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Editors • Directeurs

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
4-108 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

Alain Voizard
Département de philosophie
Université du Québec à Montréal
C.P. 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville
Montréal, QC
Canada H3C 3P8

E-Mail: roger.a.shiner@ualberta.ca

E-Mail: voizard.alain@uqam.ca

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Raymond A. Belliotti

*Seeking Identity: Individualism versus
Community in an Ethnic Context.*

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1995.

Pp. xviii + 262.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7006-0729-3);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7006-0730-7).

This interesting book addresses several issues concerning the epistemic and ethical adequacy of various sorts of group identity. Belliotti writes as a third-generation Italian-American who values his ethnic identity yet realizes that there is an 'individual-community continuum' that branches out in several, often opposing, directions. Individuals confront family, ethnic group, gender, race, country, and the international order, and these different communities often make conflicting claims on an individual. Belliotti hopes to shed light on the status of these claims by focusing on a specific set of issues: the ethics of family relations, feminist epistemology, the authority of the state, the moral status of pacifism, and the proper characterization of ethnicity. In each instance, he brings the Italian-American immigrant experience to bear on the general questions at issue.

Chapter 1 is an investigation of the relationship between individuals, their families, and the wider society. Belliotti outlines the southern Italian immigrants' unwritten system of moral rules, a set of prescriptions that defined proper relations among family members and between family members and outsiders. This account leads into a discussion of the partiality-impartiality debate in ethics, the dispute between defenders of special obligations to those close to us (partialists) and those who would deny that we can defend such obligations at any ground level (impartialists). I think this way of framing the dispute is misleading since, with a few famous exceptions (e.g., Godwin, Kagan), it misrepresents the impartialists' position. Belliotti defends a plausible version of partialism based on noncontractual obligations, but the impartialist opponent here is something of a straw man. Impartialists do not argue that we should treat every person in precisely the same way when deciding what to do in any specific context of action. Rather, they concern themselves with justifying action-guiding principles that can be defended impartially to everyone on a footing of equality. In that case, the resulting recommendations would likely include a significant degree of partiality of concern at the first-order level (though not enough to warrant favouritism for intimates in respect of their non-vital interests when strangers lack protection for their vital interests).

In Chapter 2, Belliotti investigates the confrontation between the gendered self and the family. After introducing three images of Italian immigrant women, he plunges into debates in contemporary feminist epistemology, and considers the acceptability and coherence of the idea of a 'woman's perspective'. Chapter 3 contains outlines of various forms of anarchism, and here Belliotti offers an extended critique of Roberto Unger's views.

He concludes that anarchism is not really much *practical* use, but that its heart is in the right place and, accordingly, it can provide the basis for relevant social criticism. The individual has many good reasons for rejecting the state's claims to legitimacy.

Chapter 4 mainly concerns itself with an extended critique of Robert Holmes's pacifist position (in his 1989 book, *On War and Morality*), preceded by Belliotti's outline of Garibaldi's place in the development of Italian nationalism. The chapter contains a coherent reply to Holmes's pacifism, but the link with nationalism and Garibaldi is strained at best, and there is little discussion about the central issues of the book, namely, the potential for conflict between individuals and (in this case) the nations with which they are identified. Fortunately, the final chapter contains an account of ethnicity which might be read as defending a conception of tolerant nationalism.

In Chapter 5, Belliotti explains and assesses the relationship between individuals and their ethnicity, again with special emphasis on the case of Italian-Americans. The chapter outlines various models of ethnicity and, in its most important section, offers a 'normative vision of ethnicity,' a convincing defence of ethnic identity and a rejection of alternative accounts of ethnicity. An important idea emphasized by Belliotti is that 'ethnicity is not simply a brute fact of one's being; it also implicates individuals' choices made from the background of social influences and inherited constraints' (175). Ethnicity is sometimes taken to be the classic example of an *objective* basis for group identification; Belliotti's argument shows that this drastically oversimplifies both the empirical and normative aspects of ethnic identity.

Belliotti tells us why we should value ethnic groups (because of their unique contributions to the human story), and he also points to an everpresent danger: 'ethnic imperialism', the view that ethnic groups have essences and are associated with distinctive and unchanging ideological positions. I agree with his assertion that no specific social context defines who we are, but I wonder whether this is consistent with his claim that 'concreteness trumps abstraction' (120, 193). It seems not, for if we are not defined by our context, if we can 'reimagine ourselves', it looks as though neither abstraction nor concreteness necessarily wins out: it all depends on the ethical and epistemic defensibility of the claims made in a given case. The claim that 'concreteness trumps abstraction' seems to come down firmly on the side of 'inherited constraints' as against individuals' 'freedom to retain, ignore, or remake their ethnic contexts' (165). However, Belliotti's considered position is that re-creation of the self is possible through a process of 'cultural re-invention' (165): we should acknowledge our roots while recognizing the need to transcend them. This is a reasonable, nuanced position to take on an important question, but it does not sit well with his 'concreteness trumps abstraction' claim which, as a slogan, is on a par with other misleading assertions like the statement that individuals are radically encumbered and cannot distance themselves from their self-defining context. Belliotti's view that 'the human struggle for feeling and meaning must acknowledge the truths of blood' (193) is false if it is meant to preclude the denial, on ethical

or epistemic grounds, of one's ethnic inheritance. But if he simply means that 'it is to our nuclear and extended families, our intimate friends, and our ethnic connections that we must first turn' (193), then individuals are (it would seem) entitled to turn away whenever what they discover cannot survive critical scrutiny. But in that case, a certain detachment and abstraction can — and should — override appeals to the primacy of the concrete.

Belliotti has something worthwhile to say on each of the varied topics he addresses, and the effect of combining these issues in this way sheds considerable light on the underlying problem of identity.

Charles Jones

University College Cork, Ireland

David Braybrooke, ed.

Social Rules: Origin; Character; Logic; Change.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1996.

Pp. 290

US\$62.00. ISBN 0-8133-2867-5.

This anthology derives from an interdisciplinary conference (organized by the Murphy Institute) on social rules. Some of the papers in the anthology present the so-called Dalhousie Project on social rules. The authors are from various disciplines: philosophy, economics, law, and sociology. Not surprisingly, the papers form a rather heterogeneous collection. The editor, David Braybrooke, tries in his many comments to bring together these various approaches. I will below mainly comment on the philosophical papers.

When a philosopher looks at the title of the book, he is likely to expect that the following kinds of questions would be discussed:

- a) What kinds of social rules (and norms) are there? Especially a reader may wish to learn about the relationship between i) instrumental (and prudential rules), ii) moral rules, iii) legal rules, iv) conventions, v) rules based on expectations, vi) agreement-based rules, and so on. One also would like to learn about vii) social practices and viii) customs and about their relationships to social rules.
- b) What makes a rule social? One may expect discussions of behavioral uniformity, coordination, agreements, mutual belief, social practical reasoning, and related things.
- c) Are rules deontic? One expects discussions of 'oughts' and 'mays', *prima facie* oughts and overriding oughts. When speaking of the logic of rules one expects discussions of basic logical principles concerning

the ought-operator and perhaps discussions of its semantics. Also the logical principles of the change of deontic rules can be discussed.

- d) How do social rules figure in explaining social action, social regularities and structures?

If one seeks deep-going philosophical and logical discussions concerning these questions a reader is bound to be disappointed. The philosophical discussions do not throw much light on the above questions and, on the whole, are not up-to-date. Two major areas of omission are the following. The character of social rules *qua* social is not properly discussed from a philosophical point of view (cf. b) above). See, e.g., Margaret Gilbert's *On Social Facts* (London: Routledge 1989) and Raimo Tuomela's *The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study of Basic Social Notions* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1995). Secondly, modern deontic logic is ignored. Braybrooke does briefly consider the approach by von Wright from the 1960's, but the newer developments in deontic logic (largely due to Scandinavian scholars) are totally ignored.

The Dalhousie Project on social rules is taken up in some papers (Braybrooke, Schotch, Brown) but is not described in sufficient detail for a proper evaluation. There are constant references to another book presenting this approach. [See D. Braybrooke et al., *Logic on the Track of Social Change* (Oxford U.P. 1995); reviewed in *P.I.R. / C.R.P. - C.P.R. / R.C.C.P.* 16 (1996) 315 — Editor] The logical basis of the Dalhousie Project is offered by dynamic logic. Nevertheless, as this project figures prominently in the book let me try to say something about it. According to Braybrooke, rules are presented by three features (7): a) '**volk**' — the demographic scope, b) '**wenn**' — the conditions under which the rule comes to bear upon conduct; c) '**nono**' — the routines (sequences of actions) that the rule forbids. Here is Braybrooke's example: Under the feudal social order in France, the king and nobility enjoyed the benefit of a rule under which they appropriated the social surplus and did what they pleased with it. This is rendered as:

volk = FRENCH

wenn = $(Ea)(Ex)[\text{SURPLUS}(x) \ \& \ (\text{OWNS}(a,x)] \ \& \ \text{aft } r[\text{DISPOSES}(a,x)]$

nono = $\text{BLOCKS}(r',r)$

The '**wenn**' component says that x is part of the social surplus and somebody a owns it and disposes of it. Here r stands for a routine (sequence of actions) and $\text{aft } r$ means that after r has been run the proposition that follows is true. The '**nono**' component forbids any sequence of actions r' that $\text{BLOCKS } R$, the disposal of x by a . Over and above the small point that the '**wenn**' component should speak of the king and nobility rather than just existentially quantify over people, it seems that no more than a permission (to dispose of the surplus) is entailed. More generally, the presentation in the present anthology does not make clear how the Dalhousie approach deals with obligations contra permissions! If something p is forbidden (in accordance with the '**nono**' component) it follows that the target persons ought to bring about $\neg p$, but it does not follow without further assumptions that the target persons ought

to do what the 'wenn' component says. Deontic operators are not explicitly represented in this approach (as described in this anthology).

Of the philosophers' papers, the logician Schotch writes competently about the general logical aspects of the Dalhousie Project. Brown applies this approach to (instrumental) rules of scientific research both from a historical and systematic point of view. The rules discussed are overtly descriptive. A proper discussion of the implicit deontic aspect is missing.

Sayre-McCord has interesting things to say about normative explanation. According to him, rules might play any of the following three roles in explanations (42): i) they might be the content of beliefs that in turn explain actions, ii) they might themselves explain the beliefs (about rules) that explain actions, and iii) they might explain actions, events, processes, or situations unmediated by beliefs about rules. (I find iii) highly problematic, but cannot here consider it for the lack of space.) Richard Miller presents some critical remarks on the nature of normative change (the role of quandaries) and on the Dalhousie Project, and Braybrooke answers in a rejoinder.

Of the other, non-philosophers' papers, Kornhauser writes about the different conceptions of a social rule within a game-theoretic framework. Social rules can be regularities of behavior, conventions, or norms concerned with reasons for action. This is a worthwhile paper to a philosopher, although the main points in this 1988 paper are familiar from current literature. There are also some technical papers by economists — dealing with instrumental rules for maximizing utilities in some game-theoretic situations or achieving *least cost solutions to problems about transaction costs which may interest mathematically-minded philosophers*.

My overall evaluation of this book that it is not too rewarding as far as purely philosophical (and logical) issues go. On the other hand, from an interdisciplinary point of view the book is a worthwhile enterprise. The contributions are, on the whole, competent and the editor Braybrooke is to be applauded for his painstaking job in trying to make the book understandable to readers with different backgrounds.

Raimo Tuomela

University of Helsinki

Jed Z. Buchwald, ed.

*Scientific Practice: Theories and
Stories of Doing Physics.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995.

Pp. xiii + 398.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-07889-2);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-07890-6).

The decade of the 80's saw an enormous amount of detailed work in the historical, social and philosophical study of scientific experimentation, stimulated largely by the work of Thomas Kuhn. As part of this growing trend a workshop was held in Toronto in 1990 on tabletop (i.e., small-scale) experiments, and this collection of essays is a result of that workshop. The views and topics discussed naturally differ widely but certain unifying themes may be picked out. Broadly speaking, all the contributors have been influenced to some degree by social constructivism although many of them would undoubtedly see themselves as opponents of the constructivist school. The type of constructivism at work in this volume is not the radical kind, which would seek to deny any objective status to knowledge beyond that of the product of social forces. It is instead a more mellow version which sees knowledge as constructed rather than directly 'read off' from some reality independently of social forces, but shaped and moulded by theoretical, experimental and social criteria. There is also a general consensus among the contributors that the study of experiment must be approached primarily from a local rather than from a global perspective, or in other words it must be contextualised. In understanding any particular piece of scientific work, the fruitful approach is through a consideration of the material, institutional, experimental, theoretical, instrumental and interpersonal factors operating at the particular time in the local context. The piecemeal approach dominates over the grand unifying vision.

The book's subtitle 'Theories and Stories of doing Physics' reflects the structure of the book. Part One, the theories, contains the more philosophical essays, whilst Part Two, the stories, is more historical in content. Nevertheless this division is mostly a question of degree, since much historical detail is included in Part One, and all of the authors in Part Two have some philosophical conclusion to draw from their case studies.

The first essay, by Peter Galison, exemplifies the approach through local, contextualised subcultures. Galison's emphasis is on the concept of constraints, through which subcultures may be identified. Constraints, according to Galison, act as boundaries which scientists in a particular group are unwilling to transgress. These may be theoretical constraints, such as conservation laws or symmetries, or experimental techniques, such as the evidence provided by bubble-chamber photographs, or practical knowledge, such as the properties of plastics or metals or silicon chips. For large-scale projects, such as the building of a super-collider, constraints may arise from wider sources, for example legal, economic, political or safety considerations.

The existence of such heterogenous constraints requires detailed local analysis and militates against any unifying grand philosophical theory of scientific experimentation. Galison also includes some interesting comments on the similarities between Kuhn's paradigms and Carnap's 'linguistic frameworks' and notes Carnap's positive reactions to seeing the draft of Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions'.

Andrew Pickering rejects Galison's emphasis on constraints and looks instead to the available resources of a particular group. These resources involve some material apparatus, theories about how it works, and some hypotheses about nature. They are flexible and malleable resources and Pickering sees the scientist's task as moulding and adjusting these resources to accommodate and harmonise with each other. The difficulty of experimentation consists precisely in the resistance offered to such accommodation. Pickering illustrates his views with a study of the experiments into free quarks.

Hans Radder's essay analyses in careful detail the different senses in which an experiment may be said to be reproduced. Contrasting the material realisation of an experiment from its theoretical description, he distinguishes three types of reproducibility. First, there is reproducibility of the material representation, under the same or a different theoretical description; second reproducibility under a given theoretical description, possibly under a different material realisation; and third reproducibility of the result of an experiment. He then goes on to discuss the social legitimisation of experimental science. In the early days of the Royal Society this was achieved through the witnessing by a trustworthy audience. Nowadays this legitimising role has been taken over by the technological utilisation of science.

Brian Baigrie compares and contrasts the three preceding essays, seeing Galison's description as more suitable for large scale experiments and Pickering's as appropriate to tabletop experiments. The final essay in Part One, by Yves Gingras, is a sustained criticism of the views of Bruno Latour and Michel Callon.

The essays in Part Two, apparently quite by coincidence, all focus mainly on electromagnetism in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Jed Buchwald's analysis of Hertz's cathode ray experiments and Giora Hon's analysis of Kaufmann's attempted experimental refutation of Lorentz's electron theory and Einstein's relativity theory both illustrate the importance of viewing a given project through the perspective of the local participants. This approach gives a quite different and often more accurate appraisal of the value and justification of an experiment than any subsequent judgement of history as to the success or failure of that experiment.

Margaret Morrison argues that the common distinction between philosophical and scientific considerations in assessing theories and evidence is not one that should be taken too rigidly. Her account of the late-19th-century debates over atomism and the kinetic theory and of Hertz's approach to electromagnetism show how scientific and philosophical issues may interact and influence each other.

Simon Schaffer's essay describes how Victorian astronomy, contrary to the strictures of Laplace and Comte, became an experimental science. The final essay by Andrew Warwick investigates the attempts by Trouton and Larmor to rescue the aether hypothesis and the Fitzgerald contraction. The interplay between experimenter and theorist and the influence of the 'Maxwellian network' of influential scientists is described.

This excellent volume is full of fascinating historical detail and maintains a high level of scholarship. The virtue of considering 'failed' experiments as well as 'successful' ones is well illustrated. The emphasis on the heterogeneity of scientific practice is surely to be welcomed.

Roland Sypel

Metropolitan State College of Denver

Nicholas Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James, eds.

The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy.

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers 1996.

Pp. xiv + 786.

US\$24.95. ISBN 0-631-18788-X.

This book does an admirable job of tackling an extremely ambitious project, namely that of providing a comprehensive, flexible and readable textbook and reference work for students of philosophy.

Philosophy is a notoriously difficult subject to introduce to students, and the *Blackwell Companion* makes it possible to present this extremely broad and varied discipline from both a historical and a topical perspective. The book offers individual chapter coverage of the traditional areas of philosophy including epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, political and social philosophy, and aesthetics. There are also chapters on all of the major 'philosophy of's,' e.g., philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, etc., plus applied ethics and feminism. In addition to these topical areas there are also separate historical chapters on ancient Greek, Medieval, Modern European philosophy, Pragmatism, and individual chapters devoted to many major philosophers beginning with Descartes and concluding with Wittgenstein.

The editors have designed the *Blackwell Companion* to be used in at least three different ways. First, it can function as a textbook for introductory courses in philosophy. The book could support a topical approach to issues in contemporary philosophy, an historical approach to philosophical problems and themes, or a combination of approaches. Second, the *Blackwell Companion* could serve as a secondary reference text that would be helpful to general

readers or to undergraduate philosophy students in clarifying basic philosophical concepts and in sorting out polemical issues and philosophical debates. Third, the *Blackwell Companion* can be used in conjunction with the series of *Blackwell Companions* that provide more specialized and in depth study of philosophical topics. Thus, a student might wish to read the chapter on epistemology in order to obtain some introductory assistance to the topic before consulting *The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology*.

This book does many of the things a good textbook should do. Each chapter covers the central issues of the topic or the individual philosopher and includes cross-references to other chapters. Also, each chapter concludes with a paragraph outlining suggestions for further reading, an extensive bibliographical list of references, and a series of study questions that would be useful for class exercises or as a basis for class discussions or tutorials. There is also a helpful general glossary of philosophical terms.

While the text aims at comprehensive coverage of all the major philosophical disciplines, the general perspective of the contributors is that of twentieth-century, Anglo-American philosophy. The issues, for the most part, are outlined, presented, and argued in the categories and language of contemporary analytic philosophy, and thus there are no discussions or essays featuring the 'demise of philosophy' or attempted deconstructions of philosophical topics or thinkers. Teachers seeking a 'continental' orientation with an Existentialist, Marxist or Phenomenological perspective would have to look elsewhere.

The editors wisely include two introductory essays to the book that provide both an explanation and a rationale for the analytical approach. The first, 'Contemporary Philosophy in the United States', by the eminent language philosopher John R. Searle does a superb job of explaining the origins and methods of analytic philosophy and of tracing its career. In the essay Searle discusses what might be called the unraveling of the verification principle, the ideological center of the logical positivism that dominated Anglo-American philosophy through the middle decades of the twentieth century. Thanks *in part to the original work of philosophers of the stature of Quine and Wittgenstein* there is now, as he says (12), 'no ideological point of reference that is commonly agreed upon; nor is there a universally accepted research programme.' Philosophy now is better off than it was a couple of decades ago, and, he argues (13), has happily become less insular and more interconnected with the sciences and other disciplines such as history that pursue knowledge and truth. Philosophy's defining characteristics, according to Searle, are its generality of orientation and its conceptual and logical focus which enable it to complement many areas of investigation that just a few years ago were for the most part ignored by philosophers.

The second introductory essay, 'Contemporary Philosophy: a Second Look', is by Bernard Williams, the distinguished White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford. Williams' short essay (about twelve pages) is an interesting and provocative attempt to define or fundamentally characterize analytical philosophy. Williams argues that the use of the label 'continental

philosophy' leads to a seriously misleading view of a kind of philosophical work analytical philosophy has typically been contrasted against. As he points out, analytical philosophy has two of its greatest representatives (Frege and Wittgenstein) from continental Europe, and that the practice of so called continental philosophy is not confined to Europe. 'It is not true,' he says (26), 'that work in other styles does not exist in the heartlands of analytical philosophy; it merely does not exist in departments of philosophy. The distinctions involved are not geographical but professional, and what is at issue is the identity of philosophy as a discipline.' In pursuing the distinction that defines philosophy as a discipline and profession Williams argues that what is at stake is whether philosophy as a subject can support a research program that gives some evidence of ongoing, cumulative progress. 'Quite certainly,' he says (26), 'no philosophy which is to be worthwhile should lose the sense that there is something to be got right, that it is answerable to argument and that it is in the business of telling the truth.' 'Worthwhile' philosophy thus would seem to begin with the assumption that some sort of objective truth is attainable and that philosophy is capable of contributing to the stock of human knowledge.

