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Aaron Ben-Ze'ev
Love Online: Emotions on the Internet.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xii + 289.
US$25.00. ISBN 0-521-83296-9.

How better to enhance the higher pleasures of philosophy than with the gratifications of voyeurism? Just such an occasion for compound joys is afforded by Aaron Ben-Ze'ev's charming investigation into internet affairs and their implications for the future of love, sex and marriage. His book is full of facts of which no educated person should remain ignorant. British men, for example, have sex twice a week for an average of three minutes and one second. An Italian professor exploring the cardiovascular benefits of sex has found that 'if you unclasp the bra with both hands, you will lose a mere eight calories; undoing it with only one hand burns up 18 calories; trying to unclasp a bra with one's mouth instead uses up an average of 87 calories' (125).

Ben-Ze'ev is the author of a fat but fine book on *The Subtlety of Emotions* (MIT 2000). In the book under review he applies a light touch to the effects on our emotions of the current technological revolution. Though I suppose I must have sent, in my day, the odd flirtatious e-mail, I confess I have never frequented chat-rooms or practiced cybersex, let alone formed the deep and lasting cyberlove to which a surprising number of people bear witness in Ben-Ze'ev's book. Ben-Ze'ev has convinced me that the commonalities and differences between affairs sought, conducted, prolonged or terminated in cyberspace have considerable potential for changing our conceptions of erotic and romantic relationships.

Ben-Ze'ev does not claim to be the first to have turned his attention to this subject. Among the two-hundred-and-thirty-odd items in his bibliography, he cites some fifty papers and books that directly relate to love and sex on the internet. Some titles are: *The Joy of Cybersex: a guide for creative lovers; Putting your heart on line; The rules for online dating; Cyberflirt: how to attract anyone, anywhere on the World Wide Web; Cybersex: uncovering the secret world of internet sex;* and *The Woman's Guide to Sex on the Web*, by co-authors bearing the serendipitously apt names of A. Semans and C. Winks. These titles mostly suggest instructional manuals or else breathless reportage. Ben-Ze'ev quotes liberally from them, so that his book is almost as anecdotal as it is analytical. (Ben-Ze'ev is also terrific at finding amusing epigraphs for every section, drawn from authors ranging from Rodney Dangerfield to Zsa Zsa Gabor.) But I venture to guess that Ben-Ze'ev is the first to look in depth at the philosophical implications of 'cybering'.

The central philosophical question posed by web activity goes beyond sex and relationships. It concerns the very nature of *reality*. In a recent issue of *The Walrus* magazine (1-v), Clive Thompson reported that trading in virtual identities, with the virtual powers and possessions they have garnered in online games, generates vast sums on E-Bay. Virtual wealth is convertible currency. Similarly, virtual sex arouses real emotions. The complex rules that govern the exchange rate are the subject of Ben-Ze'ev's book. 'Cybering' brings salience to some aspects of reality, while it places others in abeyance. Physical appearance, for example, notoriously more important to males than females, can play little or no role in cybersex and cyberlove, while talk, wit, and personality — which tend to be more influential in the preferences of women — play a more significant role. Hence, as Ben-Ze'ev points out in a section on gender differences, cybersex is actually favoured by more women, while online porn is mostly used by men (196).

Another crucial respect in which virtual reality differs from the offline kind is that measure and types of control of which it is susceptible: insofar as enjoyment is often proportional to the sense of control, cybersex is often more easily enjoyable than the other kind. 'if someone surprises you, you have time to consider your response' (3). This might not be true of consensual sadomasochistic interactions, in which pleasure depends precisely on giving up control. Curiously, Ben-Ze'ev says nothing at all about the extent to which non-heterosexual, non-standard sex flourishes in cybersex. It would be interesting to know whether there is much room in cybersex for sadomasochism. Doubtless the data are out there, waiting to be googled; meanwhile, in defiant ignorance of any evidence, I am tempted to predict that the infliction of pain and the pleasure of physical power don't play well when you can't look into the eyes of your partner.

Cybering is also very different in respect physical closeness and speed of response. By definition, cybersex and cyberlove differ from offline affairs in that the participants do not physically meet. And speed of response differentiates cybering from epistolary affairs of old, in that technologies such as 'chatting' and instant messaging afford immediate responses. E-mail allows for more controlled delays.

What of the morality of cyber relationships? Ben-Ze'ev notes that they are often condemned for being 'selfish, involving lust, rampant imagination, and immorality and on the ground that they lack any sincere or affectionate attitudes towards others' (86-7). But what criteria justify the appropriate judgments? One consideration is the happiness of the people who indulge in the practice: for some, perhaps, cybering represents the best relationships they can achieve, the largest attainable expansion of their potentialities. For others, they are a blight on the rest of their lives, and thereby harm the lives of others. The comparison with drugs is obvious. Should one assess the states induced by drugs to those states that might have been achieved without the drug? Or should we set a kind of baseline in some conception of the 'natural'? To do the latter is arbitrary and paternalistic. Many lives are improved by Prozac, caffeine, alcohol, or cannabis. On the other hand, some are made worse, both for the user and for their associates. Similarly, apart from its intrinsic value and drawbacks, cybering improves some offline relationships, and impinges harmfully on others.

Ben-Ze'ev lists a number of dimensions in which 'cybering' has paradoxical and ambivalent affinities and differences with offline relationships (27 ff.). These include *distance and immediacy*: there are no measurable distances on the web: yet every interlocutor is both unreachable and immediately present. Communication is both *lean and rich* — lean in that it consists only of words, lacking the touches, sights, and smells that test our actual ability to relate intimately with another person; but it is rich in fostering articulacy and openness of communication. For like strangers on a train, the participants in generally untraceable relationships are often happy to reveal their most private thoughts. Thus we also have the paradoxical conjunctions of *anonymity and self-disclosure*, *sincerity and deception*. Every medium dictates to some extent what you can and can't pretend or lie about. As Anscombe once pointed out, if you are a spy you can pretend to be a window-washer but then you had better actually wash some windows. On the net, 'people may lie about age, race, marital status, number of children, or employment' — and gender (an often favoured variable with which cybernauts like to tinker in virtual transsexualism). But it is a lot harder to misrepresent one's own wit, sense of humor, and personal interests, 'all of which emerge during lengthy online conversations' (43).

Apart from the ambivalence of online affairs (do they enhance, replace, or destroy offline relationships? do they 'count' as infidelity?), the chief downside to cyberlove — its tragic dimension — is that such affairs carry in their very essence the seeds of their own destruction. Virtual reality and offline reality, like art and life in general from times immemorial, aspire to one another's condition. Offline reality cannot bear the comparison with the ideal kind: 'cybersex never rumples clothes' (49). It therefore tends to find in virtual reality both its inspiration and its downfall. Online affairs are seldom stable for very long, for they lead the participants to crave for the materiality of fleshly encounters. Often, therefore, meetings get arranged and the resulting unpredictable shock causes them either to come to a sudden halt or to mutate into offline partnerships. In many cases cited by Ben-Ze'ev, they result in good marriages. But as Madame Bovary already deplored in a pre-technological age, adulterous loves are liable to sink anew into the very platitudes of marriage from which they promised idealized escape.

In the end, then, cybering is perhaps less a revolution than a continuation of the revolution that began with cave paintings and the invention of clothes. Natural selection has programmed us to pursue certain ends from which our ingenuity endlessly distracts us. Our ever more sophisticated goals displace the original consummations, but never entirely replace them in our longings. We are therefore endlessly dissatisfied, and that dissatisfaction keeps us questing for more ingenious detours. There is no such thing as a natural life, but it takes self-control to keep remembering that Realization is the grave of the Ideal.

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Staffan Carlshamre and **Anders Pettersson, eds.**
Types of Interpretation in the Aesthetic Disciplines.
Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press 2003. Pp. vii + 184.
Cdn$/US$65.00. ISBN 0-7735-2528-9.

The collection of essays that appears as *Types of Interpretation in the Aesthetic Disciplines* is the product of an interdisciplinary research project based in Sweden entitled 'Meaning and Interpretation', which brought together scholars over a period of several years. It is important to mention this genealogy, because the project's interactivity is critical to the book's final form. As the title indicates, the book's aim is to address interpretation in its multiplicity. It is what Carlshamre expresses quite succinctly at the outset of his contribution when he says that: 'It is a presupposition of this volume that there are different types of interpretation and that many problems in the theory of interpretation stem from a failure to recognize this fact' (112). However, such a presupposition poses the very real risk that the resulting volume will consist of no more than unrelated reflections. It is one of the more happy successes of this collection that not only is this danger averted, but that the constant cross-referencing between contributions generates the very interpretative multiplicity it wishes to address. One finishes this book having gained a sense of how a set of overlapping, and yet still not entirely congruent, activities are at work when we interpret, as well as some vocabularies to help us talk about them.

That said, the interaction and cross-commentary is unable to entirely bridge at least one important divergence in the contributors' various approaches to interpretation — namely, that between theories of interpretation and what we might call theories of theories of interpretation. The first three contributions fall into the former category. In 'What is an Interpretation?' T. Pettersson develops a definitional theory of interpretation. He examines how the term is used in aesthetic disciplines and contrasts it with what happens in scientific and artistic interpretational contexts. One of the strengths of his analysis is that it brings out a particular problem of just *aesthetic* interpretation, namely, the problem of examples. As he points out, 'no two people seem to have the same conception of exactly what range of examples is covered by the concept of interpretation' (32), and this sets the stage for unnecessary misunderstanding. Unfortunately, however, T. Pettersson's own analysis exemplifies this very problem. He stipulates that interpretations must clarify, but then does not address the limitations this puts upon the resulting range of candidates for interpretation. That is, if interpretation is fundamentally 'an effort to clarify elements that are assumed to be poorly understood' (45), it excludes aesthetic objects for which the interpretative challenge is less to overcome ignorance than to overcome the conventions of viewing and reception that subordinate art to the demands of discursive thought.

We have considered this issue at length, because the problem of examples in aesthetic interpretation is echoed in the volume's other two theories of interpretation. In his 'Five Kinds of Literary and Artistic Interpretation', A. Pettersson outlines what he calls five 'types' of interpretation (though it might be more accurate to think of them as five different interpretative tasks): *reconstruction* and *assimilation* in the case of ordinary viewing, and *retrieval of representational intentions, structural analysis,* and *exposition of focal aspects* in the case of scholarly interpretation (54). What the division achieves is a separation of those types (or tasks) of interpretation which might be judged according to criteria of adequacy and truth, and those which are irrevocably subjective. What the essay notably fails to do is to find examples which could convince us that such a division holds in practice. In fact, the very paucity of examples makes us aware of the profound difficulty of stating anything interesting about an artwork that does not depend upon one first establishing a relation with it as an appreciative subject, a point that Lagerlöf makes very forcefully later on. Rossholm in his theory, 'The Tree of Interpretation', avoids assuming such a division by taking 'a subjective perspective on interpretation' which only demands that the *interpreter* 'takes his interpretation to be true' (86). Nevertheless, even if Rossholm's tree does illuminate why aesthetic interpretations have rivals in an interesting way, it is not clear whether the task of distinguishing between them decisively is not limited to the simple cases he presents.

In the light of the problem of examples in aesthetic interpretation, the meta-theoretical approaches represented by the last two contributions have certain advantages. Their examples are much more highly developed, since often derived from the work of the scholarly community and similarly, much more easily accepted by that same community, which is the probable audience for the book. The approach broadens our understanding in the sense that it can take in whole theories of interpretation, such as Carlshamre does when he outlines the types of interpretation at work in the first three essays. However, it perhaps also narrows the scope of interpretation to the extent that it addresses itself primarily, if not exclusively, to a philosophical community familiar with notions such as the 'centrality of text' and 'pluralistic principle', which Carlshamre (very interestingly, as it turns out) connects. And it is this limitation of meta-theory that causes Carlshamre in both 'Types of Types of Interpretation' and his concluding 'Some Metareflections' to ponder why we bother with scholarly interpretation at all. As he says in the latter, 'ultimately we will have to open the question about what aesthetic teaching and research is for — what is good about it' (177).

In the light of this concern, Lagerlöf's contribution, 'Interpreting Visual Art: Performance and Articulation', offers some encouraging indications in spite of its scholarly approach — it critically compares interpretations of Van Eyck by Panofsky, Pächt, Harbison, and Seidel. For she rejects as a 'false dichotomy' the traditional opposition between one's subjective 'encounter with a work of art' and one's statements about its 'intersubjective meaning' (140). For her, scholarly interpretation expands our personal encounters with works. It is a second 'performance' that enlarges our aesthetic experience and allows 'new meanings' to emerge (159). It is a vision that is particularly open to the multiplicity of interpretation that this volume wants to convey.

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Terence Cuneo and **René van Woudenberg**
The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xi + 369.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81270-4);
US$25.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-01208-2).

The resurgence of interest in Reid since Keith Lehrer's 1989 book, *Thomas Reid*, is quite remarkable. Now Cambridge has added Reid to its series of *Cambridge Companions*. The volume is well-edited and contains an extensive bibliography. It should be noted, however, that it follows one particular line of Reid interpretation to the exclusion of others, and it is largely summary and exegetical in tone with little debate with Reid's positions.

The volume begins with an overview of Reid's context by Alexander Broadie and ends with a survey of his influence by Benjamin Redekop. Both are useful but rather sketchy. Although Broadie notes some of the biographical context of the Scottish Enlightenment, one feels the need for more insight into Reid, the Scottish minister. Redekop's survey demonstrates the extent of Reid's influence, but it says little about how his thought was actually assimilated or distorted in the nineteenth century.

The remaining essays deal with Reid's epistemology and some special topics, including his philosophy of art, his claims as a mathematician and scientist, and his philosophy of religion. The epistemological essays focus on the meaning of common sense, Reid's theories of direct realism in perception and moral facts, and Reid's anti-skeptical writings. Nicholas Wolterstorff has written a major book on Reid — *Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology* — in which he argues that Reid's direct realism and reliance on common sense are congruent with reformed epistemology. In his essay here, 'Reid on Common Sense', he pursues that interpretation. While this is a persuasive picture of Reid's thought, one might regard it as a limitation rather than as the virtue that Wolterstorff takes it to be. Wolterstorff distinguishes two not entirely compatible versions of common sense — as first principles of reasoning, and as things taken for granted. The latter, Wolterstorff argues, is the more important because it coincides with the overriding philosophical task of limiting philosophy and placing the burden of proof upon those who differ from common sense.

James Van Cleve, in 'Reid's Theory of Perception' and John Greco, in 'Reid's Reply to the Skeptic', each consider Reid's response to the theory of ideas. Van Cleve moves from that critique to a detailed consideration of the senses in which Reid can be called a direct realist. The problem is that what emerges seems question begging: Reid simply denies that 'indirect perception' — perception of one thing by means of something else — is perception. Van Cleve believes that Reid's views can be squared with direct realism, but one must say that, if they can, they do not make his direct realism any more plausible. Greco expands Reid's attack on the skepticism resulting from the theory of ideas to include Reid's alternative views of perception, evidence, and the limits of philosophy. According to Greco, Reid's theory of evidence allows a wider range of evidence than consciousness and reason, and his methodology denies that one can get behind our cognitive faculties. Greco believes that in this expanded form, Reid is successful against the skeptic, though again, one must say that the defense seems to avoid rather than confront the limitations that Reid imposes on epistemology.

In 'Nativism and the Nature of Thought in Reid's Account of Our Knowledge of the External World', Lorne Falkenstein tackles the difficult question of whether or how Reid's though implies innate ideas. The issues are complex because even the most ardent empiricists acknowledged that certain natural or instinctive capacities are part of our epistemological equipment. Falkenstein distinguishes a priori from stimulated concepts and goes on to show how Reid differs from Kant and Hume on the use of concepts. Reid, Falkenstein claims, distinguishes a different power of the mind altogether. It is difficult to see, however, why this is not just a form of obscuritanism. C. A. J. Coady's 'Reid and the Social Operations of Mind' also considers how Reid's thought should be located conceptually. By the 'social operations of mind', Coady means to refer to such activities as promising, testimony, and justice. Hume had attributed such operations to a post-natural, 'artificial' evolution of social forces. Reid objects to that artificiality and locates the social activities in such naturally occurring operations of the mind as language and social affections. Coady criticizes Reid for separating testimony and judgment, but concludes that 'the imperfections are the almost inevitable accompaniments of a pioneering investigation' (201). Similarly, René van Woudenberg, in 'Reid on Memory and the Identity of Persons', defends Reid's claims that memory is an immediate source of knowledge and his conclusion that the relation between memory and personal identity is evidentiary and not constitutive. The key point is that for Reid, memory has objects just as any other form of perception and neither has nor can have a non-circular justification. That leaves Reid with a basic dualism about mind and objects. Van Woudenberg seems to find that at least contextually defensible.

The overall impression that one gets in reading these epistemological essays is that Reid is regarded as a pioneer in direct realism whose positions are at least defensible and whose importance lies in the way that he combats the skeptical non-cognitivism of enlightenment empiricism. Whether this is the only way to read Reid or whether it does justice to his opponents is seldom considered.

When one turns to moral issues, a similar emphasis is evident. William Rowe and Terence Cuneo deal directly with Reid's moral thought. Rowe, in 'Thomas Reid's Theory of Freedom and Responsibility', bases his defense of Reid's theory of freedom and responsibility on an analysis of the power to act. Reid's view of agent causation limits agency to intelligent beings and defines freedom and responsibility in terms of an agent causing a volition. Rowe modifies what he takes to be the standard view of Reid's theory, which claims that the agent has 'the power to will to do A and the power to will not to do A', to the more restricted claim that the agent only has the power not to will A, saying nothing about the agent having the power to do otherwise. This allows Rowe to meet a number of objections on Reid's behalf. His conclusion is quite modest, however. Reid's theory is not taken as established but only as consistent with beliefs of common sense. In 'Reid's Moral Philosophy', Cuneo considers whether and how Reid is a moral realist. Against Hume, Cuneo believes that Reid holds that moral facts precede any conventional agreement. With the sentimentalists, Reid holds that the good of the whole is independent of self-interest. With the rationalists, Reid holds that moral motivations and judgments imply propositions that are true or false in themselves. A moral sense apprehends moral facts by means of a conceptual apprehension of moral qualities of persons and intentions on an analogy with perceptual apprehension of non-moral qualities of persons and intentions.

Three essays deal with special topics. In 'Thomas Reid and the Culture of Science', Paul Wood tries to make the case that Reid was a significant contributor to eighteenth-century science. Part of this case rests on Reid's contribution to mathematics, especially non-Euclidean geometry as a result of his theory of perception and his critique of Berkeley's theory of vision. This aspect of Reid's work has been explored in some detail elsewhere, and, while the insights are real, it must be said that the claims are somewhat overstated because Reid does not pursue the mathematical insights beyond their immediate application to his problem. In other areas — astronomy, natural history, and Newtonian science — Wood demonstrates that Reid was a widely read and knowledgeable teacher, but one must say that any claims that Reid himself made any significant contribution remain unproven. In 'Reid's Philosophy of Art', Peter Kivy reconsiders his earlier claim that Reid is one of the first to formulate an expression theory of art, in contrast to an aesthetic theory. It is Kivy's view that Reid does three things that together constitute a philosophy of art: he accepts the emerging analysis of the fine arts; he understands art-relevant properties in terms of expressiveness; and, by defining expression and expressiveness, Reid deals with definitional issues. Finally, in 'Reid's Philosophy of Religion' Dale Tuggy tries to extract a philosophy of religion from lecture notes taken by Reid's students. He finds Reid treating arguments for the existence of god, the relation of revelation and natural reason, and out knowledge of divine attributes. In each area, Reid takes a moderate theist position, defending the importance of argument and reason, but refusing to subordinate faith to them. On the whole, while Reid is a committed theist, his philosophical interests take him in a different direction.

All of these essays are notable for their deference to Reid. To go from these essays to Reid himself makes one wonder whether it is the same philosopher. Reid is combative, polemical, and altogether dismissive of his philosophical enemies. He thinks little about the fairness of his counter-examples nor about whether he is actually correctly understanding his opponents, particularly Hume, but also Joseph Priestley. And Reid's own arguments are infuriatingly obscurantist when it serves his purpose. What Wolterstorff and his colleagues take to be modest limits on philosophical excess before a deeply hidden intelligence appears more often in Reid himself and his followers, James Oswald and James Beattie, as a dismissive arrogance. His opponents are either lunatics or knaves. Somewhere between this dogmatic Reid and the modest epistemologist imagined by these essays there may be an important philosopher, but one longs for some more critical attention to the implausibility of some of Reid's arguments.

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Daniel H. Frank and **Oliver Leaman, eds.**
The Cambridge Companion to
Medieval Jewish Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xxiv + 483.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-65207-3);
US$26.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-65574-9).

The field of medieval Jewish philosophy has not fared well in recent decades. It once held a pre-eminent place among the various disciplines that make up Jewish Studies. From the mid-nineteenth century through the greater part of the twentieth, Jewish scholars diligently studied the medieval Jewish philosophers, not just because of their intrinsic value as thinkers, but because they saw in them role models for modern Jews who were struggling to prove their worthiness as new members of contemporary European society. If Maimonides had studied Greek philosophy, was this not precedent that Judaism was an enlightened religion deserving of a place in non-Jewish culture? Yet, several factors have conspired to erode the popularity of medieval Jewish philosophy. The rise of Jewish ethnic pride and identity with the creation of the State and Israel and the cultural revolution of the '60's undercut the apologetic motives fueling the study of medieval philosophy; concomitantly, Jewish scholars turned toward other areas of Judaism thought to be more 'Jewish', such as Kabbalah and midrash; and Jewish Studies came under the sway of postmodernism, which specifically critiqued the type of essentialist Greek thinking at the basis of medieval Jewish philosophy.

Still, a dedicated cadre of Jewish scholars in the U.S., Israel, and parts of Europe (especially France), has kept the study of medieval Jewish philosophy alive and the *Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy* is evidence that this field remains vibrant. Frank and Leaman have assembled a marvelous collection of eighteen essays from scholars of medieval Jewish philosophy, essays that provide the reader with a comprehensive up-to-date survey of research concerning personalities and themes in the field. What is remarkable is the consistency of the quality of the contributions. All the essays, perhaps with one or two exceptions, are well-researched and well-written, and a good many of them offer new and innovative insights into various aspects of the field.

