and epistemic reductions of truth as well. In their place, Glock recommends neither Quine's disquotationalism nor Davidson's primitivism, but a version of minimalism, which treats 'the proposition that' as a nominalizing operator, devoid of ontological commitment to sentence-shaped abstract propositions (134).

A presentation and critique of Davidson's attempt to turn Tarski's truth-definitions into meaning-theories is the main focus of Chapter 5. Glock follows Davidson's argument in 'Truth and Meaning', complicating it with later work as is necessary, here and in subsequent chapters. His main contention is that Davidson's optimism about extending Tarski's formal treatment to natural languages is unwarranted, a point made effectively by his critique of Davidson's paratactic account of moods (164-5).

Chapters 6 and 7 together contend that Quine's conclusions concerning the indeterminacy of translation are vitiated by a failure to take behaviourist strictures seriously enough. Quine, Glock argues, 'is a closet hermeneuticist' (177), helping himself to 'a mutual understanding between native and translator' (179) to which he is not entitled. But such backsliding is necessary if Quine is even to identify forms of behaviour as linguistic and then go on to characterize their content as indeterminate. Davidson's radical interpretation is an improvement on Quine's radical translation, but Glock maintains that Davidson's version of the Principle of Charity is insufficient for the conclusions Davidson wants to extract from it. What 'interpretation from scratch' (197) requires is the assumption that we and those we try to interpret share 'cognitive capacities and conative propensities' that issue forth in similar '*patterns of behaviour*' (197).

Chapter 8 explores further challenges to Davidson's project, touching on the extensionality problem (why doesn't 'Snow is white' mean that grass is green, given that both are true?) and Davidson's commitment to a 'modest' theory of meaning (rather than a 'full-blooded' one of the sort Dummett prefers), and culminating in a discussion of Davidson's more recent claims about idiolects, triangulation, and first-person authority in the face of semantic externalism. According to Glock, the first of these last three confuses normativity with conventionality (250), the second is vulnerable to traditional objections to causal theories of meaning (260), and the third is promising but incomplete (264). I wonder if there is not a normative element to Davidson's talk of triangulation, overlooked here, and I think that Glock oversimplifies externalism by ignoring the ways in which the fabled contribution of the environment to meaning is mediated by our interests as speakers and inquirers.

Glock's discussion in Chapter 9 of Davidson's thesis that there is no thought without language is both insightful and fair, giving credit to the plausibility of Davidson's claims, while arguing that those claims entail, not that non-lingual critters lack beliefs (or, perhaps, concepts), but that the kinds of beliefs (or, perhaps, concepts) it makes sense to attribute to them are simpler insofar as their beliefs (and concepts) belong to a 'smaller logical space' (292).

Some of Glock's arguments are weak. For example: 'it is odd to say of a sentence *s* that it means that *p*, because "means that" specifies a *consequence*. The noise coming from my bike may mean that the chain is rusty, but sentences like "The chain is rusty" or "Die Kette ist rostig" do not mean that the chain is rusty' (154). Surely this is no more than an appeal to a local idiomatic contingency, not a deep truth about whether sentences can mean that *p*. (And, speaking of idioms, what does 'evolve around' [e.g., 198] mean?)

But I am happy to recommend this book. Scarcely a major claim about language, thought, or reality made by Quine or Davidson is untouched by Glock (metaphor gets no treatment), though the welter of detail makes it difficult to be sure of this assertion. Such breadth occasionally gives the work the character of a catalogue of criticisms, some of which would benefit from further exploration, but where the detail is lacking, there are usually references to more thorough versions of the criticisms presented, and throughout the book intra-textual references to related discussions appear. The index is helpful, and the text is largely free of typographical errors and misspellings — I count five, including two sibilant occurrences of *'ex hypothesis'* (241, 263). Most importantly, this really is an excellent source-book of both key-theses and important criticisms. It would work well in a senior undergraduate or graduate seminar on Quine, Davidson, or — as might be expected — both.

Michael Hymers
Dalhousie University

Jane Heal
Mind, Reason and Imagination.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xiv + 302.
US$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81697-1); US$29.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-01716-5).

Mind, Reason and Imagination is a collection of Jane Heal's work in the philosophy of mind and language, comprising thirteen papers published since 1986 and a new introduction. The focus is Heal's substantial contribution to one of the central debates within the philosophy mind, concerning our thoughts about the psychological states of others.

As an introduction to an area of debate, a collection of papers is no replacement for an original monograph or survey. The absence of detailed accounts of the positions of the likes of Goldman, Gordon, and Stich and Nichols is to be expected, but will not help the reader unfamiliar with the geography of the area. Connections between papers in the later sections are not always completely transparent, and do not serve to provide the thorough picture of Heal's overall position that one would expect from an original book-length work. Nevertheless, there is much to recommend this collection. Heal is an engaging writer, and the papers are accessible and lucid. In the absence of a new, systematic treatment of the area, this is the next best thing.

Three interrelated issues are discussed. First, there is the method employed in making judgements about the psychological states of others. The need for an adequate account of the possession of psychological concepts is the second topic, which sees the emphasis shift towards the philosophy of language. Finally, there is the wider issue of the nature of the subjects who make the judgements and of whom such judgements are made.

The first of these issues is the central concern of the papers in the first two sections of the book, which serve to introduce the theory theory / simulation theory debate. Included here is Heal's 'Replication and Functionalism', one of the starting points for the resurgence of interest in this area.

The debate between theory theory and simulation theory concerns the ways in which we arrive at judgements about the psychological states of others, whether about the explanation of past behavior or the prediction of future behavior. According to the theory theory, when making such judgements we employ (tacitly or explicitly) some psychological theory. Functionalism provides Heal with an example of the theory theory; here psychological concepts are given a causal-explanatory gloss, and reasoning about others' psychological states proceeds in terms of causal relations. Psychological thinking becomes a form of 'natural scientific thinking' (5), and psychology, construed in an appropriately scientific way, slots comfortably into the broader reductionist scientific program.

The simulation theory denies that we possess such theoretical knowledge. Instead, when we reflect on the beliefs, desires, etc., of another subject, 'it is appropriate to seek to understand such animate creatures "from the inside" ' (28). Wondering about how another will act should certain circumstances arise involves attempting to 'simulate' or re-create her thought processes. Crucial to this is the ability to reason hypothetically. This allows one to imaginatively re-create another's train of thought even when her starting point is rejected.

The initial formulations of the simulationist approach (a term Heal is now reluctant to use) are rich and suggestive, if (understandably) lacking full development. Much of the discussion in later papers attempts to flesh out the underlying idea and to address certain crucial misunderstandings. Foremost amongst these is the mistaken belief that simulating the thought processes of another is merely a heuristic tool that can be fruitfully employed in the absence of a fully worked out psychological theory. To take this line is to treat

the simulationist thesis as an empirical suggestion about the mechanisms involved in psychological judgement, one that does not impinge on the wider issue of the psychological nature of persons.

Such an understanding can be found in much of the other literature, notably in the writings of Stich and Nichols. On this approach, simulation theory is taken as claiming that when we engage in psychological reasoning we take our inference mechanisms 'off-line', detaching them from the belief-forming and action-guiding mechanisms they would normally feed into.

Heal is at pains to distance herself from such a model (see especially Essay 6). On her account, the alternative to the theory theory should not be conceived of as an empirical hypothesis; rather, the claim is that 'it is an a priori truth that simulation ... must be given a substantial role in our personal level account of psychological understanding' (91-2). To avoid ambiguity, the term 'co-cognition' is introduced for this latter suggestion. Two people co-cognise when they run through the same process of reasoning, whether hypothetically or otherwise. Reasoning about others' psychological processes in a crucial range of cases thus essentially involves co-cognising with them.

This approach crucially involves assumptions about the degree to which another is rational, in that one cannot draw any inferences about the beliefs another will arrive at when faced with certain evidence unless she is taken to be generally rational (see Essay 8). There are also implications for our account of psychological concepts, explored in the papers in the third and fourth sections.

Underlying the discussion of the two approaches to psychological judgement is a deeper concern for the way in which we should conceive of the subjects of such psychological judgements. This takes us from the first aforementioned issue to the third. Heal rejects the suggestion that we should think of persons in the same way as we think of the rest of the physical world. The appropriate way of conceiving of an individual's psychological processes is to see them as reflective of her world-view; it is not to think of them as realizing a sophisticated causal system, describable in much the same way as the rest of physical reality. Yet thinking of them in this latter way is just what the theory theory requires of us. This difference also finds expression in the forms of thought emphasized by each approach. The co-cognition approach stresses the role of first person thought, whereas the theory theory approach is resolutely third person. First person authority is correspondingly a central theme in the final section of the collection.

The collection of these papers in one place is to be welcomed. It is marred only slightly by the absence of two relevant and important papers from 1994 and 1995. Including these might have increased repetition, as Heal suggests, but in a collection of articles, rather than a monograph or introductory text, this need be no bad thing.

Chris Lindsay
University of Glasgow

Jo Ellen Jacobs
The Voice of Harriet Taylor Mill.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2002.
Pp.xiii + 270.
US$39.95. ISBN 0-253-34071-3.

This is a fascinating, if sometimes irritating, book. It is a biography of Harriet Taylor Mill, written by J. E. Jacobs, a philosopher who has edited Harriet's *Complete Works*. It provides an interesting discussion of what to call Harriet/Mrs. Taylor/Mrs. Mill for biographical purposes, in addition to a readable, often gripping, guide to Harriet's life. Jacob suggests a solution to a major biographical puzzle, provides an impassioned defence of Harriet's character, and offers a sustained argument for acknowledging what John — as Jacobs calls John Stuart Mill — and Harriet both insisted upon, namely, their close collaboration, and joint production, of the great philosophical works that took John's name.

Married at eighteen to a man (John Taylor) who was nearly thirty, and with three children in quick succession, Harriet was initially happy with her husband and the radical Unitarian milieu he frequented. Then, suddenly, her feelings changed completely, to the point where she and her husband led completely separate lives. Why? Jacobs' plausible suggestion is that, prior to the birth of her third child, Harriet discovered that her husband had given her syphilis — a disease for which there was no cure and for which 'treatment' was often poisonous (134-41). Jacobs notes that medical advice at that time meant that John Taylor could have believed it safe to marry, and that guilt for what he had done might explain his willingness to support Harriet financially for the rest of her life, while the likelihood that this was unintentional would explain her subsequent willingness to rebuild their friendship and to nurse him carefully through his last illness (142, 158-64). Jacobs notes that syphilis was a common problem in Victorian England, and that her hypothesis helps to explain Harriet's eagerness to obtain mercury (141); her constant physical illnesses from 1841 until her death in 1858 at the age of fifty-one (135); her unwillingness to have sex with John (142-5), and the mental and physical debility of her children and grandchildren (145-6).

About Harriet's character Jacobs is firm. In her view Harriet has been unfairly portrayed as a shrewish, ambitious, ungrateful wife and partner, and as a domineering and hypochondriac mother (xxi-ii). Much of this antipathy, she suggests, arises from sexist reactions to any displays of temper, reproachfulness or self-pity by women (107-12, 182, 193) and from an unwillingness to take either her intelligence, or her ill-health, seriously. Jacobs has touching discussions of Harriet's response to her daughter's early religious devotion, despite her own passionate atheism (151), and of her emotional and financial support for Helen's pursuit of an acting career, at a time when this was still risqué (174-5). Although she seems to have been estranged from her elder son, her two younger children were devoted to both her and John. Certainly, Harriet could be impatient, even harsh, and her

mother and sister, Caroline, both felt the sharp edge of her tongue (147,172-3). But though Jacobs should have discussed the evidence on which Harriet's critics based their judgments — for example, it is hard to think of Phyllis Rose as sexist (xxi, 154 n82) — she provides a compelling portrait of passionate and intelligent woman filling a variety of complex roles (ch. 2), often not of her choosing, and a sympathetic recognition of the physical and social burdens facing this woman as philosopher and social critic.