These introductory essays by Searle and Williams are particularly useful in establishing a history and a context for the study of the history of philosophy as well as contemporary philosophical issues. *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy* will be a valuable tool for teachers of philosophy.

Stephen Paul Foster

(University Libraries)

Central Michigan University

Howard Caygill

A Kant Dictionary.

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1995.

Pp. ix + 453.

US\$23.95. ISBN 0-631-17535-0.

I approached *A Kant Dictionary* with scepticism, but came away converted. It is an extremely helpful work. It covers all the main issues briefly but enlighteningly. Its flaws are few, and its omissions minor.

In addition to the alphabetical entries it includes a brief but interesting intellectual biography, 'Kant and the "Age of Criticism"', which includes Kant's own assessment of his work as a young *Privatdozent*: 'I sit daily at the anvil of my lectern and guide the heavy hammer of my repetitious lectures, always beating out the same rhythm,' (19) lectures which however were greeted with 'applause' and indeed which gave rise to even greater demands

on him as a lecturer. Hamann tells us that, as a young man, Kant 'read everything,' and his wide ranging interests and intellectual enthusiasm would almost certainly have coloured his lectures, not to mention the 'playfulness, wit, and humour' which Herder found made his lectures 'the most entertaining talks'.

Throughout the *Dictionary* Caygill has adopted an historical approach, discussing the various concepts in terms both of their development by Kant over his career, and in terms of their prior and subsequent treatment by others. He makes full use of Kant's later, too often ignored, works such as *Reason within the Limits of Reason Alone*, with (for example) its important volte-face (compared with, say, the *Groundwork*) on the notion of a person (*q.v.*).

Caygill presents a balanced view of Kant. Noting, for example, that 'Kant's account of duty has been the subject of almost two centuries of continuous criticism and mockery,' and explaining why this is understandable, he also provides us with a good, if brisk, argument for thinking that such an attitude results from ignoring 'the background to and subtlety of Kant's texts' (167).

He is good on the groups of terms that almost inevitably puzzle readers when they first tackle Kant: *Wille* and *Willkür*, phenomena and noumena, inner and outer sense, and the sensation, perception, apperception, intuition, representation, etc. cluster. His account of *common sense* explains both senses of the term. He illuminatingly separates the notions involved in Kant's use of *Ding*, *Gegenstand*, and *Objekt*, noting that the 'distinction between *Gegenstand* and *Objekt* is crucial to [Kant's] transcendental philosophy.' It is, he adds, 'wholly obliterated in Kemp Smith's translation of CPR' (305). In general the entries are for English terms, but where a term is not easily or consistently translatable (*Gemüt*, for example) it receives its own entry.

There are no entries for topics such as *jokes*, *humour*, *jesting*, or *wit*, though Kant does tell the odd joke. Admittedly, when he does so his interest is more in the reaction to the joke than the joke itself. His jokes, incidentally, are pretty bad, things like someone being so frightened his wig turned grey, *or the one he was told by the Countess von Keyserling concerning a Polish Count* who

met a man who worked in Hamburg and was employed as a collector and curator for a natural history collection that some rich merchants had as a hobby. To make conversation, the Count said to him in broken German: "*Ich abe in Amburg eine Ant geabt (I used to have an aunt in Hamburg), aber die ist mir gestorben.*" "Why didn't you have her skinned and stuffed?" asked the curator at once. The collector took the English word "Ant" which means *Tante* [aunt], for [the German word] "Ente" [duck] and, believing it to be a rare specimen, was deploring the loss. One can imagine [Kant continues] what laughter this misunderstanding provoked. [*Anthropologie* §79n]

Other, minor, omissions concern *dreams*, which are slightly problematic for Kant, since he needs, at one level, to distinguish them from objective

experience and, at another, to allow them full objective weight since, like all items of experience, they are part of the total, determined, causal sequence. *Animals*, too, are neglected, though Kant's views on our duty to animals led Schopenhauer to take him to task: 'so one is only to have compassion on animals for the sake of practice, and they are as it were the pathological phantom on which to train one's sympathy with man!' The sections on *time* and *immortality* omit the fact that though Kant does indeed tell us that 'no sophistry will ever wrest from the conviction of even the most ordinary man an admission that they [the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality] are not true,' he *also* held that time will cease with death (*Ak.* 8:327). But the omissions are minor, and the *Dictionary* is plum full of concepts that one might never have considered, and it contains, as well, a host of helpful cross-references for all the major notions.

On the apparatus side, the *Dictionary* could be improved somewhat. It has a helpful index of concepts, but the index of philosophers is less complete than it should be in these computerized days. The Stoics, for example, are missed in the entry for *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, while the mention of 'Platonic and Stoic virtue' in the entry on *virtue* yields an index citation under the Stoics, but not under Plato. More importantly, perhaps, philosophers such as Reid, Priestley, Marx, Feuerbach, and Strawson all make an appearance in the entries but not in the index. The list of 'Works referred to in the text' is incomplete, and an indication of *where* the various works are mentioned would be helpful. Regrettably there is no general index, so that the reader who remembers a reference to (say) Greenberg, or Kristeva, or Novalis, or Schlegel, or Hölderlin, or Herz, or St. Paul, or Kemp Smith (who doesn't make it into the index of philosophers) will be left to hunt unaided. Finally some mention should be made of the selective list of suggested further reading. It contains some standards, but omits others, and includes some, such as Saner's *Kant's Political Thought: Its Origin and Development*, which I hope never to have to reread. However it also contains various works which deal with facets of Kant which will be unfamiliar to a number of his readers. Finally, there is a full and helpful list of Kant's published writings.

Despite some minor shortcomings, then, this is an excellent book, one which should be recommended to students, and one which all but the most knowledgeable of Kant scholars among professional philosophers will find highly useful.

J.J. MacIntosh

University of Calgary

Deborah Cook

The Culture Industry Revisited:

Theodor W. Adorno on Mass Culture.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1996.

Pp. xiv + 190.

US\$57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8154-8);

US\$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8155-6).

This slender volume will provide both novices and those already familiar with Adorno's work with a clear, accessible, and comprehensive account of Adorno's thoughts on mass culture. Drawing from all corners of Adorno's writings (from his 1932 essay, 'On the Social Situation of Music', to his 1969 essay 'Free Time'), Cook provides a systematic and synoptic introduction to Adorno's critical theory as well as helpful evaluations of the interpretive struggles which followed upon it. The text is largely apologetic and undertakes, with moderate success, to defend Adorno from his critics. In an extensive 'Epilogue', Cook suggests ways that Adorno's insights and theoretical apparatus might be extended and improved to address additional and current topics.

Having confronted the rise of national socialism in Germany, Adorno was acutely concerned with understanding the oppressive dynamics of late capitalism and totalitarianism. He was not, however, satisfied with the critical instruments developed by preceding thinkers. Together with others, such as Walter Benjamin and Max Horkheimer, who would be collected together under the moniker of the 'Frankfurt School', Adorno developed a hybrid form of critical theory which aimed at synthesizing the insights of Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis while engaging more penetrating and complete analyses of the workings of language, iconography, and culture. Adorno's work was especially influential on succeeding theorists such as Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas.

In Chapter One, 'The Sundered Totality', Cook depicts Adorno's Freudo-Marxist paradigm by describing the manner in which Adorno sought to provide a materialist basis to the theories of social repression and narcissism Freud had developed in texts such as *Civilization and Its Discontents* and his essays 'On Narcissism' (1914) and 'Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego' (1921). Cook pointedly delineates how Adorno's theory of capitalist domination may be used to undermine the purportedly independent 'life world' developed by Habermas. She is less effective, however, in defending Adorno's theory from his detractors.

The highly regulated, policed, homogenized, and standardized culture produced by industrial capitalism has, in Adorno's view, undermined the authority of fathers in such a way as to have produced a society of narcissists, incapable of mustering the necessary ego autonomy to resist the manipulative and repressive techniques to which it is subjected. Narcissism becomes, in Cook's words, 'an impediment to resistance against the totally administered world' (16). Christopher Lasch extended this thesis in *Haven in a Heart-*

less World (1977) and *The Culture of Narcissism* (1979). Adorno et al.'s theory has, however, been attacked on grounds of being conservatively nostalgic for a nineteenth-century, middle-class, patriarchal family structure. Others have accused Adorno of portraying an excessively passive portrait of the oppressed and of advocating a progressive but objectionable form of cultural elitism.

Cook defends Adorno against such charges by maintaining, misleadingly, that Adorno's remarks on family are merely descriptive, that Adorno explores the oppressive pathologies to which elites as well as others are afflicted, and that Adorno's view of the masses is not one of consistent or comprehensive passivity. Adorno, however, is an elitist, not simply because he derides the production of mass culture in favor of 'high' art and theory, not because he held some sort of 'contempt of the masses' (67), and not because he might (erroneously) be thought to hold elites immune to pathologies of their own. He is an elitist because he principally locates the agency of resistance and change in the reflective, intellectual power of cultural elites — that is, people like him. Whether, like Plato's, such elitism is misplaced is, of course, an independent question — though his dismissive exclusion of restive agency among other social groups might be read as a symptom of his own incapacitating narcissism.

Cook elaborates and defends Adorno's deployment of liberal, individualistic criticism in Chapter Four, 'Affirmative Culture and Enlightened Critique'. Her interpretation of Adorno's critique of capitalism's lubricated, standardized assault on individualism, particularity, and 'haecceity' is well drawn, though at times perhaps uncomfortably similar to the sort of apology for unregulated, anti-state capitalism advanced by figures such as Friedrich von Hayek.

With regard to family, Cook is similarly better at articulating than at defending Adorno. Adorno's views of family remain patriarchal not because he slips into advocacy rather than remaining objective in his description but because, like Lasch, Adorno's analyses depend upon a patriarchal model of ego development. Cook would have done well to compare Adorno's model with those feminist psychoanalysts (such as Juliet Mitchell, Dorothy Dinnerstein, and Nancy Chodorow) have been developing over the past twenty-five years. References to critiques of family organization and ideology such as Michèle Barrett and Mary McIntosh's *Anti-Social Family* (1982 & 1991) would have also found a place in such an assessment of Adorno. Indeed, for all its eloquent power in explicating and defending Adorno's thought, Cook's text might have been strengthened by addressing criticism and competition beyond the immediate circle of those orbiting the Frankfurt School. Cook would have been especially well advised to address work in feminism, economics, and post-structuralism.

Cook's second chapter, 'Toward a Political Economy of the Culture Industry', is perhaps the strongest of the book. She gives a crystalline explication of how Adorno appropriated Marxian ideas of commodification, fetishization, and the oppressive manner in which exchange-value has supplanted use-

value. Cook is especially skillful in unpacking the terms of criticism Adorno articulated under the rubric of (1) 'standardization', (2) 'pseudo-individualization', (3) 'schematization', and (4) 'stereotype' (39ff.) as well as other terms such as 'reification'. Cook argues that the common base/superstructure distinction has lost its meaning as the economic relations of society have subsumed the cultural. She engages interesting assessments of the subversive powers of film and enlists Adorno's thoughts on music to develop wide-ranging lines of critical assessment of cultural productions. She is right that Adorno's paradigm has been underdeployed in analyzing advertising and distribution networks.

Though Cook frequently appeals to scholars to pursue empirical research concerning Adorno's thought, she tellingly calls for 'empirical validation' rather than for testing and heuristic guidance. It is only in conjunction with such testing and guidance, however, that Adorno's work can be used to establish a truly materialistically grounded and informed critical theory.

Peter S. Fosl
Hollins College

David E. Cooper

World Philosophies: An Historical Introduction.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1996.

Pp. vii + 527.

US\$69.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-18866-5);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-18867-3).

World Philosophies is an attempt to write an introductory philosophy textbook which covers a wide array of philosophical movements from around the world in an historical format. Attempting to write such a work and keep it within a manageable length is a difficult task: inevitably a process of selection occurs. The two most distinctive features of this text are products of the way in which this selection process took place, and are explained by Cooper in an interesting Introductory chapter.

The first significant feature of the book concerns the choice of which philosophers (or, more aptly, which philosophical movements) to include and emphasize. Cooper has attempted to accomplish his goal by focussing on philosophical systems which are in some obvious sense 'worldviews': general accounts of the nature of the world and of humanity. (He suggests that his title is a pun: the philosophies he discusses are both from around the world and are about the World as a whole.) He intends to cover, as he puts it, 'account[s] on the grand scale of the nature of reality, the place of human beings within it, and the implications of all this for how people should com-

port themselves in the world and towards each other.' By doing so he is able to reduce the scope of his task by leaving out thinkers whose writings were very narrow, or clearly derivative, or not productive of any general movement. In keeping with this idea, he has organized his work around movements, rather than individual thinkers. Although Plato, Aristotle, and Kant receive chapters to themselves (each twelve pages long), most of the chapters concern movements with titles like 'Taoism', 'Thomism and its Critics', 'Theistic Vedanta' or 'Postmodernism'.

Having decided which philosophers to include, and which to emphasize, the next crucial question concerns which aspect of each philosopher's thought on which to focus. Again, Cooper makes an interesting decision. He argues that one very significant aspect of philosophy is the attempt by many thinkers to explain how human beings fit in with the universe around them. In one sense, he claims, many people intuitively think of themselves as a part of the natural world around them, and yet in another sense they see themselves as significantly different from rocks, trees, or other species. The book's main theme, or 'Leitmotiv' as Cooper puts it, concerns the attempt by various thinkers to try to resolve this tension, and show how human beings can be unique and yet not utterly alien. Cooper admits that not all philosophers have explicitly or implicitly considered this problem of 'Alienation', yet he argues that most of the great thinkers have had something to say about it, and so he uses this theme to try to tie the chapters together into a more coherent whole.

It is these intriguing preliminary decisions that give the text its character: the execution of the rest of the work is less significant. The book is well balanced geographically (about half on Western thought, and half non-Western, principally Indian and Chinese philosophy) and chronologically (one large part on philosophy up to the medieval period, one from the medievals to the nineteenth century, and one from then to the present). Cooper attempts to give a fairly sympathetic account of the various movements he discusses, and he does a generally good job of showing how the movements originated, what their characteristic positions were, and why other thinkers chose to reject or modify them in turn. Any such treatment is inevitably uneven: philosophers Cooper finds interesting get more treatment than those he does not. For example, Cooper chooses to give Medieval mysticism a chapter of its own, equal to his treatment of Thomism and its critics. While there is some justification for Cooper's claim that mysticism has been given inadequate treatment in many contemporary texts, that doesn't mean that it is as significant as the works of Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, etc. put together.

Cooper covers the central positions of each philosopher, and usually offers something in the way of criticism as well. Many of these criticisms are quite apt, and in some cases he points out flaws in traditional interpretations or criticisms of a thinker or theory. But in a text that tries to cover as much as this one in the space of 500 pages, it is inevitable that many of the discussions are too cursory to be of much value: Cooper's interpretations cannot be defended against rivals, nor his criticisms evaluated.

In sum, this is a very good text to use if a very broad and brief explanation of the major philosophical movements of world history is needed, but is too cursory to really give adequate treatment to any area.

Grant Sterling

Eastern Illinois University

David Copp

Morality, Normativity, and Society.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1995.

Pp. xii + 262.

Cdn\$59.50: US\$39.95. ISBN 0-19-507879-9.

This book makes a significant and original contribution to central contemporary philosophical discussions in meta-ethics, particularly to discussions concerning the truth conditions of moral propositions and the conditions under which moral standards or codes are justified. It will be of interest not only to moral philosophers, but also to those interested in normative standards more generally, in the concept of a society, and in theories of rational choice, including theories of rational choice for societies. The level of discussion is very sophisticated, and it is likely to be adequately appreciated only by an audience well-trained in the analytic tradition. The book is a meticulously thorough example of analytic moral philosophy, and needs to be 'worked through' rather than just read. In it Copp unifies more than a decade of work into a rich, comprehensive, and sustained development and defense of his views. The book is a wealth of arguments which I do not intend to take on here. Instead, I will give a sense of the focal points of the book to show that whatever one thinks of the conclusions, Copp has outlined a project that bears taking very seriously.

Copp has two primary goals. The first is to develop an account of the truth conditions of normative propositions. Since moral claims express normative propositions, this account will explain the truth conditions of moral propositions. He calls it the 'standard-based theory'. The second goal is to develop a theory of justification of moral codes and standards called the 'society-centred theory'. Along the way Copp addresses questions ranging from 'What is a society?' and 'Can societies be rational choosers?' to 'Is normative skepticism justified?' and 'What is a moral reason?' A third goal is to defend a theory of rational choice for societies based on facts about their needs, values, and preferences. He calls it the 'needs-and-values' theory.

According to the standard-based theory of normativity, a normative proposition is true just in case a relevant standard is justified. Moral propositions,

as a subset of normative propositions, are true then, just in case a relevant moral standard is justified. It is a consequence of this theory that most moral claims imply the existence of a relevant and appropriately justified moral standard. The standard-based theory of normativity is unique in that it ties the truth of normative propositions to the conditions under which certain normative standards are justified. It is a cognitivist theory insofar as it claims that moral propositions admit of truth values. Unlike most cognitivist theories, however, the standard-based theory does not account for the normative feature of moral propositions in terms of their connection with reasons or motivation. Since it explains normativity in terms of standards, the internalist-externalist debate about reasons and motivation is not as central to this theory as it is to most cognitivist theories.

Moral propositions are true just in case a relevant moral standard is appropriately justified. The society-based theory of justification specifies the justification criteria for moral standards. It is not the only theory of justification that is consistent with the standard-based theory of normativity. Nevertheless, Copp effectively shows that the two together comprise a plausible package. The society-centred theory of justification for moral standards justifies moral codes and standards relative to societies. Some moral code is justified relative to a society 'if and only if the society would be rationally required to select the code to serve in it as its social moral code, in preference to any alternative' (103). A social moral code is 'the public moral code that is socially enforced, culturally transmitted, and generally subscribed to by the members of the society as a moral code' (104). Moral standards are distinguished from standards of other kinds in virtue of an agent's attitude in subscribing to them. According to this 'attitudinal conception' of moral standards, when a person subscribes to a standard as a moral standard, then that standard is a moral standard. The attitude of subscribing to a standard as a moral standard is a complex attitude that involves, among other things, the desire that the standard 'have currency' in one's society (89). In order to subscribe realistically to a moral code, a person must desire that it be accepted as her society's social moral code. Given this feature of realistic subscription, Copp suggests that it makes the most sense to evaluate moral codes from the point of view of societies, not just individuals. In short, this feature of subscription supports the society-centred theory's claim that the justification property of a moral code is that it would be rational for the society as a whole to choose that code.

The society-centred theory of justification raises a host of questions, and Copp is thorough in addressing them. He outlines the conditions under which a group counts as a society (143). He also addresses the question 'can societies be rational choosers?' The answer: yes (144-66). Most importantly, in order to address the issue of standards of rational choice for societies, Copp defends the 'needs-and-values' theory according to which what is rational for a society is a function of the society's needs, values, and preferences. The most basic need of a society is the need for a social moral code.

As we should expect from a book whose central topic is meta-ethics, Copp's theory speaks to the ongoing discussion of realism and relativism. The theory is a form of realism in that moral claims have truth values, and some moral propositions are true. Insofar as its justification conditions are relative to societies, it is a form of relativism. Nonetheless, no moral code is justified for a society unless the society would be rational to accept it. Given this rational constraint on justified moral codes, the relativism captured in this view is not pernicious; moral codes are not justified simply in virtue of being chosen by a society. In addition, the theory represents a form of naturalism. If we accept Copp's package, including the needs-and-values theory, moral facts are empirical. They are empirical because the facts about what the best moral code for a society would be are co-extensive with the facts about what would best serve the society's needs.

I have touched on some central features of Copp's book to give some idea of the richness of the discussions contained in it, and the scope of its attention. There is hardly a debate in contemporary meta-ethics that Copp's views do not address in some respect. The book deserves, and will no doubt take, a central place in the philosophical literature.

Tracy Isaacs

The University of Western Ontario

Drucilla Cornell

*The Imaginary Domain: Abortion,
Pornography and Sexual Harassment.*
New York: Routledge 1995.

Pp. xii + 292.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-90600-8);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-91160-5).

For feminist legal theorists, does postmodernism lead to political liberalism? The American law professor and playwright Drucilla Cornell thinks so. In her latest book she constructs a detailed argument about 'the relationship of sexual difference to equality and of equality to freedom' (4), adroitly employing Rawlsian political theory and, less successfully, Lacanian psychoanalysis to her task of conceptualizing women's equality. Whereas Rawls assumes (she says) that persons are fixed or given when they engage in practical reasoning behind the veil of ignorance, Cornell contends that each human being is always becoming the person she or he wants to be. This postmodernist project 'demands the space for the renewal of the imagination and the concomitant re-imagining of who one is and who one seeks to become' (5). Accordingly, as a condition precedent to the practical reasoning required by

the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, women must have 'the equivalent chance to transform ourselves into individuated beings who can participate in public and political life as equal citizens' (4). Furthermore, Cornell maintains that sex, not merely gender, is critical to every human being's project of becoming a person. 'Sex is so basic to who we are that when we imagine ourselves, sex is always already in the picture' (6). Drawing inspiration from Lacan, she argues that we assume sexual personae through unconscious, encoded fantasies and identifications. An adequate feminist theory of legal equality must explicitly recognize the 'sexuate bases of each one of us as a human creature' (6).