The book is divided into three parts. In Part One are essays dealing with the background and context of medieval Jewish philosophy. Oliver Leaman begins with a chapter on the overall nature of Jewish philosophy; David Schatz discusses the biblical and rabbinic background of medieval Jewish philosophy; and Joel Kramer writes on the Islamic context of medieval Jewish philosophy. Part Two, entitled 'Ideas, Works, and Writers', contains the bulk of the essays in the collection and includes chapters on the major philosophical figures in medieval Judaism. Sarah Stroumsa discusses Saadya Gaon and the Jewish Kalam; Barry Kogan, Judah Halevi; Daniel Frank, Maimonides as an Aristotelian; Tzvi Langermann, Maimonides as a scientist; and Charles Manekin, Gersonides. Also contained in this section are essays on broader themes in medieval Jewish philosophy. Sarah Pessin discusses Jewish Neoplatonism; Menachem Lorberbaum, medieval Jewish political thought; Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, the relationship between philosophy and Kabbalah; Steven Harvey, the translation of Arabic philosophical texts into Hebrew; and Gregg Stern, the controversy over the study of philosophy in medieval Judaism. The third and final part is devoted to the later years of medieval Jewish philosophy. Tamar Rudavsky deals with the influence of scholasticism on medieval Jewish philosophy; Ari Ackerman, Jewish philosophy in fifteenth-century Spain, James Robinson, Hasdai Crescas; and Seymor Feldman, the end and aftereffects of medieval Jewish philosophy.

To fully appreciate the value this collection, one has to be acquainted with the other major English-language surveys of medieval Jewish philosophy. For many years, the two standard works were Isaac Husik's *History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy*, first published in 1916, and Julius Guttmann's

Philosophies of Judaism, which appeared in English in 1964. (The latter was a translation of the Hebrew edition which in turn was an enlarged version of the original German edition.) Both were masterful studies and are still consulted today, but they also had their deficiencies. They focused only on the great personalities of medieval Jewish philosophy, and therefore ignored a host of minor, and sometimes very interesting, figures. They also focused almost exclusively on purely philosophical issues in medieval Jewish philosophy, and paid little attention to its complex intellectual-historical context, with little attention devoted to the interaction between philosophy, on the one hand, and biblical exegesis, rabbinic midrash, and Kabbalah, on the other. These deficiencies were corrected in part by Colette Sirat in her *History of Jewish Philosophy in Middle Ages,* which appeared in English in 1985 and was based on a 1983 French edition. Sirat devoted chapters to the minor figures and did a much better job in linking up medieval Jewish philosophy with other intellectual currents in medieval Judaism. Finally, Daniel Frank and Oliver Leaman, the two very same editors of the collection under review here, brought together a fine collection of chapters on medieval Jewish philosophy in the second part of Routledge's *History of Jewish Philosophy,* in which essays on the great personalities alternate with essays on such themes as the Maimonidean controversy and philosophical themes in Kabbalah.

Frank and Leaman's Cambridge collection strikes a fine balance between the various approaches in these earlier efforts. Its essays focus primarily on the major personalities, but also make the reader aware of the minor figures and their contributions. It also explores the intellectual-historical context of medieval Jewish philosophy, and it does so in more depth than any of the previous surveys. Especially noteworthy here are Schatz's essay on the biblical and rabbinic background of medieval Jewish philosophy and Tirosh-Samuelson's discussion of philosophy and Kabbalah. Frank and Leaman's volume also has a number of thematic chapters that explore how several medieval Jewish philosophers dealt with a particular issue, such as Menachem Lorberbaum's excellent discussion of medieval Jewish political thought. By the end of the volume, one has therefore had a look at medieval Jewish philosophy from all the relevant angles.

Most impressive is how well Frank and Leaman's collection holds together. A volume of this kind runs the risk of being uneven and lacking in coherence because of its sheer size, the variety of topics it treats, and the number of authors involved. Frank and Leaman have managed to avoid these problems with deft and careful planning.

If there is one difficulty with Frank and Leaman's volume, it is that it is not always clear who its audience is. According to the description on the book's cover, Frank and Leaman intended their work to be 'a comprehensive introduction' to medieval Jewish philosophy. But introductory for whom? Some of the essays are written in a manner that allows them to be of benefit to a number of audiences. Exemplary in this regard is Daniel Frank's essay on Maimonides, which summarizes the complex thought of medieval Judaism's most important philosopher. This essay could be assigned to undergraduates in a course on medieval Jewish philosophy, but more advanced students will learn something from it as well. Also worthy of mention are Sarah Pessin's discussion of Jewish Neoplatonism and Charles Manekin's treatment of Gersonides, both of which also manage to speak to a wide range of readers. In both these essays, the authors have been careful to explain basic concepts while also offering advanced insights into their material. However, some of the essays are not really introductory. Thus, for instance, Joel Kramer's essay on the Islamic context of medieval Jewish philosophy is a valuable piece, but it assumes too many concepts for it to be of use to those not already familiar with Greek philosophy.

To some extent, the problem being raised here reflects the ambiguity in the term 'companion' in the book's title. What exactly is a 'companion'? Is it truly introductory as Frank and Leaman claim? Or is it meant to 'accompany' the student who already has significant grounding in the field? In truth, this ambiguity plagues a number of other volumes in the Cambridge Companion series, which contain essays written for a variety of levels with no clear indication of who the audience is.

Still, despite this difficulty, Frank and Leaman's volume is a superb effort and is highly recommended for students and scholars alike. It will certainly become one of the standard reference works in the field.

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Harry G. Frankfurt
The Reasons of Love.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
2004. Pp. 101.
US$19.95. ISBN 0-691-09164-1.

This volume is a revised set of lectures recently given by Frankfurt. Its three chapters develop and elaborate several familiar Frankfurtian themes, including work on caring, loving, and the importance of our overall volitional structure as reflective, willing agents. These themes are discussed in the larger context of their contribution to our leading meaningful, fulfilled lives.

In the first chapter, 'The Question: "How Should We Live"', Frankfurt (as in previous work) distinguishes between mere desiring and caring. He treats caring about x as involving an enduring, reflective endorsement of and commitment to a lower-order desire for x. Frankfurt suggests that we often simply find ourselves caring about certain objects (perhaps due to human nature), and that such caring need not be a response to perceived value in the objects. That is, what we care about is often not chosen voluntarily; we instead find ourselves caring about certain objects (consider a parent's love for her child). More broadly, Frankfurt argues that there are no independent criteria by which we can answer the question of how we should live in a non-circular fashion (roughly as in order to establish the criteria by which we'd evaluate this question, we would already need to have determined how we should live — otherwise, on what basis would we choose the criteria?). As such, we will need to look elsewhere — and especially to what we do in fact value and care about — in order to evaluate how we should live.

Chapter Two, 'On Love, and Its Reasons', is devoted to characterizing a particular form of love (itself a type of caring), one that Frankfurt believes is essential to leading a unified, meaningful life. His paradigm example is again a parent's love for her child, though he suggests we could have such a love for abstract ideals (a love of truth, for example), a religious tradition, and so on. This love is marked by several features, including not being directly under our voluntary control (we cannot simply choose to love — or not — in this way), with a concern for the beloved (and its well-being) for its own sake, and involving an identification with the beloved — taking on the interests of the beloved as our own. These are deep, enduring concerns that provide a framework for our lives. They provide us with final ends or goals, and we can shape our other desires, projects, and cares around them. Frankfurt again stresses that often we will simply find ourselves with such loves, but that they are no worse off for not being voluntarily or rationally chosen; instead, they are part of who we are as humans. Do we really need arguments to justify a parent's love for her child? It is thus against the backdrop of these foundational, often instinctual loves that we, as individuals, can properly balance our other values, desires, and projects (and not via some abstract set of 'objective' criteria about what constitutes a proper balancing for a good life).

Finally, the third chapter, 'The Dear Self', focuses on self-love, and argues that such love (properly understood) is in fact a significant accomplishment. Love of oneself is a form of caring about oneself, one's desires, cares, and loves. Frankfurt argues plausibly that self-love is a particularly pure form of love; after all, the lover's identification with the beloved is extensive and unforced, the lover desires the well-being of the beloved non-instrumentally, and so forth. Self-love also crucially involves a desire to love — that is, since loving gives a foundation and meaning to our lives, to the extent that we love ourselves (and thus desire our own well-being), we will want to love. Further, to the extent that we are conflicted about what to love, or how to weigh our cares and loves, to that extent we are not wholehearted; our will is divided and can undermine itself. Such a lack of wholeheartedness impedes our ability to love ourselves, because we cannot fully embrace and endorse our loves. Thus a certain confidence in what we love, and having a unified will whereby we have clear endorsements of our loves, is an important component of self-love.

Frankfurt's discussion is generally quite lucid, and many of his proposals are plausible and insightful. Still, questions can be raised, particularly about the value of self-love and whole-heartedness. For example, Frankfurt is careful to stress that a wholehearted person need not be a fanatic; one may endorse one's loves while still giving attention to reasons to change them. But notice that while a wholehearted person isn't *necessarily* a fanatic, wholeheartedness and fanaticism are entirely compatible on Fraknfurt's view. A religious zealot who loves his religion, refuses to listen to others, and thus avoids self-doubt or any hesitancy would seem to be fully wholehearted, which in turn means that he would fully love himself, and that his life would be meaningful. This might seem plausible with respect to wholeheartedness — but would such a life necessarily reflect self-love? Would it necessarily be meaningful (and not merely focused)? These seem to be open questions.

Continuing in the same vein, couldn't a desire to question (and a corresponding restraint) reflect a strong self-love, with a concern to find what is truly best for oneself — to improve and refine oneself? Moreover, there seem to be no limits on the objects of love. One could love counting blades of grass, refuse to reflect, endorse only this love, and thereby lead a wholehearted, meaningful life. While such a person might be focused, and perhaps content, it will strike many as implausible to suggest that such a life is meaningful. To the extent that wholeheartedness is compatible with (and indeed, seems easiest to attain via) a lack of reflection and instead a blind endorsement and acceptance of what one loves, it seems open to question as an ideal.

While at points more detailed argument and explanation would be welcome, the book's significant strengths lie in the insights and proposals articulated by Frankfurt. Written by a leading philosopher in the field, *The Reasons of Love* is a thought-provoking work that should appeal to those interested in love, practical reasoning, and questions concerning the good life, broadly construed.

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Roger Gibson, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to Quine.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xx + 227.
US$98.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-63056-8);
US$35.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-63949-2).

The articles in this collection, all but one new, cover the gamut of Quine's epistemological and semantical themes — naturalism, empiricism, underdetermination, analyticity, indeterminacy of translation, behaviourism and the rest. Some of the papers go over old ground, some are more adventurous; some are mostly expository and supportive, some mainly analytical and critical; some convincing, some less so. Perhaps unsurprisingly (Quine thought it a good thing that philosophy had 'lost contact with people'), the volume does not meet what the blurb says is the aim of the series: 'to dispel the intimidation [students and nonspecialists] often feel when faced with the work of a difficult and challenging thinker.' And some readers, I for one, will feel that getting Quine right too often takes a backseat to showing him wrong. Still there is plenty in the book and what I take to be misinterpretations are offset by interpretations that hit the nail on the head.

Those new to Quine will find the first half-dozen pages of Gibson's 'Introduction' and section 3 of Isaacson's paper on Quine and logical positivism the place to start (the beginner may also find Isaacson's ten-page survey of empiricism from Hume to Carnap helpful). Both Gibson and Isaacson make use of Quine's autobiographical remarks to introduce his philosophical vision and his all-important relationship to Carnap. (Incidentally Quine's remark: 'Philosophy of science is philosophy enough', which Isaacson was unable to locate, occurs in 'Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory'.)

Quine is also compared with Carnap in Creath's essay on the intelligibility and relevance of the traditional conception of analyticity. Like Isaacson, Creath aims to pinpoint how Quine differs from Carnap and to give Carnap a hearing. He argues that Quine's 'basic demand [concerning analyticity] is for behavioral criteria' (49), and suggests that Carnap could — given his principle of tolerance — have viewed Quine as proposing a linguistic framework for epistemological investigation (58; also compare Isaacson's discussion, 247, 256-7). There is a lot to be said for this line of interpretation, but I doubt it is the whole story. For one thing, I don't see how, given his philosophical stance, Quine could accept the 'proposal gambit' Creath offers (60).

Naturally enough, Quine's attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction receives considerable attention. In addition to Creath, De Rosa and Lepore discuss it in their paper on Quine's rejection of reductionism, the doctrine that every sentence has its own fund of meaning. In their view, Quine's repudiation of analyticity, his 'meaning holism' and his 'thesis' of indeterminacy of translation are 'essentially correlated' (86; also 66, 68, 73). This is a tidy interpretation but not easily endorsed. It is hard to believe the detailed discussion of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' and Chapter 2 of *Word and Object* regarding analyticity, holism and indeterminacy can be boiled down to an argument with a couple of premises (73). And it is hard as well to accept that Quine 'often refers to meaning holism as "indeterminacy of translation"' (68), has a 'theory of radical translation' (68), is worried about field linguistics (69), equates indeterminacy with the possibility of 'compensatorily juggling the translation of the apparatus of individuation' (70) and is on shaky grounds in arguing for 'moderate holism' (79-82).

Though deprecated by De Rosa and Lepore (71), there is much to be said for the common practice of discussing Quine on indeterminacy of translation separately from his argument for holism in 'Two Dogmas'. At any rate this is how Kirk discusses him. In a nicely crafted paper, the bulk of which is given over to replaying and augmenting themes of his *Translation Determined*, Kirk labours to formulate Quine's claim so that it is neither trivially true nor obviously false. While this is all to the good, especially in a Companion, I couldn't help thinking Kirk finds Quine's remarks troubling because he expects more from them than Quine intended. While acknowledging that Quine's views on radical translation are closely allied with his 'views on the shortcomings of the notion of meaning' (155), Kirk ignores the fact that Quine was of the opinion, as Gibson reminds us, that '[w]hat indeterminacy shows is the notion of propositions as sentence meanings is untenable' (17).

It was clever of Quine to speak of himself as arguing for the indeterminacy of translation rather than as arguing against meanings and propositions — clever, but misleading. One of the important lessons of Dreben's 'garland' of quotations (288) is that Quine's discussion of radical translation is chiefly directed at a philosophical myth. By confronting us with Quine's own words, Dreben gets us to see what Quine is objecting to (and appreciate better other aspects of his thinking). Thus Dreben quotes passages in which Quine says he is advancing a 'conjecture' about radical translation and states that his 'thought experiment ... was meant as a challenge to the reality of propositions as meanings' (289, 291). Reading Dreben, one sees why Gibson refers to him, the dedicatee of the volume, as 'the world's leading expert on Quine's philosophy, ... Quine's favorite sounding-board, and at times Quine's bulldog' (287).

The indeterminacy of translation makes yet another appearance in Gibson's own paper, this time in the context of 'Quine's behaviorism cum empiricism'. With his usual careful consideration of the texts and sympathy for Quine, Gibson shows how 'Quine's behaviourism permeates his philosophy of language' (195) and hence his philosophy of mind (196). While I would have liked to have had more on how Quine's behaviourism 'shapes his general epistemology' (195), I was happy to see so many widespread misunderstandings about it exploded, not least the fiction that Quine 'limits it to conditioned response' (183) and has no time for innate mechanisms for learning language (190).

Naturalism, which Gibson sees as central to Quine's philosophy (11, 181), is examined at greater length — and much less sympathetically — by Fogelin.

After putting Quine right about some minor points of Hume scholarship, Fogelin argues that his 'execution of [the] program [of naturalized epistemology' leaves much to be desired (45). Moreover he claims that 'deep down' Quine favoured the antirealist view that '[o]bjects are posits (reifications, fictions)' over the realist view that '[i]ndependent of us, the world contains all sorts of objects' (38). This seems improbable if only because Quine famously insisted that calling something a posit is not to patronize it (*Word and Object*, 22), and stressed that his 'robust realism' about sticks, stones, atoms and classes is integral to his naturalism ('Things and Their Place in Theories', 21).

Hylton sheds light on the issue of the sticks and stones (133) and much else besides in an excellent paper on Quine's thinking about reference and ontology. Unlike many commentators, he shows — rather than merely asserts — that Quine is an important philosopher. He brings him to life by comparing him with Russell on how thought can be about the world, and with Carnap on the relativity of ontology to theory. And he draws attention to the enormous shift in philosophical opinion Quine is advocating by emphasising how far Quine is taken from 'unreconstructed common sense' (145) by his rejection of Russell's conception of reference lock, stock and barrel.

Bergström too brings out the depth of Quine's philosophy in his paper on the underdetermination of physical theories by data. In the course of explaining the role of the doctrine in Quine's thinking, Bergström shows that Quine gives it an interesting twist, and underlines that, as Quine understands it, it is not as easy a doctrine as usually assumed. Also *en route* Bergström raises a number of difficulties for Quine, difficulties I imagine Quine would have been pleased to have raised — and would have had something to say about in response. My guess is that Bergström misses a trick in not going on to consider whether the holes he sees in Quine's argument are still holes when viewed from Quine's own standpoint.

One needs some logic to understand fully Ullian's 'Quine and Logic' and Føllesdal's 'Quine on Modality'. But nobody should be put off. Even those forced to skip the technical details can learn a lot from the rest. Ullian provides a useful account of Quine's contributions to logic and the presentation of logic, what Quine calls his 'project ... of pedagogical engineering' (276), while Føllesdal shows how Quine ended up more or less where he began concerning modality, silently dropping his more ambitious arguments along the way.

Several authors touch on the systematic character of Quine's philosophy (6, 68, 238, 258), but none discusses it at any length. Though not something Quine trumpeted, there can be no escaping the fact that his naturalism, his behaviourism, his empiricism, his holism, his critique of analyticity, his indeterminacy conjecture and his repudiation of meanings are interconnected parts of a unified system of the world. However Quine may have regarded his contribution to philosophy, he is a historically important figure because his philosophical system ranks with the great systems of the past.

Taken as a whole, his philosophy is much harder to dislodge than his critics often suppose — and much less obvious than Quine took it to be.

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Willi Goetschel
Spinoza's Modernity.
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press
2004. Pp. x + 351.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-299-19080-3);
US$25.95 (paper: ISBN 0-299-19084-6).

Spinoza's Modernity is an exceptional work in intellectual history and a methodical attempt to document Spinoza's influence on some significant thinkers of Modernity. Goetschel argues that Spinoza's modernity is more extensive and influential than has been thought, inspiring Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Heine. Goetschel identifies two principal dimensions to Spinoza's modernity. He argues first that Spinoza develops a novel view of the universal/particular distinction. Spinoza characterizes the particular and universal as mutually constitutive, a view that subsequently becomes a core element of modern philosophy. Second, Spinoza develops a theory of the affects that supports his innovations in social and political philosophy, and offers a critical dimension that is notoriously absent from Hobbes' political philosophy. The public sphere should not be viewed as a contest between citizen and state, but as a dynamic interaction between the affects of individuals and the sociopolitical order that constitutes and is simultaneously constituted by these affects. Goetschel further seeks to link both of these elements of Spinoza's philosophy to his Jewishness. Of course, Spinoza's excommunication entails that he is not to be viewed as a Jewish thinker from any doctrinal perspective — Spinoza is an outsider even among outsiders. However, this very isolation leads Spinoza to rethink the relation between particular and individual, such that the uniqueness of the individual is no longer an obstacle to being included as a member of the universal, but in fact required for inclusion.

Once Goetschel develops his view on these relatively neglected aspects of Spinoza's philosophy, he then documents the influence Spinoza had on Mendelssohn. One of Goetschel's main goals is to lessen the importance of the famous pantheism controversy. Obviously the debate between Jacobi and Mendelssohn regarding whether Lessing was a Spinozist has important repercussions for how Spinoza was received by later Enlightenment philosophers. However, Goetschel argues that Mendelssohn had a more sophisticated appreciation of Spinoza's philosophy, so Spinoza's influence is found in epistemology and social and political philosophy, not just in a narrow field of metaphysics. Goetschel offers several masterful close readings of Mendelssohn and Spinoza to document this influence. The similarities are indeed extensive, but Goetschel's claim involves evidence that is inherently equivocal. After Christian Wolff loses his professorship at Halle, it is clear that an emphatic defense of Spinoza might lead to public, professional disaster. Mendelssohn mentions Spinoza by name only once in *Jerusalem*, and does so in a passage that *minimizes* the influence Spinoza has had on him. In a close reading of this passage, Goetschel argues that anyone sufficiently familiar with Spinoza and with *Jerusalem* can see that the similarities go far beyond the limits explicitly acknowledged by Mendelssohn. Goetschel's conclusion is that Mendelssohn's demarcation is disingenuous, born of a need to protect himself from an accusation of Spinozism, while simultaneously serving as notice of extensive unacknowledged influence to anyone able to think correctly about these issues. While Goetschel does document some important similarities between these two thinkers, his position falls short of conviction, particularly since the strongest evidence for influence is found in an explicit denial of any such influence. Because of the dangers of overtly endorsing Spinozism, this issue is likely to remain somewhat conjectural.

Goetschel's view of Lessing's *Nathan der Weise* dramatically departs from the standard interpretation of this work as a plea for religious tolerance. Instead he argues that the play criticizes the very epistemological framework within which the question of tolerance is first raised. Rather than adjudicating incompatible religious doctrines, the play seeks to investigate the epistemic premises that lead to the allegation of incompatibility in the first place. Lessing offers a proto-pragmatist theory of truth that emphasizes procedure, contingency, and historicity. The value of money is no longer determined by the metal it is composed of, but by the conventions surrounding what is stamped on it by the mint. So too the truth of religion is not to be measured in the absolutist terms of substance metaphysics, but in the way the adherents of the religion behave toward each other. Goetschel offers an original and subtle reading of Nathan's ring fable to show that Lessing's proto-pragmatism undermines the absolutist conception of truth which first made questions about tolerance for false doctrines possible. We should not defend tolerance through skepticism about knowing the One True Religion; rather, we practice tolerance once we recognize that religious truth is constituted through our tolerant interactions.

