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**Stefan Amsterdamski, ed.**

*The Significance of Popper's Thought.*

Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the  
Sciences and Humanities Vol. 49.

Atlanta: Rodopi 1996. Pp. 97.

US\$34.00. ISBN 90-420-0079-1.

It is not obvious who the intended audience for these conference proceedings (Karl Popper: 1902-1994, March 10-12, 1995, Warsaw) should be. Rather than demonstrating the significance of Popper's thought to non-Popperians, this collection of six articles works on resolving little inconsistencies in Popper's thinking to consolidate the views of those whose allegiances are firmly established already. On the one hand, the contributions in this book do not supply sufficient information and background to constitute an introduction to Popper's thinking; the reader is largely expected to be 'in the know', as far as Popperian thought is concerned. On the other hand, not enough analysis and critique is always provided to make the book relevant to those with a professional interest. Often the arguments are rather cursory. While interesting ideas emerge, detailed and focused arguments are rarer.

John Watkins does not go beyond Popperian thinking, but eclectically draws from Popper on a number of issues. His main concern is to solve the mind-body problem, arising in Popper's theory of three worlds (World 1: the physical world; World 2: states of the human mind; World 3: products of the human mind, e.g., music, mathematics). Disregarding World 3, he draws from Popper's evolutionary thinking and develops a model, a modified version of Popper's Spearhead Model mentioned in *Objective Knowledge*, in which motor-capacity (the body) and control-capacity (the brain) are separate, but have developed together, with the motor-capacity never exceeding the control-capacity. An abundance of control-capacity is crucial to control the motor system, which, incidentally, accounts for the ability of humans to develop dexterities and for the extraordinary growth in brain-size during human evolution.

Adam Grobler is also concerned with the three worlds and discusses a problem internal to Popper's theory. This is the need to resolve the tension between Popper's insistence on rationality *and* free will. To achieve this, he separates from collective rationality the individual 'rationality' of scientists — which may induce scientists to diverge from the truth, e.g., by publishing faked results to improve their academic record. Due to certain inbuilt mechanisms of science, scientists follow truth collectively (World 3), even if they do not do so individually (World 2), thus World 3 does not *directly* result from World 2, but through the critical preference of certain rules in science, that are applied collectively, the rationality of World 2 ultimately works towards the rationality of World 3.

One purpose of Joseph Agassi's paper seems to be to attack the sociology of science. More explicitly, it is to defend the Popperian view of scientific rationality as autonomy, not as reliability. Other than that, the paper is



about many things: the asymmetry between refutation and verification, 'normal' science that is dogmatic rather than autonomous, idealisation, and public relations and science. Many, largely Popperian, views are expressed, few are conclusively defended, and a few are rather polemical.

Stefan Amsterdamski illustrates how Popper's attempts to avoid relativism in the evolution of scientific knowledge fails, even after introducing World 3 as an epistemology *without* a knowing subject. The elimination of the knowing subject is important because any factors that influence the knowing subject can give rise to relativism concerning the evolution of scientific knowledge. Amsterdamski argues, for instance, that even falsificationism (pursuing 'real' falsehood, instead of 'real' Tarskian truth) is undermined by the theory-ladenness of observation. Introducing World 3 to protect epistemology against relativism (by providing an epistemology without a knowing subject), Popper claimed that any influence of culture (objects of World 3) only had an effect on the subjective World 2, never on the objective World 3. Thus the development of World-3-knowledge can be rational, without the knowing subject being entirely rational. The idea then is that the shift from subjective to objective knowledge is similar to Darwinian natural selection, and there is 'a tendency to ground human rationality in biology' (69). This amounts to a *biological* relativism, however, because rationality becomes relative to the survival of the species. Consequently, Amsterdamski argues, Popper did not succeed with his manoeuvre of introducing a World-3-epistemology *without a knowing subject* to avoid relativism altogether: avoiding social relativism, he acquired biological relativism.

A very personal account of Popper, his personality and his views, is given by Ernest Gellner. Among other things, he recounts the historical conditions that provided the background for Popper's *Open Society* and criticizes Popper for his lack of interest in sociology which prevented him from thinking about the mechanisms of a Closed Society in more detail. Gellner concludes with some remarks about the changed conditions of today's societies.

The final paper by Jan Wolenski discusses Popper's refutation of historicism and develops an improved argument against historicism, the position that historical predictions can be made on the basis of laws or patterns that are intrinsic to history. According to Wolenski, Popper's critique relies on growth of knowledge being the main factor influencing human history. Wolenski's own argument emphasizes, in contrast, that predictions concerning human affairs always depend on human will, therefore there can be no universally conditional predictions of social phenomena.

An unfortunate feature of this book is its careless and inconsistent editing. The individual articles do not comply to a standardized form. Not all papers have the address of the author at the end. Some papers have a bibliography, others do not, even where references would definitely be required (Agassi, Amsterdamski). In addition to this, the book contains an annoying number of English mistakes. While the majority of the authors may be non-native speakers, a vaguely competent language editor should have been able to correct numerous failings, such as missing words and basic grammar. While

the focus and value of this collection is not wholly clear, specialists in the thought of Popper may find some of the detailed argument of interest.

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**Gordon C.F. Bearn**

*Waking to Wonder: Wittgenstein's Existential Investigations.*

Albany: State University of New York Press  
1997. Pp. xxv + 265.

US\$65.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3029-4);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3030-8).

At § 126 of *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche writes: 'Mystical explanations. — Mystical explanations are considered deep. The truth is that they are not even superficial.' This aphorism can be taken as emblematic of Nietzsche's mature thought as a whole, as it compactly announces his rejection of the contrast between surface and depth, appearance and reality, upon which mysticism (as well as metaphysics) trades. The question of the extent to which this aphorism may be similarly taken as emblematic of Wittgenstein's philosophy is, in large part, the subject of Bearn's engaging and provocative book. His central thesis is that a proper understanding of Nietzsche's philosophical development from his 1872 *The Birth of Tragedy* (BT) to his mature work of the late 1870s onward can be illuminating for understanding Wittgenstein's development from his 'early' *Tractatus* (TLP) to his 'later' philosophy, which centers upon the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI). Bearn maintains that just as Nietzsche came to reject the quasi-mystical, Schopenhauerian metaphysics of his youth in favor of a complete abandonment of philosophical attempts to 'ground' our existence, so too did Wittgenstein turn away 'from the esoteric depths of the *Tractatus*' (81) in favor of what Bearn calls 'a superficial conception of grammar' (85). Both philosophers, Bearn argues, ultimately reject metaphysical theorizing, and in doing so, say "yes" to the groundless surface of our lives' (203). Saying 'yes' to groundlessness, according to Bearn, constitutes the existential thrust of Wittgenstein's philosophy, or what he calls 'waking to wonder.'

Bearn is careful not to overstate his central thesis. Although he produces evidence to show that Wittgenstein had at least a passing familiarity with Nietzsche, he does not claim that Wittgenstein's development was influenced by Nietzsche's. Instead, his claim is the more modest one that a parallel can



be discerned between their respective developments. Still, even this more modest claim is not without its problems, primarily because of the role *TLP* is thereby required to play. Given Bearn's characterization of *BT* as a work that indulges in, rather than rejects, metaphysical theorizing, the same claim would have to be made about *TLP*, and this makes for a common, but ultimately unwieldy, interpretation of an admittedly cryptic little book. As Bearn himself acknowledges (e.g., at pages 37, 43, and 59), Wittgenstein regarded the propositions that make up *TLP* to be nonsensical, and so insisted that a proper understanding of *him* (and *not* his remarks — see *TLP*, 6.54) consists in the recognition of their being so. Given this insistence, namely that one in the end 'throw away the ladder' whose rungs are the propositions of *TLP*, the claim that his work presents a metaphysical system, or contains a 'mystical conclusion', is, at the very least, suspicious. At some points, Bearn reads Wittgenstein as diagnosing the nonsensical character of any talk of 'the nonaccidental scaffolding of the world' (77), or as destroying 'the impulse to speak what must not be spoken' (76), but he then goes on to depict Wittgenstein as committed to there being *something* (e.g., 'the nonaccidental scaffolding') *about which* one can say nothing: 'These degenerate propositions [i.e., the propositions of logic] are our window into the unified, understandable transcendental realm that is the primordial but unutterable ground of sense, of the world, of life' (176). But what exactly is the content of this claim? What does it mean to *say* that there is an 'unutterable ground' or that one has insight (through the 'window' of logic) into that which is 'ununderstandable'? Taking Wittgenstein at his word regarding the status of the propositions of *TLP* instead points in the direction of understanding that work, not as having a 'mystical conclusion', but as itself already devoted to unmasking 'mystical explanations' as 'not even superficial' (in the manner the *mature* Nietzsche describes). If this is correct, then the claim 'that the arc of Wittgenstein's philosophy is congruent with the arc of Nietzsche's' (36) needs to be reconsidered.

These (by no means uncontroversial) difficulties in interpreting *TLP* affect how Bearn understands the rejection or overcoming of metaphysics in the later Wittgenstein (and in Nietzsche as well). Bearn characterizes both philosophers' later work as containing a destructive component, which is directed at any attempts to ground our talk/practices in something beyond the 'contingent' features of our lives. But that destruction is followed by a kind of 'tragic insight', whereby 'the groundlessness of our lives makes it possible to find our lives wonderful, significant' (197). Although Bearn takes great pains to connect this discovery of the lack of grounding to a feeling of wonder or significance, there persists a problem in the very trope of groundlessness he deploys throughout. That is, characterizing what Wittgenstein and Nietzsche want us to accept as groundlessness, contingency, and so forth, underestimates the force of the destructive phases of their philosophies, as they are meant to expose as unintelligible any metaphysical demand for grounding. As Wittgenstein notes, 'The great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one *couldn't* do' (*PI*, § 374). Bearn's



talk of groundlessness appears to represent the matter in precisely the way Wittgenstein wants to avoid, such that we are left with the feeling that there is *something* (metaphysical grounding) we are being asked to do without. One final bit of text will help to focus my complaint here: Bearn twice, at pages 137 and 141, cites a passage from Wittgenstein's *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, wherein he writes of 'the illusory image of a greater depth,' and that 'when we seek to reach this, we keep finding ourselves on the old level' (Part VI, § 31). However, in both instances, Bearn neglects to cite a crucial sentence, in which Wittgenstein is careful to point out another 'difficulty' in the quest for this 'greater depth': 'The difficult thing here is not, to dig down to the ground; no, it is to recognize the ground that lies before us as the ground.' Here, Wittgenstein is not rejecting the very idea of a ground, but only 'the illusory image of one' that we long for in our more philosophical moments. Thus, to characterize his philosophy as an appeal to the 'superficial' or to 'groundlessness' is to adhere to the description of our lives given from the metaphysical standpoint he (as well as Nietzsche) seeks to undermine.

**David R. Cerbone**

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**Eugenio Benitez, ed.**

*Dialogues with Plato.*

Edmonton, AB: Academic Printing & Publishing 1996. Pp. viii + 215.

\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-920980-66-X);

\$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-920980-67-8).

*Dialogues with Plato* is a compilation of eight scholarly papers, most of which were presented at a conference of the Australasian Society for Ancient Philosophy in 1994. The eight authors all have past or present connections to Philosophy and Classics departments in the Australasian area. Although, as the editor notes, 'the discipline of ancient philosophy has arrived very late to Australasia,' it's apparent that enormous strides have been made. The authors of *Dialogues with Plato* display great enthusiasm for ancient philosophy which readers of this text might well find contagious.

The first three papers are concerned with the *Crito*. Dougal Blyth writes of what Socrates calls 'the part of us which is damaged by wrong action but benefited by right ones'; this part '... whatever it may be, in which right and wrong operate' (*Crito*, 48). This part is commonly supposed to be the soul, but

Blyth argues that this part 'quite aptly describes *the common good of the city* just as much as any part of the individual Socrates,' such as the soul (5). The *Crito*, and Blyth's presentation, investigate the relation between the state and the citizen, and between justice, law, and their philosophical validity.

Eugenio Benitez develops the thesis that 'the *Crito* is about deliberation because it presents a view of what good deliberation consists in and then illustrates that view in a particular instance' (35). Benitez argues that the depiction of good deliberation that emerges from the *Crito* is unlike the more technical conception of deliberation as an exact science of measurement that is found in the *Protagoras*. Rather the *Crito* seems to present a 'viable non-technical model for deliberation' (25). Doubts about the 'usual accounts of Plato on moral expertise' are brought to light. For many Plato scholars, *them's fighting words!*

In chapter three, Patrick Yong points out that for Socrates to decide whether it is 'right' for him to accept the death penalty or 'right' to escape, it seems that he must first know what 'right' is. However, if this is so, then 'it appears quite impossible for one to engage in practical ethics until the intellectual aspect has been resolved' (53). Contrary to a certain customary account of Plato's ethical thought, Yong argues that a 'practical element (moral habituation) is just as basic to Plato's early moral theory as the intellectual element (working out what the good itself is).'

Martin McAvoy contributed chapter four, entitled 'Carnal Knowledge in the *Charmides*', a somewhat misleading title. McAvoy sees recognition of one's ignorance as a necessary foundation for *sôphrosunê*, which fends off 'the hubris of thinking [one] knows everything, the false conceit of thinking [one] knows things one doesn't know' (100). *Sôphrosunê* would then be linked to knowledge and wisdom as the other virtues are said to be (in various dialogues). But McAvoy points out some problems with this, for example the paradox of one knowing what one does not know. It seems also that some who want to claim *sôphrosunê* as one of their virtues are anything but eager to espouse their own ignorance.

Harold Tarrant writes an interesting piece about older students in antiquity and how they were often the subject of ridicule. Socrates was a student his entire life, when young and when old, in love with wisdom. Socrates thought that 'learning should be pursued to the very end,' a belief which may be linked to some of Socrates' epistemological views. 'Every step towards remedying [one's ignorance] is self-improvement' (118). Plutarch called Plato 'the comic dramatist' and it is amusing that those with whom Socrates converses are able to answer 'Of course, Socrates,' and 'I agree, Socrates,' but become tongue-tied when asked for an actual substantial answer. Those who ridicule older learners may simply be revealing their own weaknesses.

Dirk Baltzly does not try to tone down the severity of 'Socratic Anti-Empiricism in the *Phaedo*', but disputes the conclusion that knowledge is impossible while embodied. He discusses some modern and Neoplatonic reactions to Socratic anti-empiricism as manifested in the *Phaedo*, rejecting interpretations which seem incoherent or which fail to account for its radi-

calness. Baltzly then proposes his own interpretation, based on a clue from the neoplatonist Damascius, in which Forms are characterized as causes, which are not amenable to study by sense-perception.

Andrew Barker takes on the challenge of deciphering the brief passage at *Philebus* 16c-17a. Reading this passage sometimes produces the strange feeling that one is approaching the limits of one's brain's capabilities. At the same time, there is a feeling that with enough effort, the passage could be understood. Barker considers the passage from a musicological perspective, discussing its Pythagorean versus empiricist motifs, and pointing out discrepancies between (musical) theory and practice. His primary conclusion seems to be that 'Measurement, in the hurly-burly of ordinary life, is not the straightforward business that the Socrates of the *Protagoras* seemed to insinuate that it could be, but is inevitably a matter of guesswork ... estimation, trial and error' (160).

The final chapter is a discussion of Plato's mistrust of language, especially 'the kind of contradiction-mongering that ... characterizes the sophist.' In 'Not-Being and Linguistic Deception', Diane O'Leary-Hawthorne argues that the *Sophist* provides a 'beautifully simple, though highly rigorous, account of the disparity between language and the world it purports to represent' (168). Such a critique of the veridicality of language helps us to understand why Plato sometimes expressed skepticism about the adequacy of language to transmit philosophical knowledge.

Oscar Wilde claimed that there are two kinds of people: the charming and the tedious. The eight contributors to *Dialogues with Plato* are of the first kind, tackling controversial subjects by combining wit with scholarship, and rarely, if ever, overstepping the bounds of *sôphrosunê*. Although some of Plato's work, such as the Forms, may on occasion be characterized as ethereal, *Dialogues with Plato* seems to recognize and emphasize the practical side of Plato, and the importance of harmonizing theory and practice.

The book contains a subject index and a useful index locorum and index nominum. Each chapter has helpful notes and references for further reading. The book resonates with curiosity, enthusiasm, and a love of learning.

**Marilyn Kane**

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**Richard B. Brandt**

*Facts, Values, and Morality.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996. Pp. vii + 319.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-57059-X);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-57827-2).

Those well-versed in Brandt's earlier works will find much that is familiar in this, his most recent book. Brandt attempts to determine: 1. which states of affairs are intrinsically good, 2. which actions are right or wrong (or blameworthy and praiseworthy), and 3. whether acting morally is rational when doing so conflicts with self-interest (1). The first two of these projects predominate; Brandt relegates the third to the book's final chapter.

Brandt's analysis of the intrinsically good or desirable is a synthesis of desire theory (which states, roughly, that an event is intrinsically good if it satisfies one's desires) and happiness theory (which states that an event is intrinsically good if it is a pleasing conscious experience). In short, he concludes that the intrinsically good or desirable is 'a total segment of one's life marked by enjoyments and/or by satisfaction of desires, which one would prefer from the long-range point of view, given full relevant information' (46). While some of our desires are based on bodily need and are, as such, not open to evaluation, others are produced by conditioning, which makes them subject to rational criticism.

Fundamental to the criticism of desires is the notion of a fully factually informed person (hereafter, f.f.i.p.) (9). To evaluate her desires, an f.f.i.p. must represent the total consequences of an action as vividly as she can. A desire is 'in the clear' if (roughly) it is not undermined by vivid reflection on all the facts concerning its acquisition, the consequences of holding it, etc. So, my desire to eat a certain mushroom may be undermined (= discovered to be not rational) if I discover that it is poisonous. We can arrive at the intrinsically good or desirable, then, by determining which states of affairs would be 'in the clear' after being evaluated by an f.f.i.p..

The framework in which Brandt analyzes the intrinsically good or desirable is revisionary naturalism, which concerns not how moral terms are used, but how they ought to be used. Thus, it will not do to criticize Brandt by noting that his account of the intrinsically good or desirable does not capture our ordinary use of the term. However, we may question whether his analysis of the concept captures how we ought to use it. Since none of us, presumably, is fully factually informed about most things (if anything), it is not clear how Brandt's account is relevant to us. Even if we grant that Brandt has correctly characterized the intrinsically good or desirable, there is an epistemological barrier to our knowing what states of affairs will be included in the set of the intrinsically good or desirable. At best, we can only achieve an approximation to knowing.

Brandt's second project, which he first announces as determining which actions are right or wrong, praiseworthy or blameworthy, really concerns finding an optimal social morality. An optimal morality for a given society is

one which is most likely to maximize the intrinsically good. The theory most likely to do this is indirect (that is, rule) conscience utilitarianism, where one's conscience is 'construed as motivations not to do certain types of thing, plus a disposition to be indignant with others who do and a disposition to believe that the foregoing attitudes can be justified in some appropriate way' (156). Because Brandt's analysis of the intrinsically good depends upon the notion of an f.f.i.p., we may question whether a moral system which maximizes the intrinsically good is really optimal for a given society. Our own desires may not even approximate those of an f.f.i.p., so adopting a moral theory which maximizes the intrinsically good may be downright harmful to us. Of course, it is possible that adopting an indirect conscience utilitarianism will best satisfy our actual desires and maximize our enjoyments, but this is a consideration independent of the theory's likelihood to maximize the intrinsically good.

Brandt spends considerable time applying indirect conscience utilitarianism to issues of distributive justice, morally required charitable giving, and the criminal law. Specifically, he argues forcefully that morality dictates that we reduce inequality of wealth through a negative income tax, spend additional funds to alleviate poverty worldwide, and reduce prison sentences for criminals.

Pertinent to the first two of these applied topics is the notion of a moral right. According to Brandt, X has a moral right to Y against Z means: 1. Z has a duty to not interfere with X's having Y, 2. X is morally permitted to feel resentment at the harm caused by Z's interfering with X's having Y, and 3. Z's duty to not interfere with X's having Y is strong (156-7). There are at least two difficulties with this analysis. First, X's friends might be morally permitted to feel resentment at Z's harmful actions. But what makes X, and not X's friend, a right bearer is that her resentment is *appropriate* in a way in which her friend's is not. A second difficulty with the analysis is that someone may feel justified resentment about someone else's violating a relatively minor duty. Suppose a friend breaks his promise to meet you at your office at an appointed time to walk with you across campus. This delays your departure by 10 minutes. Why not say that your friend's failing to fulfill his obligation, combined with your justified (mild) resentment constitutes your right not to be inconvenienced? In short, condition 3 is unnecessary.

Finally, Brandt asks whether it is rational to act morally against self interest, which he construes as the question of whether it would be rational to cultivate moral motivations strong enough to motivate moral behavior, even when doing so is harmful to oneself. While Brandt suggests that in most situations it would be rational, he concedes there are cases in which it may not be.

In sum, whether or not Brandt's arguments conclusively establish indirect rule utilitarianism, there is much interesting and important material in this book, particularly for those reading Brandt for the first time.

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**John Bricke**

*Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology.*

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1996. Pp. x + 263.

Cdn\$81.00: US\$49.95. ISBN 0-19-823589-5.

The central theme of Bricke's book is the relation of Hume's theory of morality to his theory of mind. There are three main issues with which Bricke attempts to deal: first, Hume's account of the nature of reasons for action; second, Hume's view of the nature of moral desires; and third, the relation in Hume's philosophy between desire and convention. There is a brief concluding chapter on Hume's theory of moral agency.