For Cornell, this conception of equality, which does not merely take sexual difference into account but places sexuality at its centre, demands the equal protection of three minimum conditions of individuation: bodily integrity, a prerequisite to any meaningful concept of selfhood; access to symbolic forms that permit development of linguistic skills sufficient for differentiation of self from others; and protection of the imaginary domain itself, especially with respect to envisioning sexual personae. Ensuring that women enjoy these minimum conditions of individuation will lead to reformulations of laws that currently thwart the ongoing project of personhood for individual women. The intrepid Cornell tackles the thorny question of appropriate legal regulation, if any, in 'three of the most difficult issues facing feminists — abortion, pornography and sexual harassment' (25). She defends a woman's unqualified right to decide for herself whether to have an abortion (a right recognized in Canada since the Supreme Court in 1988 struck down the criminal prohibition of abortion) as essential to each woman's capacity to imagine and project herself over time as a being with bodily integrity. In the same vein, the central problem with pornography and sexual harassment is their curtailment of the 'psychic space needed to truly play with imposed and assumed sexual personae' (9). She disagrees with censorship of pornography but supports zoning laws restricting its circulation and display, on the ground that women are entitled to avoid exposure to pornography's dictatorial representation of the 'truth' about sex. The harm of sexual harassment is its degrading effect on women's self-respect as sexuate beings and their chance of sexual freedom itself. She argues that Rawls' definitions of objectivity and reasonableness ought to replace the current standards used by courts to identify harassing behaviour, and that courts must 'replace the gender basis of comparison with one based in the primary good of self respect' (178). These new standards will reflect and produce greater equality for women. For example, protecting the imaginary domain requires a ban on questions about whether women engaged in conduct that 'asked for' sexual harassment, such as wearing short skirts.

Overall, Cornell offers an original and important book for political theorists and feminist practitioners who grapple with issues of equality and sexuality. She draws upon the best of political liberalism and radical feminism while pointing out weaknesses and constructing improvements in their conceptions of equality. Radical feminism, while praiseworthy for its emphatic attention to sexuality, 'implicitly denies to women the possibility of any

equivalent evaluation of our sex' (234), as least in the form articulated by its leading American proponent, Catherine McKinnon. The chapter on pornography is particularly enlightening, critically addressing the conflicting approaches of McKinnon and Ronald Dworkin, and incorporating Cornell's experience as a playwright and her knowledge of the efforts of sex workers to unionize and obtain better working conditions. However, the Lacanian psychoanalysis often contributes little to her arguments' persuasiveness. Sometimes I wondered why she bothered to include it, a question shared by students in my feminist legal theory class who otherwise found the book insightful in dealing with theoretical and practical questions about legal regulation. If Lacanian explanations are indeed crucial to her specific arguments about reformulating laws, she fails to make the case clearly for her readers. Happily, this obscurity is handily offset by the sensitive critique of radical feminism and excellent feminist elaboration of Rawls. Cornell promises another book to explore further the relationship between Rawlsian theory and feminism, which I join my students in awaiting with anticipation.

Donna Greschner

(College of Law)

University of Saskatchewan

Martin Davies and Tony Stone

Folk Psychology.

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1995.

Pp. viii + 301.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-19514-9);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-19515-7).

Martin Davies and Tony Stone

Mental Simulation.

Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1995.

Pp. viii + 286.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-19872-5);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-19873-3).

The focus of these two volumes is the problem of how people normally predict behavior and mental states of other people. According to the view which currently enjoys widest acceptance — the theory-theory — such predictions are a result of applying a theory of mind, a theory which we learn or at least come to master during early childhood years. Simulation theory, on the other hand, claims that our predictions depend on an ability to imaginatively project ourselves into another's situation. The other's situation is here under-

stood to include not only his observable surroundings but also his current beliefs, desires, fears, hopes, etc. Once we have successfully placed ourselves in the other's shoes, so to speak, prediction is simply a matter of determining what we would do or think in the given situation. The debate between theory-theory and simulation theory is likely to be of greatest interest to philosophers who have a predilection for issues that turn on a mix of conceptual and empirical problems. The essays in these volumes illustrate very well the main pitfall of such issues: it can be extraordinarily difficult to determine exactly what empirical consequences are entailed by each of two competing theories.

All of the essays in *Folk Psychology* (hereafter *FP*) have been previously published, though ten appeared originally as a special issue of *Mind and Language*. In *Mental Simulation* (hereafter *MS*) ten of the essays are new. In most cases, essays appearing later in both volumes are written with knowledge of the earlier essays, so the discussions are enhanced by much commenting and replying.

Though the theory-theory is clearly the dominant theory among practitioners in this area, Davies and Stone have made sure that proponents for both sides have roughly equal space to make their case. The discussions in most essays are extremely useful. Anyone who is initially unfamiliar with the debate will be fully up to speed by the time both books are completed. However, it appears unlikely that the effect of these volumes will be either to unseat the dominant theory-theory or to eliminate simulation theory as a serious competitor. Several reasons for this emerge as one works through the two volumes.

First, there is considerable disagreement among advocates of simulation theory about the precise claims of the theory. Indeed, taken individually, the simulation theorists sometimes seem confused about their own versions of the theory. The most common version of the position holds that simulation depends on introspective knowledge of one's own mental states and processes coupled with analogical inference to predictions about others. Moreover, it is generally assumed that such analogical reasoning depends upon a prior possession of the relevant mental concepts such as 'belief' and 'desire'. However, Robert Gordon's version of the simulation theory denies all of these assumptions (*MS*, 53-4). Gordon characterizes simulation as a process involving a non-inferential 'projection,' an 'egocentric shift,' a 'recentering of one's egocentric map,' an 'imaginative identification.' The terminology is certainly suggestive in various ways, but Gordon never provides a clearly coherent account of what the terms mean or how his version differs from a more standard, less radical view of simulation theory (see Stich and Nichols, *MS* 91). The common simulationist claim that predictions are obtained by having mental processes run 'off-line', according to Gordon, is really an 'ancillary hypothesis' not essential to the simulation theory (*FP*, 174). But Gordon does not explain what remains of the simulation theory if we detach it from off-line simulation. Gordon refers to the default mode of simulation as 'total projection', that is, simulation done 'without even an adjustment for spatial or

temporal differences' (FP, 102). The problem here is that Gordon needs to specify exactly what adjustments are made in total projection. If *no* adjustments are made, it is not clear in what sense one can be said to be simulating.

Alvin Goldman's version of the simulation theory is less radical than Gordon's, yet some of Goldman's assumptions nevertheless raise troubling questions about the real differences between simulation theory and the theory-theory. He allows that mental simulations can be 'theory-driven' in the sense that the simulation is 'guided by theory' (FP, 195). He also allows that a simulation can appeal to information that is represented propositionally or sententially (FP, 196). The *difference* between simulation and prediction based solely on folk theory, according to Goldman, is that simulation eschews 'nomological information' and 'causal generalizations'. There is a clear basis for confusion here about how a simulation can be theory-driven and still make no use of causal generalizations.

A second reason for thinking that the status quo will not change is the fact that, though these books contain a great deal of discussion of experimental data, there appear to be no genuinely decisive empirical results that provide unequivocal support for just one of the theories. The typical pattern is that an experimental result is offered up by one side as clearly supporting its theory and as posing a problem for the other side. The opposition then simply shows that the results are easily and naturally explainable within the competing framework. A typical example is the results on cognitive impenetrability which Stich and Nichols claim are contrary to simulation theory. In one experiment subjects who examined identical garments displayed on a counter in a shopping mall usually indicated a preference for the garment on the right. One is unlikely to predict such behavior by appealing to folk psychology alone. However, the critical point is that the correct prediction is easily achieved by simply adjusting the theory used for predictions. The prediction process is thus 'cognitively penetrable' under the theory-theory. Such an adjustment cannot be expected, according to Stich and Nichols, if prediction is done by simulation. Under the simulation model, one simply imagines oneself examining the identical garments and then makes a prediction based on one's own preferences. Simulation should yield the same incorrect result as the folk theory. But under the simulation theory there should be no way to correct the prediction based on knowledge of the results of the experiment. In response, Gordon and Goldman point out that the inputs to a simulation must be identical (in imagination, at least) to the inputs to subjects in the actual experiment. However, the simulator, unlike the actual subjects, must be *told* that the garments in question are identical. There is also the fact that any prediction based on simulation must *begin* with the current beliefs, desires, preferences, etc. of the individual being simulated. A simulation which begins with the assumption that the individual in question has a preference for objects on the right will clearly have a different outcome from one that begins with no such assumption about initial preferences. Such adjustments of assumptions about initial preferences, it

appears, can achieve the same effect as the adjustment of folk psychological theory.

A third reason for thinking that the current standoff will not change is that both theories are burdened by the need for an extensive and problematic array of assumptions about tacit knowledge and/or unconscious mental processing. Simulation theorists are fond of pointing out that the theory-theory assumes that even small children have a full working command of complex psychological generalizations which even adults have difficulty verbalizing (FP, 46-7, 79-80). Indeed, the full folk theory which children must be presumed to have mastered has yet to be completely articulated in words. However, if the simulation theory requires little in the way of tacit knowledge, it nevertheless requires positing a great deal of unconscious processing. Doubtless we are occasionally conscious of adopting the imaginary point of view, for example, of a chess opponent. But the simulation theorist is committed to the view that *every* prediction we make about the behavior and mental states of others derives from some process of simulation. Our social interactions with others depend on hundreds of humdrum predictions: my students predict that I will show up for class; I predict that the car coming in the other direction will not suddenly swerve into my lane and cause a head-on collision; the passenger predicts that the pilot will fly the plane to its scheduled destination rather than deliberately crashing, etc. Clearly, there is no *conscious* changing of shoes for any of these predictions. Hence, any simulations on which such predictions are based must be unconscious.

Though it is clear that simulation theory is not about to unseat the theory-theory, the essays in these books also provide at least one compelling reason to think that simulation theory is unlikely to go away. Paul Harris notes that we are generally very successful in predicting which word strings another English speaker will regard as grammatical and which she will regard as ungrammatical. But, Harris notes, it 'strains both credulity and parsimony' to suppose that we possess one set of rules for making our own decisions about grammaticality and a distinct set of rules for predicting the responses of others (FP, 211). The simulation theorist's proposal is much more elegant for this type of prediction: we make our own determination of whether the string is grammatical and then simply attribute that result to others.

Since neither theory achieves the status of clear winner, it seems reasonable to consider some sort of accommodation. This is the one significant area in which the Davies and Stone anthologies leave something to be desired. When stalemates occur in science, it is normal to develop new theories which recognize that both of the former competitors contained a grain truth. Given the above noted fuzziness on the part of simulation theorists concerning the details of their theory, the prospects for such a reconciliation seem promising. Unfortunately, readers will have to look elsewhere for a serious attempt to develop such a hybrid theory.

Davies and Stone have produced two extremely valuable collections which accurately depict the current state of the debate between the theory-theory

and simulation theory. Prospective buyers of the volumes should be cautioned against purchasing only one. Most of the essays in *MS* are written with the assumption that the reader is familiar with the essays in *FP*. This point probably would have been conveyed more effectively if the editors had chosen to use the labels 'Volume 1' and 'Volume 2'.

Ken Warmbrød

University of Manitoba

William H. Dray

History as Re-enactment — R.G. Collingwood's Idea of History.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1995. Pp. 288.

Cdn\$108.00: US\$49.95. ISBN 0-19-824293-X.

It's possible to be dishonest in philosophy, and this is the proof. Dray's book is a sustained polemic pretending to be a scholarly monograph. It does it by taking all of analytic philosophy's assumptions on historiography for granted, and measuring, in the light of this, an author — Collingwood — whose life work consisted in the demolition of the very assumptions which Dray takes for eternal verities. In this way Dray shows, to his own satisfaction, that Collingwood was not an analytic philosopher. That's a bit like going to great pains to prove that Churchill was not a dentist. That may be so, but it doesn't tell us much about Churchill, or in this case, Collingwood.

The issues involved here are not only central to philosophy but to all of the social sciences. They must be made explicit if they are going to be rescued from the partisan treatment they receive at Dray's hands. At least part of the matter is that old divide between analytic (or 'Anglo-American') philosophy on the one hand, continental philosophy on the other (according to a different classification: Idealism/Realism), going back at least as far as Kant's critique of Hume (Pascal versus Descartes, for that matter), reaching a kind of dramatic head during this century in the confrontation between Popper and Adorno in the early sixties. As John Passmore puts it: 'These two kinds of philosophising still survive. Philosophy is not, as science is, a single intellectual community. It is not just, as is also true in science, that philosophers specialise. In a much more divisive way, they have different philosophical heroes, different ideas about what constitutes good and bad philosophising' ('Recent Philosophers' — a supplement to *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* [London 1985], 12).

Dray's speciality is the *ad hominem*, the snide insinuation, the academic nudge and wink, the pedant's 'we are not amused'. Take the standard problem of how we are to relate to the views and attitudes of those who come from cultures different from our own, separated from us by time, geography, cultural differences — or, for that matter, by class, race or gender. No aspirant historian can ignore it. The literature on this question is huge; publications abound on individual aspects thereof — understanding versus explanation, *verstehen/erklären*, hermeneutics, structuralism versus functionalism, causes versus reasons. The questions are discussed not only by philosophers and historians but by sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists. In short: this is a standard problematic within all of the social sciences. This may offend our intuition that there are objective truths independent of the knowing subject doing the perceiving — which is what analytic philosophy insists the natural sciences are saying — but from Kant onwards even this has been forcefully challenged.

That for Collingwood these questions are central is clear even from the tendentious way they are presented in this book, but it is typical for Dray that views he disapproves of are not countered by argument but rejected as the personal eccentricities of the person holding them: 'As mentioned by Collingwood himself in his *Autobiography*, it seems to have been only in his lectures of 1928, after having experienced something like a philosophical "illumination" at le Marteau in France, that he came to make central to his account of historical reconstruction the notion that, if the historian is to understand past human activities in a properly humanistic way, he must get "inside" them by a process of re-thinking or re-enactment' (23).

In Dray's portrayal of things, Collingwood is an eccentric oddball whose views are so outlandish that we owe a special debt of gratitude to anyone prepared to muster the patience to study this stuff at all: 'It thus sometimes requires a certain amount of patience, and even of goodwill, to elicit a sensible and coherent doctrine from what Collingwood actually has to say. There is nevertheless comfort for perplexed students of his writings to be derived from the attitude which he himself adopted to the writings of Fichte. "The chief difficulty which a reader finds in dealing with Fichte's view of history", Collingwood declares, "is the difficulty of being patient with what appears so silly".'

A few more examples of Dray's style: 'apparent arrogance or intransigence', 'brusque remarks', 'stridency of manner and unevenness of performance', 'he snaps at an imaginary interlocutor bold enough to demand supporting reasons for a position he has taken: "I am not arguing; I am telling him".' 'there are traces of irritability in the earlier works as well as in the later' — some positions are 'grossly misconceived', but this may have been the result of his 'failing health'.

In short, anyone serious about understanding Collingwood or the issues raised by him will have to look elsewhere. The primary bibliography is useful, however, as well as the list of at least some of the unpublished manuscripts held by the Bodleian Library in Oxford.

All of this is a pity. Collingwood was publishing in the period between the wars, in the middle of that European and then world catastrophe which Hobsbawm calls The Age of Total War, and which was to cast its malevolent shadow upon everything which was to follow. His *Speculum Mentis* was published in 1924, his *Essay on Philosophical Method* in 1933, his *Autobiography* in 1939 (in which he explains why he was so dissatisfied with the Realism of his Oxford tutors, the same Realism with which Collingwood-expert Dray then beats him about the head half a century later), *Essay on Metaphysics* in 1940, *The Idea of Nature* posthumously in 1945. The dates speak volumes.

Our world is in crisis, while an important part of the intellectuals operating in the university system of education pretend that there is nothing amiss, and imply that even pointing this out is somehow 'not quite nice', an abuse of the rules of etiquette, or a subjective value-judgement not supported by the evidence.

'Two world wars in one generation, separated by an uninterrupted chain of local wars and revolutions, followed by no peace treaty for the vanquished and no respite for the victor, have ended in the anticipation of a third World War between the two remaining world powers. This moment of anticipation is like the calm that settles after all hopes have died. We no longer hope for an eventual restoration of the old world order with all its traditions, or for the reintegration of the masses of five continents who have been thrown into a chaos produced by the violence of wars and revolutions and the growing decay of all that has still been spared.' That was written by Hannah Arendt, not by Collingwood, and it is language which in its sense of urgency goes beyond that of the philosophizing Oxford don. But the words express the same sense of unease with a historiographic positivism which thinks of its own enterprise as an 'empirical science, like meteorology' (*The Idea of History*, 1), the same sense of unease which moves Collingwood to turn to philosophy as a means of discussing these things. On all this one learns nothing at all from Dray, because the latter represents the same narrow specialisation, the same academic provincialism, against which Collingwood was protesting in his writing — unavailingly, as we learn from this book.

Frederik van Gelder

(*Institut für Sozialforschung*)

Frankfurt University

Pascal Engel

Philosophie et psychologie.

Paris: Gallimard, coll. Folio/Essais 1996.

Pp. 473.

n.p. ISBN 2-07-032864-3.

Au cours des ans, Engel s'est imposé comme une des figures de proue de la philosophie analytique et de la philosophie de l'esprit anglo-saxonne en France. La courant de naturalisation qui touchait ces domaines lui a permis d'apprécier la contribution de la psychologie au renouvellement de certaines problématiques philosophiques, ce qui ne manqua pas de se refléter dans ses propres recherches. Or il semble que cette position d'ouverture face à la psychologie lui ait valu d'être accusé par certains de ses collègues français de «psychologisme». Comment comprendre cette attitude à l'égard de la psychologie qui s'est traduite au cours des ans par un mépris, sinon par une négligence complète de celle-ci?

Le livre d'Engel est une tentative de s'attaquer à ce problème en allant à sa source. Celle-ci se situerait à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle au moment où la psychologie quitta le giron de la philosophie pour se constituer comme science, c'est-à-dire lorsque les psychologues allemands décidèrent d'appliquer à l'étude de l'esprit les méthodes expérimentales des sciences de la nature. En dépit de cette rupture, on considérerait que la psychologie restait près de la philosophie, puisque suivant Mill, on croyait que les phénomènes les plus abstraits de la pensée humaine (comme la logique) devaient exemplifier les mêmes lois fondamentales que celles régissant les processus les plus élémentaires de la perception sensorielle (*i.e.* les lois de l'association).

Frege et Husserl contestèrent cette assimilation des domaines, diagnostiquant une confusion entre le caractère objectif et normatif de certaines notions, d'une part, et leur origine naturelle ou leur appréhension par l'esprit, d'autre part. Ils firent si bien qu'on considéra ensuite les deux disciplines comme étrangères une à l'autre et qu'on condamna systématiquement tout recours à la psychologie en philosophie comme une instance de cette confusion. Cependant, la critique quiniennne de la distinction analytique/synthétique et le retour du mentalisme sous la forme des sciences cognitives pourraient bien avoir changé les données du débat, c'est du moins ce que croit Engel qui veut rouvrir le dossier psychologie et philosophie. Selon lui, la cause mérite d'être réentendue. En fait, et c'est la thèse centrale du livre, on peut plaider en faveur d'un «psychologisme faible ou raisonnable» sorte de *tertium datur* entre le «philosophisme» et le «scientifisme», seules alternatives envisagées jusqu'ici dans le débat.

Dans son premier chapitre, Engel revient sur les arguments qui justifient la condamnation du psychologisme pour en dégager le «noyau de vérité». Pour ce faire, il réévalue, d'une part, la pertinence des arguments avancés par Frege et Husserl contre les «psychologistes» de l'époque et conclut que plusieurs ne valent que contre la psychologie subjective du début du siècle.

D'autre part, il dénonce la coupure nette chez Frege entre un «monde 3» (celui des sens) et un «monde 2» (celui des représentations psychologiques ou «pensées») qui génère plus d'obscurité que de lumière et rend coupable par avance toute tentative de rapprochement. De toute façon, Wittgenstein a bien montré l'inutilité d'une pareille mythologie mettant ainsi au jour l'essence de l'argument anti-psychologiste: les notions normatives, comme celles de raisons ne sont pas réductibles aux notions naturelles (comme celles de causes). Si cette thèse est correcte, soutient Engel, les conséquences qu'on en a tirées ne le sont pas: *[...] bien que les considérations causales touchant à la constitution psychologiques des individus ne soient pas de même nature ou de même catégorie que les considérations normatives portant sur les concepts objectifs qu'ils possèdent, elles ont quelque chose à voir avec celles-ci, et jouent au moins partiellement un rôle dans leur caractérisation: les faits concernant la psychologie d'une notion ne sont pas totalement étrangers à ce qui relève de sa définition. C'est ce que j'appellerai la présomption psychologiste*⁶ (113-4). Cette présomption, qui est le pivot de son livre, le conduira à étudier le «monde 2 1/2» où psychologie et philosophie interagissent.

