

Canadian Philosophical Reviews Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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Announcement

From the Editor

I have been Editor of *Canadian Philosophical Reviews/Revue canadienne de comptes rendus en philosophie* since the foundation of the journal in 1981. I have enjoyed very much during that time working with a number of colleagues: Prof. J.N. Kaufmann, who for many years acted as francophone editor; Prof. Allen Carlson and Prof. Robert Burch, who edited the journal during two different years of my absence from the University of Alberta; Ms. Peggy Brackett, who for several years now has acted as editorial assistant; and of course the hundreds of scholars who have given of their time to write such excellent reviews. I have found the work immensely satisfying and rewarding. Nonetheless, it is the right time both for myself and for the journal that I move on, and someone else takes my place. I am delighted to be able to announce that, as from January 1993 and the beginning of the next volume, Volume 13 (1993), Prof. Wesley E. Cooper of the Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta will be taking over as Editor of *Canadian Philosophical Reviews/Revue canadienne de comptes rendus en philosophie*. May he enjoy the same support from the profession as I have enjoyed, and may the journal flourish under his leadership.

Roger A. Shiner

John P. Anton and Anthony Preus, eds.

Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy IV:

Aristotle's Ethics.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1991. Pp. vi + 284.

US \$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0654-7);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8739-5050-X).

Fourteen papers are brought together in this book, culled from a larger set of submissions to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy. Readers may be familiar with the three earlier volumes in the series, all published by SUNY Press. Of the four volumes, the first two cover a range of topics and thinkers, the third is devoted to Plato, and the present work deals entirely with Aristotle's practical philosophy.

Robert Bolton's paper 'Aristotle on the Objectivity of Ethics' leads off the collection with an attempt to characterize the method of inquiry in *NE* Book VII. That book, which examines weakness of will, contains a well known proposal to set out certain *phainomena*, or 'things said', concerning weak-willed people. The text is analyzed by Bolton in order to determine just how Aristotle actually treats common and noteworthy opinions, and to see what role, if any, scientific method plays in Aristotle's reasoning. One result of the analysis is a claim that Aristotle holds moral knowledge to be based on our ordinary experience of our acts, rather than on direct intuition or the findings of natural science (*phusikē*). Bolton does not undertake to tell us how such knowledge may be possible. However, he offers a detailed account of dialectic, and of Aristotle's use of *endoxa*, or reputable opinions. His paper is complemented in some respects by that of Lawrence Jost, who cautiously suggests that a study of Aristotelian method may support claims that the *Eudemian Ethics* is a later work than the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Two papers, 'The *Ergon* Inference' by Alfonso Gómez-Lobo, and 'The Role of the *Ergon* Argument in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*' by Deborah Achtenberg, look closely at *NE* I 7, 1098a7-18. Achtenberg's sympathetic interpretation of the passage makes much use of Aristotle's potentiality-actuality distinction, and builds a case for believing that the *ergon* inference is central to the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Gómez-Lobo offers a striking, but implausible, alternative reading of the same passage, intended to accommodate an alleged awareness on Aristotle's part that there is a fallacy in reasoning 'from fact to value'.

It is clear that Aristotle thinks people who best realize their proper function are happy or flourishing people. A question broached by various scholars in times past is whether he can properly be called an egoist, given his view that it is good to assign to oneself *eudaimonia*, the best, noblest, and most pleasant of all things. In 'Eth. Nic. 9.8: Beyond Egoism and Altruism?', Arthur Madigan writes that the author of the *Nicomachean Ethics* would have found the issue an unrewarding one. Madigan's argument may or may not support this claim, but he does spell out two important

reasons why Aristotle might find it difficult to pose and answer questions about the pursuit of self-interest. First, Aristotle's account of the self or agent is not very clear; and second, his conception of the noble (*kalon*) prevents any sharp distinction between one's own interests and those of other people. When reflecting on the problem we should notice that Aristotle does sometimes talk as if virtue is both necessary and sufficient for the 'best' and 'most pleasant' of lives. Indeed, in *NE* Bk. X he defines *eudaimonia* as activity in accordance with virtue. But it is also interesting in this connection to note a remark made by Ronna Burger in 'Ethical Reflection and Righteous Indignation: *Nemesis* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*'. Burger observes that if the virtuous man and only he were truly happy, and vice were its own punishment, there would be no place for the Aristotelian virtue of righteous indignation at the prosperity of the wicked.

Thomas Tuozzo, in 'Aristotelian Deliberation is Not of Ends' asks whether the ultimate ends that constitute a person's *eudaimonia* are justified by deliberative reasoning, in some other way, or not at all. He argues that for Aristotle, deliberation in the virtuous is an activity of practical wisdom (*phronēsis*), which always presupposes some goal. Deliberation and practical wisdom cannot themselves fix the highest ends of an individual. According to Tuozzo, the most general ends of all are grasped by the faculty of *nous*, which cognizes universals 'on the basis of our sense-perceptions and experience'. Although acquiring moral universals puts us into desiderative and affective states, 'there is nothing specifically moral or practical about the way *nous* extracts moral universals (among other moral ends) from experience'. In fact, on Tuozzo's reading it looks as if goodness is located entirely in an agent's ends, while practical wisdom concerns itself with ways of realizing them. But for Aristotle, in determining the sufficiency of an action to reach one's ends, *phronēsis* is determining its virtuousness, since virtues are special cases of sufficiency, vices being cases of deficiency or excess. Tuozzo's paper appears to overlook that point, a mistake also shared by another paper in the anthology, W.W. Fortenbaugh's essay on moral virtue and practical wisdom.

One example of how *phronēsis* settles on action in the mean is studied by Charles M. Young in 'Aristotle on Temperance'. The wider problem of finding a 'conceptual niche' for *phronēsis* is taken up by Deborah Modrak, who builds on her earlier work on Aristotle's theory of perception in one of the best essays in the book, 'Aristotle on Reason, Practical Reason, and Living Well'. It is helpful to read Modrak's paper in conjunction with 'Aristotle's Practical Particularism' by Robert B. Louden, which explores the idea that practical science is a science of particulars.

Aristotle's Ethics contains essays not mentioned above: by Joseph Owens on value and practical wisdom, by Anthony Preus on respect for persons, and by Fred D. Miller, Jr. on Aristotle and property rights. The book has extensive indexes and a thirteen page bibliography which is somewhat haphazard, but still useful. There are a number of typos and solecisms. On p. 35, l. 4, instead of 'charisterous', the word 'chariesterous' should appear. On p. 44 for 'I am

not sure I am being uncharitable' read 'I am not sure whether I am being uncharitable'. On p. 44, l. 26 for 'characterisitic' read 'characteristic'. On the bottom of p. 118, for 'prefernces' read 'preferences'. On p. 189, l. 30 for 'mitigate against' read 'militate against'. On p. 210, note 56, for 'Gauthier' read 'Gauthier'. On p. 234, l. 16 for 'assure', read 'assume'. On p. 240, l. 8, for 'perperture' read 'perpetuity'.

Glen Koehn

University of Waterloo

Margaret Atherton

Berkeley's Revolution in Vision.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1990.

Pp. 249.

US \$29.95. ISBN 0-8014-2358-9.

This book is a study, and a reconsideration, of Berkeley's *New Theory of Vision* (*NTV*). Atherton begins with presentations of theories Berkeley contrasts and largely differs with, notably those of Descartes and Malebranche. Berkeley actually identifies the target of his opposition as so-called geometric theories of vision. As Atherton shows, these theories as reconstructible from Berkeley's writings don't quite fit either Descartes or Malebranche, but there is sufficient similarity to justify placing these philosophers' views in the background context for a proper understanding of prevailing theoretical assumptions Berkeley partly shares, and largely seeks to contest and displace. Atherton then offers an extended commentary on *NTV*, arguing that Berkeley has been widely misunderstood by other commentators; arguing also that his arguments, and the positions they yield, are a great deal more plausible than Berkeley's critics typically suppose. She concludes with a case that — again, contrary to a number of critics — *NTV* is wholly compatible with the later more famous works, themselves, she argues, rather less startling or at variance with common sense views than widely believed.

Atherton's book has many virtues, in respect of some of which it is an outstanding piece of work, a model of fine philosophical writing devoted to the careful and sensitive exposition of a philosopher's ideas. Her book also has defects, some almost as grave and limiting as its good features are exemplary.

First the good. Atherton writes generally very well, clearly, carefully, with a deft and thoughtful apprehension of the theories she discusses, those of Descartes and Malebranche as well as Berkeley. Malebranche's account of sensation is portrayed particularly attractively and plausibly. Neither Ber-

keley's arguments against it nor his own theory dislodge it. The 'geometric' operations Malebranche's theory requires the human organization to perform are quite similar to other intricate structures humans and other animals are known to implement. As well, if less plausibly, Malebranche shares with Berkeley a conception of the sensorium as the divinely-implanted guide to our survival, and our success, in nature.

Atherton is extremely effective in locating Berkeley's discussion of vision in a context of assumptions, problems, and priorities, only some of which later philosophers share. Specifically, she argues, persuasively, that Berkeley was more interested in providing an account of vision that would place it in the wider framework of sensation, showing how vision borrows from touch, how the latter is the foundational sense modality, and how all the sense modalities are radically autonomous of each other, than in coming to conclusions about mind-independent reality. For her Berkeley is more a psychologist than a metaphysician.

Atherton's case for a consistency between *NTV* and the *Principles* and *Dialogues* also seems quite convincing. She argues that *NTV* is agnostic with respect to mind-independence of objects of touch, not affirmative, Berkeley's focus here being on vision and the complete mind-dependency of *its* objects. She also tries to show that the fundamental spirit of all the works, particularly in relation to nature and our place in and knowledge of it, is uniform. There *do* seem at least stresses between the *New Theory* and the more obviously idealist texts. As his Latin work *De Motu* also indicates, Berkeley was willing that his reader see his work as within a fold of orthodoxy that only acquaintance with the full corpus shows it is not. Berkeley is an optimist, and something of a publicist. Let them see how skillfully I navigate in officially approved territory, and I'll lead them to embrace what they would otherwise view as wacky. In any case, Atherton does, I think, plausibly house the *New Theory* within the Berkeleyan corpus, speaking eloquently for its overall unity and coherence.

Now the bad in her book. Atherton is an insufficiently critical reader of Berkeley. One finishes the book without any sense that she thinks there is anything at all amiss with his theories or his arguments. This is sensitive sympathetic interpretation gone awry. The problem, I believe, is partly methodological. A good philosophical study of a philosopher's views should not be merely expository, and sympathetic. Seeing what the philosopher was driving at, what his or her concerns, priorities, and assumptions were, pointing out inadequacies in other commentators, is not enough. A good philosophical study of a philosopher's views should say something about the merits of those views themselves — and not just in their time, or in relation to predecessor and contemporary positions. Even if the philosopher, in affirming views that imply p and q and r , attaches far greater importance to p than to q or r , still, if *we* care more about q , or r , and the philosopher *is* committed to them (and knows that he is), and we think q and r are wholly wrong — in the case of some of Berkeley's views, even crazy — the commentator does no one a service by failing to say, quite unequivocally, that this is

the case. Atherton engages in very deft stick-handling to try to show that even much of Berkeley's idealism has content consonant with common sense — that, in this respect, he is more the philosopher of science than the metaphysician. Finally, it comes to seem like double-talk. She writes as though no one before her had identified phenomenalism and instrumentalism in Berkeley. Even so, they are both dubious views. And in any case, Berkeley also *has* views as to mind-independent reality, and as to the causes of our experiences, and *he* doesn't disguise them (at least in the later works); and they are (not to put too fine a point on it) quite daft.

Atherton overstates the extent to which Berkeley is (even in *NTV*) Plain Investigator, or Honest Inquirer, patiently seeking to know the truth about vision, and earnestly sifting through evidence, including the evidence of other people's theories, to find out. This conception sees Berkeley rather too much as Baconian inductive scientist, and insufficiently as Popperian bold conjecturer, and metaphysical ideologue. For example, Berkeley rejects geometric theories of vision partly because he is a nominalist, for whom mathematical entities, simply because they are unreal (with 'no real existence in nature, being only an hypothesis framed by the mathematicians' (*NTV* 14)), cannot be part of any correct theory of how nature works. Atherton doesn't see, or ignores, this metaphysical a priorism in Berkeley, preferring to argue that his whole case against lines and angles in distance perception is empirical. Someone who thought lines, angles, and points real would, it is fair to suppose, be more open to the theoretical possibilities of their playing a role in accounting for facets of visual experience than could be the case for someone with an a priori commitment to the idea that every theoretically respectable concept is a percept.

Much Berkeleyan argument seems to involve act/object (or process/product) collapse, or confusion. Atherton seems to operate with a cognate complexity herself, claiming (p. 95) that *what* we immediately and directly perceive or sense, is or can be a *way* of feeling or apprehending. Atherton seems genuinely in some confusion about this, repeatedly talking (pp. 95, 97, 98) about perceiving ways — once (p. 98) in her own voice — speaking of 'the fact that there are ways of seeing things, that take up a certain amount of space in the visual field and can be described as large or small' (i.e., the ways, not the things). (The problem recurs (p. 116) in the discussion of size, and *minima* (smallest perceivables).) Neither Berkeley nor Malebranche make any such error as this.

There is no escaping the fact that Berkeley, like Malebranche, adopts a variety of what we now call sense datum theory, according to which there are immediately sensed perceiver-dependent entities — of object ontic type (hence certainly not *ways*) — that are all we directly perceive when we perceive. Berkeley himself is completely explicit about this.

Berkeley thinks that distance perception is wholly tactile in character, distance ideas, derived from tactile experiences, then being correlated inductively with visual experiences, which then come to be assigned distance content as signs for those tactile contents. Likewise with size and shape. Even if size is really or fundamentally tangible, not visual, visual size providing

'cues' to tangible size, it seems untrue that 'the sizes things look to be provide perfectly appropriate cues to the sizes that can be felt' (p. 139), at least as a consistently reliable general fact about our sense perception and what we can confidently infer from it; so the difficulties Malebranche raised for vision seem to remain, and Berkeley doesn't vindicate the autonomous reliability of sight in information assembling about the world.

Berkeley's claim that situation, like distance and shape, is wholly tangible in origin, seems quite implausible. Can it be seriously doubted that someone could become aware of objects at some (modest) distance in the visual field being beside, below, and above each other, without eye movement of any perceptible or subjectively detectable kind — and, indeed, even for a subject totally paralyzed from birth? Berkeley simply affirms that all situational seeing is shorthand for or parasitic on touching, or imagined touching, but this seems — almost obviously, phenomenologically — mistaken. Atherton seems to suppose that visually discriminable structure, situatedness, must involve taking the elements of the structure to be representational of an exterior reality. But of course a perceiver could see blue above yellow without supposing they represented anything.

As for the alleged incommensurability of visual and tangible ideas of distance which is central to Berkeley's account of our perceptual estate, and which Atherton appears also to accept: it seems easy to imagine an extremely far-sighted person, for whom objects near at hand are an indistinguishable blur, and objects at some distance in very clear focus, undertaking to compute the distance from an object he or she is touching but unable to see to one he/she sees but is unable to touch. Of course there will be a Berkeleyan account of what is going on in such a case. But there should be induced, by its possibility, a tempering of Atherton's claim (p. 163) on Berkeley's behalf, of how absurd it would be 'that it be thought possible to compute a distance between something that we see and something else that is tangible or external.'

Berkeley's arguments against common sensibles, discussed in Atherton's Ch. 10, seem perhaps least plausible in the case of motion. Berkeley's claims notwithstanding, visual and tangible experiences of motion do involve a sensible apprehension of common directionality — you can see, as you might have felt by touch (you could do these concurrently), something's moving to the left, for example. The sensed *pace* of motion is also common to both kinds of sensing.

Atherton claims that Berkeley contrasts with Malebranche in that, while the latter held that vision is an imperfect and deceptive guide to the mind-independent world its content is caused by and indirectly represents, Berkeley held that vision is wholly adequate with respect to its content — since that content is quite meagre, and it doesn't represent anything. All we see, Berkeley holds, is light and colour, quite literally *nothing else*. (Our visual experiences happen to occur in conjunction with other sensory experiences, the regularity of the conjunctions affording us knowledge — not of the world, but of what we may reliably expect for future sensory experiences — and

permitting us to say, in a loose or elliptical or aggregative sense that we 'see' things additional to light and colour — even physical objects — even though we don't see them.) Berkeley secures veracity for vision by hobbling it. This is revolutionary? Even exciting (if false)? It is hard to believe so.

Peter Loftson

University of Saskatchewan

John Bender and David E. Wellbery, eds.

Chronotypes: The Construction of Time.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1991.

Pp. xi + 258.

US \$37.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-1910-1);

US \$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-1912-8).

The papers in this volume come from a conference held in 1988. Sponsored by the department of Comparative Literature, the Program in Modern Thought and Literature, and the Humanities Center at Stanford University in California, this conference sought both to be interdisciplinary and to seek 'new combinations,' although as the editors note the physical sciences were not and are not represented. Still one finds an interesting collection of perspectives in this volume, albeit a collection that is less unified I think than the editors present it as being in their introduction. The first question to consider, however, is what combinations, new or otherwise, may be found in the essays themselves.

Bastiaan C. van Frassen's and Cornelius Castoriadis' essays are grouped under the heading 'thinking time.' Jonathan Z. Smith and Jack Goody come under 'temporal frames of inquiry,' Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Dominick La Capra under 'time and the politics of criticism,' Thomas Luckman and Tamara K. Harever get 'the temporal order of social life,' and Johannes Fabian and David William Cohen finish things up with 'time, narrative, and cultural contact.' As might be expected some of these essays are more interesting than others, a few repeat what some of the better known (to me) of these authors have said at greater length elsewhere. And, of course, there are useful hypotheses, insights, and arguments that make the book worth mining, if only to see what others have been saying about time, which seems to have reappeared as something more than a fashionable topic for any number of disciplines, particularly where these disciplines have become attentive to questions of language and discourse as affecting both their contents and their procedures, especially that form of discourse we call

narrative. Thus van Frassen argues, to cite just one example, that 'the constitution of time in our construction of the real world is not different in essential character from the constitution of time by the reader in his construction of the narrated world as he reads a text' (24). Jack Goody, on the other hand, tries to show that narrative is not as wide-spread a form of discourse beyond European cultures as we may have presumed.