Bricke's discussion of Hume's conativism, as an account of the nature of reasons for action, refers to Hume's view of passion as an original existence which cannot be contrary to truth or reason. According to Bricke, Hume is not denying the intentionality of desire and volition, but rather their truth-evaluability. The conclusion that only desires can provide the major constituent in a reason for action is explained in terms of the notion of direction of fit, the crucial contrast being between those states which, like belief, have world-to-mind direction of fit, and those, like desire, which have mind-to-world direction of fit. Bricke's interpretation of Hume's arguments, both for conativism as an account of the nature of reasons for action and against the rival view provided by cognitivism, does make them appear persuasive. But one may wonder whether it is appropriate to refer to 'Hume's argument from direction of fit' (30), in the absence of direct textual evidence that Hume's conativism depends on an appeal to the difference between desire and belief in respect of direction of fit.

Bricke rejects Hume's identification of desires with impressions in favour of the view that they involve distinctive modes of conception, and he distinguishes desires in their relation to action from both volitions and 'affections'. This enables him to attribute to Hume an expanded moral conativism which identifies non-practical moral judgements with sentiments of approbation or blame. Moral desires reflect the general view which also introduces a fundamental impartiality with respect to interests. Thus, benevolence provides a non-moral motive of an essentially partial kind, while humanity provides a specifically moral motive. Indeed, according to Bricke, Hume regards humanity as the principal moral desire, being the reason from which one acts whenever one acts from a sense of obligation (115). However, Bricke provides little supporting evidence for this interpretation, either in relation to the significance ascribed to humanity or to Hume's supposed hierarchical conception of moral desires.

Hume's theory of sympathy is seen as an attempt to provide a psychological theory of the formation of moral desires. Our specifically moral sympathetic desires reflect the common vantage point associated with corrected sympathy. Bricke notes the parallel which Hume draws here with the case



of perceptual experience, where there is also a correction of appearances. This raises the question of whether Hume subscribes to a form of moral perception. On Bricke's view, Hume's 'moral sense' is really a matter of moral sensibility. While perceptual experiences are cognitive states, the moral sentiments are conative or affective ones (158). This, however, ignores the way in which Hume himself presents the question at issue between himself and the moral rationalist (or cognitivist): given the reality of moral distinctions, do we come to know or to be aware of them through reason or through feeling? Our moral sentiments have an epistemological role in Hume's philosophy which gives point to the comparison of the moral sense to ordinary forms of perception. Hume himself refers to these sentiments as the 'distinguishing impressions by which moral good or evil is known' (*Treatise*, 471). Furthermore, as particular species of pain and pleasure these sentiments result in aversion or desire and, therefore, have a direct relation to passion and action, thereby satisfying the requirements of Hume's moral conativism.

In his discussion of desire and convention Bricke is especially concerned with the contribution Hume's theory of convention makes to his moral psychology. Given their recognition that conformity to the conventions serves the interests of each individual involved, those with the requisite conative characteristics are provided with reason for having, and being party to, such conventions (209). There is the further question of whether they have compelling interest in complying, on any given occasion, with these rules. The coincidence of narrow interest and compliance seems assured in the case of the co-operator who sees, on an 'enlarged' view, how the action belongs to a system of actions which tends to public utility and, hence, to his own narrow interests. But even Hume's 'sensible knave' apparently finds compelling reason in his narrow interests for compliance. Bricke's discussion of the arguments by which Hume seeks to establish these important conclusions is subtle and illuminating. He also argues convincingly that, for Hume, the convention-bound does not exhaust the morally significant. Not only are there the natural virtues, but adoption of the moral point of view through corrected sympathy reflects an impartial concern for others which appears different from the narrowly interested concern of co-operators in conventions.

Bricke's discussion of moral agency focuses on Hume's treatment of freedom to act and the interpretation of his notion of liberty of spontaneity. He raises the important question of whether moral agents are misrepresented by Hume's 'official' theory of the unity and identity of persons. Such agents appear to be more than bundles comprising perceptions standing in suitable causal and similarity relations to one another. Bricke suggests that Hume displays the inadequacies of his earlier theory as he develops his moral psychology through Books II and III of the *Treatise* (246). A more sympathetic reading would be that in accordance with his own distinction between the different aspects of personal identity, Hume approaches the issues involved from different perspectives, but ones which provide an internally consistent account of the self.

Bricke's book explores many important aspects of Hume's moral psychology and it is informed by a close acquaintance with Hume's own writings as well as those of contemporary philosophers, especially in the areas of action and language. His detailed analysis of Hume's arguments raises issues of interpretative and more general philosophical interest throughout, and even where one might be inclined to dispute his account of Hume there is much to be learned.

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**John W. Burbidge**

*Real Process: How Logic and Chemistry*

*Combine in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature.*

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1996.

Pp. x + 274.

\$75.00. ISBN 0-8020-0897-6.

Hegel's philosophy of nature is notorious for being one of the most difficult aspects of his philosophical system. This notoriety is largely due to the seeming inconsistency with which Hegel regards the relation between philosophy and empirical science. On the one hand Hegel insists that philosophy must 'not only ... accord with the experience nature gives rise to; in its formation and in its development, philosophic science presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics' (§246, Remark, in M.J. Petry, trans. *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, London 1970). On the other, however, Hegel claims that 'the object not only has to be presented in its determination according to the Concept, but the empirical appearance corresponding to this determination also has to be specified, and it has to be shown that the appearance does in fact correspond to this conceptual determination. But this is, in relation to the necessity of the content, not an appeal to experience' (§246, Remark).

This difficulty motivates John Burbidge's examination of Hegel's philosophy of chemical phenomena in *Real Process*. Burbidge writes (4): 'How much [in Hegel's philosophy of nature] is driven by logical concerns, and how much responds to empirical fact? If it is primarily logical, then it is claiming the ability to derive natural phenomena from strictly a priori principles; there is no need to appeal to experience. ... If, however, it is empirical, ... as time passes and scientific investigation uncovers new information about the natural order, any logical structure will be broken into pieces.'



Burbidge seeks to answer these questions by examining in detail Hegel's separate discussions of chemical process in the *Science of Logic* and in the *Philosophy of Nature*. Burbidge's choice of chemical process 'as the focus of [his] attention enables [him] to distinguish the systematic nature of the Science of Logic from that of the Philosophy of Nature within a limited and manageable frame of reference,' and is of additional interest because of the fact that 'Hegel's lifetime coincided with the emergence of modern chemistry' (5). This coincidence provides Burbidge an ideal opportunity for examining Hegel's reaction to rapidly changing empirical discoveries.

After discussing the changing context of chemical discovery in Hegel's lifetime and describing briefly the works of Kant, Fichte and Schelling which provided the intellectual setting within which Hegel developed his philosophy of nature, Burbidge turns, in Part I of his investigation, to those chapters in the *Science of Logic* which bear upon Hegel's chemism. These are 'Real Measure', in which Hegel discusses such concepts as neutralization, elective affinity and proportion, and 'Chemism', in which Hegel traces the logical consequences of the concept of 'chemical object'. Burbidge concludes his discussions of these chapters with examinations of the textual development of Hegel's philosophy of real measure (from 1812 to 1831) and chemism (from 1807 to 1830).

In 'Real Measure', Hegel demonstrates how a logical analysis of a concept can lead to a qualitative development in the concept itself. For, as Burbidge writes (55), "measuring" can be used to describe a particular way of talking about thought itself. For each move in the logical development ... happens because the analysis achieved is measured against the basic purpose of "measuring" and found wanting.'

Hegel's discussion in 'Chemism' employs a logic more sophisticated than that involved in the logic of real measure and is directly related to the motivational questions with which Burbidge began his investigation. Burbidge reads Hegel as solving the paradox which 'emerges because the chemical object is supposed to be immediate, yet at the same time satisfy the concept of chemism' (104) by introducing the idea of a mediating process. This idea, represented by the language of syllogism, 'comes to express the interaction between the concept of what the object is to be and that object as it exists' (104).

In Part II Burbidge changes his approach to that of a straightforward commentary of §§326-36. Burbidge complements excellent translations of the German original text with notes and commentary in which he examines Hegel's integration of chemical data in his system. Burbidge uses his discussion of chemism to demonstrate the different strategies which Hegel employs in the *Philosophy of Nature* and in the *Science of Logic*. Whereas, as Burbidge demonstrated in Part I, the system of chemism in the *Logic* depends upon self-predicating concepts whose development depends upon the process of mediation through other concepts, 'the *Philosophy of Nature* is a system ... because thought learns that it should look to nature in a certain way, then considers every experience relevant to that perspective, and finally discerns



in the synthesis of all the resulting descriptions patterns that point forward to the next plateau' (203).

Burbidge interprets Hegel as employing the separate discussions of chemism in the *Logic* and the *Philosophy of Nature* as exemplifications of the structures discussed in the chapters 'Real Measure' and 'Chemism'. As Burbidge writes (208): 'Logic, as the process of thought thinking through the implications of its own concepts, turns out to be directed towards nature as an alien other. Nature, when considered in its totality turns out to have an inherent logic. Here we have two "objects" that are oriented towards each other. ... [T]ogether they satisfy the definition of "chemical object" we encountered in the *Logic*.' Additionally, when logic is considered as the active principle which measures nature, understood as passive, as that which is measured, then 'logic and nature can be understood as related to each other ... as the quantitative measuring the real as qualitative' (209).

Burbidge provides an answer to the seeming paradox posed by Hegel's project of natural philosophy by modelling the complex interrelationship of logical and empiricism according to structures provided by Hegel's discussion of chemical objects and processes. In so doing he clarifies not only the position of Hegel's natural philosophy in his system as a whole, but also provides a valuable and minutely detailed case study of the explanatory power of Hegel's system. *Real Process* will be of interest to all who seek greater insight into Hegel's philosophy of nature as well as his system as a whole.

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**Patrick H. Byrne**

*Analysis and Science in Aristotle.*

Albany: State University of New York Press

1997. Pp. xxi + 303.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3321-8);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3322-6).

Given the quantity of recent scholarship on Aristotle's *Analytics*, it is surprising that no clear and comprehensive explication of precisely what Aristotle means by 'analysis' has appeared. It is the aim of Byrne's monograph to rectify this situation and to show how Aristotelian analysis is related to Aristotelian science. The result is a highly useful clarification of Aristotle's own study of scientific analysis.

Byrne begins, sensibly, with a short but thorough survey of uses of *analuein* and its cognates throughout the Aristotelian corpus. His conclusion

is that for Aristotle analysis 'is a matter of finding the intelligible interconnection among the constituents of something ...' (20). Note that it is not merely a breaking down into constituents. The clarifying image, borne out in several concrete uses of forms of *analuein* in the biological treatises, is not a dissolving into elemental parts, but a 'loosening up', 'disentangling', or 'unwinding', of a compacted 'coiled up' whole (11-12). In analyzing something into its principles, one is drawing them out, keeping links among them intact, maintaining the integrity of the whole. The *Analytics*, then, is a treatise of how in scientific (or philosophical) investigation this 'loosening up' of a thing, concept, proposition, argument, or phenomenon is to proceed. Moreover, Byrne implies the treatise is itself an analysis — of scientific analysis — thus showing the Escher-like quality of Aristotle's notion of analysis: it is capable of analyzing the nature of analysis itself.

Thus Byrne stresses that the *Prior Analytics* is an analysis of argument, and hence more than simply a compilation of proper syllogistic forms. It 'loosens up' such forms from the concept of *huparchein*, 'to belong to' (as in 'Animal belongs to all humans'), and from the concept of predication itself. Further analysis reveals that this concept presupposes fundamental features of being, such as the law of non-contradiction. The close relation between Aristotle's syllogistic, on the one hand, and the discussion of being *qua* being and the LNC in *Metaphysics* Γ, on the other, is not news. But Byrne's point is worth stressing, that one understands the former by means of an *analysis* of it in terms of the latter. This saves the discussion of the syllogistic in *APr* from being a merely formalistic litany of rules that are arbitrarily accepted as primitive.

The *Posterior Analytics* is largely an analysis of *epistêmê*, 'scientific knowledge', which Byrne contends is itself an analysis. Given a phenomenon or fact, expressible as a certain predicate being said to 'belong to' a certain subject, scientific investigation seeks the *aition*, 'cause', for its belonging and, in effect, seeks to draw out or 'loosen up' the principle or chain of principles connecting predicate with subject — i.e., it seeks the explanatory middle term or terms 'between' them. Once this is found, the original 'mere fact' is 'demonstrated' to be a scientific truth by showing that predicate necessarily belongs to subject because this is a necessary consequence of the causal chain. Thus Aristotle accounts for what he considers the fundamental requirements of *epistêmê*, a recognition that a certain fact could not be otherwise and an understanding why it could not.

One might raise two concerns regarding Byrne's treatment of Aristotle's account of searching for the 'reasoned fact,' which ultimately comes down to a search for *ti esti*, what something is — its definition. First, it would have been helpful to supplement this exposition of *APo* II, in which illustrative examples are limited to events like eclipses and thunder, with a look at *Metaphysics* Z 17, which deals with the question of *ti esti* of genuine *ousiai*. This would better show how the search for *ti esti* that constitutes scientific inquiry is for Aristotle ontologically based (as Byrne shows the syllogistic is) and how it is closely related to hishylomorphism. Second, one might question

whether Aristotle would label such ‘hunting for’ the reasoned cause as *analysis*. For one thing, he does not seem to use the term in such a connection in *APo* II. He does not say, for example, that ‘the phenomenon of [lunar] eclipse’ must be ‘analyzed, “loosed up”, into its reasons’ (viz. the interposition of the earth between sun and moon) before it is to be understood, as does Byrne (89). Indeed there may be reasons why Aristotle would not want to use the term to refer to scientific investigation, which involves seeking causes that are *external* to the initial phenomena — especially if analysis is an ‘unloosening’ or ‘uncoiling’ of what is internal.

Nevertheless, whatever one calls the process of scientific investigation discussed in *APo* II, Byrne has given a clear exposition of much of Aristotle’s text — high praise for any interpreter of the tortuous Aristotelian shorthand one finds in the *Posterior Analytics*. He is especially persuasive in his penultimate chapter, which explains where Aristotle’s analysis of *epistêmê* culminates, with *nous*. Reminding us that Aristotle more than once identifies the first principle as *nous* itself — not some concept or proposition grasped by *nous* — Byrne gives a plausible explanation why. *Nous* is a ‘habit of the mind,’ a *hexis* for the special inquiry into principles, and not a simple ‘intuition’ or ‘grasp’. It acts as ‘the standard of measure for science [that] issues the criteria science must measure up to in its questions’ — it ‘determines what is and what is not “the reason why”’ (187). How does it act as such a standard? Based on what he admits is a highly speculative interpretation of the perhaps uninterpretable *de Anima* III 4-5, Byrne suggests *nous* as ‘active potential’ — the ‘active *nous*’ of III 5 — is ‘wonderment’ itself (187), exhibiting its character most clearly in the questions the scientist asks (like *ti esti*). As such it also exhibits the criteria for answering them, for completing an explanation, for satisfying wonder. Some will find such interpretive speculations unwarranted, given the sparseness of III 5 and other relevant texts. Byrne, however, assumes that Aristotelian analysis does not shrink from an analysis of analysis itself — and what better place to locate this fundamental inquiry than in the ‘active’ exercise of *nous*?

Indeed, it can be said that Byrne’s own study of Aristotelian science shares the same penetrating character of Aristotle’s analysis — and with much clarifying ‘loosening up’ of Aristotle’s thought and prose.

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**Joseph S. Catalano**

*Good Faith and Other Essays: Perspectives on a Sartrean Ethics.*

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1996.

Pp. xv + 180.

US\$52.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8082-7);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8088-6).

As the author of standard commentaries on Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* and his *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (vol. I), Joseph Catalano is an authoritative interpreter of Sartre's writings on ethical topics. Such interpretation forms the backbone of each of the six essays in this collection. Catalano's primary intent throughout the collection is not interpretation, however, but 'forging a moral perspective.' It is a Sartrean perspective he seeks to forge. But in each essay he also seeks to develop, correct, or supplement Sartre's ideas. This is especially true of the 70-page introductory essay, 'Mediations: A Sketch of a Sartrean Ethics', written for this volume.

In 'Mediations' Catalano first introduces some general problems of Sartrean ethics. He notes that for Sartre, values are human creations, yet 'they exist in the world independently of our private conceptions' (4). He addresses a common objection to Sartre's philosophy, namely that with this view of values, plus Sartre's emphasis on freedom, he must be an ethical relativist of the 'anything goes' variety. He argues (as Sartre did) that this objection is misdirected. Sartre's 'invitation to ... view the world from the position of the most disadvantaged members of society' (4) is justifiable without appealing to abstract moral ideals, by attending to 'the structure of oppressive and repressive acts as such' (5). 'We have an intimate moral bond with others because the very context within which our own freedom works is fixed by others as they act both individually and collectively on us' (4).

Catalano next indicates his interpretive approach to Sartre's writings on ethics — he gives first importance to Sartre's major philosophical and biographical works, sees the posthumously published works as less important though still valuable, and views the change from early to late Sartre as a development within a basic unity rather than a sharp break.

One of Catalano's refinements of Sartre is to stress a distinction between psychoanalytic, local, and historical contexts for human action. Sartre, he thinks, confused the local or social and the historical in *Being and Nothingness*, implicitly distinguished them in the *Critique*, and did not fully develop the implications of the distinction in any of his works (8,9). The historical level is that at which praxis is possible, defined as 'the action of an individual working through a group to relieve our condition of sustained scarcity.' It is at the historical level that institutionalized oppression (e.g., racism, sexism, classism) must be dealt with; and since this is rarely possible for a solitary individual, oppression becomes a kind of constraint on individual freedom. While contingent in its human origin, it nevertheless confronts those who experience it as a necessary condition of their lives. It is part of what Sartre

calls the 'practico-inert'. By contrast, most local or social interaction (among family and friends, for example) does not occur at the historical level. Questions of good and bad faith, authenticity and inauthenticity, and the like arise at both levels, but they have their first home at the local level. The psychoanalytic level, of course, connects with both the local and the historical.

By paying careful attention to the interrelation between these levels, Catalano thinks it is possible to resolve some important interpretive questions about 'the look', 'the third', the 'group-in-fusion', the 'practico-inert', and other notions Sartre developed to explain the relationship between freedom, individual consciousness, and personal, social and historical relationships. Moving beyond interpretation to constructive development, Catalano thinks that it is possible, because of the relative autonomy of the levels, to save 'an ethical space for our personal relations', because 'good and bad faith, authenticity and inauthenticity ... are applicable first and foremost when limited to the local context of our actions, such as family, friends, and neighborhood' (12). He also suggests that it may sometimes be possible to act historically at the local or even at the individual level, through identification with like minded individuals, forming in effect a weak 'group in fusion' although no formal group exists. For example, by using gender inclusive language in scholarly writing, one unites with others in countering those historical structures that oppress women. In this way, 'our behavior within the collective can have a group-like quality' (39). This fact may also be used to explain the unity of history. '[T]his unity can be accounted for only by seeing institutions, language, and the entire structure of our society not merely as practico-inert, but also as potential mediating thirds that we use to enter the historical realm. We are thus surrounded by other people's intentions, not psychologically, but insofar as these intentions are embodied in matter and thus give us the a priori conditions of our language and customs' (40).

The conclusion of the first essay reveals Catalano's concerns, and the spirit of his work. A Sartrean moral perspective, he says, 'reveals freedom at work — inventing behavior, joining with other freedoms to forge values and norms, unmasking the coverup of its own tracks, and exhibiting the world and history as a human adventure.'

The five essays comprising the second half of the book are examinations of particular issues in Sartrean ethics. Catalano examines the possibility of good faith, proposes strong and weak notions of good and bad faith, explores the category of authenticity, investigates the structure of self-deception, and explains how for Sartre value arises from action. There is (as he acknowledges) some duplication of material throughout this volume, both in these essays, and between them and the introductory essay for which they are obviously the preparatory work. All the same, each includes material that the others do not; it is an advantage to have them assembled under one cover.

*Good Faith and Other Essays* should be of interest to Sartre scholars, to those wishing an introduction to Sartre's thought about ethics, and to anyone with some familiarity with Sartre's work who wishes to think about ethical issues from a Sartrean viewpoint. Catalano's version of this view-



point is a contribution to Sartre scholarship, and to thought about ethics more generally.

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**Ralph Cudworth**

*A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, With A Treatise of Freewill.*

Ed. Sarah Hutton.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. xxxvi + 218.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47362-4);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47918-5).

Ralph Cudworth's *Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* has been rescued from obscurity once again, this time by the new Cambridge series of texts in the history of philosophy. Written in the early 1660s, this work lay unpublished for seventy years; it was first brought to the press by the Bishop of Durham in 1731, who found in it 'a proper Antidote to the poison in some of Mr. Hobbes's and others' writings' and expressed hope that it would help to resolve the 'new controversies' concerning freewill and necessity. In 1845 it resurfaced in John Harrison's three-volume edition of Cudworth; Harrison also respected Cudworth as 'the powerful opponent of Hobbes, and the worst forms of philosophical infidelity'. While several facsimiles of these editions have been published over the years, and excerpts from the *Treatise* have appeared in a number of compilations, Sarah Hutton's Cambridge volume is the first new edition of the work in a century and a half. In Hutton's estimation, Cudworth must be appreciated not only as an anti-Hobbiest, but also as an active figure in the rapidly changing intellectual climate of the early Enlightenment, a scholar who read Bacon, Galileo, Descartes and Spinoza, alongside the ancients, and whose historical influence reached Locke, Shaftesbury, Price, Reid, and possibly Kant.