Goetschel also seeks to document the influence that Spinoza had on Heine. This emphasis offers a useful corrective to the excessive weight that is placed on Heine's discussions of Kant and Hegel. Heine asserts that Spinoza is now 'rising to exclusive intellectual dominance,' so it is essential to see Spinoza as the key figure in Heine's presentation of German intellectual history. More generally, Goetschel's work is strongest in its close readings, particularly in literature like *Nathan der Weise*, or literary works like Heine's *Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland*.

Goetschel's book serves as an invaluable companion to Israel's recent work. Where Israel has focused on Spinoza's influence on the 'radical Enlightenment', Goetschel discusses its more central figures. This tracing of influence is an important project, but focusing on it exclusively tends to preclude any serious philosophical assessment of the merits of the positions described. Although it is clear that Spinoza's influence is extensive, one is left to wonder if this is a good thing. Is Spinoza's modernity philosophically defensible? Goetschel's answer to this question is presumably affirmative, but his defense of this answer is often no more than the mere assertion that Spinoza's position is 'critical,' whereas others are not. It would be helpful to have a more rigorous definition and consistent usage of this important honorific. Particularly given Goetschel's earlier work, one is apt to take this word in a Kantian sense, though it soon becomes clear that Goetschel does not seek to assert any widespread similarities between Kant and Spinoza. Lacking clarity on this central point, it remains uncertain why Goetschel attributes this praise to Spinoza more than to any other Enlightenment thinker. As a work in intellectual history, however, *Spinoza's Modernity* offers an innovative and erudite reading of Spinoza and his influence on Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Heine.

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Jürgen Habermas
Truth and Justification.
Trans. Barbara Fultner.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2003. Pp. 368.
US$40.00. ISBN 0-262-08318-3.

Truth and Justification is a translation of a collection of papers by Jürgen Habermas, the majority of which were published in the 1999 German volume *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung*. Two of the papers in the German edition had already been translated and published in the MIT Press volume *On the Pragmatics of Communication*, and so they are not reproduced here. Instead, two other Habermas papers that had not previously been published in English have been substituted.

Habermas has benefited over the years from the service of a number of very able English translators, and Barbara Fultner continues that tradition in this volume. The text moves with great ease from the jargon of Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and Habermas' own (occasionally opaque) prose stylings through to the technical vocabulary of contemporary analytic philosophy, without any loss of precision or accuracy.

The book itself is a bit more uneven. Habermas introduces it as an attempt to return to some of the epistemological issues that he first raised, and then set aside, in *Knowledge and Human Interests*. However, while the latter was a self-standing contribution to philosophical debate, *Truth and Justification* will be of interest only to those wanting to track the development and refinement of Habermas' own philosophical system. There are no self-standing arguments here, but rather claims that presuppose, in one way or another, the more general ideas that Habermas has articulated in *The Theory of Communicative Action*, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* and elsewhere.

Among the Habermas *cognoscenti* this book has a reputation that precedes it, largely because it is the one in which Habermas officially and unequivocally revokes his commitment (such as it was) to a consensus theory of truth, or an 'ideal speech situation' view, and begins to tilt in the direction of metaphysical realism. Moral claims, he argues, are still settled by whatever it is that people can agree to for good reason. Truth claims, on the other hand, stand to be corrected by the external world in a way that has no analogue in the moral case. Thus there are certain basic 'realist intuitions' that must be accommodated by any cogent philosophical analysis of truth.

Unfortunately, Habermas does not explain how these intuitions should be accommodated — there is nothing like a theory of truth developed here. He presents the claim mainly in the style of a *mea culpa*, as a recognition that his earlier approach to the problem was unsatisfactory. Surprisingly, even the *mea culpa* is underargued. The two realist intuitions, which according to Habermas forced the abandonment of his earlier position, are articulated as follows: first, there is the 'cautionary' use of the truth predicate, viz. the recognition that no matter how well justified we are in believing something, it may still turn out to be false; and second, there is the 'sense of unconditional validity' that we associate with truth claims, viz. 'that true statements deserve to be accepted as valid by everyone everywhere' (144).

Confronted with these two intuitions, Habermas argues, the pragmatist has two options: either acknowledge these intuitions as compelling and go realist in some sense of the term, or else adopt a 'revisionist' attitude toward the use of the truth predicate. Habermas identifies these two strategies with the work of Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty respectively.

Habermas fails to acknowledge the existence of a third option, which is to grant the realist intuitions, but then to deny that they entail a metaphysical commitment to an external world that somehow confronts our judgments or makes them true. This is the strategy that has been pursued, to great effect, by deflationists like Robert Brandom, who have shown that the deflationist is entitled to *say* everything that the realist says, while at the same time denying that any of it *means* what the metaphysical realist thinks it means.

If the two realist intuitions that Habermas introduces are linguistic intuitions, i.e., intuitions about what we are entitled to *say*, then the deflationist is perfectly happy to acknowledge them, and no revisionism is necessary. After all, the deflationary theory holds that the truth predicate is an expressive device introduced into natural language in order to form sentences that involve quantification over propositions. In this respect, both the 'cautionary' use of the truth predicate and the 'unconditional validity' use that Habermas presents are textbook examples of the deflationary analysis.

If snow is white, then 'snow is white' deserves to be accepted as valid by everyone everywhere. More generally, for any *p*, if *p*, then *p* deserves to be accepted as valid by everyone everywhere. But to transform the latter into an English sentence, one must substitute the pronoun 'it' for the bound variable *p*. This generates a semantic anomaly on the left-hand side of the conditional, where the freestanding occurrence of the propositional variable *p* occurs. So instead, one says: For any proposition, if *it is true*, then *it* deserves to be accepted as valid by everyone everywhere.

Thus Habermas' 'universal assent' intuition turns out to be just more grist for the deflationary mill. As an argument for realism, the observation that truth claims command the assent of everyone everywhere is a red herring. The same can easily be demonstrated for the cautionary use.

Habermas is not, first and foremost, a philosopher or language or an epistemologist. The power of his philosophical work has always stemmed from the *bricolage* he is able to perform, bringing together philosophical analysis with bits of sociological theory, developmental psychology, and political theory. One can see the power of his reach in the introduction, when he starts out with a discussion of Michael Dummett's philosophy of language, and ends up — through a series of plausible steps — talking about the constitution of the European Union.

However, when it gets down to the nitty-gritty of analytic philosophy of language and epistemology, Habermas is not really following the arguments to see where they lead, but rather searching for a view that will 'fit' with the rest of his system and prove to be reasonably defensible. One senses that if someone came along and offered him a ready-made theory that 'fit' in the right way, he would be happy never to write another word on the subject. Unfortunately, he appears destined to be kept searching.

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Joseph Y. Halpern
Reasoning about Uncertainty.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2003. Pp. xiv + 483.
US$50.00. ISBN 0-262-08320-5.

Most beliefs are not certainties, and reasoning with uncertainties is our daily routine. Halpern's expertise with such reasoning extends well beyond his own field, computer science. He is thoroughly familiar with the multidisciplinary literature on his topic. Drawing on his breadth of knowledge, he offers a textbook for students in a variety of fields, including computer science, economics, philosophy, and statistics. Exercises, besides providing practice with key ideas, enrich coverage of them. References and notes supply suggestions for additional reading. The book makes a good reference work for researchers because it reviews carefully a representative selection of approaches to inferences involving uncertainties. It covers probability, belief revision, Bayesian networks, multi-agent systems, default reasoning, epistemic logic, and statistical inference.

This work is too technical to be the primary textbook for a typical philosophy course on uncertainty but is suitable supplementary reading. My review highlights a few points of special interest to philosophers engaged in research concerning uncertainty.

Chapter 2 introduces plausibility measures as a generalization of all representations of uncertainty such as probability measures, sets of probability measures, Shafer's and Dempster's belief functions, and Spohn's ranking functions. A plausibility measure meets minimal constraints on representations of uncertainty. It assigns plausibility values to sets of possible worlds so that the empty set has the minimum value, the set of all worlds has the maximum value, and every set is at least as plausible as any set that contains it. Halpern introduces plausibility measures to facilitate proofs concerning all representations of uncertainty. By proving theorems about plausibility measures, one may establish the most general features of representations of uncertainty.

Chapter 5 generalizes the decision rule to maximize expected utility. The generalization replaces probability measures with plausibility measures. It tells a decision maker to maximize plausibilistic expectation. Halpern shows that besides the rule to maximize expected utility, the maximin decision rule and all other familiar decisions rules are special cases of the rule to maximize plausibilistic expectation (170-6). He investigates the bounds on decision rules by investigating the consequences of his general decision rule.

Although plausibilistic expectations impose some structure on decisions, they do not rule out Dutch books and money pumps in a series of decisions. A series of decisions sure to generate losses may be representable as maximizing plausibilistic expectation. For instance, suppose that a representation of a decision maker's situation features two possible worlds. One Dempster-Shafer belief function from subsets of worlds into the unit interval assigns 0 to the empty set and to the unit-set with the first world, assigns 1/2 to the unit-set with the second world, and assigns 1 to the pair of worlds (33). Using this belief function as a plausibility measure, decisions creating a Dutch book are representable as maximizing plausibilistic expectation.

Halpern's general principle of decision lays down a necessary condition of rationality. It says that a rational decision maximizes plausibilistic expectation relative to some plausibility measure. Given the weak constraints on plausibility measures, this is a weak constraint on decisions. A way to strengthen it is to require maximization with respect to a plausibility measure that represents the agent's uncertainty. But this makes the constraint too strong. A decision may be rational even though another has greater plausibilistic expectation. For example, consider a toss of a bent coin. Heads and Tails may both have high plausibility because plausibility need not be additive. Betting on Heads, and betting on Tails, may each have greater plausibilistic expectation than not betting. Still, not betting may be rational. It prevents a Dutch book, and it may maximize expected utility relative to probability and utility functions representing beliefs and desires.

Even if plausibility measures are useful representations of uncertainty, maximizing plausibilistic expectation may not be a useful constraint on decisions. The short passages motivating various representations of uncertainty (34, 54-5) do not make a good case for using all representations of uncertainty to guide decisions. They mention, for instance, the value of using belief functions to represent evidence. But why should belief functions serving that goal also guide rational decisions? A belief function may be insufficiently structured to regulate decisions. It is better to address separately the goals of representing uncertainty and directing decisions.

Chapter 11 treats direct inference from statistical data to single-case probabilities. It abandons the traditional method of using the smallest reference class for which one has reliable statistics. Settling on a reference class requires dubious compromises. Suppose that Eric has jaundice, and one seeks the probability that he has hepatitis. Besides having jaundice, Eric may have other properties relevant to having hepatitis, such as being a baby. One may lack reliable statistics for babies with jaundice, yet using as a reference class just people with jaundice, or just babies, ignores relevant evidence. Also, consider the reference class consisting of Eric and people with jaundice but without hepatitis. One knows that there is a low frequency of hepatitis in this class of people with jaundice. But the reference class is inappropriate because gerrymandered.

Halpern circumvents the problem of specifying an appropriate reference class. He favors a method of direct inference that specifies a set of possible worlds and assumes random realization of a possible world in that set. That is, the method assumes that the possible worlds are equally probable. Then the probability of any event represented as a set of worlds is calculable using Bayes' Theorem and the set of worlds representing one's knowledge.

Halpern notes that his method of direct inference makes an event's probability relative to the set of worlds the method specifies. Also, it does not regulate statistical inferences based on samples but just puts statistics inferred from samples in the knowledge base for direct inference. Despite these problems, he recommends the method. He conjectures, 'It may be impossible to come up with a generic method of obtaining degrees of belief from statistical information that does the "right" thing in all possible circumstances' (423). Besides the drawbacks Halpern notes, his method faces another problem. There is no support for its assumption of the equiprobalility of worlds. Halpern appeals to the principle of indifference (399). But, notoriously, an unrestricted version of that principle is inconsistent, and Halpern does not advance a defensible restricted version to support the equiprobability of worlds.

Chapters 7-10 treat epistemic logic, taken as first-order predicate logic with a knowledge predicate and axioms concerning knowledge. First-order epistemic logic raises questions about the relationship between knowledge *de re* and *de dicto*. To illustrate, let the knowledge predicate be K. Given an assignment of value to the variable x, $K(Fx)$ stands for knowledge of x that x has the property F. Consider the formula $(x)K(Fx) \supset K((x)Fx)$. It licenses an inference from knowledge of each individual that it has the property F to knowledge that everything has the property F. This inference is invalid, however, because a person may know of each thing that it has F without knowing that those things constitute everything, and so without knowing that everything has F. Halpern's presentation of first-order epistemic logic simplifies the relationship between *de re* and *de dicto* knowledge by assuming that a person knows what exists. It adopts the constraint that all epistemically possible worlds have the same domain (374-5).

Chapter 8 treats reasoning about counterfactuals. It advances semantics for counterfactuals that resemble Lewis' (315-16). The semantics assume, for each world w, a partial preorder of worlds that represents closeness to w. The order is partial because it allows for uncompared worlds and a preorder because it allows for distinct worlds equally close to w. Its defining properties are transitivity and reflexivity. According to Halpern, a counterfactual is true just in case its consequent is true in all the antecedent-worlds closest to the actual world. He notes that the closeness relation need not be epistemic closeness. In particular, the closest antecedent-world need not be the most probable antecedent-world (317-18). Halpern treats some special cases differently than Lewis does. For instance, a counterfactual is true according to his analysis, but false according to Lewis' analysis, if there are antecedent-worlds closer and closer without end and no point in their progression after which the consequent is constantly true.

Halpern espouses a pluralistic approach to uncertainty (54). However, he does not offer precise principles for identifying in particular cases an appropriate method of reasoning with uncertainties. He offers only rough guidelines for selecting a representation of uncertainty. For example, he says, 'Partial preorders on possible worlds may be … more appropriate [than probability measures] in [a] setting where no quantitative information is available' (55). This guideline does not say when lack of quantitative information warrants abandoning probability measures. Being specific requires addressing interesting philosophical issues.

Although this book leaves many questions open, it skillfully portrays the richness and diversity of current research on uncertainty. Both students and researchers will find it a valuable resource.

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Patricia Hanna and **Bernard Harrison**
Word and World:
Practice and the Foundations of Language.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xii + 420.
US$85.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-82287-4);
US$30.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-53744-4).

Hanna and Harrison present a very readable, wide-ranging, and engaging line of argument which unfolds largely by way of a contrast with and criticism of the views of significant figures from the short history of analytic philosophy. They explore a space between what they term 'Referential Realism' on the one hand, and the thought that, in its absence, language is sequestered to a 'prison-house of the mind' or a 'vicious form of relativism' on the other. Their plain objective is to condemn Referential Realism 'root and branch' without this leading to these alternatives. They argue that this is an improper dichotomy; that these alternatives are a wrong response to sceptical concerns regarding meaning and reference. There is a general influence of Wittgenstein in this task, they admit, but less so in detail and note that the arguments stand independent of the subtleties of Wittgenstein exegesis.

Hanna and Harrison consider varieties of Referential Realism that they attribute primarily to Russell, McDowell, and Quine. All three varieties, they say, 'have as a central goal the removal of any potential delusive "mental" intermediary standing between knowledge and its objects' (43). Their approach is to replace, as they describe, the one-level and two-component model of Referential Realism. This two-component model obtains between word and world, and it is the one-level associative link between them that, as they attribute to the Referential Realist, creates meaning. They replace this with a two-level and three-component model which involves word, world, and also practice. The importance of the links with practice is the mark of Wittgenstein. On this model, there is no associative link between a linguistic expression and an extra-linguistic entity. Rather, they say, 'What actually relates language to reality … is better conceived as a two-level process of engagement, or embedding: at the first level the engagement, or embedding, of linguistic expressions in practices; at the second level the engagement or embedding of practices in the matrix of natural conditions and circumstances, in and with respect to which they are carried on' (48). To talk about what an expression refers to, on this model, is to talk of how the 'expression engages with, or is involved in, some practice or other' (49). It is on the second level, between practice (or 'mode of engagement') and world, that language bears on the world and reference is achieved. Also, it is in this treatment of practice that they understand and incorporate Wittgenstein's dictum regarding meaning as use.

The bearing of Wittgenstein is felt throughout the book and begins with the *Tractatus* and primarily with what they term 'Wittgenstein's Slogan': logic must take care of itself. They explain further: 'the principle that "Logic," which in Wittgenstein's and Russell's usage of the period covers, among other things, all questions of meaning, reference, and assertoric content, must "take care of itself," in the sense of not depending in any way on the knowledge of contingencies; on knowledge of contingent truths. That principle implies, just as emphatically as Referential Realism implies the contrary, that there is a radical separation between "Logic" and the epistemic … ' (92). For Hanna and Harrison, Wittgenstein's Slogan anticipates the later Wittgenstein's emphasis on knowledge-how or linguistic knowledge as ability: questions of logic are settled independent of and prior to propositional knowledge of the world, and hence our facility with logic is a knowledge-how (not a knowledge-that, and not a knowledge referring to the world — indeed, by the picture theory, it is a means by which reference is enabled). But it also makes for what they interestingly call the 'failure of the Tractatus' (93): a contradictory commitment to both Referential Realism and the Slogan. Hanna and Harrison favour the latter, strongly so, and proceed in their arguments with a steadfast commitment to the Slogan.

From chapter to chapter, several different influential positions from the history of analytic philosophy of language are held to critical account. For instance, Hanna and Harrison are dissatisfied with the dominant theories of reference they find. In opposition to Description, Causal, as well as the Dominant Cluster theory of reference attributed to Gareth Evans, they appeal to what they term the 'Name-Tracking Network'. This does not involve a compromise solution, as they ascribe to Evans. Rather, it upholds a curious view of intention: 'the intentions in question are not, or not primarily, those of speakers. They are intentions, or better, perhaps, "intentionalities" of the sort which characterise not individual speakers but practices' (143). This returns the reader to the thought that practices provide for the link to the world.

Further, Hanna and Harrison, perhaps surprisingly, attribute a version of Referential Realism to Quine and Davidson, accusing the former of being a hyperempiricist: 'someone, that is, who insists that no exemption can be made on behalf of the technical terminology of empiricist theory to the principle … that unless an expression is mere verbiage, the explanation of its meaning must at some point conclude in the demonstrative indication of some feature of experience' (38). This 'empirical constraint' on our attribution of content to a sentence, they claim, contradicts Wittgenstein's Slogan as they discern it from *Tractatus* 4.064: 'one cannot affirm a proposition to which, as yet, no sense has been assigned, since "its sense is just what is affirmed" ' (199). It is by contradicting the Slogan that Quine and Davidson are said to agree with Referential Realism.

In such manner Hanna and Harrison cover much historical ground. They present their Wittgensteinian arguments against important figures of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, including Russell, Kripke, Quine, Dummett, Davidson, and more, and leveling a critique sourced in their commitment to Wittgenstein's Slogan against all. This wide a range of application displays much ambition. One also gets the impression that Hanna and Harrison think that much of Wittgenstein's main thoughts, for which they often furnish independent argument, have gone unrecognized by much of the analytic tradition — a perhaps not unusual thought (at least among Wittgensteinians).

All this makes for quite an interesting work, and certainly the arguments presented are worthy of a considered hearing. However, often they seem like opening arguments: as a reader, you can be left to your devices in wondering and casting for objections or rebuttals for what this who's who of analytic philosophy would say in response. The arguments are usually not followed through this far, and so the dialectic ends, it seems, a little too swiftly. This, perhaps, is a consequence of the work's wide enterprise: its agenda must move on to another line of application or argument, more quickly than someone whose interest in the current investigation has been piqued may like. Of course, Hanna and Harrsion's case does gain through cumulative effect, but still the range of consideration involved does seem to come with some cost. It should be noted, though, that the Epilogue does offer further response to some likely lines of objection, and does place the preceding discussion in the context of more contemporary debate on realism and anti-realism. The lengthy Epilogue, which also further elaborates Hanna and Harrison's own view, is far from an unimportant part of the book.

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Martin Heidegger
Four Seminars.
Trans. Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2003.
Pp. xvii + 118.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-253-34363-1.

This book translates the protocols of four Heidegger seminars from Volume 15 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, originally published in French in *Questions IV*. They were read to Heidegger when they were written, and he 'monitored' (viii) the German translation. The seminars were held in Provence in 1966, '68 and '69, and at Heidegger's house in Zähringen in 1973. No protocol was kept for the first seminar, but three discussions of Heraclitus were reconstructed from participants' notes. Heidegger himself wrote the text for the last day of the 1973 seminar, and it is appended with the preface he added later. The translators do a good job of indicating what is from the French version, what came later with the German translation, and what they have added of their own by way of notes. Their glossaries leave readers less likely to be misled when making connections to Heidegger's other texts. Nonetheless, the text stands in a paradoxical position: the discussion is not introductory and will be hard to follow for newcomers, who thus will probably get little from the book, while seasoned Heidegger scholars will no doubt already know this material.

