

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

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Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, eds.
Feminist Epistemologies.
New York: Routledge 1993. Pp. vii + 312.
US\$62.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-90450-1);
US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90451-X).

This is a timely collection of ten previously unpublished essays by feminist philosophers, which serves to *summarize* some of the main themes of feminist epistemologies. The essays span the spectrum from the philosophy of science (Helen Longino, Sandra Harding, Elizabeth Potter), to political and moral philosophy (Susan Babbitt, Kathryn Pyne Addelson), to more 'traditional' questions in epistemology (Lorraine Code, and Vrinda Dalmiya and Linda Alcoff). Elizabeth Grosz writes of the role of the body in knowledge, and Bat-Ami Bar On provides a critical discussion of the notion of epistemic privilege. The editors, Elizabeth Potter and Linda Alcoff provide a helpful introduction.

If there is a single theme that unites the papers, it is the idea that no epistemological theory can be 'politically innocent'. Potter and Alcoff write, '[F]or feminists, the purpose of epistemology is not only to satisfy intellectual curiosity, but also to contribute to an emancipatory goal: the expansion of democracy in the production of knowledge' (13). None of the authors deny the possibility nor the desirability of a theory of knowing. But each draws attention to what she takes to be inadequacies and/or problematic consequences of 'traditional epistemology'.

Under this general rubric, several more specific issues are discussed. It is claimed that Descartes' capital mistake, and one that survives into this century, was his adherence to the notion of what Potter and Addelson call 'epistemological individualism'. This idea, to which '[M]odern philosophy has been deeply committed,' is that 'the individual is the source of and principle [sic] agent in the production of knowledge' (Potter, 161). But Nelson and Potter, in particular, claim that knowledge is not — indeed *cannot* be — an achievement of an isolated individual; rather knowledge is a *product* of a community. Nelson goes so far to suggest that 'communities, [and *not* individual persons,] are the primary epistemic agents' (141). Several papers critically address the attractiveness of so-called standpoint epistemology. This notion, inherited with embellishments from Hegel and Marx, has it that agents at the 'margins' — i.e., those who do not occupy socially, politically, economically or culturally esteemed positions — are epistemically privileged with respect to those agents who do occupy such positions. It is not that the marginalized are better mathematicians or physicians than the academic or medical elite. Rather, unlike the members of dominant classes, members of marginalized groups are able to identify the biases and distorting assumptions which guide knowledge production. Thus, as a matter of fact, they can access knowledge that is hidden to the dominant class. Harding develops this idea into the notion of 'strong objectivity', according to which taking into account what agents at the margins know improves our chances of achieving

genuine objectivity. Bar-On is critical of the appeal to this 'politics of location'. But the relevance of an agent's social positioning, and especially that agent's understanding of it, is revived in a very interesting way by Babbitt (in what is perhaps the best paper in the collection). In a paper critical of the liberal account of rational choice, Babbitt convincingly argues that 'in certain cases what a person knows as a result of being in a particular personal state and relationship to society sometimes constitutes a kind of understanding of that society that could not be obtained through an examination of the expressible truths about that society' (Babbitt, 253). Finally, several contributors are concerned to fend off the objection that feminist epistemology collapses into epistemological relativism. This is not surprising, since the emphasis on particular communities, or on positions therein, in an epistemological theory is sure to invite the question of the possibility of objective normative criteria. Harding denies that standpoint epistemology entails relativism by pointing out that 'standpoint theory provides arguments for the claim that some social situations are scientifically better than others as places from which to *start off* knowledge projects' (61, my emphasis); and Longino takes the advocacy of diversity in knowledge production to be merely the result of a commitment to '[E]quality of intellectual authority [which] does not mean that anything goes but that everyone is regarded as equally capable of providing arguments germane to the construction of scientific knowledge' (113). Finally, Code is willing to embrace a 'nuanced' or 'mitigated' relativism: 'knowledge is always *relative* to (i.e., a perspective *on*, a standpoint *in*) specifiable circumstances' but, *for that reason*, knowledge is 'constrained by a realist, empiricist commitment according to which getting those circumstances right is vital to effective action' (40). Code's argument here lends further support to recent scepticism regarding the exhaustiveness of the realism/relativism dichotomy as it has usually been understood.

This breadth, which is the collection's main strength, is also its major weakness. On the positive side, the reader is able quickly to get a sense of the main themes in current feminist epistemology. The endnotes point to much relevant material; and there is a useful bibliography. On the negative side, as a collection of essays for professional philosophers, the anthology is unsatisfying. In the first place, most of the papers are programmatic — there is little by way of *detailed argument* for the main conclusions. For these the reader is often referred to the contributors' other publications. For example, Code, Harding, Longino, and Nelson have each recently published full-length monographs on the issues they discuss; and not surprisingly, their arguments are only sketched in their contributions here. The unfortunate effect is that, for those familiar with these works, there is little new material. And those who pick up the anthology to find out what feminist epistemologists are up to, will be frustrated by the frequent promissory notes. For this reason, the book will do little to persuade the unconverted. Indeed, the absence of argument is likely to make the collection an easy target for those who are antecedently sceptical of feminist philosophy. And that is a great shame. Second, and in a similar vein, there are no explicit arguments for some of the

framing assumptions, or 'givens' of feminist epistemology. Novices will need to look elsewhere to be told why the 'normative dualism ... [between passivity and agency is] obviously masculinist' (Bar On, 94); or what it means to say that knowledge has so far taken 'traditional patriarchal forms' (Grosz, 187). Third, most of the contributors are in one way or another critical of 'traditional epistemology', where this apparently refers either to Cartesian foundationalism, or (in the philosophy of science) to logical positivism. Quine gets a mention along the way, as do Gilbert Ryle and Thomas Nagel; but none of the papers reveal much acquaintance with work in *contemporary* epistemology (e.g., Goldman, Nozick, Stalnaker). And given the emphasis on the communal aspects of knowing, the omission of even a mention of Putnam or Burge is particularly egregious. Perhaps these more recent epistemological views are left out of account because they are thought to suffer from the same deficiencies that the authors believe haunt Descartes' view; but that claim needs some defense. The last two failings also make the book *by itself* unsuitable as an introductory textbook. Students already familiar with feminist theory will require remedial work in epistemology: an understanding of the 'traditional' positions under attack is required before one can appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of those attacks. And students unfamiliar with feminist theory, will need remedial work in that field.

Despite these weaknesses, the anthology as a whole surely demonstrates just how rich an enterprise epistemology *can* be. Each of the contributions suggest what epistemologists need to do in order to live up to their advertised mission of providing a theory of *human* knowing.

Susan Dwyer
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Daniel E. Anderson

*The Masks of Dionysos: A commentary on
Plato's Symposium.*

Albany: State University of New York Press
1993. Pp. xii + 223.

US \$45.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1315-2);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1316-0).

I asked to review this book not because I am a Platonic scholar — I am not; nor even because I have dived so deeply into the literature that has come out of late on love and sex in classical antiquity — I have not. But I have read *some*, including more recently Allan Bloom's *Love and Friendship* whose last two hundred pages are a paean to Socrates; and I give the occasional undergraduate course on the *Symposium*, always with keen pleasure —

pleasure, because love is such a wonderful topic on which to hold forth even from a professor's podium! So I looked forward to learning more about all these things. But sad to report, this has not come to pass — not because Anderson's book says nothing new, but because he is into much headier stuff. He tells us briskly on the first page that Plato identified Eros with Dionysos; that all living things are manifestations of Dionysos; that Dionysos is the god of masks; *ergo*, each person is a mask of Dionysos. *Ergo* too, self-knowledge is the peeling off of one's own mask — only to discover the next, which must be peeled off in turn; and so on and so on. Thus the title. The other 'deep' theme of Anderson's book is how to cope with the 'contradiction' inherent in Diotima's account of the theory of forms: forms are said to be eternal and unchanging, yet they cannot be. So we are treated (chapter 5) to a theory of reading, how to 'break through' the various 'screens' Plato erects against his readers. This book, then, is not really about Socrates on love — but about masks and screens. Potent fare, to repeat.

What to think of it all? First the masks. For my part I could compose with the fact that no serious attempt is made to connect them with the *Symposium* — a wise decision perhaps, given that in the dialogue they are never talked about in any shape or form, and even Dionysos receives only two perfunctory mentions. I could even make my peace with the fact that no serious attempt is made to connect masks with *loving* — yet there might well be all sorts of connections: ask yourself for example, does love require lucidity or on the contrary some opposite stance, 'idealisation' as Freud called it? Is that perhaps even what Diotima had in mind when she insisted that all love was love of the good? But no, none of these questions are of any interest to Anderson; and the texts that have held us in thrall for over two millenia — Diotima's discourse on the good, or Aristophanes' myth about finding one's other half — go by in this book with hardly a comment. Yes, I could have composed with those silences, and settled for a discussion of Anderson's chosen subject, masks and self-knowledge ... if only there had been a discussion! But after the opening salvo silence descends on that scene too, except for a brief disquisition on page 74 on the 'perniciousness' of believing in the self — it makes 'growth' impossible. Maybe, maybe. But what to think then of Anderson's remark a few pages later that 'what has survived is the persona, the mask ... not Achilles' (79)? Or again, of the judgement that a certain kind of love 'excludes just that dimension of [the lovers'] being that is central to their nature as humans' (81)? Is a believer in masks really entitled to such pronouncements?

What will survive of this book is I think the other prong of Anderson's attack — the criticism of the forms and his theory of reading Plato; for here the case is better made out. The charge against the forms rests on two main props. First of all, knowledge of them — were we to attain it — cannot conform to a requirement Diotima (and Socrates too, for example in the *Meno*) set for our knowing anything — the ability to give reasons for what we claim to know: where a form is concerned, you either 'see' it or you don't. And the more we play down the aspect of 'mystical' seeing, the less ground we retain for

insisting that forms be eternal and immutable: what we give reasons for, are typically claims about things that change. Anderson has another more direct argument against unchangeability, which goes like this. According to Diotima, things of this world 'partake' of the forms; and things are 'processive', they evolve. But — *dixit* Anderson — a thing can partake only of what is like it; so the forms must be processive too (63; also 84-5). Now dressed in this unadorned garb, Anderson's strictures may look unappealing; yet on reflection, I did not find them so easy to dismiss. Suppose we admire Penelope's stubborn resistance to the suitors, suppose we admire her tricks, her wiles, her dissimulations: would it help us to understand any better why we do, to be told that we are catching in her behaviour a glimpse of something eternal and unchangeable of which it partakes — call it the 'form of conjugal love'? What on earth would we have learnt when told this? Anderson, of course, would go further and see in such a reply not merely emptiness, but outright 'contradiction' — a denial of 'Life as process'. He may not quite convince us in the end, but his argument — as it's set out in chapter 5 — certainly deserves a serious look.

I cannot leave without adverting to one truly mysterious facet of these *Masks of Dionysos*: how *could* a book that makes so much of the contrast between Apollo and Dionysos, and so much of masks and screens, a book that so much regards belief in 'the Self' as a minus, and allegiance to 'Life' as a plus, how could a book such as that mention not even *once* the philosopher who — a century or so ago — put that constellation on the map?

André Gombay

University of Toronto

Emmett Barcalow

Open Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy
(Concise Edition).

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1993.

Pp. xii + 296.

(paper: ISBN 0-534-16514-1).

It seems that Barcalow's students found Hume's *Inquiry* (among other basic texts found in first year philosophy courses) 'incomprehensible' (ix), a text Barcalow describes as 'lively' and 'fascinating' (152). This introductory primer is meant to bridge this gap. Its success will, no doubt, be measured in the classrooms for which it is intended. I can offer here only some *a priori* remarks on its approach and possible shortcomings.

The author rounds up the usual suspects: God, Mind-Body, Identity, Knowledge and Skepticism, Ethics and Moral Theory, Justice and Political

Theory. There is, apparently, an alternate version of this text which 'includes 20 of the most readable yet substantial excerpts from primary philosophical classics.' This alternative is noteworthy only because it was the students' frustration with this primary material which spurred the author to produce this concise edition, *sans* readings.

My problem with the shorter edition is not that it is too short, but that it is too thin. This may be due, in part, to the author's style (more on which below), or to his attempt to recapture the minds of students whose attention span is already overly taxed by MTV videos (also more on which below). Before returning to these points, let me detail some specific problems with the text, first minor, then not so minor.

The minor problems fall under the heading of carelessness — or poor editing. The attempt was made, throughout the text, to make use of 'marginalia' — central ideas, principles, topics — set in italics in the margins. Some 24 occur in the first half of the book, only 12 in the remainder, with some scattered 25-35 pages apart. They seem an afterthought, and certainly not employed consistently enough to be of any use. In addition, of the 19 philosophers listed in the 'Philosophy Chronology' (xii), 7 do not appear in the text at all, others (e.g., Socrates) are mentioned only once. And an egregious slip — surely an editor's mistake — occurs when Kant's analytic claims are equated with Hume's matters of fact (124). I take these problems to be relatively minor.

Major problems loom, however, due mainly to the author's manner of explication. Although this problematic manner permeates the text, I shall sketch only two examples here. Barcalow defines moral nihilism as the 'theory that no moral statement is true or false, reasonable or unreasonable' (155). Moral codes are as arbitrary, and as free from the need for justification, as matters of taste, according to the moral nihilist. This view is to be distinguished from moral relativism, where moral beliefs are judged true or false, but only relative to either an individual (moral subjectivism) or a group (conventionalism). What is problematic is that Barcalow offers no argument for nihilism; indeed, it seems that he considers it indefensible. He does offer an empirical claim (of sorts): 'Moral Nihilism has become fairly widespread in our culture' (156), and this despite the fact that he 'suspects' that 'few of us could be consistent in accepting Nihilism' (156). Again, no argument is offered for this latter suspicion. What we get instead (in particular here, but elsewhere too) are a series of rhetorical questions, followed by example after example, with sometimes the two combined ('If the school bully attacked you for no reason and beat you to a pulp, wouldn't you think what he did was wrong?' (156).) The difficulty here is that these rhetorical devices are no substitute for argument. In fact, they often are merely attempts to lead one where arguments fear to go. The case in point is misleading in two ways: (1) one can perfectly well (i.e., consistently) *think* the bully wrong, yet be a nihilist. His actions simply do not accord with your moral code. One can believe this, and also believe that the bully is not rationally criticizable (2). That you were attacked 'for no reason' appears to beg the question. Whether

these acts are reasonable — subjects for reasoned inquiry — is exactly the issue.

This device, of rhetorical questions and the piling up of instances, occurs throughout the text. The danger of such devices in philosophical disputes is just that the answers are *not* obvious. Far from enlivening the issues for the student, without additional arguments, these devices merely serve to encourage just the relativism Barcalow (elsewhere) deplores. The student sees that the hallmark of philosophical activity is only the asking of questions, questions whose answers you already know, answers which stand in no need of a reasoned defense. In addition, many of the examples constructed (in particular on personal identity, but elsewhere too) make the same philosophical point, many times over. It would have better served the student to have used the space available to dissect one clear example. In a parallel fashion, the 'Questions for Discussion and Review' appended to each chapter, while sometimes refreshing in their novelty, are almost indistinguishable in the philosophical points they are meant to raise.

Further confusion reigns in Barcalow's discussion of moral principles. A logical feature of moral principles is their *universality* (185): they apply to everyone. This feature is to be distinguished from their *absoluteness*: they must admit of no exceptions (187). 'All moral principles are universal, but not all are absolute,' writes Barcalow (188). For something to *be* a moral rule it must be universal in its application — it must apply to me as well as you. For a rule to be absolute, the *scope* of the rule must be unlimited. (This point is easily made with quantificational logic; perhaps it is a mark in its favour that the text eschews formalism completely.) The problem arises (again) when the discussion of these two features elicits the (now) usual rhetorical questions and examples. Armed with the above distinction, how is the student to handle the proffered example, 'Thou shalt not kill people' (188)? As a moral rule it must be treated as a universal claim: No one shall kill people. As an absolute principle it reads: Thou shalt not kill anyone. Now which feature is violated by the (obvious?) answers to the rhetorical questions which follow in the text: 'What about soldiers in wartime who are expected to kill enemy soldiers? What about self defense? What about capital punishment? ...' Is it not a rule at all, since it fails to be universal? Or is it a moral rule which is simply false? If it is not clear to you, one must wonder what the student will make of it. And (again) very little in the way of argument is offered here.

Let me return to the points alluded to above about style. Barcalow's intended audience is the frustrated, uncomprehending student, in particular the student who exits a first philosophy course thinking the discipline 'a bunch of loosely connected or unconnected problems' (ix). Barcalow's text does little to address this concern, and largely, I have suggested, for reasons of style. There is an approach, or method of presentation, in an undergraduate class that, however hard it is to describe, is typically philosophical. It is an attitude, or posture, towards a particular variety of relatively intractable (and perennial) problems. This approach is not unlike (as many have

quipped) a 'dog worrying a bone'. (And it is, as many of my students have remarked, an approach very *unlike* the majority of their other courses.) There are two points of interest here. The first is that Barcalow's use of rhetorical devices and unending — and all too similar — examples is not detailed enough to exhibit this approach. It is the arguments, in all their detail which are the primary vehicles for this approach. Their absence from this text is its chief failing. Aiding and abetting this failure are the missing primary sources. However difficult they are to comprehend for today's undergraduate, they represent unique contributions to the problems raised here, and they are not without their own felicitous style, nor without arguments. A student whose only contact with philosophy might well be this text will certainly leave the course thinking philosophy a discipline with only questions, and no answers. (No doubt some of these worries may be alleviated by the alternative version of this text mentioned above.) The second point can best be put rhetorically: Why attempt to interest all students? I have long ago ceased to design my courses to ensure that *every* student is taken with the subject — though I do try to ensure that no student leaves thinking philosophy pointless.

I should note, in its favour, that the text is politically correct, both in its use of non-sexist pronouns, and culturally diverse names in its examples.

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Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy
The Language of First-Order Logic (Third Edition) including *Tarski's World 4.0*.
Stanford: CSLI Lecture Notes Number 34
1992. Pp. xiv + 319.
ISBN 0-937073-90-3.

This book belongs to a new generation of logic texts, whose distinguishing feature is their accompanying instructional software. A further distinction should be noted, between texts whose software is supplementary (i.e. is neither integrated with the treatment nor bundled with the book) and those whose software is complementary (i.e. is both integrated with the treatment and bundled with the book). *The Language of First-Order Logic* (Third Edition) is of the latter type and, as such, must be evaluated as a symbiosis of hard copy and software. The book describes itself as 'a first course in logic' (vii), which should be understood as a first course in formal logic as opposed

to an informal introduction to logic. In other words, the book focuses on symbolic logic, and not — like so many post-modern introductory 'logic and critical thinking' texts — on remedial reasoning and reading.

In terms of content, the book differs from competing treatments in that Part I begins with predicate logic, not sentential logic. Connectives, truth-tables and derivations are then introduced engagingly, with some nice detail (such as the discussions of spuriousity and tautology on p. 54-5, and conversational implicature on p. 97-9). Truth-trees, however, are not utilized. Single and multiple quantification are very carefully explained in Part II, and here *Tarski's World 4.0* is perhaps most advantageous with respect to exercises and problems. This much of the book is meant to be and could comfortably be covered in one semester. Part III contains two well-conceived chapters on applications to both set theory and induction. Part IV introduces some advanced topics in propositional logic (e.g. Horn sentences) and some metatheory (e.g. Skolemization, completeness and incompleteness). Appendices fully and clearly document the use of *Tarski's World*. The exercises and problems are numerous and varied within the constraints of the software, and are labelled according to level of difficulty.

The software itself is available for IBM-compatible, Macintosh and NeXT platforms. (I sampled the IBM PC version, which runs only in the Microsoft Windows environment.) *Tarski's World 4.0* strikes me as a potent but comparatively limited medium. And since the book's wagon of hard copy is hitched inextricably to this software's star, the package as a whole reaps both the benefits and the detriments of *Tarski's World*. The pictorial orientation of its Universe of Discourse — whose objects are graphic three-dimensional geometric solids arrangable on a rotatable grid — affords strong visual images of quantificational relations. The logical engine allows the student to verify truth-values of sentences (and their components) on both preconfigured and constructible interpretations. As concerns limitations, it is conceivable that students might become bored with the given UD, which contains six unary predicates (small, medium, large, cube, tetrahedron, and dodecahedron), seven binary predicates (smaller, leftof, etc.) and one ternary predicate (between). After a sufficient number of exercises, tagging cubes and dragging dodecahedra becomes as soporific as counting sheep. Although virtual objects can be manipulated at will in *Tarski's World*, Fitch-style proofs can neither be generated nor checked. And while the pictographic representations adjacent to typographic language may enhance cognitive progress from visual to symbolic frames, they do not necessarily stimulate development from the symbolic to the conceptual itself.