Au second chapitre, Engel s'attaque à l'une des variantes de l'anti-psychologisme, celle qui soutient qu'en s'occupant de causes mentales ou physiques des phénomènes mentaux, la psychologie néglige la dimension essentielle de l'esprit qui est celle des raisons. C'est à la version wittgensteinienne de cet argument que s'attaquera l'auteur en utilisant les idées développées par Davidson selon lesquelles l'explication par les raisons est bien une explication causale et que les événements décrits du point de vue intentionnel sont, sous une autre description, subsumables sous des lois strictes. Le monisme anomal de Davidson pose cependant certains problèmes, dont la réduction exclusive du mental au monde des attitudes propositionnelles qui freine inutilement, à son avis, la recherche de causes intermédiaires entre le niveau personnel et physique. Cette zone intermédiaire est explorée dans le chapitre suivant sous l'angle de la connaissance tacite postulée par les cognitivistes pour expliquer des phénomènes comme la vision ou la compréhension du langage. Engel s'en prend alors aux néo-wittgensteiniens qui soutiennent que cette notion implique une erreur de catégorie ainsi qu'aux philosophes comme Searle qui la récuse sur la base d'une réduction du mental au conscient. Il montre comment ces critiques reposent en fait sur une incompréhension de la nature et des propriétés de cette forme de connaissance et présente certaines thèses de Peacocke qui permettent de rapprocher le niveau subpersonnel du niveau personnel.

Engel examine ensuite différents travaux de psychologues sur les concepts, le raisonnement et le développement de la théorie de l'esprit en mettant l'emphase sur le fait qu'ils ont tous une dimension irréductiblement normative. Par exemple, les psychologues peuvent bien proposer que la forme de la représentation des concepts est prototypique plutôt que «socratique», mais ces études reposent toujours sur une définition implicite de ce que c'est

que posséder un concept. Cette définition, que la philosophie tente de rendre explicite, n'est assurément pas quelque chose que l'on peut déterminer empiriquement. Il soutient toutefois que des propositions comme celles de Peacocke qui décrivent la possession de concepts indépendamment de la possession du langage, permettent de concevoir une division du travail entre philosophie et psychologie, que ne permettaient pas des théories comme celles de Quine ou Davidson.

Le livre s'achève par une réflexion sur le projet d'une épistémologie naturalisée. Rejetant d'emblée le programme quinién parce qu'il met l'épistémologie «au chômage» et considérant les insuffisances de l'analyse a prioriste traditionnelle de l'épistémologie analytique, l'auteur se tourne vers le fiabilisme de Goldman. Le problème avec le fiabilisme, comme le montre Engel, c'est que, contrairement à ce que Goldman prétend, l'explication de la justification ne semble pouvoir faire l'économie de concepts normatifs, comme de la croyance dans le fait que notre environnement est celui dans lequel nos processus sont fiables, c'est-à-dire qu'il doit être considéré comme l'environnement normal de ceux-ci. Ce genre de critique, qui montre qu'il est impossible de tirer la norme du fait, devrait tempérer l'enthousiasme des naturalistes tous azimuts, sans toutefois conforter les «philosophistes» dans leur position.

En résumé, malgré le fait que ce livre n'apprendra probablement pas grand chose aux spécialistes et que les propositions positives concernant le monde «2 1/2» sont souvent plus programmatiques qu'autre chose, il constitue néanmoins une excellente introduction au débat psychologisme/antipsychologisme. L'ouvrage, écrit dans un style clair et compréhensif, permet au lecteur de redécouvrir certaines affinités profondes entre la philosophie analytique et la phénoménologie (avant le schisme), de comprendre la logique qui a menée au rejet de la psychologie et surtout d'en évaluer la pertinence à la lumière de la philosophie et psychologie contemporaine. Pour ces raisons, je ne saurais trop en recommander la lecture.

Luc Faucher

Université du Québec à Montréal

Dwight Furrow

*Against Theory: Continental and Analytic
Challenges in Moral Philosophy.*

New York: Routledge 1995.

Pp. xx + 224.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-91097-X);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-91080-3).

Hegel is reputed to have put the finishing touches on his *Phenomenology of Spirit* to an accompaniment of cannon-fire as Napoleon's troops entered Jena. Thus began an antagonism, practically definitive of modernity, between a French Enlightenment universalism that soured into imperialist imposition, and a German counter-assertion of particularism that soured into closure and intolerance. In moral philosophy, the rationalism of universal ethical theories runs the risk of ignoring the essentially local contexts of ethical dilemmas. But often the response, by valorizing just those local contexts, runs the equal risk of not according full moral status to those on the outside of one's local grouping. Both suffer, in a phrase that Furrow uses repeatedly, from 'moral blindness.'

Furrow's aim is to break the deadlock of this antagonism by developing a third option: a non-theoretical, non-rationalist ethical universalism. On the way, he also paints a nuanced picture of the relations between Anglo-American historicists and French post-modernists, detecting an important fault line that corresponds to the distinction between a pure particularism and his goal of context-sensitivity compatible with universalism.

The book takes its shape from this confrontation: the first part devoted to the historicists, and the second to the post-modernists. (There is also a slightly awkward 'Thematic Summary' that rehearses the whole argument at some length, and smacks of editorial intervention.) Furrow does not spend too much time defending the cogency of the anti-theory position; but his own claim that the book is merely 'tracing the implications' (xiii) of the position is belied by its consistent argumentative depth. His characterization, for instance, of the misplaced motivations of moral theorizing is full of insight. If, as Furrow argues, the human condition is shot through with vulnerability to the contingent, then *theorizing* morality misses the point. Fleeing to the fortress-like certitudes of reason is a *denial* of this vulnerability, and what is needed is an ethics that responds to contingency rather than attempting to annihilate it. (Furrow argues further that non-foundational modes of theorizing, such as reflective equilibrium, are in the same position as regular theorizing: *any* appeal to abstract principles cleaves ethics from its essential conditions.)

It is of course the historicists who provide the traditional response, introducing what Furrow terms, with a nod to Hegel's *Sittlichkeit*, a 'concrete ethics' (200 note 10). Furrow covers three historicists in his account: MacIntyre, Nussbaum and Rorty. Each, in Furrow's view, is alert to the relativist problem of particularism; but ultimately none have the internal resources to

contest it and therefore to generate any kind of universalism. MacIntyre's solution is that criteria interior to tradition can, in certain circumstances, warrant a radical break with that tradition under the external impetus of an alien tradition. Nussbaum's solution is to defend a classical literary sensibility whereby one does not seek to defuse ethical conflict of goods (what she calls tragedy), but accepts that one will inevitably do evil in choosing. Rorty suggests that we must support our own traditions publicly, but that in private we may be lucid about the lack of ground for such support and temper it with irony.

Furrow argues that the constitutive or transcendental efficacy of local tradition is in considerable tension with the historical contingency of any particular tradition. Because our moral and social identities as well as our life-worlds (populated by morally salient properties) are constructed from historically local materials, we would be giving up both ourselves and our worlds if we changed; such a mutation would in effect be a form of collective social suicide.

He also offers a diagnosis of this situation: it is because identity and the moral-perceptual world are constituted contrastively or divisively (i.e., against what they are not) that conflict is made necessary. Furrow therefore sees Nussbaum's tragic outlook not really as a solution, but as a *reductio*: if we continue to conceive ethical commitments contrastively, then irrecoverable tragedy is the result. If the premise is false, then what is the alternative? This is where Furrow appeals to French thinkers, and in particular, Levinas and Lyotard. Both have emerged from a phenomenological neo-Kantianism that avoids the inconsistencies of trying (as the historicists do) to give transcendental weight to the empirical vagaries of history.

The axiom of this phenomenological work is that the transcendental conditions of representation are not capable of cognitive representation; in Heidegger's *argot*, making present is not itself something present. Transcendental research therefore reveals something that is universally shared by all humans (as representing creatures), but which is not a theoretical principle or a contrastive principle of identity. In the abstract this fits the bill for Furrow's third alternative. This argument is bolstered because both Levinas and Lyotard follow the structure of Kant's work closely in thinking that what is not accessible to cognition (but nevertheless transcendently implicated by it) is the ethical. Levinas' quasi-phenomenologies locate this dimension in an infinite obligation to the Other (person) revealed in the face; and Lyotard's analysis in *The Differend*, shows (in Furrow's summary on p. 182) that 'bearing witness to the impossibility of presenting the unrepresentable' is 'justice.'

It is, however, not obvious that we are compelled to think absolute alterity as ethics (and Furrow draws attention to this in Levinas' case on p. 153) rather than something else or nothing at all. Indeed, the negative thrust of the arguments suggests that *any* positive characterization will be illegitimate. The universality that Furrow suggests is so thin (it is difficult to imagine one thinner than blank alterity) that it seems almost inevitable that some positive content will be imposed on it, in this case ethics. It is tempting to

wonder if this is the basis of Enlightenment imperialism: the vacuity of universals is just what permits them to be the most insidious missionary vehicles. Perhaps the post-modern French have not completely lost the Napoleonic impulse that troubled Hegel so.

Alistair Welchman

San Antonio, Texas

Don Garrett, ed.

The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. xiii + 465.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-39235-7);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-39865-7).

The editor of this companion holds that, of the philosophical systems that the seventeenth century produced in such abundance, Spinoza's 'speaks most cogently and persuasively' to our age (2). Even if certain aspects of Spinoza's thought — on the treatment of animals, for example — are unappealing, his work compels admiration for its depth, cohesion, and boldness. Nietzsche was not alone in finding 'a forerunner, and what a forerunner!' (quoted on p.425). The reception of Spinoza — for far longer than that of his contemporaries — has been marked by almost hagiographic admiration on the one hand, and by near-phobic rejection on the other. Like Nietzsche, Spinoza inspires not just exegesis and criticism but advocacy and dismay.

The analytic bent of the *Companion*, while it brings out amply the seriousness and complexity of Spinoza's thought, echoes only in muted tones the passions evoked in earlier times by his work. Some of that is documented in chapters on its historical context: a 'life and works' by W.N.A. Klever (which includes useful recent work by Klever on Spinoza's early years among the radical Cartesians of Amsterdam), and an all-too-brief study of Spinoza's 'reception and influence' by Pierre-François Moreau (translated by Roger Ariew). Of the rest, Alan Gabbey on 'Spinoza's natural science and methodology', Edwin Curley on 'Kissinger, Spinoza, and Genghis Khan', and Richard Popkin on 'Spinoza and Bible scholarship' stand out for their attention to the intellectual context. The remaining chapters are internalist in manner. Their method is the analysis of conceptions and arguments exemplified by Bennett and Donagan. The influential readings of Deleuze, for example, are given one sentence of Moreau's chapter; Christopher Norris's work on interpretation is not mentioned; even Gueroult's immense study is drawn on only by Gabbey

and Popkin. The *Companion* thus breaks little new ground in its conception of the task of the history of philosophy. It offers instead a distillation of the best that Anglo-American scholarship has produced in the last thirty-odd years. If there are few disagreements among the interpretations it presents (11), that may be as much a function of its selectivity as of any long-term convergence among interpreters generally.

In the chapters that exemplify the approach just mentioned, the key questions are: what exactly did Spinoza propose? is it coherent? is it credible — that is, credible to us, *mutatis mutandis*? Without decent answers to at least the first two questions, Spinoza's work will devolve into 'mere history', as Bennett puts it, 'with not enough followable content to engage our philosophical interests' (79). The philosophical value of Spinoza's thought rests on its being made good, or at least comprehensible, not just in his terms, but in ours. Thus Curley laments the absence of a notion of natural right in Spinoza's political philosophy (335). Michael Della Rocca concludes that Spinoza likely failed to distinguish the 'intrinsic' features of psychological states from the 'representational', a distinction Della Rocca regards as crucial (256-57). Margaret Wilson ends with a riddle: 'What is it, exactly, to come to perceive the "inmost essences" of singular things as they follow from the necessity of the divine nature?' (132): unless the riddle is solved, Spinoza's third kind of knowledge remains mysterious and his epistemology incomplete.

To give a sense of the contents of the *Companion*, I will summarize Bennett's, Gabbey's, and Della Rocca's contributions. Bennett's begins with four 'underlying assumptions' of Spinoza's system: explanatory rationalism, concept dualism, impact mechanics, and size neutrality. Drawing upon the interpretation of 'finite mode' presented in his *Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (1984), he vindicates Spinozan parallelism at the expense (worth paying, in his view) of supposing that the mode which is at once my body and my mind is a mode of neither extension nor thought, but a 'transattribute mode', combinable with both (80). Attributes, for their part, are not essences or *summa genera*, but rather the ground of 'expressions' of transattribute modes (88). Only in combination with attributes, and thus only *through* their expressions, can the intellect come to know finite modes (83).

Gabbey, noting the relative neglect of Spinoza's scientific work, agrees that he was not a significant figure in mathematics, optics, or natural philosophy. But Spinoza 'was a major contributor' to practical philosophy, to psychology, to the study of method, and to *critica theologica* (146). After discussing disciplinary taxonomies in Aristotelian textbooks of the period, Gabbey examines Spinoza's treatment of Cartesian physics in *Descartes' Principles of Philosophy*, notably his troubles with the notion of individual inherited from Descartes, and his criticisms of experimental method in his correspondence with Oldenburg and Boyle. Of the lessons we may take from Spinoza, the 'noblest', yet hardest to assimilate, has been that 'men, like the rest, are only a part of nature', as Spinoza wrote to Oldenburg in 1665 (182).

Della Rocca, writing on 'Spinoza's metaphysical psychology', takes up the task of analyzing and evaluating the project of 'deriving psychology from

metaphysics', in keeping with the claim that human beings are part of nature. In particular it is from the proposition that 'each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being' (*Ethics* 3pr6, quoted at 193) that Spinoza derives his notion of complex individual. Della Rocca attempts to interpret the principle so as to maintain consistency with its immediate context while avoiding counterexamples. He then considers Spinoza's naturalistic derivations of the primary passions. In each derivation the lack of a naturalistic account of belief creates a gap; nevertheless Spinoza's psychology can, in answering problems about prudence and altruism, do so 'by means of interesting strategies that contain much that is correct' (215). While Bennett's claim that Spinoza is a 'half-hearted teleologist' in explaining human action is doubtful, it is equally doubtful that Spinoza recognized a distinction between the claim that beliefs and desires cause our actions, and the claim that they do so by virtue of their representational features.

Unlike an encyclopedia or a dictionary, a 'companion' need not be comprehensive. It need only provide food for thought, or material to deepen and amplify the thoughts that readers of Spinoza may already have. The *Companion* performs that task ably.

Dennis Des Chene

Johns Hopkins University

Peter Godfrey-Smith

Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. xiii + 311.

US\$49.95. ISBN 0-521-45166-3.

Godfrey-Smith has produced a welcome addition to the Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology. Like the other books in this series, his study is truly interdisciplinary, engaging a wide range of issues in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of biology and evolutionary biology.

The book is divided into two parts, each of which is 'largely self-contained' (xi). Part I, 'Foundations', comprises more than two-thirds of the book. It is an articulation and tentative defence of the environmental complexity thesis (ECT), which purports to delimit the role of thought in a naturalistic setting. According to ECT, 'The function of cognition is to enable the agent to deal with environmental complexity' (3).

Godfrey-Smith notes that ECT admits of more than one interpretation. He is mainly interested in it as a specification of the *teleonomic* function of

cognition. To inquire as to a thing's teleonomic function is to ask what it does that accounts (via some process of selection) for its existence. So, on this interpretation, ECT is the claim that cognition exists *because* it deals with environmental complexity, for it is in virtue of its success in this regard that cognition has been promoted through some process of evolutionary selection (14-20). (I shall hereafter use 'ECT' to refer to this interpretation of Godfrey-Smith's ECT.) As a statement of the teleonomic role of cognition, ECT (if it is true) is crucial to an understanding of the mind, since, 'Understanding mind requires understanding the role it plays within entire living systems' (73). ECT is thus important as part of a larger 'evolutionary biology of mind' (125).

Godfrey-Smith finds ECT to be a 'coherent and promising' (195) and naturalistically acceptable hypothesis about the role of cognition. He is interested in the pattern of explanation that ECT exemplifies, and introduces the term 'c-externalist' to refer to it. To give such an explanation is to explain the complexity of some system by appeal to the complexity of its environment. Since cognition involves a high degree of complexity, and since ECT offers an explanation of cognition in terms of environmental complexity, ECT is 'a c-externalist approach to cognition' (59).

Unfortunately, there is some unclarity about what precisely is being explained when we explain cognition. As a result, it is not clear just what sort of complexity ECT is supposed to account for. Godfrey-Smith repeatedly claims to be 'concerned almost solely with functional complexity' (26), which he contrasts with structural complexity. The former feature is 'heterogeneity in what the organism does' (240) while the latter one 'has to do with both how many different parts there are in a system and ...how they interact' (26). Cognition interests him chiefly insofar as it serves as a means to functional (more specifically, behavioural) complexity (59). He seems, then, to regard ECT as an explanation of this functionally complex *result* of cognition. However, given that ECT is, in the first instance, an explanation of *cognition* (and only derivatively of the results of cognition), it is primarily an explanation of structural complexity; for Godfrey-Smith repeatedly characterizes cognition in such a way that it is a structurally complex means to functional complexity. For instance, he writes that his study of cognition 'will be concerned with a small set of the range of properties and processes normally considered "mental"', namely, those 'enabling perception, the formation of beliefs ..., their interaction with motivational states, and behaviour' (13; see also p. 22). It is hard to see how even this minimal cognitive apparatus (which should not be confused with the hardware that realizes it in a given case) could fail to be structurally complex. Thus, Godfrey-Smith's repeated claim that his explanatory project has little to do with structural complexity is puzzling.

More puzzling still is Godfrey-Smith's claim that our complex environment accounts for the behavioural complexity of organisms when, in fact, the vast majority of the creatures that have actually thrived in it are relatively simple. They seem to have fared quite well without cognition. Indeed, it is just an empirical fact that cognition is an eccentricity of the freakish few.

This remains the case even if we accept Godfrey-Smith's liberal conception of cognition, according to which it can be found (to some degree) in non-social, non-language-using vertebrates (125); for the fact is that the great preponderance of life is, and always has been, bacterial and thus utterly devoid of cognitive capacities.

Godfrey-Smith recounts having heard a similar objection (58). His response is to weaken ECT so that it means that, 'environmental complexity is necessary but not sufficient for organic complexity,' so that although the former type of complexity does not of itself beget complexity of the latter sort, 'you will not get organic complexity in any other way' (58). This watered down ECT is not very interesting. Godfrey-Smith is aware of this, for he also recounts having heard the objection that ECT is 'so obviously true that [the objector] could not understand why I was going to talk about it' (58). I cannot see that Godfrey-Smith anywhere answers this charge. Indeed, he seems tacitly to revert to the view that environmental complexity is sufficient for organic complexity, for we find him later describing conditions in which, 'complexity in the world calls forth complexity in the organism' (228). If environmental complexity is not sufficient for complexity in the organism, then what can this 'calling forth' amount to? In what sense does complexity in the world explain organic complexity?

Perhaps Godfrey-Smith can simply acknowledge that our environment does not confer a selective advantage upon organic complexity. He can acknowledge that most of the lineages that have dabbled in complexity have met with extinction. A few rare exceptions have survived, though; and, naturally, the forms that their complexity takes will be tailored (by natural selection) to fit the contours of the environment. We can thus appeal to the environment in explaining why the few organically complex lineages that have survived are the way they are. Here, environmental complexity explains not why *there is* organic complexity, but, instead, why such rare organic complexity as there is has the form that it has.

This shift in explanandum seems consistent with much else that Godfrey-Smith says, including his very interesting (and technical) investigation in Part II of the varieties of organic complexity that prosper in certain sorts of complex environment.

This book has many self-contained sections that repay careful study regardless of whether one agrees with its central program. I found the following to be especially rewarding: section 8.6, 'On Reliability', which might better have been entitled 'Advice to Reliabilists in Epistemology'; section 3.4, 'Homeostasis and Cognition', a short but excellent sharpening of the concept of homeostasis; and the remarkably subtle and illuminating discussion of contemporary naturalistic accounts of correspondence in Chapter 6.

Unfortunately, this otherwise excellent book appears to have been proof-read with a spell-check program, with the result that there are several incorrect usages of correctly spelled words. The worst of these occurs in the first line of the fifth note on p. 198, where 'animate' should be 'inanimate'. There is a glaring redundancy on p. 84, where we are told that, '...the individual

has not experienced the association in experience' Also, two of the headings from Figure 7.2 (228) have inexplicably found their way onto the bottom of p. 227. More annoying still is the meagre index, which is not quite three pages in length. Dewey there appears under the alias 'Deway' in the entry for externalism, and T.H. Huxley, though he is quoted on p. 69, does not appear at all.