These seminars are another attempt at 'dis-mantling' (42) the history of metaphysics to make possible a new beginning. Aristotle covered over the original meaning of being by interpreting time as 'a series of now-moments' (43). In modernity, subjectivity 'constitutes the barrier to the unfolding of the question of being' (70), as does a 'collusion between industry and the military' (56) in America. Heidegger observes that '*modern man finds himself henceforth in a fundamentally new relation to being* — AND THAT HE KNOWS NOTHING OF IT' (62). Throughout the seminars, Heidegger 'strives to free the original meaning of being' (42): presence. The first seminar uncovers in Heraclitus the 'fundamental relation of the Greek language to nature' that 'consists in leaving nature open in its radiance' (8). The second asks what 'unity before the tearing' (13) is possible in Hegelian dialectic, towards which Heraclitus is later said to signify the first step (81). The third contrasts ancient thinking against modern and addresses questions about technology raised by Roger Munier in 1966. It culminates in a discussion of '*Es gibt*', in which Heidegger stresses that presence is not to be emphasized, 'but rather the letting itself' (59). And he clarifies enowning: it is not an epochal destiny of being, but rather 'Sending is from enowning' (61), of which it is possible to catch sight in the essence of technology. As the translators note (xiii), these discussions mark a move by Heidegger from long-standing views concerning the withdrawal of being to the excesses of enframing and philosophy alike. The final seminar begins with Husserl to show that consciousness is rooted in Dasein rather than the other way round, and moves to an interpretation of Parmenides' Fragment 1, line 29: 'That which presences: presencing itself thoroughly attunes the fitting revealing unconcealment, encircling it' (97). The claim that 'presencing itself presences' (79) is no mere tautology; rather, 'tautological thinking' is 'the primordial sense of phenomenology' (80). Furthermore, Heidegger cannot be dismissed as falling into a metaphysics of presence, unless his comments, for example, on *kosmos* in Heraclitus, which 'shimmers ungraspably throughout everything' (8), and what is 'surplus' (66) in categorial intuition for Husserl, are glossed over.

These seminars thus clarify several themes that run throughout the Heideggerian corpus, but also add novel analyses, to which the translators draw helpful attention in their foreword. The usual suspects from the history of philosophy are encountered, but there is also novel reference to Marcuse, Wittgenstein and Marx. The latter is particularly significant for Heidegger's *analysis of technology. Reading Marx, he diagnoses in modernity 'a self-pro*duction of man' that 'raises the danger of self-destruction' (73). That is to say, what 'reigns today' is 'the imperative of progress' (73) in which beings appear as 'standing reserves (beings that are held in readiness for being consumed)' (61), 'disposable' (62) in their availability for 'exploitation and consumption' (63). Furthermore, a 'new form of nationalism' has emerged 'which is grounded upon technological power and no longer on the characteristics of a people' (55). Accordingly, this text is a rare instance of Heidegger drawing social and political implications from his analysis of the history of metaphysics.

The translators neglect to point out that these seminars demonstrate the significance of the question of science to the path of Heidegger's thinking. On July 31, 1969, he wrote to Roger Munier that 'the interlocking of modern technology and modern science has become more poignant and more urgent' (88). In the third seminar, he argues that modern physics is 'grounded upon the essence of technology' (54), but the question of science cuts even deeper historically. Philosophy began with the Greek interpretation of *physis* (8), and mathematical physics is 'the science par excellence' (26). The history of the meaning of being is the history of interpretations of what is — nature. The destiny of being in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is objectivity (61): nature becomes 'a succession of things that follow upon one another' (54). It is on this basis that the destructive power of technology, as it is experienced in contemporary contexts, is possible, for the homogeneity of space that figures in objecthood is the basis for the mathematical projection of nature in which nature becomes calculable. And 'calculability itself is posited as the principle of a mastery of nature' (53) by which nature is reduced to being 'a "reserve of energy"' (75). Heidegger will say in 1976 that science can inform technology because science is itself already inherently technological. The relation between science and technology in his thinking is complex, and much textual analysis must be done beyond this book to sort it out, but these seminars indicate why this is a pressing task. In contrast to the impoverished experiences of being determined by scientific objectivity and technological *Ge-stell*, Heidegger seeks a more original dwelling to 're-entrust the calculability and technology of nature to the open mystery of a newly experienced naturalness of nature' (44). These seminars therefore constitute a crucial text for thinking through Heidegger's critique of science and its implications for environmental phenomenology.

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Henri Lefebvre
Key Writings.
Eds. Stuard Elden, Elizabeth Lebas and
Eleonore Kofman.
New York: Continuum 2003. Pp. xix + 284.
US$125.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-6645-1);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-6646-X).

Henri Lefebvre's *Key Writings* arrives in a rash of recent translations of his work — by my count, nine since 1991. The texts and excerpts collected beneath this at once ambitious and flatfooted title represent a wide-angle snapshot of an entire itinerary, the earliest from 1933, the latest from 1990. The editors' avowed purpose is both to demonstrate Lefebvre's 'range' while insisting upon a certain consistency across the variation of themes and discursive forms: never simply a philosopher, sociologist, historian or militant, his is a trajectory scanned by breaks, ruptures, betrayals and about-faces, with no continuity save one: 'being a communist' (xii, 230-7). *Key Writings* therefore attempts to diagram a venture beginning with an early and decisive brush with surrealism followed by a thirty-year drift through the French Communist Party, a brief and very original period of collaboration with the *Arguments* group and the Situationists after the break, over a decade as a professor of sociology, and almost two decades of work right up until his death in 1991. Because it rightly attempts to present Lefebvre's career in its complexity, this volume's richness is undeniable; but this richness is also a certain poverty. The wealth of material puts great pressure on the principle of editorial selection, one here taking the form of archival neutrality or indifference. Coverage and range often amount to juxtaposition with little evaluation of the interests these texts pose from the point of view of their recirculation in the present. The inclusion of certain texts, out of historical concern or in the interest of 'address[ing] gaps' in Lefebvre's Anglophone reception (xii), does no service to his legacy. The chance to reconfigure that reception cedes to a sampling that can be called representative in an almost statistical sense. This gives the volume a paradoxically ahistorical feel, reinforced by the thematic organization of the texts. Clustering this material conceptually is perfectly legitimate, of course, but its price is a lack of sensitivity to where individual texts constitute interventions within their own historical conjuncture. Given the variation and sheer sweep of the corpus, there is a necessary stress on what makes for the unity and uniqueness of a movement, a life; but this can only diminish the importance and exemplarity of certain decisive moments within this history, in particular the break with the Party recorded and sealed by the remarkable text from 1958, *La somme et le reste* (of which we are offered two excerpts). If this text is 'testament, disputation, elucidation and confession' all at once (xiv), it is first and foremost a *profession de foi*: an avowed fidelity to Marxism in the very form of a break with the Party and the betrayal it represented.

In the interest of suturing gaps, the collection 'foregrounds' and 'gives precedence' to 'Marxism and Philosophy' (xvii). But some wants are better left blank: these are the volume's weakest and most disappointing texts, the least innovative and least philosophical. Is it really necessary to include an excerpt like the one here called 'Retrospections', a Party-programmed post-war denunciation of existentialism (as neo-surrealism) in the form of a bad faith self-criticism of Lefebvre's own surrealist past — all in the name of an 'objective dialectics' (6-13)? At best, the texts (especially from the Thirties) present Lefebvre as representative of a certain humanist strain of Marxism, conceiving man 'as a totality', as the 'production of man by his own efforts, his own labor ...' (34): this ontology of auto-production leads to a determination of ideology as 'mystification', as lie, as the distance 'between you and yourself' to be overcome (229-30). The most philosophically interesting texts are, however, scattered through the book's other groupings, especially those on 'The Critique of Everyday Life' and 'History, Time and Space'. Most powerful is the 'testimony' of *La somme et le reste* (in the 'Politics' section), a meditation on the secret complicity between the 'materialist' ontology of doctrinal Marxism and what it only seems to oppose, 'imprisoning [Marx] withing categories [he] critiqued and dismantled' (232). Only a suspension of ontology altogether, rather than an opposed thesis or position, will open the possibility of new politics in the aftermath of the disastrous coupling of ontology and politics in Marxism. This suspension takes the form of a questioning: 'What is socialism? What was it for Marx? What will it be for us? ... What is democracy? What is happiness? What is materialism? What is idealism? What is dialectics? What is practice?' (236). This is not a crisis or criticism of Marxism: it is Marxism itself, a Marxism Lukács slyly called 'orthodox'. Nothing could be further from dogmatism and bad faith.

This new politics is found in the analysis of the notion of the 'everyday' — the subject of the book's second section. First presented as early as 1933 (cf. 71-83), the everyday is a convergence of Marx' sphere of consumption and Heidegger's *Alltäglichkeit*, with the interpolation of a term belonging to neither: life as the 'lived', *le vécu*. Everyday life is first and foremost what slips through the mesh of classical political categories. Having no place within the 'sum' of instituted forms of collective existence, it is both a left over — *le reste* — and a seeming site of resistance. Lefebvre gives it a revolutionary name: the streets (90ff.). Out in the open, but where nothing appears as what it is, it is the site where freedom is articulated in a certain experience of time ('free time'). If the lived is the site of resistance, it is also the locus of the ideological. Everyday life is therefore ambiguous. It is the richness of play, love, poetry (166ff.), and yet it is marked by a boredom that is oppressive while harboring a secret power: this empty time in which nothing happens places us in contact with time itself, a time without measure whose very lengthening opens onto the brusque irruption of the event. Everyday life, at once resistance and vulnerability, is the place of what is today called 'biopolitics'. It would be tempting to use Lefebvre as a starting point for the construction of a contemporary ontology of Life — but only at the price of betraying what is most living, in Lefebvre, and in 'life' itself.

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Thomas M. Lennon, ed.
Cartesian Views:
Papers Presented to Richard A. Watson.
Boston: E.J. Brill 2003. Pp. xi + 243.
US$99.00. ISBN 90-04-13299-6.

This collection contains twelve articles and two personal reflections. The first of these latter, by Richard Popkin, deals with Watson's time as Popkin's research assistant. The second, by William Gass, deals with Watson the man (somewhat eccentric we gather) and Watson the polymath, an accomplished cave explorer, writer, ecologist, as well as a philosopher of science and an historian of Cartesianism.

In explaining what gives unity to the collection Thomas Lennon says: 'The contributors to this volume might be viewed as standing to Watson as the Cartesians did to Descartes' (vii). If this is indeed the purpose of the collection, it is successful only in part: some of the articles contributed here make a serious effort to engage Watson, but the majority do not. For readers more interested in intellectual issues relating to the history and philosophy of Cartesian thought and its critics in the seventeenth century in general than in a close study of Watson's ideas in particular, this is perhaps a good thing. In any case, all of the articles are written by seasoned historians and philosophers, are of good quality (though, as one might expect, sometimes derivative of work done elsewhere), and convey a good sense to readers of the wide range of issues comprising the reaction to Descartes' thought, mainly in Europe in the years just after his death, but also, in two articles (by David and Alan Hausman and by Fred Wilson), in Anglo-American philosophy of the present day.

Of those articles that do engage Watson's intellectual achievements seriously, Alison Wylie's recounts how, impressed with Hempelian 'positivist' theory of scientific explanation and confirmation, Watson first attempted to inject the standards of clarity and distinctness characteristic of this approach into his science of interest, Archeology, in the early 1970's, and then, in the 1990's, undertook battle with the more extreme of the reactions — social constructivism — that ensued. Lennon discusses at length Watson's reading of Foucher's role in the downfall of Cartesianism (in its Malbrancheian incarnation), arguing that the honours should instead go to another Cartesian critic, Huet. Finally, Steven Nadler gives a sketch of a logical problem that Watson finds in Descartes: (1) mind and body are dissimilar in metaphysical category; (2) there is causal interaction between mind and body; (3) causes must be similar to their effects. Watson has maintained that recognition of this problem among post-Cartesian thinkers in France was chiefly responsible for the downfall of Descartes' thought. Nadler disputes this, arguing on the basis of an analysis of Spinoza's discussion of Descartes' proof of the immortality of the soul — he sees Spinoza rejecting it — that the chief problem for post-Cartesians lay in this proof.

In a rich survey of Dutch Cartesianism, Han van Ruler discusses the different reactions of Spinoza and Geulinxc to Descartes' thought. Since Geulincx is less familiar to American audiences than Spinoza, van Ruler's clear and thorough introduction to his thought is most welcome. Geulincx elevates the naturalistic aspects of Descartes' theory of perception and cognition expressed in the developmental psychology of *Principles I, 71*, to a place at the very heart of Cartesian philosophy, also arguing for the importance of the role of judgment in perceptual cognition. In this he stays in the mainstream of Cartesian thought but, in introducing a theory of judgment structured by schemata, Geulincx seems to anticipate Kant and in seeing schemata as linguistic structures capable of deceiving us about issues in metaphysics, he anticipates Wittgenstein. Moreover, in turning to Descartes for a non-linguistically structured access to metaphysical structure, Geulincx anticipates not only the philosophical present but the future — at least as I would like to see it.

Theo Verbeek takes up the question why, having departed France initially in 1628, Descartes stayed on in Holland, arguing against Watson that he did so not because of emotional upset over the condemnation of Galileo but because, initially intending his stay to be temporary, he later found friends there that he did not want to leave. José R. Maia Neto, a dissertation student of Watson's, writes on Watson's special interest, Foucher, arguing that Foucher wanted to rehabilitate the ancient Academic tradition in France by rehabilitating Cartesian method and attacking Cartesian metaphysics. Leslie Armour, also writing on Foucher, takes us on a tour of various points of interest in Foucher's epistemology and related matters in the Stoic background to Foucher's thought.

In a piece entitled 'Exercises in Betrayal: Philosophy in Translation' Alan Gabbey discusses some particular issues in translation and articulates a general thesis about understanding works in translation. Either — I am unsure which — the thesis is (a) that one can achieve deep understanding through translation but correct translations require that the translator know historical context and the substance of the claims made in the work, or (b) that one cannot achieve deep understanding through translation at all.

Issues of freedom of expression in seventeeth-century France are explored in articles by Jean-Robert Armogathe and Daniel Garber. Armogathe details the (surprisingly scrupulous) investigation by the Roman inquisition of the question whether a work by Le Grand should be placed on the Index. (The answer was affirmative.) In his article, Garber asks why it was so important in the seventeenth century to formulate a case for the freedom to express ideas, a question he thinks is puzzling to us because we now take freedom of expression to be 'something that is beyond question' (205). (Perhaps this is so in the United States, but not in Canada, a country where intellectual censorship is enshrined in federal law [the so-called 'Hate Speech' legislation] and is represented in recent decisions of the federal broadcast-licensing agency.) Garber answers his question, first, by examining arguments given against such freedom by Mersenne, and then by examining arguments in favour of it by Bacon, Descartes and Spinoza. He finds that only Spinoza argues for freedom of expression for all. Garber offers several effective criticisms of Spinoza's position.

Finally, there are the two systematic pieces, both dealing with contemporary reactions to, or reflections of, issues in Cartesian theory of intentionality. Standardly, Cartesian ideas are taken to have two main properties: (1) they represent things, possibly non-existent (2) (a) that they represent, and (b) what specific things they represent, is obvious by simple inspection of the idea. Fred Wilson takes us on a tour of some main attempts to provide an analysis of intentionality, arguing in the end for a revised version of Wittgenstein's Tractarian account. Alan and David Hausman do not accept the standard reading, arguing that in Descartes' discussion of the material falsity of sensory ideas, Descartes identifies a class of ideas whose actual representational content, if any, is not revealed by simple inspection. They seem to identify this feature of ideas with the Evil Demon — though, whether this claim is intended as serious exegesis (one hopes not) or as picturesque language is unclear. They see a reflection of this doctrine in Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, maintaining that while Descartes has a semantic theory allowing him to ultimately discriminate between ideas that are representational and those that merely seem to be, that theory cannot defeat the PLA. (I note that the analysis of intentionality that Wilson endorses may serve to loosen the grip of the version of the PLA that the Hausmans endorse.)

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Nicholas Martin, ed.
Nietzsche and the German Tradition.
New York: Peter Lang 2003. Pp. xviii + 314.
US$53.95. ISBN 3-03910-060-2.

Readers should not let themselves be put off by the rather awkward title. This is an excellent, highly professional and informative collection of essays, one that no library with an emphasis on Nietzsche studies can do without. Just when one might be convinced that too much has already been said about Nietzsche, this book reveals how much important new work is being done and how much remains to do.

The volume emerges from a selection of the papers presented at the seventh annual conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society, held at the University of St. Andrews in September of 1997. The editor and the contributors have used the interim to revise the papers into substantial articles that cohere well. Based for the most part on extensive work in primary materials, the contributors shed light on various aspects of Nietzsche's response to a range of topics which engaged thinkers in the middle of the nineteenth century. Daniel H. Conway re-examines the questions of Nietzsche's 'Germano-mania', arguing that 'at the end of the day [...] he remains an inveterate — if complicated — Germanophile' (7). Thomas H. Brobjer, who has been doing the exacting work of collating Nietzsche's allusions and marginalia, summarizes his findings about Nietzsche's familiarity with classical German philosophers, such as Schopenhauer, Herder, Kant and Schelling. That essay is nicely complemented by Christopher Janaway on 'Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator'. Nietzsche's philological interests are the focus of Christa Davis Acompora's analysis of his reception of the debates about the implications of 'Homer' as author and authority.

One of the overriding issues for Germans in the nineteenth century was how to interpret the rise of Prussia and the concomitant decline of the alternatives such as a liberal confederation of states. These led to an ongoing interpretation of the German past, a process in which Nietzsche took lively interest. Duncan Large examines the centrality of the figure of Luther in the Reformation for Nietzsche's understanding of what had gone right and wrong with German history. Ben Morgan traces the impact of Prussian theories of order and education as revealed in *The Antichrist*. His analysis could have been given more philosophical depth through a consideration of how neo-stoicism contributed to the rise of the Prussian system.

Three essays deal with aesthetics and stylistics. In the only article left untranslated from German, Hans-Gerd von Seggern reviews Nietzsche's aesthetic theory against he background of what the Germans call 'Weimar Classicism', i.e., the theories about beauty and nature articulated by Schiller and Goethe. Of the two, it was Schiller who seems to have had the greater attraction for Nietzsche. Disappointing in their sketchiness are Paul J.M. van Tongeren's remarks on Nietzsche's 'naturalism', hardly a major advance on Maurice Mandelbaum's *History, Man and Reason* (1971: 338-47). By contrast, Jim Urpeth's critique of Heidegger's comments on Nietzsche and aesthetic disinterestedness is taut and convincing.

The short contribution by Gerd Schank on 'Race and Breeding in Nietzsche's Philosophy' (237-44) is stimulating but far too short, given the importance of the problem and the amount of research done on it, including Schank's own *'Rasse' und Züchtung bei Nietzsche* (2000). The last two contributions deal with Nietzsche's reception, or non-reception, by German leftists. Malcolm Humble compares how Heinrich Mannn and Arnold Zweig responded to Nietzsche, while Nicholas Martin surveys the virtual banning of Nietzsche by the late German Democratic Republic. After so much attention devoted to Nietzsche and the political right, this shift in focus to the left is good to see. More such investigations are needed, especially into the reception and transmission of Nietzsche by Germans forced into exile at various stages.

A carefully edited bibliography caps this solid contribution to Nietzsche studies and to German intellectual history.

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William Ian Miller
Faking It.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xi + 290.
US$30.00. ISBN 0-521-83018-4.

Faking It is a fascinating book that explores, among other things, the anxiety, tension, and self-doubt that we all experience as we try to play certain social roles. It surveys our conscious struggles at being whole-hearted and satisfying our moral, emotional, and professional expectations. Miller does not condemn our fakery or point us in the direction of a higher, more authentic way of being. Rather, he shows through numerous humorous examples drawn from real life that much of our faking is inevitable, indispensable, and even desirable. Human vanity is present throughout the book; it seems to be the source of both our faking it and our dissatisfaction with ourselves for faking it. The book also raises important questions about selfhood and leaves the reader wondering who she really is. Is she an assemblage of the various roles that she plays? Or is she, as Miller at times seems to suggest, the vain and frightened creature behind the masks that tries its best to direct the entire complicated and intimidating performance?

In the introduction, Miller talks us through the typical and multi-layered experience of lecturing in front of a room full of undergraduate students. Miller recounts what he describes as a 'split' in his consciousness — a state of mind that we all experience. The unity of his consciousness is severed and he is left with two 'selves': the first is performing before the class, and the second is monitoring the performance of the first. In this case, the second self is critical, derisive, and unconvinced by the performance of the first self. He sees through the confident exterior of the first self — the authoritative tone of voice, the language, the movements — and is well aware of his weaknesses and insecurities. Sometimes the second self is a moral judge that questions the motives of the first self. 'Am I really donating money to the poor for selfless and benevolent reasons? Or am I doing so to impress my friends or to revel in self-satisfaction?' At other times, he is a social judge whose aim it is to prevent the first self from making a fool of himself or from being seen for who or what he really is. And there are still many other shapes that this second self can take. He can be confused, amused, surprised or simply entertained by the sometimes brilliant and sometimes botched performance of the first self. And then the metaphysical questions resurface: How is this possible? Who am I? Will the real me please stand up (1-4).

This split of consciousness is a theme that appears throughout the book. In a chapter titled, 'Authentic Moments with the Beautiful and the Sublime', Miller discusses 'the split' with respect to our aesthetic experiences. You find yourself in a museum, in the presence of 'great art', and soon a series of anxious questions disrupt your unity of consciousness: 'Have I spent enough time admiring this painting? Should I turn to the next work of art? Or will my companion think that my appreciation of art is shallow and unsophisticated? And why don't I care for Jackson Pollock's paintings? Maybe *I am* shallow and unsophisticated. Is there something that I'm just not getting?' (160-1).

The book is written in a way that makes it possible for the reader to jump around from chapter to chapter. Each chapter centers on a particular context or class of experiences in which our faking it manifests itself. From agonizing courtship rituals in 'Naked Truth: Hey, Wanna F***?' to physical alterations and implants in 'Acting Our Roles: Mimicry, Makeup, and Pills', the book reveals the range and depth of fakery in the contemporary world. Miller writes in an engaging and refreshing way. He deals with 'faking it' on a personal level and shares his history and experiences with the reader; the discussion never gets very formal or abstract. Still, one is never quite sure what Miller thinks about our faking it. Are human beings wretched and miserable because of it? Or is our situation sad and strangely beautiful because we have to hide — because our care for various people and ends motivates us to hide — so much of who we are from the world and ourselves? Miller, it seems, is not primarily interested in answering these questions.

