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Editors • Directeurs

Roger A. Shiner

Department of Philosophy

4-108 Humanities Centre

University of Alberta

Edmonton, Alberta

Canada T6G 2E5

Alain Voizard

Département de philosophie

Université du Québec à Montréal

C.P. 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville

Montréal, QC

Canada H3C 3P8

E-Mail: roger.a.shiner@ualberta.ca

E-Mail: voizard.alain@uqam.ca

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Seiki Akama, ed.

Logic, Language and Computation.

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.

Pp. x + 251.

US\$95.00. ISBN 0-7923-4376-X.

The editors of the Applied Logic Series (of which this is volume 5) note that the application of logic to language and to computation 'requires the combination, the integration and the use of many diverse systems and methodologies' (v). That diversity is richly exemplified in this volume.

Akama's introduction, rather than simply summarizing the papers to follow, gives a sound and informative whirlwind tour of developments in the application of formal logic to artificial intelligence and natural language. Of particular interest is his identification of four interesting problem areas: the logic of theory change, or belief revision (16); the 'informational view of logic' (16ff); 'reasoning about negative and inconsistent information' (17ff); and 'a general proof system for information processing' (19).

Cresswell's chapter 'Restricted Quantification' proposes a mechanism to restrict quantification in sentences like *Everyone is here* which exploits the variable free semantics of his *Entities and Indices* (1990), according to which predicates/wffs are true of sequences. These sequences are expanded to contain sets as members, indexed to particular arguments and serving to restrict their domains of quantification.

The next two chapters concern the use of the epsilon operator of Hilbert & Bernays to interpret anaphoric definite NPs. Epsilon terms denote a selected member of a nonempty set, or an arbitrary nonmember of the empty set. B.H. Slater ('The Epsilon Calculus' Problematic') uses a context dependent choice function to deal with non-unique definite descriptions as in example (1):

- (1) Yesterday the dog got into a fight with a dog. The dogs were snarling at each other for half an hour. I'll have to see to it that *the dog* doesn't get near that dog again.

However on Slater's view the epsilon term is a 'rigid designator', in the sense that once the referent has been fixed it remains constant. As a result the example in (2) below (from *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, D. Lewis 1979) is not accommodated.

- (2) The cat is in the carton. The cat will never meet our other cat, because our other cat lives in New Zealand. Our New Zealand cat lives with the Cresswell's. And there he'll stay, because Miriam would be sad if *the cat* went away.

Von Heusinger ('Definite Descriptions and Choice Functions'), working within a dynamic semantics framework, remedies this situation by incorporating a series of choice functions into his semantics, which select from any set the currently most salient entity belonging to it. Thus for (2), by the time

the underlined occurrence of *the cat* occurs the New Zealand cat has become the most salient cat in virtue of having been introduced most recently.

The next two papers also extend dynamic semantics. Asher ('Spatio-temporal Structure in Text') focuses on spatio-temporal structure and the problem of fixing locations in examples like (3).

- (3) Hans took a trip last week to France. First he went to Paris. Then he went to Nantes. *He gave several talks.* Then he took the plane to Stuttgart...

The paper as a whole is a bit incoherent and jumbled, possibly the result of piecing together parts from different works in process with insufficient proofreading, which might explain an unexpected reference to 'the subject of this festschrift' (95). Nakayama ('DRT and Many-valued Logics') explores the use of major three- and four-valued logics as a basis for Discourse Representation Theory.

Akama ('On Constructive Modality') examines a quasi-intuitionistic logic which employs a notion of constructible falsity rather than the more usual intuitionistic negation, and incorporates this approach into modal systems. Wansing ('Displaying as Temporalizing') examines a class of subintuitionistic logics, and discovers an interesting relation between presenting intuitionistic predicate logic as a display logic and expanding it with the addition of temporal operators.

The last two chapters concern relevance logic. Fariñas del Cerro & Lugardon ('Quantification and Dependence Logics') present 'sequents first order versions of dependence logics' (179), where dependence is defined in terms of shared topics expressed by nonlogical constants. Sylvan's chapter 'Relevant Conditionals, and Relevant Application Thereof' is an extended discussion of conditionality and its expression within paraconsistent systems (in which it is not the case that a contradiction allows the derivation of any formula). Sylvan gives an analysis which does not distinguish between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, but which does exclude examples like (4).

- (4) a. If this theory is correct, then I'm the Easter Bunny!
b. If you're interested, there are magazines on the desk outside.

Such examples do not meet Sylvan's condition that the consequent of a genuine conditional be relevant to the antecedent.

The volume as a whole is fairly uneven. Some of the contributions are tight and well-edited while others are more casually constructed, and some are more valuable than others. Nevertheless taken together they provide a good picture of the frontiers of research in this very active field.

Barbara Abbott

(*Department of Linguistics*)
Michigan State University

Jocelyn Benoist

Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie: Husserl et la tradition logique autrichienne.

Paris: PUF. Épiméthée. 1997. Pp. 310.

FF148. ISBN 2-13-048675-4.

Cette étude resitue l'interrogation des *Recherches Logiques* sur la signification dans son contexte historico-conceptuel, celui de la philosophie autrichienne de la fin du siècle dernier. Sol commun des interrogations de la philosophie analytique et de la phénoménologie en matière de théorie de la connaissance. Tracer le propre de l'interrogation de Husserl, en suivant sa lecture de la tradition logique autrichienne, pour découvrir la spécificité de la phénoménologie, qu'elle ouvre dès la première version des *RL*, comme pensée critique (pouvant expliciter ce qu'elle fait); tel est l'objectif, respecté et combien remarquable, de ce que l'A. présente comme une introduction à une étude systématique sur les *RL*. Dans ce débat avec la tradition, Husserl rend l'intentionnalité à sa dimension proprement ontologique, en un sens non pas métaphysique, voire psychologique, mais critique. Les deux parties de l'ouvrage exposent ce 'lien critique' entre la théorie de la signification et l'ontologie de l'intentionnalité.

La première partie dégage l'acquis incontestable de la lère *RL*: l'acte de signifier en tant que rapport intentionnel à l'objet. Modifiant la théorie du jugement alors en cours (Bolzano, Brentano, Marty), et tenant compte des avancées de la 'nouvelle logique' (Husserl)(la mise en variables), Husserl élargit du coup l'objet intentionnel à l'ensemble des actes signitifs possibles. Libérant ainsi l'intentionnalité du mentalisme brentanien et du modèle bolzanien de 'l'image psychologique'. Ce qui lui permet d'identifier (plus radicalement que Bolzano et Frege) la dimension strictement formelle de la logique, et de montrer les lois de l'analytique-formel qui constituent sa grammaire pure (*RL* III). Soit les lois de possibilité ou d'impossibilité de formalisation et de composition des significations; les lois du rapport signitif (d'accès) à l'objet, condition et base de la logique *stricto sensu* (lois des énoncés) et du catégorial formel (lois ontologiques: catégories déterminant les objets) qu'elles excèdent.

Loin d'ignorer la dimension syntaxique du problème, Husserl impose (en raison de cet excès) une relecture de l'élément linguistique du signifier, et propose, à la suite de Marty, de repenser le catégorial: formel et sémantique, en son lieu, c'est-à-dire dans les lois des actes signitifs. Cette grammaire pure de la modalité signitive de l'intentionnalité doit cependant composer avec une autre grammaire, qui régit la modalité intuitive de l'intentionnalité — celle qui donne la matière concrète. Or, c'est dans l'articulation des deux grammaires que l'A. situe le sens ontologique inédit de la phénoménologie, qui en cette 'version non encore explicitement transcendantale' assure une 'position critique'.

La deuxième partie examine le nouveau statut ontologique des objets intentionnels, confinés jusqu'alors en l'écrin du psychologisme à n'être que

des représentations. Selon quels types de légalité cela fait-il sens de parler des objets ? de les penser comme existants ? C'est ici que la grammaire du synthétique, du donné concret de l'expérience, apparaît comme précédant et orientant celle de l'analytique-formel (donc ce qui peut être dit ou pensé de l'objet). En introduisant un tel *a priori* matériel, Husserl (ici plus en débat avec Kant, comme l'indique l'A., pour qui la dimension formelle précède l'apparaître de l'objet) fait échec aux propriétés dites psychologiques (Meinong) de l'objet, pour les rendre à l'immanence de leur donnée, c'est-à-dire telles qu'elles apparaissent comme propriétés de l'objet même.

Les lois du mode intuitif sont celles de la 'présence de l'objet', qui impose à la pensée les contraintes propres de cette existence, selon la légalité immanente d'une possible ou impossible cohérence dans sa constitution concrète d'objet. C'est ce qui permet de différencier les objets selon leur teneur — véritable différence ontologique (RL III, § 9), et non en vertu des propriétés logico-formelles d'un objet toujours même (général) supportant ses propriétés. La différence ontologique (des objets) appartient à la logique 'du tout et des parties qui n'est pas "logiquement" comprise dans l'objet, mais qui est sa condition *a priori* en tant que condition formelle de son existence même, possibilité pour lui d'être pensé "comme existant" (165).

Husserl oppose cette différence des apparaîtres au répertoire meinongien des objets, à sa *Gegenstandstheorie*, puisque: 'Cette différence entre l'*a priori* analytique-formel et l'*a priori* synthétique-matériel ... est ce qui structure intimement le champ des objets' (173). L'articulation des grammaires en est une de 'disjonction' entre le formel et la matérialité de l'objet, tributaire des types de légalité imposant leurs contraintes respectives. On ne peut 'dire' le monde (les objets) à la manière d'un naturaliste, ou en faire un catalogue (Meinong), sans annuler l'écart entre les modes intuitif et signitif de l'intentionnalité. La grammaire du 'dire' et celle du 'voir' imposent à l'apparaître ses formes, dont la description, à ce stade, tient plus de la 'réflexion critique' que d'une théorie des formes de l'apparaître.

Or, quel est le statut de cette description ? La neutralité métaphysique et phénoménologique des RL est d'emblée effective dès lors que depuis un site proprement critique — 'qui relève de la théorie de la connaissance' (211), l'articulation grammaticale de l'intentionnalité devient purement descriptible. Selon un 'régime d'objectivité' ne visant aucunement l'explication métaphysique, de type réaliste ou idéaliste, mais décrivant l'immanence radicale de la relation intentionnelle au donné. Conférant ainsi à la conscience un statut ontologique autre, qui dépasse le modèle psychologique brentanien de l'expérience interne et sa détermination ontologique (comme support de la donation), de même que celui de Lotze. Le principe méthodologique qui régit les RL permet, par '*l'absence de présupposition*' (Husserl) métaphysique ou ontologique qu'il neutralise, d'atteindre la pure immanence de l'apparaître, soit véritablement la conscience comme ce lieu même (éprouvé comme pur sentir) d'une double grammaire: celle 'purement immanente' des contenus et celle de l'intentionnalité en ses divers modes. Ce lieu semble cependant plutôt fixer les conditions descriptives d'une herméneu-

tique de la vie de conscience, que d'exiger comme le soutient l'A. une théorie critique de la connaissance.

Certes, la description des données de la conscience (champ de connaissances idéales) est ontologique, en ce qu'elle décrit cet exister ou apparaître des objets (ou de la conscience si elle en fait son thème), selon leur constitution possible ou effective tant au niveau formel-analytique qu'au niveau synthétique-matériel. Un doute plane cependant sur le statut de cette description. Pourquoi serait-elle nécessairement critique ? Si sa neutralité métaphysique 's'accomplit comme *thèse critique sur l'ontologie*', est-ce parce que la phénoménologie s'assigne cette tâche ? n'est-ce pas plutôt la contrepartie inévitable de l'application du principe méthodologique ? Principe qui assigne déjà à l'analyse de la vie de conscience son statut (neutre), soit à la phénoménologie d'être essentiellement descriptive.

Brigitte McGuire

GRHTC Université de Montréal

David Bolotin

An Approach to Aristotle's Physics, With Particular Attention to the Role of his Manner of Writing.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1998. Pp. viii + 156.

US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3551-2);

US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3552-0).

Old questions of contradictions in the Aristotelian corpus provide the focus for this study of his views on the nature of reality. Indeed, there is room for a fresh approach. W. Jaeger's paradigm of intellectual development, long used to explain inconsistencies, today faces wholesale questioning. And after Einstein or Eddington, the traditional role of science in explaining the nature of our world, too, is often confronted with scepticism.

Aware of the history of interpretation, Bolotin takes a truly bold approach in stating that Aristotle's scientific positions are 'consistent with modern discoveries' (7). Very few pages of this book, however, are devoted to a comparison with modern scientific views. Rather, analysis of the *Physics* and *de Caelo* aims to show that Aristotle has, in fact, contradicted himself, and deliberately disguised his genuine views.

The pattern of argumentation is clear from the first chapter, on 'principles of natural beings,' which discusses *Physics* Book I. Aristotle corrects the Eleatic denial of 'coming to be' by recognition of three principles: form,

substrate and privation. According to Bolotin, Aristotle's claim to have resolved the issue in this way, at 191a23, is undermined by referring to another approach using 'potentiality' and 'actuality' (191b27). In arguing that the latter is in fact the true resolution Bolotin highlights the textual problem regarding the 'coming to be' of the dog, at 191b20-21 (14-15, 17). But his own explanation of the passage is not convincing; a more thorough analysis of the immediate context shows that Aristotle concedes aspects of Eleatic views, only to demonstrate that without acceptance of all three principles these lead to contradictions and impossibilities. Bolotin's conclusion, distinguishing Aristotle's surface account from his more serious view of the matter (22), supposedly to conceal his true position from readers, takes us far beyond the evidence.

The second chapter argues that Aristotle's teleology (in *Physics* II) is an accommodation to popular views; even with a purposeful divine mind directing nature, Aristotle's arguments allow a significant role for chance. Similarly, in the third chapter Bolotin claims that Aristotle's presentation of infinite divisibility (in Book VI) is not serious; indeed, he revises it in Book VIII when refuting Zeno (70).

The most interesting chapter, the fourth, discusses the nature of 'place'. Bolotin shows that the definition of 'place' as the first immovable limit of the surrounding body implies that the inner surface of the heavenly sphere is the highest place (98). Again, according to Bolotin, Aristotle's explicit arguments assume the fixity of earth, as we experience it, as the perspective from which to interpret motion. Only by reading between the lines can we find his true position, namely that 'place' is not dependent on body, and far less important than might be expected (107). In the fifth chapter, too, on the weight of bodies, Bolotin shows that Aristotle argues at length for the weightlessness of fire (130-1), but his real position is the opposite, and is indirectly connected with his true view of the destructibility of the world (138).

In each case Bolotin sidesteps the inevitable question, why Aristotle might have misrepresented his true views, promising to answer this when he examines his manner of writing in the final chapter. Given also the promise of the book's title, there are legitimate reasons for expecting substantial treatment of the issue. What he presents is a short, disappointing and poorly substantiated argument: Aristotle's safe positions on providence or the eternity of the world supposedly represent his response to political persecution motivated by religious conservatism. This is apparently what Bolotin means by rhetorical accommodations (149). He does not even return to the old question of the esoteric and exoteric teachings, raised earlier by quotations from Themistius and Simplicius (5-6). Aristotle supposedly realized that he portrayed the natural world as overly 'intelligible', but his denial that science was capable of giving ultimate answers left him no valid alternative to attributing the world's existence to the gods of Hesiod and Homer, even if that in turn undermined the task of natural science (151-2). Finally, realizing that the scope of questions raised are beyond his intentions for this book,

Bolotin concedes that an adequate account of Aristotle's perspective on the world calls for further examination of his dialectics and his political philosophy! (153)

Bolotin has indeed taken a novel approach to a problem on which much ink has already been spilled. The solution, when it finally comes is slight, if not misleading. His treatment raises far more questions than he answers, far more expectations than he fulfills.

Wendy Elgersma Helleman

Moscow State University

Bob Brecher

Getting What You Want? A Critique of Liberal Morality.

New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. x + 217.

Cdn\$98.00: US\$70.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-12951-6);

Cdn\$25.99: US\$17.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-12952-4).

There is an ubiquitous conflation of freedom with freedom of choice in contemporary liberal societies. If for no other reason than that it brings this unexamined elision to light, Bob Brecher's text is an important one. Brecher offers a lively and engaged moral, cultural, and political critique of contemporary society solidly grounded in an historical evaluation of the Anglo-American liberal tradition.

Brecher's thesis asserts that contemporary liberalism is morally incoherent because its conceptual foundations wobble in the muck of the empiricist understanding of humans as 'wanting things.' This tradition extends back to Hobbes and is distinguished by two key dogmas: first, that only human wants confer value on things or practices, and second, that, in Hume's words, 'reason is the slave of the passions.' From these two sources flows the 'empirico-liberal tradition.' Reaching from Hobbes to Richard Rorty, it is unified by successive failed attempts at articulating a coherent moral theory on the basis of what we want. Rorty's postmodern skepticism is the necessary product of two centuries of conceptual confusion.

The empirico-liberals were driven to wants as the only possible source of morality because, as liberals, they valued autonomy above all else, and, as empiricists, because they were dubious about the ability of 'reason' to motivate action and guarantee autonomy. The problem, as Brecher sees it, is that if we identify autonomy with 'getting what we want' then *any* procedure

which claims to be an authoritative method for deciding what it is right and what it is wrong to want, i.e., morality, is impossible.

Brecher argues that skepticism can only be overcome in moral affairs if some species of cognitivist ethics is possible. That is, morality is possible only if reason can ground it. The empiricist tradition, however, sees reason as at best an external authority, one which cannot but compromise autonomy. But morality just is a system for adjudicating between wants. So if wants ultimately decide, the best liberalism can come up with is an 'I'm ok, you're ok' attitude regulated by contract. As he sums up his argument: 'In short, liberalism leads to libertarianism' (171). If this slippery slope is to be avoided, we need to rethink the relation between reason and autonomy.

While liberalism cannot but result in libertarianism, authority need not degenerate into authoritarianism (as liberals fear). To establish this point Brecher plays up a Kantian theme. There is an essential difference between externally imposed authority and the authority of reason. If we take rationality to be the *sine qua non* of humanity, not wants, then acting on the basis of reasons is (as Kant argued) to act autonomously. To act according to wants, then, is to act heteronomously, at the behest of irrational passions (e.g., nationalism), or at the promptings of the market.

Brecher's negative case is convincing. Moral problems arise where there is a conflict of wants. Liberalism understands this point, but hasn't been able to resolve the tension between the need to limit wants and respect autonomy. If reason is understood as free self-limitation then this tension does not arise. Free moral subjects are those who subordinate themselves to good reasons for acting. The only justified action is one for which there are good reasons. 'I wanted to' is not a reason, it is what a child supplies when they have nothing to say for themselves. But can reasons motivate action? They must, Brecher argues, if there are to be human moral subjects. The metaphysical concerns the empiricist tradition has with the motivating power of reason stem from its illegitimate assimilation of the idea of motivation to the notoriously vague notion of physical cause.

While one may be willing to grant Brecher's point concerning the necessity of the link between reason and morality one may leave the text unconvinced that such morality is possible. Brecher says little about what type of reason could ground a moral theory. As Hegel, contra Kant, shows in ch. 6 of *The Phenomenology*, reasons can devolve into the same intractable conflict as wants. That is, it is not clear that a procedure for adjudicating between conflicting reasons will more easily get off the ground than a system for adjudicating between conflicting wants. Strangely, Brecher notes this criticism in the useful Bibliographical Essay but does not entertain it in the main text. It is perhaps the most serious challenge any sort of Kantian morality is going to face, and thus ought to have been discussed.

Second, Brecher's equivocal use of the term liberalism will likely anger liberals with Kantian roots. Brecher himself is such a liberal, drawing inspiration from the Enlightenment notion of reason. He claims only to be a critic of what he calls 'empirico-liberalism' but often uses 'liberalism' to stand

for 'empirico-liberalism'. This slippage adds unnecessary confusion to what is an otherwise lucid text.

These problems notwithstanding, *Getting What You Want?* is a provocative argument which deserves to become the focal point of a much needed debate.

Jeff Noonan

University of Windsor

Domenico Costantini and Maria Carla Galavotti, eds.

Probability, Dynamics and Causality: Essays in Honour of Richard C. Jeffrey.

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.

Pp. 282.

US\$88.00. ISBN 0-7923-4361-1.

This work contains the proceedings of the Luino conference on 'Probability, dynamics and causality', held in June 1995 in honour of Princeton philosopher Richard Jeffrey. The collection, reprinted from *Erkenntnis* 45, Nos. 2-3 (1996), contains sixteen papers concentrated on three themes: the foundations of probability and statistics, inductive inference, and probability in physical science (most notably quantum mechanics). The contributors are international, and include both philosophers and philosophically-minded mathematicians, statisticians and physicists. The collection should be of most interest to technically-oriented philosophers of science and to those working on foundations or applications of probability theory.