Paul Raymont

The University of Toronto

James Robert Goetsch, Jr.

Vico's Axioms: the Geometry of the Human Wordl.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1995.

Pp. xiv + 173.

US\$25.00. ISBN 0-300-06272-9.

James Goetsch's *Vico's Axioms* is an attempt to rearticulate the basic frames in which Vico's work can be understood. The primary goal of the book is to make sense of Vico's often obtuse style and apparent contradictions, something that many commentators have explained away rather than openly dealt with. Goetsch contends that Vico is consistent, and that his writings are well-organized, but only if he is approached through the eyes of a classical humanist.

Vico was clearly not a Cartesian thinker; there are few people who claim that he was. But Goetsch's argument goes further. He claims that, while accepting Vico's attack on the Cartesian method, most commentators do not realize that they are nonetheless reading Vico with Cartesian expectations. These expectations include a particular way of ordering and justifying knowledge, a particular relationship to the past and a particular style of writing. Rather than understanding Vico as a sometimes confusing writer, Goetsch argues that it is necessary to understand the organization of Vico's writing as a heroic narrative seeking to recover the past.

Goetsch covers many of the common themes in Vico's work, such as the sterility of the Cartesian world-view, the importance of the maker's knowledge of the things that are made, the irreducible tension between reason and feeling, and the importance of rhetoric and human community for Vico's account of science. These themes are connected back to Vico's general image of knowledge, which exists within a combination of medieval epistemology and Vico's recovery of earlier (and the first) thinkers.

One of the things that Vico recovers is Aristotle — not the Aristotle of the Schoolmen, but one who embraced ‘all the faculties of reasoning’, and the interplay of reason and emotion in discourse (77, 79). This reconstruction of Aristotle connects to Vico’s account of the new science, which must deal with the complete person and not simply a disconnected and sterilized part.

In the end, Vico comes off as a typical (by medieval standards), if worthy humanist thinker facing an increasingly Cartesian world. He is one who uses medieval memory systems such as emblem books to characterize human knowledge. Goetsch connects this conclusion to the claim that ‘Vico’s axioms ultimately structure a geometry of melancholy’ (xiv), by which he means that on Vico’s account, the richness of wisdom ‘slowly runs down and bleaches itself bare-bones white’ (138). Even while recognizing the sterility of the Cartesian concept, its eventual dominance is seen as inevitable and, as Goetsch notes, ‘to become a partisan of nostalgia is self-defeating’ (138). At best, it is still possible to strike a balance between reason and feeling, between reflection and sense. But this can only happen in a heroic recapturing of a lost history.

Vico’s Axioms exists well within the current literature on Vico and early modern humanism. Perhaps this is true to a fault. The book, which is barely 100 pages, has too many long quotes, often from contemporary secondary sources. In the end, however, one wonders what Goetsch himself has to offer the reader, except an organized recollection of things that have already been said. At the same time, given Vico’s own approach to knowledge as memory and reconstruction, this strategy may be intentional. However, the books that Goetsch draws upon are not that old.

Brian Richardson

University of Hawaii

Owen Goldin

Explaining an Eclipse:

Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 2.1-10.

Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1996.

Pp. ix + 170.

US\$37.50. ISBN 0-472-10596-5.

Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* is perhaps the most demanding and frustrating treatise in the extant *corpus* of the Stagirite’s works. The principal difficulty is its epigraphic quality. Sometimes a mere phrase stands elliptically for a huge theoretical construct. There are hardly any examples to illustrate this construct. Ordinary words are given various technical senses and little

detailed explanation. It is therefore not surprising that interpretations and philosophical evaluations of the work differ dramatically.

W.D. Ross' important edition of the *Posterior Analytics* with commentary in 1949 inspired little in the way of philosophical work until Mario Mignucci's *La teoria aristotelica della scienza* in 1965 and Jonathan Barnes' translation and commentary in 1975 (revised in 1994). This was succeeded by a volume of major essays, *Aristotle on Science: Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium Aristotelicum* in 1981. There have been two recent monographs, *The Origin of Aristotelian Science* by Michael Ferejohn in 1991 and *Principles and Proofs: Aristotle's Theory of Demonstrative Science* by Richard McKirahan in 1992, as well as a small but steady stream of articles. The present work is a revision of Goldin's 1987 dissertation.

The general theme of this book is the coherence of the second book of the *Posterior Analytics* with the principles laid out in the first. Specifically, Goldin addresses the problem that although Aristotle says that the essences of the subjects of scientific investigation are assumed in definitions, nevertheless the essences of certain sorts of objects can be demonstrated. These are the commensurately universal attributes of the species and genera of such objects. As Goldin argues, 'the demonstration of the definition of a [commensurately universal] predicate is identical to the demonstration of the inherence of that predicate in some epistemic substance (13).' The phrase 'epistemic substance' here means objects of scientific knowledge, such as mathematical objects and certain natural events, that are not substances but can be treated as substances because they necessarily possess certain attributes (75-6).

There are six concise chapters in this clearly written work. In the first Goldin sets out the problem of the range of Aristotle's theory of demonstration. On the one hand, taking Aristotle's own principles literally, it seems that a scientific demonstration can only render explicit the relation between the genera and species of individuals substances. Yet, Aristotle himself quite obviously takes his theory as having far greater application than this. Goldin considers the solutions offered by Ferejohn and McKirahan and finds these wanting. The second chapter is devoted largely to an analysis of the first two chapters of the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*. Adducing support from certain texts in the *Metaphysics*, Goldin argues that Aristotle is theoretically committed to the existence of certain basic kinds which are the explanatory grounds of their own being (39). These include substances and properties of substances whose definition is an explanation of how the properties came to be, such as thunder or an eclipse.

In the third chapter this argument is buttressed by adducing portions of the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*, particularly those which refer to the positing of the existence of the subjects of scientific investigation. There is here a useful and convincing rebuttal of the argument of Alfonso Gomez-Lobo against the 'existential' reading of these texts. The fourth chapter is devoted to the aporiai in 2.3-7. As Goldin shows, these aporiai are directed to formulating the problem of demonstrating essence. The crucial fifth chapter focuses

on 2.8-10 and defends the ancient interpretations of Themistius, developed by W.D. Ross, against that of John Philoponus. Finally, in the sixth chapter Goldin concludes that Aristotle should be taken to have shown that '[i]t is possible to demonstrate the inherence in some epistemic substance S of a kind K that is not implicitly definitional of S, if K can be identified with some conjunction of predicates that *are* implicitly definitional of the subjects of the sciences' (138). At the end of this chapter there is a brief discussion of how scientific explanations of the sort constructed by Aristotle can be said to be reductive.

Within the confines of this book's narrow focus, Goldin makes a strong case for an interpretation that perhaps deserves best to be called 'traditional'. He argues convincingly for the extension of Aristotle's framework for scientific demonstration to objects other than substances where essence is demonstrable. He makes some reasonable and incisive criticisms of alternative interpretations proposed in recent years. This book does not break new ground, but it is a useful restatement of an important interpretation. It testifies to the continued vitality of Aristotle's technical writings.

Lloyd P. Gerson

University of Toronto

G.W.F. Hegel

Leçons sur la philosophie de la religion. Première partie. Introduction — Le concept de la religion. Trad. Pierre Garniron.

Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1996.

Pp. cxx + 518.

Cdn\$188.00. ISBN 9782130463641.

C'est à une entreprise d'envergure que nous convie la toute récente publication aux Presses Universitaires de France (P.U.F.) des *Leçons sur la philosophie de la religion* de Hegel, dans une traduction de Pierre Garniron, d'après l'édition de Walter Jaeschke. L'ouvrage dont la disposition définitive d'ensemble reste encore à venir, constitue la «première partie» des *Leçons sur la philosophie de la religion*, lesquelles furent prononcées par Hegel dès le printemps 1821 à l'Université Frédéric-Guillaume de Berlin. Premier tome d'une série de trois, il ouvre sur la richesse considérable de la philosophie de la religion devenue, comme le fait justement remarquer W. Jaeschke dans son Avant-propos, un savoir émancipé au cours du XIXe siècle (xx). C'est sans doute pour mettre en évidence dans son exhaustivité la plus réelle la contribution hégélienne à cette émancipation, que ce présent ouvrage est déterminant tant il réfléchit la nature du savoir de la religion. Dans ces conditions,

se laisser guider par sa construction interne, permet d'être attentif au contenu auquel réfère la première partie de l'enseignement hégélien ainsi intitulé «Introduction — Le concept de la religion».

Il faut le dire d'emblée: le mérite de la présente édition qui reproduit au paragraphe près, l'établissement du texte original par W. Jaeschke aux éditions Félix Meiner, est de permettre au lecteur francophone de prendre la mesure de la richesse, en même temps que de la régénération, de l'enseignement hégélien tout au long de sa continuité. De 1821 à 1831 soit l'année de sa mort, ce cours de philosophie de la religion fut répété par Hegel non pas dans le souci de conserver à chaque énonciation un contenu doté d'une présentation identique, mais plutôt dans celui d'actualiser dans chacune de ses reprises la vitalité de l'argument central de ces leçons. De cet argument nous pouvons dans sa généralité avoir une mesure, dans «l'Analyse du texte» établie par P. Garniron qui précède le texte hégélien. Cette analyse de texte savante et constituant un commentaire littéral, présente à son terme deux «tableaux» destinés à montrer dans sa chronologie la structure diversifiée de l'«Introduction» et du «Concept de la religion». Une telle initiative permettant de visualiser la structure de l'argument dans son ensemble peut certes être utile dans la tentative de le mettre en ordre, mais sa position manifeste à l'entrée de l'ouvrage peut risquer de compromettre en une précompréhension abusive l'accès au texte de Hegel.

Or précisément comment accéder en-deçà de la généralité des «avant-propos» et autres présentations préliminaires extérieures (utiles sans doute mais à une irréductible, infime soit-elle, distance de la «chose-même» pour paraphraser Hegel) à l'argument hégélien lui-même, défiant les généralités et exigeant que sa portée différenciante soit toujours reconnue ? C'est là sans doute le sens de ce que veut dire pour Hegel «introduire» en philosophie, un problème de *commencement* (Anfang) inévitable, aporétique par sa persistance, qui situe autant dans leur périodisation distincte l'«Introduction» (Einleitung) que le «Concept de la religion» (Der Begriff der Religion). On se rendra compte de par la puissance des questions déployées, non pas dans l'espace possible de ces multiples introductions répétées d'après le Manuscrit de 1821, le cours de 1824 ou celui de 1827, que la problématique du «commencement» s'inscrit profondément jusque dans la dernière élaboration du «Concept de la religion», celle qui nous est parvenue du cours de 1827. «La question par laquelle nous devons commencer est celle-ci: comment nous faut-il parvenir à un commencement ? (Die Frage, mit der wir anzufangen haben, ist die: Wie haben wir einen Anfang zu gewinnen ?)» (249) demande Hegel à ses auditeurs de 1827, revenant sur le problème manifeste de «l'introduction», du «s'introduire à», ignorant par ce geste d'inauguration répété la portée résolutive attendue de ses «Introductions» diversement énoncées. Toujours dans le «Concept de la religion» de 1827, et au sujet du «commencement», ces autres questions dont on peut prétendre, non pas qu'elles ne trouveront pas «réponse» au sens de la question argumentativement répondue, mais qu'elles resteront à l'état de question, suspendues par leur force interrogative radicale : «(..) qui sommes-nous (wer sind wir), nous qui avons le

contenu (immédiat de Dieu, celui que «l'on dit d'ordinaire» [254], celui des «réponses courantes» [254]) en nous (die wir den Inhalt in uns haben)? Quand nous disons: «nous, moi, l'esprit» («wir, ich, der Geist») — cela même est quelque chose de très concret, de varié : je suis intuitionnant, je vois, j'entends, etc. Je suis tout cela: ce fait de sentir, d'intuitionner, de voir, d'entendre. La question posée a donc ce sens plus précis: sous lesquelles de ces déterminations (Bestimmungen) ce contenu est-il pour nos sens, pour notre représentation, pour notre volonté, pour notre imagination, pour notre sentiment? Quel est le lieu où ce contenu, cet objet est chez lui? Quel est le sol où il trouve sa consistance? (Welches ist der Ort, wo dieser Inhalt, Gegenstand zu Hause ist? Welches ist der Boden dieses Gehalts?)» (254).

Une telle séquence de questions, dont on ne peut nier le caractère «introductionnel», a donc pour portée de montrer la situation initiale de la problématique déterminant cette philosophie de la religion à développer. Mais au fond, le propre de la question hégélienne est de déployer la mobilité d'un savoir dont les énoncés varient sans entamer la vérité *qui est-là*, présente (Vorhanden), que l'on se trouve formellement en «Introduction» ou plus avant, en cours d'élaboration dans la figure différenciée des concepts. Ailleurs, dans une formulation qui livre la ligne maîtresse du mouvement d'ensemble du concept, Hegel reprend et insiste sur la modalité du contenu d'où émerge la philosophie de la religion: «(...) cet être-présent (Vorhandensein), ce manifester du contenu (Manifestieren jens Inhalts) en question est le principe (Prinzip) simple du connaître philosophique (des philosophischen Erkennens) lui-même: à savoir que notre conscience a immédiatement un savoir de Dieu, que le savoir de l'être de Dieu (das Wissen vom Sein Gottes) est purement et simplement certain pour l'homme. Non seulement la philosophie ne répudie pas cette proposition: elle constitue au contraire une détermination fondamentale (Grundbestimmung) dans la philosophie elle-même» (66). On le voit donc, l'être-présence de la vérité conditionne le contexte de la philosophie hégélienne de la religion en informant et spécifiant les points de passage et d'articulation du contenu que sont l'«Einleitung» et le «Begriff der Religion». L'on ne s'introduit pas sous une forme subjective à la vérité hégélienne: l'«Introduction» et le «Concept» la médiatisent pour ainsi dire, pour nous, perdant de ce fait l'apparente forme d'une instrumentalité pédagogique. Certains argueront de la ruse de ce procédé hégélien pour l'accuser de sa *systématicité*. Il est vrai que dans toutes les scènes hégéliennes sensibles, des écrits de jeunesse, que l'on pense à «l'écrit sur la différence des systèmes philosophiques de Fichte et de Schelling» de 1801, aux «Philosophies de l'esprit» de 1803 et 1805, jusqu'aux derniers écrits auxquels cette philosophie de la religion se rattache — il est vrai donc que le savoir philosophique ne peut parvenir à *soi*, entendre légitimer son schème d'autonomie (72, 281) que comme un savoir médiatisé. Cette justification de la pensée philosophique qui se présente sous la forme d'une autodétermination (300) ou d'une autolégitimation (308) rend possible l'existence-même du concept. C'est le sens de ces deux remarques prélevées dans le «Concept de la religion» de 1827: «(...) le penser, le penser concret est un savoir médiatisé (das konkrete Denken, ein vermitteltes Wissen ist.). Le savoir médiatisé est le

savoir de la nécessité (Notwendigkeit) relativement au contenu.» (285) ; «La transition (Übergehen) est ce en quoi le caractère spécifique de la médiation est exprimé de façon déterminée» (291).

Que d'aucuns parmi les contemporains critiquant avec force, faisant entendre par-delà leur critique des motifs prégnants de légitimité, la systématité médiatisante du concept hégélien parce qu'il «contraint» à la nécessité tout contenu — et dans le cas présent, Dieu est de toute nécessité (315) selon Hegel, il n'est pas «(.) ce fantôme infini (unendliches Gespenst), qui est loin de notre conscience (das fern von unserem Bewußtsein ist) (6) — cela résonne le plus souvent comme un geste d'occultation stratégique. Les critiques acerbes de Ricoeur visant à fonder une herméneutique *finie* du récit en appelant à «renoncer à Hegel» à cause de son «impossible médiation totale», ou l'attitude plus modérée de Gadamer voulant «résister à la médiation infinie» (et sans parler ici des pamphlétaires qui décrivent l'«effondrement» hégélien) sont de nature à unilatéraliser le concept de nécessité. La «nécessité» selon Hegel n'agit pas dans un contenu comme une force aveugle. Comme la *totalité* (Totalität) à laquelle elle renvoie, qui est «le mouvement, le processus de s'objectiver (die Bewegung, der Prozeß, sich zu objektivieren)» (308), la nécessité décrit l'actualité *logique* du concept en son sens fort, en tant qu'elle entretient le «devenir» (Werden) (287). À ce titre, l'on ne peut confondre la «nécessité» en un rapport de contrainte qu'au prix de compromettre gravement la compréhension hégélienne. Dans une très belle formulation du «Concept de la religion» de 1824 — du reste représentative de la fluidité et de la souplesse harmonieuse de la traduction de Garniron — Hegel différencie le «Dieu «captif» (der befangene Gott)» du «Dieu libre, conforme au concept en tant qu'esprit (der freie Gott, dem Begriff gemäß als Geist)» (246) pour rappeler que le savoir de la nécessité est en même temps celui de la liberté. Davantage, il fait ressortir ce en quoi la philosophie peut prétendre à une *actualité*, être-le-présent (Vorhandensein) de son temps (41), à figurer le besoin de son époque (Zeitbedürfnis) (35). Il nous ouvre, au delà des critiques évoquées ci-dessus qui confondent sa pensée en un champ de forces, au rythme (Rhythmus) (80) de la pensée dont le propre en philosophie est toujours d'opérer un franchissement, un passage, en un mot, une *transition* (Übergang). Qu'on nous permette ce dernier mot — question de Hegel : «(.) comment effectuer cette transition (Übergang), comment apercevoir que Dieu n'est pas simplement quelque chose de subjectif en nous ? (daß Gott nicht bloß ein Subjektives in uns ist ?)» (305). La philosophie de la religion est cette transition (Übergang) qui porte à la conscience l'acuité d'un questionnement, instituant cette singulière relation de son actualité à l'histoire. Une telle manière de questionner appelle la philosophie à son événement.

Gad Soussana

Université du Québec à Montréal

Université de Paris — I

E.J. Lowe

Subjects of Experience.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. x + 209.

US\$49.95. ISBN 0-521-46503-1.

The book's major strength is Lowe's brave attempt to take up a position about the mind (the self) which has fallen into disrepute. Lowe defends the view that the self is a psychological substance different from the physical substance of the body. The dualism of his position is non-Cartesian, however. The objectionable feature of the Cartesian view, in Lowe's mind, is not the supposition that the self and the body are two ontologically different substances, but rather the fact that they are at the outset conceived of as being so distinct as to preclude the very possibility of interaction between them. By contrast, Lowe claims that psychological substances can have physical properties, e.g. being six feet tall or having a body. (It is not clear in the end, however, exactly how this helps in dealing with traditional problems: the account of mental causation related in Chapter 3 does not rely on it, for instance.)

Chapter 2 outlines the basic conception of the self as a psychological substance. Lowe argues against neo-Aristotelian views of the self as a biological substance (which are committed to anthropocentrism) as well as against neo-Lockean conceptions, viewing persons as psychological modes (which suffer from vicious circularity). The self is construed as a simple psychological substance (as having no substantial parts). It is thought to be a product of biology as well as cultural evolution.

Chapter 3 suggests a way of thinking about mental causation. There are four threads in the account. First, Lowe argues that physicalists balance between two unacceptable positions: eliminativism and epiphenomenalism. Second, he reminds one of too easy attempts to dismiss dualism, and does often succeed in knocking one out of a too comfortable physicalist armchair. Third, he finds a niche where even in a 'complete' network of physical causes there could be an independent place for mental causality. Given the chaotic and distributed neuronal activity it is worth asking the question why the activity converges onto certain patterns which cause the body to move in goal-directed ways. While Lowe does not think that mental causes should be construed as initiating neuronal activity, he thinks them responsible for (enabling) an otherwise mysterious convergence. Recalling his analogy: when balls roll down a bagatelle board in an initially random way, but then end up in a number of stable positions, the reason for their convergence (though not for the initiation of their movement) is the location of the pins on the board. Fourth, Lowe deflects some arguments leveled against the supposition that consciousness is to be construed as a strongly emergent phenomenon, with independent causal powers.

The remaining chapters discuss various capacities of the self. Chapter 4 outlines a causal theory of perception, which is at once direct-realist and

representational. Chapter 5 delineates a volitionist theory of action. Chapter 6 defends a neo-Lockean ideational theory of language from fashionable criticisms, which Lowe shows to be question-begging. These later chapters are related to the early ones only loosely. In all the accounts, the psychological aspect is emphasized (the perceptual experiences, the volitions, the ideas elicited by words), still it is not clear what relation there is between them and the concept of psychological substance. It is only in Chapter 7 (on self-knowledge), that the notion returns. There, Lowe claims that only his theory of the self can do justice to certain ways in which claims expressing knowledge about the self behave. He argues in particular that we can make direct demonstrative reference not only to our own conscious thoughts and experiences, but also to those bodily parts of ours that we can move at will or in which we can localize feelings. This doctrine tallies with, and clarifies, Lowe's non-Cartesian version of dualism.