Finally, Jacobs addresses the vexed question of Harriet's intellectual and philosophical importance. She shows that Harriet was a sounding-board for John's views, and that her advice on contracts and other financial matters was astute and highly beneficial (105-6, 216). Looking at Harriet's writings from the 1830s and earlier, she argues that many of the key arguments in the *Principles of Political Economy, On Liberty, On the Subjection of Women* and, even, of the *Logic,* come from Harriet (ch. 3). According to Jacobs, historians of philosophy wrongly discount what John said about Harriet's contributions to his *oeuvre* because they are unable to imagine collaborative philosophical work amongst equals (195-201). To counter such sceptics, Jacobs provides a detailed reconstruction of their working methods, and a discussion of what she calls the 'collaborative self' that they created together (100-31 and ch. 3). Her discussion of their joint work on the *Political Economy* — with its passionate interest in the French Revolution, and the fate of a cooperative of Parisian piano workers that they believed to indicate the relative merits of capitalism and socialism — is particularly fine, as is her lengthy discussion of their journalistic work on domestic violence (206-18, 229-45).

I would, though, enter a few caveats about Jacobs' style and approach to her subject. In a work called 'The Voice of Harriet Taylor Mill' it is uncomfortable to have a fictitious diary introducing Harriet's life, even if it incorporates Harriet's early writings and surviving letters. This approach means that we learn rather little about Harriet's childhood and social milieu, or the character of her parents, and this makes it hard to evaluate subsequent criticisms that Jacobs levies against the latter (133 and 'this ogre of a father', for example). It also makes the book feel unfocused and repetitive, as it jumps from chronology to advocacy and back. Jacobs has an annoying habit of saying things like 'When I read of their passion and respect for one another, I walk away envious, not disappointed. Do you?' (131), or of telling us to decide disputed questions on insufficient evidence (155). I would also have appreciated some discussion of John's views prior to meeting Harriet, as a counterpart to the discussion of Harriet's prior to meeting John. Nonetheless, Harriet is lucky to have such a committed and intelligent biographer, and we are lucky to have such a vivid portrait of Harriet's life, ideas, relationships and writings from a philosopher with a sense of history, and an interest in feminist biography.

Annabelle Lever
University College, London

Dale Jacquette
Ontology.
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 2002. Pp. xv + 348.
Cdn$70.00; US$70.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-7735-2463-0);
Cdn$27.95; US$22.95
(paper: ISBN 0-7735-2464-9).

Jacquette aims to tell it like it is: being *qua* being first, the results then applied to a scientifically acceptable vision of our world. He thinks we cannot afford to ignore the preliminary and basic enquiry many have considered too obscure or unintelligible. How can we argue whether sets or quarks or universals exist without a clear grasp of what it means for anything to exist?

Claiming that an analysis of being would be fruitless if it appealed to notions of reality or actuality equally in need of explanation, question-begging if it merely catalogued kinds or categories of beings, and hopeless if it sought more familiar notions, Jacquette suggests that we may yet make progress by seeing how the questions of why anything exists and why only one contingent world does so exist can be answered; the notions required to solve these problems will elucidate being itself. The solution resides in 'the only place where it could possibly be found — in logic, the only philosophical study more basic than ontology' (2).

Chapter 1 distinguishes being in the existence sense (extensional) from being in the predication sense (intensional): this rose is/is red. To avoid circularity, we must explain the existence sense in terms of the predicational. The predication sense is intensional since he allows that we need not assume an object actually exists in order for a predicate to apply to it.

Having set the stage, and as befits a work belonging to a series that surveys debates 'across all approaches to the discipline', Jacquette turns to consider Heidegger. The burden of these twenty-odd pages is that there is a fatal circularity in Heidegger's account of being — far from being the promised pure ontology, it is an exercise in applied ontology, the deliverances of 'a particular conscious animal's experience of being in the world' (22). Jacquette examines and rejects Heidegger's own reflections on the 'hermeneutic circle' and its harmlessness for his project.

Rather than phenomenology, Jacquette turns to 'logic, and the formal methods and philosophical interpretation of pure classical logic' (41) as a guide to pure ontology. Predication is fundamental to logic; nothing true or false can be thought without predicating something of something. Jacquette eventually tells us that existence is a matter of being maximally predicationally complete and consistent. If any putative entity lacks just one logically possible property or property complement then it does not exist. It is striking, however, that in giving an example (62) of a non-existent incomplete object, the golden city of Eldorado, Jacquette's argument appeals only to our *igno-*

rance of whether a monkey was ever its king. His position requires that there *be* no answer.

Jacquette requires that maximal consistency is not merely necessary but sufficient for actual existence. But why hold that objects in non-actual logically possible worlds must be incomplete? I think Jacquettte's reply is that this gives us neat answers to the fundamental questions of ontology; I cannot find a positive argument for the thesis, other than the irrelevant appeal to our ignorance (apparently repeated in note 18, p. 289, where we are told we cannot 'comprehend' all the ramifications of supposing just one extra particle in the universe, even if it is causally isolated).

Since logic guarantees that there is a maximally consistent combination of properties with objects then there must be something rather than nothing. By page 70 Jacquette recognizes that he is breaking with the standard equation of 'possible worlds' with maximally consistent sets of propositions. His justification for rejecting the conventional wisdom is that this equation is philosophically disastrous: a Platonist account of proposition sets implies the actual existence of all possible worlds. If we substitute the idea of worlds being *described* by sets of propositions for their being *constituted*, how do we characterise the difference between the one actual world and all the rest? On Jacquette's view, 'modal logic does not care about the question of being' (74); it simply helps itself to some conventions and unexplained stipulations that one world is specially 'designated' as the actual one.

Jacquette tells us modal logic ought to accept that its possible worlds are sub-maximal for three reasons. (1) Kripkean stipulation of trans-world identities is a human process that cannot capture a maximal property set (but why should this incapacity hurt only for non-actual worlds?). (2) Modal logic doesn't need maximal sets, but can get by with sub-maximal sets construed as 'world-like structures' (I leave it to the modal logicians to determine whether this is true). (3) A maximal account of one world must include claims about other worlds, in particular the actual world. Whatever the rules by which modal logicians wish to play, it seems to me that Jacquette's argument here can only conclude that one world is significantly different from the rest if it has surreptitiously assumed that from the start. One suspicious move is the claim in the second horn of his trilemma that a statement 'X does not exist (in $w_@$)' makes a description of w_i false if the set contains 'X exists (in w_i)'. 'The Eiffel Tower does not exist in Washington' hardly impugns a description of Paris that includes 'The Eiffel Tower exists in Paris' (82-3). A little later (87) he admits that his own existence is not endangered by the incompleteness of his description relative to Pegasus, since predicational completeness must be defined relative to a world.

Jacquette's reflections on the fictional status of possible worlds are attractive for one of his actualist persuasion. But it seems that actualism drives the definition of being, rather than pure logic. His third chapter proves that there is at least one actual world. Chapter four shows that there is only one (if there were more than one, their maximal completeness would require them to include the rest) and that it is contingent, reflecting the fact that

whatever makes up the world could have been differently arranged. Chapter five reconsiders the moves in the context of formal logic.

The second half of the book applies the approach: there are chapters on Quine and ontological commitment; appearance, reality, substance and transcendence; physical entities, causation, and natural laws; abstract entities; mind; god; and finally the ontology of culture. Unlike the combinatorial account of being, these enquiries are seen as a continuing work in progress. Each of these short discussions, and the long-winded earlier chapters, are accompanied by extensive references to the literature.

E.P. Brandon
(*Office of the Board for Non-Campus Countries and Distance Education*)
University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus, Barbados

James C. Klagge and
Alfred Nordmann, eds.
Ludwig Wittgenstein:
Public and Private Occasions.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2003.
Pp. viii + 419.
US$100.00. ISBN 0-7425-1270-3.

The 'public occasions' of this book include valuable information about Wittgenstein's (W) lectures, talks, and discussions at Cambridge. The 'private occasions' refer to W's diaries from 1930-1932, and from 1936-1937, usually called the Koder Diaries, since they were left in the hands of his friend Rudolf Koder. The other 'private' moments are letters to Ludwig Hänsel, whom W met in a prisoner of war camp in Italy towards the end of the First World War. Both the diaries and the letters have already been published in German and here they are translated and annotated by the editors. They are welcome gifts for English-speaking scholars, and are especially relevant to recent scholarship that concerns itself with the relationship between W's personal beliefs and attitudes and his philosophical views.

The Koder diaries are important for both biographical and philosophical reasons. The dated entries not only throw light on W's life and state of mind during the crucial years formative of the *Philosophical Investigations (PI)*, but they also provide materials that illuminate his philosophical perspective and the way he thought he is best approached by readers. First, there is a striking remark about how his thought is best understood: 'The movement of thought in my philosophizing should be discernible also in the history of my mind, of its moral concepts & in the understanding of my situation ... My

main movement of thought is a completely different one today from 15 to 20 years ago. And this is similar to when a painter makes a transition from one school to another.'

Second, the diaries may help us with questions concerning the discernment and interpretation of W's attitude to and remarks on religion. Consider for example the following entries: 'A religious question is either a question of life or it is empty chatter. This language game — one could say — gets played only with questions of life. Much like the word "ouch" does not have any meaning — except as a scream of pain ... But if one lives differently, one speaks differently. With a new life one learns new language games. Think more of death, for example — & it would be strange if through that you wouldn't get to know new conceptions, new tracts of language.'

There are frequent invocations of God as W is going through a very rough spiritual patch. 'Let me confess this: After a difficult day for me I kneeled during dinner today & prayed & suddenly said, kneeling & looking up above: "There is no one here." That made me feel at ease as if I had been enlightened in an important matter. But what it really means I do not know yet. I feel relieved. But that does not mean, for example: I had previously been in error.' 'Let me not shy away from any conclusion, but absolutely also not be superstitious! I do not want to think uncleanly! God, let me come into a relation to you in which I can be cheerful in my work!' There is reason to think that much work on W and the philosophy of religion would have to be revised in light of what we read here about the history of W's mind, his moral concepts and the understanding of his situation.

There are also remarks on race and gender. The remarks on Jewishness put in question Ray Monk's twin claims in biography *The Duty of Genius* that W did not write about the matter of Jewishness after 1935, and that it was not a significant matter for him. Consider: 'Jewishness is highly problematic but not cozy. And beware if a writer stresses its sentimental side. I was thinking of Freud when he talks about Jewish humor.'

Then there is additional material revelatory of W in love with Marguerite Respinger, and how he handles the relationship as it falters because of his unwillingness to commit to marriage and children. 'Received handkerchiefs for my birthday from Marguerite today. They pleased me though any word would have pleased me more & and a kiss yet much more ... I now have the feeling as if I would have to join a monastery (inwardly) were I to lose Marguerite.' Then we are surprised by the intensity of W's aversions: 'The thought of a bourgeois engagement for Marguerite makes me nauseous ... Every defilement I can tolerate except the one that is bourgeois.' The correspondence with Hänsel is less interesting, even though they reveal W as a generous and if somewhat overwhelming friend.

The 'public occasions' collect material on W's philosophical activities in Cambridge: his involvement with the Cambridge Moral Science Club, with the Trinity Mathematical Society, his 'at home' discussions. He also conducted conversations with two lecturers in Cambridge, the psychologist Robert Thouless and the zoologist C.H. Waddington. Two fragments stand

out in Thouless' recollections: 'When we philosophise, we must approach the problems of our language as barbarians, as if we did not know before how it is used.' Another is a response to the question whether he still held the views expressed in the *Tractatus*. W says no, but is respectful of his early work: 'I should not be where I am if I had not passed through what is expressed in the *Tractatus*. When I wrote that, I had Plato's idea of finding the general idea lying behind all particular meanings of a word. Now I think of the meanings as like fibres of a rope. One may run the whole way through, but none may.'

W took lectures seriously, spent a lot of time preparing them, and regarded them as a form of publication — as acts of making public. The impression he left was expressed by Swansea students: 'We have never *seen* a man thinking before.' The materials also suggest just how important his gifted students were to W's own philosophical activity — some of whom became W's builders and were crucial in spreading his influence. We are also given glimpses into W's relations to his colleagues at Cambridge and his attitude to philosophers at Oxford, 'the flu zone of philosophy.'

We should think twice about dismissing the materials collected in this book as W's 'laundry list'. Much of it is helpful in the interpretation of the *PI*, providing context, elaboration, and alternative formulations of points which are more instructive, or at any rate provide a better idea as to what W means by certain of his remarks in his later masterwork. The private moments enter into matters of philosophical and public importance — and not merely as backdrop either. And in his spiritual and religious struggles W is retrieving the cluster of reactions constituting the origins of the language game. With their lively translation and rich annotations James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann strengthen our exegetical resources for approaching and better understanding W's philosophy.

