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Margaret A. Boden, ed.

The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence.

Don Mills, ON and New York:

Oxford University Press 1990. Pp. vii + 452.

Cdn \$82.50: US \$55.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-19-824855-5);

Cdn \$24.95: US \$14.95

(paper: ISBN 0-19-824854-7).

Geoffrey Brown

Minds, Brains and Machines.

Pp. xi + 163 New York: St. Martin's Press

1990. US \$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-312-03145-0).

Newburyport, MA: Focus Info Group

(for Bristol Classical Press) 1990.

US \$10.95 (paper: ISBN 1-85399-013-2).

James H. Fetzer

Philosophy and Cognitive Science.

New York: Paragon House 1990.

Pp. xvii + 169.

US \$13.95. ISBN 1-55778-195-8.

Jay L. Garfield, ed.

Foundations of Cognitive Science.

New York: Paragon House 1990. Pp. xxx + 433.

US \$17.95. ISBN 1-55778-257-1.

The surest sign that cognitive science as philosophy has moved beyond the status of an esoteric research specialization is the appearance of materials designed to help us teach it at the undergraduate level. The market is clearly ready for such materials. Despite the fact that most North American philosophy departments now offer introductions to cognitive science for their majors, the scope for choice among texts has been severely limited. Most of the primers that *have* been available — including the best, Johnson-Laird's *The Computer and the Mind* (Harvard University Press 1988) — are written by and for psychologists, and do not set cognitive science within the context of the philosophy of mind as we are likely to desire. Given this constraint, Churchland's *Matter and Consciousness* (MIT Press, 2nd edition 1988) has had the market pretty much to itself. This has no doubt been a happy situation for Churchland and his publisher, but, as with any monopoly arrangement, not so happy for the consumers. Fortunately, Churchland's book is quite good; I have taught profitably from it four times now. On each succeeding occasion, however, I have become more conscious of its principal flaw, which is that the traditional philosophical material is not well integrated with the presentation of AI and neuroscience. I've thus been keeping

my eye on the catalogues for possible alternatives; and, in the Fetzer and Brown volumes, here they are.

Where anthologies of primary materials are concerned, our past situation has been somewhat better. Anderson, in editing *Minds and Machines* (Prentice-Hall 1964) showed superb judgment in detecting then-recent papers which have since attained the clear status of classics. To supplement Anderson, Haugeland brought the corpus up to date with *Mind Design* (MIT Press 1981). But 'up to date' means something different in cognitive science from what it means in Hume scholarship, and Haugeland's anthology already reads as a thin cross-section of special late-70's concerns; while Anderson has, incredibly, been taken out of print. In any case, one might wish for a *single* volume that contains *both* classics and contemporary approaches. The Boden and Garfield anthologies under review aim for such chronological breadth.

A popular structure for undergraduate courses involves pairing collections of primary sources with complementary texts. I will therefore partly address my review to the issue of complementarity among the four volumes at hand. This arises most naturally with respect to the Fetzer-Garfield pair, as Garfield states in his preface that it was among his basic desiderata that his anthology be a suitable companion to the Fetzer text. It will save space to begin my detailed comments with Fetzer, because in my view his book is so weak that it disappears from the choice set on its own merits, thus reducing our possible complementary pairs from four to two.

It was clearly Fetzer's aim to produce a text that integrates problems in cognitive science with problems in the philosophy of mind, and to do so in a way which does not presuppose acquaintance on the part of students with either set of issues. In his ambition, then (though not in his execution), Fetzer avoids the structural problem that mars Churchland's text. In Fetzer's view, one best integrates cognitive science with the philosophy of mind by framing the right initial question, to wit, 'Is a science of the mind possible?' As Fetzer rightly notes, this question has both scientific and philosophical aspects, for the answer to it depends on our philosophical conception of the scope and nature of science, *and* on the theoretical resources actually available to those who would scientifically study the mind. Fetzer's first chapter is therefore devoted to asking what sorts of stories would constitute genuine explanations of cognitive behaviour. In addressing this, he runs together a primer on the philosophy of science and an historical review of models of psychological explanation (behaviourism, Freudianism, etc.). My criticism of this opening chapter is straightforward: it is not likely to actually benefit many students. Though his style with respect to argument and sentence construction is simple, Fetzer uses quite a lot of unexplicated technical jargon from the outset. A student without background in both the philosophy of science and the history of psychology is thus unlikely to understand the chapter, and a student with background in these areas is unlikely to need it. An opening chapter that fails in its job of motivating the student reader is, I think, a deadly flaw in a textbook.

This flaw persists throughout the rest of the book, along with some others. Chapters Two and Three review the mainstream topics and arguments in the philosophy of cognitive science: representationalism, the physical symbol system hypothesis, the Turing Test, the Chinese Room. The discussion fails to convey the depth and interest of these issues, largely because Fetzer is more concerned to clear them all off of the table as boring old rubbish than to work at them seriously. He clearly believes that anything associated with the GOFAI paradigm is just a mistake. This view is probably mostly right, but the deepest issues in the philosophy of cognitive science concern *why* this is so. Fetzer's dismissive approach will, I suspect, just leave students wondering how philosophers could have been so silly for so long.

Chapters Four, Five and Six suggest the reason for Fetzer's haste with traditional issues. He has an account of his own, and is anxious to promote it. This is a loosely Peircean, semiotic theory of mentality, to be buttressed by a connectionist account of the underlying neurophysiological and causal basis of mentality. Now, I do not insist that authors of textbooks try to assume disinterestedly neutral positions on controversies in their subjects. Philosophy, in particular, is composed of almost nothing but controversy, and students are best off engaging the issues in a positive, adversarial mode from the outset. Thus it has never bothered me that Churchland's text, for example, is clearly biased in favour of eliminativism. But a textbook author's opinions should be advanced in the context of discussing salient controversies, not, as in this case, instead of discussing them. Furthermore, Fetzer's treatment of connectionism is poor in itself. The connectionist position is difficult, subtle and exciting, and needs to be explained patiently and in detail if students are to grasp its implications. But Fetzer, again, seems less interested in connectionism itself than in the possibility that it may do scientific bullpen work for his semiotic theory of mentality. He presents the connectionist thesis itself in, basically, a single (obscure) paragraph. I cannot imagine how a student could gather the slightest idea as to what connectionism is from this presentation.

Chapter Seven, on human rationality, allows me to say something good about the book. This chapter is clear, jargon-free and well integrated with the rest of the text. But given what it's integrated with, this is faint praise. In light of all of this, the issue of how well Fetzer's text is complemented by the Garfield anthology is pretty well moot.

If Fetzer's text suffers principally from being too impatient with traditional philosophical concerns, Brown's may be said to err in the opposite direction, though much less grievously. Like Fetzer, Brown begins by framing a central question: in this case, 'Could we ever be in a position to rightly say that a machine thinks?' Brown mostly treats this as a conceptual, rather than an empirical, question, and both the strengths and weaknesses of this text derive from this working presumption.

The concepts which Brown investigates are 'thought' and, more hurriedly, 'machine'. On the former, he is very good. His first eight chapters constitute a hundred-page critical history of the philosophy of mind that would be hard

to improve on in so little space. The discussion is situated around the problem of other minds and the mind/body problem, and includes accurate and sensitive summaries of solipsism, Cartesian dualism, logical behaviourism, central-state materialism, neutral monism, anomalous monism, functionalism, Strawson's personalism and even Malebranche's wonderful occasionalism. Ultimately, out of this grand clash of ideas, Kant wins. This may not be a daring conclusion, or even a very clear one (since, as far as I can tell, there is roughly one Kant per Kant scholar, and Brown is carefully agnostic amongst them all), but many will find it congenial.

This is not blandly neutral journalism, as my list may suggest; the various positions are all critically scored, in a way which will provide grist for classroom debate. Brown argues, for example, that Wittgenstein's private language argument provides the answer to the solipsist's challenge. Here, I disagree with Brown's argument, with his interpretation of Wittgenstein, and, for that matter, with the private language argument itself. But the whole business is presented with enough substance and clarity that I can readily imagine presenting and criticizing it very profitably in class.

Brown's subsequent discussion of the concept of a thinking *machine* is not quite as helpful. My general criticism is that he fails to do justice to the interest or complexity of actual cognitive science research by over-emphasizing its purely conceptual aspects. His summary of work in the GOFAI tradition is good. But his explanation of how a conventional computer works, though nice in itself, is not much used in the subsequent discussion, and his two page treatment of connectionism will be no more illuminating for students than Fetzer's. Brown's concluding argument for the importance of sentience and environmental embeddedness to the prospects for AI is effective, but errs seriously in failing to even mention the important experimental work that is now being done in this area (see Langton, ed., *Artificial Life* [Addison-Wesley 1988]).