The overarching concern with Lowe's book can be summarized briefly: Why dualism? Most of the concrete theses depend neither on the notion of psychological substance nor on the dualism between the physical and the psychological. Take the account of mental causation. Lowe's remarks indicate that the discussion of physical causes is often oversimplified. Physical causal explanations frequently appeal not only to initiating causes of the sort 'a billiard ball bumped into another billiard ball', but to more interesting causes of the sort 'a system drifted into an energy equilibrium'. A physicalist might happily admit this point, in fact endorse the direction of many of Lowe's resolutions, and then be really surprised when she has been told that the causation is somehow *sui generis* psychological. In exactly what way is it an ontologically different *kind* of causation?

But even if there is value in speaking of psychological substance, one worries that there could be value in speaking of other kinds of substance as well. Why *dualism*? Why not pluralism? If there are to be physical and psychological substances, could/should there not also be chemical, biological, ecological, social substances? One wishes one knew what exactly is involved in calling something a substance, and what theoretical role the notion plays. Could not the tree-organism be a biological substance distinct from the chemical compounds that make it up? (Lowe denies it explicitly [4], and yet elsewhere speaks as if a tree were the right comparison for psychological substance [35].) Could not a family, a unified crowd, be a substance? While Lowe thinks 'that mental facts and events *are* real and genuinely causally efficacious in their own right, in a much more robust way than socio-economic facts and events are' (76), this is hardly an opinion that a sociologist would second. What makes Lowe's account mysterious in the end, is in part his insistence on a duality rather than a plurality of substances. It is hard to believe that while there are many emergent phenomena, at many levels of organization, *only* the activity of the brain 'squirts' an ontologically different *kind* of substance. There are many levels at which we appeal to 'enabling' rather than 'initiating' causes, but *only* at the neuronal level such an appeal involves mentioning ontologically distinct *kinds* of causes. One definite ad-

vantage of physicalism, and the relation of supervenience, is that it renders the relationships between various substrata of organization intelligible. For all its shortcomings, it offers a general picture of reality. It is not clear that Lowe's book, though it opens one's eyes wide, lets one see the world any better.

Still, Lowe's many sharp criticisms and incessant attempts to defend scorned positions from too quick dismissals should be of interest to philosophers of mind on both sides of the divide.

Katarzyna Paprzycka

University of Pittsburgh

Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins, eds.

The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche.

Cambridge: The University of Cambridge Press 1996.

Pp. ix + 403.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-36586-4);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-36767-0).

The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche offers its readers a broad array of perspectives on and interpretations in Nietzsche studies. The editors' 'Introduction to Nietzsche's Works', provides helpful summaries of Nietzsche's texts, describes the central issues on which discussion of these texts has focused, and cites relevant sources in the secondary literature. Particularly noteworthy are the helpful account of *ressentiment* and textual references to the frequently discussed themes of eternal return and will to power. Three sections follow, which address 1) the purposes to which Nietzsche's works have been employed, 2) Nietzsche's philosophical strategy, style, and project, and 3) the influence of Nietzsche's work, focusing on Germany, France, and East Asia. The essays work together fairly well to provide an overview of many of the issues that have shaped Nietzsche interpretation; they will serve students and non specialists well as an excellent resource for further study of specific concerns.

R.J. Hollingdale's 'The hero as outsider' explores the Nietzsche legend and its ties to the perceptions of Schopenhauer in the nineteenth century. Jörg Salaquarda's 'Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian tradition' places in context Nietzsche's views on Christianity by providing a religious biography that considers Nietzsche's academic training, his intellectual experiences, and the trends of contemporary theological and historical scholarship. Salaquarda concludes with a concise critique of Nietzsche's views, and the essay provides

extensive notes and a very useful bibliography. In his 'Nietzsche's political misappropriation', Tracy Strong discusses the political uses of Nietzsche, Nietzsche's remarks about politics, and the politics of reading and writing about Nietzsche. Strong argues that *The Birth of Tragedy* is 'a lesson in politics' (134), as it illuminates ancient Greek accomplishments for the purpose of making them available to us, and he claims this text models the philosophical maneuvering of Nietzsche's other books. Strong concludes with the claim that Nietzsche's texts resist appropriation for specific political purposes, but he suggests ways in which Nietzsche's work could mark a beginning for a politics reconceived.

Many Nietzsches emerge in Part Three: 'Nietzsche as Philosopher'. There we meet the Nietzsche who is an 'ex-Kantian on the rebound' turned 'latter-day Vico,' striving for comprehension and 'sense-making' (Richard Schacht, 168, 169, 176); Nietzsche as a 'defender of a richer kind of morality' who has 'an ethics of the virtues not unlike Aristotle's' and who 'made resentment his style' (Robert Solomon, 203, 211, 216); the Nietzsche who is the 'metaphysical antimetaphysician' and 'postmodern thinker *avant la lettre*' who presents his readers with a 'conditional dogmatism' that he calls perspectivism (Alexander Nehamas, 238, 241, 243); and the Nietzsche who stands at the zenith of modernity as the 'first ...to understand its implications and to confront its legacy' (Robert Pippin, 273). These Nietzsches are not wholly incompatible, and even the specialist can gain from these essays a deeper appreciation for the broad spectrum of Nietzsche interpretation. Of special note are the essays by Schacht and Nehamas. Schacht makes a persuasive case for how Nietzsche's writings work together (esp. 160ff), as he enacts a philosophical strategy of reading Nietzsche's works forward, backward, and horizontally in an approach similar to the one he ascribes to Nietzsche (159). Although Nehamas' essay may not be as accessible to the student as are some of the others, his work is a fruitful engagement with a diverse group of Nietzsche interpreters, including Habermas, Vattimo, Rorty, and Fish.

The final section, focusing on Nietzsche's reception, witnesses to the enormous force of Nietzsche's legacy. Ernst Behler considers Nietzsche's influence on European thinkers, particularly German and French readers prior to and immediately following World War II. Alan Schrift describes Nietzsche's engagement by French philosophers, whom he describes as 'the philosophers of the future to whom Nietzsche addressed his writings...'(345). And Graham Parkes provides a succinct and lucid account of Nietzsche's knowledge of Asian philosophy, the philosophical issues East-Asian philosophers have developed and extended from Nietzsche's texts, and how Nietzsche's work may serve as a conduit for study of Asian philosophy. Although Behler claims Nietzsche interpretation may be divided into two periods distinguished by the Second World War, there is surprisingly little mention of Nietzsche's appropriation in Nazi and fascist propaganda and few indicators of other sources for such discussions. Behler's essay is primarily devoted to the first of these two periods (pp. 279-314), and he quickly summarizes the other. Alan Schrift effectively distinguishes Nietzsche's French

interpreters from those who “use” Nietzsche’ as a vehicle for their own philosophy, and he provides a fairly accessible account of the role Nietzsche’s philosophy plays in shaping the works of Foucault, Kofman, Derrida, Deleuze, and Lyotard.

One regrettable aspect of the book is the paucity of discussion of work by those who address issues of perspectivism, self-creation, and alternative valuation within the context of discussions of gender, race, and ethnicity. There has been a strong and significant current of this kind of work stretching back to the feminist movement in Germany while Nietzsche was still alive. Although it is acknowledged in the introduction that the objection regarding the exclusion of an essay addressing Nietzsche and feminism might be made, the apologetics for such exclusion — the lack of translated texts (from French sources), the fact that the book was planned before such discussions were common, and ‘the fact that no single treatment of Nietzsche and feminism, in English, has as yet managed to define the parameters of that debate,’ (14) — do not seem to justify the ‘silent treatment’ to which *The Companion* submits women and others who have traditionally stood outside the mainstream philosophical traditions. The parameters for discussions of Nietzsche and difference (defined in many ways) are not fixed, but these discussions are certainly relevant to perennial issues raised in other discussions of Nietzsche’s work, including his perspectivism and the theoretical and hermeneutic possibilities available in Nietzsche’s concept of self-overcoming and in his challenge to engage multiperspectival modes of philosophizing and of valuing. Still, the editors and contributors are to be commended for assembling a highly useful guide to exploring and understanding the work of a very difficult thinker. This *Companion* provides a reliable compass for charting the vast and sometimes shifting and treacherous seas that the secondary literature and Nietzsche’s own texts present for his would-be readers.

Christa Davis Acampora

Emory University

Mathieu Marion and Robert S. Cohen, eds.
Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
Part I: Logic, Mathematics, Physics, and
History of Science. Essays in Honor of Hugues
Leblanc.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995.
Pp. xi + 320.
US\$180.00. ISBN 0-7923-3559-7.
ISBN for set of two: 0-7923-3561-9.

This book, the first of two volumes of essays dedicated to Hugues Leblanc, contains 18 essays, all but one (Bunge's) previously unpublished. All the authors have some connection to the province of Québec, and the editors' preface makes clear that the volume is as much a celebration of philosophy in the province as it is of its distinguished logician. Although several essayists are French speaking, all the essays are in English. The book is volume 177 of the series *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, the book's title notwithstanding.

Half of the essays are about symbolic logic. Leblanc contributes the lead essay, 'On Axiomatizing Free Logic — and Inclusive Logic in the Bargain'. Leblanc argues convincingly that his axiomatization of free logic sets out the issues in a more rational progression than do the axiomatizations by Ben-civenga and Lambert. All but two of the other essays in the logic section — one of the two (Pelham's) is about Russell's substitution theory of quantifiers in 1905, and Gauthier's article would have been better placed in the section of the philosophy of physics and mathematics — follow Leblanc's lead in emphasizing that their recommended departures from the standard logic are motivated by the desire to remove artificialities and unrealistic assumptions, and to fit more naturally with our natural languages and our illocutionary acts. To this end they present multivalent logics, generalized quantifiers, and analyses of propositions and terms. They mobilize set theory, model theory, category theory, type theory, topos theory, ..., in the service of their projects. Some of the authors are mathematicians by profession, but their goals are philosophical.

The other essays are about the philosophy of physics and mathematics. The areas are construed broadly to include forays into a defense of Putnam's model theoretic argument against metaphysical realism and even free will. Blais's article uses chaos theory to define the locution 'the agent could have done otherwise': the agent was at some critical crest in state space and no forecast could have unambiguously predicted which of the possible bases of attraction would attract the agent. Blais does not explain how we would come to know an agent were a chaotically determined system, rather than an undetermined system, if we cannot predict the agent's choices. Bunge's and McCall's articles concern implications of the confirmation of non-locality in quantum mechanics; both reaffirm realism. Bunge defends it because all physical measurement presupposes it. But non-locality and realism seem to

me to imply more: I wonder whether the universe's having evolved from a singularity implies a monism, given the non-locality results. Bunge's account of how a single system can be dismantled (224) could not apply to the original system, and so would he concede that there is only one quantum mechanical system?

With monism, we can take another step toward Parmenides and deny becoming. If you are convinced that the phenomenon of temporal flux is mind-dependent and you read McCall's ingenious accommodations to experiments, solutions to difficulties, and assessments of the advantages of his branching model of the universe over the many-worlds interpretation, it will seem to be so much shadow-chasing. He takes temporal flow to be the vanishing of all but one branch at the first branch point to reveal a unique past; and the point is the now. But I find that 'vanishing' is a pseudo-process, and it happens at any one time to all but one branch in an arbitrary and inexplicable way. Leroux's article on Helmholtz provides the antidote, for in my opinion Helmholtz's theory of the perception of time shows how the appearance of temporal flux originates in any animal that depends for its information about temporal sequence on the temporal sequencing of its reception of information. Although Leroux is concerned more with the issue of Helmholtz's realism, he states the essential ingredients for the conclusion I draw on page 289. I was delighted to learn that Heinrich Hertz agreed with Helmholtz, and the passage in which he registered this agreement may have inspired Wittgenstein to his picture theory of language.

I have mentioned articles on Russell and Helmholtz. More than a third of the essays investigate their areas from an historical viewpoint, with titles mentioning Aristotle, Hilbert, and Kronecker. The last article in the volume is by William Shea and demonstrates how attitudes toward technology developed in the early modern period to support a mechanistic world view. It is comparatively easy to read and a delightful way to end the volume.

Arthur E. Falk

Western Michigan University

Mathieu Marion and Robert S. Cohen, eds.
Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science
Part II: Biology, Psychology, Cognitive Science
and Economics.

Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996.

Pp. xi + 303.

US\$154.00. ISBN 0-7923-3560-0.

ISBN for set of two: 0-7923-3561-9.

Québec Studies in the Philosophy of Science Part II: Biology, Psychology, Cognitive Science, and Economics is the second half of the first English collection of articles in the philosophy of science from Québec. It is dedicated to Hugues LeBlanc, the first logician from Québec, though none of the essays appearing in this volume either extend or react to his work. The volume contains seventeen articles in the philosophy of biology, mind, economics, and language. Unfortunately, there are few coherent themes running through the book — being of Québec really is not enough of a unifying motif to support a scholarly anthology. However, many of the essays are interesting in their own right.

The first section is titled 'Philosophy of Biology', though a couple of the articles would fit under the rubric of philosophy of mind better. The lead article is François Duchesneau's discussion of teleological arguments in biology. His was the most difficult of all the pieces to read, for stylistic as well as technical reasons. It is too bad that it was placed first, since it might give a misleading impression of the remainder of the book. The rest of the articles are very clear and well written. Next, Paul Dumouchel argues against Darden's 'selection-type' theories. This is one of the two best essays in the book (the other being Jim McGilvray's article on color). Through two case studies, he maintains that the paradigm 'selection-type' theories are not Darwinian (or even neo-Darwinian) at all. The final two papers focus on teleosemantics and so straddle the field between philosophy of biology and philosophy of mind. Daniel Laurier gives a detailed analysis of the notions of natural function that could be used to ground content and Murray Clarke takes Stich on over the selection of true beliefs. This is probably the weakest paper of the lot, for Clarke never actually provides an argument for his central claim, that nature selects for truth-conducive mechanisms.

The next section is called, 'Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science', even though the final two essays are straight-up philosophy of mind. Overall, I believe that this section is the strongest in the book, though I worry that my personal biases may be at work here (since I specialize in philosophy of mind and cognitive science). Evan Thompson leads off with an insightful analysis of the syntactic interpretability in artificial intelligence and artificial life using the processes of actual life as a useful foil. He provides a very cogent analysis of how information works in DNA transmission and replication and how this may provide a useful model for understanding syntax in cognitive science. Next comes McGilvray's essay

on what bears color properties in a subjectivist perspective. I already mentioned that this is one of the two best articles in the book. He argues that the popular objectivist positions fail and then outlines a subjectivist approach that explains our intuition that objects have colors out there in the world. The next two chapters concern Twin Earth thought experiments — Paul Bernier argues that, contra Burge, Marr's theory of vision is individualistic and Michel Seymour re-analyses Putnam's, Kripke's, and Burge's thought experiments used to support anti-individualism of the mental. The final piece in this section, by Denis Fisette, reviews the relation between rationality and Davidson's anomalous monism. Though carefully argued and presented, because they are responses to others' positions in traditional areas of philosophy of mind, these final three essays do not chart new territory in philosophical psychology.

The penultimate section, 'Decision Theory and Philosophy of Economics', is the weakest overall of the book, rehashing some familiar ground and spending time arguing for fairly obvious conclusions. Robert Nadeau argues that the intentional is fundamental to economic analyses and that this sort of assumption constitutes a revolution in scientific theorizing. Maurice Lagueux considers various criteria for being irrational, ultimately concluding that ascribing irrational behavior to someone requires a normative judgment, so no true science of the rational is possible. Alain Voizard revisits Newcomb's problem, claiming that a standard Bayesian approach solves the problem by being the only analysis that relies on currently available data. Nicolas Kaufmann supports including prospective intentions into models of expected utility maximization. And Jocelyne Couture, pointing to the social dimensions of the prisoner's dilemma, argues against individualistic interpretations of decision theory.

The final section is misnamed. Called 'Epistemological Studies', it should really be 'Philosophy of Language'. Though brief, the contributions here were technically adept and fascinating to read. Susan Dywer argues for a dispositional account of implicit linguistic knowledge, and Claude Panaccio enriches logical syntax so that he can provide a nominalistic interpretation of belief sentences and other mental attitudes. Both of these authors make novel and useful contributions to understanding the structure of language. The book closes with two objections by Martin Montminy to Dummett's molecularist conception of meaning, who finally concludes that it cannot support a distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences.

All in all, there is a tremendous amount of ground covered in this book and a lot to be learned from it. I recommend it to scholars in the field. I worry, though, that there may be little market for a volume such as this. Few courses would cover all (or most) of these topics at an advanced level. And rarely do we find a philosopher who counts philosophy of biology, mind, economics, and language all as specialties. Though one might take issues in philosophy of mind and cognitive science to be a larger theme — certainly the sections on biology, psychology and cognitive science, and 'epistemology' all advance discussion in cognitive science — the section on decision theory and economics

gets left out. Perhaps that section should be understood as the application of cognitive science to economic theory. In any event, Québec should be proud of its citizens' contributions to discussions in contemporary philosophy of science.

Valerie Gray Hardcastle

Virginia Tech

Michele Marsonet

The Primacy of Practical Reason:

An Essay on Nicholas Rescher's Philosophy.

Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1996.

Pp. 272.

US\$47.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7618-0119-7);

US\$32.50 (paper: ISBN 0-7618-0120-0).

Nicholas Rescher

Public Concerns: Philosophical

Studies of Social Issues.

Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1995.

Pp. 199.

US\$52.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8125-4);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8126-2).

Nicholas Rescher's new book is a collection of fourteen previously published essays, some very recent, on a variety of social philosophy issues. Some of the pieces deal with larger issues such as the role of consensus in social order, the rationale of government regulation, and distributive justice. Others address more specific matters, such as the moral limits of scientific research, allocation of scarce medical resources, and the controversy surrounding Herrnstein and Murray's *The Bell Curve*.

Rescher's approach to all such matters is one of applying rational reflection to common sense, eschewing 'radical ideological innovations.' Thus he is inclined to seek a middle ground wherever this seems most reasonable, and he identifies himself as a middle-of-the-road centrist. This approach has the advantage of seeming very accommodating and thoughtful, although we need to be mindful that compromise is not always the most rational solution. One gets the sense that Rescher is genuinely interested in reasonable common-sense decision making, and he describes the approach as inspired by the Aristotelian 'golden mean'. But, even in Aristotle's scheme of things, the right answer is not always a mean, so we might be wary of the limitations of such

thinking, no matter how reasonable or sincerely intended. To illustrate these strengths and weaknesses, let us consider some of Rescher's arguments.

When explaining how it could be possible for many people to live together in a society, he argues that the standard notion of 'achieving a consensus' is largely mistaken. It is neither possible nor desirable to get everyone to agree, he says, but it is possible and desirable, indeed necessary, for there to be acquiescence to the facts of the social structures and the fact of the disagreements among people. Acquiescence then is the key concept, obviating the need for the concept of consensus. It is acquiescence, he argues, which makes productive coexistence possible. This is the concept which enables us to live together in the absence of general consensus. The suggestion that we not fixate on achieving consensus, and instead be sure to derive social institutions to which we could acquiesce, seems like a perfectly sensible and practical one, the adoption of which could go a long way in addressing some old chestnuts of political philosophy, as well as some current issues.

For instance, Rescher is able to derive some sort of moral duty towards other species without invoking the notion of rights, which would be of dubious value with respect to worms. In Rescher's view, although we might say that other species are of 'intrinsic metaphysical value,' our duty not to exterminate other species is largely a prudential duty. It is also partly a matter not of the other species' rights to exist, but of our lacking a right to destroy something which may be of value. Seeing things this way also means that the duty to save another species may be defeasible, another eminently reasonable notion. Rescher allows that the intrinsic value of a species may be outweighed by other factors, such as human survival.

This focus on reasonableness, and the conclusion Rescher comes to in the first essay about acquiescence, form the seed for Rescher's other policy arguments in the collection, and indeed it is hard to isolate a particular instance where his arguments go astray. At the extremes though, we might ask whether even acquiescence is appropriate. Rescher's championing of acquiescence is justified in part by the fact of irreconcilable differences of values among people, and the need to get around that if we are to have a society. So, for example, if some think that pornography is immoral, we can still all live in a society if they acquiesce in the existence of pornography and the fact that some do not share their values. The alternative is endless conflict and social strife. But if we rewrite the preceding sentence, substituting 'slavery' for 'pornography,' we see that acquiescence might be an impediment to justice rather than a tool for securing it.

But this objection at most concerns the largest-scale issues. At the policy level, Rescher's approach is very sensible, and the essays which deal with the 'bell curve' and with medical ethics are eminently reasonable. Regarding the bell curve, for instance, Rescher argues that on the one hand, hysterical criticism of the very project is dangerous and wrong-headed, but that, on the other hand, no interesting policy conclusions may be drawn from such research. (The collection also includes a charming piece on why we need

not take some statistics so seriously in the first place.) This is an example of his efforts to enhance our understanding of things without forcing major ideological confrontation, an appropriate use of this strategy. This collection of essays definitely represents a positive contribution to public-policy discussion.

