

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editor • Directeur

Wesley E. Cooper
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

As a rule, C.P.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, R.C.C.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

Subscription prices

for a volume of six double issues

Institutions

\$92 (Canadian)

US\$90/Cdn\$108 (Foreign)

Individuals

\$45 (Canadian)

US\$48/Cdn\$54 (Foreign)

Students

\$34 (Canadian)

US\$33/Cdn\$42 (Foreign)

Prix de l'abonnement

à un volume de six numéros

Institutions

\$92 (Canada)

US\$90/Cdn\$108 (Hors-Canada)

Individus

\$45 (Canada)

US\$48/Cdn\$54 (Hors-Canada)

Etudiants

\$34 (Canada)

US\$33/Cdn\$42 (Hors-Canada)

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:

Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing

P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 4T2

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

© 1993 Academic Printing & Publishing

Published six times a year

Volume XIII, No. 4
August • août 1993

Table of Contents • Table des matières

Robert Almeder <i>Death & Personal Survival: The Evidence For Life After Death</i>	129
Carl R. Hahn	
John Bacon, Keith Campbell and Lloyd Reinhardt, eds. <i>Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong</i>	131
A.D. Irvine	
David Bakhurst <i>Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks to Evald Ilyenkov</i>	134
Taras D. Zakydalsky	
Harry Brod <i>Hegel's Philosophy of Politics. Idealism, Identity and Modernity.</i>	137
Renato Cristi	
Peter Carruthers <i>The Animals Issue, Moral Theory in Practice</i>	140
S.F. Sapontzis	
Patricia S. Churchland and Terrence J. Sejnowski <i>The Computational Brain.</i>	142
Michael Losonsky	
S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews, trans. <i>Ammonius On Aristotle's Categories</i>	144
Richard Bosley	
John Cottingham, ed. <i>The Cambridge Companion to Descartes</i>	146
Thomas L. Prendergast	
William Desmond <i>Beyond Hegel and Dialectic: Speculation, Cult, and Comedy.</i>	149
John W. Burbidge	
John Earman <i>Bayes or Bust?</i>	151
Patrick Maher	
William Joseph Gavin <i>William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague</i>	153
Wesley E. Cooper	
Lenn E. Goodman <i>Avicenna</i>	155
R.J. McLaughlin	
A. Phillips Griffiths, ed. <i>The Impulse to Philosophise.</i>	158
Barry Allen	
Chad Hansen <i>A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation</i>	160
Richard Bosley	
David Kolb, ed. <i>New Perspectives on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion</i>	163
John King-Farlow	

J.E. Malpas <i>Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning</i>	165
Michael Hymers	
Larry May and Stacey Hoffman, eds. <i>Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics</i>	168
Margaret Gilbert	
Ladelle McWhorter, ed. <i>Heidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy</i>	171
Véronique M. Fóti	
Susan Mendus <i>Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism</i>	173
Hans Oberdiek	
Lutz Niethammer (in collaboration with Dirk van Laak) <i>Posthistoire: Has History come to an End?</i>	176
Peter Loptson	
Alan G. Padgett <i>God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time.</i>	179
Linda Zagzebski	
Terence Penelhum <i>David Hume: An Introduction to His Philosophical System.</i>	181
John Bricke	
Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen, eds. <i>Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered</i>	184
Alexander von Schoenborn	
Thomas J. Scheff <i>Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion, and Social Structure.</i>	186
Steve Fuller	
J.B. Schneewind, ed. <i>Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant. An Anthology</i>	189
Craig Walton	
Joachim Schulte <i>Wittgenstein: An Introduction,</i> Trans. William Brenner and John F. Holley	191
Jan Zwicky	
Percy Byshe Shelley <i>The Necessity of Atheism and Other Essays</i>	195
Elmer John Thiessen	
Georges E. Sioui <i>For an American Autohistory: an Essay on the Foundations of a Social Ethic,</i> trans. Sheila Fischman	197
Tom Pocklington	
Christine Swanton <i>Freedom: A Coherence Theory</i>	200
Lawrence Haworth	
Douglas Walton <i>The Place Of Emotion in Argument</i>	203
Doug Simak	

Robert Almeder

Death & Personal Survival: The Evidence For Life After Death.

Lanham, MD: Littlefield Adams Quality

Paperbacks 1992. Pp. xii + 285.

US \$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8226-3016-8).

The *evidence* for life after death. Reincarnation, apparitions of the dead, possession, out-of-body experiences, communication from the dead.

This sounds like an ad for a series of Time-Life mail order books, and for that reason many dabblers in mysticism and the paranormal might be ready to discount Almeder's *Death and Personal Survival* by the time they've finished the table of contents. But quite to the contrary, Almeder's work is carefully researched and argued meticulously in the best philosophical style.

'Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.' This is the touchstone of Almeder's work. He is, of course, aware that he is not only taking on a monumental task, but is facing a very sceptical audience, as this book is aimed at academics. Thus the argumentation is painstakingly detailed and repetitious — even tedious at times — and an unusual lot of the work is spent responding to anticipated and actual sceptical reactions. Almeder thinks that the evidence and arguments he provides are strong enough 'that it would be irrational to withhold belief [in some form of personal post-mortem survival]' (xi). An extraordinary claim indeed.

None of the evidence presented is original; Almeder is simply summarizing and compiling material from a number of separate areas of paranormal study. This variety provides the force of Almeder's argument. Although there might be sufficient responses to, and possible explanations for, the evidence from any one area such that it would be unpersuasive, Almeder believes that collectively the evidence is irresistible.

The cases are generally well documented, and not the sensationalized ones with which many are familiar. (No Shirley McLean stories here.) Many of the cases, especially those of reincarnation, were investigated by Ian Stevenson, and culled from his writings. Most others were documented by less familiar but apparently equally trustworthy academics, journalists, etc. Almeder has hand-picked carefully only the most air-tight and persuasive cases as evidence, and indeed points out potential flaws in some of them himself.

In each chapter, Almeder lays out a number of cases and then proceeds to examine possible explanations for them other than personal post-mortem survival. These explanations usually include super-psi (psychokinesis or ESP on some grand, unprecedented scale) and fraud. Almeder recognizes that it is not scientifically possible to disprove these alternate explanations, since the evidence he relies on is *found* and not created, making repeatable experiments impossible. Nonetheless, Almeder provides powerful arguments in every case that the alternative explanations will not hold up.

Since concocting some super-psi story would be an extremely arbitrary way of explaining the evidence, he seems right in rejecting them generally

as *ad hoc*. However, the possibility of fraud is something that Almeder does not give enough credit. Not to say that he gives it short shrift; he grapples with it frequently. But he often seems either too quick to discount it, or somewhat unimaginative in considering where it might have occurred.

One example is 'the Greek case,' an alleged case of mediumship (205-6). Laura Edmonds, daughter of Judge John Worth Edmonds, was alleged to have spoken Greek — a language she had never learned — at a seance attended by her father. She was ostensibly controlled by a spirit named Botzaris, a dead friend of a Mr. Evangelides, one of the sitters at the seance. Botzaris told Mr. Evangelides, in Greek, that Evangelides' son had died recently in Greece. Almeder discounts fraud because we ought to trust the testimony of Judge Edmonds (probably true) and adds that, even though none of the other sitters spoke Greek, we know Laura Edmonds *must* have spoken Greek because Mr. Evangelides wept at the news, and later verified that his son had died. How else could he have known (268)?

The obvious alternative here is that Judge Edmonds was a victim of a small conspiracy between Laura Edmonds and Mr. Evangelides, whatever their motivations. Although Almeder ultimately treats this as a weak case because it was poorly investigated, it is only one example of his looking for fraud in all the wrong places.

Another problem in the same vein is that so much of the evidence is badly dated, making further investigation and verification impossible. Not all of Almeder's cases are subject to these two weaknesses, but certainly the collective strength of the evidence begins to wither.

Almeder would have us believe that evidence for life after death is as strong as for the existence of dinosaurs, since the evidence of dinosaurs is also found, and experimentally unrepeatable. The difference, of course, is that we have physical evidence of dinosaurs, i.e., fossils, but Almeder's evidence is testimonial, relying on people who may have various motives for saying what they say. So although this book is very powerful and challenging, in the end we are forced to choose between two miracles: one that there is post-mortem survival; the other that of the thousands of fraudulent cases ever created, some were so successfully done as to escape our closest investigations. In such a case, Hume would have us side with the lesser miracle, and it's clear which one that is.

Carl R. Hahn

University of Waterloo

**John Bacon, Keith Campbell and
Lloyd Reinhardt, eds.**

Ontology, Causality and Mind:

Essays in Honour of D.M. Armstrong.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1993.

Pp. xiv + 297.

US \$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-41562-4).

This volume marks the retirement of one of Australia's pre-eminent contemporary philosophers, David Armstrong. It contains eleven papers, each followed by a short critical response written by Armstrong. The papers are arranged under four general themes: Possibility & Identity, The Theory of Universals, Causality & Laws of Nature, and Consciousness & Secondary Qualities. Articles are contributed by William Lycan, David Lewis, J.J.C. Smart, John Bigelow, C.B. Martin, Peter Forrest, D.H. Mellor, Evan Fales, Peter Menzies, Frank Jackson and Keith Campbell. All of the papers are clearly written and many advance, not only the philosophical issues under discussion, but also our understanding of Armstrong's own views on these subjects. The volume concludes with a comprehensive bibliography of Armstrong's writings, with entries separated into five categories: Books (totalling 11, of which 4 have been translated into languages other than English), Books Edited (2), Articles (62, of which 4 have been translated), Discussions & Notes (29), and Critical Notices & Reviews (41). It would be premature to think that this list will not continue to grow over the coming years.

This is the second anthology to appear honouring Armstrong. The first, entitled simply *D.M. Armstrong* (1984), was edited by R.J. Bogdan. Unlike the current volume, the Bogdan anthology contains a 49-page self-profile by Armstrong, and its bibliography, although now somewhat dated, is annotated. The advantage of the Bacon-Campbell-Reinhardt bibliography is that, although not annotated, it is both current and exhaustive, containing references, not only to Armstrong's philosophical writings, but to his political and other writings as well.

For Armstrong, naturalism is the thesis that the world is nothing but a single spatio-temporal system, a single causal nexus bounded by space and time. It is this thesis which he has spent most of his philosophical career defending. Yet if this thesis is correct, the defender will be forced to explain (or explain away) a virtual cornucopia of supposed entities which philosophers (and others) have postulated as truth-makers for sentences which we all accept as true. Scientific and other truths appear to commit us to more than just tables and chairs, genes and DNA molecules, black holes and elementary particles. They also appear to commit us (in varying degrees) to non-physical minds, sensations, ideas, beliefs and propositional attitudes; to transcendent universals, non-material concepts and timeless propositions; to numbers, functions, sets, categories and other mathematical entities; to fictional and mythological characters; to non-actual possibilities, laws and dispositions; to negative facts, moral facts, a Prime Mover, and even non-ex-

istent objects. What is the defender of naturalism to say about such commitments? How is the naturalist to account for the truth of sentences which purport to quantify over such entities?

Armstrong's solution has been to consider in turn many of the most philosophically central of these purported entities, suggesting how a well-developed naturalism would eliminate them, reduce them to other acceptable physical entities, or simply explain them as naturally existing entities in their own right. Thus, in *Perception and the Physical World* (1961) and *Bodily Sensations* (1962), Armstrong became one of the first to defend in a systematic and convincing way a theory of direct realism concerning perception. A *Materialist Theory of the Mind* (1968) soon followed with its defense of a forerunner of functionalism — central state materialism — the thesis that mental states could be identified with states of the brain and central nervous system. Just as one need not postulate non-physical souls or vital forces to understand life as a purely physico-chemical phenomenon, one need not postulate Cartesian minds to understand the mental. Later, in *Belief, Truth and Knowledge* (1973), Armstrong went on to complete this project by developing a naturalistic account of many notions related to the mental, including beliefs, propositions, concepts and truth.

On the topic of universals Armstrong is well known for integrating a realistic theory of properties and relations with a naturalistic world view. It is Armstrong's position that although a theory of transcendent universals is untenable, so, too, is nominalism. Thus *Nominalism and Realism* (1978), *A Theory of Universals* (1978), and *Universals: An Opinionated Introduction* (1989) all argue for a theory of naturally existing particulars, properties and relations. *What Is A Law of Nature?* (1983) then shows how this theory of universals can assist in the construction of a non-regularity theory of laws of nature which, despite being necessitarian, is nevertheless naturalistic. In Armstrong's account (which is advocated independently by Dretske and Tooley), laws of nature are dyadic relations of necessity or probability between universals. The account is motivated by the observation that, although it is particulars which act and are acted upon, they do so solely in virtue of their *properties*.

Finally, in *A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility* (1989), Armstrong defends a combinatorial-fictionalist theory of possibility. In essence, his theory is that possibilities are determined by the 'mere existence' of the component elements of states of affairs, namely universals and particulars.

The majority of contributions to the present volume centre on Armstrong's theory of universals and its implications for theories of causation, laws of nature, mathematics and modality. The anthology begins with a critique by Lycan of Armstrong's theory of possibility. In 'Armstrong's New Combinatorialist Theory of Modality', Lycan raises the issue of why, given fictionalism, combinatorialism is required for the success of Armstrong's program. He also questions how it is that any fictionalist theory of possibility could be acceptable to the naturalist.

Several other papers discuss similar themes. In 'Properties and Predicates', Mellor discusses how properties relate to predicates, specifically how they relate 'to what those predicates mean' (101). One point at which Mellor differs from Armstrong is over his rejection of complex properties. In 'Sets Are Haecceities', Bigelow argues that sets are higher-order properties, in contrast to Armstrong's view that sets are aggregates of states of affairs of a special sort. In 'Power for Realists', Martin discusses the relationship between universals and causal dispositions. In 'Many, but Almost One', Lewis begins to develop a semantics of partial identity, relating it to both Geach's paradox of 1001 cats and van Fraassen's method of supervaluations.

Among the contributions dealing directly with laws of nature are those by Forrest, Smart, Fales and Menzies. In 'Just Like Quarks? The Status of Repeatables', Forrest argues against Armstrong's rejection of uninstantiated universals and against what he calls the Dependence Thesis, the thesis that universals exist because particulars exist. Forrest holds that uninstantiated universals are required for an account of physical possibility, and hence for any detailed account of counterfactuals and functional laws. In 'Laws of Nature as a Species of Regularities', Smart defends a regularity account against the necessitarian view. In 'Are Causal Laws Contingent?', Fales examines a number of challenges put by regularity theorists to their opponents. For Armstrong, who claims that laws are special second-order relations between universals, the question of whether these nomic connections are necessary or contingent is an important one. Unlike Armstrong, Fales holds that such connections must be necessary, especially if such laws are to account successfully for counterfactuals. Finally, in his ambitious 'Laws of Nature, Modality and Humean Supervenience', Menzies reviews several perceived shortcomings of both the regularity and the necessitation accounts of laws. Having disposed of both of these major contenders, he then presents his own theory of laws. It is a theory that neither forces 'physical modality into the Humean straightjacket' nor postulates 'irreducible necessary connections' (196), relying instead upon a primitive notion of physical modality.

The anthology finishes with papers by Jackson and Campbell concerning realism and mental states. In 'Block's Challenge', Jackson defends a behavioural-functionalist approach to intelligence against a well-known criticism of Ned Block. In Jackson's words, 'Sympathy for behaviourism about intelligence should be sympathy for the idea that being intelligent is a matter of being internally such as to make true certain facts about behavioural dispositions and capacities. ... In D.M. Armstrong's terminology, we must be realists and not phenomenologists about the dispositions distinctive of intelligence' (235). The final paper, 'David Armstrong and Realism about Colour', by Campbell, is helpful, not just for outlining various realist and other alternatives with regard to colour, but for prompting Armstrong, in his reply, to clarify his actual view.

In his nearly three decades as Challis Professor of Philosophy at Sydney, Armstrong has contributed greatly to contemporary philosophy, not just in Australia, but throughout the world. In large measure this is because of his systematic view of philosophy and his persuasive championing of naturalism. However, as the editors of *Ontology, Causality and Mind* point out, Armstrong's influence has not come about solely as a result of his philosophical views. In their Preface they comment: 'Quite apart from the influence of his substantive views ... those of us who have been affected by him value almost more than anything else the inspirational force of his personality. In his presence, philosophy *feels* important' (x). Anyone who has met Armstrong knows this to be the case. The editors and contributors are to be commended for successfully conveying something of this feeling with *Ontology, Causality and Mind*.

A.D. Irvine

University of British Columbia

David Bakhurst

*Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet
Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks to Evald
Ilyenkov.*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.
Pp. xi + 292.

US \$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-38534-2);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-40710-9).

Whatever the title may imply, this is a book about Ilyenkov (1924-79), a leading member of a group of Soviet philosophers, called 'critical Marxists' by the author, which arose in the 1960s and attempted to revitalize Soviet philosophy by returning to Marx, Hegel, and classical German philosophy. Bakhurst esteems Ilyenkov's work as the 'best of Soviet philosophy' (23) and proposes to do three things: (1) reconstruct his ideas as a unified whole, (2) locate them within the Soviet tradition, and (3) prove the philosophical value of Soviet philosophy. He carries out the first task brilliantly, the second — incompletely, and the third — unconvincingly.

According to Bakhurst, the heart of Ilyenkov's thought lies in his solution to what is called the 'basic question of philosophy' in the Soviet tradition — the problem of the relation of thought and being. The solution is reached through Ilyenkov's version of the dialectical method and entails the doctrine of the socially defined individual. Bakhurst devotes a chapter to each of these three topics. In his first important book, on Marx' method in the *Capital*

(1960), Ilyenkov treats cognition as a movement from an abstract to a concrete concept (141-2) and concludes that the dialectical method, by which this is to be accomplished, is not a general, object neutral procedure but, in Bakhurst's words, a 'particularist' (tailored to each object) and 'historicist' (consisting of the critique of past theories) one (163). In effect, Ilyenkov shows, without admitting it in so many words, that there is no general nontrivial method for obtaining knowledge (161).

The 'concrete universal' that serves as Ilyenkov's key to the problem of thought and being is Marx' concept of 'real, sensuous, social, object-oriented activity' (180). It is human activity that gives rise to both the difference between thought and being and their unity by projecting ideals into nature, thus transforming nature into an object of thought and man into a thinking subject (260). By acting on things men endow them with 'ideal forms' (values, meanings, uses), which then exist in things, not in minds. Although they are 'anthropocentric', ideals are in the external world (objective), not in some consciousness (subjective) (180). Collectively, the ideals constitute an organized system of spiritual culture that is embodied, on the one hand, in the state, social institutions, and language, and on the other, in the natural world we know (188). To know in this context is simply to orient oneself in the man-shaped world, to be governed not by physical causes but by the ideal forms of the environment (197, 244). It is not to have some kind of mental image of the world. Since the idealized world is objective, we can be said to know the world directly. The advantage of this theory is that it avoids all the difficulties inherent in 'two-worlds' theories of knowledge like Descartes', Locke's, and Kant's, in which the object is known only through a representation of it in the mind. These difficulties are brought out by Ilyenkov and vividly outlined by Bakhurst. For Ilyenkov the doctrine of the identity of thought and being or 'radical realism', as Bakhurst calls it, is the essence of materialism (209). To preserve it, Ilyenkov readily sacrifices the theory that reality is nothing but matter in motion (what I would call 'ontological materialism' as opposed to 'epistemological materialism', which is the same as radical realism).

Since the world we know is the idealized world, not the world as it is in itself, Ilyenkov has been criticized for holding a form of idealism very similar to Kant's. Bakhurst attempts to reconstruct a defense out of clues in Ilyenkov's writings: he draws a distinction between physical properties and ideal properties that are anthropocentric and argues that Ilyenkov, unlike Kant, can retrace in thought the change introduced by idealization and thus describe the world as it is in itself (210). I fail to follow him: in his discussion of idealization Bakhurst consistently holds that to be seen 'as an object of a certain kind' the object has to be "refracted through the prism" of our spiritual culture' (244) and in comparing Kant and Ilyenkov on experience he points out that in the former the sensuous manifold is organized in the individual mind by the a priori categories, while in the latter it is organized in social activity by the ideal forms in the spiritual culture (197). If not all objects or properties are products of idealization,

then we need another epistemology to account for our knowledge of them. I think Ilyenkov's answer to the charge of Kantianism should be quite simple: we know the world as it is, not as it appears to us (epistemological materialism) but, of course, the world as it is has been transformed by human action and is not what it was prior to man's appearance (drop ontological materialism).

Since the mind arises from social, object-oriented activity and amounts to activity appropriate to the idealized environment, it cannot be innate or reducible to brain or bodily states. This consequence was of great importance to Ilyenkov, because he took it to be a necessary condition for the perfectibility of man and the construction of communism. Yet, Ilyenkov failed to develop a satisfactory theory of the socially defined individual: he left no hint how to account for consciousness, self-consciousness, introspection, and the privacy of mental events (257) and his arguments against reductionism and innatism were unclear and inconclusive (231). Bakhurst gives an extensive reconstruction of them (244-53), which seems to contain more Bakhurst than Ilyenkov and is more complicated than it needs to be. In the end one is left wondering how ideals (rules, reasons) produce behavior in a noncausal way. Even worse, without an analysis of the concepts of activity and spiritual culture Ilyenkov's 'concrete universal' appears abstract, a verbal cover for our ignorance.

To locate Ilyenkov in the Soviet philosophical tradition Bakhurst discusses the Mechanist-Deborinite debate of 1924-9 (chap 2), L. Vygotsky's theory of mind (chap 3), and Lenin's critique of empiriocriticism and the Stalinist period (chap 4). Each chapter is well-written and interesting in its own right, but has a different bearing on Ilyenkov. The issues debated in the 1920s were similar to those debated by Ilyenkov and positivistically minded philosophers in the 1970s, but the earlier debate did not influence the later one and Bakhurst does not claim that it did. Vygotsky's theoretical contributions to psychology in 1924-34 were discovered by Ilyenkov only after he had worked out his own concept of mind, but they confirmed his ideas and he became a philosophical spokesman of the 'Vygotsky School' in Soviet psychology. Ilyenkov was familiar with Lenin's *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* and treated it as a profound work, but because Lenin's realism was ambiguous (copy theory vs direct realism) he could hardly have derived his epistemology from Lenin. Thus, Bakhurst places Ilyenkov in the context of Soviet philosophy without throwing any light on what or who influenced his intellectual development. Furthermore, Bakhurst tells us nothing about the work of the 'critical Marxists' around Ilyenkov or about his influence in Soviet philosophy.