Most of the contributors share a commitment to the subjectivist or personalist approach to statistical inference, as pioneered by Ramsey and de Finetti, and more specifically to Bayesian statistics as elaborated by Jeffrey and others. Bayesian statistics involves the use of (subjective) prior probability distributions, together with a variety of rules for updating probabilities, in order to solve statistical problems. Among philosophers, the theory may be most familiar for its application to the problems of inductive inference and the confirmation of scientific hypotheses. Most of the papers work squarely within a Bayesian framework: they (i) formulate criticisms of alternative accounts of probability, (ii) elaborate and refine the foundations of Bayesian statistics, (iii) attempt to resolve outstanding problems, and (iv) extend the Bayesian approach with new mathematical techniques and applications. The collection succeeds in advancing these objectives. As one contributor notes, however, 'subjective probability does not seem to have ever

been taken as a serious candidate to interpret probability in science'. To the extent that countering such indifference (rather than addressing the faithful) is a further objective, the collection would benefit from an introduction discussing how the included papers shed light on the merits of the Bayesian approach relative to its rivals.

The papers by Hájek and Galavotti are helpful non-technical introductions to the frequentist and subjective interpretations of probability (written from an anti-frequentist perspective). Hájek rightly argues that finite frequentism, which identifies $p(A / B)$ with the relative frequency of actual occurrences of A in the finite reference class B , has absurd (and amusing) consequences: 'it is an analytic truth that any coin that is tossed an odd number of times is biased.' Hájek's criticisms of frequentism are persuasive, but his paper lacks an account of objective probability, the desire for which underlies reluctance to abandon frequentism. Galavotti's paper traces the historical roots of radical probabilism, the view that empirical knowledge rests on 'probabilities all the way down' and that even prior probability judgements are pragmatic, based on current knowledge, rather than *a priori* assignments. She contrasts de Finetti, Ramsey and Jeffrey, finding that all three share a pragmatic approach grounded in the view of probability as degree of belief, but diverge in their willingness to accommodate some notion of objective probability.

The papers by Howson and Skyrms, which examine the foundations of Bayesian reasoning, are especially interesting. Howson's paper presents a negative result: the dynamic Dutch Book arguments that have been used to justify ordinary and Jeffrey conditionalization are only legitimate in probability spaces 'artificially restricted to exclude propositions about the agent's own degree of belief'. If $p(B) = 1$, A is the proposition 'Tomorrow I will believe B with degree $r < 1$ ', and $p(A) > 0$, then my updated probability $p_A(B)$ must be r (by the Reflection Principle); so $p_A(B) \neq p(B / A)$ (since $p(B / A)$ must be 1). Howson's conclusion, that Bayesianism can still function without updating rules, requires a fuller defense than he provides. Skyrms' paper, by contrast, argues that dynamic coherence and updating by conditionalization are absolutely central to the Bayesian point of view, inasmuch as they are needed to demonstrate both belief convergence and the positive value of cost-free information (which Skyrms calls 'the fundamental theorem of epistemology'). Since Skyrms accepts the Reflection Principle, he would reject Howson's argument, presumably arguing that Howson's initial probability assignment is incoherent.

A perennial problem for subjectivists is how to make sense of chance, i.e., objective or real probabilities. Jeffrey's own contribution explores the idea, which he attributes to de Finetti (who attributes it to Hume), that chances are propensities of physical objects to produce in us certain probabilistic judgements. Suppose the proportion of green balls in an urn is $X\%$. Then the probability $p(H / X = x)$ of the hypothesis $H \equiv$ 'green on the next draw', conditional on some observed proportion $x\%$ being green, is $x\%$. These conditional probabilities remain fixed, even if we are ignorant of the actual

value of x . Jeffrey maintains that the invariance of subjective probabilities conditional on some physical feature is enough to secure what we ordinarily take to be their 'reality' or objectivity. The challenge here is to make sense of the idea that such probability judgements are forced upon us by features of reality.

Papers by Zabell, Regazzini, Wedlin, and Festa survey recent results and develop new techniques for responding to problems arising within the Bayesian approach, such as confirming universal generalizations and reasoning with imprecise prior probabilities. The article by Diaconis and Holmes makes an unexpectedly strong case for the relevance of Bayesian reasoning to elementary problems such as the Birthday Problem (the probability that two or more people in a group share a Birthday) and drawings from a deck of cards. Philosophers and mathematicians have commonly taken such problems to be solved classically, but the authors convincingly demonstrate the dangers of 'naive use' of uniform (classical) prior distributions even in such simple cases. Conversely, they caution against the equally naive 'fantasy' of applying Bayesian reasoning to huge computer models, which requires the assignment of prior probabilities to hundreds of parameters; however, this criticism is made without supporting arguments.

Bicchieri and Schulte's paper on game theory is the lone exception to the probabilistic framework adopted by the other contributors. The authors analyze reasoning about admissibility, a basic rationality constraint that rules out weakly dominated choices. The paper is technical; the main results relate a strategic notion of sequential admissibility to other rationality principles.

Finally, five papers explore the applications of probability to physical science. Shimony discusses whether measurement introduces a time asymmetry in the quantum theory. Such asymmetries, it has been argued, are an artifact of the usual way systems are defined in terms of an initial condition that must be satisfied prior to the measurement. Shimony largely agrees with this claim, though with some qualifications in the case of non-ideal measurements. Other papers explore the completeness of the quantum theory and the measurement problem.

Although many essays will be beyond the technical reach of most philosophers, the collection is valuable both for retrospective consideration and for advancing current understanding of subjective probability and its place in ordinary and scientific reasoning.

Paul Bartha

University of British Columbia

Pascal Engel

La dispute: une introduction à la philosophie analytique.

Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit 1997. Pp. 252.

ISBN 2-7073-1610-5.

Dans *La dispute*, Pascal Engel met en scène un dialogue, que d'aucuns qualifieront de « dialogue de sourd » entre un philosophe analytique, Analyphron, et un philosophe continental, Philoconte. L'échange est arbitré par un esprit plus conciliateur, Mésothète, qui ne cache toutefois pas sa sympathie pour la philosophie continentale. Analyphron y est pris à partie et doit justifier le genre de philosophie qu'il pratique, en présenter l'histoire et les thèses dominantes. Une première partie du dialogue, couvrant environ 170 pages, est donc principalement occupée par Analyphron qui, sous le questionnement de Philoconte mais aussi de Mésothète, est conduit à raconter l'histoire de la philosophie analytique (PA) depuis ses origines dans la pensée Allemande du dix-neuvième siècle jusqu'à ses développements les plus contemporains, les retours du naturalisme et du pragmatisme par exemple, en passant évidemment par l'empirisme logique, la philosophie du langage ordinaire, et autres incontournables du paysage analytique.

Évidemment qu'une présentation si courte des origines, de l'évolution et des thèses centrales d'un des mouvements philosophiques les plus prolifiques de l'histoire (ne serait-ce qu'en nombre d'ouvrages publiés) ne peut être que superficielle et je crois qu'aucun philosophe analytique n'y apprendra quoi que ce soit — sinon quelques détails ça et là. Cette partie de l'ouvrage s'adresse au néophyte: à l'étudiant qui commence sa formation en philosophie ou au philosophe qui, par oubli, par fanatisme ou par manque de professionnalisme, serait demeuré à l'écart d'une moitié de la philosophie produite au vingtième siècle. Pour ce lecteur, l'ouvrage d'Engel constituera certes une excellente introduction à la PA. Cette partie contient aussi un utile petit catalogue des énigmes, des paradoxes et des expériences de pensées qui meublent une grande partie des écrits en PA. Il faut toutefois faire attention: quelques erreurs, un peu triviales et qui n'affectent pas l'intelligibilité du discours d'Engel, se sont glissés dans le texte. Ainsi, le calembour « a roriorti » (cf. p.53), qui signifie « pour des raisons encore plus obscures à la mode et continentales », ne provient pas du *Philosopher's Index* (lequel n'est pas, contrairement à ce que dit la note de la page 53, une publication de l'*American Philosophical Association*) mais plutôt du petit dictionnaire humoristique de Daniel Dennett, le *Philosophical Lexicon*.

La suite de *La dispute* intéressera un auditoire plus large, comprenant des philosophes analytiques « patentés ». Elle commence par une réponse de Philoconte au petit catalogue d'énigmes, etc., qui sont le pain quotidien, ou du moins hebdomadaire, du philosophe analytique. A partir d'un examen de la nature des énigmes composant l'ensemble, Philoconte évacue l'entièreté du domaine de la PA, montrant qu'il est ou bien du ressort de la science, de la logique ou des mathématiques, ou bien du ressort de la philosophie mais

qu'alors la méthode appliquée par les philosophes analytiques contient un vice qui en interdit une résolution adéquate. Je ne discuterai pas ici des thèses philosophiques substantielles qui sont présupposées par ce genre de critique de la PA, par exemple l'idée que l'ensemble du savoir humain se divise bêtement en suivant les lignes de démarcation culturellement tracées dans les institutions créées pour le produire, car il est plus important d'en noter la fonction rhétorique : elle est l'amorce d'une merveilleuse réflexion sur les fondements de la PA.

Devant cette attaque en règle, Analyphron doit en effet restituer un domaine à la PA en réfléchissant sur ses fondements. La réflexion d'Analyphron est fascinante à plusieurs égards, et j'abonde souvent dans le sens de ses propos, même si je trouve qu'elle ne va souvent pas assez loin. Je ne peux évidemment reprendre ici toutes les questions métaphilosophiques abordées, mais j'en reprend une à titre d'exemple : le rôle des énigmes, paradoxes et expériences de pensées en PA.

Analyphron note bien que la plupart des philosophes analytiques, notamment ceux qui se prêtent au jeu des énigmes, conçoivent, à tort ou à raison, la philosophie comme une activité essentiellement théorique et que, dans ce cadre, les énigmes servent de test, ou de point d'évaluation de la théorie. Les longs débats qui peuvent se poursuivre des années, à savoir si Untel a bien résolu l'énigme ou si telle objection est valide, ne portent pas sur l'énigme en première instance mais sur les théories philosophiques en compétition pour le haut du pavé. Analyphron pose le bon diagnostic pour expliquer pourquoi certains philosophes voient ces énigmes d'un mauvais oeil. Mais il me semble qu'il n'identifie pas une fonction importante des énigmes qui, comme il le remarque bien, peuvent paraître un peu loufoques, même pour des philosophes analytiques, si on les compare littéralement aux expérimentations des scientifiques. C'est que les philosophes analytiques ont adopté le modèle de la science à un niveau plus fondamental que simplement méthodologique, soit le niveau de l'organisation institutionnelle mise en place par la communauté pour soutenir l'activité philosophique, et les énigmes jouent aussi un rôle important à ce niveau. La philosophie continentale, je crois, est culturellement implantée dans des institutions datant du Moyen Âge et de la Renaissance et dont la fonction est d'implanter, entre les chercheurs, une forme d'interaction intellectuelle dont le modèle est la Bible et le commentaire philologique et interprétatif sur la Bible. La PA est culturellement implantée dans des institutions dont la fonction est tout autre : mettre en place l'infrastructure suffisante pour l'apparition et l'évolution d'un « marché des idées philosophiques », analogue au marché des biens et services, un marché où, bien à l'insu des philosophes qui y participent, la meilleure solution possible à un problème philosophique émergera, comme guidée par l'action de la main invisible d'Adam Smith (qu'on explique bien aujourd'hui en termes dynamiques non-linéaires). Tout marché a besoin d'une monnaie d'échange pour contrôler la distribution des informations dans un système dynamique ouvert, et le traitement des énigmes est un des facteurs jouant un rôle à ce niveau. Je ne sais pas quel modèle culturel s'avérera le plus

fructueux : je note simplement la différence et marque la place des énigmes, etc., dans le second modèle.

Ainsi ma critique contre cette seconde partie du livre d'Engel se résume à un sentiment : j'aurais bien aimé qu'elle aille plus loin. Quand un auteur suscite ce sentiment chez son lecteur, c'est qu'il a écrit un bon livre.

Pierre Poirier

Université du Québec à Montréal

Thomas R. Flynn

Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason.

Volume One: Toward an Existentialist Theory of History.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1997.

Pp. xvi + 340.

US\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-25467-4);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-25468-2).

Flynn has drawn upon many pages of works written by Sartre but not published until after Sartre's death in 1980. In those pages were many devoted to the philosophy of history: some 450 pages of notes for a second volume of the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, subtitled by Sartre 'The Intelligibility of History', as well as the 'Notebooks for an Ethics' in which a significant portion is given to the problem of relating ethics and history.

In the preface to this volume on Sartre [the second volume concentrates on Foucault] Flynn remarks: 'The aim of the present volume is to erect an existentialist philosophy of history according to plans scattered throughout the Sartrean corpus.' The erection will be, of necessity, a reconstruction since it is based, for the most part, on fragments not intended for publication. In the finished project Flynn promises to provide a new view of Sartre, Foucault, and historical reason. The two share some basic concepts: both shared a non-Platonic view of reason and truth, and both 'respected the practicality of reason and the politics of truth.'

History as a discipline is schizophrenic. Some argue it should be in the Social Sciences and some argue it belongs in the Humanities. Is it closer to science or to creative writing? Flynn's analysis and reconstruction of Sartre's philosophy of history would place the discipline in the humanities with an emphasis on doing and making history as a full moral and aesthetic act. '[A] basic thesis that I have been defending so far is that Sartre likens the intelligibility of history to that of an artwork because he considers the former as much the product of creative freedom as the latter' (214). Sartre's notion

of the 'analogical representative' or 'analogon' in imaging consciousness figures prominently in his theory of history. History for Sartre, Flynn argues, is no more a concatenation of brute facts or simple events than the aesthetic object is a mere linkage of perceptual items. 'The synthesizing activity of consciousness is at work in both cases and, most importantly, there is a corresponding *moral* dimension to each. This is the root of Sartrean commitment in both history and art and serves as the basis for his existentialist theory of each. Its goal is freedom as value' (215).

In addition to providing a careful analysis of Sartre's thoughts on the philosophy of history Flynn's book is a useful review of Sartre's philosophical positions in ontology and axiology. Flynn is a careful reader and interpreter of Sartre's work and his book is interesting and easy to read. The technical vocabulary that Sartre loved is kept to a bare minimum and Flynn's prose is precise and spirited. The book is divided into three parts: Part One discusses the conflicting theories of history in the current century, Part Two looks at history and biography and provides a useful concluding discussion called 'The Biographical Illusion', and Part Three concentrates on the historian as dramaturge.

From the conclusion to Part Two: 'Praxis and dialectic have ramified the notion of situation for the postwar Sartre just as intentionality did for the prewar philosopher. This socialization reaches its climax in what we have called Sartre's principle of totalization: a person totalizes his or her age to the extent that he or she is totalized by it' (208). The essential components of Sartre's philosophy of history turn out to be the essential features that he held central to his larger philosophical undertaking: contingency, freedom, and morality. History without moral judgment is empty; history without facts is blind. Or, as Flynn puts it on his last page (264), 'history without biography is lifeless, biography without history is blind.'

Flynn quotes Sartre (261) as follows: 'I assumed that the evolution through action would be a series of failures from which something unforeseen and positive would emerge, something that was implicit in the failure but that had been overlooked by those who had hoped to succeed. That something would be a series of partial, local successes, decipherable only with difficulty by the people who were doing that work and who, moving from failure to failure, would nonetheless be achieving a certain progress. That is how I always understood history.'

Volume One is well worth reading and thinking about. It would be useful in existentialism classes, philosophy of history classes, and in Great Books programs which focus on the chronological development of ideas in the Western world.

In Volume Two Flynn promises to provide a detailed analysis of Foucault's mapping of history, and to complete the comparing and contrasting of the two writers and their respective theories of history.

Robert D. Lane

Malaspina University-College

Michel Foucault

The Essential Works. Volume 1: Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: The New Press 1997. Pp. xlv + 334. US\$27.50. ISBN 1-56584-352-5.

Rabinow's aim in this three-volume series of material selected from *Dits et écrits* is 'to assemble a compelling and representative collection of Foucault's written and spoken words outside those included in his books' (vii). Volume One addresses practices that transform human beings into subjects. Essential herein to Foucault's readers is not, however, the archaeology of the subject but the tracing of his ethical vision under the rubric 'care of the self' (*souci de soi*). Foucault's use of Bentham's Panopticon, wherein subjects internalize domination in self-surveillance, conflicts with his agonistic account that power always entails resistance. In his later years, Foucault's study of the classical male ethic of self-mastery displaces that tension by thinking through power as a self-relation. This volume maps that development.

The book is divided into two parts. The first occupies a third of the text. It consists in Foucault's candidacy presentation to the Collège de France in 1969, and subsequent yearly course summaries until 1981. Having already pathologized the abnormal constituted as madness, Foucault explores in courses from 1970 to 1975 the enforcement of normalcy in delinquency and juridical practice. Over the next three years, he explores how society defends itself against 'abnormals'. The culminating issue is 'biopolitics': 'the endeavor ... to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by ... living human beings constituted as a population' (73). In 1978-79, government is defined: 'techniques and procedures for directing human behavior' (81). Pursuing government alternatively as self-government in the last two courses, Foucault looks to ancient regimens of *aphrodisia* from the first century BC to the second century AD. He finds 'a set of techniques whose purpose is to link together truth and the subject' (101), not through recovery of some hidden subjectivity, but by arming the subject with heretofore unknown truths. That is, he uncovers technologies of self.

In Part Two, interviews, talks, texts and seminars from 1980 onward reveal Foucault thinking through technologies of self, especially writing as self-writing, to an ethics of care of the self. In a post-phenomenological desert of fragmented selves, deconstructive groundlessness, and millennial nihilism, the articulated genesis of an ethical self is caravansary. This volume shows that Foucault's 'self' is identity-laden, unmechanistic although continuously self-crafting, policed not by Panopticon, but self-governed. Foucault's vision is to ask, 'couldn't everyone's life become a work of art?' (261).

The book provides in translation crucial commentary from Foucault on his work, aims, successes and short-comings. He locates *The History of Sexuality* at his core by arguing that technologies of the self 'connect the order of sexual acts to the whole of existence' (90) and calling his earlier analyses

of power and knowledge instrumental (290). Evident are dissatisfaction with Aristotle's ethics (13; 257; 268) and influence by Nietzsche on morality (14). Critiques of liberalism (73-9) and humanism (312), a conception of freedom as 'the ontological condition of ethics' (285), and a rejection of historical nostalgia (256), are explicit.

This volume is rightly, then, called essential. It is essential, however, to the Foucault scholar. The beginner would do better to start with texts prepared by Foucault for publication, rather than interviews and *a posteriori* commentary. This book is about seeing more deeply into the development of Foucault's ideas, not encountering those ideas for the first time. Editorial strategies thus fall into question. Should a text significant to experienced readers of Foucault provide an overview of biography and basic concepts by way of introduction, or details about chronology and context concerning the texts found within? The course summaries are chronological, as far as I can tell. Part Two is 'organized ... thematically' (viii), but without clear account of what themes guide that ordering and the logic behind it. Three pieces remain undated. Accordingly, the scholar who uses these books will have to look elsewhere for much of the information requisite to advanced scholarly work.

Further, despite the brief note on translation, one would do well to keep *Dits et écrits* at hand, particularly if interested in the relation and difference between *savoir* and *connaissance*, and keeping in mind that these pieces span fifteen years and several translators. James Faubion's emendations, particularly replacing 'subjugation' with 'subjectivation' for *asujettissement*, and 'subjugate' with 'subjectify' for *asujettir*, are a consistent move toward consistency across translations, but perhaps obscure the ebb and flow of emphasis that carries Foucault from relations of domination to power. This 'is a volume that might ... go far in clarifying many of those aspects of Foucault's mode of expression and thought that have been lost or obscured, if not within single translations, then often enough between them' (xlv), but it does not render originals indispensable.

Volume One marks the promise of a series of texts that contain significant pieces from Foucault's thinking outside his books. The editors deserve credit for their index, without which the text would be an excellent read but a scholarly albatross. They have brilliantly selected, if somewhat confusingly presented and inadequately introduced, key texts in Foucault's thinking throughout the last fifteen years of his life. They have made available in English a volume that encourages its reader to make sense of Foucault's rethinking of ethics, indeed, to recognize that the significance of Foucault to the history of philosophy may in fact turn out to be his remedying of post-modern subjectivism by means of a carefully thought ethical self, whose conditions are freedom, truth and pleasure.

P. Glazebrook

Colgate University

Shaun Gallagher, ed.

Hegel, History, and Interpretation.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1997. Pp. 257.

US\$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3881-1);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3382-X).

The influence of Hegel's work on contemporary hermeneutics is substantial. The nature of historical truth, the limits of reason, intersubjectivity, the historical contingency of truth, and the possibility of critical theory are problematics traceable to him. Although the recognition of Hegel's importance to hermeneutics and the philosophy of history is not new — having been acknowledged by such hermeneutists as Croce, Dilthey, Heidegger, Foucault, Ricoeur, Gadamer, and Habermas among others — there is a dearth of anthologies that capture the diversity of contemporary assessments of Hegel's impact on hermeneutics. *Hegel, History, and Hermeneutics* fills that gap, drawing on well-known scholars like Harris, Caputo, and Desmond and making room for a few carefully researched reflections by scholars new to the field like Walter Lammi and Michael Prosch.

The title suggests equal billing for interpretation and philosophy of history, but the essay count favors the former. Nonetheless, the essays that do address historical consciousness and critical theory are among the most original in the book. For example, in 'Recollection, Forgetting, and the Hermeneutics of History: Meditations on a Theme from Hegel', Lucas draws out the notion of temporality developed by Heidegger and extended in Gadamer's concept of *Wirkungsgeschichte* into an original image of the immediacy of the people and events of the past that melts the boundaries of our common sense of time.