In summary, Brown's text provides a good bridge from traditional philosophy of mind into cognitive science, but doesn't carry the reader very far into the new range. It suffers, then, from the opposite problem to that encountered in Churchland's text, which doesn't connect cognitive science with philosophy very well, but at least presents the scientific material fairly thoroughly. The latter cannot be said of the Brown book. Because of its emphasis on conceptual issues and classical philosophical themes, Brown's text could provide students whose background is philosophical with a useful lead-in to and motivator for either of the anthologies under review. It will not be a suitable accompanying text to them, however, as both collections range principally over philosophical issues within cognitive science into which Brown does not venture in much detail.

As to the anthologies themselves, both will be extremely valuable resources. Garfield's sprawls over a great range of important territory, and demands creative syllabus design from the instructor who would use it. Boden's, by contrast, marches straight up the main highway in being tightly focused round the lead issue in the foundations of cognitive science, the

tension between top-down and bottom-up strategies of explanation and its current manifestation in the connectionist and neuropsychological challenge to the GOF AI tradition. Boden thus organizes a course for the instructor: one might best use it simply by having one's students read it through in order.

Boden begins with a little-read classic, the paper by McCulloch and Pitts which inspired the original 1960's version of connectionism. Since this is followed by Turing's 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence', the organizing dialectic between the rationalist and empiricist approaches in AI is set up immediately from its sources. Traditional AI is then represented by Newell and Simon and by Marr, and major attempts to solve the problems of the GOF AI paradigm without leaving it are discussed by Hayes and McDermott. The connectionist counterpart to Newell and Simon's foundational manifesto is 'Distributed Representations' by Hinton, McClelland and Rumelhart, which Boden wisely includes. The philosopher who writes most trenchantly on connectionism is Andy Clark, and he is here also. Churchland argues, in his usual visionary tone, for cognitive neurobiology, and a previously unpublished paper by Cussins discusses the construction of concepts in connectionist environments. On the critical side, the Dreyfuses have their say, happily in an up-dated context that is sensitive to connectionism. Searle's original presentation of the Chinese Room is included along with Boden's own 1970 reply on behalf of AI which remains, to my mind, the clearest and the best.

As indicated, the Garfield volume is more diffuse. It is divided into five parts, each composed of roughly four papers. In Part One, on foundations, Pylyshyn presents the conceptual assumptions of classical computationalism, Goldman his well-known views about the relationship between descriptive cognitive science and normative epistemology, and Dennett his interpretation of the status of intentionality in psychology. Part Two deals with the role of computation theory, and includes the Newell and Simon classic that also appears in Boden. The third section, on artificial intelligence, is especially well chosen. Here we have Searle on the Chinese Room and seven replies to him from AI's leading publicists, including Hofstadter, Haugeland, Dennett, Fodor and Pylyshyn. Fodor then discusses the frame problem, which is perhaps the deepest and most philosophically interesting conundrum in AI. (I think that in this paper Fodor makes a mistake of a depth proportionate to that of the problem itself.) Dennett's famous paper 'Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology' rounds out this section. Part Four focuses on two general cognitive scientific theses that have attracted much attention from philosophers, Gibson's ecological optics and Chomskyan linguistics. In both cases, the explanations of the theories are by their originators, and the accompanying criticisms are also basic sources. Finally, Part V features a sampling of contemporary initiatives in cognitive science, including connectionism. As this summary will suggest, there is more than a term's worth of material in Garfield's volume, and most instructors will wish to use it selectively and in conjunction with a text that synthesizes the issues.

The appearance of these collections greatly expands the possibilities in course design for introducing cognitive science. They are much richer sources than Haugeland's *Mind Design*, and should make it redundant as a teaching tool. However, both will demand some preparatory setting up for use by students trained principally in philosophy. Given the problems with Fetzer's text, the competing primers are Brown and the old standby, Churchland. Brown should be favoured by the instructor who is most concerned to weave the problems of cognitive science into the historical philosophical fabric. Churchland, however, continues to hold his monopoly on philosophically informed introductions to cognitive science that truly introduce cognitive science. Indeed, Churchland would make an especially good antecedent to the Boden volume, since their emphasis on the issues that divide bottom-up from top-down theorists is exactly parallel. This seems to me to be the best available combination of texts for a one-term course, where time limitations may necessitate a tight focus around a single dominant theme. On the other hand, an instructor with more time at her disposal might most profitably combine Brown for philosophy of mind, Johnson-Laird for introductory cognitive science, and the Garfield anthology. Students emerging from a course organized around these materials will have examined the new discipline in all of its leading aspects, and will be exceptionally well positioned to move on to advanced work in the philosophy of psychology.

Don Ross

University of Ottawa

A.P. Bos

*Cosmic and Meta-Cosmic Theology in
Aristotle's Lost Dialogues.*

New York: E.J. Brill 1989. Pp. xx+242.

US \$60.00. ISBN 90-04-09155-6.

This book is not a work that would be considered a contribution to some of the chief debates now raging in English speaking circles of Aristotelian studies; it does not deal with *Metaphysics Z* and the nature of substance, the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the role of the good in human life, or the *de Anima* and the nature of thought or perception. The volume deals with topics more familiar to European scholars who have, for over one hundred years, been scrutinizing the fragments of Aristotle. Some sections of this book have appeared in print before as articles, and they are integrated into the text which presents a fairly intricate hypothesis not only about Aristotle's theological doctrines but also about the basic coherence of Aristotle's writings.

The first nine chapters constitute an elaboration of a myth about Kronos and its bearing on the Stagirite's theology; the next two chapters discuss the nature of the lost writings and the various scholarly approaches to them; and the remaining four chapters deal with relevant passages in the Aristotelian writings.

Much of the originality in Bos' volume can be found in chapter nine where he attempts to reconstruct Aristotle's Kronology, i.e., the theory behind the mythical allusion to Kronos in the lost works. The picture he presents is the following. Aristotle develops a 'double theology' which includes two sorts of divinities. On the one hand, there are *cosmic* divinities which are constituted out of a fifth element, soul (psyche), and intellect (nous). These gods have activities that are both contemplative (with regard to First Principle) and practical (with regard to the world and its affairs). As a result, one can refer to this alternation of activity as a dialectic of involvement and dissociation from this world and, hence, one can speak of a dialectical theology. On the other hand, there is a transcendent divinity, entirely immaterial and unchangeable (a pure *Nous*) whose only activity is a contemplative one and thus a being that has no providential role to play in the universe. Bos maintains that Aristotle developed this theory in criticism of Plato's theology which held that the world soul was bound to changeable entities composed of the four elements. Aristotle therefore, introduces a fifth element which prevents this earthy contamination of the divine and also further separates out the practically active divinities (which later become the movers of the spheres) from the transcendent *Nous* which will later become the Unmoved Mover of *Metaphysics* Λ. The role of Kronos in all of this seems to be that of a model for the type of cosmic divinity elaborated by Aristotle. Just as the dreaming Kronos had soul and mind distinct, was tied to the material universe in some way, and received information from Zeus and passed it on to lower beings, so the cosmic divinities have quasi-material (*quinta essentia*), psychic, and noetic components and have a purely theoretic side which somehow affects their practical (providential) side.

The advantage to Bos' theory is that it permits an integration of the so-called 'lost works' of Aristotle with the writings that are passed on in the standard works of the *corpus aristotelicum*, e.g., the *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, etc. Bos rejects the influential theory of Jaeger which maintained that Aristotle's lost works were the only known works in the Hellenistic period till the editing of the Aristotelian library in the first century B.C. These lost works, according to Jaeger, were written in a dialogue format, were destined for public consumption (and hence referred to as the "exoteric writings" — *exōterikoi logoi*) and reflected a Platonic theology and dualistic anthropology. Such characteristics distinguished these works from the treatises of the corpus which are written in an unattractive style, are composed for an inner circle of students (and hence considered, by analogy to Plato's unwritten doctrine, the "esoteric writings"), and portray an empiricist spirit very different from that of Plato. Jaeger had argued that these discrepancies could be explained by a development in Aristotle's thinking: the lost dialogues were

written by an Aristotle under Platonic influence during his days in the Academy, while the works of the corpus show a more original and empirical Aristotle who has been weaned from Platonic nurturing. Bos rejects this developmental picture and argues both that there is greater consistency across all of Aristotle's writings and that Jaeger's thesis is not sufficiently sensitive to Aristotle's early negative reaction to Plato's doctrines. Aristotle, Bos maintains, rejected the creation account of the *Timaeus* which necessitates a generated cosmos, and a deity whose creative activity involves him in change. Aristotle also rejected the simplistic dualism that appeared in a dialogue such as the *Phaedo* by clearly separating the nous from the soul. Further, Aristotle's introduction of the fifth element enables the separation of the transcendent deity from the world and the separation of nous from the soul to be better understood. As a result, Bos comes up with a new explanation of the relation of the exoteric to the esoteric writings, a purported advance over the Jaeger hypothesis. The expression '*exōterikoi logoi*' does not refer to the writings which, as vulgarizations, were destined to convey Aristotle's doctrine to the masses. Rather, the expression groups together writings which treat of those realities which exist outside (*ta exō*) the order of Nature or transcend it. In other words, the phrase does not function to separate one set of works from another in terms of the audience involved but rather indicates that one set of works has a different content from another. For Bos, Aristotle had, even in early works, set up a clear separation between the transcendent Divine and the cosmic order; a transcendent God is already present and his character will be developed later in the *Metaphysics*. Thus, the distinction between the cosmic and meta-cosmic was drawn very early in Aristotle's career and Bos tries to capture this difference in the title of the book.

