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Table of Contents • Table des matières

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Jacob Adler
The Urgings of Conscience:
A Theory of Punishment.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1991.
US $44.95 (ISBN 0-87722-826-4).

Resurgence of interest in the phenomenon of legal punishment must be one of the remarkable and distinctive characteristics of contemporary philosophy of law. There is not much doubt in my mind that it is directly tied with a collapse of confidence in the late twentieth century both at the level of theory and the level of practice of forward-looking punishment theories and rehabilitation-oriented sentencing practices. Both have dominated in their respective spheres for most of this century. Adler's book is an expression of this phenomenon.

Adler's theory rests on a view that a defining feature of legitimate government is 'the requirement that the commands of the government are morally binding on the citizens' (2). It follows from this, he argues, that a government is not justified in imposing punishment on citizens who have broken the law unless it can 'establish the fact that those who are convicted have a *moral duty* (and not just a legal one) to submit to punishment' (my emphasis) (2).

Punishment, he suggests, has traditionally been viewed from the point of view of the punisher, i.e., the state. However, if we are to justify punishment, we must look at it from the point of view of the punishee. Only if it can be shown to be justified from his point of view, can it be said to be justified at all. And of course it follows from this that if punishment is justified, the punishee has a moral obligation to submit to, indeed to seek out, punishment. Furthermore, since traditional theories cannot provide such a justification they must be mistaken. What Adler puts in their place is what he calls a rectification theory.

In the short space available to me here I cannot begin to outline what is frequently a complex and intricate line of argument. What I can do is set out briefly what I see as the fundamental moves made in the course of the argument.

Conscientious submission to punishment is for Adler the paradigm case of justified punishment around which an adequate theory must develop. Only in ideal legal systems where all legal obligations are also moral obligations is the paradigm fully at home. Hence the argument begins with a description of an ideal legal system. In such systems, it turns out, the most appropriate model for punishment is penance.

A legitimate state for Adler is one that 'systematically seeks to issue only directives that are ... morally obligatory on its subjects' (27). Such a state would respect basic liberties, allow its subjects autonomy in their choice of life plans and treat its subjects with equal concern and respect.

In such a society, what would justify punishment and why? The answer is essentially retributive in structure. When someone breaks the law, he or

she acts as though she had a right she does not have. She claims a wider sphere of liberty than is compatible with equal liberty for everyone. The offender thus has more of something of fundamental value than he deserves. Justice can only be achieved if equality is restored. And this can only be achieved if the sphere of liberty of the offender is reduced, that is liberties are relinquished that are equivalent to those which were unjustly abrogated. The resulting 'package' of liberties must be no greater and no less than that to which everyone else is entitled (195). When the relative balance has been restored, justice has been done.

This framework now sets the stage for several of Adler's central claims about punishment. Suffering is not a necessary condition or component of punishment. Penance is the model for punishment because it is self-inflicted. The ideal 'penance' in an ideal legal system would be community service.

How are these claims connected? Space allows me to provide only an inadequate and partial sketch. A person who voluntarily undertakes community service to compensate for a crime has voluntarily reduced his sphere of liberty and thus counter balanced the excessive enlargement of that sphere entailed by his offence. The act of community service is a giving back of something of value which has been unjustly taken. The extent of community service required will vary with the nature of the offence. By engaging voluntarily in community service, the offender acknowledges and repudiates his crime and opens the door to reconciliation.

Penance is a model of this kind of punishment. It is voluntary, it is an acknowledgement of moral wrong doing and an expression of repentance and it is self-inflicted. Finally, penance need not involve suffering. Legal punishment which takes the form of community service has all these characteristics. It is not necessarily painful. It does not require suffering or the infliction of harm. To the contrary, it is intrinsically beneficial both for the offender and for the community against whom she has offended. It has therefore the characteristics of doing penance, an act of atonement which has healing or socially regenerative properties.

What remains is for Adler to show convincingly that this ideal account of punishment has a place in a less than ideal society. Not surprisingly, a great deal of intellectual effort is expended with this in mind. The exercise is intriguing, but in my view it is in the end unconvincing.

The difficulty is that the legal systems against which offenders offend are often deeply flawed, and the societies in which those legal systems find their place seriously unjust in significant and relevant ways. Furthermore, most offenders are considerably less than ideally conscientious. Finally coercion is a central feature of contemporary punishment and hence community service orders are a less than perfect response.

Adler seems to take the position, largely unargued it seems to me, that American democracy, which is the focus of his account, is sufficiently cognizant of basic liberties that its authority can be accepted as morally legitimate. But he also accepts that people do not have an obligation to obey unjust laws and therefore are under no obligation to submit to punishment for breaking

unjust laws. Nevertheless the state is justified in coercively confining offenders who reject their legal obligations and refuse to submit to their punishment voluntarily.

The state's response in such cases has the character of self-defence. Liberty is forcefully removed. And the relative balance of liberties between and among citizens is restored. But has the balance been restored and can it be restored coercively? According to Adler, offenders in offending make a claim to rights they do not have a right to and thereby seek unjustly to enlarge their sphere of liberty. The social damage lies in the claim itself and its expression of superiority. Unless the offender voluntarily recants, the claim to superiority remains. The fact that someone must be restrained serves to simply emphasize the socially corrosive nature of the claim. It follows that coercive intervention cannot rectify legal wrong doing. It can only serve to defend the community by restraining offenders until they recant or cease, perhaps through the onslaught of old age, to be a threat.

Rectification can only be accomplished if the offender acknowledges that her rights claims are unjustified and recants. This however would appear to suggest that the state is justified in exercising its rights to self-defence until offenders are ready to acknowledge their wrong doing. This in turn would seem to justify indeterminate prison sentences. And if that is true where does that leave the state's obligation to respect individual autonomy?

This line of argument seems to lead to the conclusion that Adler's account commits him as a matter of practice to the kind of forward-looking theory which his own arguments also lead him to reject.

It would be less than honest to suggest that Adler does not address these issues. The difficulty, however, is that a philosopher, seeking to influence our thinking about sentencing and punishment in the real world by exploring the nature, place and justification of punishment in ideal legal systems, faces the unenviable task of first disentangling punishment from its real life context, reconceptualizing it and then reapplying it in that real world again.

The virtue of Adler's book is his determination to show that to punish is not necessarily to hurt or to harm, and his thorough exploration of the nature of legal wrong doing and its impact on social relationships. If the final result is unsatisfactory, it must lie in the obstacles that face anyone who shapes his theory in the ethereal realms of ideal legal systems. Perhaps the most important lesson here, however, is that much can be learned from the exercise.

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Louis Althusser
L'Avenir dure longtemps suivi de Les faits.
Paris, Stock/IMEC 1992, Pp. x + 357.
Cdn $42.95. (ISBN 2-234-02473-0).

Le 16 novembre 1980 un silence de mort tombait sur Louis Althusser. La parution d'un ouvrage posthume est venue rompre ce silence et redonner la parole au philosophe français. L'ouvrage en question regroupe deux textes autobiographiques. *Les faits* rédigé en 1976 (281-356) est une première ébauche qui annonce le second: *L'Avenir dure longtemps* écrit en 1985 (7-279).

Olivier Corpet et Yann Moulier Boutang (auteur de: *Louis Althusser, une biographie*, tome 1, Grasset 1992) retracent dans leur présentation (i-x) l'origine des deux textes inédits.

Dans le plus récent des deux écrits (1985), Althusser, dès les premières phrases, narre sans esquive le drame de sa vie, à tout le moins ce dont il se souvient. Par la suite, le récit emprunte un ton plus propice à l'autobiographie et un chemin plus coutumier. Il refait son parcours, remontant à ses parents, sa naissance, sa jeunesse, son adolescence, ses fréquentations restreintes et son développement au sein de sa famille. Althusser utilise un regard aux accents psychanalytiques pour reconstruire le casse-tête de sa vie. On a vite l'impression qu'il tombe dans des lieux communs: emprise de la mère, absence du père, son éducation sexuelle et tous ces morts qui défilent dans sa jeunesse. Même son prénom vient d'un mort (le premier amour de sa mère). Heureusement, l'impression s'atténue au fil des pages. Derrière l'enseignant, le philosophe, le marxiste, le communiste, Althusser dévoile l'être fragile. Celui qui cultive les peurs, les phobies, les dépressions et qui suit une interminable thérapie.

Dans tout son épanchement, Althusser, en aucun temps, ne sollicite de la part du lecteur un verdict d'innocence pour l'ultime action qu'il a commise.

Dans le chapitre II, l'on retrouve même l'esprit critique du penseur, qui nous expose les difficultés inhérentes au fou meurtrier qui 'bénéficie' d'un non-lieu. Par la suite, Althusser offre de très belle pages sur son itinéraire philosophique, son implication politique, l'Ecole normale supérieure, son internement, sa réhabilitation.

La lecture de *L'Avenir dure longtemps*, qui constitue l'essentiel de l'ouvrage, est émouvante dans la mesure où l'on est sensible à la déroute d'un être humain, trop humain. Althusser se révèle être une conscience qui saigne. Une conscience qui s'est vue glisser vers la folie pour finalement perdre complètement pied et tomber dans la tragédie. Ce fut pénible, mais il se releva de sa chute.

Avec ce livre, Louis Althusser nous oblige à jeter un regard différent sur la violence quotidienne que l'on croit spontanée et gratuite. Avec cet ouvrage, il a signé son dernier livre, mais non le moindre.

Claude Gratton
Teluq

Louise M. Antony and **Charlotte Witt, eds.**
A Mind of One's Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1993.
Pp. xvii + 302.
US $59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-7937-7);
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-7938-5).

Anthologies of feminist philosophy are being published more frequently and in greater abundance than ever, and this is both blessing and burden. On the one hand, it demonstrates the willingness of publishers and readers to take seriously a body of work in which a growing number of philosophers participate and find value. On the other, however, there is increasing pressure on each new work to distinguish itself in some way, to stand apart from the crowd. *A Mind of One's Own* addresses this tension on several levels, making it a well-rounded and engaging collection.

The essays assembled here are obviously united thematically, as the subtitle of the book indicates. In addition, the reader can easily discern further significant connections beyond the simple focus on reason and objectivity. But another kind of unity is provided by the editorial vision of Antony and Witt, who acknowledge in their introduction that they have struggled with tremendous philosophical and emotional ambivalence toward the feminist critique of the canon. Such an admission is a relatively new feature in feminist work, and it is a welcome one. Antony and Witt's explicit aim in pursuing this project has been to facilitate debate between those feminists who dismiss reason and objectivity as irredeemably contaminated by androcentrism, and those who feel unable to relinquish their commitment to the philosopher's 'tools of the trade'. In so doing, they provide, among other things, a forum in which some of the prevailing myths about feminism are explicitly dispelled, and others are tacitly challenged.

It is by now somewhat tired to emphasize to feminists that there is no unitary position to which feminist philosophers are committed, but it is certainly worth stressing the point in a compilation such as this, which aspires to and merits a wider readership. The great subtlety of the work lies in its ability to demonstrate such claims implicitly, rather than to argue for them. For example, anyone who is convinced that feminist philosophy must be non-confrontational in style will be disconcerted by Louise Antony's essay on Quine, in which work by Lorraine Code and Alison Jaggar comes in for intense and even hostile critical scrutiny. Similarly, Margaret Atherton's essay on the gendering of reason takes on the work of Susan Bordo and Genevieve Lloyd in a relatively adversarial fashion. Each of the authors represented here recognizes that feminist work in philosophy is often plagued with the problem of paradox, in appearing to rely heavily on those very principles and concepts that feminism most disdains. Some of the writers represented here deal with this dilemma with noteworthy elegance.

If there are some common values and problems around which this collection is united, there is also a great deal of respect for diversity. We are offered essays both long and short, elementary and profound, general and specific, by writers who are established luminaries in the field of feminist philosophy, and by some less well known but promising contributors. The papers range widely over an examination of writers (including Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant and Quine) and of issues (including rationality, objectivity, materialism, contractarianism and metaphysics). It is probably unreasonable to expect every essay in an anthology to be utterly absorbing, but the variety of subjects, and of stances on feminism and its potential contribution to philosophy, is likely to ensure that at least a few essays will be interesting and very useful to a broad spectrum of readers.

Considerations of space prohibit a sustained analysis of each essay, but there are several that merit further comment. Antony's 'Quine as Feminist: The Radical Import of Naturalized Epistemology' stands out as witty, well-written, and infused with the writer's personality. Antony enlightens and annoys in equal measure, and one wants to meet the woman who can write so boldly and controversially. She misses the mark in some of her comments on Code, mentioned above, but the general effect is one of even-handedness, if not quite the respectfulness she advocates. Atherton's 'Cartesian Reason and Gendered Reason', which is the most similar to Antony's in style and content, is an important critique of the tendency (by no means unique to feminists) to create universal, transcendent philosophies out of culturally and historically circumscribed positions. It would have been nice if Lloyd, whose 'Maleness, Metaphor and the "Crisis" of Reason' is included here, had responded more directly to Atherton's work. This wish is reinforced by Lloyd's offering of a very difficult work on the symbolic impact of masculinity, which seems to fall prey to the lack of historical awareness for which Atherton rightly takes her to task.

'On Being Objective and Being Objectified', by Sally Haslanger, is a clearly superior analysis of the possibility of the gendering of the norms of rationality. Haslanger's discussion of the sex\gender nexus is very good, and her grasp of the complexities of social roles, oppression and values is impressive. However, the subject is so dense that it really merits a book length treatment, and suffers somewhat from being forced into long essay format.

The insights provided by many of these writers are daring and sometimes humorous. Annette Baier's description of David Hume as an 'unwitting virtual woman' is sure to raise some hackles, as is Barbara Herman's observation that it is 'perverse but right' to translate Andrea Dworkin's views on female sexuality into the Kantian idiom. Naomi Scheman's remark that 'philosophers' problems are the neuroses of privilege' is made in a somewhat similar vein, but her rather stirring essay is quite distinctive. She relies on jargon in places and the feminist import of her views is not always immediately evident, but her far-reaching explorations are deft in their combination of the deranged and the rational yielding a 'logic of paranoia' that is unsettling in its familiarity.

Comments on the packaging of a book are unlikely to convince anyone either to read or avoid it, but two observations bear mentioning. First, the inclusion of a thorough index is noted with pleasure. However, the choice of typeface and size is rather unfortunate, as the book is printed in a tiny and very narrow type. It is likely to leave even those readers blessed with excellent vision feeling slightly wall-eyed.

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Brian Barry and **Robert E. Goodin, eds.**
Free Movement: Ethical Issues in The Transnational Migration of People and of Money.
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1992. Pp. xii + 300.
US $45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-00887-3);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-00888-1).

This is a collection of essays on ethical issues currently raised by the international flows of people and money. Although the migration of people and the movement of money are different topics the collection hopes to generate greater understanding in each case by addressing them in conjunction, and through specific perspectives. Five different perspectives are considered: liberal egalitarianism, libertarianism, Marxism, natural law, and political realism. Each perspective is represented by essays on the migration of people and on the movement of money, followed by a critical commentary.

The collection opens with two introductions: a brief outline of the collection's aims by Brian Barry and a more passionate plea for consistency by Robert Goodin. Goodin notes that in one recent year the United States expelled over a million illegal aliens and absorbed over two hundred billion dollars of direct foreign investment; Goodin comments that the people would have been welcomed with open arms if they had been money. In his view, this inconsistency illustrates the evil of restrictions on immigration. Thus the collection seems animated by disparate aims: one, represented by Barry, is analytical; the other, represented by Goodin, is partisan and activist.

The liberal egalitarian perspective is presented by Joseph Carens and I.M.D. Little. Little argues a modest position, that a liberal egalitarian perspective does not in itself establish any distinctive views except perhaps to rule out certain extreme views. By contrast, Carens asserts that liberal

egalitarianism is committed to free movement across borders as a basic human right, and that this entails a correlative right of virtually unlimited immigration. Unfortunately, Carens offers little in support of this view and does not consider adequately the considerations which might count against it. Although he notes that some restrictions on immigration might be justified, he assumes that the claims of those outside the country must be considered equally with those who are already citizens. In the commentary Joseph Woodward argues that immigration restrictions can be justified by the need to maintain liberal egalitarian policies and institutions within the state. However, Woodward says nothing about the right of community members to decide such restrictions for themselves.

In the natural law section Ann Dummett echoes Carens' view that free movement is a basic human right and that it entails a right of immigration; on this basis she infers that the rights of citizens and aliens must be identical. As regards the movement of money, Paul Weithman tries to use a modified version of Rawls' theory to systematize the recent social teaching of the Catholic Church. John Finnis argues in a commentary that both essays oversimplify natural law theory.

The other three perspectives have less direct ethical relevance but some theoretical interest. Libertarianism is represented in two versions by Hillel Steiner and Deepak Lal. Steiner's version is 'pure' to a degree that has (at best) limited usefulness for political judgement. Deepak Lal's version is modified to allow government action to relieve absolute poverty, so long as this action is construed as a collective good rather than redistribution. This makes the position less objectionable but, as Onora O'Neill notes in her commentary, it is no longer obviously 'libertarian'. Chris Brown and Kurt Hubner offer Marxist perspectives; these are limited by the fact that, as Brown notes, these issues are remote from the mainstream concerns of Marxism. In the commentary Phillipe Van Parijs discards the mainstream and tries to develop a Marxist ethical perspective based on the concept of exploitation. Political realism has even less obvious relevance to these issues, given that this perspective rejects moral theorizing. However, David Hendrickson argues that this is an oversimplification and that American realists can be found on all sides of the current debate on immigration. Unfortunately, Hendrickson does not indicate (as he might) how the ethical concerns of these individuals are related to their realist position. Susan Strange by-passes the ethical issues entirely and, in a splendid analysis of the complexity of the realist perspective, shows that there can be as many as five different 'realist positions' today.

There are two conclusions. In one essay, Terry Nardin outlines the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective; his analysis is lucid and incisive. In a separate conclusion, Brian Barry vigorously disputes the idea (held, e.g. by Goodin, Carens and Dummett) that impediments to immigration are wrong in principle.

Overall, the essays in this collection are well written and generally engaging. I especially recommend the contributions by Strange, Nardin,

Barry, O'Neill and Carens. The collection is sometimes best where this might be least expected, for example, in the discussions of political realism and libertarianism as general theoretical perspectives. On the other hand, the collection is less effective in treating ethical issues. One problem here is that the collection tries to cover too much: given the focus on *ethical* issues it is difficult to see why marginal perspectives such as Marxism and political realism were given equal space with liberal egalitarianism. Another problem is that the editors' aims are in conflict: Barry's analytical focus tends to trip over Goodin's partisan opposition to immigration controls. This was particularly a problem in the liberal egalitarian and natural law sections on the movement of people. As a result, the collection fails to present the full range of positions and arguments within the most relevant ethical perspectives, and it also fails to consider some of the more obvious and pressing objections to the idea of unlimited immigration. Barry's concluding critique redresses this in part but his view might have been asserted more centrally in the collection. A critical conclusion is small compensation for a lack of balance in the volume as a whole.

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Timothy M.S. Baxter
The Cratylus: Plato's Critique of Naming.
Leiden: E.J. Brill 1992. Pp. 187.
US $57.25 (ISBN 90 04 09597 7).

Anybody who has ever puzzled over the purpose of all the seemingly fatuous etymologies in Plato's *Cratylus* should welcome *Plato's Critique of Naming*. For all that has been written about the *Cratylus* (subtitled, although not by Plato, 'on the correctness of ὄναματα'), little has been said to unify the dialogue by way of explaining what role Socrates' etymological analysis of over a hundred Greek words plays in its overall significance. Consequently, its significance and unity are often difficult to discern from the secondary literature. *Plato's Critique of Naming* offers a unified interpretation of the dialogue that respects the essential role of the etymologies in its general structure and purpose. On the whole, this commentary is insightful, carefully elaborated and thoroughly researched.

According to Baxter, the *Cratylus* has two purposes, one personal and the other philosophical: 'the [personal] aim was to reject one of the early influ-

ences upon him, Cratylus, and to write a further chapter in his *apologia* for the life and philosophy of his true master, Socrates, whilst the [philosophical aim] was to put names in their place' (184). The dialogue's closing dilemma sets Forms against flux (439c-40d). Forms, being ineffable, are accessible only to Divine knowers, whereas flux, being indeterminate, proves incompatible with knowledge (178-81). Forms preserve knowledge, but at the cost of denying human access to it; objects in flux, on the other hand, are inherently unknowable. Cratylus stubbornly insists upon flux and Socrates states his preference for Forms, provocatively described as something about which he often dreams (439c). At the same time, Baxter sees Plato hinting that the dilemma is over-simplified. For one thing, the contrast between sensible flux and intelligible Forms need not be polarized in terms of contradictories (as opposed to contraries) as Plato does here. Also, both horns work against the fundamental principle of the dialogue, that learning and coming to know are possible for human beings (178). Baxter argues that the polarity of this contrast blatantly exploits, in *ad hominem* fashion, Cratylus' predilections for a flux ontology and an all-or-nothing attitude to knowledge (181-3). Socrates is alert to the degrees of flux and phenomenal stability that are indicated in the dialogue and he leaves open the possibility of escaping the dilemma. In fact he encourages Cratylus to pursue this possibility for himself (440d).