The editor's contribution goes further than Lucas in exploring unexamined possibilities in Hegel, and makes genuine progress in dislodging critical theory from the utopian grip of Habermas. Gallagher does this by bringing diverse thinkers into a dialogue with each other — in this case Hegel, Foucault, and Habermas — and creating a new theory of critical hermeneutics out of their conversation which follows Foucault's resistance to universalization in favor of a more immediate, local critical inquiry.

Despite such affirmative assessments of Hegel's project, this anthology is no paean to Hegelian philosophy. The editor has successfully balanced essays by such Hegel friends like H.S. Harris and Tom Rockmore with critics like Susan Armstrong and Robert Dostal. The essays frequently intersect on key issues, and one leaves the book with the sense of having witnessed a protracted dialogue. Harris, for example, creates a plausible defense of Hegel's argument for the rationality of history by focusing on the way in which thought is actualized in experience, whereas Dostal writes an equally plausible critique of this claim by developing an interpretation of Hegel's rationality that cannot accommodate actual experience.

Such contrasts of views are important, but equally important are voices that stand alone, and Gallagher's anthology makes room for those as well. Armstrong, for example, writes a well-documented feminist critique of both Hegel and Kierkegaard in which she acknowledges the contribution of each philosopher, but takes each to task for a misogyny that runs deeply through their conceptions of reason, and casts doubt on the possibility of leaving either philosopher intact after the gender prejudices have been expunged.

Some of the voices are stronger than others. Although Caputo's essay is characteristically witty and engaging, it sings praises of Derrida that have begun to sound a little flat. His essay, 'Firing the Steel of Hermeneutics: Hegelianized versus Radical Hermeneutics', is a repackaging of ideas effectively developed in *Radical Hermeneutics* and *Against Ethics*. In this latest rendition, Caputo has yet to work out the damaging implications of the admittedly parasitic character of deconstruction. If, however, one is not familiar with Caputo's theory of radical hermeneutics, this essay serves as a fine introduction.

Finally, Gallagher's anthology introduces emerging new strands of inquiry into Hegel and interpretation. Michael Prosch develops a thoughtful interpretation of Hegel's concept of the *Korporation* in the *Philosophy of Right*. By distinguishing it from a mere economic unit and brining out its ethical role within civil society, Prosch offers an engaging lens through which to critique civil society. Philip Grier also opens a new window on Hegelian studies through his introduction to the commentary of a practically unknown but original Hegelian scholar of the early part of this century, Ivan Aleksandrovich Il'in. Largely through historical misfortune — Il'in's work was first published just before the Russian Civil War began, and reissued shortly after the Second World War concluded — the work of this Hegelian has been overlooked. Yet if Grier's sampling of Il'in's reflections on the speculative concrete is representative of the Russian's work, Il'in seems likely to finally take his place among the top tier of Hegelian commentators.

One can hardly imagine an anthology of essays on Hegel and interpretation that would better maintain the balance between breadth of perspectives and coherence. Although there are other scholars whose work one would like to see included — Stanley Rosen comes to mind — Gallagher's selection is difficult to argue with, and his introduction serves as an essay in its own right on contemporary reflections of Hegel, history, and interpretation.

Robert Makus

University of San Francisco

M.K. Gandhi

Hind Swaraj and Other Writings.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. lxxv + 208.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-57405-6);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-57431-5).

There is no doubt that *Hind Swaraj* (often translated as 'Indian Home Rule') was an important book. It was seized by the British in India, and puts forward a strong case for India to be given the responsibility for itself. As an aside we may also note that it is the only one of his Gujarati works that Gandhi translated into English himself (into the 1910 edition given here). The question that needs to be addressed here is whether or not it is still an important book, beyond its undoubted historical interest. To be frank it is unclear whether there is much in the book, and its appeal for the spiritual to pervade the political, that can be applied to contemporary Indian politics (although some might say that the ideas within *Hind Swaraj* would benefit India's current leaders).

Although this is a limitation, it is not a flaw. The book is deeply embedded in the time of its composition, and in a sense this is a virtue. The reader gets a vibrant feel for the times and the debates then raging. The format of *Hind Swaraj* adds to this feel. The book consists of a debate between a fictional reader and editor, the editor being cast as one proposing *Swaraj* to a sceptical, but generally sympathetic, reader. Overall this approach is clearly successful. It makes the text easy to read, and one can get a great deal from the work with no prior knowledge of Indian politics or the history of the period.

One feature of Gandhi's thought that may strike readers new to his writings is his antipathy to certain elements of modern living. He writes that 'the lawyers have enslaved India' (58), and, although this is mainly through a concern that it ignores the spiritual health of its recipients, tries to demonstrate of medical profession that: 'there is no real service of humanity in the profession, and that it is injurious to mankind' (65).

Gandhi is unambiguous in his distaste for the march of technology. Talking of a visit to a European town he writes: 'I cannot recall a single good point in connection with machinery' (110), when questioned on the irony that his tirade against machinery is to be printed by that very means, Gandhi invokes the notion that 'sometimes poison is used to kill poison' (111). Furthermore, he does not wish only to halt the development of industry and technology in India, but goes further: 'It is necessary to realise that machinery is bad. We shall then be able gradually to do away with it' (111).

However, as throughout the book, we should be wary of placing an obvious interpretation on Gandhi's words. Parel's introduction makes clear the ambiguity Gandhi expresses towards his dislikes. They stand in the way of his vision of India, and it is this that concerns him most. He does not wish to drag India back into some Dark Age, but forward into one made brighter not by electricity but by spiritual illumination.

This new edition of *Hind Swaraj* boasts not only the text itself, but also a long and detailed introduction by A.J. Parel. This is a comprehensive and useful addition. This introduction gives essential background details, and draws in many ideas and facts that may change the reader's perception of passages in the book. While some might feel that the introduction fails to take Gandhi to task on a number of points, there is no doubt that it will assist and deepen any reading of the text, as do the extensive footnotes throughout the text.

The text of *Hind Swaraj* itself is followed by a collection of relevant and fascinating material. These supplementary writings include letters, speeches, a history of the text, a glossary, a brief biography of Gandhi in the form of a list of the principal events in his life and a set of biographical synopses. It is arguable that these make the more engaging reading, the letters in particular. The exchanges with Nehru, Tolstoy, and others are fascinating, and his speeches clarify many points found in the original text.

Overall, this is necessary reading for any student of Indian politics. Beyond this many may find in it a deeper insight into the thinking of one of the most influential and iconic figures of the first half of the twentieth century.

David Webster
University of Sunderland

Robert E. Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds.
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology.
Pp. x + 648.
US\$79.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-55786-841-7);
US\$34.95 (paper: ISBN 1-55786-842-5).

Anthologies used to be collections of the very best writings, with no further aim than simply to present the best. More recently they have become collections of representative writings, designed as useful course textbooks. What is this volume? According to its editors it contains 'canonical texts in contemporary political philosophy', although, they hasten to add, only some of them. Given the vitality and volume of contemporary political philosophizing, it would be churlish to complain about omissions. But the converse complaint can be made: is everything here really indispensable? The cover boasts that 'the book sets works in politics, law and economics alongside more ordinarily [sic!] philosophical texts'. Given this proclaimed diversity, one

naturally expects that the editors will provide introductions locating the pieces in relation to each other and providing a route through the selections. No such luck! Obviously the editors think that the principles underlying their selection are self-evident. Those who need further enlightenment are referred to the editors' earlier *Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (Blackwell 1993). Not one word of explanation concerning their principles of selection is contained in the present volume. I regard this as an outrageous way to present an anthology (assuming that it purports to be more than an idiosyncratic collection of favourite pieces).

The book contains 38 articles (or book extracts) gathered into seven sections: State and Society, Democracy, Justice, Rights, Liberty, Equality, and Oppression. Each section is 70-100 pages long.

Part I, State and Society, contains: Quentin Skinner, 'The State', David Gauthier, 'The Social Contract as Ideology', Carol Pateman, 'The Fraternal Social Contract', Claus Offe and Volker Ronge, 'Theses on the Theory of the State', Charles Taylor, 'Invoking Civil Society', and David Held, 'Democracy: From City-States to a Cosmopolitan Order?' This is a badly organized section, and only the pieces by Gauthier, Pateman, and Taylor are of serious philosophical interest.

Part II, Democracy, opens with a brief piece of Habermas, 'The Public Sphere', and continues with Robert A. Dahl, 'Procedural Democracy', Jon Elster, 'The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory', Joshua Cohen, 'Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy', Cass Sunstein, 'Preferences and Politics', and Anne Phillips, 'Dealing with Difference: A Politics of Ideas or a Politics of Presence?' The pieces by Habermas, Elster, Cohen, and Sunstein are certainly worth having.

Part III, Justice, contains standard pieces by John Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness' and 'The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus', Robert Nozick, 'Distributive Justice', and Michael Sandel, 'The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self', plus Iris Marion Young, 'Politics and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship'. This is a useful section, though the latter piece does not fit in particularly well with the others.

Part IV, Rights, starts with a long and tedious piece by T.H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', and continues at a much higher level with H.L.A. Hart, 'Are There Any Natural Rights?', Ronald Dworkin, 'Taking Rights Seriously', Henry Shue, 'Basic Rights', Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', and Will Kymlicka, 'Justice and Minority Rights'. These are good pieces, but it is unclear how they are supposed to relate to each other: the Hart and Thomson articles stand apart from the rest.

Part V, Liberty, is a well-focussed section, containing Isaiah Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', Charles Taylor, 'What's Wrong with Negative Liberty?', G.A. Cohen, 'The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom', and Jeremy Waldron, 'Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom'.

Part VI, Equality, opens with Bernard Williams' classic 'The Idea of Equality', and continues with Amartya Sen, 'Equality of What?', Michael

Walzer, 'Complex Equality', Martha Minow, 'Justice Engendered', and Brian Barry, 'Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective'. These are good pieces, but highlight the editors' arbitrary classifications. The last three pieces should really be in Part III.

Part VII, Oppression, is an odd mishmash. It opens with a brief summary by Michel Foucault of the Foucaultian project, 'Power, Right, Truth', and ends with a conceptual and ideological exploration of the notion of 'welfare dependency' by Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon. In between there is a piece by John Roemer on the definition of exploitation; also three articles — Peter Jones on 'Bearing the Consequences of Belief', Richard Wasserstrom on 'Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment', and Jean Bethke Elshtain on the failures of Suffragism in 'Moral Woman and Immoral Man' — which belong in Part VI.

Obviously, this collection contains some good articles (25 out of 38 at a conservative count); but it would not work as a philosophy textbook because it contains too much political science and not enough philosophical disputation. It is also far too heavy and the print is far too small. Readers may be interested to know that the publisher Blackwell leads the list of copyright holders with no fewer than 9 out of 38 (nearly 25%).

Mark Thornton

University of Toronto

Paul E. Griffiths

What Emotions Really Are.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1997.

Pp. xi + 286.

US\$27.50. ISBN 0-226-30871-5.

Emotions 'overstep a threshold of messiness beyond which even the most masochistic of theoreticians tend to lose heart' (Ronald De Sousa, *Emotions*, in Samuel Guttenplan, ed. *A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind* [Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1994], 270). Some may conclude with Griffiths that 'as far as understanding ourselves is concerned the concept of emotion ... can only be a hindrance' (247). On the way to this verdict, Griffiths covers a lot of ground, defending Darwin, taking evolutionary psychologists to task for insouciance about testability, identifying an interesting sense in which emotions so-called might be 'social constructions' and extracting a moral for psychologists from the practice of biologists — 'Forget functionalism; homol-

ogy is where it's happening.' Whether or not one is persuaded, *What Emotions Really Are* will provoke thought.

Griffiths champions a methodology drawn from recent philosophy of mind and language. Knowing what emotions really are is knowing to what (if anything) terms like 'emotion', 'anger' and 'fear' refer, a question to be settled by empirical research rather than linguistic intuition. (Conceptual analysis of, e.g., 'love' or 'desire' is like 'studying female sexuality by reading pornography' [201].) Ordinary emotion words belong to a tacit 'folk psychology', hence, are putative natural kind terms, responsible for picking out categories that support induction by virtue of clustering of properties among their members. In particular, Griffiths endorses Boyd and Keil's causal homeostasis account, according to which such reliable correlations are themselves explained by the causal powers of unobvious 'theoretical' properties. 'The extension of a concept,' Griffiths tells us, 'is determined by our best current theory of the causal homeostatic mechanism that guarantees the projectability of the category to which it refers. ... If there is no such mechanism, then the concept fails to refer to a natural kind and should be discarded for the purposes of explanation and induction' (246).

According to Griffiths, 'emotion' is such a failed natural kind term. True enough, Ekman and others have identified a set of 'complex, coordinated, and automated responses' (97) whose salient features have a common evolutionary explanation and whose 'phenomenologically compelling, occurrent instances ... act as a paradigm for the folk-psychological conception of emotion' (99). However, the 'affect programs' — surprise, fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy and (possibly) contempt — fail to line up, either individually or collectively, with what English speakers call 'emotions'. Affect state anger, for example, includes only a subset of cases to which 'anger' might ordinarily be applied; guilt, envy, nostalgia and *amae* elude affect program categories altogether.

Griffiths therefore nominates a second category. It includes a range of flexible, nonmodularized responses that are distinguished by substantial dependence on cognitive processes but nevertheless do not result from means-end reasoning. Like affect programs, but for very different reasons, these states appear more like passions undergone than actions undertaken. Griffiths is frankly speculative about the shared nature of such 'higher cognitive emotions.' He is sympathetic to Frank's suggestion that some 'social' emotions might be explained in terms of selective advantage — the capacity to signal a disposition to exact costly vengeance might, for example, inhibit exploitation — and unreservedly praises Oyama's Developmental Systems Theory for clarifying 'the heterogeneous construction of emotions' (132). At best, Griffiths believes, 'emotion' achieves partial reference to each of two distinct kinds. '[N]o one expects discoveries about the fear affect program to apply to responses to danger mediated by higher cognition' (242). He is, however, optimistic that scientific psychology could discover dependable generalizations within each category were psychologists to adopt the historical-adaptive approach pioneered in biology by cladistic taxonomists.

Finally, Griffiths takes up a mixed bag of residual cases in which individuals enact one or another socially negotiable pattern for the sake of a socially mediated benefit, a benefit available only if the performance is misconstrued as an uncontrollable reaction. Such 'disclaimed actions,' Griffiths tells us, are 'mythical emotions,' having nothing more in common with members of the previous two categories than a fake Vermeer has in common with a genuine one.

Readers so disposed may, of course, find bones to pick. For one thing, current though they may be, the contents of Griffiths's tool kit are by no means uncontroversial. He himself acknowledges, for example, that doctrine on natural kinds is, to say the least, unsettled. The existence of a theory of reference fit for eliminativist use is no less in dispute (Stephen Stich, *Deconstructing the Mind* [New York: Oxford University Press 1996]). Even granting his choice of background theory, Griffiths's proposal that 'the theory of natural kinds finds its real home as part of the psychology of concepts ...' (6) is problematic. To welcome 'natural kind concept' as a theoretical term in psychology is, on Griffiths's own account, to wager that it picks out a category held together by a shared nature. What could that nature be but the common ability of its members to achieve epistemic access to important aspects of the world (Richard Boyd, 'Metaphor and theory change: What is "metaphor" a metaphor for?', in Andrew Ortony ed., *Metaphor and Thought* [New York: Cambridge University Press 1979])? But this sits oddly with Griffiths's skepticism about the utility to psychological science of categories based on function rather than lineage. I cannot resist an exegetical quibble as well. Griffiths says that Plutchik's research methodology is 'based on the assumption that ordinary English speakers already have a correct theory of emotion!' (75). Plutchik says: '[T]he identification and meaning of emotion concepts should not depend entirely on naive judgments, but should, as in other sciences, depend upon their place within a theory' (*The Psychology and Biology of Emotion* [New York: Harper Collins 1994], 78). Plutchik's theory may be mistaken but I doubt that he is naively engaging in 'the psychologist's equivalent of conceptual analysis' (74). Other readers will undoubtedly find other places to dig in their heels; their interest will bear witness to the weight of Griffiths's work.

Carol Slater

(Department of Psychology)

Alma College

Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed.

The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer.

Toronto, ON: Scholarly Book Services; Lasalle, IL: Open Court Publishing 1997. Pp. 619.

Cdn\$84.50: US\$59.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9341-8);

Cdn\$46.50: US\$32.95

(paper: ISBN 0-8126-9342-6).

This volume is the twenty-fourth in Open Court's Library of Living Philosophers, a series devoted to ending, in Schiller's words, 'the interminable controversies which fill the histories of philosophy' by 'asking the living philosophers a few searching questions.' Presenting the philosophers' replies along with the questions addressed to them, editor Lewis Hahn hopes, will help us discover 'what they really mean' or at least 'produce far greater clarity of understanding and more fruitful philosophizing than might otherwise be had.'

If this is its general purpose, *The Philosophy of H-G. Gadamer* strikes one as a particularly ironic and self-subversive venture, since no one has been more outspoken than Gadamer in rejecting the *mens auctoris* as the standard of interpretive correctness, no one more emphatic in denying that the goal of philosophy is to terminate controversy, or the end of interpretation is to end interpretation with the discovery of the philosopher's (or anyone's) 'real meaning.' Vindicating Gadamer, in fact, the conclusion which this volume renders painfully evident is just the opposite of the one it promises: whatever Gadamer 'really means' will not be discovered by asking him, because (though he said a great deal, and meant even more) he did not in fact 'really mean' anything at all.

Predictably, then, anyone who approaches this volume looking for searching questions, definitive answers, and 'greater clarity of understanding' is bound to be disappointed. *The Philosophy of H-G. Gadamer* is a collection of statements, more than questions, and sometimes uninformed statements. A few of the contributors, as Gadamer remarks, 'really do not know what to make of [his] work' (64). And Gadamer's own responses (not answers) are sometimes equally nonplussed: 'I cannot do anything but describe my own obstacles to understanding what is said here,' he writes concerning Carl Page's essay (385); similarly, concerning Wyatt Aiken's, he writes, 'It is not easy for me to grasp the real point of this contribution' (420). Then, too, Gadamer has little to say about many of the best informed contributors, who 'have been close to [his] thought for a long time' (64). Of Richard Palmer, Gadamer tersely observes merely 'how closely he follows my thoughts' (548). Even where Gadamer both understands, and is understood by, the contributors, no exchange occurs in this volume that compares in depth and significance to the Gadamer-Habermas debate. They are more reminiscent of the non-encounter between Gadamer and Derrida.

The twenty-nine essays themselves, ranging in length from thirty pages to three, are printed in no discernible order and provide no complete or even systematic coverage of the major issues raised by Gadamer's philosophy. In quality, they follow the roller coaster trajectory typical of most collections. At the nadir stands Robin May Schott's 'Gender, Nazism, and Hermeneutics' — which is accurately self-described as the 'ranting of a latter-day American feminist, tasteless and out of place' (502). Schott is one of those critics who engages in biting exposé and strikes a blow for social justice by inserting an indignant '(sic!)' after Gadamer's masculine pronouns. Gadamer's response is more generous than my own: 'I can only be sorry for Ms. Robin May Schott who wasted her time' (508). Hahn should have known better.

Among the most thoughtful and thought provoking contributions are the essays by Karl-Otto Apel, Roderick Chisolm, Jean Grondin, Stanley Rosen, and Gary Madison. Especially noteworthy also is Donald Verene's comment on Gadamer's Vico interpretation. Verene alleges that Gadamer misunderstood Vico and therefore misconceived him as a hermeneuticist; Gadamer responds that Verene seems not to understand hermeneutics if he conceives it so narrowly as to exclude Vico. One would have hoped for more from Donald Davidson's essay. Concentrating on Plato's *Philebus*, as did Gadamer in *Plato's Dialectical Ethics*, Davidson does not arrive until his last few pages at the dialogical premises that inform Gadamer's hermeneutics and his own agreements and disagreements with them. It would have been extremely interesting to have Davidson's intensive thoughts on these issues, because the two thinkers come from distant philosophical traditions and yet (as David Hoy shows in his valuable contribution) Gadamer and Davidson are surprisingly close on charitable interpretation and related matters. Between them the conditions were right for a real dialogue, and the fact that it does not occur suggests once again how rare and difficult are the genuine philosophical conversations which this series exists to promote.

The whole group of contributions and replies is bracketed by Gadamer's autobiographical 'Reflections on My Philosophical Journey' that prefaces the volume and Palmer's bibliography that closes it. Gadamer's retrospections remain just as fascinating as they were in the earlier publications from which they are here patched together. Brief and therefore tantalizingly elliptical, this fragment makes us wish for much more, and encourages us to look forward to the publication of Jean Grondin's definitive biography, just completed at the time of this writing. Palmer's bibliography is adequate for the purposes of anyone using the present volume as a Gadamer handbook, but it does not compare to Etsuro Makita's exhaustive and continuously updated *Gadamer-Bibliographie* (Lang, 1995).

Joel Weinsheimer

(Department of English)

University of Minnesota

Susan J. Hekman, ed.

Feminist Interpretations of Michel Foucault.

University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State

University Press 1996. Pp. ix + 320.

US\$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01584-5);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01585-3).