Béla Szabados
University of Regina

Ken McGovern
Campion College

Henri Lefebvre
Key Writings.
Eds. Stuard Elden, Elizabeth Lebas and Eleonore Kofman.
New York: Continuum 2003. Pp. xix + 284.
US$125.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-6645-1);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-6646-X).

Henri Lefebvre's *Key Writings* arrives in a rash of recent translations of his work — by my count, nine since 1991. The texts and excerpts collected beneath this at once ambitious and flatfooted title represent a wide-angle snapshot of an entire itinerary, the earliest from 1933, the latest from 1990. The editors' avowed purpose is both to demonstrate Lefebvre's 'range' while insisting upon a certain consistency across the variation of themes and discursive forms: never simply a philosopher, sociologist, historian or militant, his is a trajectory scanned by breaks, ruptures, betrayals and about-faces, with no continuity save one: 'being a communist' (xii, 230-7). *Key Writings* therefore attempts to diagram a venture beginning with an early and decisive brush with surrealism followed by a thirty-year drift through the French Communist Party, a brief and very original period of collaboration with the *Arguments* group and the Situationists after the break, over a decade as a professor of sociology, and almost two decades of work right up until Lefebvre's death in 1991.

Because it rightly attempts to present Lefebvre's career in its complexity, this volume's richness is undeniable; but this richness is also a certain poverty. The wealth of material puts great pressure on the principle of editorial selection, one here taking the form of archival neutrality or indifference. Coverage and range often amount to juxtaposition with little evaluation of the interests these texts pose from the point of view of their recirculation in the present. The inclusion of certain texts, out of historical concern or in the interest of 'address[ing] gaps' in Lefebvre's Anglophone reception (xii), does no service to his legacy. The chance to reconfigure that reception cedes to a sampling that can be called representative in an almost statistical sense. This gives the volume a paradoxically ahistorical feel, reinforced by the thematic organization of the texts. Clustering this material conceptually is perfectly legitimate, of course, but its price is a lack of sensitivity to where individual texts constitute interventions within their own historical conjuncture. Given the variation and sheer sweep of the corpus, there is a necessary stress on what makes for the unity and uniqueness of a movement, of a life; but this can only diminish the importance and exemplarity of certain decisive moments within this history, in particular the break with the Party recorded and sealed by the remarkable text from 1958, *La somme et le reste* (of which we are offered two excerpts). If this text is 'testament, disputation, elucidation and confession' all at once (xiv), it is first and foremost a *profession de foi*: an avowed fidelity to Marxism in the very form of a break with the Party and the betrayal it represented.

In the interest of suturing gaps, the collection 'foregrounds' and 'gives precedence' to 'Marxism and Philosophy' (xvii). But some wants are better left blank: these are the volume's weakest and most disappointing texts, the least innovative and least philosophical. Is it really necessary to include an excerpt like the one here called 'Retrospections', a Party-programmed post-war denunciation of existentialism (as neo-surrealism) in the form of a bad faith self-criticism of Lefebvre's own surrealist past — all in the name of an 'objective dialectics' (6-13)? At best, the texts (especially from the Thirties) present Lefebvre as representative of a certain humanist strain of Marxism, conceiving man 'as a totality,' as the 'production of man by his own efforts, his own labor ... ' (34): this ontology of auto-production leads to a determination of ideology as 'mystification', as lie, as the distance 'between you and yourself' to be overcome (229-30). The most philosophically interesting texts are, however, scattered through the book's other groupings, especially those on 'The Critique of Everyday Life' and 'History, Time and Space'. Most powerful is the 'testimony' of *La somme et le reste* (in the 'Politics' section), a meditation on the secret complicity between the 'materialist' ontology of doctrinal Marxism and what it only seems to oppose, 'imprisoning [Marx] withing categories [he] critiqued and dismantled' (232). Only a suspension of ontology altogether, rather than an opposed thesis or position, will open the possibility of a new politics in the aftermath of the disastrous coupling of ontology and politics in Marxism. This suspension takes the form of a questioning: 'What is socialism? What was it for Marx? What will it be for us? ...What is democracy? What is happiness? What is materialism? What is idealism? What is dialectics? What is practice?' (236). This is not a crisis or criticism of Marxism: it is Marxism itself, a Marxism Lukács slyly called 'orthodox'. Nothing could be further from dogmatism and bad faith.

This new politics is found in the analysis of the notion of the 'everyday' — the subject of the book's second section. First presented as early as 1933 (cf. 71-83), the everyday is a convergence of Marx's sphere of consumption and Heidegger's *Alltäglichkeit*, with the interpolation of a term belong to neither: life as the 'lived', *le vécu*. Everyday life is first and foremost what slips through the mesh of classical political categories. Having no place within the 'sum' of instituted forms of collective existence, it is both a left over — *le reste* — and a seeming site of resistance. Lefebvre gives it a revolutionary name: the streets (90ff.). Out in the open, but where nothing appears as what it is, it is the site where freedom is articulated in a certain experience of time ('free time'). And if the lived is the site of resistance, it is *also* the locus of the ideological. Everyday life is therefore ambiguous. It is the richness of play, love, poetry (166ff.), but it is nevertheless marked by a boredom that is oppressive and yet also harbors a secret power: this empty time in which nothing happens places us in contact with time itself, a time without measure whose very lengthening opens onto the brusque irruption of the event. Everyday life, at once resistance and vulnerability, is the place of what is today called 'biopolitics'. It would be tempting to use Lefebvre as a starting

point for the construction of a contemporary ontology of Life — but only at the price of betraying what is most living, in Lefebvre, and in 'life' itself.

Jason Smith
Occidental College

Michael Losonsky
Enlightenment and Action from Descartes to Kant.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xvii + 221.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-521-80612-7.

Generally speaking, there are two approaches to studying past philosophical thought: the 'historical' and the 'analytic'. The analytic approach gives emphasis to analyzing the logic and consistency of ideas of a historically significant text. History's function in the analytic mode is simply to provide an accurate chronology of events and circumstances under which the text was written. The historical approach, on the other hand, rests on the assumption that teasing out the meaning of a classic text requires firmly situating the text in the appropriate social, economic, and political context and carefully defining the author's ideas and the world of action in which he or she lived.

Michael Losonsky's book falls somewhere between these two approaches. It is, at times, a purely historical treatise, as Losonsky, in the course of sketching the seventeenth-century European intellectual antecedents of Kant's conception of human enlightenment, draws actual historical linkages between key enlightenment figures. But the book is also, at times, a purely analytic exercise, as Losonsky assesses the virtues and shortcomings of various theories of mind that sprung from this lineage. The book should therefore interest historians of philosophy as well as those who are concerned more with the extent to which the philosophies of mind of, among others, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, and Leibniz can inform current debates.

According to Kant's conception of human enlightenment, true enlightenment involves liberating oneself from a 'self-imposed immaturity' through the public exercise of one's reason. This self-imposed immaturity is caused by an inability to exercise autonomously one's own understanding, an inability that is caused, in turn, by irresolution, i.e., by the inability to make up one's mind about truth and falsity. For some, overcoming irresolution and liberating oneself from immaturity is a relatively easy task. For the irresolute person, however, the task is more difficult, since the irresolute person's inner life is such that 'self-doubt plays an important and sometimes dysfunctional role' (16).

Historically, there are two important positions regarding the most favourable way to overcome such irresolution. One position, associated with the philosophies of Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and Leibniz, sees 'voluntary activity as a remedy for the mind's defects, particularly irresolution' (41). On this view, voluntary mental activity is the liberating force: one must apply one's will to overcome uncertainty. The other position, associated with the work of Spinoza, and enthusiastic writers such as Jacob Boehme and John Webster, sees divinely inspired thinking, unimpeded by the will, as the key to conquering irresolution. On this view, 'the human will [is] primarily a source of sin and error, and consequently the attainment of truth, virtue, and salvation require[s] the renunciation of will' (105).

Losonsky begins his examination of the dispute over the role of human volition and its merits with Descartes, arguing that, for Descartes, even the most basic knowledge requires wilful, disciplined thinking: 'for Descartes it is on account of the fact that we have a will that we come to know that there are things besides us' (40). Losonsky thereby sees in Descartes a rough outline of the Kantian proposition that enlightenment requires public activity: 'Cartesian knowledge depends on voluntary mental activity, and it is this very activity that leads us to know that we are embedded in a divine and material environment' (40).

Losonsky sees Hobbes as bringing the body, i.e., internal physical states, as embedded in an environment into focus in seventeenth-century philosophy. On Losonsky's view, Hobbes advocates a kind of weak externalism. Regulated thinking, or what Hobbes called 'passionate thought,' requires internal information processing. But 'internal states by themselves ... are mental states only if they are embedded in a natural and social environment' (71). In Hobbes, then, Losonsky argues, we can see an early contribution to the development of Kant's conception of human enlightenment as requiring the public exercise of reason.

Meanwhile, enthusiastic writers eschewed knowledge acquired through voluntary mental activity. They believed that 'inspired and involuntary human activity directed by divine powers is to be preferred over our deliberate and wilful conduct' (105). Losonsky contends that this view survives in Spinoza, who enslaves citizens 'to the divinely inspired voice of inner conviction' (157).

According to Losonsky, Leibniz's philosophy signalled a return to wilful, disciplined thinking. Leibniz, as is well known, believed that the mind is a spiritual automaton, but his compatibilism precludes this as a hindrance to conceiving of the mind as free (174). For Leibniz, that is, improving one's mind requires a 'mechanical procedure' for trained thought, and this mechanical procedure requires 'physical symbols,' which in turn require a body. It follows that thought as calculation requires bodily activity. But bodily activity without association with others engaged in similar bodily activity is powerless to contribute to general happiness. Thus, association is crucial to enlightenment: 'The importance of association is not a minor feature of Leibniz's political opinions, but a central feature of his metaphysics' (181).

In Leibniz, then, we can discern a recognizable simulacrum of Kant's conception of enlightenment as requiring public activity.

In the final chapter, Losonsky discusses Christian Wolff, who seized upon key Leibnizian doctrines in the pursuit of academic freedom, and Ernst Klein, one of Wolff's followers, who may also have inspired Kant.

For the most part, *Enlightenment and Action* does a commendable job of tracing the intellectual genesis of Kant's conception of human enlightenment, but Losonsky is insufficiently explicit about the precise nature of the relationship between wilful thinking, bodily activity, and enlightenment. Additionally, the book is trumpeted as being written in flowing, non-technical style, but the text presupposes familiarity with the writings of Descartes and the rest, and so will require careful perusal from those not acquainted with the work of these philosophers.

Nonetheless, Losonsky's book should be a welcome addition to enlightenment scholarship. Especially noteworthy is its largely tacit diagnosis of current naturalistic (read: computationalist) theories of mind — which invariably disparage volition as illusory and present human beings as involuntary automatons steered by (as yet unknown) internal computational processes — as being decidedly anti-enlightenment. Who would have thought that contemporary philosophy of mind could have such profound political implications?

Greg Janzen
University of Calgary

A.S. McGrade, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xviii + 405.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80603-8);
US$24.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00063-7).

According to the editor, this volume aims 'to enhance fascination while diminishing incomprehension' of its topic, and I think there can be no doubt that it accomplishes this end remarkably well. This review will highlight some of the particularly rewarding features of the book and then mention some things that might have been done differently.

The reader should first realize the breadth of what the volume takes medieval philosophy to cover. On its view medieval philosophy begins with the apologetic and exegetical work of Christian intellectuals following Con-

stantine's conversion, takes in the appropriation of Greek philosophy by the thinkers in the Islamic world, both Muslim and Jewish, then concentrates on the rise and full flowering of scholasticism in western Europe from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, and even continues on into the renaissance. Wisely, no attempt is made to give something like an historical survey of all this varied work; rather the contributors select various aspects of it, try to introduce the reader to the issues, and point to some salient developments.