Does Bos make his case? Given the fragmentary nature of the evidence involved in any investigation into the lost works, it seems only fair to say that Bos has presented a very intriguing hypothesis which does tie together some otherwise baffling passages. However, his hypothesizing would fare less well if the *Timaeus* creation account is not viewed as one intended by Plato to be taken literally. Similarly a more serious consideration of both the *de Divinatione per Somnum* and the *de Somniis* might demystify the seeming mantic quality of dreaming which functions as an important factor repeatedly in the argumentation. Even if Aristotle did interpret dreams as divinely inspired activities in the lost works, the corpus passages deserve a more detailed treatment than Bos has given them if he wishes to maintain his continuity hypothesis.

In conclusion, one finds some very useful thoughts in this book as well as some very puzzling ones. The book will be very informative reading for those philosophers and scholars of antiquity who have not investigated Aristotle's lost works at all. Several sections of the work provide instructive summaries of debates touching on aspects of the lost works. This is especially true of chapter ten which deals with the relationship of the corpus and the lost works generally, of chapter eleven which examines the notions of the *exōterikoi* and

enkyklioi logoi, and of chapter twelve which deals with the notion of *manteia* (prophecy) in Aristotle. Moreover, the book also proves to be useful by providing some provocative conjectures for reading the works of Aristotle as a whole. Here, however, the reader will have to exercise some caution. The repetitive style of the book might mislead one to think that a conjecture has been verified when, in fact, no really effective argument has been provided for the point at issue. Stylistically the book also poses some problems; although written in basically good English, the connectives between sentences and paragraphs are sometimes puzzling. Nonetheless, the book is worth the read and should promote discussion on the lost works especially within the English-speaking world which has so few publications on the lost works of Aristotle.

Joseph A. Novak

University of Waterloo

Noel Carroll

*The Philosophy of Horror, or Paradoxes
of the Heart.*

New York: Routledge 1990.

Pp. xi+256. Cdn \$54.00: US \$45.00.

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-90145-6); Cdn \$17.95:

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90216-9).

Carroll sets out in this book to give an account of the horror genre in terms of the emotional effects that it characteristically gives rise to in its audience. Thus in Chapter One he offers an account of the emotions 'art-horror', which he characterizes as involving physical agitation, fear and disgust at something impure. The impurity of the monsters of horror fiction is characterized in a fascinating discussion of 'Fantastic Biologies and the Structures of Horrific Imagery' in terms of their 'interstitiality' and 'categorical contradictoriness' — their violation of cultural or natural categories. And in Chapter Three he turns to an extensive discussion of plot and the most commonly recurring narrative structures found in horror stories.

It is Chapters Two and Four that are the philosophical hearts of the book, however. (Like one of Carroll's monsters, it has two.) In these chapters he turns to the two 'Paradoxes of the Heart' of his subtitle: 'the paradox of fiction' and the 'paradox of horror'. The first will be familiar to anyone with any knowledge of recent work in philosophical aesthetics. On the account of emotion that comes closest to current philosophical orthodoxy, it is held that emotions essentially involve belief: central to fear (for myself), for example,

is the belief that I am in some way threatened; and if I don't believe that you are in some sense the victim of misfortune, then whatever I feel for you, it cannot be pity. If one accepts this account, then our emotional responses to fiction begin to look puzzling. Watching *Nosferatu the Vampire*, I do not believe that Nosferatu exists, and hence do not believe that he poses any threat to me; so how can I fear him? Similarly, fictional characters cannot suffer, because — as I know even as I read about them — they do not exist. So how can I feel pity for them?

Carroll considers a couple of proposed solutions to this problem that he finds unacceptable. He rightly discards what he calls the 'Illusion Theory', according to which in responding to fiction we somehow come to believe that what it depicts is actual. He also rejects Kendall Walton's account of the issue, according to which although if I lack the appropriate beliefs I cannot literally speaking fear Nosferatu or pity Little Nell, it may be *make-believe* that I experience fear or pity in response to fiction. Carroll's major objection to this account is that 'it does not seem to square with the phenomenology of art-horror', for he takes it that on Walton's view, 'when we recoil with apparent emotion to *The Exorcist*, we are only pretending to be horrified.' However, he says, 'I, at least, recall being genuinely horrified by the film. I don't think I was pretending ...' (74). But this misses Walton's point. In holding that our emotional responses to fiction are to be understood in terms of 'make-believe', Walton is not suggesting that we merely *pretend* to be moved, but is rather making a point about the *description* of such responses; what is at issue here is not whether or not we actually experience affect, but rather how best to characterize that affect.

The problem here is that Carroll takes the central question concerning our emotional responses to fiction to be a *causal* question: If I don't believe that Nosferatu poses a threat to me, what causes my fear? His answer is elaborated in the 'Thought Theory'. Briefly, his suggestion is that emotions can be generated not only by beliefs but by thoughts (or by entertaining propositions 'nonassertively'). Just as the mere thought of falling off a precipice can frighten us, so the thought of Nosferatu can horrify us (80-2). Now with respect to the causal question, this view seems incontestable; human beings can quite ordinarily be moved not only by what they believe to be the case, but also by day-dreams and fantasies and thoughts the contents of which they know do not correspond to the way the world is or is likely to be. But the causal question is not the only question that we face here. There is also the question that Walton is concerned with, which we might call the *conceptual* question. Suppose that I am in fact frightened by the thought of Nosferatu (fright, on Carroll's view, being a component of horror.) What then am I afraid of? Not Nosferatu, because I know that he doesn't exist and hence poses no threat to me. How about my thought (as is implied by Carroll's view that monsters are to be understood as sets of properties or thought-contents)? But the contents of my thoughts cannot pose any threat to me, so why would I be afraid of *them*? The point here is that while it is reasonable to say that we can be moved — even that we can be frightened —

by entertaining certain thoughts such as those of horror monsters, it is far from clear what it is that we are moved *to* in such cases. As it stands, the 'Thought Theory' is of little help in answering this question; at the very least, it needs to be supplemented — perhaps by something like Walton's account, with which it is perfectly compatible.

In Chapter Four, Carroll turns to 'the paradox of horror': 'Why are horror audiences attracted by what typically (in everyday life), should (and would) repel them? ... How can horror audiences find pleasure in what by nature is distressful or unpleasant?' (159) Again, he reviews a couple of attempts to solve this puzzle — in terms of religious experience or 'cosmic awe' and psychoanalytic theory — that he convincingly shows to be unsatisfactory. On Carroll's own account, 'the pleasure derived from the horror fiction and the source of our interest in it resides, first and foremost, in the processes of discovery, proof, and confirmation that horror fictions often employ.' The horror and the disgust that horror fictions give rise to 'might be seen as part of the price to be paid for the pleasure of their disclosure' (184), which 'is finally outweighed by the fascination of the monster, as well as ... by the fascination engendered by the plot in the process of staging the manifestation and disclosure of the monster' (192).

One consequence of this is that Carroll has to accept that the appeal or attraction of horror is not unique to the genre, for (as he acknowledges) it is not only horror fiction that can afford us this sort of fascination. More worryingly, the account makes what Carroll calls 'the average consumer's' experience of horror very reminiscent of the experience of going to the dentist, where the pleasure (or satisfaction or whatever) of having my toothache stopped outweighs or compensates for the pain caused by the dentist drilling into my tooth. If we could bring an end to the toothache without undergoing the pain caused by the drilling, all but the most masochistic of us would do so. And on Carroll's account, we *can* get the relevant pleasurable fascination without undergoing the distress of art-horror, by attending to fairy tales and myths. So why does anyone bother to endure horror? Carroll's answer is that horror fiction may be able to give us *more* pleasure than fairy tales, 'even subtracting the price being horrified exacts' (192). But this seems implausible. I would suggest that horror stories and fairy tales differ in the kind rather than (or as well as) in the amount of pleasure that they can afford us; and that part of the appeal of horror is just that it does horrify us.

There is much in this book that I haven't been able to discuss, such as detailed analyses of the notions of character-identification, suspense and the fantastic, and a debunking of various ideological explanations of the persistent popularity of horror. The sheer range of the topics that Carroll addresses is impressive, and his knowledge of horror is truly encyclopaedic. And while there is much to take issue with in the book, Carroll is never dull. Don't miss it.

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Peter Caws

Structuralism: The Art of the Intelligible.

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press

International 1988. Pp. xiv+276.

US \$45.00. ISBN 0-391-02740-0.

Postwar France brought forth structuralism (s.), and dispatched it almost before Anglo-American analytic philosophy had time to pointedly ignore it. Caws' case for reviving it, mounted with 'continental' breadth and 'analytic' rigor, merits serious consideration, in my opinion, by anyone concerned with philosophy and the human sciences.