Although Ilyenkov's ideas coincide with some recent trends in Anglo-American philosophy (17-21) and Bakhurst's reconstruction of his doctrines is lucid, logically unified, and stimulating, I remain unconvinced about Ilyenkov's attractiveness for the Western reader. Bakhurst does not gloss over the shortcomings of Ilyenkov's works: the abstruse language, logical incoherence, incompleteness, avoidance of issues, polemical style, and politi-

cally motivated attacks. In many ways Bakhurst's book is an excellent confirmation of J. Scanlan's description (dismissed by Bakhurst on p. 2) of Soviet philosophy as a pluralism of views masked by a verbal consensus. Without 'idealization' by an interpreter of Bakhurst's caliber, Ilyenkov is 'Soviet, all too-Soviet' to be interesting, and perhaps intelligible, to the Western reader.

Taras D. Zakydalsky

Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Toronto

Harry Brod

Hegel's Philosophy of Politics. Idealism, Identity and Modernity.

Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992. Pp. vii + 216.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-8317-X);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-8526-1).

This study of Hegel's political philosophy tries to combine two different 'interpretive styles or programs' (1), a German style that focuses on the principles that underlie Hegel's argument and an Anglo-American style that opts for a more pragmatic approach and considers Hegel's institutional proposals in piecemeal fashion. Accordingly, the first three chapters articulate the 'deep structure' (3) of Hegel's political philosophy, while the remaining four examine its institutional programs and 'positive political doctrines' (6). The conclusion suggests three areas of contemporary political theory (civil society, law and feminism) that would benefit from an application of Hegelian principles.

According to Brod, the 'deep structure' of Hegel's political philosophy is found in his philosophy of history. General philosophico-historical principles provide the 'criteria' (43) to evaluate political institutions. Three general observations sustain this interpretation. Brod first defines the historical principles that support those institutions as the 'fundamental principles of the modern world' (22). Accordingly, Hegel's politics are first and foremost the politics of modernity. Secondly, Brod discusses how the politics of modernity sanctions 'rationality, universality and subjective freedom' and rejects tradition and natural authority (29). This conception of politics conforms with idealism. The mediation of subjective consciousness is needed to legitimate substantive institutional arrangements. Thirdly, Brod notes that Hegel recognizes the tension between the historical incorporation of those general principles and their philosophical distinctness. Those principles have been

the philosophical sustenance of Protestantism, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. While Protestantism allowed subjective freedom to display itself within ecclesiastical structures, both the Enlightenment and the French Revolution sharpened the tension between free subjectivity and institutional embodiments. A compromise was attained by Napoleon's strong rule. By stabilizing it, Napoleon saved the revolution from devouring itself (49). The revolution could now be vindicated by Hegel as the 'culmination of world history' (51). This account of the unfolding of modernity beckons a conservative authoritarian strain in Hegel's thought, confirmed by his association of history with religious consciousness and concomitant notions of immutability and eternal validity. Hegel extracts himself from this conundrum by sorting out 'the progressive from the regressive in the historical past' (53), by refurbishing traditional institutions like corporations and by redefining the notion of revolution as a restoration of the 'classical, Greek idea of revolution' (53). In the end, Brod sets Hegel firmly in the liberal camp, on an interpretation of liberalism that makes it responsive to authority and the tradition preserved in institutions.

The next four chapters expose in detail the institutional embodiment of Hegel's political principles. Brod detects a 'mismatch' between Hegel's programmatic principles and their detailed application (164). The distinction between principles ('deep structure') and their application ('surface') has an aim larger than a purely descriptive one. By separating these argumentative layers Brod assumes that the validity of Hegel's liberal principles can be shielded from his unsavory authoritarian, anti-democratic, nationalist and sexist institutional prescriptions. Brod, however, fails to achieve this aim. Firstly, because he does not fully discern his own verification of the conservative and realist strains that toughen Hegel's liberal principles. And secondly, because he does not acknowledge the extent to which those conservative strains influence Hegel's institutional prescriptions.

Brod restricts his analysis of institutions to the notions of civil society and the State. Civil society is defined by the self-centered needs of individuals and the universal system engendered by those needs. This rudimentary universality is strengthened by a Lockean-type of governing organization. It encompasses both a judiciary system and what Hegel calls *Polizei*. According to Brod, it is here that Hegel's liberalism is most visible. But Brod defines liberalism in vague and seemingly incongruous terms. Brod emphasizes the possessive individualist nature of civil society, which he sees as devoid of 'intersubjective, political consciousness' (91). This is confirmed by his assertion that private property is the category that rules civil society. At the same time, however, Brod notices that Hegel rejected atomist conceptions of human relations. He believes that Hegel seriously espoused corporations as Burkean intermediate associations designed to moderate extreme competitive attitudes. Furthermore, he distances Hegel from what he calls 'the individualist conception of property rights in liberal theory' (66). Hegel, according to Brod, espoused a social, intersubjective view of property (70).

The central issue debated in the sections devoted to Hegel's State is the question of the legitimacy of political authority. Did Hegel espouse the monarchical principle or did he accept democratic legitimacy? Brod favours the latter view. He assumes that Hegel acknowledged the ascendancy of modern revolutionary principles and thus relinquished the divine right of kings (135). Hegel granted that legitimacy was premised on the 'consciousness of the citizens' (133), which implies that modern political regimes base 'their legitimacy on the claim that they embody the rational will of their citizens' (169). According to Brod, regimes that represent the will of the people must be defined as democratic (170). Hence, in agreement with the dominant Anglo-American interpretation, he concedes that Hegel was not only a liberal, but also a democrat. How does this square with Hegel's unambiguous rejection of popular sovereignty? According to Brod, Hegel rejected a 'private, particularist conception of that will', and retained a 'social, universal conception' of it (133). Aside from the vagueness of this proposition, it faces grave difficulties. In the first place, Hegel's conception of society as civil society confirms a private, particularist conception that recognizes only individual sovereignty. Secondly, Brod recognizes that State authorities can exercise their legitimate sovereignty only by referring all public issues to the 'decision-making will of the monarch' (151). I see this as an explicit affirmation of the monarchical principle and a rejection of democratic legitimacy.

One last point about style. Despite a well-structured plan and penetrating analyses of some of the issues involved, Brod's eclectic style gives rise to a rather scattered portrait of Hegel's principled political options. This book's original aim was to combine the German and Anglo-American interpretive styles. Possibly an eagerness to sell Hegel as a mainstream political thinker in the predominantly pluralist Anglo-American academic scene has clouded Hegel's passion for unity. It seems to me that Hegel scholarship in Germany is, both traditionally and in much recent work, sensitive to the conservative-authoritarian strains in Hegel, not precluding acknowledgement of his liberal commitment.

Renato Cristi

Wilfrid Laurier University

Peter Carruthers

The Animals Issue, Moral Theory in Practice.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Pp. xiii + 206.

US \$44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-43092-5);

US \$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-43689-3).

The ethologist Donald R. Griffin has noted that 'it seems plausible that animals would be more likely to survive and reproduce if their beliefs included confident faith in their own superiority and the assurance that exploiting other species was normal and correct behavior' (*The Question of Animal Awareness* [New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1981], 88). Peter Carruthers' *The Animals Issue* attempts to rationalize such instinctual bias in favor of humanity.

Methodologically, Carruthers pursues a state of 'reflective equilibrium' between moral common-sense and moral theory. According to Carruthers, one of 'our' common-sense moral beliefs which must be accommodated in this equilibrium is that while 'it is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering to an animal,' 'there can be no question of weighing animal suffering against the suffering of a human being' and 'there need be nothing wrong with causing the painless death of an animal' (156-7). Carruthers then evaluates utilitarian and contractualist moral theories on the basis of their abilities to justify this belief and concludes that contractualism is the superior theory, for it does a better job of justifying that belief. Simply put, Carruthers begins with an instinctual 'attachment to humanity generally' (147) and concludes that contractualism is the superior moral theory, since it provides an apology for that attachment that utilitarianism cannot.

Carruthers then moves on to draw the practical conclusion that 'there is no basis for extending moral protection to animals beyond that which is already provided. In particular, there are no good moral grounds for forbidding hunting, factory farming, or laboratory testing on animals' (196). Carruthers' argument for this conclusion is that 'some version of contractualism provides us with the most acceptable framework for moral theory, and from such a perspective animals will be denied moral standing' (196). Thus, Carruthers accomplishes one of the tidiest circular arguments in the history of philosophy: the most acceptable moral theory is one which rationalizes our instinctual species bias, and our instinctual species bias is morally acceptable because it is rationalized by the most acceptable moral theory.

Some people might be surprised to find that a belief that 'animal suffering has moral standing, mattering for its own sake' (157) is not to be included on the list of our common sense moral beliefs. However, Carruthers argues that such a belief 'is not, properly, part of common sense itself, but is rather a theoretical construction upon it.' He even offers an explanation of how we come to be 'under the illusion of direct significance' (158). Consequently, it turns out that treating a human corpse merely as a means to insignificant ends is 'morally wrong' (146-7), while 'almost any legitimate, non-trivial,

motive [e.g., "earning a livelihood"] is sufficient to make ["actions that cause suffering to animals"] morally acceptable (159). Apparently, it would be morally wrong for someone earning his livelihood by the sword to perfect his craft on human corpses but morally acceptable for him to practice by lopping off the heads of healthy puppies, kittens, calves, and lambs. Apparently, Carruthers has something in common with those 'animals rights activists who pursue the methods of terrorism': he, too, is prepared to follow his theory through to 'its logical, but morally abhorrent, conclusion' (96).

Even more challenging to our common-sense moral beliefs, Carruthers speculates that 'it ought to be strictly impossible to feel sympathy for animals' and that 'animals can make no moral claims on us' whatsoever (192, 193). Carruthers' argument here is that to be conscious is to be self-reflective: 'a conscious experience is a state whose existence and content are available to be consciously thought about' (181). But 'it is unlikely that such creatures ["birds, mice, or dogs"] might be thinking things consciously to themselves.' Consequently, 'the experiences of all these creatures will be of the non-conscious variety' (184). This applies to the pains and desires of animals, so that their experiences of pain and frustration go unfelt (188-9). As a consequence of this, 'the pains [injuries and desires, too] of animals will make no moral claims upon us' (187). To summarize, Carruthers would have us believe that it is at least likely that since animals are not self-reflective, they do not feel pain and, consequently, not only cannot have rights but also cannot really be objects of sympathy or cruelty. Apparently, the vivisectors of Port Royal were right after all: the screams of the dogs they nailed to boards and slit open did not signify they were in pain, and only those suffering from an anthropomorphic illusion could believe that there was anything morally amiss with vivisection. Apparently, no theory is too extreme to be excluded from Carruthers' reflective equilibrium as long as it counts against the animals, although any theory — such as utilitarianism — which calls for equal consideration for animals is to be rejected as 'extreme.'

Carruthers is also ready to embrace a number of other arguments having other sorts of flaws, provided they help rationalize our attachment to humanity. For example, he acknowledges that 'the death of an animal may bring to an end a worthwhile existence' but insists that 'this is not what sympathy for the death of a rational agent normally amounts to,' since 'only such an agent has long-term projects, or the desire for continued life.' Consequently, 'fail[ing] to have such feelings in connection with the death of an animal need not show that there is anything amiss with our moral character' (156). Apparently, the possibility that we might feel sympathy for a rational agent on the basis of what it shares with animals *in addition to* what differentiates it from animals has not occurred to Carruthers.

The Animals Issue has its moments, such as its discussion of normative and governing principles as criteria for acceptable moral theories and its criticisms of Tom Regan's 'inherent value' theory as entailing intuitionism. But on the whole, it is a compendium of circular, flawed, and implausible arguments whose emotional engine — 'we find it intuitively abhorrent that

the lives or suffering of animals should be weighted against the lives or sufferings of human beings' (195) — becomes clearer and clearer as the book progresses. As intended, *The Animals Issue* is accessible to a wide audience and will, doubtless, be warmly embraced by those seeking an aggressive apology for their instinctual bias in favor of our own species.

S.F. Sapontzis

California State University, Hayward

**Patricia S. Churchland and
Terrence J. Sejnowski**

The Computational Brain.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1992. Pp. xi + 544.

US \$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-03188-4).

This book is an informed and reliable overview of current research in computational neuroscience, and it is also a spirited defense of the relevance of computational models to both psychology and neurobiology. The authors — a philosopher and a neurobiologist who are at the cutting edge of this field — offer the reader a rich smorgasbord (lavishly garnished with illustrations, figures, and tables) of computational models of neural processes, from the bending reflex of a leech to stereovision in primates.

The models the authors present are informed by neurobiological results, but they also suggest new experiments on actual nervous systems. A major line of their defense is that computational neuroscience predicts neurobiological results and thus it can guide neurobiological investigation by suggesting new hypotheses and tests. Major examples of this interaction between computational modelling and neurobiological testing are the Miller-Stryker models for the development of ocular dominance in the visual cortex, Lockery's LeechNet II for bending in the leech, Lisberger and Sejnowski's network modelling the role of the flocculus in vestibular-ocular learning, and Koch's models of single cortical pyramidal neurons.

Although Churchland and Sejnowski discuss models for single neurons, their focus is on properties of *networks* of neurons. They believe that a pure bottom-up explanation of behavior that centers on single neurons and their properties will not be sufficient. A proper explanation of behavior will address the special properties of networks of neural activity. In fact, the authors grant that organizational properties that are even higher than the level of networks (such as systems of networks, whole brains, and even networks of brains) will play essential roles in a unified science of the mind/brain. Their view is that the successful science of mind will not be limited to one organizational level (whether a high functional level or a low

neuronal level) but will encompass and have nomological relations to all the levels of organization in a nervous system, from molecules to behavior.

Churchland and Sejnowski's account is computational because the brain's processes are modelled by input-output functions on representations. However, they favor a special sort of computational process. Their models are not the digital, serial, and rule-conforming computations of your home computer, but the analogical, parallel, and associationistic computations of Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP). The basic features of their approach are that mental representations are vectors of activation values of individual nodes, learning is the appropriate changing of connection weights between nodes, and the brain's computations are functions on vectors.

This book develops a variety of important themes. A major recurring and exciting theme of this book is about 'time and the necessity for network models to reflect the fundamental and essential temporal nature of actual nervous systems' (117). For example, in actual nervous systems 'speed of response is the *only* thing that distinguishes activation from weight modification' (177). Churchland and Sejnowski also argue that the timing of neural activity (for example oscillation frequencies of cells and populations of cells or bursting schedules) are part of the very computational architecture of the brain and not features that only belong to the medium that implements the brain's computations (307). The authors argue convincingly that the brain's computations do not only involve vectors as inputs, but sequences of vectors ordered temporally and occurring at the right time with the right duration (379-81).

If Churchland and Sejnowski are right that time is of the essence, then strictly speaking their approach is not a purely computational approach. On a computationalist account, the mind is medium-independent. It does not matter what type of stuff the mind is made of as long as this stuff computes the right functions on representations, and a physical system computes a function just in case the physical states and the transitions from state to state of a physical system can be mapped onto the inputs and outputs of the computed function. However, on Churchland's and Sejnowski's account, an essential feature of the brain's computations is that it does not only compute input vectors, but that it operates on sequences of input vectors ordered temporally at specific rates, and that these temporal properties are intrinsic to the system (380-1). Thus strictly speaking the brain's computations are not medium-independent. The computations have to occur in dynamic systems with the right temporal properties.

The dynamic complexity of the brain more than anything else feeds the suspicion that the brain is 'more complicated than it is smart' (287). However, Churchland and Sejnowski do not share this suspicion. They have a 'hunch that exciting things are in store' (16), and it seems that one of those exciting things is the ability to manipulate 'efficiently and directly the very thing that makes us what we are' (426). It is difficult not to see this quest for control and manipulation of who we are in the light of the grim consequences the quest for efficient and direct control of nature had on our environment. Are we going to turn the brain into Los Angeles? It would be nice if neuro-sci-

tific knowledge were disassociated from the desire to use this knowledge for control and manipulation. At least logically the knowledge and the desire are distinct. Equally compatible with neuroscientific knowledge, including the results of computational neuroscience, is the conclusion that such sensitive, intricate, evolved, and fine-tuned natural processes that cannot be modelled or duplicated by us without many simplifying assumptions should be left alone and free from our direct and efficient control (just as we should preserve wilderness free of human interference).

Sympathetic as well as critical readers will find much to think about in this rewarding volume. The writing is lively and it is aimed at 'both neophyte and cognoscenti' (13). However, a novice will find the going difficult. The book comes with an extensive and helpful glossary, but if you do not have at least a rough idea of how neurons fire and transmit impulses across synaptic clefts or how nodes and weights make up PDP networks, this book will be frustrating. Novices should pull their college biology textbooks off the shelf and read up on the nervous system and they should also find an easy introduction to connectionist processing before they read this book. With this reading under their belts, neophytes will be able to appreciate this dynamic and detailed panorama of the computational brain.

Michael Losonsky

Colorado State University

**S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews,
trans.**

Ammonius On Aristotle's Categories.

Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press
1991. Pp. 170.

US \$46.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2688-X).

The book contains a short introduction by Richard Sorabji, a translation of Ammonius' commentary, and (in addition to textual emendations, a glossary, and indices) an appendix on the commentators. The introduction usefully places Ammonius as a commentator and discusses the commentary; the appendix discusses the tradition of commentators.

The translation is very well done: it is clear and pleasant to read. Students of Aristotle's commentators are indebted to the scholars who are bringing such commentaries into English with so much care and clarity.

What sort of commentator and philosopher does the translation present to us? I find: an altogether sympathetic thinker. His Neoplatonism, of course,

comes across: for extremes there is a middle; the number 10 arises from 4 which arises from the dyad and so on.

Ammonius is sympathetic with a text he can hardly agree with: in excusing it he makes out that it is written for, as it were, first year students still accustomed to attending to immediate objects of perception. How otherwise is the Philosopher to be excused from making particulars primary substances?

Ammonius takes on critics of the *Categories* and fends them off on grounds of Aristotle's concessions to being a teacher — a concession which does not put at risk Aristotle's standing as a philosopher. And the commentary reads as though it belongs in a first year class: a line by line explication of Aristotle's text; it rationalizes Aristotle's order, takes issue with some points but on the whole subordinated to making Aristotle come out right. The commentary is rarely philosophically engaging. The translators occasionally, in footnotes, help Ammonius pull himself together and do justice to the interest of Aristotle's treatise. Why Ammonius should be a little half-hearted about his lectures, can perhaps be made clear.

Being a Neoplatonist Ammonius took it that on metaphysical matters Plato and Aristotle were in agreement. Part of the agreement concerns universals: they are prior to particulars both with respect to knowledge and with respect to being. Why then would Aristotle say that particulars, such as this horse or that dog, are primary substances? Before answering the question another question should be considered first, namely what the point is of Aristotle's treatise. In the *Prolegomena* Ammonius comments '... the book at hand is primary both for the treatment of logic ... and for all of the Aristotelian philosophy. Thus as a primary treatment of logic it teaches about words; but also as an introduction to the rest of the Aristotelian philosophy it makes a division of beings, that is, of things.' (18)

Since what really *is* primary substance is universal, Ammonius must explain away Aristotle's apparently treating individuals as if they were primary substances. Ammonius writes, 'It is because he does not approve of this manner of speaking that he does not say "that which primarily and most of all *is* substance", but "that which primarily and most of all is *called* substance".' (47) In this way, Ammonius writes, Aristotle actually expresses his disapproval.

By allowing his Neoplatonist bias to help direct an interpretation of *said of* (λέγεται) Ammonius seems unable to address a very puzzling part of the *Categories*. He quotes line 2a20, 'Both the name and the definition of a thing *said of a subject* must be predicable of the subject' (50). Ammonius takes it that whatever is said of something as of a subject shares both its name and its definition with the subject; for Socrates is called a man and a mortal rational animal. But, given that our text is more or less the same as Ammonius' was, Ammonius' brief explication does not explain Aristotle's example. Since we would like help with the force of a family of words (λόγος, λέγειν), I shall transliterate some of the words in translating the lines immediately following the line quoted by Ammonius above: 'for example *man*

is said of (*legetai*) a subject, some particular man, and, to be sure, the name is predicated (for you will predicate "man" of some man), and the logos "man" will be predicated of some man (for a certain man is indeed a man) — so that both the name and the *logos* will be predicated of a subject' (2a21-7). Making sense of the operative concept of using language which in turn makes sense of Aristotle's examples would require a more searching examination of the text than Ammonius, within the constraints he has set himself, is willing to make. A difficulty noticed above arises again from 3a7-32; Ammonius' treatment of the passage is characteristically superficial.

Ammonius treats the text as churchmen come to treat Scripture, who know how it must read. The appeal of dealing with Aristotle in this way has long gone out of fashion. And Ammonius' commentary will strike most of us working in the current atmosphere as having largely antiquarian interest.

Richard Bosley
University of Alberta

John Cottingham, ed.

The Cambridge Companion to Descartes.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. xii + 441.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-36623-2);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-36696-8).

This is a collection of unusually fine papers written specifically for this volume and edited by John Cottingham. It contains no trailbreaking interpretations of Descartes' philosophy; however, there are a number of enlightening new perspectives elaborated. Both French and Anglo-American commentators are represented.

The *Companion* opens with Geneviève Rodis-Lewis' beautifully wrought, meticulously dated account of 'Descartes' Life and the Development of his Philosophy.' She corrects Baillet's seventeenth-century biography on numerous datings, motivations, and travels. This should become a standard source for a brief illuminating account of Descartes' life.

Roger Ariew attempts to judge what the right perspective is on the complex relation of Descartes and scholasticism. In 'Descartes and Scholasticism: the Intellectual Background to Descartes' Thought', he reviews Descartes' conflicting evaluations of scholasticism in the correspondence and the published works concluding that the severely critical stance of the public works is corrected by those given in his letters. Ariew suggests that after La Flèche, Descartes was not well-acquainted with scholastic philosophy.

Stephen Gaukroger's contribution, 'The Nature of Abstract Reasoning: Philosophical Aspects of Descartes' Work on Algebra', is the sole contribution concerning mathematics and the method. He points out that Descartes freed algebra from spatial intuitions, but argues that the move freeing it from exclusively numerical interpretation (rendering it a logic) was closed to Descartes, because the epistemically uninformative character ascribed to deduction was antithetical to algebra as a method of discovery. Gaukroger's remarks on the relation of intellect, imagination, and reality in Rule XIV are particularly helpful.