To explain how Plato puts names in their place, Baxter makes a crucial distinction between prescriptive theories about the correctness of names and descriptive theories. A prescriptive theory about the correctness of names finds its standards in *a priori* considerations for the properties of a correct name, whereas a descriptive theory finds its standards in existing languages (4). Hermogenes' conventional correctness theory and Cratylus' natural correctness theory both overlook this distinction, whereas Baxter is convinced that Plato and Socrates always keep it in view (13-15).

For Cratylus names, like 'Hermogenes' (son of Hermes), simply *are* semantic descriptions, and when one is assigned to something that doesn't match its descriptive content its use in that context is mere nonsense (429e). He gives logical priority to semantically descriptive names and uses them to appraise only the appropriateness of particular assignments. His appeal to the semantic content of Hermogenes' name tacitly assumes that 'what Greek ought to be is what it (broadly speaking) is', which collapses the descriptive/prescriptive distinction (11). Hermogenes is impressed with the inventive capabilities of name users to construct and impose novel names in a wide variety of contexts, so he gives priority to name-givers. But since he sees this enterprise as pure fabrication, anything goes (384c-d). Every name is correct, so the prescriptive/descriptive distinction is collapsed again. For Socrates, on the other hand, ontology is prior to names and the name-giving enterprise. He argues first for the existence of stable essences (οὐσία), and the theory of correct names he *sketches* (formally, without providing many details) is agnostic about the correctness of any current names; these stable essences,

he says, prescribe how names should be constructed if they are to fulfill their prime function as tools for instruction (385e-6e, 387d-8e, 428e, 425d).

When *Plato's Critique of Naming* gets to its discussion of the etymologies, it radically inverts the ordinary balance of emphasis by allocating nearly half its length to them. Chapter 4 discusses the exegetical obstacles involved in precisely specifying the targets of Plato's polemical parody. According to Baxter, anybody who ever used etymology to *support* their ideas is a potential target (5, 94-9). For anyone who does this inverts the priority of nominata over names, and Socrates' theory, being grounded in ontology, aims to establish this priority (87). Baxter's list of suspects includes a wide range of figures from all over Greek culture — Homer, the Presocratics, religious leaders, tragic dramatists and the Sophists. Three things must be noted in brief: although Socrates performs the etymologies, Hermogenes determines most of the itinerary (89); the section is an investigation into opinions (δόξαι) (91); and in constructing the etymologies Plato often 'borrowed creatively', obscuring the precise origins of many (96). Consequently, much of what Baxter has to say about particular etymologies or figures of ridicule is speculative since, as he admits, the available evidence is meagre (86).

In chapter 5 Baxter takes a long look (77 pages) at the etymologies themselves. What is most worth noting here are the figures whom Baxter *does not* examine. He finds no solid evidence that Plato had in mind his contemporary, Antisthenes, although this Cynic was once a perennial favourite amongst scholars who probed for an unmentioned villain lurking in the background of the *Cratylus* (161). As well, Hecataeus, Hellanicus and the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* are mentioned as figures who would be worth studying, but are consigned to the footnotes (161). There is still some important philological work that could be done on any of these figures.

Much that is of genuine interest in *Plato's Critique of Naming* has been left out of this review. Chapter 3 investigates the possibility that Plato held out hope for an ideal language, comparing Socrates' sketchy prescriptive theory with contemporary varieties of etymological analysis and Comenius, the 17th century educator who tried to construct a universal language. And I have said nothing about one of the crucial tasks which Baxter sets for himself at the outset, explaining the roles of Hermogenes (who is Socrates' interlocutor for most of the dialogue) and Cratylus (after whom the dialogue is named). On these issues, I encourage readers of the *Cratylus* to turn to *Plato's Critique of Naming* for themselves. I'm sure they will enjoy it.

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Cornelius Castoriadis
Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy.
New York: Oxford University Press 1991.
Pp. x + 304.
US $38.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-506962-5);
US $20.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-506963-3).

This volume collects together translations of ten articles published between 1976 and 1990 and follows on two volumes of *Political and Social Writings* which gathered together Castoriadis' previous writings. These 'essays in political philosophy' (to quote the subtitle) do not cohere together to develop an overall thesis. They tend to have the impatient tone of someone convinced that the answers are already in and that sustained argumentation is unnecessary in addressing a variety of philosophical and historical problems. Indeed much of the larger argument appears in Castoriadis' major work, *The Imaginary Institution of Society* to which these essays have a secondary relation. This volume will probably 'work' only for those who have already been convinced by the author's central writings since so little effort is put into careful argumentation or defense of the positions it espouses. In one place, Christianity, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger are simply dismissed *en masse* as acritical legitimation ideologies (9). Phenomenology and postmodernism are swept away in another (13, 223).

Castoriadis has been among the most unorthodox of Marxists, splitting from Communism to Trotskyism in the 1940s, and from Trotskyism to his own independent critical stance articulated in the pages of *Socialisme ou Barbarie* through the 1950s and 1960s. His central quest — and the strength of these essays — has been a passionate promotion of the modernist vision of a self-reflective and self-realizing society. The philosopher's role, in his view, is to assist 'a project of autonomy and democracy, [where] the great majority of men and women living in society are the source of creation, the principal bearers of the instituting imaginary, and ... should become the active subjects of an explicit politics' (6). It is a fully socio-historical view. 'The social,' he contends, 'is the always already instituted anonymous collective in and through which "subjects" can appear.' Because of this, he claims, Husserl's concept of 'intersubjectivity' amounts to a 'desperate attempt (...) to escape from the solipsistic cage to which egological philosophy leads' (77).

The credit for the modernist project is allocated to Ancient Greece and western Europe. Castoriadis accuses Habermas of having built his communicative ethics on an 'enormous logical blunder' because it presumes this Enlightenment *telos* as a given. There are, he argues, no lack of societies where cultural communication lacks a historically self-critical and self-creative dynamic. His crediting of the Greeks is not surprising in itself but is accompanied by a dismissal of all other cultural traditions without the slightest attempt to examine the cross-cultural evidence (82). Curiously, this lapse is then celebrated in the Foreword by David Curtis as the appropriate retort to the critique of curricular Eurocentrism.

'We want everyone to be autonomous, that is to say, we want all people to learn to govern *themselves*, individually and collectively,' (132) Castoriadis writes, enunciating a central article of faith. The author has always had a good nose for fraud and a sharp eye for compromises and deviations from the ideal of the self-mastering society. This is clear enough from his early breaks from authoritarian state socialism; in his latest essays, he raises ecological themes concerning the ways in which technology has escaped rational control. Yet the critics of the dark underside of the historical realization of the Enlightenment, from Horkheimer to Foucault, receive short shrift here. Much of contemporary culture fares no better, falling to Adorno-esque denunciations of its shallowness. One is left wondering (as with Adorno) whether this is sheer curmudgeonliness as no effort is made to differentiate among various forms of popular culture nor is there any engagement with the theorists who find critical moments in it.

In short, these essays are most likely to be of interest to those who already know and like Castoriadis' work and wish to see his latest writings in English.

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Joseph R. Des Jardins
Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company 1993. Pp. xvi + 272.
(paper: ISBN 0-534-20046-X).

This nice little introductory book deserves an equally nice little review. Des Jardins has provided us with a highly useful survey of environmental ethics. The text begins with a brief but generally successful overview of the application of traditional ethical theories to the environment. Each subsequent chapter deals with issues that are highly topical. These issues include: the rights of future generations, duties towards animals and the natural world, economics and the environment, biocentricity, the land ethic, ecology (both deep and social) and finally ecofeminism.

I came across this book halfway through my first year environmental ethics lectures. Had I discovered it earlier, I would have placed it on my 'recommended texts' list. Recommended, but not required, since the work

cannot stand on its own. This is by no means a criticism of Des Jardins' project since students should also have access to various primary writings in environmental ethics in order to have a well rounded understanding of the important concerns and debates. Accordingly, this text is wonderfully suited to supplement any one of a variety of environmental ethics anthologies that are out there. For example, I found that many of the specific papers that Des Jardins discussed, or gave mention of, could be found in Donald VanDeVeer and Christine Pierce's popular *People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees*.

This text is primarily an explication rather than a critical analysis of various positions. Nevertheless, Des Jardins does manage to draw out both the positive and negative aspects of the theories considered. Even if one does not agree with the various conclusions that Des Jardins draws, they provide one with ample opportunity for classroom debate.

Environmental ethics is one of those topics that is considered 'sexy'. And although there are no sexy pictures of decimated forests in this book, the clear and straightforward manner in which Des Jardins writes, as well as the way in which the text is neatly compartmentalized leads me to believe that many students will eagerly read this text over and over. Students can use this text first to ground themselves in the issues and they can then proceed to look to other primary writings for more detailed and complex discussions. Second, students can return to the book to remind themselves of the larger picture. Of course, these suggestions are also applicable to those professors who are teaching an Environmental Ethics course for the first time.

Complaints? Well, the case studies that are provided at the beginning of each chapter are rather weak. They are uninformative and unnecessary especially since the discussion questions at the end of each chapter are much more helpful in focussing the students' attention. Second, I would have liked to have seen less on animal rights and more on aboriginal peoples and their relationship with the natural environment; or perhaps a section on non-western views of the environment, or even the conflict between biotechnology and the third world. The reason for these inclusions is to recognize the impact of trade relations, culture, poverty, wealth, and science, on global environmental policies.

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Cora Diamond
The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1991.
Pp. xi + 396.
US $35.00 (ISBN 0-262-04121-9).

The Realistic Spirit consists of thirteen of Professor Diamond's papers written between 1966 and 1985. The papers are introduced by two new essays that comment on themes and arguments that run across the collection.

Diamond has two closely related aims. 1) She seeks to correct a near-standard construal of nonsense as consisting (sometimes) of a syntactically acceptable combination of words that 'clash' semantically. We should, she urges, *not* construe 'Caesar is a prime number,' for example, as misassigning — positively, but unintelligibly by metaphysical happenstance, as it were — a property of numbers to a person. Instead, we should say that put within such a context, either 'Caesar' or '___ is a prime number' (or both) must not be playing its ordinary syntactico-semantic role. We don't know what might be meant by 'Caesar' in that sentence. So that sentence is for us just an empty sequence of sounds or marks, real nonsense just like the nonsense word 'frobble'. A slogan for this construal of all nonsense as full-blooded emptiness is Wittgenstein's remark 'When a sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless. But a combination of words is being excluded from the language' (*Philosophical Investigations*, §500).

Diamond traces the roots of this Wittgensteinian thought to Frege's technique in the 'Begriffschrift' for clarifying the syntactico-semantic roles of expressions and preventing the nonsensical combination of symbols. She then follows the thought into the *Tractatus*, as Wittgenstein purges it of Frege's metaphysics of logical truth. Here she argues that we must take seriously the *Tractatus* claim that its remarks about simple objects, facts, and so forth are nonsense. We must throw the ladder away, and stop looking for metaphysical truths that are 'intimated' but not said: there are no metaphysical truths. Finally, she suggests that Wittgenstein's attention to language-games in *Philosophical Investigations* involves surveying patterns of marks that we have or haven't found a use for. That we have not found a use for 'I have a pain in my plum tree' is something simply to be noted. It does not need to be supported by the (bogus) metaphysical explanation that plum trees do not have sensations.

Diamond argues that our temptation to explain how so-called 'positive' nonsense can't be true because of the way things necessarily are is rooted in a philosophical wish to stand outside and explain our practices. She asks us to give up this wish, the philosophical desire for 'metaphysical realism', according to which requirements on what we can sensibly say are laid down by reality itself. Instead, we should maintain a *realistic spirit*, looking at what we do and say, as beings who have found uses for some linguistic patterns but not others. With regard to following a rule: 'Realism in philosophy, the

hardest thing, is open-eyedly giving up the quest for such [a metaphysical] elucidation, the demand that a philosophical account of what I mean make clear how it is fixed, out of all the possible continuations, *which* I mean. Open-eyedly: that is, not just stopping, but with an understanding of the quest as dependent on fantasy' (69).

2) Diamond seeks, in the concluding six essays that do not have to do directly with Frege or Wittgenstein to show how attention in the realistic spirit to what we say can make for better philosophy. These papers — on Anselm's proof, on eating meat, on animal experimentation, and on Martha Nussbaum's work in literature and moral philosophy — mostly bring out genuine perplexities in practice, real problems, that philosophers are sometimes inclined to 'solve,' or run roughshod over, with metaphysical arguments. For example, Peter Singer's appeal to animal rights to defend vegetarianism misses the point. 'Peter Singer vegetarians should be perfectly happy to eat the unfortunate lamb that has just been hit by a car' (326), since it no longer bears rights or has interests. The real issue here, according to Diamond, is how far we extend the nonbiological concept of a *fellow creature*, a being whom we pity for being in the same boat with us, our company, to various animals (328-9). For all of us, who are not perverse, it extends part of the way: we do not eat pets. But whatever it is that stops us from eating pets may have different force for different people when it comes to thinking about cows. Such a consideration involves 'something which is not compelling, or not compelling for everyone who can understand its force, and the possibility, even where it is not compelling for someone, of making for discomfort or of bringing discomfort to awareness' (332). Being struck by such a consideration is like being struck by the unparaphrasable 'secondary sense' that certain poems carry, a sense of being something that it is just right to say, or like being struck with the mysterious, unparsable sense of metaphysical dependence on something hidden that is expressed in Anselm's proof. Martha Nussbaum's work on literature is praised for reminding us that literary works often carry such perceptualist insights into 'the texture of being' (374); literary works can cast a certain light on things. Diamond shows herself to be an accomplished reader of passages that do this in Wordsworth, Dickens, and Hopkins, among others.

Diamond succeeds completely in diagnosing the wish for metaphysical facts that figures in so much philosophy. Her delineation of how this wish issues in mistaken readings of Frege and Wittgenstein is a masterpiece of close reading with a deep philosophical sensibility. Her own philosophical remarks in the realistic spirit on practical problems are moving and extraordinarily persuasive. *The Realistic Spirit* is a book that anyone concerned with Wittgenstein and Frege must take account of, and philosophy as a discipline would be far better off if it were practiced in the Wittgensteinian realistic spirit that Diamond both describes and exemplifies. Yet, in a number of ways, it might also have been a fuller or deeper book.

1) Emphasizing rightly a broad continuity in the treatments of nonsense, Diamond does not offer an account of the arguments that lie behind the shift

between Wittgenstein's early and late work. It is not a matter of a shift from a realist to an anti-realist or conventionalist stance. Rather, the *Tractatus* 'is metaphysical in holding that it is possible for propositions to be rewritten in such a way that [the] logical relations [of our thoughts to each other] are all clearly visible'; *Philosophical Investigations* abandons this 'requirement of logical analysis' in favor of 'looking at the use, looking at what we do' (18, 21). Yes. But what arguments or considerations motivate that abandonment of requirement and shift of attention? Wittgenstein's shift of attention is usually traced to the color exclusion problem and other problems of measurement systems. He is taken to have noted that logical analysis into an explicit tautology cannot account for the apparent necessary truth of sentences like 'nothing is red and green all over.' Or the shift is sometimes explained by appeal to the arguments in the opening sections of *Philosophical Investigations* about family-resemblance concepts and about the relativity of the concept of 'simple object' to contexts of interest. Diamond does not discuss any of these arguments or consider why they might be compelling. It would have been good to have had her thoughts about them. In general, there is less attention to *Philosophical Investigations* than to the *Tractatus*. This is natural enough, given the continuities that Diamond emphasizes. But her treatment of those is so good that one wishes for more treatment of those later arguments also.

2) In one place, Diamond seems herself to appeal to common sense to justify a judgment: 'common human sense ... rejects the pretension of any activity to special moral status' (361). This slip, if it is a slip, is a rare one, but it leaves one wondering about the possible existence of a form of sensibility that might justiably move us toward the use of certain expressions. Here we find a judgment that is, seemingly, grounded, or almost so. One wishes for more discussion of this possibility, whether to uphold or to reject it.

3) The range of comparisons in *The Realistic Spirit* is somewhat narrower than might be wished for. Diamond notes that Frege and Wittgenstein hold a view according to which 'philosophy, as it deals with the mind, is in a peculiar way stymied: its subject matter has essential features that escape it' (1). This is a Kantian thought. It echoes Kant's remarks about the synthesis of productive imagination being 'a blind but indispensable function of the soul' (CPR, A78=B103), about our inability to explain our modes of *Verbindung* — synthesis or connection — metaphysically, and about the consequent limits of Critical Philosophy. Diamond notes that 'There is indeed a sense in which Kant provides this collection of essays with its unity, but I cannot here try to show how the realistic spirit is related to Kant's conception of philosophy' (22). Here too one wishes for more, particularly for comparisons with other figures, such as Schiller and Schlegel, who bear the burden of an inheritance of Kant in strikingly literary ways.

4) In some places, Diamond seems to suggest that it is possible to wean oneself from the philosophical fantasy of discovering metaphysical explanations of what our practice is or ought to be. We might, she suggests, stop being

metaphysical, and just look at our uses, at the physiognomies of our practices. This thought — however well-motivated by the senselessness of metaphysics — has the effect of suppressing the itinerary of Wittgenstein's persona in *Philosophical Investigations*, as it finds itself *continually* encountering temptations, giving way to fantasies, in which it can then, in the end, place no sense. In contrast, for example, with Stanley Cavell's attentions to the plays of our unending engagement with skepticism-metaphysics, Diamond seems more to suggest that that engagement can and should stop, in moving from metaphysics to the realistic spirit. But what if metaphysical temptations already inhabit our practices, pressure our normal words as they stand, even while being unsatisfiable? It would have been good to see Diamond pursuing this dark, perhaps quasi-literary, Kantian thought.

Each of these complaints in a way asks for more tracking specifically of our (and Wittgenstein's, and Kant's successors') continual haunting by a wish for an impossible metaphysics to sublime away the agonies of our responsibilities within practice. They ask for more appreciation of how shot through with metaphysical temptations the ordinary already is. In this way, they think of something about human nature's openness to such temptation as showing itself in practice. Against this thought, there is a certain temperamental austerity in Diamond's writing, an austerity that appears in Wittgenstein in the remark — is it only a remark in an imaginative itinerary? or is it a true thesis? — 'The difficult thing here is not, to dig down to the ground; no, it is to recognize the ground that lies before us as the ground. For the ground keeps on giving us the illusory image of a greater depth, and when we seek to reach this, we keep on finding ourselves on the old level' (*Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, 3d. ed., VI, §31; cited 219). It is a measure of the power of Diamond's austerity that she can make this seem not the self-admonition of a persona, but just true. Sometimes I think she might be right.

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Paul Guyer
Kant and the Experience of Freedom.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press
1993. Pp. xv + 449.
(ISBN 0-521-41431-8).

Paul Guyer's *Kant and the Experience of Freedom* contains all but one of the essays he has written on Kant's aesthetics since *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, plus pieces concerning the connections between Kant's moral and aesthetic philosophies. This new book is not intended as a repudiation of the earlier work, but attempts instead to place it in a larger philosophical and historical context. Guyer's chief claims here are that Kant saw aesthetic experience as important if not essential in the development of a fully moral character, and yet that there is no inherent conflict between this and Kant's continued insistence upon the *disinterested* nature of aesthetic experience. Rather, it is precisely *because* works of art are valued 'independent[ly] of our normal theoretical and practical interests' (48) that aesthetic experience is able to serve what are ultimately moral ends.

The book is divided into two main sections: the first five essays concern Kant's aesthetics in its historical context, while the second five deal more directly with the connections between Kant's views on aesthetics and his views on morality. In the first chapter, we find a discussion of the shift in Kant's views between the *Groundwork* and the *Critique of Judgment*. While in the *Groundwork* Kant characterizes feelings or inclinations as irrelevant (if not inimical) to matters of morality, in the second *Critique* Kant's arguments imply instead that 'moral perfection requires the development of [appropriate] feelings ...' (30), and furthermore that our general comprehension of morality stands in need of some kind of sensible representation. This is where the appeal to aesthetics is made. Aesthetic experience can fulfill these needs by helping us to develop the appropriate kinds of feelings, and by supplying a sensuous representation of the essence of morality. Guyer argues that the disinterested enjoyment which is characteristic of our experience of beauty 'prepares us for the more difficult task of joyfully superseding personal interests in the way that morality can often require' (34). But beyond this, aesthetic experience can help make morality 'palpable' by providing a kind of sensuous representation of our own freedom. Since the pleasure of aesthetic experience arises out of the free and unconstrained play of our cognitive faculties, aesthetic experience makes this freedom palpable to us, and consequently makes 'the analogous immediacy, disinterestedness, freedom, and universality of moral judgments palpable as well' (41).

The second and third chapters concern the concept of 'disinterestedness.' Guyer provides a thorough account of the historical development of this idea and argues that the received view paints too simplistic a picture of the relation between Kant's understanding of this concept and that of his historical predecessors. We also see more here of the connections that Guyer finds between Kant's understanding of aesthetics and morality. Aesthetic judg-

ments are 'grounded in a harmony of imagination and understanding which is free of determination of any rules whatever, including the rules of morality ...' (99). This freedom from conceptual determination is exactly what Kant means by characterizing such judgments as 'disinterested'. So the experience of beauty can be characterized as a kind of experience of freedom. But freedom itself is the essence of morality, for Kant, and so it is this very freedom from conceptual determination, including determination by moral concepts, that allows aesthetic experiences to serve moral ends, by making palpable the experience of freedom, and thereby symbolizing the essence of morality.