On the side of how time figures in the procedures of our disciplines, Cohen's essay on the use of what he calls 'time-past' and 'time-present' in anthropological writing is especially illuminating. By time-present he means those texts that run something like 'boys are initiated after the harvest has been gathered,' which refer to some unspecified now but to no specific boys and no specific harvest, as if these details might not make a difference from year to year. Placing such sentences in the past tense — 'boys were initiated...' — obviously is a way of distancing the society in question from that of the author, which goes unnamed, and even of indicating what has been lost (if one is nostalgic) or surpassed (if one is committed to a theory of progress). To me, this was the most striking of all the essays in this volume, if only because it made me aware that in fact I have read many such essays without being aware of the form of discourse being used or its possible implications. Beyond this recognition lies a broader, disturbing thought: students in this discipline are taught to write like this. They have to do so to win admission to the profession, yet until recently no one seems to have noticed what was going on or what significance it might have, either for the data being reported or how it was interpreted. Does my own discipline, philosophy, do something similar? Certainly, as the editor of a philosophy journal, I must admit that certain 'styles' don't seem to work, they don't survive the reviewing process, even though the judgment rendered is almost inevitably that it is the content, not the temporal implications, that is less than adequate. In a word, Cohen's essay has made me a different, if not a better, reader.

It is as a philosopher/reader that I now turn to the guiding theme of this volume, the construction of time, if only to protest that a bit more clarity about this notion would have been desirable. I mean that there is a distinction between examining constructions of time (in narrative, society, or a given discipline) and the assertion that time itself is a construct. Indeed, I do not see how the latter claim can be said to follow from the former work. One might conclude that we apparently never know anything more than time's chronotypes, that we are enmeshed, so to speak, in chronotypes, but even this assertion seems to involve an appeal to a notion of time beyond the chronotype(s) under investigation. This slippage between chronotypes of time and what they are 'of' occurs most noticeably in the editors' introduction where, having begun by saying that time is a genuinely transdisciplinary category, and hence a motive for research, they point to the idea of chronotypes as 'models or patterns through which time assumes practical or conceptual significance' (4). All is well and good to this point, chronotypes, their histories, and their interactions seem indeed to be worthy objects of inquiry, even those chronotypes that are part of the very process of inquiry in any given disci-

pline. However, the editors then immediately move on to claim that time 'is not given but ... fabricated in an ongoing process.' And a few pages later: 'Time ... is intrinsically manifold. Numerous chronotypes intertwine to make up the fabric of time' (15). How do we know this? All the problems of essentialism and reflexivity loom here that have tormented those who have tried to articulate what it means to be postmodern, especially when they have sought also to be post-metaphysical, where metaphysics is freighted with heavily Platonic concepts. The ancients were already well aware of the dilemma: studying time takes time, dare we say it depends on time. How are we to think this second, yet apparently first time? The notion of chronotypes is a useful one, as are the applications that have been made of this notion in this volume. I am not convinced, however, that it gets us beyond the paradox that time has us as much as we have it.

David Pellauer
DePaul University

Richard Bosley and Martin Tweedale, eds.
Aristotle and His Medieval Interpreters.
Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press 1991.
Pp. x + 259.
Cdn \$21.00. ISBN 0-919491-17-0.

This pleasing little volume contains seven interesting papers carefully selected from the broad range of papers presented at a conference held at the University of Alberta in September 1990. It is well balanced from several viewpoints. There are almost equal numbers of papers written by women and by men, by young and by seasoned scholars. The papers examine the interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy from Greek, Latin, and Arabic perspectives.

The book opens with a short chapter by the editors which introduces the nonmedievalist to Aristotelianism in the Middle Ages. There follow three papers on the interpretation of Aristotle's logical works, three papers on Aristotelian epistemology and a paper on Aristotelian solutions to the theological problem of transubstantiation.

The first paper, Gareth Matthews' 'Container Metaphysics According to Aristotle's Greek Commentators' will appeal to classicists as well as medievalists, for it is a study of the *Categories* and the light shed by the Aristotelian commentators Dexippus, Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus and Elias and the modern commentators Ackrill and Owen on problems posed by the work. Matthews divides the problems into two groups, external (the ideas of matter and *pollachōs legomenon* and the primacy of secondary substance) and

internal (the interpretation of lines 1a20ff, how to read Aristotle's definition of 'in a subject' at 1a24-5, and what the categories is a doctrine of). Matthews spends only a few pages on the external problems and concentrates on the internal problems which all concern the 'Container Metaphysics' he attributes to Aristotle, i.e., the theory that everything is a box, a kind of box, an item in a box or a kind of item in a box. Assuming that in the *Categories* Aristotle 'deliberately shifts the focus from Plato's heaven of the Forms to the individual boxes of this world' (11), Matthews argues that the neo-Platonism blinded the Greek commentators to the fact that Aristotle makes individual substances (the boxes) the primary realities and rejects the existence of separate substances, while Owen and Ackrill erred in simply failing to see that Aristotle was presenting the 'this-worldly' story here. But could Matthews establish his conclusion without the dubious assumption that Aristotle is promoting the 'this-worldly' view in the *Categories*?

Deborah Black's paper compares the commentaries of four Latins (Robert Kilwardby, Albert the Great, Martin of Dacia and Thomas Aquinas) and two Arabs (Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina) on a selection of standard passages from the *Peri hermeneias* concerning the status of logic as a linguistic art and the relationship of logic to grammar. The conclusion of some fifty pages of comparisons based on the original Latin and Arabic texts is that there are fundamental differences in the Latin and Arabic views on logic and grammar. In the Latin tradition, logic and grammar are completely autonomous sciences, whereas in the Arabic tradition, the logician borrows linguistic theory from the grammarian. Thus, the development of a universal grammar (such as existed in the 'speculative grammars' of the West) would have been impossible in the Arabic tradition, despite the fact that Arabic philosophers recognized the existence of universal features among languages. Black's argument appears flawless, although the presentation of the data for her conclusion is tedious.

By contrast, E.J. Ashworth's sketch of the history of equivocation and analogy from Aristotle to the late thirteenth century is marvelously concise. The significance of these concepts has been undeniable since Joseph Owens showed their fundamental importance in the metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas. Ashworth's work fills in details concerning the evolution of the concepts for students of thirteenth- or fourteenth- century metaphysics.

The latter half of *Aristotle and His Medieval Interpreters* contains three papers on theory of knowledge. Joseph Owens sets out to test the view expressed by J.H. Randall, Jr. that Aristotle's thought has universal appeal. His paper, 'Aristotle and Aquinas on Cognition', turns out to be more a speech than a study of Aquinas or Aristotle. In a discussion that ranges over virtually the entire history of western philosophy, Owens argues that Randall's conclusion 'Clearly, Aristotle did not say everything; though without what he first said, all words would be meaningless, and when it is forgotten they usually are' (*Aristotle*, 300) is not an exaggeration, but an understatement.

The papers by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann — perhaps the most significant in the collection — form a sequence: Stump shows that Aquinas is not a classical foundationalist, but a reliabilist, and Kretzmann

defines more precisely what kind of reliabilist Aquinas is. After a valuable introductory discussion of the meaning and varieties of foundationalism, Stump demonstrates on the basis of his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* that Aquinas is not a foundationalist because he holds that propositions evident to the senses may be false and so are not certain and that the starting points of science are common principles that cannot be known with certainty and proper principles that are derived by induction and therefore are neither basic nor certain. Rather, Aquinas' commitment to the fact that God created human beings with cognitive faculties for obtaining truth entails that, for him, our cognitive faculties do not err if properly used. Thus, Stump concludes that Aquinas' theory of knowledge is 'a species of externalism, with reliabilist elements.' Kretzmann's paper is a lengthy and valuable discussion of Aquinas' views on the reliability of the fundamental operations of the sense and the intellect.

The final paper in the volume is Marilyn Adams' paper on transubstantiation. After tracing early views on the whether and how the body and blood of Christ can actually be present on the altar, Adams surveys the imaginative solutions of four late medieval philosophers (Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus and Ockham) to four problems connected with transubstantiation. Their solutions bring nicely into relief differences in their metaphysical views, reminding us again that few issues in late medieval theology are devoid of philosophical interest.

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Jacques-Benigne Bossuet

Politics Drawn From the Very Words of Holy Scripture, Trans. Patrick Riley.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.

Pp. lxxix + 415.

US \$59.50. ISBN 0-521-36237-7.

Students of the history of political thought will be grateful to Riley for this well-made translation of Bossuet's classic. The histories of Samuel, Saul, David and Solomon contain at least as much politically interesting material as the 'first decade of Titus Livy,' and Bossuet's reflections are at least as interesting as Machiavelli's, and much more edifying. A king must use his power only for the good of the people, especially the weak; he must not be discouraged by ingratitude, he must not act out of ill-humour; he must listen to good advisers; to get good advisers he must show that he really desires to

know the truth; the king's person is sacred, subjects must obey him except when his commands contradict God's. The first six books were written in an optimistic spirit for the instruction of the Dauphin. The others were added not long before Bossuet's death and seem to imply some criticism of Louis XIV. In several places Bossuet reminds his readers that the great king Solomon, who had at first prayed for wisdom and been granted it, in the end so much oppressed his people by his extravagance that his son lost half the kingdom.

Interpreters of the Bible are usually guided by the common sense of their age, and this is true of Bossuet. He finds in the Bible the leading ideas of seventeenth-century French conservatism. Monarchy is the best regime; women ('that sex which is born to obey') should be excluded from the succession; the king is 'absolute' but his rule is not arbitrary — he should obey the law and respect the property rights of his subjects. (The idea that the ruler is absolute seems to have originated in the dictum of Justinian's *Digest*, 1.3.31, that the emperor is *legibus solutus*. Bossuet does not mean this; he means that the king is not answerable to anyone on earth.) Subjects may never resist, rebel or try to punish the king for wrongdoing. Fathers were the first rulers, but early in history kingships arose, and later other forms of government, sometimes unjustly (e.g., by rebellion); a new government can become legitimate by peaceful possession and the consent of the people or by divine approval.

The translator's introduction provides useful information about Bossuet, his other writings and his place in the history of political thought. On this last topic some of what is said is open to question. First, the claim that Bossuet is an advocate of 'divine-right absolute monarchy'. Unless I missed it, the book includes no reference to 'divine-right monarchy.' The doctrine of Divine Right sometimes meant that by divine law a ruler must be obeyed without resistance; in this sense Bossuet holds the doctrine without using the phrase. Sometimes, however, it meant that some institution existed by divine law, for example that papacy or episcopacy existed by divine positive law. In this sense Bossuet is not a 'divine-right monarchist'; he does not hold that divine law requires monarchy. In an attempt to show that Bossuet does hold this Riley argues as if Tiberius and Pilate were kings and takes 'prince' and 'sovereign' as equivalent to 'king' (xliv-xlv, xlix). Bossuet would have observed the distinctions. His position is that any of the traditionally recognised forms of government may be legitimate. What God's law requires is that the people in each nation obey whatever regime they find established: 'In antiquity other forms of government appeared, concerning which God prescribed nothing to the human race: such that each people must follow, as if divinely ordained, the government established in its country' (55); 'God takes under his protection all legitimate governments, in whatever form they are established' (52).

Second, the suggestion that Bossuet is a 'Judaizing Calvinist' (xi) is erroneous. His political doctrine is well within the range of Catholic orthodoxy. Thomas Aquinas was not the rationalist Riley makes him out to be

(xvi). Bossuet did not hold that political doctrine must be drawn *only* from scripture. The doctrine of non-resistance was not peculiarly Protestant. Patristic and early medieval writers inculcated obedience, using much the same Bible texts as Bossuet quotes (see Carlyle, *Medieval Political Theory in the West*, vol. 1, chapters 13 and 17, volume 3, part 2, chapter 4). Later medieval writers tempered obedience with the possibility of deposition. (According to Ockham the establishment of a legitimate empire required the consent of the people, but once they consented the emperor held his power 'from God alone' and was accountable, regularly, only to God; on occasion, however, the people could rightly correct or depose an emperor who misused power; Bible texts apparently requiring absolute obedience must be taken 'with their exceptions' (*Breviloquium*, II.14, IV.6). In the sixteenth century Calvin taught obedience and excluded resistance altogether, but most Catholics and, later, many Protestants held that resistance may sometimes be legitimate. In the seventeenth century Catholics and Protestants were found on both sides of the debate (see Somerville in J.H. Burns, ed., *The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700*, 356-7).

In the translation of such a long and difficult text a few errors and misprints are bound to creep in. Some corrections (subject to correction!): 25.14 us > him (i.e., in p. 25, line 14, substitute 'him' for 'us'); 107.37 disappeared > were scattered; 122.35 tried ... back > reproached him with; 130.20 in the manner of something fully received > as a matter of form; 130.23 by ostentation > out of ostentation; 165.5 old > one; 181.18 with respect ... Pharaoh > freedom to leave and go and sacrifice to God in the; 200.15 were witnessed by travellers > were witnesses to those who erred; 202.2 not for a while > not for one time; 276.31 not too happy when truth reaches > not so fortunate as that truth should reach; 277.9 Go down from my care to inform you > take care to go down, you who are in high places. Go down out of care to inform yourselves; 283.6 Go out of yourself > start with yourself; 294.37 he disregards this > He goes further; 295.29 through [historical] outcomes > in effect; 303.16 for want ... authors of it > because of failure to hand over those responsible; 307.19 brigades > brigands; 324.18 inspired on > inspired in this action. God gave such examples of a courage resolute unto; 353.6 concepts > conquests; 372.26 much as > as long as; 388.16 piety is sometimes ... kings > piety sometimes wins credit even with wicked kings; 397.23 only of > only of anticipating or; 398.26 except > accept; 398.34 his > this; 405.30 deposit > strip; 405.32 despoiling > stripping.

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Roger Cooke

Experts in Uncertainty: Opinion and Subjective Probability in Science.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1991. Pp. 321.

Cdn \$89.95: US \$65.00. ISBN 0-19-506465-8.

Whenever society faces new technological risks as a consequence of hazards such as toxic chemicals or radioactive wastes, policymakers must decide whether the risk is worth the benefit. They must also determine whether the risk imposition meets a variety of ethical criteria associated with equity of distribution, free and informed consent, due process, and so on.

Technological risk assessment, however, faces a fundamental dilemma: The older risks — like those from automobiles, for example — that are most understood are those for which assessment is least needed. The newer risks — like those from toxic chemicals, for instance — that are least understood are those for which assessment is most needed. For the newer risks, there are few inductive data on accident frequency and the probabilities associated with various hazardous consequences. In the face of limited knowledge, society relies on the subjective judgments of experts to determine the probability and magnitude of various technological risks.

Relying on experts to assess both the scientific and social aspects of technological risks is itself risky. Such reliance presupposes that the people give up some of their self-determination, autonomy, and security to bureaucrats or guardians having the power to create or inhibit future Chernobyls, Bhopals, or Love Canals. Cooke's excellent volume focuses on several of the thorniest guardianship questions in probabilistic risk assessment: (1) What is the proper role of scientific experts who advise policymakers regarding existing and proposed public risks? (2) What is the appropriate behavior of experts, decisionmakers, and laypersons in societally risky situations characterized by probabilistic or scientific uncertainty? (3) What are the ways in which expert subjective probability assessments can either further or thwart rational consensus about public policy?

Cooke is especially interested in the problem of subjective probability, since technological risk assessment in many areas often must rely on little more than the opinion of experts about the magnitude and likelihood of various threats. Moreover, it is by now common knowledge that experts' subjective judgments of probability typically err by several orders of magnitude. They present obvious and serious threats to the public good and to rational consensus. No one, however, has systematically and methodically addressed how subjective probabilities ought to be used in estimating and evaluating societal risks. Cooke's volume does so.

The first section of *Experts in Uncertainty* surveys how risk assessors and policymakers have used expert opinion. The first chapter discusses the Delphi method and scenario analysis, the two main forms in which structured expert opinion was conveyed to decisionmakers during the 1940s, '50s and

'60s. The next chapter surveys four important applications of expert opinion: to the aerospace industry, to military intelligence, to the commercial nuclear industry and other objects of probabilistic risk analysis, and to policy analysis. Chapter three discusses the emergence, during the 1970s, of expert (artificial intelligence) systems for modeling scientific reasoning under uncertainty.

The first section of the book ends by summarizing the assets and liabilities of using experts' probabilistic representations of uncertainty. Their main asset is providing clear criteria for evaluating subjective probability assessments. Their main liability is that, although training in reasoning with uncertainty can be worthwhile, experts typically do not handle subjective probabilities with much skill. Hence, their proffered risk estimates of everything from a nuclear core melt to the incidence of pesticide-induced cancer are often highly erroneous.

To counter the errors exhibited in experts' opinions, in chapter five Cooke provides some guidelines for employing subjective risk probabilities. He argues that we need to develop methodological rules for collecting and evaluating subjective probabilities for things such as technological risks.

In the second part of his volume, Cooke assembles the mathematical modeling tools and proofs that will be needed to provide a more suitable method for avoiding errors in the use of expert opinion. He reviews Savage's normative decision theory (chapter six), De Finetti's representation theorem (chapter seven), techniques for eliciting, scoring, evaluating, and weighing various experts' probability assessments (chapters eight and nine), and calibrating experts on the basis of their past predictive successes (chapter ten). Cooke argues that, by using these tools, one can improve rational decisionmaking by quantifying experts' uncertainty as subjective probabilities.

The third section of *Experts in Uncertainty* develops three models (classical, Bayesian, and psychological scaling) for combining expert opinions into a probability distribution (chapters eleven through fourteen) and evaluating them. It also surveys the experimental results obtained from the author's using these three models — in actual technological, industrial, and environmental applications — to quantify and evaluate expert opinion about probabilities associated with risks such as space flight, groundwater transport, and chemical-plant failures (chapter fifteen).

Because it 'downloads' techniques from probability and statistics onto the problem of evaluating the subjective probabilities of risk assessors, Cooke's important work is of great significance to policymakers, risk assessors, and social, moral, and political philosophers. The author skillfully uses mathematical tools to help solve a recurrent problem of ethics: how to evaluate the decisions of those who, in a democracy, control science, technology, and safety.

An important strength of the volume is its clarity of exposition and its quantitative precision. The author wisely places more mathematical materials in a 25-page appendix, however, so that persons with quite diverse

technical skills will be able to follow his arguments. *Experts in Uncertainty* displays an impressive encyclopedic knowledge: mathematical, scientific, and philosophical sophistication combined with first-hand knowledge of how to evaluate the subjective probabilities used to solve real-world problems. The analysis reveals significant analytic skills as well as years of experience in applying Cooke's methods to the solution of problems in scientific, technological, industrial, and environmental risk assessment.