It is worthwhile comparing the Barwise and Etchemendy package with some current competitors, notably Portoraro's and Tully's *Logic With Symlog*. The latter text is essentially *The Logic Book* (Bergman, Moore and Nelson) revisited and all but bereft of metatheory, but with fully integrated software. While *Logic With Symlog* is more dryly written (and I think less entertaining) than *The Language of First-Order Logic*, its *Symlog* software is far more versatile and comprehensive than *Tarski's World*. *Symlog* permits

the student to practice paraphrases, to generate and check truth-tables, truth-trees, Fitch-style derivations (in SD, SD+, PD and PD+), as well as to define structures and to construct interpretations therewithin. *Symlog* offers hints, supports goal-analysis, and provides a virtual scratch-pad for rough work. Both *The Language of First-Order Logic* and *Logic With Symlog* allow the student to save exercises on floppy disk and to print them out. Homework can thus be submitted as soft or (uniformly legible!) hard copy. Then again, instructors who are conspiracy theorists might, upon receipt of several dozen identical and correctly-done homework assignments, be given to wonder whether students are actually mastering logic, or merely learning to copy and print files.

Instructors who wish to decouple textual and computerized materials — perhaps for the purpose of retaining the latter as an option for students while eschewing it as a compulsory element of the course — face alternatives in transition. *The Logic Book* could be used in this way, with Clark's formerly enticing but currently superseded (in plain language obsolescent) *Bertie* and *Twotie* as software supplements. Most comprehensively (at least on the software side), one could use Hurley's *A Concise Introduction to Logic* in tandem with Brady's *The Logic Works*, which offers options comparable to *Symlog*'s, and moreover which incorporates Brady's witticisms at no extra charge.

But the virtual handwriting, so to speak, is on the phosphorescent monitor. Increasing availability and usage of computers, combined with the natural pedagogic alliance — historical and functional dependencies aside — of logic with computing, favours the evanescence of fully integrated packages. Thrown forward upon a choice between *The Language of First-Order Logic* and *Logic With Symlog*, the desideratum may boil down to the individual's preference between Windows versus DOS environments (or loosely equivalently, between Macintosh's versus IBM PC's standard user interfaces). *Tarski's World 4.0* is largely iconographic and dialogue-box oriented; whereas *Symlog*, notwithstanding its menu-driven architecture, eventually presents prompts and awaits commands. Textually, I like the content and style of *The Language of First-Order Logic* (compared with *Logic With Symlog*); but I have reservations about the overall effectiveness of *Tarski's World 4.0* (compared with *Symlog*).

An appeal to empiricism appears justified. The book merits a 'field-test', and students also deserve to be polled on their experience of its efficacy. Their collective response to *The Language of First-Order Logic* and *Tarski's World 4.0* ultimately could and arguably should be factored into a more complete evaluation. I would not hesitate at least to conduct the experiment, one arm of which would certainly adopt the Barwise and Etchemendy package.

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Robert Beiner

What's the Matter with Liberalism?

Berkeley: University of California Press 1992.

Pp. vii + 197.

US \$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-520-07793-8).

Robert Beiner's book, *What's the Matter with Liberalism?*, evaluates liberalism as a product of modernity. Early on in the book, he argues that communitarian attacks actually strengthen the position of the liberal. Beiner notes that several liberals no longer make foundationalistic, ahistorical claims. The post 1980 Rawls sees the deliberations done behind the veil of ignorance as meaningful only in the context of the modern, democratic industrialized state, for instance, and Rorty argues that liberalism expresses historical contingencies arising from the manifold pressures of modernity.

But within this contextualized understanding of the claims of liberalism, Beiner still finds room to attack. Beiner sees the *rights talk* of liberalism as entrenching absolutes, no attention being given to other factors. By moving to *good talk*, Beiner hopes to avoid this quandary. Good talk is less rigid and more flexible about people's claims. Good talk avoids the distinction between facts and values: 'Talk of value implies that we do not find goodness in the good things there in the world, but confer value from our subjectivity' (41). Beiner extends this point with a discussion on the environmental crisis, arguing that there is no reason why we cannot make our intersubjective aspirations commensurable with the objective well-being of our planet.

If we wish to cash out Beiner's good talk, then we must ask questions about the ethos of modernity. Beiner cheerfully admits this ethos is completely compatible with liberalism. However the problem of context plagues Beiner throughout the book. He oscillates from an outright endorsement of liberalism to a calculated retreat into vague good talk. There may be, as both Habermas and MacIntyre suggest, an intersection and overlap between various historical communities' conceptions of the good. But this does little, if anything, to dismantle the strength of the liberal's position. The liberal contra Beiner offers concrete solutions to implementing pluralism, whereas the communitarian is forever at a loss to define the 'good'.

Using good talk as a spring board, Beiner presents a maverick socialism which stresses civic participation over social justice. With his republican communitarianism (his term), Beiner envisions the political community coming to a consensus on a conception of the good. But there is no reason why, if such an understanding of the good could ever be settled upon, that fact and values would be congruent. His position is not incommensurable with liberalism, but rather is an erudite explanation of liberalism without practical problems.

Beiner's republican communitarianism raises some important questions about citizenship that the liberal must confront. The political community is rarely, if ever, congruent with the cultural community in modern states. In modern states there are, almost without exception, substantial minorities.

Assuming that their numbers are sufficient, majority cultural groups will always be able to outbid the members of minority cultural groups. The conception of the good selected will undoubtedly reflect the biases of the cultural majority. Liberal democracy becomes ipso facto communitarianism.

Beiner points out that in the modern state people are often more valued as taxpayers than citizens. One need only think of the rise of the Reform party and the Ross Perot phenomena. While this is undoubtedly not the most important element of citizenship, it is certainly an important aspect of it. In order for citizens to be effective, they must put forth their conceptions of the good using their economic leverage — namely by voicing how they wish to have their tax dollar spent. It would seem that Beiner would see this as an important part of his communitarian platform.

Also Beiner is correct in suggesting that in our modern age, the boundaries between states become increasingly blurred. This is due to globalized trade, increase in communication due to technology, etc. The concept of 'citizen' perhaps becomes hopelessly antiquated as Beiner intimates. But perhaps the dissolution of national political communities, in the movement towards an international community, best allows us to deal with the environmental crisis mentioned earlier.

Beiner's spurious, maverick socialism is completely incoherent. One cannot be a socialist without putting emphasis on social justice. Furthermore, Beiner tries to defend the collapse of socialism in the Eastern block as a vindication of socialism, as opposed to an indictment of it. The incredible civic involvement of thousands of protesting Eastern Germans, Czechs and the euphoric destruction of the Berlin Wall, was not an endorsement of socialism, but rather a refutation of it. Contra Beiner, increased civic participation does not necessarily equate to socialism. The term 'solidarity' would be much more useful for Beiner than 'socialism'.

While one would certainly like to see Beiner's happy consensus, envisioned in his republican communitarianism, this seems an improbable goal. It has been the intuition of western political philosophy that one of the essential characteristics of the human experience is conflict. Also there will unlikely ever be an exact correspondence between fact and value (if such a state of affairs is even possible). Liberalism was originally the product of such foundationalistic thinking, but as Beiner correctly notes, this project has been abandoned by many of the leading liberal theorists. Both Rorty and Rawls have stressed that liberalism should not, and cannot, make universal, ahistorical claims about the state of human experience. Rather liberalism is the political scheme which best suits us now. By coming to terms with such contingency, the liberal can comfortably defend herself against tired and stale communitarian attacks, including those of the Beinerian republic variety.

N. Thor McLeod

Stephen St C. Bostock

*Zoos and Animal Rights: The ethics
of keeping animals.*

New York, NY: Routledge 1993.

Pp. xi + 227.

cloth: ISBN 0-415-05057-X;

paper: ISBN 0-415-05058-8.

As noted on the back cover, this book 'explores the long history of zoos, as well as current philosophical debates, to argue for a conservational view of their role in the modern world.' The book has fourteen chapters, with most divided into sections. There is a name index, a subject index, and an impressive bibliography. The bibliography covers sixteen pages, includes close to four hundred entries, and, like the book generally, covers a large range of topics.

Chapter one (Introduction) raises the major issues that Bostock takes to be relevant, sets the stage for the later discussions, and provides what amounts to a detailed abstract of the book. Having provided this framework Bostock presents some historical information in chapter two (4,500 Years of Zoos and Animal Keeping). While interesting, this chapter is a superficial historical sketch. There are seventeen sections in the twenty page chapter, with the discussion moving from ancient Egypt to ancient China to the London Zoo in the nineteenth century to twentieth-century developments. However, the chapter is well referenced, and will be useful to anyone interested in the history of zoos, attitudes towards animals, and the like.

Moral questions are the subject of consideration in chapter three (Animals and Their Rights). Bostock's view is that animals have rights 'because of their nature as conscious beings' (37). After noting several ways that are not useful in considering the zoo/right to freedom issue, Bostock offers his analysis. '[H]ow then can we defend zoos from the charge of overriding animals' right to freedom? By showing that we are providing what the animals need, and that our keeping them is in their interests' (46). Bostock claims that animals have a right to freedom but suggests 'that "freedom" may reasonably be rendered as "being in an environment in which the majority of their needs are catered for"' (49). He concludes the chapter with the suggestion that 'we can go a long way towards providing good conditions in zoos, and this, backed by the now very serious conservational reasons for keeping animals, means that, given really good conditions, we are not trespassing upon their right to freedom' (50).

In chapter four (Wildness, Cruelty and Domination) Bostock considers the notion of a wild animal, and, in particular, the issue of whether zoos actually keep wild animals. He suggests that 'the distinction between wild and domesticated animals is less real than often imagined' (53). This suggestion serves as part of Bostock's justification for keeping animals in zoos. The main theme of chapter five (Wild Living Versus Zoo Living) is that it is justified to keep animals so long as there is sufficient compensation in terms of their

well-being. Assessing well-being is considered in chapter six (Judging Well-being). Bostock suggests that 'the successful wild individual — the one who dominates, who wins territory, who mates successfully, and so on — seems to me the right standard. In as much as the captive animal shows similar behaviour to them, we have a strong indication of well-being' (85). In chapter seven (The Keeping and Display of Animals) Bostock considers what he claims are, 'several acceptable approaches to keeping animals' (102). Animal captivity and human captivity are also contrasted. He concludes that 'animal captivity is at least substantially different from human captivity, and we could well regard the word "captivity" in connection with good zoos as a technical term' (122).

Chapter eight (Why Conservation is A Moral Matter) incorporates a rich variety of topics. The topics range from a consideration of the proper way to value animals and animal species to the suggestion that animals are nature's works of art. Given the clear importance of animals, especially at the level of species, conservation is extremely important. Bostock argues in chapter nine (Zoos and Conservation) that zoos have a vital role to play in such conservation. In chapter ten (Science in Zoos) Bostock examines a variety of ways in which zoos are useful for scientific inquiry. 'We have to be satisfied on other grounds that the keeping of particular animals in particular conditions is acceptable; but if we are, then the above considerations must help to persuade us that such keeping has a serious justification' (166). The same moral sentiment underlies the discussion in chapter eleven (Education in Zoos). Zoos are important for both the general education of the public and the education of science students. Such education requires access to real animals. This theme is developed more fully in chapter twelve (Why Keep Real Animals?).

The difficult issue of wild animal capture is addressed in chapter thirteen (Taking Animals From The Wild). Bostock claims this issue 'has been left until now to make clear the strength of the conservational, scientific, educational and "environmental" cases for keeping animals. For only these, plus the likelihood of the captured animal's ending in good conditions in a zoo, and adjusted to its life there, can justify taking it from the wild' (186). While such a view seems to leave the force of the animal's rights unclear, Bostock contends that 'if we can make the act of capture such that the animal is stressed as little as possible, and then transport it in good conditions in which it is little upset, and if ... the animal is being taken to a zoo where it will be provided with the best conditions — then we have gone a long way towards respecting its right to freedom' (187). In the last chapter (Conclusion) Bostock provides a summary of the main themes, discussions and arguments of the book.

In the Preface Bostock describes the book as a 'Glasgow University thesis which has now been fully metamorphosed, I hope, into a book of wider appeal' (x). However, the price paid may be that the book now has less philosophical appeal. Despite its title, and Bostock's numerous references to the moral status of animals and their rights, there is actually very little discussion of

the basic issues pertaining to the moral status of animals. There is, for example, no discussion of 'speciesism' and what ramifications, if any, it might have with respect to zoos. In addition, although the works of Peter Singer and Tom Regan appear in the bibliography, there is no discussion of their views and how they might connect with Bostock's efforts to justify the existence of zoos on moral grounds. Indeed, Bostock's general discussion of 'animal rights' is only four pages long. This lack of discussion is particularly troubling given that Bostock seems willing to endorse what appear to be rights violations with ease. For example, he allows that we would not cull the human herd in the ways that we are willing to cull the nonhuman herds, and notes that some people raise this as an objection to the killing of nonhuman animals.

Bostock's response to this argument is troubling. 'I respect [this] argument because I agree that animal lives are of value for the same kinds of reason as human lives are of value. My defence of culling is to plead necessity' (148). It is difficult to see how the plea of necessity is compatible with the view that animals have, in any real sense, rights, and Bostock provides no additional discussion of the issue whatsoever. The book is full of such seeming contradictions, which at the very least require much fuller consideration. While there is much of interest in the book, there is also much that frustrates insofar as the analysis fails to come to grips with many of the central arguments pertaining to the animal rights controversy.

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John Hick

Disputed Questions in Theology and the Philosophy of Religion.

New Haven: Yale University Press 1993.

Pp. xi + 198.

US \$22.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-300-05354-1).

Hick tells us by employing titles that his five Parts of eleven essays fix on (1) the *Epistemological*; on (2) *Christ and Christianity*; on (3) *Hints from Buddhism*; on (4) *Religious Pluralism*; on (5) *Life and Death* (including psychics, mediums and parapsychology).

Here are some of the issues on which it seems worth cautioning a brilliant Hick, profound and charming though he can be:

First: Some of Hick's best early work was directed to showing the intelligibility of Judaeo-Christian monotheism and of relevant talk about 'seeing

as'. Some of his most striking arguments were once devoted to slapping down heirs of Logical Positivism with his noted, partly Schlickian challenge of *Eschatological Verification*. This book stresses doctrines about Salvation and the After Life in Judaism, Christianity and Islam — also in some forms of Buddhism and Hinduism. Hick's concern before, with indicating the sense of religious language, was rightly kept central in his ideas. Then came Hick's new devotion, mostly shown in 1976 and onward, to juxtaposing parts of world religions as equally revealing (See his *Death and Eternal Life*). Less effort has seemed here to go into disclosing the intelligibility of five religions than originally went into showing the sense of one. Charting 'likenesses' between great poems of different cultures need not establish that any make as much sense as some tend to think. What would it mean at all clearly to talk of a *person's* verifying scriptures by the 'eschatological' views of many Buddhists or Hindus?

Second, why should a believer or philosopher of religions focus on these five sorts of religion as giving *these* five great — supposedly equal and exclusive — essential representations of Ultimate Reality? Was it due to Aldous Huxley's stunning vogue among British intellectuals over many years? Was it due to Hick's own experiences, described in his fascinating Chapter Eight, 'A Personal Note', as a Professor of Theology and a leading worker for All Faiths for One Religion against the thugs of the neo-Nazi National Front in Birmingham from 1967? But, if I may wiggle an archaism, these would be more like causes than justifying reasons that had generated the drawing of a selective circle. Why should not more forms of these five, or of other religions which teach no afterlife of any kind be viewed as just about equally important? Is there a demographical popularity contest? Why should not a few deeply moral, *secular* ideologies, such as Epicureanism and Marxism, also be taken *de rigueur* as very useful naturalist representations of the One of Ones? Next, let us flip matters over. Why should not some individual branches of each 'world league' religion be worked on just as eagerly by Hick in this study (of ideas needing to be interpreted to us limited humans) through the internal application of some rival ontologies and systems of metaphysics? (See my *Self Knowledge and Social Relations*, New York, 1978.)

Third, Hick often feels a temptation to *kick upstairs* his problems about religious discourse with a cry like 'It's only another *metaphor*!' (Try the Trinity or the Incarnation.) This is sometimes a blessing, but its overuse may ruin *metaphor's* contrastive coinage. Why not talk more often of *literal* truths in religion that are, for us, painfully obscure?

Fourth, Hick calls himself a *religious pluralist*. Fair enough, though I'd still like to find a more philosophical basis for his particular selections of focus. Eclecticism *can* be made into an intellectually sound religious policy. But Hick gives the impression of wanting to keep his own creedal cake and scatter it widely to quite a rainbow of creedal children. Can he call himself a pluralist and wave oh! so insistently such a soldier's dazzlingly distinctive flag and hat? He craves the title of a *religious pluralist*, but hunts for that of a *Christian* just as fiercely! Well, one might coherently be a good Christian

pluralist, yet possibly never quite so in Hick's preferred senses of those two terms. One might believe, just partly like Hick, in deeply respecting other religions and races. In poring over many known scriptures and forms of meditation, then living as bold agents with the hope of gaining some more still urgently needed means to salvation and eternal life. In acting for tolerance, for ending oppression and persecution. In mixing as a friend and admirer among humans of very different cultures. In confessing about ones human bondage to personal and sectical fallibilities. In loving and helping neighbours as a simple Christian. Yet in safeguarding as well the Faith that, despite so many religions' shattering greatness, Christianity remains closest to Heaven and Truth. That could suffice for being a sort of Christian pluralist or, with the right substitutions, for being a plausible sort of *Muslim* pluralist, and so on.

Nevertheless, *Hick* fears that such a position would be poisoned and wrong; that it's an analogue of neo-Nazi tribalism which must serve the cause of exclusivists, bigotry and hegemonism! He hopes to mean too much and too little by what he says. Perhaps he licks up paradoxes for breakfast, treating them as plain, old Biblical kippers — or as cosmic blood sausage? Whoever reads this probably does at times something like it, too.

Anyway, this book is awash with lovely, provocative clockings of Hickory-Dockery. Browse and see. Why the Hick not? Should a review end on a more *demonstrative* note? Try HICK, HAECK, HOCK, Hich thyology Blues.

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Manju Jain

*T.S. Eliot and American Philosophy:
the Harvard Years.*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.
Pp. xviii + 345.
US \$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41766-X).

It is a comforting thought that reading a book of philosophy might make one a better reader of poetry. It is even more comforting to consider that training in philosophy is crucial to understanding the central concerns of a poet's intellectual life, and that a philosophical perspective can make sense of even its most baffling dimensions. While the explicit goal of Manju Jain's *T.S. Eliot and American Philosophy* is to explore Eliot's work as philosopher during his graduate study at Harvard, this cross-pollination of philosophy and poetry is one of the more enjoyable side-effects. Knowledge of Eliot's central philosophical concerns is quite illuminating when one returns to his more familiar

work as poet, dramatist and critic. But knowledge of Eliot's stand on philosophical matters answers much more than this: it contributes to an understanding of why Eliot chose poetry over philosophy, and how his eventual conversion to Anglicanism in 1927 can be seen as one of the fruits of his enduring scepticism.

Jain's first chapter traces the influence of Eliot's Unitarian upbringing, and explores Eliot's rejection of his familial values in relation to the dominant mood of the Cambridge intellectual community. The relationship between Eliot's religious and sceptical sentiments is what most puts him at cross-purposes with the mainstream debates in the Harvard philosophy department. The irony here is complex, for Eliot begins to form his views, such as the emphasis on tradition that made such an impact on the Modernist movement in literature, by reacting against his religious and intellectual heritage. In an atmosphere of optimism, where the dominant outlook is voluntaristic and positivistic, Eliot as a student defines himself by rejecting the progressive, scientific mood of the day.