In commenting on the book's accomplishments, Miller points out that *Faking It* directs our attention away from twentieth-century depth psychology and towards ordinary notions embedded in the moral psychology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries such as vanity, pride, honor, self-command, interest, and the passions (235). Miller is right about this. He provides us with a straightforward, non-mysterious conceptual framework for interpreting a host of human experiences and social situations. His analyses of faking it in its various forms are always perceptive and compelling; collectively, they provide the reader with a rich and complex understanding of human life and conscious experience. Nevertheless, there is surely a great deal about human experience — consciousness, and emotional and intellectual responses to the world and ourselves — that the book and the moral psychology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries cannot adequately explain. *Faking It* is written in a clear and accessible way and would be of interest to anyone curious about deception, insincerity, authenticity, and human nature.

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Douglas Moggach
The Philosophy and Politics of Bruno Bauer.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. vii + 290.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-521-81977-6.

This book represents a major contribution to our understanding of Bruno Bauer and his place amongst fellow Young Hegelians such as D.F. Strauss, Arnold Ruge, Ludwig Feuerbach and, of course, Karl Marx. More than that, however, it offers an original and insightful interpretation of Bauer's republicanism, one that is grounded in an ethical and aesthetic critique of Hegel's late political philosophy. Given its detailed, nuanced exposition of the development of Bauer's *Vormärz* or pre-1848 philosophy, from his 1829 Prize essay on Kant's aesthetics — discovered by Moggach at the Humboldt Universität in 1992 — to its completion in the *Trumpet of the Last Judgment* in 1841, it is scarcely possible to do the book justice in the space of a short review. What I will attempt, however, is to outline what I take to be the central features of Moggach's exposition before raising some critical questions.

Moggach's presentation emerges in opposition to the two dominant schools of Bauer-interpretation. The first holds Bauer to have fallen behind Hegelian idealism, in which subject and object are mediated by way of the Idea, to a 'subjectivist' position. The second follows Marx' polemical interpretations of Bauer in the *Holy Family* and the *German Ideology*; it engages in a critical periodization of Bauer's work, to the effect that in 1843 an impotent social critique comes to supplant an incisive critique of religion as alienation. According to Moggach, the former misses the central importance of aesthetic judgment as crucially forming the basis for an over-coming of the abstract opposition of subject and object. Indeed, against the criticism of the latter school, it is precisely the faculty of aesthetic judgment, leading to a worked out theory of Republicanism, that establishes the inner continuity of Bauer's thought to 1848.

Bauer's critique of Restorationism, by virtue of a simultaneous critique of its religious underpinnings and an affirmation of the Hegelian idea of the state, aims to show how Christianity represents an essentially alienated form of thought. The assignment of genuine universality to an otherworldly realm opens up a vacuum permitting the State to embody the illegitimate claims of purely particular interests. In contrast, Hegel's theory of the State intends the unfolding of a dialectical mediation of universality, particularity and individuality. Indeed, although Moggach doesn't mention it, the dispute between Right- and Left-Hegelians can be reduced to conflicting interpretations of Hegel's famous dictum that 'what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational'. While the former interpret this literally and therefore as a justification for the Restorationist state, the latter take it to imply an 'ought', namely, that the actual should become rational through a practical, revolutionary confrontation with such a state. In other words, the Left-Hegelians seek to show how the intentions of Hegelian philosophy actually *misfire* in its theory of the state. The latter is characterized by two short-comings: it 'lacks and adequate principle of individual autonomy; and the Hegelian state is an illusory community' (83). The Left-Hegelians develop, therefore, a republican political theory that follows more consistently from the premises of Hegel's dialectical philosophy. Such republicanism is distinguished from Hegel's constitutionalism by its express endorsement of popular sovereignty; it differs from liberal constitutionalism in its repudiation of possessive individualism as a conception of freedom. While the Left-Hegelians share the broad premises of this republicanism, they also differ in the details of their respective political theories. For example, Feuerbach 'develop(s) the idea of the community elevating itself to conscious universality through acknowledgment of a collective species-being, with mutual recognition and common concerns gradually supplanting egoism as a social bond' (84). In contrast, Bauer's specific development of republican or civic humanist political theory out of an immanent critique of Hegel's theory of the state, is grounded in, as suggested earlier, aesthetic and ethical categories: 'Bauer reactivates the distinction of praxis and poiesis, upholding the possibility for individuals to act autonomously in elevating themselves above their immediate (heteronomous) interests and representing the universal as a condition for their access to the political realm' (85). Bauer distances himself not only from the egoism of the liberal possessive-individualism, but also from the socialist tradition that, in his view, presupposes an atomized 'mass society' not unlike liberalism. Thus, against the ideology of the Restoration, i.e., a conservative, Christian reading of Hegel, but also against liberalism and socialism, Bauer's republicanism is based on the idea of a 'beautiful', that is, disinterested, truly universal self waging a sublime, unending struggle against all forms of 'positivity' or unjustified and therefore irrational institutions.

If it is possible to speak of a *tragedy* of German philosophy, from its glorious zenith in post-Kantian Idealism to its lugubrious fall in Heidegger's Rectoral Address in 1933, then Bauer would be a central protagonist of this drama. In the failure of the German Revolution of 1848, which centered on the demand for a genuinely popular, National Assembly to be established in Frankfurt — to which Bauer, himself, stood as a candidate for Berlin-Charlottenburg — Bauer saw the failure of German philosophy as such. Consequently, in the aftermath of 1848, his thinking takes a conservative turn in the direction of anti-Semitism and cultural pessimism. Anticipating Nietzsche, Bauer comes to diagnose history as consisting of 'great politics' between contending imperial powers.

The implicit premise that seems to motivate Moggach's powerful interpretation of Bauer — one which might have been more explicitly articulated — is the following: in the wake of the historical exhaustion of socialism and in a period in which the unleashing of possessive individualism on a planetary scale portends a destructiveness whose limits correspond only to the continued existence of life itself, Bauer's political philosophy presents us with a serious alternative to both of these positions. Contemporary liberals, however, would retort that, in the context of a diversity of goods in Western societies, a republicanism based on an over-arching conception of the good is simply unsustainable. Moggach could meet such a criticism, however, with the argument that, precisely because Bauer's republicanism is grounded in aesthetic categories, it possesses more finely-honed philosophical resources to point beyond the stand-off between the abjection of the good, on the one hand, and its reification, on the other. Unlike liberals who wish to evacuate the concept of good altogether from the political realm, and communitarians who contend that it is always already embodied in extant traditions, Bauer's aesthetic republicanism argues for the constant struggle against what merely exists in pursuit of a good understood in negative terms, to wit: a sublime good beyond presentation or ultimate realization.

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Plato
Protagoras and *Meno*.
Trans. Robert C. Bartlett.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2004.
Pp. ix + 155.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-4199-4);
US$11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8865-6).

Given the number of contemporary translations of Plato's early dialogues *Protagoras* and *Meno*, the need for new versions is not immediately obvious. The standard single-volume translation of the entire Platonic corpus (including spurious works), edited by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett 1997), contains largely accurate translations of these dialogues by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell (*Protagoras*), and G.M.A. Grube (*Meno*). Yet a reading of Robert C. Bartlett's volume is enough to show that a new translation, while not perhaps *necessary*, is certainly welcome.

The most valuable aspect of Bartlett's translation is the copious footnotes. These contain helpful explanations of the various characters and events mentioned in these dialogues; references to variant manuscript readings and scholarly emendations; and useful explanations of, or sometimes justifications for, the translator's choice of a particular word when several alternatives were available. Bartlett's 'interpretive essays' will be of value to students at both the undergraduate and graduate level. There are a few minor criticisms to be made of the volume, but these do not detract from its overall value.

The *Protagoras* has been acknowledged as the literary masterpiece of Plato's early dialogues, and Bartlett's translation captures the drama and immediacy of the original. An example of a simple but effective translation technique is Bartlett's rendering of *Nê Dia* literally as 'By Zeus', departing from previous translators who have rendered this basic Greek oath as 'good god', 'for heaven's sake', etc. As Bartlett explains, a less literal translation 'needlessly conceals from readers the speaker's emphatic recourse to the greatest of the Greek gods ... and imports the familiar but misleading notions of God and heaven. In thus making Plato apparently more "accessible," one in fact pushes him still farther away' (vii-viii). For the most part, Bartlett succeeds in making Plato more accessible than certain other translators have done.

One of Bartlett's translation decisions, though, imports a 'familiar but misleading' notion into both of these dialogues. Like his predecessor W.R.M. Lamb, Bartlett translates the term *hetairos* as 'comrade' rather than 'friend' (departing from Lombardo and Bell), and gives an unfortunately brief explanation of his decision that is not entirely satisfying. Explaining that the Greek equivalent of 'friend', *philos*, implies 'genuine intimacy between Socrates and his interlocutor, the much more ambiguous *hetairos*, with its suggestion of membership in a political club or party, need not' (viii), Bartlett goes on to posit an analog between communist informants and the gossiploving fellow who accosts Socrates at the beginning of the *Protagoras* that is not compelling. The term 'comrade' is so laden with negative historical associations that one would have wished for a less-distracting alternative. Overall, however, the dialogue is rendered with a level of accuracy and readability that makes this translation ideal for students and beginners, and even more advanced readers of Plato.

The *Meno* is one of the most-read dialogues of Plato, notably for its introduction of the concept of learning as recollection, and the problems arising from Socrates' supposed demonstration of this concept in his famous questioning of the slave boy. Bartlett does an admirable job of rendering this dense dialogue in clear, readable prose. Socrates' conversation with the slave, in which a geometrical rule is 'recollected' by the boy, is particularly well done, including diagrams more detailed than those in the Grube translation in Cooper, ed., and inserts indicating when the slave fails to answer. The footnotes to the *Meno* translation are even more copious than the *Protagoras*, and thankfully so, given the many obscure references, word-plays, and variant manuscript readings. However, two minor criticisms are to be noted, one of the translation, the other to an uncited reference in a footnote.

At 81d, Bartlett translates *eristikôi logôi* over-literally as 'eristic account'. Given the primary definition of *eristikos* as someone who enjoys battle or strife, and that this term came to be connected with sophistry, Grube's rendering of the Greek as 'debater's argument' is more apt, if only because it leads one to think immediately of the sophists, whom Socrates clearly has in mind here.

The other criticism has to do with a reference to the quote from Pindar at 81b-c. Bartlett footnotes this passage thus: 'Commentators have generally assumed Pindar to be the author of these lines, but their authorship is uncertain' (107, note 51). The Pindar passage is listed as 'Fragment 133' in the edition of B. Snell, and is cited without comment by Grube. Another sentence or two by Bartlett, explaining why we should doubt the attribution to Pindar, and a supporting citation, would have been helpful.

The interpretive essays are solid accounts of the main points of the dialogues, offering possible interpretations but avoiding any dogmatic stance toward these works. For example, Bartlett does well to point out how Meno's desire for immortality, and his consequent desire to possess the 'good things' for all eternity, is possibly evidence of an inherent selfishness on his part (145). The inclusion as an appendix of Xenophon's *Anabasis of Cyrus* 2.6.21-7, dealing with the demise of Meno, provides compelling evidence from Antiquity for Bartlett's suggestion regarding Meno's character.

The interpretive essay on the *Protagoras* contains one point for criticism, and that has to do with Bartlett's assessment of Zeus and his relationship to the human race in the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus recounted by Protagoras. Bartlett remarks: 'Zeus cares for the human race; i.e., he is indifferent to the fate of individuals,' and describes this as a 'dark picture of the human condition' (73). This is a rather anachronistic value judgment, for one will recall the Homeric gods and their intrigues, in which individual human beings — even heroes — were simply tools to be used for divine ends, whether noble or ignoble. The concept of a personal, providential God is not part of the Classical Greek tradition. Even Plato never conceived of his transcendent Good (*R* 509b.9) as personally involved in the lives of individuals. This was a task reserved for the daimons.

These admittedly mild criticisms aside, the overall value of Bartlett's translation is very high. The footnotes are extraordinarily helpful; the prose is clear and readable; and the interpretive essays will surely prove to be an excellent source of classroom discussion. This volume is a welcome addition to Plato scholarship.

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Thomas W. Polger
Natural Minds.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2004.
Pp. xxvii + 294.
US$38.00. ISBN 0-262-16221-0.

The ostensible purpose of Thomas Polger's *Natural Minds* is to mount a defense of the brain-mind identity theory. But the core of the book is a sustained and multi-faceted attack on the 'received' functionalist account of mind. There are several reasons for this, which become ever clearer as Polger proceeds to elegantly eviscerate functionalism.

One is that the identity theory is severely underspecified. This has always been admitted by proponents, who use the hoary old 'c-fibres' example to stand in for whatever future science will correlate with mental activity. But Polger makes a more important point here. It is not simply that we are at a loss about which brain states peg onto familiar mental states — we don't even have candidate states. We do not yet possess a theory that categorizes brain states in the right way to 'match up' with mental states. As early science stood with respect to the physical basis of thermodynamical properties, so our science now stands to the physical basis of the mind. We need to find a better way to think about the brain before we can hope to find mental states in the cerebrum (and, alas, mental states are not likely to turn out to be simple mathematical transforms of neural properties, as temperature turned out to be just the straight average of molecular kinetic energy). Call this the 'specificity problem'.

This radical underspecification explains why Polger can't really spend too much time developing the identity theory *per se*. Another reason for focusing on anti-functionalism is that it has been widely accepted that the identity theory has been refuted by the very considerations that support functionalism. Although there is less consensus on this than a few years ago, functionalism remains the mainstream account of the mind-body relation. Polger thus faces the question of why we should dump functionalism for what is really only the *hope* for a future unification of mind and brain. Functionalism has the advantage of intentionally linking the mental and physical at a highly abstract level, which frees it from delving into messy physiological details and of course supports the widespread intuition that mental states are 'multiply realizable'. In fact, we might be forgiven for thinking that functionalism is the royal road to the *solution* of the 'specificity problem', for the famous Ramsey-Lewis method of abstractly representing the functional structure of the mind should at least give us a clue about what the mysterious brain states we seek do, and how they interact. The research program is then to invent the categorization scheme that lets us find *those* brain states.

Polger's *riposte* is that functionalism is a bankrupt theory which is either false or will at best reduce to some form of the identity theory. This attack is intricate, complex, multi-faceted and should worry any functionalist. Polger turns the specificity problem around and presents the functionalist with a dilemma. How do we know that, appropriately described, all enminded creatures *do not* share some common physical property (think again of temperature)? But — the other horn — even if we doubt such a high level physical description is possible, why believe that diverse creatures can have the *same* mental states? After all, it is common wisdom that everybody's experiences are somewhat different than everyone else's. Identity theory is happy to embrace species specific, or even finer, identities.

Polger charges functionalism with internal problems as well. He outlines four desiderata that functionalism ought to satisfy: causal efficacy of mental states, objective existence of mental states, synchrony of realization (roughly, realized states should supervene locally on realizing states) and biological abstractness of mental states (this is the core idea behind multiple realizability). Polger then weaves an intricate argument that involves showing how functionalisms of various kinds (and Polger distinguishes *many* forms) threaten to fail to satisfy one or another of these desiderata (e.g., biofunctionalism may fail the efficacy test, due to its function-externalism). These failings have been disguised by the complexity and convoluted history of functionalism, which Polger is at pains to delineate. In effect, Polger claims that functionalists have been illicitly bolstering the plausibility of the doctrine by a kind of equivocation.

One such equivocation is over the core term 'function' itself. There are now a number of different theories of functions, and Polger effectively explores the pitfalls of mixing and matching them. But Polger once again sees a deeper problem and more significant point, which is the conflation of function and *mechanism*. There are lots of mechanisms in nature but not quite so many functions. One random example, drawn from a textbook: the *mechanism* of star formation in the Milky Way. We know quite a lot about this mechanism. It is a specific physical process. It is certainly *not* the function of the Milky Way to make stars. At the limit, any relatively confined and inter-related causal system might be called a mechanism. Sometimes functionalists seem to mean little more than this when they talk of 'causal role'. Polger argues that a functionalism without functions is not worth the name and, in that case, is entirely compatible with identity theory.

The identity theory is not without problems of its own. There is the issue of zombies, which Polger takes on in a very brave chapter. Yes, functionally isomorphic zombies are possible according to the identity theory, for distinct mechanisms that lead to the same overt behaviour could not be the *same* mental state and may be *no* mental state at all. Identity theory also appears to endorse the bizarre idea (first explicitly put forth as an anti-materialist argument by Roland Puccetti, I believe) that mental states can exist in a petri dish, so long as the appropriate mechanism is maintained (which may be far less than an entire cognitive system). Polger is willing to bite these bullets and urges that they are not so very unpalatable.

I confess to a lingering affection for multiple realizability. Why could mental states not depend upon 'network properties', such as connectivity? These are surely not *physical* properties in any significant sense of the term. Various mechanisms could implement the same kinds of connectivity. Why should we think they will all share some one, abstract physical property? More abstractly, if Martian and Earthling use different 'mechanisms' in their mental machinery they must have different mental states. But insofar as they are both conscious beings they will share the mental property of 'what-it-is-likeness'; they will both be in states with a subjective aspect. They share these properties, even if they differ as to exactly how things look, sound and feel to them, so the identity theory asserts they must share a physical state as well. I fear we remain quite clueless about what physical state could marshal all conscious states together and underlie their common subjectivity.

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Naomi Reshotko, ed.
Desire, Identity and Existence:
Essays in Honour of T. M. Penner.
Kelowna, BC: Academic Printing & Publishing
2003. Pp. ix + 300.
Cdn$/US$74.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-920980-84-8);
Cdn$/US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-920980-85-6).

An undergraduate once confessed to me that, after hours of trying to understand the first book of Plato's *Republic*, she became so frustrated that she closed the book and threw it against the wall. I expect many other readers of Plato have had similar inclinations. Terrence Penner claims to find a clear teaching in these dialogues, or rather two teachings, one in the aporetic dialogues and another in the non-aporetic dialogues. Penner and others base the teaching in the aporetic dialogues on Socrates' claim that virtue is knowledge. This claim they interpret to mean that knowing what is right is sufficient for doing what is right. Since the latter is not the view expressed in the non-aporetic dialogues, Penner and others argue that Plato abandoned this part of Socrates' teaching. Penner's chief contribution to defending this position is to argue that this intellectualist view of human motivation is plausible in the first place, thereby countering the argument that this couldn't be Socrates' view because nobody with any brains — including, presumably, Socrates — would believe anything so implausible.

In his contribution to this volume in Penner's honour, Christopher Rowe agrees that the question of what is required to get people to do the right thing is the best place to look for the difference between Socrates and Plato, rather than in the separate existence of the Forms, the difference highlighted by Aristotle. The Socratic project, Rowe says, was 'not only innocent of metaphysics, but probably combinable with a whole range of possible metaphysical views' (20). While conceding that there are ways of reconciling the apparent doctrinal differences between the aporetic and non-aporetic dialogues, he agrees with Penner that the best explanation for these differences lies in Plato's subsequent recognition of the importance of irrational desires, the ones that can prevent us from acting for the sake of what we know to be good.

Other articles in this collection take up this question. James Butler argues that Plato was an intellectual hedonist because he believed the exercise of the intellect was not a component of happiness, but the means that produced the greatest predominance of pleasure over pain. George Rudebusch argues that Socrates was neither a moral egoist nor a eudaemonist because both of these define the good in relation to the agent; the only difference is that the eudaemonist includes the good of others in his own good. Socrates, says Rudebusch, held an agent-neutral position, where the perfection of human nature is the goal, regardless of whose happiness it is. Scott Berman offers a defense of psychological egoism, which he takes to be the position Socrates defends in several aporetic dialogues. Berman holds that for Socrates the good of others is not intrinsically good. Michael Taber seems to agree. Taber argues that when the good of others is necessary to our own welfare, there is no difference between treating others as means to our own happiness or as constituent parts of it. Taber thinks that it is difficult to tell which view is held by Socrates in the early Platonic dialogues. The good of others might simply be the means necessary for one's own good, even if the latter is the care of one's soul.

According to Penner's interpretation of Socrates' account of human motivation, we desire only what is truly good, not something under a description in which it appears to be good. In the *Meno* and *Gorgias*, Mariana Anagnostopoulos counters, Socrates seems to be talking about mistaken beliefs about the goodness of the object desired. It may be that we want whatever we desire to be truly good. Still, the apparent goodness of the object does seem to be crucial to its being desired.

It is difficult enough to discover the views of the historical Socrates in the aporetic dialogues, given their apparently inconclusive character. It becomes even more difficult in the face of Socrates' reputation for speaking ironically. One possible example of ironic speech is found in Socrates' last words, his admonition to Crito to pay the debt they owed to Asclepius. Why would a dying man owe a debt to the god of healing? Sandra Peterson argues that Socrates believed he had incurred a debt to Asclepius for the great self-control he displayed in the final days of his life. But does this remove the enigma of Socrates' last words? One can understand why Socrates would have been grateful that he had not lost his self-control as he approached death. Still, why thank Asclepius for this? Peterson's interpretation presupposes that Asclepius wanted Socrates to be true to the principles of Socratic ethics. If this is correct, once again Socratic piety turns out to be an expression of thanks to the gods for encouraging people to behave in just the way Socrates says they should.

David Estlund considers whether Plato's programme for the rule of wise persons could be realized in a modern democracy. While conceding that there are kinds of knowledge that are useful for political rulers, he rejects John Stuart Mill's suggestion that more educated persons be given more votes. Such a scheme is unwarranted, he argues, because there is no guarantee that more educated persons will exercise their power justly. This could be construed as a comment on modern education, but it also makes the rule of Plato's philosopher-kings appear more plausible: there seems to be no alternative to Plato's programme of education for coming up with rulers who are both wise and just.

David Sachs charged that Socrates never proves in the *Republic* that a just person, one with a well-ordered soul, will also be just in the sense of not harming others. Penner argued that Plato is not guilty of the fallacy of irrelevance here because this psychological state is what determines the true nature of justice, including which actions turn out to be just. Gerasimos Santas wonders whether this defence is adequate.