Those who are suspicious of analytic methods of assessment, like cost-benefit analysis, are likely also to be suspicious of Cooke's techniques for improving those analytic methods. Those who are most comfortable with such methods are likely to find a number of insights in Cooke's volume. He favors analytic methods and believes that they can be used to protect public health and safety, but he is no apologist for either the industrial or military status quo. Given this remarkable balance, Cooke is especially to be commended for his noting the shortcomings of his proffered models. He indicates, for example, the strong modeling assumptions underlying the transformations used in the psychological scaling models (271). He also is careful to point out possible future research that would improve his models, for example, the need for parametric techniques to elicit subjective probability distributions (270).

Experts in Uncertainty is organized well, so that those interested in understanding the ethical and policy problems associated with the use of subjective probabilities and probabilistic risk assessment can read Parts I and III, whereas those most interested in using Cooke's models to combine and evaluate expert opinions, or in applying them to real-world problems, can read Parts II and III of the volume. In any case, the book is a 'must read' for risk assessors, decision theorists, policymakers, mathematicians, economists, and environmentalists, as well as social, political, and moral philosophers.

Although there are no significant shortcomings in the book, a few readers may wish that Cooke had spent more time tracing the ethical presuppositions and the policy consequences of the three models that he develops for evaluating expert opinion. After all, only a philosopher with highly developed mathematical skills (like Cooke) is capable of speaking with authority about such presuppositions and consequences. Hence, Cooke is in a position to do us a service not likely to be done well by others, and in this position, he succeeds remarkably well. It is refreshing to find a philosopher so obviously able to contribute substantively to the solution of real-world problems. Cooke makes us all look good.

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Nicholas of Cusa

The Catholic Concordance.

Ed. & trans. Paul E. Sigmund.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.

US \$69.95. ISBN 0-521-40207-7.

Francisco de Vitoria

Political Writings. Ed. & trans. Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.

US \$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-36442-6);

US \$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-36714-X).

Both of these translated volumes are additions to the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Both contain valuable introductions, select bibliographies, chronologies of significant events in the authors' lives, and notes on the textual sources of the translations. Both feature Renaissance ecclesiastical-political authors not generally read or available in English translation, yet of no little import in their own right and in the development of what we consider modern political thought. But why cannot CUP make the Nicholas of Cusa volume available in paper, as they have done with the Vitoria? Even allowing for the 1492 anniversary celebrations, there is presently more Anglophone interest in Cusanus than in Vitoria.

Sigmund's graceful introduction to Cusanus' *Concordance* provides much help for anyone approaching this lengthy and somewhat rambling work for the first time. Sigmund even picks out the most significant chapters to assign students. He stresses how Cusanus' treatise reflects his Christian Neoplatonic vision of unity in hierarchy, as he makes proposals for reforming both church and empire as parallel harmonies or 'concorde.' The *Concordance* displays Cusanus' research in earlier conciliar and canon-law documents and his attempt to pull together and synthesize the variety and multiplicity in traditional teachings and pronouncements about civil and ecclesial authority and its foundations.

In Book I Cusanus focuses on the church's hierarchy and Rome's place within it as well as on the relation between pope and bishops. Book II takes up the relation between pope and council. Here Nicholas upholds the supremacy of the council, yet argues for the independence of the papacy with divinely established rights and prerogatives. He is obviously seeking an intermediate position to harmonize previous claims of both popes and councils. According to Sigmund, 'His belief in harmony, his attachment to law and order, his strong interest in the reunion of the Eastern and Western churches, and the considerable authoritarian and hierarchical elements in his world view, all help to explain his change from the conciliarist to the papalist positions' (xxxii) just three years later.

Book III (after considerable unacknowledged borrowing from Marsilius of Padua) takes up reform of the Holy Roman Empire, continuing Cusanus'

elaboration of a hierarchy in the empire parallel to that in the church. Throughout Cusanus' focus is that of a reformer, making proposals for an ideal concord the real church and empire of his time were far from achieving.

Sigmund sees the significance of the Cusan *Concordance* as a transitional expression of 'the considerable theoretical limits that medieval constitutionalism placed on the ruler' (xxxv). Natural law is here used not just to justify existing political and social institutions but to criticize and reform them. Nicholas' idea of representation moved beyond personification to actual delegation based on the choice of those represented. The seeds of modern constitutionalism are apparent in the new and original philosophic grounding Cusanus proposes: 'For since all are by nature free every governance ... can only come from the agreement and consent of the subjects. For if by nature men are equal in power [*potentes*] and equally free, the true properly ordered authority of one common ruler who is their equal in power cannot be naturally established except by the election and consent of the others, and law is also established by consent' (98-9). Just as in his later theoretical treatises, Nicholas of Cusa here synthesizes new and old in an original *concordantia*.

The Dominican theologian Francisco de Vitoria (1485-1546) is even less well-known than Cusanus to English language students of political thought. The century between their political writings saw the world known to Europe at least double with the discovery of the 'new world.' Spain's colonizing and conquests put the older moral and legal questions about constantly warring Europe in a larger and more tangled international context. As Pagden's earlier studies have signaled, Vitoria was one of the first Europeans to recognize the human status and natural rights of native Americans and to condemn the murder, rape and pillage they suffered from the Conquistadors.

The writings attributed to Vitoria are all lecture notes (*reportationes*) taken by his students. Lawrance explains the fortunes of these notes and his English version amounts to a fine translation of what would be a critical Latin edition of whole portions of Vitoria's lectures. The volume contains as well biographical notes on obscure authors Vitoria takes up in his lectures plus a glossary of old Spanish terms, technical scholastic concepts and classic canons cited by Vitoria from canon law.

Vitoria lectured on the foundations of law, of civil and ecclesiastical authority. He appealed to natural law no less than did Cusanus, though in the ecclesial realm he favored papacy over council. Pagden's Introduction on these matters needs cautious reading since at least one page (xv) contains three factual 'howlers.' (a) The golden rule is *not* 'the simplest and most often quoted' maxim of natural law, as Vitoria's own text (170) witnesses; rather it is 'Good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided.'

(b) *Synderesis* is *not* the 'process' of deriving secondary and tertiary principles from the primary principles of natural law; Vitoria himself describes this process as 'deduction' and 'inference' (170-1). For the different senses of *synderesis* as the basis of the medievals' theory of conscience, see c. 36, 'Conscience,' in the *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*. (c)

Natural law is not an 'efficient' cause 'underpinning' or 'governing' anything; if causal language is helpful here, law is a *formal* cause — *ordinatio rationis*, as Vitoria (159) quotes from Aquinas — reflecting and encapsulating the order God created in the human part of the universe. Perhaps some of Vitoria's English Dominican descendants could have been consulted on these points.

Pagden's own scholarly expertise comes to the fore when he turns to analyze Vitoria's ideas about the Spanish conquests in the new world. His introduction presents a clear picture of how unjustifiable Vitoria (and the later authors he influenced) found both conquest and colonization. For Vitoria, Spain violated the natural rights of the native peoples and had no justification at all for their conquest. Vitoria dryly proposes legitimate trade in place of immoral conquest after the example of Portugal to avoid any 'intolerable' loss to the royal exchequer (291-2).

The selections on cannibalism, the American Indians and the law of war plus (in two appendices) four of Vitoria's Spanish letters and his lecture on forcible conversion bear fascinating witness to the fact that not all Christian thinkers saw what Christian kings and conquerors did as morally justifiable. As Vitoria wrote his superior about Peru, 'no business shocks me or embarrasses me more than the corrupt profits and affairs of the Indies. Their very mention freezes the blood in my veins' (331). And again, 'Even if I badly wanted the archbishopric of Toledo which is just now vacant and they offered it to me on condition that I signed or swore to the innocence of these Peruvian adventurers, I certainly would not dare to do so. Sooner my tongue and hand wither than say or write a thing so inhuman, so alien to all Christian feeling!' (333)

Perhaps more significant, as Pagden indicates, is that Vitoria's lectures used moral and legal principles to address a new international order that was less than orderly. As Vitoria himself put it, 'if the reality of some unsuitable thing or injustice were affirmed by a good many people, I should not dare wholly to cling to the excuse that "the king and his council know and approve of it". Kings often think from hand to mouth, and the members of their councils even more so' (335). Pagden and Lawrance have done a considerable service in making such texts as these available to those limited to English. Their relevance remains perennial, especially since nations and leaders across the world still manage too often to 'think from hand to mouth'.

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Michael E. Gorman

*Simulating Science: Heuristics, Mental Models,
and Technoscientific Thinking.*

Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana

University Press 1992. Pp. xx + 265.

US \$45.00. ISBN 0-253-32608-7.

Gorman enjoys the unique distinction of being an experimental cognitive psychologist whose research programme is generally hostile to artificial intelligence. At the very least, his work should be read by philosophers of scientists and epistemologists in order to shatter certain stereotypes that have developed (aided by *both* Quine and Fodor) concerning the role that psychological inquiry plays in the normative philosophical enterprise.

The book is engagingly written as an intellectual autobiography of the trials that Gorman has had to endure, primarily from psychologists, before getting his work taken seriously. This style provides a wonderful forum for methodological reflections, as Gorman always seems to be running up against people who object to his mixing the historical and the experimental, the normative and the empirical, the individual and the social, or the human and the computer. Sometimes these encounters cause Gorman to change the direction or emphasis of his research; other times he simply discounts the objectors and goes to another journal. In any case, he hypothesizes about the heuristics he implicitly used in deciding as he did, thereby contributing some indirect evidence to the comprehensive theory of scientific cognition that he ultimately wants to develop. The book provides the reader with enough detail to make informed judgments about whether Gorman's research demonstrates the points he wishes to make. Thus, it would be an excellent text to use in a graduate seminar.

Gorman's most elementary philosophical point is that even if one is committed to a naturalized theory of the mind or knowledge, that still leaves open the question of which evidence from which empirical sciences should be used to build and test such a theory. He begins, simply enough, with an interest in locating the conditions under which Popper's falsification principle might have some purchase as a norm of scientific reasoning. The welter of studies produced by historians and sociologists of science suggests that the principle has rarely been applied, though it has often figured in many rhetorical appeals to scientificity. Indeed, experimental psychologists in the Tversky and Kahneman paradigm have studied Popper's principle and have even drawn a stronger conclusion, namely, that human beings are cognitively incapable of falsifying hypotheses. None of these studies have asked whether the introduction of falsificationism might *improve* problem-solving performance in certain settings. Enter Gorman.

Gorman proceeds systematically, taking up nearly half the book in studying a simple problem-solving task that appears in both Popper's and Wittgenstein's own writings, namely, to infer the rule that governs the sequence 2,4,6, ... The way this works is that subjects propose other triples and are told

whether they too are governed by the implicit rule that the experimenter has in mind. Periodically, after having proposed several such triples, the subjects guess the rule. Gorman basically finds that falsificationism works best in group settings, and when there is little or no error in the feedback to the triples that the subjects propose (i.e., the experimenter informs the subject correctly as to whether the triple is governed by the implicit rule). Indeed, it would seem that subjects hold on to their initial hypotheses most tenaciously when they are tested alone and are told that there may be a lot of error in the feedback they are receiving. Images of what Richard Bernstein calls the 'Cartesian Anxiety' spring to mind. Popper would be pleased.

The rest of the book provides some ingenious experimental simulations of aspects of the history of science and technology that are used to explore various causal hypotheses. Specifically, Gorman proposes simulations of scientific controversies over the interpretation of ambiguous data (the alleged canals on Mars), the transmission of knowledge claims that are either arbitrarily or regularly related to some target reality, and the process by which inventors translate their ideas into working devices. The first two simulations are closely modeled on the tradition of social psychology experiments associated with Solomon Asch, Muzafer Sherif, Donald Campbell, and Serge Moscovici — all devoted to the role that a minority can exert in altering or solidifying the opinion of a larger group. The last simulation, the subject of Gorman's most recent and ongoing research, actually involves the use of computers but in a way that deviates interestingly from the role that computers normally play in cognitive science. For a philosophical audience, this point deserves some scrutiny.

Gorman is generally suspicious of attempts by psychologists, and increasingly philosophers (Peter Slezak and Paul Thagard are singled out for severe criticism), to portray computers as direct simulations of cognitive processes, thereby giving the false impression that what Fodor calls 'methodological solipsism' is ontologically realizable: namely, that thinking can occur without reference to an environment, be it natural or social. Gorman basically believes that most of the computer-based research that has fascinated philosophers of mind should be disregarded for the same reasons that the positivists' rational reconstructions went out of favor in the philosophy of science.

However, Gorman himself uses a computer as an expert system in the simulation of the invention process. He and his associates have programmed a computer with the notebooks that Edison, Bell, and Elisha Gray left with their drawings of prototypes for the telephone, along with their patent records and their subsequent attempts to design an apparatus that actually worked. Gorman is then able to manipulate the computer's visual displays, which, in turn, allows him to interact with the creative process by stipulating intermediate steps and alternative possibilities and looking at the results. Gorman describes this activity as determining how the 'slots' in the inventor's 'mental model' were converted into 'mechanical representations.' Philosophers of mind would interpret what Gorman is doing as a rather concrete

strategy for specifying the 'physical structures' that 'instantiate' the inventor's 'functional architecture.' In plainer terms, how did Bell turn his idea of a telephone into a real telephone?

What Gorman finds striking from the historical record is something that functionalist philosophers of mind have remarked for a long time, namely, that even the most articulated functional architecture (as one finds in a patent report) vastly underdetermines the range of physical structures that can instantiate it. However, while this statement is usually taken to mean that there are many different ways to think the same thoughts, Gorman — following in Bell's computational footsteps — has learned the opposite lesson, namely, how difficult it often is to find just the *right* way.

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Terrence Horgan and John Tienson, eds.

Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind.

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers

1991. Pp. xii + 227.

US \$99.00. ISBN 0-7923-1482-4.

'Connectionism' (CON) refers in the first instance to a growing group of artificial intelligence (AI) systems which are inspired by nervous systems. Although the creation of computer jockeys, CON's interest to psychologists and other philosophers of mind is manifest in this volume. Here we find heroes of already entrenched debate, such as Fodor, Smolensky, Cummins, Clark, Horgan and Tienson, alongside talented newcomers. Six of the nineteen papers were previously published in the Spindel Conference Supplement of the *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 26. That volume concentrated on the fascinating clash between the East Coast Establishment of AI, namely to GOFAI (Good Old Fashioned AI) Family, and the brash PDP (Parallel Distributed Processing) newcomers from California who were muscling in on the AI turf. As proven by the growing list of engineering volumes and periodicals dedicated to neural net systems which recognize patterns (including spoken words), identify cancerous cells, direct robotic activities (including speech), or assess loan applications, CON was cutting into GOFAI business. By definition, engineering is about practical applications, hence about money — but what really made the GOFAI Family go to the mattresses was the CON claim to be the basis for a new and better *science* of the mind. This was personal, not just business.

Fodor and Pylyshyn counter-attacked on behalf of the establishment in a paper which, for thematic unity, ought to be in this volume as well — it is on everyone's mind and tongue, and might just as well be typographically present. Never mind, Tienson outlines the main points in his introductory essay, Rey elaborates upon them in his contribution, and copies are easy to come by. The main idea of Fodor and Pylyshyn is that CON cannot account for language and linguaform thought: the processing of symbol strings is the initial and exclusive domain of GOFAI, though CON may usefully, and subserviently, work out the details of its 'implementation.' It is against this background that most of the papers in this volume can be located, although the editors have wisely widened the CON debate by including such traditional philosophical concerns as behaviourism (Graham, Maloney), perception (Bradshaw, Glaser), and consciousness (Lloyd).

But most of the volume concerns the GOFAI-CON wars. Here we find the essay with which Smolensky regrouped the CON camp and charted its retrenchment under the banner of PTC (Proper Treatment of CON), as well as a first assault by Fodor and Brian McLaughlin on this new position. Smolensky admits CON's difficulties with linguaform psychological phenomena, such as grammar-ruled speech and logic-ruled mathematical reasoning, but proposes that these 'hard' phenomena will 'emerge' from 'soft' phenomena CON models so well, such as telling cats from dogs or typing forty words per minute, if only CON has time enough to build from the bottom up: 'the hard side has had priority for several decades now with disappointing results. It is time to give the soft side a few decades to produce disappointing results of its own' (285). Smolensky also sketches his tensor-product solution to a major obstacle for CON, binding variables to their values. To think that John loves Mary, it is not enough merely to think (i.e., activate the neural patterns for) John, love, and Mary. The thought of John must be bound to the subject position of 'x loves y', and so on. Kirsh outlines the analytic and abstractive power of variable binding *and* the extreme computational cost to CON of implementing it on Smolensky's plan, then concludes (presumably on the assumption that CON models our brain) that, perhaps, we do less real variable-binding than we thought. All the analytic, abstractive, and recursive power we thought we had are just illusions! Though only our neurophysiologists can know for sure — *pace* Fodor and cohorts, who by now must be pulling out their hair.

In a tone of patient fatigue, Fodor and McLaughlin explain not only their doubts about the tensor-product approach to variable binding, but also their sense that Smolensky's talk of micro-features has simply missed the point about syntactic structure. They are right. But wrong, perhaps, to say CON cannot overcome its current difficulties. Clark chastises them thus: 'Fodor, as a philosopher, should be more sensitive than most to the dangers of confusing lack of imagination with a priori impossibility' (212). Clark reconfigures the problem domain to suit CON: it need not address just those points that GOFAI handles so well, but rather must model the behavior which made the GOFAI approach plausible in the first place, i.e., the behavior which in Dennett's holistic sense supports intensional belief-desire talk. Van Gelder

amplifies this vision of Kuhnian incommensurability between two 'paradigms': the establishment sets the terms of the debate, so either the rebels ignore their logic, or the new paradigm is forced to grow in the shade of the old. He recommends the first option. Smolensky should ignore the demand that CON representations have syntactic structure: 'The boxer will always beat the chess player in the ring, but that's not a very interesting contest' (376). CON representations are structured, but in a non-syntactic, tensor-product, way, which may finally explain linguaform thought, he argues.