This book collects twelve essays to assess critically what the work of Michel Foucault offers feminism. It is divided into four parts. Part One asks, Is there a Foucauldian feminism? Fraser surveys three ways to read Foucault's critique of humanism, none of which she finds persuasive. Hartsock criticizes that Foucault, recognizing no omnipotent knower, opts for the impotent critic. She asserts rather feminist standpoint theory: marginalization brings knowledge, however partial. These papers do not make clear that there is a Foucauldian feminism. Rather, they articulate feminist objections to wrong-headed readings of Foucault.

Part Two raises questions of body. Butler and McCallum salvage Foucault. Butler objects to Foucault's historical analysis that we did not always have a sex, meaning that sex as identity 'surpasses and displaces death' (63) in the age when epidemics are over. She argues that medico-juridical responses to AIDS dominate homosexuals technologically. The conceptual tools Foucault makes available work for her, even if he was wrong about sex as post-epidemic. Likewise, McCallum looks to redeem Foucault even further. Her claim that 'there is a deeply challenging and provocative use of gender that Foucault puts to work' (83) remains unconvincing. Arguing that gender is for Foucault the essence of sexuality (85) and 'still too strategically effective' (96) a binary category to give up, seems apologist if not dishonest. Foucault's deliberate gender-blindness is glaringly non-trivial and cannot be absolved.

Alcoff and Haber cannibalize Foucault for method and conceptual tools. Alcoff studies the politics of pedophilia in an informative and well thought-through account of the ethics and issues of adult-child sex that treads carefully between 'sexual libertarians', including Foucault, and 'advocates for child victims' (119) characterized as paternalistic, homophobic, rightist, and/or sexually repressed. She rejects Foucault's pro-pedophilia, but appropriates method, initiating a 'normative account of sexual practices ... [beginning] with an analysis of the modes of subjectivation produced by various configurations of pleasure, power, and discourse' (133). Neither defending nor condemning Foucault, Alcoff's is an exemplary critical reading that uses his work constructively.

Haber seeks to subvert the hegemony of phallogocentric desire through the muscled woman's body. She warns of the danger of appropriation of this body to male desire. Against her worries, however, increased diversity of body-images and the incorporation of strength into female beauty are politically progressive moves. Haber's applied Foucault is well worth reading.

Part Three tackles identity. Sawicki writes a 'response to those critics troubled by Foucault's positions on the humanist subject and the possibilities of social transformation' (170). She argues that a tension between resistance and panoptical self-subjugation is worked out in later texts. Despite androcentric gender-blindness, Foucault makes available to feminists 'useful tools for struggle' (176) and self-critique. Alcoff and Haber are already working proof of Sawicki's insights.

Simons applies Foucauldian analysis to motherhood. He recognizes that mothers empower rather than dominate children, and argues for 'a subversive performance of motherhood that disrupts ... the maternal matrix' (181) as Butler's strategy of parodic performance disrupts gender identity. His model is 'caring adult relations of friendship' (205) in a Foucauldian-feminist alliance that transforms both motherhood and patriarchy.

Deveaux' historical overview of three waves (surveillance and bio-power; the agonistic model of power; and sexual identity and regimes of truth/power) of American feminist reception of Foucault suggests that his work is inadequate to feminists throughout. The first obscures women's struggles against coercion (219, 230); the second provides no conceptual tools to understand empowerment (224, 231); the third fails on solidarity (226, 230) as it 'desexes' the political struggle (228) and is a vague vision of resistance (229, 231). Yet perhaps Deveaux must acknowledge that Foucault only falls short because feminism has advanced so far on ground he opened up.

Part Four treats politics. Lloyd argues that Foucault's ethics 'offers a way of rethinking the politics-subject relationship' (243). His politics grow out of a destabilizing and unfixing of identity that can productively resist the category 'woman'. A discursively constituted self is politically strong for feminists. Alternatively, Allen's intensive analysis argues that, although Foucault has tools to offer feminists at the microlevel of individuals' relations of power, his account is 'insufficiently structural' (280) to help at the macrolevel of the 'larger structures of domination that make up the context within which a particular power relation is able to emerge' (267). Yet Aladjem calls Foucault 'a useful companion to the feminist critic of liberalism and modernity' (296).

What does Foucault's work offer feminism? Several writers agree that Foucault provides conceptual tools and strategies. Yet almost all are wary and agree further that there are limits to the effectiveness of both for feminism. Fraser and Hartsock show what Foucault could learn from feminists. Butler, Alcoff and Haber uncover and delimit his significance on power and the body, while McCallum inverts his account of sexuality to gender. Sawicki and Simons use him well on identity; Deveaux argues he is inadequate. Lloyd and Aladjem find him significant for feminist politics. Allen argues he fails feminists' political needs. The application of his practical analytic by Alcoff to pedophilia, Haber to bodybuilding, and Simons to motherhood, are so successful that perhaps this kind of work is feminism's most promising direction of appropriation of Foucault. This volume certainly demonstrates that although Foucault is no ally, his methodological strategies

and his account of power and domination, especially its bodily disciplines, are monumentally insightful if not indispensable to feminism.

P. Glazebrook

Colgate University

Paul Helm

Faith and Understanding.

Reason and Religion Series.

Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. Eerdmanns 1997.

Pp. viii + 212.

US\$26.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8028-4451-0).

One strength of Paul Helm's new book is that it combines the encouragement of readers to form fresh thoughts about theism while keeping them rooted in good, relevant texts from the history of ideas. He covers some leitmotifs in Western culture by making it clear how challenging certain issues and thinkers remain over many centuries — and how nicely much earlier questions may be linked with modern ones. He writes as a convinced Christian, speaking for notions of Faith Seeking Understanding held from Augustine and Anselm to Nicholas Woltherdorff and Alvin Plantinga.

For grasping some major issues concerning theism, this work should prove helpfully illuminating to agnostics and atheists, as well as to Helm's fellow believers. Other figures brought under scrutiny include: Aquinas, John Calvin, Locke, Jonathan Edwards, Karl Barth, S. Hawking (on creation), N. Kretzmann, N. Malcolm, D. Hoitenga, D.Z. Phillips and R. Swinburne. Helm shows a keen interest in epistemology, metaphysics and linguistic analysis, as well as in religion and history.

I've gladly paid this much due tribute to a friend and former colleague — with a notable mastery of texts and a Chair at the University of London (King's College). I now risk making a fool of myself by suggesting some ways in which *Faith and Understanding* might be altered to become a still better book.

First, there are arguments that Helm nicely chastises in commenting on passages of Phillips' alleged Wittgenstein. That is, about the *incommensurability* of the 'realities' addressed by radically different language games. Helm is gentler with Norman Malcolm's ways of articulating his alleged Wittgenstein, but cautions us lightly against Malcolm's fideistic slippery slope. I mean the one inclined toward too much faith in the incommensurability of 'realities' adduced by science and religion. Here Helm is largely sound

and in part enlightening. But only in part. Take some epistemic terms that he likes to try clarifying, such as 'believe', 'know', 'explain', 'take on faith', 'interpret', 'justify' ... The quasi-Wittgensteinian approach of, say, Phillips, seems to treat '*real*', first used in 'God is real' and second in 'war is real', as examples of all by *homonymous* predication.

But quite possibly what Helm sometimes tells us ('willy-nilly') is to reject the option of stark *homonymy* in favour of attributing something like full or virtual *synonymy* to 'real', etc., in earthly and godly lingo. Secular talk of Senator Robert Dole's *faith*, [or *hope*, or *belief*, or *trust*] in the Republican Party is frequently, not always, quite secular and straightforward in meaning. Serious talk of Dole's faith in God, as proclaimed by *this* Biblical Church, is often, not always, talk of a spiritual commitment, of a sort made possible by God's *grace* or by some other form of special inspiration or help from God. (Helm mentions 'Grace' only once and offers little linking.) Think next of 'Smith's *knowledge* of making salty potato chips' and 'St. Damian's *knowledge* of God's Will', then of 'She depends on insulin to keep going' and 'She depends on her mother's love to keep ground'. 'Depends' in the former sentences may be treated as synonymous with 'depends' in the latter. The kinds of causal things depended upon may shift a lot here without the sense of 'depend' shifting, too. But religious talk of our utter *dependence* on God often conveys further points as a matter of standard theist semantics: God made us, protects us, cares for us like his children, has *intentions* about our well-being, will be specially united with us after our death, holds us in a position of being obliged (not forced) to love Him in return and communicate with Him, etc., etc.

Helm also has some sensible things to say about uses of 'explain' and 'explanation' in theist talk. But he does not appear to drive enough of a gap between what is often meant by (a) 'the long drop in temperature explains the 'flu epidemic' or 'Fred's death explains Pam's *Weltschmerz*' and (b) 'the Resurrection explains our refusing to give up' or 'God's love and glory explain why eternal life is our goal'. The first two sentences in secular uses will tend, in great part, to be of *efficient-causal* import. The last two to be partly causal in meaning and, more importantly, *justifying*. A justifying explanation is often efficient-causal to some extent, but mainly it is employed to tell us that something gives meaning, point, value, consolation, worthy inspiration to persons whose minds are open.

If such comments are fair, then Helm needs to view terms in secular and theist use as being frequently something more like *analogous* in significance (Thomistically?) than homonymous or purely synonymous. Such a conclusion raises real, but not necessarily impossible problems for his programme of Faith Seeking Understanding. For it is not just verbs and adjectives of which 'God' is the analogical subject, as plenty of Thomists would say. It is also true that many theist uses of 'knows', 'believes', 'hopes', 'trusts', 'learns', 'remembers', etc., etc., where a sentence appears in its surface grammar to be strictly about a *finite* person, are intended to mean and taken to mean at least as much about a *Divine* agent's doings and perfections. Helm's remarks on the

religious epistemology and sense of Biblical teachings sometimes suggest a fair grasp of such analogical points, but sometimes a much more 'literalist', 'synonymist', 'quasi-Scotist', 'univocalist' interpretation that weakens his metaphysics.

Don't Helm's Augustine and, sometimes, Helm himself fail to grasp that a finite human mind needs *both* atemporal and *temporal* models of God's agency to pursue a Biblical understanding of Creation? Doesn't a finite creature need both Pluralist and Monist ontic models for a Biblical understanding of the Trinity? Note again: too large doses of univocity can spoil a theist's broth.

I sing the praises of Paul Helm's valuable book. But further elucidation and readjustment of where he consistently stands on such matters would be welcome in a second edition.

John King-Farlow

University of Alberta

Leslie Hill

Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary.

New York: Routledge 1997. Pp. 302.

Cdn\$104.95: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-09173-X);

Cdn\$34.95: US\$24.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-09174-8).

Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary is a concise intellectual biography of Maurice Blanchot, a figure whose name, Leslie Hill claims, marks the site where the most important ideas of the 19th and 20th centuries overlap, intersect, and, indeed, come to their fruition. However, 'the name Blanchot', Hill argues, 'is not a stable identity consistently present to itself ... but an empty name that coincides with its own multiplicity and endless fragmentation' (223). Nevertheless, from the controversial political journalism that Blanchot published during the 1930s, to which Hill devotes fifty thoroughly researched pages, to the sustained analyses of Levinas, Bataille, and Nietzsche in the fragmentary works of the 1970s, Blanchot's work is, as Hill understands it, consistent in its attention to the limits of coherence, that *other* night that threatens thought from the point of its own origin.

This threat to thought, which Blanchot variously refers to as the '*other* night', 'the outside', the *il y a*, and later, the neuter, renders Being *impossible*. The theme of the impossibility of Being is, accordingly, a recurrent theme in *Extreme Contemporary*. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger wrote that death was

the 'possibility of the impossibility of Dasein' because it presented Dasein with an eventuality that could not be experienced, and was therefore not a possibility to be actualised, even though it loomed before Dasein as an inevitability. In keeping with Heidegger's departure from the figure of Dasein after *Being and Time*, the impossibility that death presents becomes radicalised in Blanchot as the originary disaster to which Being is indebted.

In analysing Blanchot's novel, *Thomas the Obscure*, Hill speaks of this as the 'limitlessness beyond the limit [that] limits the limit and affirms its own necessity as an always prior demand, a demand that is thereby at odds with the law of the limit' (93). There is an implicit critique of Hegel in this notion. Contrary to Hegel's claims for the comprehensive power of *Geist*, what Blanchot calls the 'outside', and what Hill calls 'the limitlessness beyond the limit', lies (like Levinas' conception of the Other) beyond the bounds of comprehension: another limit does not rise up to limit the 'beyond' of the transgressed limit, nor is it theologized as an incomprehensible transcendence. The 'outside' beyond the limit thus recoils upon thought and becomes its abyssal and ungraspable origin, a point which as definitively destroys the unity of the present as it affirms the inescapability of death. The influence of Bataille's reading of Hegel should be clear here: thought aims at the experience of non-experience, unincorporated negativity, but this 'experience' would be precisely *not* an experience since it excludes all possibility. It would be the absolute renunciation of all experience, what Bataille called 'sovereignty'.

In Blanchot's mature thought, this pre-foundational 'refusal of all conceptual self-identity ... , an interruption of totality' (137), comes to be reconfigured as the neuter. Hill argues that the conception of the neuter signals Blanchot's final break with the Heideggerian question of Being, and his turn toward the Levinasian notion of the Other, to which Blanchot's later thought will bear a significant (if troubled) relation. Hill presents the neuter as an advance on both Derridian *différance* and the Levinasian *il y a*. The definitive account of the relationship between *différance* and the *neuter* remains to be written (as I think Hill would acknowledge) but Hill's characterisation of the political and atheological radicalisation of the *il y a* that is accomplished by the neuter decisively dispels the notion (held by some) that Blanchot has merely misunderstood Levinas. As Hill writes, 'in a remarkable shift, what throughout *Totality and Infinity* Levinas addresses under the rubric of the asymmetry between the Same and the Other is reconfigured, in Blanchot's exposition, as the double disymmetry between Self and the Other' (176). According to Hill, this challenges the verticality of the relation to the Other as 'Most High' in Levinas, and insists instead upon a doubled relation which would be at once 'beyond reciprocity' but which makes every Self into an Other. Hill argues that this reconfiguration of the relation between Self and Other both secularises and multiplies it (176). Blanchot named this ethical relation *friendship*.

Extreme Contemporary is a provocative work. It situates Blanchot as the radical heir to the multiple questions concerning totality, experience, limit,

Being and the Other which Hegel and Heidegger left in their wake, and it distinguishes him from Bataille and Levinas, his friends and close counterparts. It does justice to the subtlety and elusive quality of Blanchot's writing and stands as an invitation for further work in English on this important figure. It is compelling and essential reading, not only for those seeking an introduction to Blanchot's thought, but equally for those who already find themselves gripped by it.

Victoria I. Burke

Morton Hunt

*How Science Takes Stock: The Story of
Meta-Analysis.*

New York: Russell Sage Foundation 1997.

Pp. 256.

US\$29.95. ISBN 0-87154-389-3.

Meta-analysis is a relatively new way of synthesizing experimental results in the sciences. It involves gathering together all studies performed on a specific topic (e.g., on whether homework improves pupils' grades) and assigning numerical codes to certain aspects of the individual studies (e.g., 1 for boy pupils, 2 for girls and 3 for mixed sexes). After the studies have been coded, the meta-analyst can determine statistically whether there is an overall effect (e.g., does homework improve grades?) and whether the effects are stronger or weaker under certain circumstances (e.g., does homework help only boys or only girls?).

Most books on meta-analysis focus on the statistical methods for combining results once the coding has been completed. However, Hunt's book is aimed at a more general audience and its aim is to bring an understanding of meta-analysis to a wider range of people — notably policy makers and people in the medical profession. Because meta-analysis encompasses the whole range of studies undertaken in a given area of interest, meta-analytic results are able to give a more accurate indication of the trends in the data.

Hunt describes how meta-analysis was designed to resolve conflicting experimental findings. These conflicting findings casted doubt on the whole scientific enterprise, for science came to be seen as a self-serving enterprise that never attained any truth.

Nevertheless, many controversies arose when meta-analysis first started to take hold in the academic community. These controversies included claims

that poor quality studies could not be mixed with good quality ones and that studies in the meta-analytic database often differed from each other and thus conclusions from combining such studies were invalid. Moreover, publication bias might mean that meta-analyses would include a disproportionate number of significant studies, for more significant than non-significant studies would be published. Therefore unpublished studies with null results could outweigh the positive findings from the meta-analysis.

Hunt shows how these (and other) criticisms were overcome by meta-analysts. Throughout the book he gives many examples of meta-analytic findings that have had real consequences on policy makers and medical practitioners. He ends the book by contemplating the future of meta-analysis. His suggestions include the continuous updating of meta-analytic findings, further refinements in methodology and a move from interpolation (looking within the studies) to extrapolation (using meta-analysis to predict future research).

The book also has an appendix by Harris Cooper. The appendix is more statistically based and explains the use and interpretation of effect sizes. It also discusses how to decide whether the variance of meta-analytic results is due to sampling error (i.e., having some non-representative studies in the database) or due to the effect of individual variables within the studies.

This book is very readable and serves well as an introduction to the basic concepts of meta-analysis. It also gives some entertaining descriptions of some of the major players in the field. The list of references is particularly useful even for those who are already versed in meta-analysis. Although the book is rather obviously supported by the Russell Sage Foundation (who are mentioned a number of times within the text), it is clear that this volume fills a gap in the existing meta-analytic literature.

Fiona Steinkamp

(Department of Psychology)

University of Edinburgh

Michael Jubien

Contemporary Metaphysics.

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers 1997.

Pp. xi + 212.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-55786-858-1);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 1-55786-859-X).

A member of Blackwell's Contemporary Philosophy series, planned to provide comprehensive introductions to contemporary philosophical discourse, Jubien's book is frankly a text intended to introduce metaphysics to undergraduates, and it should be evaluated as such. But then different metaphysics teachers are likely to differ about its usefulness as a text. In a nutshell, it is a good work which many will dislike.

What everyone will like is that the style is engaging and the prose pitched at a level an intelligent and reflective but philosophically unsophisticated undergraduate will readily understand. Jubien divides the work into chapters 1-7 especially geared to introductory and general students, and chapters 8-11 more suitable to upper-level philosophy majors, with some overlap. This makes the text a flexible tool, and a work which should appeal to a wide range of students. Exercises inserted in the text consist of instructions to answer questions or develop ideas relevant to topics under discussion and provide students with opportunities and provocation to think beyond the text. The exercises are somewhat uneven in quality but likely frequently to be useful.

But teachers may disagree about the topics covered. *Contemporary Metaphysics* is as comprehensive as a modest-sized text could be without being shallow, but then some selection must be made. After an illuminating general account of the work and subject matter of metaphysics, Jubien discusses numbers and other abstract entities, identity, truth, color, causation, determinism and freedom, modalities, the nature of things, truth in fiction, and cosmology. These topics provide contexts for discussion of others, such as time, language and God. Altogether, Jubien manages to introduce much of importance in contemporary metaphysics; and Jubien's weaving together of discussions through many chapters will provide some sense of unity and systematicity in metaphysical thinking.

But those who like to guide their first-year students through the hoary old debates concerning the existence of God will be disappointed by the brevity of Jubien's treatment of the topic; most of the traditional arguments are not to be found in the book and the topic itself is merely adjunct to a discussion of certain issues in cosmology. And what is likely to shock more teachers is the near-total absence of discussion of mind-body problems. Jubien mentions in passing the difference between dualism and materialism, but he is clearly not interested in going further with it. Those who think advances in neuropsychology and artificial intelligence should renew metaphysician's interest in mind and matter and that students should and would like to know about such things will have to look elsewhere. But those of us who think theology no longer informs most of contemporary metaphysics and

who are tired, even temporarily, of mind-body debates will be refreshed by Jubien's choice of topics.

Jubien's approach, too, is likely to please some and offend others. Jubien is unabashedly realist, indeed Platonist, and that slant is apparent both in the doctrines he espouses and in the ways in which he introduces issues. Indeed the realist spirit ties together much of the book. Sometimes the arguments for realist positions or against others are hugely unsatisfying. For example, Jubien casually dismisses idealism as 'unfortunately very exotic and counterintuitive' (50) and 'implausible' (51), so that exploring its possibilities is not worth the effort required to do it. Since *Contemporary Metaphysics* is an introductory text, we might not worry overmuch about such dismissal if nothing turned on it. But shortly thereafter Jubien announces positively the existence of physical objects as a consequence of setting idealism aside, and that in turn Jubien takes as a premise in his refutation of conceptualism, a refutation which is part of the ground-clearing for Platonism. On the other hand, Jubien does a more thorough job of presenting and answering opposing positions and arguments when he discusses, e.g., nominalism, and if nominalists think there is still more to be said, they can fairly be directed to other texts, because this one is only introductory.

Unfortunately, Jubien is of no help in this regard, for in the text he names few other thinkers and those infrequently; and, since he thinks instructors more able than he to make recommendations appropriate to their courses and students, he provides no lists of related readings. Nor is there even a bibliography for the book. Still, a teacher can work around that small deficiency.

But teachers who like to have students reading sympathetic accounts of a range of positions on any given issue may still find the book too one-sided to use as the only text for a class, and may regret that Jubien does not more explicitly and fully reply to other contemporary metaphysicians.

Many realists will and many anti-realists will not like Jubien's ways of presenting issues to students. Those who think it important that students have a clear example of a unified approach in metaphysics are likely to think highly of the work, while those who think it important that students appreciate a variety of approaches or positions will prefer anthologies or course packs.

Jubien's book is a good text, but not for everyone.