Patrick Mooney argues that Plato's criticisms of the poets in *Republic X* is not so much that they are copying something, but that they are copying the wrong thing, namely copies of the Forms rather than the Forms themselves, and thereby implicitly deny the existence of the Forms. Melinda Hogan considers a possible parallel raised by Penner between an argument made by Plato in the *Phaedo* for the separate existence of Forms and an argument made by Frege for the difference between sense and reference. Antonio Chu looks at Socrates' discussion of false judgment in the *Theaetetus* and considers how it might be construed as an argument against Frege's account of false judgment. Alan Code carefully examines Aristotle's uses of the terms 'actuality' and 'potentiality.' Aristotle is famous for his claim that 'being' and many other important philosophical terms are used in several different, though related ways. Yet so often commentators use these terms without any clear indication of which of the senses distinguished by Aristotle is being employed. It is nice to see attention being paid to their various meanings.

These articles, together with an introduction by Naomi Reshotko, provide a detailed and stimulating discussion of several topics in ancient Greek philosophy dear to Penner's heart, and indicate the fruitfulness of his approach. In addition, they reveal how difficult the aporetic dialogues truly are, and yet these are the works most often assigned to introductory philosophy students. It is a wonder that our university campuses don't echo more to the sound of Plato's dialogues striking the walls of our students' rooms.

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David Sedley, ed.
The Cambridge Companion to
Greek and Roman Philosophy.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xvi + 396.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-77285-0);
US$24.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-77503-5).

The aim of this book is to provide 'a suitable entry route' to an understanding of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy (6). In a useful introduction, David Sedley points out that the value of ancient philosophy lies partly in the difference of its conclusions from modern ones. This book surveys the field in a series of chapters by leading scholars. The contributions cover important areas of classical philosophy: major figures, movements, periods, and topics.

The writing is always clear and often lively. Decked out with a couple of maps, a few illustrations, charts of figures and works, a glossary, and a bibliography, the book can provide students with a great deal of information and a basic understanding of the major thinkers and movements. While the book surveys a great deal, the editor regretfully omits treatments of 'minor' schools including the Cynics, Megarians and Cyrenaics (11-12).

In the first chapter, Jonathan Barnes discusses 'Arguments in Ancient Philosophy'. Barnes is dazzling as usual, jumping from Aristotle to the Stoics to Proclus to Plato to Sextus, covering also Christian writers, Plotinus, and so on. His main thesis is that Aristotle's view of science as a deductive system is overstated and indefensible. Barnes provides many insights, but one wonders whether a more pedestrian presentation might meet the needs of a neophyte better.

Malcolm Schofield contributes Chapter 2 on 'The Presocratics'. He provides a nice survey of the major figures. I am disappointed to see that he calls Anaximenes the 'last and least of the Milesian triad' (50) (Anaximenes deserves better), and to see him attempting a partial rehabilitation of Pythagoras (54). (Students should be hit over the head several times with Walter Burkert's *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* until they realize that we do not know anything about him as a philosopher.) In his presentation of fifth-century thought, Schofield presents the atomists before Anaxagoras, without warning the reader that Anaxagoras preceded the atomists by a generation, thus inviting an anachronistic understanding of the period.

Sarah Broadie writes on 'The Sophists and Socrates'. Putting Socrates together with the sophists is a good choice: it stresses their common interests and allows us to see Socrates in his historical context, as in competition with the sophists. Broadie provides a useful survey of several key figures and their thought. She concludes that the sophists' 'hyperbolic devotion to rhetoric makes sense only if there are no realities beyond the appearances' (96). There is, however, another alternative, suggested by Isocrates: even if there are realities, the complexity of their interactions can also provide a reason for preferring probabilistic reasoning to allegedly demonstrative argumentation.

Christopher Rowe's chapter 'Plato' discusses Plato's life and some important themes of the dialogues. Having explained the division of the corpus into early, middle, and late dialogues, Rowe mentions different styles of interpretation. Oddly, he equates the analytic reading with the ancient sceptical tendency (119-20), although analytic readers often attribute positive doctrines to Plato. He supports the developmental reading against the unitarian.

John Cooper's chapter 'Aristotle' surveys Aristotle's life, work, and influence. He expounds different areas of Aristotle's philosophy in the traditional order of the corpus, in a clear, non-partisan account.

The chapter on 'Hellenistic Philosophy' by Sedley and Jacques Brunschwig is one of several chapters treating different periods of post-Aristotelian philosophy. The authors present sections on Pyrrho, Epicurus, the Stoa, and sceptical movements after Pyrrho in a helpful discussion.

A. A. Long discusses 'Roman Philosophy', arguing that it deserves consideration separate from Greek movements that it is dependent on. But the only evidence he cites for his thesis is the influence Roman philosophy exercised in Renaissance and later times, and that owing mainly to its being 'written in accessible Latin' (184-5). This is hardly a resounding justification of its unique character and content. Long treats Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca at some length, and more briefly follows developments down to Boethius.

Martha Nussbaum considers aesthetic theory and practice and its connections with philosophy in her chapter 'Philosophy and Literature'. She presents the views of Plato and Aristotle on literature, especially tragedy, and then discusses Hellenistic philosophical literature. Her treatment is rich and covers much ground, but I miss a discussion of Timon of Phlius, who was a pioneer in philosophical satire. Perhaps Cynic writers should also have been mentioned for creating the diatribe form later practiced by Epictetus, as presented by his scribe Arrian. On the other hand, sometimes less is more, and perhaps a more limited survey is better.

Frans A. J. de Haas discusses 'Late Ancient Philosophy' insofar as it is post-Hellenistic and non-Roman. He divides the subject into two periods, one from Philo of Larissa to Plotinus, the other from Porphyry to Stephanus. In the first period, thinkers were dedicated to 'establishing the universal truth', drawing on the old Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, and a revival of Pythagoreanism (242-4). In the second period, philosophers aimed at 'exploring the universal truth', often in commentaries with a Neoplatonic agenda; during this period Christianity had a growing, then decisive influence, which de Haas notes in general but ignores in detail (242, 244-6). He explains the philosophical curriculum as it became standardized after Plotinus, and goes through its main stages.

R. J. Hankinson's chapter 'Philosophy and Science' briefly surveys topics in science from Thales on down. Hankinson covers medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and astrology *inter alia*. He also deals with methodological controversies such as that between teleology and mechanism. Hankinson covers much ground, but he provides more data here than can be easily digested by a beginning student.

Glenn Most treats of 'Philosophy and Religion', explaining the main features of traditional Greek religion and then discussing how philosophy interacts with it. He points out that the aim of philosophical theology was generally to improve rather than to destroy religion. He rehearses the views of various philosophers on the gods, and then points out that philosophy is often seen as a religious way of life. One might add that for some, including Philo of Alexandria, religion can be seen as a philosophical way of life.

In the final chapter, Jill Kraye explains 'The Legacy of Ancient Philosophy', stressing influences from the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries. She presents a historical survey of rediscoveries of ancient texts and revivals of ancient thought. The rediscovery of Aristotle changed the course of medieval philosophy and made Aristotle the dominant figure throughout the period discussed. But Plato, scepticism, Epicureanism, and Stoicism made important comebacks.

The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy provides a feast of materials and insights into them. Many chapters contain charts of figures or works of an author with dates or content, to help sort things out. The 350 pages of text are packed with discussion of figures, theories, and developments. The very scope of the undertaking may perhaps be a cause for concern. The beginning student on taking this 'entry route' into ancient philosophy will quickly find himself on an information superhighway. Not only will he meet Plotinus, but also Aspasius, Alexander of Aphrodisius, Calcidius, Porphyry, Themistius, Iamblichus, Dexippus, Syrianus, Hermias, Proclus, Hierocles ... And that is only a partial list of figures from a single chapter.

Will the philosophically and historically challenged beginner be able to digest the rich fare of this banquet? Certainly, the student can track down thinkers and their works; yet perhaps a less comprehensive survey might have been more serviceable. Inevitably, a historical survey of philosophy is difficult to package neatly. The most obvious anomaly in the present case is the fact that post-Aristotelian philosophy is covered in three historically oriented chapters and several more topically oriented chapters. The chapter on Hellenistic philosophy, which is supposed to parallel the Hellenistic period from 322 to 27 BC in fact goes on to treat Sextus, from the second century AD; the chapter on Roman philosophy starts with Lucretius in the mid-first century BC; and the section on later ancient philosophy overlaps the period of Roman philosophy and ignores early Christian philosophy. The volume itself suggests another ordering that might be at least slightly more perspicuous: Hellenistic philosophy to Sulla's sack of Athens in 86 BC, which effectively put an end to the Academy and Lyceum, and brought Aristotle's writings to Rome; a period in which Rome was a major center of philosophy, whether Latin or Greek speaking, i.e., down to the time of Plotinus; and a time of scholasticism and ideology thereafter. There is no perfect classification, but this seems less artificial than the one used in the book.

The present work will be an invaluable resource for the library and a boon companion for the instructor's own bookshelf. Whether it will serve as a supplementary textbook will depend on how much time is available for it and how much information the instructor wants to convey to students.

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William Paul Simmons
An-Archy and Justice: An Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas' Political Thought.
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2003.
Pp. xi + 143.
US$65.00. ISBN 0-7391-0703-8.

With *An-archy and Justice*, William Simmons (Political Science, Arizona State University West) has indeed written an *introduction* to Levinas' political thought (or, more accurately, an introduction to the possible implications of Levinas' thought for politics), as the sub-title of the work suggests, rather than delivering on the promise of the work's 'Introduction' to 'fill the void' left by Levinas himself, so far inadequately filled by scholars, by attempting 'to systematically develop [Levinas'] political thought' (1).

The book is divided (although there is no formal indication of this in the Table) into two parts: first (in Chapters 1-3), an introduction of Levinas' thought in general (with the occasional gesture toward what some particular point might mean for politics), and then (in Chapters 4-7), an examination of the import of Levinas' thought for politics. As an introduction to Levinas, Simmons' first three chapters are overly ambitious (attempting to cover 'Levinas' Critique of the Western Philosophical Tradition', and to provide, in a short chapter each, an overview of Levinas' two *magna opera*, *Totality and Infinity* and *Otherwise than Being*). Moreover, an overdependence on Levinasian jargon — perhaps endemic to any attempt to cover so much so quickly — often obscures the path to clarity. The task of an effective introduction is, I propose, not to explain by means of jargon, but to explain the jargon. Of these three chapters, however, the best is the third, by which time Simmons seems to have hit something of a stride.

As a venture into Levinas' political thought (or the implications of Levinas for political thought — a distinction perhaps insufficiently attended to by Simmons), Simmons often merely collects and simplifies ideas from bigger, and far more complex, books on the topic, although, to Simmons' credit, he does so in a fairly straightforward manner that avoids the rather labyrinthine prose that any more nuanced engagement of Levinas seems to demand. Simmons' central thesis throughout his development of Levinas' politics is that such entails 'a never-ending oscillation between ethics and politics' (65), between, as reflected in his title, 'an-archy and justice' (75). Chapter 4 tells how in Levinas' thought ethics, the responsibility for the singular other, is forced toward justice, the responsibility for each and all, across the coming of 'the third' person who interrupts the purity of the face-to-face. (But, *pace* Simmons, is the relationship between ethics and justice one of 'oscillation', or is ethics the 'inspiration' for justice, the 'spirit' or 'depth structure' of justice, and thus enacted *across* justice in a relationship better described as a simultaneity?) Subsequent chapters deal with Levinas' reading and criticism of the Western tradition of political thought, in particular liberalism (Chapter 5), modern and post-modern anti-humanism (Chapter 6), and international relations, focussed on Levinas' writings on Zionism (Chapter 7). Simmons' 'Conclusion: The Questioning of Levinas' serves as a summary of the book.

The chief limitation of this book is that each of the two main tasks Simmons undertakes in it have been better achieved elsewhere. If one wants an introduction to Levinas, one is better off looking, for instance, to A. Peperzak's *To the Other*. And if one wants to study and question the political from out of a Levinasian orientation, more substantial books are available, such as B. Bergo's *Levinas between Ethics and Politics*. The value of this book is that in it an introduction to the thought of Levinas and this thought's potential import for politics appear together, and flow into each other. Indeed, if one wants a relatively quick and provocative introduction to 'Levinas and political thought' (useful perhaps for undergraduates, or for someone who wants to see if Levinas 'resonates' with them before making a more serious intellectual investment), and one from the side of political science rather than from the side of philosophy, then Simmons' book might well serve that purpose. Careful and sustained exegetical work is sacrificed here for the sake of covering a lot of ground fast; for some purposes, that is not such a bad thing.

On a wider view, one might ask oneself whether the 'systematic development of Levinas' political thought', the value of which is unquestioned for Simmons, but which Levinas himself did not undertake (and that — by Simmons' reading, at least — has been underattended to by scholars), might be underdeveloped precisely because the thrust and import of Levinas' thought does not lend itself to the '*systematic* development' of political thought. Might Simmons' own 'failure' in this book to systematically develop Levinas' political thought not be more consistent with Levinas than the 'successful' execution of his plan would have allowed him to be? For does Levinas' thought have anything more to say about the development of the science of politics than it does the science of biology, for example? Levinas is not concerned, one could argue, with the development of the sciences in terms of their internal structures, but with calling the sciences (all of them, including philosophy) to account, with referring the sciences, whatever their internal structures, to the face of the other to whom their practitioners are responsible, and it is part and parcel of his resistance to totality thought that this other of the sciences not be able to be incorporated into the sciences that answer to it, that is, that the systematic development of the disciplines cannot contain 'the other'. So Levinas has much to say to political theorists, as he has much to say to biologists, but there is no more reason to believe that there would be a 'Levinasian politics' than there is to believe that there would be a 'Levinasian biology' (or, technically speaking, a 'Levinasian philosophy' — but that is a more complex matter). Levinas is interested in the (ethical) condition of possibility for discourse, any discourse, including that of politics, and so his thought does have profound implications for 'politics' ('Levinas lays a foundation — and at the same time some dynamite — under institutions,' as Theodore de Boer so aptly puts it), but it may well be that his discourse on discourse, his meta-discourse, neither lends itself to, nor pretends to, the 'systematic development of politics'. Simmons is not unaware of these difficulties, but his language, the language of 'Levinas' politics', often betrays a forgetfulness, and with that the possibility of a more refined consideration, of them.

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Barry Smith, ed.
John Searle.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xi + 292.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-79288-6);
US$20.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-79704-7).

Over a period of forty or more years, John Searle has covered a considerable amount of philosophical territory. This collection of eleven papers is one of the first 'comprehensive introduction[s] to John Searle's work' (i), including papers on speech acts, the intentionality of perception, consciousness, the Chinese Room Argument, and Searle's more recent views on social constructions, freedom and rationality. Neophyte readers will find the book highly accessible because it consists of clearly written papers introduced by Barry Smith's highly informative introductory paper. For those familiar with Searle's work, though many of the papers contain substantial exposition, explication, and defense, at least half of them contain sufficient critical or elaborative argumentation to be of significant interest. Given Searle's sizeable impact on analytic Philosophy, the book is a welcome introductory exploration of Searle's philosophical work.

Largely shaped by the seven years he spent at Oxford (1952-59) under the tutelage of Ryle, Strawson and, especially, Austin, Searle rejected the prevalent 1950's view that 'major philosophical problems' can be dissolved by linguistic analysis (1-2). In its stead, Smith tells us (2), Searle has developed a down-to-earth, realist approach to genuine philosophical problems, which, grounded on the correspondence theory of truth, rejects philosophical theories (e.g., linguistic behaviorism, eliminative materialism) by reduction to absurdity and attempts to 'build' a 'unified theory of mind, language, and society' from the knowledge of the various scientific disciplines.

Searle's career began, mainly, with work on speech acts (1962, 1965, 1969). Performative utterances, Austin told us, are actions that 'bring about some result' (5), and which may or may not be successful. Austin endeavoured to categorize and catalogue a large number of 'expressions' and 'actions', but it was Searle who provided 'a theoretical framework' for unifying speech acts through 'rules [*regulative* and *constitutive*], meanings, and facts' (6). 'The central hypothesis of Searle's [1969 *Speech Acts* is that] speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with certain constitutive rules' (7).

In 'Intentions, Promises, and Obligations', Leo Zaibert claims that 'promises are the most important' speech act that Searle investigates, because, in promising, we 'create social reality by engaging in speech acts that give rise to obligations' (52-3). Zaibert argues that, despite Searle's famous 'How to Derive "Ought" from "Is" ', Searle's system 'neglects the realm of morality', which is 'significant' because morality and moral obligations constitute a very important part of the world.

George P. Fletcher offers a further analysis of Searle's theory of speech acts by analyzing Searle's treatment of the 'counts as' relationship in connection with the law. Fletcher grants that this relationship 'presupposes the use of language', but, interestingly, he argues that it does not follow that 'brute facts exist prior to their description in a language' (87), for without language, a world of objects would lack 'differentiation' and hence would not constitute individuated (brute) facts. Unfortunately, this suggestion, reminiscent of problems with logical atomism, is not connected with logical atomism nor pursued to a terminus.

In 'Action', Joëlle Proust investigates Searle's unorthodox attempt in *Intentionality* (1983) to show how 'actions performed without a prior intention are still intentional' (102). Utilizing Searle's 'conditions of satisfaction' and 'direction of fit' notions, Proust explicates Searle's untraditional 'intention-in-action' and questions whether it can accommodate impulsive actions (106).

'Consciousness is central to John Searle's philosophy of mind,' Neil Manson argues in 'Consciousness', for, according to Searle, 'mind, meaning, and social reality depend upon consciousness' (128). According to Manson, Searle overcomes our philosophical problem with consciousness (a natural, *unproblematic* phenomenon) by offering a 'higher-level property' account of consciousness, which constitutes a foundation for 'his theory of intentionality, linguistic meaning, and social reality' (148) while avoiding dualism and various forms of reductionism (144-5).

Fred Dretske's 'The Intentionality of Perception' is undoubtedly the most critical paper in this collection. Dretske argues that Searle is mistaken in claiming that perceptual experiences have intentionality (i.e., intentional, 'self-referential content') and that 'nothing much works in the way Searle says it works,' since Searle's 'theory of experience' 'is the cornerstone of his theory of intentionality, mind, and language' (156). The crux of Dretske's disagreement with Searle lies in Searle's claim that 'all seeing is seeing *that*' (*Intentionality*, 1983, 40). Dretske rejects this claim, saying that '[o]ne can see, hear, or feel a yellow station wagon without knowing what a yellow station wagon is' (160). On Dretske's view, it is true that 'Bob sees Alice' even if 'Bob believes he sees Greta' — on Searle's view, 'Bob sees Alice' is false if 'Bob believes he sees Greta' is true. One wonders, contra Dretske, first, whether one can see anything without seeing something *as* something (e.g., 'Freda sees something larger than a breadbox and smaller than an elephant moving over by the cottage, in the dark — but isn't sure what it is'), and, second, whether if 'Bob believes he sees Greta' is true, 'Bob sees Alice' is false, though 'Alice is the object that is causing Bob's visual experience' is true?

In 'The Limits of Expressibility', François Recanati examines Searle's rejection of the 'largely unquestioned' 'Determination View', which claims that 'meaning determines truth conditions' (189). According to Recanati, Searle rejects the Determination view because he rejects 'contextualism' in favour of the 'Principle of Expressibility', which states that 'the content of a speech act — what the speaker communicates and the hearer understands — cannot be equated with the content of the sentence uttered in performing that speech act' (193).

In Chapter 10, 'The Chinese Room Argument', Josef Moural explicates Searle's most famous argument, as Searle presented it in 1980 and more recently. Though Moural's explication is very clear at many junctures, he is mistaken in saying that '[t]he Chinese Room is intended by Searle primarily as a polemic device against the research program that he calls *strong Artificial Intelligence*' (221). Strong A.I. is a claim, not a research program, and Searle's aim is to refute this claim. Moural argues, without cogency, that the Systems Reply forces Searle to 'claim only "I implement the program and it is conceivable that no understanding occurs"' rather than 'no understanding occurs' (251).

The remaining three papers — Nick Fotion's 'From Speech Acts to Speech Activity', Brian O'Shaughnessy's 'Sense Data', and Kevin Mulligan's 'Searle, Derrida, and the Ends of Phenomenology' — offer, respectively, a sketch of one way in which Searle's theory of speech acts could be extended as a theory of speech *activity* (i.e., 'discourse', 'language-games'), one type of sense-datum theory that 'can handle objections of the kind John Searle makes to sense-datum theories generally' (171), and an exploration of Searle's criticisms of Continental Philosophy. Most noteworthy in these three papers are Mulligan's dual claims (Endnote #43) that 'the three most influential philosophers of the twentieth century' were 'Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Derrida' and that all three 'arrived at the view that what they were doing ... was not a part of philosophy' (285-6). The first claim is false if only because Russell must displace one of Heidegger or Derrida. The second claim is strange since Mulligan seems aware (286) that the later Wittgenstein viewed genuine Philosophy as a type of therapy.

John Searle offers us very interesting examinations of the work of one of the most important philosophers of the past fifty years. It will be up to the reader to decide, however, whether, as Smith claims, Searle's 'work represents a new way of doing philosophy' (29).

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Jordan Howard Sobel
Logic and Theism:
Arguments for and against beliefs in God.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. xix + 652.
US$95.00. ISBN 0-521-82607-1.

Within natural theology and philosophy of religion, arguments for and against the existence of God have been given, claiming that someone following only the lead of reason would see thus that there is a God or that there cannot be. There are a number of these arguments and the literature, corresponding to the importance of the matter in point, is vast. Howard Sobel has written a monumental study of some 650 pages (the last hundred being notes) outlining the most (in)famous of these arguments. The book gives a detailed reconstruction of each argument, and discusses in a balanced way proposals for improving the argument in question. Not only given its length, but more so the succinct and precise way Sobel puts the matter, this is by far the most comprehensive and detailed discussion in a single volume that is around.