Here are some contributions that I found particularly interesting. (1) The piece by Therese-Anne Druart on philosophy in Islam, although far too short to do justice to this sphere of medieval thought, certainly entices one to read further. I was particularly fascinated by the 'therapeutic' literature to which several Islamic thinkers contributed. (2) Idit Dobbs-Weinstein's piece on Jewish philosophy is remarkable for its interesting introduction to Gersonides, who worked in the fourteenth century at the papal court in Avignon. (3) Stephen Menn does an excellent job of drawing the reader into the twists and turns of the sort of argument for the existence of God pioneered by Avicenna which starts from the fact of contingent existents. (4) In her piece on 'Creation and Nature', Edith Dudley Sylla has an enlightening section on how theology influenced and broadened the scope of permissible speculation in the natural sciences. This is a theme that has been around since Duhem, and, I think, would reward further elaboration. (5) James McEvoy gives us a lively picture of medieval doctrines about happiness, the ancient *summum bonum*, and how Christian thinkers tried to work it into their theology where original sin and the eventual vision of God figure so importantly.

There are, however, some things that might have been done differently and thereby perhaps improved the end result. Although it is noted several times that philosophy in Islam until the thirteenth century was far in advance of contemporary thought in Europe, the *Companion* does not really give it the importance it deserves. Just about all the issues brought up in the book need to have their treatments in Islam explored as much as those by Christian scholastics. Also, no mention is made of the ninth-century followers of Al-Ashari with their atomism and occasionalism, which was eventually to become influential through Al-Ghazali. In my opinion we scholars of medieval thought need to get much more serious about incorporating philosophy in Islam into what we think about and teach. I do not say this because of the current surging interest in Islamic history and culture, but because by any objective standard the Islamic tradition deserves to be treated as equally important philosophically with the Christian one.

To grind another axe, I'd also like mildly to complain about the lack of any overarching theme that could bind a history of the very disparate strands of medieval philosophy together. I think there is one, and a 'companion' of this sort ought to draw more attention to it, not least because it gives a note of drama to the story. What is common to all this body of thought is the effort on the part of people with sincere monotheistic beliefs to incorporate the remains of the Greek philosophical world into their system of thought. This *Companion* would do well to start with a resume of the main strands of

classical thought that were still extant and ready to be appropriated at the end of the ancient period and how these strands were at points complementary to monotheism and at other points in definite conflict with it. Then there is the story of how in the Islamic world a neo-platonized Aristotelianism became something like an established science with views on everything from cosmology to ethics. And there is another story of how this body of doctrine took hold in the universities of high medieval Europe and interacted with orthodox Christian theology. We get bits and pieces of this drama from our *Companion*, but at some point we needed a glimpse of the forest, not just the trees.

Finally, there needs to be more of an overview of how the conflicts between theology and Aristotelian science worked themselves out in both Islam and Christendom. The monotheistic religions had many beliefs in common which reflect an outlook basically at odds with that of the Greek philosophical tradition. In addition Christianity had a number of very odd dogmas that all its theologians in the middle ages were duty-bound to defend, even though no rational mind operating independently of faith could possibly have viewed them as defensible. I refer here to such beliefs as those in the Trinity, the incarnation, original sin, and the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist. In the end these dogmas were part of the solvent that broke down the consensus in favor of Aristotelianism and led to an acceptance of an entirely new kind of science. There is an exciting drama here in the history of ideas that the reader of this *Companion* will get very little intimation of.

The volume concludes with a useful set of short biographies of the main medieval thinkers, a very extensive bibliography organized in part under particular figures and topics, and at the end a useful index. Despite the reservations expressed above, I am happy to recommend the *Companion* to anyone starting out on an exploration of philosophy in the medieval era. He or she cannot help but find it a stimulant to attacking the primary texts themselves, as well as a useful reference guide.

Martin Tweedale
University of Alberta

Alexander Miller
An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics.
Malden, MA: Polity Press 2003. Pp. xi + 316.
US$64.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7456-2344-1);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7456-2345-X).

An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, by Alexander Miller, is a close and careful examination of the major theoretical positions in twentieth-century metaethics. This primarily exegetical work offers critical analyses of several metaethical positions, including moral realism, moral scepticism, and projectivism. However, the debate that is at the heart of Miller's text is between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. While the cognitivists hold that moral judgements — expressing beliefs — are assessable in terms of being true or false, the non-cognitivists 'think that moral judgements express non-cognitive states such as emotions or desires', and thus are not truth apt (3).

Broadly speaking, the text can be broken down into two parts. The first half deals with non-cognitivism and its problems, examining Ayer's emotivism, Blackburn's 'quasi-realism' — two forms of 'projectivism' — and ending with Gibbard's 'norm-expressivism'. Miller's analysis of non-cognitivism draws heavily on two arguments: Moore's 'open question argument' (OQA) and the 'Frege-Geach problem'. The classic OQA targets attempts to analyse moral concepts, such as 'good', in terms of *any* predicate (N) because the question 'Is N good?' is always an open — or *significant* — question. If it is a conceptual necessity that *being good* is identical to the property of *being N*, then Moore holds that the question 'Is N good?' would not be open in the sense just described (13-14). While Miller outlines several rebuttals to the OQA, he also considers Darwall, Gibbard and Railton's modern attempt to salvage this classic argument (20-4). Miller concludes that the success of this salvage operation ultimately depends upon the outcome of other 'hotly' contested debates in metaethics (24, i.e., replacing *analytic* naturalism with contingent naturalism). The OQA, in one form or another, reappears in Miller's assessment of Ayer's emotivism (47-50), Blackburn's attempt to address the moral atti- tude problem (89-94), and Wiggins' argument against ethical naturalism (202-8).

The 'Frege-Geach' problem presents a challenge to emotivists who think that sincere expressions such as 'murder is wrong' express a *feeling*. According to Geach, the emotivists need to explain the semantic functioning of 'murder is wrong' in 'unasserted contexts', such as in the antecedent of 'If murder is wrong, then getting little brother to murder people is wrong' (40). In short, how can the emotivist 'account for the occurrence of moral sentences in "unasserted contexts" ... without jeopardizing the intuitively valid patterns of inference in which those sentences figure?' (42) Miller proceeds to critically examine both Blackburn's and Gibbard's response to this argument, but ultimately concludes that Gibbard's analysis of validity in terms of possible worlds is superior to Blackburn's 'commitment theoretic' approach because Gibbard's solution offers a *unified* account of logical operators,

whereas Blackburn's view must defend a (suspiciously *ad hoc*) moral *and* non-moral account of the validity of, e.g., *modus ponens* (68, 98-104).

The second half of the text deals with cognitivism and its problems. Mackie's 'error theory' regarding moral judgements serves as the backdrop against which the cognitivists operate. Miller outlines Mackie's sceptical argument against moral realism, focussing on both its metaphysical and epistemological questions: what kind of entities would objective values be? How would humans come into 'cognitive contact' with these entities (117)? Mackie holds that any form of moral realism must offer answers to these questions. In explaining the insurmountable nature of this task, Mackie highlights the 'queer' nature of such objective values: such entities or relations would be totally different from anything else humans have ever encountered (117). By way of *reductio*, Mackie suggests such entities would have to be similar to Plato's Forms, a view he holds to be explanatorily bankrupt (117).

In attempting to answer Mackie, Miller distinguishes two forms of cognitivism: *strong* cognitivism — the thesis that moral judgements are a) truth apt and b) 'can be the upshot of cognitively accessing the facts which render them true' — and *weak* cognitivism, which accepts a) but denies b) (4-6). After a brief examination of weak cognitivism, Miller examines two (possible) forms of strong cognitivism — naturalist and non-naturalist — in an attempt to solve Mackie's argument from queerness. Naturalists hold that moral properties are either identical to or reducible to natural properties, whereas non-naturalists deny this identity or reduction (4). Miller devotes lengthy chapters to two types of naturalists, the 'Cornell Realists' (Sturgeon and Brink) and the 'Natural Reductionists' (Brandt and Railton). A last chapter is devoted to the non-naturalist McDowell and focuses on his critique of Blackburn's form of non-cognitivism. The upshot of Miller's examination of strong-cognitivism is that the Natural Reductionists offer the best solution to Mackie's argument from queerness (242).

A problem with Miller's text arises during his examination of the contemporary non-naturalism of McDowell. McDowell attempts to maintain strong cognitivism, reject the view that moral properties are equivalent to or reducible to natural properties, and yet also manage to avoid the pitfalls of Moorean-style intuitionism (138, 243). The problem with Miller's treatment of McDowell can be found in Miller's uncritical adoption of Moore's account of a 'natural' state of affairs: 'By nature, then, I do mean and have meant that which is the subject matter of the natural sciences and also of psychology' (4, quoting G. E. Moore's *Principia*). Miller fails to adequately explore McDowell's criticism of the naturalist programme because Miller holds that his conception of 'natural' entails that non-natural properties 'are neither causal nor detectable by the senses' (11) — the very thesis that McDowell's non-naturalism calls into question (257). Miller prejudges the issue against McDowell, for it is McDowell's view that there is no epistemically privileged set of facts which science has pre-philosophical access (see 'Projection and Truth in Ethics' and 'Two Sorts of Naturalism' in John McDowell, *Mind, Value, and Reality* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1998]).

My rather limited worry to one side, Miller's text manages to walk a fine line between being too difficult for students just beginning their study of metaethics and being not rigorous enough to facilitate more advanced scholarly work. Miller's concise and clearly written explanations — combined with his original insights — makes *An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics* an engaging and profitable read.

Tim Christie
University of British Columbia

Jean-Luc Nancy
A Finite Thinking.
Ed. Simon Sparks. Trans. Edward Bullard et al.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2003.
Pp. 348.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3900-5).
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3901-3).

Despite its name, *A Finite Thinking* is not a translation of Jean-Luc Nancy's 1990 text *Une pensée finie*. A number of essays included in *A Finite Thinking* were originally published elsewhere, for example, in *La pensée derobée* and *L'impératif catégorique*. A number of essays from *Une pensée finie* do not appear in *A Finite Thinking* (which, for the most part, appear in *The Birth to Presence*). Other essays have been translated for the first time. The absence of an introduction, while laudable in many respects, nevertheless means that no explanation is given to any decision to include or exclude any of these essays.

The collection opens by asking the question of sense. Even though Nancy acknowledges numerous phenomenological analyses of sense (320n5), the sense of 'sense' is firmly placed within the Kantian tradition, thus enabling him to begin with the definition of sense as finite. 'Whatever the content or the sense of what I am calling "finitude" ... we can at least be sure that any attempt to think such an "object" is going to have to marry its form or condition, while also being a finite thinking: a thinking that, without renouncing truth or universality, without renouncing *sense*, is only ever able to think to the extent that it also touches on its own limit and its own singularity' (5). *A Finite Thinking* is more about sense than finitude, more about the possibility of a non-reductive intersubjectivity and a primordially shared understanding of being (10-11).

The argument of the first essay informs many of those which follow, including those not originally in *Une pensée finie*. The next two essays, 'Concealed Thinking' and 'The Unsacrificeable', consider Georges Bataille's contribution to the question of sense and the critique of transcendental

concepts, such as the sacred, employed to order and justify sense. The next three essays appraise the work of Jacques Derrida. Compared with the gentle challenge to Bataille's thought, Nancy is very careful not to make any explicit critique of Derrida. In these essays ('The Indestructible', 'Elliptical Sense' and 'Borborygmi'), precedence is given to the question of closure, especially concerning the primordial issue of sense (79). Destruction is not an accidental failing, but an essential possibility of sense itself (85). For Nancy, this means that massacre (considered in 'The Indestructible' and 'In Praise of the Melee') is not evil. Massacre is the destruction of identities and defines Western culture as such.

It is in the context of destruction that Nancy comes clean with his understanding of the meaning of Being. As the indestructible Being of the 'there is' [*il y a*], destruction is a 'regulating fiction' (85). *A Finite Thinking* is negatively characterised by a wholehearted rejection of the phenomenological tradition, including the phenomenological elements of Heidegger, due to its apparent reduction of experience to essence. Divorced from experience, Nancy's understanding of Being risks becoming an alibi.