In 'Cartesian Metaphysics: the Simple Natures,' Jean-Luc Marion argues convincingly that the *Regulae* contain the listing but not the ordering of the simple natures that the *Meditations* introduced. Based on a reading of the first, second, third, and fifth meditation, Marion attempts to establish that the simple natures from the *Regulae* are an integral part of the development of the metaphysics which paradoxically undermines the method as foundational with the replacement being the metaphysics itself.

Attention to the cogito is provided by Peter Markie's 'The Cogito and its Importance.' A reconciling project is the impetus for this contribution in which the conflicting texts are so interpreted that various modifications of the 'self-evident intuition/immediate inference' model of the cogito yields an improved interpretation that avoids many of the textual problems plaguing the initial version.

A complex and subtle analysis with a number of interlocking conclusions concerning 'The Idea of God and the Proofs of His Existence' is offered by Jean-Marie Beyssade. This contribution defies easy summary. Nevertheless, a few highlights are the treatment of the incomprehensible/understandable distinction in our knowledge of God, the role of 'induction' in the elaboration of God's attributes, and the dependence of our knowledge of God's properties on the proof for His existence.

Louis Loeb tackles 'The Cartesian Circle' with its enormous literature and filters out two attempts to avoid the circle, i.e., an 'epistemic' and a 'psychological' interpretation. Loeb finds the second and less well-known one more promising. It interprets the truth rule concerning clear and distinct ideas as rendering doubt of clear and distinct ideas psychologically impossible rather than establishing that there is no good reason to doubt clear and distinct ideas as the epistemic interpretation argues.

Three strands contributing to Descartes' dualism are investigated in John Cottingham's 'Cartesian Dualism: Theology, Metaphysics, and Science.' It is the author's conclusion that no one of the three considerations can be singled out as having primary influence on Descartes' adherence to the immateriality of mind. In fact, Cottingham emphasizes that Descartes' mechanistic scientific claim concerning the astonishing capabilities of the body tends to hasten the emergence of the phenomena of 'the disappearing soul' (245). Cottingham points out, that it is only morally impossible for Descartes that there be a body of such complexity that it could talk and think.

A principal theme of Desmond Clark's, 'Descartes' Philosophy of Science and the Scientific Revolution', is the ambiguity between Descartes' claims concerning the use of hypotheses vs. his sporadic statements about the certainty of his physics. Clark explores the ambiguity against the background of the scholastic conception of science and demonstration. Clark's analysis of Descartes' view that a plausible though incorrect model is better than none at all is particularly noteworthy.

Daniel Garber, in the most informative contribution, 'Descartes' Physics', presents a reliable, relatively detailed guide to the title topic, properly emphasizing certain crucial areas: matter as extension, motion as transference, the general laws of nature, and the problem of force. Two highlights include (1) an insightful probing of Descartes' definition of motion which on Garber's reading is not relativistic as many commentators have claimed (2) A Critical assessment of Descartes' attempts to establish that the essence of matter is extension.

In 'Descartes' Physiology and its Relation to His Psychology', Gary Hatfield deftly sketches the background theories of Galen and Aristotle pointing out that Descartes drew heavily from both, while at the same time introduced the radical innovative mechanistic interpretation of the body's functioning. Particularly noteworthy is Hatfield's presentation of Descartes' physiology and psychology of vision using the three grades of sensation (Sixth Replies) as his framework.

In her searching paper, 'Descartes on Thinking with the Body', Amelie Rorty provides a creative reconstruction of how the character of an individual body affects thinking. The heart of the paper is an insightful account of the co-dependence of the body as an information system (depending on perceptual ideas) and the body as a maintenance system (depending on bodily sensations and emotions-passions). The motto of her reconstructive hypothesis concerning the relation is '... find a healthy body type and you'll find a reliable perceiver' (377). Rorty's unfolding of the criteria problems concerning their interrelation on various levels, including the moral, contribute to the success of this singular contribution.

In the final paper, Nicholas Jolley provides a succinct overview of 'The Reception of Descartes' Philosophy' in which he delineates the varied responses to Descartes from The Netherlands Protestantism and French Catholicism through the Jesuits, Jansenists, and Oratorians to Spinoza, Leibniz, and Locke. Jolley does not neglect to discuss the post-Cartesian disciples or the various committed anti-Cartesians, Hobbes, Gassendi, and Huet.

Descartes' ethical views is one area that is slighted by the present collection. Nevertheless, the *Companion* is successful in providing a valuable guide to contemporary interpretations of Descartes for readers who have at least some familiarity with his thought.

Thomas L. Prendergast
Marquette University

William Desmond

*Beyond Hegel and Dialectic:
Speculation, Cult, and Comedy.*

Albany: State University of New York Press
1992. Pp. xii + 365.

US \$57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1103-6);

US \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1104-4).

In two previous books, Desmond has presented his thesis that there is a distinctive 'metaxological' philosophy, which explores the relations 'between' self and other. In this volume he develops this approach along five themes: time and eternity, religious cult, religious representation, evil, and comedy. It is, as he says, a metaphysical meditation, 'which mingles expository, interpretive, critical and speculative thinking' (1 & 22). Hegel is not the only philosopher interpreted. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are constant companions, while Plato, Heidegger, Marx, Derrida and Levinas get extended treatment. In the dialogue between Hegel and his successors, however, Hegel usually comes out the wiser, more sensitive to duality and plurality than their accusations suggest.

Desmond does not adopt a simple opposition between Hegel's dialectical self-mediation and his own metaxological intermediation. He teases out the ways in which Hegel takes both time and eternity seriously, recognizes the interactive function of cult, acknowledges the necessity of religion, senses the existential agony of evil, and delights in comedy's mocking of philosophical pretension. Since Hegel reincorporates this otherness into the autonomy of self-thinking thought, however, he must be surpassed.

Even this is not Desmond's last word. Inspired by deconstruction, he adopts a hermeneutics of generosity (rather than a hermeneutics of suspicion) to discover in Hegel's reading of comedy and in his *Letters* a Hegel who is not self-mediating, but who, inspired by Aristophanes, laughs at himself and recognizes the vanity of philosophy.

It is his form of writing that betrays him. While the *Phenomenology* presents a series of comic characters, and the *Logic* displays concepts playing parts, their final chapters strip away the masks to reveal the underlying self-determining logos. It was rather Plato who, in the *Symposium*, successfully captured the plurivocal voice of metaxological reflection, by offering reports (once, twice and even four times removed) of diverse eulogies to eros at a banquet twice broken up by drunken revelling.

Within this extended meditation on the philosophical tradition are embedded vignettes of Desmond's philosophy of religion. He suggests how an eternal may erupt into time, providing an answer to historicism's shifting sands, how in cult the self, open to an Other it cannot anticipate, is overwhelmed by wonder, how images and fragments of stories reveal the interaction of divine and human, how the gratuitous decision to do evil can only be contemplated in horror (though repentance can prepare for an equally

gratuitous forgiveness), how the comic sense of failure is the condition for the episodic illumination of transcendence.

These are vignettes because Desmond explores a different mode of philosophical expression. Although he documents the failure of philosophy to do justice to the metaxological between, he does not abandon philosophy altogether. He calls for a philosophical mindfulness that takes time to meditate. He expounds thinkers to expose their strengths, and he shows their weaknesses by argument. At the same time he speculates, not in the Hegelian sense of reflective comprehension, but by asking leading questions, by offering vivid epigrams, by playing on words, and by following the associations of images no matter where they lead. His voice varies in tone from earnestness to comic frivolity.

This is deliberate. For if the Other erupts into time in episodic moments so that it hides as much as it reveals, the philosopher never gets to the point of comprehending what is going on. He only suggests with teasing allusions and open-ended questions. He makes 'idiotic' claims in the sense that they are peculiar to himself; but he never affirms. He invites the reader to share his meditations; but he never builds the bridges of rational discourse. This is how he goes beyond Hegel and dialectic.

While Desmond's hermeneutics of generosity enables him to discover a greater sense of otherness in Hegel than before, one wonders whether his generosity has gone far enough. For at one point Desmond's 'non-dialectical logic' (79) leads him astray. He combines two descriptions of the *Science of Logic*: that it is the exposition of God before creation and that it is the kingdom of shadows, and concludes that God is the kingdom of shadows. If, however, Hegel is saying that the *exposition* is the kingdom of shadows, that leaves God in his sovereign 'otherness'. So nature and spirit remain other to self-thinking logic, even when reflection discerns in their independent, isolated 'others' (and in the relations they nonetheless have with each other) patterns that betray rational traits.

If Hegel's overall project is more metaxological than Desmond admits, Desmond is also more dialectical. For in his book the only absolute other, in the sense that it enters no relation at all, is evil. One contemplates it in horror; one does not resist it, or repudiate it in a life that learns from its wicked past. Yet in a way repentance and forgiveness convert evil from being an absolute to a relative other. More importantly, the 'agapeic' Other is said gratuitously to illuminate time in episodes. By establishing contact, however fleeting, this Other creates relations and so ceases to be absolute; it inspires a metaxological mindfulness that can recognize and talk about those relations, if only in an indirect way. For both self and Other share in the 'original power of being' (124).

So perhaps Desmond is not as far beyond Hegel as he claims. The real otherness that separates them is the language they use to indicate the realm 'between'. Does one adopt the communal language of reflective thought, which builds bridges between speaker and listener and invites discussion and disagreement, or does one meditate using 'idiotic' rhetorical flourishes

and vivid images, inviting equally 'idiotic' readers either to abandon their otherness and identify with the story told or else to go their alien ways? That question remains when one has finished this brilliant, perceptive and thought-provoking book.

John W. Burbidge

Trent University

John Earman

Bayes or Bust?

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1992. Pp. xiv + 227.

US \$35.00 (ISBN 0-262-05046-3).

This book is the best survey available today of Bayesian confirmation theory. Earman is ambivalent about the theory: He asserts that 'Bayesianism is the only view presently in the offing that holds out the hope for a comprehensive and unified treatment of inductive reasoning' (2), but he thinks the theory faces serious unsolved problems.

After a chapter on the views of Reverend Bayes, and another on the machinery of modern Bayesianism, Earman recounts the successes of Bayesian confirmation theory and challenges that it has met. Next comes a chapter on the problem of old evidence, which Earman feels has not yet been adequately resolved. Much of the remainder of the book relates to Earman's desire to preserve the objectivity of rational scientific inference. Earman maintains that objectivity can be provided only by partitioning the space of seriously possible theories and then eliminating all but one alternative — a process that he thinks is incompatible with accepted Bayesian orthodoxy. The last regular chapter of the book discusses results in formal learning theory which indicate that Bayesian inference depends essentially on regarding certain possibilities as impossible a priori; Earman is deeply disturbed by this.

The book would have been even better if Earman had had a clearer conception of his audience. Earman intends the audience to include students at the advanced undergraduate level and beyond, and the space that is given to recounting familiar material is evidently aimed at novices. However, Earman assumes the reader to have a level of technical expertise that is rarely possessed by philosophy students, even at the graduate level. The reader is regularly assumed to be adept at first-order logic and calculus; occasionally it is assumed that the reader is also familiar with model theory and analysis.

It is natural to compare Earman's book with Howson and Urbach's 1989 book *Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach*, since both aim to be Bayesian textbooks. Much of the latter book is devoted to statistical theory, which Earman does not discuss. Earman's account of the confirmation of non-statistical theories is more extensive, more open-minded, and (of course) more up-to-date. Howson and Urbach's book makes less technical demands on the reader and can be read by many philosophy students.

Earman discusses so many difficult and contested issues that he could not possibly get it all right. I will now indicate some of the places where I think he has got it wrong.

Earman presents a number of justifications for the probability calculus and for the principle of conditionalization (38-51). He finds all those he considers to be questionable, yet he concludes that together they provide powerful support for these principles. While Bayesians can appreciate that a set of individually weak arguments may together make a strong argument, there seems to be no reason to think that is the case here. There are in fact much better justifications than the ones Earman considers, both for the probability calculus and conditionalization, as I have explained in my 1993 book *Betting on Theories*.

Earman discusses the thesis that predicted or novel evidence confirms a theory better than accommodated evidence (113-7). Earman represents this thesis as being that if T_1 and T_2 both entail E , and E was used in constructing T_1 but not T_2 , then $p(T_1|E) < p(T_2|E)$. However, this does not correctly capture the thesis for two reasons. First, the thesis is comparing two different possible scenarios involving the *same* theory, not different theories. Second, Earman's inequality leaves out the crucial point that E was predicted in one case but not in the other. Let O denote that E was used in constructing T ; then the correct representation of the thesis is that $p(T|EO) < p(T|E\bar{O})$. Earman's mistake here vitiates everything he says on the topic. I gave the correct analysis in 'Prediction, Accommodation and the Logic of Discovery', (*PSA 1988* vol. 1), where I also showed that Bayesian theory supports the thesis under certain conditions. See also 'How Prediction Enhances Confirmation' in Dunn and Gupta (eds.), *Truth or Consequences*.

Earman argues that Kuhn's philosophy of science is incommensurable with Bayesian theory because Kuhn's theory is couched in terms of acceptance, and acceptance is a notion that must be rejected by Bayesians (191-5). Earman offers an argument by elimination to support the view that Bayesians must reject the notion of acceptance: If acceptance is giving probability 1 to a theory then it is unjustified, and if it is acting as if the theory is true then its rationality depends on all sorts of pragmatic factors that Kuhn does not allow for. However, there is another conception of acceptance that Earman has not considered: Acceptance may be directly linked to assertion rather than to non-verbal action. I have elaborated this view in *Betting on Theories*, where I also argue that Bayesians need such a notion. Incidentally, this failure of argument by elimination illustrates why

I am sceptical of Earman's view that argument by elimination provides the touchstone for objective scientific inference.

Consideration of Kuhn leads Earman to discuss scientific revolutions and the introduction of new theories (195-8). Earman argues that the introduction of new theories changes the probabilities of existing theories and that this change cannot be by conditionalization or its generalizations. He goes on to argue that shifts in probability, induced by the recognition of new possibilities, are ubiquitous even in daily life; he concludes that violations of conditionalization must be allowed to occur regularly. The result is that Bayesian learning theory is essentially vacuous. This pessimistic conclusion is mistaken. In fact, it is even possible to update probabilities by conditionalization when a new theory is introduced. This is possible because we can refer to future theories before they are introduced — as I am now doing — and thereby have probabilities for them. For a full account of this, see my 'Probabilities for New Theories' forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*.

Earman says that if it 'serves as a spur to further progress, I will count this book a success' (xi). I expect *Bayes or Bust?* to be a success in this sense.

Patrick Maher

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

William Joseph Gavin

William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992.

Pp. xi + 227.

US \$37.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87722-946-5).

Gavin attempts to use the notion of vagueness as the interpretive key to James' philosophy. He starts out from James' remark in *The Principles of Psychology* that 'It is, in short, the reinstatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life which I am so anxious to press on the attention.' And Gavin concludes, in the final words of his book, that 'James' texts are *vague*' (193). His italics remind the reader that Gavin is using the term 'vague' in a theoretical, stipulative sense, far removed from its 'usual perjorative force' (2). This fact has to do with one of two major problems with a book that can otherwise be recommended as an engaging and erudite introduction to James' philosophy. The problem is that the notion of vagueness is made to

cover so much ground that it fails to illuminate. In the first few pages, for example, vagueness is understood to mean profusion, not simplicity; unfinished, not finished; uncertainty, not certainty; subjectivity, not objectivity; different types of truth, not universal truth; ineffable, not discursive; richness, not poverty; intensity, not blandness; informal, not formal; and so on. The other problem with the book is that the author shies away from applying his interpretive key in a thorough way to James' texts, but instead, after eighty pages or so, he introduces a series of loosely related essays on Peirce, Dewey, modern art, and medicine. It is as though he realized that his interpretive key wouldn't afford the illumination of James' work that one might have hoped for, and opted instead to take advantage of the breadth of his key term 'vague' in order to shelter several independent essays underneath it.

Having established to his satisfaction in Chapter One that vagueness 'in the good sense' (5) is characteristic of both the *Principles* and *The Variety of Religious Experience*, Gavin argues in Chapter Two that James' metaphysics of radical empiricism is a form of theism (pluralistic pantheism), hence 'not neutral on the question of religion' (54); furthermore, reality is larger than the knowable; and further, reality compels commitment, even in philosophical formulations of it. In Chapter Three Gavin attributes to James a philosophy of science in which theory is dependent on, but not reducible to, sensory experience; and he distinguishes, first, a Jamesian view of language as static and inadequate to reality, and second, another Jamesian view of language as dynamic, a view 'not unlike that of later Wittgenstein' (77). In Chapter Four Gavin adds to the list of meanings that belong to his stretched notion of vagueness, urging that 'Pure experience is vague in the sense that it is beneath the subject/object dichotomy; it is vague in the sense of being available most primordially as activity, as process; it is vague in the sense that conceptualizations of it are retrospective, not immediate; and finally, it is vague in the sense that even James' own description of it is a hypothesis, one in which he has ultimate faith, to be sure, but a hypothesis nonetheless' (92-3). Chapter Five wrestles with the relationship between Peirce's theory of meaning and his theory of reality, concluding that 'whether one grounds Peirce's metaphysics in his epistemology or his epistemology in his metaphysics, a version of James' "will to believe" seems to be a necessary ingredient' (108-9). Chapter Six identifies a theme common to Dewey and Marx, namely, a concern with situations where one has to make decisions before all the evidence is in (125). Chapter Seven is largely taken up by a brisk survey of the history of painting over the past century, swiftly followed by the conclusion that 'Both James and modern art have the same beginning: the discrediting of the object' (152). Chapter Eight is a professed Jamesian view of medicine, in which a Jamesian commitment to vagueness will help us resist attempts, attempts for instance to offer universal definitions of diseases, which 'turn a vague, contextual situation into one that is immediately self-evident' (168). Such 'immediacy' is not only the opposite of vagueness but a threat to everyday life and to philosophy itself. Chapter Eight, entitled

'(Non)Conclusion: Life as "Real Fight"; Text as "Spur"', concludes with the thought that James wrote from the standpoint that life feels like a real fight, and that his texts constitute a spur or invitation to 'overcome' them by going further. 'There is, then, still something "ineffable" or "inarticulate" about the texts written by James, something "more", in that they undermine themselves, indirectly disclose their own insufficiency, urge the reader to "surpass" them, and so on. In this final, or rather nonfinal sense, James' texts are *vague*.'

Wesley E. Cooper
University of Alberta

Lenn E. Goodman

Avicenna.

New York and London: Routledge, 1992.

Pp. xv + 240.

US \$72.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-09129-X);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-07409-6).

Not intended for philosophical neophytes or for people lacking any familiarity whatsoever with Muslim philosophy, Goodman's *Avicenna* should be of interest and profit to readers with at least modest background in both these areas (xi). Aptly called an 'appreciation' of Avicenna rather than a 'history', the book is an exercise in comparative philosophy (x), constantly seeking to illuminate Avicenna's teaching by juxtaposing it with doctrines of other philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle to al-Farabi and Al-Ghazali to moderns like Descartes, Hume, and Kant (mediaeval Christian parallels are largely ignored). The result is a meditation that is philosophically stimulating while being at times frustrating too: the references to other philosophers do challenge the reader to look beyond questions of historical accuracy to the philosophical truth of the matter, but the panoramic sweep of Goodman's vision sometimes leaves the reader wishing for closer focus on Avicenna's text. Of course, it may be a virtue of the book that, when one puts it down, one longs for direct interchange with Avicenna himself.

After an opening chapter setting the religio-political scene, reviewing Avicenna's quite remarkable life, and surveying his writings, the book moves directly to metaphysics. Central to Avicenna's metaphysics, says Goodman (63 ff.), is an argument for the existence of God as the uniquely Necessary Being who confers existence on all other things, which of themselves could as well not be. It is the radical contingency of this world, highlighted in

Biblical and Qur'anic accounts of creation and stressed by Muslim theologians, that led Avicenna — no thanks to al-Farabi, to whom Avicenna's own *Gems of Wisdom* has been mistakenly attributed (117-8) — to see in all things other than God a real distinction of essence and existence, the latter being accidental yet somehow prior to the former (77-8). The truth that Avicenna sees in the creation myths, Goodman tells us, is not that there is a temporal beginning of the cosmos but that an eternally existing cosmos is ontically dependent on God (79). Creatures thus acquire a conditional necessity: *given that* God wills them, they (all things and actions that occur) *must* be. Here in Goodman's view is the basic insight that sets Avicenna apart (66).

Against this thesis both Al-Ghazali and Averroes argued that whatever is eternal is *eo ipso* necessary. While Averroes held that the talk of contingency tainted Avicenna's philosophy with an un-Aristotelian indeterminism, Al-Ghazali voiced an opposite objection: that the admission of an eternal emanation of things from Necessary Being rendered the view irredeemably deterministic (86). The implications for human freedom are serious. Though Avicenna insisted that creatures have a measure of independent causal efficacy under the overarching power of God, how freedom is possible if creation not just of heavenly bodies and their guiding Intelligences but also of us and our works is a necessary emanation from God remains unclear. In the end Goodman has to admit that Avicenna is not entirely successful in his efforts to synthesize necessity and contingency (108-9).

The contingency-necessity theme runs through the Avicennian account of human knowing also, the role of the Tenth Celestial Intelligence known as the Giver of Forms in no way eliminating the human role. Goodman sees (Chapter 3.1) the Giver of Forms doing for Avicenna what Plato's free-standing Forms did for him and what Aristotle's induction from sense could not satisfactorily accomplish — explaining, for example, the presence in thought of 'perfect circles, straight lines, and other such regulatory notions' (139). But the givens of sense are needed too, and what knowledge we actually acquire depends also on our receptivity, on the forms already present to our consciousness (see especially 144-5).

What is it that is conscious? Chapter 3.2 brings us to Avicenna's famous 'floating man', which Goodman sees as a clear forerunner of Descartes' *Cogito*. Perhaps more than other discussions in the book, this one, thanks to its generous quoting of primary sources, gives the reader the impression that he has really met Avicenna. The mental experiment in which the philosopher envisioned himself floating in empty space with limbs disjointed so that he would have no awareness of other bodies or even of his own body brought him to see his individual conscious self as other than his body. This self, or soul, is more than a form; it is a substance, the subject of actions that cannot be those of body (149-63). Although the mind's access to pure rational concepts Avicenna took as proof of human immortality (126), the union, or communion, of the soul with the separately existing Active Intellect raises the question whether personal identity can survive the death of the individuated body. Goodman points out that Avicenna rather harshly rejected Prophecy's argu-

ments for a negative answer and himself maintained that consciousness presupposes individuality (169).

