

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing

P.O. Box 4834, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 5G7

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550

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Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

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Published six times a year

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George Ainslie

Picoeconomics:

*The Strategic Interaction of Successive
Motivational States Within the Person.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. xvi + 440.

US\$64.95. ISBN 0-521-26093-0.

It is best to begin discussing this remarkable book with Ainslie's own sense of what he is doing:

The fundamental insight of picoeconomics is that the mind bears less resemblance to a fact-gathering or puzzle-solving apparatus than to a population of foraging organisms. The foraging entities are interests that grow from rewards, just as populations of organisms grow on the basis of food sources. Like the variety of organisms that stably occupy a habitat, interests fill various motivational niches on the basis of their specific abilities to maintain and defend themselves there, which largely depend on the time courses of the rewards on which they are based. (362-3)

In support of this vivid analogy, Ainslie, a practicing psychiatrist, reinterprets operant conditioning research on motivation in light of both recent cognitive psychology and classic psychoanalytic theory. The synthesis is then brought to bear on such traditional problems of moral psychology as self-deception and weakness of the will. Here Ainslie is influenced by Jon Elster's quasi-economic formulation of these problems in *Ulysses and the Sirens* and *Sour Grapes*. (Elster, in turn, has drawn on Ainslie's empirical material, much of which is based on experimental work that Ainslie himself did as a student in the 1970s.) The book is a bit more unwieldy than one might have wanted, but there is enough repetition of the basic points to enable a wide range of readers to get something out of it.

Ainslie begins by observing that no extant psychological theory can explain why we always seem to prefer relatively poor short-term rewards to better long-term ones. Indeed, we prefer immediate gratification even when we know not only that it will undermine loftier long-range goals but also that it will cause us in the future to want more gratification sooner. Thus, the signature malaise of modern life is a loss of 'the texture of experience,' what earlier in the century would have been called *ennui*. The pervasive, yet elusive, quality of addictive behavior testifies to the seriousness of Ainslie's concerns. Not content with the conclusion that we are all irrational a good deal of the time, Ainslie proposes a model in which the mind is a bundle, not of perceptions, but of individually rational interests, whose conflicting tendencies constitute an irrational person. Already we have an intriguing complement to Adam Smith's invisible hand, which suggests that rationality can be found both within and between persons, but not in the person as such.

Ainslie is adamant in his rejection of any model of the mind that posits a single-minded rationality with periodic interruptions from the 'passions' and other irrational forces. Reason is simply the most efficient means available to an organism to pursue an 'interest,' which is defined here as an operant, that is, a naturally occurring behavior for which a reward is correctly anticipated. Thus, there are as many reasons as there are interests. If we could pursue every rewarded activity at the same time, psychic conflict would disappear altogether. Unfortunately, our resources are too limited for all of our interests to be satisfied. In that case, Ainslie hypothesizes, we tend to revert to a mechanism that was adaptive in earlier stages of evolution but now threatens our future survival, or at least the quality of that survival. The mechanism is to prefer the short term to the long term, regardless of how much better we expect the later rewards to be. Such a mechanism is adaptive when the future is completely up for grabs, as in a Hobbesian state of nature. However, we have now enjoyed stable living conditions long enough to realize the irrationality of continuing this attitude of living each day as if it were our last. Yet, the attitude persists.

Of course, we have ways of pacing our rewards so as not to completely sell out the future. In fact, Ainslie seems to believe that this is a principal evolutionary role played by the run of humanity, who by interrupting, constraining, or, in some other way, making personal demands, divert our most expedient attempts at satisfying our most pressing desires. These other people, and the normative structures embodied in our interactions with them, become part of the environment within which our behaviors are selectively reinforced. As Freud observed, it is not long before the socialized infant wishes to satisfy parental figures nearly as much as his or her libidinal impulses; hence, the need for executive ego functions to strike a balance between the two motivational forces in the name of the long-term goals with which person ultimately wants to be identified. However, Ainslie quickly admits that the 'reality principle' supposedly enforced by the ego is more compromise than calibration, for every aspect of reality not directly indexed to those long-term goals is susceptible to self-serving distortion.

Picoeconomics is potentially more fertile than even Ainslie himself seems to realize. It is possible to forge some interesting links between this field and certain conceptions of economic, scientific, and sociological rationality. In the case of economics, if Ainslie is correct, then market theorists should stress, not the efficiency with which a free trader can pursue her self-interest, but rather the optimal level of delay needed to manufacture a product that will attract someone capable of satisfying the trader's interests. In the case of science, some Scottish ethologists have argued picoeconomically (in R. Byrne and A. Whiten, eds., *Machiavellian Intelligence* [Oxford University Press 1987]) that the depth of our understanding of nature is a function of the complexity of the social relationships within which such an understanding must first be embedded before obtaining general acceptance. Finally, in the case of sociology, Arthur Stinchcombe (in *Information and Organizations* [University of California Press 1990]) has offered a picoeconomic account for

the weakness of both conservative and radical orientations to social change: whereas the conservative's infatuation with already existing institutions points to someone suffering from the modern malaise, the radical's utopian vision of change is symptomatic of someone who (perhaps self-deceptively) underestimates the power of the modern malaise to undermine even the best of long-term intentions.

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Julia E. Annas

Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind.

Berkeley: University of California Press 1992.

Pp. ix + 245.

US\$44.95. ISBN 0-520-07554-4.

Although Aristotle's views about the mind have been the subject of intense scrutiny, other ancient discussions of mind typically have been held to merit much less interest. In her systematic examination of Stoic and Epicurean theories of mind, Julia Annas seeks to demonstrate the innovative nature of their views. According to Annas' exactly lucid book, the Stoic and Epicurean accounts are philosophically worthy and, properly construed, the first genuine theories of mind.

After an introductory chapter which sketches the differences between Hellenistic and Aristotelian inquiry into the mental, Part One clearly summarizes the scientific and medical background for the Stoics and Epicureans. Part Two is devoted to the Stoics and Part Three to the Epicureans. These sections consist of chapters on such topics as the mind, perception and thought, action, and the emotions. In the concluding chapter, Annas contrasts the Stoics and Epicureans and argues that Hellenistic philosophy of mind is distinctive.

In Part One, Annas explains the basic features of the scientific theories on which the Stoics and, to a lesser extent, the Epicureans rely. Although the notion of *pneuma*, i.e., originally, breath or warm air, was used by Aristotle, the later Hellenistic concept of *pneuma* acquired a much more extensive set of characteristics. Hellenistic medical theory attributed many human functions to aspects of a centralized pneumatic system. The Stoics, especially, appeal to this best available empirical science. The centralized pneumatic

system has a certain resemblance to features of the brain and central nervous system to which contemporary neuroscience usually ascribes the mental.

The Stoics develop a version of non-reductive physicalism in light of such medical theories. Part Two of Annas' book expands this Stoic position and relates it to questions about thought, perception, action, and the emotions. Annas first reviews (40-2) their arguments that the soul is something physical. They base their conclusion on the thesis that any explanation of causal interaction between the physical and non-physical is bound to be implausible or incoherent. Thus, the Stoics accept physicalism as a result of anticipating issues that modern discussions of the mind-body problem often raise.

The soul, according to the Stoics, has parts corresponding to different functions such as reproduction or the use of the senses. One part of the soul, the *hēgemonikon*, rules over the soul. Annas shows (63-4) that the Stoics tend to identify the soul with the ruling part, hold that perception and action involves cognition of some sort, and are committed to a strong thesis about the unity of the soul. Annas concludes (64) that the *hēgemonikon* is correctly described as the mind and the Stoics are giving an account of mental life.

On Annas' view, the Stoics develop the most interesting account of perception in antiquity. There are two stages of perception: appearance (*phantasia*) and assent (*sunkatathesis*). Although how something appears to a perceiver is separate from whether he or she assents to the appearance, Annas argues that the appearance is not a raw uninterpreted perceptual given. According to the Stoics, thought is associated with or a constituent of each perceptual event. The Stoics wish to explain how perception conveys information. Perceptual events and other mental acts must have propositional content in order to do so.

Despite appealing to the authority of science, Epicurus departs from the Stoic reliance on the best available scientific theories. According to Annas, Epicurus defends common sense and wishes to explain the tenets of folk psychology in his account of soul and the nature of agency. Although the Epicureans advocate atomism, they adapt atomic theory in order to support folk psychology. For instance, Annas argues (125-31) that Epicurus accepts a non-reductive physicalism because we are committed to the intuitive belief that we are agents and that our actions depend on us. A thoroughly reductive physicalist position is incompatible with our belief in agency.

More sharply than the Stoics, Epicurus distinguishes parts of the soul and, accordingly, he more clearly separates perception from thinking. The rational soul is the source of reasoning, cognition, and emotions; the irrational soul perception. However, according to Annas, the Epicureans also hold that perception essentially conveys information, although our textual sources do not specify precisely how perceptual events have content. Epicurus leaves fundamentally unclear how some aspects of the mental, e.g., a capacity to focus selectively on certain images, result in perception and, ultimately, any thoughts which contain propositional content. Persons acquire concepts through the mind's processing of preconceptions (*prolēpseis*). As Annas points

out (167), a preconception resembles the British empiricist notion of 'idea' and has similar defects. For instance, empiricists also propose that we derive concepts from the raw material of ideas. Finally, beliefs for Epicurus are in some way necessary for emotion. However, unlike the Stoic position that ordinary emotions should be extirpated, Epicurus argues that certain natural emotions are unavoidable (193-4).

In Aristotle's account of perception, first an object's color or shape affects one. Only subsequently does one perceive that, say, the red thing is one's favorite book. But both the Stoics and Epicureans emphasize that we need an explanation of how perception conveys information. Annas argues throughout her book that their concern marks a larger shift in which the Stoics and Epicureans are, unlike Aristotle, giving an account of mind and the mental. Their views resemble our contemporary theories of mind because they focus on the propositional content of the mental instead of its biological mechanisms. Is Aristotle unable to give an adequate account of mental content? Although Annas' book is not about Aristotle, she owes us a fuller answer to this question since it is pivotal in establishing what is novel about Stoic and Epicurean thought. But she is convincing and insightful in characterizing the Hellenistic emphasis on content.

Annas carefully and sympathetically attends to the arguments that the Stoics and Epicureans construct, while indicating their defects. As a result, we gain a sense of the enormous attraction of their reasoned, philosophical positions. She also regularly compares Stoic and Epicurean approaches to modern and contemporary views. Her discussion of the continuity and contrast of ancient theories with more modern ones clarifies and deepens our understanding of each. As Annas acknowledges (210), *Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind* is a preface to further detailed study. However, her work will focus subsequent philosophical inquiry into ancient investigations of philosophy of mind and, particularly, about the notion of content. Her book is a model of philosophical scholarship about Hellenistic antiquity.

Glenn Lesses

College of Charleston

Arnold Berleant

Art and Engagement.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1991.

Pp. xx + 259, 12 b&w illus.

US\$44.95. ISBN 0-87722-797-7.

Arnold Berleant has given us an interesting and valuable volume. The interest and the value of *Art and Engagement* is indicated by the title, for it is Berleant's insight into the role of engagement in our appreciation of art which is the highlight of the book. The main thesis is that engaged participation rather than disengaged contemplation constitutes the substance of art appreciation.

The core of the volume is a series of studies of various art forms in which Berleant demonstrates how art appreciation involves active participation. The thesis of appreciation as participation is applied to those forms, such as architecture and literature, which somewhat lend themselves to it, as well as to others, such as painting and classical music, with which it might seem less at home. Moreover, it is brought to bear not simply on easy modern cases, such as the 'happenings' of the 60s and their analogues in other art forms, but also on traditional works which one might think were created purely for calm, serene contemplation. On the whole these studies are excellent, the kind of penetrating and perceptive research which rewards careful consideration. Moreover, the number and range of examples which Berleant considers in developing and defending his thesis is in itself very impressive.

Of the cases Berleant discusses, that of classic landscape painting is particularly interesting. Berleant argues persuasively that this art form, seemingly a paradigm for the passive disengaged gaze, frequently presents itself such as to bring the viewer into the landscape, opening its space to constitute an environment in which the appreciator is free to participate, to engage, to be a part of the work rather than a mere spectator. However, landscape painting also brings out what is perhaps the main worry about this part of Berleant's thesis, which is the possibility of equivocation on his central notions of participation and engagement. This possibility is signalled by the fact that the way in which we are enjoined to participate in landscape painting turns out to be quite different from our engagement with some of the other arts, for example, literature. While in the former case our engagement seemingly involves immersing ourselves in and thus becoming a part of the completed work, in the latter it rather involves, at least with many of Berleant's examples, our acting in an artist-like fashion to complete the work.

In addition to Berleant's rich account of engaged appreciation of different art forms, the volume also addresses important theoretical issues. The more theoretical side of Berleant's thesis involves not simply demonstrating the role of participation in art appreciation but attempting the more ambitious task of constructing an 'aesthetics of engagement'. This is what Berleant calls 'the new aesthetics' which is meant not only to give theoretical justification for the emphasis on participation, but also to replace traditional doctrines

which, Berleant contends, have 'impeded and distorted' appreciation and 'misrepresented' aesthetic activity (18). More precisely, the new aesthetics of engagement is intended to be 'an alternative to the Enlightenment's aesthetics of distance and disinterestedness,' which involves, Berleant claims, three dogmas: first, 'that art consists primarily of objects', second, 'that these objects possess a special status', and, third, 'that they must be regarded in a unique way' (11). Berleant holds that these 'eighteenth-century principles' are 'simply inadequate' and 'utterly irrelevant' (20).

Berleant argues for the 'unsuitability' of each of the three dogmas by reference to recent developments in the history of the arts. His argument against the first is that 'during the past century, the art object has become less important in the aesthetic situation and at times has vanished altogether' (20). He cites the movement in the visual arts which ends with 'conceptual art, Happenings, and performance art,' saying that it 'started with the dissolution of the representational object' and 'concluded with the disappearance of the painting itself' (20). Against the second dogma, he points out that some 'artists in this century have been intrigued by the ordinariness of things, by the very features that make them undistinguished' and cites as examples, first, drama which involves the 'dull mundanities of common speech' and the 'seemingly pointless reiteration of banalities' such as *Waiting for Godot* and, second, the readymades and found objects of Duchamp and others (24). Concerning the third dogma the essence of the argument is that 'the recent history of the arts ... reads as an intentional denial of disinterestedness, for artists have shaped works in every medium in which the active participation of the appreciator in completing the artistic process is essential to the aesthetic effect' (25-6).

Although these arguments fit well with Berleant's 'appreciation as participation' thesis, they nonetheless miss the point as arguments against the three dogmas. A lack of objects in the sense indicated in Berleant's first argument does not refute the first dogma because this dogma has to do not with objects as such, but rather with the fact that art typically involves formal 'objects' of appreciation, which formal objects can be processes, activities, gestures, and the like, that is, the kinds of events which have always constituted the 'objects' of appreciation in art forms such as music and drama. Berleant's argument against the second dogma does no better. If anything is demonstrated by the kinds of works cited in this argument, it is not that art is not special, but rather that many of the things that may initially strike us as ordinary and undistinguished are, when seen anew, also special. The third argument is also ineffective. It fails to recognize that there is no essential conflict between appreciation involving active participation and its being disinterested. Modern exponents of aesthetic disinterestedness typically stress, as Berleant, the active, involved nature of appreciation. Moreover, other states of the disinterested type, such as those induced by drugs or religion, frequently involve intense, active engagement.

If Berleant's arguments against the three dogmas fail, however, this is perhaps just as well, for without at least some of the resources provided by

the three dogmas, we are apparently without the theoretical analysis which is required for demarcating the realm of the aesthetic. Of course, Berleant is aware of the relationship between the three dogmas, especially the third, and the demarcation of the aesthetic. He begins the volume by noting that disinterestedness emerged 'as the mark of a new and distinctive mode of experience called "aesthetic"' (12). Moreover, after presenting his arguments against the three dogmas, he concludes: 'Disinterestedness no longer identifies what is distinctive in the aesthetic situation' (26). Therefore, given his rejection of the dogmas, Berleant is seemingly required by consistency simply to abandon the concept of the aesthetic. However, rather than embrace this radical option, he only flirts with it. Thus, in the Epilogue of the volume, interestingly titled 'Art and the End of Aesthetics,' Berleant claims only that we have come 'to the end of aesthetics as we have learned it' (211). Moreover, throughout the volume he continues to employ the concept of the aesthetic and to employ it in the traditional manner, speaking of 'aesthetic perception', 'aesthetic experience', and the like.

Consequently, in spite of his flirtation with the 'end of aesthetics', it seems that Berleant wishes to pursue a more constructive option. Indeed, he claims we 'need a new guiding theory' and a 'rewriting of aesthetic theory' and appears to think that in contributing to this new theory his aesthetics of engagement yields the required analysis of the concept of the aesthetic (211). For example, in summarizing this contribution he says that 'the underlying principle is that aesthetic activity is a unified process that conjoins the distinguishable aspects of art and aesthetic appreciation into an inseparable experiential whole' and that concerning such 'aesthetic experience', it is 'aesthetic engagement' that is to be identified 'as both the common feature' and 'the factor whose theoretical significance is most fundamental' (212). However, this summary, despite what it claims, reveals clearly that the notion of 'aesthetic engagement' cannot play the fundamental theoretical role which is at issue. Each of the substantive components mentioned in the summary, 'activity', 'appreciation', 'experience', and 'engagement', is modified by the adjective 'aesthetic'. In other words, the summary demonstrates that the aesthetics of engagement rather than contributing to an analysis of the nature of the aesthetic, only presupposes such an analysis. Thus, *Art and Engagement*, although it provides a rich and compelling account of our aesthetic appreciation of art, yet requires a theoretical analysis of the nature of that appreciation.

Allen Carlson

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Oliva Blanchette

*The Perfection of the Universe According to
Aquinas: A Teleological Cosmology.*

University Park: Pennsylvania State

University Press 1992. Pp. xvii + 334.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-271-00797-4.

Blanchette attempts to do two things: to give some Thomistic definitions of perfection (Part One of the book) and to explain the cosmology of Thomas Aquinas (Part Two). In Part One we find that there are three different sorts of perfection, in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The first sort is the perfection that is achieved when a process reaches its end. Processes, like all motions, are in a state of imperfection that is succeeded, ended, by a perfect state. Thus, the end of plant or animal reproduction is the production of a new substance that is a complete member of the species; the maturation of a living being is the acquiring of powers and abilities to allow it to operate to its fullest extent; or, one species may have an end that is outside of itself, as the end of an insect species may be to provide food for a species of birds. The second sort of perfection is that of a whole or of a totality. The very fact that something is a whole and not a part means that it is perfect, for the part, as part, must be incomplete and hence imperfect. As well, a totality, like the universe itself, that includes all and excludes none is a sort of perfection. The third sort of perfection is that of wholes the parts of which are harmoniously integrated: the parts are the right size, or the right shape, or the right number, or whatever. Blanchette completes Part One with a discussion of causality, especially the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes, for causality is required to understand the cosmology in Part Two.

In Part Two, Blanchette expounds three aspects of Thomistic cosmology, always to show how the universe is perfect, in one or more of the senses just given. The first is physical arrangement, the fact that there are natural places, for example, or that the universe is finite in matter and in time. The second is what Blanchette calls the 'order of generation and time', by which he means that the species are ordered one to another hierarchically from lowest to highest: prime matter, elements, compounds, plants, animals, man. Each higher level of being contains the perfections of the lower levels, and Aquinas would have it that the lower levels are more perfected by being a part of the higher levels than not. The third aspect of cosmology is that the universe is perfected by the existence of a range of intellectual beings, both human and angelic. Blanchette does not think that the existence of angels is something that can be strictly demonstrated in a philosophical manner, but he does think that compelling arguments can be given for their existence and that they play an important role in the universe.

Blanchette has many insights in this book, for example, his discussion of chance (181-5) or his argument for the priority of local motion (206-8), but the book as a whole suffers from the fact that the term 'cosmology' is never defined. In the absence of a definition, one might think that cosmology refers

only to that part of one's world-view that is bound to the current state of observation. Thus cosmologies would be temporally or even culturally bound such that as techniques for observation improved, older cosmologies would be discarded in favour of newer ones. But one might also think that cosmology is a discipline having more to do with principles and demonstrations in natural philosophy and that its truths are not dependent upon specialized techniques but are either true or false depending upon common experience and philosophical reasoning. Such a cosmology would not be limited in validity to one time or culture.