On one (wholly uninteresting) version, s. comprises any philosophy that takes 'structure' seriously, beginning with Plato (Piaget's view). In a more interesting (but most implausible) version, s. could bring at last to the human sciences and scholarship in the humanities the enviable precision and universality of the algorithmic sciences. C.'s balanced and nuanced s. is fully alert to both these spurious claims.

For C., the concepts are 'system', 'function', 'structure', and (a variant on 'significant') 'signiferous'. A system is a set of entities such that the state of each of its elements 'determines and/or is determined by the state of some other element or elements, and every element is connected to every other by a chain of such determinations ...' (12). Thus, a system 'has no isolated elements' (12). I understand C.'s definition to be satisfiable by all sorts of modest sets of elements, by no means envisaging a single, hyperorganic system as required by, say, Spencer. C.'s structuralist explanations would be occupied with relatively localized systems. Elements of a system have 'functions' insofar as they contribute to something the system as a (limited) whole is doing. A system may in turn have a function in a more inclusive system (13). A structure is then 'a set of *relations* among entities that form the elements of a 'system,' (13; C.'s emphasis).

What makes C.'s structuralism a specific rather than an all-purpose philosophical approach is its particular concern with, and distinctive characterization of, a subject matter that is quite different from the domain of the natural sciences: structures that *carry meaning* (though they will often not be language structures, despite s.'s indebtedness to Saussurean linguistics) and that *matter* (to human beings). Such structures that both mean and matter are termed 'signiferous' (145). Empirical structuralist theories, then, would attempt to understand actual sets of signiferous relations, which could be embodied in human behavior, kinship schemes, families, games, myths, languages, and as many other meaningful social arrangements and human practices, both un-selfconscious and self-conscious, as may matter to those who engage in them and those who investigate them. Such signiferous structures have been internalized by their participants and agents, who practice and sustain them without necessarily entertaining any objective theories about them, nor even any awareness of alternative possibilities. Given their variety, C.'s structuralism conceives no *grand récit*, no transcen-

dental *survol*. Structuralist inquiry is itself practical, like the structures it investigates, as well as theoretical, for its objects are visible only as intentional or 'mind-dependent' practices, and structuralist theory itself is a signiferous meta-practice. The theoretical task is thus to make second-order sense out of what is already making first-order sense (170). Hence the subtitle, 'the art of the intelligible'.

After laying out his conceptual framework, C. provides a historical and critical introduction to the structuralist movement which, judiciously, neither narrows it down to its roots in the French rediscovery and extension of Saussurean linguistics nor makes it all things to all comers. The Bourbaki publications in mathematics; Cassirer's symbolic forms; Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, and other seminal French thinkers; the pioneer anthropologist, Morgan; Peirce's 'phaneroscopy'; Saussure, Sapir and Whorf, Chomsky — are among those given their due. C. elaborates the pro's and con's of s. by a careful study of some major theories of linguistic phenomena, social practices, myths, history, and works of art and humanities. There are some cautionary though not wholly unsympathetic observations about Derridean deconstruction.

'Structuralism as Philosophy' begins with a brief survey of Russell, Carnap, and Wittgenstein (169-82). C. then broaches such topics as language, mind, human nature, society, and philosophy from his structuralist position. Review space permits only a few indications. While affirming that 'everything ... has somehow been generated out of whatever stuff the universe contains' (252), C. stresses the methodological necessity of crediting intentional subjects, resulting in what seems like a heuristic idealism (where the human sciences are concerned) (234). Qualified materialism though this combination of theses may be, I cannot but agree that in the human sciences one does not have the luxury of being a puritanical physicalist if one is to develop any useful theories, as Hull's dead-end behaviorism demonstrated long ago. Diehard reductionists, eliminativists, and strong-AI proponents may object on principle to C.'s phenomenological insistence upon intentionality ('the ... holding in as it were toward the subjective pole, [and the] holding out as an object ... of the thought content for the mind's *attention*' [211]), but they have shed little enough light on the important subject of signiferous phenomena.

I can imagine a somewhat more interesting doubt (from, say, marxist quarters) concerning the objectivity of social theories, thus construed. According to C., structuralists study evidence for the representational models of signiferous structures held by the individual agents, and evidence for their operational models, (naturally, these need not be the same), and then formulate explanatory models. The latter are, of course, themselves representational models entertained by the structuralists (233). Does such a theory represent an objective state of affairs? The marxist criticism could be that the structuralists may well be just as heedless of the actual operational models influencing their theories as are the subjects under investigation. This is, roughly, the longstanding issue in the human sciences of the objective critique of ideology. C. would not deny that the structuralist's explanatory

models are 'mind-dependent', but contends that 'the (social scientist's) explanatory model (is) the only one that is in a position to reflect all the relevant relations and to get them right' (233). This is, I think, a somewhat Socratic conception of inquiry in the human sciences, to which I am not unsympathetic. I should think, however, that objectivity would be more attainable regarding a 'fragmented, sparse, and primitive society', because the conscientious inquirer has the perspective and freedom to explore most of the system sympathetically; and less attainable regarding a complex, populous, and advanced society (the sort in which social theory must find itself increasingly interested, for obvious reasons). C., however, thinks exactly the reverse, because in an advanced society 'all the relations required by an explanatory model of the (signiferous) social structure might be in fact instantiated' (233). Perhaps so. But then, how to choose objectively among such an embarrassment of riches?

C. seems to me dead right that the human sciences must be both interpretive and empirical, and are obliged to deal with various limited 'signiferous' structures, and that the structuralist movement, as he describes and shapes it, is our best hope for useful empirical knowledge of what both means and matters. I found the book immensely well informed, lucidly written, persuasive, and bidding fair to be the definitive work on both the sources and the possibilities of a very important philosophical approach.

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Richard Eldridge

On Moral Personhood: Philosophy, Literature, Criticism, and Self-Understanding.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1989.

Pp. xiv+210. US \$27.95. ISBN 0-226-20316-6.

This is a book of immense sweep and great richness. The difficulty for a reviewer lies in conveying what it is about, what it is a book on. The title promises a book in the area of moral philosophy; the subtitle warns one not to expect a book that fits into conventional categories. This is philosophy undertaken at the limits — the limits of morality and of historical understanding, and certainly the limits of neatly separable disciplines into which the concerns of philosophy can be parcelled up.

There is a steady conceptual focus: moral personhood. It defines the area in which concern with morality and concern with what it is to be a person become mutually illuminating. Personhood, life history and the growth of

moral awareness in individuals embedded in society are seen as goals of human striving; and partial achievement, failure in coming to self-understanding, stunted growth and wasted lives as a result of prideful misunderstanding or wilful abandonment or lack of moral fibre are the edges of tragedy which frame the horizon of this vision of personhood. But Eldridge has not written a straightforward philosophical discourse on the theme he states in his first sentence as 'How should one live?' This first sentence is preceded by a motto from Wittgenstein's *Blue Book*: 'One might say that the subject we are dealing with is one of the heirs of the subject which used to be called "philosophy".'

The first chapter, 'Opening: The Space of Reading', confirms that this is not a book in moral philosophy as traditionally understood, although it contains a rich harvest of contemporary moral thought and never leaves the opening question of the book far behind. Eldridge develops a line of thought that links our deepest moral endeavours, our striving after full personhood, to one of the universal human capacities: to narrate stories and to read and interpret narratives. The space of reading is more than the space for the employment of an intellectual skill; it is the space in which our humanity can be tested and our goals articulated in the multifarious encounters with the lived and narrated lives of others, and with other specific situations as they have been captured in great works of literature. The way in which Eldridge proceeds to blend philosophical analysis with literary criticism is novel and exciting. Structuralism and post-structuralism have accustomed us to the notion of a 'text' as that which has to be manufactured and reconstructed before it can be read. Eldridge integrates strands of this tradition into his programme of 'close reading' of literary texts: it is reading which interprets and questions literary narratives for their power to provide insights into the moral life of the protagonists. Such reading forces the philosophical reader to test his own capacities of understanding morality in the imagined concrete interaction between persons and would-be persons.

The second chapter ('The Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness') is still of a scene-setting nature. It is partly a deeply thoughtful essay on the competing claims in contemporary moral thinking of relativism and rationalism; and partly it is a re-evaluation of Kantian principles. That Eldridge takes his philosophical bearings as a Kantian should come as no surprise to anyone who has understood that moral personhood, as Eldridge sees it, manifests itself as respect for persons. But what about the objection that Kant's adherence to the rigour of principles rendered his ethics an empty formalism, incapable of dealing with the particularity of content?

That was Hegel's criticism of Kant, and it is the criticism still, not only of modern Hegelians, but also of many moral philosophers of the broadly analytical persuasion who, like Bernard Williams and Philippa Foot for instance, are deeply sceptical about Kantian claims that what matters in the last resort is respect for the moral law in its purity. They find Kant's adherence to abstract principle incapable of explaining how the gulf between moral thinking and acting can be bridged; and they expect of a philosophy of

morals that it deliver interpretations which can acknowledge specifiable content and have application to particular situations — which are, after all, what we find ourselves in when what we ought to do becomes deeply problematic.