Reading the *Treatise* will not yield any immediate answers to questions of Cudworth's influence on his near contemporaries: while Hutton alludes to 'the possibility of manuscript circulation' (xxviii) most would have known Cudworth through the one work he did publish in his lifetime, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, which was published in 1678, and which contains revised versions of many of the arguments of the *Treatise*. Locke, in particular, seems to have studied the *System* closely, especially in composing his arguments against innatism. But, despite the *System*'s greater influence in its day, there are reasons why we have now the *Treatise* before us instead: it presents a clearer and more succinct statement of Cudworth's views on



epistemology and the foundations of ethics, trimmed of his long disquisitions on atheism through the ages, and with fewer lengthy quotations from antiquity. The *Treatise* for this reason provides the modern reader with an excellent introduction to Cudworth's thought; furthermore, for those who become inspired to look more deeply into Cudworth or his impact on his contemporaries, footnotes in this new edition of the *Treatise* identify corresponding sections of the *System*.

The *Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* is (somewhat surprisingly, given the title) mainly concerned with epistemology. Cudworth's declared intention in the work is to refute the view that moral good and evil are produced by convention or institution, whether human or divine. In the first and shortest of the four books that compose the *Treatise*, Cudworth argues that morality cannot first arise from positive commands, because they presuppose a prior moral order for their legitimacy. He then argues that we cannot see God as creating a moral order through an arbitrary act of will; rather, if God is to be credited with benevolence, God's will must be guided by his recognition of the eternal essences of good and evil. The second book offers a general defense of eternal essences; in particular, Cudworth is keen to establish the compatibility of his doctrine with the 'atomical, corpuscular or mechanical philosophy, that solves all the phenomena of the corporeal world by those intelligible principles of magnitude, figure, site, and motion' (34). Sympathetic to this 'atomical' philosophy, which he takes to have originated even before Democritus and Epicurus, and to be only 'lately restored by Cartesius and Gassendus' (38), Cudworth directs his arguments against Protagoras, whom Hutton calls 'a kind of stalking horse for Thomas Hobbes' (xviii). Against the Protagorean claim that the atomical philosophy implies that all truth is merely relative and all opinions the products of sense impressions, Cudworth contends that the atomical philosophy in fact presupposes that we possess a rational faculty capable of grasping the difference between what is real and what is only apparent. If we were merely passive recipients of sense impressions, Cudworth argues, we would be unable to grasp that secondary qualities are not absolutely in the objects we perceive, and unable to grasp the abstract geometrical and mechanical principles by which the atomical philosophy makes matter intelligible. In fact, Cudworth claims that the atomical philosophy serves as 'the most impregnable bulwark' against atheism and immorality, insofar as it implies that the mind is not simply passive but is able to judge what is true, on the basis of rational principles (48). The third book presents the distinction between sensation and knowledge in more detail, with particular emphasis on the claim that sensation on its own fails to distinguish between the real and the fantastical. In the last book, Cudworth argues that the knowing mind is not passive, that even knowledge of corporeal nature requires the active participation of the intellect, and that the 'intelligible notions of things' are eternal and immutable.

The Cambridge edition also includes Cudworth's *Treatise of Freewill*, first published in 1838. Starting from the observation that we seem to presuppose

human freedom in holding others morally responsible for their acts, Cudworth is concerned to explain how freedom is possible in a world that might seem to operate by purely mechanical principles, and under the watch of an omniscient God. Again, his approach is epistemological: he argues that our thought is not simply the product of corporeal impacts, and from this he deduces the presence of an active power of conscience in the soul. From the fact of self-consciousness, he argues to possibility of the soul's acting upon itself. Our self-governance is such that 'we are not merely passive to our own practical judgements and to the appearances of good, but contribute something of our own to them' (179). Anyone intrigued by Stephen Darwall's recent study of the similarities between Cudworth and Kant will find much of interest in this short essay.

Hutton's clear and well-researched introduction to the volume provides a useful historical background for the work, and a summary of Cudworth's arguments. The summary is not entirely on the mark; for example, while she praises Cudworth as 'a thoroughly self-consistent thinker' (xxviii), she ascribes to him the view that 'the senses do not perceive external objects as they are' (xxi-xxii) but claims that Cudworth is 'not anti-empiricist ... he specifically acknowledges the adequacy of the senses for providing knowledge of the external world and of the body' (xxii). For this latter point she cites p.57, where Cudworth grants that the senses are adequate to warn us of external things in a way that may be useful as far as the body is concerned, but insists that sensation is *not* knowledge; sensation can at best 'give the understanding sufficient hints' that the understanding may 'by its own sagacity' attain knowledge of external objects (57).

The text itself is presented with an excellent index and good footnotes, in which Cudworth's classical sources are presented clearly and his inaccuracies noted; there are some particularly useful references to relevant passages in Descartes, Hobbes, and Cudworth's own *True Intellectual System*. The volume contains a glossary, indispensable for an author whose diction is as inventive as that of Cudworth, whose antiquarian style results in what he might term some rather operose ambages of discourse. Notwithstanding Cudworth's occasional bouts of rhetorical excess, the text is in fact quite readable; Hutton has modernized the spelling and punctuation, and also broken up some of his lengthy sentences. The results of this last innovation are sometimes awkward: after a sentence describing Epicurus's allegiance to the atomical philosophy, and to the claim that the human soul is merely a corporeal phenomenon, Hutton presents, as a separate sentence, the fragment 'Than which two assertions nothing can be more contradictions' (152); this ungrammatical division does more to unsettle the modern reader than Cudworth's original longwindedness. But on the whole there is much to be admired in Hutton's scholarly presentation of this rich and provocative text.

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**David Dyzenhaus and  
Arthur Ripstein, eds.**

*Law and Morality: Readings in Legal  
Philosophy.*

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1996.

Pp. xii + 779.

\$80.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-0846-8);

\$34.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7878-8).

Courses in Legal Philosophy typically attract three quite different types of students. First are the philosophy majors who have the background for serious philosophical discussion. Second are the students bound for a career in law and who think that a course in legal philosophy may help them do better on their LSAT. Third are the science and social science majors looking for a humanities elective that is not too 'artsy'. Faced with such a disparate clientele instructors face the difficult challenge of finding an approach and a text that will work for all three types of students. What is needed is a text that provides enough grounding in legal philosophy to give the course philosophical substance while at the same time addressing important questions of social policy. These latter questions may be of a specific legal nature (e.g., judicial interpretations of unjust laws, the constitutional entrenchment of rights), or they may be of a more ethical nature (e.g., the abortion and pornography debates). There are many American texts on the market that do a good job of covering such a broad range of material, but all are too narrowly American in focus to meet the needs of a Canadian clientele. This is a major problem since legal philosophy (unlike most areas of philosophy) deals with issues that require a specific social and historical context to be understood properly. It is impossible to deal adequately with the Charter using a text which presupposes the U.S. model of how rights should be entrenched. This splendid new anthology by Dyzenhaus and Ripstein is therefore likely to be welcomed enthusiastically for it meets this need admirably. It covers the basic philosophical materials that most Canadian instructors are likely to want to cover as well as including cases and materials dealing with several important and controversial issues in Canadian jurisprudence and social policy.

The book is large (779 pages) but is reasonably priced at \$34.95 for the paper edition. It is divided into two parts: *Morality and the Rule of Law*, and *Some Contemporary Issues*. Part One covers a suitably broad range of topics. Chapter 1 (*Positivism, Legal Ordering, and Morality*) presents selections from Hobbes, Hart, Fuller and Dworkin, along with two cases, *Whitely v Chapel* and *Riggs v Palmer*. Chapter 2 (*Adjudication*) includes a selection from Melville's *Billy Budd*, papers by Robert Cover (on *Billy Budd*), Anthony Sebok (on Fugitive Slave Acts), Wil Waluchow (on Charter challenges), and John Finnis (on natural law). It also includes two U.S. slave cases and the Patriation Reference. Chapter 3 (*Feminist Approaches to the Rule of Law*) includes readings by Catharine MacKinnon, Martha Minow and Patricia



Williams as well as the *Lavallée* case. Chapter 4 (*Law and Values: Law as Protector of Individual Liberty*) includes a selection from Mill's *On Liberty* and papers by Hayek, Charles Taylor and Lord Devlin. Chapter 5 (*Law and Values: Law as a Tool of Democratic Self-Rule*) includes papers by Ronald Dworkin, and Allan C. Hutchinson and Patrick Monahan as well as the *Hofer v Hofer* case.

Part Two deals with a selection of contemporary social policy issues: defining the family, civil disobedience, the limits of the legal order (dealing mainly with aboriginal rights), hate propaganda and pornography, and abortion. The selections throughout Part Two are intelligent and are likely to engage students in the substantive policy issues as well as their underlying principles and legal niceties. There are some idiosyncrasies in the depth of coverage that presumably reflect the editors' current pre-occupations; the chapter on hate propaganda and pornography covers 168 pages while the chapter on aboriginal rights receives a scant 28 pages. Still, there is plenty of material here to give most instructors ample choice in selecting a good set of readings. The book concludes with three appendices: (i) the Charter, (ii) an overview of the division of powers and the essentials of procedure in Canadian law, and (iii) a glossary of legal and philosophical terms. The latter two are both probably a little too skimpy to satisfy every instructor but will certainly be useful for many students.

So this is an anthology that should work extremely well for most introductory legal philosophy courses. But there is a certain underlying philosophical narrowness that may cause difficulty for some instructors. There is very little to assist instructors who want to challenge the conventional assumption that the distinction between law and morality is as conceptually clear as the book's title and most of the philosophical selections suggest. The selections from Dworkin and Finnis and several of the feminist selections could help to address this issue, but on whole the text would be uncongenial for such instructors. Similarly, instructors who want to highlight the evolving historical relationships between law and morality in the manner of Foucault or MacIntyre would find the text unsatisfactory. Most instructors, however, will not be concerned about such reservations and will simply rejoice in the appearance of an excellent Canadian oriented anthology suitable for an introductory course in legal philosophy.

At a more practical level, however, some instructors may be a little unhappy at the way Part Two deals with Charter cases involving Section 1 challenges. Instructors who have found Section 1 challenge cases to be especially effective teaching materials may regret some of the omissions. The *Oakes* case would have been nice to have in its original version rather than in the truncated version found in *Keegstra*. And, since Section 1 challenges are likely to remain a significant feature of Canadian jurisprudence, it would have been nice to have had a broader range of cases to consider. This, however, is a minor and probably very personal cavil that should not obscure the substantial merits of this excellent anthology. Every anthology reflects compromises and this one is better than we had any right to expect. Canadian

legal philosophers should be extremely grateful to Dyzenhaus and Ripstein for a job well done.

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**Dion Farquhar**

*The Other Machine: Discourse and Reproductive Technologies.*

New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. i + 231.

Cdn\$83.95: US\$59.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91278-4);

Cdn\$24.95: US\$17.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-91279-2).

Dion Farquhar's book, *The Other Machine: Discourse and Reproductive Technologies*, is a compelling account and critique of the discourses that constitute the 'loose amalgam of techniques, procedures, and interventions' termed assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) (1). Farquhar truly excels in her ability to 'de-naturalize' and 'de-mystify' the social, economic, and historical embeddedness of ART techniques and discourses. However, in thematizing heterogeneity and resistance, Farquhar underestimates the degree to which power relations of class, race, and gender overdetermine ARTs' possibilities.

Farquhar begins by arguing against the existence of an essential and/or unmediated (i.e., 'natural') set of reproductive conditions and/or experiences. Instead, she claims that biological reproduction is always/already made meaningful by articulating social discourses. Similarly, she claims that there is 'no "real," fixed, or essential [reproductive] technology' (5). As with 'unassisted' reproduction, Farquhar believes that 'assisted' reproduction is also discursively articulated. In effect, lacking a fixed and essential nature, the possibilities for ART enactments are multiple, including their capacity to 'break the naturalized associational chain of biology with genetics by making different performances or "experiences" of maternity and family possible' (6).

Although Farquhar argues that ARTs have the potential for 'distributing' 'essential unitary maternity' (16), she also acknowledges their potential for reinforcing 'obsessive natalism' and fetishizing 'bio-genetic paternity and maternity' (36). She claims that these latter possibilities are realized by two dominant discursive regimes, 'liberal' and 'fundamentalist' discourses. Accordingly, these regimes condense ARTs into a binary logic of 'the unqualified principled good of free choice or the twin moral evils of denatured commodi-



fication and/or patriarchal determinism' (17). Despite their oppositional character, both 'liberal' discourses, which endorse ARTs, and 'fundamentalist' discourses, which oppose them, assume that a woman's body is 'unmediated and prior to discourse' and deny the degree to which ARTs disrupt the 'reproduction of kinship' (18, 19).

After explaining what ARTs can do to bodies, Farquhar deconstructs the assumptions and implications of these discursive regimes. Beginning with liberal discourses, she differentiates popular and medical variants. Popular discourses articulate infertility as a 'disease' (73) suffered by desperate, infertile, white, economically privileged, married women who are grateful for organized medicine generally and ARTs specifically. Within this discourse, ARTs deliver miracle babies to deserving couples. The second form of liberal discourse, medical discourses, represent ARTs as 'a privileged set of knowledges and techniques about reproductively deficient bodies' (64). As Farquhar puts it, this discourse utilizes a 'hubristic, sexist and racist Western medical model of assisted reproduction as neutral, necessary, market-driven, and client-centered' (77).

Farquhar contends that both variants of liberal discourses deny their political foundations while recuperating 'the connection between maternity and biology that ARTs subvert, interrupt, and renegotiate' (87). By articulating infertility as a disease, liberal discourses render it amenable to medical intervention. However, they deny the (painful) degree to which these technologies act upon female bodies and they erase high infertility rates among working-class people and people of color. Finally, and perhaps most disturbing for Farquhar, liberal discourses suture biogenetic kinship by denying the ways in which ARTs — in-vitro fertilization, surrogacy, and/or egg/semen donation — dislocate (through their distribution) reproductive processes formerly regarded as natural and unitary.

Farquhar's arguments against what she terms 'fundamentalist' discourses are even more vehement. She lumps both fundamentalist Christian discourses and feminist discourses within this category. Although feminist discourses also see ARTs as misogynistic, both discourses are inclined to regard ARTs as 'hubristic' technologies that commodify women's reproductive labor. While acknowledging this potential, Farquhar argues that both forms of fundamentalist discourses too readily lapse into a Marxist critique of commodification which denies individuals rational agency by articulating them as passive ciphers.

In particular, Farquhar is highly critical of what she sees as two forms of feminist fundamentalism, pronatalist cultural feminists and antinatalist feminists. Pronatalists, Farquhar argues, privilege female 'nature' as the binary other of male 'technology' (98). Farquhar critiques this group for endorsing 'unmediated' women's experiences as the source of transformative resistance to male domination. They naturalize and essentialize fundamentally social reproductive processes. This move causes them to reject ARTs because the technologies are seen as fragmenting the supposed unity of female reproduction.



Antinatalists are equally guilty of ignoring the ontological and existential possibilities offered by ARTs. By virtue of their critique of patriarchy, this group views women's biology as antithetical to their freedom. By positing all maternity as 'bad', antinatalists view the very telos of ARTs as specious (107). In addition to erasing the heterogeneous desires which prompt motherhood, Farquhar charges that they fail to recognize the ways in which ARTs 'unwittingly undermine traditional "feminine" and "masculine" contributions to reproduction and deracinate reproduction from its heterosexual physiological base' (107).

In sum, Farquhar argues that both liberal and fundamentalist discourses deny the degree to which ARTs disrupt traditional, biogenetic models of kinship and the possibilities offered by the distribution of female maternity. In contrast, Farquhar celebrates the ways in which ARTs de-center 'coitus as the paradigmatic sex' (32) by rupturing the 'naturalized associational chain of biology with genetics' (6). In her final chapter, (M)other discourses, Farquhar summarizes and expands the possibilities afforded by ARTs.

Although Farquhar's text is intellectually rigorous and provocative, it is not without weaknesses. By reason of her failure to examine the ambiguities within discourses, Farquhar has an annoying tendency to cast 'liberal' and, particularly, 'fundamentalist' discourses as monolithic, homogeneous entities. In articulating the latter as uniformly reactionary, she underestimates the very real dangers posed by ARTs. For instance, in critiquing fundamentalist discourses for casting the egg-donor, surrogate, and IVF recipient as helpless victims, Farquhar's emphasis on resistance elides the social conditions of possibility for agents' choices. The course between agency and structure is a difficult one to navigate, as illustrated by her rather troublesome chapter on surrogacy. In centering surrogates as agents, Farquhar dismisses 'fundamentalist' feminists' arguments that a surrogate's 'choice' to undergo the significant physiological and emotional effects of pregnancy for a mere \$12,000 (152) cannot be de-contextualized from the politics of class, race, and gender. In effect, Farquhar too easily rejects and/or minimizes the ways in which ARTs privilege the interests of upper-class white men and women and the ways in which they colonize the bodies of lower-class women. After personally experiencing some of pregnancy's unpleasant complications and medical interventions, I balk at any legalized contract which subordinates a woman's reproductive decisions to economics, law, and litigation.

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**Ronald N. Giere** and  
**Alan W. Richardson, eds.**

*Origins of Logical Empiricism.*

Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science.

Vol. XVI. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota  
Press 1996. Pp. vii + 392.

US\$49.95. ISBN 0-8166-2834-3.

The Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, founded in 1953 by Herbert Feigl as one of the successor institutions of the Vienna Circle in North America, celebrated its 40th birthday in 1993 with a large-scale meeting of philosophers devoted to the history of the Logical Empiricist movement. The present volume is a collection of the conference papers and a very handsome anniversary document indeed.

The papers range over a wide variety of issues; I'll concentrate here on those contributions which explore the cultural, political, and scientific background of Logical Empiricism and which all add considerably to the fuller and more adequate picture of the movement that has begun to emerge in recent scholarship. The historical scope of most of the essays is restricted to the *origins* of the movement in Europe as opposed to its development in North America after the mid-1930s. It is important to emphasize this distinction of cultural and political contexts because Logical Empiricism, as most of us have come to know it — that is, its American version — was a movement significantly different in its public appearance from the European original. As the contributions by Galison, Cartwright and Cat, and Uebel show, the motivations in the origin of the movement were, at least partly, political and, in the case of Neurath, explicitly Marxist. These original motivations were hidden behind an intentionally apolitical rhetoric when the Logical Empiricists emigrated to the US and tried to adapt to a different cultural context. 'Once in America, the logical empiricist philosophers of science pretty much stuck to their p's and q's', as Giere puts it. According to him, this strategy may also have contributed to the blooming of the Logical Empiricist movement at a time when American pragmatism, the dominating philosophical school in the 1930s, was in decline because in the anticommunist climate after the war pragmatism appeared suspiciously involved in social and political affairs (348).

In pre-war Austria and Germany, the very concept of *Aufbau* (roughly: 'construction'), famously used by Carnap in his 1928 *Der Logische Aufbau der Welt*, had eminently socialist or social democratic connotations, as Galison documents at length, supplementing his earlier studies on the connections of the *Bauhaus* modernist movement in architecture and the Logical Empiricists. 'An *Aufbau* reformed life, restructured values away from the decorative and superfluous and toward the practical; *Aufbau* in 1917-26 incorporated rationalism and in general reached all the way down to the very form of life.' No such connotations existed in the North American context into which Carnap and the others subsequently moved. For Galison it is, there-



fore, not 'a mere accident that Rolf George translated Carnap's magnum opus as *Logical Structure*, not *Logical Construction*. Red Vienna had vanished, and the New World had its own fascination with universal, ahistorical, and apolitical structures.' (41f.)

The paper by Cartwright and Cat studies Otto Neurath's quasi-anarchist attitude against falsification, induction, and confirmation as candidates for 'the method of scientific inquiry', an attitude that has always clashed with the received view about Logical Empiricism as a philosophy emphasizing method and rigor. The roots of his view are discovered in methodological discussions among Marxist theorists *circa* 1900, debates which the economist Neurath was thoroughly familiar with. This intimate connection of economic and philosophic ideas also throws light on Neurath's seemingly paradoxical association of the attitude 'against method' with the famous doctrine of the 'unity of science'. It becomes clear that for Neurath the unity of science had much more to do with central planning as found in socialist economies than with a reduction of all sciences to one basic master science — a theme that is also pursued in Uebel's paper on Neurath's antifoundationalist theory of knowledge. With regard to the unity of science one should further note that an important sense of the original term *Einheitswissenschaft* got lost in the translation as 'unified science'. What was lost becomes evident when we recognize that the Logical Empiricists' neologism *Einheitswissenschaft* was very probably formed after the model of the term *Einheitskunstwerk*, used in the *Bauhaus* circle. The latter does not primarily mean 'unified work of art'; it rather implies the idea of standardization, of constructing a work out of standard building blocks. This idea of standardization, I suggest, is the main sense to be given to the project of *Einheitswissenschaft*; it was not the project of reducing all the sciences to a common foundation like physics but rather the attempt to provide standardized 'building blocks' for the different sciences which could be used by every scientist. Neurath's *Encyclopedia of Unified Science* was intended as the execution of such a standardization, not as the blueprint for a grand reduction of everything to a basic science.

How close the connection of developments within Logical Empiricism and those in theoretical physics, in particular, in General Relativity Theory in fact were, is demonstrated in the contributions by Howard and Ryckman on Carnap and Reichenbach. In this regard, the old Logical Empiricist philosophy of science differed significantly from later work on the unity of science and theory reduction.