It may be that Blanchette intends both senses of cosmology, for he contends that an examination of how Thomas associated the idea of perfection with his particular model of the universe could show us how the same might be done with the model used in modern physics (12). Yet apart from a clear definition of cosmology and a demarcation of what is part of an outmoded world-view and what is not, it is hard to see how this project can be realized. Consider, for example, Blanchette's very good explanation of how local motion in Thomistic natural philosophy is fundamental among natural motions and of how local motion requires natural place (204). As Blanchette points out, modern cosmologists do not accept the doctrine of natural place which the medievals or Aristotle did. How then do we understand natural place in some way that makes sense of the modern cosmology? Without an answer to that question, it would seem that if the doctrine of natural place cannot stand then neither can the doctrine of natural motion. If natural motion cannot stand, then neither can the Thomistic concept of nature. I *do* think that an argument can be made to show that natural place need not be *absolute* place, as Aristotle thought it was, but apart from such an argument it is hard to know how the medieval cosmology of Thomas Aquinas is relevant to the cosmologies of today.

The point that I have made about natural place could also be made about other important parts of Thomistic cosmology. How, for example, do we understand the role of angels in today's cosmologies? What are the elements that stand at the next level above prime matter? The sub-atomic particles? The elements of the Periodic Table? Is there anything analogous in today's science to the role of the heavenly bodies in Thomas' view? Though Blanchette's book gives a generally sound account of Thomistic doctrine, its philosophical use for contemporary philosophers is restricted without answers to questions such as these.

Steven Baldner

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Mary I. Bockover, ed.

Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility:

Essays Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette.

La Salle, IL: Open Court 1991. Pp. xxvii + 228.

US\$48.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9164-4);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9165-2).

The subtitle of this volume suggests a standard Festschrift, but it appears in a series called 'Critics and Their Critics' and it contains an autobiographical sketch by Fingarette as well as a 50-page reply to the essays, which suggests a Schilpp-type volume. Since Festschriften are generally a bore, holes in the ground filled with ephemera by colleagues and former students, the additions are most welcome, especially since Fingarette's reply is the best piece in the book. Unfortunately, though, the nine essays here are more Festschrift-like than really critical.

In many ways Fingarette has been a pioneer, combining an analytic orientation with an interest in psychoanalysis, existentialism, and Eastern philosophy, and with an interest in 'real' (i.e., practical) issues like criminal insanity and alcoholism. Now that such diversity of interest is approved for analytic philosophers, he should receive the recognition he deserves. The bibliography lists seven books by him and thirty-six articles. It was his *Self-Deception* (1969) that first drew him to my attention, followed by *The Meaning of Criminal Insanity* (1972) and *Heavy Drinking: The Myth of Alcoholism as a Disease* (1988). His other books are *The Self in Transformation* (1963), *On Responsibility* (1967), *Confucius — The Secular as Sacred* (1972), and *Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibility*, with his daughter Ann F. Hasse (1979).

The essays in this volume cover Fingarette's main interests (though insanity is not specifically discussed). They are: 'The Criminal Responsibility of Conspirators for the Acts of Their Co-Conspirators' by Ann Fingarette Hasse, 'Alcohol Addiction and Responsibility Attributions' by Ferdinand Schoeman, 'Herbert Fingarette, Radical Revisionist: Why are people so upset with this retiring philosopher?' by Stanton Peele, 'Talmudic Reflections on Self-Defense' by George P. Fletcher, 'Rights-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons' by Henry Rosemont, Jr., 'Reflections on the Confucian Self: A Response to Fingarette' by Roger T. Ames, 'Honesty with Oneself' by Mike W. Martin, 'Self-Knowledge and the Possibility of Change' by Ilham Dilman, and 'Mysticism and the Question of Private Access' by Angus C. Graham. The most worthwhile of these is Schoeman's, 'a model of philosophical inquiry' according to Fingarette (176). Fletcher, Martin, and Dilman are also worth reading. The others are of little interest in themselves, though Fingarette's replies manage to make something of them all. He shows himself to be a sensitive, wise, and humane commentator.

Schoeman argues that discussion of alcoholism has been vitiated by simplistic opinions, e.g., alcoholism is either a sin or a disease, if it's a disease it is out of the person's control, if it's not a disease it is blameworthy, etc.

Fletcher argues that the right of punishment and the right of self-defence have often been run together, either as part of a theory or as the result of plain confusion, and suggests they should be kept separate (he relates this to the Bernhard Goetz case on which he has written a book [*A Crime of Self-Defense*, reviewed *CPR/RCCP* 9 (1989) 353-8 (Ed.)]). Martin argues that self-honesty is different from the avoidance of self-deception and that self-deception may sometimes be OK; it is only bad when it impedes self-honesty: it is the latter, rather than avoiding self-deception, which is the virtue. And Dilman argues that self-knowledge is 'practical' in the sense that it implies the possibility of change. This sounds Socratic ('knowledge is virtue') and indeed Dilman refers to Socrates. But Dilman has not in fact bridged the logical gap from theory to practice: self-knowledge for him is clearly a practical rather than a theoretical matter, more like Aristotle's *phronēsis* than *theoria*.

Festschrifts rarely contain memorable pieces; but this volume is worth noting for the picture, incomplete though it is, that it provides of Fingarette's work. Fingarette believes that moral psychology is important, that philosophers can make substantial contributions to the theory of criminal responsibility, that the dominant Western concept of 'a private atomic self' (188) is at best parochial, and that 'objective' holding people responsible makes sense only as a corollary of 'subjective' taking responsibility. These are valuable thoughts (why else would I have agreed to review this volume?), and I hope this collection of essays will help make Fingarette's contributions more available to those who have not yet availed themselves.

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Michael Brint and William Weaver, eds.

Pragmatism in Law & Society.

Boulder: Westview Press 1991. Pp. xii + 200.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-8309-9);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-8310-2).

This collection of papers by philosophers, legal scholars and literary theorists is welcome at a time when one hears 'pragmatism' applied, confusingly and not always flatteringly, to everything from Deweyan experimentalism to the policies of the Bush administration. The contributors are Thomas C. Grey, Richard A. Posner, Stanley Fish, E.D. Hirsch, Richard Rorty, Lynn A. Baker, Cornel West, Margaret Jane Radin, Joan C. Williams, Jean Bethke Elshtain,

Milton Fisk, Hilary Putnam, Martha Minow, Elizabeth Spelman, Catharine Wells, Sanford Levinson, Daniel R. Ortiz, Steven Knapp, David Hoy, and Ronald Dworkin.

In Part One, 'What Difference Does Pragmatism Make to Law & Society', Posner ('What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?') offers a useful overview of the history of the American pragmatist movement, emphasizing its influence on trends in legal theory such as Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies and, most recently, Legal Neopragmatism. In 'Almost Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, Richard Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin', Fish, who disavows being a pragmatist himself, voices a theme repeated, in variously sanguine and sceptical tones, by other contributors: that pragmatism, understood as a descriptive account of the 'foundationless' nature of social practices such as the law, entails no *normative* conclusions about the preferred ends of such practices, let alone about the ends of society as a whole. Any attempt by pragmatists to derive such substantive conclusions from their nonfoundationalism would, Fish points out, be theoretically undermined by the nonfoundationalism. This fact, he thinks, generates a tension in the work of writers like Posner and Rorty, who are fond of writing as if a nonfoundational account of social practices intrinsically lends itself to their liberal visions more than to other visions or, as in Fish's own case, to resolute scepticism about the point of having visions at all.

Readers of Rorty's earlier work will not be surprised, however, to see that Fish's objection (given Fish's antitheoretical stance, one should perhaps say simply 'observation') reappears as a premise of Rorty's own argument in 'The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice'. Pragmatism's failure to *theoretically* entail any general conclusions about what we should do, he suggests, can work in its favor. Or at least it need not be a rhetorical liability in a culture where normative proposals of all kinds are routinely defeated, for various audiences, with a by now familiar battery of deflationary moves provided by, among others, pragmatists themselves. Moreover, Rorty points out, pragmatism's theoretical arguments about the foundationless nature of legal discourse are now so widely accepted that we can easily read diverse writers of liberal stripe, from representatives of Critical Legal Studies like Roberto Unger to more conservative writers like Ronald Dworkin, as pragmatists. This still leaves room for different interpretations of pragmatism's *nontheoretical* 'prophetic' strand, exemplified by the romantic visions of democracy of Emerson and Dewey, and reinterpreted, more recently, by writers such as Cornel West and Rorty himself. Through lending itself to such reinterpretations, Rorty suggests, pragmatism makes itself useful to social critics, such as feminists, who may find strong logical linkages between their theoretical commitments and their practical objectives more of a rhetorical hindrance than a help.

Several further papers explore the consequences of pragmatism for feminist approaches to legal studies. Radin and Williams (in 'The Pragmatist and the Feminist' and 'Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze', respectively) see pragmatism's critique of foundationalism and its linkage of

inquiry to social practice as providing useful ammunition against conservative efforts to 'essentialize' such basic notions as gender and selfhood. Williams, however, takes Rorty to task for advocating the creation of a liberal culture predicated on a problematic distinction between private individual freedom and the public sphere. In "Just Do It": Pragmatism and Progressive Social Change', Baker looks sceptically at the link between the 'nonfoundational' and 'prophetic' strands of Rorty's pragmatism, arguing that he provides no reasons for supposing that his approach is more likely to support progressive causes in the real world than its foundational or metaphysical alternatives. (One can, however, imagine Rorty replying that if what Baker wants are *generally* compelling reasons, her pragmatic criticism applies indifferently to *all* philosophies of social change — a fact which makes his position no worse than, if also admittedly no better than, the others.)

The centerpiece of Part Two ('Pragmatism, Judicial Decisionmaking, and Constitutional Interpretation') is a spirited and instructive debate between Knapp and Dworkin over the nature of interpretation, with particular reference to the originalist/constructivist controversy. Both, as in their earlier writings, come down forcefully on different sides of the question of whether the meaning of a text is better construed holistically, à la Davidson (Dworkin), or in a more localist fashion (Knapp).

A larger theme which surfaces here is the question of how much epistemological respect to accord those who believe that defendants are *really* guilty or innocent, laws *really* just or unjust, and so on — rather than its being the case that our beliefs in guilt, justice, fairness, etc., are, as Fish provocatively puts it in his paper, simply fictions necessary for the operation of the system. Dworkin, in contrast, who is well known for his strong advocacy of a 'one right answer' approach to legal decisionmaking, gives such beliefs a realist spin by explaining them, in Davidsonian holistic fashion, in terms of features internal to the practices in which they are held — with the result that one can be genuinely right or wrong in holding them. In this respect Dworkin, as Hoy brings out in his penetrating commentary ('Is Legal Originalism Compatible with Philosophical Pragmatism?'), is more of a pragmatist (even though Dworkin, like Fish, does not think of himself as a pragmatist) than Knapp, whose analysis of legal interpretation lines up with Fish's analysis of legal practice in several respects. At the same time, Hoy remarks, Knapp and Dworkin seem not to differ all that much about how authorial intention gets 'constructed' by interpreters who lack direct access to an author's intention, or about the role played by such constructions in actual interpretive practice.

By the end of the book some readers may be asking themselves whether all philosophical and jurisprudential roads inevitably lead to pragmatism. Others may find themselves still puzzled as to whether there is any one thing that pragmatism is. In any case, these essays invite all readers to reflect, on a question which, for all its unwieldiness, bears asking by all who care about the mechanisms of democracy: In what ways does the law, as we practice it now, *work*; and in what ways not? It is a question whose answer will probably

never be 'finished', in Peirce's sense. But it is, if there ever was one, a good pragmatist's question. Or as Dewey might have put it: it is a good pragmatist's question precisely *because* its answer will never be finished. For those who care about such questions, this stimulating collection is highly recommended.

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David Copp, ed.

Canadian Philosophers: Celebrating Twenty Years of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

Calgary: University of Calgary Press 1990.

Pp. 421.

Cdn\$24.00: US\$20.00. ISBN 0-919491-16-2.

The volume contains fourteen recent essays by Canadian philosophers. Seven have historical themes; the others cover technical topics like mathematical modelling (Adam Morton), a formal description of change (Ali Akhtar Kazmi), and traditional issues like causation, meaning and translation, and neuroscience and the philosophy of mind. G.A. Cohen's essay on 'Marxism and Contemporary Political Philosophy ...' stands out because it demonstrates a personal shift in Marxist thought about fair distribution. Terrence M. Penner's '... Parts of the Soul and Weakness of Will' addresses the paradox in choices based on 'will' by a clever adjudication of theories of Plato, Socrates and Donald Davidson.

Of the historical papers, two on Descartes, typical of the scholarship found here, and two readable topic essays on methodology, and neuroscience, will be analyzed. Jonathan Bennett's 'Truth and Stability in Descartes' *Meditations*' challenges the traditional test for truth with an analysis of 'stability' within a rational context. Quoting Descartes: '... a doubting or thinking substance [is] ... the bedrock on which I could lay the foundations of my philosophy' (75). Descartes, for Bennett, is concerned with factual indubitability, ignoring personal limitations of immediacy (76). Feeling something is true, no matter how vivid, is no guarantee of truth (79) and extended rational consistency can be broken by later irrationality (80). Descartes' 'truth rule' fails '... because one can have ... a controlled, unmuddled, transparent apprehension of a false proposition' (86). God (87) is used more as the basis for an intuition than a protracted proof that would free truth from an intuitive 'truth-rule' (96). There is a chasm between intuitive clear and

distinct 'ideas' and guaranteed rational truth (100). The 'stability project' is plausible but Descartes has not provided a basis for philosophical truth. Bennett provides a fresh perspective on whether the cogito is the result of a philosophical argument or a personal and existential insight. We can't have it both ways, and we should focus on the implications of 'stability'.

Ann Wilbur MacKenzie's 'Descartes on Sensory Representation: A Study of the *Dioptrics*' compares human sensing and cognition. There is another component between the cognition of something and the '... objects and (mechanical) properties in the real world (146)'. Sensing does not give us pure data; we need another layer of analysis to detect and compensate for perceptual distortion; sensing is representing rather than resembling (109). Wilbur MacKenzie claims that Descartes' chief use of the term 'sensation' is to refer to 'qualia in consciousness' (115). The distinction between the process of analysis and what is decided objectively true is determined by a logical distinction, not phenomenological analysis (120). Sensations are not 'veridical'; '... they help embodied minds get around on a day to day basis (125)'. Descartes instructs scientists to use the images formed in our brains as access to reality. Methods of scientific examination provide built in checks for consistency, e.g., the laws of perspective (130). 'Descartes ... is urging us to seek the same kind of link between brain images and what they represent as is provided by the rules of language and the laws of perspective' (130). Wilbur MacKenzie lays out the syntax for what the mind gives us for an adequate representation, while unpacking some of the ontological features of the 'extraordinarily complex' (142) processes of relating brain states and environmental states.

Calvin G. Normore is concerned about '... a crisis of confidence in our community approach to philosophy as a whole' (226). The intellectual historian is primarily concerned to discover what was said and believed, and what immediate and distant affect a given piece of philosophy had (208). Normore distinguishes between this project and what he calls 'doxology' (the 'word' according to ...) which is a close examination of a text '... in an effort to determine what reasons would best cohere with it' (209). Often the best reasons for believing what an author said and/or meant are historically based (209). There are important exceptions and he develops an overview of medieval philosophy with some of the problems resulting from traditional readings (216). Another example is from Richard Rorty's 'The Invention of the Mind' in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*. Rorty tries to show that the concepts of mind created by Descartes and his contemporaries were inadequate (217). Rorty's thesis may be refuted but he demonstrates, at least, the possibility of an alternative conceptual framework; an intelligible way of thinking about key epistemological issues which does not involve frowned upon concepts like 'consciousness' or 'mind' (218). Normore's conclusion is that doxology is '... centrally interested in presenting views and arguments of past philosophers in ways that *make sense of the text*' (221). We are not restricted to criteria that suit current philosophers and may best focus on standards that colleagues would have applied to the works at that time (224).

(apparently combining, for a methodology, both current and historically appropriate aspects). The historian of philosophy is not committed to rational reconstruction of any kind. But, if philosophers are to examine historical philosophical materials effectively, we can benefit from immersing ourselves in their context, checking the standards of our own tools of critical analysis. We are reminded of aspects of R.G. Collingwood's methods of historical analysis.

'Is Neuroscience Relevant to Philosophy?' by Patricia Smith Churchland surveys new technology that defends the identity theory of mind. She cites '... spectacular blossoming of data describing the nervous system' (324), subtle, sophisticated experiments in psychology and ethology which have deepened understanding of exact psychological, intellectual, capacities. And, there are clarifications of the molar phenomenon for which neurobiology seeks mechanisms and computer models that permit simulation of neural networks responsible for such tasks as associative memory and pattern recognition (324-5). Ample data, thorough analysis, diagrams, and flow charts demonstrate her thesis. We have sought physical correlates for the processes of logical thinking, challenged now by the development of '... connectionist models of learning and associative memory' (337). These models avoid the pitfalls of trying to relate explicit rules of thought to exact brain processes. Honouring general neurobiological constraints '... computational models ... [bridge] the gap between structure and function — between neurons and thought' (339-41). Convergence of research and willingness in philosophy to modify how we 'picture' our mental concepts promises that '... some basic principles of neural representation can be understood' (341). Faith that the least complex explanation, philosophically, should be pursued is paying dividends.

All in all, interesting contributions to central issues.

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Lawrence Ferrara

Philosophy and the Analysis of Music:

Bridges to Musical Sound, Form, and Reference.

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1991.

Pp. xxii + 361.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-313-28345-1.

Philosophy and the Analysis of Music offers an unusual and ambitious approach to musical analysis. Music involves us in so complex an experience, Ferrara believes, that one cannot do justice to it using customary formal and interpretive methodologies. What makes musical understanding especially difficult is the fact that it is an intensely dynamic process, engaging composer, performer, and listener on many different levels in a complex relation of reciprocity. This book shows how phenomenological and hermeneutic methods can be combined with conventional analytic techniques to produce an integrative account of auditory experience, and of the interpretation of musical reference, and an explanation of musical form. It is what Ferrara terms his eclectic method.

The book itself exemplifies an eclectic approach, for it joins several separate strands to support its thesis. An examination of the origins and development of phenomenology, mainly by Husserl, provides the background for dealing with music as sound in time, which is detailed in a thorough account of recent phenomenological approaches to musical understanding. The review of the current literature on referential meaning in music in the first chapter is complemented by a comprehensive account of the background and development of hermeneutic phenomenology, principally in the writings of Heidegger. The book assumes a knowledge of conventional techniques of musical analysis. All this stands behind the eclectic analysis of two musical compositions, Béla Bartók's *Improvisation #3*, Opus 20, and the third movement of David Zinn's *Spanish Sojourn*.

The remarkable scope of *Philosophy and the Analysis of Music* is, in fact, at the same time both the book's strength and its weakness. For while the effectiveness of Ferrara's eclectic method follows from the sequence of its separate steps, which increasingly inform one another, that cumulative strength does not carry over to the book itself. One could read the chapters on phenomenology and hermeneutics, nearly a third of the book, and benefit from Ferrara's unusual ability to explain a difficult tradition in modern philosophy, yet find surprisingly little concern for its contribution to musical understanding. One could read the chapters on referential meaning and the phenomenological analysis of music and gain an excellent sense of the issues and contributions in these areas, again without much attention to Ferrara's eclectic method, for his expositions are invariably clear, comprehensive, and judicious, but largely self-contained. The original contribution of the book, however, appears in what are surprisingly its two shortest chapters, although the eclectic approach is exemplified by the two lengthy musical analyses that constitute the final chapters. Each of these three groupings,

especially the first two, could, in fact, be read independently of the others with much profit and little loss. One of the strongest virtues of *Philosophy and the Analysis of Music*, its clear and coherent expositions, is at the same time a burden in developing its own position.