The next five essays, excluding 'Originary Ethics' (a defense of Heidegger), are based upon close readings of Kant, in particular, the 'categorical imperative'. 'Respect', which defines the relation to the law *as practical*, is revealed in the awe at that which alerts the subject to its finitude: 'there is a destination, an ultimate abandonment to the sense of finitude' (149). Yet this finitude is defined by its being *without* end, without determinate outcomes. 'What counts', therefore, 'is the beginning ... the *sending* of the imperative' (150). Freedom does not confirm the individuality of the subject as an end in itself, but what is categorical about each and every individual, namely, its being-*sent* as free (151). In '*Lapsus judicii*', Nancy argues that the origin of judgement must be found in the 'case' [*casus*]. Based on this originary contingency, which is again denied its possibility of being led back to experience, Nancy claims that 'the imperative is *illegitimate*' (169).

'The Kantian Pleasure System' further explores the notion of respect in relation to the third *Critique*. The absence of pleasure or pain in the feeling of respect is constituted by Kant as an exception or prohibition — a prohibition of desire: 'that singular pleasure, within reason, to which the *a priori* banishment of pleasure gives birth' (205). Yet it is this pleasure, also defined as 'incentive' or 'delight in itself' that governs the movement from the possible to the actual (208).

The essay after 'The Sublime Offering' (the latter reprinted from the collection of essays entitled *Of the Sublime*), situates the problem of love within thinking and marks a more explicit exploration of the indefinite than the finite. Nancy writes in 'Shattered Love', 'to think love would thus demand a boundless generosity ... that would command reticence: the generosity not to choose between loves, not to privilege, not to hierarchize, not to exclude' (246). Based on an originary and indeterminate dissimulation from the previous essay, love dissimulates itself without end (249).

The problem of measurelessness is related to responsibility in 'Responding to Existence'. Nancy is less careful here to distinguish infinitude from indeterminateness. Responsibility is infinite: 'without this infinity, there is no sense; as such, it is nothing less than an unreserved responsibility for this infinity' (295). The question of democracy is of chief concern here: responsibility is for that which is precisely *not* given in democracy, namely, the *demos*. The voice of each one cannot be heard at the same time and thus exceeds the possibility of the fulfilment of democracy (299).

The collection finishes with a 'Coda' entitled '*Res Ipsa et Ultima*'. The *res* of Descartes' thought is emphasised, especially its irreducibility in the distinction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. The 'real', which translates *res* for Nancy, underlies both thinking and extension as the 'identity and difference of relation and exposure' (317). Unfortunately it is not clarified how this relates to the issue of infinity in relation to sense, except to say that the indeterminate that defines *res* cannot itself be reified. It thus somehow distinguishes itself from sense. The opening of sense in *A Finite Thinking* abandons itself as an opening in which the finite manifests itself as sense. It is another question, though, whether the finitude of sense obscures a more fundamental indeterminacy that, while not reified, is nevertheless still guilty of an arbitrary closure.

Alexander Cooke
(*Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies*)
Monash University

S. Jack Odell
On Consequentialist Ethics.
Toronto and Belmont, CA:
Thomson/Wadsworth 2004. Pp. 191.
Cdn/US$19.95. ISBN 0-534595-75-8.

Wilfrid J. Waluchow
The Dimensions of Ethics:
An Introduction to Ethical Theory.
Peterborough, ON and Orchard Park, NY:
Broadview Press 2003. Pp. 256.
Cdn$26.95; US$22.95. ISBN 1-55111-450-X.

These two books cover much of the same ground, but achieve quite different degrees of success.

Waluchow has produced a very useful textbook. Within the brief compass of less than 250 moderately-sized pages of uncrowded text, it covers just

about all of the major concepts, theories, and arguments that a student should be exposed to in an introductory ethics course. These are organized and explained with great care, in order to make the material as digestible as possible for undergraduates lacking any background in philosophy. By combining brevity with clarity of exposition, Waluchow has written a textbook which even reluctant young scholars will be likely to actually read.

The book is comprised of two large sections; the first five chapters deal with meta-ethics, the latter five with normative ethical theories. Chapter one opens with a discussion of the meaning of ethics, distinguishing it from aesthetics and prudence. It continues with a broad outline of the book's concerns, and describes the issues which ethical theories are expected to address.

Chapter 2 sets out the main themes of meta-ethics, and manages to introduce the reader to a large assortment of ideas and theories. These include: the difference between judgments of obligation, of value and of virtue, supererogation, consequentialism, deontology, theories of value, moral rights, emotivism, and prescriptivism. My only complaint regarding this chapter is that Waluchow may have gone into *too* much detail in his taxonomy of different kinds of rights. For a few pages he loses the fine balance between comprehensiveness and conciseness, making a number of passages read like lists of definitions.

Chapter 3 crisply describes the major arguments for and against moral relativism. Anyone who has taught introductory ethics has had to deal with the notion that relativism makes it pointless to debate moral issues. Waluchow effectively inoculates the reader against such moves by carefully explaining how moral judgments made in the context of relativistic ethics remain open to criticism on the basis of factual disagreements, disagreements over the correct application of socially endorsed rules, and demands for internal consistency.

Chapter 4 examines the relationship between ethics and religious belief. It opens with an explanation of the difference between divine command theories which claim that God's will establishes the difference between right and wrong, as against those theories which view God's commands as offering the only reliable guide for distinguishing between right and wrong, and offers a Leibnizian argument for preferring the latter. It is further pointed out that all divine command theorists must face up to the limited capacity of humans to correctly identify and interpret ostensible divine commands. The rest of the chapter is devoted to an overview of Aquinas' theory of natural law, ending with an explanation of how questions regarding natural law invite its substitution with social contract theories, which are the subject of the next chapter.

In chapter 5, Waluchow takes David Gauthier and Thomas Hobbes as his primary representatives of social contract theory. This is fine for getting across the basic notion of the social contract, but Locke, Rousseau and Rawls (in a footnote) are barely even mentioned in passing. It would have been in better keeping with the book's general level of comprehensiveness if some indication had been given of their unique contributions.

Chapter 6 opens the 'Normative Ethical Theories' section, and it deals with utilitarianism. Here again we find Waluchow painlessly imparting the core material of his subject including act vs. rule utilitarianism, the value theories of Bentham, Mill and Moore, etc. It would have been worthwhile mentioning Nozick's 'experience machine' in the discussion of hedonism, but that is a minor quibble.

By this point, the reader should be well aware of the deficiencies of utilitarianism and is prepared for Chapter 7, which introduces Kantian ethics. The chapter is built around the three different versions of the categorical imperative. Waluchow does an admirable job of bringing the reader to appreciate the value of Kant's formulations without trying to sweep any of their difficulties under the rug.

Chapter 8 deals with W. D. Ross's ethical theory, which arrives as a kind of synthetic solution to the tensions between utilitarianism and deontological ethics. Besides setting out Ross's views, the chapter also offers the reader a good illustration of how theories become messy when they try to satisfy all of our basic intuitions regarding moral obligations.

Chapter 9 is devoted to Aristotle's virtue ethics. It not only explains the central ideas of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but also discusses the relative advantages and disadvantages of virtue ethics as against theories of obligation. Waluchow concludes this discussion with the suggestion that virtue ethics might be symbiotically combined with a utilitarian or deontological theory of obligation.

The book ends with a chapter on feminist ethics, which, like virtue ethics, has largely developed in reaction to the perceived weaknesses of consequentialism and deontology. Again, Waluchow manages to touch upon all of the essential points (the notion of patriarchy, ethics of care, Carol Gilligan's feminist moral psychology, etc.) with which a novice philosophy student should be acquainted. Beyond its more strictly feminist interest, this chapter also serves as an introduction to contemporary 'anti-theory' in ethics.

According to the publisher's website, *On Consequentialist Ethics* is supposed to present 'a general overview of Consequentialist Ethics', and 'enable students to achieve quick familiarity with this philosophical topic as they prepare for in-class discussions or for reading relevant original sources.' The book's failure to fulfill these functions can be demonstrated in objective, even quantifiable terms. In reality, only two of the book's seven chapters are devoted to an overview of consequentialism. The first three attempt to give a general account of ethical theory, while the last two are devoted to Odell's own personal philosophical contribution, 'Folk Based Practice Consequentialism'. The two chapters that actually do present 'a general review of consequentialist ethics' go into deeper detail than does Waluchow, but they are not written in a particularly clear fashion, and each suffers from fundamental deficiencies in the choice of material covered. Chapter four, entitled 'Act, Rule and General Utilitarianism', devotes ten pages to the views of Bentham, Mill, and Moore, and another ten to the ethical writings of *Bertrand Russell*, making for a quite idiosyncratic account of the classical

utilitarian literature. Chapter five, 'Standard and Recent Criticisms and Recent Defenses of Utilitarianism', mentions no work published after 1984.

Some sections of the introductory chapters offer relatively straight-forward expositions of meta-ethics, deontology, and egoism, going into deeper detail than does Waluchow. However, they are often marred by confusing use of technical vocabulary, irrelevant side-discussions, and writing that simply cries out for an editor's red pencil. A typical example of the latter: 'David Hume (1711-1776) was a Scottish philosopher who is recognized by nearly every contemporary philosopher to be one of the most important philosophers in the history of western philosophy' (36). Generally speaking, much of the book is written in a careless, flippant style that does not read like a final draft.

One section from the second chapter seriously compromises the book's usefulness as a text for undergraduate courses in a more specific way. Odell's gratuitous, uncharitable, and ill-informed discussion of divine command ethics is likely to undermine the scholarly authority and neutrality of *On Consequentialist Ethics* in the eyes of religious students. We know that he is in trouble as soon as we find him telling us that, 'nothing better captures this version of DCT' than the hackneyed joke about the Ten Commandments whose punch line reads, 'The good news is, according to Moses, "I got him down to ten!" The bad news is, "Adultery is still on the list!" ' (24). Later we are treated to a nineteenth-century-style description of Judaism, based on a fragmented and literal reading of the Old Testament. Catholic students will discover that 'sexual prohibitions of the kind institutionalized by the Catholic Church exemplify religion's distortion of the folk ethic' (32). The philosophical content of the section is almost completely restricted to a whirlwind critical presentation of traditional arguments for God's existence.

The final two chapters treat Odell's own pet theory, which, he repeatedly promises us throughout the book, overcomes the deficiencies of all previous doctrines. Chapter 6 explains that 'Folk Based Practice Consequentialism' urges us to behave in ways that everyone already believes will promote social harmony, inasmuch as everyone is correct in their assessment of what will promote social harmony. Odell's moral program is reminiscent of Karl Popper's call for 'piece-meal social engineering'. Changes in the actual list of prescriptions supported by this theory must pass the test of practical experience. If an existing moral principle is found to disrupt social harmony, it must be discarded, while new moral principles must be shown to improve social harmony. It is not clear why Odell believes that social harmony is the *only* desirable consequence worthy of serving as the goal of his ethics.

Chapter 7 applies Odell's new theory to the issues of euthanasia, the death penalty, abortion, cloning, and stem-cell research. In each instance, Odell first reviews and criticizes how various ethical theories approach the problem at hand, and then tries to demonstrate the superiority of his own views. The preliminary discussions hardly do justice to the efforts of other ethicists to confront these issues. The discussion of capital punishment does not consider the problem of false convictions, while the discussion of abortion makes no mention of even the best-known work on the subject, such as that of Judith

Jarvis Thomson and Don Marquis. Odell's own solutions to these dilemmas are tautological. Whatever policy best serves social harmony will eventually be discovered by an historical process of trial and error, and that policy will be, by definition, identified with 'Folk Based Practice Consequentialism'.

Given the criticisms catalogued above, I cannot recommend *On Consequentialist Ethics* for classroom use. Advanced students who are already acquainted with the material it covers may find parts of the book of some interest, especially its discussion of Kantian ethics (40-50). Of course, anyone interested in Odell's own ethical theory must read his book.

Berel Dov Lerner
Western Galilee Academic College

Paolo Parrini, Wesley C. Salmon, and **Merrilee H. Salmon, eds.**
Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press
2003. Pp. ix + 396.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-8229-4194-5.