None of this is lost on Eldridge. In the words of the blurb, he ‘presents an extensive new interpretation of Kantian ethics.’ In fairness, it should be said that Eldridge is fully aware that he is not interpreting Kant but reading him from the vantage point of the present moment and the present need. Thus, his Kantianism can no longer be Kant’s but it is a modified, that is, historicized and socialized and even Hegelianized Kantianism. It is a Kantianism of this world, not cutting morality off from it or removing it into the ‘other world’ of the noumenal. In the second chapter Eldridge argues in depth for such a modification of Kant’s doctrine. It would, he thinks, meet the objections that stand in the way of philosophically subscribing to the most fundamental insights of Kant’s moral philosophy, insights that Kant encapsulated in the principle of respect for persons as ends in themselves. If we add to Kant’s demand for autonomy the recognition of human embeddedness in the social world, we arrive with Eldridge at a phenomenology of moral consciousness that can do justice to our deepest individual aspirations *and* the conviction that relations to others are what completes us as persons, as moral agents. But this sketch is but a poor substitute for the way in which Eldridge argues his case for a moral Kantianism of our own age.

For many readers, this sustained critique of moral rationalism will make this predominantly a book on Kant, or on one philosopher’s creative and courageous struggle with Kant. For others, the lure of the book will lie in the chapters in which a new Kantian understanding of our moral life is tested in interpretative readings of literary narratives. In these four chapters, individually on Conrad’s *Lord Jim*, on Wordsworth’s poetry, on Coleridge’s *Frost at Midnight* and on Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice*, Eldridge’s thought on the role of reading and on the moral demand to lead worthwhile lives are combined with the Kantian perspective. They are brilliant chapters which can be enjoyed as literary criticism in their own right. But the role they play in this book is a complex one, as is the entire strategy of involving the reader in self-exploration. ‘Once we take narrative art seriously as a vehicle of self-reflection, then the most moving and critically absorbing accounts of deliberation and action, and of their circumstances, successes and failures, can enable us to test to what extent we see ourselves as commanded by principle as part of our highest aspirations for ourselves as persons and for our projects, in specific social and institutional circumstances’ (34).

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A. Erskine

The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action.

Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1990.

Pp. xi+233. US \$37.50. ISBN 0-8014-2463-1.

Despite the attention that Stoicism has received in recent years, the political philosophy of the Stoa still remains, in most cases, a peripheral subject of enquiry. Erskine's book aims to fill this gap by tracing the evolution of Stoic political thought from its emergence in the philosophy of Zeno to its consolidation into a doctrine that supports and justifies the Roman rule. In the first chapter E. challenges some traditional assumptions about Zeno's controversial work, *The Republic*. On the grounds of the apologetic tone and the content of later Stoics' comments on it, he argues that the early date of *The Republic* is a fiction later Stoics invented to avoid embarrassment. Also, E. explains away the alleged Cynic character of Zeno's work as an invention of some opponents of Stoicism (notably Philodemus) intended to link Stoicism to the disreputable shamelessness of the Cynics. The later point is strengthened by a careful review of the evidence about the philosophical content of *The Republic* and by a meticulous indication of the differences between Zeno's ideal society and the political proposals of the Cynics. E.'s suggestions are attractive because they connect political features of the work with philosophical elements of early Stoicism, stress the positive character of Zeno's proposals, explore the idea that these proposals constitute an answer to Plato's homonymous dialogue and finally view *The Republic* primarily as a philosophical enquiry rather than as a description of an ideal state. Zeno's preoccupation with equality, the abolition of coinage and private property, and his stress on freedom in the ideal society are seen as an acknowledgment 'of the complaints of the discontented', a reminder of political demands for abolition of debts and redistribution of land, and as 'a direct, although impracticable response to contemporary problems.' The chapter on slavery and society outlines early Stoic positions on various forms of slavery (moral slavery, chattel slavery and subordination), examines the master-slave relationship in early Stoicism against its Platonic and Aristotelian background, brings out the social implications of the master-slave relationship, and relates slavery to civic concord, which is the knowledge of the common good and as such the privilege of the wise. E. claims that the Stoic theory of slavery both was influenced by contemporary society and attempted to analyse it; thus, that according to Zeno class strife is due to slavery and its corollary, ignorance of the common good, and causes burning political problems. The alternative that Zeno proposes, an ideal society of wise men, is slavery-free and therefore strife-free.

The Stoic wise man is not a hermit. Both in the ideal and in the existing society he participates actively in politics with the objective of promoting virtue and restraining vice. This is how his assistance to various leaders ought to be understood and consequently the traditional scholarly belief that the Stoics were exclusively advocates of kingship ought to be abandoned. In

fact, E. argues, the opposition of the early Stoics to the political theories of Plato and Aristotle suggests that they had democratic sympathies.

The fourth chapter provides rich information about the insightful analysis of the troubled politics of the 3rd. century B.C. E. proposes a convincing reinterpretation of Zeno's relation to the Antigonids and concludes that he became gradually alienated from them and eventually got involved with anti-Macedonian movements. Since the political slogans in the Chremonidian decree contain the ideas of freedom and concord E. argues that they are due to Stoic influence. In the same spirit, he claims that Stoicism provided the ideological support for the reforms of Agis and Cleomenes in Sparta: the extension of citizenship and the equalisation of land allotments were motivated by Stoic concerns of equality, justice and fairness which E. duly discusses in an excellent chapter on justice and property. His overall analysis of the Spartan revolution rejects a standard interpretation according to which the latter is accounted for solely in terms of Spartan tradition and historical and financial factors.

Stoic political thought underwent significant revisions during the Roman era. The notion of justice was no more conceived in solely moral terms as distribution according to deserts, but came to be connected to the laws of the city as well. There resulted new political concepts such as equity and new platforms of debate: the conflict between morality and expediency, various legalistic concerns over major or minor issues, and the subject of property rights. In this new framework, one can recognize two different tendencies in the Stoa: adherence to the political and moral radicalism inherited from the early Stoics and defense of a new conventionalism which is focused on the issue of private property and reinforced by constant contact with the Roman authority. Blossius is a representative of the radicalist trend who had democratic sympathies and who, according to E., influenced the political principles supporting Tiberius Gracchus' agrarian law. On the other hand, Panaetius was on the conservatist side and probably participated in the debate about the reforms of the Gracchi. But the debate is not only internal to the Stoa. It also occurs between the Stoics and the sceptical Academy. In an enlightening discussion of some passages from Polybius E. outlines a pattern of Academic attacks and Stoic defenses on the subject of Roman imperialism and of the merits of Roman rule. This reconstruction is persuasive both historically and philosophically. It stands to reason that Carneades did not miss the opportunity to point out the incompatibility between the word of the Stoic doctrine and the salient facts of the Roman rule by stressing the gap between justice and civic prudence and by arguing that the Roman state possessed the latter but not the former. Some Stoics responded by revising their political theory as well as its metaphysical and psychological underpinnings in order to justify the Roman empire. If this picture is accurate, E. is right to conclude that the Stoics moved from theoretical discussions within the Stoa to a controversy found in the political reality of the Roman state.

E's analysis relies on a basic methodological principle: that Stoic political thought is influenced by and conditions the social and political reality in

which it occurs. How strong this claim is meant to be remains unstated but is indicated by E.'s persistence in discussing philosophical problems mainly by reference to specific social contexts and not by applying strictly philosophical criteria. In some instances this attitude is, I believe, problematic. For example, E.'s arguments are insufficient to prove that Zeno's preoccupation with equality and freedom is due to the political demands of the discontented rather than, say, to his reaction against Plato or Aristotle. The same holds for the Stoic theory of slavery: both slavery and class strife feature in Greek political theory before Zeno just as much as in the historical reality of his day. E. takes the opposition of the early Stoics to Plato and Aristotle as revealing their democratic sympathies. I do not contest that their criticisms are compatible with their having democratic preferences nor do I contest the historical evidence supporting E.'s claim. But I do doubt that they opposed Plato *because* they were democrats and that this is the best explanation of their opposition. Also, the importance attributed to Stoic influence on actual politics sometimes seems far-fetched. For example, there is too little evidence of Zeno's active involvement in politics or of Persaeus' role in Macedon and virtually nothing on the relation between Stoicism and the Chremonidian decree to allow for speculation on the subject. Sphaerus may well have been asked to reform the Spartan educational system; that does not mean that he was behind the major political reforms of Cleomenes III. E. argues for Sphaerus' wide political influence in Sparta on the grounds that it explains measures such as the redistribution of land which E. asserts were not necessitated by political circumstances and therefore cannot be accounted for in purely historical terms. But in the first place it is debatable whether particular measures in a political revolution are completely determined by the historical circumstances, and in the second place, even if they are not completely so determined it does not follow that they are due to philosophical influences.

These reservations aside, E.'s book should be welcomed by historians and philosophers interested in the Hellenistic and Roman eras. It offers a challenging way to approach the surviving evidence and argues forcefully for many original interpretations of Stoic political thought.