We have here, then, a book that is really several books in one, three, to be exact: a philosophical survey of the phenomenological movement, a review of two areas of music theory — referential meaning and the phenomenological analysis of music, and finally a proposal for a ten-step eclectic method elaborated through its full and detailed application. That Ferrara undertakes all these methodically and in detail testifies to the seriousness of his undertaking, and that he does it so well reveals the unusual breadth of his competence. But they do not achieve the kind of intellectual integration that he claims for the eclectic method. However, does that method itself succeed?

This is the principal question, for the real touchstone of this book's contribution must rest with the effectiveness of that method. How well does it fuse these diverse approaches to musical understanding? Since I have studied and played the Bartók work, I was able to reflect on Ferrara's discussion from personal experience, and I am pleased to report that his proposal offers an unusually effective approach to musical analysis. Knowledge in music, as in other domains, is never the exclusive property of a single school. While I may take issue with specific assertions and wonder at certain omissions, these are no fault of the method but only of its application. Let me mention two such instances, not to cavil at minor details but to suggest how the eclectic approach can gain by its own fuller development.

Bartók's work, a short piece for piano solo, is built on a Hungarian folk song which the composer had earlier collected and published. Step Three of Ferrara's eclectic method, Syntax, is the stage of formal analysis, and Ferrara takes twelve pages to elaborate a detailed study of its forty-five measures. The care with which this is done pays off in recognizing the complex thematic and intervallic interrelationships that unify the piece. It is surprising, however, to find Ferrara casting its larger order into the mold of sonata-allegro form, with an exposition, development, recapitulation, and coda, especially since the brief piece consists essentially of five repetitions of the opening melody. To me as a performer-listener, the work's title is a truer indication of its dominant formal quality. For Bartók follows the lead of the folk song, which typically moves by repetition, rather than by any larger structural plan, supplementing this with transpositions and subtle extensions. In fact, this is an instance where the phenomenological *epoché* would be especially desirable in suspending formal presuppositions and being guided purely by what is heard.

There is another place, however, in which Ferrara's method leads us to seek a larger background: Step Seven, the Onto-historical World. Here the later hermeneuticists like Gadamer supplement the ontological with the cultural, and where would this be more appropriate than in examining a folk song, a prototypical cultural artifact? It is surprising, therefore, to find no mention of Hungarian folk instruments like the cimbalom, a type of dulcimer,

and the zither. These offer an explanation of the character of the strummed accompaniment to the melody, sometimes notated metrically, that may be more illuminating than syntactical rhythmic and intervallic relationships.

Philosophy and the Analysis of Music is a valuable contribution to the kind of contextual understanding that is perhaps the major intellectual recognition in this age of complexity. While the book is marred by poor copy-editing and proofreading, it is nonetheless a substantive accomplishment in a promising direction.

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John R. Fincham and Jerry R. Ravetz, eds.
*Genetically Engineered Organisms:
Benefits and Risks.*

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991.

Pp. xiii + 158.

Cdn\$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-5918-X);

Cdn\$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-6863-4).

Genetics seems to arouse the fear and imagination of the public unlike any other science does. Reaction to news of the early recombinant DNA work in the early 70's is a case in point. Public concern prompted Cambridge MA to prohibit recombinant DNA research within its city limits.

The fire of these early debates has died down, but the issues remain, and are likely to become more volatile in the future. The field has advanced considerably in the past twenty years: a project of enormous proportions to map the human genome is now under way; genetically engineered organisms are finding new uses beyond the relatively safe and easily monitored confines of the laboratory; commercial applications of microbial technologies are proliferating.

Genetically Engineered Organisms will be useful for those wishing an overview of the genetic debates today. Prepared under the auspices of the Council for Science and Society (Britain), it represents a consensus of a Working Party charged to investigate problems with the release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment. (The group's mandate was subsequently extended to encompass genetic engineering more generally, so the title is not quite accurate.)

A work of several hands, the book is divided into ten chapters that together form a reasonably well-organized whole. Two introductory chapters provide

a helpful overview of the state of the art today. The reader who does not already know something about 'reverse transcription' or 'plasmid vectors' may find the lessons a little overwhelming, but should be able to grasp enough science needed to work through the social issues.

Each chapter focuses on a different area (e.g., industry, agriculture, animal husbandry) and enumerates an inventory of current and potential applications, with risks and benefits discussed at the end. This layout is reader-friendly, and ideal for organizing such complex and diverse information.

Most large-scale releases of genetically manipulated micro-organisms are for agricultural purposes. The benefits are many: increased resistance to disease, pests, or herbicides; improvement of nutrition; and ultimately better and perhaps cheaper products to the consumer. The main worry is that artificial DNA will find its way to other species. For example, manipulated genes from a crop engineered to withstand pests might inadvertently be transferred (e.g., through pollination) to an undesirable wild species, giving it greater robustness to proliferate and invade. Precedents for such undesirable invasions already exist.

Such risks can be minimized through cautious regulatory measures, but never to the point of zero risk. However, as the text argues, the risks are no different in kind than those posed by selective breeding according to more conventional means. Indeed, genetic engineering in agriculture, in the main, is but a new and more direct method of selective breeding. This is also true of animal applications. Most interventions enhance or improve desired characteristics or functions (e.g., use of genetically engineered organisms to produce bovine growth hormones), although some involve engineering animals to do things for which they were not naturally programmed (e.g., living factories for producing pharmaceutical products).

The main worries about animal applications are different than for agricultural ones (interspecific DNA transfer between animals is unlikely to occur inadvertently). However, the possibility of harmful consequences to humans from the use of animal viruses in gene transfer is a concern. So too is animal welfare. The text has a brief discussion of 'animal rights' (85-7), but arguably this concern warrants more attention than it is given.

Chapters seven and eight discuss the applications of genetic engineering to humans. Most are diagnostic: genetic fingerprinting; direct identification of defective genes; use of cloned DNA as diagnostic reagents. Issues arising, which will become more acute as we progress in mapping the human genome, mainly have to do with the use (and abuse) of new and potentially harmful knowledge.

Therapeutic applications pose different issues. There is great disease prevention potential in using live recombinant DNA viruses that are engineered to stimulate immunity against a pathogen by mimicking the pathogenic virus. Gene therapy holds the promise of correcting disease through direct genetic manipulation. It will become increasingly controversial as we develop 'curative' abilities not just with somatic but also with germ (repro-

ductive) cells. Germ-line therapy would alter not just the present patient, but future prodigy as well. On a grand scale, this raises the spectre of eugenics; less dramatically, the consequences of an accident—which would be manifest in every cell of future prodigy—could be considerable and far-reaching.

The most philosophical discussions take place in the final two chapters, which discuss risk assessment and management (but focusing mainly on the environmental release of genetically engineered organisms). Risk assessment is always something of a blind man's game, but in this field even more so. 'The microbial flora of natural and agricultural environments,' the authors point out, 'is so diverse that there is little hope of enumerating and quantifying all the possible pathways of information transfer; and it is even quite difficult to monitor empirically any particular DNA fragment after it has been released' (129).

Moreover, the knowledge base (e.g., microbial ecology, taxonomy) that would enable greater prediction and control is poorly developed. A 'predictive ecology' is of course impossible, but increased knowledge in the field sciences would enable more informed risk assessment and management. The authors make a plea for more research, beginning with 'a map of ignorance' sketching a 'profile of research that has *not* been done' (135).

Problems of prediction aside, the risk profile of releasing genetically engineered organisms is not really novel. The risks are 'likely to be no different *in kind* from those that have always been associated with the introduction of the novel products of plant and animal breeding, or new vaccines' (126). After all, humans have been introducing foreign species into new environments for a long time, and by means of conventional plant breeding have effected gene transfers less precise than through recombinant DNA techniques.

Still, genetic engineering has an almost mythical stature in the public imagination, and the authors complain that 'the discussion of the risks of genetic engineering has been too much dominated by an over-dramatic view, verging at times on apocalyptic' (125-6). Even so, they are not arrogant and dismissive of public concerns, even when they believe these concerns are exaggerated or ill-informed.

Indeed, the discussion of science and the public is one of the most insightful in the book. The authors understand that public dialogue requires a considerable measure of humility from scientists. The cause of sound and socially responsible genetic work will be best advanced if public concerns are addressed head-on, and regulatory measures are designed, implemented, and monitored in accordance with public concerns.

In addition to a brief account of current regulatory measures and techniques of risk assessment, the authors offer six principles of 'ecological assessment' to guide further developments in the field. Perhaps the most astute of these is 'quality assurance in application'. According to this principle, '[t]he realities of practice, and of regulatory processes as well, must be included in any assessment of hazards in any context of agricultural or

commercial application' (139). Rules and regulations are of no use if they are not followed, and it is much more difficult to control and police agricultural districts than it is the laboratory. Accordingly, risks should be assessed on the basis of existing and likely practices, and not on the basis of official statements about what does or should happen.

Genetically Engineered Organisms is not a large book, and the treatment of issues is cursory. Those wishing detailed philosophical arguments and analyses will have to look elsewhere. It is limited in its scope, which is to provide 'an objective survey of the scene as at present' (1). Some readers, and particularly those who would prefer more caution and conservatism in these matters, will question the book's 'objectivity'. Still, it is at least reasonably fair, and the reader wishing a primer in this complex and controversial field will find it very useful indeed.

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G.W.F. Hegel

Elements of the Philosophy of Right,

ed. A.W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.

Pp. lii + 514.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-344387);

US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-349990).

Nearly fifty years after T.M. Knox published his translation of the *Philosophy of Right* in 1942, we have now a new version by H.B. Nisbet. Knox provided copious notes of his own. Here that task is ably performed by Allen Wood. The *Philosophy of Right* was already the best served of all Hegel's texts in English. Now it is served even better; and the mass of relevant Hegel manuscripts published since Knox made his edition have here been excerpted and utilized very judiciously in the notes.

The volume begins with an extremely enlightening introduction by Wood which obviates many of the misunderstandings of Hegel's political theory, and shows us why 'there is now a virtual consensus among knowledgeable scholars that the earlier images of Hegel, as philosopher of the reactionary Prussian restoration and forerunner of modern totalitarianism, are simply wrong' (ix).

The translator explains in his preface some of the most notable differences between his approach to the text and that of Knox. Each claims to be aiming

at literalness. But Knox respected Hegel's sentence structure, while Nisbet seeks to render Hegel's vocabulary reliably. This is, in my view, the right criterion of 'faithfulness'. Hegel translations, whether good or bad, are almost never 'handsome' — though the Knox version of the *Aesthetics* comes close. But Nisbet has avoided mechanical ugliness, by using the natural English word with the German term in brackets in the many cases where important conceptual distinctions are involved. Thus 'existence' serves for both *Dasein* and *Existenz* (but both terms are given); and *aufheben* has five renderings, but keeps bracketed company with four of them (the 'normal' equivalent being 'supersede'). A complete Glossary is provided. (According to Nisbet, Knox renders *Bestimmung* in twenty-five different ways; but he never marks its presence.)

The 'Additions' made by Eduard Gans from the lecture notes of H.G. Hotho (course of 1822-23) and K.G. von Griesheim (1824-25) are here printed in their place — and not relegated to an Appendix as they were by Knox; and because Ilting has published the notes of these two students in full, Nisbet is able to indicate in each case where the 'Addition' comes from. (Gans did some editing revision, so the serious student must still go to Ilting for a critical text.)

Nisbet claims that Knox is 'even at times archaic.' Clearly he means simply 'old-fashioned', for he adds that the fault is 'scarcely surprising after almost half a century.' What genuinely is 'old-fashioned' is the way that Knox loves to expound Hegel's 'system' in his notes. His respect for Hegelian sentence structure certainly makes his translation rather stilted at times; but it is Nisbet's claim to have found some seventy-five 'outright errors' that provides the best justification for a new translation. I do not think that the Knox version will rapidly be set aside everywhere in favor of this new one. So I hope that Nisbet will put together an annotated list of Knox' mistakes and publish it somewhere.

Part of my reason for believing that Knox will continue in use, is that his notes and commentary contain much that is still of value. Wood's notes are admirably clear, and often just as copious as Knox. He explains many things that Knox took for granted (references to Penelope and Oedipus, for example); and he does incorporate many useful points that Knox made. But he concentrates largely upon different points; and he brings in much that was not known to Knox. He makes us aware, for instance, that Hegel's notorious attack on Fries in the Preface, is only the visible tip of a polemic that runs right through the book. We now have in print lecture transcripts from six of Hegel's seven courses on the philosophy of right; and Wood has made good use of them all. He gives more cross-references to Hegel's philosophy of history than Knox, and not as many to the logic. But students will often find it worthwhile to look at them both.

Altogether, the Nisbet-Wood edition is a work of sound scholarship and balanced judgement. It makes Hegel reliably accessible, and about as clear and readable as he can be. In addition, the critical apparatus makes their work into a valuable stepping stone for the study of the other texts and

sources with which more advanced students and professional scholars must be concerned. I have noticed only one serious omission from the 'Selected Bibliography': A.T. Peperzak's *Philosophy and Politics* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff 1987) certainly ought to be here.

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**Tamara Horowitz and
Gerald J. Massey, eds.**

*Thought Experiments in Science
and Philosophy.*

Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
1991. Pp. 335.

US\$47.50. ISBN 0-8476-7706-0.

These twenty-one essays issue from a 1986 conference at the University of Pittsburgh, on 'The Place of Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy'. There are four sections: on thought experiments in the history of science and philosophy, in logic and mathematics, in the sciences, and in philosophy, the last two being the most extensive. The essays offer a variety of explicit and implicit answers to the question: what is a thought experiment? It is somewhat bewildering to encounter a new or subtly different account in paper after paper, but it is an informative kind of bewilderment. There simply is no widely accepted account, so it is useful to have an array of possible accounts gathered together.

Perhaps the most striking divide among the accounts of thought experiments concerns whether they are most centrally pieces of *reasoning* or processes of *observation*. In thought experiments, are we primarily *deducing* conclusions, or *noticing* things about the hypothetical scenario? B. Massey and Brown ally themselves most clearly with observational models. Massey speaks of 'constructing a situation in imagination and *observing* it' (99), and Brown develops a 'platonic' account, arguing that natural laws are relations between abstract universals, and that 'in some thought experiments *we see the relevant laws*' (127). Similarly, Mohanty portrays Husserl's method of imaginative variation as the 'imaginative reconstruction of experience', and not as a process of reasoning (269).

On the other side, the most precise proposals are given in four essays in the science section which characterize thought experiments as *arguments*. Norton states that, 'Thought experiments are arguments which: (i) posit

hypothetical or counterfactual states of affairs, and (ii) invoke particulars irrelevant to the generality of the conclusion' (129). He notes that the presence of particulars 'is what makes thought experiments experiment-like' (130). Irvine defends a further requirement that thought experiments arise in a well-defined theoretical context with empirical support (150), to ensure that thought experiments be properly scientific. Laymon sees a problem for the argument account because, he claims, the hypothetical situations are always idealized, making arguments which posit them unsound. He gives these unsound arguments a respectable role by construing them as 'invitations' to construct or imagine a series of actual experiments whose results would approach the thought-experimental result (188).

Forge, also adopting the argument account, pursues briefly the question of what the 'experimental' nature of the hypothetical particulars amounts to (210-12). His answer is sketchy, but it suggests an important question for the argument account: can it explain why we appeal to hypothetical *particulars* and why we are tempted to call this activity *experimentation*? The observational model has this in its favor: it highlights the 'work' which seems to be done by appreciating the hypothetical scenario. In the examples from Einstein and others which are used to illustrate the argument account, there are points at which *suddenly something appears obvious*, and these points seem to deserve more attention than they get when reconstructed as premises in arguments.

The essays which focus on just one thought experiment, presenting them as cases still to be reckoned with, are especially welcome. They are independently interesting and keep the book in contact with the phenomena of thought experimentation. B. Massey describes a group, the Xenophobes, to persuade us through 'plausible story-telling' (103) that we can conceive of a group as logically deviant and *rational*, countering the Fregean claim that the rationality of such a group is inconceivable. She remarks, '[W]hat is conceivable ... in this case does not admit of as certain and as clear an answer as one would expect if analysis of concepts or deductions of consequences were at the heart of the thought experiment' (103). This opens up the issue of *what else* besides deduction and conceptual analysis thought experiments may help us to do. It compares provocatively with G. Massey's thesis in 'Backdoor Analyticity' that current philosophy's appeals to thought experiments and what is *conceivable* — in rejecting the project of meaning analysis — in fact assume a notion of conceivability which is indiscernible from analyticity.

Wilson, meanwhile, echoes B. Massey in claiming that, at least in mathematical physics, thought experiments resist an analytic/synthetic functional dichotomy: they do not just clear up conceptual muddles or show up empirical inadequacies (193-4). Wilson describes his example, the eighteenth-century debate over the plucked string, as driven rather by 'considerations of mathematical harmony' (193), in particular by the difficulty of harmonizing the geometric and analytic descriptions of the string. The example's complexity makes it hard to move gracefully from its details to insights about what lies

beyond the analytic/synthetic distinction, but the attention to its details is also satisfying. It is a good companion to Anapolitanos' essay on thought experiments in mathematics. He embraces such a wide range of 'exploratory ideal processes' (87) as thought experiments that one wants a better idea of what these processes are like and how they compare to thought-experimental activity in other disciplines.

In a challenging critique of common appeals to Newcomb's problem, Horowitz argues that *realizations* of the problem, where a realization fills out the story behind the problem's stipulated facts, do not leave us with a thought experiment supporting causal over Bayesian decision theory. She claims that the relevant realization of the problem is not one that we — with our actual epistemic values — could confront, and that it thus offers no interesting test for rational choice theory (315). Her critique is related to a critical strategy developed at length by Gale, and briefly by Forge (220). The problem is roughly that thought experiments may require imagining ourselves in hypothetical situations, with the concepts we actually have, although the situation is one in which, as Gale puts it, there would be 'no point or value' (301) in having those concepts. It is interesting to consider whether the task Massey sets us in the Xenophobe case violates this condition on the imaginative project. Massey's and Horowitz's essays, both concerned with *value* concepts, and both stressing the need to flesh out the *story*, suggest a connection between the kind of concept under investigation and the need for 'plausible story-telling.'

There is much more to say about this volume. Many essays reflect on our thought-experimental *history*, everything from Presocratic hypothetical reasoning to medieval scientific method to Darwinian just-so stories. And several take up underlying questions of conceivability and modality. The reader is left to draw many of the connections within this great range of material, but that process is stimulating. It illuminates an aspect of our intellectual practice which has received too little of this kind of sustained attention.

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Luce Irigaray

Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche,

trans Gillian C. Gill.

New York: Columbia University Press 1991.

Pp. 190.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-231-07082-9.

Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche is a demanding book departing from convention in both style and content. Irigaray, the marine lover, engages Nietzsche in an 'amorous dialogue', a genre designed to give space to the new voice of women freed from patriarchal dominance. The new voice is neither narrative nor analytical; rather, it is a direct engagement of the reader in a personal encounter.

There are two problems with this approach. First, Irigaray's references to Nietzsche are not obvious unless one is already familiar with his work. Even Nietzsche scholars may not always recognize specific passages to which she is responding in her outpouring of grievances against him. Second, in her attempt to free herself from patriarchal syntax she puts an added burden on the reader that sometimes becomes counterproductive and seems too often gratuitously mystifying.

On the other hand, given those reservations, the book is dazzling, original and provocative, filled with vivid imagery and original insights reflecting her extensive background in philosophy, linguistics, and psychoanalysis. Her intent to tear off the veils — the patriarchal projections on women — and to speak from genuine difference succeeds, even if the response for some readers may be merely exasperation. She is often outrageous in the way that Nietzsche is, courageous in speaking the unspeakable, and then spoiling it by going too far. Nietzsche scholars may also be offended by the fact that, though the dialogue is addressed to Nietzsche, at times she misuses him as a vehicle for her arguments aimed at Freudian and Lacanian dogmas or even western philosophy in general. What she is trying to do with the new voice and language is to rethink philosophy in the light of what is specific sexual difference, hence the intimate dialogue, filled with sensual imagery emphasizing touch, passion, desire, instead of analytical criticism and logical argument. Why the sea imagery? Irigaray claims that Western thought has been dominated by the physics and mechanics of solid matter, and she sees women as undefinable, open, fluid. For that reason she has chosen the undiscovered depths of the sea as a metaphor for the submerged, unformed feminine.