However, this does not imply that Eliot had no concern for science, or that he did not engage in the debates emerging around the philosophical positions of James, Royce and Münsterberg. Much of the book explores Eliot's investigations into psychology and sociology, and Eliot displays a keen eye for uncovering reductive or biased interpretation of religious phenomena, prompting Jain to point occasionally to the possibility of Eliot being a precursor to contemporary hermeneutics.

In her second chapter Jain explores the comment by Ralph Barton Perry that Eliot was 'an attenuated Santayana', meaning he was similarly uninterested in the political and ethical dimensions of philosophy. Both seemed to embody a dangerous form of aestheticism that put them at odds with the prevailing mood at Harvard. There are some interesting similarities between the two writers: both seemed to reject the progressive ethos of Harvard for its indebtedness to Emersonian romanticism. But more interesting is the lively debate in the Harvard philosophy department about Eliot's future as he neared completion of his doctoral dissertation. The debate however, while revealing much about the diversity of opinion among Harvard philosophers, seems moot, for simultaneously Eliot is developing his opinion that philosophy is of no use to him.

Jain's book has the good fortune of moving more or less chronologically through Eliot's graduate career, giving the reader both an overview of the themes that distinguish Eliot's thinking (both in his poetry and his philosophical prose) and some sense of how Eliot's thinking matured as he encountered new ideas. Jain's chapter on Eliot's studies under Irving Babbitt is insightful, for it clarifies the development of Eliot's complex relationship with history and tradition, as well as the emergence of Eliot's critical study of absolute idealism, the eventual subject of his dissertation. Jain here takes the unusual tack of exploring Eliot's relationship with lesser known instructors, in philosophy as well as in his study of Sanskrit. Such a strategy pays

dividends when one learns to appreciate the depth and complexity of the issues surrounding Eliot's intellectual adventures.

Jain does deal with the more noted figures in her chapter 'The "Golden" Age of American Philosophy', pointing out the predominant concern with reconciling science and religion, and the pervasive influence of William James and Josiah Royce in the formation of Harvard's unique philosophical style: 'What gave the "Golden Age" of philosophy at Harvard its distinctive character was that it had to create a new framework to assimilate Darwinian science. Those who came after Royce and James were simply working within that framework' (64). Interestingly, it is from within this framework that Eliot seems to emerge as an original thinker on this issue, and while Jain doesn't contradict her original portrait of the mood at Harvard, she does point indirectly to the vivid and original character of this debate that has largely been overlooked.

Jain next explores Eliot's participation in Royce's logic seminar of 1913-14, and the various papers he composed on the science versus religion question highlight Eliot's dissatisfaction with Harvard, and point toward more personal and poetic investigations of spirituality. Here Jain is scholarly to a fault, as the discussion of Eliot's papers gets slightly drawn out, but this is the only place where the pace of her book falters. The chapter ends with a comparison of Eliot's theory of interpretation with those of contemporary hermeneutics (especially interesting is the comparison between Eliot and Gadamer's views of history and truth), but the most interesting issues are yet to come.

It is in the chapter 'The varieties of psychological and mystical experience' that Jain makes the most compelling case for the convergence of Eliot's philosophical and literary curiosities. Here she relates Eliot's explorations of mysticism and psychology, on his own and in relation to James's influential work on the subject. She also illuminates the connections between this and Eliot's recurring themes in verse: the fragmentation of the self, the fear of nothingness, the problems of faith. Eliot rebelled against the pathologizing of religious experience, siding with James in the belief that it must be interpreted from inside. But on this issue as on many others, Eliot's scepticism separates him from his more optimistic colleagues. Here 'Eliot would not have been sympathetic to James's endeavours to establish the validity of visionary and mystical experience on ... pragmatic grounds, although he would have agreed with James's insistence that mysticism is not merely a psycho-pathological phenomenon' (175). This chapter highlights a personal struggle for Eliot concerning his spirituality, for, following Ribot, and contrary to the optimism of his milieu, scepticism seemed "'a chronic disease of the mind" a questioning without pause or limit, and it comes under the category of "conscious madness"' (177). This is just one more instance of how Jain convincingly depicts Eliot's growing alienation from academic philosophy.

The final chapter (excluding a brief conclusion) is an examination of Eliot's doctoral dissertation, which Jain calls 'a tormented book ... haunted by the

author's need to find meaning and order in a universe that appears to be discordant, inchoate, indefinable, and swarming with contradictions' (205). Thankfully, a full-blown investigation of its arguments is avoided. What is attempted, and achieved, is a consideration of how Eliot's partial acceptance of Bradley's idealism colours the verse which would within a year establish him as a major figure in modern poetry. Eliot's hostility to the notion of the Absolute, as well as his dialectical musings about scepticism and dogma, faith and doubt, show him to be neither a shallow philosopher, nor an unphilosophical poet. The book approaches a biographical flavour at this point (and this is in part what makes it such a pleasure to read), and Jain does go a long way towards de-mystifying Eliot's transition from philosophy to letters. Also worth mentioning is Jain's frequent reference to Eliot's continued engagement with philosophical issues later in life; she is careful to point out Eliot did not stop thinking about these issues after leaving Harvard, nor after his conversion and baptism. From this perspective, Eliot's thinking — in whatever form it found expression — was so personal it could hardly be considered optional. Such considerations make his comment that 'scepticism too is a faith — a high and difficult one' (11) seem less and less glib.

Manju Jain does a remarkable job showing how serious Eliot really was about philosophy, and how much talent he had in this area. Jain provides a strikingly comprehensive bibliography, as well as an appendix listing the courses Eliot took while at Harvard. This is an excellent starting point for study of his writings, and from Jain's portrayal there seems to be a great deal of interesting material waiting to be discovered. Besides cultivating an interest in looking at Eliot's work as a philosopher, her book also shows the depth of the turn of the century philosophical milieu at Harvard. It helps destroy the myth that our philosophical heritage is either simple or based on a central concern. Diversity is what this book presents — both of Eliot's philosophical outlook in his early adulthood, as well as of the academic landscape usually described in reference to the towering figures of William James, Josiah Royce and George Santayana. But by not stealing the last word on the subject, Manju Jain has opened the door to an exciting new range of possibilities.

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Peter Kivy

*The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the
Philosophy of Music.*

Cambridge University Press 1993. Pp. x + 373.

US \$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-43462-9);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-43598-6).

Peter Kivy ends the preface to his collection of 19 essays — written over a span of thirty years — with a parenthetical expression of hope: 'I am glad that now, with the publication of these essays in a single volume, my work on the philosophy of music to date can be viewed and (I hope) discussed in its entirety' (ix-x). What makes the fulfillment of this hope unlikely is the breadth of Kivy's interests in the philosophy of music exercised in this collection. And yet it is precisely the breadth of this display that recommends *The Fine Art of Repetition* as among the handful of most important books in recent years on the philosophy of music. Indeed, *The Fine Art of Repetition* compares favorably with, and is a worthy complement to Carl Dahlhaus's very fine introduction to the philosophy of music, the *Esthetics of Music* (Cambridge University Press, 1982). Kivy might well have taken Dahlhaus's insight regarding the unity of the aesthetics of music as the organizing principle for his own interests in music and for the collection at hand: 'The system of esthetics is its history: a history in which ideas and experiences of heterogeneous origin interpenetrate' (Dahlhaus, 3). The strength most prominent in Kivy's book lies in the extent to which he allows the aesthetics of music to show itself as the product of just such an interpenetration of heterogeneous origins.

The Fine Art of Repetition displays its heterogeneous origins in a manner more prodigious than any one of Kivy's four previously published books in the aesthetics of music. The collection includes the following: three essays on opera, four essays on various aspects of Mozart, three essays on Platonism and music, a couple of essays on Hanslick, an essay on Kant's *Affektenlehre*, etc. The pleasure of reading this variety of Kivy lies not just in the refined wit and eloquence of the formulations he offers but in attending to his pleasure and astonishment at how even the most minute or seemingly mundane questions regarding the nature of music and musical experience lead — it seems inevitably — to some of the most central and constitutive features of human life. An essay, for example, that investigates the phenomenon of, and claims made regarding so-called 'historically authentic' performances argues that both music-making and listening are historical; historical authenticity (if such a concept is in fact possible) must then, precisely in order to be authentic, take account not only of the changes in the history of the instruments that produce musical sounds, but also the history of the listening to those sounds. In short, the sound of music relies only in part on the objects ostensibly producing it; at least as important is the history of the subjects who listen and who have been shaped by their listening. As Kivy convincingly argues, an historically authentic sound might possibly be produced, but an

historically authentic listener is a construct always still in production, and can thus only be contemporary. (The historically authentic listener is the evil stepsister of the often dismissed concept in visual art theory of the innocent eye.)

In his *Introduction* Kivy has the following to say regarding the genesis of one of the two longer essays in the collection, this one entitled 'A New Music Criticism?': 'In completing my last book on the aesthetics of music, *Music Alone*, I became aware that I had been moving over a ten-year period, without really being aware of it, toward a version of musical *formalism*, unusual in that it countenanced in absolute music just those expressive qualities — what I had begun to call the "garden variety emotions" — that from the time of Hanslick formalists are well known for dismissing. I am certainly not the only writer presently dissatisfied with traditional formalism in its rejection of emotive properties' (6). The attraction of Kivy's position — which might be called 'informed emotivism' — lies in its success at ameliorating the centuries old dichotomy in the philosophy of music between formalism and emotivism. (Kivy deserves much better than Edward Lippman's dismissive quip that his work merely 'rediscovers the tired topic of "expression"' [*A History of Western Musical Aesthetics*, 1992].) Kivy not only shows the untenability of the more extreme formulations of each position (a too strict formalism empties music so completely that any articulate response to it seems unwarranted, conversely, an exaggerated emotivism reduces music to symbol, representation or vehicle of something nonmusical), but more importantly he argues for the compatibility of the two positions. Kivy's pithy formulation of this compatibility is expressed, perhaps curiously, via an analogy to linguistics: 'music alone is, by hypothesis, a syntax without a semantics' (317).

Some might well object here that to revert to the linguistic in order to formulate the nature of absolute music is to have already irredeemably compromised the nature of formalism and absolute music both. That would be too harsh an objection; more important is what Kivy achieves with such formulations: he produces an affinity with one of the central tenets of Kant's aesthetics. That is, Kivy's informed emotivism is best understood as an application to the aesthetics of music of what Kant describes as purposeless purposiveness. (In a rough and not at all ready way, formalism may in general be equated with purposelessness and emotivism with purposiveness.) It is thus no mere coincidence that in the second of the two longer pieces in the collection, this one the title essay, Kivy discusses Kant's designation of wallpaper designs and pure instrumental music as the supreme examples of free beauty since they neither represent nor refer to anything in particular. Kivy concludes that, 'If absolute music is wallpaper for the ears, it is a many-dimensional wallpaper that offers intrigues and complications far beyond its visual counterparts' (355).

For all the Kantianism inherent in his reflections, Kivy nonetheless withdraws from the implications of Kant's aesthetics in regard to two crucial matters. The first follows from that nagging, analytically-tainted expression, 'garden variety emotions' as a description of the expressive qualities of

absolute music. Regardless however else one might characterize Kant's description of aesthetic response, if it is taken to be truly mundane it is difficult to understand how a sufficient degree of disinterest from this experience of the everyday and ready-to-hand might be achieved as Kant thought requisite for an aesthetic judgment. Secondly, the contention that absolute music is best understood as a kind of sonic wallpaper obscures an important feature of Kant's notion of free beauty in particular and aesthetic experience in general. Absolute music is an extreme example of free beauty since it does not, as is the case with designs on wallpaper, simply present the absence of a missing concept — an absence which thereby allows a free play within the subject. Music in general, and absolute music in particular, present the curious case not only of a missing concept but of an always evanescent object, whereas wallpaper is stuck with (to?) its objectivity. Absolute music is thus importantly not a 'counterpart' to wallpaper. This difference has tremendous consequences: since the *object* of aesthetic experience never congeals into a whole entity, the harmony and unity of the *subject* of aesthetic experience becomes a wholly different beast than that generated in response to wallpaper designs.

Kivy's quite wonderful title essay, which investigates the phenomenon of repetition in music, fails to mention a work that is centrally concerned with formulating a philosophy of music based upon repetition: Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*. Indeed, the famous dichotomy between the Apollonian and Dionysian is grounded in the musical repeat: 'Assuming that music has been correctly termed a repetition and a recast of the world, we may say that he [a Dionysian artist] produces the copy of this primal unity as music. Now, however, under the Apollinian dream inspiration, this music reveals itself to him again as a *symbolic dream image*' (*Birth of Tragedy*, section 5). What would Kivy make of Nietzsche's contention that the musical repeat is the first aesthetic *appearance*, and further that repetition in music functions as a defense against the music itself?

The *Fine Art of Repetition* will be read with profit and pleasure by students and experts alike in music theory and aesthetics. The book's only faults are a dozen and a half typographical errors and the lack of an index.

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Laurence Lampert

*Nietzsche and Modern Times: A Study of
Bacon, Descartes, and Nietzsche.*

New Haven: Yale University Press 1993.

Pp. xii + 475.

US \$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-300-05675-3).

In Lampert's *Nietzsche and Modern Times*, we have almost two separate books: a study of Bacon and Descartes, the twin fathers of modernism, and an explanation of the Nietzschean principles upon which rest the reevaluations of the first book. Those unschooled in Lampert's views may do well to read Part Three first.

Two questions dominate Lampert's study of Bacon and Descartes: Why did they write? Why did they write in the manner in which they did write? Answers emerge from three introductory Nietzschean premises: 'The greatest thoughts are the greatest events.' 'Genuine philosophers are commanders and legislators.' 'The difference between exoteric and esoteric [was] formerly known to philosophers.' These pronouncements from *Beyond Good and Evil* reflect Lampert's broader argument 'that a new history of philosophy can be written on the basis of Nietzsche's thought ... based on a comprehensive new understanding of the human and of nature [that] is historical in its essence and treats culture as a whole' (279). Bacon and Descartes wrote as the greatest events of their time in history. What they wrote legislated thought thereafter.

How they wrote is a matter of dissimulation, hiding as much as is revealed. The occasion for dissimulation is the conflict between the power of the new ideas and the power of religion in Bacon's and Descartes' era. Lampert argues (260) that, 'dissimulation does not make [Descartes or, by extension, Bacon] our moral inferior.' The focus is always upon the writer, the writing, and — as texts — the writings Lampert can construe as fables. Some may miss the analyses of and grappling with doctrinal issues, while others will appreciate the manner in which Lampert teases out of small texts and small bits of larger texts insights into the mentalities of the writers.

Lampert begins with Bacon's *New Atlantis*, analyzing character after character to reveal the conflict between the 'new religion of scientific technology' and the 'old religion it imitates in order to supersede' while recognizing its own limitations in doing so (66). The analysis next turns to Bacon's *An Advertisement Touching on Holy War* for a nearly line-by-line dissection. Crucial to the investigation of both Bacon and Descartes is a certain historical continuity the writers maintained with their ancient progenitors, especially with respect to dissimulation. As Lampert proclaims (126), 'My book aims to recover the honorable role played by esotericism in the history of our culture, a role that has its effective beginnings in the Socratic turn and especially in the writings of Plato.'

Lampert sees Descartes as striving for the same ends as Bacon, but through original means. Instead of regarding Descartes' style as grounded

in fear of suppression while wearing a happy face, he views that style as a joke upon his times and opponents. The most central conflict governing Descartes' writing is that between philosophy and religion, a conflict deserving respect if for no other reason than that it is 'so much in the open in Nietzsche's own writings' as the focus of his philosophical efforts (153). Lampert treats the *Discourse on the Method* as a fable, attending closely to Descartes in the *poêle*. As with Bacon, Lampert is most interested in matters of style and esotericism that link the French writer with Plato, especially as they show the Descartes of the *Discourse* to be sheltered, resolute, and happy (as one segment title has it on p. 227).

Although Lampert ostensibly bases his examination of Bacon and Descartes on three premises from *Beyond Good and Evil*, his study of Nietzsche's philosophy of the history of philosophy focuses upon the early *Use and Disadvantage of History for Life* and Book 5 of *The Joyous Science*. The heart of Lampert's interpretive analysis of the earlier untimely meditation is the discovery of a political antiplatonism. As he summarizes (298), 'Platonism is the politic philosophy which judged that truth is deadly to community and must be covered in salutary lies grounding moral behavior.' Whether a culture, community, or people can be built upon deadly truths, in contrast to the salutary lies deemed necessary since Plato, is the task Nietzsche apparently set for himself in his late addition to *The Joyous Science*.

In the most extensive interpretation of a single section of one Nietzschean work (140 pages), Lampert explores serially the numbered sections of Nietzsche's 'Hyperborean' perspective from which the hidden history of philosophers comes to light. Although Lampert's early attention to style gives this Part an affinity to the studies of Bacon and Descartes, the number of references to Parts One and Two are remarkably few and the author quickly turns to internal interpretive questions. As a postmodernist, of course, Lampert opposes both existential and Heideggerian frameworks for reading Nietzsche, especially with respect to the question of whether we are free to construct ourselves, and if not, what may be the constraint or source of our unfreedom in this regard. Lampert trusts Nietzsche's use of unanalyzable retrospective inference that allows the trained ear to derive the truth that we are not our own.

Lampert artfully draws out the web of Book 5 to make more natural Nietzsche's assertion of positions previously opposed in earlier writings. Most significant are the appreciation of Plato and the support of science. In the end, however, Lampert uses rhetoric no less confusing than Nietzsche's own aphorisms. For example, he finds a new and 'joyous science of Dionysian pessimism' (405) in Nietzsche, namely philology, that 'supplants physics because the mechanistic worldview inadequately accounts for the richness of phenomena' (302). Unfortunately, this slant on physics was suspect among physicists in Nietzsche's day a century ago and is virtually untenable today, even if the position seems able to undergird Nietzsche's shifting assertions about science.

Such uncritical views rest on a philosophical vision of Nietzsche that can see no datedness, let alone error, to the least of his views. Such devotion to a master may be laudable, but perhaps the postmodern movement deserves better in its quest for plausibility.

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Thomas M. Lennon

*The Battle of the Gods and Giants: The
Legacies of Descartes and Gassendi, 1655-1715.*

Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.

Pp. xiii + 420.

US \$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07400-3).

This is a curious work. It began well, discussing an era of considerable interest, and in a swashbuckling style that promised a good read. It deals with many figures seldom discussed (Gassendists such as Gilles de Launay, François Bernier, Samuel Sorbière, and Savinien de Cyrano de Bergerac; Cartesians such as Jacques Rohault, Robert Desgabets, and Pierre Sylvain Régis), and so it was bound to be enlightening. But the framework chosen for the discussion is selected not from the late seventeenth century as one might anticipate, but rather from ancient philosophy: Plato's reference to the interminable battle that is always going on between the gods and the giants (35). Thus the contest between Gassendists and Cartesians is immediately reduced to a skirmish, or at least a series of skirmishes, in a much more extensive battle which not only continued beyond these engagements, but indeed continues still. The full import of this perspective was not immediately evident to me, and so, while certain comments and the treatment allotted to certain issues were disturbing, the ultimate thrust still came as a surprise.

Chapter VIII provides the final twenty-five pages of the book: 'Philosophy and the Historiography of Philosophy'. This section begins with the observation that a particular interpretation of Locke is a crucial thesis of the work (367). The essential point is that Locke is very strongly anti-Cartesian, and that this orientation is an important undercurrent throughout his work. More controversially, it is maintained that Locke was a closet Spinozist, and that he either was, or ought to have been, an atheist. Because there is not really much evidence to support this thesis in Locke's *Essay*, a long discussion follows in which Lennon considers the possibility that Locke is guilty of

dissimulation, or that Locke himself was simply unaware of the implications of his own commitments (368-75). Ultimately both of these possibilities are rejected in favor of a third alternative: Locke actually *did* say what Lennon maintains (the crucial thesis), and at least part 'of Locke's failure to be more explicit is the fluidity of philosophical language in the seventeenth century...' (375, n. 21). This assertion comes very late indeed, and one may be forgiven for suggesting that this 'fluidity' is precisely the kind of problem that one would have expected Lennon to address (and demonstrate) at some much earlier point in the text. Moreover, it is troubling to read in the midst of this account: 'Texts, it seems to me, must be taken much more at face value' (375); and somewhat later: 'there is no other touchstone but the text for the acceptability of a historical account' (391).