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Nancy Fraser

*Unruly Practices, Power, Discourse and Gender
in Contemporary Social Theory.*

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

Press 1989. Pp. vii+201.

US \$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1777-5);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1778-3).

Academics tend to see themselves as engaged in tough but honourable intellectual labour. Recently, however, that rather comfortable self image has been challenged by Foucault's troubling analysis of power/knowledge and by sustained feminist attack on the canon and its effects. The upshot is a passionate debate about the political and social effects of intellectual work. Nancy Fraser's *Unruly Practices, Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory* is an important contribution to this process of self-reflection.

The book contains eight essays, divided into three sections. In the first section, Fraser takes on Foucault; in the second she offers an essay on the French Derrideans and one on Rorty; and, in the last section, she develops her own explicitly feminist assessment of welfare state capitalism.

It seems at first sight an unwieldy collection, but Fraser is a methodical and interdisciplinary thinker, and her reasons for taking up the topics she has addressed are perfectly coherent. She interrogates the continental theorists — French and German — and Rorty, about their contributions to radical democratic politics.

In the first section, Fraser thematizes the widely-shared suspicion that Foucault's radical effects depend on smoke and mirrors; if so, his texts veil rather than clarify political objectives. In the lead essay, she suggests that Foucault's genealogical analysis of power has sobering implications for activists. If indeed, power can not now be understood as 'belonging' to some and 'withheld' from others, then statist and economic political analyses appear dangerously reductive. And, if power works through bodies and non-discursive practices, then ideology critique targeting belief systems also seems to miss the mark.

But while Foucault may be able to make standard political questions seem wrong — for instance, questions about whether particular kinds of authority are legitimate or whether particular practices are liberatory — Fraser argues that he offers no evaluative framework of his own. Using her unerring ability to 'cut to the chase', she simply asks: 'Why is struggle preferable to submission? ... Only with the introduction of normative notions could he (Foucault) begin to tell us what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it' (29).

Her second essay, 'Michel Foucault: A "Young Conservative"' echoes Habermas' scathing epithet for Foucault from a 1981 article in *New German Critique*. The issue is whether or not Foucault portrays modernity with no redeeming features, and thus qualifies himself for the role of Arch-Conservative.

Fraser asks whether Foucault's opposition to the humanist project is a philosophical objection to Cartesian dualism, a strategic objection to the efficacy of 'rights talk', or a normative rejection of humanism as complicit in disciplinary practices. She concludes that Foucault is indeed guilty of a condemnation of humanism which is, to say the least, nonchalant. This sloppiness shows up badly, Fraser argues, when contrasted with the nuanced critique of the humanist ideal of autonomy being developed by feminist theorists in many disciplines.

The third essay focuses on Foucault's now notorious pronouncement that the deployment of sexuality can only be resisted through a focus on 'bodies and pleasures'. Here again she finds Foucault's failure to elaborate an alternative social vision essentially unsatisfactory. 'Foucault, one might conclude, isn't much good as a husband; one wouldn't want, politically speaking, to cohabit with him indefinitely. But he makes a very interesting lover indeed. His very outrageousness ... provides just the jolt we occasionally need to dereify our usual patterns of self-interpretation renew our sense that, just possibly, they may not tell the whole story' (65-6).

In the second section, Fraser addresses the dangers of political elitism associated with a pre-occupation with literary theory. In the more interesting of the two essays offered, she traces the tensions in Rorty's work between competing visions of the theorist as creative and as pragmatic. She claims Rorty used to link the production of human solidarity with cultural innovation and then, reversing himself, with the essential 'decency' of the pragmatist. His final solution, to 'house' creative intellectual work in the private domain, and pragmatic analyses in public life, is, of course, unacceptable from a feminist perspective.

The final section of the book begins with Fraser's widely-known argument that Habermas' analysis of advanced capitalism is flawed by masculinist blindness — to patriarchal structures in the economy, and to economic structures in the family. This essay is followed by an analysis of how the U.S. welfare system actively reinforces gender inequality, and, finally, by Fraser's sketch for a politics of need interpretation. Needs talk, she argues, 'functions as a medium for the making and contesting of political claims' (161); and must itself be a target of political analyses.

The essays in this collection are all tightly argued and topical (although they have all been previously published). If one can fault Fraser, it is because one sometimes feels the heavy hand of Habermas in her work. She seems entirely persuaded, for instance, that rational criteria for evaluating social progress exist; it is on this basis that she calls Foucault 'normatively confused' (31). I suspect it is also why her own analyses lose their focus on non-discursive practices, although she praises Foucault for stretching the domain of the political in exactly this direction.

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Grant Gillett

Reasonable Care.

Pp. 147. New York: St. Martin's Press 1989.

US \$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-312-03147-7).

Newburyport, MA:

Focus Info (for Bristol Classical Press) 1989.

US \$10.95 (paper: ISBN 1-85399-073-6)

J.P. Moreland and Norman L. Geisler,

The Life and Death Debate: Moral Issues of Our Time.

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Pp. xiii+174.

US \$42.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-313-27556-4);

US \$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-275-93702-X).

Both of these works are introductory in nature. Gillett's, a volume in a series billed as 'not "Philosophy Made Easy" but rather "Philosophy Made Intelligible"', deals specifically with medical moral problems, while Moreland and Geisler deal not only with abortion, infanticide and euthanasia but also with suicide, capital punishment and war. The former offers a more refreshing and original treatment: viz. 'an attempt to develop a substantial account of medical ethics on the basis of a broadly Aristotelian approach to moral philosophy.' The latter is more the standard 'he-said-she-said' presentation and analysis of positions, although the authors' own 'intuitionism' all too obviously manifests itself.

Moreland and Geisler evince a preference for a deontic ethical approach on the grounds that ontic approaches are 'counter-intuitive'. Their framework is generally Kantian, but relies heavily on intuition, 'an immediate, direct awareness or acquaintance with something', which is 'not infallible, but ... prima facie justified.' These intuitions presumably acquaint us with prima facie duties which we somehow juggle around to arrive at substantive answers to 'end-of-life issues'. The proof of the pudding is supposedly in the eating, in the 'adequacy of the deontological treatment of various issues considered.' Of course, should any particular application of this 'method' prove unconvincing or inconclusive, there is always the excuse that ethical issues are 'sometimes difficult to solve.' Although this is doubtless true, it is all too often an excuse for moral theorists who are unable to produce a generalized theory, reluctant to embrace relativism and refuse to countenance alternative analyses of moral discourse. Having had no luck with the cow (theory), 'they are gone to milk the bull' (intuition): rarely a productive enterprise.

Typical of the unsatisfactoriness of the Moreland-Geisler programme is their treatment of abortion. Their intuitions concerning this problem are suspect to say the least. To begin with, the issue is discussed entirely in terms of the status of the unborn: as if this were somehow an empirical question that had some empirical answer. Moreover, we are treated to such flashes of insight as: '[I]f the unborn is merely a potential human life, then the rights

of an actual human life could take precedence over it. And if the unborn are subhuman, then they have no human rights and can be aborted at will.' It should come as no surprise that those who wallow in the mire of intuitionism would clutch at the insubstantial straw of rights-talk. Even if any real sense could be made of this argument, it remains a complete *non sequitur*. What are 'subhumans'? (Dolphins? Trees?) Might they not have *non-human* rights? (Ecologist would be horrified at possible implications of the Moreland-Geisler intuition.) But even if these subhumans have *no* rights, whatever happened to duties?

The kinds of prejudices that spark Moreland and Geisler's 'intuitions' quickly come to light. In the abortion chapter, for example, we are presented with a totally biased treatment. Whereas arguments are given against pro-abortion positions, any arguments suggested against anti-abortion positions are immediately countered. Moreover, although we are informed that 'abortion has been declared wrong by many societies and moralists since the dawn of civilization, whether Christian or pagan,' no mention is made of the equally loud voice of Catholics and Jews who have spoken in favour of the practice, nor of the societies 'since the dawn of civilization' that have endorsed it.

Moreland and Geisler present their position as deontic, but it is, as they themselves admit, rather a synthesis of deontic and ontic approaches. Moreover, despite the fact they disparagingly characterize ontic theories as 'creating' or 'inventing' moral truth — as opposed to deontic theories that 'discover' such truth — the result is not likely to embarrass even a utilitarian.

Although Gillett's work is broadly Aristotelian, it draws heavily on Wittgenstein and incorporates both Kantian and utilitarian ideas. Essential to the treatment is the notion of the individual as concept-user: '[I]n the very process of becoming a language user [the individual] has also become a moral being-among-others.' But the use of concepts is not simply to construct true or false statements, it is always interest and activity oriented. The practice of medicine is seen as arising from the very nature of our interaction with others 'who are engaged with us in relations of reciprocity and mutual understanding.'

It is from the basic notion of interpersonal dependency, of 'an Aristotelian understanding of medical care for rational and social beings,' that Gillett develops positions on the physician-patient relationship, paternalism, informed consent, proxy consent and patient autonomy. He then applies the notion of longitudinal development of persons to approach questions concerning the beginnings and endings of life.