As the title suggests, Sobel uses the tools of logic to reconstruct the arguments. The main text of a chapter contains the discussion, the formalization of the argument in question, and in most cases informal reasoning for or against belief in God. Appendices in the chapters set out the tools used and present the proper proofs for the claims made or proper formal renderings of the informal proofs given. The logic used consists mainly of First Order Logic in a somewhat unusual natural deduction format, to which one can, however, easily adapt. Some arguments need some basic modal logic; others use basic set or probability theory and Bayesianism. Anyone who has mastered a course in First Order Logic and has heard of the other fields should have no difficulties. (There are, as usual in books with lots of formulae, a few typos, but the reader following the text can always guess what should be written there.) I recommend this book to anyone interested either in the philosophy of religion as such or in the painstaking reconstruction of non-trivial philosophical arguments.

The book is divided in five parts. The first chapter, a part all on its own, concerns the concept of divinity. The second part concerns arguments for the existence of God, and consists of a chapter on the classical ontological arguments, one on modern modal ontological arguments, one on Gödel's ontological proof, one on Aquinas' proof by first causes, one on cosmological arguments, one on arguments from design, and a chapter on miracles. The third part deals with the common conception of God, and consists of one chapter dealing with the concept of omnipotence and one dealing with omniscience. The fourth part contains the arguments against the existence of God, one chapter dealing with evidential arguments from evil, one dealing with the logical problem of evil. The fifth part dealing with practical arguments for and against God consists of a single chapter presenting several versions and refinements of Pascal's wager.

What is missing is a chapter or an introduction reflecting on what the book is doing. This is unfortunate for two reasons. First, religious people supposedly do not believe because God was proven to them. They do not expect Him to be disprovable; the very idea of approaching faith in this philosophical (i.e., fallible) manner is anathema for a stout believer. Thus it is necessary to reflect why there is natural theology and who uses it for what (as, for example, Aquinas claims that it *supports* belief …). Second, no argument establishes just a conclusion. An argument establishes a conclusion given its premises *and* the logic used. So given some conclusion supposedly establishing the existence or non-existence of God, a critic can always either turn the argument around seeing it as an argument against one of the premises *or* can claim that either the logic used is not sound, or at least not sound as applied in this area. The latter option is the more live one, as we have seen a number of non-classical and philosophical logics — and even set theories — coming up in the last century. Thus the discussion of some argument for or against God has to reflect both options. This methodological meta-reflection is missing in the book, although Sobel in fact often tries to cover both ways of reacting (e.g., when discussing the employed set theoretical principles in arguments against the consistency of omniscience).

Sobel does not give concluding recommendations whether one should or should not believe in God, but he dismisses some of the traditional arguments and sees greater strength in others. Some classical ontological arguments (e.g., Descartes') are rejected, since the move to define something into existence seems not only too suspect, but in actual fact can be shown to fail logically in misusing existential quantification. Others (e.g., one going back to Anselm) presuppose that what is conceivable is possible. This, however, is a very controversial thesis itself. And on this assumption the modern modal versions (e.g., by Plantinga) of the ontological argument are — despite their formal sophistication — no improvement. Too permissive tools of cross-world definition of concepts deliver not only God, but dragons and whatever you like to have around! Gödel's proof, on the other hand, really works (given the logical background), but the concept of 'God-like being' that is employed is much too wide to resemble the classical concept of God — Gödel proves too much. Arguments from first causes rely on a questionable principle of sufficient reason; a strong version of it (in Leibniz) yields the breakdown of all modal distinctions (i.e., makes the world itself necessary). A principle of complete reasons goes against the existence of contingent truths. Arguments from design received their death blow from evolutionary explanations. Swinburne's cumulative design argument contains a fallacy in probabilistic reasoning with cumulative evidence. Hume's argument against believing in miracles can be given a formally valid rendering.

The common conception of God Sobel takes to include a strong conception of omniscience and omnipotence, where 'strong' is spelled out either as 'at all times' or 'essentially'. These distinctions generate — not only in these two chapters — several versions of the argument under discussion. Essential omnipotence turns out to be definable, but not applicable, since the famous counter-argument of making a stone one cannot lift goes through. Grim's more recent arguments against omniscience, arguing by Cantor's Theorem against the existence of a set of truths and thus against the possibility of a set of all 'things' an omniscient being knows, can be modified in a way that relies less on ontological controversial assumptions about propositions and that uses weaker set-theoretical principles. Still these (valid) arguments make use of diagonalization assumptions that may be at least controversial. Sobel finds fault with Rowe's evidential argument from evil, but assents to the incompatibility of evil and the existence of a *perfect* being. The wagers in the manner of Pascal depend heavily on the background assumptions a person the wager is offered to accepts. Once these assumptions (like God rewarding the wilful believer) are made, decision theoretic reasoning delivers a verdict on believing or not. Sobel just rejects the objection that one cannot make oneself believe something by will.

Sobel often highlights what a defender of faith had to assume to get rid of the arguments against God. (This concerns the general remark above, how arguments may be turned around or re-interpreted.) In the probabilistic cases like the miracle reports or design arguments the force of the arguments rests on the prior probabilities someone may assign. In this way probabilistic arguments can also be rejected or turned around! If — for example — the prior probability assigned to God's existence is much higher than the probability of His non-existence, then the existence of evil may not raise the probability of non-existence to over 50% (which may be taken as the crucial mark).

Sobel seems inclined to see the balance of the arguments to be in favour of rejecting God's existence, this *being taken* as the existence of a *perfect* being as conceived in philosophical theology. Some of the arguments arise out of the strict understanding of being perfect, omnipotent or omniscient. Whether these arguments have force against a somewhat reduced concept of God — as is supposedly the case in Christianity or Islam — is an open question. Sobel sees this point, but does not address such historical conceptions of God and their reply to the arguments given. That is understandable, since this may have taken some more hundred pages. However, the force of what the arguments against omnipotence, omniscience (in the third part) and the arguments from evil (in the fourth part) show thus has to be taken with caution. Defenders of faith like van Inwagen start here. Someone like van Inwagen, who certainly shares Sobel's rejection of equating conceivability with possibility, would add further scepticism on modal epistemology. Sobel's stepwise improvement of the logical argument from evil, for example, relies not only on us knowing that what we consider evil is evil, but on stepwise weakened major premises one may increasingly doubt (going from 'Evil exists' to 'If there is a best possible world, the world is improvable').

Anyone taking on the task of widening the scope of the arguments towards criticising Christianity or Islam, and anyone taking on the arguments from the mutual support of, say, the claims of a Christian *weltanschauung,* should start with Sobel's book. Since 650 pages are a lot, one may start with the chapters dealing with the ontological arguments. Here you can see best the strength, quality and sometimes originality of Sobel's work.

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David N. Stamos
The Species Problem: Biological species, ontology, and the metaphysics of biology.
New York: Lexington Books 2003. Pp. vii + 380.
US$80.00. ISBN 0-7391-0503-5.

The use of 'species' in biology predates the acceptance of evolution, and evolutionary biology provides us with no simple corresponding notion. The trouble is, at root, logical: the traditional, essentialist understanding of 'species' requires that conspecificity be an equivalence relation on organisms: reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and that it select sets of organisms closed under reproduction. But evolution tells us there is no such relation. Whatever species are, the descendents of one species may belong to any number of distinct species. The preservation of species membership under reproduction fails, as does transitivity. Nevertheless, taxonomists continue to use binomial nomenclature, marking out 'species' for both sexually and non-sexually reproducing organisms. So simply dispensing with the notion (as with phlogiston) is not an option. The result is a plethora of proposals, as philosophers and evolutionary biologists try to construct a notion that fits our taxonomic practice and that has a clear place in the conceptual framework of evolutionary biology.

The centre of this debate concerns the species *category*. The successful development and application of taxonomic systems demonstrates that there are ways of picking out species *taxa* with reasonable success, roughly as isolated, occupied regions in phenotypic space (sometimes two or more distinct regions to allow for sexual dimorphism or distinct castes). Evolutionary, ecological, reproductive and other relations of theoretical importance can be invoked to explain why it's useful to group some organisms together under a single binomial. But there does not seem to be a single general notion that covers all 'species'. We pick out different taxa by appeal to different similarities and relations between member organisms, and aside from the unilluminating fact that taxonomists pay attention to a range of similarities and interactions linking the various members of each species, there seems to be no *rule* that would, applied to each such group, come up with what are intuitively the 'right' lines.

In *The Species Problem*, David N. Stamos reviews the issues and ideas at stake. He concludes by proposing and defending his own position, which he calls the 'biosimilarity species concept'. Stamos presents an immense amount of detailed scholarly work in his review of the history and the contemporary views of various philosophers and biologists on the species question; in this regard I think the book is a substantial success, and a useful reference for anyone interested in the issue. Unfortunately, neither his philosophical critiques of these positions nor his arguments for his own are convincing.

Stamos argues that the species question must be dealt with in a broad philosophical context. He addresses, at various points, the status of universals, Quine's extensionalism, realism and anti-realism in philosophy of science, and (in the closing pages) Goodman's critique of objective similarity. None of these discussions is particularly successful, but I will restrict myself to comments on just one: Stamos' position on universals is quite puzzling. Stamos holds that one-place predicates have classes as their meanings; in turn, he identifies these classes not with each predicate's extension, but with the conditions that class members must meet (176). As abstracta, Stamos argues that such classes cannot change (and a fortiori cannot evolve); this is one of Stamos' main objections to views that identify species with such abstract classes of organisms (179). But Stamos' position on multi-place predicates (relations, which play a central role in the biosimilarity species concept) is different: the existence of relations, he argues, depends on the existence of their relata. This, he argues, makes relations a kind of intermediate entity, neither purely abstract (and so unchanging) nor purely concrete (and so mere individuals) (325-6, 336ff). This allows Stamos to claim both that his account of species allows species to evolve (which a pure 'species as the membership conditions for a class' cannot), and that it allows species to be repeatables, so that, as he sees it (and in contradistinction from Hull and Ghiselin), extinction is *not* necessarily forever. But why a similar view of the dependence of single-place predicates on the individuals that satisfy them could not allow the same mixed status for a membership-conditions view of species is left unexplained (in fact, I believe Stamos' account of taxonomic species really is just such a view).

Stamos' canonical statement of his biosimilarity species concept declares: 'A species is a primarily horizontal, all the while dynamic, phenotypic similarity complex of organisms objectively and maximally delimited by causal relations, in the case of sexual organisms mainly interbreeding, ecological, ontogenetic, and possibly social and sociomorphic relations, and in the case of asexual organisms mainly ecological, possibly gene transfer, and possibly social (e.g. colony formation) relations' (297) . Though horizontal, this view does require a 'timeslice' big enough to support the relations that bind members of a species together, and small enough for transitivity of the 'same species' relation to hold. This introduces an arbitrary line with respect to our choice of time-slice; 'How far can we go and still have transitivity?' has no non-arbitrary answer, given the vagueness of the criteria. Stamos' account focuses on types (a contrast with 'species as historical individual' views such as those of Hull and Ghiselin). This allows room for species that are not monophyletic, i.e., that have multiple origins, and for the possibility that extinct species might be resurrected. As an example, Stamos cites separate polyploidy speciations producing inter-fertile, pheno- and geno- typically indistinguishable organisms. Finally, species that are sexually dimorphic or divide into various morphologically distinct castes are united by the causal relations involved in reproduction, ecology, ontogeny, etc.

What troubles me most about this account is its vagueness. '[O]bjectively and maximally delimited' suggests that a clear and unique line will emerge when we combine the phenotypic similarity of (perhaps some sub-classes of) species members with the causal relations that link them. But when I think of difficult cases, such as ring species, or strongly marked varieties, or groups linked by a population of hybrids where their ranges overlap, there is nothing here to help me decide where this objective, maximal line should be drawn. 'Maximal' suggests we should draw it more inclusively rather than less — but this doesn't help with tradeoffs between maximality, degrees of similarity and levels of the various causal interactions.

Stamos applies his account to a wide range of highly varied taxonomic species, including sexual organisms (dealing with sibling species, sexually dimorphic species and species with morphologically distinct castes), and asexual, parthenogenetic, obligate self-fertilizing hermaphrodites and obligate sib-mating species (304ff). He quickly adopts, without much discussion, the radical, complex and challenging view that easy gene-transfer between bacteria makes all bacteria one species. This quick skate across thin ice is revealing. Given a rich list of properties and relations, choosing some that will 'cover the ground' of taxonomic practice *case by case* is easy. But it provides no account of why and when particular relations and resemblances matter more than others. Thus Stamos allows us to draw whatever lines we find intuitively convenient to draw between 'species'. But the results serve different explanatory purposes in different cases; Stamos has avoided species pluralism in name only.

I will close with remarks on two other issues. First, regarding the important problem of ring-species, over time, a single non-branching clade of organisms can cross (intuitive) species boundaries. This conceptual nettle is firmly grasped by cladists, who simply accept that such a clade is one species from beginning to end. But Stamos replies that it's often absurd to regard the populations at the beginning and end of such a clade as conspecific (263). He avoids drawing arbitrary lines in this roughly continuous process by restricting his biosimilarity species to a *horizontal* (synchronic) account of species (an interesting position for someone who also insists that species must be able to evolve). However, when he turns to the parallel but synchronic problem of ring species, Stamos' view parallels the strict cladists' view of species identity over time: 'Since the reproductive relations of a "good" ring species delimit one continuous similarity complex, and since it is phenotypic similarity, on my view, that is constitutive of species, not reproductive isolation, it seems to me that I would have to consider a ring species as a single species' (330). Here he ignores the real problem: in both cases *continuity* imposes no limits on how different the end points may be from each other. Insisting that his species concept aims only at horizontal applications allows him to avoid treating many of these kinds of cases, but his decision to reject continuity in the diachronic case while invoking it in the synchronic does not reassure us that his concept is a *principled* one with a real role to play in biological science (as opposed to a 'label of convenience' grouping organisms that are, for various biological purposes, more or less interchangeable).

Second, regarding realism, Stamos describes himself as a realist regarding not just taxonomic species, but the species category as well. I found no clear account (apart from some brief and undeveloped early remarks about explanation) of just what advantages this realism has over more pragmatic views (which allow for the usefulness of the distinctions taxonomists actually draw between various groups of organisms without having to make them fundamental aspects of the ontology of biology). Neither was I able to find an argument showing that the biosimilarity species concept proposed by Stamos really does meet some standard for realism. A less ambitious book, focused on the scholarly tasks of exposition and discussion, would serve the reader much better; in its absence, I recommend this book as a handy reference for a wide range of views on the species question, but not as an original contribution to that literature.

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Jeffrey Stout
Democracy and Tradition.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
2004. Pp. xv + 348.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-691-10293-7.

In *Democracy and Tradition,* Princeton religion professor Jeffrey Stout addresses one of the most contentious issues in contemporary American politics, that of the role of religious and other 'traditional' discourses in democracy, especially in liberal, pluralistic societies. Stout attempts to articulate a third way between the two dominant philosophical and theological positions that generally frame this debate, particularly in the U.S. The first, often called 'secular liberalism', represented by such thinkers as John Rawls and Richard Rorty, attempts to limit the discourse of public debate to a set of consensual, rational principles, and demands that all who enter the public sphere make their case on the basis of such principles. The opposing view is represented by what Stout calls the 'new traditionalists', writers like Alasdair MacIntyre, Richard John Neuhaus and Stanley Hauerwas, who see this secularized understanding of democracy as excluding the most significant and substantive moral values at work in a society from the public sphere.

Stout argues that the protagonists on both sides of this debate share a common set of mistaken assumptions about the nature of democracy and secularism. They are, in fact, 'mutually reinforcing tendencies in American intellectual life that spell trouble for American democracy' (303). In rejecting these assumptions, Stout lays out an alternative theory of democracy, which, rather than setting it a priori in opposition to what the dominant liberal view sees as the 'sectarianism' of the traditional communities within it, interprets democracy itself as a 'tradition'. As with traditionalist moral communities, the values upon which democratic societies are founded are the product, not of principles consented to by rational agents, but of discursive and social practices pragmatically worked out in the life history of a people.

Building upon the pragmatic approach to ethics in the tradition of Hegel, Emerson and Dewey developed in his earlier work, *Ethics After Babel*, Stout develops a theory of democracy he calls 'pragmatic expressivism'. This theory, he says, 'takes enduring democratic social practices as a tradition with which we have good reasons to identify,' and which can 'explain the strengths of liberalism and traditionalism, as well as their weakness' (184). Although his account discards the Rawlsian conception of justice based on a fictitious consent of rational individuals, it nevertheless retains the idea that democracy depends upon a process of argument that requires persons to find persuasive reasons for the political stands they take. It also provides a way for people to hold each other responsible across the boundaries of race, religion and ethnicity. Modern democracies are, in fact, traditions of this kind; the healthier they are as democracies, the better they are at encompassing a wide range of traditionalist discourses into their own.

The trouble with both the dominant liberal theories of democracy and their new traditionalist critics is that they share the assumption that liberal democracy is essentially secularist. 'Secularism' in this context is the presumption that arguments for public policy that cannot be fully defended on shared secular premises (rationally agreed upon, independent of traditional 'authority', etc.) are inappropriate in democratic debate. The problem with this presumption is that it excludes religious and other traditional values from public policy, despite their currency within the society. Liberal values, and thus liberal ideology, determines public policy by default. By interpreting democracy itself in terms of a pragmatically developed tradition, Stout rejects this secularist requirement. He distinguishes, as have others, between 'secularism' and 'secularization'. The latter does not necessarily exclude theological and other traditional discourses from the public sphere of debate and decision-making. Secularization is merely the historically conditioned fact that in pluralistic societies, 'the participants in a given discursive practice are not in a position to take for granted that their interlocutors are making the same religious assumptions they are' (97). Modern democratic society is secularized, not only by the fact of religious and moral pluralism, but perhaps even more profoundly by the fact that members of even the same religious/moral traditions recognize that their different interpretations cannot be settled by reference to their scriptural or other authorities. Reasoned argument and persuasion beyond appeal to authority is still required, even here. Thus, Stout distinguishes between two conceptions of 'authority': one having to do with the way individuals form their own conscience and commitments; the other with what individuals can reasonably appeal to as an arbiter in disputes with other groups (94). Secularization, he argues, does not undermine the first as a legitimate source of the values that 'have standing' in democratic politics. It undermines primarily the latter. Recognition that values rooted in traditional authorities cannot be persuasively defended in the public sphere by mere appeal to the sectarian authority ('secularization'), then, 'does not reflect a commitment to secularism, secular liberalism, or any other ideology' (97).

Several chapters of *Democracy and Tradition* take up the philosophical issue of the role of concepts like 'truth' and 'objectivity' in ethical discourse. Though as a pragmatist Stout believes in the possibility of 'ethics without metaphysics' (the title of Chapter 11), he argues persuasively that his approach does not reduce ethics to mere conventionalism or moral relativism. Stout's discussion of truth and objectivity in ethics, and his rejection of pure conventionalism and relativism, one of the most philosophically stimulating sections of the book, is critical to the high view of democracy as a mode of moral discourse that is his focus.

In what appears at first as a somewhat tangential Chapter 8, entitled 'Democratic Norms and Terrorism', Stout takes up the knotty 'dirty hands' moral dilemma often faced by political leaders, where, in order to fight evil it appears necessary to 'dirty one's hands by engaging in a similar evil (e.g., terrorist acts). Rather than tangential, this chapter is in fact a powerful case study in Stout's theory of democracy, illustrating how the moral discourse about this troublesome issue requires us to address the underlying values within democracy as a tradition, which are put at risk by capitulation to 'dirty hands' activities.

Democracy and Tradition establishes Jeffrey Stout as a major interlocutor in contemporary political philosophy. The book is an imposing challenge to the dominant theories of political liberalism represented by Rawls, Rorty, and Nozick, as well as their communitarian critics like MacIntyre. It is also offers a devastating critique of the theological critics of this liberal theory like Hauerwas, Millbank, and Neuhaus, who have dominated especially the American Christian theological centres, and whose views, as Stout aptly points out, mirror those of the anti-democratic theological voices within contemporary fundamentalist Islam. The book will be of critical interest to political and moral philosophers, theologians, legal scholars, and all those committed to sustaining a vigorous democratic culture.

With this book, Stout offers an imposing theoretical alternative that reintegrates traditional religious and moral discourse into the very essence of democracy. It could not be more timely, particularly as Western liberal democracy is being exported by force of armed invasion to traditional religious societies that view it with understandable traditionalist suspicions.

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Jan Such
The Multiformity of Science.
Atlanta: Rodopi 2004. Pp. 430.
US$150.00. ISBN 90-420-0938-1.

The Multiformity of Science is a collection of thirty-seven essays by Jan Such. Although most of the papers have appeared in print before, many have appeared only in Polish and will have escaped the notice of the volume's intended readers. The essays date from the late sixties to the present, and together they represent a welcome introduction of this very able scholar to an Anglo-American audience. Moreover, *Multiformity* provides ample evidence of sophistication in eastern European philosophy of science, and thus holds the promise of increased engagement between eastern European philosophers and analytic philosophers from North America and Western Europe. Such is a philosopher of physics, but most of the book deals with general issues in the philosophy of science, epistemology and metaphysics, and the book's intended audience is wide.

The papers are divided into six sections, each dealing with a different theme — what Such terms the 'idealizational' theory of science, the nature of scientific cognition, the development of science, problems in the verification of knowledge, the philosophy of physics and cosmology, and, finally, problems in theories of reality. The first section and the last two contain well-categorised papers that focus on more or less the section's theme. However, the middle three sections seem arbitrarily categorised and the papers are disparate in their subjects. The book employs a number of translators and the results vary in readability. Most of the papers read quite well, but some badly mangled sentences remain.

Some of Such's more original and interesting arguments are in the first section. Such claims that modern science is 'idealizational' in method, rather than purely inductive. He identifies the modern origin of the method with Galileo and opposes it to Newton's account of his method. By the 'idealizational' Such means that science operates by formulating laws that apply to ideal models that are abstracted from, and approximate, reality rather than by simply generalising from observed facts as Newton claims. Galileo, for Such, forms the paradigm and earliest case of idealizational science, and he points out that the method is explicitly acknowledged in Galileo's works. Newton, while actually operating in a similar way, consistently provides an inaccurate assessment of his own methods (37-9). This section not only offers attractive arguments about the role of idealized models in the practice of science; it also contains an interesting analysis of Galileo's contributions to scientific methodology. However, some of Such's further claims about the idealizational method will strike many as less plausible. Two examples are his identification of the view with Plato's theory of ideas and his attempts to identify the methodology of contemporary microphysics and relativistic theory with the methods of the seventeenth century. However such controversies will add to the book's interest, not the reverse.