Winston A. Wilkinson
Michigan State University

Immanuel Kant

Lectures on Metaphysics. Trans. and ed. Karl Americks and Steve Naragon.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. xlvii + 642.
US\$69.95. ISBN 0-521-36012-9.

Immanuel Kant

Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science with Selections from the *Critique of Pure Reason*.
Trans. and ed. Gary Hatfield.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. xlv + 188.
US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-57345-9);
US\$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-57542-7).

The new Cambridge translation of Kant has received favorable reviews as each of its volumes appeared, and there is little need for a further catalogue of its virtues. It is important, however, to recognize how these virtues, especially thoroughness and precision of scholarship, are brought to bear in the present volume. In addition to a complex system of notes throughout the careful translation (i.e., notes dealing essentially with details of the process by which the various manuscripts have been brought through several stages to the present critical edition), the reader is provided with 136 pages of complementary interpretive tools. These include: an English-German glossary; a German-English glossary; a table of Latin-German equivalents occurring in the text; a Concordance of Baumgarten's *Metaphysics* and Kant's *Metaphysics* lectures; explanatory notes (with a bibliography of Kant's works cited); a name index; and a subject index. The Translators' Introduction offers a sketch of the students whose notes are translated, the condition of the eight manuscripts involved, probable dating, etc. These lectures cover a broad range of topics which relate to different aspects of Kant's published works, and because the different versions contain significant variations on each topic, all of these tools are required and play an important role in helping us to recognize the intent and implications of passages which are at times so difficult to decipher in the works published by Kant himself.

'Metaphysics' is a deceptively simple designation for these lectures, and it is important to appreciate the complexity of the materials covered. Because Kant used Baumgarten's *Metaphysics* as the basis for his presentation, there is a standard format: Introduction, Ontology, Cosmology, Psychology — although several manuscripts do not contain the full range of topics. In the complete versions, however, the student was introduced to basic epistemological and logical issues, followed by a brief history of metaphysics before entering into the main questions of metaphysics itself. In this way, Kant set the stage for a presentation of metaphysical issues from a transcendental

standpoint. Thus ontology is presented as dealing not with the general properties of being itself, but with the a priori cognitions through which alone it is possible to know the properties of anything whatever. Similarly, cosmology is presented as dealing with the various conceptions which we are able to have of a world in general. These include a positive and a negative conception of the world, the notion of simple parts, the origin and nature of bodies, and of the structure of nature in general. But Kant ends his treatment of cosmology with a final chapter on the supernatural, and the possibility of miracles — a reminder that at times he is merely following the text and providing a contrasting commentary. Thus, when Kant turns to psychology, he begins with a rather thorough treatment of empirical psychology in spite of the fact that he explicitly excludes empirical knowledge from the domain of metaphysics. The second section, on Rational Psychology which *does* belong to metaphysics, receives a much briefer presentation.

The interaction between Kant's own thought and the material covered by the text he employs is both revealing in itself and, in a much broader sense, extremely significant. Kant is often seen as the first philosopher to adopt a vocabulary and structure in his systematic thought which virtually deny access to the untrained reader. The suggestion is that Kant is intentionally obscure and arcane where he might rather have been clear and direct. However, in these pages Kant is attempting to clarify and to critically evaluate the details of a basically scholastic system (that of Baumgarten and Wolff). This process requires Kant to relate his own terminology to Baumgarten's Latin, and to provide reasons for his own choice of terms and distinctions. These clarifications permit the reader to understand more precisely Kant's reason for choosing the vocabulary which he employs, and to appreciate the structure which characterizes his published works.

From the perspective of the historian of philosophy in the broader sense, however, what emerges from these pages is Kant's attempt to come to terms with the essential elements of traditional thought. One may argue cogently, for example, that Kant is revolutionary precisely *because* he is true to the tradition in the best sense. That is, he reaches back into the past for concepts and terminology (e.g., matter and form, ideas, transcendental, categories, etc.) in order to demonstrate the necessary implications of earlier thought which had previously been unrecognized. Baumgarten's text is perfect for this exercise because he is totally immersed in the tradition, assuming the legitimacy of the terminology employed, and the appropriateness of applying the corresponding conceptions to an extra-mental realm of entities. Kant can therefore use the context as a display-case for a critical evaluation of such assumptions, and a demonstration of the inherent limitations which the tradition necessarily imposes upon itself, and must recognize, if philosophy is to claim any legitimacy in its conclusions.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate what Kant is attempting to do is to consider specific examples. His use of essential terms will display the relation of his thought to the tradition, and at the same time will permit us to evaluate the extent to which Kant was able to succeed in his project. The key terms

are those already mentioned, and we can begin with 'transcendental'. This term had been employed by the Greeks to express the fact that certain aspects of entities extended beyond the normal set of sortal criteria (or categories) by which things might readily be divided into groups (or categorized). Such properties as being, unity, truth, goodness, etc. were recognized as belonging inherently to each entity: a necessary condition in order that it exist at all, irrespective of what kind of entity it might be. Later, as scholastic philosophers began to focus on the role played by language in our analysis of the essential features of entities, their natural tendency was to emphasize the logical function of the relevant terms employed — with the understanding that these terms designated (or acknowledged) the necessary properties of actual objects. Thus concepts and their logical relations were seen as a direct reflection of reality itself. This understanding was based upon the principle that being as such (ultimately God) is inherently intelligible, and that the human intellect, within its finite limitations, is ordered to (i.e., intended and structured for) the apprehension and recognition of that intelligibility. Within such a framework, the distinction which we would choose to draw between logic and epistemology would be considered merely a matter of emphasis, and logic would be seen as a science of the very possibility of being. But the coordination of philosophy and theology gradually faded, and the logical status of the transcendentals eroded into a somewhat less rigid conception of the manner in which the human mind must think of any object whatsoever, if it is to attain a consistent and coherent conception of it, and succeed in avoiding potential illusion. For example, J.H. Lambert's *Neues Organon* (1764) offers a method for the interpretation of appearances which he calls 'transcendental optics.' Kant's 'transcendental philosophy,' therefore, both acknowledges this tradition and gives definitive formulation to a logic (not of possibility, but) of the real: i.e., a logic/epistemology based on the principles which must govern a system of knowledge which begins from passively apprehended empirical data and is brought to synthetic unity in an experiential whole. Kant's categories, like the principles of logic itself, emerge for us as the necessary ways in which the elements of our thought must hang together if it is to attain this simultaneous unity of consciousness/unity of experience. As Kant insists, however, it would be self-deception to assume that the necessity of thought by which we are brought to a conception of reality is at the same time a necessity to which being itself must submit.

When Kant employs the terms 'matter' and 'form' within this transcendental scheme, he is intentionally calling upon the basic principles of the Aristotelian-scholastic model of philosophy. That is, he sees himself as standing in direct relationship with the earlier tradition. Matter is correlated with potency, and form is taken to be the actualization of that potency. At times Kant actually says that form gives being to a thing (*'Forma dat esse rei'*, 240); but more commonly he simply designates matter as the determinable, and form as that which determines (205, 339). 'In our soul the sensations are matter; but all our concepts and judgments are the form' (338). We are

unable to produce the matter (which we passively perceive), but we do produce the form, the manner in which the data stand in connection (338). All of these elements are to be found in scholastic philosophy and provide little basis for a revolutionary conception of Kant.

When we turn to the details of Kant's epistemology, however, it becomes clear that he is not simply repeating the scholastic tradition. When, for example, he introduces space and time as the pure subjective forms of sensibility, he clearly deviates from the tradition. The scholastic philosopher will insist that matter (as a real, rather than as a merely logical entity) must have its own inherent form in virtue of which it is capable of affecting us. And if Kant insists that he is concerned with 'matter' only as appearance, and thus as subjective phenomenon, the scholastic would still have a point to make. Within a transcendental philosophy, space and time are absolutely essential conditions for the possibility of appearances which we are able to synthesize into a unified experience. But whether space and time are necessary to the perception of matter because they are essential to the perception or essential to the matter is irrelevant to the role of these ingredients from a *purely* transcendental perspective. Kant was unable or unwilling to answer this objection when it was raised in his own time. These pages provide ample opportunity for us to consider the issue anew.

What is important about this volume, therefore, is not simply that it is an excellent scholarly contribution to the available material on Kant in English. It also provides the basis for a new perspective on his work and a new set of criteria for evaluating that work. In addition to issues such as matter and form, and their application to space and time, we also find an extremely interesting discussion of mind-body interaction; the question as to whether there is an actual world independent of our perception of it; a careful treatment of miracles — including apparently contradictory comments on whether creation is to be seen as a miracle (240, 276); and a great variety of other matters common to philosophy textbooks. In each of these areas, Kant's thought may be evaluated in terms of perspectives not encouraged by the works he himself published.

The new edition of the *Prolegomena* offered by Hatfield is an offshoot of the Cambridge series in which the *Metaphysics Lectures* appears. The translation provided 'varies slightly' (xl) from that which occurs in his contribution to the main series: *Theoretical Philosophy After 1781*. The introductory essay points out the manner in which Kant would have us understand the legitimacy of his enterprise and its accomplishments, and the way in which the reader might proceed to evaluate both. But no attempt is made to provide such an evaluation, even in the form of a sketch. One looks in vain for a consideration of particular problems, or of suggested interpretations which might obviate such problems: i.e., assertions concerning the adequacy of Kant's position in the *First Critique* or in the *Prolegomena*, or both, to meet the problems raised by his contemporary critics (e.g., Garve, Feder, or Maass).

This seems to be a difficulty inherent in such a text if it is to remain simply a text, rather than becoming a monograph in commentary. The question which the potential buyer must face, therefore, is whether the value of combined translation and notes is sufficient to warrant a purchase, or whether the availability of the full new Cambridge edition in the library for reference purposes makes the standard cheap editions adequate as texts — and this new text a luxury. Hatfield helps us to make that decision by indicating the guidelines which he has followed in the new translation (xl-xliv). Certain of his revisions of previous translations are important, such as 'sensory intuition' rather than 'sensible intuition' for *sinnliche Anschauung*, and 'cognition' rather than 'knowledge' for *Erkenntnis*. But the careful instructor would caution students about these problems in any case, and the more completely annotated full edition would always be available for reference. The contrast with the preceding volume is therefore clear. The *Lectures* could not at all be seen as a luxury.

Frederick P. Van De Pitte

University of Alberta

Matthew H. Kramer

*John Locke and the Origins of Private Property:
Philosophical explorations of individualism,
community, and equality.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. xiii + 347.

US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521-58412-4.

Matthew Kramer sets out to prove two things in this book; first, that Locke's labour justification of property appropriation fails, and second, that the basis (though not the result) of any correct Lockean theory of property will be communitarian not individualistic. Kramer's method is a detailed philosophical examination of the labour theory of property as he believes Locke advocated it. His task is neither Locke exegesis nor the history of ideas, though he claims not to have made errors in either of those areas. By 'philosophical' he means an examination of ideas, their relationships, and the validity (if any) of arguments about them. His goal is complete clarity about how ideas do in fact relate to each other; the trophy to be won is an assessment of whether Locke got it right.

In Part II, Kramer clarifies the words and concepts he will use. He sketches Hohfeld's definitions of right/duty, privilege/no right, immunity/disability and power/liability. This structure by itself has no content; he will use

it to examine property rights. He also clearly distinguishes the norms of equality and community from descriptive beliefs about equality and community; he accuses Locke of 'is/ought' errors in confusing norms and descriptions and deriving norms from descriptions. At much greater length he separates equality from both individualism and communitarianism. His claims are that equality of rights and privileges (their 'apportionment') is logically separate from the 'substance' of entitlements which tends towards either individualism or communitarianism. He argues that Locke was wrong to derive the substance of rights from equality; and that any discussion of equality when debating individualism and communitarianism befuddles the issue. Kramer is thorough and right. However, in fairness to Locke, Kramer might have highlighted more how Locke's belief in normative equality was not just a belief about the apportionment of rights; it was also a substantive moral claim that rights with certain contents were illegitimate — namely rights of one person to subdue another based on (a) divine appointment, or (b) the kind of basis which allows people (Locke thought) to subdue animals. Kramer is quite right that this has nothing to do with the apportionment of rights, with the individual versus community debate, or with hierarchies built on other bases. But it was of the essence in Locke's revolutionary rejection of the divine right of kings and of feudal rights. However, history is not the pond Kramer is fishing in, and emphasis is not error.

Kramer is now ready to tackle Locke's labour argument for the appropriation of private property. The purpose of the labour argument is to justify appropriation given that God gave to humanity in common a rich natural world that surrendered plentiful goods to people who worked hard for them, and also given that God imposed on humanity a complex set of duties or 'natural laws'. Kramer's clarification of what exactly these natural duties are and how they relate to each other takes up most of this book and is his most valuable contribution to discussion of Lockean philosophy. The key natural duties Kramer is concerned with are the duty to: (1) preserve humanity, (2) help humanity prosper by industriously maximising productivity, (3) preserve oneself, (4) preserve through charity those who cannot labour or whose labour goes amiss, (5) not let goods spoil, and finally (6) respect every individual's self-ownership. Kramer is especially good on the distinction between self-preservation and species preservation; he is poor on distinguishing species preservation from species flourishing. He argues that in the case of conflicts between duties, the primary duty in almost all circumstances is species preservation/flourishing. The exception is the duty of charity to the disabled when their preservation may hinder maximal human flourishing but not if it hinders survival.

Given these duties, what is the just distribution of goods in a state of nature? Locke defends private ownership of property; his argument, according to Kramer, starts with self-ownership, proceeds via claims of mixing one's labour with objects, to the ownership of the objects themselves. Kramer thinks this argument is invalid on the grounds that it incorrectly derives 'the ownership of one's labor-qua-effected-improvement from the ownership of

one's labor-qua-activity-or-ability-or-energy' (148-9). Kramer is right that this argument does not solve Locke's problem as Kramer defines Locke's problem, but Kramer has defined the problem in a way that it can have no solution. If the ownership of objects is part of self-ownership, there is no need for any argument; if it is not contained in the concept of self-ownership, no valid argument can derive one from the other.

Given the failure of Locke's attempt to justify private property on the basis of self-ownership, is any other derivation possible? Kramer considers attempts to derive the right of appropriation of property from the duty of self-preservation, the right of self-determination, the duty of preservation of humanity, a duty of efficiency (either Paretean or maximization), desert based on the 'pain' of labour, and desert based on the creation of useful things. He concludes that none of these arguments work. These arguments come from the literature on Locke, but Kramer discusses 'possible' arguments, seldom the arguments of specific scholars. The book has an excellent bibliography, but is not a guide to current literature on Lockean property theory.

If Locke cannot establish the right to appropriate private property, how are goods to be distributed? Kramer provides no answer, but he argues at length that the answer must be based on the primary natural duty — the preservation and flourishing of the human species. He thinks it cannot be shown that private property achieves this, but he proposes no alternative. His concern at this point is to show the precedence of species survival and flourishing over other natural duties, except, in certain cases, charity and self-preservation. This precedence is the basis of Kramer's claim that any Lockean theory of distribution will have a communitarian, not individualistic, basis. He does not argue the distribution will be communitarian in the sense of group ownership.

The first two-thirds of Kramer's book is worth reading. Any future discussion of Locke's theories of appropriation and natural laws will need to consider this minutely detailed analysis. But the last hundred pages seems to get lost in exactly when we owe charity and when we are entitled to give priority to self-preservation. And Kramer never does suggest a distribution system to replace private property which is consistent with his view of Locke's theory of natural law.

John Douglas Bishop

(Administrative Studies Program)

Trent University

Isaac Levi

The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. xiv + 258.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-57288-6);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-57601-6).

The Covenant of Reason is a collection of twelve essays on topics pertaining to being rational. The major question the book addresses is 'To what is an agent committed by her words and deeds when she follows principles of rationality?' All but two of the essays appeared previously in one form or another, and another is slated to appear elsewhere. The essays are on four topics: (1) the gulf between the demands of rationality and the capacities of deliberating agents; (2) the implications of the thesis that deliberation crowds out prediction; (3) the conditions for doubt and consensus amid disagreement; and (4) value pluralism and how to deal with dissent.

The first essay is about the function of principles of rationality in inquiry and deliberation, rather than their content. Levi argues that since our ability to satisfy the demands of principles of rationality is limited, they are not prescriptions that must be obeyed to the letter and are poorly suited for the explanation or prediction of human behavior. But the qualification 'to the letter' is important, since Levi thinks that it is a mistake to scale down the principles of rationality so that we can satisfy them. For one, humans cannot satisfy the demands of even pared-down principles of rationality. For another, that route leads to complacency. A commitment to rationality is comparable to a religious vow in that principles of rationality impose requirements we cannot meet, but to which we ought to aspire. We should seek ways to improve our performance, just as a religious person tries to be saintly, fully realizing that she will fall short. Hence the religious-sounding and yet rationalistic title *The Covenant of Reason*.

The second essay stresses that rational agency includes examining one's own beliefs, choices, and attitudes for coherence. Levi argues that insofar as someone uses principles of rationality to examine her own conclusions, those principles cannot be used to predict or explain them. This is what Levi means when he tersely writes 'deliberation crowds out prediction.'

The third essay is about the logic of full belief. Frege and Russell think our obligation to believe the laws of logic is a consequence of our duty to believe what is true. But that would make it obligatory to believe all extralogical truths. Levi proposes that our duty to believe the laws of logic derives from our commitment to standards of rational health. That will require beliefs that are consistent and closed under deductive consequence without requiring belief in the true laws of physics.

Some philosophers do not think that the logic of consistency for full belief is S5. In Levi's estimation they are so wedded to the belief that the logic of

consistency coincides with the logic of truth that they have forgotten the commonplace that consistency does not imply truth.

In the fourth essay Levi maintains several theses: (1) the extensive-normal form equivalence assumption is untenable; (2) Hammond's version of consequentialism should be rejected; (3) some other forms of consequentialism escape Levi's criticism of Hammond's; (4) consistency is a 'synchronic' property of beliefs at a given time; and (5) there are no principles of 'dichronic' rationality specifying conditions for beliefs, values, and decisions over time.

In essay five Levi takes on Aumann's (1987) claim that Bayes rational players must attain a correlated equilibrium. Aumann's argument is a reply to Kadane and Larkey's (1982 & 1983) papers. Levi argues that Bayes rational decisions only sometimes lead to equilibrium because there is no norm of Bayes rationality that recommends how someone should make probability judgments about the choices of other players. (115)

In the sixth essay Levi maintains that the logic of probability and value judgments does have room for indeterminacy, contrary to Ramsey. Levi interprets indeterminacy in probability and value judgments as doubt or suspense with respect to probability or value.

The seventh essay is an examination of the reaching of rational consensus when two or more agents initially differ about probability judgment. Levi contrasts his 'model' with a proposal from Lehrer and Wagner, a proposal that allegedly cannot handle the problem of relevance very well. Levi argues that his proposal fares better.

The eighth essay is, as its title states, about 'Compromising Bayesianism' in order to consider seriously the role of indeterminacy (as opposed to imprecision) in probability judgment. Levi thinks his proposal preserves the attractive features of Bayesianism while recognizing as rational forms of behavior that honest and intelligent decision makers insist are acceptable, but which strict Bayesianism implies are irrational. For Levi this is accomplished by rendering strict Bayesianism a special case of a more general point of view.

The ninth essay defends the claim that one needs to take into account more than Pareto unanimity in order to obtain a plausible account of consensus.

Levi applies his proposals to situations where individuals appear to violate the 'independence postulate' of expected utility theory. Levi thinks that the independence postulate must be satisfied and infers that value or preference is not the same as revealed preference. Levi attacks the 'dogma' that rational agents choose for the best, all things considered. For Levi there are situations in which there is no best, given the available evidence. The diversity of values creates conflicts for agents that prompt moral reflection, and agents must often make decisions before resolving them. It is wrong to suppose that conflicts are resolved by the decisions made. Rather, the choices they make are not for the best.

Essay eleven is about John Dewey's value pluralism. Levi believes that it is superior to the value pluralism of Isaiah Berlin and Bernard Williams because their theory fails to take moral inquiry seriously.

The last essay is a discussion of good reasons for taking dissent seriously. Levi notes that there is a difference between tolerating dissent while failing to take it seriously and respecting dissent by inquiring into the issues the dissenters raise. Levi thinks that the sorts of reasons that would justify a person in ceasing to take for granted what she regarded as certain parallel good reasons for taking dissent seriously.

It is good to have some of Levi's important writings collected in one convenient volume, rather than in several journals.

Peter Hutcheson

Southwest Texas State University

Knud Ejler Løgstrup

The Ethical Demand. Trans. Theodore I. Jensen (Introduction, chs. 1-12), Gary Puckering (ch. 13), Eric Watkins (Appendix).

Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1997. Pp. xxxviii + 300.
US\$22.95. ISBN 0-268-00934-1.

The Ethical Demand, written in 1957, is based upon Jesus' command to love one's neighbor, and is an ontological alternative to teleological and 'deontological' ethical theories. Løgstrup follows Friedrich Gogarten's interpretation that 'the individual's relation to God is determined wholly at the point of his relation to the neighbor' (4), and concludes that this means that the neighbor puts himself into one's power, so that 'to fail him is to fail him irreparably' (5). Løgstrup believes that this ethical demand can be described without reference to God, so long as we accept: 1) that our lives, along with capacities such as 'intelligence, speech, experience, [and] love' (116), are gifts in the sense that we did nothing to deserve them, and 2) that people depend upon and must trust one another. The demand is to act unselfishly toward those who put their trust in you. This demand is silent, radical, one-sided and unfulfillable. It is silent because it is not that which is expressed by the other person's implied or spoken wishes and expectations. Rather, we have to decide what is in the best interests of the other person. And here we have to use the utmost of our intelligence and imagination. The moral demand is not one that the other has a right to make, but is simply implied by the other's dependence on us. This is what makes the demand one-sided, as we in turn are not allowed to demand that the other be unselfish toward us.