A large part of the historical research, for more than a decade now, into the origins and the development of Logical Empiricism and the Vienna Circle has been motivated, at least exoterically, by the need to correct misconceptions and clichés about the movements. These efforts have undoubtedly been very successful. One of their effects has been to make the 'scientific philosophy' of the 1920s and '30s interesting again — at least as a period in the history of philosophy — so interesting, in fact, that historical work can now proceed more or less without the original justification of setting the record straight. This welcome sort of progress notwithstanding, there remain unfinished tasks within the program of rectifying misunderstandings. The introduction to the volume under review — co-edited by Wesley Salmon shortly before his untimely death — identifies some such tasks concerning the widely used distinction between Analytic and Continental Philosophy. As one of the contributors reports, the 1999 conference in Florence from which the volume originated was called 'Analytical and Continental aspects of Logical Empiricism' (110). But the conference that started under the assumption of this dichotomy was turned into a book with a different title — 'historical and contemporary perspectives' on Logical Empiricism. Why?

First, there is the obvious reason that the labels do not reflect the fact that Analytic Philosophy, at least in one of its most influential forms, originated

on the European continent, in Vienna and Berlin. But there is a more interesting reason as well, which the original conference title, in the editors' opinion, may have not brought out clearly enough. This reason is brilliantly introduced by Michael Friedman's essay on the development from a common origin — the movement of Neo-Kantianism in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century — of what we have come to label the Analytic and Continental branches of philosophy. According to Friedman, the split into two opposed traditions, which is most clearly seen in the opposition during the 1930s between Carnap and Heidegger, is preformed in the division of the Neo-Kantian movement itself into two schools with different agendas about how to understand and revise transcendental idealism. One tradition (the 'Marburg School') took the sort of knowledge we have in mathematical physics as its paradigm and tried to extract the rules according to which we are able to achieve objectively valid knowledge in general. From this logic and science-oriented approach grew Carnap's program of the logical construction of the world in the *Aufbau* of 1928. The other tradition (the 'Southwest School'), by contrast, conceived of logic and science as products of abstraction; in Heidegger's modification of this approach the scientific model of objective validity became subordinated to the analysis of *Dasein*. The main focus of Friedman's essay is the work of Ernst Cassirer, one of the Marburg neo-Kantians, who was significant not only for Carnap's *Aufbau* project but who emerges as a heroic figure in his attempt to reconcile the two opposed tendencies in philosophy in the 1930s within an overarching theory of 'symbolic forms'. 'We must strive', he wrote in 1942, 'without reservation or epistemological dogma, to understand each type of language in its own particular character — the language of science, the language of art, of religion, and so on; we must determine how much each contributes to the construction of a "common world" ' (25).

Friedman's paper is usefully supplemented by Gabriel's study of the common ground between Carnap and Heidegger and his analysis of their most basic disagreement as a difference in 'styles of thought', reflected in different rhetoric attitudes. Gabriel suggests, somewhat in the vein of Cassirer's program, that in order to overcome the division without abandoning the achievements of either camp philosophy needs to interest itself more in rhetorical, non-propositional forms of knowledge.

Cassirer's work in relation to the development of Logical Empiricism is further discussed in Thomas Ryckman's instructive comparison of Cassirer and Reichenbach's almost simultaneously published interpretations of the General Theory of Relativity (1920/21). Since both Cassirer and Reichenbach came from neo-Kantian backgrounds, it is interesting to see how they arrived at very different philosophical evaluations of the theory. Surprisingly, in Ryckman's view Cassirer turns out to be the philosophically more significant and fruitful interpreter; he appears, in brief, as a fairly radical representative, together with Carnap, of what has recently become known as Structural Realism.

Although the neo-Kantian background to Logical Empiricism has figured prominently in much recent research, a more balanced view has to give credit also to the specific Austrian roots of the movement, which were expressly oriented against any sort of Kantianism. Thomas Uebel provides this balance by arguing in support of the claim — made before by Rudolf Haller and others — that there was, prior to the 1920s, a 'First Vienna Circle', consisting of Hahn, Frank, and Neurath, which formed the *Austrian* background for the second circle of that name. Instead of taking inspiration from Kant these intellectuals derived their outlook from the writings of the French conventionalist and instrumentalist philosopher-scientists (Poincaré, Duhem, Rey) and from the empiricism of Ernst Mach.

Mach's empiricism, according to Michael Stöltzner's wide-ranging essay, also is the philosophical source of a genuinely Viennese tradition of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a pre-quantum mechanical sort of indeterminism that seems to have had surprisingly many supporters among Austrian scientists, including some that would later be counted among the Logical Empiricists. Stöltzner's claim is of significance not only for the historiography of the movement but also with respect to the famous 'Forman thesis', the contentious view that the indeterministic interpretation of quantum physics in the 1920s was due mainly to 'external' (cultural) pressure on the scientific community. If Stöltzner is right, then a full blown indeterministic tradition was available long before the advent of quantum mechanics.

The contributions of Logical Empiricists like Schlick and Carnap to the way we understand the mind-body problem today is analyzed by Jaegwon Kim. He finds functionalism, as discussed by Lewis and Armstrong in the 1960s, anticipated in Carnap's works from the 1930s. Among the members of the movement, at least Carnap seems to have abandoned very early the behaviorist views often associated with Logical Empiricism. For Carnap, mental states seem to have been functional states, characterized by their causal roles, and were to be identified, once our knowledge of neurophysiology progresses far enough, with physical states of the brain that can fill the causal roles.

In an attempt to put some of Kim's claims in a historically informed perspective, Michael Heidelberger argues in detail that the revival in the 1950s of philosophical discussion of the mind-body problem in Analytic Philosophy (especially by Herbert Feigl) is actually a continuation (or revival) of a particular strand in the very lively but today virtually unknown debates concerning this topic in nineteenth-century Germany philosophy and psychology.

Two last examples from the collection of success stories in this volume should be mentioned. Martin Carrier traces the development of qualitative confirmation theory from Hempel's proposal of the 1940s, requiring that one has to check for positive instances of a hypothesis-to-be-confirmed rather than for true deductive consequences of the hypothesis, to Glymour's (still controversial) 'bootstrap' account of 1980. According to Carrier, this was a fairly smooth evolution, in fact, a paradigm for progress in philosophy: the

fruitful development of a philosophical theory through conservative modifications of a less successful predecessor theory. The special twist of the story is that the original theory had been renounced by its author; in Carrier's evaluation, Hempel's misgivings about his own work turned out to be misplaced. This has a rough parallel in the fate of the Logical Empiricists' verifiability criterion for cognitively meaningful statements. Although many of us may think the criterion had been conclusively criticized long ago, Wesley Salmon, in the last essay of the volume, attempts to rescue it, arguing that the criterion, properly understood as a rule rather than as an empirical statement of fact, is alive and well and serves important purposes.

Many of the contributions (including some not mentioned here) will provide surprises, especially for readers who have not followed closely the more recent historiography of the Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism. It should be noted, however, that the some of the papers (by Friedman, Uebel, and Stern) were taken from books that have been published since the conference took place in 1999.

Alexander Rueger
University of Alberta

Michael Payne and **John Schad, eds.**
Life After Theory.
New York: Continuum 2003. Pp. vi + 196.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-8264-6565-X.

Perhaps the first thing one should ask when confronted with the possibility that an 'event' is taking place, even beyond the question 'what is an event', is the question 'is it happening?' In a sense this question asks, in a surreptitious way, whether what is being called an 'event' deserves that name. The book *Life After Theory* begins with the premise that an 'event' has taken place (very much in the past tense) in the world of literary theory in particular, and that that event is described through the title of the book itself. As the editor, John Schad, makes clear in the preface, 'there is a widespread understanding, explicit or implicit, that literary studies is now experiencing something we might just call "life after theory" ' (x). The question of the meaning of the term 'life after theory' is approached through a series of interviews with Jacques Derrida, Frank Kermode, Christopher Norris and Toril Moi. The last three are conducted by one of the editors of the volume (Michael Payne), while the interview with Derrida is the transcript of a round table discussion held at Loughborough University on November 10th, 2001.

What 'theory' appears to refer to in the context of the discussions that are presented in this volume is primarily the structuralist and post-structuralist French theory, broadly defined, that emerged in France in the 1960s and '70s and was largely responsible for the 'culture wars' that engulfed Literary Departments in North America in the 1980s. The extent to which each of these interviews is able to move towards an answer to the question 'is it happening', or the precise nature of the 'event' named 'life after theory', is far from certain, in part because of the broad use of the term 'theory' to describe an extremely wide range of intellectual work, and in part because it is continuously unclear whether what is being described through that phrase is a mutation within 'theory' itself, or a result of institutional practices and priorities. With the exception of the interview with Derrida, who treats the term 'life after theory' as a theoretical problem, as an 'event' within theory itself, the interviews tend to focus on the state of affairs within the institution of literary studies. The book thus, unfortunately, fails to account for whether the subject of its title is a specifically institutional or intellectual problem, and to the extent that it is treated as an institutional problem, one is left to wonder whether 'life after theory' in that sense constitutes an 'event' worthy of that name.

It is perhaps not surprising that Derrida, the subject of the first interview of the volume, addresses the question in part through a discussion of what it means to inherit. This motif is at work throughout most of his oeuvre, and Derrida here responds to the title 'life after theory' by transposing it immediately into terms that deal with his own philosophical project: ' "Life after theory"; I'm not sure, from the very beginning, that I understood what this title meant, the "after". To "be after" may mean that you try and be consistent with what you left, you try to live after theory in a way which is consistent with theory; or if you survive theory, you do something else. So this is the opposition ... Now I never use the word "theory" in the way that you do here; I don't use the word "theory" after you, after the Americans and the English speakers. So I would translate this into French as "life after philosophy", after deconstruction, after literature and so on and so forth' (7-8). From his translation it becomes evident that Derrida wants to displace the question of the title onto the ground of the closure of Western Metaphysics — a ground that his work has been addressing for his entire career — and away from the particular institutional determination of 'theory' as the invasion of (continental) philosophy into British or North American Literature departments. In effect, this makes the question of the title a philosophical question, and not just a problem of the way in which 'theory' is housed in specific institutions. He then proceeds through a variety of concepts and motifs, among them the problem of the signature, the counter-signature, hospitality, forgiveness and perjury, and the problem of inheritance, in order to draw out this (philosophical) problematic. Readers of Derrida, however, will find very little new here, and these problematics are more robustly articulated elsewhere. What does appear to be new follows from Derrida's talk that precedes the transcript of the discussion (a reading of the novel *Le Parjure* published by Henri Thomas),

but which, not being reprinted in this volume, remains somewhat obscure. Nevertheless, some touchstones for thinking the problem of what 'life after theory' might mean are clearly laid out.

The problem is that the subsequent interviews with Kermode, Norris, and Moi neither respond to nor articulate further any of these problems. This may be due to the fact that the subsequent interviews take place at other events, and other times. But to the extent that the interviews extend discussion beyond the current and past work of each of these theorists towards the problem of the title of the volume, they deal primarily with the institutional marginalization of theory. Kermode, for example, in response to a question about why there is so much 'hatred' towards theory, answers: 'There's a hatred of religion; what do you conclude from that? Would you expect any movement not to have its detractors? After all, theory has taken control of what is by now a very large, though impotent, institution: namely the study of Literature' (66). Moi's interview similarly draws on mostly institutional justifications for why 'theory' is 'fading': 'The early days were inspiring because people came to theory from all sorts of different backgrounds and were more broad in their training. Now, on the other hand, we are training a whole generation of scholars who are simply theorists' (146-7). Though the Norris interview does lay out some important questions concerning, among other things, Derrida's recent turn towards a reading of religion, the brevity of the interviews on the whole leads one to conclude that one is best served by simply reading the texts of these theorists. And while the epilogue by Schad struggles valiantly to bring the subjects of the interviews into contact with one another, the result there is something closer to pastiche, simply because there is no common understanding between the interviewees of what 'theory' is, or to what extent we are living 'after' it. What results, ultimately, is something closer to a 'missed event', than an understanding of 'what is happening', or has happened in and to theory.

Kir Kuiken
(Department of Comparative Literature)
University of California, Irvine

David G. Peddle and
Neil G. Robertson, eds.
Philosophy and Freedom:
The Legacy of James Doull.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2003.
Pp. xxix + 520.
Cdn/US$115.00. ISBN 0-8020-3698-8.