The book is divided into three parts. Part One is an imitation of Nietzsche's style, a loosely connected series of aphoristic explorations under cryptic headings, which culminate in a sustained thesis in the final part of the book. Her thesis begins with the claim that woman is the shadow of man, veiled by his projections, made into his mirror, to be nothing but his chosen reflection. But now she is awakening. Irigaray accuses Nietzsche of using his noon (the sun a metaphor for the masculine) to eliminate the other side of

the earth (mid-night) and the depths of the sea. Now, she warns him, he must listen to what Midnight has to say. The marine lover vehemently refuses to continue as man's shadow and rejects eternal recurrence which forever condemns her to that role. But her rejection is also a lament for what could have been. A repeated refrain is 'If your hour ends when mine begins, that gives me no pleasure, for I love to share, whereas you want to keep everything for yourself.'

Irigaray, the marine lover, repeatedly uses Nietzsche's own attack terminology to turn upon him with her complaints. It is a double mockery, since she performs a Nietzschean transvaluation of values, reversing the meaning of his terminology to serve her own attack on him for his failure to acknowledge the feminine. At times this becomes spiteful; she calls his sun-worship a kind of *rancor*, claims that he *resents* women most of all. She accuses him of hurrying to his neighbors out of fear, going there to lose himself. Rancor, resentment, running to others out of weakness are all herd values Nietzsche despised. She taunts him with the phrase, 'What if you had to make a choice', whereas he often proclaimed the difference between strong and weak as one where the strong alone are capable of choice and goal. She advises him to 'break up his certainties with a hammer', another way of throwing him back at himself, a reference to the subtitle of *Twilight of the Idols* — 'How to philosophize with a Hammer'. Here it is she who instructs him to turn the hammer on his own dogmas.

At times this amorous dialogue becomes a lovers' quarrel that goes out of bounds; for instance, she repeatedly accuses Nietzsche of being anti-body. Since she identifies the feminine with body and nature and accuses Nietzsche of making woman his shadow, she interprets his anti-feminism as anti-body. But Nietzsche insists often enough, in his vendetta against Christianity that the Christian devaluation of the body is decadent and unhealthy. In *Zarathustra* he argues for a holistic self-identity, in fact identifies the self as body. Perhaps Irigaray is just reacting to a traditional dichotomy between body/spirit as a differentiation between the sexes, or making reference to her belief that women express themselves through their bodies whereas men use language. Similarly, in her reference to language, Nietzsche seems a mask covering a hidden Lacan whom Irigaray challenges. 'The evil begins at birth ... the birth of your language' she writes. She accuses Nietzsche-Lacan of wanting life to be engendered from a language-body alone, of annihilating the feminine because he wants to overcome the body. This is a far cry from Nietzsche. (No. 354 *The Gay Science*). Her main thesis emerges as a challenge to Nietzsche's goal of an *übermensch*. No Superman can be born or reborn without water, she insists. She accuses Nietzsche of wanting to stay in his circle of eternal recurrence because it is a protection against a genuine encounter with the feminine, an encounter which would change him. She, the marine lover who has cast off the veils that hid and imprisoned her, wants to invent a new relation to men, new music, graphics, art, language. 'That wasn't your request' she reproaches Nietzsche. She taunts him with the title he adopted in his early days of madness, the 'crucified one'. 'You wanted to

be Dionysus, but you became the crucified one.' She tells him to give up 'the spirit of revenge [another reversal of his values] ... you've murdered yourself'.

Nietzsche opposed to Christ the figure of Dionysus as giving a healthier meaning of suffering (No. 1052 *Will to Power*). This was a crucial distinction for him, but Irigaray does not acknowledge a difference between them because from her point of view they are alike in that both dismiss the feminine ... which also explains why both fail. Therefore, she accuses Nietzsche of opposing a sham contradiction. With either, because difference has not been affirmed, the path to self-hood is lost before it can begin.

Part One closes with the accusation that woman has been veiled, possessed, covered over by projections and that the only hope for the future is to unmask, unveil and find a true meeting of difference. The second part, *Veiled Lips*, elaborates on the long history in which woman has been continuously veiled. From Greek mythology Irigaray draws upon examples to support her defense against Nietzsche's perspective on woman as superficial. She also stresses his need to keep woman at a distance, a recurring theme in her complaints. The third part, 'When the Gods are Born' concentrates on Dionysus, Apollo, and Jesus from a feminist point of reference, and challenges the traditional interpretation of Christ as well as the psychological interpretation of him by Nietzsche in *The Anti-Christ*. Christianity, she claims, keeps God at a distance encountered only through death and resurrection. Irigaray holds a visionary belief that an aspect of Christ — the feminine view of eros — is still to be discovered, one of touch and sharing. She sees the crucifixion as evidence that that age failed the test. What should have been stressed instead of resurrection and another life, is the world of the flesh, the incarnation. What Christianity should have meant was sharing, love, ordinary human behavior ... eating, sleeping, speaking, silence. The good news should have been the incarnation, which meant 'a grace that speaks silently through and beyond the word'.

The book concludes with a final reference to Nietzsche and what she sees as his failure, the same failure of the patriarchy all through history ... that the *idea* of woman was preferred to a genuine openness to her difference. Her condemnation of Nietzsche is thus the same condemnation she brings in all her critical interpretations, from Greek Mythology to Lacan. In this respect Nietzsche is only an arbitrary target standing for the patriarchy as such.

At the same time Irigaray honors Nietzsche by choosing him to hear her out, for it is as a lover that she takes him to task. And perhaps her passionate, sometimes unfair accusations are appropriate as a ground-breaking unveiled feminist expression and even, perhaps as a unique addition to Nietzsche scholarship. Lou Salome has a similar suggestion:

Readers wishing to discern the significance of Nietzsche as a theoretician ... will turn away disappointed, without having penetrated to the core of Nietzsche. For the value of his thoughts does not lie in their originality of theory, nor does it lie in that which can be established or refuted dialectically. What is of value is the ultimate force which speaks

through one personality to another personality ... (*Nietzsche*, trans S. Mandel [Black Swan Books 1988])

From that point of view, Nietzsche above all those in the history of philosophy is the right choice for an amorous dialogue, and Irigaray's title is not deceptive. This is a lovers' quarrel, with all its passion and excess.

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Richard Jeffrey

Probability and the Art of Judgment.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. xi + 244.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-39459-7);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-39770-7).

The essays by Jeffrey collected in this book treat mainly epistemology and decision theory, and complement his well-known work *The Logic of Decision* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1983).

The essays on epistemology promote radical probabilism, the view that the basic epistemic concept is subjective probability — not knowledge, belief, or acceptance. Jeffrey analyzes learning as revision of probabilities. According to him, if a proposition is learned with certainty, and new and prior probability assignments conditional on the proposition agree — so that the proposition is a sufficient representation of new information — then conditionalization governs probability revision. That is, new probabilities should equal prior probabilities conditional on the proposition. The sufficiency condition replaces the usual, in Jeffrey's view unrealistic, requirement that the conditioning proposition express everything learned. In cases where experience alters the probability of some proposition, but no proposition satisfying the sufficiency condition is learned with certainty, a generalized form of conditionalization, *probability kinematics*, governs probability revision.

Jeffrey supports probability kinematics with diachronic Dutch book arguments and a version of van Fraassen's principle of reflection. He also explains how probability kinematics, together with de Finetti's ideas about exchangeability, provide an account of statistics, how some versions of probability kinematics meet Field's standard of independence of order of learning, and how accommodating the effect of reasoning on probability assignments handles Glymour's worry about the confirmation of novel scientific hypotheses by previously known facts.

The essays on decision theory use Harsanyi's ideas to formulate a representation theorem for interpersonal utility, one that gives conditions under which fair social preferences can be represented as preferences for a greater sum of personal utilities. They also use Bolker's ideas to formulate a representation theorem for probability and utility, one that gives conditions under which preferences can be represented as preferences for greater expected utility.

Since Jeffrey's representation theorem for probability and utility is one of his most notable achievements, I will consider his comparison of it with an earlier, similar theorem by Savage (ch. 14). Both authors introduce axioms of preference and show that if the axioms are satisfied, there are probability and utility functions that represent preferences, and all the representative functions are related by certain transformations. Savage's theorem takes acts as functions from states of the world to consequences, and requires that states be causally independent of acts. Jeffrey's theorem takes acts, as well as states, to be propositions, and drops the independence requirement in favor of a formula for expected utility that makes probabilities of states conditional on acts. Savage's theorem yields a unique probability function, and a unique utility function given a zero point and a unit, whereas Jeffrey's theorem yields probability and utility functions less determinately.

Jeffrey claims that a unified treatment of acts and states, and the elimination of causal primitives, are important advantages (see also 215-17). And he claims that his theorem yields probability and utility functions with as much determinacy as is psychologically warranted, and, in any case, with sufficient determinacy to account for decisions (see also 224 and *LD*, 161). The evaluation of these claims is complicated by unclarity about the role intended for his theorem. Sometimes he suggests that the theorem is intended to serve as the basis for definitions of probability and utility (*LD*, 74). Other times he suggests that the theorem is intended to serve merely as a means of measuring probabilities and utilities (*LD*, 41). And still other times he suggests that the theorem is intended to be taken only at face value, as the formulation of some connections between preference, probability, and utility (220-1). Let us see how Jeffrey's theorem compares to Savage's in each of these roles.

If both theorems are taken only as formulations of connections between preference, probability, and utility, then neither is clearly better for the purpose. Both are fascinating and profound; neither is clearly more interesting or deeper. If both theorems are taken as the basis for definitions of probability and utility, then again neither is clearly better for the purpose. Both fail since neither gives necessary conditions for the existence of probability and utility assignments. Each uses arbitrary structural axioms of preference (229).

Suppose, then, that we take the theorems as instruments for measuring probabilities and utilities. At first it appears that Jeffrey's theorem has the advantage of wider applicability because it dispenses with Savage's independence requirement. But, as causal decision theorists have argued, Jeffrey's theorem needs a substitute restriction to cases where the probabilities of states given acts equal the probabilities of corresponding subjunctive

conditionals. Consequently, the gain in range is not clear. However, although Jeffrey does not argue this point, taking acts and states as propositions yields a clear gain in range. It allows Jeffrey to represent the consequences of an act given a state as the conjunction of the act and state. This provides a comprehensive representation of consequences. In contrast, taking acts as functions from states to consequences, Savage treats only consequences that can be produced by multiple acts. Hence his theorem must be restricted to agents who are indifferent about act-specific consequences.

Is the greater generality of Jeffrey's theorem purchased at the expense of precision? Jeffrey's claim that his theorem reveals an inherent indeterminacy of probabilities and utilities assumes that the theorem grounds definitions, and so is not tenable. His fall-back reply, that his methods yield probabilities and utilities accurately enough to account for decision, is not completely correct. His methods account for existing preferences, but not for the preference formation that is part of a decision. However, the problem of imprecision can be corrected. Jeffrey shows that starting with *two* primitives, preference and comparative probability, he can measure probabilities and utilities precisely (230-1). Thus casting Jeffrey's theorem as a measuring instrument makes its attractions shine brightest.

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John Kleinig

Valuing Life.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1991. Pp. xvii + 284.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-691-7388-0.

Philosophical discussions of the value of life have often revolved around the morality of particular forms of killing, such as abortion, active euthanasia, capital punishment, and the killing of animals. One unfortunate result of this process is that the very meaning of the word 'life' has become ideologically loaded. For instance, abortion opponents often presuppose that if the human conceptus is alive then it must have a value which precludes abortion in all or most cases.

In *Valuing Life*, Kleinig aims to refocus these issues through a rigorous examination of the arguments for valuing individual living things, as well as the various meanings that may be attached to the phrase, 'valuing life'. Chapter One presents a taxonomy of ways in which life may be valued. These

include the ascription of *worth*, *sanctity*, or *dignity* to living things; having *reverence* or *respect* for life; and asserting the existence of a *right* to life. Each of these evaluative concepts can be defined and defended in a variety of ways, some predominantly secular and others arising from specific religious beliefs.

Not only are there many ways of valuing life; there are also many views about which forms of life should be valued, and many properties of living things that have served as a basis for the ascription of value. Albert Schweitzer considered all living organisms worthy of reverence, while utilitarian animal liberationists such as Peter Singer consider all and only sentient beings to be morally considerable, and animal rights theorists such as Tom Regan ascribe inherent value and a right to life only to those beings that have a degree of mental sophistication which is at least comparable to that of a normal mature (nonhuman) mammal. Meanwhile, more anthropocentric theorists argue that membership in the human species is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for having a life that is morally valuable.

Kleinig's own view might be described as a three-stage theory of the moral value of living things. Mere 'organismic' life such as plants possess may be valued for its *telos*, its purposeful and striving nature. Nevertheless, the absence of sentience in plants means that we are under fewer moral constraints in relation to them than in relation to sentient beings. Sentience matters morally because with it comes the ability to experience pain and suffering; however, its relevance to the value of life, or the wrongness of a *painless* death is not intuitively clear, and Kleinig needs to say more about this. His view is that, although sentience matters, it is not a sufficient basis for the ascription of a right to life. For that something more is required, i.e., a capacity for reason, reflection, and imagination.

Kleinig's arguments for this view have an appearance of ambiguity, in that it is at times unclear whether they are meant as empirical descriptions of how human agents actually do (tend to) evaluate human vs nonhuman lives, or as a normative account of how they *ought* to evaluate them. For instance, he says that, 'Plants are not seen as sentient, animals are not seen as rational, or reflective and imaginative, and for valuers — at least human valuers — both sentience and thought are given normative significance' (178). However, on his account of the evaluative enterprise such blurrings of the fact/value gap are not necessarily problematic. Evaluation, he says, is always simultaneously objective and subjective, linking the presumably real properties of objects with interests which we have as agents and evaluators.

On this view, a degree of ethical anthropocentrism is inevitable. Moral rights are restricted to human beings because rights are claims which we are prepared to enforce through coercion and it is only in the case of human beings that it is appropriate to use coercion to enforce the claims in question. The reasons are largely pragmatic: it would not be practical or in our individual or collective interest to attempt coercively to prevent other moral agents from ever killing or injuring nonhuman animals, much less plants or microbes. But this partiality towards moral agents is not entirely based on practicality and self interest. There is also an element of logical necessity, or

something like it. The authority of our moral claims, Kleinig says, requires that we accord 'greater inherent worth to beings who engage in ... moral reflection' (88). This is an intriguing claim, and one that cries out for a more extensive defense than Kleinig here provides. Be that as it may, he is surely right that the value of life may consistently be held to come in degrees, such that we may value all living things while at the same time valuing the lives of moral agents above those of sentient beings that are not moral agents, and those of sentient beings above those of nonsentient living things.

In his final chapter, Kleinig draws some tentative conclusions about the ethics of meat eating, abortion, capital punishment, euthanasia for the irreversibly comatose, and human genetic engineering. While not arguing for the prohibition or abandonment of any of these practices, he does find each of them morally problematic in the light of his reflections on the value of organismic, sentient, and rational life. Abortion, for instance, is not to be seen as the moral equivalent of murder since fetuses are not yet moral agents or (in the early stages) sentient beings. He argues, nevertheless, that the life of the fetus has significant value by virtue of its potential (208). While few in the pro-choice camp would debate that conclusion, many would object to the further claim (which Kleinig seems to endorse) that women have a *prima facie* duty to complete all of their pregnancies (205). Even lives that have significant value may sometimes rightly be ended — a point that does much to undermine the hope that issues involving the ethics of killing can be settled simply by focusing upon the value of the lives in question.

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Klaus Christian Köhnke

The Rise of Neo-Kantianism,

trans. R.J. Hollingdale.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.

Pp. xiii + 290.

US\$64.95. ISBN 0-521-37336-0.

This book appeared in German in 1986 and is here rendered into English by a well-known Nietzsche translator, with a foreword by Lewis White Beck. It deals with German philosophy after Hegel and prior to the well-known twentieth-century movements in German thought. It treats a movement which was influential in its time but has since been ignored and now is unfamiliar territory, even in Germany. This is the most comprehensive study

ever written on Neo-Kantianism, ranging from its earliest beginnings and figures like Jürgen Bona Meyer, 'the first neo-Kantian of all' (5), whose work *Zum Streit über Leib und Seele* appeared in 1856, up to the 'golden age' of the Marburg and Baden schools which 'lasted until the First World War' (280).

The book's subtitle (*German Academic Philosophy between Idealism and Positivism*) sounds like a dilemma with contemporary relevance. Richard Rorty (one of the editors of the 'Ideas in Context' series in which the volume appears) seems to have been thinking along these lines when he wrote in his dust-jacket comment that the book 'shows that many philosophical ideas we associate with the twentieth century were largely anticipated in the nineteenth'. But whatever the contemporary philosophical import of the ideas put forth by the authors discussed in the book may be, the book itself is not a traditional 'history of philosophy'. Instead of simply presenting the march of disembodied ideas, Köhnke's history of Neo-Kantianism chronicles it as part of an epoch using a host of standpoints ranging from social and political history, individual and group biography, and an astonishing amount of detailed archival research including, among other things, the exact numbers of courses taught in all German-speaking universities on particular philosophers in particular years over decades. Köhnke's concern, as he states it, is to understand 'how Neo-Kantianism emerged and what led or contributed to its dissemination' (1). The reader learns what the Neo-Kantians philosophers taught and why. The chief merit of the book is that it combines the social history of ideas with a truly philosophical narrative. This is due in large part to Köhnke's mastery of Kant. This permits him to show how Otto Liebmann, famous for his call to go 'back to Kant', based his renewal of Kantianism upon Liebmann's casting aside much that is essential in Kant's philosophy, including Kant's whole attempt to show the practical character of reason and to rehabilitate practical philosophy. Köhnke shows how Liebmann's appropriation of Kant subjugated a philosophy of enlightenment to a political philosophy in which 'Germany' and 'Kaiser Wilhelm' were the 'highest ideals' (142). At the same time, Köhnke is able to show how Hermann Cohen's Neo-Kantianism, motivated by universalistic — ultimately religious — ethical commitments, selected those elements from the *Critique of Pure Reason* that permitted him to establish his own *Weltanschauung*. He shows how the 'credo of the Marburg school', viz., 'that we know a priori of things only what we ourselves have put into them' shifted the Kantian view from the sphere of metaphysics to that of experience, thereby bringing the nature (and existence) of the a posteriori into question, moving Kantianism away from the question of the objective validity of the categories to the question of the participation of the a priori in cognition. The book provides probably the best elucidation of Cohen's — often obscure — appropriation of Kant available in English.

More generally, Köhnke delineates a paradigm shift in philosophy away from 'systems' towards 'The Rise of an autonomous discipline called *Erkenntnistheorie*.' A specific section of the book bears this title and it is a recurrent

theme throughout. It is often said that there is a linkage between Neo-Kantianism and epistemology, but here this linkage is made clear and its historical origins with Friedrich Eduard Beneke, Christian Hermann Weise, and others is set out for the first time (with the exception of Köhnke's own earlier article on the origin of the term *Erkenntnistheorie*). Showing how the terminological use of this term arose is one of Köhnke's main historical achievements. Another is his chronology of the Neo-Kantian movement itself. Otto Liebmann, whose book *Kant und die Epigonen* of 1865 was long treated as the beginning of the movement, is here shown actually to have come in at the conclusion of the formulation of the Neo-Kantian programmata.

Included among the many topics dealt with in this work are the reception and role of Schopenhauer's pessimism, the course and significance of the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate, the outcome and consequence of the first German congress of philosophy, and the interrelationship between philosophy and the great political events of the time — the failed 1848 revolution and Bismarck's ascendancy.

The 'positivism' mentioned in the book's subtitle refers to the 'scientific materialism' widespread in Germany during the mid-nineteenth century. The most important Neo-Kantian treatment of materialism was Friedrich Albert Lange's *History of Materialism*, which first appeared in 1866. Köhnke gives this assessment of that book: 'The object of Lange's critique of materialism is thus solely to rescue the ethical picture of the world from the mechanistic-determinist and to repulse *weltanschaulich* claims to universality regardless of who formulates them' (166). Köhnke is clearly sympathetic to this undertaking.