Some of Such's older papers dealing specifically with the philosophy of physics neatly anticipate current debates in the field. A good example is 'Transcendental Philosophy and Physics of the Microworld'. As the title implies, this paper addresses the connections between Kant's transcendental philosophy and contemporary microphysics, specifically as they are discussed in the writings of Heisenberg and Weizäsker. Admittedly, some of Such's discussion of neo-Kantian philosophy of science is dated, and his attempts to connect the discussion with debates over the neo-Marxist schools seem idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, the recent works of Michael Friedman and others have raised considerable interest in neo-Kantian philosophy of science again, and followers of that debate will find Such's discussion a solid contribution.

Although there is much of interest in *Mutliformity*, the reader must sift what the valuable from other material that is of much less interest. While some of the older papers are of still interest, the vintage of many represents a weakness in the book as a whole. Large sections, for example, engage the works of Popper and will strike most as out of date and no longer relevant. Most of the papers in the section entitled 'Problems with the Verification of Knowledge' are of this sort. An example is a 1975 paper, 'Atomistic vs. Holistic Empiricism', where Such claims, contra Popper, that statements cannot be verified or falsified in isolation from one another. Other examples include papers on the scope of scientific laws. Although there is currently a lively debate on the subject, Such refers only to obscure older material that does not contribute to the contemporary debate on the subject.

Additionally, many of Such's attempts to connect the philosophy of science to the Continental tradition seriously weaken the book's appeal. To this end, Such provides some overly general and inaccurate characterisations of some contemporary sciences. For instance he maintains that Hegel's 'conception of universal progressive evolution' is exemplified by biological evolution and the irreversible processes of thermodynamics (387-8). To describe any part of biological evolution as progressive is, of course, simply mistaken, and the resulting entropy created by irreversible thermodynamic processes is hardly progressive in Hegel's sense.

Such is also at pains to rebut Popper's claim that Hegel's politics are totalitarian. While Such might well be correct in this, he misses his mark. Contemporary neglect of Hegel's politics stems from Rawls-inspired interest in doing politics divorced from Hegel's brand of speculative metaphysics, not from Popperian arguments about totalitarianism. However, it is the final paper that is of the least interest. Such argues that quantum mechanics and Heidegger's phenomenology coincide in overcoming the subject/object distinction. The idea rests on the claim that quantum mechanics, like Heidegger, unites the subject and object because the observer and observed form a 'unity' (421). Assuming we can make sufficient sense of Heidegger to make Such's comparison possible, many commentators on quantum mechanics, such as Bohr, would not agree. For Bohr, the measurement apparatus and its behaviour are to be read in classical terms: the microworld, while influenced by measurement context, is viewed non-classically, i.e. differently. However, a more pressing question to ask is what current problem in the philosophy of quantum mechanics is supposed to be solved by the comparison?

In sum, *Multiformity* definitely contains some interesting arguments that are worth reading. However, the book contains many weaknesses that carry it off track and reduce its interest for the intended audience.

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Arthur Sullivan, ed.
Logicism and the Philosophy of Language: Selections from Frege and Russell.
Peterborough, ON and Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press 2003. Pp. 298.
Cdn$34.95/US$26.95. ISBN 1-55111-471-2.

Early analytic philosophy, the fifty-year period (exactly!) from Frege's *Begriffsschrift* (1879) to Wittgenstein's 'Remarks on Logical Form' (1929), includes some of the best philosophy by some of the best philosophers in our tradition. So it is puzzling that there should be so few (any?) anthologies canonizing this work as a whole. True, many of these original contributions were book-length, and many were highly technical, but there is almost always a shorter less technical account by the authors of the general nature of the project and its purported contribution(s) that would be suitable for an anthology. Therefore, the work under review is welcome, as is its substantial (seventy-five-page) introduction to topics of the period. From Frege we have nine selections: the Preface and Chapter 1 of *Conceptual Notation* (1879), the two expositions of that system from 1882 'On the Scientific Justification of a Conceptual Notation', and 'On the Aim of the Conceptual Notation', the Introduction from *The Foundations of Arithmetic* (1884), the classics from the 1890's: 'Function and Concept' (1891), 'On Concept and Object' (1892), 'On Sense and Reference' (1892). There also 'What is a Function?' (1904) and the classic 'The Thought: A Logical Inquiry' (1918). From Russell we have six selections: 'Mathematics and Metaphysicians' (1901), the classics 'On Denoting' (1905) and 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', as well as 'Logic and the Essence of Philosophy' (1914), 'Descriptions' (1919), and 'Mathematics and Logic' (1919). From Sullivan we have an excellent survey of terminology, concepts and issues that both sets the context for Frege and Russell's logicist project, and presents the project in summary form. Its main components are (i) philosophical background to the logicists project, especially Kant's philosophy of logic and mathematics, (ii) logicism, especially Frege and Russell, (iii) modern philosophical logic, (iv) some disputes in 'Early Analytic Philosophy' and (v) the legacy of logicism. All of this is, in my experience, very useful for the student new to the subject.

In an anthology, the materials collected are its focus and so choice of material is the issue. There were two options here: (i) to concentrate on early logic(ism) and language, or (ii) to broaden the coverage to Early Analytic Philosophy. Both are legitimate. Taking the first tack, Sullivan chose to restrict the collection to Frege and Russell, presumably leaving out Wittgenstein because of the difficulty of selecting relevant material from the *Tractatus*. Still, there is a definite continuity of subject matter from Frege's *Conceptual Notation* to the *Tractatus*, a period which marks the transition from a work (roughly) on logic and mathematic with a language subtext to a work (roughly) on language with a logic and mathematics subtext. Wittgenstein's comments on logicism, Frege and Russell are often obscure, but sometimes (relatively) clear and to the point — especially in the case of comments on Russell. So I for one would have appreciated an attempt here (though the *Tractatus* is available in inexpensive editions). Regarding Frege, two expository articles from (1882) are not necessary, nor is (1904), which overlaps (1891). I would have used the space for e.g.: (i) section #3 from the *Foundations of Arithmetic*, which contains Frege's important recasting of the analytic-a priori distinction; (ii) selections from the Introduction to the *Basic Laws of Arithmetic* (1893/1903), parallel to (1879) and (1884), but also where Frege spells out his anti-psychologism in more detail; (iii) Russell's letter (1902) announcing the paradox and Frege's amazingly gracious reply (1902; see also 1903). As with Frege, I would have reduced some of the overlap ('Descriptions' is a clean introduction to the theory of descriptions, but contains little that 'On Denoting' lacks). However, in contrast with Frege (and even Wittgenstein), Russell worked on logicism for only about a decade, and did little innovative work on logicism after *Principia*. So there is not as much new that could be added. However, the parallelism with Frege could be brought out more clearly by having more of Russell's earlier work (playing the role of Frege's *Conceptual Notation*), for instance selections from *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903), especially the chapter on denoting concepts (as an unacknowledged foil for 'On Denoting'). Also, some selections from *Principia Mathematica* (the Introduction?) to parallel the Frege selections might have been useful. In short, an anthology on (early) logicism might want to display the parallel development of Frege and Russell through their major works on the subject.

Taking a cue from the introduction (iv) 'Early Analytic Philosophy' it might have been useful to enlarge the project not only to include some Wittgenstein (if not selections from the *Tractatus*, then 'Some Remarks on Logical Form'), but to include a range of topics that all three philosophers had something to say about besides the foundations of arithmetic: meaning, reference, propositions, compositionality, truth, judgment and understanding, propositional attitudes, opacity, quantifiers, proper names, indexicals, descriptions etc. Obviously most of these topics are already here in the collection as it stands. Why not canonize this fact with a broader approach to the selections? From this angle, selection choices would be slightly different. It would now be relevant to include, e.g., (i) Frege's important letter to Husserl (1891), where the sense and reference of predicates as well as singular terms and sentences (a Fregean singular term) is clearly endorsed, (ii) selections from Frege's *Logic* (1897) where he introduces the idea of 'mock' thoughts and assertions, providing an impetus for Evans' (1982) re-interpretation of Frege as a 'Russellian', (iii) Frege's correspondence with Russell (1904) where the issue of whether objects of reference can be constituents of propositions is debated — a preview of the current 'singular' (Neo Russellian) vs 'general' (Neo-Fregean) propositions debate, (iv) selections from Frege's (1914) 'Logic in Mathematics' which contains rare discussions of grasping senses, compositionality, and principles for testing for identity of sense.

It would be relevant to include, e.g., (i) some very interesting unpublished works (from Russell's *Collected Papers*) between *The Principles of Mathematics* and 'On Denoting', where Russell toys with and rejects something like Frege's sense-reference distinction (see especially 'On the Meaning and Denotation of Phrases' and 'Meaning and Denotation' — both 1903); (ii) selections from 'On the Nature of Truth and Falsity' (1907) where he criticizes Frege's theory of propositions (who remains anonymous, however), contrasts it with his 'multiple relations' view, but criticizes that too; (iii) and/or section 3 of Russell's (1910) 'Truth and Falsity', where he settles on and defends his own multiple relation view; (iv) selections from *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (1918) relevant to any of the above themes, but including the last, sweeping 'Excursus in Metaphysics: What There Is'. In short, there are also reasons to consider a broader-scoped collection, relevant to Early Analytic

Philosophy (courses), and not just to logicism (courses). But we should also be grateful to Sullivan for the excellent collection and introduction he has given us.

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Alan Wertheimer

Consent to Sexual Relations.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xv + 293.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-82926-7);
US$26.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-53611-1).

This is a wonderful book. It explores factual, conceptual, and normative (moral and legal) positions on the character, role and significance of consent in relation to sexual behaviour. It does this with imagination, insight, thoughtfulness, and maturity, as well as with a very high level of philosophical sophistication and understanding. Proposals are constantly tested by a wealth of real-life examples so as to keep the discussion honest. A valuable inclusion is the listing in an appendix of the huge battery of examples (over 120) that are discussed, each being given a one to two sentence summary — these can be handily referred to by the reader throughout. The book as a whole is a compendium of penetrating and intelligent reflections on the issues it addresses.

Wertheimer begins by looking at models that have been proposed for the sexual offence of rape — the violence or force model, consent model, autonomy model, property model, and the 'consent plus' model — and argues that a consent or consent-plus model is the most promising account of our moral and (historical) legal understanding of that offence. He then examines some controversial psychological claims about sexual behaviour. He accepts that there are gender differences in desire for sex, for casual and promiscuous sex, and in typical motivations for sex. Evolutionary psychology is accorded a plausible role in explaining many male-female asymmetries in sexual desire. He rejects the objections that evolutionary psychology has unattractive normative implications, and entails a form of determinism that precludes our being responsible for our behaviour. He also carefully examines the claim that 'rape is about violence, not about sex'; his position is that while coercive sex may sometimes be expressive of (male) hostility towards victims or may be instrumentally valued by men, it remains true that sexual motivations are very important in both sexual harassment and rape. Sex from the male perspective is almost never simply a matter of the exercise of violence or power. It is important for us to understand the causes behind rape if we hope to influence its prevalence. It may be true that men have certain selected dispositions to engage in behaviours that may sometimes culminate in coercive sex/rape; still, there is no reason to think that their dispositions cannot be influenced by rational factors, or that all who have behaved wrongly lack moral capacities that can be strengthened and educated. Women should be aware of these broad dispositions and adjust their protective behaviours accordingly.

From the victim's perspective, rape is not merely a serious injury but a traumatic violation that invades important rights to bodily security and autonomy. Wertheimer provides a subtle and sensitive account of the dimensions of harm and wrong involved in rape, and the interrelations between harm conceived as a setback to important interests or rights and experiential *harms such as forms of psychological distress and trauma. There is a deep* connection between rights violations and experiential harms, in the sense that such violations typically if not always give rise to such harms. Rape (non-consensual sex) is experienced as a harm of a special and important kind, and this is supported by deep facts about women's psychology. This provides the basis for a right not to experience it. The core of the wrongness of rape lies in its being a violation of rights, which is held to be a serious wrong whether or not it leads to injury or other experiential harms in a given case. Wertheimer prefers (108) the particular interpretation of this which holds that rights are moral devices that protect important interests, and further that such rights claims are supported by the experience of non-consensual sexual relations; this makes our right not to engage in non-consensual relations to be a conclusion of a moral argument about the way in which the world should be organized, rather than a premise in such an argument.

The book moves to a discussion of the role of consent in relation to morally permissible sexual interactions. Consent is to be seen as morally transformative, being 'an act in which one person alters the normative relations in which others stand with respect to what they may do'. It can make morally permissible certain acts that would be illegitimate without consent, while not necessarily being determinative of an 'all things considered' assessment of the action's morality. Wertheimer is interested in specifying certain principles of valid consent (PVC) for legal (PVC-l) and for moral (PVC-m) contexts, where such principles are seen as the object and outcome of moral theorizing rather than as a 'settled input which affects the outcome in a decided way' (124). By skilful use of a telling set of cases, Wertheimer provides a sophisticated and insightful discussion of the implications for consent of various accounts of conditions such as voluntariness in conduct, behaving autonomously, and mutuality of desire and sexual attraction. He leans towards a 'weak reciprocity view' of consent that says that legitimate sexual relations should offer benefits to the parties but do not require equality of exchange or consent only to what is reasonable. The view will accommodate motivational pluralism, and allow some forms of sexual objectification within what is permitted.

On the ontology of consent, Wertheimer considers a subjective view (consent is psychological), a performative view (consent is behavioural) and a hybrid view (both relevant behaviour and mental state are needed for consent). He decides, rightly in my view, that a suitably qualified moralized performative view of consent is the preferred one for sexual relations. This requires a performative token of consent, because if the point of consent is to alter our normative relations with others, 'some public indication of our will is required' (148). There follows a complex and penetrating discussion of when sexual relations are coerced, making consent invalid or non-transformative. Wertheimer thinks that whether A coerces B into sexual relations depends in part on B's moralized baseline, which in turn rests on a framework of rights — what B's rights are or what A has an obligation to do for B. If A proposes to make B worse off relative to an appropriate baseline if B acquiesces, and it is reasonable of B to acquiesce or wrong of A to proceed in the face of B's unreasonable acquiescence, then A coerces B into sexual relations. A's proposal can be morally wrong without violating this baseline and so being coercive. There is a good discussion of (contrasting) cases where A's proposal does not violate any of B's rights but the circumstances are coercive for B in the sense that B has no reasonable alternative but to do what A proposes, e.g., medical amputation is the only alternative to death by gangrene. In such circumstances, consent can retain its morally transformative power.

Later chapters take up the implications for consent of deception, competence, and intoxication. The last of these generates a fascinating discussion of whether it should be permissible for a man to have sexual relations with a woman who unambiguously gives consent while voluntarily intoxicated. The position defended is that it is plausible to regard persons as morally responsible for certain actions done as a result of voluntary intoxication, but it does not follow that their consent should therefore be regarded as valid, because the conditions required for responsibility may be weaker than those required for valid consent. To be weighed on the other side is that setting high mental capacity standards for transformative consent risks precluding individuals from giving their consent to acts such as voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, which many of us regard as proper exercises of our autonomy.

Anyone interested in the topic of consent in relation to sexual activities will find this book richly rewarding.

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Catherine Wilson
Descartes' Meditations: An introduction.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.
Pp. 284.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80981-9);
US$19.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00786-6).

Catherine Wilson's new handbook can be read at two levels. At the first level, she provides an introductory exposition of Descartes' arguments *Meditatio* by *Meditatio*, and supplements this with brief biographical sketches of the *Meditations'* original 'Objectors' (256-7) as well as glosses of such notions as 'Mortalism', the 'Hierarchy of Ideas' and the 'Causal Noninferiority Principle' (258-61). She has an accomplished talent for what might be called analytical casuistry, and her well-chosen 'everyday' analogies guide students who wish to explore the work's predicaments more deeply for the first time. At the second level — which includes a final *tour d'horizon* which she entitles *Descartes in Context* (230-355) — she integrates more than usually extensive summaries of the 'objectors' arguments into her exposition of each Meditation, and whimsically reconstructs the work's rhetorical *persona* as 'the Meditator' (cf. 10 ff.), a not-so-expert placeholder whose pronominal gender reverses from chapter to chapter.

Wilson's initial stage-setting for 'hyperbolic doubt' also explores the *stereotypical* and *nonconstructive* and nature of much of what passes for analytic-philosophical as well as nonphilosophical *'knowledge'* (cf. 18-21). But she does not seem to consider the extent to which such characterisations might also apply to the 'invariance' of 'Archimedean points', such as the one Descartes famously invoked at the beginning of Meditation II.

In one of its metalogical reconstructions, for example, the *cogito*-argument is a valid implication, whose consequent ('I' exist) is a provable fixed point for its antecedent ('I' doubt that 'I' exist). Unfortunately however for Descartes' ultimate metaphysical aims, Gödel has shown that any expressible metatheory 'the Meditator' might propose will prove that no consistent cognitive agent could adequately express this antecedent's application to itself, much less evaluate its (potential, metatheoretic) 'truth'.

Far from disabling skeptical regresses (or ascents), in other words, the *cogito*-argument may actually generate one of them. One might even construe it as a kind of dialectical confutation of the more dogmatic aspirations Descartes cherished for his *methodus*; or alternatively, as a gentle parody of Russell's famous characterisation of 'mathematics': that metamathematics is 'the field in which we can never set 'ultimate' limits to 'the' limits we set, or know whether the things we say about such limits are 'true'.

Be that as it may, 'the Objector' (or 'the Reviewer') might also formulate cognate observations about Aristotelian, medieval, Cartesian. Kantian and metalogical 'hierarchies', whose Cartesian variants Wilson considers with more than usual care in her examinations of Meditations II through V (cf., e.g., 89-99). One might construe 'ideas', for example, as attributes, predicates or assertions in hierarchies of metatheories; and (assorted varieties of) 'causes' as 'objective' syntactic representations or 'formal' semantic realisations in such hierarchies. Wilson aptly observes that prototypes of such hierarchies are woven into Cartesian redactions of several classical metaphysical arguments. But she devotes relatively little space to skeptical (or even Kantian) arguments that 'all' such hierarchies might be incomplete, provisional or indeterminate 'from within'.

Such omissions seem to me serious. For they effectively wave aside skeptical arguments that assorted antiskeptical commonplaces simply do not 'work', and some may yield dialectical negations of the conclusions Descartes sought to derive from them. At best, this might disable some of Descartes' most cherished claims, and render more or less moot Wilson's careful canvass of Cartesian phenomenology in the three chapters she devotes to Meditation VI. At worst, it might suggest that the Meditations were an enormously prestigious metaphysical pyramid scheme.

I have therefore decided to focus the rest of my comments on skeptical *elenchoi* Descartes and Wilson may have overlooked, citing Gassendi as my seventeenth-century ally, and let the reader draw his or her own conclusions.

A number of self-referential paradoxes, first, generate skeptical reconstructions of the metalogical hierarchies mentioned above (or historical reconstructions of them as *transzendente Vernunfideen*). And these in turn might provide settings for interpretation of Cartesian arguments as begged 'resolutions' of such paradoxes.

Consider, for example, Descartes' apparent presupposition that (1) whatever doubts 'must' not doubt that it doubts; or the 'wax'-arguments' conclusion in Meditation II (cited in 4 and 5 below) that (2) one 'must' know more clearly and distinctly that which more clearly and distinctly knows; or Meditations III-V's 'circular' presuppositions that (3) one 'must' know most clearly and distinctly that which most clearly and distinctly knows. Consider finally two of Descartes' ostensible 'conclusions' from the 'wax'-argument: that (4) 'I see that nothing can be perceived more readily and evidently by me than my own mind' (AT VII 34); and that (5) 'from the very fact that I see [the wax], it is rendered much more evident that I myself exist' (AT VII 33).

To me at least, the second remark suggests that Descartes intended to offer the wax-argument as a reserve-'demonstration' for one of the more readily granted conclusions in the history of western philosophy; and the parallels between 1 and 3 above that he hoped the *Meditations' ordre de raisons* would preserve as well as elaborate a single underlying — metaphysically 'obvious' but metalogically untenable — presupposition: namely, (6) that whatever 'conceives' 'objective' (object-theoretic) 'existence' must 'formally' (metatheoretically) 'exist'.

Wilson might have good reasons to reject such skeptical interpretations, and my remarks might be out of place in an introductory survey of Descartes' programmatic intentions. But they seem to me compatible with her cautious critiques of 'Cartesian' 'cognitive science', as well as her qualified endorsements of 'Gassendist' criticisms of 'Cartesian' bars against scientific ('materialist') studies of 'mental' dynamics (cf. 47, 72-5, 114-16, 119, 147, 150-1, 182-3, 188, 225-9, and 241).

Trapped in seventeenth-century 'epicureanism' or 'corpuscularianism', Gassendi quaintly invoked '*ventos subtiles*' (a source of innumerable bad Cartesian jokes) to characterise the illimitable but partially describable dynamical currents he hoped scientists might someday study. But what (say) if one were to call such 'currents' 'action potentials' ... ? Such thumbnail assimilations suggest to me that Gassendi may have sought to adumbrate a deeper underlying conjecture: (7) that 'mental' activities might well be physically complex (*subtilis*) rather than 'metaphysically simple'; (8) that such 'complexity' might also be hierarchically organised in orders of conceptual 'subtility' as well as physical magnitude; (9) that competent scientific inquiry into such complex processes might therefore be organised in representational counterparts of such indefinitely extended hierarchies; and finally (10) that Descartes' censorious rejection of such open-ended hierarchies' might have betrayed scientific, philosophical and methodological ideals both men sought to vindicate.

Whatever one thinks of the value judgment in (10), the mitigated-skeptical 'Gassendist' conjectures in (7)-(9) seem to me to have had a rich heuristic future; and 'Cartesian' rejections of them a magisterial but uninformative past.

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