Rescher has been an active contributor to this and many other areas of philosophy for decades, so his large body of work deserves to generate good secondary sources, both for interpretive exegesis and for bibliographic surveying. Michele Marsonet's new book attempting to do this is thorough and well-organized. Rescher endorses it (in a Foreword) as a good introduction to his corpus, saying that the book is 'readable, accurate, and highly informative.' As to the book's accuracy, we may take Rescher's word for that. I concur with Rescher's assessment that the book is highly informative. Anyone doing research on Rescher would surely profit from consulting it, as it contains a useful overview of Rescher's main contributions to logic, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and social philosophy. Marsonet helpfully begins with chapters which lay out the historical background to which Rescher is responding, explain the development of pragmatism and positivism, and situate Rescher in terms of his disputes with Davidson, Putnam, Habermas, and Rorty.

So Marsonet's book is praiseworthy as a guide to Rescher, and the level of scholarship is impressive. Regarding the book's readability, Rescher may have overstated the case slightly. An archaic citation style makes it difficult to benefit from references, and the reader is more than occasionally distracted by grammatical or spelling errors. But on the whole, Marsonet has produced an impressive scholarly tool. Anyone interested in Rescher, or in the development of philosophy in America, will benefit from consulting it.

Aeon James Skoble

Southeast Missouri State University

Paul K. Moser, ed.

Empirical Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Second Edition.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1996.
Pp. vii + 468.
US\$69.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8203-X);
US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8204-8).

The new edition of *Empirical Knowledge* comes complete with endorsements describing it as 'first-rate' and 'important'. I don't disagree. Paul Moser has successfully revised an already excellent collection. The result is an up to date and thorough anthology of analytic work on justification and knowledge. It consists of four sections. The first presents a variety of views on the nature of knowledge and justification, the second deals with the Gettier problem. These sections comprised the whole of the first edition, but, for this edition, Moser has added sections on skepticism and naturalized epistemology.

The first section covers the territory well. The only full blown account of knowledge presented is a formulation of Keith Lehrer's coherentist account. However, since many philosophers still believe knowledge is something very much like justified true belief (when justification is properly analyzed), the possibility of an account of knowledge lurks in the background of the discussions of justification included. Foundationalist, coherentist and contextualist accounts of justification are all well represented (through articles by William Alston, Laurence Bonjour, Robert Audi and David Annis, among others). Epistemological externalism gets too little attention though. While reliabilism, the most popular variety of externalism, is discussed by Ernest Sosa, more space should have been devoted to the case for externalism.

The section on the Gettier problem works particularly nicely. Gettier's original article is included, along with pieces by Richard Feldman and John Pollock. Together they discuss a number of proposed solutions to the problem and a variety of Gettier-style examples that make trouble for those solutions. This illustrates effectively the difficulty of the problem, but does not drown the reader in Gettier cases. The section ends with Earl Conee explaining why the Gettier problem is philosophically important. For those who have forgotten, it is because understanding the nature of knowledge is important and an answer to the Gettier problem is necessary if we are to achieve that understanding. An obvious point, but one too often lost.

The discussion of skepticism is somewhat unbalanced. It consists of arguments by Alston and Sosa against skepticism and a somewhat tentative argument for skepticism by Barry Stroud. Given such a fascinating topic, it's a shame that the case for skepticism is not made more forcefully.

The section on naturalized epistemology presents Quine's original blueprint for the reinvention of epistemology as a subfield of psychology and two articles (by Louise Antony and Alvin Goldman) which illustrate how naturalized epistemology has come to be thought of after Quine. Rather than epistemology becoming part of psychology, naturalized epistemology usually

looks very much like traditional epistemology except that more attention is paid (and deservedly so) to what psychology has to tell us about how we do in fact form beliefs.

If there is a potential source of serious dissatisfaction with this collection, it is that the articles included all fall very much into the analytic mainstream. Those looking for radical new approaches to epistemology will be disappointed. But for those of us interested in what's going on in the mainstream — or for those of us looking for a text for an advanced undergraduate or graduate epistemology course — this is indeed a first-rate collection.

Andrew Latus

University of Toronto

Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman

History of Islamic Philosophy.

Routledge History of World Philosophies.

New York: Routledge 1996. 2 vols.

Pp. xx + 1,211.

Cdn\$260.00: US\$185.00. ISBN 0-415-15667-5 (set).

This remarkable two-volume set charts a vast terrain of contributions and controversies associated with the field of 'Islamic philosophy'. It offers critical perspectives on what Islamic philosophy is, what it has been, and how it has interacted with related fields of inquiry in different historical periods and geographic regions.

The volumes contain introductions from each of the editors followed by 71 substantive chapters, a bibliographic guide, and indices of names and terms. The overall conceptual organization of the volumes provides an intelligent map of, and path through, the diverse realms of Islamic philosophy, as well as a framework for understanding some of its historical problems and situations. The 71 chapters, for example, are organized in ten major sections. The conceptual organization of these sections is a contribution in itself, and their headings give a clear sense of the scope of the volumes: I) Religious, intellectual and cultural context; II) Early Islamic philosophers in the East; III) Islamic philosophers in the Western lands of Islam; IV) Philosophy and the mystical tradition; V) Later Islamic philosophy; VI) The Jewish philosophical tradition in the Islamic cultural world; VII) Philosophy and its parts; VIII) Later transmission and interpretation; IX) Islamic philosophy in the modern Islamic world; and X) Interpretation of Islamic philosophy in the

West. In light of this breadth of topics and approaches, this review concentrates on the major themes and a selection of highlights.

The editors take care to distinguish their approach to Islamic philosophy from previous histories of ideas and individual philosophers, and from broader cultural surveys. They argue persuasively that Islamic philosophy has continuing importance for philosophers in other traditions. Their framework also raises a host of intriguing questions about the relations among philosophy, history, and geography which invite a broader audience.

The volumes have four main aims. They seek to convey a sense of the richness, variety, and intellectual tensions in Islamic philosophy. Notwithstanding this diversity, they also seek to present Islamic philosophy as 'philosophy', which they construe as the scholarly pursuit of conceptual problems that are related but not confined to specific historical and cultural contexts. They further seek to present Islamic philosophy as a living intellectual tradition, continuing through the modern era to the present moment. In each of these ways, they seek to counter disparaging criticisms of Islamic philosophy (such as its purported lack of originality, opposition of religion to reason, exclusively 'Arabic' identity, and its alleged decline after the 12th century CE).

Not surprisingly, the first and second aims struggle with one another, for the greater the diversity of philosophical approaches and more complex their associations with theology, mysticism, law, and science, the greater the difficulty of coherently defining them as an 'Islamic philosophy' or 'philosophy' in any narrow sense of the term. Those tensions render the volumes particularly engaging and interesting. In the opening chapter of Volume One, for example, Seyyed Hossein Nasr describes the view of philosophy as 'foreign' (i.e., derived from Greek sources) to Islamic scholars. Two chapters later, F.E. Peters discusses why philosophy was viewed 'in Islamic circles' as one of the 'foreign sciences' (40-1). The tensions addressed in Oliver Leaman's discussion of 'What is Islamic philosophy?' reach a high pitch in Massimo Campanini's later chapter on al-Ghazzali in a section on 'Early philosophers in the East.' al-Ghazzali was one of the most vehement critics of philosophy in his time; and he drew a sharp distinction between religion and philosophy which these volumes redraw in ways that reach out to the intellectual brilliance of al-Ghazzali and other mystics and theologians.

These creative tensions also arise in the substantive emphases and contexts of the essays. Special attention is given to Persian contributions, for example, partly to correct the historical identification of Islamic philosophy with 'Arabic philosophy', but also to advance the argument that Islamic philosophy is 'living' tradition, as exemplified by its continuous development and importance in the Persian realm. The overall scope of the volumes remind us that the sources of Islamic philosophy range from Spain to Malaysia and extend to most regions of the world.

Section one of the volumes balances chapters on **hikmah** (the Arabic term for wisdom) and **falsafah** (translation of the Greek term for philosophy), with chapters on the *Qur'an* and **hadith** (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) and

a series of chapters on pre-Islamic and theological influences on Islamic philosophy, ranging from Greece and Syria to India and Persia, and from Sunni to Shi'ite and Isma'ili **kalam** (theology). This constitutes the most multifaceted, while still coherent, perspective on Islamic philosophy available.

Sections II and III include essays on individual Muslim philosophers, and occasionally their schools, in the east (Middle East to Central Asia) and west (principally Spain and the Maghreb). The list is familiar, but the essays are especially clear, fresh, and well-balanced. Differing views appear on such topics as Ibn Sina's 'Oriental philosophy' which invites the reader to weigh alternative perspectives.

The essay on al-Ghazzali prefigures some challenges that are also squarely addressed in Section IV on the relations between philosophy and mysticism. After a brief introduction by Nasr, who emphasizes cases of integration over division, there follows an excellent long essay on 'Ayn al-Qudat Hamadani, and two pairs of essays on Suhrawardi and Illuminationism, and Ibn 'Arabi and his school. Each author considers the ways in which these leading mystics challenge, complement, and deepen the ideas of philosophy more strictly defined.

A similar pattern of essays comprise section V on 'Later Islamic philosophy', at which point the argument for the continuity of Islamic philosophy from the later middle ages through the 19th century takes shape in a series of chapters that culminates with Mulla Sadra and his school. This historical path is prefigured by references to the philosophy of Mulla Sadra introduced earlier in the volume. The ideas of Shah Waliullah, who is described as '... perhaps the greatest Islamic thinker of the subcontinent' (371), are also examined but are not as systematically woven into the cross-currents of philosophical, theological, mystical, and political debate among 19th- and 20th-century Muslim intellectuals in India.

Section VI on Jewish philosophical tradition in the Muslim world constitutes a second major thread of philosophical continuity, exchange, and development — introduced by thoughtful essays on Jewish philosophy in Muslim contexts by Oliver Leaman and Arthur Hyman. It then offers a series of succinct yet probing essays of individual Jewish thinkers including Saadiah, Ibn Gabirol, Judah Halevi, Maimonides, and Gersonides; and concludes with thematic essays on 'Judaism and Sufism' and 'Jewish Averroism'.

Section VII shifts to substantive and sub-disciplinary branches of philosophy, spanning from metaphysics to law (both of which are particularly engaging essays). Some of the chapters strive for a broad perspective (e.g., Daibar on Political philosophy) while others take up a single illustrative philosophical problem (e.g., Frank on Ethics), or train of exploration (e.g., Kilij on Mysticism). A chapter on aesthetics deals creatively with poetry but not with Islamic art or architecture which have received considerable attention over the past two decades. As in previous sections, these chapters vary in scope and style and are much more focused than their encyclopedic titles suggest.

Section VIII contains two crisp essays and a short case study of the 'Later transmission and interpretation' of Islamic philosophy in Europe. The chapters by John Marenbon and Catherine Wilson offer a valuable corrective to superficial perceptions of the role of Islamic philosophy in early modern European philosophy (e.g., as having merely a 'conserving' or 'copyist' function). Wilson's appraisal of influences on early modern western philosophy reaches into the 18th century, to Leibniz, Hume and Descartes, setting the stage for a later section on the 'Interpretation of Islamic philosophy in the west'. However, that section is appropriately reserved until after a collection of essays on 'Islamic philosophy in the modern Islamic world'.

The essays on the modern Islamic world are organized by country (e.g., Persia, India, etc.) and region (the Arab world and Southeast Asia). This organization raises a host of fascinating questions about the relations between philosophical inquiry and geographic context, particularly the context of modern nation-states which become increasingly prominent and problematic for Muslim societies and intellectuals from the 18th century onwards. Most chapters trace out selected threads of philosophical continuity in these recent centuries and thereby mitigate some the neglect and misrepresentation that has occurred.

Mehdi Aminrazavi charts out four contemporary schools of Islamic philosophy in Persia and their historical roots in the works of Mulla Sadra, Suhrawardi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Arabi. A chapter on India provides a broad overview of Islam in India leading up to Shah Waliullah (d. 1762) and his successors. A brief chapter on Pakistan touches upon recent work there along with some issues of Islamization, leaving one hungering for more extended discussion of Allama Iqbal and Fazlur Rahman. Another short essay on Southeast Asia includes a valuable discussion of contemporary Sufism. An overly brief chapter on Turkey returns to the theme of al-Ghazzali's constraining influence.

A particularly searching pair of essays by Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' and Massimo Campanini explore Islamic philosophy in modern Arab and Egyptian contexts. Abu Rabi' addresses three questions: 'Firstly, how do we define Muslim philosophical thinking in the Arab world over the past century? Secondly, is there a need for a reassessment of the relationship between philosophy and religion in Arab society? And, thirdly, what is the relevance of the Muslim religious and philosophical heritage to modern Arab intellectual history?' (1082). Campanini then undertakes a substantive exploration of the modern encounters between Egyptian and European cultures, a theme that arises more briefly in other regional contexts.

The final section on 'Interpretation of Islamic philosophy in the west' is selective, with thoughtful chapters on orientalism, Henry Corbin, and the Soviet Union. Readers interested in the problems of intellectual history in the context of post-colonialism and 'westernization' may find it profitable to sift back again through the rich insights of the previous 1,000+ pages, for these final essays do not fully engage emerging fields of social theory and

philosophy that have sought to address the trans-cultural and trans-national situations of Muslim intellectuals.

The final essay by Shabbir Akhtar, however, boldly addresses 'The possibility of a philosophy of Islam', and thereby stands as an appropriate finale for this history of a 'living' philosophical tradition. To paraphrase William James, these volumes successfully demonstrate that in numerous ways Islamic philosophy is and has been a 'live' possibility. They achieve a scope and organization broader than previous collections; and they effectively complement the detailed monographs and articles available in Islamic research encyclopedias.

James L. Wescoat Jr.

(*Department of Geography*)

University of Colorado-Boulder

John Henry Newman

The Idea of a University. Ed. Frank M. Turner.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1996.

Pp. xxxiv + 366.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-300-06404-7);

US\$18.00 (paper: ISBN 0-300-06405-5).

Frank M. Turner says that *The Idea of a University* really should be irrelevant by now; unlike many twentieth-century university presidents, John Henry Newman answered to no state legislature, dealt with a quieter, ununionized faculty, could safely ignore student services, had no alumni to court, faced no government regulation — and Newman never had to hire a coach (283). But Newman's arguments are still used and misused in nearly every serious discussion on the role of the university. Part of Yale's 'Rethinking the Western Tradition' series, this edition of *The Idea of a University* includes the original nine discourses Newman delivered in 1852, four later lectures from his *Lectures and Essays on University Subjects*, and five new critical essays.

The five essays (a third of the total volume) explain the context of Newman's lectures and tie his arguments to contemporary issues. Martha McMackin Garland's essay explains that when Newman arrived in Dublin to establish a Catholic University and delivered the original lectures, he was still sorting out his own Oxford education and the loss of social standing from his conversion to Roman Catholicism. Newman was also confused about his mandate from the pope: he thought at first that he was establishing a uni-

versity as much for the remaining elite *English* Catholics as for the Irish. Garland's point that mid-eighteenth-century agricultural Ireland most needed middle-class professionals makes Newman's stated intention to produce 'gentlemen' seem amusingly misguided.

Frank M. Turner's essay explores Newman's often unexpected influence on twentieth-century universities. For Newman, 'uselessness' was the identifying characteristic of liberal education; Turner wryly notes that modern academics want to have it both ways: they want to defend liberal education as an end in itself, yet moonlight outside the university as consultants precisely because they are so useful after all (292). Turner also observes that liberal education has itself become professionalized — liberal arts instructors have become so specialized that they are incapable of offering general education. Even more ironically, professional schools now demand liberally educated applicants, making a liberal arts education precisely an instrumental means, not the intrinsic end for which Newman argued. (Here Turner makes Aristotle a patron saint of professional schools that advocate the active life over the contemplative life within the university — never mind that Aristotle himself apparently considered contemplation a higher human function.)

Advocates of Newman's arguments for liberal education usually neglect his arguments for the role of theology in the university — an omission that would puzzle and trouble Newman. For this reason, George M. Marsden's essay, 'Theology and the University', is crucial to this set of critical essays. Newman's ideal of theology as uniting and governing other disciplines is only appropriate for institutions sponsored by religions, Marsden admits, but Newman's broader points still have relevance for modern universities. If universities claim the whole of human experience as their domain, theology ought to be much more than a marginal discipline. Marsden claims that the marginalization of religion in American universities was 'an overcorrection for what were real problems' in the past (307), but that now religious viewpoints can play a role in universities without religious excesses. Intellectual debate would not be cut off by including religious viewpoints; there would simply be new, or rather finally more explicit, religious voices joining that debate. Marsden also points out that usually ignored 'religiously defined institutions' contribute to 'pluralism *among* as well as *within* universities' (316).

Sara Castro-Klarén is particularly effective at pointing out certain tensions in Newman's arguments in her essay. For one, Newman is inconsistent about what he takes to be universal knowledge; on the one hand, he claims that *universal* knowledge includes theology, yet on the other hand finds no place in his 'universal' curriculum for other cultures. Given what he says about the role of great authors as creators of cultures, Newman does believe in strong subjectivities, and thus would seem to have to grant some authority to the strong subjectivities of other cultures. Second, Newman is insightful enough to recognize the strong tie between literature and national identity, but instead of calling Irish Catholics to challenge the authority of Protestant English culture with a literature of their own, discouraged them from at-

tempting to write anything so foundational. Castro-Klarén also claims there is (at least) a third tension: Newman believes the literary canon is closed, but elsewhere states that both scripture *and* the long tradition of authoritative Church voices constitute the canon of Church doctrine. So ‘if Newman could defend innovation and change in sacred teaching, how could he consistently deny the same to the canon of secular literature?’ (333) But Castro-Klarén forgets the resources Newman has to make this distinction consistently after all. Newman believes that the nature and purposes of church doctrine and secular literature are so different that there is no reason for him to treat the nature of tradition in both consistently (157-61). Still another tension in Newman’s arguments — unfortunately neglected by all of the contributors to this collection — is his concession that liberal education actually turns out to be quite useful after all (116-22).

George P. Landow’s essay on the notion of an ‘electronic university’ warns against being too sentimental about the technologies present universities currently favor: for one, printed text, and for another, the physical proximity of teachers and students. Landow describes a number of educational uses for electronic texts and the World Wide Web. But many of us who have already incorporated these technologies into courses are struck by disadvantages as well: in particular, the incivility that tends to develop in virtual environments. Landow is certainly right, however, that it is odd to worry about another disadvantage — the loss of faculty/student interaction — when such interaction has already nearly disappeared independent of technology.

It’s unclear which of the last three contributors’ suggestions for the future of the university is most radical — Marsden’s for an expanded role for religion, Castro-Klarén’s for a more universal curriculum, or Landow’s for an electronic, non-spatial university. The essays generally succeed at provoking a rethinking of Newman’s points, and their diversity indicates the real depth of the modern university’s identity crisis.

Kelly D. Sorensen
Yale University

Andrea Wilson Nightingale

*Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the
Construct of Philosophy.*

New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pp. xiv + 222.

US\$49.95. ISBN 0-521-48264-X.

Over the past 30 years, Plato scholars in the English-speaking world have become increasingly concerned with the wider historical and discursive contexts of the dialogues. In part a reaction to treatment of the Platonic text by linguistic analysis, in part recognition of the hermeneutical movement and what we might call broadly the sociology of knowledge, this concern has blossomed, more recently, in a number of studies the express purpose of which is to situate Plato's philosophy in the political, social, and literary economy of its day. Andrea Wilson Nightingale's *Genres in Dialogue* is a welcome addition to that literature. In a series of focussed readings (of the *Gorgias*, the *Symposium*, and the *Phaedrus*) it advances convincingly the general claim that Plato constructs the discipline of philosophy by marking out its territory over against that of other genres (tragedy, encomium, comedy); that philosophy is born in a kind of intertextual dialogue. Accordingly, the title of the study has a double meaning. Nightingale aims to tell us both how Plato appropriates other genres for his own purposes and how the encounter of those other genres is programmatically definitive.

The book comprises five chapters. The first is an extended general reflection on the relation of Plato's philosopher to the Athenian social economy. Playing against Isocrates' *Antidosis*, which offers a utilitarian apology for the examined life, Nightingale stresses the distinction in the dialogues between sophists, politicians and poets (all of whom operate within the material system of exchange as interested parties) and philosophers (who operate outside that system and are therefore genuinely disinterested). For Plato, the argument goes, the discipline of philosophy requires recognition of an order of merit separate from and deeper than that encoded in the class structure; an order in which one's *freedom from* the system of exchange is determinative. The emancipated (philosophers) are *daimonioi andres* (enlightened or spiritual persons), the rest (slaves and craftsmen, certainly, but also those whose labours are in any way determined by material and social exchange) are *banauoi* (the vulgar).

The reinforcement of this alternative hierarchy governs Plato's encounter, appropriation and parody of specific genres. Encomium, for example, treated in analyses of the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus* in Chapters III and IV, is censured for mixing truth and flattery. The latter is often politically or materially expedient. But it is never philosophically desirable. Plato attacks this vanity from without (in contrasting the truth of Socrates' modest claims about love in the *Symposium* with the exaggerated or patently false claims of the speakers who precede him) and from within (in the parodic emendation and eventual rejection of Lysias' encomium of the non-lover in the *Phaedrus*).