Köhnke's *Rise of Neo-Kantianism* is a storehouse of historical research. This does not come through, however, in this English version. The translation includes no notes: no sources for the quotations and none of the other back matter. The German edition contains roughly a hundred pages of detailed endnotes as well as a further hundred pages giving bibliographies with primary and secondary sources and tables listing, among other things, all the courses taught on Kant, by whom, when, and where, from 1862 to 1890. The decision to eliminate all of this research from the English version of the book was no doubt motivated by questions of cost. Of course, interested readers can always obtain the German version to check the source of quotations, and the tables and bibliographies do not need translating. However, the reader and author would have been better served if some indication had been made about these omissions.

Köhnke's *Rise of Neo-Kantianism* fills an important gap in the historiography of German philosophy, and is clearly an enduring contribution to the field. It also offers a stimulating methodological model for historical research.

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S.A. Lloyd

*Ideals as Interests in Hobbes's Leviathan:
The Power of Mind over Matter.*

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. xii + 396.

US\$54.95. ISBN 0-521-39243-8.

Lloyd wants to present a radical new interpretation of Hobbes' political philosophy, as can be seen from the subtitle of the book. His point is that Hobbes is neither a scientist nor a materialist but a political reformist and religious believer. Lloyd supports his overall thesis by his reading of *Leviathan* and *Behemoth*. He concentrates on parts 3 and 4 of the former book because, as he thinks, parts 1 and 2 are designed to support the religious climax; otherwise they are not interesting. The credo of the book is, 'our primary moral duty is to obey our existing sovereign in all of his commands not repugnant to our duty to God' (e.g., p. 266).

Lloyd rejects the view that social peace could be achieved by means of coercive power wielded by a central authority. His argument for this thesis seems to be both interesting and correct. He claims that Hobbes must have seen that if coercive threats are directed against citizens they may take them to be just another sort of violence against their interests and therefore react in an anti-social manner. The sovereign looks like another violent agent in the state of nature. The only way out is to educate the citizens so that they recognize legal threats as what they are, something which morally should not be resisted.

The next radical departure from the standard interpretation, according to the author himself, is this. People have transcendent ideals and interests which influence their behavior independently of their egoistic and prudent desires. Therefore, the focus of legal control should be towards the field of religion rather than economics. The real trouble which threatens to throw us back to the state of nature is *not* our selfish psychology or social competition but religious sects. They divide society into warring factions. The main historical evidence is presented in *Behemoth*. The situation can be controlled only by means of sovereign power over religious life. This is to say that the sovereign determines what doctrines and rituals are allowed in the commonwealth. Lloyd believes that Hobbes was right in his own time, but also that the present time is different. Lloyd also emphasizes Hobbes' genuine religious motives here. He was nothing like an atheist.

Lloyd tells us that Hobbes recognized the human tendency to sacrifice anything, even one's life, because of religious interests. In this sense they are transcendent interests, they are grounded on something that cannot be found in the empirically given world. The problem which this fact creates is that a Hobbesian agent is supposed to be afraid of death which is, accordingly, the supreme motive. People do anything to avoid death. However, since transcendent motives are immune even to this ultimate fear, they cannot be controlled by means of it. The only possibility is to educate people so that they surrender

their religious interests to their sovereign. This guarantees peace, according to Lloyd.

The difficulty which one has when one tries to understand such an interpretation of Hobbes is that if the transcendent interests are very important to individuals, so that they are willing to sacrifice everything, it may seem unlikely that the same people would be willing to let the sovereign decide on religion on their behalf. The only argument the sovereign can use in this context is to appeal to the prevention of rebellion and civil war. But the citizens could not care less simply because their dominant interests are transcendent. The key must be education, especially university education, as Lloyd emphasizes. People are initially educated to believe that religion is not a private matter, nor a matter to be decided by their church, but something which belongs to the field of sovereign power and authority. Only then is this crucial aspect of social unrest controllable.

This may well be so but, nevertheless, it seems to me that it is indeed misleading to claim that Hobbes' religious ideas are sincere and also that transcendent interests should depend on the sovereign. The sovereign is authorized and thus created by the people. This fact makes people also the creators of religion; the contradiction between prudence and social harmony on the one hand and religious transcendence on the other is obvious. One might argue against Lloyd that if religion is taken seriously it cannot be controlled by the sovereign because in that case religion is not taken seriously. The crucial test case must be the introduction of an atheist or a non-Christian ruler, or a ruler that changes the key doctrines too often. But Lloyd does not pay much attention to such a situation. On the contrary, Lloyd argues also that any political disobedience should be seen as sanctioned on religious grounds. It is the citizen's religious duty to obey the laws.

This book is well-written; it is clear and readable. Its point is exciting and challenging. Yet I have several reservations. Lloyd contrasts his view to what he calls the standard philosophical interpretation which emphasizes egoism and power. But this man of straw looks weak mainly because Lloyd emphasizes *Leviathan* and neglects all other philosophical material. And he pays minimal or no attention at all to *De Corpore* and other material on natural science and its method. It seems that the standard view, as presented by Lloyd, may be old-fashioned, but the same cannot be said of those views that see Hobbes as a natural scientist whose psychology is based on the theory of motion and endeavor. The picture of Hobbes looks unfair. It may well be that in *Leviathan* and later in *Behemoth* Hobbes emphasized religion as a source of social trouble, but this is just one feature of his philosophy and its development. One cannot read *Leviathan* as a definitive summary of all of Hobbes' thought, like Lloyd tries to do. The title of his book is accurate but its generalizations are less so.

Perhaps the most severe criticism I have to present against this book is that it does not offer a detailed and informative interpretation of the religious material in *Leviathan*. It is paradoxical to claim that religion is a key to Hobbes' person and theory and then leave the matter without touching the actual texts. The reader expects an accessible guide through the religious

jungle which is the second half of *Leviathan*. Lloyd has written an interesting but at the same time a misleading work. The reason is that it deals with a fragment of Hobbes' theory and generalizes from it too quickly.

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**Dieter Misgeld and
Graeme Nicholson, eds.**
*Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education,
Poetry, and History*,
trans. Lawrence Schmidt and Monica Reuss.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1992. Pp. xxvi + 238.
US\$54.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0919-8);
US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0920-1).

This book presents translations of fourteen of Gadamer's essays and four interview texts organized under the topics 'The Philosopher in the University'; 'Hermeneutics, Poetry, and Modern Culture'; and 'Europe and the Humanities'. The essays span the years from 1947 to 1988. Most of the interviews took place at the beginning of July, 1986 with some material added from an interview in November of 1985. The editors explain that the purpose of the interviews is 'to illustrate the relation of Hans-Georg Gadamer the *philosopher* to his and our times' (xix). The editors accomplish this goal not only by means of the interview texts, but also by the selection and careful organization of the essays.

Part 1, 'The Philosopher and the University', begins with an interview text, 'The German University and German Politics. The Case of Heidegger'. Gadamer discusses changes in the German universities, particularly the tremendous increase in the numbers of students. He notes how difficult it now is to develop the close student/faculty contact that was so important to his own education. Of particular interest is his recounting of receiving a copy of Heidegger's 1933 Rectoral Address with the dedication 'Mit deutschem Gruss' (the equivalent of 'Heil Hitler') (10). However, he also stresses that in 1933 no one could have foreseen 'subsequent events' (14).

The four essays in this part are 'On the Primordially of Science: A Rectoral Address' (1947), 'The University of Leipzig, 1490-1959: A Former Rector Commemorates the 550th Anniversary of its Founding' (1959), 'The University of Heidelberg and the Birth of Modern Science' (1987), and 'The

Idea of the University — Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow' (1986). These essays, which span forty years, show Gadamer's ongoing concern with the task of teaching. As educators consider how to structure universities and how to live the academic life of teachers and researchers, they must encounter the subject matter (*Sache selbst*) in an open manner and be continually aware that the process of education is one of self-formation and of structuring a 'humane culture' (21). He emphasizes the importance of maintaining universities as free spaces where 'something happens to us' and which remain 'one of the few precursors of the grand universe of humanity ... who must learn to create with one another new solidarities' (59).

Part 2, 'Hermeneutics, Poetry, and Modern Culture', begins and ends with interview texts. The opening interview text includes comments about the writing of *Wahrheit und Methode*, and offers the definition of hermeneutics as 'the skill to let things speak which come to us in a fixed, petrified form, that of the text' (65). Yet, he emphasizes that language is a barrier to this letting speak, particularly in the case of poetry and philosophy where translation is almost impossible. He agrees with what he identifies as Heidegger's deepest concern, 'to make visible the ambiguity inherent in authenticity' (66). The concluding interview reiterates this concern for humans to recognize their own inadequacies. He says, 'Think of *Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*. The consciousness which we have of what has happened in history is never adequate to the real effects which have reached us' (128).

The four essays in this part are 'Are the Poets Falling Silent?' (1970), 'The Verse and the Whole' (1978), 'Hölderlin and George' (1967-68), and 'Under the Shadow of Nihilism' (1988). These essays include interpretations of poems by Paul Celan (including 'Todtnauberg'), Johannes Bobrowski, Stefan George, Hölderlin, and Gottfried Benn. All poems are quoted in German and then translated into English. These essays are of particular interest for work in aesthetics. However, they also contribute to the overall purpose of the volume in that they again show that Gadamer's own life has led him to recognize the importance of addressing the ambiguity of human finitude and of finding ways of living with the withdrawal of God. He finds that poetry is especially suited to this task. 'Poetry is more than an ability or an art. It is learning how to submit to the measure [Mass] which gives freedom. It is the "Christ dancing"' (91).

Part 3, 'Europe and the Humanities', begins with the final interview text. This text clearly situates Gadamer as a person of his times and reveals a political side of Gadamer that is not evident in most of his writings. He comments on being a professor who was not a Nazi, recognizing that this placed him in an ambiguous position. His response to the situation was 'to never speak like a Nazi' (149). He believes that it is a political act to be a thinker and to awaken the exercise of thought in others. 'To understand someone else is to see the justice, the truth, of their position. And this is what transforms us ... a philosophy which teaches us to see the justification for the other's point of view and which thus makes us doubt our own' (152).

The six essays in this section are 'The Philosophy and the Religion of Judaism' (1961), 'Notes on Planning for the Future' (1965), 'The Limitations of the Expert' (1967), 'The Future of the European Humanities' (1983), 'Citizens of Two Worlds' (1983), and 'The Diversity of Europe: Inheritance and Future' (1985). These essays remind us of the diversity of the roots of our intellectual culture (163) and warn us not to conceal 'the communality of human reason, which rises above all facts of nature and history to the infinite conversation concerning human destiny, which we call philosophy' (164). The essays written in the 1960s are particularly pertinent, raising questions as to the extent to which we can create world order and the role of the expert in such order. Gadamer's recognition of the ambiguities of human finitude is again evident in these essays. He warns us against embracing any approach that leads us to shift responsibility from ourselves. 'We need to acknowledge as our responsibility all that which is entailed by our decisions. This is a responsibility which cannot be shifted to the expert's shoulders' (192).

The final essay concludes with a political consequence that also voices what emerges as a unifying emphasis in Gadamer's life and writing, 'We may perhaps survive as humanity if we would be able to learn that we may not simply exploit our means of power and effective possibilities, but must learn to stop and respect the other as an other, whether it is nature or the grown cultures of peoples and nations; and if we would be able to learn to experience the other and the others, as the other of our self, in order to participate with one another' (125-6).

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Jacques Rancière

The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation,

trans., with an intro. by Kristin Ross.

Stanford: University of Stanford Press 1991.

Pp. xxiii + 148.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-1874-1);

US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-1969-1).

In 1818, Joseph Jacotot had 'an intellectual adventure' (1): without knowing a word of Flemish, he 'taught' French to Flemish students by having them memorize a bilingual edition of Fénelon's *Télémaque*, then use the words of the book to express their thoughts and feelings about it. The result was a revelation: *explication*, the primary task of the learned master, is absolutely

unnecessary for learning. Jacotot made this the founding principle of his 'universal teaching,' proclaiming that one learns best what one must figure out — translate — for oneself; one teaches best what one does not know, hence cannot explicate. The teacher's function is to *emancipate* the student: to make him conscious within himself of the powers every human mind possesses. Rancière translates Jacotot's polemic into a language familiar to observers of the contemporary Parisian intellectual scene: eliminating *explication* precludes the establishment of the master-slave power relation characteristic not only of the classic pedagogical situation, but of social relations in general.

Rancière nonetheless explicates a great deal in these pages. He explains that all understanding entails translating, that is, saying what one thinks in the words of others. Communication is a process of translation and counter-translation: one gives one's immaterial thought material form in words; the listener counter-translates the message into thought, and tries to express his own thought in the language of the other, and so on, in 'a kind of perpetual improvisation' (64). All languages being arbitrary and material, the truth can never be completely known and said: it is felt and approximated 'poetically' in words, each of us recounting the 'story of our mind's adventures' (64), the 'orbit' of our immaterial intelligence around the truth (59). Reason, or intelligence, manifests itself through this careful attention to the text, this effort to understand the other and to express what one thinks through the act of *speaking*. All minds are equally capable of this effort; there is no stupidity, only laziness, distraction, inattention.

Total coincidence between two minds is neither possible nor desirable, for no two orbits are the same; reasonable beings are '*distant*' (58), that is, distinct individuals. The coincidence of two minds can only mean the annihilation of one; this is what occurs in traditional pedagogy, when one intelligence submits to the explication of the other. In letting itself be thus silenced, that is, in renouncing its distance or difference from the other, the reasonable being is subjecting itself to the 'laws of matter' (77), the gravitational pull of irrationality, which brings it plummeting downward into a state of aggregation.

Society, Rancière explains, is just this state of aggregation, in which individuals have abdicated their reason, to agglomerate into a stable, ordered mass. Order implies ranking, classification: society is by definition inequalitarian; upon joining it, equal, reasoning individuals become unequal, irrational citizens. Explication forms the 'bond of the social order' (117), serving to justify inequality and subjugate individuals into citizenship; like its other manifestation, political rhetoric, its goal is not to stimulate communication by inviting response, but rather to reduce the other to silence.

Thus Jacotot/Rancière rejects the republican vision of society as a rational egalitarian community of irrational, unequal beings. Even so, reasonable beings recognize 'the superiority of order over disorder' (91), and can and should submit to the irrationality and inequality of society without, however, adopting its justificatory explications. Moreover, the reasonable individual

must not withdraw into a condescending silence, but *participate* in society by learning to 'rave reasonably' (91) — to use rhetoric, 'the language of the assembly and the tribunal' (94) — better than the mad inegalitarians, seizing the occasion to speak to fellow citizens as equals, emancipating them by awakening them to their own intelligence. For if society is never reasonable, claims Rancière, 'it could experience the miracle of reasonable moments arising not in the coincidence of intelligences ... but in the reciprocal recognition of reasonable wills' (96).

Since a society, class, or group is never reasonable, only an individual can emancipate another individual. Universal teaching cannot be institutionalized. Hence Jacotot/Rancière's critique of the notion of Progress and the social programs it inspires: the progressivist is an inegalitarian in disguise, who euphemistically defines inferiority in temporal terms, as a lagging-behind; his program consists in helping the ignorant catch up to the educated. However, the gap will never be fully closed, for the continuation of progress depends upon the perpetuation of the inequality that founds it. The progressives' extension of education to the masses has served only to ratify and enforce inequality, through the multiplication of institutions designed to examine, compare, and rank.

As Kristin Ross explains in her introduction, the 1987 publication of *Le Maître ignorant* constituted a contribution to ongoing debates among French intellectuals and politicians regarding educational reform in France, as well as to more abstract philosophical discussions of epistemological questions. Albeit devoid of references to contemporary French society, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* was understood by initiated readers as a critique of the theories of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, late Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, and linguist Jean-Claude Milner. Thus even though its very presence should offend the author, Ross' introduction will be welcome to most readers. One might even wish it were more extensive, for the book resounds with echoes of numerous other recent critical controversies as well, in relation to which Rancière is positioning himself, sometimes with the perversity characteristic of Jacotot himself, e.g., Foucault's analysis of power; Derrida's textualism; Lyotard's celebration of pagan rhetorical ruses. Differences aside, Rancière shares with all the above the post-1968 French intellectual's distrust of groups and institutions, coupled with an emphasis on individual, local, and singular action, in the defense of heterogeneity and difference.

What interest might *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* hold for the English-speaking reader unschooled in French intellectual issues? Ross remarks only briefly on this, pointing out that in the aftermath of Reaganism and Thatcherism, it constitutes 'an extraordinary philosophical meditation on equality' (ix), and reminding us that the critique of Progress applies to every advanced 'enlightened' nation in its relations with 'backward' developing countries. One could, of course, seek to apply Rancière's lessons on a more local level, for instance reading them as a prescription for some of the ills of the American educational system, embroiled in controversies over the proper approach to educating increasing numbers of underprivileged, presumably underpre-

pared students. Indeed, the book often seems to propound theories much like those of today's 'enlightened' educators, which emphasize the notion of *empowerment*, conceived of as giving *voice* to the subaltern.

However, such a pedagogical application of Rancière would ignore his warning that emancipation, institutionalized, is just another form of subjugation. Jacotot/Rancière claims that all the proponents of universal teaching can do to promote it is exemplify its tenets, acting individually to emancipate other individuals by speaking to them as equals. But who might those proponents be, who will read *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*? Probably professors, who will explicate it to their students. No matter, reading it is an intellectual adventure.

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Jeremiah Reedy, trans.

The Platonic Doctrines of Albinus.

Introduction by Jackson P. Hershbelle.

Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press 1991. Pp. 79.

US\$20.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-933999-14-3);

US\$9.50 (paper: ISBN 0-933999-15-1).

This is the first published English translation of the *Didaskalikos* of Albinus since the version of Thomas Stanley in 1656. That makes it a potentially useful tool for the Greekless reader who wants to explore an important document in the history of middle Platonism. Unfortunately, Reedy apparently did not have available to him the important scholarly edition and commentary published by John Whittaker in 1990 in French in the Budé series. Whittaker's book will certainly now provide the starting-point for future work on Albinus, including future translations. Reedy in his translation relies heavily on the 1945 French translation of Pierre Louis. Whittaker in his edition prints a revised version of that translation by Louis along with the new text. It is a pity that Reedy was not able to make use of these.

Another unfortunate consequence of this bad timing is that Reedy relies totally on the apparatus of sources provided by Louis in the 1945 edition. These are almost totally limited to Plato's texts. Whittaker's *index auctorum*, however, identifies about 100 direct references to Aristotle in the text. This point is of some importance. A reader of Reedy's translation might well get the impression from his notes that the Platonism of Albinus is of a purer,

even if somewhat eccentric, strain than it in fact is. Albinus, evidently a 2nd century A.D. philosopher of some eminence, was steeped in Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines and distinctions and he employs these constantly in interpreting Plato. If one is aiming to understand the history of Platonism, this fact is essential to bear in mind. I think it would also have helped Reedy in translating Albinus to have had in mind the Aristotelian context that his author is often obviously using for his understanding of Plato.

I have been referring to Reedy's author as 'Albinus' in the tradition which Reedy follows. Alas, Whittaker in his edition has made a strong case that that tradition, which goes back only to the 19th century, is probably mistaken, and that the older tradition, based on the manuscripts, that the work is to be attributed to Alcinoos, is probably correct. This does not make all that much difference, because we do not know more about Alcinoos than about Albinus. But the putative misattribution of this work is certainly going to cause some confusion, especially for those who do not follow this area of scholarship closely.