The heart of this book is philosophical investigation of the conceptual agreements and differences between theories, their categorial and evidential foundations, their consequences, their promise. Some are tempted by business which is more scientific than philosophic, like Maloney, whose long paper, which is designed to show that CON cannot account for good old fashioned Pavlovian conditioning, has already been outstripped by scientific research. CON simply *is* AI modelled on neural circuits, which circuits clearly are capable of classical conditioning, and indeed explain it, as in the now classic studies of *aplysia* by Hawkins *et al* (*Science* 219 (Jan. 1983): 400-5). Some are scientists first, and philosophers second, like Smolensky, Dyer, and Kirsh, computer jockeys all. Each has been disappointed by CON as well as GOFAI, and sounds ecumenical. Some philosophers join in. Horgan and Tienson again propose to harness the hard-edged, syntactically structured representations characteristic of GOFAI in the soft information processes of CON. Garson details the absence of real logical contradiction between the two sides, though he does not recognize the case for incommensurability he has made thereby. Cummins and Schwarz profess not to see any interesting difference between the two approaches, since both sorts of systems take inputs into outputs in a way which counts as executing algorithms, and both fail, therefore, to account for the vast bulk of human cognition which is non-algorithmic.

One thing GOFAI and CON have in common is that they are AI arts. We casually think of AI as a science, or (better) as engineering, but in any case as *scientific*. This is, I suggest, wrong. Instead AI is a perfectly eclectic association of technologies, mathematical techniques, logical theories, neuroscientific loans, psychological speculations, robotics innovations, devices, kludges, hacks, and philosophical marriages of convenience. Here we find no dominant paradigm ensuring consensus, no shared goal. Nevertheless, it is likely that much of the progress in the philosophy of mind will come from this ungainly assemblage. So it behooves philosophers of mind to become fluent in connectionese, to add 'node', 'activation', 'input/output vector', 'weight matrix' and so on to 'syntax', 'semantics', 'belief', 'memory' and so on. This book aids such fluency, and sets the stage for continuing study and debate. It is not only a very good read for professionals in this field, but is suitable as a graduate or advanced under-graduate text as well.

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En Collaboration

L'intolérance et le droit de l'autre.

Genève: Labor et Fides 1992. Pp. 226. n.p.

ISBN 2-8309-0628-4.

Ce volume rassemble 12 contributions présentées dans le cadre d'un séminaire intitulé 'Éthique et Droits de l'Homme', qui s'est tenu à l'Université des Sciences humaines de Strasbourg. Après une présentation écrite par Vergote, l'ouvrage se divise en 3 parties réunissant chacune 4 contributions. La première partie porte sur les formes modernes de l'intolérance, la seconde, sur l'état du droit face à l'intolérance, et la troisième, sur le droit de l'autre.

La première partie comprend les textes de Laborit, de Wackenheim, de Mengus et de Freund. Laborit voit le comportement humain comme la résultante de motivations et d'automatismes inconscients, qui poussent les uns à dominer les autres, sous le couvert d'une idéologie habituellement intolérante. D'après lui, l'intolérance trouve son arme dans l'idéologie (29), et ses fondements dans les processus économiques (30). Il n'y a d'issue pour l'homme que s'il prend conscience du caractère déterminé de ses choix prétendument libres, pour se rendre compte que toute action n'est valable que si elle l'est pour l'espèce entière (33-4).

Wackenheim s'efforce quant à lui de comparer l'intolérance religieuse à celle, plus récente, qu'ont générée les idéologies contemporaines. L'intolérance est générée selon lui par '... la manière dont les religions et les idéologies poursuivent un certain nombre d'*objectifs*, qui sont d'ailleurs communs aux unes et aux autres' (38), à savoir la cohésion, le salut, le pouvoir et la vérité. Mengus vient ensuite souligner les apories relatives à la manière de concevoir et surtout de réaliser la société 'interculturelle'. Pour la réaliser, écrit-il, il faut plus que de la tolérance, car '... l'opposé de l'intolérance ... n'est pas la tolérance, trop marquée d'indifférence, mais l'attention positive à l'autre, sa prise en compte favorable, la considération qu'on lui accorde' (65).

Freund termine cette section en retraçant les origines politiques de la tolérance, dans le contexte des guerres de religion. En réaction contre l'héritage des Lumières, il voit dans la tolérance non pas une vertu intellectuelle, '... mais une condition minimale et élémentaire de la cohabitation humaine' (88). Il précise que '... la tolérance et l'intolérance ne sont pas des relations entre les idées ou croyances mais entre les hommes qui se réclament d'opinions différentes ou divergentes' (87).

La deuxième partie s'ouvre sur un texte de J.-B. Marie. Ce dernier présente un aperçu historique de la lutte contre l'intolérance, dans le contexte du droit international où les notions d'intolérance et de discrimination sont posées comme étant équivalentes. Pour Collange ensuite, il est clair que l'intolérance est '... au cœur même du sectarisme...' (112). Collange énumère les effets pervers du sectarisme, pour en conclure qu'il faut opposer une tolérance ferme à l'intolérance (117), tandis que les sectes posent le défi de '...l'élaboration d'une spiritualité réellement adulte, qui sache faire face aux exigences de notre temps' (118).

Kiss fait brièvement l'historique de la circulation des personnes et des idées. Posant comme 'thèse' le développement des moyens techniques favorisant une telle circulation, et comme 'antithèse' la volonté des États de l'entraver, il voit la 'synthèse' dans '... les solutions législatives ou politiques qui tendent à concilier un maximum de liberté avec le contrôle de l'État' (126-7). Vient ensuite le texte de Duprat qui examine les conditions d'une véritable opinion publique, en rapport avec la question de la tolérance.

La troisième partie commence avec la contribution de G. Vincent, ayant pour objet la tolérance par rapport à 4 topiques: la religion (incluant l'idéologie), la science, le scientisme (dans ses effets politiques), et les cultures. Vincent conclut que la compréhension interculturelle est en fait possible, mais qu'à défaut d'une authentique volonté de rencontrer l'autre, la tolérance peut faire office de garde-fou salutaire. D'après Tinland par ailleurs, 'il faut renoncer à penser séparément, pour fonder l'idée de droit inhérent à son humanité, un homme essentiel... Ce sont, ici, les relations entre les hommes et leur cadre d'existence qui déterminent l'humanité de leur existence, leur manière humaine d'exister' (170). À partir d'une telle conception, Tinland s'élève en principe contre l'ingérence externe au nom d'une vision abstraite et universaliste de l'homme. Il définit ainsi un droit d'insertion dans un réseau donné d'échanges culturels, impliquant comme corollaire un droit de retrait, et complétant le droit fondamental à la vie et à l'environnement qui rend celle-ci possible.

S'inspirant de Rousseau et de Kant, Vergote essaie ensuite de voir l'humanité comme idée assimilable au règne des fins, que la raison aurait pour tâche de penser. La conclusion est laissée à Guibal, qui traite de 'l'intolérable' en l'envisageant sous 3 formes: '... l'horreur (de la souffrance inutile), la perversité (de la haine destructrice) et le non-sens (du vide déshumanisant)' (225). Devant l'intolérable, dit-il, la philosophie doit demeurer 'en armes'.

Les communications composant ce recueil sont bonnes dans l'ensemble, bien qu'elles soient de valeur inégale. Parmi les meilleures, mentionnons celles de Freund et de Wackenheim. Par ailleurs, une erreur s'étant glissée dans le processus d'impression, les p. 162 et 195 manquent.

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Keith Lehrer and Ernest Sosa, eds.

The Opened Curtain:

A U.S.-Soviet Philosophy Summit.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1991.

Pp. ix + 308.

US \$38.50. ISBN 0-8133-1234-5.

This volume collects 18 essays in epistemology and philosophy of mind. Eight are by American and ten are by Soviet philosophers, and most were presented at conferences in Moscow, Leningrad, and Brown University in 1988. The American essays are from familiar analytic philosophers: Alston, the late Hector-Neri Castañeda, Dennett, Alvin Goldman, Hintikka, Kim, Lehrer (who also wrote the introduction), and Shoemaker. The Soviet essays represent a broader range of approaches and provide us with some new voices, now that the former Soviet Union has taken steps toward rejoining the rest of the world.

N.S. Avtomomova holds psychoanalysis to be a science in formation. He outlines the differences between Freudian and Lacanian (the unconscious is linguistically structured, and therapy results from evocative linguistic and emotional interaction with the therapist) interpretations of psychoanalysis, and some post-Lacanian trends in psychoanalysis.

M.S. Burgin and D.P. Gorsky argue that concepts other than the rigorous general concept exist. Their taxonomy divides concepts into real types, generic concepts, rigorous concepts, and ideal types. Their own general theory of the concept is a version of the prototype theory. The concept is a four-component complex including: (i) a real type of conceptual representation; (ii) an extension, whose elements form a fuzzy set; (iii) a degree of membership of an element of the extension; (iv) a measure of the degree of membership of the elements.

D.I. Dubrovsky argues for a nonreductive view of the concepts of value, intentionality, and sense. The language used to describe them differs radically from that used to describe the brain's processes. Identity theories fail and behaviorist theories are methodologically bankrupt, but dualism has the problem of interaction. He then presents an information-theoretic functionalist account. Information is intentional, yet it requires a vehicle — the brain. Thus consciousness is a functional property of the brain's processes.

A.A. Ivin presents an essay on the history of thought, in the tradition of Hegel, Spengler, Heidegger, and Kuhn. The history of thought falls into epochs characterized by a dominant set of (mostly implicit) models and principles. In parallel to Kuhn's concept of normal science, theorizing proceeds within a set of unchallenged assumptions. Also in parallel with Kuhn's views, when working within an epoch's models and principles, the theorizer is blinded to other options.

A.L. Nikiforov's essay concludes that degrees of rationality and freedom are inversely related. Rationality is a success concept: Rational activity is defined as action leading to a projected end. And rationality is objective: the relationship between means and end is not dependent upon the subject.

Freedom is also predicated of activity, but free actions are determined only by the subject's desires. Freedom requires choices, but there is often a tension between the subject's desires and external constraints. So perfect freedom would require omnipotence.

V.V. Petrov offers an account of metaphor, drawing on semantic field theory. A metaphor is a type of name transference from one field to another, but after surveying recent work on metaphor and cognitive psychology he concludes that we do not yet have the resources for a complete theory.

V.S. Shvyrev presents an account of the distinction between understanding and reflection in science. Science is based within a broader social context. Reflection is a regulatory stance taken toward a science which attempts to uncover its basic assumptions and to put them to the test. Understanding, by contrast, is the ability to grasp a science's basic principles; this makes possible the creative acts which advance the science.

V.S. Stepin investigates the hierarchical structure of scientific knowledge. Theories start as embryonic schemes formed by a cluster of largely philosophical principles. These form a world view and act as the control unit for the addition of new data, which is integrated hierarchically. Added new levels impact upon the others in the system, forcing adjustments. The science is mature when the original philosophical constructs are replaced by scientific ones rigorously and mathematically connected to experience.

A.L. Subbotin presents a short essay in the philosophy of logic focused on the value of formal disciplines for substantive ones. Logic is an instrument that structures the basic categories of a substantive discipline and establishes its norms of inference. But since each substantive discipline has its distinctive categories, logics will be system-relative.

Finally, V.P. Zinchenko offers an organic account of consciousness, which he defines relationally: consciousness is an existential relationship of an organism to being and reflexively to itself. Consciousness can be studied from internal and external perspectives, though the latter is the final authority. From the internal perspective, consciousness is constituted not only by two tiers — one its sensory fabric (the level of existence) and one its meaning and sense states (the level of reflexion) — but also by a 'biodynamic fabric of movement and action.' Thus from the external perspective, the whole range of activity of an organism bears on and makes possible its consciousness. So all of physiology and genetics bear on the study of consciousness.

Overall, the Soviet essays offer a great range of styles. In most more emphasis is placed on exegesis than on argumentation and new theorizing. Occasional references to Marx, Engels, and Lenin appear in contexts that may be surprising to Western thinkers. Most of the Soviet philosophers are well aware of current European and analytic philosophy, though there is also a noticeable influence of the style of European philosophy in the early part of this century.

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G.E.R. Lloyd

*Methods and Problems in Greek Science:
Selected Papers.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1991.

Pp. xiv + 457.

US \$64.95. ISBN 0-521-37419-7.

This collection of eighteen papers by Geoffrey Lloyd on Greek science conveniently presents important samples of his work printed or delivered over the last thirty years. The papers cover the Greek 'inquiry into nature' from its earliest stirrings to the second century AD, the time of Ptolemy and Galen, and address critical issues in the history of medicine, biology, cosmology, and astronomy. This in itself should certainly interest students of ancient Greek philosophy and science. But, what makes the collection particularly valuable is that Lloyd prefaces the papers with acute remarks assessing the scholarly debate since their publication, and indicating whether (and how) this debate and his own subsequent research have brought him to recast his views. The result, then, is not just a selection of past work by a leading historian, but a commentary suggesting points of departure for future research. The commentary is especially helpful in the areas of Lloyd's expertise, ancient medicine and biology. In sum, this volume offers to those studying ancient Greek science and philosophy much for profitable reflection and analysis.

Throughout the papers, Lloyd pays close attention to the aims, methods, assumptions, and social background of ancient Greek science. He also addresses philosophical and methodological problems that arise for historians in plying their trade. Indeed, one of Lloyd's sub-themes is what he regards as the business and qualifications of the historian of Greek science. For my part, I do not endorse the prescriptive element in Lloyd's account of the ideal historian of Greco-Roman science (xi-xii); nor do I share his enthusiasm for social anthropology and comparative studies. I do agree, however, that there is an urgent need for collaborative effort in historical research devoted to Greek science (xiv). Granted, none of the articles included here is collaborative; but, even so, the exhortation to collaborate by such a prominent scholar is rare among specialists in ancient Greek science and most salutary. Yet, it may also be revolutionary in ways that Lloyd does not foresee.

One of the major developments in the study of the exact sciences during the last few decades has been the publication of a great number of mathematical and astronomical documents from Mesopotamia of roughly the first two millennia BC, documents bearing significantly on the interpretation of their Greek counterparts. The study of these documents has, under the leadership of Otto Neugebauer in particular, produced a new school of historians of ancient science. A fundamental precept of this school is that interpretative claims be subject to verification by recourse to the documents themselves. This requirement is, I suspect, a consequence of working with the Mesopotamian materials: since the documents (and pieces of documents) are primarily lists of numbers in columns, claims about the meaning of these

numbers can be generated and tested only by examining their mathematical structure. But, when the same requirement is also made of how historians interpret documents in Greek mathematical and astronomical science, as it is by Neugebauer's associates, students, and their collaborators, one quickly discovers the vulnerability of classical scholarship concerning the history of Greek science to the charge that it rests for the greater part on fabrication and fantasy. Specifically, the classical reconstruction of the lost scientific writings of the Presocratics by collecting, sifting, and analyzing citations (quotations, reports) found in later documents begins to seem a misguided effort to discover what is lost by misreading a privileged subset of what is in hand. Such criticism, of course, leads to a bald refusal to play the 'fragment game', if one holds strictly to the requirement of verifiability. (For individuals choosing this course, there are still numerous papers in Lloyd's collection devoted to problems in treatises which are directly accessible.) The question is whether anyone who aims to determine on the basis of evidence 'what actually happened' will be brought to the same result by demanding plausibility rather than verifiability in dealing with citations of lost works.

Lloyd is well aware of problems in using later citations to reconstruct earlier Greek thought. On some occasions, he indicates doubts about reports (146-8) and their sources (128); on others, he admits, in effect, that some reports are sufficiently under-determined to allow numerous divergent interpretations (158). He even recognizes the advantages of working with treatises in hand to the analysis of isolated citations of works long lost (110). Still, he insists without argument that some reports are authoritative and is confident that certain quotations are accurate (128, 131). The question is, then, What are the criteria by which such quotations and *testimonia* are to be deemed authoritative and reliable?

It is imperative to realize that the burden of proof or argument lies on the historian accepting ancient citations about works no longer extant. For, even a cursory review of cases in which the work cited is extant reveals the common occurrence of (a) inaccurate quotation, (b) misleading report, and (c) accurate quotation with misleading report. Furthermore, there are also Latin translations of Greek works which distort the original to alien, and even antithetical, purposes. In sum, it is apparent in such instances that, given the citations (and translations) alone, one might never have guessed the original, to say nothing of reconstructing it by applying some set of credible criteria in a rational, coherent way.

Accordingly, historians *have* to give reason(s) for any confidence that one ancient writer has preserved the thought of another whose writings are lost. Their continued failure to do so will be disastrous. For, not only will they cripple the effort to understand Greek astronomy, for instance, and its response to its Mesopotamian competitor; they will leave the rival reconstructions in the classical tradition of the early and Hellenistic periods of Greek science and philosophy liable to the criticism that they are but different ways in which historians read themselves into the past.

This question of evidence and its use is a fundamental challenge for any Hellenist who seeks valid, testable answers to the perennial questions about what the ancient Greeks really accomplished and why. I raise it not in criticism but in sharing Lloyd's admirable concern with the prospects and demands of continued research in the history of Greek science.

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Ralf Meerbote and Hud Hudson, eds.

Kant's Aesthetics. Vol. 1, North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy.

Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing 1991.

Pp. viii + 146.

US \$36.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-924922-56-7);

US \$18.00 (paper: ISBN 0-924922-06-0).

This volume inaugurates the North American Kant Society's new series under general editors Manfred Kuehn and Karl Ameriks. Their goal is quick publication of reasonably priced works that will be of interest to Kant scholars, but publication will not be limited to works on Kant. With some exceptions, *Kant's Aesthetics* presents the proceedings of a conference on Kantian and Post-Kantian aesthetics, held at the River Campus of the University of Rochester in 1990 to commemorate the 200th birthday of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*. The book includes revised versions of the previously unpublished papers presented by Carl J. Posy, Stephen F. Barker, Peter Kivy, Mary Mothersill, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Papers presented by Paul Guyer and Douglas Dempster are not included, nor are any of the commentators' remarks, but there is an additional essay by associate editor Hud Hudson. Predrag Cicovacki contributes a thirteen-page bibliography on Kant's aesthetics between 1980 and 1990.