What follows is a discussion of various camps of historians, of niceties of distinction between history and interpretation, and a recognition that all history is selective and all interpretation relative. Within this framework of relativity and tolerance, it is pointed out that 'the failure of Locke's position to be obvious except in terms of an interpretation, one that is incidentally highly contentious, is not a special problem because nothing is obvious, nothing at all, except in terms of interpretation' (391). 'Taking this tack I would advance my interpretation of Locke as simpler, more efficient, and more fruitful, as more *interesting* than the history of philosophy that concerns, for example, only the primary-secondary quality distinction or the history of ideas that wonders whom Locke had in mind in his attack on innate ideas' (392).

Instead of an authoritative account of philosophical issues in the second half of the seventeenth century, therefore, the work turns out to be an extended analysis of Lennon's rationalizations as he attempts to come to terms with the fact that he is ultimately unable to provide a decisive defense for a pet thesis. These are not novel insights; they are the traditional problems that every competent historian has always faced, and has had to come to terms with, in producing a scholarly work. And if it is currently fashionable to impose these problems on the reader, rather than simply assuming responsibility for them as part of the creative process, it should be recognized that it is neither generous nor profitable to do so. In effect Lennon has acknowledged this in saying that 'the thesis I have been arguing makes no methodological difference — relativizing the text has no direct relevance to the ways of doing history of philosophy' (391). This is precisely correct, and these portions of the work should have been reserved for a text on literary theory (where such thoughts are already a bit dated).

Dwelling on disappointment with the volume is equally self-indulgent, however, and what is more important is the manner in which the arguments advanced must be judged in relation to the (at least apparent) facts of the period under discussion. New works on the philosophy of Gassendi have made it essential that we reconsider the role of his thought and its influence during the period. In this respect, Lennon's work is timely and helpful. He provides a very extensive evaluation of Gassendi's thought and its impact on

both Continental and British writers. Clearly this is an essential prerequisite for his task, since a sound understanding of the two major figures, Descartes and Gassendi, must underlie any analysis of their influence. Unfortunately, however, it is the interpretation of Descartes which (along with the treatment of Locke) proves to be the weak component of this foundation.

Lennon maintains (against a growing body of scholarship indicating empirical tendencies) that Descartes is an idealist. He anticipates, however, that his argument will be found defective in at least two respects. 'The full defense of claims expressed in terms so different from Descartes's *verba ipsissima* must involve a philosophy of history whose defense I attempt only in the final chapter below, and then only partially' (191). Nonetheless, he insists that he is 'prepared to defend these claims as historical, as what really happened' (*ibid.*). Secondly, while this interpretation was at least foreshadowed by Cousin in the last century, the interpretation is non-standard and would require massive documentation — which is 'also a task clearly beyond the present scope' (192).

Curiously, parts of Lennon's position seem to suggest an empirical perspective: for Descartes, 'the only object of knowledge, or even of thought, is extension' (191); and (given the finite nature of the mind) 'my awareness is never without a sensuous component' (196). But he then goes on to provide a reduction of extension to the status of an ideal entity. In fact, however, this is inappropriate. The case is extremely clear in Descartes's treatment of the mathematical object — the paradigm of an ideal entity. In *Principles*, I, 59, we are told that the ideas of number and geometrical figures are formed by the mind on the basis of particular experiences. Such ideas are universals which depend upon particulars for their existence (*Regulae*, VI). In *Regulae*, XIV, Descartes says that such 'abstract entities are never formed in the imagination in isolation from subjects'. This is because 'quantity and number differ only in thought from that which has quantity and is numbered' (*Principles*, I, 55). Thus, ultimately, Descartes can say that: 'geometrical figures are entirely corporeal' (*Reply to Objections* V). The point, therefore, is that rather than idealizing extension, if we are to remain true to the text, we must make mathematical ideas, along with all other universals, dependent in some sense upon the particular elements of experience. Lennon ignores these passages in his discussion of mathematics (206ff.).

It must be remembered that Lennon is a strong Malebranche scholar. There is thus good reason to suspect that he is reading the case backwards. Like Malebranche himself, Lennon seems to see Malebranche as the 'true Cartesian' (211). In his 'Preface' he mentions that: 'Descartes's things are Malebranche's perceptions of things' (ix). It is no surprise, therefore, when he says of Descartes's idealism that 'in any case, our ultimate interest in the ideas sketched is in how they were instantiated, not in Descartes, but subsequently in Malebranche, who was the gods' chief spokesman in the latter half of the century' (192). The consequences are very significant for the kind of study under consideration. Descartes *can* be read as an empiricist. Lennon even finds that some of Descartes's disciples 'argued toward empiri-

cism' (210). But, of course, such a reading would make it much more difficult (but much more interesting?) to establish a clear contrast with the empiricism of Gassendi. The gods would be difficult to distinguish from the giants. Soundness of interpretation as a basis for this study is absolutely essential.

A good deal more should be said about this volume — for its considerable virtues, as well as its limitations. But these comments will have to suffice. Lennon has given it his best effort: 'I could say more here about the period that I take to be true, but the addenda would likely not improve upon this, my best attempt at conveying my understanding of the period' (388). The work was written for professionals who also understand these matters very well, and some will surely feel sympathy for the sentiments expressed. But others will undoubtedly join me in being troubled by a 400 page promissory note.

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Steven P. Lee

Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons.

Cambridge University Press 1993.

Pp. xiv + 418.

US \$64.95 (cloth; ISBN 0-521-38272-6).

The end of the Cold War has been a mixed blessing for those of us whose rice bowl had been issues of war and peace and are now relegated to (ugh!) business ethics. But it is not just special pleading to caution that this reallocation of philosophical resources may prove dangerously shortsighted. After all, 'nuclear deterrence through mutual vulnerability is a general relationship, [of which] any pair of nations that are [or may become] strong political adversaries — and have fairly modest technological and industrial capabilities — can become an instance. So we need to know what we can bring from [our Cold War] experience to future instances of nuclear deterrence' (vi). More particularly, thinks Lee, 'the difference nuclear weapons [have made]' (1-33) is that, unlike conventional weapons, they violate 'the *principle of tolerable divergence*, according to which what the moral norms of an institution prescribe [must] not greatly diverge from what [its] prudential norms prescribe' (21). 'The point of referring to the divergence as tolerable is that any divergence that was great enough to be *intolerable* to those pursuing the institution's prudential goals would result in the moral norms being systematically disregarded, and so in time being revised or replaced' (22). 'Because

nuclear deterrence appears to be the only way in which such basic prudential goals as the avoidance of nuclear war and the maintenance of national sovereignty can be reliably achieved' (31), prudential reasoning would seem to approve it. And yet, because nuclear deterrence is hostage holding (42-5), moral reasoning — at least deontological moral reasoning — would seem to preclude it. Lee's project, then, is 'to reconcile morality and prudence' (32).

To this end he considers three approaches. *Moral* revisionism (260-72) — 'clearly a last resort' (80) — urges us to 'alter the moral principle of respect for innocent civilians in [such a] way [that] the obligation not to practise nuclear deterrence would not exist' (79). *Strategic* revisionism argues for those 'forms of nuclear deterrence [that] avoid the deontological objections' (78). And *prudential* revisionism attempts to show that 'the consequentialist and prudential arguments for nuclear [over conventional (84)] deterrence are unsound' (78).

Against strategic revisionism Lee argues (Chs. 3-5) that all such putatively 'innocent' strategies — existential deterrence, scrupulous counterforce, a no-intentions policy, and so on — depend for their deterrent effect on the risk of either 'things getting out of hand', unintended but foreseen collateral civilian damage, and/or escalation to countervalue targeting. But where the traditional abolitionist pegs her case to the Wrongful Intentions Principle (60) — or, more accurately, to the Principle of Double Effect as governed by the Principle of Moral Dissociation, i.e. 'for an effect to be counted as a second effect, it must be unconnected with what the actor wants to achieve' (177) — Lee, by contrast, takes pains (49-59) to show that nuclear 'hostage holding is morally wrong because it imposes a *risk* of harm upon innocent persons without their consent' (45). Moreover, claims Lee, this deontological disadvantage cannot be simply outweighed by the unprecedented consequences at stake, since 'the deontological stakes have been raised to unprecedented heights as well' (62), 'a rough measure [of which] may be made by considering both the number of [innocents put at this aforementioned risk] and the seriousness of the injustice that it perpetrates on each' (67). That is, the immorality of nuclear hostage holding lies not in the conditional *intention* to kill unwilling innocent civilians, but in putting them at risk of being killed either *unintentionally*, or for reasons *disassociated* from those driving the policy producing the risk.

Less convincing, however, is Lee's case for prudential revisionism (Chs. 6-7), the essence of which is that each of the three deterrent strategies — extended, counterforce, and minimum — can achieve only one of the three prudentially required species of stability — respectively: crisis, noncrisis and accidental-war — and only by incurring the two species of instability remaining (288). Since *any* instability, multiplied by the probability and direness of the outcome being risked, is greater than the corresponding products for conventional deterrence, it follows that prudential reasoning does *not* counsel nuclear deterrence.

Why is this case less than convincing? Because one of its premises is that 'no one should expect a nuclear war between nations in a condition of mutual

vulnerability to be limited' (16, 127, 191). But since this premise cannot be grounded on historically contingent technological constraints alone (15, 191), Lee needs to get it from the *logic* of nuclear war. To this end he begins by acknowledging that 'limited war is a "public good", at least by comparison with its unlimited alternative' (192). So the possibility of limiting war comes down to the possibility of resolving the 'bargaining dilemma' over the distribution of the cooperative dividend. The war ends when both victor and vanquished are 'satisfied' (respectively) with the extent of their victory and defeat. When, as in conventional warfare, 'military force is used for denial or aggression, the idea of victory as overall relative advantage makes some sense, because one side's gain implies the other's loss and vice-versa. But when, [as in nuclear warfare], military force achieves [only] a significant level of *punishment*, the situation is not zero-sum' (200). Both sides are in for an unacceptable loss from the outset. Thus once 'overall advantage is understood in absolute terms, the answer to the question, How limited must a nuclear war be to be appropriately limited? is that it cannot be limited enough!' (200). What this amounts to, however, is an argument against hoping for any meaningful victory in *initiating* a nuclear conflict; whereas what it *needs* to be, recall, is an argument for abandoning all hope that, once a nuclear war has been (albeit irrationally) begun, it might nonetheless, somewhere short of mutual destruction, be rationally brought to an end.

Lee's final chapter addresses the problem of extrication. 'Though there are serious instability problems with nuclear deterrence, those resulting from unilateral nuclear disarmament,' he allows, '[may] seem to be worse' (299). And even supposing mutual disarmament can be safely achieved, nuclear weapons cannot be *uninvented*, nor can a nation divest itself of its own rebuilding capacity. So, Lee concedes, abolitionism amounts to just one more species of nuclear deterrence, namely *weaponless* deterrence. Moreover, 'if a moral defense of impure counterforce deterrence or of existential deterrence on the grounds that no explicit threats against civilians are involved is not allowed, neither can such grounds be used to defend the nuclear threats inherent in the rebuilding capacity' (311). So, he needs to ask, can a weaponless deterrence policy withstand the deontological objection?

Lee thinks it can. 'To threaten to hold hostages,' he observes, 'is not to hold hostages; so to threaten to threaten nuclear destruction is not to run afoul of the proscription of hostage holding. What puts civilians at risk is the *existence* of the weapons. So when a nation threatens to rebuild its nuclear weapons it seeks to influence the behavior of the opponent's leaders, but it does not do so by putting civilians at risk' (312). It would put civilians at risk only if it carried through on that threat.

The problem with this answer, however, is that it runs afoul of Lee's own *credibility* axiom, according to which, 'unless a nuclear strategy [leaves] something that is in [the nation's] interest to do if the deterrence fails, its threats will lack credibility, and the strategy will not be effective in achieving its deterrent end' (183). So by threatening to rearm we are announcing our willingness to rearm should our threat fail to achieve its deterrent effects.

Thus some readers might see Lee's reasoning as analogous to that of the Gestapo interrogator who asks of his victim, 'Now then, shall we do this the easy way, or the hard way?!', but safeguarding his virtue by displaying his implements of torture in a state of pre-assembly!

But even if Lee's case for abolitionism is less than convincing, parsing the issues as he does does immeasurable service to their clarification. What recommends the book even further is that it is utterly bereft of the polemics that so often infuse these debates. Passion expressed as rigour is as refreshing as it is rare.

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Daniel Little

Varieties of Social Explanation:

*An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Social Science.*

Boulder: Westview Press 1991. Pp. xiii + 258.

US \$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0565-9);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0566-7).

Little approaches philosophy of social science 'from below', as he says, working in close proximity to the actual problems in the area. As the author of *Understanding Peasant China: Case Studies in the Philosophy of Social Science* (1989) and *The Scientific Marx* (1988), he is well qualified to fashion his philosophy of science from the science itself. He is led to a pluralistic methodology which recognizes several legitimate explanatory models, but there are also subtle reductionist and individualist themes, for instance in the reduction of (most) functional explanation to causal explanation, and the demand that explanations in decision theory should be aggregative of individual choices. The most striking feature of Little's 'from below' approach is the insertion every few pages of extended examples taken from the literature of social science, for instance, a boxed paragraph on Philip Kuhn's work on the causes of the Taiping rebellion, cited by Little in support of his contention that causal claims in social science should specify the mechanisms that mediate social causation.

Little urges that causal explanation is basic to social science, and he advocates an analysis requiring the scientist to provide at least a sketch of a causal mechanism leading from cause to effect, the mechanism being a series of events leading to each other in a law-governed manner. He contrasts his CM analysis with a Humean inductive regularity analysis and with a

Mackie-type necessary and sufficient condition analysis. Although he perhaps neglects the Humean objection that his 'mechanisms' will eventually bottom out in laws of inductive regularity, Little is to be commended for a more extensive analysis of causation than is usual in an introductory text, including a critique of functional, structural, and statistical explanation to the degree that they fail to honor his demand for causal mechanisms. (These forms of explanation are also set out in helpful detail.)

The same commendation is in order for Little's treatment of rational choice theory, which he presents as an equally basic explanatory model in social science. Topics covered include the frequency and degree-of-belief interpretations of probability, maximizing versus satisficing, strategic rationality and the Prisoner's Dilemma, and collective action theory. Little understands RC theory to be aggregative, explaining social patterns as the upshot of the rational choices of large numbers of participants. This has been challenged recently in *The Nature of Rationality* by Robert Nozick, who emphasizes influence in the opposite direction, from social patterns to individual decisions. Nozick's ideas about symbolic utility and commitment to principle may address Little's concern (following Sen) that RC's theory of narrow economic rationality needs to be expanded beyond such standard assumptions as egoism, etc.

Little's third major explanatory model, interpretation theory, is also examined in rewarding detail, showing how the meaning of human behavior is scientifically studied using such hermeneutic techniques as Clifford Geertz's notion of ritual, Victor Turner's notion of drama, and Bourdieu's notion of habitus. Little is skeptical about the explanatory value of interpretive theory, but he concedes that its semiotic descriptions can have scientific status. He is far from endorsing the strong anti-naturalist positions of theorists like Geertz and Winch, who argue that social explanation must conform to the interpretive paradigm, urging instead that there is a core of human needs and motivations to which RC theory can refer in a 'thin' vocabulary of rationality, perhaps augmented by some materialist premises, without employing the 'thick' vocabulary of a particular culture. He illustrates this in his discussion of materialist explanation in social science, in which RC explanation is extended by Marxist premises about technology, class, ideology, and so forth. While Little allows, on one hand, that 'the utility of the interpretive approach as a contribution to social science depends chiefly on the degree to which interpretive social scientists succeed in identifying symbolic structures within human behavior' (77), he is also pessimistic, on the other hand, about incorporating such structures in RC theory, for 'once we require that rational choice take normative constraints and commitments into account as well as interests, it is much more difficult to provide formal rational choice models' (153). I mention Nozick's work again to suggest that it might help Little to arrive at a more satisfying account of the relationship between interpretation theory and RC theory.

Little concludes the book with chapters on methodological individualism, relativism, and methodological pluralism. He distinguishes between onto-

logical, definitional, and explanatory versions of methodological individualism, accepting the ontological thesis that all social entities 'are constituted by the ensemble of individuals and the behaviors that underlie them' (184), while denying that social concepts are definable in terms of concepts that refer only to individuals and their relations and behavior, and denying too that social explanations should be reduced to facts about individuals. But Little insists on the following constraint on social explanation, in the spirit of his causal mechanism account of causation: '... we must have at least an approximate idea of the underlying mechanisms at the individual level if we are to have a credible hypothesis about explanatory social regularities at all. A putative explanation couched in terms of high-level social factors whose underlying individual-level mechanisms are entirely unknown is no explanation at all' (196).

As for relativism, Little distinguishes conceptual relativism, belief relativism, and normative relativism. Conceptual relativism is understood as the view that different conceptual schemes are incommensurable with each other, and Little discusses versions of the view associated with Benjamin Whorf's hypothesis about the Hopi world view, Thomas Kuhn's thesis of incommensurability across paradigms, and W.V.O. Quine's thesis about the indeterminacy of translation. Little readily concedes that arguments like Quine's establish the possibility of conceptual relativism, 'but empirical attempts to identify existing schemes incommensurable with our own appear to have failed,' (207), he says, and he returns to the thought that 'human cultures share a core set of concepts and beliefs defining the structure of the ordinary world' (209). Little takes this point one step further in his rejection of belief relativism, the view that there are no culture-neutral standards of belief rationality. Given that we conceptualize the world in basically the same ways, we can move forward to empirical and causal reasoning with some confidence of securing agreement, confirming that 'truth, then, is cross-cultural, and the standards of rationality are those that produce true beliefs more reliably than alternatives' (212). Turning from these cognitive forms of relativism to normative relativism, Little proposes that there are rationally grounded moral universals. He interprets Rawls' work in *A Theory of Justice* as supporting that proposal, although he is aware that this is a contentious interpretation, and that Rawls has been backtracking from it in recent writings. (He does not refer to Rawls' recent *Political Liberalism*, which is far removed, quite explicitly, from the project of grounding moral universals.)

The final chapter is an overview of methodological issues, defending methodological pluralism against both naturalism and antinaturalism. Little takes from naturalism the weak thesis that it is possible to use a methodology based on natural science to investigate social phenomena, but he denies the strong naturalist tenet that such a methodology is necessary. Also he develops a core/periphery analysis of scientific method, which puts at the core empirical testability, logical coherence, and an institutional commitment to intersubjective processes of belief evaluation and criticism. Natural and social science share this core, but he rejects what he calls

'predictive-theory naturalism', which requires that all science should share what Little regards as belonging on the periphery of scientific method, such as permitting relatively precise predictions, describing laws of nature, arriving at a unified theory of a domain of phenomena, and so forth. Little urges instead that social science must be viewed as a 'theoretically informed effort to analyze historical particulars' (227), and that 'we should think of the social sciences as contributing to an eclectic body of knowledge that sheds light on the various forms of social causation and structured human agency' (229).

This is an admirable book, both philosophically sophisticated and in close touch with the literature of the social sciences. It is occasionally repetitive (particularly in the rejection of strong antinaturalism and related views), but more typically the reader has the sense of being taken deeply into the issues by someone who knows his way around. I missed however a discussion of the 'critical theory' associated with Jürgen Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Presumably Little thinks that there is nothing to its 'emancipatory' ambition, or nothing that belongs in social science, and that for the rest it dissolves into studies that are captured by his causal, rational-choice, and interpretive explanatory models. If so, it would have been helpful if he had made his case.

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Larry May
Sharing Responsibility.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 1992.
Pp. x + 183.
US \$31.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-51168-5).

Watching the continuing carnage in Bosnia, any sensitive person in North America must at times wonder about how much he or she bears responsibility for what is happening. Should the developed countries of the world intervene? Militarily? Exactly how much are we responsible for not keeping the Serbs from murdering the minorities among them and expanding their hegemony?

In *Sharing Responsibility*, Larry May explains that he will argue that we are responsible first, for our attitudes and the results in the world of those attitudes; second, not only for our actions but also our failures to act as individuals and as collective communities, and third, that we should increase our responsibility for good and evil in the world through the various roles we each play in our communities.

May devotes a first long chapter to basing his theory not on the Existentialism of the early Sartre and Camus, but on the 'social existentialism' of Heidegger, Jaspers, and the later Sartre. This kind of Existentialism sees

the self as a social construct formed by the multiple influences of occasional key choices, socialization and conditioning, and the historical situation.