The fourth chapter compares Kant's views on aesthetics to those of Moses Mendelssohn and Karl Philipp Moritz, and discusses Kant's understanding of the autonomy of art. Guyer claims that Kant's account of disinterestedness does not commit him to the view that art is to be pursued for reasons entirely distinct from human values. Kant sees aesthetic experiences as serving a function for morality (by giving us a sensuous representation of the freedom that is inherent in morality), and recognizes that fine art is always produced as the result of some human intention. We avoid a conflict here by allowing the existence of 'dependent beauty,' i.e., a kind of beauty that objects can have even though they 'stand under the concept of a particular purpose' (155). Even though the concepts implicit in the artist's intention place some limitation on the free play of the imagination, they do not completely determine the final form of the work of art, and so fine art can be 'guided' by the artist's intentions without thereby eliminating this freedom.

The fifth chapter claims that the differences between Kant's and Hegel's aesthetic theories 'are both less, and greater, than meet the eye' (161). This follows from Guyer's belief that 'Kant's fully developed conception of art and aesthetic experience is not the exercise in formalism that might have been expected ..., but insists upon a deep connection between the experience of beauty and ... an idea of reason, [a view] ... that sounds very much like Hegel's own' (161-2). The crucial difference is that for Kant the idea of reason that must influence the work of art is always a moral one, whereas for Hegel it is something broader, such as the relation of spirit to the world.

In the sixth and seventh chapters Guyer offers a broader account of the sublime than in *Kant and the Claims of Taste*. According to Guyer, Kant views the experience of the sublime as inherently 'complex' since it includes an element of pain or frustration arising from the inability of the imagination to synthesize the infinite capacity of reason. But this frustration then leads to a subsequent feeling of pleasure since the frustration itself serves as a sensuous representation of the infinite capacity of reason. And so it is our frustration at our inability to represent ideas of reason that makes palpable to us the infinite scope of human reason.

Chapter eight deals with a dialectical tension Guyer finds in Kant's account of artistic genius. Artistic genius must be both original and yet also 'exemplary,' i.e., it must be productive of an artistic canon. Guyer claims that this tension cannot be eliminated from Kant's views, and that the tension

itself is the source of a 'dialectical pattern in the history of art whereby every new candidate for classical status must itself be rejected and superseded by new aspirants to the same position' (297-8).

The ninth chapter concerns Kant's mature understanding of our duties concerning nature. While Kant believes that we have no moral duties directly *toward* inanimate or non-rational parts of nature, he thinks that we do have duties *concerning* them — duties that stem from obligations (toward ourselves) to develop appropriate sorts of inclinations. Actions that are destructive of natural beauty inhibit our ability to value something in a disinterested way, and 'dull' our moral sensibilities. Thus, '... the fact that the appreciation of natural beauty can contribute to the development of feelings favorable to morality in us, combined with the acknowledgment of a general duty to cultivate all such feelings, generates a duty toward ourselves but regarding nature' (318).

In the final chapter we find a systematic review of the relation between duty and inclination, and a defense of Guyer's claim that while Kant recognized that 'inclination cannot ground either the *principle* or the *motivation* of duty, ... it is [nevertheless] both *metaphysically possible* and *morally requisite* for us to pay considerable attention to our inclinations *out of the motive of duty itself* ...' (337). This is largely a textual argument for the kind of position appealed to throughout the book that due to our sensuous nature, reason dictates that we form the inclinations necessary to more readily comply with the further demands of duty. And so while we must always act out of the motive of duty, this can generate a 'second-order intention governing ... [the] cultivation of moral sentiments for their use on particular occasions where they might help one ... perform the actions required by duty' (380).

In sum, this is a thorough, scholarly account of the relation between Kant's thoughts about aesthetics and his thoughts about morality. My only complaint is that it is sometimes dry reading, and that I wish Guyer had better motivated the discussion by making more apparent the philosophical significance of the issues discussed, or even his own personal interests in them. Nevertheless, this sort of dryness is well nigh inevitable in an endeavor of this sort, and it remains a major contribution to Kant scholarship which should be considered required reading by anyone with a serious interest in either Kant's aesthetic or moral theories.

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Peter Johnson
Frames of Deceit: A Study of the Loss and Recovery of Public and Private Trust.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press
1993. Pp. x + 212.
US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-43193-X).

In recent years the issue of political trust has become increasingly prominent. John Major defeated a strong challenge by persuading the British electorate that the Labor party could not be trusted as competent managers of the economy. Political scandals in France, Japan, and Italy have created a widespread atmosphere of suspicion and cynicism. In Canada the distrust of the provinces toward a strong federal system threatens to undermine and perhaps destroy the federation. Unfortunately, this distrust comes at a time when a myriad of social problems requiring public trust for effective resolution are demanding immediate attention. How does one recreate the public trust which is necessary for engaging in such large scale public projects as health care reform, deficit reduction, negotiating trade treaties and so on? Is it even possible?

Peter Johnson examines the role of trust in the political sphere in, *Frames of Deceit: A Study of the Loss and Recovery of Public and Private Trust.* Johnson focuses on the problem of 'dirty hands' as a means of looking at the interstices of personal and public trust; that is, since leaders must lie, deceive, make deals, forge alliances with morally corrupt power brokers, they will find both their own personal moral codes as well as those of their constituents severely tested.

In order to grapple with the complexities surrounding such questions Johnson claims that one must move beyond a theory which '... construes individuals simply as units of uniform psychology, abstracted from ideas of moral character and from the circumstances of their lives ...' (2). Instead of relying on any of the traditional utilitarian or contractarian accounts of trust which invariably depend on such abstractions, Johnson argues that we must see trust as a feature of the various *narratives* of human life. Utilizing a wide range of novels, short stories, plays and poetry, but relying especially upon Sophocles' *Philoctetes*, Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cressida* and Zola's *Therese Raquin*, Johnson brings out the many commonalities between private and public trust as well as how these two forces interact and affect one another.

Johnson has three stated goals. First, he wishes to establish that an adequate understanding of political trust reveals it to be more than simply a concern that leaders do not operate from pure self-interest. They are also being trusted to act positively, exercising specific virtues of character in furthering national interests. Second, he argues against cynical characterizations of trust as merely a form of foolish naivete. Such characterizations give an inappropriate priority to the fear of being duped and miss significant features of political and personal loyalty. Last, he asserts

that the occasional but inevitable betrayals by political leaders should not be cause for cynicism or apathy, especially not when betrayal and trust are now understood in light of his first two points.

The decision to develop these points via literature is both the book's strength and its weakness. Johnson ably demonstrates how many classical political philosophers have mistakenly minimized the importance of trust by viewing it either simply as a tool in a utilitarian calculation or as synonymous with gullibility. By carefully examining the inner struggles of Neoptolemus in deciding whether to carry out Odysseus' plan for deceiving Philoctetes, we begin to see the logical complexity of trust; we see how individual character, motivation and circumstances, rather than an abstract, universal vantage point should be the starting point of the investigation. The disintegration of Therese and Laurent after their murder of Camille forcefully exhibits the disastrous results of trying to forgive ourselves in private, in isolation from others, and how such strategies destroy the trust in each other and ourselves which forms the basis for any sort of peaceful life.

At a number of places in the book Johnson augments his literary analysis with historical examples such as Churchill's decision to not protect Coventry in order to safeguard the secret that the Allies had broken the Nazi codes. Grounding the book in the real world these historical examples help clarify the point Johnson wants to make with his literary analysis. Regrettably he does not do this more often and consequently, he is not as clear as one would like. More importantly, the literary texts, in isolation, frequently lend themselves to interpretations much different from those Johnson wishes to endorse. Great literature, after all, has the disconcerting habit of being obstinate and independent of our own personal purposes.

For example, in the play *Philoctetes* Johnson contends we have a classic dirty hands problem. Odysseus has told the young man Neoptolemus to befriend Philoctetes and win his trust in order to steal Philoctetes' bow, which the prophets have said must be brought to Troy if the Greeks are to defeat the Trojans. In Johnson's view, the play demonstrates the dilemma of a good man, Neoptolemus, who is forced to deceive, lie and steal for a worthy political goal, ending a long and bloody war. Plays such as *Philoctetes* are also supposed to demonstrate the impractical, unrealistic standpoint of theories (e.g., Kant, Rawls, Bok) which strongly link trust with publicity. Johnson is skeptical of such theories because publicity would spoil the deceit required for the theft. But Johnson doesn't bring out sufficiently that in the play the prophets have said the bow is useless without Philoctetes himself and so without his willing consent the prophecy cannot be fulfilled. Therefore a reasonable alternative interpretation of the play would be that, even in times of great crisis such as a war, political ends cannot be fulfilled unless those whom these ends must involve are aware of the conditions and goals of their leaders. Here and elsewhere Johnson is unable to secure the philosophic conclusions he desires from literature alone; real world examples are crucial to his arguments.

While this is a serious problem for the book, it is to Johnson's credit that he has recognized the question of trust as an important one. Moreover, his insight that trust is best understood in the context of narrative is a significant step toward a richer understanding of this hitherto neglected topic.

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Immanuel Kant
Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770.
David Walford and Ralf Meerbote, eds. and trans.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press
1992. Pp. lxxxi + 543.
US $75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-39214-4).

This volume is a sumptuous feast of scholarly riches and aesthetic delights. As the first in a fourteen-volume series, it collects eleven works from Kant's precritical period which document his philosophical interests and trace his development towards the critical philosophy announced by *The Critique of Pure Reason*. These works include the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770 (especially important for understanding the development of Kant's critical philosophy), as well as essays significant for Kant's later ethics and philosophy of religion (e.g., *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* [1763], *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* [1766], and others). Cambridge University Press has rendered Kant scholars and readers an extraordinary service in making these essays available in current English translations accompanied by exceptionally extensive scholarly apparati.

With one exception (the *Inaugural Dissertation*), the translations are new. Scholars who want to check translations with the original will be pleased with the clear pagination references to the standard 'Academy' edition of Kant's collected works; these references run alongside the text in a generous margin which further invites reader's notes and comments. As well, the translations faithfully preserve important orthographical details of Kant's writing (e.g., paragraphing, his use of what amounts to italics, etc.). At the same time, however, David Walford's translations avoid clumsy literalism. Indeed, Walford achieves remarkable fidelity to the sense of the original text as he adroitly brings Kant's complex conjunction of concepts, dry wit, and 'voice' into clear, readable English. Readers familiar with Kant in the original will also enjoy Walford's consistently clever and stylistically polished solu-

tions to the frequently knotty problems of translating Kant's academic German. And scholars who have puzzled over the meaning of particular words or phrases will find Walford's extensive notes richly instructive. Simply in terms of a project of translation, the volume is an impressive achievement.

The translations are further surrounded by an elegant and comprehensive framework of scholarship. General resources include the introduction which interweaves Kant's biography with his intellectual development and corresponding publications, and a thematic essay which identifies and discusses seven 'philosophical preoccupations' of the eleven works presented in this volume. These are: the question of compatibilism between science and religion; the problem of theodicy; the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God; important distinctions between the logical and the real, and between reasons and causes, especially as these relate to the problem of causality; and additional questions regarding mind, the ontological status of space, and the possibility of metaphysics (see xix). In addition, both epistemologists and philosophers of science will appreciate the references in this thematic essay to Kant's consideration of non-Euclidean conceptions of space.

Other standard scholarly apparati include an extensive and precise index, and a useful 'Guide to abbreviations' which doubles as a helpful bibliographic overview of Kant's works, important editions, etc.

In addition, the volume further includes a glossary which identifies the German or Latin originals of key Kantian terms. This glossary, in turn, is complemented by notes which discuss terms especially troublesome to translate. These notes are most helpful as they give the reader an excellent sense of Kant's linguistic context — a sense achieved otherwise only by laborious work with the often inaccessible 17th c. dictionaries, etc. A final scholarly bonus are the biographical-bibliographical sketches of persons mentioned by Kant. Like the glossary and notes, these sketches of persons, both well-known (Newton, Wolff) and obscure, who figure in Kant's writings will be enormously helpful to undergraduates, instructors, and Kant scholars alike, as they handily collect and summarize useful but otherwise arcane and scattered information which is nonetheless crucial for understanding Kant's references and context.

These general resources are further matched — in both quality and depth — by the scholarly materials accompanying each essay. These include: a specific introduction which discusses the philosophical and biographical circumstances of its inception, as well as bibliographic details of publication; a résumé which summarizes the work's argument, content, and structure; a bibliography of the work's editions and printings during Kant's lifetime, as well as of important translations; linguistic notes, ranging from simple citation of the original word or phrase (so as to allow non-German readers, for example, to keep track of Kant's usually meticulous technical use of key terms) to complete discussions of philosophical and/or translation difficulties associated with a given word or passage; and factual notes (which include

cross-references to other works, explanations of key philosophical and scientific ideas, sources of ideas, and translations of Kant's copious Latin citations and technical vocabulary). A 'Preface' nicely succeeds in orienting the reader to the wealth and organization of these scholarly resources.

The volume is equally rich aesthetically. In an age which touts CD-ROMs and computer keyboards as the future of education, scholars and readers who enjoy *books* — and those who may still learn to do so — will delight in this volume. Great care has been lavished on presenting Kant's works in ways that not only enlighten the mind but also please the senses. There is a refreshing absence of typographical errors. Positively, title pages are both faithfully translated and reproduced in terms of text location, fonts, etc. As noted, the texts are accompanied by unusually wide margins which invite the reader's notes and comments. These and other aesthetic details (paper and binding quality, size and weight, etc.) render this an extraordinarily satisfying book. Like the fruit in a well-known Garden, it is to be desired for wisdom as it also pleases the eye.

Should Cambridge University Press maintain this level of translation quality, scholarly wealth, and aesthetic pleasure, it will doubtless achieve its stated aim of establishing a new standard edition of Kant. In presenting the Kantian corpus, conjoined with a virtual encyclopedia of pertinent scholarship, this new edition promises to inspire deeper insight and broader appreciation of this most significant philosopher.

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John Kekes
The Morality of Pluralism.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1993. Pp. 227.
US $29.95 (ISBN 0-691-03230-0).

John Kekes' *The Morality of Pluralism* is, at its broadest, an attempt to sound a note of optimism about a perceived difficulty in conceptualizing moral values and the choices that we ought to make in response to these values. Kekes argues that those who take the cacophony of moral values as a sign that the 'moral center' no longer holds are confusing the disappearance of morality itself with the emergence of a different moral system. It is instead a particular version of moral theory — namely moral monism or absolutism

— which is disappearing; its replacement is not moral chaos, but moral pluralism.

Kekes describes pluralism as 'a theory about the nature of values whose realization would make lives good' (9). Kekes goes on to explain that a life is good 'only if it is both personally satisfying and morally meritorious ... neither evil nor frustrated lives should be supposed to be good' (9). Thus, the good life is, from the beginning, defined in such a way as to involve benefits to both the individual and the society. Throughout his analysis, Kekes emphasizes the interrelation between individual and society in the creation and satisfaction of pluralistic goods. The society is responsible for providing us with possibilities which make our pluralistic choices possible: we are responsible for seeing what their realization would entail for us.

The image of a hard-centered, soft-perimetered moral theory is a recurring image in Kekes' analysis: this image helps to provide the contrast between pluralism and the rival theories of moral monism and moral relativism. Monism lacks the soft perimeter; it fears any change as a threat to the hard center. And with relativism, there is no center at all. So, Kekes' job is to build the hard center of pluralism while still allowing the soft perimeter to exist. In doing so, Kekes introduces several interrelated distinctions. The most basic of the distinctions is that between 'primary values' and 'secondary values'. Kekes explains that 'primary values' are those involving basic human physiological, psychological or social values; the 'benefits and harms which are, under normal circumstances, universally human' (18). Kekes' claim that these values are 'universally human' can seem to be more of an assertion than a conclusion to an argument except for the fact that his point here has such an intuitive plausibility. He notes, for instance, that it would take extraordinary circumstances for 'being tortured, humiliated or exploited not to be regarded as harms' (18): this hardly seems like a claim worth debating.

Because Kekes believes these primary values are universally human, they are at the heart of the construction of the hard center of moral pluralism. Secondary values, on the other hand, vary with persons, societies, traditions and historical periods; these are the values which relativists have pointed to in defense of their theory. Kekes, however, argues that variety of secondary values is not a mere clutter, with no means to distinguish between or to rank them. Rather, these secondary values can be judged according to how well they allow the *satisfaction* of the primary values. Thus, while still maintaining a flexibility not present in absolutism, Kekes' pluralist has a standard of evaluation which is missing from relativism.

Kekes' secondary values are, then, both variable in themselves *and* tied to the invariable primary values. This apparently simple move allows Kekes a surprisingly convincing response to worries about the plurality of values. For the monist, such plurality is a cause for concern; for the relativist, it is simply a matter of fact. Kekes argues, however, that for the pluralist, 'the plurality of values is not a regrettable feature of our life, but a positive value' (12). The more secondary values we have, and the more *difficulty* we have in choosing between these values, the greater the *success* of our society in

providing equally fulfilling ways of satisfying our basic primary values: 'the incommensurability and incompatibility of values therefore is not an obstacle to good lives ... conflicts will not seem to be necessary evils but welcome signs that we are on the right track' (30-1).

Even those who do not associate the incommensurability of choices with a breakdown of morality might still feel a bit disconcerted at being told that conflicts are a sign of success. This seems to remove all force from moral dilemmas — and, indeed, from moral deliberation: if conflict is inevitable in a well-structured life and society, and if the conflict results from the presence of *too many* valuable options, then concerns about making the 'right choice' may appear misguided. But, this is to confuse Kekes' pluralism with relativism. Kekes dedicates several chapters to showing how his analysis of pluralism still leaves room for moral progress. Not surprisingly, his argument in these chapters harkens back to his original claim that 'the possibility of living a good life is dependent partly on ourselves and partly on the tradition of the society in which we live' (28). In the chapter 'Prospects for Moral Progress', Kekes defends his view that 'moral progress consists in enlarging the area within which individuals can endeavor to make a good life for themselves' (140). In 'Some Personal Implications of Pluralism', on the other hand, Kekes argues that pluralism indeed requires *more* moral deliberation than the alternative theories. Since the good life of pluralism 'depends on the realization of some of our possibilities' (185), this realization cannot occur without deliberation about the possibilities and their value. Our desire for the good life of pluralism motivates our reflection; but this deliberation is part and parcel with moral deliberation.

Because pluralism stands, as it were, between the extremes of moral monism and moral relativism, Kekes' explication of moral pluralism is at the same time an analysis of these rival moral views. Much of the pleasure in reading this work comes from the masterful way Kekes builds a rich theory of pluralism while still keeping a distance from monism and relativism.

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Peter C. List, ed.
Radical Environmentalism: Philosophy and Tactics.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1993.
Pp. x + 276.
(paper: ISBN 0-534-17790-5).

Peter List points out correctly in his introduction to this collection that radical environmentalism has not received the philosophical scrutiny it deserves. Although environmental philosophy has generated a huge literature, and new introductory readings are appearing thick and fast, none is quite like this one. Here we find Arne Naess reflecting on the foundations of deep ecology alongside Paul Watson's graphic description of how *Sea Shepherd II* rammed and crippled ships belonging to a Japanese drift netting fleet.

Here's a sample of Watson's account: 'The Japanese were attempting to cut a large shark out of the net. Looking up they saw us bearing down at full speed upon them. Eyes wide, they ran toward the far deck. We struck where intended. Again to the roaring crescendo of tortured metal, the power blocks and gear were crushed; the deck and gunnels buckled. The net was severed' (182).

List suggests that the philosophical foundations for radical environmental action are to be found in three sources: deep ecology, eco-feminism and social ecology. The first part of the collection consists of extracts from books or papers on these themes. List has done his job well here, and I would expect authors of the originals to have no complaints about the extracted material. Each piece of material provides a coherent statement of the author's position, often with commendable conciseness.

Two pieces by Arne Naess, and one by Devall and Sessions provide an overview of deep ecology, showing how it moved from its original fairly general platform to its more recent focus on self-realization through identification with nature. Ecofeminism is represented by four pieces. The one by Karen Warren sums up the main principles of the ecofeminist claim that in the industrialized countries the domination of women has the same patriarchal roots as the domination of nature. Finally, Murray Bookchin is used as a source for social ecology — the view that our alienation from nature needs to be overcome by adopting anarchism. By emphasizing unity in diversity, and by trying to build society on mutualistic principles, social ecology draws on a deep continuity, Bookchin argues, between nature and humanity. Interestingly, List adds in some material on bioregionalism, suggesting that it is a view which goes well with social ecology. This is a bit misleading. The key thing for bioregionalists is the importance of place, and setting, for human lives. A more detailed treatment of bioregionalism would link it to ecofeminism and other contextualist ethics rather than presenting it as an addendum to social ecology.