The parameters of the bibliography summarize the thrust of *Kant's Aesthetics*. It starts with 1980 as a supplement to *Essays in Kant's Aesthetics*, edited by Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (1982), whose bibliography ends with 1980. To some degree this whole collection simply picks up where Cohen and Guyer left off; none of the authors from that earlier collection reoccur. This new collection is the more focused of the two; except for Peter Kivy's essay, this volume focuses on Kant's theory of beauty and his antimony of taste. (As a general introduction to Kant's theory of beauty, this collection is actually

superior to the Cohen and Guyer volume.) But as is to be expected from the proceedings of a conference of this sort, there is a certain amount of redundancy as each author summarizes the main points of Kant's third *Critique* before spinning off on his or her own direction. One or two of the papers would have profited from more aggressive editing. But on the whole this is an auspicious start to a new series and the book's main weakness is that there's not more to it. While they were at it, the editors might have located three or four more essays, perhaps representing some of the newer names in Kant scholarship that turn up in the bibliography.

The first half of Meerbote's Introduction provides the historical background to Kant's aesthetics, covering a lot of ground with economy. The one nugget of interest for those who think they already know this information will be Meerbote's summary of Kant's disagreements with his former student, Kreuzfeld. Written and presented in response to Kreuzfeld's 1777 inaugural dissertation upon appointment to professor of poetry, Meerbote is right to call it to our attention. The second half of the Introduction outlines each of the six essays that follow. Since five of the six were followed by a commentator at the conference, it would have been interesting had Meerbote also summarized the gist of their criticisms.

As Meerbote emphasizes, several of the essays overlap or address central difficulties concerning Kant's theory of beauty. Three of the essays, Posy's 'Imagination and Judgment in the Critical Philosophy', Barker's 'Beauty and Induction in Kant's Third *Critique*', and Wolterstorff's 'An Engagement With Kant's Theory of Beauty', are a case in point. Each focuses, rightly, on Kant's theory of imagination as the key to his aesthetic theory, for Kant's third *Critique* must be read in light of Kant's general theory of perception. Posy's essay, one of the collection's best, traces imagination's different roles as a unifying element in organizing potentially chaotic manifolds of sensation. Posy and Barker analyze Kant's reflective judgment, exploring the process by which aesthetic pleasure arises in imagination's efforts to unify a manifold when no concept is at hand to provide a rule for unifying what is given. Both interpret the pleasure as arising from confirmation of a provisional hypothesis about an object's organizing schema, but in each case understanding's role in the 'free play' requires more attention. Where Posy carefully contrasts beauty and sublimity, Barker's interpretation of objects which are not beautiful as featuring 'purposiveness of a malicious type' (59) blurs the line between sublimity and ugliness. Barker also downplays the importance of *productive* imagination. He makes it sound as if imagination acts as some sort of detective, guessing at an object's sensory organization. Yet its true role, as Posy emphasizes, is to generate that structure; on Barker's model, it is not clear what object is subsequently present to the mind to allow one to confirm or disconfirm an imaginative projection.

Both Posy and Barker recognize the need to show that Kant's theory does not make every object beautiful, a topic that takes center stage in Hudson's 'The Significance of an Analytic of the Ugly in Kant's Deduction of Pure Judgments of Taste'. Fleshing out Kant's occasional references to the 'dis-

pleasures' which contrast to the various types of aesthetic pleasure, Hudson emphasizes Kant's proposal that there are various proportions of accord and discordance in the '*Stimmung*' of our mental faculties. Yet we are again left wondering about the understanding's precise role in the nonconceptual reflective judgment, including cases where the imagination has a high degree of accord with the understanding.

Wolterstorff, Mothersill's 'The Antinomy of Taste', and Kivy's 'Kant and the *Affektenlehre*: What He Said, and What I Wish He Had Said' have less sympathy for Kant and call for major revisions of Kant's doctrines. Mothersill reprises some of the main themes of *Beauty Restored*, but they are less persuasive when separated from that book's supporting arguments. Wolterstorff has valuable things to say about beauty's status as an indeterminate concept, but his criticism that 'very few of us have that concept' (121) simply dismisses the possibility that we operate with an innate concept which is not accessible through introspection. As usual, Kivy has some valuable insights on the aesthetics of music, focusing on Kant's failure to follow his own proposal that music is a source of aesthetic ideas. It is the collection's one contribution treating the broader riches of Kant's aesthetics.

On the whole, this is a book that Kant specialists and philosophers of art will peruse with profit.

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J.M. Moravcsik

Thought and Language.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1990.

Pp. ix + 283.

US \$35.00. ISBN 0-415-04322-0.

Books in Routledge's 'Problems of Philosophy' series have two parts: the first is supposed to survey the history of some great philosophical problem, the second to present the author's solution. Readers expecting Moravcsik's contribution to the series to offer a comprehensive general survey of theories of thought and language will be disappointed. His account is highly selective, being concerned principally to establish the background for his positive views. There are glaring omissions (Wittgenstein gets only a passing mention), and the treatment is too cursory to be informative for readers not already conversant with the literature.

In the presentation of his own ideas, however, Moravcsik is more inspired. Central to the book is an energetic attack on naturalism in the philosophy of mind. Moravcsik argues that our concept of cognition essentially includes structural, functional and phenomenal elements; whether we count something as, say, 'seeing' depends on considerations about the nature of the objects supposedly seen, the character of felt experience, and the nature of the causal processes and perceptual mechanisms involved. No philosophy of mind can be adequate if it fails to do justice to all these factors. Both behaviourism and functionalism are therefore rejected for artificially restricting discussion to behavioural or functional elements. Moravcsik also rejects the eliminativist view that 'folk psychology' is destined to be replaced by more adequate neuroscientific theories. This, Moravcsik suggests, misrepresents the relation of common sense and science. 'Basic common sense' comprises concepts, beliefs, and forms of explanation that are invariant across times and cultures (e.g., the concept of a human being, belief in the external world, and 'because'-explanations). These conceptions are simply not up for revision. Moreover, since science explains the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, there must be continuity rather than conflict between science and our everyday conceptions.

In his chapters on ontology, Moravcsik maintains that particulars, universals, physical objects and events are all equally fundamental ontological categories, and argues for realism about modalities and principles of individuation. His proposed alternative to naturalism — the 'objectual theory' of cognition — draws heavily on this ontological groundwork. Its point of departure is the recognition of thought's 'special conceptual involvement with its objects' (192). The theory 'defines thought and other parts of cognition as a basic indefinable relation between certain states and processes ... and the peculiar abstract entities that serve as "objects" to thought' (72). These abstract entities include not just propositions, concepts and universals, but also aesthetic and musical objects. The objectual approach sets the framework for research into mind. We are to determine what must be true of the mind if it can employ abstract objects (76). We must characterize these objects as best we can and then attempt to investigate cognitive processes under idealization (200). Though Moravcsik doubts there can be a unified science of thought (88-91), he nonetheless believes that much of the relevant research will be empirical.

Moravcsik insightfully suggests that contemporary naturalism adopts a misleadingly pragmatic picture of human beings. Human beings are portrayed as information processing creatures whose mental states are to be understood primarily in terms of their role in the explanation of action. In contrast, Moravcsik offers a vision of *homo explanans*: human beings are 'explanation-seeking and puzzlement-removing creatures' (49). In consequence, thoughts must be seen as 'elements in larger complexes of explanations, ... representing either that which is problematical or that which is part of what renders the problematic unproblematical' (199).

Moravcsik then proceeds to develop a conception of language in harmony with these conclusions. The result is a theory of linguistic meaning which is neither Fregean nor Kripkean in kind. The meaning of a word 'w' is that in virtue of which something counts as a *w*, and to understand 'w' is to be able to explain what makes something count as a *w*. The latter involves a grasp of explanatory patterns in terms of four factors: (a) the ontological category under which *w* falls (e.g., is it an object, event, or state?), (b) how it differs from other members of the group (in terms of individuation and persistence conditions, plus relevant qualitative considerations), (c) functional considerations (if appropriate), and (d) considerations about causal agency. Since explanations may be more or less detailed according to context, there are many 'layers' to the meaning of particular words.

Meanings so construed do not determine reference and extension. To know the meaning of 'w' is to have necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for *w*-hood. To know the actual extension of 'w' requires knowledge of the extra-linguistic world. I may have an explanatory schema for the word 'emergency' in terms of the factors above, but whether some state of affairs counts as an emergency is determined by a mass of contextual considerations.

While *Thought and Language* is certainly interesting, it is also often puzzling. For example, Moravcsik claims that both science and common sense may remain neutral on the debate between materialism or dualism. Psychological research that makes an explicit commitment to materialism can always be reinterpreted along dualistic lines. Yet even if this dubious neutrality thesis is true, it is unclear how it sits with Moravcsik's claim (on the same page) that the materialism-dualism issue must be settled by 'future empirical research' (177). Also odd is Moravcsik's idea that since a person may be mistaken about whether she holds some fundamental belief (e.g., about the existence of God), we should interpret such beliefs as 'in principle unobservable and take behaviour, introspection, answer to questions, etc. as indirect evidence on the basis of which we form empirical hypotheses about the person — who may be ourselves' (204). While Moravcsik is right to question the idea that we have transparent access to our beliefs, his proposed alternative offers an equally curious view of self-knowledge.

Moravcsik's 'lexical theory' of meaning raises more serious problems. The idea that understanding involves a grasp on explanatory schemes may work well for words like 'democracy' or 'emergency'. But when a child grasps the meaning of 'dog', can we really say he has mastered some explanatory scheme, however primitive? There are substantial disputes in psychology about when children acquire a grasp of 'in virtue of relations' and the other nuts and bolts of explanation. Moravcsik's failure to discuss developmental issues perhaps derives from his confidence in the idea of *homo explanans*, which seems to make explanatory prowess a brute feature of human nature. It is therefore unfortunate that the suggestive notion of *homo explanans* is strikingly underdeveloped. For example, Moravcsik asserts that concepts are

formed in response to puzzlement and offers the following illustration: 'among women in a social unit there will be one with special biological and emotional ties to a given child in that community. Wonderment at this leads to the formation of the concept of a mother' (49-50). Such speculative anthropology is unpersuasive.

Thought and Language may not win many converts. However, its eccentricities notwithstanding, it remains a valuable reminder that the prevailing species of naturalism are not the only ways to think about cognition.

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Gonzalo Munévar, ed.

*Beyond Reason: Essays on the Philosophy
of Paul K. Feyerabend.*

Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers
1991. Pp. xxi + 535.

US \$135.00. ISBN 0-7923-1272-4.

This book consists of twenty-four essays on the philosophical contributions of Paul Feyerabend, as well as a 'Concluding Unphilosophical Conversation' by Feyerabend himself. Some of these essays have been published elsewhere, and some are as much as thirteen years old. The volume will be of interest to Feyerabend scholars, but also to a wide range of other readers because of the themes that are touched upon. Some of the essays collected here would be of use in both graduate and undergraduate courses on philosophy of science and radical social theory. The reason for this is that Feyerabend's work raises questions concerning rationalism versus irrationalism and anarchism, relativism and pluralism versus objectivism. As Feyerabend and his commentators are aware, these are themes that transcend — especially in this era of political correctness — the narrow confines of science, where they first made their appearance.

Feyerabend's methodological *dictum* is that anything goes. This is just as well, because this book is a collection of varied and often wildly contradictory opinions on just what it is that Feyerabend has to say. There is something here for everyone! Feyerabend is portrayed in these pages, sometimes as sage, sometimes as clown, sometimes as reactionary, sometimes as radical, sometimes as radish (red on the outside, but white on the inside), and sometimes as a curious mixture of all of the above.

A number of papers consider Feyerabend's contributions to salient themes in contemporary philosophy of science. Cliff Hooker, in a rather long essay, sets the scene for much of this debate by trying to delineate Feyerabend's position in the western intellectual tradition. Issues surrounding materialism are inevitably raised. Churchland, for example, hopes to provide a grounding for Feyerabend's philosophy in an analysis of the microanatomy of the brain. This paper may usefully be read in tandem with Grover Maxwell's discussion of Feyerabendian materialism.

The debate between realists and anti-realists is one of the great concerns of contemporary philosophy of science. The reader will find a mixed bag of essays on this topic. Wartofsky, for example, discusses the issue of how to be a good realist — but without any apparent awareness of the difficulties which realists are faced with by experimental and theoretical results in contemporary physics. By contrast Ian Hacking discusses experimentation as a means to 'create phenomena'. This paper contains an excellent discussion of the relations between experimental and theoretical science. The realist-anti-realist theme continues with Musgrave's historically oriented arguments defending realism in the face of orthodox claims about the role of instrumentalism in pre-Copernican astronomy. In a similar vein, Worrall considers Feyerabend's claims concerning the theory-ladenness of facts, and appears to find at the core of these claims some defensible views previously articulated by Poincaré and Duhem.

In a volume of this nature, it is perhaps inevitable that some considerable discussion should be devoted to issues surrounding scientific methodology — and in particular to such matters as epistemological anarchism, relativism, critical rationalism, and falsificationalism. Essays by Hannay, Kekes, Andersson, Suppe, Perovich and Margolis discuss issues related to these topics. Suppe concludes that Feyerabend's philosophy, 'is the ultimate *reductio ad absurdum* of Lockean empiricism' (308). Feyerabend's relativism and his critique of falsificationism are discussed by Kekes and Andersson respectively. Perovich's essay provides a useful analysis of the concept of the incommensurability of theories as it appears in Feyerabend's work. And Margolis discusses Feyerabendian anarchism and compares the methodological strategies of Feyerabend and Lakatos.

There are also political themes in this volume. Ravetz' essay deals with ideological presuppositions in philosophy of science, and with Feyerabend as a product of the 60s California counter-culture. A rather more sinister picture of Feyerabend is painted by Agassi. If the methodological claim that anything goes is taken seriously, then perhaps we have to take Nazism seriously. The essay contains some interesting biographical comments about Feyerabend, but also a very serious challenge to any would-be relativist: 'He says anything goes; I say, not anything, not brutality, for example, not Auschwitz. He retorts, a well written play may make us sympathize for a fleeting moment even with a Nazi brute' (385). Analogous worries are expressed by Schnädelbach concerning some of Feyerabend's irresponsible remarks on creationist

science as an alternative to Darwinism: ‘... one should not try to present every reactionary victory as a triumph of pluralism’ (445).

Feyerabend has his defenders. Vine Deloria sees Feyerabend as one of the few westerners who are actively trying to promote a multicultural dialogue. In this regard, the relativism and pluralism decried by others is seen as a positive virtue. Essays by Munévar and Koertge consider a number of issues surrounding the relations between scientific institutions and other social institutions — and the state, in particular. (Koertge’s discussion has more to do with Popper than Feyerabend).

Margherita von Brentano’s essay will repay serious reading. She links issues discussed by Feyerabend with issues relating to the persecution of witches, native Americans and African Americans, as well as anti-semitism. Feyerabend is praised for his hostility to ‘expertocracy’ and the other social diseases issuing forth from the modern bureaucratic state, as well as his pleas on behalf of the oppressed. This essay represents the other side of the relativist/pluralist coin discussed by Agassi. Perhaps more than any other recent figure in western thought, Feyerabend has seen the full import of the downside of the naive rationalism and pretended objectivism which has apparently mesmerized so many influential people in our social and scientific institutions.

This leads to the final theme in the volume: the connection between Feyerabend and the ecology movement. These topics receive an excellent treatment by Arne Naess, who relates various aspects of Feyerabend’s philosophy to some of the diverse strands that go to make up the Green Movements. He finds Feyerabend to present a philosophical vision which is consistent with Green philosophy and politics. These themes are important, for we have just witnessed a decade when one President of the U.S. has blamed trees for air pollution, and another believes that the wet lands may be preserved for wildlife by opening them up for commercial development. If this is objective western rationalism, then the sooner it is critiqued, the better!

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Wallace A. Murphree

Numerically Exceptive Logic: A Reduction of the Classical Syllogism.

New York: Peter Lang 1991. Pp. 211.

\$32.95. ISBN 0-8204-1449-2.

Wallace Murphree has developed a system of syllogistic which is completely new and original. It may even be important. I'll say more about this system below. A little over a century ago Frege developed a system of logic which was completely new and original. And it was, to say the least, important. Unfortunately for Frege, he presented his logic in a little book which was not much read for a very long time. Moreover, his system was presented in an awkward manner and burdened with a symbolic algorithm which was far from simple. Fortunately for twentieth-century logicians, Frege's logic was eventually discovered, appreciated and put into its now classical form by articulate, influential logicians like Russell. Now, of course, *Numerically Exceptive Logic* is no *Begriffsschrift*. And numerically exceptive logic is no predicate calculus with identity. And Murphree may be no Frege. But what they do have in common is that each produced a new and interesting system of logic in a little book which fails to do justice to that system.

So let me first say something about Murphree's system and then something about his book. The hegemony enjoyed by the standard predicate calculus has been challenged recently by (among others) logicians bent on reestablishing some version of traditional syllogistic logic. The old, original version, as all concede, is simply not viable as an alternative to today's mathematical logic. Any syllogistic with a chance as an alternative must be an extended and strengthened one — moreover, one provided with an effective, simple algorithm. Fred Sommers and his followers have been building the most comprehensive version of such a logic. A different approach is to strengthen syllogistic by providing it with a variety of nonclassical quantifiers. There have been generally two versions of this approach. The first sees quantifiers as ranging from zero (none) to one (all, 100%), expressed either as percentages (e.g., Bruce Thompson) or fractions (e.g., Philip Peterson). On that version there are an infinite number of quantifiers (e.g., 'at least one', 'at least seven', 'at most 10%', 'at most half', etc.). The second version is Murphree's numerically exceptive logic. For Murphree, as well, there are an infinite number of quantifiers. However, in this case the quantifiers are infinite in number because each is formed relative to a natural number. Murphree's quantifiers are numerically definite expressions such as 'one', 'seven', 'four hundred and twelve', and so forth. Now the idea that there is a logic involving such expressions is an old one. But what is unique about the present system is that Murphree has built it with an eye toward preserving certain essential features of classical syllogistic (viz., traditional immediate inferences and the square of opposition relations). In order to do this he had to recast the numerical expressions in two ways: (i) each quantifier has a basic form which is 'exceptive' ('all but x S's are P' or 'none

but x S's are P', where x is a natural number or zero), and (ii) each such expression is qualified by either 'at least' or 'at most'. As a result there are four *general* forms of quantifiers: 'at least all but x ', 'at most all but x ', 'at least none but x ' and 'at most none but x '. Since there are an infinite number of values for ' x ' there are an infinite number of possible quantifiers. The four classical quantifiers are seen as merely limiting cases of these. Thus, the four categoricals are read as follows. A: At least all but 0 S are P; E: At most none but 0 S are P; I: At least none but 1 S are P; O: At most all but 1 S are P.