A different kind of background to the movement is studied in Friedman's paper on Carnap and Heidegger. This contribution is an outstanding and, I think, the authoritative discussion of the well-known critique by Carnap (1932) of what he perceived to be Heidegger's trespassing of the line separating responsible philosophy from metaphysics. Heidegger's discourse, Carnap argued, had violated restrictions imposed by pure logic on any possible discourse. The accused's response (1935) was to deny the authority of logic in matters concerning truth as 'disclosedness of what exists'. Friedman shows how this fight over the status of logic arose out of an older dispute between

two factions of German neo-Kantianism, the early Carnap being associated with the 'Marburg school' of Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer, and the early Heidegger coming out of the 'Southwest German school' of Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask. Both camps had set out to overcome the Kantian duality of an active, discursive faculty of the mind (pure understanding) and a passive, intuitive faculty (pure sensibility) which, in their interplay, explain how, for instance, geometrical knowledge is possible. The development of non-Euclidean geometries and of Relativity Theory had generated problems for Kant's claim that the human mind comes equipped with a priori forms of intuition; in response, the neo-Kantians tried to derive the possibility of geometrical knowledge from the understanding alone, without the assistance of the dubious a priori structures of the faculty of sensibility. The Marburg school solved the problem through dissolving the geometric objects into mere places in a network of relational structures. Logic, understood as the theory of relations (in Russell's sense), thus becomes the basis for all geometric knowledge. (In the *Aufbau*, Carnap followed a similar strategy.) For the Southwest German school, by contrast, logic was just the result of artificial processes of abstraction from the concrete objects of experience; hence, logic could not claim to be basic to, or constitutive of knowledge at all.

Beyond its interest as a study of the Carnap-Heidegger controversy, Friedman's paper throws an interesting light on the history of the separation of contemporary philosophy into 'analytic' and 'continental' traditions. This is something that can be said about Giere and Richardson's collection as a whole, and it is certainly not the smallest of its merits.

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**Ruth W. Grant**

*Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1997.

Pp. xii + 201.

US\$22.50. ISBN 0-226-30528-1.

Saints (antihypocrites) and liars (hypocrites) should not be trusted because of the personal and political tolls they extract from others. Grant's book seeks to address the ethical and political implications of this proposition. The general problem she examines is how to distinguish between a legitimate compromise and a sellout, idealism and fanaticism, statesmanship and demagoguery. In short, can we determine the moral limits of both moderation



and moralism in politics? Grant finds within Rousseau's works an ideal of 'integrity' that is an alternative both to the sanctimonious righteousness commonly attributed to Rousseau and to the cynicism of Machiavelli. A person of integrity is someone who can be trusted to do the right thing — to remain principled even at some personal cost — but who still utilizes degrees of deception, hypocrisy, and compromise.

Grant begins by focusing on the similarities between Machiavelli and Rousseau. Generally speaking, both characterize politics as mutual dependence, and the inevitable result of that dependence is hypocrisy. Moreover, they share an appreciation of the strength of vanity, pride, and ambition as political forces irreducible to calculations of interest. In addition, they share an abiding pessimism concerning the prospects for rational solutions to many political problems. Finally, Machiavelli and Rousseau believe that evil is not simply a matter of ignorance or error but intertwined in the very fabric of political passions such as vanity, pride, and ambition. Grant's somewhat cursory approach to the similarities and differences between Machiavelli and Rousseau, it may be noted, will likely dissatisfy some readers.

Hypocrisy is necessary in every type of polity since it arises out of the character of political relationships. We learn from Machiavelli that because society requires trust and morality, but men are neither trustworthy nor moral, deceit and hypocrisy are inevitable. As Grant explains, social and political hypocrisy '... cannot be altogether eliminated. It is necessitated by the natural and ineradicable moral shortcomings of human beings; it functions as an alternative to force in public relationships; and it is also a necessary concomitant of relationships of dependence among people who are not intimate' (33). Political discourse will always include appeals to pride, honour, ambition, religion, loyalty, morals, and principles — qualities and beliefs not always reducible to prudential calculations. Machiavelli understands this and gives full recognition to the importance of hypocrisy in political life.

Rousseau, however, provides an alternative to Machiavelli's cynical manipulator. To provide such an alternative, Grant substitutes 'integrity' for 'authenticity' as Rousseau's core concept. Rousseau's more common terms such as *probité*, *vertue*, *droiture*, *intégrité*, and *honnêteté* are more aptly captured by the term 'integrity'. It implies neither the subjectivity nor the moral rigidity attributed to Rousseau's thought by those who see authenticity or virtue as the distinguishing feature of his works. As Grant explains, '... integrity, as opposed to authenticity or unity, is an ideal with some substance' (111). By reminding readers that authenticity is a marginal element of Rousseau's thinking, she provides a corrective to the literature on Rousseau. Most obviously, he uses the term 'authenticity' rather infrequently, and when Rousseau does he means to characterize an act or object as genuine or original as opposed to counterfeit. More importantly, to describe Rousseau's central concern as revolving around 'authentic' acts confuses his ideas with those of future romantic and existential thinkers whom he influenced.

Grant leads her readers to consider what types of political flexibility and compromise in Rousseau's view are and are not consistent with integrity. At issue is whether his conception of moral purity can form the basis for a practical ethics. Much of the literature on Rousseau concludes that he encourages either fanatical revolutionary politics or an indignant rejection of the modern world. The latter reading tends to reinforce the view that he offers little to those interested in practical ethics. Grant challenges the characterization of Rousseau's works as either revolutionary or reclusive in spirit. Here she asks: What are the possibilities for flexibility and compromise within the boundary set by the seemingly uncompromising character of the man of integrity? Is there a politics of integrity to be found in Rousseau, or does he offer only a curious mix of resignation and indignation?

Rousseau does provide a largely unrecognized type of character: a 'mature idealist' who is neither a fanatic nor a misanthrope. Such a person, Grant argues, is capable of making flexible political judgments, and is more likely to resist rather than to embrace fanaticism. The mature idealist is more realistic about the prospects of honesty in politics, and possibly in a better position to confront the political problems associated with *amour-propre*: how vanity, envy, ambition, vengeance, and pride can be markedly more difficult to resolve than rational or economic conflicts of interest. By excavating Rousseau's less-familiar works such as *The Government of Poland* and *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, Grant unearths a self that balances moral purity and political pragmatism. There is therefore another way to read Rousseau that avoids a drastic choice between the life of a revolutionary or that of a hermit.

Grant reconceptualizes both the common ground between Machiavelli and Rousseau and their distance from Hobbes, Locke, and Smith. She correctly notes that liberal political philosophy underestimates qualities such as pride, love, and faith by treating them as mere interests. Yet here more precision and amplification on her part would have been helpful. While contemporary liberals sometimes write as if citizens of liberal democratic regimes were all civic-minded Harvard graduates, it is less convincing that Hobbes, Locke, and Smith harboured such high expectations. Here one can point to the attention devoted by Locke — and Hobbes too — to the political advantages and hazards of religion and faith in civil society. In sum, while only a gifted scholar and writer could effectively present the mixture of philosophical exegesis and conceptual analysis Grant provides, even she may have addressed too many topics. Her otherwise timely effort to provide a 'useful' Rousseauian political ethic was in the end (like Rousseau himself) somewhat vague if not occasionally obtuse. Readers interested in Machiavelli will be uninspired by the one chapter Grant devotes to him, although those tackling the issues Rousseau raised will find this book well-worth reading.

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**David Ray Griffin**

*Parapsychology, Philosophy, and Spirituality: A Postmodern Exploration.*

Albany: State University of New York Press  
1997. Pp. xiv + 292.

US\$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3315-3);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3316-1).

The title of Griffin's book is misleading. The book is neither a philosophical assessment of the implications of *experimental* parapsychology (as suggested by 'Parapsychology, Philosophy ...'), nor does it have any substantial reference to postmodern philosophers ('A Postmodern Exploration') and neither does it provide a rigorous philosophical justification for 'new age' type beliefs ('Philosophy and Spirituality'). Readers interested in these books will have to write them themselves.

Instead, there are three main aims in Griffin's book. Its overall theme is to introduce a Whiteheadian metaphysics and to show how it can overcome problems in the current worldview. Griffin also illustrates how a Whiteheadian view is both suggested by and can accommodate evidence from psychical research. A second focus of the book is to point to the existence of three types of thinkers — paradigmatic thinkers (such as philosophers who think in terms of worldviews and logical consequences); data-led thinkers (such as scientists) and wishful thinkers (those who are led by what they want to be the case). All three are intertwined. To persuade paradigmatic thinkers to his Whiteheadian perspective, Griffin outlines some necessary core beliefs (e.g., in causation as influence, in consciousness etc.) that cannot be explained by materialism in order to introduce the notion that a change in worldview is necessary. He then provides some (parapsychological) data that likewise contradict materialism and he introduces Whitehead's philosophy as an alternative worldview. He stresses that merely wishing that paranormal phenomena did not exist does not make it so. That is, Griffin not only expounds the theory that there are three different types of thinkers; he also uses it to make his points more persuasive. Griffin's third aim is to use a Whiteheadian metaphysics in conjunction with the findings from psychical research to assess the possibility of survival after death (Chapters 4-8).

It is in Chapter 3 that Griffin most comes to grip with the many philosophical issues at play. It reviews problems that face the Philosophy of Mind and the clear prose may well make it a useful chapter for students to read and to ponder. In this chapter Griffin outlines two problems that are incurred by dualism, seven problems that the materialistic view of mind must answer and five problems that dualism and materialism share. He then offers a 'panexperientialist' view as one that circumvents these problems. In panexperientialism there is no ontological difference between mind and matter; there is simply a difference in kind. Due to the lack of space available, Griffin notes that he has pursued his view more thoroughly elsewhere. Thus the chapter serves well as an introduction and as a stimulus for further thought,

but not as a full-blown argument. It is, incidentally, unclear whether Griffin himself manages to retain a dualism that is not an ontological one. For instance, in Chapter 6 on reincarnation Griffin hypothesises that a person could incarnate some previously existing 'occasions of experience'. This, however, suggests an ontological dualism in which occasions of experience somehow exist independently.

In the final chapter Griffin addresses the topic of 'spirituality' or non-institutionalised religion. He introduces the presuppositions entailed by viewing life as a 'spiritual' path and shows how evidence from psychical research would support this notion. The final sentences are somewhat apocalyptic, arguing that unless we change our worldview the planet will head for destruction. This is somewhat out of keeping of the general gist of the book that we should not submit ourselves merely to wishful and fearful thinking. It is, however, indicative of the occasional impression that some points are pushed so hard that it appears as if the author has a mission rather than (or as well as) an argument. Griffin describes his overall approach as 'postmodern' because he sees the difference between sciences, social sciences and humanities as one in kind rather than as one in essence (paralleling his view of mind vs matter and the lack of sharp distinction between different types of thinkers).

In conclusion, the book is clearly written and it is an interesting attempt to address some of the more awkward issues that face anybody trying to construct a coherent worldview. Its scope is too large to be able to address *thoroughly* the validity of the paranormal phenomena introduced or to satisfactorily solve the many philosophical issues at play, but as a stimulus for further thought it should serve well.

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**G.L. Hagberg**

*Meaning and Interpretation: Wittgenstein,  
Henry James, and Literary Knowledge.*

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1994.

Pp. 183.

US\$27.50. ISBN 0-8014-2926-9.

In *Meaning and Interpretation: Wittgenstein, Henry James, and Literary Knowledge*, Hagberg argues that the dictum 'meaning is use' has important implications for aesthetics. He claims that there is an analogy between linguistic meaning and artistic meaning. And just as the conception of



meaning as use dissolves pseudo-problems arising from the picture theory of language, the idea that artistic meaning is context-dependent shows the senselessness of questions typically posed in aesthetics. As Hagberg argues 'the meaning of a work of art is its use within the form of life of the art world' (62). Thus, just as we should avoid asking questions like 'What *is* language?' or 'What *is* a proposition?', we ought not to ask 'What *is* artistic meaning?' as though the answer could be provided in isolation from the artistic practices within which gestures have their meaning and prior to any future artistic developments (54). To a certain degree, the analogy between language and art is enlightening, but there are respects in which Hagberg strains it. I will summarize his argument and close with some remarks on where the analogy breaks down.

In Chapter 1, the concept of a language-game is compared to that of an artistic style. Hagberg argues that language-games are autonomous and self-sufficient. That is, the range of moves that are possible within a language-game are internally generated so that they 'define their own boundaries' (20). In a parallel way, artistic styles define the moves that are possible within them. Therefore, just as we can recognize a given utterance *as* a move within a particular language-game, we can recognize a work by a given artist by the characteristics of his style. It is also easy to recognize 'mistakes' in the arts — we immediately recognize a gothic window next to a Romanesque or the use of parallel fifths to harmonize a choral melody as transgressions of those artistic styles.

Chapter 2 begins with a syllogism: 'To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life', art is a language, therefore to imagine an art form means to imagine a form of life (45). 'Imagining a form of life', according to Hagberg, 'requires roots reaching down into human activities and practices. Language does not float freely, without roots to action and practice, above the world to which it refers' (46). He then suggests — in support of the premise that art is a language — that gestures, such as those used in ancient rites, might well constitute the paradigm case of a nonverbal language-game. Because such gestures are embedded in a set of social practices, they carry meaning that nevertheless defies propositional formulation. Hagberg argues that 'if gestures possess meaning *like* language but not *within* language, then we are approaching a very promising analogy for our understanding of art' (50). What we should learn from the analogy is to give up our belief in some hidden and intangible realm of meanings, either in art or in language. Artistic meaning, like linguistic meaning, is grounded in human *action*. Those who see the central task of aesthetic theory as the development of a method for searching for hidden meanings are in the grip of a picture of meaning which the later Wittgenstein exploded. If an artist or writer meant something by a work and if we as critics want to recover that meaning, we can only do so by looking to the particulars of the context within which that 'utterance' was made (61). Art cannot mean just anything that the perceiver perceives in it (82).

Hagberg's application of the slogan 'meaning is use' to artistic meaning is interesting, but one wonders whether it can do the work that he wants in a critique of aesthetic theory. Exactly how analogous is 'artistic meaning' to linguistic meaning? Do we understand art in the way that we understand language? Is it correct to say that the meaning of a work of art is its use within the form of life of the art world? It makes sense to say of linguistic meaning that 'meaning is use' because there are clear criteria for understanding and not understanding language (cf. *PI* §269, *PI* §29). But are there similar criteria for saying that someone does or does not understand a work of art? Hagberg seems to suggest as much with his remark 'to understand a work of art is to imagine a form of life — i.e., to understand what it was to be a certain kind of person at a certain time ... just as *language* cannot mean anything that the user or receiver wants, correspondingly works of art cannot mean whatever the perceiver perceives in them' (81-2). It is not clear, however, that Hagberg can make this point about art in the unqualified way that Wittgenstein makes it about language when he says 'It is only in a language that I can mean something by something ... the grammar of "to mean" is not like that of "to imagine"' (*PI* p. 18). Arguing that someone has misunderstood or misinterpreted a work of art is a notoriously tricky and controversial business. Many people would not want to say that someone has misinterpreted or 'misunderstood' a work of art if he finds some meaning in it which the artist did not intend. They may want to say that the interpreter has an important insight which is in some sense 'there' in the work of art whether or not it was one that the artist imagined or intended to express. Of course, this issue is widely debated. But the point is that the criteria for saying that someone has misunderstood a work of art are obviously less clear-cut than those for saying that he has misunderstood someone's speech-act. And if it is more problematic to speak of 'misunderstanding art' than it is to speak of 'misunderstanding speech', then perhaps artistic meaning cannot be explained on the model of 'meaning as use'. Indeed, perhaps we ought not to speak — except in a suitably qualified sense — of artistic *meaning* at all. This would have been a more interesting book — and a more substantial contribution to both Wittgenstein scholarship and aesthetics — if Hagberg had also discussed the respects in which language and art are disanalogous. Nevertheless, it's still an interesting book; it's certainly a scholarly one, and many of the explications of Wittgensteinian concepts are valuable in their own right.

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**Arthur Herman**

*The Idea of Decline in Western History.*

New York: The Free Press 1997. Pp. 521.

US\$30.00. ISBN 0-684-82791-3.

Since the Enlightenment Western history has been written largely under the influence of the idea of progress, and there have been plenty of scholarly accounts and analyses of that idea. In this book Herman provides a well-informed and wide-ranging examination of the opposite notion, that of decline. It is, according to Herman, an essay in the history of ideas and 'not a pronouncement on whether modern civilization [is] actually doomed or not' (1). However, Herman has views on that subject too, and is not overly impressed by any pessimistic verdict concerning the imminent collapse of the West. In spite of the doubts he claims to find evidence that the essential ingredients of Western thinking are not just maintaining but are increasing their hold over global thought.

Herman's main concern, however, is to chart the growth of the pessimistic outlook from the Enlightenment to the environment. If you believe in laws or cycles in history, progress and decline are the two sides of the same coin, as each can turn into the other. But, claims Herman, the idea of progress has itself declined since the Enlightenment and its nineteenth-century culmination in Hegel and Marx. Rousseau had already fuelled Romanticism's break with optimistic progressivism, and had thus paved the way for the disparate and depressing cast of characters who appear on Herman's stage. It is these, he claims, who have falsely set the modern agenda, from early racial theorists like Gobineau, through Nietzschean pessimists, Wagnerian fascists and Spenglerian determinists, to the environmental doom-sayers of today.

There is an excursion via the Frankfurt School and French philosophers like Sartre and Foucault, but do they really belong in the same narrative? The fact is, though, that this book is not just a dispassionate essay in the history of ideas, but has a sub-plot, a defence of the American Dream against all comers. As he reaches more modern times Herman stops giving the reader mere summaries of the writers examined and resorts increasingly to a defence of American society through fundamental critical analyses of its mainly feminist and black critics. But it should be noted that this form of argument is fallacious. Seeing off these critics, as Herman does fairly easily, does not provide a vindication of American society.

Herman also relies on a fallacious argument when criticising contemporary environmentalist ideas by showing that similar views were held by Nazi writers. No doubt many Nazis believed that  $2+2=4$ , but this is insufficient to discredit arithmetic. A more general criticism of the book is that although Herman does attempt to provide a philosophical framework within which ideas of decline can be analysed, it is underdeveloped. It is important to emphasise that the notions of progress and decline require the specification of a standard against which the progress or decline can be measured, and that such standards are bound to be contentious. Such points aside, though,

this book is filled with thought-provoking material, and it is not totally destroyed by the fact that the names of Sukhano and Sihanouk are transposed on p. 218.

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**Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne, eds.**

*Misunderstanding Science? The Public  
Reconstruction of Science and Technology.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. vii + 232.

US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521-43268-5.

**Charles Alan Taylor**

*Defining Science: A Rhetoric of Demarcation.*

Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1996.

Pp. vii + 292.

US\$53.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-299-15030-5);

US\$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-299-15034-8).

According to Popper, one of the most important problems in epistemology is the 'problem of demarcation', that is the question of defining what science is and how it differs from other things. The other things Popper had in mind were metaphysics and pseudo-science. For Popper the criterion of demarcation is provided by the principle of falsifiability: thus a statement is scientific if and only if it is falsifiable; it is metaphysical if and only if it is not falsifiable, but is verifiable; and it is pseudo-scientific if and only if it claims to be scientific but is not. Such definitions are to be understood so that any false statement is automatically falsifiable and thus scientific; and metaphysical (unfalsifiable) statements are meaningful, and thus the demarcation criterion is not a criterion of 'meaning'. These initially simple ideas were considerably elaborated by Popper's followers and critics.

Taylor's book starts with a discussion of Popper, but quickly goes beyond, for its main purpose is to outline a 'rhetorical' approach to the problem. What exactly Taylor means by rhetorical is not as clear as one would wish. But there are indications that he means an approach which focuses on techniques of persuasion; on scientific controversy; and on the discourses and language in which such controversies and techniques are embedded. The jump from the traditional 'philosophical' approach to a 'rhetorical' one is not as difficult as it might seem, although Taylor's way of doing it is somewhat roundabout.



My way of bridging the gap is to focus on the notions of argumentation and reasoning (i.e., the activity of reason giving).

The procedure Taylor follows to sketch his rhetorical approach is to first undertake a critical examination of philosophical accounts of the problem from Popper to Steve Fuller, including the views of Lakatos, Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Laudan. Taylor's aim here is to argue that such discussions point in the direction of a rhetorical approach. He then undertakes a similar analysis of the views of exponents of the sociological approach to the problem, from Robert Merton to J. Ziman, B. Barnes, D. Bloor, B. Latour and S. Woolgar, G. Gilbert and M. Mulkay. Here, the jump from the sociological to the rhetorical is relatively simple in principle, and the bridging notion is the communal or interpersonal character of science.

A third undertaking by Taylor involves the examination of the work of several scholars who have made contributions to the rhetoric of science, such as L. Prelli, A. Gross, J. Campbell, and J. McGuire and T. Melia. As a rhetorical scholar, Taylor is here on his home turf. But this is not to say that his account is uncritical or unoriginal. He properly objects to many exaggerated and self-defeating claims, and his distinctive twist involves paying more attention to the notions of *phronēsis* and practical judgment.

After these relatively metascientific discussions, Taylor goes on to examine two recent scientific controversies. The first involves the question of the status of so-called creation science or scientific creationism; that is, the approach to the study of life and geological and cosmological history which denies the theory of evolution and advocates a bible-based account according to which these phenomena were created by an act of divine intervention in the time span of the last several thousand years. This dispute reached a climax in the early 1980s with the trial about the constitutionality of the Arkansas law which legislated a treatment of these topics balanced between evolution and creation. The law was found to be a violation of the separation of church and state.

The second controversy is about cold fusion. This began in 1981 when two chemists at the University of Utah claimed to have devised a new and simple way of fusing atomic nuclei, very different from the process of thermonuclear reaction. Allegedly, they were able to generate fusion energy by immersing some metals in heavy water and connecting them to a source of electricity, with apparatus of the kind found in many high school laboratories. The claim elicited many heated discussions among scientists, conferences, investigations by legislative bodies such as the U.S. House of Representatives, articles in the popular press, and public commentary. Within a year a consensus emerged that what was happening in this laboratory setup was not fusion, but some other phenomenon; that this other phenomenon was hard to replicate; and that the two alleged inventors had been probably careless in their experimental design, rash in their theoretical interpretation, and unethical in their behavior vis-à-vis other scientists, funding sources, and the public.

These two controversies are certainly well chosen for the purpose of concretely studying the rhetoric of demarcation. Thus, Taylor's account of them is a good complement to the earlier more metascientific examinations. More generally, the book is well documented and intelligently argued, and so it is a valuable addition to the literature on the rhetoric of science.