With the theory in place, List devotes the next hundred or so pages to activist writings. This is the material which makes the collection specially valuable. The forms of activism represented are Greenpeace, two extracts from Edward Abbey on monkeywrenching, three extracts from Paul Watson describing *Sea Shepherd* activities, a considerable amount of material dealing with *Earth First!* and finally descriptions of ecofeminist and bioregional action. These extracts provide teachers and students with a valuable source of material for discussion and reflection. The range of views expressed is very wide. Some of the quasi-militarist fervour of *Earth First!*ers is well-conveyed in some of the readings, and this contrasts with the emphasis on resistance through more passive means in some of the other extracts. The value of reading the words of participants in all these forms of environmental action cannot be overstated, and List has again chosen his extracts with an eye to combining clarity, coherence and brevity.

In the short final section, List has chosen to reprint exchanges between Abbey and Foreman on the one side and Eugene Hargrove, editor of Environmental Ethics, on the other. This section concludes with a more lengthy discussion of ecosabotage and civil disobedience by Michael Martin. This is the section which is most problematic, and anyone using List's book for teaching would need to consider supplementing this material with further reading. For example, the whole issue of whether ramming ships, booby-trapping logging roads and spiking trees constitutes violent action requires more detailed treatment than given here. The defenders of monkeywrenching and other forms of direct action usually maintain that their behaviour is non-violent on the grounds that their intention is to damage machinery, block roads and the like. They also maintain that every precaution is taken to avoid direct threats to human safety. However, a range of issues (including those about intention and double effect) would have to be discussed here before a considered view is possible. The 'marxist' conception of violence, for example, claims that poor maintenance and shoddy guards on industrial machinery represent a kind of violence of capitalism against workers. Those with this conception who feel attracted to monkeywrenching would have to take care to establish the claim that tree spiking and related activities are not also a kind of violence.

It is in the second section that this book shows its strengths. Here we have a number of different voices providing a fascinating texture. Some of the voices are cocksure, perhaps even eco-fascist; others are gentler, ultimately more moving, describing how small numbers of people braved the threat of chainsaws in the vain attempt to save a grove of old forest, or how the Chipko women defied guns to save their beloved trees. This is material that students of environmental ethics and politics will find fascinating as a way into these topics. Coupled with a book like Andrew Dobson's *Green Political Thought*, or Robert Goodin's *Green Political Theory*, List's collection would be useful for students taking a unit on green politics. It also deserves a place in a unit on environmental ethics, though here care would have to be taken to expose students to more detailed work in environmental ethics and to a wider range

of foundational positions. All in all, this book stands out as offering something distinctively different in a field that is rapidly becoming overcrowded with decent, but rather similar, introductory works.

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David Lyons
Moral Aspects of Legal Theory: Essays on Law, Justice, and Political Responsibility.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1993.
Pp. xiii + 217.
US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-43244-8);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-43835-7).

This volume is a collection of 10 essays written by Lyons over a period of 22 years. All but one of them have been previously published. The 10 essays of course do not constitute the whole of Lyons' work on legal theory. Nor can they be fairly read as representative of it. There is no apparent reason for putting them together in one volume. Lyons' own excuse seems to be that they all share one dominant theme, namely, a lack of reverence for the law (ix). But then much of Lyons' other works on legal theory can also be said to share this theme. However, for those who are interested in Lyons' work but do not have ready access to a law library, this remains a convenient collection, since four of the essays are reprinted from law journals.

Chronologically, the book can be divided into two sections. The first section comprises the first six essays which all date before 1986. They are largely commentaries on issues related to the works of H.L.A. Hart and his critics. The remaining four essays are all post-1985 and are generally concerned with the more current subject of American constitutional interpretation. The title of the book is taken from the fourth essay, and the subtitle is a more accurate description of the content of the book.

Among the first six essays, both the first and fourth are significant contributions to modern legal theory. Lyons' critical interest in legal positivism is a long-standing one and his contributions are numerous. Legal positivism, with its fundamental rejection of inherent or necessary relatedness between law and morals, and its insistence on a separation between what the law is and what the law ought to be, became a dominant school of legal theory in the early half of this century. Strong and influential statements and restatements of legal positivism include Hans Kelsen's *The Pure Theory*

of Law (trans. M. Knight, 1967) and H.L.A. Hart's *The Concept of Law* (1961). These statements in turn were met with vigorous challenges from natural law theorists, who took up various positions against the 'separation thesis' of legal positivism. This developed into a long-running debate which is still very much alive today. Books are still being published, e.g., on Hart's work in recent years: see R. Gavison, ed., *Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy — the Influence of H.L.A. Hart* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987), and Leith & Ingram, eds. *The Jurisprudence of Orthodoxy: Queen's University Essays on H.L.A. Hart* (London: Routledge 1988). As Lyons acknowledges in the book, he owes his introduction to legal philosophy to Hart, and his essays show a special interest in Hart's work. Although issues surrounding the debate between legal positivism and natural law theory is by now rather over-discussed, these essays by Lyons still merit serious reading by students of legal philosophy.

Lyons' four remaining essays on constitutional interpretation are less impressive. Much of these are devoted to discussion of the 'originalist' position, with U.S. Federal Judge Robert H. Bork being identified as a prime target. Lyons is critical of the alleged possibility and desirability of interpreting the American constitution (and the law in general) strictly in accordance with original legislative intent. Lyons' critique, however, suffers from a misunderstanding of the lawyer's discourse as distinct from the philosopher's.

Lyons' understanding of 'original intent' is based on a commonsense notion of actual intent (205-6). Based on this understanding, he makes the argument that since original intent is not knowable, what the originalist does in practice is to 'identify a plausible justifying rationale' for the legislative or constitutional provision in question (206). As such, the original-intent arguments are 'neither purely historical nor value free; they involve judgments of political morality' (206). In an earlier essay, Bork is criticized for insisting that judges should not incorporate value judgments into their constitutional decision because value judgments cannot be 'neutral, principled, or nonarbitrary' (166). Lyons wonders why a value choice cannot be 'principled'.

This simplistic rendition of the original-intent argument makes it an easy target for Lyons. But anyone familiar with the common law rules of interpretation would know that when lawyers like Bork speak of 'intent' they do not mean actual intent. What they mean is the intent as found in the constitution or law itself based on established legal rules of interpretation. As Bork says in *The Tempting of America* (New York: Simon & Schuster 1990), if judges are required to know the actual intent of the lawmakers, they could never decide, because they almost never know (Bork, *op. cit.*, 162). Bork does not claim that an originalist interpretation is value free. What he contends is that the judge's task is to apply the law and judges should not claim a license to impose his own value choice. The value choice is not theirs to have; it is already made in the constitution. Value choices can of course be principled, but a judge's own choice which is not based on a faithful interpretation of the

constitution in accordance with *established legal rules* would indeed be *legally* unprincipled and arbitrary.

Bork's *The Tempting of America* was only published in 1990, and Lyons may be forgiven for not showing a deeper appreciation of Bork's position. But since these essays are now being collectively published in 1993, one would have expected at least a brief footnote or comment on Bork's book. The last essay in fact has not been previously published but has only been presented as a seminar paper. It is disappointing not to see Bork's position more fairly represented even in this latest essay.

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Howard Margolis
Paradigms and Barriers: How Habits of Mind Govern Scientific Beliefs.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1993.
Pp. xii + 266.
US $40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-50522-7);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-50523-5).

The author's goal in *Paradigms and Barriers: How Habits of Mind Govern Scientific Beliefs* is to defend the 'barrier' hypothesis as a cognitive-psychological explanation of Kuhnian 'paradigm shifts'. The first three chapters argue for the theoretical notions required for this enterprise and subsequent chapters explain famous cases in the history of science in terms of these notions.

In chapter one, Margolis explicates the notion 'habit of mind', the central concept of the book. 'Habit of mind', as the notion is elaborated, is attractive for both the entrenchment it implies and the plasticity it allows. The psychological 'governance' suggested by the notion 'habit of mind' is useful in understanding the realization of paradigms in actual practice. The surmountable resistance that is also suggested casts light on several aspects of paradigm shifts. These features as well as others (e.g., how such habits are acquired) are elaborated in a comparison with physical habits, transforming the notion from a discussion ending 'explanation of last resort' to a substantive cognitive concept.

The explicated notion of 'habits of mind' is utilized in chapter two in an account of 'paradigms' that will support Margolis' 'barrier' account of para-

digm shifts (chapter three). The latter account contrasts with the received 'gap' view of these shifts and with its supporting notion of 'paradigm'.

Whereas on the 'gap' view, paradigms are sets of theories, procedures, and apparatus, on the 'barrier' account, paradigms are collections of 'habits of mind'. In an explanation of the relation between 'habits of mind' and paradigms (section 2.2) that is extremely helpful, if not essential, to an understanding of Margolis' overall argument, we are asked first to think about, *so that we can reject*, an explanation of this relation on analogy with the relation between physical habits and games such as squash or tennis.

The physical habits associated with particular games facilitate the playing of these games and a change from one game, squash, to another game, tennis, would be accompanied by changes in some of the facilitating physical habits. But, on this understanding of the relation between habits and games, the physical habits are not constitutive of the game — a player of the game with a radically different style (habits) could remain a member of the community of players of the game. Such is not the case with respect to habits of mind and paradigms, according to Margolis. To depart from the habits of mind associated with a paradigm is to depart from the community of 'players' of that paradigm, and hence to depart from that paradigm. This is because, on the view that Margolis is urging, 'habits of mind are constitutive of paradigms'. While paradigms operate to constrain a particular scientific enterprise, particular scientific enterprises are not properly thought of on analogy with playing a game *as the game is*. Rather the core activity in science is doing research, i.e., changing the game. As research proceeds, habits, amended by changes, constrain the enterprise, as does the world that is being researched. These changes in habits are as on-going as research is, and can lead to situations where there is no (relatively) easy path from one set of habits to the next and, as a consequence, to occasions for radical change.

On Margolis' view, it is the cognitive discontinuity that the lack of an easy path creates that underlies the 'Kuhnian sense of conversion'. Additional support for cognitive discontinuity, rather than logical discontinuity (the gap in the 'gap' view), as the explanation for radical changes in science is provided by instances of Kuhnian incommensurability without logically difficult transitions and logically difficult transitions without incommensurability. Instances of these kinds are provided in the discussions of concrete cases in later chapters.

The 'barrier' account of paradigm shifts is described in the third chapter 'Barriers'. On the barrier account, new paradigms and paradigm shifts are the result of revolutionary thinking necessary to overcome 'robust' habits of mind that block the way to new thinking. These 'robust' habits of mind are robust relative to the (possibly relatively new) habits of mind that support the new thinking and they form the barrier to which the 'barrier' accounts of revolutionary change appeal. Margolis argues that 'episodes that clearly show Kuhnian symptoms of revolutionary development characteristically involve a particular habit of mind that needs to be overcome'.

Margolis turns from the discussion of the explanatory apparatus in the first three chapters, to a display of the explanatory power of the 'barrier' view with respect to actual cases in the history of science — Lavoisier's overthrow of phlogiston (chapters 4 and 5), the emergence of probability (chapter 6), and the Copernican revolution (chapters 7 through 10). In Margolis' hands, these applications of the theoretical notions developed earlier do indeed seem to strengthen his case for his explication of paradigm shifts, though there will no doubt be responses from other historians of science.

Margolis offers, in chapter 11, a 'habits of mind' account of the Hobbes-Boyle controversy, and in chapter 12, a 'habits of mind' account of the changes in experimentation in the seventeenth century. The relativistic implications of the 'habits of mind' apparatus are drawn in chapter 13.

Treating 'habits of mind' as a substantive, cognitive notion, rather than as a vacuous explanation-terminator, is clearly a significant contribution. The insights (possible or actual, as examination will reveal) into the history of science that the cases discussed provide make this much clearer. Not as clear is the significance of Margolis' reduction of habits of mind to pattern-recognition of 'P-cognition'. Aspects of his efforts along these lines are discussed in chapter 1 and in appendix A of '*Paradigms*'.

In any case, the author's contributions in the present work do not depend on this reduction nor on the theory of judgement he has developed in his earlier work. The history of science is apt to be richer for the 'cognitive turn' Margolis has taken in '*Paradigms*', whether his earlier 'theories' stand or fall.

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Michael McGhee, ed.
Philosophy, Religion and the Spiritual Life.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
1992. Pp. iv + 257.
US $50.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-421969).

Too many of these essays are pompous or fatiguing or unduly precious. One reads: 'A new agenda for the philosophy of religion from this interdisciplinary collection'. This claim of the editor, along with the presence of several noted contributors under the Cambridge aegis, etc., led me to review such a collection, anyway. 'It must be important'. So the back cover tries to convince us. 'Going outside the traditional concerns of natural theology, contributors to this volume explore such topics as the nature of self-hood and its images

in the ancient, the mediæval and the modern world; the role of philosophy as a route to wisdom; non-conceptual awareness; the nature of love and its relation to attention.' These topics all sound good, but the texts often drag along, among more iniquities.

McGhee offers the view in his introduction (1-8) that *natural theology* may need now to be displaced from the core of the philosophy of religion. Then the lead-off player, Michael Weston, smacks along his lead balloon, 'Philosophy and Religion in the Thought of Kierkegaard' (9-29), into a down-draggledy pond. The brilliance and sarcasm of the Socratic Dane are sadly concealed. In *'De Consolatione Philosophiæ,'* by John Haldane, the excitement of Boethius, in his deliberately excluded and most philosophical book of *On the Consortium of Philosophy* (regarding Time, Foreknowledge and God), gives way, instead, to remarks on the consolation of *natural beauty, matter* and *form, painting* and *sculpture*. Some odd analogies between a philosophical tract and the graphic arts are thought to show the consoling power of Boethius' propositions. The needed arguments are somehow buried in colours and shapes (31-45). Anthony O'Hear's 'The real or the Real? Chardin or Rothko?' reads like a still more bizarre extension of Haldane's attempts to reduce partly an infatuation with nature and the plastic arts to something like philosophical persuasion (47-58). Reasoning appears to be reducible to hues and screeching patterns of light. Well, I find it hard to believe that logic is meant to be turning to technicoloured psycho-babble.

Stephen R.L. Clarke comes up with something that might be more philosophical, 'Descartes' Debt to Augustine', (72-88), or the relation of *'Si fallor sum'* to *'Cogito, ergo sum'*. Alas, the relevant *historical* points about early Arab thinkers, like *Al-Ghazali* and later French Occasionalists, like *Malebranche* on Creation, never do surface in the discussion. For the continuous 'I', required for the better discussion of such proofs does not arise if God (in His omnipotence) prefers to create 'persons' and everything else just for a series of atomic instants. Indeed, the Deity may prefer to make these psychologically minimal pinpricks of consciousness just for individual moments, (*puncta temporis*), looking as if they have pseudo-memories. If God has so chosen to let an Ego 'live', then Augustine and Descartes lack the necessary basis for Selfhoodish Demonstrations. Also, if the Creator wishes, he may have let 'humans' only exist as modes of a single, self-embracing Absolute for Egoless existence. (No substance, no Egos.) [Compare my points in *Sophia*, 1991-92, and in *Self-Knowledge and Social Relations*, 115-31.] Actually, the whole topic range of monism, self and logic appears to be unknown to all the contributors! Spinoza is simply shut out. All the authors should be sure to reread Bertrand Russell's *The Problems of Philosophy, Mysticism and Logic* and *Lectures on Logical Atomism* before touching their chapters again or seeking to market them any more.

Ronald W. Hepburn's 'Religious Imagination' (127-43) needs to start by distinguishing the more obvious senses that the word 'imagining' covers. Such include: Pretending, Thinking Falsely, Picturing, Supposing, Sense-Imitating, Dreaming, Daydreaming, Thinking originally and\or Creatively,

Inventing, etc., etc. (See John King-Farlow's *Inquiry*, 1969, also, Alan R. White's *Imagination*, 1992.) [Also consider Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* and his chapter on the Imagination.] Then, I suspect, he would have found himself proceeding more clearheadedly and fruitfully. Hepburn's refusal to go through enough analytical philosophers' contributions makes reading him feel rather like quaffing a dose of obscurantism. Or is this kind of *new* philosophy of religion, I ask the editor, all just too carelessly careless?

T.L.S. Sprigge's 'Refined and Gross Supernaturalism' (at 105-25) offers useful comparisons of William James and F.H. Bradley. Yet, by refusing to apply the Principle of Maximizing Expected Utility to James' 'The Will to Believe' he misses too much of the fun. (See John King-Farlow's *Faith and the Life of Reason*, 1972.) To what extent, one may ask, is Bradley really an ontological monist and James a pluralist? In what *senses* of these terms? How is Bradley's attack on Relations relevant to world religions and several metaphysical systems? To great ideas of Immanence and Transcendence?

Janet Martin Soskice, Lecturer in the Faculty of Theology at Cambridge University, patters about with 'Love and Attention', twitters away about the great gulf fixed between, first, single male dons who can afford to take vacations abroad and experience bliss in exotic monasteries, and, second, married couples whose holidays are awash with sex, brats and ice cream, soaking sheets and Catholic or Anglo-Catholic domesticity — at least the former get to read immense works of Augustine in the original Latin for the first time in ever so many terms, you know. This kind of religion seems to yield no time for any Social Gospel, no political Christianity to fight tragedies of starvation, environmental destruction, racial and sexual follies, Yugoslavian and Somalian massacres, organized crime ... How mindlessly ecstatic the words and worlds of cooking sound. Even Encyclicals and sermons sound too intellectual for such mating faithful. The Sacraments must not evoke cerebral reflection. Well, if one just cannot bring children into the world *and* Yale's Mary McCord Adams' vast and brilliant work on Ockham home, why have children in such numbers at all? Is Soskice's essay a piece of highbrow journalism, mothers' meetings' clutter, women's chatter, parental complaining? This Contribution sounds like an insult to theology, religion, philosophy, analysis and logic. What is the donna doing even under this awful pile? Parodying herself?

If the Philosophy of Religion and Systematic Theology, too, go the way of this dreadful book, those subjects should be withdrawn from all non-Scholastic campuses. Plenty of worthwhile Philosophy of Religion will remain. Not this. *Caveat emptor*!

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Phillip Montague
In the Interests of Others:
An Essay in Moral Philosophy.
Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishing 1992. Pp. xi + 140 + index.
US $69.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7923-1856-0).

In the Interests of Others is a fairly important and very useful essay in moral philosophy. It requires some patience and isn't entirely correct; however, it certainly adds useful material to discussions of rights and obligations and could be an excellent classroom tool.

Montague attempts to preserve a 'traditional' rights theory yet still allow other-interested concepts to enter the set of rights and obligations. These other-interested rights are those commonly known as 'welfare rights'.

The meat of the argument is in chapter 3, where he argues in favour of obligations to help those who need it, and the corresponding rights in chapter 4. Montague introduces what he calls the 'limited altruism thesis.' A brief description of it is rather difficult given the amount of jargon and distinctions he bases his discussion on, but it is designed to keep an other-interested morality from becoming unacceptably demanding.

In the earliest chapters, Montague splits other-interest into more than the standard number of categories: non-maleficience (refraining from doing harm), beneficience (helping someone who is well-off) and anti-maleficience (relieving or preventing harm to another). He grants there are obligations of non-maleficience as with traditional rights theory, and that there aren't obligations to beneficience, but there are *some* obligations to anti-maleficience.

The dilemma Montague faces begins with the 'easy-rescue' example, where one has an opportunity to, say, save a drowning child with minimal effort and absolutely no risk to oneself. Surely any respectable moral theory requires one to perform this rescue. But then this obligation can be extended to cover all acts of anti-maleficience to the point where morality becomes 'perversely demanding'. Montague settles the dilemma by arguing that our personal projects have moral worth, and that they can outweigh some of the obligations of anti-maleficience to others.

Rather than simply argue that these obligations of anti-maleficience imply corresponding rights, Montague brings out further arguments for these rights in chapter 4. He argues that refraining (from an easy rescue), like acting to harm someone, makes one the author of the outcome, as opposed to a non-doing, where one does nothing because one is not in an immediate position to help someone in particular. Since Montague bases his definition of rights on sovereignty over yourself or others, then to refrain from saving someone would be to author his death, which would arrogate his sovereignty over himself, which, of course, violates his rights.

In chapter 5 Montague goes on to discuss more foundational issues such as whether people should be judged morally by their actions, or actions

judged by the character of the people who do them. But the most interesting material is in the first four chapters.

Many of the distinctions and definitions Montague provides are worth much consideration. The anti-maleficience, non-maleficience, beneficience trichotomy is a development of Feinberg's 'benefit$_1$, benefit$_2$' distinction, and deserves some study. As it stands it certainly requires a solid definition of a baseline above which a person is being treated beneficiently, below which, anti-maleficiently. And does his distinction between refraining and non-doing in chapter 4 carry the kind of weight he puts on it? Does he need to consider the fact that our actions change the course of others' lives, while our refrainings do not? And can rights be adequately defined in terms of sovereignty? There is much innovation here; the question is whether it works.

The limited altruism thesis also is very interesting. But one is left wondering exactly when permissive defeaters stop defeating and one becomes obligated to help others — Montague has very little to say about it. But perhaps the thesis can be further developed to provide a full-blown prescriptive morality. And the discussion of supererogation in chapter 2 is a very welcome addition to the under-developed literature on the topic.