Because of the uniqueness of each situation in which the demand is made of us, we cannot develop a general theory of the demand, but must always reflect anew on what it requires of us. Furthermore, Løgstrup warns of the dangers of following a moral theory with such zeal that the other is coerced 'for their own good.' We need to avoid carrying responsibility beyond human limits. We must not control what use the other makes of our help (26). Moreover, we should not act so as to hinder the other's understanding that his or her life is a gift (117).

Finally, the demand is in some sense unfulfillable because, while it is human nature to be selfish, the demand requires that we be selfless (166). The conflict is resolved by our taking responsibility for not fulfilling the demand to love our neighbor. We can, however, at least compromise with the demand by acting as if we love our neighbor, whatever our true motivations are. If this is done, others will not be able to tell whether we are obeying the demand or not (105), and will have to trust that we are (216).

In addition to describing the demand, Løgstrup gives a historical account of the changing views of love and of political responsibility. His view of the social norms in general is that they provide a buffer so that we can often interact with others without having to place so much trust in them. He also gives an account of what can destroy natural love (131-5) and of how we rationalize our failure to live up to the ethical demand (151-7). He points out that most of us are never in a critical situation where we must sacrifice our own lives for others, but rather live in the normal situation of not wishing the comfortable routine of our lives to be disturbed, even when we could effect some real positive change for another. 'In everyday life we cling more to our desire to be undisturbed, and more to our material and spiritual possessions, than many a person in the critical situation clings to life itself' (163).

Løgstrup also gives an account of poetry, and how, like the ethical demand, it presents reality to us in a way that cannot be captured by a mere theory or scientific description.

In relating personal responsibility to the truth of determinism Løgstrup does not deny the latter, but states that since to accept it is to see ourselves as a succession of motivational states, rather than as a whole person, we have reason to affirm ourselves as persons and take responsibility for fulfilling the ethical demand. The argument is reminiscent of Susan Wolf's 'The Importance of Free Will'.

While some may question the validity of giving the ethical demand absolute authority, this book presents an interesting new way of looking at ethics, and its account of the various ways we rationalize our failures to live up to the demand had me examining how far I fell short. It would prove interesting to compare it to accounts of 'particularist' ethics, and of the ethics of care.

Alex Boston

University of British Columbia

Dominic Lopes

Understanding Pictures.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1996. Pp. viii + 240.

Cdn\$64.50: US\$39.95. ISBN 0-19-824097-X.

In developing a theory of pictorial representation, Dominic Lopes seeks to reconcile perceptualism with what he calls the symbol theory. According to the perceptualist, pictures represent or are perceived as representing because they 'look like' their subjects. According to the symbol theory, though, pictorial representation is to be explained in terms of analogies with symbols — most especially natural languages. Lopes rightly attempts to reconcile these two positions, arguing in a short and interesting book that the two positions can be reconciled.

The reconciliation that Lopes seeks depends on 'recent advances in our understanding of perception, cognition, and language' (11). The visual mechanisms involved in object recognition possess just that sort of flexibility and dynamism, he argues, that enable us to understand how we recognize what a picture is of (Part Three). And following Gareth Evans in *The Varieties of Reference*, he argues that linguistic understanding is intimately related to the exercise of our perceptual capacities, thus furnishing a model in Part Two of the book for Lopes's own perceptual theory of pictorial symbols — or, as Lopes puts it, of 'how pictures refer.'

Since on Evans's view, our grasp of certain kinds of referring expressions depends on thinking of their referents 'on the basis of information derived from them' (106), pictures are treated by Lopes as part of an information system, and individual pictures are said to convey 'perceptual information from their subjects.' Hence, on this view, a picture refers to or 'represents an object only if it conveys information from it on the basis of which it can be identified' (107).

This, then, lies at the heart of Lopes's 'hybrid view' of pictorial representation. Following Evans, something is a picture's subject only if it is also the source of information contained in the picture. The picture's perceptual content plays an essential role in representing its subject, for it is only on the basis of its content that it is possible to identify its subject.

What is this content? In Chapter 6, Lopes makes good use of Ned Block's notion of committal in order to explain this, telling us there that a representation is 'committal' with respect to a particular property provided that it represents its subject either as having or not having that property. Using this formulation, he goes on to say that 'the totality of a picture's commitments and non-commitments comprise what I shall call the "aspect" it presents of its subject' (119). A pictorial aspect, in its turn, is thought of as 'a pattern of visual salience'.

An emphasis in this way on aspects as the bearers of visual information, marshals support for Lopes's view that pictures are highly selective (112-19) in that no picture represents all of its subject's properties (125). Such

selectivity (we learn) is partly systemic since different 'systems of representation differ from each other in the kinds of aspects they typically present' (127) — which is just to say, that the rules of representation differ systemically in ways that make it possible to convey some types of visual experience and not others. Here Lopes puts one strongly in mind of Flint Schier's natural generativity — as well as of other writers on the topic who preceded Schier. But there is no extended discussion of the differences between Lopes's position and theirs, which makes it difficult to assess the originality of his position.

Leaving this on one side, a picture is said by Lopes to be 'a representation that embodies information on the basis of which its source can be identified by a suitably equipped perceiver' (151). This enables him to introduce the notion of basic picturing (151-2). A picture, we are told, 'basically portrays' an object or scene if and only if it embodies aspectual information from it on the basis of which a suitable perceiver is able to recognize it.' A suitable perceiver for a particular picture 'is one who possesses a *suitably dynamic* recognition ability,' where the latter requires the ability to interpret pictures, an acquaintance with the appropriate system of depiction, as well as familiarity with the subject of the picture (152-3). Importantly, then, the recognition of 'aspects' is system-dependent.

Lopes does a good job of developing his theory, and relates it interestingly, although not always accurately, to other positions — especially those of Goodman, Wollheim, and to a lesser extent Peacocke, Kaplan, and Walton. He uses recent work in the philosophy of language, cognitive science and epistemology to good effect in the development of his own position, and takes considerable care to show how his theory helps resolve certain classical puzzles about pictorial representation — puzzles that any adequate theory must be able to handle.

There are difficulties, though. In part these have to do with the exposition of the philosophers he discusses, for Lopes often explains too sparingly, so that the expository passages of the book are not as accessible or as accurate as they should be. Then, too, there is the frustrating tendency to restate his position in different parts of the book in ways that are arguably different so that the reader is sometimes at a loss to know what *exactly* is being claimed.

By far the greatest difficulty that I have with this book is Lopes's attack on resemblance theories of pictorial representation. 'The fact', he writes, 'is that pictures' resemblances to their subjects are highly variable from one system to the next', so that noticing these resemblances depends importantly on the representational systems relative to which they are interpreted (150-1) and are not independent of them. Perhaps so, but it is difficult to see how his aspectual theory gets round the difficulty in ways that meet his 'independence challenge' (17). For what counts as visually salient in a picture — hence as an 'aspect' — itself depends on the system of representation in play, and so is no more independent of representation than resemblance is. What is more, since a picture will represent an object only if it conveys an

'aspect' that we can recognize in its subject, it is difficult to see how Lopes eludes a resemblance theory of representation.

David Novitz

University of Canterbury

Charles W. Mills

The Racial Contract.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1997.

Pp. xii + 171.

US\$19.95. ISBN 0-8014-3454-8.

Charles Mills achieves something rare in his book, *The Racial Contract*. He has produced an important work of philosophy that is at the same time short and accessible. Relying upon traditional, rather than hypothetical, contract theory, Mills argues that 'White supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today.' That is, most whites and most philosophers do not see racism as a political system at all. While attempting to uncover the implicit racial presuppositions of traditional social contract theory, Mills argues that we are the inheritors of an actual racial contract, global in scope, codified not by any single literal act, but by a series of acts, revolving around European conquest and its social and legal consequences. Consequently, Mills defends three broad claims: the existential claim — white supremacy is real; the conceptual claim — white supremacy is a political system; and the methodological claim — white supremacy as a political system can best be understood as a contract amongst whites.

The shape of Mills' presentation is such that it reads as an internal critique of the contract tradition and ultimately of liberalism. At one point he reminds his readers that critiques of the idealized liberal state are nothing new, citing communitarianism, anarchism, and Marxism as examples (82). His claim, though, is that the racial contract shows that we need another way of challenging the liberal state, one capable of naming it as white supremacist. The history of liberal contract theory is such that in theory and practice its commitment to equality is a lie. Real world inequality is not an accident, not an instance of flawed individuals failing to live up to their ideals. Rather the liberal social contract is grounded in the racial contract. Mills does indeed make a powerful case for this point. But is this critique supposed to stand as a complement to one or more of the above noted critiques of liberalism? Or is it to substitute for them? While not emphasizing this point, it seems that it is the latter project which Mills pursues. Communitarianism, anarchism,

and Marxism each, at least in their standard self-understandings, present themselves as alternatives to liberalism and contract theory. Mills, on the other hand, presents his work as something that 'should ... be enthusiastically welcomed by white contract theorists' (7), and claims that he 'does not see the ideals of contractarianism themselves as necessarily problematic' (129). In this way *The Racial Contract* constitutes a kind of necessary preamble to a richer, more honest, non-racist contract theory. So, while rejecting understandings of the social contract that see only failed practices that do not live up to stated ideals, Mills' own view seems to be that the ideals of contract theory are flawed, insofar as they do not live up to deeper ideals that can and ought to constitute it.

Is this the best approach? Or might Mills' insights be better situated in an alternative theoretical context? For Mills, the racial contract provides the fundamental, though unacknowledged, grounding for both the current social order as well as mainstream political theorizing. From this perspective Mills is able to make the case for a kind of blindness and superficiality at the heart of conventional contract theory. However, tensions emerge in the analysis suggesting that an alternative theoretical context might be in order. For, according to Mills' own account, the origins of the racial contract seem to lie at a different level of explanation than that which Mills generally pursues, one which relies upon factors beyond race. Mills tells us that 'the Racial Contract is calculatedly aimed at economic exploitation' (32), and further that 'the bottom line is material advantage' (33). Arguing further that race is a cultural creation linked to economic exploitation, he claims that the designation of some as non-white/subpersons arises so as to create economic advantage for whites: 'The Racial Contract constructs its signatories as much as they construct it' (78). This is all plausible. But we do run into some tension here. Rather than the racial contract being the 'metatheory' within which other ethical and political theories operate, as Mills claims, a consequence of the view seems to be that the very existence of race is an epiphenomenon of economic exploitation, suggesting at least the possibility of a different sort of metatheory. In fact the racial contract seems to be the result of a particular sort of economic exploitation. Slavery could be justified in antiquity for no other reason than it was useful. As Mills himself notes, no creation of racial subpersons was necessary. On the other hand, race was, at least in substantial ways, *created* during the time of European discovery/conquest (53-62). Why? Surely part of the answer must lie in the fact that brutal exploitation is rendered easier for those subscribing to the ideologies of equality that facilitated the beginnings of capitalism if those to be exploited are subhuman. So, race and the racial contract are linked ultimately to economic exploitation and to capitalism. This, along with the fact that the struggle against the racial contract must surely be linked with the struggle for greater economic equality suggests that a tradition like Marxism might be a more natural partner for Mills than liberal contract theory.

None of this undermines the profundity of Mills' project. In most respects Mills succeeds admirably in arguing his case for the existence of a racial

contract. That he can do this in a way that is rigorous, passionate, and accessible is an important achievement.

Michael A. Principe

Middle Tennessee State University

Jeff Mitscherling

Roman Ingarden's Ontology and Aesthetics.

Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1997.

Pp. xvi + 245.

\$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7766-0435-X);

\$28.00 (paper: ISBN 0-7766-0425-2).

In the foreword to this book, Raymond Klibansky describes it as the first comprehensive monograph on the life and philosophy of Roman Ingarden. Ingarden's philosophy is apparently a life's passion of Mitscherling; his writing conveys a sense of the importance of Ingarden's work. However, as a result of this enthusiasm, apart from remarking on Ingarden's clouded presentation of his doctrine of the supratemporality of the artwork, Mitscherling is an entirely sympathetic reader.

This monograph is primarily about Ingarden's life-long debate with Husserl, regarding the latter's doctrine that the reality of the world depends on the perceiver's interpretation, or consciousness. Mitscherling's main thesis is that previous commentators relied heavily on a misunderstanding of the issue: they took Ingarden to be criticizing Husserl as a subjective idealist — and Mitscherling makes the standard, largely mistaken use of Berkeley's name in this connection — whereas Husserl professed a version of Kant's transcendental idealism. Although much of Ingarden's criticism is on the face of it directed to a doctrine of solipsism, which Berkeley would have had no difficulty answering, a closer reading reveals that Ingarden effectively criticized transcendental idealism.

As such, Ingarden's criticism is well defended, but Mitscherling does not develop any defence that Husserl might have had, nor does he explore any alternative interpretation, such as a reading of Husserl as an absolute idealist or neo-Platonist. The main examples of Ingarden's objections covered by Mitscherling include the argument that to determine the truth of ideas, the world has to be real independently of consciousness, which Ingarden developed by suggesting that Husserl's failure to distinguish the objective reality of the world from our consciousness of it leads to the intentional object's being the only reality of the idea and the idea's only referent. This

suggests that Husserl's transcendental idealism is self-contradictory, but how much did Husserl's doctrine differ from Kant's? Mitscherling merely alludes to Ingarden's objections to a reading of Husserl as a neo-Platonist, thus avoiding a most interesting avenue of discussion. Furthermore, according to Ingarden, since physical objects have infinitely many details and the interpretation is always finite, reality must be other than the consciousness of it. However, as this whole debate so much resembles that between Kant and Hegel, Mitscherling would have done well to consider Hegel's objections to transcendental idealism and the possible rejoinder to Ingarden's criticism these objections suggest: that Ingarden, too, is giving an interpretation, and that the truth of absolute idealism is a more appropriate conclusion in this debate than Ingarden's realism.

Ingarden's ontology seems most convincing as an interpretation of art, Mitscherling goes further and develops this aspect as a further argument for Ingarden's general ontology. Mitscherling's use of Ingarden's aesthetics to analyze Joyce's 'The Dead' and Poe's 'The Raven', and his adjudication of the dispute between Gadamer and Ingarden on the objectivity of the aesthetic response, are the most interesting parts of the book. However, again one feels that Ingarden's opponent lacks an effective advocate and the verdict in favour of Ingarden is perhaps somewhat tainted. For Ingarden, the artwork has strata, or levels, of being — its physical features, symbolism, structure, and the aesthetic experience. These levels allowed Ingarden to distinguish the artwork as an objective reality with an inexhaustible potential for interpretation from the spectator's consciousness, or aesthetic response, whereas Gadamer interprets the spectator's response as constitutive of the aesthetic object. Mitscherling argues in Ingarden's defence that Gadamer's program introduces an undesirable ontological diversity, with as many artworks as the works have ways of being perceived. However, if an appropriate cultural background is needed to correctly evaluate an artwork, as Mitscherling's exposition of Ingarden suggests, then it is difficult to distinguish the appropriate evaluation of the work from a supposed objective reality at the level of the work's symbolism.

Mitscherling focuses on Ingarden's *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, and because Mitscherling's work is controversial, too, it is worth reading. Although I think the discussion could have been further developed in a number of directions, Mitscherling provokes some important philosophical debate in ontology and the philosophy of art. He spells out objections from the viewpoint of realism which are genuinely relevant to contemporary debate about the role of intentionality in perception, and he shows that Ingarden made some interesting contributions to aesthetics concerning the objectivity of the aesthetic response and the status of the artist's intention.

James Thomas
Ottawa, Ontario

Mira Morgenstern

*Rousseau and the Politics of Ambiguity:
Self, Culture, and Society.*

University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania
University Press 1996. Pp. xviii + 270.

US\$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01572);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01573-X).

Mira Morgenstern's book makes a virtue of the ambiguity that has been for so long a damning indictment of Rousseau's social and political philosophy. She believes that what is condemned in Rousseau — his confusing verbiage, his endless paradoxes, his maddening contradictions — is, in fact, an opportunity to reflect upon the present malaise of modernity: the dissonances between public and private life and the inability to experience an ennobling and transformational politics. And if this is not enough to test the limits of ambiguity, Morgenstern believes that Rousseau's methods should be seen as contributing to the feminist project of social and political reform. Morgenstern argues for a Rousseau who believed that women embody modernity's most damaging effect: inauthenticity. And it is women who can lead us out of this crisis.

Each chapter reads like a self contained defence of some aspect of Rousseau's social and political thought. It is possible, however, to split her book into three distinct parts: the first identifying the breadth and depth of inauthenticity as understood by Rousseau; the second part comprising Rousseau's approach to the solution of inauthenticity in his major works; and the final section comprising a more subtle textual interpretation, emphasizing Rousseau's literary works. It is in this final section that Morgenstern can offer the value of ambiguity in Rousseau's writing as both a feminist contribution to the difficulties with the public-private dogma of liberal political theory and a source of hope for unleashing a creative approach to overcoming our inauthentic personal and social lives.

The first chapter explains the meaning of ambiguity in the modern world through an inquiry into Rousseau's understanding of the origins and development of language, a part of his work that is rarely cited, much less systematically analyzed. For Rousseau, language reflects what Morgenstern has called the indeterminacy of life. This indeterminacy, or inability to overcome dissonances between options available to us for the purposes of achieving self happiness and social harmony, is what comprises the ambiguity of modern life. And it is this ambiguity which is exposed in the ensuing chapter, by examining Rousseau's sources of inauthenticity — love, pity and imagination. The complex affective and cognitive properties of pity and imagination, respectively, and their combined effect on one's understanding of love wreak havoc on our attempts to construct an authentic polis on the basis of affective social cohesion. Morgenstern reads Rousseau's initial attempts at articulating a solution to the effects of inauthenticity not as a failed project of emancipation, so often reflected in the conventional interpretations

of Rousseau, but as a complex description of the costs in not seeking creative, modest and sustained efforts at harmonizing our personal and social lives.

The remaining three chapters begin the work of re-interpreting Rousseau, attempting to develop the conditions necessary for merging the aspirations of private life with the requirements of public life that might reflect a love-based authentic existence. Morgenstern begins with an analysis of Rousseau's political work, an analysis that winds its way through the nature of a social contract, the act of alienation in establishing the general will and the role of the Legislator in cajoling a people to the right arrangement. The difficulties associated with creating this authentic political existence — effecting the right sort of other-regarding love, finding the right balance between passion and reason in the service of duty to one's political community, implementing the structural catalysts (the Legislator) without sacrificing the integrity of a people's identity — lead Morgenstern to reiterate the futility 'of constraining human growth to fit a preexisting notion of the ideal human relationship' (119). According to Morgenstern, Rousseau wants 'to establish the environment that will allow each person or group to maximize its own personal or political authenticity' (175-6). This environment is the family. Thus, Morgenstern argues that Rousseau's feminist persona materializes because it is women, as the 'linchpin of the family' (184), that occupy a central place in his work. It is with women, furthermore, in and through the family, that personal and political authenticity finds its best hope. Rousseau provides a feminist contribution for Morgenstern because he not only exposes the farcical nature of a public/private-dominated political theory (liberalism) through the lives of women but he also sees the incremental changes in the minutiae of everyday life as issuing from the important moral education that women can pass on to their children and spouses.

Even though Morgenstern's work is centred around such topical themes as the effects of modernity on our personal and public lives, the dominance of a bankrupt liberal public philosophy, the fragility of authenticity in the face of an ever changing world, and the place of feminist contributions to the preceding, in the end hers is a work for the specialized Rousseau scholar. Strong familiarity with Rousseau's work is a necessity. Throughout the work her general themes seem only distant problems to be commented upon after a rigorous textual reinterpretation of Rousseau is offered. Any prescriptive force that might be exerted on the modern concern with making political life co-extensive with our personal and private commitments seems drowned by the language of Rousseau's time. And though Morgenstern struggles to make Rousseau seem central to all these themes, at best he comes across simply as relevant, at worst anachronistic.

Dimitrios Panopalis

(Department of Political Science)

University of Alberta

James H. Olthuis, ed.

Knowing Other-wise: Philosophy

At The Threshold of Spirituality.

New York: Fordham University Press 1997.

Pp. xv + 242.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8232-1780-9);

US\$19.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8232-1781-7).

There is a general impression, sometimes even within academic circles, that philosophers are the enemies of faith. Despite a resurgence of spirituality in popular culture, professional philosophers express ambivalence towards the spiritual. *Knowing Other-wise* does not set out to rectify this misconception by rationalizing faith; rather the authors respond to feminist and postmodernist assertions that reason needs to be in touch with other ways of knowing. The collection of essays in *Knowing Other-wise* asks questions about philosophy, ethics, and spirituality from the limits of conceptual and theological thought.