Gillett, like Moreland and Geisler, does have recourse to intuition and rights language. Thus, in treating of the physician-patient relationship, he observes that: '[T]he intuitions of doctors and nurses are a very important component of the data to be considered in coming to a good decision about a given ethical problem.' This is especially so 'where the practical or moral calculus is fiendishly complicated.' But for Gillett these intuitions are perhaps to be seen as secondary appraisals based on those conceptions taken in with our learning of the language. They must always be 'constrained by

respect for ... patients as persons and finely honed to that standard through caring clinical practice.' As for rights, Gillett maintains that these 'arise directly from the implicit structure of moral thought and the grasp of moral concepts.' Thus, although Gillett's treatment may not be totally satisfactory, it can nonetheless be seen as an integral part of his thesis as a whole.

The Moreland-Geisler work is generally well written and does explore many more aspects of problems than does the Gillett work, and it does, as one would expect, present various positions on each issue. It could, therefore, serve as a source for differing ideas for an introductory course on contemporary ethical problems. But it is doubtful whether it achieves its goals to any appreciable degree better than any one of the many similar treatments — and one must be careful of the bias. Gillett's work, although presenting a unified ethical approach, is more a personal document. If it is simplistic, it is refreshingly so. It could well serve as a secondary reading for a beginning or advance course in medical ethics.

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David J. Gouwens

Kierkegaard's Dialectic of the Imagination.

New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. 1989.

Pp. 304. US \$38.50. ISBN 0-8204-085-0.

This study derives its inspiration from the characterization in *The Sickness unto Death* of the imagination as 'the capacity for all capacities'. The key statement in Anti-Climacus' text reads as follows: 'As a rule, imagination is the medium for the process of infinitizing; it is not a capacity, as are the others — if one wishes to speak in those terms, it is the capacity *instar omnium*.' From Plato onwards, with the notable exception of Kant, philosophers by and large have always looked askance at the imagination. Poets, on the other hand, have consistently espoused the opposite view. Considered by Baudelaire as 'the Queen of the faculties', by Blake as the provenance of this world's configuration, and by Wallace Stevens as the very essence of being human, the imagination is likewise adulated by Kierkegaard the poet as a power *par excellence*. The task that Gouwens sets for himself in this presentation is to demonstrate the multiple ways in which the imagination is primarily featured in the Kierkegaardian corpus.

From the outset I purposely contrast the attitudes of philosophers and poets concerning this subject matter. The distinction is crucial for a fair appraisal or a critical assessment of Gouwens' work. Briefly stated, Gouwens claims that together with feeling, will, and thought, the imagination is an essential factor in the constitution of the self. By virtue of the centrality of its role in egological formation, the imagination is pervasive and as such, functions differently as medium, state, activity, capacity, disposition, and passion (141). Accordingly, Gouwens begins his study with a detailed analysis of Kant's contribution to early German Romanticism. After discussing at length Fichte, Schelling, and Schlegel, the author undertakes a careful exposition of *The Concept of Irony*. His treatment of Kierkegaard's dissertation serves as a propaedeutic for a fuller account of how the imagination manifests itself as a distinctive agent in each of the stages depicted in the formal authorship.

To the extent that the overall nature of Gouwen's project is expository, it complies with the standard rendition of the pseudonymous literature. In addition, he writes very clearly and chisels his prose with Occam's razor. If for no other reason, he deserves applause from the scholarly community for having thematized the dialectical interplay of the imagination in Kierkegaard's works. I am doubtful, however, whether he succeeds in capturing the irony involved in the use of philosophical language to body forth the various *acts* of the imagination.

In Kierkegaard's world the poet, ingenious master of pure possibilities, is often conjoined with the philosopher, legendary despiser of imaginative acts. Taken together, they make a singular statement: philosophy is inseparable from language, and language is inoperative without the innovative thrust of the imagination. For collapsing the poet and the philosopher together creates a tension, which in turn serves as a breeding-ground for irony. Take, for example, the notion of freedom, a term dear to both Haufniensis and Anti-Climacus. While as *personae* these two pseudonyms represent the free act of the poet's imagination, in this very capacity they play the philosopher in their attempt to treat freedom as a mere being of reason. The use of abstract categories such as possibility, eternity or Plato's *apeiron peras* (the limitless/the finite) to characterize freedom, and analyzing it in terms of anxiety and despair only intensifies the tension and accentuates the irony, for these affective phenomena forcefully bespeak the pervasiveness of the experience of freedom itself.

I readily concede that the range of material covered by Gouwens in this study far exceeds the gist of my remarks. It would have been interesting, for example, to consider the dexterity with which he treats the Idealist's attempt to identify the self with abstract thought and the Romantic's escape into the reality of a fanciful world. Equally worthy of reflection would have been the manner in which Gouwens explicates the teleological functioning of the imagination in each of the stages and in terms of one another.

In the end, in spite of the shortcomings indicated, David Gouwens has, in *Kierkegaard's Dialectic of the Imagination*, succeeded in providing Kierkegaard scholarship with a genuine and timely contribution.

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Stuart Hampshire

Innocence and Experience.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1989. Pp. 195.

US \$20.00. ISBN 0-674-45448-0.

Hampshire's main concern in this essay is to expound and defend the view that morality has two interdependent aspects. One, negative and universal, consists in a 'rock-bottom and preliminary morality of justice'; the other, positive and particular, is exhibited in multiple conceptions of the good.

No such conception is authoritative for all human beings, because there is no single good for all human beings to aim at. Aristotle was prevented from seeing this by his hierarchical model of the soul, in which the dominant role is played by reason. Hampshire prefers to speak of the dominance of thought. Reason is but one element in thought. Another is imagination. Reason is tied to argument, while imagination is linked to the mastery of language. Human beings are divided in their languages. And to a degree they are divided in their powers. But they also have certain shared powers, traceable to species-wide needs. First among these powers is the recognition of justice.

Justice, both procedural and substantial, is a negative virtue because it is meant to be an obstacle to the forces of destruction (those of Nazism, for example). A bare minimum of procedural justice, in particular, is required if there is to be a peaceful and coherent society. Rawls is therefore right that justice is the first of all virtues in basic social arrangements. But his procedural justice isn't 'narrowly procedural enough', for it presupposes a particular conception of the good. Hampshire's procedural justice, on the other hand, is, he believes, neutral between different conceptions of the good: its essence lies in negotiation marked by fairness in the exchange of concessions between people whose conceptions of the good conflict.

Determinate conclusions about the justice of a particular practice result from the interaction of this elementary concept of procedural justice with varying conceptions of substantial justice. Whereas procedural justice depends upon rational patterns of thought, conceptions of substantial justice are largely formed by diverse imaginations. Largely, but not entirely; for the

very process of arbitrating between competing interests can introduce modified conceptions of justice — as when a challenge is made to the justice of an institution previously represented as unalterable.

Slavery was so represented in Aristotle's Athens. But in all conditions slavery is unjust because it involves treating human beings as less than fully human. Here Hampshire challenges the philosophical relativist who holds that practices are just or unjust only in relation to the norms of a particular society, not unconditionally.

Questions about justice, Hampshire grants, are matters of opinion — but opinion supported by arguments from analogies with admitted cases of injustice. Indeed, many value judgments are rationally supportable matters of opinion, and some are true. What is more, there is no unbridgeable gap between fact and value. It would be different, of course, if evaluations were mere expressions of feeling. But feelings enter into the assessment of a value judgment only as part of the presupposed background that explains why the reasons to be given in support of the judgment are good reasons. So Hampshire argues against Hume.

He further objects to Hume's 'spectatorial' conception of morality. For Hampshire the primary focus of moral thought is not observation but deliberation about practical possibilities.

The practical possibilities that people envisage depend upon their conceptions of the good. There is value in the diversity of these conceptions — value rooted in the value we attach to individuality. The value of individuality is a fundamental element in defensible conceptions of the good. And so is the value of procedural justice, since procedural justice is the precondition of the various conceptions of the good being realized.

Minimum procedural justice is a duty. But, as Machiavelli saw, strict attention to justice is incompatible with effectiveness in exercising political power. Nevertheless, it can reasonably be demanded of those with the responsibility of political power that they be prepared for a conflict of duties in situations excluding the possibility of a decent outcome. Here the contrast between innocence and experience becomes indispensable in ethics. The contrast marks an opposition between two conceptions of virtue — the private virtues of innocence (e.g., absolute integrity) and the public virtues of experience (e.g., tenacity and resolution). A person of experience expects that his or her typical choice will be among evils. Faced with such a choice, a government must strike a balance so as to satisfy the minimum conditions of procedural justice.

Hampshire himself is no innocent: he was a wartime intelligence officer and served a peacetime British government. This experience, as he explains, informs the present work. So does a richly cultivated mind.