This essay begs for second or third reading, not only because of the plethora of distinctions and innovations but also because of a fairly dense style. 'To this end, let us begin by examining the intuitively plausible idea that having moral discretion with respect to some act type is explicable in terms of propositions concerning the permissibility of performing acts of that type. Exploring this idea will involve attending to details to a degree which may seem excessive ...' (16). Excessive indeed! The pages that follow threaten to break out in logical symbols at any moment. At only 136 pages the book reads like 400.

In fact, *In the Interests of Others* not only calls for re-reading, but a thorough break-down of the kind provided by an honours or graduate philosophy seminar. Montague skillfully draws together and summarizes different authors, and builds interesting and original work on top of them. It would take time and effort to completely analyze and criticize his work, but, even though I don't expect it to completely hold up, it would still be an effort well spent.

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Stanley Moore
Marx versus Markets.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Press
1993. Pp. x + 126.
(cloth: ISBN 0-271-00865-2).

This short book 'examines Marx's claim that classless economies with markets are in some sense inferior to communist economies'. From its analysis, two conclusions emerge. 'First, Marx's major arguments for abolishing commodity exchange rely on moral and philosophical premises — Second, Marx's ideal of a communist society is incompatible with his materialist approach to history' (vii).

Professor Moore successfully shows, as he did in his earlier book *Marx on the Choice between Socialism and Communism* (1980), that the abolition of market exchange does not follow, as Marx claimed, from the principles of historical materialism, but from his normative concepts of human nature and society. Moore does not, however, successfully demonstrate his second claim that 'Marx's ideal of a communist is *incompatible* with his materialist approach to history'. He shows only that this ideal does not follow from it. But this point is the same as his first.

By far the most insistent, themal argument of Moore's study is this first point, whose conclusion he reiterates often (i.e., 10, 17-18, 22-3, 28, 40-3, 46, 50, 60, 66, 76, 78, 88). Marx, argues Moore, never shows by historical materialist argument why market exchange or — Moore adds in as he moves — individual incomes and competitive pricing are slated for the dustbin of history. Nor does he prove that they cannot be integral to a non-exploitative, viable socialism.

Moore does *not* object to Marx's argument for the end of capitalism and exploitation, for the end of private ownership of the social means of production, nor for the end of people living off profit, rent or interest rather than productive contribution. He appears, courageously, to accept all of these goals (x, 17, 27, 30-1, 52, 68). So, you might wonder, has he not then accepted Marx's — and socialism's — main objectives? Yes, but Moore's concern is not to address arguments for or against socialism, but rather to demonstrate that even from an historical materialist standpoint, market mechanisms and socialism are compatible. This is a major and timely claim.

Marx never accepted such a view, nor did his most famous 'heirs' from Lenin to Mao. Marx, as Moore shows well, invariably attacked other socialists for seeking varieties of market socialism — Proudhon and Lassalle most vigorously, but also Bray, de Roberty, Gray and Harrison. Marx misrepresented or evaded these and other writers' reasons for retaining commodity exchange in a future socialist society, argues Moore, and permitted 'pronouncement to take the place of reasoning' (35).

But, Moore also interestingly argues, Marx and Engels *themselves* conceived of the process of revolution in terms of market socialism in the *Communist Manifesto* — namely, by their transitional programme of abol-

ishing private property in land, ending inheritance of wealth, introducing steeply progressive taxation, and rationalizing credit, transportation and other key sectors of the economy (7ff, 66ff).

Since such a transitional, mixed economy clearly allows for the continuance of commodity exchange, individual incomes and competitive pricing, why did Marx later abandon these market mechanisms in his proposals for building communism? Moore's answer to this question is that Marx could not give historical materialist reasons for his rejection of the market because he had only moral and philosophical reasons. So, claims Moore, Marx turned his inability to give an answer into polemic against those who favoured market socialism.

So far, all that Moore argues seems both true and important. The weakness of his argument is that he does not seem to comprehend very well Marx's 'philosophical communism' and its reasons for repudiating such mechanisms of the market as income-driven work and competitive pricing. Moore puts almost all his emphasis on two points. First, there is Marx's moral concern for a distributive justice in which people receive what they need independent of their production, a concern for which Marx provides no historical materialist justification (42-57). Secondly, Marx's theory of commodity fetishism is 'an Hegelian theory' which, claims Moore, demands the end of civil society's illusory exchange-value 'appearances' for the 'substance' of conscious communal organization of production with no mediation by money or prices (58-66).

Moore also suggests a somewhat different, hybrid third point several times *en passant*: Marx is committed to a 'social unity' in which there are 'unified systems of production and exchange' (37), and in which people are not driven by 'egoistic needs' (19, 28).

In making these points, Moore's case comes apart. To begin with, his first and strongest point is confused with the false claim that Marx is committed to 'the unfairness of general rules' (54-6). Moore infers this from Marx's rejection of distribution in accordance with work for, in the second state of communism, distribution in accordance with need. This argument is, however, self-defeating because distribution in accordance with need is as much a general rule as distribution in accordance with work.

Moore's second point regarding commodity fetishism is hardly more sustainable. In grounding Marx's theory of exchange-value 'appearances' and labour-value 'reality' in Hegel's Doctrine of Essence, Moore explains essence (my emphasis) as 'a *nonrelational* property of each commodity taken *separately*' (61). But labour-value is not 'nonrelational' or 'separate' for Marx because it depends on other labour and other values. And Hegel's doctrine of essence, from which Moore says Marx's idea is derived, above all rejects the 'nonrelational' and the 'isolated' as lacking any substantial truth.

But Moore is not finished. He goes on to equate the very different oppositions of 'form and content' and 'accident and substance' on the same page, and then in the next page cites Hegel's profoundly non-Marxian remark, 'To these powers [of laws and institutions] individuals are related

as accidents to substance', as an element of his attempt to explain *Marx* in terms of Hegel. Moore (and one might infer his publisher reader, the economist John Roemer who is not a philosopher) seems to be quite out of his element with the 'philosophical communism' he seeks to explain.

Moore's third point about Marx's desired 'fusions' of production and distribution systems and individual citizens in a 'social unity' undivided by commodity exchanges is not developed beyond a few lines. It is an extremely important point, but so far as Moore follows it up, he misreads its substance.

First, Marx does not seek a 'total fusion of labour and enjoyment'. In fact, he explicitly rejects the labour-as-pleasure idea as superficial, the idea of a 'naive grisette'. He asserts in contrast, that 'really free working is at the same time precisely the most damned seriousness, the most intense exertion' (*Grundrisse*, 611).

Second, Moore gives no source for his claim that Marx thinks that 'to receive an income' for work performed is 'forced labour'. It is true that Marx regards labour as forced in a market society if the worker has no other means of life, and must sell his labour-power into someone else's ownership to stay alive. But Moore ignores this defining condition. Since Marx never talks of 'receiving income' as 'forced labour' in any other context, Moore's attribution here has no grounds.

Third, Moore's claim, that for Marx 'dehumanization and estrangement ... are therefore inextricably embedded in exchange', is therefore mistaken. If the exchange is not within conditions where a person must sell his working life to stay alive, then Marx does not claim that it is 'dehumanized and estranged'.

Finally, Moore's claim that Marx holds 'egoism is the *basic* evil' is opposed to what Marx in fact says. Marx asserts that the egoism-altruism dichotomy is a false dichotomy: '... Communists do not put egoism against self-sacrifice or self-sacrifice against egoism — on the contrary, they demonstrate the material basis engendering it, with which it disappears of itself' (*The German Ideology*, 266-7).

In addition to these erroneous attributions, there are very basic omissions in Moore's account of Marx criticisms of the market. Marx thinks it is of basic importance for historical materialism to distinguish between different *types* of commodity and of exchange: for prime example, between the commodities and exchanges of the shoemaker and the candlestick maker in which the medium of money functions so as to enable each to buy the use-value he does not make (Use-Value → Money → Use-Value) *and* the commodities and exchanges of the capitalist circuit in which goods, including labour-power, become the medium whereby the capitalist who buys and sells them seeks only to gain more money for himself (Money → Use-Value → More Money). This distinction is perhaps the central point of Marx's *Capital*, but Moore declines to mention it. Yet the concept of market exchange not only admits of these polar-opposed senses for Marx, but of further different senses within a situation where the means of production are socially owned.

Consider, for example, a public-sector university where professors are guaranteed a tenured livelihood from which they can do their work in independence and freedom (as is standard in Western universities now), in contrast to a University where instructors get paid for the teaching work which the university and/or other corporations choose to purchase from them on a piecework, competitive-pricing basis (as is increasingly the case with contract-teaching and further market-style reforms advocated for public-sector universities by leading business and government sectors). We might feel quite unfree and demeaned as independent scholars in the latter situation (Thoreau once called the marketplace 'a site of humiliation'), and we might think of the University in such circumstances as a kind of 'abstract capitalist'. This was the term Marx in fact used in his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* for a socialist economy which, as many like Proudhon recommended, maintained a market and wages system. But Moore's analysis, typically of the market-socialist idea, quite overlooks these very different kinds of possibility which public ownership with market exchange and money-incomes can take.

In summary, Moore's study makes his essential point that Marx repudiated market mechanisms holus-bolus without historical materialist justification. On the other hand, his study seems itself given to a holus-bolus acceptance of the idea of market socialism. That is, it is insensitive to the vitally important distinctions to be made among the different sorts of market, commodity exchange, individual income and competitive pricing regimes there might be in a socialist society. Marx's 'philosophical communism', if it is given its fair due, points to the problems which market relations pose — essentially, the deformations of the freedom of producers *and* of their motivation as producers and members of society when their work is bought and sold like a commodity. Market relations in a socialist society too can demean and dehumanize alienating people's productive lives into mere instruments for sale to the state and public institutions *or* they can — as in the case of the regulated individual incomes, competitive pricing and exchange relations into which the traditional university and its faculty enter — allow them to realize their distinctively human capacities. In the latter case, standards of freedom and autonomy are sovereign and market rules are subordinate within a system of social ownership. Marx did not see this kind of possibility, and Moore does not recognize the difference between the two possibilities. There is need for development of the idea of a market socialism which takes into full account Marx's arguments against market relations, while at the same time conceiving how market relations can be so regulated as to meet his arguments head-on. So far, market socialists including Moore, seem to have fallen into much the same trap as Marx — not fully comprehending the opponent's case.

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Wayne A. Patterson
Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Logical Atomism.
New York: Peter Lang 1993. Pp. xiii + 364.
US $52.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8204-1235-X).

This book may be useful for philosophy instructors who qualify thus:

1. they have nothing better to do than use eight meetings on Russell's lectures on logical atomism, 1919 (see his *Logic and Knowledge*);

2. their students are ignorant of the distinction between meta-language and object-language (39-42), truth tables (119ff), and the square of opposition (198-202), not to mention Euclid's being a Greek mathematician (14);

3. they prefer other people's commentaries, examples and exercises to their own.

There is nothing in this book about the choice of strategy, the choice of background items, or of the choice of their location in this book. The 10 page introduction reports on main themes — Russell's and the author's views on them — metaphysics, epistemology, and theory of meaning, syntactical [!], semantical and even pragmatical, though Russell said nothing on pragmatics. Heidegger's notorious passage, which ends with 'The nothing itself nots', is added with neither context nor comments. The introduction ends with the book's rationale: 'It is hoped that in the end we will be nicely placed to at least begin judging whether Russell has succeeded.' Later on a (variant of Goodman's) paradox of confirmation is introduced, and other odds and ends, plus a brief, unexplained mention of Wittgenstein's contribution to logical atomism. That last item escapes the index. (Shoddy indexes make sad exegeses uncouth.) The references to the discoverer of the electron (323) and to Newton and Einstein on gravity (327) are inaccurate, puzzling and redundant.

What might be expected of such a book? Precision, transparency, didactic insight. This book has none of these. But then, philosophical exegeses lack the advantage of religious ones: tradition, framework and standards. Even in philosophy, exegeses on rejected texts lack the advantage of those on canonical ones — St. Thomas' and Marx's, old Wittgenstein's, Husserl's and Heidegger's. And this book pertains to an abandoned view. This is its novelty. The expression of hope that it may help judge the success of logical atomism is pious: the book's saving grace is that it does explain criticisms of logical atomism, and even rejects it on the two final pages. Russell gave up behaviorism (178). He likewise abandoned neutral monism (347). Does the rejection of neutral monism not entail the rejection of logical atomism? 'The full story is long and complex and may be found in [Russell's] *The Analysis of Mind* and *The Analysis of Matter*' (352). Not so: the full story is short and sweet: Russell refuted logical atomism by observing that the statement of the

completeness of any list of atomic statements is neither atomic nor compound. This book's philosophical problem, one may surmise, is, what of analytic philosophy survives the demise of logical atomism? Its answer is elusive: 'The full story is long and complex'.

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Tom Rockmore and **Joseph Margolis, eds.**
The Heidegger Case:
On Philosophy and Politics.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992.
Pp. xi + 437.
US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87722-907-4);
US $22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87722-908-2).

Over the last five years or so, *l'affaire Heidegger* has generated a huge amount of philosophical discussion. Many would agree that of the scores of books and articles published on this topic, many are not really worth reading. However, I don't think this is the case with this volume. The analyses are sophisticated, the insights are interesting, and the intentions are sincere. The aim of this book is neither to sling mud nor to apologize.

In contrast to those who insist that the man and his work must be kept distinct, Margolis and Rockmore take the opposite approach. They suggest that to do otherwise would be to proceed in a very un-Heideggerian fashion, to ignore his emphasis on existence and hermeneutics. Therefore, it is important to situate Heidegger's thought in the historical, political and social context in which it arose, which includes of course his relationship to National Socialism.

The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics attempts to do just that. It is comprised of eighteen essays written by a number of well-respected scholars in the field. Each essay explores a particular aspect of the intersection between Heidegger the man and Heidegger the thinker based upon evidence drawn from, not only the philosophical texts, but also his personal and political writings. The questions which the analyses address include: What led up to Heidegger's decision to turn toward National Socialism, and to what extent was his philosophy involved? Was his thought implicated in his turn away from National Socialism? What role did politics play in the later development of his thought? How did larger historical, political and

social trends influence his personal and political development? What was the intellectual climate in which he developed and to which he responded?

The essays are divided into seven numbered sections. The logic of this organization eludes me as there often doesn't appear to be a particular theme uniting all the papers in any given section. As such my brief comments will not follow the order of the essays as they appear in the book.

Theodore Kisiel and Hugo Ott both explore the connections between Heidegger's life and thought by examining biographical details. Kisiel looks for evidence of an 'apology', and Ott is particularly interested in Heidegger's relationship to Catholicism. Michael Zimmerman, Otto Pöggeler and Domenico Losurdo are all interested in various aspects of Heidegger's concern with the decline of 'the West'. Zimmerman discusses technology, art and Jünger, while Pöggeler focuses on the development of this crisis theme over a period of years. Losurdo takes a particularly close look at the importance of nihilism and the will to power.

Three texts clearly deal with Heidegger's sometimes dubious interpretations of the canon. Rainer Marten questions his appropriation of 'the Greeks', Jacques Taminiaux wonders whether Heidegger has a viable notion of praxis in the Aristotelian sense, and Leszek Kolakowski chooses to focus on Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. Hans-Christian Lucas examines the similarities between Hegel and Heidegger regarding political complacency, and he is particularly interested in what the relationship between philosophy and politics should be. In a similar vein, Hans-Georg Gadamer claims outright that philosophers don't make good political advisors.

Two essays involve close textual analyses of disturbing passages in Heidegger. John Caputo grapples with the comparison of agribusiness to gas chambers in the 1949 lecture 'Das Gestell', and Dominique Janicaud focuses on the reference to the 'inner truth and greatness of the movement' in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Fred Dallmayr queries whether any critique of humanist metaphysics is bound to result in fascism and concludes that it should not.

Two writers analyze *Die Beiträge zur Philosophie*. Nicolas Tertulian looks for clues as to the nature of Heidegger's 'break' with Nazism in the late 1930s, while Reiner Schürmann is interested in the extent to which Heidegger's thought in this period suffers from what he calls the 'totalitarian impulse'. Victor Farías offers the foreword to the Spanish edition of his book in which he responds to his critics. The debate between the so-called necessity and contingency theses is surveyed by Tom Rockmore, and Joseph Margolis considers what of Heidegger's work may be salvaged.

This book succeeds by and large in its intention to seriously examine the written record in so far as it is available. It is a difficult text, presupposing a sophisticated knowledge of Heidegger's work and a familiarity with what have become the basic texts on *l'affaire Heidegger*. One thing is clear by the end of the volume; there can be little doubt that there is more than a circumstantial relation between Heidegger's life and his work. And this is, of course, what Rockmore and Margolis hoped to illustrate.

However, a burning question remains. Despite Margolis' efforts in the final essay, it still isn't clear how we as Heidegger scholars are to proceed. We are still uncertain as to which parts of Heidegger's work are corrupted and which are usable, and whether such threads could be disentangled from one another at all. Of course, Rockmore and Margolis never set themselves the task of addressing this issue, so it would be unfair to hold them to it.

Nevertheless, upon finishing the book, one is hardly left satisfied, content in the way that one feels when a difficult problem has been solved. If anything, the problem is more complicated than we realized and seems to have become more entrenched. Although the contributors are very successful at suggesting connections between Heidegger's philosophy and his politics, they are equally successful at remaining relatively noncommittal when it comes to drawing definitive conclusions. I imagine that this is a tribute to their intellectual integrity. They present evidence and leave the reader to form her own judgments, refraining from offering positions which she might rather effortlessly adopt as her own. And of course, this is what good Heideggerians should do. In this case in particular, it is important that each of us face this problem and the anxiety which it arouses individually and forge a position which our consciences will allow us to live with.

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Roy Sorensen
Thought Experiments.
New York: Oxford University Press 1992.
Pp. xii + 318.
US $45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-507422-X).

What do armchair inquiry, an intuition pump, a mental crutch, and a vignette have in common? If you are intrigued by this question then you already have a good reason to read *Thought Experiments*. And once you start reading it, you will be impressed by the incredible breadth of the book: almost any branch or specialization of philosophy, you soon discover, uses — and has been using — thought experiments. Consequently, any reader, especially those within analytic philosophy, can easily recognize many of the topics dealt with in *Thought Experiments*.

For most commentators, a thought experiment is a mental activity which has *more* significance than merely thinking about an illustration or an interesting case study. If successful, thought experiments boast a notable

level of integrity, independence, and intrinsic value. This is exemplified in the tendency of certain thought experiments to outlive the actual arguments they were devised to support or to undermine. For example, virtually any professional philosopher can nowadays recount the story about Schrödinger's cat, as part of the famous quantum mechanics thought experiment. But how many of these philosophers can, in fact, recount the theory behind this thought experiment?

Sorensen's overall motive for writing this book is to contribute to the growing interest in experiments and experimentation. His main thesis is that thought experiments, although executed in the mind, are to be considered a species of 'real' experiments. This is evident from his short definition of thought experiments: 'A *thought experiment* is an experiment that purports to achieve its aim without the benefit of execution' (205).

Sorensen offers no clear-cut definition of thought experiments, and perhaps an attempt at one is too much to ask, since we have not yet established strict criteria for their identification. It seems that they owe their existence to the fruitful convergence of induction and fiction. In Sorensen's words: 'I argue that thought experiments evolved from experiment through a process of attenuation. This builds inductive momentum behind the theme that thought experiments are experiments. My commitment to viewing them as limiting cases of experiment is solidified by defining thought experiments as experiments that purport to deal with their questions by contemplation of their design rather than by execution. But in the course of this analysis another reduction is endorsed: in addition to being experiments and paradoxes, thought experiments are stories. This brings one of the book's minor themes into prominence: many of the issues raised by thought experiments are prefigured in aesthetics and the logic of fiction' (6).

The book provides a rich variety of examples for readers not familiar with the power of thought experiments. The following one Sorensen draws from Albert Einstein: 'Suppose a train travels six-tenths the speed of light. One observer is stationed on the middle car while a second observer stands on an embankment. Lightning bolts now strike each end of the train, leaving burn marks on the train and the ground. The light from the bolt striking the locomotive and the light from the bolt hitting the caboose reach the ground observer at the same time. Hence, the events look simultaneous to him. To be sure, the ground observer measures the distance to each of the burn marks on the ground and verifies that he was standing exactly midway between the two events. Now consider the observer on the train. Since he is travelling toward the light emanating from the locomotive and away from the light of the caboose, he sees the locomotive bolt before the caboose bolt. He, too, is situated exactly midway between the burn marks left on the train. So he infers that the bolts were not simultaneous. Who is right? Einstein amplifies the query by supposing that another bolt hits the locomotive so that it is measured as simultaneous with the caboose bolt by the train observer but as later by the ground observer. We have a number of options here. We might draw the moral that light should not be assigned a central role in our tacit

definition of simultaneity. We have assumed that two distant events are simultaneous if the light emanating from them reach their midpoint at the same time. However, Einstein urges us to stick with this aspect of the definition and instead relativize "simultaneous" to reference frames. Thus Einstein's answer to "Who is right about whether the bolts struck simultaneously?" is "Bad question!"' (178).