Turning to the translation itself, I would characterize it as generally adequate, but not outstanding, neither in accuracy nor in felicity of expression. A few examples must suffice. An 'open mind [*eleutherion tei gnomēi*]' is not the correct contrast with 'pettiness [*micrologia*]' (21) as requisite for the aspiring philosopher. Reedy translates *praktikos* when used of a kind of life as 'active' (22) but also as 'practical' (23) and the *gnōsis* that is called *praktikē* 'ethics' (22). It is at least misleading to render *hothen oude epistēmas tauta ta mathēmata ephasen ho Platōn* as 'Hence Plato refused to grant to Mathematics the name of science' (35). The reference to Plato's demiurge in the *Timaeus* as 'God' (with a capital 'G') and as creator and his work as creation is at best a sort of over-translating. The translation of *isōs oukh oiou te ontos nou aneu psuchēs hupostēnai* as 'and the intelligent and intelligence cannot in all likelihood exist without the soul' (47) contains multiple errors: the force of *isos*, the otiose 'intelligent', and the absence of reference to the obvious source *Sophist* 249a4-7. The Stoic definition of time in the text as *diastēma tēs kinēseos tou kosmou* (48) is simply misidentified as being Plato's. 'Resilient' is not the antonym of 'resistant' as Reedy would have it in the translation of the description of types of bodies (54). Calling *to pathētikon* 'the faculty of suffering' (57) in contrast with the faculty *to logistikon* is clearly based on a misunderstanding of what these faculties do in Plato. The translation of *pathe* as 'emotions' makes pleasure and pain emotions (71), which is surely not the Platonic point.

Although an English translation of the *Didaskalikos* is to be welcomed at this time given the burgeoning interest in later Greek philosophy, I regret that I cannot recommend the present work with enthusiasm.

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Michael E. Rock

Ethics: To Live By, To Work By.

Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of

Canada 1991. Pp. xxviii + 205.

Cdn\$41.50. ISBN 0-03-922904-1.

This textbook is designed specifically for community college students. Michael Rock is a professor of organizational behaviour and business ethics at Seneca College, Toronto, Ontario. As well as being a human relations consultant for governments and such corporations as IBM and NCR, Rock has to his credit over 120 articles on human development. He has advanced degrees in theology and education, and has been trained in transactional analysis at the San Diego T.A. Institute and also in depth psychology at the C.G. Jung Institutes in Toronto and Zurich. Given Rock's background and experience, this should be an excellent text for a community college. In my opinion, it is not. This work has many faults but few virtues. After a brief overview of the structure of the book, I will list some of its virtues and then sample some of its faults.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part, *Living Ethically*, has one chapter on the good life and another on the ethics of relationships. The second part, *Working Ethically*, has a chapter on the importance of ethical conduct by business and a second on different conceptions of corporate social responsibility. The last part, *Performing Ethically*, consists of six chapters dealing with the following: employment equity, employee loyalty, health and safety, advertising, the environment, and international business. The book ends with a short conclusion. There is a helpful index, but no bibliography or list of recommended readings.

I found two typographical errors within the first eighteen pages: 'faciliate' for 'facilitate' (xiii), and 'settlnig-in' for 'settling-in' (xviii). The binding on my copy has cracked and pages are set to fall out. Hopefully, community college students will be kinder and gentler to this text than I was.

Among the virtues of this book is its use of timely material collected from newspapers. The *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* are the most frequently cited sources. Rock is good at finding bite-sized bits and short articles students will find relevant and interesting. Rock also provides students with numerous exercises and assignments at the end of each chapter. He highlights important ideas by emphasizing them in the running text or placing extracts, summaries or simply buzzwords in boxes. This highlighting, however, is often carried to extremes. Frequent variations in size, style, and emphasis in the type suggest Rock is interested in becoming a concrete poet. Much space is wasted. For example, half of page xxii is taken up by the words 'What will your decision be?' and an additional large question mark.

The faults of this book are many. The following illustrates typical faults both of proofreaders and of Rock (2):

At one company a particular manager [sic] that he was being overlooked for promotions and he never quite understood why. He was given "rational" reasons, but he knew inside himself that there was some other reason. The company never did tell him. It was only later in the week, in speaking with his boss, that this author was informed that while the manager in question was well liked and honest, he wasn't believable. The manager had not been able to project this quality of believability and trust. His superiors were *always suspect* [my emphasis] and, in the words of his boss, "He just doesn't quite have it."

A word is obviously left out in the first line. In the last sentence, Rock means to say that the *manager* was always suspect in the eyes of his superiors, not that his *superiors* were suspect.

Rock uses the ideas of important philosophers from time to time but oversimplifies or even misrepresents them. Several times he adapts and abridges material from one secondary source. The concepts of happiness of Epicurus, Nietzsche, and Aristotle are dealt with in less than a page. Epicurus is said to have regarded the fear of death as the most painful suffering of all 'because imaging death seems so final' (9). Yet Epicurus' claim was that many people fear death as painful or find the anticipation of death as painful, and many fear it as involving punishment by the gods for misdeeds. The thought that death is *final*, assuming this is what Rock means by 'imaging death seems so final', that we can have no sensation and thus no pain when dead, is a *means of overcoming* fear of death rather than a *cause of* that fear.

Rock's project of writing a textbook on business ethics tailored to the special needs of community college students is laudable. But in my opinion Rock has not executed his project with the care and precision it demands. Even though community college students may not be able to understand texts 'with a university orientation, emphasizing theories, systems, and complicated language' (vii), this seems no reason to subject them to sloppy thinking, careless writing, or oversimplified and/or distorted versions of philosophers' ideas.

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Sandra B. Rosenthal and

Patrick L. Bourgeois

Mead and Merleau-Ponty:

Toward a Common Vision.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1991. 231pp.

US\$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0780);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0790-X).

In *Mead and Merleau-Ponty*, Sandra B. Rosenthal and Patrick L. Bourgeois know their stuff and write convincingly. No obvious errors of interpretation are committed with respect to Maurice Merleau-Ponty or George Herbert Mead. My only reservation is a lack of reference to Merleau-Ponty scholarship.

While the comparison and contrast of two thinkers is often odious, the affinities of these two psychologist-philosophers have long been remarked. A nuanced discussion of the relationship between their doctrines has long been overdue. The book is highly recommended to students of Mead and Merleau-Ponty.

The present volume is the third in a series of monographs coauthored by Bourgeois and Rosenthal, the others being *Pragmatism and Phenomenology: A Philosophical Encounter* (1980) and *Thematic Studies in Phenomenology and Pragmatism* (1983). In the collaboration, Rosenthal is more the pragmatist, Bourgeois more the phenomenologist.

Rosenthal and Bourgeois' research is not the only project that seeks *reapproachment* between pragmatism and phenomenology. Rosenthal opposes her brand of pragmatism and her treatment of pragmatism's relationship to phenomenology to Mark Okrent's, as in his *Heidegger's Pragmatism: Understanding, Being, and the Critique of Metaphysics* (1988). ('Heidegger's pragmatism' amounts to little more than the quasi-pragmatic element in the existential analytic in *Being and Time*, specifically the doctrine of the priority of the ready at hand over the present at hand.)

In *Speculative Pragmatism*, Rosenthal defends the view that classical American pragmatism, which incorporates the thought of Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, C.I. Lewis, and G.H. Mead, represents a unified perspective. Okrent's view is less robust; he draws the circle more narrowly, including as acceptably pragmatist only Rorty's 'good Dewey,' that is, Dewey when he reads like an anticipation of the Derrida of the 1960s.

In contrast to Okrent, the scholarship of Rosenthal/Bourgeois is a paragon of seriousness. They are content to tell the truth as far as they can recognize and convey it, and they do not sacrifice veracity to the desire to be congenial or rhetorically effective. They compare and contrast the opinions of Merleau-Ponty and Mead on many topics, including perception, the dichotomy of subject and object, time, self, language, and freedom.

Their conclusion is that both the thinking of Mead and Merleau-Ponty have something to contribute to each other. Merleau-Ponty's opposition to

speculative philosophy is interpreted as a rejection more of philosophical interpretations of empirical science than of speculation as such, and Mead is thought to show Merleau-Pontians that a more worthwhile form of philosophical speculation is possible that grounds itself in concrete descriptions of the life-world.

Again, Merleau-Ponty is said to demonstrate to Meadeans that his kind of philosophical speculations is reasonable only if grounded in descriptions of the life-world, thereby demonstrating the centrality of the metaphysics of sociality to Mead's larger project. In other words, pragmatism must separate itself even more radically from scientism than it has done if it is to remain plausible in light of what the phenomenology of perception reveals about the relationship of science to our prescientific situation.

The conclusions of Rosenthal and Bourgeois differ markedly from those of Okrent's book. Okrent insists that Heidegger's pragmatism should have led him to recognize that no privileged ontological perspectives from which to determine the essence of being human exist, Rosenthal and Bourgeois see the phenomenology of perception and of the life-world as a privileged standpoint for the grounding of a pragmatist ontology.

In my view, Bourgeois and Rosenthal need much more to stress the dialectical aspect of Merleau-Ponty's thinking. In the phenomenology of perception is a dialectics that negates both empiricist and neo-Kantian speculation and leaves no ground for the validity of any philosophical speculation of any kind.

Bourgeois and Rosenthal, as well as Okrent, err if they think that phenomenology reveals enough of the operation of the means-end distinction at the pre-thetic level to ground pragmatist speculation, that is, a speculation that takes the means-ends distinction to be validly applicable in any and all ontological contexts. Even did the pre-objective level display the means-ends relationship in a nascent mode, it would provide at most a groundless ground. For the nascent means-end relationship to serve as a ground, it would have to ground the emergence of its own fully constituted mode, and in this manner ground itself, but nothing can stand firm solely in the anticipation of its own emergence.

Okrent is equally wrong in seeing in Heidegger's idea that today's technological society is the ultimate consequence of the metaphysical treatment of the task of philosophy as a vindication of pragmatism. Not only is pragmatism, as the only philosophy that places technology's means-end distinction at the center of speculation, the one philosophy true to the age; but the occurrence of the age itself, in which the means-end relationship becomes explicitly what it had always been implicitly, is, for Okrent, the fulfillment of a promise (of mechanico-organizational mastery) rather than, *pace* Heidegger, a curse (of having the essential openness of human being cast into the oblivion of technocratic systematicity).

Pragmatists must confront the paradox of technologism, that while it celebrates the dominance of the technological mode of comprehension, it cannot explain, in its own terms, why this end is desirable. For technological

thinking determines means for given ends, such that this determination is its only intrinsic end, but technological thinking, not having a basis for determining preference among ends, cannot validate its own end. And pragmatism, under any account, passes for no more than its mistaken attempt to do so. At the risk of sounding cavalier, let us say that the ultimate problem for Rosenthal and Bourgeois, and for Okrent, is the same: by seeing truth as a function of utility, pragmatism has the gravest difficulties in establishing its truth consistently, for it is unclear how the view that the true is the useful could be itself useful and hence true.

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Andrew B. Schoedinger ed.

Introduction to Metaphysics,

The Fundamental Questions.

Buffalo: Prometheus Books 1991. Pp. 469.

US\$21.95. ISBN 0-87975-622-5.

Norman Swartz

*Beyond Experience, Metaphysical Theories
and Philosophical Restraints.*

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1991.

Pp. xiii + 449.

Cdn\$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-2783-0);

Cdn\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-6832-4).

Schoedinger's anthology has five parts: Universals, Causation, Personal Identity, Free Will and Agency, Artificial Intelligence. Each part begins with pioneers and ends with contemporary authors. There are very brief introductions to the book and to each part.

There are a few misprints but not enough to distract one. Most of the articles are extremely helpful, e.g., Bambrough and Carnap on Universals, Collingwood and R. Taylor on Causation, Strawson on Persons; MacIntyre, Davidson and Goldman on Free Will and Agency. A few confuse more than they clarify, e.g., Pears on Universals and Danto on Free Will and Agency.

Here are the classic articles on some of the central metaphysical problems. Many of the later articles explicitly discuss arguments made in earlier ones so there is a beautiful dialectic here, something not present in all anthologies. This collection would make an excellent textbook in an introductory Meta-

physics course and far from competing with Swartz's book it complements it almost perfectly. One thing missing in Schoedinger is a chapter on space and time but there is an extended discussion of this in Swartz. All in all, Schoedinger's anthology is a fine representation of metaphysics throughout the ages.

Common to both Schoedinger and Swartz is the conviction that metaphysics is not incompatible with empirical science but goes beyond it and, in a sense, deeper than it. These two books will disabuse anyone of the notion that metaphysics is necessarily unclear. In fact, the metaphysics found here is what we call philosophical analysis, conceptual analysis and occasionally even linguistic analysis.

When I was younger, I was a logical positivist and would allow nobody to utter the M-word (metaphysics) in my presence. These books prove that metaphysical problems are genuine, inescapable and capable of resolution, even if only provisional resolution. But are scientific problems any different?

Swartz shows by example after example that in this respect, metaphysics is no worse off than any empirical science. He begins by characterizing metaphysics as an extension to scientific theorizing but whose theories are even more underdetermined by the empirical data than science. He argues convincingly that putting concepts under stress by imagining possible worlds can do much to clarify the concepts we have fashioned for the world we happen to inhabit. Again and again he shows us that our world and therefore our concepts could easily have been different and that many of our prephilosophical beliefs and concepts stand in need of critical examination.

Some of the problems he explores are Space and Time, Properties, Individuation, Identity-through-time and Persons. In every case, we see a mind steeped in the history and philosophy of science and in historical and contemporary philosophy. He shows that science and metaphysics have always had a symbiotic relationship and that they are necessarily interdependent. In effect, a scientist who claims not to have metaphysical assumptions is either very ignorant or a liar and a metaphysician who ignores the theories and findings of the empirical sciences will make little progress in philosophy.

Swartz rightly insists on the need for clarity and for each of us to think autonomously. As he says on p. 6, 'there are no authorities in philosophy. There are only gradations of plausibility.'

Swartz shows by detailed, historical examples that pure Empiricism, i.e., observation alone, could never have generated any of the interesting and fruitful scientific theories. He also shows by examples that rarely in science are there conclusive verifications or falsifications of these theories. What is absolutely indispensable to science and to philosophy is a creative imagination, a willingness to explore counterfactual, possible worlds and the realization that any of our current theories might be improved or even replaced.

This is a delightful book to read. It is full of honesty, modesty and a most refreshing untechnical style, even though the problems are sometimes very subtle. There is a little technical material, e.g., on pp. 160-1 on the curvature

of space and there is some symbolic logic throughout, but most of this book is readily accessible to any alert reader.

Swartz sheds a great deal of light on some of the most recalcitrant problems of metaphysics. If you wonder what makes for a successful theory, what is the real nature of space and time, what makes it possible to individuate physical objects, what are the conditions under which an object retains its identity through time and what makes each of us the same person from birth to death, you would be wise to read this book. Even if he leaves you hanging at times, he shows you the way to proceed and he convinces you that ultimately you have to rely on your own intuitions and research if you are ever to be satisfied with a metaphysical theory.

An example of Swartz's insight is his critique of the notion that each physical object has a substratum (Locke's 'I know not what') that accounts for our ability to individuate it and to identify it over time. Swartz shows that we know of no such substratum or substance and we need no such notion to account for individuation and identity. This critique of an alleged material substratum in physical objects parallels his critique of the notion that each of us has an immaterial soul which somehow makes us who we are, enables others to tell us apart from other persons and accounts for our continuing identity.

Swartz not only criticizes effectively but he has many theories of his own to try to solve these problems. He wisely chooses negative (sparse) theories over positive theories and always defends his choices against alternatives. Most of the time I found him to be extremely plausible but his alleged examples of a physical object being in two places at once or at two times at once seem to me to utterly trivialize his claims. What would be interesting is genuine time travel or genuinely being in two different places at once — but I suspect that each of these is not just physically impossible but logically impossible.

Another (rare) place where Swartz's discussion loses credibility is his alleged possible world (see pp. 118 ff.) where we would call something a pain that was literally outside of our body. While it is fun and often enlightening to envisage possible worlds, surely the experience of pain, the having a pain, is always in one's brain. In the actual world, pains are private because they are brain states. If Swartz is trying to show only that they might not have been brain states, he would be right. But so long as pains are experiences and not objects of perception, they cannot sensibly be said to be shared (unless by Siamese twins sharing a brain) or public. Pains could not literally be out of the body and at the same time experiences. If we imagine a world where pains are analogous to colours, of course, this is not necessarily true.

One final protest. Swartz underestimates the power of evolutionary arguments. On p. 185 in footnote 23 he argues that even if 'the coincidence of our visual and tactile senses ... can be explained as a product of evolution ... to argue in that fashion would be to miss the point ... there must antecedently be correlative features in objects which can be accessed by different sensory modes. It is the very existence of such correlative features, even before

evolution comes into play, that is the source of the marvel of this particular world.'

I do not share Swartz's marvel here. Perhaps I am a lost cause, metaphysically speaking. Even though I realize that the world, including our sensory modes, might have been quite otherwise — that things 'ain't necessarily so' — surely what we want to understand is how we managed to survive thus far and how and why we perceive and categorize things the way we actually do. That the world is such that life was generated and that only those life forms survived which had the necessary perceptual goods seems to me to be explained by historical, biological, chemical and evolutionary theories. Yes, things might have been drastically different. But then so would we be very different, if we were to have evolved and then survived. So??

I have not even begun to do these two books justice. They are both eminently worth reading, especially if you have ever been tempted to dismiss metaphysics as meaningless gibberish or as a royal waste of time. Schoedinger's anthology shows us the road well travelled, so far. Swartz's book shows us how exciting and important philosophy can still be. In short, either of these two books, though especially Swartz's, will rekindle anyone's curiosity about how things are, how different they might have been and why this matters. Even more importantly, one is reminded of the fun of grappling with metaphysical monsters who haunt us all from time to time.

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Bart Schultz, ed.

Essays on Henry Sidgwick.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. 421.

US\$65.00. ISBN 0-521-39151-2.

As J.B. Schneewind notes in his Foreword to this volume, Sidgwick studies do not now appear very active, especially in comparison with studies of other British philosophers. There are major editions underway or planned of Mill, Locke, Hobbes, Hume, and Bentham, and a steady stream of books and articles on different aspects of their thought. But of Sidgwick's twelve books only *The Methods of Ethics* and *Outlines of the History of Ethics* are in print, and his essays and reviews have never been completely collected. Since C.D. Broad's fine chapter in *Five Types of Ethical Theory* (London 1930), the only

sustained commentary is Schneewind's *Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy* (Oxford 1977), and even journal articles are rare.

In part, this neglect reflects Sidgwick's merits as a philosopher. He states his positions so clearly, and is so sound on abstract questions in moral philosophy, that there is little room for controversy about his meaning. *The Methods of Ethics* will never suffer the fate of *The Nicomachean Ethics*: to have a succession of articles claim that its real view is whatever has just become fashionable in moral philosophy, so Aristotle really believes McDowell's theory of moral perception or Sen's theory of functioning-vectors. But the neglect also does Sidgwick a disservice. Some aspects of his thought do call for careful exegesis; see, for example, Schneewind's disentanglement of the 'dependency' and 'systematization' arguments. And our current approach ignores the larger context of *The Methods of Ethics*: its relationships to Sidgwick's other writings, to earlier and rival work in ethics, and to the intellectual and social life of its time.

Essays on Henry Sidgwick, composed half of previously published papers and half of papers from a conference on Sidgwick at the University of Chicago, attempts to remedy this situation. After a fine Introduction by editor Bart Schultz, it contains a core of standard philosophical contributions — by Russell Hardin, J.L. Mackie, David O. Brink, John Deigh, and Thomas Christiano — expounding passages in *The Methods of Ethics* or debating ideas it suggests. But there are also papers on Sidgwick's place in the history of (especially British) ethics, by Marcus G. Singer, Schneewind, and Alan Donagan; on Sidgwick as a historian of British ethics, by William K. Frankena, and of Greek ethics, by T.H. Irwin and Nicholas P. White; on the relationship between Sidgwick's political writings and currents in late nineteenth-century thought, by Stefan Collini; and on his relationship to the pragmatists William James and John Dewey, by James T. Kloppenberg. The result is not just new insight into *The Methods of Ethics*, but a more rounded sense of its context.