A final chapter of the book discusses Avicenna's teaching on logic, rhetoric, and poetry — material that generally receives less attention from students of mediaeval philosophy. Here too Avicenna shows the philosopher's disposition to wonder, and Goodman credits him with significant contributions to the development of logic, particularly the logic of the conditional (188-211). Since the varieties of poetry that Avicenna knew were different from those of Greek culture, it was unavoidable that what he took from Aristotle's *Poetics* would receive original interpretation and adaptation (221-4).

One of the most striking features of this book is its illuminating and testing of Avicenna's views by setting them alongside those of other philosophers. Thus the chapter on metaphysics sets up the necessity-contingency problem by showing the collision between Greek philosophy and Islamic religious belief, and it is not complete until Goodman has invited the reader to confront challenges to the Avicennian view from modern Humeans and linguistic determinists. The treatment of knowledge and the soul requires Aristotle to converse with Plato, and Avicenna with both of them; and this section is not done until Goodman has brought Descartes, Kant, Peirce, Chomsky and others into the conversation. The aim is not simply to clarify Avicenna's doctrine; it is also to show its abiding relevance.

This setting of Avicennism alongside other world-views understandably prompts Goodman to talk much about schools of thought, such that the reader is apt to suspect that Goodman never met an *-ism* that he didn't like. Indeed, too often the text fairly groans from the piling up of abstractions (sometimes even as the author seeks to enliven his text with vivid imagery). This feature plus an overly complex sentence style and the frequent use of transliterated Arabic terms for which English equivalents are provided only in their first usage (one longs for a glossary) makes reading sometimes a chore. *Still and all*, if the reader will persevere, he will be rewarded with new questions about Avicenna and his place in the history of philosophy and will be inspired to test Goodman's judgments by studying anew an original and great philosopher.

R.J. McLaughlin

St. John Fisher College

A. Phillips Griffiths, ed.

The Impulse to Philosophise.

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 33.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. viii + 240.

US \$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-43981-7).

Is metaphilosophy a profitable subject for philosophical discussion? It is exceedingly difficult to say anything worthwhile on the subject. None of the contributors to this collection appreciates this difficulty. Most are satisfied with anodyne clichés about 'critical reflection' and clearing up muddles. Yet this metaphilosophy is not quite what it seems. The contributors (all British) do not indulge in what Frederick Raphael calls the 'vindictive modesty to which British practitioners were much disposed in the 1950s' (62). In other words, they no longer claim that the muddle is the philosophers' own doing, so that the best philosophy would (as Wittgenstein said) let one stop 'doing philosophy' when one wanted. Instead, we human beings just have confused concepts. They're everywhere.

'Conceptual confusion is deadly,' Mary Midgely writes hopefully. 'A great deal of it affects our everyday life. It needs to be seen to' (142). We 'live in a constant, and constantly increasing, conceptual mess,' and 'unless we acknowledge the resulting shameful confusions and do something to sort them out, none of our projects, whether grand or mundane, is likely to come to much' (150). Why confusion is shameful rather than stimulating is not explained. Neither is the assumption that a distinctly 'conceptual' sort of confusion is a serious impediment to good works. Lots of projects have succeeded in the eons of history, and it is unlikely that 'conceptual confusion' and not, say, lack of cash or solidarity, stands in the way of more of the same, grand or mundane.

Midgely says, 'the alternative to getting a proper philosophy is continuing to use a bad one. It is not avoiding philosophy altogether, because that is impossible' (147). It is impossible only if the world 'philosophy' is tacitly construed in vague and global terms as, say, 'how things hang together.' But whatever we doctors of philosophy learn in graduate school, it is nothing that makes us especially good at revising the *Weltanschauung*. Everybody does a little of that. How much conceptual plumbing one does and how well has nothing to do with one's relationship to the historical discourse of Western philosophy, or one's commitment to the practice of philosophy as a discipline, or with the problem of its self-understanding in the institutional setting of the contemporary research university.

None of the contributors has a fresh idea about what it should mean to practice philosophy as a discipline today. They intone comfy bromides about clearing away 'conceptual confusion', 'getting clear', the 'struggle to reflect on ourselves', and so on. Nobody asks hard questions. For instance how one tells conceptual from other kinds of confusion, error, or infelicity. Can one distinguish reliably and without ideology or polemic between somebody's

'conceptual confusion' and a difference of belief about a subject? Can one speak of 'conceptual' confusions at all without falling into problematic dichotomies like analytic/synthetic, scheme/content, a priori/a posteriori, necessary/contingent? And what does the doctor of philosophy really *know* that makes her or him so good at doing something constructive with confusion?

Despite my skepticism about their impulsive metaphilosophy several of these essays are enjoyable to read. Most contributors begin or end by deploring our confused concepts, thanking goodness for philosophers to clarify them, then using most of their time to say something interesting about whatever they've been working on. Anthony Palmer states the obvious — 'there is no single reason why people are led to philosophise' (161) — and then unfolds an interpretation of representation in the *Tractatus*. As an engaging introduction to a fundamental problem in the theory of rational choice, Martin Hollis' 'Trouble with Leprechauns' is a pleasure to read. As an attempt to show that 'philosophy flourishes on the border between closed and open questions' (25), it makes no advance on the problem of the institutional and disciplinary integrity of philosophy.

Stuart Brown connects Wittgenstein's idea of 'family resemblance' to the practice of philosophy itself, drawing a conclusion contrary to Wittgenstein's own metaphilosophical pronouncements: 'philosophy is a large family of pursuits, variously though not all closely related to one another' (42). What unity there may be in these pursuits is historical. 'We do not really understand what philosophy is unless we have come to terms with how it has been conceived in the past. For philosophy would not be what it is apart from that past' (45). But neither would physics, nor poetry, nor theology, nor pop music be what they are apart from *their* past. I'm afraid that if we turn to 'how it [philosophy] has been conceived in the past,' we shall find only more banality: 'the pursuit of truth', 'theoretical knowledge', 'science', 'wisdom' — these are the terms in which the *philosophi* have always described their enterprise. Aristotle and Descartes cannot be expected to see the difference we do between their research in anatomy and their proof of god. The way the universities and the whole production of knowledge are presently organized makes this insouciance about 'philosophy' difficult today. If we cannot say what we philosophers particularly do, our niche in the research university is threatened. But it is no good looking to the past to find hints about how to conceive that institutional and disciplinary identity. We would be looking for answers to a problem that no one grappled with before the rise of the modern research university earlier in our century.

Colin Radford writes, 'when we do philosophy we are engaged in reflective, critical thought. We are puzzled — or merely intrigued — by some matter, and trying to understand and sort it out' (1). How does that differ from 'doing physics' or 'doing history' or 'doing a novel'? Physicists engage in critical reflection on their concepts. Historians propose and evaluate arguments. Novelists try to understand and sort out what puzzles (or merely intrigues) them. Brenda Almond says of philosophy, 'its single core element is the use of argument' (215). Philosophers love that argument. But argument obvi-

ously happens right across the disciplines. Professional philosophers have neither a special talent for it, nor privileged criteria for evaluating it, nor (if truth be told) an especial respect for it. Unless we can do better than the banal reassurances these essays proffer the practice of philosophy will continue to lack a self-understanding of its disciplinary integrity.

Barry Allen

McMaster University

Chad Hansen

*A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought:
A Philosophical Interpretation.*

New York: Oxford University Press 1992.

Pp. xvi + 448.

US \$57.00 (ISBN 0-19-506729-0).

Exoticism is like haunting haze, in which one sees the outline of something yearned for: riches, for example, the erotic or the outline of wisdom. The book under review, if successful, would blow away the haze in which classical Chinese philosophy is usually translated, interpreted, and presented to Western readers. The success of the book depends, in part, upon placing the great ancient thinkers of China in a common linguistic and cultural community: a later thinker picks up the diachronic conversation learning from and correcting his predecessors. Their learning curve fluctuates somewhat independently of crossing school boundaries: from Confucianism to Mohism to Daoism and back again. This setting the philosophers in a self-correcting conversation is one of the very best things in the book. The book has going for it a canon of correct interpretation: making sense of the dialogue internal to ancient China and not necessarily external with Western philosophers.

The history of Western philosophy offers many theories which could be turned into interpretive frameworks; some of these Hansen rejects on behalf of not presenting Chinese philosophy in the wrong frame. Among those rejected are Platonism, various aspects of Cartesianism, and certain theories of language. I shall consider, briefly, the three rejects.

Regarding Platonism Hansen writes, for example, 'Daoism contrasts starkly with the Platonic and Kantian myths of transcendent realms of meaning' (27).

With respect to Cartesianism Hansen denies (18) that Chinese thought has a theory of mind-body dualism and of private ideas as a basis of the meanings of terms.

And, third, with regard to theories of language, Hansen argues that Chinese thought did not develop a theory of the sentence. Many of us think it a great moment in the development of the thought of Plato and Aristotle that Plato came to see that discourse involves a combination of names; Aristotle comes to think that sentences of a certain class bear truth or falsity and help compose syllogisms, thus giving rise to a theory as to important and interesting units of language. Chinese philosophy did not follow a parallel route.

Hansen's book offers an aggressive program of putting a good name to Chinese philosophers whom scholars of a Neo-Confucian bent cannot see aright; part of the merit of philosophers who deserve a better name than they have in the West is what they omit to do: not getting all tied up in the subjectivity of internal states of the soul (or, to relieve the bad stench left by the death of that word) of the mind; not positing universals (platonist or aristotelian versions which Hansen seems incapable of dealing with except in terms of philosophical contempt).

Turning to notions which Hansen does depend upon in interpreting and examining Chinese thought I find the following two of central importance: language and skepticism. Chinese thinkers did not develop a correspondence theory of truth; they took language as a means for guidance and social control.

Reflection upon language shows the need of interpretation; between discourse and a course of action lies interpretation. Hansen writes, 'A performance *dao* is a possible course of action. The same discourse may generate different courses of action. The regulative ideal of the constructivist period was that a single body of discourse should guide behavior in a single *constant* course. Mozi proposed a different discourse from that of traditional Confucianism' (205).

Hansen uses Wittgensteinian skepticism (there are many ways of following a rule) to bring out a difficulty in Confucianism and to set the stage for the continuing debate among Confucianism, Neo-Mohism, and daoism. Hansen writes, for example, 'The skeptical vertigo sets in because we can ask about the *way* to interpret every *way* we presuppose. This means we can raise the question about interpreting any higher-level standards that we proposed to interpret the level-one *dao*' (93). This sounds like the kind of use which Sextus Empiricus makes of the skeptical trope of regression. An example of a classical text which does this would be helpful; it is typical of the book that when one wants the historian of philosophy to stay put and provide an illuminating example, that role disappears and is displaced by the role of the skeptic tutored, rather self-consciously, in modern, analytical philosophy (but without the patience for the history of philosophy which is shown by Sextus Empiricus).

Hansen writes, 'Each tradition ... had its skeptics. The nature of the philosophical projects Chinese philosophers criticized affected the shape of Chinese skepticism. Where Western skeptics argued that we can never know any formula to be *true*, Chinese skeptics said that no set of rules or intuitions yields a *constantly reliable guide* to action (a constant *dao*). Chinese skepti-

cism does not focus on the truth of some expression, but on how it guides behavior' (93). With respect to the skepticism which emerges in Chinese thought the question arises with what the notion of constancy contrasts. We need an answer to this question in order to understand the challenge of the Chinese skeptic.

Mozi's use of the term *chang* (*constant*) suggests 'a point of contact with reality' (110). Further to the Moist use of the term Hansen writes, 'Any self-defeating *dao* is an inconstant *dao*. A *dao* ought to be one that can govern people with a single standard. Universal, utilitarian attitudes, character, and motivation are more constant than partial, familial moralities' (114). But how can one *dao* be more constant than another if the constant rules out difference? Hansen suggests a contrast between constancy and the absence of change. A constant course would then be the same course — a course without change or variation. The case for this interpretation, I find, remains unproved.

In daoist use Hansen takes on a standard translation such as 'The *Dao* that can be spoken is not the constant *Dao*' (215). How then are we to resolve the negation? If not constant, then inconstant? Hansen writes, '... it makes the rectifying-names point that any prescriptive system put into words gives inconstant guidance' (216). It is one thing to give this advice: no system of rules serves us well under all circumstances. From this advice it hardly follows that every system of rules misguides us under any set of circumstances. At the other extreme is the dogmatist's assurance: this system of rules guides us well under all circumstances. Between the two extremes we grope along, not putting unlimited trust in any system of rules or in any one ordering of the Five Constant Virtues, say; it doesn't follow there is never a fit. Hansen tries to persuade us that the skeptic here has the upper hand: How do we know when there is a fit? Does the skeptic challenge the Confucian to discover what he should do from a record of the precedents of sage-kings? Hansen takes the skeptic's question to be this: How does the Confucian know that he has followed the rules correctly? (See p. 68.)

Hansen's book is challenging and engages the reader in a direct and personal way. In addition to language and skepticism there are many topics woven into the fabric of the book which will also engage the reader.

I'm afraid I must end on a sour note as to the production of the book: there are typographical errors every few pages, sometimes one or two on the same page. The book is not sufficiently edited, and here and there the writing is careless.

Richard Bosley
University of Alberta

David Kolb, ed.

*New Perspectives on Hegel's
Philosophy of Religion.*

Albany: State University of New York Press
1982. Pp. xi + 224.

US \$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0714-1437-X);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1438-8).

In his later years Hegel notably stressed his commitment to plenty of Lutheran Christianity, in particular, and to much of the Christian religious messages in general. Earlier, he had usefully discussed and contrasted the significance of several other great world religions, in order to illuminate the unfolding of what he called *Geist* in world history. Although the strength of his source materials varied as Hegel went from subject to subject, he retained — from the young *Phenomenology of Geist* on and up to his final lectures and death in 1831 — a great flair for engaging his listeners or readers with examples, based on history's apparent roots.

Possibly, Hegel's talk of avowed commitment to a religion was hypocritically, quite deceivingly employed to make his religious colours seem to resemble more nearly those of the Prussian autocracy. However, it is more likely that Hegel may just have been a creative Don Quixote, who sincerely expected his efforts to succeed in reconciling the mainly lucid, hardnosed and simple teachings of the Gospels with the so pretentious, obscure, abstract, ambiguous ways of Hegelian metaphysics, psychology and 'logic'. In the latter case Hegel could be a very nice fellow, but too tragically misguided in choosing terms for the wise to bother with his verbiage.

Some of us still suspect that Sir Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* is not wholly mistaken about Hegel's limitations. But for that very reason it is we who should welcome David Kolb's recently edited collection *New Perspectives on Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*. Most of the contributors do not seem eager to argue seriously and at length against anything like the two alternative verdicts of my last paragraph. This is, alas, a great pity. (Compare Shlomo Avineri). Nevertheless, a number of these essays are, on the whole, surprisingly clear and readable, even enjoyable for meta-Hegelian efforts. And, furthermore, a majority do appear to give culturally enriching reasons for many believers and intellectuals to take Hegel's philosophy of religion more seriously at last.

Of the thirteen papers presented, I think I derived most profit from the following: (1) Walter Jaeschke: 'Philosophical Theology and the Philosophy of Religion', (2) Martin J. De Nys: 'Philosophical Thinking and the Claims of Religion', (3) Stephen Ricker: 'The Integral Relation of Religion and Philosophy in Hegel's Philosophy', (4) Martin Donougho: 'Hegel and Creuzer: or Did Hegel Believe in Myths?', (5) John Burbidge: 'Is Hegel a Christian?', (6) Louis Dupré: 'Transitions and Tensions in Hegel's Treatment of Determinate Religion', (7) Clark Butler: 'Hegelian Panentheism as Joachimite Christianity', (8) Stephen Dunning: 'Particularity not Scandalous: Hegel's Contribu-

tion to Philosophy of Religion'. Of these eight pieces, those by Burbidge, Butler and Dupré looked especially good for the volume's cluster of topics.

In building common ground between Hegel's sympathizers and his more alien critics, a commentator needs to eschew further *uses* (as opposed to *mentions*,) of his stunningly idiosyncratic pawns of jargon. Kolb's better appointees can sound ready to minister for full pages to reconciliation, increasing lucidity and neologicistic restraint.

But, no, not all the authors always do. For instance, William Desmond irresponsibly uses the notorious '*aufheben*' and '*aufgehoben*', as well as the old and still worse English translation, '*sublate*' on pages 170 and 177. Such sense-begging offers no family profit, only philosophical sins. The editor should have applied his power of 'excision'! Indeed, no few essays should disambiguate at the start. They should do so in a systematic and Aristotelian manner, with such battered words as 'particular', 'particularity', 'universal', 'universality', etc. (*Passim*). Many different, relevant, but confoundable sense of expressions in Hegel or in ordinary German or ordinary English should be left publicly to hang out and dry before one sets a foot of syllables on the parade ground. (For Kolb's volume to make it a more helpful work, a long editorial glossary is badly needed.) Then add more senses from some pertinent history of ideas and concepts. It may be, after these preliminaries, that Hegel's critics will choose to be more constructive and Hegel's best and shrewdest admirers will feel less worried about unfruitful sorts of conflicts, tensions, strains, 'contradictions' and the like: conversation could be multi-lateral, but friendly, as Charles Taylor has begun to show.

Clark's essay on Hegel, pantheism and panentheism, like a few of the other papers, helps me reach on my own the following conclusion, *C*. I take *C* to be valuable for a good range of philosophers of religion. *C*: In the case of Christianity, but also of Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and, again, of a thinker like Parmenides, Plato, Eriugena, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel or Bradley, it should repay us well to construct formal and 'natural' languages (with meditation techniques) for both ontological Monism and Pluralism. (Compare some efforts in my *Self-Knowledge and Social Relations*, New York, 1978). Juxtapose *C*: Heterogeneous insights of various religions and sages can usually be expressed for enlightenment in both kinds of languages and forms of meditation — yet not always in just one, nor always in either. Sometimes thoughts about Immanence and Transcendence call for both a Monist and a Pluralist articulation. Hegel, who worked so hard, strove to allow both for Three and for One, (although flinching from some Father-Son orthodoxy), then both for the Absolute and for a Christ, set a strange, but real example. This book can help us to see some things in more rewarding ways.

At this stage it seems best to let those considering a scan or a purchase of this collection simply sniff at a handful of passages:

Burbidge: 'Hegel gives evidence of having himself lived through traumatic feelings, described in similar terms by Christian mystics; he makes the cultural practice of individual confession constitutive of absolute knowing;

his belief in Christian doctrine is a necessary condition for the truth of philosophy. In such areas he betrays the distinctive traits that define the mainstream of the Christian tradition. We can therefore conclude that Hegel WAS a Christian.' (102)

Burbidge: 'In other words, if Hegel could not easily be a Christian in our present day, he would at least believe in Providence: that the method will work its inevitable way through history; that the actual will turn out to be rational. Is Hegel a Christian? The answer to that question we can now know only in part. For our knowledge is imperfect and our prophecy is imperfect' (105). (Might not this argument turn on allowing some Hegelian definite descriptions to dictate, in a semantic fog much of *our* use of 'prophecy' and 'religion'?)

Butler: 'Pantheism asserts the all in the One and the One in the all ... Spinoza is properly a pantheist, since finite things in the intelligible modes and attributes of the infinite substance are not illusory; they are contained as finite in the infinite, which they reveal' (138).

Butler: 'Pantheism and theism deny that the finite things as finite preserve any positive disclosure of the absolute. Pantheism [as in Hegel] asserts they provide such a revelation in the developmental process through which the absolute realizes itself Since the attribute of thought is not analytically contained in that of extension, the extended subject as such is not spiritual. Yet, in fact, it shows itself to be spiritual' (138).

John King-Farlow

University of Alberta

J.E. Malpas

Donald Davidson and the Mirror of Meaning.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. xviii + 301. n.p.

(ISBN 0-521-41721-X).

This book is an impressive attempt to spell out the holism that underlies Davidson's views, linking it explicitly with the Heideggerian notions of horizon, intention and *aletheia*, and drawing suggestive parallels with the work of Gadamer, Saussure and Wittgenstein, among others. Malpas' prose is admirably clear, and his exposition is well organized, with frequent summaries and conscientious attempts to highlight important connections at different stages of the discussion. The author's plausible contention is that Davidson's work is philosophically interesting to the extent that it embraces psychological holism. The details of Davidson's semantic theory are, thus, of

secondary importance. This approach, although fruitful, leads to occasional imprecisions, as when Malpas claims that 'we need,' on Davidson's view, 'a theory of meaning' (35), if we are to interpret a language. (Davidson has claimed only that such a theory would be *sufficient* — itself a contentious assertion.) But given Malpas' purposes, such flaws are of minor importance.

Chapter 1 gives a credible account of Davidson's debt to Quine, emphasizing the 'inseparability of meaning and information' (23) and its Davidsonian transformation into the 'interdependence of meaning and belief' (23). Here we meet three key-concepts that recur throughout the book: holism, indeterminacy and charity. In Chapter 2 we get an overview of Davidson's work, focusing on the importance of these concepts and their development in his account of radical interpretation, as well as on the centrality of truth in Davidsonian philosophy. The argument for holism here is very much Davidson's: interpreting another, I must make certain background assumptions about her beliefs, desires, *etc.*, and the attribution of particular beliefs depends both on what she says and does, and on what other intentional attitudes I attribute to her. All this, in turn, must take place in the context of my own beliefs and presuppositions about what is true and my own interests and desires in interpreting her.

Chapter 3 elaborates this holism and supports it against criticisms (notably, Fodor's). Holism, Malpas argues, is not just a methodological constraint on interpretation, but a constitutive principle of the psychological, because the interdependence of attitudes is not to be 'written off as a feature merely of the way we come to know attitudes' (54). The very identity of intentional attitudes is constituted in part by their rational connections with other such attitudes. Nor is this constitutive holism limited to so-called 'attitudes'; the significance of the psychological can be determined only in conjunction with non-linguistic behaviour. This conclusion leads to perceptive discussions of animal-intentions, holism and rationality, and the claim that basic to holism is 'the idea of a person as a unity (albeit an imperfect unity) of behaviour, attitude, feeling, capacity and so forth located within a shared world of objects, events and other persons' (92).