Sorensen begins with the history of science by showing, in the first chapter, the differences and similarities between thought experiments in philosophy and science. Chapter 2 is devoted to voicing some important questions about thought experiments. Chapters 3 and 5, respectively, present the theories of Ernst Mach and Thomas Kuhn, two of the most important figures in the history and philosophy of scientific thought experiments. Sorensen draws heavily on both Mach and Kuhn. With the latter, he disagrees with the claim that thought experiments reveal a special kind of contradiction, an incoherency in the logic of reasoning. Sorensen nevertheless believes that we should nevertheless continue to appeal to standard logic. As well, Sorensen finds Mach's sensationalism, which attempts to reduce everything worth saying to sense data, much too limited for the rich variety of thought experiments developed outside of the natural sciences. Chapter 4 is about some significant models of thought experiments, most notably, 'homuncular' and 'cleansing' ones. Chapter 6 deals with the logic of thought experiments, questions about necessity and possibility regarding thought experiments, and questions about their identity conditions. Paradox and conflict vagueness are the topics of chapter 7. Chapter 8 attempts to account for the origins and evolution of thought experiments, trying to capture some of their most salient properties. Chapter 9 contrasts thought experiments with other related notions such as imaginary experiments and fictional experiments, and the notion of an empirical experiment. The final chapter of this book is an attempt to assess the hazards of thought experiments, showing that there are interesting ways in which they can be deceptive. However, this latter property of thought experiments can sometimes lead to excessive, though in some cases justified, criticisms and to the claim that certain sorts of thought experiments are *nothing but* deceptive. Sorensen sides with the philosophers who approach thought experiments with sympathy: 'So if there are sides to be taken, I count myself among the friends of thought experiment' (6).

This book is clearly a milestone in the literature on thought experiments. Some of its arguments may be contested and some novel interpretations and theories might have been added to Sorensen's critique of thought experiments. In particular, there are some recent thought-provoking computational approaches to thought experiments that are worth investigating. Nevertheless, Sorensen presents a common ground and a starting point for future discussion of thought experiments.

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Ernest Sosa and **Michael Tooley, eds.**
Causation: Oxford Readings in Philosophy.
Toronto: Oxford University Press 1993.
Pp. 252.
US $39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-875093-5);
US $13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-875094-3).

Causation, a new addition to the Oxford Readings in Philosophy series, consists of fifteen articles selected to provide a comprehensive survey of this important topic. They include contributions by John L. Mackie, Michael Scriven, Jaegwon Kim, Donald Davidson, G.E.M. Anscombe, G.H. von Wright, C.J. Ducasse, Wesley C. Salmon, Michael Tooley, David Lewis, Paul Horwich, Jonathan Bennett and Ernest Sosa.

Two fundamental questions provide the starting point and unifying theme of the book. First, since causal states of affairs involve both laws and relations, what is the relationship between causal laws and singular instances of causation? Are causal laws or causal relations more basic? Do causal relations supervene on causal laws, or can we make sense of causal relations independently of laws? Can we talk meaningfully of singular causal relations, or must we accept types of events that are similar in nature? Ducasse, argues that we can have singular and recognizable instances of causal relations independently of laws (125).

The second issue addressed is whether causal relations are an appropriate candidate for reduction in which causal terms are replaced by non-causal terms. Mackie answers affirmatively. His contribution includes the key ideas that he has developed more fully in his book *The Cement of the Universe*. The most common means of reduction is to give a conditional analysis. Sosa and Tooley assert that ever since Hume it has been traditional to assume that 'causal laws are more basic, with causal relations between events being logically supervenient upon causal laws, together with the non-causal properties of, and relations between, events' (1). This view is challenged by those who contend that a singularist construal of causation is possible and that the causal relation is not dependent upon causal laws. The dominant position has been to follow Hume in his contention that causal facts are entirely supervenient on non-causal facts. This position has been opposed by those who deny that such a reduction is possible. In the editors' opinion such a reduction, if not impossible, is not very promising.

Attempts to reduce the causal to the non-causal inevitably meet with counterexamples. Complicating factors make a conditional analysis of causation very difficult. For example, how do we know that A and B are not just two different effects of a common cause, C? Problems also arise in specifying just what conditions are necessary for an event to occur in circumstances of over determination or in cases where there are preemptive causes. Complex conditions make a comprehensive entirely sufficient definition of causation a very difficult task. Perhaps the most intractable problem facing the reductionist is to give a direction to causation in non-causal terms. The causal

relation is asymmetrical and thus some means of establishing causal priority is necessary to differentiate the cause from its effect. Thus, when we assert that A causes B we mean more than just that events of type A and type B are constantly found to occur together. The relationship between A and B must also support counter-factuals, to the effect that if A had not occurred, B would not have occurred. But this is not enough in itself to establish a causal relation. One needs also to ascertain that it is A that produces B rather than vice versa. This has proved to be an extremely difficult problem for a conditional analysis of causation. It often appears that attempts to provide an adequate notion of causal priority covertly import causal notions into their analysis of causal asymmetry. Lewis argues that causal relations must be analyzed with contrary to fact conditionals or counterfactuals. He interprets the truth conditions of these counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds. Although it can be argued that the reductionist program does not succeed in providing a complete reduction of the causal to the non-causal, its endeavour to analyze the causal using non-causal elements has added a great deal to our understanding of the concept of causation.

At the quantum level we are required to accept the existence of probabilistic laws. If there are probabilistic laws then there can be a cause that is not sufficient for its effect. Consequently any acceptable concept of causation must make room for indeterminacy. This makes a conditional analysis much more problematic, and makes an analysis of causation in terms of some set of necessary or sufficient conditions all the more difficult, if not impossible. How can we consistently combine causation with indeterminism? For example, there may be laws that are only statistical in nature but are nevertheless causal. The issue of indeterminate causation also opens up fruitful speculation on whether the nature of laws makes everything that is to happen in the future already fixed, given some set of initial conditions. It has been argued that once an event has taken place, a particular cause for it can be identified, but this does not necessarily mean that the event was fully determined or that no other possibilities existed given the prior state of the world and the operative causal laws. Any discussion of the nature of indeterminate causation also has important implications for the free will debate. Both Anscombe and von Wright say relevant and intriguing things concerning the indeterminacy of laws that provide new possibilities for considering what is required for free will to operate.

Salmon advocates the view that causation can be understood in terms of probability rather than in terms of conditionality. In another article, he takes production and propagation as the crucial concepts needed to analyze causation. He argues that causes produce effects and can have their causal influence transmitted through time and space. For Salmon, we need to think of causation primarily as a process rather than as a relation between two separate entities. Another key idea he presents is that causation transmits causal 'marks' (155). He analyses the causal process further by introducing the notions of conjunctive and interactive forks. By these concepts Salmon

attempts to develop a means of establishing temporal symmetry so that he can analyze causation in terms of causal priority.

Von Wright analyses causation in terms of agency, although the editors point out that this approach generally has met with little acceptance. Causation is widely believed to be more basic than agency, and it is hard to see how such an analysis will give us deeper insight into the nature of this problem.

Tooley supports a realist view of causation. He maintains that the reason that efforts to reduce the causal into the non-causal have failed is that there is something irreducible about causation. Anscombe argues that in the right circumstances causation is directly observable and is therefore not in need of any further analysis. A realist construal of the causal relation is a plausible alternative to analytical reductionism, but realism comes in a number of varieties and it is not clear just which version should be accepted.

In their introduction, the editors attempt to pull together the various themes of the articles in this collection into a unified whole. Their effort is only partially successful. In an anthology such as this it is difficult to unite diverse viewpoints and perspectives into a cohesive integrated whole. Although this book does call attention to the key issues in the philosophy of causation it may be difficult for readers who have limited previous knowledge of this subject to find in it a systematic discussion of an evolving theme. At the very least the book does make it clear that von Wright is correct when he comments that causation is 'notoriously one of the most entangled problem-bundles in the whole of philosophy' (105). In spite of these difficulties, the more experienced reader will be able to tease out the crucial philosophical issues germane to causation and will find much in this work that is provocative and interesting. This anthology will be quite valuable to professional philosophers, graduate students and advanced undergraduates. It could easily be used as a source of material for a seminar on causation. The book contains an extensive bibliography and this alone makes it a valuable resource to anyone doing research in this or a related field.

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William V. Spanos
Heidegger and Criticism. Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction.
Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press 1993. Pp. xxii + 335.
US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-2096-2);
US $24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-2097-0).

This recent monograph, comprising five papers that range over a wide intellectual terrain, represents more than a decade of coming to terms with the implications of Heidegger's thought. Yet the book holds together remarkably well. It does so largely because of the book's overall thematic convergence on the question of Heidegger's politics and the way that issue has been taken up in American liberal-humanist discourse.

Following a detailed introduction, chapters two and three are representative of Spanos' 'early' appropriation of Heidegger's 'destructive hermeneutics' (described by Spanos as entailing the '... interrogation of the metaphysics of the ontotheological tradition' (10)). In these early chapters Spanos embarks upon a sustained critique of literary criticism as it is practised by Anglo-American Modernism in general and the New Criticism in particular. Chapter four forms a bridge between the first and second parts of the book as it juxtaposes Heidegger's *de-struction* with Derridean *de-construction*. Notwithstanding an explicit recognition of the importance of Derrida's contribution here, Spanos is unequivocal in nevertheless opting for Heidegger's prioritising of the ontological.

Underpinned by some solid Heideggerian exegesis, the second part of the book aims to establish the more concrete genealogical approach of Michel Foucault over the approach associated with the Derridean 'autonomy of the text'. In chapter five, a pivotal chapter in the book, Spanos carefully interweaves Heidegger and Foucault. In particular this entails the knitting together of Heidegger's retrieval of being as historicity with Foucault's 'repressive hypothesis'. Spanos is convincing in his account of the way in which Foucault's genealogy of modern knowledge/power relations can productively address the imbalance and socio-political blindness of certain aspects of Heidegger's thought. For Spanos the combination of Foucault's historically specific analyses of transformations in power relations and Heidegger's critique of the Western philosophical tradition is the perfect strategy to counter the hegemony of the modern humanist discourse.

It is by way of such a strategy, and the founding presupposition that Heidegger can indeed be read as prefiguring Foucault, that the reader is led to the final and critical chapter in Spanos' carefully constructed theoretical weave. It is in this chapter that Spanos reveals the 'political' rationale for the book. Citing the continental resurgence of the issue of Heidegger's politics, Spanos asks the question specific to his intellectual 'site': '... what has prompted the editors of *Critical Inquiry* to displace this European debate to North America at this historical juncture?' (183). Concentrating on Arnold

I. Davidson's paper in *Critical Inquiry* Spanos interrogates the 'real motives' behind the American displacement of the question of Heidegger's politics. He demonstrates the way in which the offending commentaries (Spanos also identifies Richard Wolin and Tom Rockmore as co-protagonists) make use of the specific question of Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism in order to discredit his philosophical work *in its entirety*. Spanos is persuasive in his account of the political motivations underlying much of the contemporary debate concerning Heidegger's political rectitude.

The most significant problem with Spanos' account is its tendency to use the language of 'emancipation' and 'intervention' as they have arisen within such meta-discourses as Marxism. However de-essentialised and 'situated' Spanos is in his use of the post-Marxist discourses of Gramsci, Althusser and Jameson there is always the risk of capitulating to the humanist imperative to provide a 'lesson'. What makes Spanos' occasional (inadvertant?) lapse in the direction of a humanist morality more difficult to understand is the degree to which it is at odds with the sort of philosophical ethic that Foucault was experimenting with before his death in 1984. It is not that Spanos identifies crudely in any way with the humanist binaries of us/them, good/bad, outside/inside or non-Nazism/Nazism. Rather it is simply a matter of drawing attention to the ill considered claim that Spanos makes in his concluding chapter that: 'Heidegger indeed was guilty of a remarkable lapse in human sensitivity, and further, that the particular bias of his antihumanism had as one of its deplorable consequences his inability to acknowledge the Nazi persecution of the Jews' (188). At the very least it seems that what should be recognized — and yet has all too seldom been recognized in the literature — is that the 'inability' to acknowledge might just be genuine given the (now) widely recognized difficulties of speaking about the Holocaust in any adequate sense. As the testimonies of 'survivors' have born witness, there is a sense that, in the words of a victim, 'That truth was always more atrocious, more tragic than what will be said about it' (M. Blanchot, *The Writing of Disaster*, p. 82).

As an engaging examination of the current 'state of play' of what is possibly the most protracted of contemporary philosophical controversies (witness the recent and protracted Wolin/Sheehan/Derrida debate and the unprecedented scenes of attempted political correctness over the recent conferral of an honourary doctorate to Derrida by Cambridge University) Spanos' book represents an important contribution. Stylistically and thematically the book is complex, but the depth of comprehension of the problems at hand is sufficient to successfully sustain the ideas presented. For those who are genuinely interested in working through the legacy of Heidegger's thought and who are thus interested in taking Heidegger seriously this book is highly recommended.

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George J. Stack
Nietzsche and Emerson:
An Elective Affinity.
Athens: Ohio University Press 1992.
Pp. xii + 379.
US $39.95 (ISBN 0-8214-1037-7).

Even more than its title would indicate, this is a book dedicated to the project of demonstrating the range of influence 'From Emerson to Nietzsche', as George J. Stack titles his introductory chapter. Stack aims to convince the reader that there is 'a deep one-way relationship' (3) between Nietzsche and Emerson (an association effected as much by repetition on Stack's part — his style is exhortatory — as by argument). It is doubtless not insignificant that in an earlier book, Stack summarily, similarly reduced Nietzsche to Lange, but to trace the connection between Stack's Lange and Stack's Emerson would take us too far afield.

Where other scholars have explored the connection between Emerson and Nietzsche (Baumgarten, Hubbard, Thurin, Gilman, Schottländer), Stack's reading is a focussed effort to reduce Nietzsche to Emerson in effect as epigone. This is the ultimate parsing of Stack's subtitle: 'An Elective Affinity', now heard as an effective affinity, that is in stylistic affect and cultural, intellectual effect. Thus although conceding the wide range of influences on Nietzsche and noting Nietzsche's sensitive reception of a 'variety of cultural resources' (5), Stack claims 'of all those to whom Nietzsche was indebted ... Ralph Waldo Emerson was ... one of his most prominent creditors' (6). The list of debts is considerable: Nietzsche's concept of Nature, history, *amor fati*, will to power, Nietzsche's challenge to traditional morality and the self, the idea of the *Übermensch*. Only in the final chapters does Stack's study lighten its use of repetitive emphasis, to speak of common values between the two authors. In consequence, Stack's chapter on morality, 'The Paradox of Good and Evil', is the strongest in the book, although heavily indebted to his earlier published article, 'Nietzsche's Antinomianism'.

Nietzsche himself offers a refutation of Stack's general project of tracing philosophic influence as a matter of ultimate significance. It is not that such things do not matter for the Nietzsche who liked to claim that philosophy should be practiced as psychology, but that the stuff of abundance, of genius always equals and exceeds such psychologizing. Thus the inconclusiveness of the question of influence, even where such influence can be successfully demonstrated. Referring to the case of Greek roots in the Orient (or Africa), Nietzsche notes that 'nothing would be sillier than to claim an autochthonous development for the Greeks.' Instead, for Nietzsche, 'the art of fruitful learning' is the heart of ingenuity. If the Greeks are said to have invented philosophy it is because 'they knew how to pick up the spear and throw it onward from the point where others had left it.' But it is not priority or 'originality' that is at stake. Noting that

'everywhere the way to the beginnings leads to barbarism', the philologist Nietzsche knew as well as any other reader of Ecclesiastes that it must be easy work to find an earlier source. For philosophy, beyond origins, especially for philosophy in post-Nietzschean as post-metaphysical times, the point of drawing such associations beyond the literary tracing of affinities, must be shown. And Stack does not proceed far beyond the task of showing that the range of Nietzsche's philosophy traces a parallel with or reflects the direct influence of Emerson's thought. This is a fair achievement, but its value is more apt for literary criticism than for philosophy, if only because Stack does not mine it for whatever philosophical import it might have.

This last issue addresses Stack's own critical point concerning the literary influences within philosophy. In the case of Emerson's influence on Nietzsche, beyond Nietzsche's own account of this influence we have what matters rather more to Nietzsche's Anglophone readers. No one less than Walter Kaufmann emphasised the special importance of this connection, and though Kaufmann hardly equals Stack, one could argue that Kaufmann's introduction to his translation of Nietzsche's *The Gay Science* seems very like the intellectual palimpsest over which Stack incised his own musings. And if Stack's reference to Kaufmann's *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, acknowledges Kaufmann's ultimate refusal of the constitutive importance of Emerson for Nietzsche's thought (68), it is also true that Stack does not need Kaufmann's imprimatur. These days, the academic palm is held by others, such as Stanley Cavell, and Stack's reading of Cavell's own association of Nietzsche and Emerson is suitably approbative, whatever the valence of influence.

Beyond influence, the tracings of which constituted a Petrarchian discipline in which Nietzsche found himself past master, excelling in and exceeding the scholarly conventions of his time, Nietzsche thought the higher or esoteric value decisive in every case. The task from this vantage is not to sound out base affinities but higher resonances — to join that 'high-spirit converse' Nietzsche invokes in the case of Greek antiquity: 'each giant calling to his brother through the desolate intervals of time.'

Stack's aims are more modest, and decidedly, deliberately sobering. Perhaps he was overwhelmed by the difficulty of reducing what some would name the most provocative philosopher of all time to an American essayist, however genial. Stack's observation, 'Nietzsche, of course, was more of a philosopher than Emerson' (211) is a lame concession made in a book dedicated to showing, in a philosophically loaded parallel, that 'Emerson served as Socrates to Nietzsche's Plato' (5). What such a comparison means must then be finally unclear, for if ideas thought to be Nietzsche's 'coinage' are merely enlarged replicas of Emerson's 'mintage,' (11) Nietzsche would appear to be a colonialist and indeed, as the image of a wooden nickel could suggest (the quintessential counterfeit coin of American nostalgia), copied in the mold of souvenir kitsch. Or is there another reason why Emerson (with his full advantage or priority as Nietzsche's senior) was not able to

leave his very own stamp on philosophical thought (whatever about art and letters)? One would like to think that the debate between European and American intellectual currents turns on more than matters of copyright.

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W.J. Stankiewicz
In Search of a Political Philosophy: Ideologies at the Close of the Twentieth Century.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1993.
Pp. xiv + 460.
US $59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-08874-7).

One of the more beguiling paradoxes of modern politics is that the politicization of individuals within many formerly authoritarian states has coincided with the increasing cynicism and apathy of voters within the more stable democracies. Common to both, however, is the search for an epistemological and normative framework permitting a comfortable balance between personal liberties and a sense of responsibility to the polity.

The precise nature of such a framework is of especial interest to political theorists at the close of the twentieth century; for, as any collective certainty regarding the proper ends of political organization weakens, the necessity for societies to interact and cooperate on a scale never before imagined becomes more imperative. As an investigation into the contemporary role of ideologies, however, the volume that Stankiewicz offers us is as disappointing as the issue is relevant. *In Search of a Political Philosophy* is an exegesis of 'the assumptions — both conscious and unconscious — underlying the ideological thinking of the proponents and followers, and some theoreticians and critics, of the three democratic "isms"': 'prudential' conservatism, 'empty' liberalism, and 'hedonistic' socialism.

Conservatism is 'prudential' as it provides the only solid basis for democracy: i.e., 'the worth of the "self" as a fundamental concept without which no other statement can be made' (18). In contrast, liberalism is 'empty' and socialism is 'hedonistic' because they rely upon the twin evils of Relativism and Determinism. Liberals, for instance, merely promote freedom for freedom's sake; they are only able to derive a positive content to liberty by going outside liberalism. Thus liberals are 'intellectual opportunists' who are 'ready to promote at any given moment whatever is represented as a good by a sufficient number of the electorate' (155). Moreover, liberalism leads to a

breakdown of democracy as it 'shifts the balance in favour of the individual' by, for instance, regarding the judiciary 'as an independent system set up to protect the individual against the oppression of society' (139). 'Responsibility' has disappeared from the doctrine of liberalism 'and has been replaced by the "right" to follow desire' (124). Even the seemingly innocuous policy of equality of opportunity 'has a potential for something worse, totalitarianism' (185).

Like liberalism's dependence upon relativism, declares Stankiewicz, socialism's inherent determinism jeopardizes democracy by declaring that social forces, not individuals, are responsible for specific outcomes. Democratic socialism, which appeals to man's 'sloth and passivity' (216), is hedonistic because of its use of the welfare state to distribute resources. We are, for example, informed that 'a great number of the "arty" people are "on welfare" by choice' (239), that '[t]he best modern prisons in the West are now rather attractive recreational centres where criminals can relax from the effort of supporting themselves' (280), that peace marches and nuclear free zones are 'ritualistic' and 'neurotic' (365), and that people on welfare constitute an 'artificial leisure class' (386). Socialism and its deterministic focus, which 'portray "choice" — and hence "responsibility" — as illusions' (278) can only, according to the author, lead to the self-destruction of democracy.