Philosophy and Freedom: The Legacy of James Doull (PF) is a fitting tribute to an esteemed teacher and colleague such as any scholar would value. It is always heartening to experience genuine academic *Gemütlichkeit.* James Doull (D) was a Professor of Classics at Dalhousie University from 1947 until his retirement; in succeeding years he gave classes in the Philosophy Department at Memorial University. A native of Nova Scotia, D did his undergraduate work at Dal and obtained a MA degree in Classics from Toronto. A Rhodes Scholar, D attended Oxford, was in military intelligence during WWII, and matriculated at Harvard, where he enrolled as a doctoral candidate but did not complete his degree. PF takes the form of occasional essays by D arranged in world-historical order with comments by former students and colleagues. Readers used to assuming that linguistic analysis and iterations of phenomenology and hermeneutics in various states of construction are cutting-edge philosophy will find in PF a cornucopia of opposition. Those who like their philosophy neatly packaged by topic or era with aesthetic ribbon will also feel a strangeness not easily overcome. Uncompromising are the essays by D, filled as they are with the certainty of historical ideality. Not so austere are the companion pieces, which show laudable effort in trying to keep pace on a journey less tranquil as it moves along the linearity of human time remembered to that experienced and then anticipated. It is worth the steep price of the book (are student editions so impossible!) to feel the strangeness and sense the struggle of professor, colleagues and students. As might be expected the essays of D alone are worth the costly admission.

The classical life at Dalhousie during the years when D was at the height of his powers could be pretty enjoyable. From the Olympus of the Classics Department one could gaze at the rubble of the Philosophy Department -- and this leavened with the periodic visits of foreign experts in one field or another whose unacquaintance with Aristotle and Hegel — masters of actual truth — always led them into a trap of one-sidedness. Expecting analysis, synthesis was demanded; expecting hermeneutics, hermetica were asserted. The results were predictable. Picking over the aftermath of their sophistry was always entertaining and often not without educational value. The cry, if there had been a cry, would have been 'back to the texts' in counterpoint to 'back to the things'. The dialectic of events even reached a point where two foreign experts within the Classics Department tried to orchestrate a *putsch* to depose Chairman Doull. The *putsch* failed, a civil trial ensued,

one of the foreigners fled, and D had to relinquish the Chair, though he tried to retain control behind the scenes in true Roman fashion. The persistent and illuminating reconstruction of texts in open and conscious opposition to their assumed deconstruction had the practical dialectical effect of creating a pathological compulsion on the part of the American-dominated Philosophy Department to block the ever-immanent birth of a Classics PhD programme. Such was the ferment due to the strength of D's personality and learning.

PF is the result to date of D's work and influence. D's relation to Hegel was uncannily similar to that of a devoted Neoplatonist to Plato. Thus, D's perspective was strangely simple: Hegel's rendition of Human History as *equally* Divine Life is the TRUTH. Any argument or historical event *before or after* Hegel existed in his *Phänomenologie* as historically embodied Concept. Hence, D's *modus operandi* was to always oppose *any* thesis with an antithesis. No one and no book or article was exempt. His charm, the twinkle in his eyes when the antithesis flashed, and the intense interest of those who stuck with the Labour — and most did not — was nurtured by the fact that empirically James remembered even minor texts virtually verbatim and that intellectually he could seemingly analogize any historical or contemporary idea or happening into Hegel's conceptual scheme.

The problematic of D's position is best gleaned by the responses of the only two colleagues actually qualified to oppose D's, *née* Hegel's, World-historicism with accurate antitheses. First, there are the remarks of Robert Crouse, the Other Master in the Dal Classics Department, in this volume with respect to the accuracy of D's empiricism. Second, Fackenheim makes a renmark in his rejoinder (reprinted in PF) to D that D's claim about Christianity being all religions is nowhere to be found in a Hegel text. Readers may wish to think about these objections and contemplate what their truth might imply.

So, what is the legacy? Is there a school? Is there written work that will stand with the great commentators like Simplicius and Proclus or with commentary-like masterworks as in Plotinus' *Enneads*, Hegel's *Logik*, Thomas' *Summa* — or even with historically-oriented contemporary expositions such as *Sein und Zeit* or *Wahrheit und Methode?* D's gift lay more in reading than in writing, more in listening than in speaking. Not seeking to innovate but to comprehend, he was content with the phenomenological grid bequeathed by Hegel, within which D thought every potential historical artifact to be *already* actual. Readers of PF will doubtless notice the deep moat that cuts between the remembered empirical potentiality of D's knowledge of the *Geisteswissenschaften* and the very limited actuality of his written artifacts as catalogued in PF. Whether students and colleagues as a collective can bridge this gulf remains to be seen. It is perhaps to be hoped that the D archive mentioned by the editors will contain the necessary extensive insights into the texts of Aristotle and Hegel, particularly the metaphysical ones. As things now stand, using this notable tome as the best extant artifact, attentive readers can do no better in understanding

the phenomenon of a *belles-lettres* in the guise of a philosophical Glass Bead Game than to comprehend Jean Paul's poetic *Glasperlenspiel* — the *Vorschule der Ästhetik.*

James Lowry
Dominican College of Philosophy and Theology, Ottawa

Jacques Rancière
Short Voyages to the Land of the People.
Trans. James B. Swenson.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2003.
Pp. 141.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3681-2);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3682-0).

Short Voyages to the Land of the People is the most recent English translation of a philosopher slowly gaining recognition beyond the confines of academic and Marxist French philosophy — Jacques Rancière, whose intellectual career began with Althusser in the early days of structural Marxism.

Short Voyages forms one of the most direct illustrations of Rancière's desire to 'affirm the "poetic" nature in politics' by insisting 'first and foremost that politics is an activity of reconfiguration of that which is given to the sensible' (Rancière, 'Ten Theses on Politics', *Theory and Event* 5:3). Rancière begins by stating that 'this is a book about voyages' (1), and while a number of his chapters deal with figures whose travels he recounts, Rancière's more profound aim here is to deal with the intersection between *foreignness*, the *encounter*, and a certain kind of *political perspective* in the above sense, insofar as the first two bring about a redivision of human experience. As the book progresses, in fact, less and less attention is given to voyages in the ordinary sense, and more to the emergence or rupture of this foreignness within the context of quotidian life. Thus, the last chapter considers Ingrid Bergman's role in Rossellini's *Europe 51*, in which Rancière discusses very brief journeys, like that which carries Bergman's character Irene to the end of the tram line, or up a flight of stairs in an apartment block, or even the moment where 'all of a sudden she turns around' (116). These very short voyages themselves are subsumed under the claim that *Europe 51* is 'a film that is capable of teaching us something about what "something is happening" means' (109): that is, something about the event.

The book discusses this triple intersection in a style that calls for a great deal of care on the part of the reader, and relies on a great deal of patience. Each of the chapters in *Short Voyages* presents, with very little theoretical

structure, a single frame or a handful of instants from certain episodes in the history of modern European life. The first Part of the book, entitled 'The New Land', offers four such accounts: Wordsworth's shifting allegiances to the revolutionary France that he encounters on two of his youthful voyages; the fervour of the Saint-Simonians traversing the French countryside, a post-revolution movement dedicated to the working life of the proletariat, attempting to incarnate thereby a union between ideals and reality; George Büchner's meeting with, and cynical appraisal of, Achille Rousseau in Augsburg, and his brief writing career which dissolves the ideals of both revolution and science in the face of a more fundamental violent and unpredictable nature; and Claude Genoux's fantastical voyages through the South Seas, which in fiction enact the same attempt found in the Saint-Simonians to unite thought and life in the return to the experience of being a worker. The remainder of the book proceeds in just such a fashion, considering the historian Michelet, the poet Rilke and the filmmaker Rossellini.

In each case, for Rancière, there is an encounter with people or events that ruptures the dominant social order of reality, bringing about an experience of foreignness — manifested primarily through the experience of being unable to make sense of life through the provided categories. More than this, each of these scenes suggests that through the encounter with foreignness, a creative experience of living is made possible. As Rancière puts it: 'It is the foreigner's gaze which puts us in touch with the truth of a world' (125).

The most important, and certainly the most illuminating, chapter of the book is the final one, in which Rancière discusses *Europe 51*. It is here that much of his present theoretical ambitions are set out, at least in some brief outline. However, he also describes, through the mechanism of Rossellini's film, his own journey away from his roots in Althusserian Marxism and his attempts to understand culture through the lens of structuralism, towards a concern with the event of the encounter beyond all such interpretosis (119ff). Once again insisting on the importance of understanding politics as concerned with the aesthetic division of the sensible (*Le partage du sensible* — the title of another of his books), Rancière sees *Europe 51* as staging a revolutionary reorientation of the herione's experience.

This is a rich book, certainly rewarding repeated readings, and each of the scene-chapters are interesting and evocative. Its weakness lies in the fact that, in order to distinguish it from a collection of musings about 'favourite' texts and historical moments, some grasp of Rancière's more general theoretical position is necessary. The faith invested in the reader to divine the thetic threads at play in amongst the writers, the workers and the visionaries, is perhaps — broadly speaking — too great a demand for the uninitiated reader. As Rancière's work becomes more widely known, this little text is bound to garner the interest that it certainly justifies.

Jonathan Roffe
University of Melbourne

William Sweet, ed.
Philosophical Theory and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 2003.
Pp. vii + 241.
Cdn$24.95. ISBN 0-7766-0558-5.

This is a nice, nourishing collection of essays on human rights that will be of interest to anyone working on the theory behind human rights practice. William Sweet edits this volume of fourteen essays, and provides a very handy introduction to the entire piece.

The volume is organized into three parts, with roughly five essays per part. A strength of the volume is the diversity of contributors, who range from philosophers to political scientists, from lawyers to civil servants, and which even includes an ex-soldier who served in Rwanda. Many of them do, though, share an interest in the Catholic tradition, and all save one are from the developed world. The volume is dedicated to Leon Charette, a scholar of Jacques Maritain, and it's fair to say that many of the contributors share similar sentiments.

The first section of the book is devoted to foundational issues in rights theory. What are human rights, and what justifies us in believing we have them? How does our answer to these questions affect our list of what we have human rights to? These are, of course, eternal questions in human rights theory, and everyone has his or her own beliefs. There are here Thomistic attempts to ground human rights in the 'natural' law as well as pieces inspired by T.H. Green, who argued by contrast for a constructed or 'artificial' conception of human rights. Two essays stand out in this section. The first is by Sarah Hutton on early English feminists, such as Mary Wollstonecroft, and how they conceived the foundations of human or natural rights. The second is by Thomas Jeannot, who puts together an interesting mixture of Maritain, Karl Marx and John Dewey and arrives at a humanistic construction of human rights.

The book's second section focuses on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948 and ratified into two supposedly binding covenants in 1966. The four essays in this section are quite sceptical of whether the UDHR has had any improving affect on the moral stature and behaviour of mankind. Philip Lancaster, the soldier who served in Rwanda, crafts an account of humanity's failure in Rwanda in the summer of 1994, when 800,000 Tutsis and others were slaughtered by Hutus in a near-genocidal frenzy. In light of Rwanda, can we say that we've learned the lessons of The Holocaust, and the explosion in contemporary human rights consciousness that resulted from it? The only essay in this section with an optimistic assessment is Mostafa Faghfoury. The others are quite cold to the idea that the UDHR has had a positive affect, and Jack Iwanicki, in an interesting case study, shows how the Supreme Court of Canada has not referred extensively

to the UDHR, or its two follow-up covenants, in making human rights rulings over the years.

These are all valuable insights to glean, and it's important not to be too naïve about international institutions and what they can achieve. Global governance is, indeed, still very much in its infancy. But what this section had me wondering was whether we don't focus too much, at least in the developed world, on the role of the law regarding human rights protection. I believe this a very common failing, and while it is understandable it remains a severe and damaging one. Human rights are much broader and deeper in their implications than the classical picture of drafting new bills, charters and declarations of rights, and then passing them into an enforceable legal code. For human rights do *not* just target the legal system for reform: they target all of what we might call, following John Rawls, 'the basic structure of society'. Human rights proponents maintain that the entire basic structure of society should be shaped in such a way that human rights get respected, which is to say that vital human needs get met and that everyone has a shot at living at least a minimally decent and enjoyable life.