On a critical note, the exposition is not as clear as it could be. Moreover, it tends to be full of jargon common in rhetorical circles, but somewhat distasteful to philosophers. And the book lacks in incisiveness insofar as it is not easy to find a particular thesis or well-defined approach being advanced. Finally, there is an ambiguity in the problem of demarcation which creates confusion and difficulties but is not explicitly addressed; demarcation can refer either to the distinction between science and other things that are not science (but which may be perfectly good and respectable within their sphere) or to the distinction between good and bad science.

The other book under review, edited by Irwin and Wynne, is a collection of papers by various authors, but it has a high degree of thematic and methodological unity. The approach is generally that of the sociology of science, and more specifically that of micro-level, case-study, qualitative research, by contrast to macro-level, statistical, quantitative research. The thematic unity derives from the fact that all papers deal with the problem of the 'public understanding of science.' And here an original and interesting twist is given to this problem.

Let us begin with some capsule descriptions of the typical cases under investigation. They involve the reactions of various publics to various scientific or technological developments: sheep farmers in northern England, whose sheep and pastures were contaminated by the Chernobyl radioactive fall-out in 1986; people in communities exposed to pollution and other routine risks from chemical plants; patients suffering from a genetic metabolic disorder which has no obvious symptoms but can lead to a sudden heart attack; pregnant women who have access to imaging technology which enables them to see the embryos and fetuses in their own womb; the inhabitants of the Isle of Man and their reaction to ionizing radiation; and the construction and reception of a permanent gallery at the Science Museum in London.

The editors and contributors are generally critical of the approach to the public understanding of science which presuppose a one-sided assumption to the effect that the problem is due to the public's ignorance or misunderstanding of science, and so the solution lies merely in conveying the proper scientific education or information to the public. Such an approach takes as unproblematic the question of what science is and how scientific conclusions are interpreted, the fact that scientific authorities sometimes disagree, etc. Instead, this book follows a relational approach which explores the interaction between science and the public. A key thesis supported in it is that in cases like those described above, the public is as likely to misunderstand science, as science is likely to misunderstand the public.



This thesis and approach are both intended to be embodied in the book's title. *Misunderstanding Science?* is meant to be ambiguous and to refer both to situations where science is misunderstood as well as situations where 'science' (scientists) perpetrate the misunderstanding.

It turns out that this thesis and approach presuppose a view of science very similar to the 'rhetorical' one advanced in Taylor's book. Of course, *Misunderstanding Science?* does not use the terminology of 'rhetoric'. The two books employ different kinds of rhetoric, so to speak. However, the similarity is unmistakable, as may be seen from the following statement in regard to which the reader should guess from which book it comes: 'science will not be represented as a simple "body of facts" or as a given "method," but as a much more diffuse collection of institutions, areas of specialized knowledge and theoretical interpretations whose forms and boundaries are open to negotiation with other social institutions and forms of knowledge.' This is found in *Misunderstanding Science?* (8), but it could have been written by the author of *Defining Science*.

Finally, in regard to philosophy, from one point of view such a conclusion supported by both books might be taken to represent bad news for philosophers, for it seems to imply that the philosophy of science must give way to the rhetoric and/or sociology of science. But such a conclusion need not be drawn, for doing so would presuppose an impoverished conception of philosophy. Philosophy may also be taken to deal with argumentation and reasoning, and if we take this point of view then the study of scientific argument and reasoning will be a key part of the philosophy of science. Both books may be taken to suggest that argumentation and reasoning plays a crucial role in science.

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**David Farrell Krell**

*Son of Spirit. A novel.*

Albany: State University of New York Press

1997. Pp. vi + 180.

US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3221-1);

US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3222-X).

*Son of Spirit* (SP) is a novel about Hegel's illegitimate son Louis. A prologue and chronology set the historical stage, but the body of SP is fictional, diary-like entries or voicings by Louis ('Son of Spirit') and the historical figures around him: Hegel ('Spirit') and Goethe among others. These voicings are punctuated by actual historical letters and reproduced lithographs.

Anyone familiar with the historical period and figures will be intrigued and appalled: reading SP is like eavesdropping on the thoughts of Germany's giants and their relations, but Spirit's voicings about ethics are a bastardization of Hegel's theory (e.g., 157), and the anglicizing often grates ('I am off to scenic Stuttgart, to go jobbing for Jobst, to fetch a dog a Bohn' 129). The pictures of Hegel, sunk into Spirit's text, make the historical Hegel seem an uptight, self-contradictory, neurotic, lusty nerd, not to mention an unimaginative and superficial ideologue. To Krell's credit, SP is called a novel, not a philosophical or historical novel.

History aside, SP has literary and philosophical merit (even if wrong about Hegel). It is about how the space of writing exceeds (Hegelian) spirit. The symbol of excess is the 'Son of Spirit', who as a bastard, exceeds the ethical forms of family and social life to which Spirit is committed. The relationship is tragic: Spirit's ideology effaces Louis' individuality; Louis ends believing that his life constrained his father's philosophy (172).

Louis' social identity is itself made up of signatures, collected in his autograph book. Inscribed are the thoughts and good-wishes of those who care — or pretend to care — for him. (The prologue reveals nothing about the authenticity of the autographs.) SP is like this series of autographs: the place of writing, of traces, of attempts to give identity to something that exceeds identification. In the end Louis perversely recognizes his identity as excess: having enlisted in a distant army, his social identity left behind, he thinks of 'my autograph book, which has wandered off on a life of its own, opening its leaves to signatures I will never see. I should have auto-aborted ...' (171). SP has the religious subtext of the life of Christ: Louis is innocent and dies young; he is the space of the word. Goethe muses: 'They will make of his brief journey a way of sorrows, a crucifixion' (85).

But Louis (like SP) symbolizes not just excess of relations, but also lack of essential ones. There is an unconscious desire in many voicings to see Louis distanced (e.g., 80). Louis is a victim not only of this desire, but also of its *hiddenness*, which makes him always already distanced. Krell invites psychoanalytic complicity with his reader by (not so surreptitiously) couching the desire (e.g., 57). The voices of Spirit and his wife (Marie von Tucher) are obvious in this respect. Those of Goethe, Minna and Louis are more complex and literary.

The delightful Goethe-Minna relationship dominates the first fifty pages of the book — an interesting counterpoint to the second half that focuses on Spirit and Louis. If the latter is about ethical strife, the former is about heart. Early on Goethe admires intertwining trees, a motif played on subsequently (e.g., 47 where Goethe dreams his signature and that of Minna's are intertwined). In contrast, Goethe muses that Spirit's Lutheranism makes Spirit blind to the 'intertwined and espoused' nature of reason and pleasure. SP is an effort to get beyond the 'appearances and appurtenances of love' (Goethe 84). Nevertheless, Goethe's erotic/metaphoric musing sometimes falls into smutty rumination: 'If I had all the seed I have spent in my life here on my



gold-rimmed plate, how paltry these sturgeon eggs would seem by comparison! I would be swimming in my own spilled ecstasy' (52).

The son of spirit is the sensuous excess of Spirit: *in* the text, the bastard son, *as* text, the voicings of desire, and Krell's desire to give voice. Krell is best closest to reverie (see the wonderful Goethe entry on the 'unsaid' 121-3): to love, to insanity (88-90), at play (see the doctor's musing on the nature of fever 155-6); or giving voice to Adeodatus, son of Saint Augustine, another son of spirit (165).

SP is an intertwining of voices. All the more clearly, therefore, is Hegel's 'Spirit' the fall guy: instead of being the community of interpreters with all the variety that that implies (and of which the book is an embodiment), in SP 'Spirit' is one individual, a voice at odds with its own inevitable excesses.

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**Michael Leahy and Dan Cohn-Sherbok, eds.**

*The Liberation Debate: Rights at Issue.*

New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. xiv + 264.

Cdn\$83.95: US\$59.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-11693-7);

Cdn\$24.95: US\$17.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-11694-5).

**Juha Raikka, ed.**

*Do We Need Minority Rights: Conceptual Issues.*

The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1996.

Pp. 240.

US\$100.00. ISBN 90-411-0309-0.

**Thomas W. Simon**

*Democracy and Social Injustice: Law, Politics, and Philosophy.*

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1995.

Pp. xxiii + 341.

US\$69.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7937-3);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7938-1).

The question of what, if anything, to do about various disadvantaged minorities continues to be a live one with an ever-expanding list of groups clamoring to be included under the banner of those deserving special protection. National, ethnic, and racial minorities, gays and lesbians, women, children, animals, the economically disadvantaged, victims of environmental injustice, and religious minorities are all, according to one or another advocate, in need

of and entitled to special treatment. Such debates are variously carried out in terms of legal, political, moral, and social concerns, and the form that protection from the majoritarian process should allegedly take is equally diverse, ranging from negative rights (primarily in the form of anti-discrimination regulations), to positive entitlements, such as guaranteed representation, special allocations for the maintenance of a particular culture, and special opportunities to ensure that members of an oppressed group begin with a 'level playing-field'. While minority rights are usually designated as 'special rights' (those to which persons are differently entitled depending on their membership status in particular groups), effort is almost always made to demonstrate that they are nevertheless an essential component of an egalitarian system. Thus special rights — those which offer some citizens benefits denied to, and sometimes funded by, others — are often defended on the basis of a commitment to equal respect. Advocates of minority rights thus face the task of showing either that the group inequalities with which they are concerned can be rectified through a more precise, or rigorous, application of existing rights which apply equally to all citizens, or that new rights to which only some citizens are entitled can be justified in the name of equality. Answering this challenge includes identifying the deserving minorities (and differentiating them in a principled manner from others who demand but should not qualify for minority rights), determining the content of the special rights (or the new interpretation of the existing equal rights), and showing how the costs that such rights inevitably incur for the majority are nonetheless legitimate. All of these steps are complicated by the dynamic quality of the groups in question (particularly cultures), the question of whether special rights should be accorded only to involuntary minorities for protection against injustice or to so-called organic ones as well for the advancement of the group, the problem of overlapping memberships, the dangers of focusing on potentially divisive group differences rather than the allegedly equal individual rights of citizenship, and the question of which inequalities society is responsible for, or should rectify even if it is not causally responsible for them. These questions and more are addressed, if not always answered, in the books under review.

In *Democracy and Social Injustice*, Thomas Simon attempts to work through such difficulties by arguing that democratic institutions *presuppose* an initial level playing-field. As such, those who are denied the opportunity to effectively participate deserve special assistance and/or protection. Given that genuinely democratic procedures cannot even get off the ground absent the initial levelling, equal participation actually requires unequal treatment. Briefly, the argument proceeds as follows. As the title suggests, Simon chooses to focus on injustice (rather than the realization of the ideal of justice), specifically on what he defines as social injustice: 'an infliction of social harm upon relatively powerless individuals because of their negative group identity' (30). Simon then attempts to flesh out this definition, and more importantly, offer a way by which we can identify genuinely disadvantaged groups through a discussion of the various components of social



injustice. These include: agency (in particular human agency as the cause of seemingly 'natural' disasters); group harm; powerlessness; negative group identity (that which is externally — and harmfully — imposed by non-members, rather than that which is chosen by members); and the use of historical narrative to 'make a case for an injustice, much as they would if they had to go to a court of law' (62). The remainder of the project, then, is to show how the members of such groups can — and must — be afforded special protection from the majoritarian process in the name of democracy.

Simon's views regarding *how* disadvantaged groups might be afforded such protection are both interesting and persuasive; his argument for *why* they must be protected fares rather worse. His choice of weapons in the war against social injustice is the judiciary (by way of equal protection adjudication) rather than the legislature. Judicial review has a number of advantages over the more blunt instrument of legislative reform. These include the possibility of being heard despite minority status (because 'disadvantaged status limits access of the disadvantaged to other avenues of redress' [99]); offering greater precision in rectifying only those harms which merit special attention; and the provision of 'a systematic way of ferreting out suspect classes, that is, disadvantaged social groups' (74). Given the necessity of a level playing-field for democracy, Simon concludes that 'the judiciary has a legitimate claim to the title of "the most democratic branch of government"' (100). In the penultimate chapter, he argues that this role must be executed from within a value-driven system (what he calls 'Rule For') rather than a merely procedural one ('Rule By'). Simon's case is severely weakened, however, by the fact that he doesn't even consider the possibility that the pursuit of minority protection might be in conflict with other equally valuable ends. Thus, even if one agrees with the substantive rather than merely procedural approach, it's not at all clear that this leads inexorably to special rights for minorities as Simon implies.

The argument for why disadvantaged groups must be protected (as opposed to how they might be) runs into a number of problems as well. First and foremost, Simon's discussion of the components which serve to define disadvantaged groups is unsatisfying at best. His arguments for the presence of group harm, powerlessness and the historical narrative which is meant to document them are largely anecdotal and filled with bold, but unsupported statements. (The discussion on negative group identity is rather better.) For instance, after running through a few instances in which individuals face increased vulnerability on the basis of harm to other members of their group, he concludes simply that 'group harm makes sense' (50). And in his otherwise interesting case-study of the Slovaks, he states that 'the factors for evaluating disadvantaged status are subject to interpretation, where value judgments can intrude.' Nevertheless, 'despite their flexibility the facts still give an objective evaluation in the sense that they enable us justifiably to determine disadvantaged status in a context' (129). Unfortunately, the way in which this objective evaluation is reached is far from clear. Finally, at the outset of his discussion of equal protection he states 'IP [the Injustice

Perspective] recognizes that disadvantaged groups deserve special treatment' (110). IP obviously does, but he's given little reason for the unconverted to do so. Such unsupported conclusions are all the more disappointing given the promises of greater precision and objectivity allegedly gained by focusing on injustice rather than justice. In short, if one begins this book with a commitment to special rights for disadvantaged minorities above all else, it will be a welcome read. If however, one has any reservations regarding the desirability or practicability of such protection, the book offers little more than an interesting method by which one of any number of political and social goals might be achieved.

Several of the questions the reader is left with at the end of Simon's book are taken up in Raikka's *Do We Need Minority Rights?* In the introductory essay, the editor makes the welcome observation that 'it does make sense to ask whether there are special obligations to minority protection' (13). While the contributors answer almost unanimously in the affirmative (with various degrees of qualification), the fundamental questions regarding how such obligations should be grounded are squarely confronted. Given the broad range of perspectives from which the eight essays approach the issue, it is difficult to summarize the contents of this interesting volume; several things, however, stand out. First, at least half of the essays address the special problems faced by multinational states and the particular sorts of rights which should (or could) be allocated to national minorities. John Packer's 'On the Content of Minority Rights', for example, offers a detailed and comprehensive review 'of the provisions of positive international law and so-called "binding" political commitments' (145). This extensive study (which is on the whole more descriptive than philosophical) will be of value to anyone interested in human rights, international relations, and the status of minorities as these issues have actually been played out in the last sixty-odd years, as well as providing an excellent bibliography. Other approaches to the multinational question include W.E. Cooper's attempt to strike a balance between recognizing distinct cultural groups and the 're-enchantment of citizenship' based on equality, and Andreas Follesdal's argument for liberal contractualism as a means of providing cultural protection for minorities (specifically within the European Union), or what he calls 'a normative theory of cultural rights' (60).

This emphasis on national minorities forces the authors to grapple with a number of questions which do not arise in the case of geographically dispersed minorities (the economically disadvantaged, for instance), such as the meaning and proper role of cultural identity, whether it has intrinsic or only extrinsic value, whether the protection called for is new or simply an application of already existing constitutional or human rights (that is, whether they are special or equal rights), and how, or whether, groups formed on national and ethnic lines differ from those which are organized primarily around the defense against injustice.

Also included are essays on particular applications of minority rights such as the question of fair representation for historically marginalized groups,



the impact of environmental injustice on the politically and economically disadvantaged, and an essay on gay and lesbian rights. Although these pieces are relevant with regard to the question of what sorts of claims are at stake in the demand for minority rights (in particular, whether they essentially require only an increasingly rigorous application of existing anti-discrimination laws or should rather deliver more than simply protection), there is some sense that they belong in another volume insofar as such geographically and culturally diverse minorities differ radically from the national groups discussed in large part in the earlier essays. This difference is variously characterized as involving negative versus positive minorities (Packer, 124), or ascriptive groups in which the minority is defined when 'a negative social meaning is ascribed to those characteristics by persons who do not possess them, and makes the traits a justification for the subordinate status of those who do possess them' (Williams, 93). Arguments for the rights of such ascriptive minorities usually take the form of protection or rectification of past and present wrongs, and an attempt to ensure that members of the group are treated the same as non-members. Arguments for the rights of national or cultural minorities, on the other hand, focus on promoting and enhancing the group's distinct identity. The rights at stake, then, are posited for very different purposes and may well have corresponding differences with regard to justification, distribution, and shelf-life. Overall, however, this is a book which at least moves the discussion forward by confronting the tough questions which arise in any rigorous account of minority rights.

*The Liberation Debate* consists of a series of exchanges on six different liberation movements, those of women, blacks, gays and lesbians, children, animals, and liberation theology. For each issue, an advocate of 'liberation' presents arguments in favor of special protection, an opponent gives a counterargument, and the proponent offers a brief reply. Intellectual disagreement is obviously an integral — and desirable — part of philosophical exchange, particularly in the case of the sort of controversial issues discussed in the volume under consideration. It is, however, worth considering wherein lies the value of that disagreement, something the authors (or perhaps more specifically the editors) of *The Liberation Debate* fail to do. One of the primary benefits of hearing both sides of the issue, especially for those who are new to the field such as the audience intended for this volume, lies in discovering exactly which claims, usually normative rather than factual, are in dispute. Rather than sketching out the reasonable boundaries of the controversy at hand, however, the authors engage in endless bickering, often finding themselves (with apparent glee) surprised or embarrassed at the ignorance, simplicity, or philosophical ineptitude of their opponents. Not only does this result in fruitless debate, a sort of one-upmanship which does nothing to inform the reader, but reading it is rather like attending a dinner party at which the hosts are obviously quarrelling; you feel not only that you shouldn't be there, but that you'd much prefer to be almost anywhere else. This impression is brought home all the more forcibly insofar as the debaters are, for the most part, clearly familiar with one another's views, and are simply

rehashing the same old irreconcilable differences. (For instance, in response to Michael Levin's criticism of his piece on Black Liberation, Richard Boxhill begins by bemoaning the fact that Levin's remarks are racist, fallacious, offensive, and false. But, he continues with the patience of a spouse running through the same tired arguments: 'Nevertheless it seems I must deal with them, though I do so with distaste' [82].) The editors could have much more effectively achieved their goal of challenging 'readers to examine and judge the arguments' by choosing authors who did not so obviously consider their opponents' position complete rubbish.

The collection is further weakened by the fact that there is little or no cohesive treatment of the concept of liberation, in particular any real discussion of the questions of liberation from what or for what purpose. As a result, there is often a good deal of confusion over what exactly is at stake, in particular about whether it is a question of morality or legality which is being discussed. For instance, in the interchange between Martha Nussbaum and Roger Scruton over gay liberation, one senses in the end that both authors agree that gays and lesbians should have legal protection from arbitrary discrimination and other sorts of harmful treatment. If all that is meant by liberation is this sort of protection, then, there is little at issue for the two. However, Scruton's response to Nussbaum focuses on the morality of homosexual activity, not on the question of legal protection from overt harm. The discussions of feminism and black liberation leave one with a similar impression that the disputants are not addressing the same issue insofar as the proponents for these movements argue for legal reforms on the basis of moral claims to equality and autonomy while the opponents respond largely in terms of the empirical effects of existing legal claims. On the whole then, although the format is a potentially interesting one, the collection fails to either provide an accessible introduction for those who wish to familiarize themselves with the controversies discussed or to advance, or even clarify, the disputes which arise within them.

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**Adam Morton and Stephen Stich, eds.**  
*Benacerraf and His Critics.*  
Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell 1996.  
Pp. vii + 271.  
US\$54.95. ISBN 0-631-19268-9.

Paul Benacerraf is known for two papers which have shaped much of the debate in the philosophy of mathematics in the second half of the twentieth century. 'What Numbers Could Not Be' (hereafter WNCNB) argued that numbers could not be any kind of object, because there was no principled way to determine which objects they were. 'Mathematical Truth' (hereafter MT) argued that philosophical accounts of mathematics faced a trade off: they could do justice either to the semantics of mathematical language or to the epistemology of mathematical knowledge. A formal semantics for mathematics that fits smoothly with the semantics of ordinary language will have to postulate mathematical objects that are inaccessible to human knowers. On the other hand, any account of mathematical objects that renders them accessible to human knowers will necessitate that 'mathematical truth' mean something quite different than 'truth' *simpliciter*. Both papers claimed that the philosopher of mathematics could not do something she wanted to, and both prompted thinkers to try to produce accounts that proved Benacerraf wrong.

This volume has an impressive list of contributors: George Boolos, John Earman and John Norton, Richard Grandy, Richard Jeffrey, Jerrold Katz, Penelope Maddy, Adam Morton, Robert Stalnaker, Mark Steiner, Steven Wagner, as well as Benacerraf himself, all provide interesting and thoughtful pieces. It does not, however, offer much of a sustained dialogue on the issues in Benacerraf's work. Although Benacerraf contributed to the collection, he does not have a piece at the end responding to the other essays, as is customary for volumes in the *Philosophers and Their Critics* series. Only four of the eleven articles deal with Benacerraf's work in detail. Benacerraf's own 'What Mathematical Truth Could Not Be — I' disavows most of WNCNB on both formal and general philosophical grounds. Maddy's 'The Legacy of "Mathematical Truth"' notes that interest in MT has survived even though both of its explicit premises — a causal theory of knowledge and a disquotational theory of truth combined with a picture theory of meaning to yield a correspondence theory of truth — have fallen out of favor. She goes on to note an implicit premise — that mathematical statements are strictly true — that she is coming to doubt. Wagner's 'Prospects for Platonism' places MT in the context of a distinction between two arguments for platonism, one from the necessity of mathematics in the science and the other from general semantic concerns. The argument Benacerraf imputes to the platonist is a hybrid of the two, whereas Wagner feels that the semantic argument is more appealing, in part because it generates a more robust ontology. The best of the articles that treats Benacerraf directly is Katz's 'Skepticism about Number and Indeterminacy Arguments'. Katz classifies WNCNB as an *indetermi-*

nacy argument — similar to Quine's indeterminacy of translation or the 'quus' argument Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein — and develops a general strategy for defeating all such arguments.