The threshold of spirituality pertains not primarily to any particular set of religious beliefs but rather to ways of remaining open to the other. Spirituality, as Hendrick Hart explains in the first essay, inspires human responsibility and presents us with a dimension of reality beyond our immediate control. Here Hart affirms a central theme interwoven throughout these nine essays: knowing as trusting.

Love, informed by Levinas' understanding of the other, can lead us towards differences that matter. The face of the other can betray or lead to violence; however as Jeffrey Dudiak explains, this makes it a beautiful risk, one that indicates the outermost limit of theory. The authors fashion links between ethics, spirituality and epistemology; moreover, they address questions about the place of ethics in postmodern critiques. Though the authors do not explicitly state a commitment to move beyond postmodernism, the essays depart from at least one key aspect of postmodernism, namely, descriptions of the self as de-centered. James Olthuis maintains '[P]erhaps the postmodern non-self is yet another version of the adapted or "false self" which needs to be abandoned in a dark night of the soul in order that the core or "true self" may emerge from hiding...' (247).

The authors suggest that there is only one order, love, and this order requires that there is no *a priori* privileged interpretation of this gift. So, even though the authors share in the reformational or Calvinist philosophical spirit, they do not claim to have the definitive interpretation of love. This dialectic between monism and pluralism, though controversial, resonates more with the lived experience of those who respect difference without abandoning meaning and wholeness.

Another important dimension of *Knowing Other-wise* is its contribution to the emerging literature by feminist philosophers of religion who seek to reveal the dangers which result when religious meaning is subjectivized. Spirituality does not denote a private sphere removed from questions of social

justice and communal transformation. Negative theology speaks to the potential violence of conceptual language, but these authors urge us to respond with good storytelling (since silence can also do violence). These stories might lead us out of the desert to a homecoming that while susceptible to conflict, opens us to meet in the space, 'now unbound, deemed feminine outside the logic of modernity' that Julia Kristeva calls a sacred place of passage. Olthuis calls these the wild spaces of love, where we sojourn together, not to say 'no' to philosophy, but to cross philosophy's boundaries.

Knowing Other-wise is an important interdisciplinary volume that provides ways of asking questions about the role of the spiritual in philosophy by listening to the voices within feminism, postmodernism, theology, and other modalities of human experience.

Ellen Miller
York University

Michael M. Sandel
*Democracy's Discontent: America in
Search of a Public Philosophy.*
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1996. Pp. xi + 417.
US\$24.95. ISBN 0-674-19744-5.

Whether it be the hula hoop, sushi bars or a windowing graphical interface, the product that finds its right time and place will soar. For Michael Sandel's 1982 book, *Justice and the Limits of Liberalism*, the time was the aftermath of John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice*. The place was Harvard University, the venue that had not only given birth to the Rawls phenomenon but also, a couple of years later, to Robert Nozick's remarkable broadside, *Anarchy, State & Utopia*. By transforming the Cambridge duo into a trio, Sandel complemented Nozick's thrust from the libertarian right against Rawls with a critique of liberalism from the communitarian left. Constricting the heart of liberalism, Sandel contended, is its depiction of people as detached at the most fundamental moral level from the ends that move them and the causes that afford meaning to their lives. Contra liberalism (which Sandel all but identifies with Rawls), persons are not unencumbered paragons of autonomy who in their moral reflection rise above particular attachments so as to generate universal principles of justice. Rather, they take their bearings from local moral environments that determine for them the forms that the good

life can take. A community's values, then, are not posterior to general principles of the right; rather, they are what is morally basic.

Although a powerful stimulus to philosophical debate, *Justice and the Limits of Liberalism* exhibited two conspicuous lacunae. First, it was by no means obvious that Rawlsian liberalism was committed to anything like the theory of unencumbered selves that Sandel had pinned on it. No less an authority than Rawls himself protested that this was a misconstrual of the methodology of the original position, a confusion of the political with the metaphysical. Second, although Sandel had spoken at some length about the deficiencies of liberal morality, he had not supplied except in the most sketchy detail a positive communitarian alternative. The reader could well ask: Once the stultifying hand of liberal neutrality is removed from communities, what are they to do? For these and other reasons, *Democracy's Discontent* was keenly anticipated.

In one respect at least, those expectations have been disappointed. Sandel declines the opportunity to respond to Rawls's objections to the so-called liberal theory of persons. The earlier critique is presented without modification; for all one can tell here, Rawls might have put his pen down forever in 1971. Sandel does provide some particulars concerning the communitarian alternative, but these are offered in something of a roundabout manner. Following a pathologist's report on the woes of the contemporary American polity, dubbed by Sandel the 'procedural republic,' he serves up generous slices of political practice and prescription from a bygone era, aspiring thereby to distill a substitute for a politics grounded on the primacy of liberty-as-noninterference. Merely to require of citizens that they leave their fellows alone, Sandel argues, is too desiccated a notion of responsibility to sustain a vital society. Nor is it true to the country's heritage. Rather, accompanying negative liberty through every stage of American development from the Revolution up until the day before yesterday — roughly, the New Deal and its aftermath — has been a lively conception of liberty as active involvement of a vigorous citizenry in promoting conditions for the flourishing of prosperity and, more important still, virtue. Sandel does not deny the liberal credentials of this heritage, but it is, he argues, a liberalism infused through and through with republican rectitude. Indeed, in *Democracy's Discontent* it is republicanism rather than communitarianism that takes pride of place as the preferred alternative to liberalism.

What is wanting in the liberalism of the procedural republic? It is defective, maintains Sandel, both at the level of the individual and the community. The liberal self is too thin to bear the (mostly unchosen) obligations and loyalties that we recognize. Similarly, a political realm from which moral and religious argument have been banished in the name of neutrality 'cannot contain the energies of a vital democratic life. It creates a moral void that opens the way for narrow, intolerant moralisms. And it fails to cultivate the qualities of character that equip citizens to share in self-rule' (24). In the historical chapters, by far the largest component of the book, we observe a youthful America through whose civic veins coursed a moral energy, the

waning of which accounts for today's *anomie* and democratic dissatisfactions. The indicated conclusion is that restoration of citizens' faith in their national prospect will require restoration of a public philosophy in which virtue, obligation, and positive liberty return to center stage.

Sandel has done an immense amount of digging in the archives. Although his synopses radically downplay the prominence of 'don't tread on me' libertarian motifs of American political thought in favor of programs for institution- and character-building, almost anyone will learn a great deal from the wealth of material that he lucidly presents in these pages. Whether Sandel has drawn the appropriate moral from this fascinating tale is, however, much more open to question. One has to be somewhat suspicious of an author who gazes across a contemporary American political landscape in which pious invocations of 'family values' pore forth from every political quarter, where abortion rights are a perpetual bone of contention, schools and universities are battlefields on which wars of 'correctness' are waged, tobacco is reproved with a fervor once reserved for the Prince of Lies, Hollywood celebrities appear before Congressional committees to declare their devotion to the family farm or very old trees, and where that same body is given over for days at a time to declaiming and legislating against the blight of gay marriage — I say one must be suspicious of an author who then issues reports of a public square from which moral and religious concerns have been exiled. Most observers from beyond the country's borders will, I suspect, instead see in America an excess rather than deficiency of public moralism. Also questionable in Sandel's disinclination to take up seriously the liberal response that divorcing the state from particular moral and religious campaigns is not to disparage the ends sought but rather to leave their furtherance to the voluntary undertakings of a pluralistic and free people. Nowhere is such an omission more striking than in a volume purporting to reveal the meaning of the American experience. Through their churches, colleges, libraries, museums, hospitals, periodicals, mutual aid societies, philanthropies, fraternal orders, glee clubs and, yes, political advocacy organizations, Americans from Tocqueville's time to the present have lent care to character and given shape to their ideals, often with only the most minimal state involvement. It is the tradition of negative liberty rather than that of republican civic engagement that primarily feeds this efflorescence of moral energy. So even for someone who wishes to maintain the priority of the good over the right, it is by no means clear that liberalism comes off second-best to communitarian prescriptivism.

The mass of evidence accumulated in *Democracy's Discontent* makes it impossible to deny the existence of a longstanding American penchant for tinkering with political institutions so as to produce virtuous democratic souls. We are informed that for the health of the new republic Jefferson prescribed a citizenry of yeoman pastoralists; Jacksonians endorsed a regime of independent artisans and mechanics; ante-bellum apologists defended slavery as friendlier to moral character than the northern factory system; Teddy Roosevelt recommended first war and then its moral equivalents as

restoratives of American manliness. Other once-prominent personages employed the rhetoric of republican virtue to denounce wage labor, large corporations, chain stores, price discounting, immigration of swarthy European types, and so on. Sandel presents these as promontories of a proud history that has sadly been allowed to sink into desuetude. I am persuaded by a different reading, one that sees republican advocacy as populated by an engrossing series of cranks, crackpots, and, at best, well-intentioned but severely myopic would-be oracles. Despite their diversity of visions and prescriptions, they have one important trait in common: each got things wrong. Not just a little bit wrong: spectacularly wrong! Had the republic been squeezed into any of their procrustean beds, the consequences would have been crippling. Even setting aside the intrinsic value of free activity, spontaneous social evolution simply works better than top-down design exercised by a coterie of savants. It is, of course, the procedural republic's negative liberty and neutrality that erected barriers against these various republican nostrums. If this is correct, then, there is no need for critics to leap to the attack against Sandel's communitarian republicanism: his own narrative has already dealt it a mortal blow.

Loren Lomasky

Bowling Green State University

Richard Sorabji, ed.

Aristotle and After.

London: Institute of Classical Studies,
University of London 1997. Bulletin of the
Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 68.
Pp. viii + 218.

£20.00. ISBN 0-900587-79-2.

Only a few years ago, non-specialist philosophers probably regarded Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle as the chief sources of significant philosophical thought in classical antiquity. Historians of philosophy have had some recent success in correcting the deficiencies of that account. One example — close scrutiny of Hellenistic philosophy has demonstrated that Chrysippus and Epicurus, among others, have often made impressive philosophical contributions. Furthermore, ancient philosophical inquiry has been shown to be a continuous record of vigorous and subtle intellectual debate. This collection of essays, most of which are based on work originally presented in seminars at the Institute of Classical Studies at the University of London, seeks to help address some of the remaining gaps in the narrative. This volume encom-

passes a period of some 900 years beginning with Aristotle and ending with Simplicius. I shall describe some of the contents in what follows.

Michael Frede focuses on Euphrates of Tyre, a late 1st-early 2nd century CE Stoic about whose views we know very little. Although Frede confesses that Euphrates is a relatively minor figure, ancient commentators attributed a high philosophical reputation to him. What did they see that modern and contemporary scholars have missed? Frede's answer is that Euphrates chose to lead a life based on theoretical commitments rather than merely theorizing. His essay is a model of philosophical historiography, treating fragmentary evidence sensitively and showing why investigating a neglected philosopher can be important.

According to A.A. Long, the basis of many of the psychological and moral characteristics that we now attribute to persons can be traced to the Stoics. Our conception of person has its source in their doctrine of *oikeiosis*, which describes a process by which animals acquire inclinations to act and become self-conscious. By carefully examining texts in Cicero and Hierocles, Long shows how the self-consciousness that results from *oikeiosis* can be the foundation for a notion of self and subsequently lead to an account of social relations. But *oikeiosis* is also closely bound up with notions of property. Thus, the pursuit of property, on this Stoic account, is the natural development of fundamental features of human psychology.

Heinrich von Staden examines Galen and the resurgence of sophistical method in 2nd century CE. Although Galen theoretically eschewed *sophistic*, his behavior, according to von Staden, demonstrates a more complex attitude. Galen's public philosophical performance and his awareness of the nature of his audience often led him to adopt rhetorical strategies and procedures similar to those of contemporary sophists.

Despite considerable recent attention to their cognitive theories of emotion, the Stoic account of *eros* has been less closely scrutinized. In his essay, Brad Inwood tries to remedy this inattention. The Stoics formulate a revisionist account of love in which the erotic attachments of the sage are constituted by the virtuous dispositions of the beloved. These genuine instances of *eros* must be distinguished from the cases of irrational desire that count as ordinary love.

Suzanne Bobzien considers Stoic conceptions of free will and argues that different periods in Stoicism explore different issues about freedom of the will. Because Stoic fatalism entails causal determinism, Chrysippus formulates a compatibilist position that some actions, nonetheless, are up to us. Epictetus accepts Chrysippus' basic view, but restricts what depends on us to impressions. Finally, according to Bobzien, the debate later shifts because Peripatetic critics of the Stoics make rational agency undetermined. The Stoics reply that they alone can provide an explanation of attributions of moral responsibility.

More briefly, let me describe several other essays. Richard Gaskin discusses the Stoics on grammatical cases and the nature of propositions, relating issues in Stoic philosophy of language also to questions of ontology.

Hans Gottschalk looks at Peripatetics in the period of the early Roman empire. His examination of both their educational program and scholarly activities shows that there is evidence of a reaction against earlier Stoicized readings of Aristotelianism. Travis Butler investigates issues in Aristotle's philosophy of language and rebuffs arguments made against the attribution of a concept of word meaning to Aristotle. Andrea Falcon offers an account of Aristotle on the method of division and develops different models in order to deal with different kinds of definition. Sylvia Berryman argues that there are several available explanations of the widely recognized phenomenon in antiquity of 'motion into empty spaces' and that it is a mistake to attribute, as Hermann Diels did, the medieval theory that nature abhors a vacuum to, among others, Erisistratus. M.B. Trapp discusses the literary context, doctrinal background, and history of illustration of the Tablet of Cebes, which was a moralizing Pythagorean text that remained popular for instruction until the end of the 19th century. Marwan Rashed argues that two manuscripts contain fragments of Alexander of Aphrodisias' lost commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*.

The final two selections include Richard Sorabji on the value of Stoic philosophical psychotherapy and Bernard Williams' brief response. Sorabji develops further Martha Nussbaum's account of the Stoic theory of the emotions and its therapeutic application. The later Stoic, Posidonius, objected to Chrysippus' cognitive theory. Sorabji argues that Seneca provides resources for a plausible reply and that the Stoic position on the emotions has therapeutic consequences. Williams responds that there is little in the Stoic position to explain why candidates in serious need of therapy would recognize that need. Moreover, if they were to endorse Stoic assumptions, then they would have less need of Stoic therapy. Finally, Williams presses the point that any Stoic therapeutic success depends on the acceptance of the unreasonable Stoic position that nothing matters other than the agent's virtue.

Many of the contributions in *Aristotle and after* are valuable. Because the essays generally exhibit a high level of professional competence, scholars working on a related topic will wish to consult relevant articles. However, because there is little methodological or thematic unity, it is unlikely that many will read the entire volume. Originally the papers were to be included in an issue of the *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* and this volume reads much more like a journal issue than a work with greater focus. Finally, one other minor editorial complaint: it would have been useful to the reader to have included additional indexes — there is an index of ancient authors — as well as a bibliography. In fact, a bibliography is essential because occasionally authors (e.g., Long, p. 25, n. 31) cite works incompletely.

Glenn Lesses

College of Charleston

Noël Sturgeon

*Ecofeminist Natures: Race, Gender,
Feminist Theory, and Political Action.*

New York: Routledge 1997. Pp. xii + 260.

Cdn\$97.95: US\$69.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91249-0);

Cdn\$26.95: US\$18.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-91250-4).

Noël Sturgeon's book comprehensively explores the wide diversity within ecofeminist theory and activism while challenging the common assumptions that (1) feminist theory is, or should be, anti-essentialist, without any reliance on essentialist constructs, and that (2) all essentialist constructs are politically problematic, having no political usefulness. In providing well-documented, elaborate, powerful arguments against these assumptions, the book makes an important contribution to feminist scholarship as constantly renegotiating, recreating and redefining the thin divide between feminist theory and practice. The main drawback with such a detailed account is that precious insights tend to get buried.

Sturgeon defines ecofeminism as articulating 'the theory that the ideologies that authorize injustices based on gender, race, and class are related to the ideologies that sanction the exploitation and degradation of the environment' (24). Chapter 1, 'Movements of Ecofeminism', presents a historical analysis of the origins and evolution of U.S. ecofeminism. Sturgeon argues that U.S. ecofeminism has roots in the antimilitarist or 'peace' movement of the late seventies and eighties, fostered by that movement's connections between militarism, racism, classism, sexism, speciesism, and environmental destruction. Women's movements worldwide were concerned since the mid-70s with nuclear power and weapons and nuclear technology, however, and so ecofeminism should primarily be seen as a feminist rebellion within male-dominated radical environmental movements such as the anti-nuclear movement, social ecology, deep ecology, and the radical activist organization Earth First! (25). Sturgeon presents various ecofeminist critiques made by others of the sexism of the biocentrism in these movements.

In Chapter 2 Sturgeon begins to develop the most philosophically interesting argument of her book. Here she focuses on the feminist charge of essentialism that was directed at the feminist direct action movement in the 1980s. This movement encompasses the actions organized by and for women as early manifestations of ecofeminism, such as the Mother's Day Actions at the Nevada Test Site in 1987 and 1988. She refers to feminist critiques that maintain that the symbol 'Mother Nature' and 'Moral Mother' imagery, where women are seen as innately pacifist, nurturant and compassionate, reinforce the nature/culture dualism and the patriarchal assumption that women are closer than men to nature. Sturgeon admits that Moral Mother imagery and rhetoric pose real dangers of essentialism, within and outside the antimilitarist direct action movement. Nonetheless, she argues, it can be

seen as part of a theory and strategy of resistance. The language of motherhood, in articulating a common concern for children and future generations, with which many different kinds of mothers could identify (grandmothers, lesbian mothers, socialist mothers, etc.) served to collectively organize women in antimilitarist protest (73).

Chapter 3 makes a similar argument to that presented in Chapter 2. In the second half of the 1980s feminists of colour advanced critiques of the racism of mainstream feminism. In particular, the whiteness of antimilitarist ecofeminism was examined. As an attempt to harmonize white women and women of color, four women of color and four white women founded the organization 'WomanEarth Feminist Peace Institute' according to a vision of racial equality as 'racial parity' (79). The notion of racial parity, however, embodied a racial essentialism. Nonetheless, WomanEarth was effective in widening the concerns of ecofeminism and ensuring that these extended beyond narrow, racist boundaries (110). Further, in Chapter 4, Sturgeon focuses on another historically contingent, contradictory essentialism within ecofeminist discourse and practice, that is an offshoot of prior anti-essentialist critique. In challenging dualistic, patriarchal concepts of nature and of woman, some ecofeminists turned instead to holistic, non-dualistic conceptions that championed 'indigenous women' as the ideal ecofeminists. This reevaluation reinforced the nature/culture dualism and the essentialist conception of Native Americans as being closer to nature, thereby promoting the view that difficult ecological problems can be resolved by simply shunning industrialized culture and pursuing a more 'primitive' way of life (123).

Chapter 5 shifts away from a U.S. context to an international level and focuses on efforts to construct an international ecofeminist movement made by an organization called 'Women's Environment and Development Organization,' or WEDO. Sturgeon examines on a larger scale effects of strategic essentialisms, such as the appeal to women as a political collective. While WEDO highlights differences among women and their different environmentalist activities around the globe, it, like the feminist direct action movement in the 1980s, employs an essentialist rhetoric for strategic purposes, emphasizing a natural bond between the earth and women in their roles as mothers and healers. In this way WEDO calls on women to act together against environmental destruction.

The final chapter, by far the most philosophically exciting, presents a full picture of ecofeminism, or of different ecofeminist positions, in the wake of the dominant view in feminist scholarship that any essentialist perspective, however historically specific and transient, is politically suspect. Sturgeon points out that different forms of feminism (liberal, radical, socialist, and poststructuralist feminism) are evaluated on the basis of their 'nonessentialist purity' (177). As a result, a hierarchy is created where socialist feminism or poststructuralist feminism is seen as 'the best' kind of feminism (177). Liberal and radical/cultural feminism, with its histories of activism, securing equal rights and liberties for women (liberal feminism) and creating battered-women's shelters and other safe spaces for women only (radical/cul-

tural feminism), is relegated to an inferior status, thus causing a division between feminist activism and feminist academic practice (177). Sturgeon bemoans the development of a parallel phenomenon occurring with different forms of ecofeminist theory where socialist ecofeminism or what Karen Warren calls 'transformative feminism,' which stresses the interconnections between all systems of oppression, comes out as superior. On Sturgeon's view, what constitutes 'the best' ecofeminist theory and practice, if one wants to retain that category at all, is dependent on contextual social variables and will be subject to continual displacement.

With the number of feminist and ecofeminist perspectives ever increasing and thus presenting a real danger of disunity across differences within the feminist movement, the need for strategic alliances between feminists is all the more urgent. In this sense Sturgeon's argument is itself strategically well timed. Her book illuminates the ecofeminist literature that precedes it and affords clear direction for future work.

Andrea Nicki

Queen's University

Edwina Taborsky

The Textual Society.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1997.

Pp. xiv + 229.

\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-0812-7);

\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7180-5).

Moving beyond a mere sociological perspective of the individual and society, Taborsky presents a comprehensive view of the individual and group, and the dialog that defines each. Her purpose moves beyond an explication of the dynamic of an individual within a group, or even the development of a society or the evolution of civilization (all of which she addresses), to develop a theory that accounts for the biological and physical nature of the individual, as well as, accounts for the cause and effect of revolutions and social change. As she builds the foundation of her theory, she critiques various social theories, explaining their successes and failures, and is particularly critical of Derrida and Saussure.