Because we have some responsibility for the self who we are and might become, May devotes the next two chapters to explaining how we are responsible for our attitudes. His second chapter essentially argues that the racist is responsible for his racist attitudes and the insensitive person is responsible for hers. His claim is that we are responsible for the habits we form because we are aware of other possible habits. Even our ignorance may be 'culpable'.

As members of professional groups, May argues that we are collectively responsible for the actions or inactions of our members. If one is a physician, one is partially responsible for allowing a physician to continue to operate who one knows to be incompetent. Even if one is not a member of a group, 'often, people could organize themselves into the kind of group that could prevent massive starvation or racial injustice' (105).

More ambitiously, May attempts to construct a theory of 'liberationist communitarianism' that demands more responsibility of us than the demands of liberal individualism. Unfortunately, other than telling us that his theory requires more of us than a liberal individualism that only holds us responsible for the harms we cause, he leaves it up to the individual himself or herself to decide how much he or she is responsible for.

Occasionally there are statements that just seem wrong: 'There is no good reason to see omissions as less a part of one's life plans than commissions.' Well, yes and no. There are billions upon billions of actions that each of us omitted doing in our lives, and only a few of them bear great reflection in thinking about our 'life plan' (assuming most people have a 'life plan', which may be doubtful).

Many of the ideas in *Shared Responsibility* grow out of May's previous book, *The Morality of Groups* (1987) and there does not seem to be that much new in his latest. His examples (the Kitty Genovese case, racism, sexism, famine relief) are entirely predictable. Moreover, other than a vague exhortation to share more responsibility for what is going on in the world, such as in Bosnia, one gets no real sense of exactly how May conceives each of us to be responsible for our collective inaction in Bosnia. Perhaps it is unfair to ask this, but philosophers such as Peter Singer and James Rachels (to whom May refers favorably) have given us much more concrete and exact views, and felt no need to justify their views with any theory of the self, existential or otherwise. May thinks he is doing new, daring work, but it seems old and mundane. In a lot of the book, May tells us what he will do or has done, but often, when it gets down to making the argument, there is a lack of substance — a kind of vacuity that leaves one restless.

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Terrance McConnell

Gratitude.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1993.

Pp. xi + 273.

US \$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-56639-038-9).

When Terrance McConnell told a friend and nonphilosopher that he was writing a book on gratitude, she thought a moment and asked, 'You mean there is more to it than just saying thank you?' And for the most part, contemporary moral philosophy has likewise tended to ignore gratitude or to consider it as a peripheral and minor moral virtue of little philosophical interest. McConnell, however, points out that this has not always been so (Hume, for example, called ingratitude 'the most horrid and unnatural' of crimes), and that examination of moral issues like gratitude that are 'on the edge' can enhance our understanding of more central questions about the usefulness of various moral theories. Moreover, an understanding of gratitude is crucial to explaining friendship and filial and political obligations.

McConnell says a beneficiary owes a debt of gratitude to a benefactor only when: (1) The benefit was granted freely, voluntarily, intentionally, and not for disqualifying reasons (such as the desire to coerce some reciprocating benefit from the beneficiary); (2) the benefit is not forced unjustifiably on the beneficiary; (3) the beneficiary accepts the benefit (or would in the absence of certain impairing conditions); and (4) the benefactor provided a benefit or exerted great effort or sacrifice in trying to provide a significant benefit (44). Since, for example, one owes gratitude to a lifeguard who saves one's life in the course of her duty, McConnell denies that only benefits conferred supererogatorily generate debts of gratitude. Fair enough, but then any duty- or obligation-fulfilling act, no matter how trifling, that fulfills conditions (1) through (3) demands one's gratitude. Rather, condition (4) should endorse only actions that (a) provide significant benefits, or (b) are supererogatory, or (c) involve great effort or sacrifice in trying to provide a significant benefit.

Given that one *does* owe a debt of gratitude, what is one then required to do? McConnell denies that the beneficiary must make a return of equal value; such 'tit for tat' gratitude can destroy the force of the original act, and in cases where a great benefit (such as saving one's life) has been granted, an equal return is frequently impossible to make (5). Instead, one must recognize that one has a debt of gratitude, reciprocate with an *appropriate* and commensurate benefit if the proper occasion arises, and must do so *because* one has been benefited (56). McConnell argues that gratitude is an 'imperfect duty'; it requires the right sort of motivation as well as the right sort of act (67f).

However, McConnell further argues that since *feeling* gratitude (or any similar emotion) is generally one within one's *indirect* control (if at all), a debt of gratitude cannot require that one feel a certain way. However, such

feelings *do* have moral weight; they fall within 'the realm of the moral ideal'. As such they can elicit our admiration or repugnance by their presence or absence, but not praise or blame (96ff).

In constructing this account, McConnell's methodology is to winkle out our intuitions on a large number of imaginary puzzle cases, and elucidate these as principles while accommodating the insights and opposing interpretations offered by other commentators. Only then does he attempt to accommodate his account to versions of impartialism, utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. Within these theories he claims to find a 'rough convergence' of sentiment supporting gratitude at what he terms an 'intermediate' level (i.e., somewhere between an abstract, metaethical level of moral thinking and judgements about particular cases [148ff]).

McConnell's treatment of gratitude and political obligation will likely elicit the most controversy. McConnell argues that those citizens who have benefited from a just state owe a debt of gratitude to that state, but in arguing for this he must overcome several strong objections: (1) debts of gratitude are involuntary and hence not politically binding; (2) it is individuals who make efforts to benefit one, not institutions, and it is therefore to individuals, not institutions, that gratitude is properly owed; (3) the state cannot be said to have 'motives' for its benevolent acts, or if it does, they are disqualifying ones; and finally, (4) the state pays for benefits given to citizens by taxing those very citizens, hence no real benefit is conferred (186-203). It is however difficult to fairly appraise McConnell's replies to these objections since he speaks of 'the state' and 'the government' as if the two were identical. For example, he recognizes that it is the *government* that provides services (198), but does not explain why this compels gratitude to the *state*. Likewise, he admits that governments confer benefits solely to win popular support (200) (thus disqualifying them from any claim to citizens' gratitude) but later says that 'some *states* do provide benefits primarily for [the purpose of putting its citizens in debt]' (202, emphasis added). Plainly more can be said here about whether one can owe gratitude independently to either state or government, or whether one must owe gratitude to both. McConnell, however, does not see the distinction. It is worth pointing out that while McConnell thinks political gratitude demands obedience to just laws on a host of other duties befitting the good citizen, he is adamant here (as elsewhere in the book) that debts of gratitude can be overridden by other moral considerations (204). In a final chapter, he argues in a similar fashion for filial gratitude.

McConnell's writing throughout this well-organized book is clear and engaging, and one is rarely in doubt about where he is headed. As mentioned above, McConnell relies heavily on puzzle cases to draw out our intuitions about gratitude, and usually to good effect. I am not sure, however, if consensus on these puzzle cases is as clear as McConnell thinks it to be, or if he recognizes the cultural differences on such matters. And in places, McConnell's examples are just mundanely improbable, devoid of the compelling perplexity of, say, Judith Jarvis Thompson's. Other than a lone reference

to *Antigone*, McConnell makes no use of historical or literary examples to elucidate his concept of gratitude, an omission which (to note a personal prejudice) drains his book of much cultural resonance. But all in all, a good account of an obscure topic for which we owe McConnell, well, a vote of thanks.

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Anne Minas, ed.

Gender Basics: Feminist Perspectives on Women and Men.

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 1993.

Pp. iii + 545.

(ISBN 0-534-17814-6).

It is always a surprise to hear students in an undergraduate feminist philosophy class claim that women are not oppressed. Even near the end of a course, after they have delved deeply into feminist political theory, some continue to make this claim, believing, I suspect, that oppression is a thing of the past and that feminist philosophy is an intellectual relic of an ancient era. I am always perplexed by these claims. The oppression of women seems so obvious to anyone who is even remotely aware of women's role in the modern world. But one must remember that many students in undergraduate feminist philosophy courses are young women who have yet to experience living in the 'real' world — the world of struggle in the workplace, the world of parenting, and the world of old age and fading beauty.

So, what can one use in a feminist philosophy course to raise the consciousness of these young students? It seems that *Gender Basics* was written with just this purpose in mind. Anne Minas has edited a collection of articles that were intended to 'touch us directly' (1), dealing with gender issues in the private as well as the public realm. She chooses articles that, while not always explicitly focused on women's oppression, have that oppression as an underlying theme. She even begins her series of articles with a section entitled 'Oppression', which explores the theme from many different perspectives, including those of Asian women, disabled women, African American women, as well as white, middle class women. Throughout the book, Minas uses articles that help students explore gender issues in ways that stretch the powers of critical thinking as well as raise consciousness. For example, she includes a marvelous article by Peggy McIntosh entitled 'White Privilege

and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming To See Correspondences Through Work in Women's Studies' which some white students have claimed to be the best article they have ever read on racial discrimination. There is no doubt that after reading Minas' text, students would be more aware of the problems women from many backgrounds face in today's world.

In addition to consciousness raising, Minas' anthology has several features that make this an excellent text for the beginning philosophy student. She includes helpful questions before and after each article, and she lists suggestions for further reading after each section. She also chooses articles of varying degrees of difficulty so that students with different skill levels can find something of interest. But, most of all, she is committed to balance. The articles that she selects reflect various viewpoints that challenge the student to think critically about various themes associated with gender. Some of the themes she explores are: sexist language, pornography, prostitution, sexual orientation, gender clothing, women in the workplace, gender and sports, etc.

In summary, Minas' anthology is an excellent text for either an introductory women's studies course or a supplementary text in basic undergraduate feminist philosophy. It is easily accessible to students and deals with issues that both men and women will find interesting and informative.

But there are problems that make this book unacceptable as a primary text in feminist philosophy. Generally, the book lacks theoretical depth. While it contains issues that are important to applied philosophy, there is not enough work on the philosophical foundations underlying the issues. For example, the book explores the various ways that women experience sexual oppression, but it does not analyze the political, metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions that help maintain sexual inequality. It is important to be aware of the problems that women face, but it is also important to explore the philosophical underpinnings that create and maintain the oppression.

Furthermore, most of the authors that Minas chooses for this anthology are not professional philosophers. While Minas' text can be applauded for presenting an interdisciplinary perspective and for stepping out of the exclusive, insular, and often elitist world of academia, it generally lacks the intellectual depth that very often can be supplied only by professional philosophers. Students need articles that are accessible, but they also need to read articles that introduce them to the exciting world of feminist theory, and which stimulate their philosophical interest. One cannot assume that all college students are incapable of handling the complexity of feminist theoretical philosophy, especially if they have been well prepared in the basics of Western theory.

Not only is the text lacking in intellectual depth, but it is also limited in breadth. While there is a definite attempt to offer a multicultural/multiperspectival approach, Minas does not go far enough. Many of the issues seem to focus on the concerns of white, heterosexual, middle class women in capitalist society, e.g. issues of sexual harassment on campus, comparable worth. There are no articles that link capitalism and oppression, nor are

there articles that question the basic structure of Western society. There are no socialist feminist voices among the many perspectives. Likewise, the voices of Native American women, Jewish women, Hispanic women, and Third world women are either absent or underrepresented.

One text cannot fulfill all needs, and certainly Minas makes no claims that her work is all encompassing. So, for limited purposes, this is a fine text. It is relevant to the lives and concerns of students, both men and women, and it offers a broad look at gender issues. It would make an excellent supplementary text, but it should not be a substitute for feminist philosophy.

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Robert Nozick

The Nature of Rationality.

Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.

Pp. xvi + 223.

US \$19.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07424-0).

Nozick wants a theory of rationality which will root it in our animality, while also guiding us towards conceptions of ourselves and the world which permit us to live lives which would not be available to mere animals, or indeed to human beings if Hume were right about our psychology. Instrumentality can't be the whole story about rationality, for one thing, since rationality in Nozick's sense gives weight to non-instrumental, symbolic utility. The symbolic dimension of human action needs to be absorbed by decision theory, in order to capture the respect in which the utility of an action can be boosted (or depressed) by the symbolism involved in its representing a class of actions or by its expressing commitment to a valued ideal. When it becomes a matter of principle to me that I should not snack between meals, for instance, a particular occasion for forbearance comes to represent all such occasions, and the utility of not snacking on all those occasions 'flows back' on the strength of the symbolic connection, so as to strengthen the otherwise weak desire not to snack now. Nozick regards this symbolic relationship as analogous to, though distinct from, the unproblematic causal relationship in which the utility of a desired outcome flows back on the strength of a causal connection, so as to heighten the utility of performing the action producing that outcome.

Emphasizing the symbolic meaning of action leads Nozick to suggest that decision theory should expand so as to include the interpretive studies in

anthropology and other social sciences, to the extent that their descriptions of the rich symbolic worlds we live in help to explain the effect of the symbolic on the utility of performing an action. Decision theory should not construe rational self-interest narrowly in terms of satisfaction of egoistic desires, but broadly so as to include the weight we attach to the symbolic dimension of our action. Consequently it is rational to be ethical: 'Being ethical is among our most effective ways of symbolizing (a connection to) what we value most highly, and that is something a rational person would not wish to forgo' (63). This is a dramatic response to the urging of A.K. Sen and others that decision theory should move beyond narrow economic rationality by taking into account commitments and other normative principles. It also promises to bridge the gap between social scientists who favor the 'thin' explanatory vocabulary of decision theory, on one hand, and interpretive theorists on the other hand, who favor the illumination afforded by interpretations using the 'thick' vocabularies of particular cultures. Nozick is suggesting how decision theory could redefine its notion of self-interest, in such a way that the symbolic meanings described by interpretive theorists are directly relevant to the maximization of utility, or rather the maximization of what Nozick calls *decision-value*.

In place of the standard account of expected utility (EU), which treats the expected utility of an action as the weighted sum of the utilities of its possible outcomes weighted by their probabilities, Nozick distinguishes evidential expected utility (EEU) and causal expected utility (CEU). EEU treats the expected utility of an action as the weighted sum of the utilities of its possible outcomes weighted by the conditional probabilities of the outcomes given the actions. EU is a special case of EEU, namely, the case in which the outcome is probability-independent of the action. Then CEU is like EEU, except that conditional probability is replaced by some causal-probabilistic relation indicating direct causal influence. This distinction sets up a discussion of Newcomb's problem, which Nozick introduced to the philosophical literature two decades ago, and which he returns to now in order to propose a solution which points to the broader decision theory he favors. Nozick shows how Newcomb's problem gets resolved in different ways depending on what weight one attaches to EEU and CEU, and that these weights are liable to vary when the amounts of the rewards are varied. Accordingly, he arrives at a 'decision-value' formula for rational choice, which combines the weight of the two accounts of expected utility: $DV(A) = W_c \times CEU(A) + W_e \times EEU(A)$, where 'Wc' and 'We' represent the degree of a person's confidence in being guided by each of these two kinds of expected utility. Taking this eclecticism one step further in order to capture the importance of symbolic meaning, Nozick arrives at a complete decision-value formula by adding to DV(A) the symbolic utility SU of performing A: $DV(A) = W_c \times CEU(A) + W_e \times EEU(A) + W_s \times SU(A)$.

Nozick also has some unHumean proposals about belief, reminiscent of William James' doctrine of the will to believe, permitting the theory of rational belief to be governed in part by his account of decision-value. He

distinguishes the intellectual component of belief from the practical component, the former conforming to the rule, 'Do not believe h if some alternative statement incompatible with h has a higher credibility value than h does.' Nozick's account of credibility-value draws on a connectionist (parallel distributed processing) model of an ideal assessment of reasons for and against h . The practical component doesn't address credibility but refers directly to the utility or decision-value of believing h : 'Believe (an admissible) h only if the decision-value of believing h is at least as great as the decision-value of having no belief about h .' The practical component must be constrained by the intellectual component, since otherwise the practical component could license belief in the Tooth Fairy. So Nozick arrives at something like this rule: 'Believe a statement h if there is no alternative statement incompatible with h that has a higher credibility value than h does, and the credibility value of h is high enough, given the kind of statement that h is, and the decision-value of believing h is at least as great as the decision-value of having no belief about h .' For instance, the statement 'There is extra-terrestrial intelligence' might satisfy the intellectual component of this rule, such that a Star Trek Trekkie or someone whose life revolves around SETI would be licensed by the practical component in believing that there is extra-terrestrial intelligence.

Another of Nozick's projects in this book is to bring the theory of rationality into an evolutionary framework, seeing rationality as 'embedded within a context and playing a role as one component along with others, rather than as an external, self-sufficient point that judges everything' (123). Acting from principle, for instance, is a complement to our conative nature, as DV implies, not a source of motivation fundamentally antagonistic to desire. And the self-evidence in the natural light of Cartesian rationality gives way to the idea that acting upon reasons involves recognizing a connection of structural relation among contents, a recognition that has proven useful and has been selected for: we've been selected for finding some things self-evident, especially the connection between reasons and what they're reasons for. Rationality is a biological adaptation with a function, Nozick holds, interpreting *function* by combining Ernest Nagel's homeostatic account with Larry Wright's historical account so as to arrive at the following definition. *Z is a function of X when Z is a consequence of X, and X's producing Z is itself the goal-state of some homeostatic mechanism M satisfying the Nagel analysis, and X was produced or is maintained by this homeostatic mechanism M.* The processes of evolution produce entities with functions in this sense, but evolution itself has no function unless there is some other homeostatic process that produced evolution to have that effect. This definition of function raises the question of what homeostatic mechanisms actually operated, and towards what goal, in shaping us to act and believe on the basis of reasons. The evolutionary process operating through natural selection is presumably one of the mechanisms, and it may have built into us assumptions (about induction, other minds, the external world, etc.) that had survival value but which rationality didn't have the function of justifying. (Hence the intracta-

bility of philosophical problems.) A second homeostatic shaping mechanism comprises the processes by which societies mold their members, in such a way as to propagate the societies' institutions. This suggests that rationality is shaped not to serve a level below that of organisms [Dawkin's 'selfish gene'] but to serve a level *above*: the level of institutions.

This is a dense and difficult book. It raises a host of questions it does not answer, and it suggests programs of research that have not yet begun. But it is an important attempt to broaden our conception of rational choice and belief.

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Derek L. Phillips

*Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal of
Communitarian Thought.*

Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.

US \$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07425-9).

In 'Looking Backward: A Critical Appraisal of Communitarian Thought' Derek Phillips addresses the current debate between liberalism and communitarianism. Communitarians criticize liberalism because they believe that modern liberal society inhibits the formation of meaningful relationships, a sense of belonging and shared values that form the basis of 'genuine community'. Liberalisms' emphasis on individualism and a politics of rights, they argue, encourages isolation and detachment from community. However, out of this critique of liberalism a politics of the common good may be constructed where the individual is bound to the community through ties of affection which arise from a common history and values. Some communitarians further argue that prior to modern liberal society there were periods in history that exemplified community, for example the founding of America, the Middle Ages and ancient Greece. This feeds their dissatisfaction with modern liberal society and motivates a call for the re-emergence of community in contemporary society. Phillips reveals through current historical evidence that community, in the required sense, was not prevalent in any of these historical periods.

In Chapter 1 he lays bare four essential features that embody a working definition of 'community'. These he believes are common to the philosophies of the forerunners of communitarian thought such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and the authors of *Habits of the Heart*. The

first feature is a common geographical territory, the second is a shared history and common values, the third is widespread political participation and the fourth is a high degree of solidarity. Each characteristic is developed, fleshed-out in some detail and its importance as a necessary feature discussed. For instance, a common history and common values include '... traditions, practices, common understandings, and conceptions of the common good. A common history — with a specific background of events, activities, victories and defeats, successes and failures — helps assure consensus about where people come from and who they are' (15). For communitarians, Phillips believes, these common experiences provide the basis for strong community identification amongst its members whereby members internalize community values and norms making external sanctions unnecessary.

In chapters 2-6 Phillips gives a compelling historical account and analysis of the founding period of America, the Middle Ages and ancient Greece. He argues from current historical evidence that community was absent in all three periods. Therefore communitarians cannot show that their '... ideal is possible by establishing that it was once widely realized' (8). The analysis is intelligent and the data carefully considered. Phillips realizes that he must not only show that the features of community are not prevalent but he must also explain why the features are absent and how this shows a lack of community. Moreover, he is quick to point out that the prevalence of a characteristic need not always confirm the existence of community.