Holism is further elucidated in Chapter 4 with the notions of intention and horizon. Interpretation is intentional insofar as it picks out certain events and objects as of significance, but it is also 'horizontal' — those events and objects become significant only against a background which recedes toward a limiting horizon of significance. This horizon is not absolute; it can expand or contract in one or more directions. What I take for granted in interpreting a particular utterance can also be called into question, but to do so is always to take something else for granted. Yet we retain the regulative idea of an ultimate horizon — for any two horizons of interpretation there is always a broader horizon within which both are situated. This notion of a 'world-horizon,' like Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, 'presents itself as an almost entirely empty, formal structure' (140). But it also undermines relativism, construed as the incomprehensibility of alternative

conceptual schemes. As such it is related to another 'horizontal notion' (146), the principle of charity, which is the focus of Chapter 5.

At its most general level, Malpas argues, charity consists in the methodological assumption of a community of rational agents who share a common world. Such community is a consequence of holism, for the beliefs and desires of another can be identified only against the background of one's own, and one's own only against the background of others'. Holism is interpersonal, and charity is what 'enables the setting up of the immediate or local horizon within which any particular interpretative project proceeds' (147). According to Malpas, the agreement posited by the principle of charity thus varies with context and is compatible with attributing false or irrational beliefs to another. We should, therefore, not be tempted to offer the principle of humanity as an alternative to charity. Indeed, on this reading, there is no difference between the two, for charity says simply that there is always a horizon within which I can make sense of another person.

In Chapters 6 and 7 Malpas draws out the consequences of his views for the problems of relativism and scepticism and for contemporary debates between realists and anti-realists. Relativism, he urges, violates the assumption of community latent in holism, and scepticism too sharply divides the causes of beliefs from their objects. Since the sceptic is the metaphysical realist's *alter ego*, the latter's position must also be foregone. Davidsonian holism leads us to a 'naive' or 'horizontal realism' (274).

Malpas concludes by returning to Heidegger and arguing that Davidson's Tarskian view of truth needs augmentation. Truth, he says, must be thought of as *aletheia* — an uncovering or revelation of things as they are involved in specific, local, but always revisable and expandable, intentional projects. Part of Malpas' point seems to be that objects appear to us (and meaning arises) only insofar as those objects have roles to play in our practical affairs. Whether such 'uncovering' counts as truth is debatable, but this picture is surely congenial to the idea that truth is *epistemic* — that there is an internal connection between truth and justification (which — *contra* Malpas' reading of Putnam — is not to say that truth reduces to justification).

Malpas gives a lucid presentation of the subtleties and philosophical interest of holism, as well as an intriguing extension of Davidson's project. But his account of indeterminacy in interpretation (Chapter 4) is troubling. Inherent in Davidson's project, he says, is an indeterminacy of interpretation both similar to Quine's indeterminacy of translation and more radical in its extent. He reasons thus: Davidson's holism is more thorough than Quine's in rejecting the privileged status of observation-statements (for which Quine thinks we can give 'genuine' translative hypotheses); so, it weighs the anchor that kept indeterminacy from floating free on the seas of interpretation.

But Quinean indeterminacy depends on a confusion of norms with empirical *regularities* — a confusion that leads us to look for generalizations that will capture the regularities of linguistic behaviour. Indeterminacy then arises, since indefinitely many generalizations will fit the data. However, learning to follow a rule is, typically, quite different from testing hypotheses:

it is normative. Linguistic understanding requires that I generally be able to 'get things right', that I be able to use an expression in actual cases. Linguistic 'rules' are not empirical generalizations, but norms of linguistic conduct.

To suppose, as Malpas seems to, that understanding always requires interpretive hypotheses — if only 'implicit' ones — is to fall into much the same trap. (It is also to conflate indeterminacy with the fallibility of our assessments of others — with the fact that misunderstanding is always possible, but not always present.) Malpas does not seem to take seriously the possibility that understanding another person can, at times, be much like understanding oneself (on Davidson's account of first-person authority), that interpretation is something to which one *resorts* when understanding fails. Nor does it follow from the possibility of giving multiple interpretations of literary texts that 'The same point applies to our readings of those people whom we encounter in everyday life' (107). Success in interpreting others (when we must) is importantly different from success in interpreting literary works. Works of literature don't talk back; they contribute little or nothing to their own creation and development — or at least not in the same way that persons do.

These criticisms express significant disagreement with Malpas' position, but this book remains a worthy contribution both to the secondary literature on Davidson and to overcoming a dogma of empiricism and anti-empiricism alike — the analytic/continental distinction. And it is also good philosophy.

Michael Hymers
University of Alberta

Larry May and Stacey Hoffman, eds.
*Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of
Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics.*
Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield
1991. Pp. viii + 292.
US \$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7691-9);
US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8746-7692-7).

It is good to have a set of philosophical essays on collective responsibility collected together as in this volume. The relevant issues certainly merit the attention of moral and political philosophers and their students.

The first part of this collection, 'Conceptual Issues', consists of seven previously published essays, some by now quite well known, examining the idea of collective responsibility. These essays are by H.D. Lewis (first published in 1948), David Cooper (1968), R.S. Downie (1969, a reply to Cooper),

Joel Feinberg (1970), Howard McGary (1986), Virginia Held (1970) and Stanley Bates (1971, a response to Held). The second part, 'Applications', is divided into five sections on collective responsibility in business (Manuel Velasquez [1983], Peter French [1979]), professional life (Richard deGeorge [1981], James Muyskens [1982]), wartime (Richard Wasserstrom [1980], Kurt Baier [1972]), and with respect to apartheid and university divestment (Anthony Appiah [1987], Larry May), and genocide (A. Zvie Bar-On [1985], Hannah Arendt [1945]). (May's essay, a chapter from his book *Sharing Responsibility*, is first published here.) Essays in both parts address conceptual issues. the editors introduce the themes and summarize the individual papers at the outset.

Is there such a thing as collective responsibility? If so, what are its implications for individual group members? The two key concepts pertinent to these questions are difficult ones. First there is the notion of a collectivity or group. This can be defined narrowly or broadly and in significantly different ways. Thus the editors note, 'the range of groups to which collective responsibility has been or may be attributed is quite broad ... from highly structured groups such as corporations and armies ... the national and university communities, to groups as loosely connected as mobs, crowds, or even all of humanity' (8). The term 'group' is implicitly defined quite broadly here.

Peter French sees important differences between corporations, on the one hand, and mobs, on the other: to say that a particular mob is responsible for something is simply 'to make summary reference to each member of the mob' (139); it is different in the case of corporations. Whether or not one agrees with French about mobs or corporations, it is clearly necessary to be sensitive to the differences between so-called groups in discussing the possibility and ramifications of collective responsibility.

The other key concept here is that of responsibility itself. H.D. Lewis, among others, stresses a distinction between moral responsibility and other forms. According to Lewis individuals as opposed to groups are 'the sole bearers of moral responsibility'. This claim is controversial. In Part I, Downie concurs with Lewis, while Cooper, Feinberg, McGary, Held and Bates disagree.

Assuming that it is moral responsibility we are talking about, we have the questions: what is moral responsibility? What general types of entities can be morally responsible? For instance, is a capacity to act or form intentions necessary? If so, can human groups themselves act in any relevant sense? Is there perhaps some limit on the type of group that can itself act or intend? Is there for this or another reason some limit on the type of group that can be morally responsible? If a group is morally responsible for an act, are all or at least some of the group's members themselves morally responsible for it? All of these questions receive some discussion in one or more of these essays.

Held discusses and endorses the possibility of the moral responsibility of 'random collections' of individuals such as three unacquainted pedestrians

on an isolated street (96). She suggests that random collections are special since generally, though not in their case, 'From our attribution of ... moral responsibility ... to a collectivity, it does not follow that the collectivity's members are morally responsible for the action of the collectivity' (93).

Responding to Held, Bates argues that it is at least not possible that none of the members of a collectivity be morally responsible for something the collectivity is responsible for (105). He does not argue directly for this claim, which deserves discussion.

Held usefully suggests that there is a distinction between being morally responsible for the act of a group of which one is a member, and being morally responsible 'for the quite different actions of having joined or of retaining membership in the collectivity in question' (93). Which members, if any, bear moral responsibility for a particular act of the group may be a question left open by the ascription of moral responsibility to the collectivity. Which members, if any, are morally responsible for joining or retaining membership in the group may similarly be left open.

Is there perhaps something in some way morally negative about simply being the member of a group which is morally responsible for some evil, something which perhaps stops short of being morally responsible for that evil oneself? Larry May discusses a concept of 'metaphysical guilt' (the phrase is from Karl Jaspers) which does not entail moral guilt but rather 'moral taint'. According to May, metaphysical guilt does not arise simply from group membership, but rather from the fact that the individual 'does nothing to disconnect himself ... from those fellow group members who perpetrate harms' (241). One should at least indicate that one disapproves of these harms (241).

It is not clear that group membership as such never brings with it some form of moral taint or (correspondingly) that even strenuous condemnation of one's fellows' behavior is always sufficient to rule out such taint, given that one nonetheless remains a member. It may be that in certain cases at least only a 'distancing from one's group affiliation' (250) that constitutes exit from the group can achieve this. As always, different things may be true of different types of groups.

There is a wealth of material here to stimulate reflection. The various authors disagree among themselves on a variety of points at different levels of detail. Meanwhile there is a useful degree of overlap among the papers.

Margaret Gilbert

University of Connecticut, Storrs

Ladelle McWhorter, ed.
Heidegger and the Earth:
Essays in Environmental Philosophy.
Kirkville, MO: The Thomas Jefferson
University Press 1991. Pp. xi + 98.
US \$35.25 (ISBN 0-943549-08-6).

This small, thoughtfully organized book opens with McWhorter's critique of the scientific ideal of unified knowledge and of the guilt-response to ecological crisis, moving on to Hanspeter Padrutt's insightful study of the orientations Heidegger offers to ecological thinking, and to an exegesis, by Steven Davis, of Heidegger's meditation on the second choral ode of Sophocles' *Antigone*, which exalts the resourcefulness and power of man. These essays are followed by Kenneth Maly's reflections on transformative 'earth-thinking', which instantiate, in their very articulation, the envisaged transformation, and to Gail Stenstad's exploration of the 'trails' of darkness and desire that Maly opens up but does not follow out. Thomas Davis' finely argued essay on 'Meeting Place' closes the volume.

In reading *Heidegger and the Earth*, one has the sense that the contributors are genuinely in conversation; the book's coherence evokes the image of a wave that crests, reaches out along different lines of flow, and folds back on itself. This wave image suggests itself not only as a tribute to the editor's thoughtfulness, but also as a compensation for the insistent dominance of earth imagery in the book, to the exclusion of other elemental powers or, in Bachelard's more anthropocentric terms, of the imagination and 'psychoanalysis' of the elements. The earth-focus unwittingly reaffirms the centrality of earth-dwelling man, and moreover of continental humanity, as contrasted with island dwellers who are aware of the ceaseless, dynamic interaction of the elements, of the instability of earth, and of the fragmentation of the archipelago.

Of the essays published in this collection, I found Padrutt's 'Heidegger and Ecology' (previously published in *Heidegger Studies*) and T. Davis' 'Meeting Place' to be of particular interest. Padrutt's essay is remarkable for its critical vigilance and careful exploration of the ecological relevance of the Heideggerian thought structures of 'coming-forth-holding-in-reserve' (*zuvorkommende Zurückhaltung*), abandoning objectifying subjectivity, and thinking the turning of Being's forgottenness. Davis' contribution, which juxtaposes Wendell Berry's encounter with a hawk, and Heidegger's with an oak (that does not 'speak' to him, but rather to the field path), so as to trace out the boundaries and rhythms constitutive of *ethos*, has a questioning and poetic intensity that involves the reader from beginning to end.

Although all the essays are lucid and interesting, I do have some critical misgivings. McWhorter's 'Guilt as Management Technology' seems to me to take for granted and overemphasize a collective guilt response; and it neglects reference to Nietzsche's important analyses of the structure of guilt. What troubles me most in Maly's essay is his insistence on translating

Heidegger's *Wesen* as 'root-unfolding' (I myself translate it as *essence*, to emphasize both its verbal and Being-character; but it might with equal justice be left untranslated). 'Root-unfolding' leads on to a whole discourse of roots and rootedness (but never up-rooting), such as 'root-being', 'root-desire', 'earth-root-thinking', and even 'root-amazement' that extends, in this volume, beyond the bounds of Maly's contribution. The root metaphors of 'connectedness' and 'expansion' is assimilated, without much explanation, to an 'alchemical' metaphors of transformation. The sexual and potentially violent overtones of the metaphors of the penetrating and expanding root remain unthematized, as does the resonance of *Blut und Boden* rhetoric (that infiltrates Heidegger's own discourse). I am also uneasy about Maly's moves of 'gathering up' chains of associations (rhetorical moves that, for him, displace linear argument), since they can far too readily be adapted to the (pseudo-)justification of ideologies. Politics, in general, is kept in abeyance in this book. With regard to Maly, however, I value his inclusion of feminine, North American Indian, and Meso-American voices as a gesture of valorizing difference.

Stenstad's 'Singing the Earth' remains within the parameters of Maly's thought but introduces new concerns and finely observed imagery, such as the fox 'going to earth' or the rustling of a cottonwood tree. I am critical, however, of her dichotomous thought-structure (opposing connectedness and expansion to disconnectedness and contraction) and of a too facile practice of linguistic association which leads her from *gehören* to 'belonging' to 'longing' to 'desire', as if by an Indogermanic sleight of hand. Steven Davis' essay, finally, is valuable for its exploration of power or violence in Heidegger's meditation on the Sophoclean ode, but would have benefited from a broader textual basis. In his 1942 lecture course on Hölderlin's hymn *Der Ister*, Heidegger offers a subtly but importantly different reading of the ode.

The book as a whole suffers from careless Greek. Greek terms and phrases are cited abundantly, in the Greek alphabet, but stress marks are often omitted or incorrectly placed; long vowels are sometimes changed to short (as with ἔπος, where the *omicron* form is not standard), and, most seriously, questionable etymologies are given importance in the discussion without being, in any way, explored or substantiated with reference to the standard sources. Given that Heidegger's own Greek is impeccable, these lapses are disconcerting.

Véronique M. Fóti

Pennsylvania State University

Susan Mendus

Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism.

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press

1989. Pp. ix + 177.

\$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-391-03621-1);

\$15.00 (paper: ISBN 0-391-03622-X).

Mendus clearly and provocatively addresses three central questions regarding toleration: What is it? What is its justification? and What are its limits? Contemporary liberals would benefit by accepting Locke's limited, pragmatic defence based on the irrationality of intolerance, she argues, than by embracing Mill's expansive defense grounded in diversity and autonomy. For whether liberals defend tolerance based on skepticism (Ackerman), neutrality (Rawls and Dworkin), or autonomy (Raz), their theories inevitably have illiberal implications. Only socialism promotes a sense of loyalty, belonging, and common citizenship among those who crave more than mere tolerance can provide: namely, esteem.

Questions of tolerance occur where diversity produces dislike, disgust, or moral disapproval. To these *circumstances of tolerance* Mendus adds that one must have the power to affect those tolerated. Mendus uneasily limits toleration's scope, however, by excluding unalterable matters, though she acknowledges that this exclusion runs counter to everyday usage, where appeals to racial and sexual tolerance abound. Where toleration arises from moral disapproval, it follows that what we tolerate is reprehensible and shouldn't exist; but then why tolerate it? The paradox arises because moral judgments entail universal validity even if their grounds needn't be objective or universal.

The state shouldn't concern itself with saving men's souls, Locke argues, because the state can only compel the will. Coercive attempts to alter authentic belief necessarily fail. Any time officials try to do so, they are 'engaged in fundamental irrationality' (26). Unlike professions of belief, 'the manner in which [authentic] belief is held or the causal story which explains how it came to be held' are crucial (30). So critics (e.g., Waldron) are mistaken in arguing against Locke that belief can be coerced, if only indirectly, by manipulating the 'epistemic apparatus' of belief; e.g., controlling information, propaganda, and the like. Mendus backs away from this strong claim about irrationality, however, by admitting that the 'task of obtaining genuine conformity in the areas of moral and religious belief is likely to be *extremely difficult* and to *have far-reaching ramifications*' (35; emphasis added). Would any inquisitor disagree?

Locke's negative and limited defense of toleration contrasts sharply with Mill's positive and expansive vindication. Where Mill and contemporary liberals look to the *consequences* of tolerance and intolerance, Locke looks to *reasons*, which must be neutral with respect to religion, morality, and anything unalterable. Further, where Mill and contemporary liberals address the *victims* of intolerance in terms of rights or harm, Locke addresses

the *perpetrators*. For if the immorality of intolerance lies in its rationality, then an intolerant official neglects his own duties.

Mill justifies both liberty and toleration by reference to autonomy — the view that one is the author of one's own life. Autonomy implies that 'it matters more that people should find their own route to the best way of life than that they should lead the best way of life' (51). Now autonomy wouldn't be important if human nature were uniform. Mill's belief that it is not provides the key to understanding his advocacy of liberty, autonomy, and tolerance. If we are to become autonomous, we need liberty which, given the fact of diversity, entails tolerance: otherwise, we won't be free to chart our own lives.

Mill's argument yields answers to the substantive questions concerning toleration: the need of diverse individuals 'to flourish and grow, dictates the necessity of toleration' and toleration is unlimited, except 'in circumstances in which it will be employed so as to stifle and stunt the growth of autonomous individuality' (147). Because one cannot be truly self-determining unless one has an adequate range of acceptable alternatives from which to choose, the state has a positive duty to foster a wide range of alternatives, including those we find repugnant — a duty of affirmative action not found in Locke.

Mill's doctrine of progress and moral improvement underpins his belief in diversity. Only if freedom normally and regularly leads to moral improvement, can we be sure that tolerated diversity won't be socially destructive. Where his optimism flags, Mill doesn't shrink from suggestions with illiberal consequences. Contemporary liberals — just because they reject Mill's doctrine of progress and perfectibility — inherit this fatal flaw.

Liberalism comes in many guises. The premise of individual diversity, however, is central. Because contemporary liberals deny that there is one best way to live, they urge the state to be neutral between competing conceptions of the good. Not surprisingly, this leads to the following dilemma: although the *need* for neutrality is created by the fact of diversity, the *application* of neutrality is possible only by assuming the neutrality principle itself. However, there is no reason to think that people of widely differing religious and moral backgrounds will accept that principle.

Although liberals shy away from any grand theory of human nature and human good, they are nonetheless committed to the value of autonomy. They can't say anything compelling about the degree of toleration we should extend to less than tolerant subcultures, however, because they can't satisfactorily reconcile (1) a *condition* of autonomy demanding *detachment* from the world to reflect on and critically evaluate social norms; (2) the *development* of autonomy demanding *embeddedness* in the world to develop one's autonomy; and (3) the recognition that autonomy can never be more than partial.

Although important, diversity is not the only significant feature of modern liberalism and its defense of toleration. *Choice* and *transparency* are equally central. Autonomy and the requirements of neutrality dictate that ways of life, commitments, and moral ideals are at root matters of individual choice. Further, authority and power relations in the social world are legitimate only to the extent that they are transparent; i.e., available for public apprehension

and scrutiny. This demand generates a contractarian view. However: 'liberals exaggerate the extent to which choice is possible in the case of personal ideals, and thus exaggerate the scope of toleration. Similarly, liberals exaggerate the extent to which legitimation is appropriate in the case of our most deeply held relationships, and thus exaggerate the importance of toleration' (153).

The state is not a neutral arena within which people pursue their own interests, Mendus contends, but a set of institutions that 'can invest people's lives with meaning' (155). Although sometimes this dictates diminishing toleration of those sub-groups that demand loyalty at odds with loyalty to the state, socialism may expand toleration even to them. First, people don't usually choose to belong to a particular subculture: 'people are victims as much as agents' (155). In such cases, *pace* Locke, political intolerance would be irrational. Second, because of its emphasis on the 'given' and interdependence, socialist unity must be constructed from diverse solidarities, and that requires tolerance.

The socialist, then, justifies toleration as a way of promoting and sustaining citizenship. Further, 'If toleration is justified because it is a way of promoting a sense of belonging, then there can be no justification for tolerating those actions or beliefs which do not promote a sense of belonging' (160). Socialism (allegedly) avoids becoming oppressive because of Locke's proviso that intolerance isn't justified when it is irrational. And since we are all 'interdependent victims' of our cultural embeddedness, it appears that socialism can avoid the worst cases of intolerance.

Toleration seems a grudging virtue. Certainly, we can only tolerate what we don't already regard as fully virtuous. Sometimes, however, we find ourselves tolerating limitations, weaknesses and even vices if we believe they are inextricably linked to an admirable, or at least acceptable, way of life. Contrary to Mendus, even when we tolerate something on moral grounds, we need not regard the thing tolerated as '*reprehensible*' (149). We may think that it isn't as good as it could be, or has regrettable elements which are more than compensated for by the thing taken as a whole, or that abolishing it would have far worse consequences than simply letting it be. The ways of life of certain sub-groups in a liberal society often fall into this category. These cases do, of course, raise difficult substantive questions, but not by way of conceptual paradox. Indeed, without her controversial claim that moral judgments entail universal validity, much of the force of the 'paradox of toleration' vanishes.

Mendus also errs by excluding the unalterable from the domain of tolerance: here she conflates logical oddness and moral inappropriateness. *If* we follow her by defining the intolerable in purely descriptive terms as the unbearable, there can be nothing logically odd about bigots finding the presence of (say) blacks, Muslims, or homosexuals intolerable: that is simply a fact about them. That they do so, of course, is morally indefensible — and not solely or even primarily because race, religion, or sexual orientation are unalterable. Such judgments take us directly to substantive moral reasons, and cannot be determined by definition.

Liberalism has many critics. Too often, however, they attack a highly abstract strawman, a tendency Mendus exhibits. She seems particularly unfair to the views of Raz (*The Morality of Freedom*, 1986), who argues against rights-based theories, individualism, contractarianism, and neutrality in favor of a form of perfectionism. The quest for full autonomy does not deny interdependence: it depends on cultural embeddedness as much as birds need atmosphere to fly. No inconsistency exists, therefore, between the conditions and development of autonomy. No one who has ever written on the topic — including Mendus — believes that we can tolerate everything.

Mendus' own answers need clarification and development. It isn't clear, for instance, in what sense her views are 'socialist', since she never defines the term, nor why we must acquiesce in the state's self-image as requiring allegiance and providing a source of meaning. Finally, just because we don't choose our religious and moral outlooks the way we choose pizza toppings, it doesn't follow that we are all 'interdependent victims' (162). Nothing Mendus says shows that we aren't responsible for how we see things and that we can't bring ourselves to recognize that we can suffer a kind of blindness or distorted vision. If this weren't true, rational criticism, discussion, and education would be nothing more than forms of rationalization.