Murphree has supplied the logic with an elaborate system of diagrams ('schematics') involving arrows, dotted arrows, lines, etc., which are meant to display the logical form of a statement by virtue of all the 'assignments' and 'dispositions' of each 'division' of each term (and its negation). Avoiding technical details, one can think of assignment and disposition as affirmation and denial. Division is the splitting of the extension of a quantified term into two subsets by virtue of the 'deviation' (the relevant numerical value for ' x '). The diagrams (not to mention the terminology) are often overly complex, displaying more information than is usually required. But Murphree's symbolization is clear and simple. He merely prefixes the deviation to the classical A, E, I and O symbolization. For example, 'At least none but seven S's are P' is symbolized as '7SIP', 'At most all but four hundred and twelve S's are P' would be '412SOP'.

There are clear accounts of how sets of statements with numerically exceptive quantifiers are related by contradictoriness, contrariety, subcontrariety and implication. Consequently, Murphree can show how the square of opposition is preserved (or, to be precise, how an infinite number of such squares hold since each is relative to some deviation). The heart of the system is its theory of validity for arguments. To put it roughly, but simply, arguments are generally syllogistic, having a pair of categorical premises and a categorical conclusion (in the now extended sense of categorical). As with classical syllogistic, a valid argument is one in which the middle term can be eliminated. Eliminability here amounts simply to having opposing distribution values in its two occurrences. As well, there is a restriction involving the divisions of the three terms: 'supply-leak=recovery'. Supply is the division of the minor assigned to the middle. Leak is the division of the middle disposed to the negation of the major. Recovery is the division of the minor assigned to the major. All this may sound excessively obscure (and is made even more so by Murphree's free-wheeling use of neologisms — using 'supplier', 'transmitter' and 'receiver' for 'minor', 'middle' and 'major', for example). But, in fact, the idea is quite simple — indeed, elegant. Consider one of his examples. The premises are '9SIM' and '2MAP'. The strongest valid conclusion here is '7SIP', since 7 equals the supply (9) minus the leak (2). Weaker conclusions, e.g., '6SIP', could also be validly drawn.

A very large portion of the book is taken up with tables of general forms of arguments (valid and invalid), differentiated by kinds of conclusions, presuppositions of terms, and moods. A summary would have probably sufficed (and the result would have been a *very* short book). That is, it would have been very

short unless Murphree had done what in fact he did not do — offer clear and more thorough motivations for, and discussions of, the various elements of his theory. I shall elaborate briefly. Though I have in no way presented the formal algorithm in sufficient detail here, the fact is that it is a quite simple and effective one (though I believe it can be further simplified). But the question still remains: why build numerically exceptive logic in the first place? Numerically exceptive quantifier expressions, such as ‘at least all but nine’, are perhaps grammatically in order, but they are hardly to be met with in ordinary discourse. *That* their logic can be elegantly formalized cries out for an explanation of *why* it should be. Now to be fair, Murphree does attempt something of the sort in his final chapter, situating his logic with respect to Aristotle’s, the predicate calculus, and mathematics. But it is too little, too late. Finally, as alluded to above, the book is marred by an unwarranted enthusiasm for new coinage when common currency works just as well (or better). This, coupled with unnecessary complexity of presentation in many places (and such minor flaws as the lack of an index and the presence of many typos in key places) makes the book a less than happy vehicle for a system of formal logic which has, at the very least, great promise.

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Graeme Nicholson.
*Illustrations of Being: Drawing Upon
Heidegger and Upon Metaphysics.*
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press
International Inc. 1992. Pp. xiii + 293.
US \$49.95. ISBN 0-391-03738-2.

This is an extraordinary achievement in comparative hermeneutics, perhaps, the culmination of the narrative of Gadamer’s *Truth and Method*. A rigorous study of Heidegger’s thought, Nicholson’s work is also a fine survey of *Seinsverständnis* in the history of philosophy. It offers a precise and extensive review of writings by Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Hegel, Kant, Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Quine, and Derrida.

The text begins with the theme of illustration. What comes together under this title takes its force in large measure from a dynamic hermeneutic reading/writing of being. The question of being is not limited to presence, repression, or nostalgia. Nicholson argues that Heidegger’s illustrative styles exceed deconstruction: ‘For a long time now, all too long, thought has been sitting on the dry land. What it needs is the vast open sea’ (11). His concern is illustrative thinking. This is a kind of thinking that casts light into (*in-lustrare*) a unique

embrace of ancient and modern philosophy. The event of this embrace is illustrated by the image of Marcus Aurelius, marking the manifest and hidden truth of being throughout this text. Quite plainly, thinking according to Nicholson draws upon the rigor and discipline of an ever-widening trajectory of *Seinsverständnis*, one that includes the power linked to the fascinating Stoic emperor on a horse. Illustration, therefore, is not simply another method of interpretation but rather an economy of *Verstehen*. A *Wort-Werk*, illustration 'is a characteristic movement of philosophical thought' (23). More precisely, illustration signifies illustrations, of being's power first of all. Invariably, the frame of thinking fits infinite paintings of being. This Leibnizian enthusiasm, which permeates Nicholson's text, touched by the radiance of Marcus Aurelius, 'cannot but strike up an affinity with being — no matter in what subject or in what illustration' (273). Thinking that works by illustrations preserves the difference without losing the identity. It preserves becoming without losing being. Illustrative thinking reorganizes the entire landscape of metaphysics. Surprisingly, perhaps, it marks philosophy's 'promise' to be 'friendly and accessible.' Without arrogance, Nicholson tackles lofty questions about Heidegger and metaphysics.

Chapter one opens upon a philosophy that writes about being from the standpoint of *Verstehen*. Chapter two unfolds this theme in diverse illustrations of 'the exister,' who poses the question of being. The exister draws upon being while withdrawing from a self-critical process. 'Existing brings ... exiting' (47). Exiting from self, the exister (as 'exiter') is also a 'discloser' advancing toward an undetermined future. Chapter three regards this future as the out-standing site of freedom, an illustration of *Unverborgenheit* (unconcealedness). Here 'disclosive existing' is precisely the 'open zone' in which truth is rendered by illustrations of being rather than by the property of subject. For Nicholson, deconstruction, which does not articulate sufficiently the question of being, loses sight of 'the native element proper to thinking' (110). His turning away from Derrida is an illustrative re-turning to Heidegger and metaphysics. He draws upon Heidegger's understanding of being in order to see metaphysics differently. He reinscribes another structure, 'a major *new principle*' into metaphysics: the flux of *Unverborgenheit*. In doing so, chapters four, five, and six are bound to arouse new arguments with regard to the relationship between Heidegger and deconstruction.

Chapter seven provides a superb history of modernity by shedding light on the concept of reality from Descartes to Heidegger. It illustrates the story of early modernity which says that reality is the interpretation of being. Nicholson shows that Heidegger's *Dasein* transcends reality as ready to hand and present at hand. Indeed, Heidegger invites us to think modernity from the standpoint of *Existenz*, utterly different from reality.

Chapter eight is a brilliant ontological inquiry into the complex relationship between hermeneutics and modern logic. It is too brief, however, and ought to be, perhaps, the initial chapter of another project.

Chapter nine draws the reader back into the very enterprise of this text, — the question of writing about being, this time from the standpoint of a

philosophical Christianity. Nicholson questions not merely the ease with which contemporary philosophers (Sartre, Derrida, Deleuze) dismiss the Christian awareness of being but also the comfort some find in no longer posing the question whether there is a place for being.

The final chapter is perhaps the most personal as well as the most provocative part of this book. Nicholson expresses 'a complaint of the 20th century against the 19th. We are the heirs of a range of staggeringly huge undertakings, each of them the work of an exuberant will' (270). Here, the strategy of illustrations destabilizes the philosophy of willing. Nicholson's 'green philosophy' confirms Heidegger's *Gelassenheit*. Quite plainly, *greening* means understanding 'how thinking belongs within being,' and how it too acts on that understanding (276). This peculiar 'concinnity' or proportioning of thinking to being sketches out two possibilities for the future: one, the institution of a rule of justice and two, a psychology of abundance. The first idea concerns the power of international law. No doubt Nicholson needs to explore this matter in greater detail. The second idea is commendable too, yet it is too indefinite and utopian: 'The condition of abundance that is within reach is the condition, where, for every person's needs and desires, there is a supply sufficient — and then some' (278). Nicholson concedes that this moral-psychological abundance fosters anarchist communism: 'It would be the absolute disappearance of the property relation; it would continue a change in our relations, not only to one another but to the animals and things that constitute our environment' (279).

Does *greening* signify better castles in the sky? How does it relate to *filming*, paradoxically, a counterfoundational, nonimaginal *Blicksprung*? (See my *Filming and Judgment* [Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1990]). While filming breaks the mirror of mimesis, releasing imagination from telos, *greening* retains a dynamic mimesis in search of a distinctive social opening. In *greening* there is an anticipation of being and truth. Filming takes this metaphysical anticipation out of reflection by glancing at capital, without channelling the latter into a 'positive' or 'negative' reading of the postmodern epoch. Green philosophy seems to have left this matter unthought.

Beyond the contours of this issue, Nicholson's text is exceptional in the way it absorbs the whole tradition of philosophy since Aristotle. Building upon his earlier *Reading and Seeing*, the current text offers a new and provocative interpretation of philosophy after deconstruction. Truly a learning experience, *Illustrations of Being* is invaluable not only to students and scholars of philosophy and Western intellectual thought in general but also to a wider readership interested in the crucial issues of our time. Invigorating to read, Nicholson's work is lucid, bold, and remarkably rigorous, full of crystalline insights. This is indeed a calm and welcome breeze in contemporary philosophical scholarship.

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Leszek Nowak

Power and Civil Society:

Toward a Dynamic Theory of Real Socialism.

Trans. Krzysztof Sawala.

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1991.

Contributions in Political Science series,
number 271. Pp. xii + 233.

US \$47.95. ISBN 0-313-27505-X.

Leszek Nowak is perhaps not very well known to wide circles of Western readers and neither are his philosophical works. Both, however, merit at least close attention, if not recognition. Nowak himself has long been, along with Jerzy Kmita, one of the pillars of the much respected Poznan centre for Marxist methodology of science. Scarcely ever being an orthodox Marxist, with his turn towards the philosophy of history, Nowak ceased to be even a revisionist. After his theory of non-Marxian historical materialism had turned out to be an indirect critique of the regime, all this finally costed Nowak the job at Poznan University and an internment during the marshall law of 1981. For six years his ideas had circulated underground until Nowak regained his previous position in 1989.

Power and Civil Society is Nowak's latest publication in non-Marxian historical materialism, the theory created by Nowak and developed since the late seventies by his own school at Poznan. Like all of his previous works, it focuses on power, the central category of Nowak's philosophy of history. However, unlike many of his previous works, in particular *Property and Power* (Norwell, MA: Kluwer 1983), the first major exposition of Nowak's version of historical materialism, the present book does not argue with Marxism. Non-Marxian historical materialism is now established as a methodology of political theory and the author's efforts go to showing its consequences for the civil society.

This last theme has already been analyzed in *Property and Power*, and *Power and Civil Society* is primarily its continuation. Out of the five parts of the book, only the first and the last contain new ideas. Virtually all remaining material is an elaboration and refinement of the concepts previously introduced in *Property and Power*. This certainly does not detract from the value of the book; new analyses are more detailed as the models of society Nowak considers become more systematic. However, as a follow-up, the present book heavily depends on the previous. Non-Marxian historical materialism is only scantily explained and one's knowledge of the basic tenets of Nowak's theory seems tacitly assumed throughout. For the reader who is new to non-Marxian historical materialism, a brief introduction to Nowak's theory would be, in fact, more than useful.

As much as a methodology of politics, non-Marxian historical materialism is a theory of power, in the same way as Marxism has always been both a theory of economics and a method of political science. In Nowak's perspective the power factor has been unduly neglected by traditional Marxism where

the relations of ownership and production alone determine the class division and stimulate the process of political transition.

In contrast, non-Marxian historical materialism postulates the existence of not just one class division in society but as many as three. In addition to the division between the disposers of the means of production and the hired workers, Nowak claims a similar stratification in the spheres of power and ideology. The class struggle can be political or ideological, as well as economic. On one side are *rulers*, defined as the disposers of the means of coercion or *priests*, disposers of the means of indoctrination. On the other — the ruled and the indoctrinated. It is unavoidable that the interests of the antagonistic classes must clash; those in the positions of power (in a broad sense) strive to extend the sphere of domination, be it political or ideological, at the expense of the autonomy of the subjugated class.

However, the area of conflict is never limited to intra-class antagonisms alone. In fact, Nowak claims, the dominant classes remain themselves in constant fight as the aspiration to enlarge the sphere of political regulation encounters the desire to maximize the profit. The outcome of this *supra-class* struggle determines the basic character of a given formation, more political or more economic.

The phenomenon of supra-class struggle could not be accounted for by Marx who did not provide for the existence of other class divisions. The exclusive emphasis on property blunted, in effect, the explanatory capacity of historical materialism and made it misrepresent the real causes of historical processes. The type of explanation it offers works well only with the purely socio-economic formations of West-European slavery and feudalism. It is less effective with respect to modern capitalism, where the political interest of the rulers is powerfully advanced by the growing influence of the state. Yet it fails remarkably in the case of socialism where the class of rulers own the means of production and indoctrination as well.

Socialism, with its politically totalitarian society, is therefore a *par excellence* test-case for a theory of power. However, despite the subtitle *Toward a Dynamic Theory of Real Socialism*, Nowak's new book does not so much focus in on socialism *per se* as, rather, treats it as a horizon of political events in our culture. *Power and Civil Society* is intended to be a dynamic theory of power, tracking down 'the regularity of changes of relations between the authority and civil society' (49). And it indeed is what it is meant to be even though Nowak's claim to absolute originality should perhaps bow before Aristotle, Machiavelli or Weber, to name but a few.

The book opens with the part entitled 'Assumptions: The Nature of Power'. Its two chapters lay out the basic foundations for the models of society developed in parts two through four. The idea of including this part could certainly be a valuable addition to the theoretical framework of *Property and Power*. However, these two chapters seem to be most questionable of all.

In the first Nowak sketches out an anthropology of non-Marxian historical materialism. His model of man is built in contradistinction to a Christian model which to him is ubiquitous in political theory of our culture. The

characteristic features of the Christian model are two: rationality of the individual and linear relationship of human interactions. They mean, in a word, that people normally act according to their own preferences and knowledge, and that they reciprocate proportionately the same kind of treatment they received from others. Yet, while the Christian model is accurate within the range of typical behaviour, it fails at the extremes of malignity and benevolence. Nowak observes that in the state of economic, political or ideological dependence, people do not realize their own interests but they advance the interests of their owners, rulers or priests. On the other hand, when receiving too much of kindness, they tend to respond with hostility.

Having rejected the faulty assumptions of the Christian model of man, Nowak proceeds to develop a comprehensive graph of social behaviour. Depending on the level of hostility or benevolence, individual attitudes pass from proportional reciprocity to rebellion and enslavement on the one end of the spectrum, and to increased kindness and *satanization* on the other. This observation seems to be interesting and quite accurate, despite the weird terminology in which it is wrapped. Much less inspiring is a rather confused discussion of the notions of negative and positive freedom which concludes the non-Christian model of man and chapter 1.

Yet the real problem starts with the transition from the level of an individual to that of a society. As it appears, for Nowak, social relations are shaped by extrapolation from individual reactions appropriately to social movements. Nowhere does he prove, however, that such an extrapolation is methodologically warranted; in fact, society usually is considered to be something more than a mereological sum of individual people. Barring this difficulty, we are presented again with a chart which traces the fluctuations of the attitudes of social resistance and consensus on the axis between total enslavement and total satanization. The chart is interesting enough though, like all charts in this book, not easy to read for the reader unacquainted with the Polish language (all symbols are clearly derivatives of Polish words). However, the reader may feel more uneasy about some of its assumptions, especially those which deal again with the non-Christian model of man. The state of social anarchy, or *social alienation*, which occupies the far left end of the chart has been linked to satanization although the latter was earlier defined merely as 'responding to the greatest benevolence with hostility' (13). Perhaps, the account of anarchy would be more plausible if it were instead connected with the excesses of freedom. This obvious idea may have appeared to Nowak too since the state of social alienation is placed on the opposite pole to the state of *civic alienation* which is characterized by total enslavement. So is satanization tantamount, or at least conducive, to anarchy? Unclear and at best speculative.

The concept of social alienation was the last major innovation introduced to the framework of the political theory of *Property and Power*. From now on Nowak mostly fills in the details, and things go nicely. In parts 2 to 4 the reader is presented with a number of models of power of an increasing level

of complexity. The accepted methodology of the book lets the author start in chapter 3 with six simplifying assumptions and gradually enrich the model by dropping them one at a time. This so-called *idealization method* is a tried method of Nowak's school of methodology.

The initial, *elementary* model pictures a society which (1) is completely isolated from other societies, (2) has only one class division, i.e., political, (3) is void of technical progress in the area of means of coercion, (4) has no intermediate apparatus of coercion, (5) has no political institutions, and (6) is ideologically blank. Easing up on the appropriate assumptions, Nowak next gradually expands the model. Still in part two he lets in only political institutions and ideology (chapters 4 and 5) yet later, in subsequent parts, the allowance is made for international relations (in part three, chapters 7 through 9), and technological progress in exercising power, separate forces of coercion and competing factions within the authority (part four, chapters 10 through 12).

All these models are much more specific and closer to reality than those studied before in *Property and Power*. In fact, they are rich enough to include such phenomena as the transition from ideology to utopia or the balance of power within a block of satellite countries. Though none is free from simplifications, the different combinations of assumptions let the reader realize the significance of most of them. In Nowak's analyses they just lead to scenarios of possible developments in the relationship between power and civil society. The dynamics of that relationship is marked by the stages of growing civil alienation — revolution or a series of revolutions — declassing of the society — enslavement of lower-rank rulers — revolution — falling civil alienation as a result of lost revolution or a spiral of subsequent revolutions in case it is won.