In general the historical discussions of the three periods are amply supported. Since it is impossible to recount all the historical data I will concentrate on Athens as an example.

The Greek polis or city-state is often cited as the model of communitarian life. But in terms of relevant features Phillips reveals that the population of Athens was a community only in the sense that it shared a locale. Recent historical research from, for example, de Ste. Croix and M.I. Finley suggests that only 20 percent of the population were citizens while the remaining bulk of the population consisted of non-citizens such as women, children, foreigners, and slaves. They '... did not have a common history and shared values. The fact that 30 percent of the population consisted of slaves who were imported "barbarians" by itself testifies how little was shared' (142). It is clear from this evidence that political participation was not widespread and there was comparatively little in the way of shared traditions and common values especially between citizens and foreigners and slaves. Given that much of the interaction between citizens and non-citizens was based on subordination and exploitation it is not surprising that there was little feeling of solidarity amongst the people of Athens (142). Since only one feature of community out of the four is realized it is clear that some communitarians have a romantic view of Athens as a genuine community.

Although the citizens of Athens did share common values and traditions, a common territory and had the opportunity to participate politically, solidarity was not prevalent amongst citizens of different economic standing

thus reflecting, Phillips argues, less community feeling than is sometimes attributed by communitarians. When examining the extent of solidarity amongst citizens several things must be taken into account. Solidarity is measured in terms of citizens' concern for the polis as well as their concern for each other. The data, drawn primarily from Finley, suggests that although most citizens believed that the 'good life' was only possible in the polis and that there was a great deal of patriotism, there was much less mutual concern between citizens. It is noted however, that community patronage by the rich was common through liturgies and there were certain 'welfare state' benefits. Through massive employment of the poor in the navies and pay for office as well as some governmental form of 'subsistence crisis insurance' Phillips believes that this shows that there was some attempt to alleviate economic inequalities and shows some concern for all citizens (146-7). Yet he also believes that given the division between the rich and the poor citizens and the size of Athens at the time the rich were primarily concerned about citizens of their own economic standing. 'At the level of relationships among individuals, then, attitudes of mutual concern do not seem to have been very strong in fifth-century Athens' (147).

Unfortunately the use of Aristotle as a primary source for this position is dubious at best. Phillips claims that Aristotle recognizes the conflict between the rich and poor citizens, for when theorizing about his ideal state Aristotle feared '... that the poor might use their numerical superiority to outvote the propertied class and to confiscate the property of the rich' (128-9). Here Phillips illegitimately employs a claim by Aristotle that involves some speculation about what might happen given his view of human nature — a bit of political theorizing on Aristotle's part — to support the claim that the conflict between the rich and poor citizens is historical fact. Moreover, Phillips asserts that Aristotle's claims about different classes of people, and social and economic arrangements were based on his observations of the time. To some extent they undoubtedly must have been, but to say that Aristotle '... paid very close attention to actual historical processes, social and economic arrangements, and the behavior of various sorts of people' (129) does not guarantee that the political theorizing that is in the *Politics* is itself an accurate reflection of the conflict between the rich and the poor citizens any more than Aristotle's theoretical claims about the 'natural' inferiority of women and slaves to Greek men is a factual account of that relationship. It may even be the case that Aristotle's *Politics* reveals certain 'truths' about the nature of political and social systems and their relations to each other as Finley argues in the first chapter of *Politics in the Ancient World*. But again a claim like Finley's is about Aristotle's insightfulness as a political theorist and should not be confused with a claim about his accuracy as a historian. Phillips' motivation for using Aristotle as a primary historical source is in response to MacIntyre's own use of Aristotle as representing one of the traditions of classical Athens. Phillips views his references to Aristotle as legitimate '... because Aristotle is often taken as a source of insight into the actual lives of people in Athens,

...' (122). Surely the accuracy of historical claims made by either Phillips or MacIntyre require some independent confirmation from sources other than Aristotle. Although this is a concern for Phillips his use of Aristotle is infrequent and does not affect the credibility of the remaining historical analysis.

In the last two chapters Phillips considers the possibility that even if community was not prevalent in the past it is still an ideal worthy of attainment. In chapter 7 he discusses the preconditions for community and the social conditions that are necessary for its maintenance in addition to the dangers he sees associated with attempts to realize this view of community. The final chapter evaluates the extent to which communitarianism and liberalism are viable moral and political options for us today. Here Phillips presents a solid discussion of the ways in which communitarians have misconceived liberalism and the difficulties with the communitarian conception of the self. He also argues that liberalism with its thin conception of the good and its central tenet of equal concern would buttress many of the central characteristics of a communitarian conception of community. Much of the discussion in these last chapters is right-minded, intuitive and of interest philosophically, although the treatment of the material is at times sketchy and underdeveloped.

More specifically, Phillips argues in chapter 7 that cultural homogeneity is a necessary precondition for community based politics. Further those who do not qualify for cultural membership are also often excluded from political membership. It is argued that the feelings of hatred and contempt bestowed on those who do not qualify for cultural membership and the disadvantages associated with the absence of political participation are detrimental consequences that result from a communitarian view of community. One compelling example that Phillips refers to is the treatment of the Jews in Germany during the Nazi era. It is clear that the Jews suffered greatly under this regime. However, Phillips wrongly assumes that those who are excluded from a community politically and culturally always wish to be included in the prevailing community. For example, certain segments of Black South African society as well as some North American Native groups do not want membership in the controlling community. What these groups often appeal to is membership, yes, but membership in their own community with their own judicial and political institutions. The justification for these claims often reflect the desire to preserve their own cultural identity. Moreover, it is this desire to maintain their culture which they believe is possible only through cultural isolation which has been frequently ignored by many liberals. Although Phillips has accurately pointed out the negative consequences of groups and individuals being denied the political rights to control their own destinies he wrongly assumes that those who are excluded because they are different wish to be part of the politically dominant culture.

Derek Phillips' book and especially his historical account of the extent of community in the past provides an important contribution to the liberal/com-

munitarian debate. Moreover, Phillips' in-depth examination of the historical references often introduced by communitarians but rarely scrutinized by others will serve to advance the discussion.

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Louis P. Pojman, ed.

The Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings.

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1993. Pp. xii + 556.
(ISBN 0-534-17826-X).

Intended as a text for graduate students and upper-level undergraduates, this anthology consists of fifty-five readings divided into nine sections ('The Theory of Knowledge', 'Skepticism', 'Our Knowledge of the External World', 'The Analysis of Knowledge', 'Theories of Justification I: Foundationalism and Coherentism', 'Justification II: Externalism and Internalism', 'A Priori Knowledge', 'The Justification of Induction', 'Other Minds', and 'The Ethics of Belief'). Classical readings include selections from Plato, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, as well as a number of more modern classics, such as essays by William James, Bertrand Russell, W.V.O. Quine, and Edmund L. Gettier. Contemporary contributions include four essays which appear here for the first time (one by Charles Landesman, two by Robert Audi, and one by Richard Fumerton).

Pojman's intention was to provide a collection of readings selected both for their overall importance and because they are representative of diverse perspectives (xi). Although individual instructors might wish for additional or alternative readings in some categories (e.g., selections from neither Aristotle nor Wittgenstein are included), Pojman's choices provide an adequate and well-balanced sampling of readings from the point of view of mainstream Western philosophical thought. The most noticeable and regrettable omission is Pojman's failure to include any readings specifically related to particular epistemological concerns which lie outside the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition, such as feminist philosophy or oriental philosophy. And even though the topic does not lie outside of mainstream Western philosophical thought, a section on the special epistemological questions related to philosophy of religion (covered only fleetingly in the section on the ethics of belief) would have been a welcome addition. Pojman offers no explanation for these omissions.

Each of the nine sections is preceded by a brief essay in which Pojman introduces the problem at hand, outlines various positions which have been taken on the problem, and situates the individual essays which follow within this overall framework; in addition, each essay is preceded by a succinct synopsis of its content and (where appropriate) its historical setting. The introductions are of uneven pedagogical value, in that some require a more specialized background in philosophical terminology than others. Still, all serve as adequate introductions to the topic being considered, and some are outstanding in that a great deal of background material has been successfully condensed into an informative and useful format (e.g., the introduction to 'A Priori Knowledge'). At the end of each section there is a bibliography of suggested further readings; these would be more useful had they been annotated.

Despite the omissions noted above, this volume does contain a useful core of readings in epistemology. Instructors who have searched in vain for an anthology which provides both historically important background selections as well as important essays published during the past couple of decades will welcome this one, and an instructor can certainly supplement this text as he or she sees fit. Another problem, however, and one not as easily rectified, is that Pojman's editing of some of the essays leaves much to be desired in terms of consistency and style. In Quine's 'Epistemology Naturalized', for example, Pojman has silently deleted notes occurring in the original (notes 5-11). In Grice and Strawson's 'In Defense of a Dogma', the latter half of the original essay has been silently deleted. These silent deletions are the more significant because in other essays Pojman has provided appropriate stylistic indications of editorial changes. Ideally, each and every change should have been so indicated; at the least Pojman should have indicated in the preface that some of his changes are silent ones.

This occasional lack of careful attention to editorial obligations occurs in other forms, as well. The selection from Hume, for example, is identified only as coming from his *Treatise of Human Nature*; students who wish to locate the passage more precisely will have to do so for themselves. Another example is Pojman's editing of Jaegwon Kim's 'What is "Naturalized Epistemology"?' In this case, Pojman, after quite properly noting that he has edited (i.e., deleted) some of Kim's footnotes, provides textual citations to passages from Quine's 'Epistemology Naturalized' which Kim quotes; for no apparent reason, however, Pojman refers the reader back to the pages of Quine's essay as it appeared in *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays* rather than to these passages where they occurred in the same (immediately preceding) essay in the volume at hand. These (and other) infelicities of style affect only the form of the edited essays and are in no way misrepresentations of the originals. They will most likely not be noticed by undergraduates. Nevertheless, instructors who consider attention to style to be a part of their pedagogical responsibilities might want to point out — especially to graduate students, who often use published materials as paradigms for their own initial forays

into professional writing — that shortcuts such as these are not a generally accepted scholarly practice.

Wadsworth has, as usual, produced an attractive textbook. The addition of an index would have been helpful.

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Rod Preece and Lorna Chamberlain

Animal Welfare & Human Values.

Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press

1993. Pp. x + 334.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-88920-227-3).

This book addresses the whole range of human uses of and relations to nonhuman animals. Much of the discussion is interesting, many of the conclusions are supportable, and some of them are supported. But overall the work is quite unsatisfactory.

Chapters 1 and 2 survey the history of human relations with other animals. The eleven central chapters concern particular varieties of animal use. Chapters 3 through 6 deal with animal experimentation. The conclusion is 'moderate' in that total abolition of such experimentation is judged undesirable. But the authors would control animal research by ethics committees with strong charters and a substantial majority of non-researcher members. The effect in practice could be radical. Chapter 7 is on hunting and fishing. Culling of wild populations may sometimes be acceptable, but sport hunting never is. Chapters 8 and 9 are on fur. Trapping for trade, even by indigenous people, is unacceptable, and fur ranching is even worse. In Chapters 10 and 11, on entertainment, we are told that animal fighting, greyhound racing, and steeplechasing are all indefensible. Flat-track horse racing is too, without very extensive reform. Rodeos are barbaric abominations. Circuses (with animal acts) are ethically hopeless. Most existing zoos are morally unacceptable, but a good zoo is very valuable for humans and for other animals. Chapter 12 is on animal agriculture. Intensive agriculture is judged a living hell for animals, but human meat eating is claimed to be defensible. In Chapter 13 the keeping of pets is defended as highly beneficial to humans and to (some) other animals.

Chapter 14 begins the theoretical summing-up by arguing that morality must rest on felt community and that we should feel ourselves to be members of a 'community of sentient beings'. Chapter 15 criticizes the views of Peter

Singer, Tom Regan, and several others. Chapter 16 expounds the authors' 'philosophy of animal protection', which is communitarian rather than individualistic and relies on sensibility rather than moral principle. Finally Chapter 17 'Epilogue: Ode to Sensibility' calls us back to Romantic identification with nature.

The first chapter, prehistory to the Renaissance in fifteen pages, is a disaster. The second is slightly better. About one page is devoted to 'Oriental thought' on humans and animals. It would have been wiser to say nothing at all. In these superficial chapters one also becomes acquainted with the authors' very exasperating habit of making interesting and important factual claims that are wholly unsupported by citation or argument, and with the captiousness of much of their criticism.

The middle chapters dealing with animal uses are on the whole much more useful than the beginning and concluding 'theoretical' chapters, but all are marred by poor organization, repeated digressions, and the unrelieved tone of sniping and carping. 'Animal rightists' are reviled (usually without citation) again and again. The authors concede in almost every case that the forces of animal liberation have the better arguments and the stronger evidence, but they maintain a rhetorical double standard that judges animal liberators by their most obnoxious representatives but is much more balanced and sympathetic toward the defenders of animal use.

Still there is much of value in these middle chapters. The authors, Chair and Vice-Chair of the Ontario SPCA, offer many illuminating examples. Some of the discussion of animal experimentation, several of the arguments against the defenders of sport hunting, and the whole discussion of zoos, are quite useful.

The really glaring defect in the 'applications' chapters is the treatment of meat-eating. The authors admit to some ambivalence, even guilt about meat eating. They explicitly recognize that the arguments they made for the immorality of wearing fur apply as well to eating meat. But they believe, or so they say, that a preference for beef protein rather than bean protein 'can be defended far more readily' (212) than a preference for fur rather than cloth coats. But they make no attempt to provide that defense. Instead they launch into a treatment of the horrors of intensive farming. Along the way they recognize that market forces compel farmers to raise animals intensively. So the eating of meat is even more obviously in need of justification. But the authors simply move on to the next topic.

In the last four chapters the authors attempt to refute animal liberators and to present their own position. Individuality and philosophy are rejected, community and sensibility embraced.

But the authors' ignorance of the philosophy they reject is striking. They appear unaware of the principle of universalizability, speak of 'the abstract utilitarian individual "right"' (32), and believe that MacIntyre and other communitarians have so swept the field that 'the notion of an abstract self as bearer of abstract prior rights has by common consent been eliminated from the discourse — but not from the writings of Peter Singer, Tom Regan

or Paul Taylor' (292). Not only is Singer a libertarian or Kantian but both views are dead.

The authors' positive arguments are unpersuasive. They add little if anything to the communitarianism they embrace. And though they repeatedly complain that Singer and others do not give algorithms for solving moral conflict, their 'sensibility' gives almost no specific guidance.

This is not just an intellectually substandard book, it is a corrupt one. The treatment of meat eating is intellectually dishonest. The authors should have provided a real defense of their carnivorousness, or recanted or recast their criticisms of experimentation, hunting, and trapping, or abandoned the manuscript.

Two unwillingnesses of our authors tell us something about their sensibility. They are unwilling to visit slaughterhouses (211). 'And just as we refuse to visit the slaughterhouse, so too, we will not watch the animals being euthanized. We know how heart-rending it is without having to see it performed' (233). I remind you that the authors are Chair and Vice-Chair of the Ontario SPCA. They are willing to require that SPCA employees do this horrible work, but unwilling to risk their own delicate natures. They are willing to condemn hunters and trappers and factory farmers for the way they treat animals. But they are not willing to change, to defend, or even to face directly the eating habits to which they have become accustomed. We do need sensibility as well as (but not instead of) moral principle. Preece and Chamberlain, however, do not display the sensibility we require.

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K. Ramakrishna Rao, ed.

Cultivating Consciousness: Enhancing Human Potential, Wellness, and Healing.

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers 1993.

Pp. ix + 234.

(ISBN 0-275-94515-4).

There is little of philosophical interest in this book. The volume incorporates 16 papers presented at a 1991 conference called 'Cultivating Consciousness for Enhancing Human Potential, Wellness and Healing'. All of the authors share a belief in 'the reality of anomalous phenomena such as ESP' (1) and apparently consider consciousness a similarly anomalous phenomenon.

The main philosophical thesis of this book is that the nature of science and the role of science in society must be changed because the current scientific paradigm cannot explain consciousness and other phenomena,

including ESP. The sixteen papers touch on many topics, but five of them address this issue. The five papers are: 'Does Further Progress in Consciousness Research Await a Reassessment of the Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science?' by Willis W. Harman, 'Getting Clear about Wholeness: A Critical Response to Harman' by Stephen E. Braude, 'Facilitating the Study of Consciousness: Emerging Themes on the Frontiers of Science' by Thomas J. Hurley III, 'Embracing the Subtle: The Emerging Paradigm in Relation to the Subtle Realms' by Beverly Rubik, and 'The Complementarity of Consciousness' by Robert G. Jahn.

All five papers make the same argument: First, science is based on certain foundational commitments; Second, science has failed to account for certain phenomena; Third, therefore, science should abandon its foundational commitments. The authors disagree slightly about exactly what the foundational commitments of science are, about exactly which phenomena science has failed to account for, and about exactly what will be left after science as we know it has been done away with. Those who remember Roger Penrose's book *The Emperor's New Mind* will recall his version of this argument: consciousness and quantum physics are both hard problems; therefore, the solution to both will be the same.

The authors of this volume cite many candidates for foundational commitments of science. The candidates include: objectivism, positivism, reductionism and 'an ontological assumption of separateness' (Harman, 15), mechanism and 'the small-is-beautiful assumption' (Braude, 31), naturalism and empiricism (Hurley, 42), materialism and fragmentation (Rubik, 102), and 'the primordial distinction of self from not-self' (Jahn, 119).

The authors also cite many phenomena science has failed to explain. Of course, the paradoxes of quantum theory are first on everybody's list. Consciousness itself is second. Also included are: the search for fundamental particles in physics, evidence for a fundamental self-organizing force in living systems, the persistent puzzle of action at a distance or nonlocal causality, the concept of the self, and altered states of consciousness, (Harman, 11-13), evolution, morphogenesis, alternative healing traditions, 'subtle energies', exceptional states of awareness, exceptional abilities, and transformational life events (Hurley, 42), and bioelectromagnetics (Rubik, 105).

The problem with this argument is simple: its conclusion does not follow from its premises. It is true that science has not accounted for many phenomena. But, it does not follow that the problem is the same in every case. The explanation of consciousness and the explanation of subtle energies might even have less in common than the explanation of consciousness and the explanation of the quantum paradoxes do.

Even if we grant that consciousness, the quantum paradoxes and subtle energies must all be accounted for the same way, it does not follow that the account must involve a major shift in the foundations of modern science. One can imagine, at least in vague terms, many accounts that might encompass all three, for example, that none of them needs a scientific explanation, or that they are all due to some hitherto unknown force.

Much more careful and detailed criticisms of science than that presented in this volume are available. Philosophers from other subfields interested in the topic would do well to start with an introductory text in the philosophy of science. The authors of these essays would have much to gain from such an excursion as well.

There are a few other items of philosophical interest in this volume. Essays by David R. Griffin, K. Ramakrishna Rao, Charles T. Tart and Michael Grosso touch on philosophical topics in different ways.

In 'What Is Consciousness and Why Is It So Problematic?' David R. Griffin considers a number of reasons one might deny the existence of consciousness, but rejects them in favor of a kind of panpsychism based on an interpretation of A. N. Whitehead. He also argues that his panpsychism solves the problem of how thoughts can be causes. Finally, Griffin asserts that his view can help us solve many existential problems, including 'the issue of why human beings are so destructive' (67).

Editor K. Ramakrishna Rao's paper, 'Cultivating Consciousness: Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues', surveys the tradition of philosophical approaches to consciousness. Of the contributors to his volume, Rao has the most sophisticated understanding of philosophy. He discusses Locke, Descartes, Kant, Moore, Brentano, Husserl, Sartre and others with intelligence. However, he does not contribute anything new to the philosophical tradition he describes.

Charles T. Tart, in an article titled 'Mind Embodied: Computer-Generated Virtual Reality as a New, Dualistic-Interactive Model for Transpersonal Psychology', documents similarities between reports of out-of-body experiences and reports of computer-generated virtual reality experiences. He goes on to speculate in an interesting way about the embeddedness of our own minds, which he calls 'biological-psychological virtual reality' (133). Though none of his conclusions is particularly convincing, his discussion contains some fascinating examples and bears comparison with other arguments for embeddedness, for example, Gareth Evans' in *The Varieties of Reference*.