In both cases, the basic thrust is the same: the interest in and attachment of encomiastic discourse to prevailing political, social and religious orders makes it intrinsically banalistic.

Old Comedy, treated in Chapter V, represents the other side of the same coin. It may well disclaim specific social and political allegiances — making a pretense of the disinterestedness Plato wants to claim as the property of philosophy. But its invective is indiscriminate. It tends to target novelty of any kind as a threat to the *demos*. That is to say, it deploys ridicule in defense of the established order. This is why, notwithstanding his own appropriation of comic character and situation in the *Protagoras*, the *Symposium* and elsewhere, Plato warns against the abuse of ridicule so forcefully in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. Invective is legitimate only if it is properly targeted, i.e., only if it proceeds on the basis of disinterested philosophical knowledge against what is bad or ignorant.

Singularly impressive, perhaps, is the discussion of tragedy and philosophy in Chapter II. There, Nightingale maps the conversation of the *Gorgias* onto Euripides' *Antiope*, arguing, on the basis of Plato's multiple references to the work and the dialogue's own nexus of problems, that the *agon* of Socrates with Callicles repeats and radicalizes that of the brothers Amphion and Zethus. In both texts, we are asked to consider the merit of the philosophical or 'musical' life as an alternative to the life of political power and influence. But whereas Euripides can only endorse this alternative from a God's-eye perspective in the *deus ex machina* with which his play closes, Plato recommends it consistently via Socrates — i.e., via the philosophical character for which the tragic choice between political and religious orders is irrelevant. Here as before, the comparison yields a twofold result. On the one hand, it sanctions our recognition of the *daimonios aner* as the truly serious man. On the other, it subordinates the seriousness of tragedy to the system of social and political exchange. The conflict between political and religious perspectives which sees Amphion defeated in his argument with Zethus (who, like Callicles, champions the quest for political power) but exonerated by Hermes, has real force only if we take the demands of politics as binding — i.e., only if we recognize as fundamental the double-bind of the political and the religious. Philosophy outstrips tragedy precisely to the extent that it declares this double-bind an illusion.

The study as a whole is admirably worked out. Nightingale moves seamlessly between the development of her guiding thesis concerning Plato's construction of philosophy as a discipline and the close reading of specific texts. It is also philosophically compelling for at least three reasons. First, it establishes the importance of the question of the relation of genres for Plato scholarship. At roughly 200 pages, Nightingale's book stakes no claim to being exhaustive. But its hermeneutical experiments are certainly successful enough to invite further testing of the main hypothesis. Secondly, it shows how careful Plato was in the construction of his dialogues. The meticulous attention to detail Nightingale uncovers in his appropriation and parody of other genres serves to remind the reader of the depth and sophistication of

his texts — and so of the significant extraphilosophical (or interdisciplinary) responsibilities that fall to those who wish to discuss and interpret them adequately. Finally, it provides a resounding endorsement of the paradox that nourishes our perennial fascination with Plato: that the establishment of a disinterested discourse requires a most active *interest* in the structure of the very social, political and literary discourses from which we seek deliverance. To the extent that we treat our discipline now almost always as an inheritance (i.e., as already constructed) we are tempted to forget this.

James Crooks

Bishop's University

Paul Rabinow

Making PCR: A Story of Biotechnology.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996.

Pp. 190.

US\$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-70146-8);

n.p. (paper: ISBN 0-226-70147-6).

Writing from an anthropological perspective, Rabinow uses a particular biotechnological example, the polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which he claims is 'arguably the exemplary biotechnological invention to date' (1), to explore 'the "style of life" or form of "life regulation" fashioned by the young scientists who chose to work in this new industry rather than pursue promising careers in the university world' (2). He engages the question, raised in diverse ways by his main informants, of whether PCR is most properly considered to be a technique, a concept (perhaps inextricably linked to an experimental system), an invention, a revolution, or something else; more generally, the question presented is 'who has the authority and responsibility to represent experience and knowledge,' as Rabinow phrases it on p. 17. While these questions are well posed and provocative both in this particular context and more generally in much of what occurs within the practice of science today, Rabinow's investigation makes little progress toward answering them. The final chapter, which juxtaposes a number of segments of interviews by way of summary, makes for the most interesting and suggestive section of the book, whereas the rest of the work contains what are oftentimes unfocused interviews reproduced in detail, without sufficient commentary or context.

Rabinow does do an admirable job throughout his book of translating the scientific details so that they are accessible and interesting to a lay audience.

As he explains, PCR allows the exponential amplification of selected segments of DNA outside of a living system by doubling the DNA through a relatively simple cycle which can be repeated as often as is desired. The process has greatly increased the ability to identify and manipulate genetic material, which is essential for genetic diagnostics and therapeutics. Rabinow goes to great lengths to describe the complex milieu within which PCR was developed, the Cetus Corporation, which was the first recombinant DNA start-up company (founded in 1971) and whose scientists published the first paper on PCR in 1985. One of these scientists, Kary Mullis, received the Nobel prize for chemistry for this work in 1993, and is acknowledged by most as the 'inventor' of PCR. Du Pont Corporation challenged the Cetus patents on PCR in 1989 since the constituent methods used were in fact not new, having existed since the late 1960s. Largely because the methods had not been utilized in this particular combination, Cetus' patents were upheld in 1991; as Rabinow explains, 'Mullis conceived of a way to turn a biological process (polymerization) into a machine; nature served (bio)mechanics' (9).

However, through his narrative and interviews with scientists, officers, and technicians at Cetus, Rabinow gradually leads the reader to the conclusion that Mullis never quite understood what he was doing and that because of various personal and professional issues, he would have never managed to make PCR work and gain scientific credibility without the help of his colleagues. These sometimes embittered colleagues indicate that Mullis has exaggerated his claims regarding his role in the development of PCR in part through his explicit rational reconstruction of its history. Mullis has accomplished this reconstruction largely by redefining PCR as a concept, rather than a technique, which allows his initial conceptual realization to count as the important 'discovery' for the purposes of the PCR story. Rabinow disputes the claim made by Mullis that PCR presented a solution to a longstanding problem, especially since Mullis never seems to identify the particular problem; in fact the power of PCR, as some of Rabinow's informants explain, comes from its versatility and applicability to many different experimental situations.

Underlying the rich conceptual issues surrounding PCR itself are more general questions about the ethos of corporate science compared to academic research science, and the emergence of the biotechnology industry. Although individual scientists' fears about moving into commercial science are frequently aired in the interview transcripts, Rabinow's examination seems to suggest that there are at least some advantages to the commercial setting, perhaps most importantly its ability to allow and encourage interdisciplinary work in a less hierarchical structure. However, examination of the development of PCR at one biotechnology company during a very short term period can provide only hints regarding the broader issues and conflicts between commercial and academic science. Rabinow provides a fairly good account of the history of the emergence of what came to be termed the biotechnology industry due to increased abilities to manipulate DNA and other molecules, a regulatory environment hospitable to commercial ventures both due to

changes in patent law and encouragement of research that could quickly be used in applied contexts, and the possibility of combining government funding with venture capital to finance large scale research endeavors. His fine-grained interviews with those involved in the fledgling biotechnology industry provide unique miniportraits of the types of persons attracted into this field, which in turn shed light on the social space of biotechnology that was created specifically at Cetus. The book's cover, featuring a painting entitled 'The Return of Jonah' that was commissioned by Mullis and another Cetus scientist, Tom White, for their lab, is one of the most provocative and amusing science studies book covers to date, and in itself helps to capture the atmosphere and characters described in the book.

Making PCR is extremely accessible and is likely of interest to philosophers of science, particularly the biomedical sciences, and those in the field of science studies, but will probably frustrate readers unaccustomed to undigested ethnography. Caution must also be noted regarding the relatively small scope of Rabinow's investigation; interviewees are limited to those closely associated to the project at Cetus and in fact do not include one of the main characters in the drama, Mullis, whose viewpoint is represented using previously published materials and court proceedings (because, as Rabinow puts it, 'first, by the 1990s Mullis was telling the same stories with the same details regardless of context; second, this procedure simplified the legal picture' [177]). Readers should take note that Rabinow calls this 'a' story of biotechnology; we can only hope that it becomes one of many stories about PCR from a variety of disciplinary perspectives.

Rachel Ankeny

(Department of History and Philosophy of Science)
University of Pittsburgh

Alexander Rosenberg

Philosophy of Social Science. 2nd edn.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1995.

Pp. xv + 236.

US\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-2659-1);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-2660-5).

The 1995 second edition of Rosenberg's book, an expanded version of the 1988 first edition, provides a broader coverage of the field with the addition of new sections to most of the chapters. The three aims of Rosenberg's book are: to show that current controversies in the philosophy of social science are a continuation of traditional disputes; to demonstrate the relevancy of these disputes by showing that social scientists take sides in these disputes; and

to show social scientists both the importance of questions that daunted Plato, Descartes, Hume, Kant and how the various inquiries of social science reflect that the search for knowledge is unified. The three aims are admirably achieved.

Rosenberg's model for scientific knowledge is natural science. Does social science yield knowledge similar to that of natural science? He argues for a negative answer in the book. In Chapter 1 Rosenberg asks why natural science is so successful in prediction and social science so much less successful. One answer to the question is there is no agreement between the methods of the social sciences and the methods of the natural sciences. His argument is informed by his positivist colours in a new section 'A Brief History of the Philosophy of Science.' In this section Rosenberg gives a history of logical positivism. In 'Lawlessness in Social Science', another new section, Rosenberg's answer as to the above question on why natural science is so successful on prediction and social science less successful is that, unlike natural science where there are lawlike regularities which allow for prediction, there are no lawlike regularities in social science. (His explanation of why there are no lawlike regularities in social science is found in Chapter 6.) In the concluding new section of Chapter 1, 'Naturalism versus Interpretation', Rosenberg writes that, for the philosophy of social science, the choice of theories is between a naturalistic social science or an interpretative social science. The domain of social science is said to be beliefs, desires, and actions of folk psychology and not social structure or social change. The central issue is how are beliefs, desires, and actions are explained by social science. If social science is to follow the methodology of natural science and if beliefs, desires, and actions are to be explained naturalistically, then intentionality or meaning is lost. Explanation for the natural sciences is causal. If beliefs, desires, and actions are to be explained via interpretation, then social science is not a science like natural science. Rosenberg claims there is no bridging between the two forms of explanation of beliefs, desires and actions, causal explanation and intentional explanation.

Chapter 2 discusses folk psychology in terms of the explanation of human action and behaviour. The chapter focuses on whether reasons are causes of action, the deductive-nomological explanation of action, and the problem of intentionality.

Behaviourism and rational choice theory are the topics of Chapter 3. In this chapter Rosenberg examines behaviourism, and in the new section, 'The Ghost in the Behaviourism's Machine,' he argues that behaviourism is not able to explain behaviour without resorting to intentional notions. He concludes the chapter with a new section on economics as a form of behaviourism. Chapter 4 is on the hermeneutics of human action, the philosophy of history, and critical theory. The addition of 'The Philosophy of History' section to the chapter does not save the chapter from a more comprehensive explication of those areas. Functionalism and macro social science are the topics of Chapter 5. Rosenberg shows his individualistic and positivistic leanings with criticisms of holism and functionalism.

To explain large scale human behaviour, Chapter 6 focuses on individualism and on Adam Smith's invisible hand theory. In the new section, 'Causes, Statistics and Policy', Rosenberg argues that exact lawlike regularities in social science are complex and beyond our grasp. There will be no lawlike regularities. Instead, there are statistical regularities. 'In other words, the categories ordinary language identifies will not be the natural kinds that figure in these laws' (178). To Rosenberg, humans are not a natural kind and hence not the subject of a real science. Should we accept Rosenberg's sceptical conclusion? Or should we, like some other philosophers, reject Rosenberg's positivist conception of natural science as a form of knowledge superior to social science? Also in the chapter, there is a good discussion of the prisoner's dilemma in terms of the explanation of social facts by rational choice models. As well, Rosenberg recognizes the moral and methodological difficulties for sociobiology, that is, the application of evolutionary theory to the explanation of social behaviour.

Chapter 7 focuses on moral issues in the social sciences. The social sciences face many more moral issues than the natural sciences because its subject is humankind. An example, is the problem of controlled research. The new sections are on Mill's consequentialism and Kant's deontology. They provide a good explanation of the two main competitors in ethical theory as applied to social science.

Problems in the philosophy of social science as relevant both to philosophy and to social science are the topics of Chapter 8. For example, the question 'Is the goal of social science to improve prediction or to expand intelligibility?' is an epistemological issue. There are other problems in the philosophy of social science which are issues of science and metaphysics. In a new section on 'Reductionism and Instrumentalism' Rosenberg raises some serious problems for both methodological individualists and holists.

Although the second edition of the book does expand on topics mentioned above, it does not introduce recent debates in philosophy of science and social science. Because the book is aimed at social science undergraduate and graduate students, it is mainly free of philosophical jargon. In this respect Rosenberg's book can be contrasted to James Bohman's *New Philosophy of Social Science* (MIT Press 1991), which is also targeted at students in social science and philosophy. Unlike Rosenberg, Bohman rejects positivism and accepts indeterminacy in social science. There cannot be lawlike regularities in the social sciences with indeterminacy of facts and values, of criticism as a social action, of how explanation affects causation, of roles, of interpretation, and of macro-structures and criticism. However, for Bohman, who advocates the critical social science of Habermas, social science is not irrational.

Despite some limitations noted above, the second edition of Rosenberg's book is an improvement on the first edition and should provide students with a very good introduction to the philosophy of social science.

Francis Remedios
University of Louvain

Rowland Smith

Julian's Gods: Religion and Philosophy in the thought and action of Julian the Apostate.

New York: Routledge 1995.

Pp. xvii + 300.

Cdn\$83.95: US\$59.95. ISBN 0-415-03487-6.

'The focus of attention in this book is the cultural mentality of an individual Emperor, not the controversy over Christianisation. On the broader issue it does not presuppose or argue for a definite answer' (xiii). This work is an assessment of the reign of a philosophically minded, pagan emperor for whom philosophy and rhetoric were integral aspects of his conception of culture and its religious expression (221). Although only a brief reign (he ruled barely a year and a half) and ending in débâcle, the reign of the Emperor Julian (AD 361-3) is significant on two grounds. 1) The profusion and quality of material available, particularly the array of the emperor's own writings which survive. 2) The significance of an emperor in the 360s attempting a pagan restoration, and the reasons for its failure in the wake of the Christianisation of the empire by Constantine and his sons.

Having converted away from a Christian upbringing to paganism, Julian actively discriminated against Christians. 'His intolerance of Christianity stemmed from a sense of outrage at those who denied the existence of the many gods and did their best to obliterate the worship of them' (222). '...his attack on Christians was not to centre on the familiar demand that they sacrifice on pain of death, but rather on a determination to counter what he saw as a Christian perversion of the staples of classical culture' (16).

Julian demonstrated remarkable energy in pursuit of his ambitious public aims (4). He sought to restore what he perceived to be the authentic Greek culture in the face of the changes that had already taken place. Thus he proclaimed religious toleration, and revitalised activities such as pagan cult sacrifice. A side effect, although apparently intentional with the subtle aim of undermining Christianity, was the exacerbation of existing tensions and schisms within the Church; leading ultimately to a need to resolve the Arian debate.

Julian's prolific writings reflect a familiarity with the philosophical discourse and literature of the times. His philosophic ideals reflect a broad cluster of interests widely shared by cultured men in the Greek world (46, 64-5). He is described as '...a cultured writer with a keen sense of the literary proprieties' (23). He had been educated by Christians and spent years devoted to liberal studies (15-16) prior to entering public life.

His philosophy was influenced by his theurgic initiation, and also by more conventional studies of Platonic texts, the neo-platonists, Aristotle and the Stoics (34). His education made for a learned man with an abiding interest in philosophy and a high regard for philosophers (35, 39).

Although more an historical assessment than a specifically philosophical treatment, this book is well written and closely argued. It provides some

fascinating insights into Julian's reign and his influence as well as his application of philosophy into public life.

Erich von Dietze

(University Chaplain)

Curtin University of Technology

Alan Wertheimer

Exploitation.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1996.

Pp. xiii + 316.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-691-02742-0.

The designation of exploitation to relationships and transactions is ubiquitous, yet its meaning and moral force is obscure. Commercial surrogacy contracts are exploitative, contracts of adhesion are unconscionable (understood as exploitative), universities' use of student athletes is exploitative, professors' sexual advances to students are exploitative, American companies exploit third world labor, the list goes on and on. What is it that these relationships share that make all of them similarly wrong? The wrong they share, according to Alan Wertheimer, is that one person is taking unfair advantage of another person. Another interesting shared feature of the above relationships and transactions, according to Wertheimer, is that they are consensual and arguably mutually advantageous. These mutually advantageous and consensual exploitation cases are the primary focus of Wertheimer's *Exploitation*. He articulates the purpose of the book to answer two sets of questions about mutual advantageous and consensual exploitation: '(1) what are the truth conditions of an exploitation claim, and (2) what is the *moral weight* and *moral force* of an exploitation claim' (5)?

Wertheimer starts out with a moral criterion as a necessary condition for exploitation, that condition is that the relationship or transactions be *unfair*. Correctly applying the term 'exploitation' means then that a moral judgment has already been made; it might, therefore, be thought that the moral work is over. Wertheimer rejects this view, 'the (moral) "fact" of exploitation settles less than meets the eye' (6). This leads him to the distinction between the *moral weight* of exploitation, its degree of wrongness, and the *moral force* of exploitation, 'the various moral upshots that exploitation might involve for parties to a transaction or for society: Can people have a right to exploit? Is it wrong to allow oneself to be exploited? Should society prohibit actions if they are exploitative?' (6). Another interesting

starting point for Wertheimer's analysis is that for him exploitation need not be *harmful* to the exploitee.

The book proceeds by considering at length a number of specific contexts of alleged exploitation cases. These include unconscionable contracts, student athletes, commercial surrogacy, unconstitutional conditions, and sex with patients in psychotherapy. Out of the detailed analysis of these types of cases, Wertheimer develops in the second part of the book the theoretical account of exploitation. That account argues that a necessary condition of exploitation is that the substance of the transaction or relationship is unfair. Having unfairness as an element of the concept makes the concept a moralized concept. In other words, it is not possible to give a purely descriptive, non-normative, account of exploitation.

Since unfairness is a necessary condition for exploitation, Wertheimer unpacks what makes a transaction unfair or wrong. He argues that there are two 'dimensions' of transactions that work to make a transaction or relationship unfair: '(1) the benefit to A [the exploiter], ...and (2) the fairness of the transaction to B' (208). Out of the idea of the hypothetical market price, according to Wertheimer, comes the most plausible candidate for understanding the notion of fairness and unfairness of transactions. The hypothetical market price is the price that would be generated by a competitive market. Wertheimer uses the examples of friends contracting with one another for the sale of one of their houses. Since they are friends they both want to arrive at a 'fair price'. They might arrive at such a price by hiring a professional real estate appraiser to come up with the 'fair market value', that price is arrived at by averaging the selling prices of houses in the neighborhood and considering other relevant factors. The resultant price is the fair price for the house. Using this analysis as a baseline for a 'fair' price, we can understand what is an unfair price. This is an interesting device, nevertheless, its usefulness is limited to cases where it is plausible to talk about a market price. In some of the cases of, for example, unconscionable contracts it may be of help, other cases like the surrogacy contracts, unconstitutional conditions, professional-client sex it will not be helpful. Also the notion of a fair market price tells us nothing about the background conditions that are unfair that lead to many cases of exploitation. Hypothetical markets take the bargaining positions of the agents as given and work out the price from those putative conditions.

Many writers on the subject of exploitation have argued that a necessary condition of exploitation is that the relationship is not consensual or that there is a defect of one kind or another in the consent. Wertheimer disagrees with that view. He considers three conditions that have been thought to give rise to defects in consent: false consciousness, inequality of bargaining power, and hard circumstances. All three are rejected as leading to defects in consent. Wertheimer does think that it is important to determine if genuine consent was given to an unfair transaction for reasons other than determining whether it was exploitation or not, for example, whether we ought to legally respect that agreement. If there was genuine consent then that fact serves to legitimate the relationship.

In the final chapter, Wertheimer directly considers the questions of the moral weight of exploitation; namely, is it seriously wrong for A to engage in consensual mutually beneficial exploitation with B and is it wrong for B to allow himself/herself to be exploited by A? And he considers what the political or legal upshot of exploitation should be; should we prohibit exploitative deals, should we censure exploitative relationships? Wertheimer argues for the surprising outcome that there may be good moral reasons to think that A has a right to take unfair advantage of B, even though it is wrong. Furthermore, he concludes that we should 'permit and enforce mutually advantageous *and* consensual agreements' (296), in order to respect B's autonomy.

Wertheimer's book is a careful and exhaustive analysis of exploitation. One may well disagree with some of his conclusions but no one interested in the topic will be able to ignore this classic work on the topic of exploitation.

Joan L. McGregor

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