To build such a comprehensive theory, Taborsky begins with a broad base, defining the realities of the individual and the group, and the interactions between them. She effectively uses and integrates: Charles Peirce's categories and semiotic logic; Niels Bohr's quantum mechanics; Einstein's spa-

tiotemporal frame; Thomas Aquinas's concepts of the individual and revelation; David Bohm's dynamics; the chaos theory of Ilya Prigogine; and the dialogical analysis of Plato and Mikhail Bakhtin, with Bakhtin and Peirce being the predominating influences. Additionally, there is a plethora of references to sociological and anthropological studies, particularly the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, and to various psychological works from Freud to Jung to Piaget. The text lacks neither a linguistic nor semiotic sophistication, nor philosophical underpinnings. Using the works of Jacques Lacan, Umberto Eco, Descartes, Foucault, Hegel, Kant, Marx, Popper, and Searle, Taborsky frames her theory to address micro and macro human and cultural issues.

Beginning with the essence of the realities of the individual and group in Chapter One, 'The Realities of the Social Text', and the actions and interactions within the social settings in Chapter Two, 'The Action of Textuality', the author establishes why the social fabric is a dialogical text. Chapter Three, 'Otherness in the Production of Meaning', continues with the dynamic between the individual and the other, reminiscent of George Herbert Mead (although he is not mentioned), but moving far beyond Mead to present the energy, organization, and structure of the dialog so precisely that a sociophysicist could establish the experimental parameters for measuring the thermodynamics of social interaction, much as a physical chemist would measure it for a chemical reaction.

The arrow of time, absolute and relative time, and the cultural frameworks of time build upon the 'otherness' of the preceding chapter to define group reality in Chapter Four, 'Dialogical Time'. The group history and where and how cultural information is stored moves logically into human knowing, the topic of Chapter Five, 'Patterns of cognition'. Sentence structure and the logic of speech, Taborsky argues, define cognition and thus, the essence of the individual and society.

Chapter Six, 'Textual Change', and Chapter Seven, 'Two Bodies/Two Powers: Stasis and Heteroglossia [from Bakhtin] in Textual Society', both address the social change from a thermodynamical to a sociological perspective. 'Conclusion: Society as Text', Chapter Eight, summarizes the society as a semiotic text, structured, yet dialoging outside its structure to bring in new social energy.

The advantage of this text over others is its comprehensibility in two hundred short pages. With its strong accurate presentation of a semiotic logic, grounded in our current understanding of the physical world, Taborsky's dialogic text will allow for mathematical modeling, quantitative social analysis (beyond statistics), psychosocial understanding, and theoretical insight beyond our current capabilities. This work could well define the academic future for many fields.

George W. Stickel

Georgia Institute of Technology

Raymond Tallis

Enemies of Hope:

A Critique of Contemporary Pessimism.

New York: St. Martin's Press 1997.

Pp. xvi + 499.

US\$39.95. ISBN 0-312-17326-1.

A spectre haunts the contemporary world: a pessimistic discourse which undermines the Enlightenment hope of social progress. In the long and rambling Prologue to his unmasking of the *Enemies of Hope*, Tallis situates contemporary pessimism in an historical context of Counter-Enlightenment thought, broadly construed to include writers as diverse as Maistre, Hamann and Adorno. While Tallis sees some value in aspects of their critiques of the sometimes rigid and too optimistic programmes of the Enlightenment, he does not believe that we must accept the denial of 'the distinctive feature of humanity: a reflective consciousness which has a margin of autonomy' (63).

In the first of two major parts, titled 'Pathologising Culture', Tallis tries to deflate the pretensions to omniscience and moral superiority he finds in cultural critics, from assorted Romantics to T.S. Eliot, Heidegger and Roland Barthes. Their gloomy claims, like those regarding the alienation of the modern subject, are the result of an uncritical leap from isolated observations to the social totality. Having exposed the hasty generalization as the pessimistic method, Tallis goes to the heart of the matter in the book's second part, 'Marginalising Consciousness.' By claiming that the most important determining forces of individual and social life do their work behind the backs of conscious subjects, Marx, Durkheim and Freud prepared the ground for the post-structuralists, who go even further, wilfully misinterpreting Saussure and thus liquidating the conscious subject in the differential play of signifiers. Against this, Tallis insists that my mobilization of language as a speaking subject in an existentially unique situation requires a level of self-presence on my part, thus presupposing that I am 'not fully consumed by the meanings embodied in the utterance I am engaged in' (287). It is this 'irreducible remainder' (255) of autonomous consciousness in language use that is suppressed by Derrida and friends.

In the Epilogue, Tallis defends a chastened, context-sensitive universalism of reason. Yet he believes that a surprisingly extensive set of ethical prescriptions can be derived from the fact that all cultures recognize human existence to be a good (e.g., where modern science and technology are available, they should replace the ineffective methods of traditional medicine). Finally, Tallis concludes that we should retain the Enlightenment's hope of progress, at least as a 'regulative idea' (379).

I have mentioned only a few of the alleged pessimists that Tallis takes up in this book. In fact, his scope is far too vast for the critical resources he brings to bear on the material. He attempts to head off criticism of his very heavy reliance on secondary sources by characterizing his book as 'a polemic, rather than an original contribution to the history of ideas' (xiii); however, a polemic

which psychologizes opponents as often as Tallis's does quickly becomes grating rather than bracing. The most obvious symptom of the overextension of critical resources is Tallis's persistent tendency to generalize about cultural critics — and this after his caustic denunciations of their own generalizations. To give just one example, Frankfurt School critics are mischaracterized as nostalgic theorists of *Gemeinschaft* (38-42), lumped in with assorted conservatives and reactionaries.

While the engagement with Derrida is slightly more promising (273-80), the arguments for the irreducibility of the conscious subject are far from conclusive. At one point, the extra-linguistic specificity of an existential situation which is given in consciousness and establishes its 'margin of autonomy' is characterized as a level of pre-conceptual 'brute sensation' (348), while elsewhere it is said to include a sense of 'responsibility for the thing that I am' (344). Greater clarity about what is given in this autonomous consciousness and how, precisely, it grounds 'hope' would have been helpful. The failure to recognize differences between various pessimists, the disproportionately polemical tone and the underdeveloped nature of the arguments make reading *Enemies of Hope* a rather discouraging experience.

Martin Kramer

University of Toronto

Dabney Townsend

An Introduction to Aesthetics.

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers 1997.

Pp. vii + 248.

US\$21.95. ISBN 1-55786-731-3.

This work examines three central traditions, or 'theories', as Townsend has it, in aesthetics from five points of view. The first theory emphasizes the concepts of beauty and imitation. It is most closely associated with ancient Greek thought about what we now classify as the fine arts and with the revival of this body of thought in the Renaissance and early modern period. The second theory emphasizes taste, aesthetic experience, and the aesthetic attitude needed to have this experience. Expression takes precedence over imitation in this theory. The third 'theory' is less tidy, covering a number of late twentieth-century attempts to find an alternative to the first two lines of thought. Most discussed here are institutional conceptions of art, but various structuralist, post-structuralist and historical conceptions fall under the rubric of theory three.

Each chapter examines a particular aspect of these theories. The first chapter is concerned with language: the key terms through which the subject matter is conceptualized. The main issue for the second chapter is the (distinct) aesthetic objects identified by each theory. Subsequent chapters focus on each theory's conception of: the relation of the artist to work (chapter 3), the relation of the audience to work (chapter 4) and finally the relation of artist to audience (chapter 5). Laid over this general pattern is the discussion of a great many other topics that appear as they become germane to the larger issues. Thus in the first chapter alone, we get discussions of beauty, taste, aesthetic feeling, aesthetic terms, aesthetic value judgments, definitions of art, and the essentialist/anti-essentialist controversy surrounding such definitions. Eventually most of the important issues in philosophical aesthetics get taken up, often more than once, as new light is shed on them by the altered focus of a new chapter.

This is an intricate and demanding design for an introductory textbook in aesthetics. It makes possible some of the signal virtues of the book, but also creates some of difficulties for being a successful textbook. Taking the virtues first, the first two theories, especially, receive deep and sometimes beautiful expositions. This is done with special mastery in chapter 2 which contrasts the aesthetic object as an imitation and the aesthetic object as an expression of feeling or attitude. Townsend is particularly good at setting out the historical and philosophical context in which these theories are embedded, and explaining how particular theses about the nature of the aesthetic object are supported by larger metaphysical and epistemological views. He is good at setting out arguments for these theses based on the larger views, but also in showing how these arguments become suspect as their philosophical foundations (are perceived to) lose plausibility. Equally good is Townsend's exposition of the audience in classical theory, where art is experienced communally, and sense of self tends to dissolve, and the audience in the modern theory of aesthetic experience, where art can be privately experienced and the focus is on the feeling of the individual person. There are also some excellent discussions of some of the many narrower topics that get taken up. My favorite is Townsend's discussion of the form/content distinction (56-64) which takes off from the best example in the book: Gustave Caillebotte painting 'On the Europe Bridge' (also the cover illustration).

However, at least as a textbook, Townsend's complex design also creates problems. I am not sure whether many students have the patience to follow the exposition of the three main theories over the course of the whole book. I also suspect students will often have trouble keeping track of the exposition of the larger theories through the discussion of specific issues. They may also find themselves unsure of the significance of those issues independent of a commitment to one or another of the theories. In short, the intricate pattern of the book's design is likely to throw off beginning students especially. In fairness, it should be mentioned that Townsend does his best to help students along by placing a summary (called 'conclusions') after each main section in

each chapter. This is helpful, but I'm not sure it completely solves the problem.

A second, though not unrelated problem, is that many specific topics get taken up more than once and over the course of several chapters, and this makes it hard to follow Townsend's arguments on these issues and to decide what are his own views, or sometimes, whether they are on offer. One instance of this is the discussion of the interpretation of artworks, which is first taken up in chapter 3 and reappears in both chapters 4 and 5. I know that Townsend is a moderate anti-intentionalist and a pluralist about interpretation, but about the details of his view, I am uncertain.

Though this book will be a challenge to use as an introductory textbook, it is worth attempting. A class that meets the challenge will be well rewarded.

Robert Stecker

Central Michigan University

Douglas Walton

Appeal to Pity: Argumentum ad Misericordiam.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1997. Pp. xv + 225.

US\$53.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3461-3);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3462-1).

Is attempting to produce an action or an attitude in an audience by arousing the emotion of pity ever a legitimate — as opposed to an effective — persuasive technique? Should we be moved to action by the sight of 'poster kids' on the Jerry Lewis Telethon for Muscular Dystrophy or of baby seals being clubbed to death? In the tradition of informal logic textbooks, appealing to pity is a form of irrelevance, an argument from consequences, or an appeal to emotion. It has almost always been considered a fallacy, on the grounds that emotions in general and pity in particular should have no place in practical deliberation, which should be performed by an emotionally detached 'pure inquirer'; emotions are 'inherently misleading or untrustworthy' (5). Some more recent texts allow that in some circumstances appealing to pity may be justified, but there is still a lack of consensus about exactly what is being appealed to in *appeal to pity*. Sympathy, compassion, empathy, mercy, and pity are often confused. Obviously what is needed is more than the superficial analysis usually accorded *appeal to pity* in informal logic textbooks. This book fills that need. It approaches its subject *via* the dialogue-based pragmatic analysis of fallacies which was developed in considerable

part by Walton himself, e.g., in *The Place of Emotion in Argument* (1992) and *A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy* (1995).

According to Walton's definition of 'pity' (slightly simplified), A pities *B* when (1) A mentally puts herself in the subjective situation of *B* (i.e., A empathizes with *B*), (2) *B*'s situation is one of undeserved pain and suffering, (3) A is not actually in that situation herself, though (4) she imagines that she could be, and (5) she is substantially powerless to ameliorate *B*'s suffering (73-4). Defined in this way, pity is a kind of compassion and may be an appropriate response to others' distress; it may even form an acceptable element in practical reasoning generally, since people *should* sometimes be swayed by compassion. Thus Walton recognizes a role for pity in warranted argument and motivation (similar to actions warranted on the basis of compassion or sympathy), but he also realizes the potential for misuse. Therefore guidelines are necessary to distinguish proper from improper use of appeal to pity.

To assess whether an argument containing an appeal to pity can be reasonable, according to Walton one must recognize the structure of the argument in which it occurs — e.g., argument from need for help, argument from distress, plea for excuse, etc. (155). For example, an argument from distress is said to have the following structure:

Individual *x* is in distress (is suffering).

If *y* brings about *A*, it will relieve or help relieve this distress.

Therefore, *y* ought to bring about *A*.

Such an argument contains factual premises, like other forms of practical reasoning: belief in the truth of the conclusion will be warranted if and only if the premises are true. This will be the case regardless of any ancillary appeal to pity, and so not all arguments containing appeals to pity are fallacies.

Placing appeals to pity in the context of practical reasoning and evaluating their strength on factual grounds says nothing about whether emotion *should* play a role in argument. Against those who hold that the appeal to an emotion such as pity could be justified only as a compromise with a mass audience (118) and should play no part in reasoned discourse, Walton sees compassion especially as a generally reliable guide to practical reasoning, useful particularly when time constraints preclude a full investigation of factual premises. On the other hand, argumentation errors occur because feelings of pity tend to induce immediate action based on short term consequences before consideration of all available evidence or points of view; acting solely or primarily on the basis of pity tends to lead to simplistic conclusions (158). On the dialogue-based pragmatic theory of argumentation to which Walton subscribes, appeals to pity are fallacious when they violate rules of the dialogues in which they occur, principally by preempting the possibility of critical questioning.

Walton does not discuss the difference between first- and third-person appeals to pity: the difference between appealing to pity for someone else and for oneself. Appealing to pity is condoned more in the former than in the latter case: because of moral objections to self-pity, sometimes it is acceptable to solicit help for someone else when it is not acceptable to solicit it for oneself. This points up a fundamental objection to appealing to pity, namely its moral objectionability — which Walton underemphasizes, probably because of his dialogue-based analysis: acceptable and unacceptable forms of argumentation depend on the dialogue-forms in which they are embedded, which leaves the rules of the recognized dialogue-forms themselves inaccessible to reflective criticism from a (non-dialogue-relative) moral point of view.

Robert H. Kimball
University of Louisville

Kathleen V. Wider

*The Bodily Nature of Consciousness:
Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.*
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1997.
Pp. vii + 207.
US\$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3395-9);
US\$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8502-9).

The central claim of Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, Wider asserts in this thoughtful book, is that all consciousness is self-consciousness. However, Wider is only interested in 'Sartre's belief in the reflexivity of consciousness primarily as he works it out at the level of pre-reflective and reflective consciousness ... [ignoring] almost completely the self-consciousness involved in our existence for others, and hence [failing to] discuss the social dimension of consciousness' (3). Wider aims to re-evaluate Sartre's phenomenological approach to consciousness in light of the recent work in contemporary analytic philosophy, which has tended to deny the reflexivity of consciousness. Her contention is that Sartre, and phenomenologists in general, have a valid contribution to make to the 'purely objective' Anglo-American accounts of consciousness. In this text, Wider demonstrates both a sophisticated understanding of Sartre's thought, and a broad-based understanding of the current theories of consciousness and self-consciousness.

Sartre takes his place among the Western philosophers who believed that all consciousness is, at base, self-consciousness. Wider takes the time to consider arguments for the reflexivity of consciousness from Descartes, Locke, and Kant; and in considering the defenses of these philosophers, she

shows the ways that Sartre's analysis of consciousness remains faithful to his heritage and yet parts company from these thinkers. Following this, Wider extracts key components of Sartre's philosophy to bolster her claim that Sartre's belief in the reflexivity of consciousness plays a foundational role in *Being and Nothingness*. This section of the book deserves special attention. Wider does an exceptional job of selecting enough information to make Sartre's position clear and her thesis intelligible, but not so much as to overwhelm the reader. The main thrust of her point is that a considerable portion of Sartre's system is built on his belief in the reflexivity of consciousness. A failure to support this claim would shake the foundation of Sartre's system.

Wider proceeds to unravel Sartre's position on consciousness and concludes that Sartre fails to develop an adequate account of consciousness that will allow him to maintain his tripartite distinction between pre-reflective self-consciousness and the self-consciousness of pure and impure reflection. Sartre, Wider maintains (92), has a two-fold problem. First, his theory of consciousness does not allow him to draw a clear distinction between knowledge and consciousness, thereby undermining his tripartite distinction. Second, Sartre's account of consciousness's noncognitive presence to itself does not allow him to distinguish cases where this self-presence is reflective from cases where it is not reflective. Furthermore, there are counter-examples to Sartre's thesis that all consciousness, even pre-reflective consciousness, is self-consciousness. Here, Wider focuses on 1) dreaming, 2) Armstrong's example of a 'long distance truck driver who suddenly "comes to" after a long period in which he has apparently been unaware of what he has been doing' (94), and 3) people with blindsight. Sartre, Wider thinks, has two alternatives for disarming these types of counterexamples. First, he can treat them as cases of 'nonconscious perceptual processing,' but that undermines his belief in the translucency of consciousness. Second, he can claim that they are cases of self-conscious consciousness; but, as Wider argues in chapters 2 and 3, this claim needs more support than Sartre's theory provides.

The upshot of Wider's book is that she thinks Sartre's problems can be overcome through an appeal to a notion of bodily self-consciousness. Chapter Five is notable as a review of current thinking on consciousness as embodied. Wider's arguments for the claim that intentionality and consciousness are embodied relies heavily on the work of other thinkers, including Adrian Cussins, Gerald Edelman, Owen Flanagan, Mark Johnson, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. From Wider's perspective, Sartre was right in thinking that the subject of consciousness is the body, but he failed to make that belief more central to his account of consciousness. This mistake, Wider claims, is the root of the problems revealed in chapters two and three. It seems clear to Wider that, '... the body's presence is always given within the context of my presence to the world. It is always given in hodological or egocentric space, just as the world is always given within the context of the body' (148).

Wider then goes on to spell out the way in which she sees a biological analysis of consciousness (like Edelman's) as working in conjunction with, and perhaps lending plausibility to, Sartre's phenomenological account. In all places, Wider does a great job of guiding the reader through her theses and presenting clearly written arguments. As she incorporates her notion of the bodily self-consciousness into Sartre's account of consciousness, her goal is to show how such an account may save Sartre from the problems previously discussed. All things considered, however, she doubts that this 'remembering' the primacy of the body in self-consciousness will give Sartre what he really wants, i.e., the radical freedom inherent in the human condition. For Sartre, freedom exists in the 'nothingness' of consciousness, the negating or absence of the self from the self. Being bound too tightly to the body would constrain freedom and deprive Sartre of what he wants most, absolute freedom as part of the human condition.

Brian Stone

University of Bristol

Michael P. Zuckert

The Natural Rights Republic.

Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame

Press 1997. Pp. xi + 298.

US\$32.95. ISBN 0-268-01480-9.

Despite being more of a work in early American political history than philosophy, this book will likely be of at least some interest to moral philosophers. Early on, Zuckert points out that contemporary work on natural rights has been more theoretical than historical; Americans (including American philosophers) are less clear about the nature of the political philosophy to which the founders of the Republic actually subscribed. 'Rights talk' is pervasive in contemporary American society, and he argues persuasively that as we attempt to apply natural rights to current social issues in an effort to affect legislation, it is desirable to understand the motivation of the framers of the earliest documents on which that legislation is based.

Thus, the philosopher wishing to place rights theory in historical context will find this book valuable. However, anyone with even a mild curiosity in American political thought leading up to the late 1700s will find it interesting. Zuckert suggests that America, as a 'natural rights republic,' draws on several apparently distinct political and religious threads. While his conclu-

sions are moderately persuasive, his arguments are clear, accessible, and make effective use of some fascinating historical documents.

The book is divided into two parts. In part I, Zuckert is concerned to describe natural rights theory as conceived by the founding generation. The opening chapter is a discussion of possible readings of the Declaration of Independence, the document thought to express most clearly the political philosophy of the time. Zuckert suggests a liberal (rather than republican or communitarian) reading, and on this basis, together with supporting historical documents, proceeds in the next two chapters to offer interpretations of various aspects of the Declaration. The intentions of Jefferson and the other framers, in using terminology such as 'creator' and 'self-evident,' are described in a way that offer a coherent overall picture of the underlying ideology.

The bulk of the argument exists in part II. In chapter four, he compares the ideological picture developed in part I to that of the 'Old Whigs' in England, who revolted against King James II in 1688-89. Despite using similar language in their document, the English Declaration of Rights, the Old Whigs were not committed to a natural right to alter or abolish government. Therefore, the American founders (who also called themselves Whigs) cannot be said to have relied on those tenets exclusively. With similar dexterity, Zuckert in chapter five dissociates the views of the early Protestant settlers of the seventeenth century, and then describes the transition to the very different views of late eighteenth century Puritans, 'Lockean Puritans', so labeled because of their religiously-grounded commitment to a (Lockean) secular political democracy. A third potential influence, republicanism, is discussed and minimized in chapter seven.

Thus, according to Zuckert, the Declaration of Independence is not, contrary to some theories, a continuation of any one of these philosophies (Old Whig, early Protestant, republican) but is an amalgamation of the three. The argument, while not airtight, appears wholly plausible, and if correct it offers an interesting and valuable historical context for the analysis of natural rights and their role in political society.

John R. Rowan

Purdue University Calumet

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