There are many fine papers in the volume, but the most exciting is Irwin's 'Eminent Victorians and Greek Ethics: Sidgwick, Green, and Aristotle,' which contrasts Sidgwick's interpretation of Aristotle's ethics with that of his perfectionist contemporary T.H. Green. The main philosophical disagreement between Sidgwick and Green is about whether the goods of different people can conflict. Sidgwick thinks they can, and presupposes this in his 'dualism of practical reason'. Green thinks they cannot; on a true, perfectionist, account of the good, each person's good consists in promoting a 'common good' that involves the good of others. In benefiting others, therefore, a person achieves rather than sacrifices his own interest. Irwin shows how this disagreement colours the two philosophers' interpretations of Aristotle. Green sees Aristotle's view as close to his own, and argues that for Aristotle the criterion of virtuous action is always promotion of the common good. (This requires some ingenious exegesis for apparently self-regarding virtues such as temperance.) Sidgwick, by contrast, thinks a perfectionist account of the good like Green's is too vague to identify morally right acts and therefore

cannot do so in Aristotle's ethics. Aristotle's accounts of the particular virtues do not derive from a prior account of *eudaimonia* or the good; instead, they merely summarize the 'ethico-aesthetic sentiment' of his society, in which certain acts are found admirable without there being a deeper reason why they are admirable, and certainly not a reason concerned with their effects on others.

Through much of the paper Irwin sides with Green, both about the interpretation of Aristotle and about ethical theory. Towards the end, however, he concedes that on the fundamental issue Sidgwick is right. On no plausible perfectionist view can a person's good consist entirely in promoting the good of others, and the other states that are good are ones for which conflict, especially over scarce resources, is possible. But Irwin does not state Sidgwick's argument in its strongest form. As (accurately) characterized by Irwin, Green's account of the good involves a vacuous circularity: each person's good consists entirely in promoting the good of others, which consists entirely in *their* promoting the good of others, which consists entirely in *their* promoting, etc. Unless there is something else that is good, there is nothing for all this promoting to aim at. This is Sidgwick's argument against the view that virtue, understood as pursuit of the good, can be the only intrinsic good, in *The Methods of Ethics*, p. 392. And his response to Green therefore takes the form of a dilemma: for the good to be entirely non-competitive it must consist entirely in virtue, but then the theory of the good is vacuous; for the theory of the good not to be vacuous it must contain goods other than virtue, for which conflict is possible.

It does not follow that Sidgwick's hedonistic theory of the good is the only option. Even if virtue cannot be the only intrinsic good it can be one intrinsic good among others, and its being so can make the good less competitive than on views like Sidgwick's. (This possibility was explored by G.E. Moore, Hastings Rashdall, and W.D. Ross.) Nonetheless, Irwin's paper is exemplary. It connects Sidgwick's ethics to his history of ethics, and relates him to Aristotle and Green. At the same time, it shows how, on yet another important topic, contemporary work in ethics must begin by examining Sidgwick's arguments.

Other papers in the volume also make a solid contribution. Among the new papers, Deigh gives a thorough defence of the 'internalist' reading of Sidgwick's views about the moral 'ought' against Brink's 'externalist' reading, and White uncovers an interesting tension between one of Sidgwick's main claims about Greek ethics — that it uses 'attractive' rather than 'imperative' notions — and Sidgwick's own meta-ethics. But where, after this volume, do Sidgwick studies stand? How far have they been advanced? Though *Essays on Henry Sidgwick* is a valuable contribution, much work remains to be done before Sidgwick studies reach the level of Mill studies or Aristotle studies. A few papers in the volume are only tangentially about Sidgwick, and not all the authors have editor Schultz's deep sense of the overall aims of Sidgwick's ethics. Obvious tasks are not undertaken: only Mackie's paper, first published in 1976, examines the substantial changes

between successive editions of *The Methods of Ethics* to shed light on the development of Sidgwick's thought. Sidgwick scholarship is moving forward, but still has a long way to go.

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Mark Siderits

*Indian Philosophy of Language. Studies
in Selected Issues.*

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers

1991. Pp. viii + 196.

US\$79.00. ISBN 0-7923-1262-7.

A fact rarely appreciated by modern students of philosophy is that the studies of metaphysics and of language are two of the great contributions of Classical India to the intellectual human legacy. By the sixth century BC, the Indian linguist Panini had written, or compiled, his *Aṣṭādhyāyīn*, an informal, generative grammar of the Sanskrit language; and, by the sixth century AD, the philosophers of the sub-continent had worked out positions on the principal metaphysical problems, easily recognizable by any student of European thought. It should not therefore, be surprising that Classical India might and does have much to say of interest concerning current issues in the philosophy of language.

Mark Siderits' book turns to some of the relevant insights and arguments in Classical Indian philosophy to address three problems which have played a prominent role in current analytical philosophy: namely, the problem of the source of sentential unity, the problem of how statements of identity are informative, and the problem of making sense of talk about non-existent things. The result is a welcomed contribution to a small but growing literature dedicated to bringing serious classical Indian philosophy to the philosophically serious.

A central problem in philosophy is the problem of the ontological status of a whole and its parts: is a whole distinct from or identical with its parts? Philosophers, Indian and European, have debated this issue vigorously insofar as physical objects such as, for example, chariots or ships, are concerned. Indian philosophers have carried the issue farther to address words and their phonetic parts (so-called phones). They have even taken the debate to the analysis of sentences and their lexical parts. It is this last debate which resonates with Frege's concern as to how the meaning of an entire

sentence arises from the meaning of its parts. This, then, comprises the second chapter of Siderits' book.

The second problem, which is addressed in the book's third chapter, is that of the informativeness of identity statements. This issue is also a legacy of Frege; though as Siderits observes, it seems to have made its first brief, if fleeting, appearance in Medieval Buddhist philosophy. In his third chapter, Siderits sets out the problem and shows how a rational reconstruction of the peculiarly Indian Buddhist theory of exclusion metaphysics (Sanskrit: *apoha*) provides a solution for this problem as presented, not only by the Medieval Buddhist philosophy, but also by Frege.

The theory of Indian exclusion metaphysics originated with Dignāga, the father of logic in India. Himself a metaphysical minimalist, this sixth century AD Buddhist philosopher rejected universals as unknowable, if not impossible. He sought to replace the role of universals in an account of inference and lexical meaning by the notion of the exclusion of what is other (*anya-apoha*: literally, other-exclusion). (See Richard Hayes *Dignāga on the interpretation of Signs* for further discussion.) This ersatz for universals, strongly criticized by philosophers of other philosophical persuasions, was elaborated and emended by some of Dignāga's Buddhist successors, including Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Ratnakīrti.

It is this doctrine, as elaborated and emended by the last three philosophers especially, that Siderits seeks to rationally reconstruct for deployment, not only with respect to the problem of the informativeness of identity statements, but also with respect to the problem of non-referring terms. It forms the subject-matter of the book's fourth and last chapter. This problem, of great interest to classical Indian philosophers, resonates with current debates over the semantics of fictional names and the semantics of constants and quantifiers in modal logics.

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Robert L. Simon

Fair Play: Sports, Values, and Society.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1991.

Pp. xi + 229.

US\$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-7973-3);

US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-7974-1).

Fair Play is a finely crafted, rigorous investigation of substantive and important issues arising within and from contemporary competitive sport. This revised edition of *Sport and Social Values* extends Simon's exploration of the moral and ethical dimensions of various philosophic, sociological, and cultural presuppositions we bring to our understanding of sport. The book is intended for and accessible to generally well-educated audiences from many disciplines. It should serve well as a text for sport philosophy/sociology courses, and as a resource for sport theory scholars.

The first chapter is a straightforward introduction to the philosophy of sport in which Simon presents some of the general philosophic and moral issues he develops more fully in subsequent chapters. Simon philosophizes within the Socratic model, in which we are to: 'examine our beliefs, clarify the principles on which they rest, and subject them to critical examination' (4). Simon himself draws careful logical distinctions, clearly conceptualizes relevant issues, and firmly presents the philosophic principles to which he appeals in investigating difficult questions.

In Chapter Two Simon begins to evaluate sports from 'the moral point of view' (14). He offers a provocative and helpful ideal of good competition as 'a mutually acceptable quest for excellence through challenge' (23). Because this ideal presupposes a cooperative effort by competitors to 'generate the best possible challenge for each other' (23), it precludes cheating (21) as well as 'competition' with self (24-7), while justifying the pursuit of victory as one representation of the human striving for excellence (32-5). This substantive position allows Simon to conclude that sports competition is 'a paradigm case of an activity in which the participants treat each other as equals' (32).

The next two chapters present Simon's developed positions on cheating and violence in sport, and the use of performance enhancers. These are complicated issues, and Simon's treatment is generally sensitive and illuminating, well grounded in the literature, and provocative of further consideration. His choice of primary examples is especially noteworthy: the 1990 Colorado fifth down football victory over Missouri; Louis Wade's fatal 1982 fight against Benji Davis; and Ben Johnson's positive stanozolol test at the 1988 Olympics. Simon's revisions to Chapter Three are quite successful and improve on the original. His distinction between the actual and the ideal in sport is well drawn and helpful, for 'unless we knew what ideals should apply in sports, how could we tell what reforms are needed in current practice' (70)?

Chapter Four is somewhat less successful. Simon's primary example of enhanced performance is Ben Johnson's positive stanozolol test at the 1988 Olympics. His discussion now includes much more extensive reference to

current literature on the problems of justifying drug proscriptions, and more fully developed discussions of paternalism, freedom, and the ethic of competition in sports. Simon's appropriately restricted conclusion is that neither proponents nor critics of current drug bans or testing protocols have established their positions: we are still confronted with a complex of unresolved issues. The one unsatisfying aspect of this chapter is an implicit philosophic dualism, which departs dramatically from Simon's earlier, more phenomenological focus on persons. To this point, Simon has argued persuasively that good competition involves persons striving after excellence through challenge. Now he is concerned that 'By making victory depend on qualities of bodies, the ability to efficiently utilize a drug, which have nothing to do with athletic ability or our status as persons, the use of performance enhancers moves sports in a direction that makes it less an expression of our personhood,' (88) and he raises the specter of robot athletes competing at levels of excellence far beyond human attainment. But since he has not demonstrated that drugs are different in kind from technological advances in shoes, golf clubs, or vaulting poles, Simon's conclusion outruns his premisses.

Simon uses Chapter Five to establish the general position that 'inequality of result, in sports or elsewhere, should not be equated a priori with unfairness or injustice' (120). Working within the Rawlsian tradition, Simon concludes that American sport policy should have two basic goals: to 'provide adequate opportunities for exercise for all its citizens,' and not 'to ignore the excellence and achievement of the unusually talented' (121).

Chapter Six extends this position to cover issues of sex equality in sport. Simon maintains that 'As persons, women are entitled to the same respect and concern as men in seeking excellence through the challenge of athletic competition' (125). The challenge is in working out the details entailed by this position. Simon starts with Title IX, considers assimilationist and pluralist theories, equal funding versus equitable funding, and finally equivalent funding. He admits that there are no unitarily acceptable answers, and suggests two conclusions: sex equality is not always equivalent to sex blindness, and equivalent opportunities are more justifiable than equal expenditures on men's and women's sport. Again, equality of opportunity must not be confused with equality of result.

Chapter Seven raises the question whether intercollegiate athletics belong on campus. Simon offers careful consideration of such challenges to college athletics as recognized corruption, disproportionate budgets, and athletes' academic success. Since the primary function of the university is to transmit and extend the realm of human knowledge, the justification of intercollegiate sport should be made in terms of its contributions to self knowledge, and its role as an arena in which the pursuit of excellence is demonstrated and reinforced.

Chapter Eight's reflections on sports and moral education is a suitable reprise for the themes of *Fair Play*. Sport is clearly a significant cultural form, in which moral values play a large role. By reinforcing values taught elsewhere, sport can 'promote and illustrate values that all committed to the

development of autonomy and reason in both public and private life have reason to support' (196). Simon's original book was a significant addition to the literature. *Fair Play* is a commendable and highly recommended successor.

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Tony Smith

The Role of Ethics in Social Theory.

Essays from a Habermasian Perspective.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1991. Pp. xiii + 256.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0652-0);

US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0653-9).

It is becoming increasingly obvious that Habermas is at least as important to social and political philosophy as Rawls. Some bemoan his convoluted style, and he makes too many references to German thinkers like Hegel, Weber, and Dilthey, whom our English-speaking Analytic philosophers instinctively know they don't have to know very much about. But Habermas is not a Marxist, not a Hegelian, and no friend of hermeneutical or postmodern obscurantism. He tries seriously to understand positions different from his, and he freely incorporates the work of philosophers familiar to an English-speaking readership, like Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Searle. He is a liberal social thinker whose work develops an approach to social theory significantly different from that of Rawls, and more and more English-speaking philosophers seem to agree that the results have to be taken seriously.

For those new to Habermas or Critical Theory there are a number of books that offer concise and useful introductions. Useful and necessary as these are, they remain disappointingly hermeneutical, interpreting the man's thoughts for us, sketching their historical context, elucidating his sometimes difficult arguments. But if one wants to see what a Habermasian perspective can do in social and political philosophy, there is little homegrown material to consider.

One such book is Smith's *The Role of Ethics in Social Theory*. The role of ethics in social theory is in fact little discussed in this book. Its contents are more accurately described by the subtitle, as social theory from a Habermasian perspective. Smith is convinced of the importance of what Habermas has to say on several main issues of social philosophy. He summarizes these

well, explaining and criticizing Habermas' arguments. But that is not chiefly what this book is about. Smith is a philosophical social thinker who can effectively use the discussion of Habermas to advance his own arguments, which he does on a number of issues at the interface of traditional social philosophy and the new discourse of 'applied ethics'.

Space does not allow me to go into detail about the several arguments in this book, though they merit a detailed discussion, for there is much at stake and something to learn in most of them. The central feature of Habermas' social theory which Smith defends is a principle of universalizability that Habermas derives from what he calls a 'communicative ethic'. Smith provides a clear and accurate explanation of how the derivation is accomplished. He defends the Habermasian principle in general, and in several chapter-length studies shows its value by application to questions from social theory. These include a comparison of Habermas and G.A. Cohen on the truth about historical materialism, chapter-length studies of Kant and Rawls, and a provocative discussion of the research university in contemporary society. The Habermasian perspective allows Smith to enter the dreary field of 'business ethics' and say something worth reading, as he does in a good chapter on agriculture science and the family farm, and in two more on markets and entrepreneurial profit. In all, enough is said about Habermas's work, and it is combined with enough straight-ahead philosophical argumentation, to make a good text for a seminar on recent social philosophy.

The book has qualities that do not please me, though perhaps I'm idiosyncratic. In an unnecessary and unsuccessful effort to unify a number of independently published papers, Smith begins with a chapter of architectonic, dividing social theory into three times three nicely deduced categories. What metaphilosophy Smith has is a banal neo-Thomist conception of philosophy, which he mechanically applies to each a priori division of the social field, to prove philosophy's indispensable foundational role in social theory. This is unnecessary, because the Habermasian principle of universalizability and the interest Smith creates in seeing it applied in cases, *used* to think philosophically, provides unity enough for the eleven chapters. It is also unsuccessful, at least for me. How does Smith know the truth about 'philosophy'? what it most authentically or properly is? He implies that he knows this, that it is a hard-hitting Parmenidean *logos* which 'makes the implicit explicit ... Philosophy brings to light what would otherwise remain hidden and ... simply presupposed' (7-8). This is, of course, a Platonic picture. We are cave-dwellers who take shadows for reality, until a philosophical hero, imbued with lessons learned in the realm of True Being, enlightens us about our hidden categorical, epistemological, normative, etc. 'presuppositions'. But who says anything is hidden? Hidden in a way that only Philosophy (and not, say, journalism) can find? Smith seems unfazed by doubts of the kind Richard Rorty inspires about the competence of philosophers to tell the rest of inquiry what is really known or how known it is. On this point if no other he could perhaps profit from Kai Nielsen's attempt to take Rorty and Habermas equally seriously (*After the Demise of the Tradition: Rorty, Critical Theory,*

and the Fate of Philosophy [Westview 1991]). The result is a very different understanding of the place of philosophy (and ethics) in social theory.

Happily, one can forget this first chapter, skim the occasional later reference to it, and still find many interesting arguments cogently presented on a broad range of important questions for social theory. These mostly take some proposition from Habermas as a point of departure. In a typical chapter, Smith introduces an issue, explains Habermas's position, discusses some of the criticism it has (or sometimes has not) received, and concludes with a plausible and well-argued position Smith favors. For Smith, 'the task of institutionalizing discourse' — his infelicitous shorthand for the effort to make Habermas's principle of uncoerced and universalizable discourse the first principle of public institutions — 'is the most profound practical challenge facing humanity today'. But he also thinks 'that Habermas's own working out of the implications of this perspective is inadequate' (161). Smith makes several detailed and convincing critical observations about Habermas's results; for example, he argues against Habermas's view that there is a 'structural tendency' to legitimation crises in late capitalism (189). Yet Smith's position remains broadly Habermasian by its commitment to the universalizability principle as Habermas derives it in his communication ethics as the first principle of social justice.

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Leon E. Trackman

Reasoning with the Charter.

Toronto: Butterworths 1991. Pp. viii + 219.

Cdn\$55.00. ISBN 0-409-80896-2.

In criticizing the Canadian courts' exercise of power under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Leon Trackman reiterates many familiar criticism of liberal individualism. He attempts to show how the ideas of thinkers like Rawls, Nozick, Hobbes and Austin are reflected in the attitudes of judges in Charter cases and he criticizes judges for embracing the failures of liberalism: failing to understand the importance of community, having an emaciated conception of the individual, and both disingenuously and incorrectly describing themselves as neutral and objective. He draws from a number of different philosophical movements including feminism and post-modernism but his most pervasive debt is to the communitarian critics of liberal individualism.

He argues that negative rights, universalism, and the public/private dichotomy are constructs that help those who are already empowered. He is in favour of positive and collective rights and he relates these conceptions of rights to an image of a dynamic community committed to defining itself through unalienated social discourse. He argues that a full concept of democracy must consist of more than the right to vote, a full concept of a right to freedom of expression must consist of more than state protection of any form of speech however harmful, a full right to equality must consist of more than a right to be treated the same as everyone else, and that an enlightened interpretation of the Charter must deal with the problems that constitutional litigation raises with a full understanding of the social context of those problems and the social ramifications of constitutional decisions. Since judges necessarily draw on their own views about the relative worth of various claims when they make decisions about the practical meaning of the abstract language of the Charter, they ought to do so openly. Issues surrounding the social justifications of competing interpretations of rights should be the focus of discussion in and by the courts.

Thus, Trackman endorses the staples of a progressive understanding of constitutional rights. He is passionately committed to a vision of Charter interpretation that goes beyond the limits of individualism and formalism. Given that he is on the side of the angels, it is unfortunate that he allows himself to write in a manner that is sometimes undisciplined, disorganized, repetitious and indulgent in imprecise rhetoric.

His use of metaphor is often confusing. For example, he writes: 'Reproductive rights are not immaculately sown in legislative fields. Nor can judges reap those fields all by themselves. However, they can no more dispel the effect of social attitudes upon their construction of rights than birds can fly without wings' (181), and: 'It [to endorse affirmative liberty] embraces more than the air we breathe and water we drink, and more than the status of the disadvantaged' (36), or: 'Judges who insist that constitutional law, like breakfast porridge, be prepared only by legislative chefs, forget that the scientific link between a hierarchy of constitutional principles and human rights is illusive at best' (184), or: 'Each [liberation of private life from the state and liberation of the state from dominant private groups] is falsely conceived through the static pie of opposing social forces' (52).

Paragraph after paragraph begins with a descriptive sentence in which either 'courts' or 'judges' are the subject, and is then fleshed out with a string of sentences giving further description of what 'they' do or should do. The frequent repetition of this same formula makes the rhythm of the text tedious. Further, it is somewhat unsettling that Trackman, on a number of occasions, uses the words 'anglophile' and 'francophile' where (I assume) he means 'anglophone' and 'francophone' (vii, 44, 119, 172). His use of the feminine pronoun throughout the text is also jarring, particularly when 'she' is used in descriptions of theories that assume a male subject. This is most evident in his narration of the liberal individual. He writes: 'The individual, undoubtedly, is a soldier who needs to fight against intrusion. She is a maverick, entitled to

protect her own domain' (46). His use of the feminine pronoun to signify the judge also imports distortion (81). If one wants to understand the ways in which personal views about social justice are reflected in constitutional decisions of the Canadian courts we must be mindful of the fact that the court is overwhelmingly male.