The single discerning idea to be found in this book is that agreement on procedural issues (i.e., democratic processes) is frequently insufficient for a stable and well-regulated polity: there must be some core cluster of accepted values which forms the indelible and deep-rooted bonds between fellow citizens. This argument has already been made gracefully and forcefully by theorists such as Alasdair MacIntyre, and it is increasingly arising in the current debates between communitarians and liberals. But the author of *In Search of a Political Philosophy* seems oblivious to any contemporary philosophical or political developments. In response to the query, 'what system of ideas defines *you*?', more and more individuals reply 'feminism' or 'post-modernism' or 'environmentalism' or, in some areas, even some variant of 'nationalism'. Stankiewicz does not address any of these, even though he makes a point of defining 'ideology' quite broadly as 'a system of ideas used to comprehend socio-political reality' (405). This book reads as if it were published in 1953 rather than in 1993; and nowhere is this more obvious than in the sustained tirade against Communism (the 'politics of evil' [358].) 'Convinced that Communism must become more "realistic" — less ideological', writes Stankiewicz, 'the West plays for time: whatever the present stance of Communism, most people believe it will eventually change to accord with realities. This assumption endangered Western society by leading to an imprudent policy of ignoring the fact of Soviet military power' (321). It is incredible that this passage could have been published in 1993, when it has become apparent that Communism has indeed changed to accord with realities; just as Soviet military power

has proven less destructive than the upsurge of numerous indigenous nationalisms.

The most annoying aspect of the text is the continual use of unsubstantiated assertions, frequently phrased in snide and dismissive tones. 'Surely any government that allows its policy to be influenced by a demonstration [i.e., a peace march] does not deserve to be called a government' (365). Why not? We are not told. And to declare that '[n]on-Marxists cannot help wondering what there is in Communist theory that is supposed to make facts go away' (335) is a cheap sneer, not sophisticated analysis. This disparaging and protracted rant against communism not only lacks the elegance and insight of some of Hayek's best work, but it also seems a pointless exercise given the political developments of the past five years.

A final concern is the very selective definition of the various traditional ideologies offered by *In Search of a Political Philosophy*. While ideologies are notoriously difficult to define precisely to the satisfaction of all, the claim that 'freedom' and 'the concept of the self' are cornerstones of conservative thought (37, 30) would doubtless surprise many liberals. If one is searching for a reflective and penetrating analysis of political philosophy at the close of the twentieth century, it will not be found in this book.

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David Stove
The Plato Cult and Other Philosophical Follies.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1991. Pp. xiii + 209.
US $26.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-17709-4).

When David Stove taught philosophy at the University of Sydney he had two types of student. The first sat in the back rows of the lecture hall and thought him to be a capable instructor, but given his advancing years and esoteric interests, rather boring. The second sat in the front rows. In contrast to those in the back, these students hung on Stove's every word. They also knew him to be about as boring as a carrion falcon caught in the act of ravaging its prey.

As it turns out, the seating arrangements of these two groups of students were not accidental and the dividing line between them was perfectly predictable. Only those seated in the first four or five rows were capable of hearing the quiet asides and soft but acerbic comments which regularly punctuated the more audible and predictable points of Stove's lectures. In

fact, it was often joked by those in the know that the importance of Stove's comments varied inversely with the audibility of his voice. Inevitably, his best jokes and most insightful *bon mots* were doomed to come across as inaudible mutterings to the dullards in the back rows concerned more with GPAs and social activism than with philosophy.

Luckily for all of us, though, Stove's latest book captures and records many of his best comments, weaving them together into a caustic critique of what regularly passes for academic philosophy. *The Plato Cult* has little to do with Plato, other than recognizing him as the primary progenitor of a kind of philosophy which is concerned very little about either the natural world or common sense. Instead, the book concentrates on many of Stove's favorite contemporary targets — Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Goodman and Nozick — together with several equally deserving historical figures, including Berkeley, Bradley, Kant and Hegel. It is written with ingenuity and style, and with the same sharp wit that readers of *Popper and After* (1982) have come to expect from Stove. As Stephen Stich tells us on the dust jacket, 'Stove's essays are elegant, insightful, beautifully crafted and enormously interesting. They are also outrageous, opinionated, occasionally unfair and almost always side-splittingly funny. ... he says things that need to be said, and ... he says them with brilliance'.

Bad philosophy, Stove reminds us, is easy to catalogue but difficult to characterize. Parmenides claims that there is no motion, even though he travelled, and knew that he travelled, around Greece and southern Italy defending this view. Similarly Plato claims that no particular object ever really has any given property, even though he himself was, and knew that he was, a particular object with given properties. In much the same vein Berkeley claims that there are no mind-independent physical objects, Popper claims that there is no general knowledge, and Feyerabend claims that the correct way to decide upon scientific laws is by means of a democratic vote. Yet, as Stove points out, all these claims are so obviously false that one begins to wonder how it is that such highly regarded thinkers could come to believe them.

Stove's own response is two fold: The first is to conclude that the positivists were basically correct in their abandonment of metaphysics. As Stove puts it, 'These facts ... *prove* ... that *there is something fearfully wrong with typical philosophical theories*. But this conclusion is Positivism, or at any rate the basic proposition of Positivism' (xi). The second response is to inquire into what it is that leads to such errors. However, the task of developing a systematic and comprehensive theory of mistaken belief — what Stove calls a *nosology* of thought — is almost too daunting to consider: 'The Logical Positivists, to their credit, at least *tried* to frame a nosology of thought ... They acknowledged *three* ways in which thought can go wrong: contingent falsity, self-contradiction, and meaninglessness. A proposition is meaningless, they said, if it is not a tautology and not verifiable either' (194). This is perhaps not a bad beginning, but given the range of cognitive error that *homo sapiens* appears capable of committing, Stove judges the positivist's catalogue to be 'pitifully inadequate' when viewed as a comprehensive inventory

of mistaken beliefs (195). Even so, particular *cases* of mistaken belief can be investigated, and in these cases, just as was the case in explaining the sharply divergent views of Stove's two groups of students, one begins searching for social or psychological or physical — rather than rational — explanations of such beliefs.

Of course, social explanations of why it is that people believe what they do have been much in vogue this century. As Stove himself points out, Marxists especially like to claim that the currency of a scientific or political theory can be explained simply by the historical circumstances and class origins of the theory and its adherents. But they are not the only ones. The current champions of this approach — the sociologists, psychologists and philosophers who are members of the Edinburgh School — believe that *all* belief can be explained by the social and political interests of the believer. These are the people 'who have so far succeeded in transcending the cognitive limitations of their own "class-situation" as to be in a position to inform the rest of us that no one can ever transcend the cognitive limitations of his class-situation' (62). As such, says Stove in a typically biting remark, they are both 'beneath philosophical notice and unlikely to benefit from it' (30).

The moral is that resorting to a social or psychological or physical explanation is in some cases appropriate, and in some cases not. Typically, rational beliefs are explained *ad rem* and not *ad hominem*. In other words, they are accepted or rejected on the basis of evidence, not as a result of historical circumstances. Thus we explain Kepler's beliefs about the orbits of the planets on the basis of the evidence that he had available to him. We do the same for Newton and Darwin, Mendel and Einstein. Social, political and psychological factors are invoked only when necessary. As Stove points out, 'You are more likely to need to do so, obviously, the less merit the theory has' (2). If a slogan is needed, Newton-Smith's comes to mind: 'Sociology is only for deviants', (William Newton-Smith, *The Rationality of Science*, [Oxford: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1981], p. 238) and it is philosophical deviants that Stove wishes to discuss.

The Plato Cult consists of seven essays, all but the last of which discuss either a well-known philosopher or school of philosophy. The last, Stove says, 'is about philosophy itself' (vii), although it might also be fair to characterize it as an apology for positivism and so, for many, it too will be viewed as being about a particular school. Entitled 'What is Wrong with Our Thoughts? A Neo-Positivist Credo', this chapter also indicates something of Stove's ultimate philosophical pessimism. After all, says Stove, it is unfortunate but true that 'rational thought — what Hume called the "calm sunshine of the mind" — is historically rare, local, and ephemeral' (184). Thus, 'given a large aggregation of human beings, and a long time, you cannot reasonably expect rational thought to *win*. You could as reasonably expect a thousand unbiased dice, all tossed at once, all to come down "five", say. There are simply far too many ways, and easy ways, in which human thought can go wrong. Or, put it the other way round: anthropocentrism cannot lose. The jungle *will* reclaim the clearing ...' (202). Nevertheless, Stove remains defiant: 'I cannot help

feeling that rational thought, "the calm sunshine of the mind", has a right to exist, as well as madness; and even that it has some right to be heard' (201).

Each of the book's remaining chapters can be read independently of the others except for the two on British idealism, the second of which follows on from the first. Entitled 'Idealism: A Victorian Horror-Story' Parts 1 and 2, these two chapters view idealism as primarily a religious reaction of the nineteenth century against the Enlightenment of the century before. According to a quotation from Quine on the back cover, Stove's target in these chapters 'is the predominantly idealistic gobbledygook that dominated European philosophy until about seventy years ago, and his attack is praiseworthy and devastating.'

Of all the essays included in the book, only one has appeared previously, and this one, 'Cole Porter and Karl Popper: the Jazz Age in the Philosophy of Science', certainly deserves reprinting. In this essay, Stove draws a parallel between the influence of the jazz age (summed up in the famous Cole Porter chorus 'day's night to-day', 'true is false today', 'the world's gone mad today,' 'anything goes'), and that of such contemporary icons in the philosophy of science as Popper ('not verification but falsification') and Feyerabend ('anything goes'). When this essay originally appeared in 1985 in the now sadly defunct British journal, *Encounter*, the letters to the editor column was still sizzling six months later.

Other chapters include essays on Nozick and Goodman, and on solipsism. In '"Always apologize, always explain": Robert Nozick's War Wounds', Stove takes Nozick to task for his attempt to substitute explanation for argument in correct philosophical methodology. In response to Nozick's suggestion (one cannot consistently call it a thesis) that, because it is coercive, 'Philosophical argument, trying to get someone to believe something whether he wants to believe it or not, is not ... a nice way to behave toward someone', (Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1981], p.13) Stove points out the obvious. Philosophical arguments *are* coercive, but so are geometrical arguments, chemical arguments, and biological arguments. 'No idea could be more destructive of human life than the ideal of non-coerciveness. A new-born human is so helpless ... that it would never survive for one day if hands which are *both coercive and loving* did not guide it ...' (58). In 'Philosophy and Lunacy: Nelson Goodman and the Omnipotence of Words', Stove similarly devastates Goodman's remarkable claim, not only that multiple worlds exists, but that through language and other social practices these worlds are of our own making.

Stove's chapter on solipsism, '"I only am escaped to tell thee": Epistemology and the Ishmael Effect', is by far the most philosophically interesting in *The Plato Cult*. The reason is that in this chapter Stove gives an argument against the very coherence of the solipsist thesis. In outline the argument is a simple one: The question, 'Does an external world exist?', is what Stove calls an 'Ishmael-question'. An Ishmael-question, in turn, is defined as 'one which the questioner could not ask unless the answer to it were a certain way ... "Did anyone from the *Pequod* survive?" is an Ishmael-question if it is asked by

Ishmael ... But there are other questions which would be Ishmael-questions whoever asked them. For example, "Do I know any words?"' (67). The reason is simply that the very fact that the question is being asked means that it must have a given answer. In the case of solipsism, the claim that 'An external world exists' turns out to follow necessarily from 'At least one human being exists.' Thus, it also turns out that it is not possible for a human being to ask, 'even inwardly, whether an external world exists, unless at least one human being exists. And necessarily, if at least one human being exists then an external world exists. Therefore, necessarily, no human being could ask whether an external world exists, unless an external world does exist' (71). Working through the argument in detail gives the reader a first-hand example of how the verification principle was used by the positivists with such devastating results.

Is anything missing from such a vigorous attack on metaphysics? One subject which it would have been enjoyable to see Stove target is, of course, the ontological extravagance of David Lewis. After all, Lewis if famous for claiming that 'the world we are part of is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that we who inhabit this world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds (David Lewis, *On the Plurality of Worlds*, [Oxford: Blackwell 1973], p.85). As is well known, for Lewis, such possible worlds are intended 'to be respectable entities in their own right. When I profess realism about possible worlds, I mean to be taken literally'(David Lewis, *Counter-factuals*, [Oxford: Blackwell 1973], p.85).

Yet what is almost as good as a chapter by Stove is that, on the dust jacket of *The Plato Cult*, a comment by Lewis himself appears: 'When philosophers follow where argument leads, too often they are led to doctrines indistinguishable from sheer lunacy—and nobody quite notices! Somehow, the way we write and read philosophy can entice us into taking absurdities seriously. A none-too-gentle shaking does us good. Once it was Moore who did the job. Nowadays it is above all Stove, and he does it with devastating wit. Naked emperors, beware.' The irony is surely too great to go unnoticed even by Lewis himself.

At one time not so long ago, no philosophy undergraduate could complete a degree without having read A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936), the book that startled an entire philosophical generation out of its metaphysical complacency and launched logical positivism upon an unsuspecting English-speaking world. Today, in contrast, logical positivism is mentioned in many classrooms only as something of a curiosity, a form of naive science worship that correct-thinking intellectuals have been successful in deconstructing. To this unstudied view of philosophy *The Plato Cult* is a helpful corrective. For anyone young enough not to have been inspired by the original goals of the positivists, *The Plato Cult* will introduce and enlighten, as well as entertain. For the rest of us, it will remind us of what we may have forgotten, namely the vigour and clarity of rational thought that is the legacy of positivism.

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Yael Tamir
Liberal Nationalism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.
Pp. xi + 194.
US $24.95 (ISBN 0-691-07893-9).

Contemporary political philosophers have largely ignored the issue of nationalism. While there is a sizeable literature on its historical and sociological dimensions, there are few in-depth discussions of nationalism as a normative political theory, with its own ideals of democracy, liberty and justice. This book helps fill that gap. In it, Tamir defends certain nationalist ideals, and argues that they can be accommodated within liberal theory.

Underlying Tamir's theory is a particular conception of the person, which she calls the 'contextual individual' (chap. 1). Tamir starts from the liberal assumption that people are capable of making autonomous choices about their aims and ambitions in life (what she calls 'moral choices'). But the ability to make these choices depends on 'the presence of a cultural context' (22), so that individual liberty is dependent on membership in a cultural community. Over time, individuals can put these cultural contexts themselves in question, and choose which culture they wish to live in ('cultural choices').

On the basis of this conception of the person, Tamir argues that individuals should be accorded a 'right to culture' (chap. 2). Being able to express one's cultural identity is important for many reasons: cultural membership is a precondition of autonomous moral choices, and itself reflects an autonomous cultural choice that is worthy of respect (36); it is a 'constitutive' aspect of one's identity which affects one's sense of status and self-respect (41, 71-3); actions performed in a cultural context are 'endowed with additional meaning' because they can be seen both as acts of individual achievement and as contributions to the development of one's culture (85); and shared membership in a culture promotes a sense of belonging and relationships of mutual recognition (85-6).

According to Tamir, the right to culture entails 'the right to national self-determination' (chap. 3). Tamir defines nations in cultural terms, as the bearers of distinct cultures (67-8). And the right to national self-determination is the right to ensure the continued existence and development of that distinct culture. This requires the ability to freely express the culture in the public sphere. Without this public component, the existence of a nation as a distinct social unit would be jeopardized (73). Hence the state should serve an 'expressive' role, actively reflecting a particular national identity in its symbols and institutions (139).

Tamir emphasizes that national self-determination does not require that each nation have its own sovereign 'nation-state'. If it did, self-determination for some nations would entail the subjection of smaller nations located within its boundaries (74). The existence of such national minorities cannot be avoided, no matter how boundaries are redrawn. Instead, the right to the

public expression of one's national culture can be ensured within multi-nation states, through mechanisms such as federalism or consociational democracy. Liberal nationalism is a 'polycentric' theory of nationalism which attaches value to national identity per se, not a racist or xenophobic nationalism based on claims of cultural superiority (chap. 4).

Nationalists believe that members of a nation have special obligations to each other, in addition to any duties towards humanity at large. Tamir defends this 'morality of community', arguing that special obligations flow from belonging to a group or community, like a nation, whose existence is seen by its members as intrinsically worthy (chap. 5). She then argues that this morality of community is implicitly invoked by contemporary liberal theorists (chap. 6). These theorists assume that obligations of distributive justice operate within a single political community, that this community can legitimately restrict the entry of new members from outside, even if they accept liberal democratic norms, and that people have political obligations to their own government even if some other state is more just. All of these assumptions, Tamir argues, only make sense if citizens share a sense of belonging, and accept a morality of community (121). In this sense, *malgré eux*, 'most liberals are liberal nationalists' (139).

The book concludes with a discussion of some mechanisms for implementing liberal nationalism (chap. 7). Rather than creating more sovereign nation-states, Tamir suggests that sovereignty should be transferred from existing states in two directions: upwards towards transnational organizations (such as the EEC) in areas of environmental and economic policy; and downwards towards local nation-based units in areas of education and cultural policy.

Tamir's project is a worthy one. Liberalism and nationalism are both powerful forces, responding to different but equally pervasive features of the human condition, and it is important to see whether they can fit together. This is a clearly written and provocative book that will serve as a useful starting point for anyone working in the area.

However, there are gaps in Tamir's argument. First, it is not clear what counts as a 'nation'. Tamir says nations are cultural communities, so that 'two people are of the same nation if, and only if, they share the same culture' (68). But this must be culture in a very specific sense, since she excludes groups such as gays, religious sects like the Amish, vegetarians and Communists, even though each of these can be said to have a shared 'culture' (68, 76, 149). Nor, at the other extreme, does she count 'Western civilization' as a culture. Her examples of cultures are Germans, Québécois, Palestinians, Kurds, etc. What Tamir seems to mean by a 'culture', then, is a specific historical society, generally associated with an ethnic or linguistic group, which is institutionally complete, and which provides individuals with a variety of subgroups and lifestyles to choose from.

Tamir implicitly relies on a distinction between 'subcultures' (voluntary associations, lifestyle enclaves and social movements) on the one hand, and 'nations' on the other. The latter provide the 'cultural context' for the former.

Whereas membership in the former is based on 'shared values', membership in the latter 'is based on national, cultural, and historical criteria' which 'lie outside the normative sphere' (90).

This implicit restricting of nations to societal cultures accords with everyday usage. But it creates problems for Tamir, since most of her arguments for a 'right to culture' (respect for autonomous choices, promoting communal bonds, ensuring self-respect, etc) apply equally to membership in religious or lifestyle groups. Tamir recognizes that she has not provided a satisfactory way of distinguishing nations from other cultural groupings (65, 68, 76). The deeper problem is that she has not explained why this distinction is important.

Moreover, if nations are societal cultures, it seems implausible to claim, as Tamir does, that individuals are able to create new national communities by an act of will. Tamir suggests that if a group within a nation disagrees with the majority's practices, they can establish an 'alternative community', leading to the 'emergence of new national groups' (49). But wouldn't this alternative community be a voluntary association or social movement not a new 'nation'?

Second, it is unclear what 'national self-determination' means in practice, or why it requires anything other than familiar liberal civil and political rights. Tamir says that the 'public expression' of a culture is needed to ensure its continued existence. But why does the public expression of a culture require its *political* expression through the state? After all, freedom of speech and association allows people to express their cultural identity, both individually and collectively. Why is the state needed for people to 'share a language, memorise their past, cherish their heroes, live a fulfilling national life' (8)? If (as liberals assume) people can collectively express their religious identity through freedom of association while still maintaining a strict separation of church and state, why shouldn't we maintain a separation of state and nation?

In places, Tamir implies that state involvement is simply unavoidable. She rightly argues that the state cannot avoid expressing a national identity when it adopts official languages and public holidays (148). On this view, state expression of a national identity is more regrettable than desirable, but since it is unavoidable, justice requires that we compensate national minorities for disadvantages this creates, and protect them from pressures to assimilate (e.g., 54, 149, 154).

Yet at other times, Tamir implies that it is a positive good that states express a national identity, and that existing liberal democracies should do more to develop the 'cultural essence of the state' (148). She says that the 'yearning for self-determination' is to see political institutions as 'carriers of the national identity'. On this view, political arrangements 'should reflect the unique character and draw on the history, the culture, the language, and at times the religion of the national group, thereby enabling its members to regard it as their own' (74). The argument here is not about the survival of

the culture, but about the desire for political affirmation of self-identity, and the desire to have a sense of ownership of government through one's nation.

Tamir's last chapter is entitled 'Making A Virtue Out of Necessity', which captures the two strands in her thought. But it is unclear why liberals should see the political expression of national identity as a virtue to be promoted (unlike religious identity), or even what this would involve. Part of the problem is that Tamir does not spell out the concrete political implications of liberal nationalism. She talks about a scheme of 'cultural vouchers' that would allow people to spend public funds in accordance with their own cultural identity, and about ensuring that 'state investment in cultural services' (such a language teaching, book publishing and curriculum formation) are 'based on a per capita calculation' (54). She also endorses the ideas of federalism, consociational democracy and local autonomy (151). But these are just passing comments, and she does not try to apply them to any real-world nationalist conflicts.