The seven remaining pieces in this volume are an odd lot. Boolos' 'On the Proof of Frege's Theorem' does a lovely job of reconstructing the portion of Frege's logicist program that succeeded. Morton's 'Mathematics as Language' compares the mental processes that go into comprehending mathematics to the mental processes that go into understanding language in general. This kind of study will become more and more important as advances in the philosophy of mind are picked up in the philosophy of mathematics. The third piece I enjoyed was Earman and Norton's discussion of supertasks — processes like Achilles' attempt to catch the tortoise that require an infinite number of steps be completed in a finite amount of time. The essay was an informative treatment of a topic whose history is often mistakenly believed to begin and end with Aristotle's discussion of Zeno. The other pieces certainly have much to offer. Steiner's 'Wittgenstein: Mathematics, Regularity, and Rules' presents the relationship between rules and regularities in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics with tremendous clarity. It would have benefited, however, from more discussion of competing views. Things in Wittgenstein are never as clear as the treatment Steiner gives here. Jeffrey's paper makes the interesting point that traditional logicism took number theory as a paradigm for mathematics, and a new logicism could be founded on group theory. Unfortunately, with only four pages to call its own, his 'mini-manifesto' is too miniature to make much manifest. Stalnaker's piece on David Lewis argues that real yet causally inaccessible possible worlds are more problematic than real yet causally inaccessible mathematical objects. The viewpoint is plausible, but the arguments are, by Stalnaker's own admission, inconclusive. Similar comments could be made about Grandy's paper, which begins by outlining an historically minded naturalism, and then goes on to remarks on fictionalism about mathematical objects and the Gödel theorem.

The other volumes in the *Philosophers and Their Critics* series were not simple *festschriften*; they offered real debate between the thinkers who were the focus of the collection and the other philosophers in their field. Drafts of papers written for the collection were exchanged in advance, and the authors made an effort to address each other. As a result, they managed to carry discussion on current topics forward in a way that this volume does not. Some of these pieces will find their way into the syllabi of courses in the philosophy of mathematics in the years to come. It is unfortunate, though, that this collection does not have the focus of the other volumes in the series.

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**Peter A. Morton, ed.**

*A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Readings with Commentary.*

Peterborough, ON and Orchard Park, NY:

Broadview Press 1997. Pp. xvi + 499.

Cdn\$31.95: US\$24.95. ISBN 1-55111-087-3.

Peter Morton has provided an impressive addition to the anthologies aimed at undergraduate courses in the philosophy of mind. It comprises a long historical section in Part 1, with readings on the theories of Plato, Aristotle, and the scientific revolution, two sections on aspects of Descartes' position, and a section on materialism and idealism dealing with Hobbes and Berkeley. Part 2 concerns contemporary theories, comprising sections on logical behaviorism, linguistic philosophy, the identity theory, artificial intelligence, functionalism, and eliminative materialism. Finally, Part 3 examines recent problems with sections of readings on consciousness and intentionality. As this summary demonstrates, Morton's anthology deals thoroughly with contemporary theories and issues, though the book does not embody any uneasy compromises in its selections of readings. Contrary to its title, the book would serve equally well for both topic-based and historical courses. In addition to the readings there are commentaries on each section, and these are clear, accurate and written in an accessible style. A very helpful glossary completes the book.

The readings selected by Morton are some of the clearest and most accessible on each topic. From my experience in teaching classes in the philosophy of mind I believe Morton has also selected the most essential readings. Unlike many anthologies, rather than a collection of readings on an issue, each section's readings are obviously chosen to form a dialectic. For example, in the section on the identity theory classic readings from Armstrong and Smart are immediately followed by Kripke's criticisms. Similarly, in the sections on consciousness, the seminal readings from Thomas Nagel and Frank Jackson, outlining skeptical positions about the physical nature of consciousness, are immediately followed by physicalist responses in readings from Dan Dennett and Owen Flanagan. Given these points, although fewer in the number of its readings than some of the larger anthologies, Morton's book provides them with a serious competitor. The only note I would make about the readings is that those on the topic of intentionality concern the recent debate over internalist versus externalist theories of mental content, and I think these might usefully be supplemented (or replaced) by more recent material on the naturalization of mental content. In general, Morton does a good job of tying historical accounts together with contemporary theories, and recent naturalizing accounts of content would link to his commentary on Aristotle's 'naturalizing' approach.

As the book's title indicates, there are substantial commentaries on each section of readings. I am wary of using such commentaries in my teaching since I have often found them to be misleading or even simply wrong.

Happily, however, Morton's commentaries suffer from no such problems and are extremely welcome in the depth of background they provide on various issues. Perhaps most useful is the resource the commentaries provide in explaining various technical terms, and the book's excellent glossary supports this role still further.

To summarize, *A Historical Introduction to Philosophy of Mind* is a well constructed textbook clearly honed by its previous use in classes on the subject. Contrary to the impression given by its title, I would strongly suggest those who teach non-historical topic based classes to consider the book, since it covers all the main contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind, as well as the two 'hot' topics of consciousness and intentionality. I thoroughly recommend anyone who teaches philosophy of mind classes to consider Peter Morton's excellent text.

**Carl Gillett**

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**Friedrich Nietzsche**

*Twilight of the Idols.*

Trans. Richard Polt. Intro. Tracy Strong.

Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 1997.

Pp. xxxii + 96.

US\$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-355-7);

US\$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-354-9).

For the first time, an accurate English translation of *Twilight of the Idols* is available under its own cover. All prior translations have been bound with other titles and none has included the extensive notes and serviceable index that grace this slim, inexpensive volume from Hackett.

This book, from the final year of his productive life, Nietzsche called a 'precise and quick digest of my essential philosophical heterodoxies.' It includes his most important discussion of Socrates, his most abstract presentation of his psychological principles and perhaps his most mature and penetrating analysis of art. There are also two important discussions of morality, metaphilosophical and metaphysical comments, a chapter of very brief epigrams, political ideas and an autobiographical sketch. Teachers will find this volume an excellent choice, especially in courses unable to devote to Nietzsche enough time for the study of one of his longer works, such as *Beyond Good and Evil* or the *Genealogy* — hitherto standard fare for those approaching Nietzsche as one among several figures of existentialism or of



the nineteenth century. Though short on genealogical material, *Twilight* offers students a savory slice of Nietzsche at his best.

There is much to admire about this new translation. While capturing Nietzsche's exalted expressions, Polt's Nietzsche often speaks a livelier and less formal English than prior translators have assigned him. Some of this is achieved through the use of colloquialisms and contractions. Consider:

Kaufmann: **Out of life's school of war.** — What does not destroy me makes me stronger (I:8).

Hollingdale: **From the military school of life.** — What does not kill me makes me stronger.

Polt: **From life's military school.** — What doesn't kill me makes me stronger.

Nietzsche: **Aus der Kriegsschule des Lebens.** — Was mich nicht umbringt, macht mich stärker.

Even if the cultivated remember this famous line using Kaufmann's 'destroy', Polt's version might already be the most overheard in ordinary English conversations — and '**umbringen**' normally means 'to kill', whereas '**zerstören**' might mean 'to destroy'. In addition, while '**Krieg**' is 'war', the only idiom available in English would be 'war college', which seems a stretch. So one's choice is probably limited to either 'military school' or Kaufmann's descriptive construction.

Polt's less formal Nietzsche is also more personal, for he often speaks to 'you' rather than speaking of a generic 'one'. Consider this passage on the ubiquitous theme of the overflowing artistic state:

Polt: In this state, your own fullness leads you to enrich everything: whatever you see, whatever you will, you see as swollen, packed, vigorous, overloaded with strength. In this state you transform things until they are mirrors of your own power — until they reflect your perfection. This **necessity** to transform things into perfection is — art (IX:9).

Kaufmann: In this state one enriches everything out of one's own fullness: whatever one sees, whatever one wills, is seen swelled, taut, strong, overloaded with strength. A man in this state transforms things until they mirror his power — until they are reflections of his perfection. This **having** to transform into perfection is — art.

Nietzsche: Man bereichert in diesem Zustande alles aus seiner eignen Fülle: was man sieht, was man will, man sieht es geschwellt, gedrängt, stark, überladen mit Kraft. Der Mensch dieses Zustandes verwandelt die Dinge, bis sie seine Macht widerspiegeln, — bis sie Reflexe seiner Vollkommenheit sind. Dies Verwandeln-**müssen** ins Vollkommne ist — Kunst.

Polt has consciously avoided adding the sexist-sounding burdens of English to Nietzsche's decidedly sex-neutral language here and throughout the text. In addition, his use of 'you' reminds the reader of personal experience and does not separate the artist from us. Kaufmann's pronoun may be more

accurate, but Polt is in harmony with the passage, and '**Mensch**' is rarely translated as 'man' these days.

Strong's introduction opens with an error — claiming that Nietzsche's younger brother died when he was four and that his father died 'two years later' when he was six (vii). In fact his father died in July of 1849, three months short of Nietzsche's fifth birthday in October. His younger brother, Joseph, born in 1848, died a few months after that. While some of Strong's introduction is informative, most of it is speculative interpretation. If there is any sense in a 'musical reading' of Nietzsche's most succinct statement of his philosophical views, such a reading is most certainly not 'central to grasping this book' as Strong claims (xx). Such a belabored and remote interpretation belongs in a journal or a book to be sure, but it is wildly inappropriate for the scholarly apparatus of a new translation destined for the classroom. One fears that Strong's erudition, whatever its merit, encourages students to believe that Nietzsche's writings amount to mere rhetorical-polemical bells and whistles — if it does not merely chase them away.

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**Onora O'Neill**

*Towards Justice and Virtue:*

*A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. x + 230.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-48095-7);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-48559-2).

Onora O'Neill's goals here are both critical and productive. She shows that advocates of universalist (especially justice-based) ethics and advocates of particularist (especially virtue-based) ethics miss the best of what the other has to offer. Both parties are chastised for failing to give an adequate account of the fundamental value espoused by the other, but of the two the particularists spend more time at the receiving end of O'Neill's criticisms. Whatever one thinks of the essentially Kantian line she is selling, she discharges her critical duties with remarkable clarity and precision. She also, thankfully, does not sacrifice her analysis on the altar of technicality; she writes always with an eye to the relevance of her remarks to life in the 'real' world. Thus, her work here is sure to prove invaluable to all parties in the dispute.

Again, the particularists (including some among the virtue ethicists, communitarians, and those articulating an ethic of care) will find more bitter



medicine here than will universalists (especially Kantians). One example is O'Neill's analysis of the particularist critique of universalist abstractions (chapter 2). Here, O'Neill gives us an education in the difference between idealization (the sort of thing that bases ethics on wishful thinking about the capacities of typical agents) and abstraction (which, more modestly, moves outward from the specific to the general). The former grants easy license to false conclusions (Rawls' original position is suspect here, as is the ideal consumer of libertarian economics). The latter works from known truths; thus, 'it never arbitrarily augments a given starting point, so will not lead one validly from a truth to a falsehood' (40). O'Neill also argues that abstraction is entirely unavoidable in practical reasoning. 'Particularists, who may make much of the point that justice differs in Athens and in Sparta, and conclude that abstract accounts of justice mislead, take for granted that the principles of Athenian or Spartan justice apply to many varying cases, from some of whose differences jury or judge must abstract' (40).

Particularism also comes under fire for being inherently provincial. 'Although particularist reasoning can allow for the revisability of norms or commitments across time, in the light of other norms and commitments ... , it cannot allow for the thought that one stretch of practical reasoning may have multiple and differing audiences' (53). This makes particularist reasoning of limited value in a world that is increasingly cosmopolitan (28, n. 31). Radical particularists face a special difficulty with the very possibility of practical reasoning — or, in O'Neill's phrase, 'productive judgments' (87). Focusing on specific cases yields, at best, *appreciative* judgments. Yet, 'even when we agree on all descriptions, we may disagree deeply about what is to be done by whom ... It is only because so many practical principles are embedded in characters and institutions, so have become received views, that it can sometimes seem that fixing on a description is all that is required. But the moral life is a matter of action, not of connoisseurship' (87-88).

Particularist critiques of universalism trade on an apparent confusion between universalism and uniformity. O'Neill argues that, first, uniformity is a matter of content, not form or scope. Universalism sometimes demands variation (as when it demands that we adjust our teaching to meet a child's abilities). Second, even where they do prescribe uniformity, universalist principles underdetermine action and permit varied implementation. Third, universal principles hold universally only relative to some domain of agents (for example, the exhortation to 'cast your vote on election day' applies only to eligible voters) (75).

If callous uniformity is universalism's Scylla, empty formalism is its Charybdis. O'Neill asserts throughout that rules must indeed be indeterminate and incomplete but are not empty. She notes two ways in which principles can conflict. Intrinsic conflict arises between principles that cannot possibly be instantiated at the same time — e.g., 'an inclusive principle of subordinating oneself to others and ... an inclusive principle of retaining one's independence' (158). Contingent conflict arises not between principles themselves but 'between particular tokens of certain act-types' (159) — e.g.,

the familiar example of having to lie to save a life. Such conflicts show not that principles must lead to conflicts and impasses, but that 'life ... can be demanding' (159). The proper response to the unmeetable obligation ranges from 'apology or confession, by way of restitution or reparation, to regret or remorse' (160). No doubt many will find this conclusion unsatisfying until someone takes up O'Neill's challenge to philosophers to give more attention to rectificatory action other than punishment (160, n. 6).

For all the criticism that particularists suffer here, O'Neill is nevertheless engaged in a constructive enterprise in which their concerns will play a role. For example, she offers a method for determining the scope of morality which avoids metaphysical accounts of personhood and focuses instead on assumptions that must be made in the course of concrete activity. 'What is assumed for purposes of activity must also be assumed in fixing the scope of ethical considerations' (106). She notes that Nazis who engaged in torture had to assume, despite their claims to the contrary, that their subjects had the very traits which would have to be absent for their treatment to be remotely excusable (106, n. 24).

O'Neill also takes into account particularists' objection that accounts of justice leave too much room for cool disengagement from others. She argues for a conception of virtue as imperfect and sometimes, as in the case of social virtues (e.g., altruism), required obligation — the complement to the conception of justice as perfect obligation. The argument she gives for the social virtues is elegant and Kantian, depending as it does on the simple observation that neglect of others is not universalizable. 'Human beings acquire even their most essential physical and social capacities and capabilities with others' support' (192).

*Towards Justice and Virtue* exhibits an ingenious application of Kantian reasoning to a current debate. O'Neill's attention to the concerns of both particularists and universalists will make her critical and constructive contributions invaluable for informed discussion.

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**Nicholas Rescher**

*Priceless Knowledge?:*

*Natural Science in Economic Perspective.*

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1996.

Pp. vii + 186.

US\$52.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8244-7);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8245-5).

In *Priceless Knowledge?*, Rescher argues that the increasing cost of conducting scientific research is placing a constraint on the progress of knowledge. Though scientific knowledge is priceless in a cognitive respect its acquisition 'has a price and indeed a price that will, in the end, escalate beyond our means' (113). According to Rescher, science is always in a state of flux, that is to say, 'viewed not in terms of its *aims* but in terms of its *results*, science is inescapably plastic: it is not something fixed, frozen, and unchanging but endlessly variable and protean — given to changing not only its opinions but its very form' (76). Therefore, science is an ongoing human activity which, theoretically, will never be completed.

Rescher holds that progress is not determined by how accurately science unveils the inner workings of nature. If this was the goal of science then it would be an unattainable one. Each scientific theory is subject to further revision or even refutation based on new evidence. Since the collection of this evidence never ceases we will never be in 'a position to claim that our knowledge of reality is *complete* (that we have gotten at the *whole* truth of things)' nor will we be 'in a position to claim that our knowledge of reality is *correct* (that we have gotten the *real* truth of things)' (163). For Rescher, progress is defined by the discovery of new phenomena as well as by observing and measuring old ones with greater precision. There are an infinity of possible ways of accounting for natural phenomena and many of these ways we have yet to conceive. Aristotle, for example, could have never foreseen the development of quantum mechanics. Likewise, what holds in the future of science is a mystery to us. However, its realization is impeded by the inability of financial resources to keep up with the cost of scientific research. Unfortunately, Rescher neglects to mention any contemporary examples in which economic cost has served as an obstacle to scientific progress.

*Priceless Knowledge?* also offers an interesting discussion of the interaction between science and technology. Until about the eighteenth century, science and technology operated as separate autonomous realms. Thereafter scientific knowledge was used to create new technologies. Currently we are experiencing a reversal of these roles. Advanced technological equipment is needed in order to conduct scientific investigations because 'without an ever-developing technology, scientific progress would soon grind to a halt. The discoveries of today cannot be made with yesterday's equipment and techniques. To conduct new experiments, to secure new observations, and to detect new phenomena, an ever more powerful investigative technology is needed' (41). The cost of these technologies and the diminishing returns on

the knowledge they provide are a threat to the rate of scientific progress. More and more costly technology is needed to provide us with less bits of scientific data. All in all, Rescher reminds us that science research is not an isolated undertaking but bound to certain external factors. Among these factors, economic cost has come to play an increasingly important role.

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**James Risser**

*Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other:  
Re-reading Gadamer's Philosophical  
Hermeneutics.*

Albany: State University of New York Press  
1997. Pp. xii + 278.

US\$65.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3257-2);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3258-0).

Given the centrality of problems of interpretation to debates over methodology in philosophy and the human sciences, it is perhaps not surprising that treatment of Hans-Georg Gadamer's thought has been largely focused on only about one third of his 1960 work *Truth and Method*. One of the main contributions of Risser's book is that it gives a clear and comprehensive overview of the full breadth of Gadamer's thought, particularly his later writings. Opting to move beyond two of the dominant modes of Gadamer interpretation — as a critique of objectivist methods in the *Geisteswissenschaften*, and as an extended footnote to and commentary on selected sections of Heidegger's *Being and Time* — Risser further elucidates Gadamer's reanimation of classical thought, his aesthetics, and most importantly, his comprehensive claim for the hermeneutic character of human experience and existence.

After an admirably clear synopsis of Gadamer's project, Risser locates it in the historical context of German philosophy of the early 20th century, especially as arising out of phenomenological responses to the prevalent forms of neo-Kantianism. The discussion is particularly good at indicating how Gadamer picks up and transforms themes treated in early Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and Dilthey: the primacy of our living-in-the-world and factual temporality, dynamic repetition and existential choice, and the interpretive character of historical understanding and the interpreter's place within an historical tradition.



Risser then explains how Gadamer extends the analysis of historical interpretation to make a claim for the universal applicability of the structures of hermeneutic understanding to all human experience. Rather than understanding philosophical hermeneutics as merely a critique of objectivist methods in the social sciences, Risser argues that Gadamer 'has existentialized the Heideggerian project. The hermeneutic aspect of human life is not limited to history and texts, but pertains to everything about which one seeks to communicate' (13-14). Gadamer establishes his 'ontology of living being' by modeling experience according to the logic of *phronesis* outlined by Aristotle and by taking the dialogical situation as the paradigm for analyzing language and communication (whether between persons or between readers and texts).

The second half of the book takes up Gadamer's account of truth in terms of mimesis, productive recollection, and artistic disclosure. Gadamer seeks to emphasize the productive character of coming to an understanding about something with another interlocutor — whether that interlocutor is a canonical text, an individual within one's own tradition, or someone from another tradition. Taking the Romantic notion of the experience of art as the paradigm for hermeneutic experience, Gadamer intends to show that successful understanding is not merely the reproduction of an antecedently established meaning, but the productive creation of new meanings out of a fusing of diverse horizons of preunderstanding. Only if all participants are fundamentally open to the voice of the other can the dialogical encounter be a site for the creation of truth and the transformation of individuals' self-understandings. Because Risser pushes his reading beyond Gadamer's early works, he is able to capture a subtle change in tone in Gadamer's later writings on the poet Celan: a tone no longer as optimistically confident in the potential transparency of communication, but one rather more attentive to the difficulties of overcoming the radical otherness of diverse horizons of significance and preunderstanding.

Of course, this change of tone probably also arose as a result of Gadamer's confrontation with Derrida. Risser's discussion of this debate, while well written and quite suggestive about the various points of contention between the two, does not fully answer the deconstructionist charges. By stylizing the confrontation as one between two contrasting Platonic images of the philosopher — as midwife to the truth (Gadamer) and as the gadfly who reminds us of our ignorance and limitations (Derrida) — Risser adopts an illuminating strategy, particularly for those already familiar with the work of both philosophers. The discussion neither distorts the contrasting positions nor fails to highlight the central points, but, perhaps because the debate is not laid out in the same straightforward manner as his earlier treatments of Gadamer's relation to Heidegger and other German philosophers, Risser never marshals the argumentative resources needed to sufficiently adjudicate the debate or to carry out his aim of defending philosophical hermeneutics from Derrida's criticisms.