Hans Oberdiek
Swarthmore College

Lutz Niethammer (in collaboration with
Dirk van Laak)

Posthistoire: Has History come to an End?
Trans. Patrick Camiller.

Verso Books: London and New York 1993.
Pp. 158.

US \$29.95 (ISBN 0-86091-395-3).

Recent North American attention to a conception of the 'end of history', even within the academy, stems especially from Francis Fukuyama's widely read article of that name — subsequently expanded into a book (*The End of History and the Last Man*). In the best older tradition a figure outside the university, Fukuyama caught a particularly golden moment, offering a sort of Hegelian analysis of culture and history in tandem with the east European revolutions and the sense of a new dawn they generated (the spirit of '89). Of course he was vilified for his efforts, almost universally within the academy. (The one notice the book under review makes of Fukuyama adds to that vilification, in a fairly standard way.)

At any rate the end of history idea — or end of history ideas, because there are several — by no means originate with Fukuyama. *Posthistoire* is an essay in the history of that idea, or those ideas, and a delightfully readable and absorbing one. It is indeed more than merely enjoyable: it achieves a depth and sagacity, especially in its concluding chapter, that make it an extraordinarily impressive piece of philosophical writing, deserving a wide readership, well beyond those who study philosophy of history or 20th century German philosophy, who would be its first natural audiences. Wide-ranging, richly allusive, ironic, humane, well-informed in American as well as French and German cultural and historical perspectives, this essay brings illumination wherever its author probes, and wanders.

A strikingly apocalyptic mood or note seems to have fallen upon western cultural reflection in the period since the early 1970s, marked by the ubiquity of word formations with the prefix 'post'. Posthistory, the postindustrial, postrevolutionary, postphilosophy, postmodernism, and now post-Marxism, post-feminism. (The predecessor prefix of preference may perhaps have been 'meta'. If so we have gone from the larger higher perspective to the one where everything is washed up.) *Après nous le déluge*.

Posthistory differs from most other 'post-' phenomena in involving something other than just ideas, theories, matters of value and attitude. A posthistorical thesis is a thesis about the *world*, to the effect that history has ended or will presently do so. (Niethammer insufficiently appreciates that such theses are frequently predictive, not (allegedly) descriptive of our actual case.) The idea, typically, is that a condition or state of *historical* life is one of free rational agency (by no means necessarily for all, or even most), on individual and group levels, making a causal difference for human fortunes, those differences actually changing those fortunes, changing the very conditions of life, in ways that can be recognized as significant. There is also involved, for many posthistorians, an essential component of *diversity* in history: so history might have ended because everything had become everywhere the same. Most fundamentally though history could be over because people became powerless to act to make any difference (or real or major difference) in their lives, on large group levels; or else because even if people had such power, they would cease wanting to exercise it. This latter distinction will signal the important contrasting cases of negative or pessimistic posthistory, and positive or optimistic posthistory. Advocates of the former think we're doomed, of the latter that some sort of utopia is at hand. Utopian posthistory has especially taken socialist or communist form. After the revolution, once world-wide, there will be a general stateless condition of better living through proletarian chemistry (Marxism-Leninism); or technological and structural organization will reduce scale (anarchist and 'green' visions). Fukuyama's conception is of a liberal democratic/free market utopian (or positive) posthistory.

Niethammer's concerns in this volume, however, are chiefly with posthistorical dysutopia. He sketches with varying degrees of detail, the thought, books, personal and professional histories, of a dozen or so

individuals who became drawn to the posthistorical idea, on the right or left (and in some cases both), primarily in the period 1935-1960. All are 'negative' or pessimistic posthistorians, for whom the future is bleak, frozen, unfree. For most the chief villain is industrial civilization and industrial technology. A key element in the analysis is that *something* has immobilized 'the masses' and the possibility of their transforming the world (even with the right leadership). Niethammer gives primary attention to ten thinkers: Bertrand de Jouvenel, Alexandre Kojève, Ernst Junger, Hendrik de Man, Arnold Gehlen, Hans Freyer, Gunther Anders, Jean Baudrillard, Peter Bruckner, and Jacob Taubes. Also included in the net of posthistorical significance are Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, Henry Adams and several others. Of contributory importance, also explored by Niethammer, are Weber, Freud, Norman O. Brown, and the historian Walter Benjamin. Obviously a book of 158 pages cannot and does not purport to be a comprehensive study even of select themes in so many writers. Nonetheless Niethammer conveys vivid plausible accounts of the posthistorical motif and paradigm practitioners.

Briefly, Niethammer's thesis is that the posthistory thesis is the expression of disgruntlement and dislocation of western intellectuals who would have desired a leadership role in their societies, but were unable to achieve one. Because the world did not turn as they would have wished or as their theories prescribed, they fashioned new theories, according to which the world cannot turn as desired: theories in which the world becomes 'petrified' or 'crystallized' in a state that will no longer permit free creative difference-making rational agency, due to an autonomously functioning 'system' that impersonally regiments all life, or a tyrannical ruling class, or a spiralling technological current that will rush human life finally to destruction. A robotized regimented tomorrow awaits us (or is already here), consumerist, shallow, changeless — unless and until ecological or technological Armageddon arrives.

Niethammer makes in general a persuasive psychobiographical case — these do come across as eccentric, marginal, or opportunistic people (even if — some of them — talented), acting in some variety of Nietzschean *ressentiment*. (With one exception, it seemed to me. Both the human being, and the work and theoretical stance, of Hendrik de Man — uncle of the now infamous deconstructionist Paul, who better fits Niethammer's model — seemed, as presented here, not pathological. Unlike all of the others, his ideas seem 'serious', intelligent, genuinely aiming at a synoptic understanding of 20th century European realities, and a politics that would unite social democracy and liberalism — even though he became dubious that it could succeed. Though a pessimist, he seems in fact nearer what appears to be Niethammer's own centrist liberalism, and to deserve better than the theoretical company he is placed among.)

Apart from dimensions of biography Niethammer's case persuades also. The simple fact is that the negative posthistorians offer no serious *evidence* for their views. This is not to deny degrees of plausibility and justification

for grounds of complaint and concern *vis à vis* the liberal western states and their citizens. These too are sensitively aired here; not however — which is in part Niethammer's point — by the posthistorians.

This is a wonderful book, a superb, well-crafted read. Every contemporary philosopher should make its acquaintance.

Peter Loftson

University of Saskatchewan

Alan G. Padgett

God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time.

New York: St. Martin's Press 1992. 208 p.

US \$35.00 (ISBN 0-312-06813-1).

In this book Padgett argues for the view that God is eternal in the sense of 'relative timelessness', a type of eternity intended to be in between traditional absolute timelessness and everlasting temporality. By 'relative timelessness' Padgett means that God's existence and acts cannot be measured by time, nor is he affected by the negative aspects of temporal passage. God is both the creator and Lord of time, and he transcends 'our' time. But God is a temporal being and he changes in relation to the created world. What is immutable is his basic nature, character, and perfections.

In spite of the fact that Padgett rejects both of the traditional conceptions of divine eternity as either absolute timelessness or everlasting temporality, he does not directly argue against either one of them. In fact, a proponent of either of the traditional views will find plenty of evidence in Padgett's book to support her own position and little reason to reject it. For example, Chapter Two, 'The Witness of Scripture', is devoted to an examination of the biblical understanding of God's relation to time which shows that 'Scripture knows nothing of a timeless God' (2). The exegesis of this chapter clearly points in the direction of God as everlasting, but Padgett concludes instead that 'Scripture does seem to this exegete to point in the direction of relative timelessness' (37). Presumably, the reason for his hesitation in accepting the temporality of God *tout court* is that he wishes to accommodate the long tradition of absolute timelessness in natural theology, although the methodological connection between Scripture and the philosophical/theological tradition is not completely clear. In any case, Padgett does not argue for the rejection of God's temporality, and since the concessions he makes to the timelessness view are those which many adherents of divine temporality would be happy to make, we may conclude that what he calls relative

timelessness really is temporality. The idea that God's temporality is not 'measured' is the major contribution of this book to the analysis of an everlasting God.

While Padgett's conclusion comes down on the temporality side of the dispute, he also gives plenty of comfort to the traditional timelessness advocate. In Chapter four he argues that the view that God is absolutely timeless is coherent, and when combined with the position that God sustains the universe, it entails the stasis theory of time (roughly, MacTaggart's B theory). In the following chapter Padgett argues that neither scientific nor philosophical arguments force us to accept the stasis theory of time, and he concludes that it should be rejected. This is surprising since a proponent of absolute timelessness would simply reply that he had himself given a compelling argument for the stasis theory in the previous chapter. What's more, the lack of a compelling argument for the stasis theory is insufficient reason to conclude that it is false since no compelling argument for the process theory is given either. But Padgett's preference is to argue as follows: (1) Since no argument for the stasis theory is compelling, the process theory (A theory) must be true. (2) But if the process theory is true and if God sustains the universe, God cannot be absolutely timeless. Now even though (1) is inadequate as it stands, many philosophers would agree that the process theory is preferable anyway. Let us then move on to (2).

Padgett argues that since on the process theory the future is not real, an absolutely timeless God 'cannot timelessly "will" that a certain effect take place at a future time since the effects of his "will" do not exist yet' (73). 'If it is not T2, then God is not sustaining E ... Even God, therefore, must wait until time T2 to act in the specified manner' (74). Similar statements appear in other places.

This argument seems to me to be mistaken. It is incoherent to say God can only affect what is real *now* since the point of timelessness is that there is no 'now' to God. If God is timeless, what is real to God may very well be different than what is real to temporal beings, regardless of which theory of time is correct. The two theories of time differ with respect to the ontological status of the future *within the temporal universe*. They have no implications on the ontological status of what *we* call 'the future' from a perspective outside of time. Past, present, and future simply make no sense to a timeless observer, nor does the notion of *waiting*. Padgett, then, seems to be guilty of infecting the discussion of an atemporal deity with process terminology, the same mistake he attributes to Delmas Lewis (79).

Padgett's position is that God's sustaining act and its effect must be Zero Time Related (21-22, 71-73). This rules out not only the view that God is outside of time, but also the position that God is in time effecting the future. But I am not convinced that 'the mere passage of time has no causal efficacy' (22). When a tenure decision is made at my university, the candidate is informed that it will take effect approximately eighteen months in the future. A professor does not have tenure until that time, even though all sufficient causal conditions for tenure obtain except the mere passage of time. It is

possible, of course, that this procedure is incoherent, but if so, I do not think it can be demonstrated without more argument.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the first section of Chapter Five, responding to the scientific arguments for a stasis theory of time (82-95). There Padgett argues that there are several positions on the 'true' nature of simultaneity compatible with Relativity Theory. The problem with drawing metaphysical conclusions from scientific evidence is brought out well, and, at the same time, Padgett is aware of the fact that physics *is* relevant to metaphysics, and a metaphysics of time arising only out of common sense and outdated physics is not going to give us an understanding of time that is very deep or lasting.

God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time is easy to read, covers a lot of the traditional and contemporary literature, and makes a number of good distinctions on temporal relations and metrification. It includes an extensive bibliography, although it omits an important book on eternity published the previous year: *Time and Eternity* by Brian Leftow (Cornell University Press, 1991). Students and scholars working on either the nature of time or the divine attributes will find much useful material in this book.

Linda Zagzebski

Loyola Marymount University

Terence Penelhum

*David Hume: An Introduction to His
Philosophical System.*

West Lafayette: Purdue University Press 1992.

Pp. xi + 218.

US \$27.00 (cloth: ISBN 1-55753-012-2);

US \$13.75 (paper: ISBN 1-55753-013-0).

Intended for students, Penelhum's *David Hume* provides a modernized text of Sections II, III, IV, V, VII and XI of the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* and of Appendices I and II of the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. In addition to a brief account of Hume's life, and an annotated bibliography, it includes five substantive chapters: 'Hume and His Philosophical System'; 'The Science of Mind'; 'Cause and Effect'; 'Morality and Justice'; and 'Religion'. Though focused on the two *Enquiries*, these refer, where appropriate, to the *Treatise*, the *Dialogues*, and the *Natural History of Religion*. Penelhum's commentaries are thoroughly

successful: they set out Hume's fundamental concerns and their interconnections, the significance of Hume's many philosophical achievements, his central doctrines and some of their chief difficulties, with economy and clarity; and they do so while providing unobtrusive and judicious comment on contemporary Hume scholarship. The student he introduces to Hume will be much in Penelhum's debt.

Penelhum's Hume is a highly systematic philosopher whose thinking is dominated by the seemingly competing, but in fact mutually supportive, demands of skepticism and naturalism. Hume is a neo-Academic skeptic with post-Cartesian concerns: 'reason is unable to generate any assurance that perceptions correspond to realities' but 'our instinctive natures force us to assent in spite of this; ... [and] reason is able to modify the form of this assent by refining it in the light of the regularities we encounter in daily experience' (28). Hume's naturalism — his 'fundamental theoretical step' (11) — is similarly post-Cartesian. If 'sufficiently Cartesian to assume the reality of the inner mental life' (16), Hume initiates a non-teleological science of human nature designed to display human cognitive activity as a naturally explicable phenomenon subject to natural laws and to integrate cognitive activity with the life of the emotions. If post-Cartesian, Hume is clearly anti-rationalist: he dismisses rationalist pretensions concerning the powers of reasoning, subverts rationalist efforts to provide foundations for human inferential activities, and argues that rationalist representations of 'the separateness, self-consciousness, and freedom of the inner self' (16) must give way to a view of the human mind as a part of nature. This anti-rationalist science of human nature, itself compatible with Hume's skepticism, helps him explain the skeptic's inability to undermine perceptual belief and inferential practice. In Hume's case, 'the skepticism is the source of doubts that can be *solved* without the skepticism itself being *refuted*' (18).

Given the importance Penelhum assigns to Hume's skepticism, one could wish its several targets were more clearly limned and their interrelations more explicitly depicted. He provides a good overview of the many regions in which Hume deploys skeptical arguments, but he often leaves it unclear whether it is philosophical theories or ordinary practices against which Hume directs his skeptical fire, whether it is the content or the credentials or the truth of beliefs that is questioned. Penelhum's neglect of the notorious discussion (*Treatise* I iv 1) of skepticism with regard to reason is understandable, but one could wish for a more probing treatment of Hume's skepticism with regard to the senses. Penelhum comments on the 'pedestrian picture' of properly philosophical investigations that emerges from those parts of Hume's writings — the skeptical parts — 'that are so exciting to read' (27). The picture of Hume's skepticism with regard to the senses that Penelhum offers, however, is itself the traditionally pedestrian one: Hume argues that no justification can be found for perceptual belief. There is no hint of Hume's claim to prove by irrefutable argument that there are

no physical objects, or of his taking that proof to be the product of cognitive operations having the same origin as those that generate beliefs in just such objects. There is no hint of Hume's exciting claim that human understanding is radically antinomous in character.

Penelhum's handling of Hume's science of human nature corrects a number of common misunderstandings. Hume's empiricism rests on the requirements on a best psychological theory of human cognition; it is not to be confused with latterday positivist proposals about the links between verification and meaning. Though Hume attends closely to the many social dimensions of being human, his account of the social is, at bottom, individualist in character. On two points, however, Penelhum (here following Hume) is less clear than he needs to be. First, can the mind both be part of nature and be subject to norms? If Penelhum is right to claim both that Hume's skepticism regarding inductive reasoning is compatible with his endorsement of normative status for 'the rules by which to judge of causes and effects', and that adherence to these rules is itself to be explained by means of associative causation, the question is a pressing one. Second, how encompassing is the primacy of the passions in Hume's naturalism? Penelhum emphasizes the place of passions in the generation of intentional action and the constitution of moral evaluation. He misleads, however, when he blurs the line between passion and instinct, especially when invoking instinct in the explication of ostensibly cognitive activities such as causal reasoning.

Against Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Penelhum holds that Hume does raise the question of inductive skepticism; against Stove, he holds that the question has no answer. He maintains nonetheless that Hume can, as he purports to, distinguish warranted from unwarranted inductive inferences. Ineluctability and explicability together provide the key. Nature forces our hand (though in ways compatible with the sophisticated techniques of the scientist) for the cases of causal inference and perceptual belief. As the *Natural History of Religion* makes plain, however, deflationary explanations are available for religious beliefs that are far from ineluctable.

Penelhum's naturalist account of Hume's moral theory comports with much that is widely received amongst Hume commentators. His Hume is a non-cognitivist who insists on the parallels between moral sentiment and indirect passion, takes the requirements of justice to be the product of self-interested conventions, and assigns a critical etiological role to the mechanism of sympathy. In making Humean morality a matter for spectators rather than agents, however, he ignores two points Hume emphasizes: morality's place in the explanation of action; and the moral agent's attention to motivation when deliberating what to do. In his account of sympathy he is quick where Hume is careful: for Hume, only regularized sympathy can accommodate the objectivity of moral sentiment.

Penelhum's final chapter is a characteristically subtle examination of Hume's treatment of religious belief. He explains the tie, for eighteenth-

century thinkers, between the design argument and the question of the credibility of miracles. He convincingly sets out the structural similarities between the *Dialogues* and Section XI of the first *Enquiry*. Acknowledging a case for Hume's 'attenuated deism' (187), he thinks it as likely that Hume was an undogmatic atheist. He ends with a compelling treatment of Hume's contrast between 'true' and 'false' religion, and of his secularizing concern not to 'fan religious conservatism by an open attack on all religious forms' (190).

John Bricke

University of Kansas

Philip J. Rossi and Michael Wreen, eds.

Kant's Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered.

Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1991.

Pp. 244

US \$25.00 (ISBN 0-253-35027).

Kant's *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* (1793) marked a major milestone in the intellectual life of the West. It retains this character today.

Many view their moral values and principles as grounded in religion. Jacobi certainly thought this view correct when he argued in 1785 that human beings can embrace either supernaturalism as a fideistic framework for life based on revelation or a naturalistic system of theoretical knowledge based on reason. He further argued that the latter alternative entails the denials of God, freedom and immortality and hence is false. Jacobi's view is still widely held. As U.S. Justice Clarence Thomas remarked two hundred years later: 'My mother says that when they took God out of the schools, the schools went to hell. She may be right.'

Kant responded to Jacobi the following year, claiming that he had overlooked a third alternative. The beliefs in question are based neither on theoretical reason nor on special revelation, but rather on practical reason as operative in a moral life. Morality is the foundation of religion which in turn is the completion of morality. *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone* then spelled out this alternative most fully.

Focus on this work is thus philosophically and culturally important. Yet this importance has hardly been sufficiently appreciated. The 1987 Marquette University symposium organized around this work by the editors of the present volume is, to my knowledge, unique. The editors and Indiana

University Press are to be commended for letting the best contributions to that symposium now appear here in revised form.

The titles of the contributions give a sense of their range: 'Kant's Deism' (A. Wood), 'Kant on Reason and Justified Belief in God' (J. Runzo), 'Conundrums in Kant's Rational Religion' (N. Wolterstorff), 'Kant's Rejection of Divine Revelation and his Theory of Radical Evil' (D. Savage), 'Freedom and Providence in Kant's Account of Religion: The Problem of Expiation' (L. Mulholland), 'Kant's Doctrine of Atonement as a Theory of Subjectivity' (W. Sparr), 'God and Community: An Inquiry into the Religious Implications of the Highest Good' (S. Anderson-Gold), 'The Final End of all things: The Highest Good as the Unity of Nature and Freedom' (P. Rossi), "For reason ... also has its mysteries": Immortality, *Religion*, and "The End of All things" (A. Perovich), and '*Rationis societas*: Remarks on Kant and Hegel' (B. Tuschling).

Given this diversity of topics, the editors provide a helpful introduction which organizes the contributions and focuses the issues around three questions. 'What is the scope and status of Kant's claims about "rational religion," especially as these claims bear upon notions such as grace, providence, and revelation?' 'What impact does Kant's account of "radical evil" have upon his understanding of human agency and subjectivity?' 'What is the systematic significance of the place that Kant gives to religion within the workings of human culture and history?'

I have found most of the papers in this volume, especially those by Mulholland and Rossi, very valuable. I had to look at particular concepts and evidential ties that, left to my own predispositions, I would not have. I found myself forced to adjudicate disagreements on text and substance between authors and led to see new implications. In brief, I learned a lot and so, I think, will others. My regrets are few. None of the authors make enough reference to current work in Kant's ethics which would have provided a helpful basis for evaluating their attempts to go beyond Kant in theological matters. Given that all the authors adopt some variant of Jacobi's position, I would like to have seen one rousing defense of the Kantian religious alternative. And I would have liked an application of this alternative to public policy within a multi-religious society committed constitutionally to a separation of church and state.

Some recurring difficulties emerge from these papers. They concern the scope of ascriptions of accountability, the variety of rationality ingredient in human action and the nature of the subject to whom autonomy is ascribable.

Professors Anderson-Gold and Rossi claim that, prior to *Religion*, Kant has no way of accounting for immoral actions. Their view falls between that of G. Prauss, who in *Kant über Freiheit als Autonomie* argues that Kant never does come up with a plausible account, and those of R.J. Sullivan and H.E. Allison, who in their recent books argue incompatibly on Kant's behalf.

Kant's distinction between theoretical and practical reason is anything but clear and bedevils virtually every paper in this collection. For example, the self-deception at the root of 'radical evil' and the implicit possibility of

insight into our true good, as already the Delphic *gnothi seauton*, do not fit Kant's distinction.

Kant at times ascribes autonomy to reason as the nature of man qua intelligible being. But, contrary to Professor Perovich, the subject of transcendental capabilities must be the subject of empirical ones as well; otherwise, the former capacities are merely transcendent.

Relative to these transcendental capacities involved in human agency, the temporality of that agency clearly needs further scrutiny. Time and hence history emerge as problematic in nearly all the papers in this collection.

I doubt that whatever proves to be the best construal here will have the implication anticipated by several authors: that Kant's sharp distinction between the external order of legality and the moral order will no longer be tenable, that realization of the kingdom of ends will obviate need for the state. For this assumes an isomorphism between morality and legality which does not hold. Even if it were to hold, it would provide no assurance that a community of saints would have the theoretical knowledge and the political prudence to erect precisely those institutions which ensure the maximal exercise of each person's freedom compatible with that of every other.

Alexander von Schoenborn

University of Missouri-Columbia

Thomas J. Scheff

Microsociology: Discourse, Emotion, and Social Structure.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990.

Pp. xviii + 214.