The transformations of the society are always powered by two opposite tendencies. On the one hand, the authority strives to increase the sphere of regulation; on the other the civil society tries to broaden its autonomy. Both tendencies are, in fact, laws of social dynamics and operate regardless of the intentions of individuals. In effect, the rulers tend to increase their control even if this turns against the people who elevated them to the positions of power, or participate in power as lower-rank functionaries. Nowak, as a theorist of power, is as helpless in confrontation with the laws of non-Marxian historical materialism as anyone else. Yet he is not a disinterested spectator; his sympathy goes clearly to the oppressed societies and nations. At places the book reads indeed like a compendium of tips for the civil society, the most important one being the paradoxical 'make revolutions but loose them'.

A careful discussion of the models would take us far beyond the limits of a review; I cannot therefore but recommend them to the readers themselves. Nowak's analyses are shrewd and inspiring, and shed light on much of the political history of our civilization. In the last, fifth part of the book he even attempts a prediction about the future of the former Soviet empire. Though the assumptions of his models are being thrown in and out somewhat

haphazardly, methodological standards of the author are generally admirable. A more inquiring reader will additionally find six appendixes which clarify the main tenets of Nowak's theory and relate it to other concepts of power.

All in all, *Power and Civil Society* is an interesting book, original and stimulating, even if sometimes speculative. For the theory of non-Marxian historical materialism this is a step in the right direction as the analyzed models get more flesh and explanative power. However, the attempt to broaden its theoretical foundation has failed: the non-Christian model of man seems too weak, or perhaps just ill-suited for Nowak's concept of power.

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John Passmore

Serious Art.

LaSalle, IL: Open Court 1991. Pp. x + 301.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9181-4);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9182-2).

Having published some 40 years ago a widely read paper entitled 'The Dreariness of Aesthetics', John Passmore recognizes that he puts himself at some risk in presenting this large-scale work in the philosophy of the arts. ('What an opportunity for reviewers ...' [ix].) In that article, however, he in fact defended aesthetics against Wisdom's suggestion that there was something inherently wrong with philosophizing about the arts, attributing what he took to be its *de facto* dreariness, at least as pursued at the middle of the century, to the persistent attempt to say something interesting, general, and true about Art, particularly about what makes for value in Art, rather than talking about say, literature or music or even the novel or the symphony. He claims, moreover, that the current book 'is not a contribution to aesthetics (ix)' as there stigmatized, a claim that can be justified on at least two grounds: in the book the subject of aesthetic value does not figure very prominently at all, and the argument of the book proceeds against a background of scrupulous attention to specific examples and to the differences between the arts. (The generalizations which Passmore occasionally permits himself have a sense of being very hard-won, indeed.)

The fundamental question addressed is 'What makes some art serious?' This use of the word 'serious' in describing a certain kind of art is attributed to George Bernard Shaw and is initially explicated by Passmore by reference

to Collingwood's distinction among magical art (Passmore prefers the term 'telic art'), amusement art, and art proper. Serious art is thus first negatively characterized as art which invites attention and criticism in terms other than those of its relative success or failure as entertainment (amusement art) or propaganda (telic art). The bulk of the book, then, consists of a survey of some of the traditional staples of aesthetics (including aesthetics of the dreary sort), e.g., beauty, formal perfection, artistic 'truth', and expressivity, only now considered as candidates for use in a positive account of what makes for seriousness in art. Imaginativeness emerges as 'at least a necessary although not a sufficient condition of being serious art' (104); more specifically, the satisfaction of certain 'formal requirements' (e.g., balance, unity) in imaginative ways 'distinguishes serious art' (212). (Passmore's positive account of serious art thus has little in common with Collingwood's account of art proper, despite the fact that the concept of the imagination figures prominently in both.) The general upshot is confessedly 'untidy' (291); perhaps not unexpectedly in view of Passmore's meta-aesthetic strictures, nothing of the form 'W is a serious work of art if and only if ...' emerges.

Although there is constant contact with familiar disputes in aesthetics, it should be clear that Passmore's inquiry is not identical with any of them. To seek an account of seriousness in art is not to seek an account of art, for telic art and amusement art are still art (25). Nor is it to seek to distinguish 'classical' or 'high-brow' art, for some of that, Passmore claims, periodically sounding a note of disenchantment with 'post-modern' art and the theorizing associated with it, is mere amusement for the art world (220); (One might add, though Passmore himself is perhaps not as clear about this, that some popular art is obviously serious in the relevant sense.) Nor is the search for seriousness in art the search for aesthetic value; serious art can fail (11). Rather it might be described as the search for what makes some art worthy of being evaluated (hence the connection with value) in its own right, apart from its effects, of being in itself *taken seriously*.

Something that deserves to be called a kind of aestheticism — art for its own sake — thus appears to be a fundamental assumption of the book, carried in the very way in which the concept of seriousness as here characterized is taken as its *explanandum*, this despite the fact that officially Passmore is careful not to take it for granted that there is any art that is truly serious in the relevant sense (6). One can sympathize with this assumption, but one would like to see a more direct confrontation between Passmore and those, of whom he is well aware however unimpressed he may be by their position, for whom the idea of serious art is an illusion.

Besides the many examples from the arts (whose presence Passmore feels called upon to defend against charges that they are 'confusing' and 'distracting' (292) — surely only an aesthician of irredeemable dreariness would suggest such a thing), there are frequent quotations from and discussions of many of the philosophers who are staples of what might be called, parochially enough, 'pre-analytic' aesthetics (Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Tolstoy, Bell, Dewey, Collingwood). But there is virtually no scholarly apparatus — an

index, but no footnotes, no page references, no bibliography. This is perhaps a forgivable inconvenience. (Passmore excuses himself implicitly on the grounds of having been super-scholarly in his work up to now (ix), something for which any reader of *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* can cheerfully vouch.) More serious is the fact that there is virtually no reference to recent work in aesthetics in the English-speaking tradition which might fairly be said to have rescued the field from at least the specific kind of dreariness Passmore found in it 40 years ago. (One may be less than enamored of recent Anglo-American aesthetics for other reasons, but these would not necessarily impress someone of Passmore's particular artistic interests and philosophical proclivities.) Some of the 'untidiness' of Passmore's conclusions may be, as he suggests, inherent in the subject, but some of it may be the result of a lack of awareness of recent writing in the field. It is not too much to imagine that something may have been achieved in that literature by way of making sense of issues which may seem intractable to someone who refers more frequently to Prall and Parker than to Dickie and Danto.

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Kenneth Rankin

The Recovery of the Soul:

An Aristotelian Essay on Self-Fulfillment.

Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's
University Press 1991. Pp. xii + 258.

Cdn \$44.95. ISBN 0-7735-0796-5.

Taking his lead from Aristotle, Rankin's 'psychocentric physicalism' offers a novel approach to an old problem: How to explain the apparent psychological unity of human action in terms of a world ultimately accountable to physical law. Rankin's attempt to 'recover the soul' is notable on at least three counts. First, his portrayal of Aristotle sheds new light on a thinker whose relevance to contemporary philosophical psychology is far from obvious. Second, Rankin makes a valuable contribution to recent scholarly attempts to reconcile ill-fitting aspects of Aristotle's philosophy into a more integrated whole. Lastly, Rankin offers a philosophy of psychology that deserves attention in its own right.

Rankin's approach to philosophy of psychology is essentially holistic in that he views its ontological, epistemological and psychological elements as mutually implicative. Rankin refers to this holism as *The Integrative Pro-*

gram: 'As conceived through the integrative analysis of the psychocentric physicalist, space and time ... are not to be regarded as alienating us from the rest of the universe ... [i]t is within the dispersions of space and the longeurs of time that the possibilities, to the mutual discrepancies of which we owe our intrinsic thinghood, divide and proliferate. Conversely, it is through the diminutive portions of matter to which thinghood pertains that the spatio-temporal order presupposed by this division and the proliferation of possibilities ... acquire a non-arbitrary status as the basic physical order' (238). That is, as physical objects ourselves we are not 'alienated' from the universe, but rather owe our 'non-arbitrary thinghood' to potencies which emerge from the same spatio-temporally given possibilities that we share with all other things.

Rankin's conception of 'non-arbitrary thinghood' reflects a theme basic to Aristotle's hylomorphic approach to psychology in *de Anima II*. Here, Aristotle offers several tentative conceptions of soul as a potency or orchestration of potencies that characterize a living thing (DA 412a19-b17). Crucial to each of these is the notion that the soul is the *body's* organizing principle, the power of a *physical* thing differentiated from others 'by virtue of having organs of certain kinds' (xix). Armed with this tentative conception Aristotle enters upon what Rankin calls The Path to Enlightenment (xv), a quintessentially Aristotelian journey from that which is 'more knowable for us to what is more knowable by nature' (xv, 71-2).

According to Rankin, Aristotle strays from The Path at the point at which he posits a Prime Mover who becomes the essences of objects and their motions through contemplating them (122-5). In Rankin's 'rectified' version, '[e]ach one of us takes over the function of Prime Mover in more than one way ... in as much as some of our actions are causally underdetermined, we move other things without ourselves being moved' (161). For Rankin, then, Aristotle fails to take his own hylomorphism seriously enough, sheering away from its originally physicalist basis (xviii-xix, 122-5) toward an inconsistent 'proto-Cartesian' notion of mind (124-5).

It would be mistaken, however, to read Rankin's 'rectified' version of The Path as a demotion of the Prime Mover to the 'merely' material, for it is precisely here that the holism of The Integrative Program is most evident. As 'each one of us', the Prime Mover knows not that which is radically different from itself, but knows precisely because knowing is itself an essentially physical activity, the product of a temporally instantiated (210) 'self-intimating reflexive potency' (184, 238). Rankin refers to this potency as the O-ability: the ability to act otherwise. He argues that '[t]he soul is nothing but the occasion-loose (OL) form of the occasion-bound (OB) abilities. It is what qualifies you as an agent, as a being that is liable to be responsible for what it does on certain occasions in a primary way ...' (127). 'Each one of us,' in other words, is a potential knower just in so far as we are also actors.

Rankin argues that '[t]he O-ability that pertains to that agent by virtue of a causal underdetermination of his action is the distinctive sort of power

from which the intrinsic thinghood derives' (157). The epistemological is thus implicated in the ontological in that the reflexive ability agents have to do otherwise is a physical ability; the ontological is likewise implicated in the epistemological in that '[a]s bearers of the primary power [O-ability] we as substances are intrinsically mutable and the source of the less exclusive extrinsic non-arbitrary mutability that we share with other things' (161). By the same token, then, as the non-arbitrary status of reality and its contents is ultimately conferred through knowledge of it (122-3, 239-41), knowledge is essentially self-knowledge since it is *our actions* which provide this non-arbitrariness.

There is much for the physicalistically oriented philosopher to sympathize with in Rankin's 'recovery.' However, good philosophizing often raises interesting difficulties. One such difficulty is Rankin's treatment of Aristotle's discussion of the orchestration of the nutritive, perceptive and intellectual souls (DA II3) which he describes as a mere 'vertical stacking of faculties in a one-way relation of functional dependence' (106) — a rather shallow reading for a philosopher who displays considerable sensitivity to the possibility of alternatives elsewhere. What makes this striking, however, is the possibility of a plausible alternative *very* much kin to Rankin's own psychocentric physicalism.

A closer read of the relevant passages shows that Aristotle is not simply 'resting a column of cups on a single saucer' (106) but providing a careful articulation of the interrelations among the powers whose orchestration define the soul of a living thing (DA 412a14-15, 414b30-2, 415a20). At least two implications follow for Rankin's rectification should such an alternative prove plausible: First, an orchestration of essentially interrelated powers mutually implicates the ontological and the epistemological in a manner relevantly similar to Rankin's own schema. Second, the 'non-arbitrary thinghood' implied by interrelated potencies supports Rankin's revised conception of the Prime Mover. Lastly, if Aristotle's orchestration of potencies may be read as the blueprint for a psychocentric physicalism in its own right, there would seem to be less to recover; perhaps Rankin fails to take Aristotle seriously enough. After all, a soul not lost need not be recovered.

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Jürgen Ritsert

Models and Concepts of Ideology.

Atlanta: Rodopi 1990. Pp. 212.

US \$32.50. ISBN 90-5183-200-1.

What makes this book annoying to read, hard not to put down, and impossible to recommend, is that it is badly conceived, disjointed, and full of gratuitous typographical errors; as is happening so often lately, the whole turns out to be considerably less than the sum of its parts. However, there is no index to identify and locate those interesting parts! Jürgen Ritsert is a sociologist and the author or editor of several earlier books in German — a volume on Hegel bears the provocative title *A Dead Dog Barking* —, but this one was apparently written in English for the series 'Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities' and produced in The Netherlands. Ritsert's wide-ranging knowledge and polyglot documentation cannot obscure the fact that he is not a synthetic writer and thus it is often hard to follow the plot from chapter to chapter or to see the connections with the title.

After a preface of a dozen pages, the book consists of six chapters that follow a more-or-less historical sequence for examining the subject of 'ideology': a look at some theoretical problems including four kinds of relativism (Chapter 2) is followed by a survey of Marxian and Mannheimian models (Chapter 3); Weberian models (Chapter 4); the debate around the Strong Thesis identified in particular with Barry Barnes and David Bloor (Chapter 5); French connections, especially Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault (Chapter 6); and finally the Critical Theory of Ideology formulated by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer. An example of the mixed metaphors and the general tone of the book is given on the first page, when Ritsert claims to have written a text that 'introduces a field which seems to expand like stony acres of ideology growing between scattered crops of pure reason. There are a lot of different and internally differentiated ways to deal with the weeds — theories of ideology they are called!' Later he appears to come back to the same locale when he writes of 'the fields where the heaviest rocks are thrown at philosopher-kings as rulers of the universe of rational analysis and explanation' (119). The analogies are often no more lucid than this.

The separate discussions, for example the distinction between base and superstructure in Marx, or how Foucault's concept of 'discourse' can easily be traced back to Nietzsche, or the four axioms embodied in the 'strong program' of the Edinburgh School, are convincing enough, but there is no set of concepts that reappear throughout the book either to tie the narrative together or to link it to the topic of ideology.

R provides a number of diagrams, such as the sketch of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's model on p. 11 or of an expanded Weberian model on p. 102, that never get mentioned again. Too often the reader puzzles: 'This is interesting enough, but what does it have to do with material in

earlier chapters? How does it illustrate concepts of ideology?' The exception is in those sections where the author is doing his own translations from German, which often become so garbled as to be incomprehensible; this is especially true for Max Weber's 'Objectivity' essay (1904), of which an adequate English translation by Shils and Finch has existed for forty years. The outcome is that the discussion of Weber is distorted and totally at odds with interpretations found elsewhere. (The other persons who get seriously mistranslated are Karl Mannheim and Max Horkheimer. The French, Althusser and Foucault, fare better.)

For someone aware of the self-referential nature of ideology (however defined) R is surprisingly diffident about his own point of view. Apart from identifying himself as a 'stubborn humanist' (167), he also claims to belong to a German tradition critical of strict determinism or causality (128). He appears to accept the conflation of knowledge, science, and ideology, but he does not agree that they can be reduced to hermeneutics, or language games or discourse-analysis alone. Instead, he refers to the importance of 'Fichte's circle' — i.e., the realization that finite minds need to posit something absolute outside themselves while at the same time fully accepting that there is no access to a God's Eye point of view of noumena — and if anything ties the whole book together it is recurrent allusions to this epistemological dialectic (see 21; 23; 35; 36; 37; 66; 134; 142; 175-6; 179; 194).

While the book often seems rather vapid and abstruse, there are just too many unnecessary quotations, and the reader can never quite shake off the impression of being looked upon with contempt (the book has clearly not been proofread; many translations are cavalier; there are lines of text repeated but also lines missing ...), it is possible to find enough odd words and outrageous errors to sustain some level of fascination. The word 'hindsight' is used twice, for example, instead of reflection or consideration, and R appears to have simply invented 'falsnessity' and 'singule'. My favorite, however, is something he calls 'the rubber-and-gum-concept of "culture"' (134), because it represents so well the vogueish imprecision of the whole text.

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Jerome M. Segal

Agency and Alienation:

A Theory of Human Presence.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1991.

Pp. xii + 259.

US \$42.50. ISBN 0-8476-7628-5.

This is a refreshingly novel sort of book — at least from a narrowly contemporary perspective. Chapter One dismisses current confrontations between interpretations of agency to which the use of such terms as 'cause' and 'reasons' are critical (e.g., the Davidson-Goldman sort of alignment v. more variously Chisholm and Melden) as not germane to the central issue. In a historically less limited context, however, Segal's concerns are perennial and widely shared. His main reactions are to a babel of writings or writers, ancient and modern, such as the Yoga Sutras, The Republic, Nietzsche, D.H. Lawrence, Villiers de l'Isle-Adam, McDougal, Dostoevsky, Freud, R.D. Laing, Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Sartre, Trotsky, Marx, Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, and Derek Parfit. From these he derives a generous diversity of personality diagnoses and identity nostrums upon which to reflect.

Contrary to current practice he professes to treat the questions 'What is an action?' and 'What is it to be an agent?' as separate. In effect, however, he merely associates them in an unusual way. He draws a distinction between action and activity in terms of another between person and self as follows. Activities have a molecular structure. Each such molecule consists of a set of events which are causally integrated by an ongoing perceptual awareness which sets certain standards to which the set should conform. Examples: carrying a cup of coffee to the table, riding a bike through the city streets. These molecules are performed by persons, but the agency which imparts to them the status of action consists of something further, viz. the presence of the self within the activity.

His basic distinction between person and self rests upon a reductionist kind of analysis in terms of such elements as beliefs, values, emotions, intentions, etc. Ideally, he allows, the person may achieve full selfhood through an appropriate integration of these, but actually the integration that for each of us constitutes our self is less comprehensive. Accordingly, on this understanding, agency or the presence of the self in activity is a kind of webbing, consisting in a threefold integration 'among the components of the activity, among the components of the self, and between these two complexes' (134). This webbing, however, may take some time to establish. Thus past activities which seemed at the time alien to the self of their performer may play a key role, by courtesy of those done later, in a more comprehensive integration. For agency-webbings, furthermore, there can be no general specification of a less schematic kind (101). The phrase 'presence of self', he insists (118), 'should be seen as something of a formula whose content will vary depending on the kind of personality we are dealing with.' For one kind

of personality the presence might lie in a Nietzschean spontaneity. For another it might involve the abnegation of spontaneous desire.