A similar disappointment results from Risser's insufficient treatment of the confrontation between Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas in the early 1970s. Although this debate was formative for both philosophers' later work, it is handled almost subtextually by means of a few long footnotes and scattered references to the claims of Habermas interpreters. But Habermas's critique of hermeneutics goes to the heart of three of the main claims that Risser intends to establish in his defense of Gadamer: 1) the hermeneutic claim to universality for human experience, 2) the hermeneutic claim to a comprehensive notion of truth, and, 3) the contention that hermeneutics does not necessarily lead to a form of cultural conservatism. As in the discussion of deconstruction, the stakes of the debate and the central points of contention are clearly recognized, but an adequate defense of the philosophical claims of hermeneutics awaits a fuller treatment.

No other book in English has covered both the breadth of Gadamer's writings and the diversity of themes addressed throughout his prolific, and still continuing, career. Risser amply demonstrates how much can be achieved by a sensitive and original rethinking of the classics of European philosophy, particularly Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Husserl and Heidegger. *Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other* will be important not only for those approaching Gadamer for the first time, but also for those familiar mostly with *Truth and Method*. Risser's most significant contribution, however, consists in showing how much light philosophical hermeneutics can shed on problems that have animated recent poststructuralist and post-colonial critiques of the tradition of Western reason for its erasure of the voice of the other. For the structures that hermeneutics analyzes in the dialogical experience of coming to a mutual understanding with another, and the transformative effects on the participants' self-understandings which ensue from such experiences, arise equally from multicultural encounters as from encounters with canonical texts. And the hermeneutic encounter begins — but does not end — in the experience of the strangeness of an other.

**Christopher F. Zurn**

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**Ted Sadler**

*Heidegger and Aristotle: The question of being.*  
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press (for  
The Athlone Press) 1996. Pp. xii + 250.  
US\$90.00. ISBN 0-485-11486-0.

The relationship between Aristotelian thought and Heidegger's philosophy is a topic that deserves a book-length study, not only because of Heidegger's controversial interpretation of the Stagairite's philosophy, but also because Heidegger's attitude towards Aristotelianism is itself an unsettled matter. While Sadler suggests that his book may serve to introduce Heidegger's interpretation to classicists and philosophers not already familiar with the German thinker (ix-x), this 250-page volume is obviously written for those who have pondered these very issues.

Although Sadler often engages Aristotle's writings independently of Heidegger's commentary, the goal of his analysis is the clarification of how Heidegger's evaluation of Aristotelianism shapes the former's own philosophy. This is why Sadler does not try to defend Heidegger's interpretation; instead, he concentrates his efforts on illustrating how Heidegger's criticism of the tradition of metaphysics in the West is at root a criticism of Aristotelianism. It is argued that Aristotle's interpretation of 'the question of Being' fails to respect the difference between Being and beings — what Heidegger terms the 'ontological difference.' (Henceforth, I follow Sadler's capitalization of 'Being' where appropriate.) Aristotle claims in the *Metaphysics* that an understanding of 'being *qua* being' can be obtained by first answering the question: what is substance (*ousia*)? In the chapter 'Being and the Ousiological Reduction', Sadler tries to show how this Aristotelian move can be interpreted through Heidegger's claim that Being was implicitly identified with 'presence' by the Greeks. Not surprisingly, he does this by an examination of Aristotle's account of time — *the* problematic in Heidegger's philosophy. In particular, Sadler focuses on the precarious status of the 'now' in Aristotle's system (68-81). 'Now' seems to be the principle of time insofar as the latter is a succession of the former such that time cannot be without any 'now.' Yet, any given 'now' can only be defined as the limit of 'past' and 'future' — neither of which has any independent being. Sadler notes that Aristotle's 'solution', viz., that time is not itself a substance and that its determinations depend on the inherent determinateness of substances, still renders the ontological status of time problematic and illustrates the way in which the Aristotelian system is constructed to preserve the idea of substances as ever present.

In the chapter 'Truth, Language, and Logic', Sadler moves his discussion from being to propositions. He shows how Aristotle uses 'truth' to relate Being and propositions and argues that the Stagairite is committed to the idea that 'truth is primarily the self-revealing of the things themselves' (120). Sadler maintains that Heidegger has a similar conception of truth though the German philosopher insists that truth is an 'existential' category, rather than

an 'intellectual' one (121). To Sadler, the Aristotelian identification of truth with the sayable (or propositional) is parallel to the equation of Being with presence in Aristotelian metaphysics. Furthermore, he suggests that the rejection of Aristotelian intellectualism does not force us to giving up truth as the fundamental relationship between 'Being' and human beings. Indeed, letting go of the conception of human beings as detached observers allows us to attend to ourselves as existing beings involved in the world through what Heidegger calls 'care' (163).

Having explained Aristotle's metaphysics as a theoretical encounter with the question of Being, Sadler argues in the final chapter that Heidegger's criticism of Aristotelian thought is not restricted to metaphysics, but extends to practical philosophy as well. Arguing against the view that Heidegger has a more favourable attitude towards Aristotelian ethics, Sadler maintains that *sophia*, the pinnacle of human excellence, is fundamentally an intellectual category and cannot be transformed without affecting the Aristotelian system as a whole (145-6). While this represents the negative side of Sadler's study, there is a positive, though perhaps not entirely original, thesis too (178). Put succinctly, it is claimed that Heidegger's reaction to Aristotle is Neoplatonic at heart and represents a form of negative theology. We have already seen the 'negative' in the earlier idea that Heidegger refuses to identify being with the sayable. The 'theology', on the other hand, is not articulated from Heidegger's own writings on the divine — as there is little on that topic to draw upon — but enters through an interpretation of Heidegger's personal intellectual development, especially his early Catholicism and subsequent fascination with Luther (172, 149-53).

Sadler's discussion of Aristotle's God deserves a brief comment. Although Sadler is primarily interested in explicating Heidegger's claim that Western metaphysics is fundamentally 'onto-theology', he could have strengthened his argument — and hence engaged a larger audience — by having Heidegger speak to the debate on whether Aristotelian theology should be understood as the key to his *general* ontology or simply as a *special* ontology. Indeed, Sadler did not find it necessary to discuss the concept that connects Aristotle's discussion of substance and that of God, viz., activity (*energeia*). Since there is no indication as to whether or why this concept is not important to Heidegger's interpretation, readers familiar with the Aristotelian corpus will likely find Sadler's treatment wanting.

While 'the question of Being' provides a promising approach to the two thinkers, Sadler's study is burdened by his unsubstantiated assumption that there can be only two opposed relations to that question, viz., the scientific-technological and the 'mystico-religious' (133-4, 161). Indeed, after going through various arguments aimed at revealing Aristotle's scientific approach, the reader is left wondering what it means to have a mystico-religious relation to the question of Being. Nor did Sadler present any evidence, direct or otherwise, from Heidegger's writings to substantiate his claim (e.g., 57-8); instead, he seems to think that certain facts about Heidegger's intellectual development are enough to secure the point. Even if such facts can determine



Heidegger's perspective, Sadler would have to show how that perspective is not confined to the period in question but also plays a crucial role in his mature philosophy — as Sadler appears to suggest throughout the book. This is especially important because he relies on materials drawn from lecture courses from 1921 to 1926. Indeed, the scarcity of close textual analysis is one of the weaker aspects of *Heidegger and Aristotle*. While this may prove more 'user-friendly' for newcomers, Heidegger scholars will likely be frustrated by the need to consult original texts to properly evaluate Sadler's interpretation.

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**Gopal Sreenivasan**

*The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property.*

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1995. Pp. x + 162.

Cdn\$44.50: US\$29.95. ISBN 0-19-509176-0.

Sreenivasan offers an interesting interpretation and critique of Locke's theory of property, and then defends a modernized reconstruction of Locke's theory.

According to Locke, an unappropriated natural resource comes to be privately owned by a person when she *mixes her labor with it* if the appropriation leaves 'enough and as good' for others. Following (in broad outline) James Tully, Sreenivasan insightfully argues that labor-mixing should be understood as metaphor for making or producing something from natural resources. For there are notorious problems with the idea that mere labor-mixing with an unowned object entitles one to ownership. Why doesn't one simply lose one's labor? If, however, one understands labor-mixing as a metaphor for production, then it becomes much more plausible that labor-mixing entitles one to private property under certain conditions. For why shouldn't one own something that one brings into existence?

But of course merely making something out of unappropriated natural resources is not a sufficient condition for private ownership. It is also necessary that enough and as good be left for others. Sreenivasan interprets Locke as holding this to require that no one should be deprived of access to the *means of preservation*. If someone appropriates some land, and leaves enough for the preservation of all others, then this proviso is satisfied.

Locke's theory, Sreenivasan emphasizes, includes the central theological premiss that God gave Earth to humankind to be used for its preservation (and presumably, flourishing). Because we are bound by God's will, this imposes restrictions on the sorts of private property rights that can be acquired through appropriation. First, no one may allow one's property to *spoil* (which would waste resources that could be used for the preservation or flourishing of others). Second, if there are not enough unappropriated natural resources left for the preservation of all, then one has a duty to hire the landless or allow them access to one's property (to the extent compatible with one's own preservation) on at least subsistence terms. Third, one has a duty to provide the consumer goods necessary for survival to those *unable* to provide them for themselves. This is a duty of *charity* to the severely disabled and to children (especially one's own children, who have a right to inherit enough for their subsistence during childhood). Thus, the private property rights justified by Locke's theory are limited by these duties, and thus are not *full* private property rights.

Sreenivasan points out that a secularized version of Locke's theory would have to drop the theological assumption. He holds further that dropping this assumption would lead to dropping the duties of non-spoilage and of charity (and bequest). But it's not clear that this is so. For these requirements may be independently plausible. The duty of non-spoilage is probably not, but the duty of charity to the severely disabled and to dependent children is a fairly plausible limitation on the sorts of private property rights that might be acquired from resources originally held in common. Admittedly, it won't follow from the enough and as good proviso (since the severely disabled may not survive under common ownership) but it may be a plausible independent condition.

Sreenivasan also argues that the private property rights justified by Locke's theory (even with the theological assumption) are much less full than Locke supposed. First, there is the question of what rights of ownership one acquires by producing something. At a minimum, we may suppose, it includes rights to control the use of that thing (to use it, and to permit/deny others to use it). This leaves open, however, whether one has the right to *transfer* these control rights to others. Sreenivasan argues that Locke's theory commits him to denying that one acquires the right to transfer *by gift* (including bequest) the rights one acquires by producing something — except in the special case where one has a duty of charity. Sreenivasan's idea is, roughly, that according to Locke it is *only* the producer of a thing that has private property rights over it. More carefully, it is only the producer that acquires a private property right in the *value* of a thing. Thus, a producer has the right to *exchange* her product for a product of equal value. But a person cannot acquire private property in a thing merely by gift. For the recipient has not engaged in the requisite production.

I'm not qualified to comment on this as an interpretation of Locke, but as a theory of property I find this claim very plausible. I would not, however, justify the absence of a right to make gifts in terms of labor and production



being the sole basis for private property. For I believe, as Locke did, that each person is a self-owner, and given that we don't produce ourselves — at least not in our initial states — this would mean that we do not own our selves on the view Sreenivasan advances. A more plausible way of justifying this claim is, I believe, to appeal to intertemporal egalitarian considerations. We can grant that a person owns her product under certain conditions, as long as the inequality that this generates is not transmissible to others. Any wealth that a person does not use during her lifetime reverts to the common stock.

The second way in which the private property rights justified by Locke's theory are less full than Locke thinks is, according to Sreenivasan, that the enough and as good proviso must be understood in a much stronger form. Sreenivasan attributes the view to Locke that the proviso only requires that everyone have access to the means of *preservation*. But, as he points out, this understanding of the proviso fails to ensure that no one is worse off than he/she would be under common ownership. For under common ownership people may be able to achieve much more than mere subsistence. A plausible proviso would have to require at least no worsening compared with whatever level of well-being could be achieved under common ownership. Sreenivasan goes further than this and claims that a plausible proviso would require that no one be worse off than she would be if she had an *equally valuable share* of natural resources. This understanding of the proviso would make Lockeanism similar to the views advocated by Henry George, Hillel Steiner, and Philippe Van Parijs. Although I find this construal of the proviso much more plausible, I am unsure about Sreenivasan's claim that this follows from the core logic of Locke's argument.

The book is extremely well-written and well-argued, and it focuses on important philosophical issues. And there is much interesting discussion of the work of other interpreters of Locke, including Richard Ashcraft, Robert Nozick, Karl Olivecrona, Alan Ryan, Richard Tuck, James Tully, and Jeremy Waldron (although not, unfortunately, John Simmons' excellent *The Lockean Theory of Rights* [1992]). Consequently, the book is essential reading for anyone interested in Locke or in property rights in natural resources.

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**Ellen Kappy Suckiel**

*Heaven's Champion:*

*William James's Philosophy of Religion.*

Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press

1996. Pp. xvi + 184.

US\$28.95. ISBN 0-268-03814-7.

This book is a critical commentary on James's philosophy of religion. Suckiel shows the power of James's views on religion and investigates the moral, epistemic and metaphysical implications of these views. In the preface, she declares that her main goal is to 'integrate James's numerous writings on the topic of religion, and to show how his religious views rely upon the broader principles of his pragmatism' (xi-xii). Nevertheless, she thinks that it is a mistake 'to look to James for a single, coherent theory of the justification of religious belief' (14-15).

The book is comprised of seven chapters; chapter 1 is an introduction which summarises the author's major claims. The main theme of chapter 2 is James's analysis of religious belief versus the scientific rationalist's. It also contains a discussion of James's famous essay '*The Will to Believe*.' According to Suckiel, James has two main aims in this essay: The first is 'to establish the pragmatic justification for religious belief; and [the] second ... is to demonstrate the impoverishment of the position of the scientific rationalist' (37). Suckiel rightly regards the scientific rationalist's position as less satisfactory than James's subtle account. The scientific rationalist holds that religious claims, being subjective, are insufficient for establishing the justification of religious interpretations of the world (22). These claims merely satisfy the believer's yearning for a deeper spiritual reality and so they go beyond any obvious empirical facts. For scientific rationalists, then, religion is not a *live* option. But in adopting this position they, James argues, not only miss the 'momentous consequences' of religious belief but they also show themselves to be 'unimaginative and ultimately irrational' (37).

For James religion means 'feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude' (11). These religious experiences constitute a genuine source of knowledge of the divine. Suckiel discusses in chapter 3 James's view that experience, as opposed to conceptual thought, is a direct source of religious knowledge. She seems to endorse James's view and argues that there is no ground for 'trusting our experience in claiming to know common empirical facts' (51), while regarding religious experience as unreliable. Although she would go along with James in distrusting logical methods as means for providing answers to religious questions, she admits however that '[t]he respect for religious experience has some sort of objective pertinency, even if we cannot yet fully specify the mechanism to explain it' (53). Although her argument here may not be convincing, she continues by arguing that religious feelings 'provide *pragmatic* justification for religious belief,' and 'constitute *evidence* for religious claims' (75). This conclusion is based on the



claim that feelings have cognitive value. Suckiel explores James's arguments for this claim in chapter 4.

In chapter 5, Suckiel examines James's view of truth as it applies to religious claims. The chapter contains a defence of James's view against standard objections with the aim of showing how his position can be made more satisfactory and convincing.

As mentioned earlier, one of James's main aims in *'The Will to Believe'* is to provide a pragmatic justification for religious belief. Suckiel cites references wherein James's justification of religious belief is based upon a realist conception of truth. This position was mainly developed in James's work *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. In this work, James seems to argue for a realist position regarding the truth of religious claims whereby he distinguishes the truth of religious beliefs from the fruitful consequences of believing them. Suckiel reminds us, however, that James's aim in the *Varieties* was to pave the way for a 'science of religions'. His interest lay in reconciling science and religion. Therefore, he argued that some religious beliefs are confirmable by experience. This significant change in James's position does not prevent Suckiel from concluding that 'nowhere in James's philosophy of religion is he a realist in his conception of truth' (94).

But, can there be a science of religions? The answer to this question is given in the final chapter where Suckiel considers James's religious metaphysics, and the way he deals with the difficult problems of establishing a scientific basis for religious belief.

In the *Varieties*, James argues that if religious claims are to be meaningful, they must have genuine empirical consequences in the natural world. This position he calls 'piecemeal supernaturalism' (114). Thus, if religious claims can be in principle empirically confirmed, then religion would be compatible with the methods and principles of empirical science.

In his religious metaphysics, James is not a metaphysical dualist. He emphasises the experience of religious communion as a central element in the empirical confirmation of religious claims. He conceives of the self as 'an everchanging series of experiences.' The boundaries of the self are continuously changing. In this picture, God is a wider series of experiences with which our experiences are continuous. However, James firmly believes that the 'hypothesis of God's existence must have *some* empirical consequences beyond that of the subject's sense of communion' (126).

In conclusion, Suckiel correctly judges James's attempt to prove that religion is 'scientific' to be misguided. For she thinks that James should have been satisfied with communion as providing empirical support for religious belief. It is simply wrong to ask for further empirical support as James did (127).

If her conclusions were correct, then James would have been more successful had he adopted the position he was approaching in his article 'Reason and Faith.' But in the light of James's later position, she is right to conclude that '[i]f personal experiences of religious communion may be used to negate

claims about the natural world' (130), then James's answer to the question 'Can there be a science of religions?' should have been 'Happily, there cannot.'

In summary, a good deal of the book is well-argued and engaging throughout. Suckiel clearly highlights James's ambivalence towards the way of looking at religious beliefs. Are they objectively true? Or do they only have human value? She offers at times new and interesting discussions of some of James's ideas. Her book offers a lot to ponder for those interested in James's philosophy of religion.

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**L.W. Sumner and Joseph Boyle, eds.**

*Philosophical Perspectives on Bioethics.*

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1996.

Pp. vi + 299.

\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-0771-6);

\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7139-2).

L.W. Sumner and Joseph Boyle have collected papers that address bioethics as a discipline and focus on its failure to deliver uncontroversial solutions in real-world contexts. Why this is so, and whether this makes moral philosophy useless to bioethics commissions, are just some of the problems discussed in this collection. In searching for solutions, most of the authors address the troubled relationship between general principles and specific judgments.

Daniel Callahan opens the collection by observing that the moral life of the bioethicist is itself somewhat fragmented, moving as bioethicists do between being moral theoreticians, bioethics committee members, and moral persons. This would seem to parallel Callahan's division of ethical theory into thinking, doing, and living. He argues that the integration of these three has been made difficult not only by social fragmentation but by the practices of moral theorists, particularly those who fail to use real-world data or consider the practical implications of theory.

R.M. Hare runs dutifully through a list of theories which are more or less antagonistic to principle (virtue ethics, ethics of care, and so on) and finds confusion about what principles are and how people use them in reasoning. The first sort of problem is solved by appealing to grammar: 'suppose we have a description of one way of being virtuous ... By a simple grammatical manoeuvre, one can change the mood of this descriptive statement and put it into the imperative' — thereby revealing the principle (22). Hare then



argues that situationists have misinterpreted the role that such principles are to play in everyday life. They are not formal templates which, given the facts, dispense moral truth. Rather, they are practical tools, subject to revisions, for getting along without engaging in close critical thinking at every turn — ‘usually we do not have time for this, nor always the necessary information about the consequences of particular actions’ (33).

In the contextualists’ corner, Albert R. Jonsen argues for the significance of ‘morally appreciated circumstances.’ These are ‘certain facts ... associated with certain goals and perspectives that can themselves be subject to moral evaluation’ (44). At bottom, though, these are just ‘facts’, despite some disparaging remarks Jonsen aims at the is/ought distinction (44). Two cases Jonsen cites say less about the inadequacies of moral theories and principles than they do about the inadequacies of human knowledge of a complex world. In both cases, one real and the other hypothetical, the topic is vaccine research and the costs and benefits of control groups. Jonsen notes that, among other issues, ‘the vaccine case must balance the possibility that the unvaccinated children will contract whooping cough ... against the possibility that the vaccinated will suffer some side-effects that might be serious’ (41). Jonsen concludes that in such a case either course of action may be permitted. Now, it may be that, as we are agents with limited knowledge, we will incur no *blame* in performing either act, but an absence of blame does not entail anything about the permissibility of the act itself.

The same problem attaches to Laura Shanner’s invitation to adopt a phenomenological approach to bioethics. She suggests that bioethicists have heretofore failed to identify just what the problems are that they wish to solve. She locates the root of this failure in their neglect of patients’ experiences of their bodies as well as their feelings toward others (family, doctors, etc.). Shanner’s argument is punctuated with excellent criticisms of bioethics-as-usual, but it is difficult to resist the idea that phenomenology simply offers more empirical grist for the bioethics mills. An act utilitarian would certainly welcome phenomenological data.

Laura M. Purdy and Christine Overall advocate in their respective contributions a broadening of the concerns of bioethics to encompass politics. They challenge the distinction between ethical versus political issues, calling on us to resist accepting bioethical problems as they are given. As Overall notes, ‘attention must be placed, not only on individual persons, considered as particular units, but on the social values and practices that help both to constitute and to set limits on what individuals can do and be’ (175). Perhaps a broader conception of the work of bioethics might take its cue from those doctors who have agitated for gun control — a ‘political’ issue which has ramifications on the health of patients and the resources of hospitals.

The collection closes with two papers on the role of moral philosophy in ethics commissions. Will Kymlicka criticizes two views. The first holds that it is the philosopher’s job ‘to persuade commissioners to adopt the right comprehensive moral theory ... and then apply this theory to particular policy questions’ (245). The second holds that it is the philosopher’s job ‘to

ensure that the commission's arguments are clear and consistent' (245). The second view is clearly uninteresting and inadequate, and Kymlicka argues that the first should also be abandoned since, as deliberative bodies representing a diverse public, commissions 'are expected to come up with recommendations that, so far as possible, are acceptable to a variety of ethical perspectives' (249). This argument is ultimately unpersuasive. After all, commissioners do not want to be bound to judgments that are immediately acceptable to the people they represent; rather, they want to reach a consensus by the give-and-take of mutual persuasion. Nevertheless, there are many other reasons for giving up the goal of convincing fellow commissioners that any one ethical theory is the right theory. These reasons are offered not only by Kymlicka, but also by Dan Brock, who is otherwise more optimistic about the value of the methods of moral philosophy — especially coherentism — in the public policy context.