US \$29.95 (ISBN 0-226-73666-0).

Sociologists are always surprised and disappointed by the relative lack of attention that philosophers have paid to the problems surrounding the integration of 'micro' (interpersonal) and 'macro' (structural) accounts of social life. Sociological theorists regularly engage in subtle theoretical arguments over the appropriate 'unit of analysis' and the generalizability of empirical claims acquired by different methods, arguments that rival those to which philosophers have noticeably contributed in physics and biology. (The best volume of work in this vein is still Karin Knorr-Cetina and Aaron Cicourel, eds., *Advances in Social Theory and Methodology*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.) However, when philosophers turn their attention to sociology, they tend to ask only one big ontological question: Is it necessary

to postulate the reality of social structures, or is social life reducible to the interaction of socialized individuals? A respected student of mental illness and the family, Thomas Scheff has produced a work, nearly thirty years in the making, that attempts to circumvent the crudity of this question by explaining the complexity of social structure in terms of interpersonally experienced affective bonds. The combination of analytic sophistication, erudition, case studies, and readability make Scheff's efforts worthy of philosophical attention.

Some remarks are in order about the sociology of contemporary sociology that has enhanced the popularity of a realm of mind called 'emotion', 'motivation', or 'affective bonds'. Not only Scheff, but also the noted sociological theorists Anthony Giddens, Randall Collins, and Niklas Luhmann have turned increasingly to this realm as the glue that holds social life together. It is no secret that, in recent years, much of the 'cognitive' side of sociology's subject matter has been cannibalized by rational choice theory and, to a lesser extent, cognitive science. But contrary to what philosophers might think, the turn to emotion does not amount to an endorsement of irrationalism. More subtly, it is an admission that any given society is too complex for any one of its members to grasp cognitively. Emotions, then, constitute a kind of bounded or 'para' rationality of the sort one finds discussed in the work of Jon Elster. While most of these recent theorists focus on trust as the relevant social glue, Scheff is distinctive in his emphasis on *pride* and *shame*, two fundamental emotional responses that have no place in most methodological individualist accounts of social life, but which reflect an instinctive response to others in one's environment. Indeed, Scheff argues that the status relations among individuals — the building blocks of social structure — are inscribed in the patterns of pride and shame that appear in the interactions of those individuals.

Like Rom Harre, the only philosopher who has systematically taken up this lead, Scheff draws on Erving Goffman for much of his inspiration. However, Scheff significantly differs from Goffman in his refusal to treat pride as a residual affective category. Goffman's infamous theory of the self as 'impression management' implies that social interaction boils down to a matter of inducing and avoiding shame; hence, his preoccupation with 'face saving' interpersonal strategies. By contrast, on the basis of an extensive case study of Goethe's literary and scientific output, Scheff hypothesizes that pride may be the most important social determinant of the traits associated with 'genius'. A genius is someone who must be able to cope with living on the margins between well-defined social roles, a position that enables the individual to explore creative paths unknown to others but often at the risk of chronic shame induced by those whose collective identity is potentially threatened by what the individual does. Scheff has some interesting things to say about the role that early language acquisition plays in the cultivation of genius — especially in terms of the range of verbal performances that parents allow children to explore.

Microsociology is replete with insightful passages that try to diagnose and rectify the problems that contemporary sociology has had with encompassing the full range of social life. Many of these problems involve integrating research done by incommensurable methods. Here Scheff draws an extended analogy between the 'instruments' used to study macro- and microsocial phenomena (the survey and the videotape, respectively) and the telescope and microscope. In the history of physics, both the telescope and the microscope have obscured the occurrence of change, because physical change occurs either more slowly or more quickly than the respective instrument can record. Scheff notes a similar problem in the biases that can be detected in the conclusions reached by sociologists who dwell exclusively in either the macro- or the micro- domain. In addition, Scheff argues that an overreliance on Durkheim's account of the emergence of modern society has driven an artificial wedge between micro- and macro-. Durkheim basically believed that role-based relationships have increasingly replaced interpersonally-based ones, which would seem to situate the 'logic' of social relations exclusively at the macro-level, namely, in the functions that these interrelated roles play in the overall maintenance of society. To remedy this bias, Scheff draws heavily from one of the American founders of sociology (and associate of John Dewey's), Charles Horton Cooley, who argued — in a manner reminiscent of Freud — that interpersonally-based relationships have not disappeared but have rather been overlaid with the role-based ones, engendering sublimated experiences of primitive pride and shame.

One of the most intriguing aspects of Scheff's book for philosophers will no doubt be his treatment of abduction, which he derives directly from the writings of Charles Sanders Peirce. Abduction is presented as a kind of fundamental social inference Scheff continually invokes to interpret what social actors are doing in a variety of situations. Scheff sees abduction as the calibration of the introspective imagination with extrospective observation — or 'theory' with 'data', to use terms more resonant with the scientific contexts in which philosophers normally discuss the process. However, the 'theory' here is the social actor's personalized map of the entire social world and the 'data' are experiences of parts of that world that may be consonant or discrepant with the map. This second-order experience of consonance or discrepancy constitutes the cognitive sources of pride and shame, respectively. In this context, Scheff will provoke scientific realist sensibilities with his claim that among the most personalized features of this abductive process are the 'hidden structures' that an individual postulates as part of his or her folk macrotheories of how society works.

Steve Fuller

(Department of Communication)

University of Pittsburgh

J.B. Schneewind, ed.

Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant.

An Anthology (two volumes).

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990.

Vol. I: Pp. xiii + 350 [1-350];

Vol. II: Pp. 312 [353-664].

Vol. I: US \$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-35361-0);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-35362-9).

Vol. II: US \$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-35362-9);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-35876-0).

For scholars working in the history of moral philosophy, Schneewind's two volumes have been a long time in coming, and signal a fresh current on the seas of moral discourse. Surveying the past thirty years in the field, I notice that in 1962 Jones, Sontag, Beckner and Fogelin published *Approaches to Ethics* featuring a wide range of selections from ancient Greece to the present, together with sample 'syllabi' enabling the instructor to emphasize historical features, systematic features, problems, etc. In the middle-'60s John Anton published a piece in *Buffalo Studies* noting that anthologies and texts almost uniformly present us with the history of philosophy as the history of metaphysics and epistemology, slighting or omitting moral philosophy. As Schneewind notes, his focus changes from that which has dominated the recent past. He does not present us with ethics as currently construed by many in Anglophone academic philosophy, but, rather, moral philosophy in these centuries as 'simply the study of the whole of human action, undertaken with the hope of improving practice' (2). With Schneewind's work in hand, both fresh teaching and fresh lines of research in the history of moral philosophy will be charted through rarely-explored water.

Schneewind's goal is not only to provide sources containing arguments for analysis, but also to contribute to the telling of 'a philosophical story' able to suggest not only what, but also why a philosopher wrote; such a story enables us to consider possible lines of development. Most selections fill in gaps in what had been a continuing discussion, such that the 'canonical' thinkers now appear as if in dialogue with their predecessors and contemporaries. Without this method, he notes, we 'will also fail to see just why we now understand the problems of moral philosophy as we do' (1) — no small failure.

Each selection's introduction includes detail about religious, scientific, economic and cultural questions as well as more-strictly philosophical ones. Also included are valuable 'Further Reading' comments. More often than not, these note the absence or paucity of philosophical discussion of these thinkers in English or, indeed, often in any language. Thanks to this editorial material, lines of research are suggested or implied, to the delight of active readers.

The anthology's plan has six parts: first, an introduction provides helpful orientation to the literature of moral philosophy from The Classical Republic, Cicero and St. Augustine to Stoicism, Epicureanism and Skepticism, concluding with Montaigne as a turning point. This is followed by a 'Prolegomena'

of enticing selections from Montaigne's *Essays*, which raise a number of themes recurring in the four subsequent sections.

These four larger sections represent Schneewind's own, admittedly somewhat 'arbitrary' hunches about what has been happening in moral philosophy since the renaissance. Three questions guide his hunches: is the moral order guiding our personal and social lives patterned after an external source, or is it internal? Is needed knowledge available to only a few, or to everyone? And do we need external sanctions for moral maturation, or are we so constituted as to have the needed motives within us? (18). Underlying all three questions Schneewind sees 'a scale of autonomy', such that 'the development of moral philosophy in our period is best understood by seeing the complex problem of autonomy at its core' (20). The period from Montaigne to Kant, then, is to be seen developmentally along that scale, proceeding both chronologically and systematically, plus or minus some rough edges. The four groups and their members are: 'Reworking Natural Law' (including Suarez, Grotius, Hobbes, Cumberland, Pufendorf, and Locke); 'Intellect and Morality' (Du Vair, Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Cudworth, Clarke, Leibniz, and Wolff); 'Epicureans and Egoists' (Gassendi, Nicole, Mandeville, Gay, Helvétius, d'Holbach, Paley, and Bentham); and 'Autonomy and Responsibility' (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Hume, Crusius, Price, Rousseau, Reid, and Kant). Our editor himself translated the selections from Christian Wolff, Crusius, D'Holbach, and the Kant 'Lectures of Kant on the Metaphysics of Morals' of 1793-4. He also includes a new translation from Nicole's 'Of Charity and Self-Love' by Elborg Forster.

Presumably all four groups address the three questions in ways usefully generic to their group. The first group not only were seen as a group, but dwell on our 'unsocial sociability' and the consequent problem of obligation; the second group (named 'rationalists' here, p. 24) look beyond the law model to a more ontological model (such as Malebranche's 'immutable Order' or the 'eternal fitnesses' of Samuel Clarke). Group three examines our nature as agents, not merely selfish but also either amenable to the same acts as charity requires (Nicole), or educable to such acts (Bentham). The inward focus of enlightened egoism then shifts our discussion visibly toward a kind of autonomy free from the 'externalities' considered in the first two groups. Group four, for Schneewind, reaches more deeply than any hitherto in the period, because of political or religious concerns reaching beyond the individuals of group three. Group four undertakes a 'rehabilitation of human nature', though they were at odds with each other as to how to do it (26f.): for some (such as Hutcheson and Hume), moral sense or moral sentiment provide 'the original' for subsequent moral reasons and judgments; for others (such as Price and Kant) only the rational agent can undertake the autonomous moral life. Schneewind sees Kant at the highest, but at the same time the most democratic end of the 'scale of autonomy': 'Kant is as far as one can get from the belief that only a few people can truly know what morality imposes on us and that all or most people must be brought to comply with it by means of sanctions' (29).

Of course the reader may well contest these claims, or build a somewhat different list for capturing the development of moral philosophy in this period. Schneewind himself laments the absence of Pierre Bayle and Christian Thomasius, to whom I might add Pascal, Vico and Adam Smith. Again, the schema of presentation and hunches about development can be disputed — some of Montaigne's attack on 'presumption' would cause heavy sledding for Kant, it might be said; there may well be more defensible schemata of development forthcoming.

All things considered, however, this is more than an anthology. It is designed to provoke research, generate controversy, recover lost insights, renew potentially useful moral idioms and, as Hume might have said, 'enlarge our view' of ourselves, each other, and the assets available to us. The design and its execution are well-suited to both the philological and philosophical aims announced by Schneewind. The set can be taught several ways without exhausting its resources. As Schneewind noted about the period in question, so in the period we are entering, the strictly-academic issues of meta-ethics and close analysis of argument is being supplemented, one hopes, by concern with the larger questions about human practices and their amenability. From this renewed concern for moral philosophy in the classical and early modern sense, this anthology sees philosophers working historically as well as systematically; it rekindles questions, language and proposals long lost from circulation. A loud and clear 'well-done' goes out to Schneewind for such a welcome achievement.

Craig Walton

(Institute for Ethics and Policy Studies)

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Joachim Schulte

Wittgenstein: An Introduction, trans. William
Brenner and John F. Holley.

Albany: State University of New York Press
1992. Pp. ix + 187.

US \$29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-1081-1);

US \$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-1082-X).

What a *good book*! Noted Wittgenstein scholar Joachim Schulte has, amid what some might regard as a glut, produced an account that in its combination of lucidity, comprehensiveness, concision, and readability far surpasses any other introduction to Wittgenstein's thought currently available in English. But even this is not to go far enough: Schulte succeeds also in actually doing justice to a corpus that to a large extent has resisted exegetical reconstruction. If you are interested in the thought of Wittgenstein, and at

all puzzled about its fundamental outlines, I recommend it most highly; if you are contemplating teaching any of Wittgenstein's works, it is a must.

While retaining a focus on the two primary texts, the *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*, Schulte draws from a wide range of the *Nachlass* to elucidate his readings of the central themes of Wittgenstein's thought. He tracks the history of that thought — its self-repudiations, re-envisionings, and changes of direction — without ever losing sight of its organic unity. But although he stresses the work's intellectual continuity, Schulte wishes to resist any suggestion that this continuity might be understood in terms of an architectonic: '... we must not create the impression that we are dealing with a continuous progression in Wittgenstein's philosophical development — constant progress from one work to the next with their clearly appropriate sketches, drafts, and preliminary stages. For the deposits of sediment in the flow of the philosophical investigations of Wittgenstein ... are at the same time also interruptions in the current; they are the points where Wittgenstein — probably because of his awareness of unsolved problems and unresolved difficulties — decided on an entirely new approach; they are the points at which the river seeks out a new riverbed' (35).

The book is divided into six main chapters, each of which has several sub-sections. The first chapter — the longest in the book — constitutes an overview of the life, personality, and works of Wittgenstein. It is appropriate that Schulte should have taken time over these matters: biographical information is particularly important to an adequate introduction to Wittgenstein's thought because Wittgenstein's philosophical struggles are not clearly separable from his attempts to lead a good life, nor is his general sensibility (in particular, his attraction to and perceptiveness about music) separable from his approach to fundamental problems in the philosophies of logic, mathematics, and language. In Wittgenstein's critiques of the sayable and the systematic and in his temperamental disaffinity for the academic life, we see sides of the same coin: his originality.

The second chapter is an exposition of central themes in the *Tractatus*. Schulte's reading is an eminently sound one that foregrounds the book's metaphilosophical agenda and links that agenda to the book's ethical point. This is not to say that Schulte fails to give adequate attention to the theory of logic and meaning that is the vehicle for the expression of that ethical point: on the contrary, his accounts of Wittgenstein's notions of objects, signs, and analysis, the picture theory, the saying-showing distinction, 'logical constants', elementary propositions, tautology, contradiction, and logical form are exceptionally clear. The discussion is focussed on precisely those questions that most students, in my experience, ask; and is organized according to the order in which they usually ask them. The chapter is prefaced with some excellent advice on *how* to read the *Tractatus*; in particular, Schulte notes that appreciating the *Tractatus*' style is of central importance for understanding its claims. Pages 45-6 contain the most insightful discussion of Wittgenstein's own preface that I have read, including his gnomic obser-

vation that the book may not be intelligible unless the reader has already had the thoughts it attempts to express.

The third chapter treats the so-called 'transitional period', the decade between the publication of the *Tractatus* and Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge. It contains illuminating discussions of both the 'Lecture on Ethics' and 'Remarks on Frazer's *The Golden Bough*'; it documents the beginnings of Wittgenstein's change of heart about the rôle of calculi in understanding the workings of natural language; and also charts the emergence of a new tack, particularly in Wittgenstein's work in the foundations of mathematics. (Indeed, one of the most useful features of this book is the way in which it does not separate Wittgenstein's views on the philosophy of mathematics from the rest of his work.) Schulte frequently cites Wittgenstein's own elucidatory conversations with Waismann and other members of the Vienna Circle to good effect in this chapter; and his discussion of Wittgenstein's concept of grammar will come, I hope, to serve as an exegetical benchmark of sorts. Commentators regularly complain about the apparently fluctuating meaning of this apparently central term: Schulte first distinguishes two primary meanings — each contextually cued — and then demonstrates the affinities of the more metaphysical use with the *Tractatus* notions of logic and pseudo-propositions. He concludes (87), correctly I believe, that 'grammatical propositions' may in general in the later work be characterized as Wittgenstein characterized tautologies in *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (III, §33): 'degenerate propositions on the side of truth'.

I said above that Schulte draws widely on the *Nachlass* in his elucidations of concepts central to the published work. This does not mean, though, that his interest in the *Nachlass* is exclusively heuristic: in fact, it is Schulte's contention that, especially with the later work, it is difficult to make judgements about what ought to be deemed canonical. The question of what ought to be considered a 'work of Wittgenstein's' receives what might at first strike the reader as a surprising amount of attention in the introductory chapter. — With Schulte's final three chapters, which collectively treat Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the point of that extended discussion becomes clear.

Rather than dealing with Wittgenstein's later views book by book, Schulte organizes his discussion around three central concepts — language games, criterion, and certainty — to which he devotes a chapter each. In each chapter his discussion draws from a number of sources, though the emphasis remains on *Philosophical Investigations* in Chapter 4 and on *On Certainty* in Chapter 6. Schulte's grasp of the rôle of the notion of criterion in Wittgenstein's philosophy, including its relationship to the concept of verification, is especially impressive, as is his grasp of Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as a kind of physiognomy. But there is really no aspect of the later philosophy concerning which his presentation is not both illuminating and *accurate*, and a simple list of the subdivisions in the final three chapters may be the best way to give an indication of its scope: games, forms of life, family resemblances, rules, paradigms, use, verification and criteria, persons, pain, errors, privacy, aspects, knowledge, and world picture. Schulte does not, on the whole, refer

much to other commentators, but he does indicate, in Chapter 4, where his account differs from Strawson's, and in Chapters 4 and 5, where it differs from Kripke's.

There is an index, a bibliography of Wittgenstein's writings, and a very select bibliography of other materials. It is arguable that the list of secondary sources (which is actually simply Schulte's 'Works Cited') might have been expanded, but apart from that, I would add to Schulte's account only the following: mention, somewhere, of Feyerabend's 1955 review of *Philosophical Investigations*, which grasped from the outset the continuity of the *Investigations*' metaphilosophical project with that of the *Tractatus*; mention of the importance of the Hertz-Boltzmann approach to philosophy of science for the *Tractatus*' formulation of, and attempted answer to, the question 'How is linguistic meaning possible?'; and a suggestion — entirely compatible with what Schulte says, but never made explicit — that 'forms of life' in Wittgenstein's later thought are precisely the 'things' of *Tractatus* 6.522 — namely, those that can only be shown and that 'make themselves manifest' (with all that thereby hangs).

The translation is solid, and the translators are to be commended for having themselves rendered a number of passages from Wittgenstein's works which Schulte quotes. The occasional differences from the standard translations are instructive. From time to time, the English is not idiomatic, and the flavour of the original German is apparent; but nowhere does this obscure the meaning, and in one or two places, it arguably heightens it.

Schulte's stated aims are pedagogical, not scholarly: 'I try to discuss most of Wittgenstein's central ideas, but without attempting "ideal completeness."' And though always concerned to keep in view the aspect of gradual shifting and changing in his thought, I had to present it in a simplified and schematic way in order to preserve a clear overview.... This book is intended more for the student than for the scholar' (vii). But here I think Schulte underestimates his own achievement — there are many advanced students of Wittgenstein who will benefit from the clarity and insightfulness of his exposition. To repeat: this is a very good book. Buy it. Read it.

Jan Zwicky

University of Alberta

Percy Bysshe Shelley

The Necessity of Atheism and Other Essays.

Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1992.

Pp. vii + 88.

US \$22.95 (ISBN 0-87975-774-4).

Yes, the author is the great Romantic poet, Shelley (1792-1822), who also expressed his anti-religious feelings and ideas in works of impassioned prose. While at Oxford in 1811, Shelley published his first of a series of pamphlets, 'The Necessity of Atheism', which soon led to his expulsion from the university.

Four other anti-religious tracts of Shelley's are included in this volume, two short essays, 'On Life', and 'On a Future State', and two that are longer, 'Essay on Christianity', and 'A Refutation of Deism.' The title of the latter — a dialogue, with much of the deist's side unfortunately omitted — is somewhat misleading as it is in the main a refutation of Christianity. I begin with several themes which are shared in the two longer essays.

Shelley begins with an admission that Jesus was a 'wonderful man' of 'extraordinary genius' who encapsulated the best of the ethical ideas of philosophers of the past (1, 4). According to Shelley, Jesus explicitly denied the superstitious doctrine of a Creator God, or 'a peculiar Providence' who punishes the vicious and rewards the virtuous (6). Instead, Jesus, who had 'the imagination of some sublimest and most holy poet' used the word 'God' to express 'the overruling Spirit of the collective energy of the moral and material world' (11, 4). While at times suggesting that it is only a metaphorical notion (6, 9), Shelley dismisses the question as to whether the doctrine of God is to be taken literally or not as 'foreign' to his considerations (9). In fact, he repeatedly refers to 'a Universal God' (5, 20, 25), a mysterious and all-pervading Power or Spirit coeternal with the universe (3, 31). One wonders, therefore, whether it is not somewhat misleading for Shelley to call himself an atheist.

Unfortunately, Jesus had to accommodate his doctrines to the opinions of the masses and this led to some misrepresentations of his true feelings and beliefs (18-9). Also, his followers, due to their ignorance and fanaticism (16), distorted his teaching and wrongly represented Jesus as 'narrow, superstitious, and exquisitely vindictive and malicious' (15, 16). The doctrine of punishment in hell is particularly singled out as offensive. Ideas of retaliation and revenge are described as empty, absurd, unjust, and contrary to the character of Jesus who taught us to love our enemies (6-14, 19, 62-3).

Shelley is not unaware of the hermeneutical problem he faces. Who is the real, historical Jesus — the gentle and wise teacher, or the narrow and vindictive tyrant? Shelley's 'rule of criticism' is to adjust the details to conform to the 'general image' of Jesus character and doctrines (16). But this surely begs the question. It would seem that Shelley is the judge of what is and what is not acceptable in the story of Jesus. He merely fashions a Jesus

according to his own preconceived ideas, hardly a sophisticated critical-historical approach.

Christianity is further described as not only being 'utterly impotent in restraining', but of having been most active in accentuating the malevolent propensities of men (65). Indeed, Shelley becomes very specific — 'eleven millions' — butchered, burned, poisoned, tortured, and pillaged 'in the spirit of the Religion of Peace, and for the glory of the most merciful God' (65). Hasty conclusion? Questionable cause? We need to be more careful! But perhaps this is merely poetic license. Or, is it 'zeal', Shelley's own self-description (87)?

Miracles are discredited in Humean fashion (68-9; 17). Prophecies are criticized as being obscure and thus not subject to testing (69). The last essay also includes a dialogue concerning the design and cosmological arguments with many of the familiar Humean objections again being raised.