Trackman speaks generically of 'judges' and 'courts', seeming usually to be referring to the Supreme Court of Canada but sometimes not specifying that he is drawing from decisions of lower courts (42, 43), the House of Lords, (12, 106) or the U.S. Supreme Court (104, 156). For example, American cases such as *Skokie v National Socialist Party of America* (21) and *University of California v Bakke* (36) are referred to in the discussions of free speech and affirmative action without further reference to the fact that these decisions come from very different legal and constitutional cultures. They are presented simply as further examples of the sorts of things 'courts' do.

Trackman's discussions and definitions of concepts like collective rights, communal rights, positive rights, affirmative liberty, plural rights and transformative public at times seem virtually interchangeable as do his discussions of negative rights, contingent rights, a priori rights, relational community, relational private, and correlative relations. Nevertheless, the book's vision of a constitutional court exercising its power under the Charter by engaging in inclusive discourse about the social justifications for competing interpretations of rights is admirable. Still, it is regrettable that the book was not written with more rigour and less rhetorical decoration.

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Thomas E. Uebel, ed.

*Rediscovering The Forgotten Vienna Circle:
Austrian Studies on Otto Neurath and the
Vienna Circle.*

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1991. Pp. xii + 326.

US\$99.00. ISBN 0-7923-1276-7.

The book's sub-title, *Austrian Studies on Otto Neurath and the Vienna Circle*, is more apt than its title, as the volume's purpose is to raise consciousness of and appreciation for Neurath as both a thinker and an important figure in the Vienna Circle. Virtually all of the 22 essays in this collection have

appeared before in German. While the last third of the book does not deal with philosophical matters, but with Neurath's views on various topics, such as adult education, planned economy, the use of pictorial devices to present data, etc., the first 15 essays, by Uebel (1), R. Haller (6), H. Rutte (4), E. Köhler (2), and F. Stadler (2), contain much information about The Circle and Neurath's role in it.

The essays argue, and provide factual information to support the claim, that Neurath was a major figure in The Vienna Circle — one of its 'poles' as Uebel says — and was a key figure in the 'The First Vienna Circle', a group Haller holds was formed by Neurath, Hans Hahn and Philipp Frank and which provided the foundation for the development of the *later* Vienna Circle around Schlick. In addition to boosting Neurath's historical importance, as a founder and member of the Circle, several of the essays argue that Neurath was a forerunner (unrecognized until recently) of the new pragmatism associated with Quine, Goodman, Davidson and others on the contemporary 'analytic' scene. Supposedly this has been overlooked by historians. Yet, Russell's detailed examination of this aspect of Neurath's philosophy, in his 1940 *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, is only cited once in the book, and that only in connection with an offhand remark of Haller's that 'Neurath still is not as naive as Russell or we might think he is' While there does not appear to be anything especially novel about Neurath's instrumentalism, or his view that 'every sentence is theory laden', given the holistic-empiricism of the American Instrumentalists and of the British Absolute Idealists, it is dated quite early, from his 1907-12 reading of Duhem and the 'French conventionalists'. Moreover, given Russell's criticism and Quine's citations of Neurath, Neurath's instrumentalism has not been totally ignored. That aside, Haller's cautious approach and careful discussion make for good historical reading. In another article Haller takes Neurath's holistic-instrumentalism to involve the 'Neurath principle': 'there exist always two possibilities to effect agreement' between 'a sentence and the whole system' — *alter the sentence or alter the system*. This principle is the 'principle of the change of scientific theories' which fits with the 'basic motive of scientific research to unify and simplify'.

In 'The Philosopher Neurath', Rutte takes a more polemical tone in support of Neurath's anticipation of later criticisms (by Quine, Kuhn, Feyerabend) of 'the hidden weaknesses, the hidden metaphysics and absolutist claims of the new empiricism.' Neurath 'consequently arrived ... at a position of stunning radicalism and relevance.' Here one would expect Russell's criticisms to be answered, or at least mentioned, but they are not. One simply gets a litany of themes, 21 in all, and 7 further 'principles'. The former include '... there is no ... appeal beyond sentences from which we could pass judgement on the comparison of sentence and fact, and so on truth. Sentences can only be compared with sentences.' The latter include 'Meaning too must be reconstructed in behaviouristic terms' and 'Metaphysics as secularised theology is meaningless ...'

In a second essay, 'Ethics in the Vienna Circle', Rutte cites Kraft's remark that the emotive theory of ethics had been set out earlier by the Swedish philosopher Hågerström. This fact, well known among Swedish philosophers, deserves wider acknowledgement. Rutte detects a 'cliché of emotivism' that brings on 'confusion' that is purportedly dispelled by noting that 'Ayer only compared evaluations with interjections, but did not equate them It is sufficient for a true interjection to say simply "bah" in a particular situation, but the corresponding value judgement would have to go "Theft, bah"; not to distinguish this constitutes the source of the misunderstanding of emotivism.'

A further essay, 'On Neurath's Empiricism', finds Rutte trying to mediate between the absolutism of foundationalism and the familiar problems that beset coherence theories. Put as he does not quite put it, the foundational experiences may be epistemologically questioned but are psychologically compelling. In short, rock bottom is what is at the moment 'unmediated knowledge'. But this does not mean that 'we have no right to doubt this belief, or that this belief may not come into question; it may come into question because it implies indefinitely many expectations which at one time may not be fulfilled'. His resolution is no resolution: 'It is at this point that it becomes useful for my actions to ask the question "Shall I accept this and that observation sentence?", and to answer it.' His observation that we stop at what is, for the time, *psychologically indubitable*, but, nevertheless, *epistemologically questionable* is not an unfamiliar theme in the anti-holistic empiricism of Russell, as directed against Neurath in the *Inquiry*, and other 'empiricists'. In an essay on Neurath (coherence) vs. Schlick (correspondence) on *truth*, Rutte goes over some of the same ground and proposes 'the following definition of "truth" in Neurath's spirit. A content ... sentence is true if it is accepted ... is non-tautological and free from contradiction ... does not stand in contradiction to the other sentences of the ... system ... and ... conforms with ... test sentences of the system' This accepts the scrambling of questions about criteria for taking sentences as true with questions about the nature or ground of truth but leads Rutte to critically note that 'experience is forced upon us' and '... the relative stability of observation sentences ... is ... more than a historical-social fact.'

Not surprisingly the 'ship at sea' metaphor surfaces and in a way anchors and thematically connects the discussions. It is also not surprising to find Neurath's truth-is-coherence holism linked to his championing of social and economic democracy and his opposition to totalitarian absolutism. This recalls 'justifications' of Carnap's *reduction sentences*, and *implicit* definitions in general, as 'open' and in accord with the 'scientific spirit' of progressive 'inquiry', as opposed to 'closed' and 'limited' *explicit* definitions, as well as Dewey's attacks on classical logic and his advocacy of a 'logic of inquiry'. Foundationalism's seeking absolute reductions and analyses is seen to oppose a democratic, scientific outlook, while contextualism fits the 'open', ongoing nature of a democratic society and of science. Seeing epistemological foundationalism as an absolutism in philosophy that parallels political

absolutism may help provide a psychological portrait of Neurath, but it also recalls *ad hominem* attempts to discredit empiricism on Freudian grounds.

Stadler's two articles on the socio-political background in Vienna and the political and philosophical divisions in the Vienna Circle relate interesting facts about anti-semitism at the University, and its effect on the Circle and its members, and convey a sense of the atmosphere in Vienna, in the University, and in the Circle. His accounts, and those of others, can be usefully supplemented by a long letter (not in the book) that Gustav Bergmann wrote to Neurath, to fulfill a promise made as 'payment' for Neurath's aiding him on his journey to the U.S. in the Hitler era. Bergmann's recollections of the Circle present a philosophical perspective and a picture of Wittgenstein's influence and the roles of Schlick and Waismann quite distinct from the material presented in the book. The letter, published in German, will soon appear in English.

The book's principal merit lies in the wealth of interesting history it presents, rather than in the cogency of its arguments or the insightfulness of its philosophical analyses. It is well worth reading.

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F.C. White

On Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Kinderhook, NY: E.J. Brill 1992. Pp. xii + 184.
US\$54.50. ISBN 90-04-09543-8.

Schopenhauer's thought is of increasing interest to analytic and continental philosophers. This is in part because of his historical influence on such diverse thinkers as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, in part because of the counterpoise he serves against Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, in reinterpreting Kant's critical idealism as its self-proclaimed only legitimate heir, and in part because of the beauty of his system, a simply conceived but powerful metaphysical distinction surrounded by a marvelously eclectic learning, a tireless search for implications and confirmations of the central doctrine, sharp criticism and bitterly sardonic polemics, all conveyed by an elegant aphoristic German prose.

F.C. White's study of Schopenhauer's *Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* is a thoughtful provocative investigation that makes an excellent companion to the second (1847) edition of Schopenhauer's dis-

course. The *Fourfold Root* is in many ways a difficult work, but indispensable in understanding Schopenhauer's idealism. Schopenhauer distinguishes the world of appearance from Will or blind urging as thing-in-itself, and systematizes all knowledge under four heads, on the principle that every true judgment has a sufficient ground or reason, as the subjects of causal, logical, mathematical, or moral laws. White admires Schopenhauer's project, and explains why he finds the undertaking philosophically important, even if unsuccessful. But he reads Schopenhauer with a critical eye, prepared to engage his ideas at every point in terms of contemporary philosophical criteria. He weaves together exposition and evaluation, uncovering Schopenhauer's insights along with the philosophical difficulties and internal inconsistencies in his complex treatise. White finds Schopenhauer's claims about the knowability and unknowability of Will as *noumenon* mired in contradiction, the theory of concepts logically inconsistent, and other key propositions in Schopenhauer's account of the principle of sufficient reason so utterly at odds with what philosophers believe today, as to call into question their supposed *aprioricity* if not also their truth.

The core of White's commentary follows the structure of Schopenhauer's *Fourfold Root*. The central chapters are organized around the four classes of objects determined by the fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason — empirical objects, i.e., phenomena or representations; concepts; space and time; and individual wills. Interspersed with these are more detailed chapters on special problems about Schopenhauer's views about perception, concepts, reason, truth, and understanding. An introduction outlines Schopenhauer's metaphysics in the context of his later writings, especially the significance of the *Fourfold Root* in relation to *The World as Will and Representation* and the *Essay on the Freedom of the Will*. This is framed by an explanation of Schopenhauer's preliminary and final remarks about the work, and a concluding evaluative chapter in which White assesses Schopenhauer's ambitions, achievements, and unresolved difficulties. The two appendices take up issues White reserves for lengthier extraexegetical analysis, including Schopenhauer's ideas about individual subjects of willing, and the historical background of Schopenhauer's revisionary Kantian synthesis of rationalism and empiricism, his agreements and disagreements with Kant's critical philosophy.

If there is a flaw in White's book it may be the speed with which he moves through some of his criticisms. On the whole, he smoothly paces criticism with section-by-section explication of Schopenhauer's text. But in a few places one has the impression that his refutations even if correct are too compact, and that there are solutions to the problems he raises against Schopenhauer's conclusions which he leaves unexplored. This too may be unobjectionable, since White claims in his Preface that the work is to be 'philosophical rather than historical, introductory rather than definitive' (xi). He may wish to provoke rather than answer certain questions, inviting the reader to think through the possibilities of reconciling Schopenhauer's teachings and rescuing his theory from its dilemmas, without lapsing into further

inconsistency. White offers wise counsel when he observes (130): 'The trouble is that the more one attempts to make Schopenhauer's doctrines consistent, the less characteristically Schopenhauerian they become.' But even so it would be useful to see more of White's reasoning against obvious rejoinders to compare with his arguments for Schopenhauer's inconsistencies. He identifies this kind of tension in Schopenhauer's theory of concepts, when he maintains that (59): '... Schopenhauer subscribes to conflicting doctrines. He holds that concepts are individual objects, different sets belonging to different persons and lodged in different brains. At the same time he holds that concepts are universals: spaceless, timeless objects instantiated in particulars, and jointly apprehended by communicators and scientists.' But whether this is a deep difficulty for Schopenhauer depends on whether his philosophy can be made to support a distinction White never considers, in modern parlance, between *concept tokens* and *types*. Schopenhauer's remarks about concepts as particulars are fully compatible with his remarks about concepts as universals, if concept particulars are understood as tokens of universal types. The same concept can no more be both token and type than it can be both particular and universal. But if the distinction is permitted, Schopenhauer's equivocal references to concepts can charitably be disambiguated to avoid contradiction as tokens in some contexts and types in others. Later, White argues that Schopenhauer's concepts can be neither particulars nor universals (87-8). But his criticism rests on the assumption that the only way to avoid inconsistency in Schopenhauer's account of concepts as abstracted private particulars is to interpret them as capacities, general in application but existing as mental brain particulars. Yet the assumption is unnecessary if the type-token distinction is invoked on Schopenhauer's behalf. If this straightforward way of escaping inconsistency is unavailable to Schopenhauer, it would be interesting in White's discussion to know why.

White's book is a valuable introduction to Schopenhauer's philosophy, and to the wide range of philosophical issues with which he was preoccupied. Schopenhauer's reflections on the principle of sufficient reason deserve to be more widely read, for historical and philosophical enlightenment. With White's introduction, new readers may now have the compass to navigate its previously uncharted waters.

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Richard Wolin, ed.

The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader.

New York: Columbia University Press 1991.

Pp. viii + 315.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-231-07596-0.

From Wolin's Preface (viii): 'The present compilation of texts is partly intended as a complement to my earlier study of Heidegger's political thinking, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger*. And thus, one of the volume's primary goals is to serve as a type of sourcebook and guide to the many fascinating interpretive questions that have arisen around the theme of "Heidegger and National Socialism." To this end, I have sought to present a number of key texts by Heidegger himself, as well as seminal documents and commentaries that situate Heidegger's political involvement both historically and in the context of contemporary scholarly debates.' Wolin's choice of texts is outstanding, and the book could not have achieved its goal more effectively. Many of the texts were previously untranslated, and for all but two of those that had been translated previously ('Overcoming Metaphysics' and 'Only a God Can Save Us'), excellent new translations, with explanatory notes, are provided. The selected pieces detail the extent of Heidegger's involvement to a telling degree, and while this achievement is perhaps unnecessary for Heidegger scholars (especially those familiar with Hugo Ott's research into Heidegger's connections with National Socialism during his Freiburg rectorship, research which Ott began to publish only in 1984), it is a refreshingly honest alternative to Victor Farias' heavy-handed *Heidegger et le nazisme* (1987), which (largely by virtue of its inclusion of the recently published findings of Ott) most recently revived 'the case of Heidegger'. More importantly, however, and certainly more unusually, many of the texts that Wolin has collected here raise intriguing questions of interpretation and evaluation arising from this involvement and take us far beyond the typical Monty Pythonesque 'Yes he was' 'No he wasn't' sort of discussion that this issue has tended to provoke. (Even the substantial contributions of the two outstanding French Heideggerians, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jacques Derrida — who attempt to rescue Heidegger from the charge of die-hard allegiance to the Führer and his cause by means of what Wolin refers to, in his concluding contribution to this collection, as 'a brilliant piece of hermeneutical chicanery' [259] — must be viewed as belonging to the latter sort of discussion.) Following Wolin's Introduction, "Over the Line": Reflections on Heidegger and National Socialism', in which he outlines both the basic problem of Heidegger's Nazism and the related, more philosophically profound problems of the 'surfeit of subjectivity' (7) characterizing modern philosophy *qua* epistemology and the currently debated possibility of an immanent critique of modernity, the sixteen texts are presented in three Parts.

Part I, 'Texts by Martin Heidegger', includes: 'The Self-Assertion of the German University' (the notorious rectorship address of 1933); 'Political

Texts, 1933-1934' (including Heidegger's relatively little-known eulogy for Albert Leo Schlageter, 'a young German hero who a decade ago died the most difficult and the greatest death of all' [Wolin's note (40): Schlageter, 'a former student at Freiburg University, was shot for acts of sabotage against the French occupation army in the Ruhr on May 26, 1923.']); 'Letter to the Rector of Freiburg University, November 4, 1945' (Heidegger's request that he be reinstated as a faculty member — the request was denied); 'Overcoming Metaphysics' (the curious 1936-1946 set of reflections that find Western Metaphysics to be responsible for the 'events of world history in this century'); and finally, "'Only a God Can Save Us": *Der Spiegel's* Interview with Martin Heidegger (1966)'.

Part II, 'Context and Testimony', includes: Ernst Jünger, 'Total Mobilization' (first published in 1930, this call for a society of workers to arise and prepare themselves technologically for the age of total warfare — and the next German war — greatly influenced Heidegger's political thought); Karl Löwith, 'My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome, 1936'; Karl Jaspers, 'Letter to the Freiburg University Denazification Commission, December 22, 1945'; and 'An Exchange of Letters' between Herbert Marcuse and Heidegger.

The seven pieces contained in Part III, 'Interpretations', are incisive and sometimes ruthless, dealing with issues that range from (initially) personal queries regarding the size of Heidegger's ego and the strength of his grip on reality to such 'fascinating interpretive questions' as the extent to which Heidegger's philosophical thought was consistent with — presaged, followed from, or perhaps even demanded — his political allegiance to National Socialism. Included here are: Karl Löwith, 'The Political Implications of Heidegger's Existentialism'; Jürgen Habermas, 'Martin Heidegger: On the Publication of the Lectures of 1935' (as Wolin recounts [187], this 1953 review essay, published by the then 24 year-old author, 'in essence set off the first German "Heidegger controversy," with Heidegger himself deigning to reply in a September 24, 1953 letter to *Die Zeit*'); Otto Pöggeler, 'Heidegger's Political Self-Understanding'; Ernst Tugendhat, 'Heidegger's Idea of Truth'; 'Philosophers' Hell: An Interview' with Jacques Derrida; 'Back to History: An Interview' with Pierre Bourdieu; and Richard Wolin, 'French Heidegger Wars'.

Wolin's selections make it clear that questions regarding Heidegger's reality grip and his ego trip extend far beyond 'initially personal' considerations to matters which call into question the theoretical framework of Heidegger's entire philosophical endeavour — both before and after 'the turn' — and which, moreover, thereby challenge the legitimacy of the program of postmodern thought to the extent that the latter's motivating concerns include anti-subjectivity, anti-humanism, anti-metaphysics, and anti-'will to will.' (Wolin's Introduction and concluding contribution, too comprehensive to summarize here, offer an instructive exploration of this challenge.) And the selections deal with still more than that: Concerning the relation between Heidegger's philosophical and political thought, Pöggeler, Löwith, Habermas, Marcuse, and Lacoue-Labarthe offer insightful remarks. Regarding the

need to understand Heidegger's thought in its appropriate historical context, Marcuse, Löwith and Bourdieu provide essential details and provocative reflections. And as Pöggeler sums up the situation for us, for someone who wanted so much to talk about reality, Heidegger appears to have had astonishingly little personal contact with it (243 n.21): 'After 1945 Heidegger spoke no public word about the extermination of the Jews and others. May one not therefore conclude that Heidegger's thinking remained unable to make connections with reality?' Perhaps the most troubling question concerns Heidegger's staunch refusal to acknowledge any responsibility whatsoever for his allegiance to the Nazi cause, which takes on special significance in light of the fact the Heidegger never once admitted that he had made anything other than a strategical error in his thinking. Wolin's book articulates this question explicitly, and the reader — especially the Heideggerian — is left with seriously soul-searching misgivings.

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PHILOSOPHER

L'avenir de la philosophie au collégial

Numéro 13, 1992

ISBN 2-9802484-28 ISSN 0827-1887

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Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie
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BAND 40

1991

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Fondée en 1894 par D. Mercier

Publiée par l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie de l'Université catholique de Louvain. Paraît quatre fois par an.

Directeur: Cl. TROISFONTAINES. **Comité de rédaction:** J. ÉTIENNE, G. FLORIVAL, J. LADRIÈRE, J. TAMINIAUX, Georges VAN RIET, F. VAN STEENBERGHEN.

Adresse de la rédaction: Collège Thomas More (SH3), Chemin d'Aristote 1, B-1348 LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE, Belgique.

Service des abonnements et administration: E. PEETERS, B.P. 41, B-3000 LOUVAIN, C.C.P. 000-0425099-45.

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\$11.00

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