Contributions by Earl Winkler, Tom L. Beauchamp, Norman Daniels, Susan Sherwin, and Kathryn Pauly Morgan round out this moment of self-examination for the bioethics profession. It will also be useful for those whose forays into the field are limited to the classroom. While there are no papers on the bioethicist-as-teacher, an unfortunate omission, the attentive reader will find that the discussions also bear on the business of teaching bioethics.

### **David Waller**

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### **Elizabeth Telfer**

*Food for Thought.*

New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. xi + 132.

Cdn\$76.95: US\$55.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-13381-5);

Cdn\$23.95: US\$16.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-13382-3).

This book's clear, succinct, and easy prose belie the amount of philosophical work that gets done in its 125 pages. Not a book essentially on the aesthetics of food, but one squarely in the liberal British moral tradition in both style and content, its six chapters cover a wider variety of moral questions raised by the role in life of food and eating. And although Chapter 3 does discuss food as art, it is more an argument for the claim that food is a (minor) art rather than being a treatment of food aesthetics, and Chapter 2, entitled 'The Pleasures of Food', is not a catalogue or analysis of such pleasures, but a



quasi-Aristotelian rebuttal of the Platonic tradition of viewing the pleasures of food as lower, animal pleasures at best, and false pleasures at worst.

The bulk of the book is about the nature of the values, the moral duties, and the moral virtues revolving around food. Telfer convincingly argues that eating and drinking have value beyond that which they have solely as necessities of life — a value which ties them to the exercise of our own autonomy and individuality, to our interest in friendship and hospitableness to others, and to our aesthetic and lifestyle interests. Telfer concludes that the capacity for combining with other pleasures is one of the most important aspects of the pleasures of food.

The book discusses food-related rights and virtues including that of the hungry's right to food, duties to ourselves and others to eat healthfully, duties to ourselves to pursue optional ideals that may involve the food arts such as entertaining and gourmet cooking, duties to animals not to eat them, and the food-relevant virtues of hospitableness and temperance.

The reader with a background in rights-based moral theory or the animal rights literature will probably not find Telfer's arguments for her various positions deep enough to be the last word on some hard matters, but all of her discussions are disarmingly straightforward and comprehensible. One comes away from the book with an appreciation for the coherence of Telfer's moral and aesthetic attitudes toward food.

Here is a summary of the comprehensive positions Telfer takes, as well as a few critical observations.

(1) The world's malnourished have the right against their governments and against their better-off fellow citizens for their support of organizational structures that would meet food needs. The hungry also have rights against the United Nations to provide, and against other governments to support, hunger relief. Individuals in affluent countries have the duty to support famine relief but this duty is circumscribed by our rights to some things of our own that are immune to the claims of others and by the special obligations we have to our family and friends. We each have the right to pursue a worthwhile life and cultivate our talents, as well as the right not to sacrifice our own happiness. Telfer acknowledges that there are no rules for deciding between these competing rights, but we might observe that since one person's interests and talents are another's extravagances and decadences, it is unclear from Telfer's discussion just what is the extent of our duties to the hungry.

(2) There is no reason to despise or denigrate the pleasures of food; because of its capacity to combine with other deeply human as opposed to animal pleasures, food's meaning and value go far beyond that of simply 'being fed'.

(3) Food and drink can sometimes constitute works of art. Cooking which follows a recipe is sometimes analogous to performance art, and if the distinction between art and mere craft is based on the degree of creativeness, then original cookery is at least sometimes justifiably considered an art rather than a (mere) craft.

(4) However, food and drink are at best a minor art form, because tastes and smells cannot be arranged in patterns and do not possess form, and hence lack the complexity of the more serious arts. Food is transient, and does not speak to different generations. It cannot express emotion or tell us about the world, as major art forms can.

(5) A 'strong case' for vegetarianism can be made first along the front that animal farming causes pain and that eating animals is only a preference and not a necessity, and secondly along the emotional line that even if animals can be killed painlessly, our sense of kinship with them, based on their cognitive/sensory capacities, is violated.

(6) We each have a general duty to ourselves to exercise our autonomy, engage in self-development, and pursue ideals (some of which regard friendship, hospitality, the good life, elegant living, etc.), and these duties can either instrumentally or more directly involve our orientation towards food. Of course, ideals have numerous alternatives, and this makes certain food-related virtues, such as hospitality, optional virtues.

(7) We have two kinds of duty of hospitality to friends: the duty to meet their needs for hospitality, and the duty to give them its positive benefits (such as a strengthening of their self-esteem and sense of well-being). If we construe our duty to help friends as a Kantian imperfect duty, one where we choose between ways of carrying it out, then positive hospitableness can be thought of as an optional virtue, so that people are not at fault as long as they fulfil any perfect, i.e., unavoidable, duties of hospitality.

(8) Gluttony is generally the vice of eating/drinking too much because of the pleasures of the food/drink. But qualitative gluttony is also possible: a person can 'care too much' for these pleasures and be too extravagant or too fussy about them rather than simply consuming too much. Gluttony is not always a case of weakness of will; a 'principled glutton' may have a false and self-deceptive belief that he/she is not extravagant or self-indulgent regarding food. Meat-eating may be a form of gluttony. (This last point follows only if Telfer has convinced us that meat consumption is extravagant relative to our moral duties towards animals.)

(9) 'Balanced' temperance avoids gluttonous excess but gives due appreciation to the pleasures of food (pleasures that may be partially justified in terms of the virtue of hospitableness.) Temperance is a non-optional moral virtue.

(10) The pleasures of food have their limits as values. They cannot provide us with the important experiences of solitude, timelessness, and self-transcendence, as, for example, other of the arts can provide. They cannot yield a sense of the sublime or a feeling of connectedness to something distinct from and more important than ourselves. (Perhaps Telfer is here too temperate in regard to the awesomeness of some food and wine experiences, and to the sense of history and 'place' that wines and food, at the highest aesthetic level, can provide.)

It is probable that many readers may find too much talk of rights and duties in this book. Telfer herself admits, e.g., that talk of duties one has to



oneself has met with skepticism from a number of philosophical perspectives, and it is unclear that she offers any convincing antidote to this. Moreover, if we have duties to pursue our ideals, as she argues, then it is morally wrong (*ceteris paribus*) when we don't. But this doesn't sit well with the idea that an ideal is a praiseworthy option open to us to either pursue or not. Hospitality professionals may have a duty to be hospitable, but it seems a stretch, at least in our society, to talk about one's duty towards one's friends to provide hospitality, except, of course, in cases of real or special need.

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**Stanley Tweyman, ed.**

*Hume on Natural Religion.*

Herndon, VA: Books International (for  
Thoemmes Press) 1996. Pp. xiv + 334.

US\$72.00 (cloth: ISBN 1-85506-451-0);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 1-85506-450-2).

Tweyman's collection contains 27 historical texts, exemplifying both the contemporary reaction to and the later, mainly 19th-century debate of Hume's writings on religion (and related topics like the immortality of the soul) with the exception of his 'Of Miracles' (reactions to which were the subject of another volume, *Hume on Miracles*, also edited by Tweyman for the Key Issues series at Thoemmes — unfortunately, that volume was not available for reviewing). There are 7 texts on the *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (113 pages), 7 texts on the *Natural History of Religion* (63 pages), 4 texts on the essays 'On Suicide' and 'On the Immortality of the Soul' (30 pages) and 3 texts on the Section XI. of the first *Enquiry*, 'Of a Particular Providence, and of a Future State' (38 pages). There are also two papers on Hume's philosophy of religion in general (47 pages), and at the beginning of the volume there are four texts of biographical nature, which provide some information on the attitudes towards religion held by Hume himself during his life (34 pages). The contemporary reactions (1755-1784) are more numerous (16 out of 23 texts dealing with Hume's writings) but typically shorter than the 7 instances of the later (1837-1907) debate (135 pages compared with 156 pages of the later debate).

The most striking feature of the volume is the scarcity of any traces of the editor's hand at work. As to the editor-supplied texts, all one can find is a three-and-half-pages long Introduction (of which more than two pages are occupied by lengthy quotations from Hume) developing a small though not uninteresting point about doing philosophy as a free inquiry on the one hand

and *à la thèse* on the other: Hume, claiming that he proceeds 'by no other passion but the love of truth, is repeatedly accused of doing philosophy in order to promote his own prejudices regarding religion' (xiv). Apart from that — and contrary to the publisher's cover blurb saying that 'each text has a new editorial introduction to supply the necessary historical background' — there is not a single sentence by the editor, leaving non-specialist reader to wonder, e.g., whether the text No. 25, anonymous 'An Essay on the Immortality of the Soul', is identical with 'the small tract' recommended in the last sentence of the preceding text, the *The Gentleman's Magazine* review of Hume's suicide and immortality essays (286), or why the first of Warburton's 'Remarks' is printed twice (first in Hurd's version on pp. 237-41 and then in the original one on pp. 242-5).

Even more unfortunate is the absence of editor's work in the texts themselves. I do not worry much about trifles like no translation of quotations in other languages than English (see the five-lines long quotation from Kant in German, p. 136), disregard of emerging cross-references (Priestley on p. 80 refers to pages 32 and 33 of Hume's 'My own Life', which happens to be printed on pp. 3-10 in the same volume, cf. also p. 237), or simple misprints (among which the one on p. 17 mentioning 'the whimsical Rouffeau' has a bit of a special charm). One could also respect — if not understand — the decision to provide no original pagination and only incomplete bibliographical data of texts taken not from journals but from books or pamphlets (only author, title, and year of publication). But what is quite annoying is that the original references were left intact, without supplying references to currently accessible editions of Hume's writings (or at least the information which edition the individual authors use in their references), and without giving meaning to those notes that refer to what stands in the other parts of the book from which only a small portion is reprinted in our volume (these occur chiefly in O'Connor's 'A Brief View of Hume's Theory of Religion', 249-63).

Selections of this kind need to decide on their course between reprinting relevant but readily accessible texts on the one hand and unknown yet uninteresting on the other. Tweyman does not avoid any of the extremes: he reprints easily accessible texts like Hume's 'My own Life' (3-10) and Adam Smith's 'Letter' to William Strahan (11-16) or two chapters — possibly less relevant but still quite accessible — from T.H. Huxley's *Hume* (129-148 and 320-334). He also goes for *curiosa* like the nine-lines long anonymous review of Thomas Hayter's pamphlet on Hume's *Dialogues* (93) or two other brief and rather irrelevant reviews of contemporary writings about Hume (220-1 and 234-6). Nevertheless, there are also some luckier strikes: my favourites are two interesting pieces of antiquated scholarship, John Hunt's paper from 1869 (94-120) and Bruce McEwen's introduction to the *Dialogues* from 1907 (149-98), and a good piece of contemporary polemics, anonymous 'An Essay on the Immortality of the Soul' from 1784 (287-98).

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**Richard Vernon**

*The Career of Toleration:*

*John Locke, Jonas Proast, and After.*

Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens

University Press 1997. Pp. 164. \$44.95.

ISBN 0-7735-1022-2.

To what extent and on what ground are an individual's beliefs and actions rightly subject to coercion by the state? The divergent answers to this question offered by Locke and Proast over the course of their twenty-year exchange mark a fundamental distinction in modern political theory, viz. the distinction between political authority issuing directly from claims to moral rightness and political authority having only indirect relation to moral judgement, resting rather on claims to political legitimacy.

Vernon's aims in this book are two-fold: to reconstruct, examine, and adjudicate the Locke-Proast dispute and to demonstrate that their controversy has abiding historical interest. Both aims are achieved, although the earlier chapters (those directed explicitly to the Locke-Proast exchange) are more lively, coherent, and informative than the later chapters where the discussion is piecemeal and uneven.

After a brief historical introduction, Vernon presents what many take to be Locke's chief argument for toleration: the argument from belief. As beliefs are subject to evidence but not to compulsion, individuals ought not to be persecuted by the state for their beliefs. Yet this argument fails to meet three powerful objections. First, raised by Proast, states may use force as a means to bring individuals to reason. Second, the argument is irrelevant if states are interested in compliance independent of any potential causal nexus with belief. Third, Locke does not consistently hold that beliefs are independent of will. Vernon responds by showing that these objections misfire because, against standard interpretations of Locke, the argument from belief is neither freestanding nor central.

In the second chapter, Vernon reveals what he takes to be Locke's more significant claim. Toleration is, and persecution is not, consistent with the public use of reason. 'It is the availability of reason that makes possible a self-governing human society whose members can adopt and apply for themselves a "law" that regulates their association' (38). Civil contexts may require us to withstand actions that we would not endorse in private or individual contexts. The reason for this asymmetry emerges from the nature of a public principle, which must be directed to a public good, generally sustainable by reason, and susceptible to 'successful interpretation and application by members of a public' (44). In the absence of a standing rule for interpretation, the fluidity of possible interpretation makes plausible limits to state intervention, thus toleration.

When I was a child I found irresistible the game of 'if I were king' (never mind that I was a girl — it was easy to imagine being king). Locke is suggesting that Proast's playing of the game would require him not only to

dictate the principles allowing for force but to be an unimpeachable authority as to their employment.

But why can there not be such authority? In the third chapter, Vernon examines the critical view (suggested by Proast and adopted by others) that political toleration is undergirded by epistemic scepticism. Any such view would have to overcome two difficulties: the conceptual question of whether a sceptic can be tolerant and the political question of whether scepticism is the preferred ground for convincing persecutors of the merits of noninterference. Locke can sidestep these difficulties because, on Vernon's reading, though it is tempting and there is textual reason to think otherwise, this is not Locke's position. Vernon argues that it is 'the "equal status" as well as the "partial nature" of each person's understanding' (55) that makes Locke's case for toleration. As long as there is dissent one need not appeal to scepticism to find the political ground for refraining from intervention; 'in addition to epistemic rightness or wrongness, there is the manner in which people constitute relations of command and obedience among themselves and assign and set limits to the power to judge in the jurisdictional rather than the epistemic sense' (68).

Vernon turns his attention, in the fourth chapter, to the employment by both Locke and Proast of putative slippery slope strategies. Locke, for example, argues that if Proast allows the state's enforcement of moderate penalties as a means to change people's minds, he would have no ground to resist severe penalties. And Proast argues that if Locke would endure vicious religious activities, he would have to tolerate all manner of vice. The high rhetoric of the duelling claims is an absolute delight, a joy diminished by Vernon's pedantic intervention between crossed swords. Vernon shows that the arguments are not successful and are not properly slippery slopes. He says rightly that better ways must be found to discern 'those failings that the law should punish and those the law should ignore' (86-7).

The direct treatment of the Locke-Proast controversy ends with the fourth chapter. The remaining three chapters offer a twinning of the dispute thus far examined with the Mill-Stephen debate (with the end of showing that as defences of political morality Locke is better able to respond to the structure of illiberalism than Mill), an examination of pluralistic perfectionism as an alternative to contractarian liberalism, and a reasoned resistance to the radicalization of Locke, arguing against the view that the championing of toleration on Lockean grounds leads thereby to deliberative democracy. These chapters are self-contained and are independent claims for the trans-historical interest and righthheadedness of the Lockean defence of toleration rather than progressive steps in a sustained argument.

The book ends with a short inquiry into the question of 'what is living and what is dead in the exchange between Locke and Proast' (143) and concludes that, while the context for the initial exchange was one of relative religious homogeneity, insofar as 'appeals to procedural criteria ... and to substantive identity' (153) continue to have import for political theory, Locke and Proast remain relevant.



For an admittedly analytic treatment of toleration, there is one important oversight. It is only in the fourth chapter that Vernon focuses directly (and then only in passing) on the concept of toleration. He stipulates there that '[t]o tolerate is to refuse to suppress something that one does have views about, that one does think is wrong, and that one thinks others would be better off not doing' (71), thus differentiating toleration from indifference, scepticism, and broadmindedness. This characterization is unduly restrictive (as we surely tolerate beliefs and attitudes as well as actions) and arbitrary. It certainly seems odd to say, if I think it is loathsome for neo-Nazis to endorse and profess anti-semitism but politically acceptable for any group to march down city streets, that I tolerate their anti-semitism but am broadminded about where they are anti-semitic.

Vernon promises a discussion of the career of toleration. Those interested in modern political theory will be well advised to pay close and careful attention to Vernon's presentation of Locke and Proast, then to close their books and reflect hard about the after.

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**Richard J. White**

*Nietzsche and the Problem of Sovereignty.*

Champaign: University of Illinois Press 1997.

Pp. x + 209.

US\$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-252-02300-5);

US\$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-252-06603-0).

This recent volume in the International Nietzsche Studies series argues convincingly that both the nature and possibility of individual sovereignty are ongoing problematics in Nietzsche's works. White wisely does not present individual sovereignty, as the topic appears in Nietzsche, as either a unified doctrine or the key to understanding Nietzsche (174). Instead, he traces tensions which led Nietzsche consistently both to place a major emphasis on the need for individual autonomy and to question its possibility.

White begins with a clear and interesting account of Nietzsche's links to earlier thinkers concerned with individual self-control and self-determination. Concentrating on St. Paul, Kant, and Schopenhauer, White shows where Nietzsche is indebted to these earlier philosophers, and where he crucially transforms their concern with and approach to the value of the individual. In particular, his exegesis of Kant's treatment of autonomy is

commendable. It is not easy to give a short, clear, and nevertheless not oversimplified account of Kant's thought on any topic.

The chapters which follow trace Nietzsche's ongoing interest in and struggle with topics relating to individual freedom, self-control, and the deliberate reshaping of one's self. One value of this volume is that both the earlier writings, such as *Birth of Tragedy*, and the often neglected later writings, such as *Ecce Homo*, *Twilight of the Idols*, and *The Antichrist*, are given as detailed a reading as Nietzsche's more frequently studied middle texts.

White follows these studies of Nietzsche's texts with a brief analysis of the extent to which more contemporary continental philosophers, in their critiques of the goal of individual autonomy, fail to engage with Nietzsche's nonabsolutist 'discussion of individual sovereignty and the self-in-process, which is aware of the pitfalls and excesses that have plagued traditional accounts of autonomy.' (185) White argues that Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault, who have all acknowledged the importance of Nietzsche's influence on their work, nevertheless fail to do justice to the extent to which Nietzsche has already rethought the nature of sovereignty, and critiqued its more traditional subjectivist dimension.

While White does offer some suggestive criticisms of contemporary continental philosophers' dismissal of the possibility of degrees of individual autonomy, his sketches of the positions of Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault are so brief as to be vague. He leaves key concepts like Derrida's references to 'an illicit notion of presence' (182) basically undefined. Moreover, he also needs to do more to establish why the abandonment of concern with the possibility of individual autonomy is to be lamented. We need more of an argument as to why individual autonomy and hopes for revolutionary praxis or human liberation are inevitably linked.

White's monograph is throughout both clearly written and admirably well-organized, both within each chapter, and within the book as a whole. It also contains some useful footnotes, which draw on both the more analytic (Strong, Nehamas) and the more continental (Heidegger, Derrida) approaches to recent Nietzsche scholarship. Both of these virtues, along with its analysis of an important topic in Nietzsche's work as it occurs throughout his entire corpus, make the volume a useful one for upper level undergraduate study of Nietzsche, or for the curious philosopher who has little familiarity with Nietzsche scholarship. However there are several drawbacks to the volume which make it less useful for more advanced Nietzsche studies.

Two of these drawbacks are its insufficient attention to other recent studies of Nietzsche on the topic of individual sovereignty, and its rather elliptical account of controversies in contemporary Nietzsche scholarship. It was surprising, for instance, to find no reference to Mark Warren's *Nietzsche and Political Thought* (MIT Press 1988), given that Warren's book is chiefly devoted to explicating Nietzsche's ideal of sovereign individuality. Warren argues that we can separate this ideal, along with what he calls Nietzsche's postmodern philosophy of power, from his decidedly antidemocratic political



presuppositions. White, by contrast, underemphasizes the often brutish social and political positions Nietzsche takes, and does little to discuss the ramifications of Nietzsche's belief that very few were capable of achieving any degree of autonomy, and his lack of concern with the many men, and all women, whom he dismissed as so incapacitated.

White's neglect of contemporary feminist scholarship is symptomatic of his disinterest in paying serious attention to either Nietzsche's dismissal of virtually all human community as 'herds', or Nietzsche's condemnation of those who aspire to overcome social and political oppression. Mention of feminism appears only in the very last footnote in the book, where we are told that 'This is not the place for a survey of recent feminist thinking' (205). Not only are no feminist critics or interpreters of Nietzsche mentioned throughout the volume, but White seems to suggest in the remainder of the footnote that if only continental and analytic feminism were to engage in creative interchange on the topic of individual sovereignty, presumably under the guidance of Nietzsche, that feminism might be able to 'provide us with a critically renewed conception of the self' (205). This suggestion ignores the reality that much such interchange has already happened, and it fails to reflect the substantial amount of work feminists such as Diana Meyers have already devoted to rethinking traditional accounts of autonomy.

One example of White's insufficient attention to important controversies in recent Nietzsche scholarship is his downplaying of the variety of interpretations of the eternal return. White mentions the existence of selective interpretations of the eternal return in a footnote on Deleuze but he does not explain what they involve, and they do raise serious questions about the consequences he chooses to draw from the eternal return for understanding the meaning and possibility of individual sovereignty.

At times, moreover, White is overconfident that what he terms the performative dimension of Nietzsche's texts, the extent to which they attempt to communicate an experience, can make more determinate Nietzsche's often vague and contradictory references to individual autonomy (189, 193). It would be more convincing, perhaps, to claim that this performative dimension can provoke Nietzsche's readers to inquire further as to the value of individual autonomy. White can then hope to help Nietzsche reach and provoke a new generation of readers.

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