The question in most nationalist conflicts is not whether to devolve power to national groups, but how much power (and over what area of land). Should we devolve as little power as is necessary to ensure the survival of the nation as a distinct culture, or as much power as possible to increase the extent to which national members identify the state as 'their own'? Similar questions will arise over the formula used in distributing seats in a consociational democracy, or drawing boundaries in a federal system, or defining the scope of official language rights. In all these cases, the ambitions of nationalists generally far exceed what is required to ensure the continued existence of the nation as a distinct society. Yet they all increase the public expression of the national culture, and promote national identification with the state. Tamir's theory provides no way to resolve these conflicts, in part because she provides no clear basis for judging whether nationalist politics are a necessity to be minimized, or a virtue to be promoted.

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Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson,
and **Eleanor Rosch**
The Embodied Mind — Cognitive Science and Human Experience.
Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press 1991.
Pp. xx + 308.
US $13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-262-22042-3).

Should cognitive science take notice of Buddhist thought? In particular, why might traditions according to which everyday human experience is transformed through meditation be of importance for a science of the mind? In this ambitious and truly interdisciplinary book, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch argue that the intrinsic dynamics of cognitive science have stranded the field at an impasse where scientific understanding and lived experience contradict each other; and whilst such a situation may be tolerable in other areas of study, it is untenable when it is the human mind itself under investigation. The proposed solution to the predicament is to develop a new scientific understanding of the mind, which is distinctly Heideggerian in flavour, and both in harmony with — and enhanced by — the disciplined examination of human experience through meditation.

Since the birth of cognitive science as a declared research programme, the field has been dominated by the hypothesis that cognition can be explained as the manipulation of internal representations by computational information processing mechanisms. In classical cognitive science, the processes were rule-driven, syntactic manipulations of symbols in the style of digital computers. With the advent of connectionism, the focus shifted to emergent states and behaviors which could arise out of locally determined interactions across large networks of relatively simply, interconnected processing units; but, nevertheless, the basic commitment to representations and some notion of computation remained. Varela *et al.* claim that both cognitivism and the emergence-theory are hounded by forms of the fundamental difficulty identified above. Neither account of cognition is compatible with the deliverances of human experience. The problem is explored via two converging themes. The first is the failure of either philosophy or science to validate our ordinary sense of self; the second is our commonsense-realist notion of the relationship between mind and world.

The message of 'The Embodied Mind' is that the self, far from being the unitary entity assumed by prereflective commonsense, is actually fragmented. As Varela *et al.* observe, from the introspections of Hume to the technological advances of modern cognitive science and neuroscience, theoretical investigations of mind, brain, and cognition have failed to locate the permanent self of everyday lived experience. And although *in the laboratory* scientists may respond to the situation with a 'so much the worse for commonsense experience', the very same theorists will continue their everyday lives by assuming the existence of that elusive and discredited self. Those who admit the seriousness of this predicament develop nihilistic views

according to which we are 'condemned' by our ordinary experience to believe in something — the existence of a unitary self — which we know from theoretical investigation cannot be true.

Crucially, the 'mindfulness' tradition of Buddhist philosophy also discovers the selfless mind, but does not become nihilistic in the wake of the realization. Rather it seeks to show that our 'grasping' after an ego-self is an 'inauthentic' mode of everyday existence. According to Varela *et al.*, this provides the basis for a 'middle way' between, on the one hand, the dismissal of experience and, on the other hand, its uncritical acceptance. The purpose of this meditative tradition is to enable the individual 'to become mindful, to experience what one's mind is doing as it does it, to be present with one's mind' (23). The idea is to investigate and transform human experience via disciplined meditative techniques.

But this 'solution' is open to a powerful objection. Why should it be that the deliverances of introspective meditation present 'the truth' about the mind as viewed from the individual experiential perspective, where commonsense does not? One possible response might be 'because such meditation produces the same conclusions about the self as current cognitive science.' But then it seems impossible to escape the conclusion that it is the findings of cognitive science which justify the endorsement of a Buddhist perspective on human experience; and this would seem to upset the balance of the intended thesis.

Even if the proposed rapprochement between cognitive science and Buddhism faces difficulties, there is much of value in the other major theme of the book, the critique of representationalism. Varela *et al.* identify the metaphysical assumptions which they take to underpin both our commonsense view of cognition and the representational theory of mind, namely that the world consists of pregiven properties and relations which our cognitive systems then internally recover. But this view of the relation between mind and world is not obligatory. In its place, Varela *et al.* offer the *enactive* view of cognition, in which a world is not a pre-existing, value-free domain of objects whose properties are internally recovered in cognition. Rather, a world is an inherently meaningful domain of significance for an embodied organism.

The nervous system is an *operationally closed* network. Its intrinsic activity is merely perturbed by structural changes in the network itself. These structural changes can be triggered by the medium in which the system exists, but they are not *specified by* that medium. The structure of the system itself determines the features of the medium to which it will respond. It is, therefore, misleading to describe the network as implementing some input-output mapping. Thus our worlds are not externally specified and internally recovered, but are *brought forth* or *enacted* through the process of *structural coupling* between the nervous system and the medium. In the sense that mind and world codependently arise together through structural coupling, worlds are irreducibly perceiver-dependent.

Given that the argument of 'The Embodied Mind' often takes the form of a critique of realism, it seems that the onus is on Varela *et al.* to resist a sceptical, Kantian-style worry which the realist may raise for the enactive view. The medium, 'as-it-is-in-itself', would seem to be essentially unknowable, and, therefore, our epistemological access is fundamentally limited to our own perceiver-dependent world. But, if the only 'realities' that make sense are themselves relativized to the perceiver-dependent worlds brought forth through coupling, Varela *et al.* could presumably respond that the 'problem' of a realm of unknowables is — for their relativistic philosophy — simply a non-issue. Unfortunately, they do not consider the objection at all.

This book is brave and stimulating. It should be read for its identification and questioning of the philosophical assumptions made by traditional cognitive science, as well as the breadth of vision which accepts the possibility of a cognitive science not tied to such assumptions. However, in the final analysis, many of the arguments are incomplete and, consequently, they fail to establish the putative conclusions.

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William A. Wallace
Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof: The Background, Content, and Use of His Appropriated Treatises on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.
Galileo's Logical Treatises. Volumes 137 and 138 of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science.
Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer 1992.
US $139.00 (ISBN 0-7923-1577-4);
US $99.00 (ISBN 0-7923-1578-2).

Less than two years before his death, Galileo declared that in his logic he had always been an Aristotelian. The two volumes under review here represent the latest in a series of notable studies by William Wallace, aimed at demonstrating the meaning of that declaration. *Galileo's Logical Treatises* is a translation, along with notes and commentary of MS 27, a Latin manuscript in which Galileo appropriates a significant part of the Aristotelian logic of the Italian Jesuit, Paulus Vallius, of the Collegio Romano. In the introduc-

tion, through a comparison of the contents of MS 27 with those of logic courses offered by various professors at the Collegio Romano between 1584 and 1592 (and, in some cases, their subsequent books) Wallace presents the evidence for considering Vallius to be Galileo's chief source for MS 27 and for placing its composition in Pisa in the early part of 1589 (when Galileo was 24). This conclusion is based chiefly on the considerable, sometimes word-for-word correlations between Galileo's text and Carbone's 1597 plagiarized version of Vallius' notes to lectures delivered in 1587-1588 (hereafter referred to as 'Vallius-Carbone') as well as the fact that the subject matter and conclusions of Galileo's text coincide with those of Vallius' *Logica* of 1622. The lengthy introduction also includes similar discussions of the condition and contents, possible sources and dating of Galileo's other two Latin manuscripts, MS 46 and MS 71, dealing with physical questions (corresponding to Aristotle's *de caelo* and *de generatione*) and questions on motion respectively. Wallace shows that MS 46, like MS 27, was directly appropriated from Jesuit sources; in addition, he disputes Stillman Drake's claim that MS 46 was composed before MS 27 and, again in contrast to Drake, he argues that MS 71, the final composition, also betrays Jesuit influences. Wallace rounds out his introduction by briefly considering additional possible influences on Galileo in Pisa, some of whom were notably anti-Aristotelian (notably Manzoni and Benedetti), but argues that these sources are not sufficient to keep us from viewing Galileo as 'the Renaissance Aristotelian he most probably was' (79).

The aim of the companion volume, *Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof*, is to demonstrate 'first, that Galileo had a logic, and second, that this was not merely a logic of justification but that it was also a logic of invention, one that would prompt his later scientific discourses' (xv). After a brief review of the debates over the nature of Galileo's methodology and the Greek and Latin traditions upon which Vallius drew, Wallace indicates that he will 'set out Galileo's teaching on logic (*logica docens*) in Chapters 2 through 4 and then document his use of it (*logica utens*) in Chapters 5 and 6' (22). This claim is not exactly accurate, however. Precisely because those parts of MS 27 translated in *Galileo's Logical Treatises*, namely the 'Treatise on Foreknowledges and Foreknowns' and 'Treatise on Demonstration', contain only about two-thirds of the Vallius-Carbone logic, Wallace turns for the better part of chapters 2 and 3 to the texts of Vallius and Carbone in order to reconstruct the way logic and science were most probably conceived by Galileo. Nevertheless, in these chapters Wallace presents clearly and expertly a variety of complex issues central to a traditionally scholastic understanding of logic, science, and opinion (for example, second intentions, the difference between method and order, various senses of 'resolution', the definition of science as a 'habit', the distinction between inventive and judicative sciences, and the classification of sciences).

In contrast to these opening chapters, Chapter 4 is explicitly proposed as a 'guide' to the contents of MS 27. After summarizing material missing at or from the beginning of the manuscript (once again on the basis of the Vallius-Carbone text), Wallace gives a straightforward exposition of Galileo's

account of the foreknowledge involved in demonstrations, namely, foreknowledge of the principles, of the existence and meaning of the subject matter, and of the properties and conclusions deduced. In this context he establishes that the expression '*ex suppositione*' in Galileo — so often misleadingly translated as 'hypothetically' and understood to modify a topical (dialectical) argument yielding a probability — refers rather to a demonstrative (apodictic) necessity, namely, a necessity conditioned by suppositions (ten categories of which are delineated by Wallace), perfectly consonant with the model of scientific argumentation articulated in the *Posterior Analytics*. He then turns to the second treatise in MS 27, the central topics of which are the nature of demonstration and its importance in comparison with definition, the properties of demonstration, and the kinds of demonstration. Particularly noteworthy in this connection and central to Wallace's overall thesis is Galileo's claim that the 'demonstrative regress' — the inference to a cause from an effect (*quia*), followed by the deduction of the effect as a conclusion from the reasoned fact (*propter quid*) — is most frequently used in the physical sciences.

The burden of the final two chapters of Wallace's study is to show that this doctrine of demonstrative regress, which effectively recapitulates the scientific methodology elaborated in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, is at work in Galileo's scientific practice, specifically, in his 'search for a new science of the heavens' and his 'sciences of mechanics and local motion'. Chapter 5 reconstructs the 'demonstrative regress' in Galileo's demonstrations of mountains on the moon, the satellites of Jupiter, and the phases of Venus, his 'indirect proof' that the sunspots are not stars, but probably clouds, and the basically dialectical argumentation in his discourses on tides and comets and his *Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems*. In the interesting, final section of this chapter Wallace suggests why Galileo decided to introduce into the *Dialogue* an argument from the tides for the earth's diurnal and annual motion, a topic that the pope's censor had instructed him to avoid. According to Wallace, Galileo proposed the argument, despite its inconclusiveness, because of its greater probability and persuasiveness than the Tychonian argument, on the basis of the same observations (many of which were supplied by Galileo himself), that the earth is the immobile center of the universe. In conclusion Wallace briefly mounts a defense of Galileo for disagreeing with the pope whose counterargument is tantamount to invoking logical possibility to rule out any determination of natural necessity.

Chapter 6 traces the development of Galileo's interrupted studies of local motion and terrestrial mechanics from his early work at Pisa to his experiments on motion in Padua and hydrostatics in Florence, culminating in his masterpiece, the *Two New Sciences*, completed during his 'house arrest' at Arcetri. Wallace helpfully distills the sort of reasoning involved (schemata of the definitions, suppositions, cause and effect, theorems, progressions, and/or intermediate stages) at each stage of Galileo's development. On the basis of this review, Wallace argues that Galileo, while unable to convince others of his new sciences of the heavens, did succeed in constructing a new science

of local motion because he effectively incorporated an experimental program into the suppositional reasoning and demonstrative regress that he had appropriated into his logical treatises. Thus, Wallace shows, for example, how Galileo supported the supposition (*supposto* or *postulato*) for the derivation of the properties of naturally accelerated motion by a pendulum experiment 'that falls little short of a "necessary demonstration"' (286) and how he provided a proof for the 'times-squared' theorem deduced from this supposition (together with the definition of such motion) by means of experiments with balls rolling down inclined planes.

Wallace's reconstructions of Galileo's scientific reasoning are at once impressive, painstaking, and groundbreaking. Nevertheless, they will certainly find their share of challenges as will the heavy emphasis he places upon an early Latin transcript of lecture notes in order to interpret the development and maturation of Galileo's methodology. At times, particularly in chapters five and six of the *Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof*, the discussion is largely expository and schematic, more propadeutic than definitive, setting the stage for a more considered evaluation of the relation between Galileo's studies of mixed sciences (heavens, mechanics, and motion) and the logic reviewed in the first half of the book and translated in part, in *Galileo's Logical Treatises*. For example, Wallace concludes his study with the surprising claim that the continuity with the Aristotelian tradition is 'in the method Galileo would use to argue for the truth of his own results' (301). The claim is surprising because it is at odds with the study's reconstructions of demonstrative regress, especially in chapter five, which seemed to be involved as much in discovery as in proof (see, for example, the comments on page 198). In this regard it might be helpful to try to sort out the supposed continuity in terms of the Vallius-Carbone distinction between judicative and inventive science. This sorting out becomes all the more pressing in the light of Wallace's qualification that the continuity concerns the essentials of the method while 'discontinuity begins to manifest itself' in the way that Galileo develops experimentation and approximation techniques within that 'established methodological context' (301).

Despite these pleas for clarification and further development, in both books under review here Wallace makes an impressive case, however rudimentary, for the central thesis that the discontinuity in content represented by Galileo's achievements within the history of science is traceable to a profound continuity in method. This thesis, as he quite rightly points out in the conclusion to *Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof*, is one that both scholars of Galileo and contemporary philosophers of science can ill afford to ignore.

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Thomas E. Wren
Caring About Morality: Philosophical Perspectives in Moral Psychology.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1991. Pp. x + 202.
US $25.00 (ISBN 0-262-23163-8).

According to Wren, the book 'is mainly a "second level" enquiry, whose aim is to tease out some of the structures of moral care by asking how it has been represented in moral philosophy and, especially, moral psychology' (1). A theme is that many social and behavioural scientists 'fail to appreciate the philosophical dimensions of the psychological positions they have argued for (and from)' (3). Wren claims that the book's 'main conclusion is that if psychology is to explain the motivational force of conscience it must first do justice to the cognitive dimension of experience' (ix).

In chapter one (Moral Motives and Moral Motivation) Wren explicates his general conceptual framework. After brief discussion of Butler and Kant on 'conscience', and the difference between nominalism and realism with respect to it, Wren suggests that 'by and large, the philosophical history of "conscience" has revolved around the *role* conscience is thought to play, from which has arisen a conception that is not so much substantive as function-oriented' (8). This conception 'retains the valid insight of the old moral sense theorists ... — that there really *is* something special about moral cognition' (8). Wren attempts to show this 'by considering the function of conscience as itself having two aspects or subfunctions. The first can be thought of as the tendency or set of tendencies to act in conformity with one's moral judgements. ... I shall refer to them as *moral motives*. The second role of conscience can be thought of as an underlying sense of conscientiousness or moral care, which for lack of a more perspicuous term I shall call *moral motivation*' (9). Wren examines moral motivation through, what he labels, its summary and constitutive conceptions. The constitutive account of moral motivation portrays it as something distinct from moral motives. Wren claims 'that the function of what I am calling moral motivation is ... understood "top-down," i.e., as a determining factor or regulative disposition that somehow constitutes the stage on which more specific motives play themselves out' (13). In contrast, the summary conception of moral motivation is best viewed as a logical construction, 'as having no content or meaning beyond that of the individual entities to which the term collectively refers. ... Since ... the "individual entities" that are gathered up are moral motives, the summary conception of moral motivation could be characterized as verbally different but not really distinct from the conception of moral motive' (12). He favours the constitutive conception of moral motivation.

Wren then turns to the distinction between the externalist and internalist perspectives on moral motives. He illustrates the distinction by considering the relationship between the proposition Eve believes that abortion is wrong (P1), and the proposition Eve is at least somewhat motivated to oppose abortion (P2). According to Wren, 'the thesis of internalism is: P1 entails P2.

Externalist theories, in turn, are those which implicitly or explicitly deny this entailment, no matter how much importance they otherwise attach to the motivational features of moral living. Most philosophers who discuss the issue turn out to be internalists, and I am no exception' (16). However, Wren claims the 'perspective favored by most moral psychologists is (regrettably, in my view) the externalist one' (14).

In the second chapter (The Principle of Universal Heteronomy) Wren contends that many contemporary socialization theorists 'are fundamentally committed to the reinforcement paradigm. In that paradigm, all human action — and therefore all moral action — is regarded as a response to arbitrary contingencies, whose features as rewards or punishments are logically disconnected from the propositional content of whatever moral beliefs are "learned", i.e., acquired and internalized in the course of one's socialization' (24). Given this paradigm, moral judgements like abortion is wrong 'can always be explained in terms of externally imposed rewards and punishments, i.e., by conditioning. I shall refer to this postulate as the *Principle of Universal Heteronomy*, drawing on Kant's distinction between a will that is ruled from without (heteronomy) and one ruled from within (autonomy)' (26). Wren raises concerns within this paradigm that are largely analogous to concerns found in the free-will/determinism debate. How can one be free if everything is caused? How can moral commitments be taken seriously if such commitments have no basis outside of external rewards and punishments? Wren suggests that 'a theorist who takes the Principle of Universal Heteronomy seriously would necessarily regard all moral commitments ... as parts of a great social con game' (32). So, a moral agent is only 'a kind of high-grade parrot, more or less faithfully repeating previously acquired beliefs without regard for their assessment-status. For real parrots, this would be accomplishment enough. But for us who are capable of self-concepts it is not, if for no other reason than that part of the infrastructure of our self-concepts is the tacit belief that we are not parrots' (34). This theme runs throughout the book.

In chapter three (Externalist Moral Psychologies: Socialization Theories) Wren considers 'several theoretical approaches to socialization that, because of their relevance to moral behavior, can also be read as rudimentary theories of moral psychology' (40). He claims that 'exclusively externalist theories are, for all their complexities, fundamentally inadequate as accounts of the moral experience of mature adults and are at least very questionable as accounts of the moral experience of children and other relatively immature moral agents' (40). Wren provides a rich discussion, with the main conclusion that each of the accounts 'has nothing to say about moral motivation that is not already contained in the Principle of Universal Heteronomy' (73). What is needed, according to Wren, are views which favour internalism, not externalism. He turns to examine some such views in chapter four (Internal Moral Psychologies: Internalization Theories). Wren characterizes these views as ones that 'have tried ... to build a semantic dimension into moral motives and, by implication, to create room for some construct or other corresponding to

my notion of moral motivation. ... In them the semantic dimension is linked with the conative dimension along the lines of what I have called metaethical internalism, which is to say that within these theories moral motives do indeed function as reasons for actions (albeit not necessarily as moral principles) and vice versa' (75). Wren examines self-regulation, reinforcement, affect-conditions, and psychoanalytic accounts that fit into this general structure. The problem that resides in each of them is that, while they do provide reasons for action, there is still no mechanism in place for assessing the reasons themselves. In order to 'develop a truly adequate theory it is, I think, necessary to go beyond the conceptions of internalization discussed ... and to look at the far end of the spectrum for still more robustly cognitive models of moral self-regulation, in which moral reasons motivate because of their very reasonableness' (107).

In chapter five (Internalist Moral Psychologies: Cognitive Developmental Theories) Wren examines the views of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. He claims that though there are 'important differences in their approaches, they both believed that morality is inherently rational, not only in the sense that the moral significance of a situation is a highly cognitive construction but also in the sense that moral reasons are thought to have motivational efficacy *qua* reasons' (107). As noted earlier, Wren's insistence on allowing for a rich and robust account of 'personhood' and self-concepts provides a theme that runs throughout the book. This theme dominates the last chapter (Some Philosophical Speculations). Wren proposes that 'morality, even cognitivist, juridical morality, can be thought of as a mode of evaluation whose criteria are ideals articulating the agent's deepest sense of what is important, the identity-constituting desires' (165). His proposal is supported by an examination of autonomy, and the connection between motivation and self-interpretation. Wren claims that 'it seems undeniable that self-interpretation is an important type of moral cognition, just as decisive for living well as our social interpretations are' (165). While much in the book is incomplete and may be open to challenge, it is an interdisciplinary study of morality and moral psychology that is well worth examination.

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Editor's Note

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W.E. Cooper