What is the basic structure? It refers to all those social institutions whose affects on all of us are, as Thomas Pogge says, 'profound, pervasive, inescapable and present from birth.' The legal system *is* one such institution, but it is *not* the only one. Others include the system of governance, the ground rules and resources of the economy, the method for employing armed coercion, the family, and the system for providing vitally needed basic goods like food, water, education and health care. Human rights are respected, in a given society, not when there is a fancy legal document in place that gets enforced but, more deeply, when the basic structure is shaped in such a way that everyone in that society enjoys secure access to the objects of all their human rights. This approach, I believe, is a much more comprehensive and rewarding way of conceptualizing the realization of rights. It makes us more mindful of spheres outside the legal one when talking about human rights, and it also makes the stakes smaller when we talk about whether any one written document has been especially influential. I realize that this volume was partly dedicated to analyzing the effects of this document, and hence its legalistic focus, but I feel it important to mention that such a focus need not be the only one, or even the most important one.

The final section of the book concerns contemporary human rights controversies post-UDHR. Most of the fine essays in this section revolve around the clash between more individualistic conceptions of rights versus more communitarian understandings of, and critiques of, human rights. I thought this section might have included other contemporary debates — for example, a piece on contemporary human rights institutions and their successes and failures, or one on the proper role of human rights in foreign policy — but it must be admitted that, on the one topic, these pieces all have something interesting to say.

In sum, this is a fine volume that makes a decent contribution to the ever-growing literature on human rights. Most of the pieces are interesting,

thoughtful and well-written, and the organization is impeccable. I did think that, because a major purpose of the book was to look at the UDHR, that the UDHR itself should have been included in its entirety, say in an Appendix. And, as mentioned, I did think there was excessive focus on human rights through the one prism of the law.

Brian Orend
University of Waterloo

Donn Welton, ed.
The New Husserl: A Critical Reader.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2003.
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US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21601-X).

One of the publishing phenomena of recent years has been the number of 'new' studies of established figures. *The New Spinoza*, *The New Bergson*, or perhaps one of the earliest, *The New Nietzsche*. But while in these cases what was being treated were new ways of reading, new interpretations of these thinkers, what was not at issue, with the partial exception of Nietzsche, was new work. *The New Husserl* is rather different, as what we have here is new material for reading. This is similarly the case with recently published lectures by Foucault and Heidegger.

Husserl published relatively little in his lifetime, at least if the amount he actually produced is taken as the measure. He died in 1938 and therefore his intellectual legacy was in serious danger — he was, after all, a German Jew in the Third Reich. One of the stories in this volume is of how his manuscripts and other papers were smuggled out of Germany, and eventually reached Leuven, Belgium, where they now reside. The task of cataloguing, collating and publishing these writings, still under way, is one of the key themes of this volume. Klaus Held estimates 45,000 pages of work. Some of these writings have been published in the German language *Husserliana*, and a programme of translations in other languages has followed. As Held points out, it is notable that *Husserliana* comes from a Dutch, rather than German publishing house (4). Many other writings are only available at the Husserl archive itself, and its openness to scholars has meant that a trip there is almost *de rigueur* for serious work on this difficult and multi-faceted thinker.

The reading of these new materials is however intended to replace or at least problematise the 'old' reading of Husserl. This is the reading that

Welton suggests gained currency in the 1960s and 1970s, which took the first book of *Ideas* as the key work. Lectures, which comprise much of the *Husserliana*, show a mind at work, a mind moving through changes and always seeking productive reformulations. As Zahavi points out, 'if there is anything that contemporary Husserl scholarship has demonstrated, however, it is that it is virtually impossible to acquire an adequate insight into Husserl's philosophy if one restricts oneself to the writings that were published during his lifetime' (158). If this is slightly misleading — many of the key commentators of the earlier period made extensive use of the archive — the general point is well-taken. It is also a project designed to rehabilitate, or rather reinvigorate, interest in Germany.

The highlights of this collection are the brace of essays by Held that open the volume (dating from the mid 1980s), and the two contributions from Welton himself. While Held provides a broad sweep general introduction to Husserl as a whole, Welton, in common with the other collaborators, picks particular themes. The first of these is a short but very useful essay on the notion of 'world'; the second is a detailed discussion of the tension between system and method in Husserl's thought. Elsewhere we get important analyses of the relation between Husserl and Kant, in an essay by Dieter Lohmar, later works on time that expand and correct the study of internal time-consciousness (Lanei Rodemeyer), and insightful references to the role of Heidegger in providing the framework within which Husserl is generally understood. Rudolf Bernet, the director of the archive shows how Brentano was a common influence on both Husserl and Freud; and in similar vein Anthony J. Steinbeck demonstrates the role of Dilthey in both Heidegger and Husserl's work. The latter essay uses this to show that Heidegger probably had less impact on the later Husserl than is sometimes claimed.

This then, is a remarkable and extremely rich collection. Welton is to be congratulated for bringing together such a range of quality work, by many of the world's leading Husserl scholars, from Europe and North America, either newly commissioned for this volume, or translated specifically for it. There are omissions, naturally, and it is testament to Husserl's range that even a volume of reasonably substantial length can only show the key contours. I was disappointed not to have treatment of issues around mathematics, nor to have any real light shone on the questions of politics that emerge in some of his late works. But overall this is a really important book, well worth attention from those deeply embedded in Husserl scholarship, those with a more tangential interest, or just to see how this figure influenced so much twentieth-century European thought.

Stuart Elden
(*Department of Geography*)
University of Durham

Thomas Williams, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xvi + 408.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-63205-6);
US$23.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-63563-2).

The *Cambridge Companion* philosophy series is by now well known, and so most readers will be familiar with its approach: each volume is a roughly three- to four-hundred page collection of journal-length articles by specialists, organized around an important philosophical figure (e.g., Kant, Sartre), or, less commonly, an historical epoch (early Greek philosophy) or subject (feminism). The outstanding philosopher/theologian John Duns Scotus (d. 1308) is of course one of the three most famous Scholastics, the other two being Thomas Aquinas and William Ockham. He is the last of these three figures to get his own volume in the *Companion* series, Aquinas having been done by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump in 1993, and Ockham having been done by Paul Vincent Spade in 1999.

The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus contains a dozen chapters covering Scotus' biography and oeuvre, metaphysics, natural theology, semantic theory, philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, and moral psychology. Especially welcome is an entire chapter devoted exclusively to the (in)famous formal distinction and Scotistic realism on universals. The authors are leading scholars on Duns Scotus himself, or on Scotus' contribution to the relevant subject areas. The chapters are uniformly high in quality but vary widely in their approach, style and intended audience. Overall they will provide an excellent source for a university instructor, either piecewise or as a whole, for an advanced philosophy student, mediaevalist or not, and perhaps even for some general readers.

However, *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, and indeed the *Companion* series in general, tends not to be edited with the general reader in mind; perhaps, in an attempt to be current, emphasis is given to narrowly delineated, authoritative commentaries. According to the deliberate editorial strategy of the series, one needs a dozen authors because it is impossible to be perfectly expert in every single dimension of Scotus' thought, say, and the result is a set of self-contained expositions divided into thematic units yielding a somewhat fragmented text. Hence, if one does not already have at least some comprehensive grip on Duns Scotus' philosophy, one may have some trouble getting it from reading the *Companion*. The paradox an educated general reader faces is that the *Companion* series covers precisely those systematic thinkers for whose acquaintance expert assistance is most needed from the very beginning. In brief, the obscure mode of expression, breadth, and comprehensiveness of a Scotus (or a Hegel, etc.) makes it nice for the uninitiated to have a companion who can give an overview, but a *Companion* from Cambridge avoids such an overview by strongly favoring a principle of

specialization. These are books to teach from, not necessarily books to teach yourself from.

Of course, no book can be all things to all people, and it is not clear how a book about Scotus' philosophy in particular could be aimed at *too* general a level of reader. (Is *The Subtle Doctor for Dummies* an oxymoron?). With this in mind it can be said that the *Companion to Scotus* serves its intended audience admirably. The themes of the chapters, summarized above, cover a range of topics but still wisely emphasize those areas where Scotus made distinctive and memorable contributions. One commendable element of this book is that we find a useful form of repetition regarding certain difficult theories. Anyone who has attempted to explain and motivate the formal distinction to another human being can appreciate a text in which the doctrine is nicely summarized by Peter King (Chapter 2), again by Timothy Noone (Chapter 3), and also by James Ross and Todd Bates (Chapter 6). Indeed, in addition to the formal distinction, the main landmarks of Scotistic philosophy are discussed, and often more than once, among them: (1) the principle of individuation (haecceity), (2) instants of nature and synchronic modality, (3) the famous 'triple primacy' argument for the existence of God, (4) the univocity of the concept of being, (5) the possibility of a simple conception of God, (6) the radical freedom of the human and divine will.

Before reading this book I might have included as a seventh theme 'intuitive and abstractive cognition', or at least *intellectual* intuitive cognition. But after reading Robert Pasnau's provocative discussion in the chapter called 'Cognition', I'm less certain that it belongs. Pasnau suggests that scholars of Scotus himself ought to de-emphasize the importance of the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, popularized by Duns, even as they recognize the importance his emphasis on the distinction had for subsequent philosophy. It seems that it did not play a large role in Scotus' own (relatively unoriginal, but still profound) account of human cognition, contrary to common opinion.

Discussion of these landmark themes has occurred in print in other places, of course, but still there are improvements on older treatments, if not always in adding new material, then certainly in clearly showing the connections among Scotistic threads. For example in 'Duns Scotus' Modal Theory' Calvin Normore crafts an extremely deep exposition of (1) how Scotus' commitment to the contingency of creation led him to partially divorce time and modality, (2) how he seems to view the necessity of God's existence, and then, (3) using an strange text where Scotus asks whether it would be possible for the creation to be if there were nothing, not even the necessary existent, Normore finally tries to answer the question whether and to what extent Scotus allows for possibility and free human action independent of God's power. Normore has been writing about these subjects for many years (indeed, some of his unpublished manuscripts on this topic from thirty years ago still circulate here and there among graduate students and professors of mediaeval philosophy), and he has a reputation for testing the connections between philosophical doctrines that may seem to function distinctly. In this particular

article he brings together all the nuances of those years of insight and study to hypothesize such connections in Scotus and so to yield something that can be credibly denominated his 'modal theory'. This approach also has the virtue of presenting Scotus' views fully contextualized — somehow Normore manages to motivate the 'why' behind Scotus' modal outlook, rather than simply reducing that outlook to a numbered list of propositions, and leaving the reader to guess why on her own.

In another fresh presentation of familiar themes, Richard Cross traces out Scotus' concerns with the soul, its immateriality, its powers, and its survival after death. A comparison and contrast with Aquinas' own account reveals Scotistic motives, previously obscure to me, for positing a form for the human body itself, considered independently as the material component of the traditional form/matter analysis of a human being, of which the soul proper is the substantial form. This explains how a dead human body can continue to exist as an intelligible, subsistent thing, even though the substantial form previously joined to it, the soul, has departed; the body, of itself, has its own form.

In addition to the treatment of Scotistic 'landmarks', this volume gives us insight into less popularly known arenas of his thought. Here the editorial strategy of the *Companion* series pays off. What might Scotus have to say about space and time? (Most mediaeval specialists probably don't have much of an idea.) Although Ockham's natural philosophy is far more famous than Scotus', Neil Lewis' chapter on this topic shows that Scotus had interesting things to say. Similarly, Bonnie Kent argues that Scotus, although known for his voluntarism, has an original take on the virtues, particularly regarding the connection between infused charity and acquired moral virtues. Similar remarks apply to Thomas Williams' 'From Metaethics to Action Theory', which, along with Thomas Mann's delightful article on knowledge of God, are among the most reader-friendly essays in the collection. Likewise Dominik Perler's chapter on philosophy of language and Hannes Möhle's chapter on natural law theory basically begin in the same way, by saying: 'It is not generally recognized how important philosophy of language (natural law theory) is in Scotus' philosophy, but I will show it is in fact.' Each author makes good on this claim.

A dozen articles of this complexity cannot be summarized with any fullness or charity in such a short space, so no further attempt will be made here. Suffice to say that in the *Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus* the specialist will find rigor and new results, more casual students will find the classical topics treated with clarity, and the general reader with sufficient courage and determination will catch a glimpse of why Scotus was and is one of the most revered intellects in philosophy.

Rondo Keele
The American University in Cairo