In 'The Power of Imagination: Toward a Philosophy of Healing', Michael Grosso argues that we should center our philosophy around the themes of healing and wholeness. However, Grosso's understanding of philosophy, which he himself describes as 'some preferred image of the whole, some vague "philosophy of life"' (168), is so broad, and his suggestion for restructuring it so vague, that there is little of value here.

In summary, this book is too heavy on parapsychology and too light on philosophy to be worthy of serious consideration.

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David Rothenberg

Is it Painful to Think? Conversations with Arne Naess.

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1993. Pp. xxiv + 204.

(cloth: ISBN 0-8166-2151-9);

(paper: ISBN 0-8166-2152-7).

Is it Painful to Think? represents a partial, autobiographical, intellectual history of Arne Naess, the Norwegian philosopher most noted for founding the environmental philosophy known as deep ecology. The history has the form of a series of conversations between Naess and the author/editor David Rothenberg. Rothenberg, who also assisted Naess in the translation and editing of his *Ecology, Community and Lifestyle* (Cambridge, 1989) compiled the text of *Is it Painful to Think?* during a number of visits with Naess beginning in the early 1980s and culminating in the summer of 1990. Though Rothenberg declares that one will not find in the text of the conversations 'summaries' of Naess's ideas, but rather the 'spirit of the man', *Is it Painful to Think?* does provide the reader with extraordinary access into the personal and philosophical development which has shaped Naess's thinking over the years. In coming to know the 'spirit' of Naess, one comes to better appreciate his thought as well.

Though Naess is most well-known for his work in environmental philosophy, his interest in that area of inquiry came late in his life. For the greater portion of his philosophical career, he was concerned with more traditional philosophical pursuits such as the study of knowledge, semantics, and logic. One of the outstanding features of *Is it Painful to Think?* is that it documents Naess's interest and work in these areas, and the many ways in which his earlier ideas are linked to his more contemporary views in environmental philosophy.

The text is arranged into nine chapters, and is supplemented with an introduction, an epilogue, and two bibliographies of works by and about Naess and deep ecology in general. All of the chapters contain discussions of events in and stages of Naess's life, but the most concentrated biographical material can be found in chapters one, two, three and six. Therein, Rothenberg queries Naess about his childhood, a period of his life which Naess characterizes as dominated by a 'distanced' relationship with his mother whose emotional and linguistic exaggerations Naess grew to despise, his introduction to and immediate love of mountaineering, his association with the logical empiricists and psychoanalysts of Vienna during the 1930s, his two visits to Berkeley in 1938 and 1968, his marriages and familial relationships, his life under Nazi occupation, and his work with UNESCO after the war, to name but a few. Out of these conversations emerges a fairly intimate, though at times scattered vision of Naess the man, as well as Naess the philosopher.

The remaining five chapters are devoted to conversations which are more explicitly targeted at explication of Naess's philosophical ideas, principles, and attitudes. For example, there is an extensive discussion of Naess's long devotion to empiricism as a methodology by which to bring clarity and precision to philosophical inquiry and discourse, a devotion which persisted until the late 1960s. There is an equally detailed treatment of the philosophical methodology which came to replace his empiricist, behavioral approach, a view which Naess refers to as 'possibilism'. And, of great importance for those interested in deep ecology, the final three chapters contain discussions targeted at the grounding ideas of deep ecology, such as 'Self-realisation' and 'identification'.

For those sympathetic to the ideals and principles of deep ecology, *Is it Painful to Think?* will represent a return to basics, as it were. As a true dialogue in which, as Rothenberg notes in the preface, Naess refuses to be pinned down to one viewpoint, one school of thought, or style of life, the reader is given direct access to the style of philosophizing which Naess came to advocate later in life as the most profitable for intelligent inquiry. Since he introduced the term 'deep ecology' to academic environmental philosophy in his seminal 1973 essay, 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements', Naess has argued that the kind of ecological thinking embodied in deep ecology has its origins in the intuitions spawned by one's immediate experiences of their environment, cultural and natural, and not in the desire to generate philosophical or logical argumentation. The point of doing 'ecophilosophy', as Naess has called it, is to further articulate and develop these intuitions, considering along the way, the implications they may have for other beliefs and values one may hold. The eventual outcome is an 'ecosophy', which amounts to an integrated personal philosophy which is rooted in the experience of being a part of nature. Ecophilosophy does not represent, for Naess, an exercise in systematic, philosophical theory building, in the traditional Western sense; it is not an effort at constructing rigorous, philosophical arguments to be evaluated using the tools of logic. The dialogues contained in *Is it Painful to Think?* do a much better job of conveying the spirit and tenor of Naess's approach to philosophizing than do his more academic writings.

Readers more critical of deep ecology, especially those dissatisfied with its apparent lack of philosophical rigor and resistance to articulating specific environmental policy, may find the biographical material interesting, but will probably find few, if any, new considerations which might assuage their intellectual worries about deep ecology. Those chapters devoted specifically to discussions of ideas endemic to deep ecology leave many questions unaddressed, and really present no new insights into those basic ideas which cannot be found in other, more structured essays on deep ecology.

Overall, *Is it Painful to Think?* is an admirable work, especially given Rothenberg's intent in collecting, editing, and publishing the interviews. If the desire for substantial philosophical explication is set aside, and one reads the text with an eye towards discovering 'the spirit of the man', *Is it Painful*

to Think? is a rewarding journey into the intellectual spirit of Arne Naess, and, by association, those who follow him in the pursuit of a powerful, yet personal understanding of humanity's place in and relationship to the natural world.

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Zachary Seech

Open Minds and Everyday Reasoning.

Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing

Company. Pp. xv + 288.

US \$22.50 (paper: ISBN 0-534-17882-0).

Open Minds and Everyday Reasoning is designed to be used as a textbook for a one-semester introductory course on critical thinking. It is a good book. Seech writes clearly and knows his audience. He succeeds at helping the reader become better at arguing, explaining, and decision-making.

The book is in four parts. The first part is designed to help readers understand how they will benefit from studying the book. Seech points out that all of us are 'logically vulnerable' (2). Often we are not able to be objective. In a casual manner he helps us recognize this. In the first part he also helps the reader think about ways of communicating in more objective ways with our opponents. He advises us to be careful about using emotional language and to put ourselves in the shoes of our opponents. The second part helps the reader answer questions of the following sort: 'Could I restate my sentence so that it would be more precise?' and 'Could I define the notions involved in my claims so that they would be more accurate?' In this part Seech also talks about spotting 'sidetracks' (49), such as references to 'straw men' (50). (Throughout the book, Seech chooses casual names to refer to virtues and vices in informal reasoning.) In this part Seech introduces the reader to familiar Beardsley diagrams for mapping arguments. In the third part Seech discusses the evaluation of arguments. He introduces (108) his 'R-E-T' method for evaluating arguments: i) Are the reasons the *Right* kind?, ii) Are the reasons *Enough*, and iii) Are the reasons *True*? Next he gives a discussion of some standard informal fallacies, such as Division (but not Composition?), and a discussion of some valid forms of inference, such as *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*, as well as some invalid forms of inference, such as *affirming the consequent*. For the most part, validity is discussed informally. No truth-tables or Venn diagrams are presented, for example. Seech's 'evalu-

ative mappings' (108) join mappings with the R-E-T method. The fourth part helps the reader think more clearly about writing, statistical reasoning, and decision-making.

All chapters conclude with practical activities. As Seech says, many of these activities may be performed in a variety of ways and still be correct. Solutions for some exercise are given.

Two problems with the book need be mentioned. 1. Seech's discussion of validity and inductive strength is marred. His opening remarks (101-7) about these concepts are okay. To evaluate an inference ask how likely it is the conclusion is true given the premises are assumed to be true. However, later (202, for example) inference is linked with form. He suggests that good reasoning requires a certain type of form. The reader is given only a small list of valid forms and has no idea about what form many of the arguments labelled 'valid' or 'inductively strong' have. What is more disturbing is that Seech suggests (163-4) that all instances of invalid forms are invalid. This is an egregious mistake. By his opening remarks about validity it follows that an instance of the invalid form *affirming the consequent* is valid if the conclusion is necessarily true or if the minor premise implies the conclusion, for example. 2. Some of Seech's analyses of reasoning are not carefully worked out. See, for example, his analysis of example 4.2.1.b on p. 68: '... one man [Saddam Hussein] has made life truly miserable for tens of thousands of people. Billions of dollars have been lost on the stock market.' He attempts (271) a full analysis of this passage. According to it Hussein isn't referred to in the premises. Surely the arguer must be using the claim that Hussein caused the stock market losses as evidence for the conclusion. Oddly, Seech says that '... when stocks go down, billions of dollars *can* be lost by investors' (my italics) is an unstated premise that helps support the intermediate conclusion that 'billions of dollars *have* been lost by investors' (my italics) (271). The so-called 'intermediate conclusion' is not a conclusion at all.

Despite the above negative remarks, Seech's book should be considered by anyone who teaches a critical-thinking course.

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E.L. Stone

Pleasure & Realitas.

Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1993. Pp. 155.

US \$23.95 (ISBN 0-87975-785-3).

Stone offers this account of the dialectic of desire and constraint as a skeleton key to human history. He identifies the human wants which drive the movement of history as 'Pleasure', while the social need for a political order which limits the aspirations of individuals is identified as 'Realitas'. Stone asserts that to read history as a dialectical process of Pleasure and Realitas — a dialectic which, he argues, offers no promise of completion or synthesis — renders intelligible both the past course of human history as well as the general direction of its future.

There is a distinctly nostalgic flavour to a theory of this kind. Theoretical claims in respect to the dialectical intelligibility of history have gradually fallen into disrepute for much of this century — casualties, in their various incarnations, of World War One, the writings of Karl Popper and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, the theoretical resources which Stone draws upon here are largely, if not exclusively, nineteenth century in origin: in particular the early Nietzsche's distinction between Dionysian and Apollonian instincts and its psychologised counterpart in Freud's distinction between Id and Ego. Even the metaphors in which Stone presents his dialectic of Pleasure and Realitas are drawn from that quintessentially nineteenth century piece of technology which is the steam engine. Pleasure, we are told in a typical passage: 'is indeed a pent-up force: so long as there is more external pressure than internal upward-thrusting pressure, it will remain repressed and under control. It will increase in inverse ratio to the decrease of external pressure. By "external pressure" we mean all of those psychological and physical elements outside the Pleasure, the positive application of which represses it' (15). On the basis of this pipefitter's understanding of historical phenomena Stone allows himself to speculate that 'the onflow of human history could be controllable, to a certain extent' (11).

However, while Freud's psychology owed much to steam power in rendering a thermodynamics of the soul, we have alternative technological models from which to choose and one might well ask whether thermodynamics is really adequate to the task of making sense of historical phenomena. To cite but one example, human society is presently being transformed by the microchip in ways that do not appear to lend themselves in any obvious way to explanation or prediction on the basis of Stone's dialectic of container and contained; yet microchip technology is undoubtedly effecting a profound social revolution in changing the way that we work, play and educate ourselves — quite likely in ways that are unforeseeable at present. Yet transformation from within by technological development is probably more typical of historical movement than the relatively rare phenomena of popular revolution and world war upon which Stone concentrates his discussion.

Whatever explanatory power the dialectic of container and contained might offer is further diminished by the standard objections to nineteenth century historicism. Appeals to the dialectical intelligibility of history, as found, for example, in Hegel and Marx, have typically been advanced as the source of explanations for history as well as the basis for prophecy concerning the future, but as explanatory hypotheses they are subject to the fatal objection that they simply cannot be tested. At best they might serve as descriptive theories that point toward certain historical phenomena as 'typical', but knowing the future is possible only where prophecy concerns phenomena that are recurrent and isolatable; historical phenomena are neither recurrent nor isolatable. The dialectician has no recourse but to argue for his/her view via the logically invalid process of starting with a theory and then seeking confirming evidence — as Stone does here with his discussions of the Russian Revolution and the rise of Nazism.

It would only be fair to point out that Stone does not intend his dialectical model as a science of history but rather as a basis for 'artful interpretation' (12). However, if artful interpretation is what we are after, it is by no means clear why we would want to assign preference to the interpretative code that Stone offers here.

What he might have argued effectively instead is that, if it is true that historical movement is driven by the 'perpetual invariability of the impulse content of the human psyche' (12), then we have good reason for being sceptical about claims of the sort advanced by Francis Fukuyama in respect to an 'end of history'. This would have been a particularly interesting course for Stone to have followed because Fukuyama argues that the capitalist liberal democracy is the end of political evolution. Stone might have addressed the question as to why it is Fukuyama is wrong in thinking that liberal democracy offers a synthesis of *Pleasure* and *Realitas*. After all, a liberal democracy circumvents revolutionary self-destruction by continuously remaking itself through popular election; as such, it appears to offer precisely the kind of social pressure venting through controlled anarchy which might appeal to someone who fancies a pipefitter's understanding of history. Further, constitutional government, if properly constructed, would seem to allow for a balance between individual rights as claims to self-fulfilment/determination and the constraints to individual freedom requisite to the maintenance of a civil society. That Stone does not pursue such questions stand as rather large missed opportunities on his part.

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nOts

Chicago: Chicago University Press 1993. Pp. xiii + 276.

US \$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-79130-0).

On the back cover of this rather murky book, Avital Ronell of Berkeley clarifies matters a little: 'God, drugs, architecture, the Kyoto School, Madonna, and AIDS are submitted to the pressure of the not. Neither something nor nothing, the not inhabits the interstices between being and non-being and asks what it would mean ethically to act after the death of God. The not, whether morphed as God, Satan, the good, evil, a killer cell or the unconscious, articulates the space of a *different* resistance that brilliantly speaks to our most poignant anxieties'.

The Parts and the Chapters are entitled: A, 'RELIGION'; 1, 'How Not to Think God'; 2, 'nO, nOt, nO'; 3, 'Nothing Ventured/Nothing Gained/Nothing Ventured'; 4, 'Not Just Resistance'; B, 'ART'; 5, 'Saving Not'; 6, 'Not Architecture'; 7, 'Adverteasing: Forget Not'; C, 'BODY'; 8, 'The Betrayal of the Body: Live Not'.

Chapter 1 gives most space to Saint Anselm and Hegel on the Ontological Arguments, touching more quickly upon other theist proofs. It concludes: 'How not to think of God? Perhaps by (the) thinking (of the) not' (27). Chapter 2, even more tediously Heraclitean, turns to Heidegger and Derrida, with a flash of Blanchot, a dash of Eckhart and even Plato. 3 tends to be most about overcoming nihilism, about Nietzsche, Keiji Nishitani and Hegel (again), Descartes, and much added Derrida. 4 is largely space for Kierkegaard, spread to the tunes of longish encores for Hegel and Derridisms.

Chapter 5, 'Saving Not', largely concerns the artistic, architectural and literary gifts of the now prominent associates Arakawa and Madeline Gins. Several trendy, enjoyable photographs are offered. The further quotations from Heidegger — out of his *Poetry, Language, Thought* (1971) — play quite a stimulating role for aesthetics and art appreciation, compared to earlier chapters that cite Black Forest cakes and riddles.

The relations of Arakawa-Gins, on the one hand, to divisions between Hegel, Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, on the other, are discussed in a fetching way.

Chapter 6, 'Not Architecture', largely concerns the work and aims of the modern architect David Libeskind, providing a number of egg-headed, but amusing photographs. Interesting remarks fall on God, Libeskind, Freud and Schönberg. And, Oh, by the end, we have still not moved nearly far enough with the subject of *nOts*. The appendix, however, provides some insight into the Taylor behind all the babble.

In Chapter 7 Taylor tries to urge that the creations and ideas of peculiarly vulgar, modern advertising, of Madonna as Catholic and anti-Catholic, of Andy Warhol and Tammy Faye Bakker are somehow, both artistically and philosophically, quite teasingly valuable. Taylor's preachings should fall on

deaf ears. But will they grasp this in the established and wealthy, Philistine cocktail parties of Manhattan and his Little Ivy New England? Who (wisely) cares? In 8 one finds a preposterously technical, dreary and ill-fitting fling at biology, cells, diabetes and AIDS. Those who know such vocabularies well may be bored. Others may try in vain to follow enough to be bored. Again very few metaphysical not-parsnips get visibly or sniffably buttered — let alone *debuttered*. For *good* philosophy of negation and culture, talk of *nOts* could have much more happily and clearly been grounded in essays of Friedrich Waismann within his *How I See Philosophy*.

This is not an impressive book in most places. Publishers' readers should check out submissions which frequently fall bloody prey to complaints like these. (W) The employment of 'No', 'Not', 'Nothing', etc., in religious, ideological, metaphysical discourse deserves a break over and above direct quotations and no clearer paraphrases or comments. Deep creedal themes, real penetration into critical forms of prayer and meditation, local history, etc., are often required for the serious illumination of such enigmatically negative talk. (X) Proper exposition, especially when aimed mostly at *generalists* by a Taylor, requires a nicely clearer comment-language or 'meta-language' which confines the more baffling terms of the artists', philosophers', or worshippers' original object-language largely to quotations and mention-quotes and scare-quotes. Add a *nOt* glossary. It would be glorious to read truly liberating accounts of passages from Hegel, Kierkegaard, Derrida and modern writers on the modern arts. (Like Cleanth Brooks' superb essay on "The Waste Land" of T.S. Eliot?) What if this Taylor were honest enough to confess that his efforts — unlike many in Charles Taylor's *Hegel* — do not extricate candle-lights and lanterns from such black ice? Then he should turn again and explain simpler topics and texts for which he shows humbler promise. Let him cease indulging in making such mixtures of explaining *obscurum per obscurius*, *absurdum per aequaliter obscurum*, *obscurum per se-ipsum*, *obscurus conceptus per obscuriores citationes et commentarios*.

(Y) If one wants to talk profitably about art, negation and ontology, one had better speak most about works of *high aesthetic excellence* at length across more of humans' space and time. For extending attention to moderns like Cézanne, Picasso, Matisse, Max Ernst, Marc Chagal, Henry Moore and Mark Rothko would have been more enlightening than so much fuss about some present New Yorkers' more transient objects of gossip. And what of the truly great manifestations of creativity from the world's living aboriginal peoples, not least from Canada?

And in sophisticated America, shouldn't we be going further afield into spheres of partly crass undervaluing, into such glorious American sights as the photography of Stephanie Dinkins and the water colours of Hazel Guggenheim McKinley?

I think I viewed or reviewed, on a recent, brief trip to London and Oxford, canvases and ceramics far worthier of some depth of aesthetes' focus than Taylor's preferred N.Y.-artsy and Danto-esque fads. (Ancient Chinese and Greek flowerings in the Ashmolean; very recent Chinese brilliance in [Oxo-

nians'] Museum of Modern Art; Blakes and Turners and Moores in the Tate Gallery.)

If Taylor wants to *philosophize* ecumenically and metaphysically about American art, why doesn't Taylor fix any serious attention upon *outstanding American* philosophers of religion, or art, or ontic naturalism? What about the enlightening *nobility* of William James, C.S. Peirce, Charles Hartshorne, Nelson Goodman, W.V. Quine, William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, Noam Chomsky and Donald Davidson? And what about *Outis*, *Oudeis*, and Homer's Cyclops, John Wisdom's 'Gods', or Central Europeans like Carnap and Tarski?

This is a book for a thumb to strum, above all for browsing at photographs in a Blackwellian labyrinth. Buying it all or poring throughout it would not appear to warrant the deficit. nOr to bless our consequent, far-out geometried eyeballs. nOr to justify our newly aching, defenestrated, all too often gnat-bitten neurons. nOr even the neutrOns and nOtrons. Gava-nOt-gai? tOn!

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James Tully

An Approach to Political Philosophy:

Locke in contexts.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993.

Pp. 333.

US \$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-430607);

US \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-43638-9).

Tully's is the twenty-fifth book in the Cambridge *Ideas in context* series. It is a challenging, thorough, erudite and insightful contribution, one of the additions which continue to enhance the series' excellence.