In developing this thesis he rejects what he calls 'locus theories' (91), viz. theories that pick out a particular mental state — e.g., second- or higher-order volitions (Frankfurt) or desires that emerge from first-order evaluative judgements (Watson) — or a particular part of the personality as having a special authority in determining what truly belongs to the self. Plausibly he argues that one may identify one's self with the particular component which the supposedly more authoritative component would counter, and further that from any desire with which one may identify one may always at a later date come to be quite estranged. He concludes that, unless the identification is of a Stevensonian noncognitive kind (perish the thought), it must have some judgemental basis. More specifically, to identify a desire or an action as one's own must be to posit the existence of a structural relationship between it and one's self (94).

Segal's further project is to remove the appearance of paradox from, and scrutinise, what he calls 'alienness'. This phenomenon, he claims, has so far never been properly identified. It is the felt experience, valid or invalid, of an inner fragmentation which on the basis of the preceding analysis he now specifies further (with a spot of push and pull) as deficiency in one or other of the three distinct forms of coordination in the aforesaid sort of webbing. Nor is it the same as alienation, for the latter is the fragmentation upon which the validity of the experience depends. He lists in schematic detail various ways in which webbings can be experienced as defective, but once again leaves his account open enough 'to encompass alternative understandings of the self and the necessary modes of integration' (140).

The remaining chapters focus on: (1) psychological inquiry into one's own nature as a specific individual; (2) philosophical inquiry into the most general features of the human condition; and (3) political activity that aims at basic changes in our social world. As separate essays Segal's discussion of these is informative and insightful. Topic (1) centres on the phenomenon of self-deception (with reference, e.g., to Fingarette), topic (2) on the thesis that alienness is the authentic experience of the human condition (with reference to Nietzsche, Parfit and Sartre) and topic (3) on the Marxist notion of alienation. His overall aim is to show 'the centrality of alienness to the human condition' (141), but otherwise his findings are too disparate to be summarised here.

My main overall reservation relates in a twofold way to the apparently unrestrained pluralism of his concept of selfhood. First, in the final chapters he presents what he calls 'the dynamics of alienness' as the common theme. Insofar as I can give precise sense to this somewhat elastically applied phrase it refers to the manner in which the two dichotomies alienness/identification, on the one hand, and alienation/selfhood, on the other, may interact. Given this interaction in conjunction with no constraint on the range of integrative structures which may constitute a self's identity, an individual's identification with or sense (alienness) of alienation from, any one may seem perilously

close to having just that noncognitive character which in rejecting locus theories Segal tries to avoid. Second, it would seem arguable that the self of an individual who is characteristically passive, or acquiescent, or reactive rather than proactive might be present in the latter's activities. Yet one might feel less than wholehearted in saying that he or she is thereby the agent thereof. However, while he leaves a number of philosophical questions tantalisingly unresolved, Segal has made a major contribution to the phenomenology of action.

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Paul Thagard

Conceptual Revolutions.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1992.

Pp. xvi + 285.

US \$35.00. ISBN 0-691-08745-8.

The idea of testing philosophies of science against data from the history of science in a way similar to testing theories in the empirical sciences has fascinated methodologists, in particular since Thomas Kuhn challenged the empirical adequacy of the mainstream philosophical views about how science works. The idea is simply stated: Given a scientific theory, a set of propositions about evidence, competitor theories, etc., and given some proposed rules for theory appraisal, can we reproduce the factual evaluation of this theory by the scientific community? If so, the methodological rules gain some support as adequate descriptions of scientific practice. A major obstacle to realizing such tests, however, was the comparatively vague and unspecific formulation of those rules: algorithmic precision and historical adequacy did not go together easily.

Suppose, however, that we could make the methodological rules so crisp and specific that a computer could simulate the evaluation of a theory (or simulate the discovery of a new theory) if given the requisite input. Suppose further than such a simulation is not merely a simulation delivering the desired result, but rather a simulation of the cognitive processes that are operating in the actual scientists' minds, the very processes by which the inquirers appraise theories. We are then looking at a program that Paul Thagard, one of its most active proponents, has baptized in the title of a book: *Computational Philosophy of Science* (1988). It is, in his own words, 'the use

of AI techniques to increase philosophical understanding of important episodes in the history of science.'

In his new book, *Conceptual Revolutions*, Thagard attempts to substantiate some of the promises that the general program makes. He gives more or less detailed reconstructions of seven major theoretical changes in the history of science — from the Copernican revolution to Continental drift and quantum theory (chapters 3, 6-8). These reconstructions involve a two-component analytical machinery: a theory of change for systems of beliefs (ch. 4) and a theory of how conceptual systems change (chs. 2, 3). Conceptual systems in Thagard's sense exist within systems of beliefs. Scientific beliefs change all the time — usually without affecting the embedded conceptual structure. What makes scientific revolutions so special and rare among the ongoing changes of beliefs, is that they involve radical modifications of conceptual systems as well. Thagard so far agrees with Kuhn's analysis. In Kuhn's view, however, such radical conceptual differences between paradigms make communication between inhabitants of the paradigms impossible: incommensurability ensues with all its relativistic side-effects. Not so for Thagard. He is able to trace step for step — that means, by simulating on a computer — the rearrangement and ultimate replacement of conceptual systems by radically different ones. Based on linguistic and cognitive science studies, Thagard identifies as the main organizing principles of conceptual systems 'kind' hierarchies (e.g., oxygen is a kind of gas) and 'part-whole' hierarchies (oxygen is a part of lead oxide). In a scientific revolution like the transition from phlogiston to oxygen chemistry, these hierarchies change in many ways: they can branch, items switch places, get deleted or are added. Mercury calx which, on phlogistic terms, used to be part of the metal mercury becomes, on oxygen terms, the whole: the metal is now part of the calx.

Any such revolutionary change in science, if it is to be rational change, is governed by a superior methodological principle: Thagard's 'explanatory coherence'. This is a quantitative measure of the degree to which a set of propositions — hypotheses, including statements of the available evidence — cohere. Again, Thagard has a computer program, called ECHO, that can evaluate input information according to this principle. Depending on the relation, explanatory or not, between any two given propositions in the set the program sets up excitatory or inhibitory links between the propositions. Thus a system of links is constructed which resembles somewhat a connectionist network in AI. (To me, however, as it has been to other commentators, it is not clear how seriously the connectionist gloss on Thagard's program should be taken.) Repeated runs of ECHO with a theory plus evidence as input will maximize the explanatory coherence of that theory. In a competition among several candidates the theory with the highest degree of coherence wins.

ECHO simulates the evaluation of a scientific theory in the mind of a scientist: The data selected and interpreted by Lavoisier, for instance, support, according to ECHO, the oxygen chemistry better than the phlogiston

system. It is also true, however, that the same program will turn out the phlogiston theory as superior if given 'phlogistic' data (85ff). Is this disturbing? In one sense, certainly not: ECHO is supposed to simulate the mind of a scientist, not the deliberations of a fictitious ideal community of investigators. In another sense, however, it is worrisome: What does ECHO actually do for us? Thagard, following Lavoisier, carefully selects and prepares the input in order to achieve a certain kind of result — shouldn't we therefore rather confidently expect that Lavoisier wins? This weakens ECHO's claim to be a better model of what goes on in hypothesis evaluations than other approaches, e.g., non-connectionist programs like H.A. Simon's, or, for that matter, Alan Musgrave's reconstruction of the controversy in terms of Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programs.

Thagard recognizes that his theory 'would be seriously undermined if historical cases exhibited variability in the principles of explanatory coherence or serious disagreement about what constitutes an explanation.' If the standards of theory evaluation really vary with theories, we would have 'few grounds for saying that the new theory is better than the disregarded old one' (106). This, of course, had been Kuhn's point all along, and at least in a weak form this claim has got to be true: all our standards are acquired through learning processes, none can be regarded as *a priori*, i.e., independent of our theories about the world.

Was the debate, for example, between Bohr and Einstein on the status of quantum theory governed by shared standards of theory evaluation? Thagard, after looking more carefully at the case, would presumably say, yes; what accounts for the different evaluations are the values of parameters which were different in Bohr's and Einstein's cognitive mechanisms (cf. p. 80). Could this kind of argument ever be refuted? Can't we accommodate just any outcome of such debates by adjusting the parameters of the evaluative program?

These are somewhat abstract worries that should not distract from the considerable merits of Thagard's book as a report on work-in-progress on a new research program in philosophy of science.

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Daniel J. Wilson

Science, Community, and the Transformation of American Philosophy, 1860-1930.

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Pp. x + 228.

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Wilson sees American philosophy from the Civil War to the 1930s as dominated by two closely related struggles. One struggle pitted philosophers for whom their discipline was one of the reflective humanities — perhaps, indeed, *the* discipline which might determine the choice of world views — against those who wanted to make philosophy a ‘science’ and to adopt a scientific world view. The second struggle was between those who thought knowledge depended on a co-operative community and those who saw the philosopher more romantically as one whose value lay in his insight and his singular visions. These struggles are related, for many who wanted philosophy to adapt to science — including Peirce, Royce, Dewey, and C.I. Lewis — also saw knowledge as a community endeavour.

Wilson’s main study ends just as the great depression was beginning — before its consequences began to influence the social sciences and before the militarization demanded by the second world war had its impact on science. But he does venture into the present and contends that both struggles continue and still find philosophical expression. The writings of Rorty and Putnam for example address both these struggles.

All this is worth thinking about, but Wilson faces a central difficulty: There were and still are many notions of what science is, some mere images, but many others full-blown theories which reflect (and perhaps influence) the way in which science is pursued. Equally, the notion that knowledge is a community activity is not a simple one.

The participants in the disputes Wilson describes do not divide neatly into two groups. Josiah Royce, for instance, was a strong proponent of the idea of community and of knowledge finding as a collective activity, as well as a friend of the new mathematical logic and an admirer of the sciences. But he tended to see philosophy as giving legitimacy to the sciences and not the other way around. For he thought one needed philosophical insight and argument to understand the way in which there could ultimately be a rational system of knowledge within which the findings of the various sciences could be reconciled. Without that, he thought, one could hardly justify the effort which must be addressed to the most intractable and seemingly arcane problems, and science would be dominated by technology. C.I. Lewis, by contrast, thought science arose out of the pragmatically justified tendency to choose concepts and ways of organizing knowledge which favour co-operation, and he saw philosophy as having a clarifying role which depended more than anything else on the growth of logic. It is not easy to say whether Royce should be thought of as defending the

independence of philosophy or pursuing a particular kind of integration of philosophy with science. Equally, however, it is not clear that Lewis is subordinating philosophy to science rather than attempting to make science fit a particular philosophical mould.

Philosophical discussions about science pose a difficulty for Wilson because there is a serious asymmetry. Clearly, the works of the philosophers he talks about must necessarily, if they are a good sample, reveal much about what American philosophy was. For what they wrote *was* American philosophy. But all of them may have been wrong about what science was and about what it ought to have been. Wilson describes Peirce and James as practising scientists, but they did not dominate science as James did philosophy. Many people now think that the philosophy of science of the period was one of philosophy's least successful ventures, but Wilson is content to report various views about what science was and does not inquire into their soundness or their cultural origins.

He *is* aware that both the problem of philosophy's relation to science and the questions about community and knowledge are closely tied to the process whereby philosophy became professionalised, ceased to be mainly the preserve of pontificating college presidents, and managed to fit itself into the complex of developing humanistic disciplines and social sciences. His description suggests that much of the talk about 'science' is a cover for the struggle to fit philosophy into a new pattern. He is an historian by profession, and his training stands him in good stead on these questions.

The philosophers Wilson mentions are a plausible sample, but there are omissions which may distort the picture: John Eloy Boodin appears only as the author of a doubtful witticism to the effect that it is 'the chief end of academic philosophy to provide a living for professors ...' (194) and George Holmes Howison makes only a brief appearance in connection with the way in which room was made at Michigan for Dewey and in connection with some correspondence with James about the founding of a psychology laboratory (James thought there were already too many of them). Yet both Boodin and Howison exercised considerable influence and both tried to show how philosophy could use science and respect it without being dominated by it. Apart from Royce, the speculative metaphysicians make only cameo appearances, though the vigorous interest in metaphysics in the United States even during periods of its relative eclipse in England is something which needs explanation and suggests a continuing interest in the limitations of science, one of Wilson's main themes.

Wilson seems to suggest that he is writing a general history of the American philosophical community and that he has shown that 'science' and 'community' were its central issues, but it would be wiser to read the book as a history of the specific issues he singles out. For it seems odd to ignore the historical approach to philosophy as a competitor to the 'scientific' and 'romantic' views in the struggle to establish a professional discipline. The notion that the history of philosophy has an internal logic

which explains its development and which, once one has seen the pattern, provides the basis for determining what the next move in philosophy ought to be has occupied a good many American philosophers and American philosophy departments have mostly been able to agree that the history of philosophy should be taught.

Within its self-imposed limits, though, this is a highly competent study which casts light on the past and present of American philosophy, and even gives us some clues about what its future might be like.

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Julian Young

Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art.

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In *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art*, Julian Young, who is also the author of *Willing and Unwilling: A Study in the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer*, has written a valuable book. Young brings together the various aesthetic theories his subject entertained over the course of his relatively short philosophical career and subjects them all to critical scrutiny. Young pursues his analytic chores in the service of three broader goals: (a) against several influential interpretations (including Nietzsche's own in *Ecce Homo*), Young argues that Nietzsche's theorizing about art is divided into four distinct periods and so, far from being best grasped from the perspective of the aesthetically unifying totalization the older Nietzsche himself proposed, it cannot even be grasped in terms of the familiar young Wagnerian — free spirited revaluator — late pessimist tripartite schema; however, (b) Young also contends that Nietzsche's thinking about art traces an expansive circle such that in the later works, most notably *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche returns to essentially the same view he held in *The Birth of Tragedy*, that art saves us from the pain of the form of existence imposed by the principium individuationis; (c) Young anchors the movement along this circle in Nietzsche's shifting relationship to the pessimistic wisdom of Silenus that human life is necessarily a trail of tears, nausea, and bad faith from which, at best, we can hope to be saved.

The purpose of this last and broadest of Young's arguments is to connect the aesthetic thought he has isolated for critical attention back to the

metaphysical concerns of Nietzsche's philosophy. Young's most general thesis is that the more pessimistic Nietzsche's metaphysics the higher his valuation of art. At his gloomiest Nietzsche believes art especially can save us from life and so is to be highly valued, whereas in his most optimistic works (e.g., *Human, All-too-human*) Nietzsche thinks we do not need to be saved but rather to be saved from too much saving and so disvalues art. Only in the works of 1879-1881, when Nietzsche speaks of art as providing signposts for the future, does Young think Nietzsche begins to develop a non-redemptivist aesthetic according to which art saves us not from life but, so to speak, *for* it, returning us to our own futures. However, Young sees this period, despite its personal appeal to him, as an aberration (he does not regard it, oddly, as deserving treatment as a fifth distinct period despite seeing Nietzsche's own claim for continuity here as seriously misleading). Overall, Young's Nietzsche is forever trapped by the internal connection between pessimism and redemption.

Because Young regards Nietzsche's career as best understood through an analysis of his relation to pessimism, he treats Nietzsche's proximity to Schopenhauer's philosophy as something of a master key. Young believes that even *The Gay Science* 'is a work in which the only kind of gaiety its author achieves is a kind of manic frivolity which is really no more than a symptom of desperation and despair' (92). Only in *Human, All-too-human* does Nietzsche approach an exit from Schopenhauerian pessimism, but when the pessimism vanishes the need for art does also and so Nietzsche capitulates, if not to Schopenhauer's metaphysics, at least to the internal connection characteristic of Schopenhauer between pessimism and art.

This reorientation of Nietzsche toward Schopenhauer is useful and convincing, but in his eagerness to overturn the downplaying of Schopenhauer by, for example, Kaufmann and Schacht, Young, to my mind, overstates his case. The question of Nietzsche's relation to pessimism is surely central to any understanding of his aesthetics, but it is equally surely false that the only grounds for pessimism in late nineteenth century European philosophy were close readings of Schopenhauer. Young reads Nietzsche as in perpetual dialogue with his philosophical master, but Nietzsche was also in dialogue with a post-1848 and then a post-1871 Europe; in transforming a dialogue into an inescapable shadow, Young obscures Nietzsche's own reasons for pessimism. This effacement is felt most palpably when Young concludes that Schopenhauer was perhaps a more attractive, more human figure than Nietzsche because he refused any stance beyond good and evil and instead embraced 'morality' (150); this is, of course, an arguable point, but in the face of the transformations in European culture and civilization between 1815 and 1880 Schopenhauerian 'morality' may have been — and this may be Nietzsche's courage — the less moral option. Now, a philosophical recontextualization of Nietzsche need not generate this kind of historical decontextualization, but in his pursuit of the rehabilitation of the importance of Schopenhauer Young risks erasing the specificity of Nietzsche's own relation to pessimism.

The only point at which Young engages the historical dimension of Nietzsche's own pessimism in its relation to art is when he addresses Nietzsche's late admiration for some naturalistic novelists, particularly Zola. Such admiration was problematic for Nietzsche since Zola was not merely socialist but overtly so and Nietzsche, famously, despised socialism, articulating his own pessimism most darkly in opposition to it. It is important to be delicate here since my political sympathies are with Young, but he so much wishes Nietzsche to drop his opposition to socialism that when Nietzsche refuses and finds alternative, cold-blooded reasons to admire Zola, Young resorts to some rather intemperate language (an ironic charge to bring against a critic of Nietzsche). Nietzsche locates in Zola a kind of delectation for the degradation which is also polemically despised in his novels, a reading Young calls 'a misrepresentation of absurd proportions' and 'a really quite stupid account of Zola' (132-3). Now, even though I do not share his admiration for Zola, Nietzsche's interpretation, far from being stupid, seems to me quite brilliant. Zola, after all, was not a mere reporter of social ills; he was a novelist who shaped violence to produce pleasures specific to narrative and spectacle, including the very deep pleasure of fictional outrage, of moral insight that first implicates and then forgives the reader. Nietzsche's account of naturalism, in short, is one of the first great attacks on committed culture, an attack only possible in the historical moment of thematically socialist art — Nietzsche's moment, not Schopenhauer's — but for just that reason an attack any socialist concerned with art needs to take seriously. Young's intemperance here is, I think, a symptom of the danger of dehistoricizing Nietzsche's pessimism.

This danger notwithstanding, Young's book is a lucidly presented biography of Nietzsche the aesthete. Its challenges to longstanding interpretations of Nietzsche's career and its relation to Schopenhauer are well worth careful consideration by both Nietzsche scholars and anyone interested in nineteenth century aesthetic theory.

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