In 'The Necessity of Atheism' Shelley follows Locke in describing belief as a perception of the agreement or disagreement of the ideas inherent in a proposition (31). Belief is not an act of volition, and hence Shelley objects to any merit or criminality being attached to belief or disbelief, as occurs in Christianity (35, cf. 67-8). Three sources of belief in God are reviewed, all of them found wanting: the senses; the 'decision of the mind' based on the senses; and the testimony of others (32-5). Oddly, Shelley talks here of decisions of the mind, contradicting his earlier claim (32, cf. 46). It is our ignorance of nature that gives birth to the gods, and once educated, mankind ceases to be superstitious (38). Unfortunately for Shelley, religion seems to remain alive and well among modern and 'Enlightened' men and women.

'On Life' begins with a celebration of the wonder of human life. 'On a Future State' is a refutation of life after death. Shelley argues that we must not let the 'miracle' of life lead us to speculate that it was caused by a supreme Mind, since minds can only perceive (45, 50). Besides, 'cause' is merely a word expressing a certain conjunction of ideas, as Hume taught us, and hence we must rid ourselves of 'unphilosophical' transcendent explanations (50-1, 57). Indeed, we must not think of minds as independent substances at all. Minds are simply ideas (55-6). Hence, when the ideas cease, the mind ceases. As a body deteriorates and dies, so does the mind (55). All that we see and know perishes, and so do we (57).

There is little that is new in this little monograph. As a specimen of nineteenth century anti-Christian polemics it is perhaps interesting, though the argument is somewhat anachronistic. If we accept Shelley's naive empiricist epistemology (32, 58, 88) and his dogmatic naturalism (79, 55, 80, 88), it is surely logical to conclude that there can be no proof of God (353). But these assumptions need to be examined critically, and there is much in contemporary philosophy of science and philosophy of religion which would suggest that they are problematic. Science simply isn't as perfect, consistent and uniform as Shelley assumes (39). Naive realist epistemology has been virtually abandoned among philosophers of science over the last two decades. And Plantinga has even dared to suggest that for mature theists God is a properly basic belief, the very foundation of his rational noetic structure.

Indeed, given the empiricist thrust of these essays, it would seem that the conclusion should be agnosticism rather than atheism. Only occasionally does Shelley provide us with some hints as to the *logical* necessity of atheism, for example, when he suggests that God's attributes are 'discordant' (42-3). He also asks: 'If God wishes to be known ... why does he not show himself ... to all these intelligent beings by whom he wishes to be loved and adored?' (41, cf. 43, 64). This is an interesting question which has been recently explored at length by John Schellenberg in *Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason* (Cornell University, 1993). But Shelley needs to provide much more by way of sophisticated argument in order to establish atheism as logically necessary. Indeed, the case for atheism (and theism, for that matter) must finally involve a defense of a whole belief system, not just a defense of an isolated statement about the existence or non-existence of a God.

Elmer John Thiessen

(Humanities and Social Sciences)

Medicine Hat College

Georges E. Sioui

For an American Autohistory:

an Essay on the Foundations of a Social Ethic,

trans. Sheila Fischman.

Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's

University Press 1992. Pp. xxiv + 125.

Cdn \$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-0950-X).

Is this book philosophical in any serious sense? It is not trivially philosophical in the manner of my philosophy of interior decorating, your philosophy of barbecuing chicken, or her philosophy of coaching basketball. It deals with grand questions often addressed by people whose philosophical credentials are not in doubt: What is the character of historical writing, and how should we distinguish between good history and bad? What is human nature, if there is such a thing? Do different 'races' have different natures? Are there fundamental differences between the natures of men and women? Are there religious truths? Are there any universal moral truths? Doubts about the serious philosophical intents and achievements of the book stem from its determined preference for assertion over argument to answer these questions.

The book can be divided roughly into two parts, with three chapters in each. The first part is concerned with elaborating guidelines for studying Native history, and the second with applying these guidelines to the study of the history of the Iroquois and the Hurons (the author himself is Huron),

especially in the seventeenth century. There is an intimate connection between the two parts, however, which we can begin to grasp by focussing on the central notion in the book's title, 'Amerindian autohistory'.

As a rough approximation, 'Amerindian autohistory' is history of the indigenous people of the Americas from their own point of view. What is their point of view? It is the point of view embodied in their cultures. Their cultures consist of their systems of values. Although there are some minor differences among Amerindian cultures, they agree unanimously in their basic values. Accordingly, Amerindian autohistory is Amerindian history informed by the basic values of the Natives of the Americas.

Why do we need history of this kind? The reasons can be reduced to two. The first is that Europeans and Euro-Canadians have always had strong motivations to falsify Amerindian history. It suited them to explain the steadily worsening plight of the Amerindians as stemming from their being 'savage', 'uncivilized', and 'unChristian'. The truth is, according to Sioui, that the main villains since the very first days of contact have been microbes. By devastating the Amerindian populations, microbes made it impossible for the Native people to gradually initiate the Europeans into the values appropriate to the Americas. Recognition that microbes, not men, are responsible for our deepest problems will relieve Euro-Canadians of guilt and enable them to adopt the right (Amerindian) values.

The other reason why we need Amerindian autohistory is that non-Native history has always been based on one or other of two false theories of history. The first chronologically, and probably still the most widely accepted, is cultural evolutionism. According to this theory, more 'evolved' cultures naturally supplant less 'developed' ones. This is the view that undergirds the idea that Amerindians need to be civilized, through instruction in superior technology and higher values, by Europeans. The second false theory, widely accepted by anthropologists, is cultural relativism, according to which no culture can be ranked higher or lower than any other. Sioui rejects the second theory, and therefore the first, because they reject the (correct) view that Amerindian values are superior to European ones. Holistic, environmentalistic, and harmonic, Amerindian values alone can save the planet.

Amerindian values are described mainly in the second and third chapters: 'The Sacred Circle of Life', and 'The Amerindian Idea of Being Human'. The first of these elaborates, but does not argue for, two main claims: that everything in the universe moves in circles, and that — apparent exceptions to the contrary notwithstanding — all Amerindian societies are matriarchal. The other maintains (again, arguments are not presented) that all Amerindians respect not only all life but all beings, so that coercion and war are virtually non-existent in Native societies. There are some pretty heady declarations in this chapter. For example: 'An examination of the Amerindian philosophical tradition will show the persistence, vivacity, and universality of the essential values proper to America' (23). One would like to hear more about this 'philosophical tradition', not least why it is a *philosophical* tradition.

The second half of the book uses the 'findings' of the first half to reinterpret some historical events. Chapter Four rejects the view that the Iroquois viciously decimated the Hurons, mainly on the ground that such conduct is contrary to Iroquois values. In fact, according to Sioui, the Iroquois were killing people only to stop the spread of microbes and thereby to save the Amerindians in northern North America. The Hurons, as traders, had close ties with the diseased French, and only the Iroquois could stop the spread of epidemic.

Chapter Five discusses the Baron de Lahontan, a seventeenth-century French nobleman who emigrated to New France and increasingly spent more time with Amerindians, especially Hurons, than with his original compatriots. Lahontan wrote at length, commending the way of life of the Amerindians, and defending the views of these 'naked philosophers' against all calumnies, especially those of the Jesuits. Because Lahontan had no axe to grind, and because his views correspond to those derived by the 'autohistorical method', Sioui finds him unusually reliable.

In the final chapter, Sioui uses autohistory, among other techniques, to show that the Hurons of Quebec were long-standing residents of the lower St. Lawrence region. The point of this chapter is to establish that this group possesses aboriginal rights in the area.

Even though this is a short book, it includes at the end a Conclusion, an Epilogue, and an Appendix. Each of these repeats one or more themes from the body of the text. All of them suggest that Amerindian values can redeem not only Euro-Americans but also people throughout the world who have lost touch with their own ancestors' understanding of the laws of nature, which are founded on an understanding of the interdependence of all beings.

Sioui's book is impressive as an unequivocal and passionate statement of the values — and to some extent the world-view — he believes animate all Amerindian peoples. Of course I have no way of evaluating the claim that all these people agree about basic values. The most I can do is add the anecdotal evidence that I have talked to plenty of Cree and Metis elders, and all of them say what we would expect them to say if we had read this book.

But this leaves the question I raised at the beginning: Is this a nourishing meal for a serious philosopher? In the latter half of the book Sioui reports, with evident delight, the cutting, rationalistic scepticism of a Huron chief concerning European theology and morality. But in his chapter on the sacred circle he writes, without supporting evidence or argument, the following passage: 'Four is the sacred number in America: there are four sacred directions, four sacred colours, four races of humans ... as well as four ages of human life ... , four seasons, and four times of day which are also sacred' (10). Is there any Amerindian *philosophy*?

Tom Pocklington
(Political Science)
University of Alberta

Christine Swanton

Freedom: A Coherence Theory.

Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 1992. Pp. x + 200.

US \$29.50 (ISBN 0-87220-129-5).

Freedom is a prime example of a philosophically contested concept, and, if any are, of an essentially contested concept. Christine Swanton's book is of interest partly because it is perhaps the first attempt to define freedom (or similarly contested concepts) by means of explicit and thoroughgoing reliance on the method of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE). In her version of WRE, one appeals not to considered judgements but to *endoxa*, the beliefs of the many and wise. (In effect, she is following Aristotle's advice to 'save the appearances'.) She lists twenty-two such beliefs and develops a theory which seeks to account for the fact that they are all thought (by someone or other) to be truths regarding freedom.

Here are some of the *endoxa* from her list:

In New Zealand a person is not free to commit acts of murder.

Those in prison are not free regardless of their desires, goals, or choices.

Anticipated punishment limits one's freedom inasmuch as it constitutes a threat that *inhibits* agents from performing actions.

A smoker who does not want to have the desire to smoke in a sense smokes unwillingly; his first-order desire, being a fetter to willing action, limits his freedom.

A person cannot be unfree to do something he actually does.

An all-consuming desire to complete a great work of art does not limit an agent's freedom, even though it renders the option of wasting time very difficult to entertain.

Of course there is more to it than merely finding the theory which best coheres with all such beliefs. In addition, one wants an account of freedom which explains why it is thought to be valuable, an account which can be defended against competing accounts, and an account which, when it does not square with certain *endoxa*, helps one to see why that is acceptable.

The theory of freedom which is offered as best satisfying these requirements derives from a view Austin alluded to in passing in his 'A Plea for Excuses'. Austin held that freedom is a defeasible notion which signifies the absence of various breakdowns in 'the machinery of action', so that 'unfreedom wears the trousers'. Swanton translates the idea of breakdowns in the machinery of action as obstacles to a person realizing their potential in agency. This idea leads to the thought that there are four sorts of breakdown which may contribute to an agent's unfreedom. One sort concerns availability. A constraint may have the effect of limiting the agent's options. A second sort concerns eligibility. Censorship, for example, may cause a person not to realize that some option is actually available to her, in consequence of which it is not eligible to be chosen. A third sort concerns heteronomy. Dependency may render a person unable to realize her potential as an agent. A fourth sort concerns what Swanton calls 'executive failures'. The agent may suffer from

some flaw which impedes her ability to fulfill her intentions or act on her judgements. Thus, a person suffering from *akrasia* may be unfree if, though she strongly (and positively) evaluates a course of action, she nevertheless avoids performing the action, pleading inappropriately that there is an emergency which warrants not doing that which she all the while believes would be the right thing to do. (She believes that she ought to visit her ailing mother but from laziness opts instead for the cinema, pleading that this is the last day the movie will be shown.)

A question any theory of freedom should answer is why being free matters (to those to whom it does matter). Swanton's answer consists in pointing out the connection between freedom and human flourishing, where flourishing is understood as realization of a favoured set of potentialities: freedom is perceived as valuable owing to the contribution which realizing one's potential in agency makes to flourishing.

Although on Swanton's theory being free consists in not being beset by flaws and impediments which limit one's potential in agency, not all such flaws and impediments are freedom-relevant. We would not say, for example, that a drought which limits the availability of the option of growing tomatoes also limits an agent's freedom to grow tomatoes. It is the task of the wide reflective equilibrium theorist to draw the line between freedom-relevant and freedom-irrelevant constraints in a way which respects the *endoxa*. In the event, Swanton draws the line so that more constraints are freedom-relevant than many theorists would allow. This reflects a notable feature of her theory which results from the method she follows. WRE is inevitably an inclusive method. One who follows it is driven toward accommodating as many diverse points of view as possible.

This feature of Swanton's theory will not be attractive to those who champion narrower views of freedom. Typically, the point of these narrower views lies more in what they exclude than in what they include. Thus, those who define freedom as absence of restraints which limit availability of options typically intend by espousal of this view to reject the idea of 'positive freedom'. To be told that they are right in what they admit but wrong in what they exclude will not be pleasing. All the more so since the narrower theories serve ideological purposes: espousal of the idea that freedom means negative freedom and nothing more typically serves to buttress business-oriented politics.

A result of these two facts (and of the fact that both are fairly obvious), that WRE will almost inevitably land one in an inclusive theory of freedom and that adherence to a narrower theory of freedom usually serves an ideological purpose, is that those who espouse one or another of the narrower theories will likely be resistant to adopting WRE.

My own concerns lie elsewhere. First, I think it problematic that WRE supports a defeasibility theory of freedom. Second, I think that all things considered, including consideration of the *endoxa*, it would be better to define freedom more narrowly than Swanton proposes, and introduce the complementary term 'autonomy' to cover the rest of the ground Swanton uses the blanket term 'freedom' to cover.

(1) The defeasibility account of freedom implies that if two individuals are identically situated regarding impediments to freedom then they are equally free. This is to say that there is nothing positive about the condition of being free. There are two compelling reasons for doubting this. First, there are endoxa which allude to freedom as a positive condition. For example, there is the Biblical idea, variously expressed, that 'In Christ is perfect freedom'. And, in the OED, alongside numerous entries which reinforce the defeasibility account, one meets a few other uses which point in a different direction. Examples: There is a sense of free as 'guiltless', as in 'My hands are guilty, but my heart is free'. A nautical use: 'She is on the wrong tack, but the last puff was free and helped her.' The idea of being *ready to do* something: 'I shall be very free to open my heart.' Also: 'Laughed and joked with everyone, with the utmost freedom.' Related to this: 'When he's drunk he's very free and will give me anything.' The idea of taking liberties: 'I advise you not to make so free with your servants.' Vigour of execution: 'Nature ... but seldom ... vouchsafes to a man a poet's just pretence. Fervency, freedom, fluency of thought.'

A related reason for doubting the defeasibility account results from the need to apply it to the idea of autonomy — since for Swanton autonomy is a dimension of freedom. But it seems obvious that if two people are identically situated with respect to impediments to autonomy they need not be equally autonomous. That is, we understand autonomy as having an important positive aspect. One's being in control of her own life does not reduce to not being beset by such flaws as dependency. It involves also positive traits, such as ebullience, confidence in one's own powers, and decisiveness.

(2) Perhaps the defeasibility account is more plausible when it is required to cover only freedom-as-availability issues, that is, when freedom is thought of as absence of restraints which restrict availability options. There is reason to think that when Austin first mentioned the defeasibility theory he had some such limited notion of freedom in mind. I don't mean to claim that the defeasibility account is correct when restricted to freedom-as-availability, but only that it is at least less vulnerable when so restricted.

If the idea of freedom is limited in this way, the natural continuation is to define autonomy so that it covers eligibility issues, what Swanton calls 'heteronomy', and what she calls 'executive failures' (but, I would add, also their positive counterparts). This makes sense if we think of autonomy as referring to a person having control of, being in charge of, her own life. Eligibility of options, heteronomy and its opposite, and executive failures and successes are all relevant to autonomy in this sense.

An advantage of distinguishing between freedom and autonomy in this way — so that freedom refers specifically to availability of options and autonomy to eligibility, to heteronomy (and its opposite), and to executive failures and successes — is that the latter, autonomy, may be defined positively and the notion that 'unfreedom wears the trousers' can with some plausibility be retained.

Lawrence Haworth
University of Waterloo

Douglas Walton

The Place Of Emotion in Argument.

University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press 1992.

Pp. xiv + 294.

US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-00833-4);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-00853-9).

Walton claims that the 'book is built around the analysis and evaluation of case studies of controversial arguments in everyday conversations. ... Chapters 1 and 2 present some tools useful for analysis and evaluation of these case studies and a background in the essentials of argumentation theory relevant to these cases. Chapter 8 welds the insights accumulated throughout the book into a theoretical synthesis' (xiii). As the title suggests, Walton is concerned with defending the place of emotion in argument. His thesis is that 'appeals to emotion have a legitimate, even important, place as arguments in persuasion dialogue, but that they need to be treated with caution because they can also be used fallaciously' (1). He claims that such appeals 'are basically tactics or mechanisms used to gain assent by an appeal to a party in the dialogue rather than an appeal to external evidence ... The object of the argument is to shift a burden of proof, or a weight of presumption, toward the other party's side and away from the arguer's side' (10). To clarify his analysis Walton distinguishes three different concepts of reasoning and argumentation.

Walton characterizes these as deductive reasoning, knowledge-based reasoning (which finds its roots in AI), and interactive reasoning. He endorses the third: 'According to the third concept, called the *interactive (dialectical)* concept of reasoning, two separate systems (participants in reasoning), each with its own knowledge base, reason together, one system interacting with the other. Each system takes account of the knowledge base of the other, as the two systems interact in joint reasoning. ... What makes dialectical reasoning distinct from the first two kinds is that the conclusions inferred by a system follow from premises drawn from the propositions in the knowledge base of another system' (13). Walton contends that 'interactive reasoning is inherently dialectical, in that it involves a back-and-forth sequence of interactions — in effect, a dialogue between two participants who are reasoning together' (14). His focus on the notion of 'dialogue' moves him away from the standard view of fallacies. 'In the standard textbook treatment ... a fallacy has come to be understood as an argument that seems to be valid but is not' (16). According to Walton, 'a fallacy is a technique of argumentation that may in principle be reasonable but that has been misused in a given case in such a way that it goes strongly against or hinders the goals of dialogue' (18).

A central theme is that one must not demand too much from an argument. 'To require that an opponent's thesis be proved *without exception* is a high standard of proof that may be inappropriate and unfair in many contexts of dialogue' (36). This connects directly with the notion of burden of proof.

'Appeals to emotion can be useful, and correct, in argumentation because they can steer an arguer toward a resolution of the conflict of opinion by burden of proof and weight of presumption. ... As such, the arguments based on them are not decisive or absolute, but they can steer the line of argument in a favorable direction' (27).

In order to appreciate this one needs to recognize that not all reasonable arguments fit into a deductive account. An example drawn from Sherlock Holmes illustrates this point. 'Seeing Watson's deep tan, military bearing, injured arm, and haggard face, Holmes concludes that Watson must have returned recently from military service in Afghanistan. Holmes is right' (35). Yet many logic texts contend that 'he has committed a fallacy, because his conjecture is "founded on insufficient evidence." But insufficient for what? Because Holmes puts forward a defeasible presumption based on signs, a conjecture that can then be verified or refuted by Watson, has he committed a fallacy? Only if Holmes' conclusion is meant to be taken in a rigid and unqualifiable, nondefeasible way. Many rules and inferences used in everyday argumentation are of a qualified or defeasible type that cannot be literally or automatically applied in all cases' (36).

It is important to keep in mind that 'when these emotional appeals are reasonable arguments, they are often instances of practical reasoning, directed toward a conclusion describing a prudent course of action. *Practical reasoning* may be defined as a kind of goal-directed, knowledge-based, action-guiding argumentation that steers an agent toward a prudent course of action in a set of particular circumstances' (19). Of course, such arguments are defeasible, but that does not make them fallacious. Assuming that reasonable arguments can occur in the realm of practical reason, then it must be the case that such arguments need not conform to the deductive paradigm.

Suppose a child objects to her parent's argument against smoking on the grounds that the parent smokes. One standard portrayal of such arguments is in terms of the fallacy of 'circumstantial ad hominem' or 'tu quoque'. However, Walton suggests that a more subtle analysis is required. 'The child is not in a position to understand and evaluate this medical evidence directly, so the best that she can do is to take her parent's word for it. But the parent smokes. If so, the child may be reasoning, how can the parent be a serious or sincere advocate of nonsmoking? Interpreting the argumentation in this way, it seems that the child could be raising a legitimate concern' (203). Walton then turns to the question of whether it is appropriate to classify the argument as one involving a fallacy. 'It depends on whether the child's argument is a strong or weak refutation of the parent's argument. If interpreted as a weak refutation, a kind of critical questioning that raises doubts about the parent's sincerity, then the child's *ad hominem* is reasonable enough. However, if the child's reply is meant as a strong refutation that wholly dismisses the parent's argument, the reply is an instance of the *ad hominem* fallacy' (203).

The need to keep the strength of the conclusion drawn in mind is illustrated even more clearly in another example. Suppose a person is leaving a

train in a foreign city, and does not know which way the exit is. 'In both directions there are stairwells at the end of the long platform. However, nobody is going in one direction, and everyone pouring off the train is hurrying in the other direction' (94). The conclusion of the practical argument is that the exit is in the direction that all the people are going. This looks like an instance of the 'ad populum' fallacy. However, once again, it depends on the exact nature of the conclusion that is drawn. 'As a working presumption, in the absence of any better indications, it makes sense to follow the crowds. What makes the inference to follow the crowds reasonable in this case is that the assumption that the crowds of people are heading in the right direction towards the exit is a defeasible presumption' (94). The person then notices a sign which says the exit is in the other direction, and a sports stadium is in the direction the crowd is moving. 'Suppose, for example, that even after reading and correctly interpreting the sign, I were to argue ... "Well, look, I know the sign says the exit is that way. But all these people are going this way. All these people can't be wrong. They must be going toward the exit. Let's follow the crowd." This apparent dogmatic refusal to take the new evidence properly into account could be grounds for alleging that I am committing an *ad populum* fallacy' (96).

These examples illustrate some of the kinds of concerns that Walton addresses. He provides a rich theoretical and practical analysis of the fallacies. The book also includes material relating to the historical background of the fallacies. He discusses types of bias, the relations among dogmatism, prejudice and fanaticism, the different types of dialogue, and the standards of argument appropriate to each. The book provides analyses for over sixty examples. For anyone dissatisfied or frustrated by the apparent superficiality and brevity of many standard textbook discussions of the informal fallacies, this is a book that is well worth examining.

Doug Simak

(Arts and Humanities Department)

Douglas College

Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS-G@VM.UCS.UALBERTA.CA

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

W.E. Cooper