The idea of 'context' — pluralized in the book's title — plays a dominant role. Tully presents Locke's work in the context of theories prior to and contemporary with those of Locke's days; and he illuminates our own concepts, practices and expectations against the background of Locke's influence. In the second part of this exercise the connection with Locke sometimes becomes tenuous, as in chapters 7 ('Rights in abilities') and 8 ('Progress and scepticism') where Locke's position is an assumed rather than explicit backdrop to contemporary ideas. These chapters are, nevertheless, among the most informative and provocative. The first exposes how 'use of the liberal language of rights, liberty, and community ... legitimates the productive systems of modernity which undermine the social conditions necessary for

engaging the practices of rights, liberty, and community' (261). In the second, an able historian of philosophy and political theory is revealed as a thinker of considerable wisdom in astute critiques of modern and contemporary notions of progress and the post-modern deconstruction of these notions.

There are weaknesses. The book is a collection of (in part re-written and expanded) articles not all of which should have been included. I would have liked it to have ended before the ninth chapter ran out of steam after the powerful paragraph on page 307. The section which closes this chapter (pp. 307-14) should have been left where it was published to begin with; it is different in tone and level from what precedes, and rehearses material met earlier in more interesting forms. The same must be said about at least the first two of the tenth chapter's three parts. Second. There is inevitable and legitimate overlap among an author's articles published on related topics in various venues and at different times. Once these articles are put together tedium tends to arise through unnecessary repetition, in this instance through Tully's reiteration of doctrines about the nature of the self; the role of uneasiness as a factor in human action; the relations among a voluntaristic account of freedom, the nature of God, and the demonstrability of (the goodness or justice of) law. Third. There is, throughout, an uncritical use of 'revolution' which at times leads to opacity. The term is nowhere clearly explicated and is used to characterize a large variety of contexts from the Cromwellian upheavals in the middle of the seventeenth to the East European turmoil at the end of the twentieth century. Sometimes (as through most of the first chapter) it seems to be used interchangeably with 'rebellion' and 'reformation'. Sometimes, it has a Copernican ring (as on p. 45: 'even when there is a revolution, people usually return to the old forms of government to which they are accustomed'). Elsewhere, it shows affinity with '*coup d'état*' (as on p. 301: 'the people ... regain their natural liberty and duty to punish the government for violating natural law through a revolution and to establish a new government').

However, the excellence of most of the individual articles and their enhancement of one another through their presence in a single volume easily outweigh whatever shortcomings the work may have. This excellence comes about in part through Tully's constant effort to implement two principles as he reads Locke in context: distance from currently standard interpretations, and freedom from the assumption that context and inherited tradition entirely account for a thinker's work. The result is a nuanced account which does justice to Locke's originality, highlights both his weaknesses and strengths, and succeeds in demonstrating that the strengths are often greater than many contemporary critics would have us believe. After reading Tully, it will be more difficult to continue seeing Locke as a relatively incoherent and superficial thinker (although Laslett's 'Introduction' to the Cambridge edition of *Two Treatises* will no doubt keep this view alive for some time) or to subscribe to the Macpherson view of Locke as an unabashed advocate for individualistic capitalism who ascribed to the state no more than

the tasks to preserve individual property and the laissez-faire context in which it was acquired.

Throughout the book, there are passages which, in brief compass, provide clear insight into Lockean doctrine (such as that on p. 123 which characterizes the Lockean servant as both post-Filmer and pre-modern) or into the context of Lockean doctrine (such as the sketch of the natural liberty tradition on pp. 287-9). All of these enhance the book's theme and add to its colour and depth.

Chapters 5 and 6 stand out particularly. In the first of these ('Rediscovering America: the Two Treatises and aboriginal rights') Tully argues that Lockean doctrine was utilised in two ways which led to the injustice First Nations suffered with respect to the lands they originally inhabited. It was used 'to defend aboriginal property rights in order to validate English property in America based on consent' through individual treaties with Amerindians, as well as 'to deny aboriginal property rights in order to validate English property in America based on settlement and cultivation without consent' (170). An interesting twist is Tully's conclusion that *Two Treatises* allows 'its self-critical use to expose and justify public action against [such] monumental injustice' (176). Chapter 6 ('Governing conduct') presents an excellent analysis of Locke on freedom in the contexts of Aristotelian-Thomistic intellectualism and Ockhamistic-Calvinistic voluntarism as these traditions were articulated — and engaged each other in warfare — in Locke's days. Given Locke's stress on individual freedom and autonomy I had, in the penultimate part of this chapter, expected greater sensitivity to individual autonomy than that of Tully's statement which conveys Locke's intent as 'to fabricate an individual who is habituated to obedience and useful labour' (237). This seems too one-sided a characterization of Locke's theory of education even when it concerns the working class. In contrast to the rest of the book, Tully here appears too caught up in dominant contemporary views of Lockean doctrine.

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Stephen Voss, ed.

Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes.

New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press
1993. Pp. 342.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-507551-X).

Historically, this volume is inspired by a conference held in 1988 at the old Sainte Claire Hotel in San Jose to celebrate the 350th anniversary of the second edition of the *Meditations*. According to Voss, 'it originated in my conviction that Americans ought to join in celebrating the 350th anniversary of the *Discourse on Method*. As Henri Gouhier observed in 1987 in opening a major conference in Paris, "three and a half centuries after the publication of the *Discourse* and the *Essays*, the land of Descartes is not simply the one we know today as France,"' (p. 3). Parenthetically, the papers presented at that conference were subsequently published under the title *Le Discours et sa méthode* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1987), edited by N. Grimaldi and J.-L. Marion.

Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes consists of nineteen chapters, divided into three parts: (1) Cartesian Philosophy: Its Foundations in the *Cogito* and Theology; (2) Cartesian Metaphysics: the Mind's Capacities and Relations to the Body; (3) Cartesian Science: Its Rhetoric, Principles, and Fruits. All of the contributors are well-known Descartes scholars: Michelle Beyssade, Jean-Marie Beyssade, Edwin Curley, Willis Doney, Alan Gabbey, Daniel Garber, Marjorie Grene, Gary Hatfield, Michel Henry, Evert van Leeuwen, Jean-Luc Marion, Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Marleen Rozemond, John Schuster, Dennis Sepper, Jean-Pierre Seris, Stephen Voss, Stephen I. Wagner, and Margaret Wilson. The wide range of viewpoints expressed by these authors justifies the editor's opening remark: 'In his philosophy and science, René Descartes was able to construct a world so capacious that anyone who studies his ideas well can live there — can acquire a unique understanding of our common world by examining it from his perspective' (3). This statement is especially true of Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion, both of whom attempt to read Descartes counter-traditionally by de-emphasizing the age-old association of the *cogito* with representation, and instead approach it from a modified phenomenological angle of vision. The gist of their strategy is to shift the focus away from the 'ecstatic definition of representation', the object of thought as *res*, and concentrate on the 'auto-affection' of the *cogito*: the act by means of which the soul begets, and acknowledges itself as the cause of its own, perceptions (64).

Hence, although the method employed is phenomenological, Henry reverses the process of inquiry by disregarding the presuppositions of Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenology. 'Instead, quite to the contrary, we shall appropriate the Cartesian concept of the soul and thereby give the idea of phenomenology a radical meaning still unnoticed today' (40). On Henry's accounting, the captivating characteristic of the *cogito* consists in its primary

search for the Beginning in a radical sense (40). In developing his 'material phenomenology', however, Henry reverts to a language reminiscent of the later Heidegger: standing-at-the-beginning, the unfolding of being, a luminous trail of light, the auto-appearing of appearing, etc. The reader who is familiar not only with Heidegger's poetic diction, but with classical phenomenology as well, will easily recognize the force of Henry's arguments. But readers with a different orientation and background may encounter some difficulty in pursuing the train of Henry's thought. In this respect, if Henry's seminal insight can be expressed in less esoteric terms, it would amount to the following: The beginning that emerges with the *cogito* is absolutely original inasmuch as prior to any act undertaken by the soul there is no possibility for the self-manifestation of any phenomenon whatsoever. Or, 'in his own language Descartes calls appearance as such "thought" (*pensée*). And just because the initial unfolding of appearance in its own auto-appearance — thought — is identically the unfolding of being, Descartes thought he could find the radical beginning he was seeking: *je pense, je suis*' (40).

Given the centrality of the concept of auto-affection, what exactly does Henry mean by it? Marion, in 'Generosity and Phenomenology: Remarks on Michel Henry's Interpretation of the Cartesian *Cogito*', explains: '... while the soul's absolute power over its volitions may be opposed to the independence of the passions, which "depend absolutely on the actions [of objects] that produce them," an exception must be maintained: the soul suffers its passions "except when it is itself their cause." Hence the soul can indeed cause its own passions, in certain exceptional cases, without external objects. So, strictly speaking, it indeed affects itself, by itself; it suffers the passion of self. In short, it is auto-affected' (62). It is this creative propensity of the soul: the power to generate perceptions from itself alone, as in the cases of wonder, generosity, esteem, and scorn, that material phenomenology seeks to explore. To support his position, Marion reverts to various articles of *Passions de l'Ame*.

Another account of the soul is rendered by Rozemond in 'The role of the Intellect in Descartes's Case for the Incorporeity of the Mind'. She attempts to connect the issue of the immortality of the soul and the immateriality of intellection by arguing that unlike the Aristotelian Scholastics, who include nutrition, growth, locomotion, and sensation among the activities of the soul, Descartes confines this activity exclusively to thought (97). For in Descartes's scheme of things, because the other activities are characteristics of matter, they can be explained mechanistically.

In the canonical literature Descartes is usually viewed primarily as a philosopher and also as the father of modern philosophy. However true these claims may be, they do not tell the whole story. For, 'Descartes was a scientist before he was a metaphysician. The Descartes we know today, the Descartes of the evil demon and the *cogito*, was the later metaphysical Descartes, who used his philosophy to ground his physics' (259). Between the early *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* and the *Meditations* and the *Principles of Philosophy*, a fundamental change, known as the 'metaphysical turn', occurred.

Accordingly, in 'Reason, Nature, and God in Descartes', Hatfield offers a lucid analysis of this transition by examining two of its aspects: (1) a reforming of the intellect such that the truths of metaphysics can be sought in the clear and distinct ideas of an intellect free of the imagination and the senses, and (2) the creation of the eternal truths, whereby it is shown that the human intellect has the ability 'to perceive the essences of things by appeal to the alleged fact that both the mind and the essences were mere creatures of God, placed in harmony with one another' (277).

If, as Hatfield claims, Descartes was a scientist before he was a metaphysician, the implication is that *qua* scientist Descartes was an experimenter, at least in his biology and optics. Then why is he generally characterized as a *rationalist*? Indeed, 'how can Descartes be *both* a rationalist, who sees knowledge as deriving from the intellect, and an experimentalist, who sees experiment and observation as essential to the enterprise of knowledge?' (288). In 'Descartes and Experiment in the *Discourse* and *Essays*', Garber argues that instead of a contradiction, the co-existence of the appeal to experience and innate knowledge is essential for the kind of method that constructs a deductive science.

Finally, the superlative quality of the essays examined in this review represents the promise of those that are not mentioned. Suffice it to say that in this volume Stephen Voss has succeeded in presenting the intellectual community with a wealth of perspectives from which Cartesian scholarship can be fruitfully approached. That is why *Essays on the Philosophy and Science of René Descartes* is recommended reading for my Honors Philosophy Seminar course.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein

Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951. Eds.
James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann.
Indianapolis, MN: Hackett Publishing Com-
pany 1993.
US \$48.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-155-4);
US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-154-6).

Hackett, the admirable American publisher of philosophical classics, offers a collection of smaller Wittgenstein works. All but one have been published before, and many are widely known and cited. It is nonetheless useful to have them available in this form. The editors confine themselves to the task of improving the editing of the texts, touching up the available translations

where appropriate, and briefly setting the selections in the context of W.'s literary legacy.

I shall briefly describe the fifteen documents which Klagge and Nordmann have collected:

1. Wittgenstein's first recorded views are found in a review of P. Coffey's *The Science of Logic*, which was published in *The Cambridge Review* in 1913 (2 pages). The arrogance of the young man is very evident, as is his commitment to several theses of contemporary logic about which Coffey erred.
2. This section consists of nine 'Letters of Ludwig Wittgenstein' and one by his sister, Hermine, written to William Eccles between 1912 and 1931 (8 pages). Eccles and W. became friends in 1908 during their engineering studies at Manchester, and these letters, though published by Eccles in 1963, have not been easily accessible. They give an impression of W.'s care for his friends, hints of the great changes in his life during these years, and a fine example (from 1914) of his aesthetic disapproval of ornamentation.
3. The 'Preface to the *Dictionary for Schools*' (German with facing English translation, 14 pages) was published in 1977 with a reprint of the dictionary. The preface was originally an explanation to the board of education for Lower Austria of why he had assembled the dictionary of 'important words of everyday life' which his pupils needed to be able to look up. The board approved its publication in 1926. W. wanted each individual pupil to be responsible for his or her compositions, and disapproved of the practice (then, and now again, in vogue) of having each pupil's work marked by another pupil before it reached the teacher.
4. 'Some Remarks on Logical Form' (7 pages) was published in 1929. Papers to be presented at the annual Joint Session of the Mind and Aristotelian Societies are printed in advance of the meetings and published as Supplementary Volumes to the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. Notoriously, W. declined to present or discuss his paper, but lectured on a different topic. The paper is nonetheless considered an important indication of W.'s early reasons for dissatisfaction with the *Tractatus*. He maintains that propositions like ones about colour, which admit of gradation or degree, 'cannot be further analyzed' (33). Previously he had insisted that such propositions could not be atomic precisely because 'outside logic all is accident' (*TLP* 6.3), and any atomic proposition could be true or false independently of the truth or falsity of any other atomic proposition. But 'x is red' is incompatible alike with 'x is white' and 'x is blue'. Thus we are led to admit that there are 'ever so many different logical forms' (31).
5. The 'Lecture on Ethics' (8 pages) which W. delivered to the Heretics Society in Cambridge in 1929 is widely known. It was published in the *Philosophical Review* in 1965. It was written in English and the

body of the text is presented in a single paragraph. (A German translation was prepared for the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in 1968 and is reprinted in *Geheime Tagebücher* [Vienna: Turia & Kant, 1991]; it gratuitously adds paragraph breaks, and repeats the error that the lecture was delivered in 1930.)

This lecture is the only 'popular' philosophy W. wrote, and it is indispensable reading for students. It not only presents in vivid form and with moving examples the *Tractatus* doctrine that the ethical is unsayable, but it also makes abundantly clear that this is not to be equated with Vienna Circle positivism. The attempt to say something about ethics is 'a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it' (44).

6. G.E. Moore's account of 'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33' (70 pages) has long been accessible in *Mind* 1954, 1955, and in Moore's *Philosophical Papers* (1959). I have been particularly struck by the brief passages on aesthetic judgement, in which W. presents his method of using parables (*Gleichnisse*), and placing cases 'side by side', as a form of reason-giving which extends from aesthetics through ethics, theology, psychology, the law, and philosophy itself. But these notes are a major research tool, and inform us about W.'s teaching style as well as about his thinking on such topics as language, logic, mathematics, and expressions of pain 'in which connexion he said something about Behaviorism (*sic*; the book is meticulous about preserving W.'s orthography but does not hesitate to Americanize Moore's), Solipsism, Idealism and Realism' (50).
7. 'Remarks on Frazer's *Golden Bough*' (German and English, 38 pages). The bulk of these date from the first conception of the *Investigations*, which W. once thought of beginning with remarks about magic. They include concrete objections to Frazer's tendency to read anthropological evidence through the lens of contemporary science: e.g., rain eventually follows a rain dance, and 'primitive man' may take this to confirm the dance's efficacy. But the same man, W. notes, 'builds his hut of wood and cuts his arrow with skill and not in effigy' (125). Frazer leads us to think that these people made errors, which are detectable because we now have better explanations of certain phenomena. W. denies that they were using explanatory language at all, and discusses ceremonial and expressive utterances which differ profoundly from theoretical explanations. These are extremely interesting notes, and form an excellent introduction to W.'s later thought. (I have used the more graceful translation by Miles and Rhees, which is also available [in *The Human World*, and reprinted as a pamphlet by Brynmill Press 1980], but the translation here by Beversluis is meticulous.)

8. In 1933 W. wrote a letter to the Editor of *Mind* disclaiming thoughts reported as his by R.B. Braithwaite (2 pages).
9. Much of the 'Big Typescript' of 1933 was incorporated into *Philosophical Grammar*. One chapter which was not, and which has only recently been published (in *Synthese* 1991), is the one W. titled '*Philosophie*' (German and English, 42 pages). It is an example of the state of much of the unpublished work; W. had edited parts of it, and there are many alternate wordings cluttering the text. Some of the characterizations of philosophy are familiar from the *Investigations*. Others are newer, for instance that his method 'only works with those who live in an instinctive state of rebellion against language' (185).
10. 'Notes for Lectures on "Private Experience" and "Sense Data"' were written in 1935-6 and were published (in part) in *The Philosophical Review* 1968 (87 pages). This fuller version wins my nomination for Most Valuable Selection in this collection. Its range of examples is dazzling (just to open discussion W. mentions fright, the feelings of 'long ago' and 'there must be something else', anguish, and the feelings which music gives you, as well as the more familiar pains and colours). And if its concern with sense data seems dated, the discussion of matters fundamental to theory of knowledge, of meaning, of objects, of realism and anti-realism, remains of profound and permanent value.
11. Wittgenstein did not lecture from notes, but the material in §10 was work which he did in preparation for lectures. Rush Rhees attended those 1935-6 lectures, and published his notes as 'The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience', in *Philosophical Investigations* 1984. Read in conjunction with W.'s preparatory notes these give as good a picture of W., the lecturer, as one could hope for.
12. 'Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness' (German and English, 59 pages) was written in five weeks in 1937. Together with other material it is reprinted from *Philosophia* 1976. It is an examination of Russell's thesis that we must have intuitive awareness of causal relations (as we do of sense data) if empirical knowledge is to be possible. W. sees here reactions instead of awarenesses. The feeling of certainty which we mistakenly associate with a sense datum is out of place here, too. The philosopher is describing a game, not reporting a feeling.
13. 'Lectures on Freedom of the Will' (16 pages) are more lecture notes. In this case the note-taker is Yorick Smythies. These two lectures were probably among those given in 1939, and the notes were just recently published in *Philosophical Investigations* (the journal) 1989. Freedom of the will is not a topic to which W. often turned, but he was consistently concerned with the nature of natural laws. One's first impression is that his position is compatibilist because he holds that laws describe but do not compel. The feeling that one is compelled can

be a gripping metaphysical picture. '[I]t is one of the most important facts of human life that such impressions sometimes force themselves on you' (435). The similes in which he discusses the topic are especially fresh and provoking.

14. The only material in this collection which has not already been published is 'Notes for the "Philosophical Lecture"' (12 pages). David Stern, who edited the MS., believes that this was prepared in 1941 in response to an invitation to deliver the British Academy's 'Philosophical Lecture' in 1942. W. later decided not to give the lecture. The subject was to be privacy. A sign that he was preparing to explain his ideas to a general audience is his: 'general remark about grammar and reality. Roughly speaking, the relation of the grammar of expressions to the facts which they are used to describe is that between the description of methods and units of measurement and the measures of objects measured by those methods and units' (449). He is careful not to deny that there are pains or that people feel them or that we can speak of them. 'What I do deny is that we can construe the grammar of "having pain" by hypostatizing a private object' (451). These notes are well-focused and will be helpful to anyone trying to understand the anti-private-language argument.
15. The collection concludes with thirty-five letters from W. to von Wright, who came to study with W. in 1939 and was named one of his literary executors (21 pages). They date from 1939 to 1951, ending with an anecdote about W.'s death. There is further evidence here of W.'s loyalty as a friend, and anyone tempted by one trivializing of the anti-private-language argument should note his wish: 'all good luck for your outer life, but by far more for your inner life; and I wish myself the same' (464).

As an Appendix the editors include a revised and expanded version of G.H. von Wright's outline of the *Nachlass*, 'The Wittgenstein Papers', which first appeared in the *Philosophical Review* 1969 (31 pages). There are also both a German and an English index.

These documents vary greatly in length, importance and availability, but they do, as the editors claim, present a reasonably faithful portrait of the philosopher and the range of his thought. The book cannot be used, of course, as the main text in a first course on Wittgenstein; the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* are much too important. The book does, though, constitute a very useful supplementary text. Moreover, everyone who writes about Wittgenstein will find it handy to own a copy.

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