But the argument is defective in places. Thus, in confronting the relativist Hampshire does not foresee the obvious rejoinder that the notion he relies on of what it is to be fully human is culture-bound. In defending his position on the fact-value problem he gives an example of a 'valid' inference from observation to evaluation but neglects to consider whether the inference

depends upon an unstated evaluative assumption. In criticizing Hume he anticipates the objection that the Humean analysis of value judgments applies to those judgments that identify what he calls the great evils of life (e.g., suffering, starvation), but his reply, which emphasizes that the great evils are 'universally accounted bad', apparently assumes that for a Humean the predicative use of 'good' and 'evil' must vary from speaker to speaker. Not only is this false, but Hampshire himself later notes that Hume envisages a 'convergence of all humanity on shared moral sentiments.'

A final, more central criticism. Hampshire believes that there is a moral requirement to negotiate whenever there is a conflict of ends (142). Yet he would grant that this requirement is overridable (140, 172). Might it be overridden in a conflict with absolute injustice, and the injustice justly opposed, even if negotiation is possible (as it was not with the Nazis)? I believe that Hampshire is free to answer this question in the affirmative. My criticism is that he does not consider it.

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Thomas Hobbes.

Behemoth or The Long Parliament,

ed. Ferdinand Tönnies.

Intro. Stephen Holmes.

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

1990. Pp. xi-204.

US \$12.95. ISBN 0-226-34544-0.

Here indeed, as Charles II said of the aging Hobbes, 'comes the Bear to be baited.' And a splendid bear he is in this facsimile reprint of Tönnies' 1889 corrected edition of the work which Hobbes submitted to his king and protector some years before its first spurious (1679), and later 'authoritative' editions (1682). Saucy and sardonic, as 'impudent' as those 'democratical assemblies' which Hobbes despised, *Behemoth* (whose original subtitle 'the History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England, and of the Counsels and Artifices by which they were carried on from the year 1640 to 1660' was almost longer, and certainly more self-explanatory, than the 'Long Parliament' itself) was simply too anticlerical, at root anti-Universities (as seditious 'as the wooden horse was to the Trojans') for the king not to proscribe. A friend to the jurisprudential doctrine of 'passive obedience', Hobbes had to suffer this setback gladly. On the basis of the four dialogues in *Behemoth*, and in

spite of the rebelliousness implicit in its very title, it is not clear whether Hobbes really needed to.

In Dialogue I, the master (unassumingly 'A') recommends to this pupil ('B') Allestree's *The Whole Duty of Man* on this very subject. Since it reflected the correlative *rights* of subjects to security and benefit of law and *obligations* of the chief magistrate to protect and guarantee that well-being, *active* obedience was never much in dispute. Only when, in apparent defiance of 'God's command,' the sovereign might seem to fail in his duty did the question of 'patient suffering' arise. In 1741, George Turnbull commenting on Heineccius' *System of Universal Law* declared passive obedience a 'monstrous absurdity' and its treatment by Heineccius as well Grotius, Pufendorf, et al 'an odd jumble.' Odd it was and no stranger to rank confusion, whether in the minds of a God- (or priest-) fearing populace or, as suggested by Turnbull and his own pupil, Thomas Reid, in the minds of divines and jurists. The case of a convicted subject whose life being 'in extreme danger' he would preserve at all costs returns to *Behemoth* from its haunting appearance in *Leviathan*; for consideration also is a royal command to 'execute' one's own father, 'condemned to die by the law.' Whether a thief would run or a king so order is not at issue: Hobbes assumes that kings' laws are 'general,' not personal, that miscreants 'would break loose if they could.' ('Such is their *passive obedience*,' he comments sardonically.) Alone in contention is whether, the danger to security from royal edict becoming extreme ('If a king raise an army against his subject ...'), that subject may take up arms and whether, in doing so, he draws justification from the higher court of divine command. Heineccius had argued that distressed subjects 'may try all methods in order to obtain their rights' (Hobbes' thief), but 'may not take up arms against their prince or republic' (Hobbes' faith). The fact that university-spawned preachers might whip up 'opinions,' thence arms, against a monarch, citing their own private audience with God, while at the same time; as Calvin had, quoting biblical injunction *against* resistance, incited Hobbes to rationalist fury.

For in large measure, *Behemoth* is the story of linguistic 'impudence,' of an older thinker's frustration with those upstarts who resist that strict order whereby 'laws' *declare* a thing to be 'what it is,' claiming instead that the right to mix pronouncements and thus authorities. 'Mix-archies' were as noxious to Hobbes in the desperate rationalist game of the 'settling of significations' as they were in *Realpolitik* where crafty political masters play loose with both meaning and opinion. The result everywhere is 'anarchy.'

The tale of those 'seditious blockheads' who owe allegiance to the many tongues of 'scriptural interpretation' is frightening. Being 'jealous,' usurpers are far more dangerous as dispensers of envy than they are as the victims of their own relentless, albeit enlightened self-interest. As Stephen Holmes cogently argues in his Introduction, Hobbes has become in *Behemoth* the deft analyzer of the sheer irrationality of those 'children of pride' over whom one man, be he 'king' or (shying away from that name, as Cromwell did) 'Protector,' would fain rule. 'Rational actors' they scarcely were; 'irrational sots' they

clearly be. Hobbes fairly delights in their portrayal (particularly of clerics and preachers — ‘Presbyterians are everywhere the same’), though he is frankly appalled by the havoc they reap. Pufendorf lamented the sheer ‘malice of men’ and, like Allestree who deemed it unnecessary to dwell on the Sovereign’s duty to the populace ‘none of that rank being like to read this treatise,’ witnessed ‘the force of reason [growing] deaf.’ But could any be more gullible, less inclined to reason, than those ‘congregations of Englishmen’ preyed upon with ‘great sedition’ by ‘preaching friars’? ‘Why,’ he complains bitterly, ‘is there so little preaching of justice?’ Presbyterian orators, ‘seeing politics [as] subservient to religion,’ have no ‘want to wit, but want of the science of justice ...’ Where in all the turbulence of the ‘long parliament,’ where now, asks our petulant rationalist, is ‘the science of *just* and *unjust*’?

Hobbes’ view of causes, notes Holmes, was more psychological, less economic than Harrington’s, though he recognized in merchants ‘the first encouragers of rebellion,’ their own ‘glory being to grow excessively rich by the wisdom of buying and selling.’ It is also ‘ideological,’ pushing the ‘obedience of the subject’ ahead of the ‘right of the sovereign,’ even that granted ‘by every man’s express consent.’ True right *is* ‘the right of the sword’; *true* sovereignty is the king’s (only) ‘right of the militia,’ which power is ‘in effect the whole sovereign power.’ Hence there is no mistaking *Leviathan*, whilst confusion is the plague of *Behemoth*.

Hobbes’ strategic summaries of events ease the strain of the dialogue form. Yet the narrative itself is gripping even where, as with English-Scots hostilities, Hobbes cannot quite appreciate the latter’s ‘foreignness.’ The ‘hunt’ of the king is as exciting as the baiting of this old ‘bear’ must have been. Charles II was right to fear *Behemoth*; Holmes is to be congratulated for reintroducing its text; to Hobbes belongs the triumph.

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Ted Honderich

Conservatism.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1991.

Pp. 255. US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-1219-1);
n.p. (paper: ISBN 0-8133-1220-5).

Ted Honderich’s *Conservatism* is more political tract than philosophical discourse. It is written with lively rhetoric often expressing personal impressions. None of this is bad, but problems do arise with the goal and method of the book. Nevertheless, positive contributions are made in discussions of particular policy issues.

The goal is to find the single principle upon which Conservatism rests. The Conservatism in question is defined as '... the particular tradition of belief, feeling, policy, legislation and action exemplified by the Conservative Party in Britain and a main part of the Republican party in the United States ...' In short, the book amounts to an attempted unmasking of Conservatism by showing that no such rationalizing principle can be found and that the actual policy decisions of New Right governments express only the principle of self-interest.

The story-line is the search for what Conservatism really is. It is told by canvassing all the areas in which one might plausibly find the sought for principle. The first three areas, change, theory and human nature, are the more philosophical. The remaining four, freedom, government, society and equality are more directly discussions of New Right policies. Honderich is best in these critiques of the policies which Conservative governments have utilized.

Honderich's discussion of the first three areas raises the problems of the goal and method of the book. These problems begin with his identification of the tradition of Conservatism as the background of the present Conservative Party. He does not leave room for the possibility that this may only oddly be identified as one tradition or that it may exhibit significant incoherence. There is a conservative philosophy, which Quinton calls 'procedural', that takes stands on change, theory and human nature. The stand is anti-rationalist and anti-theoretical. A large gap exists between this conservative philosophy and New Right policies even if New Rightists sometimes appeal to such philosophical stances. In fact, New Right politics which tends to act uncompromisingly on principles, such as those to do with private ownership, may be at odds with an anti-rationalist conservative philosophy.

There is a clash between conservatism anti-rationalism and Honderich's goal and method. He assumes that there must be a single rationalizing principle and that there must be explicit, universal criteria of application for lower level principles. These are assumptions that simply conflict with the conservative anti-theoretical stand, so it is not surprising that he finds them unfulfilled. It was guaranteed to be so.

This would not be so bad if his chapter on theory supported his own assumptions or refuted conservative anti-theory. However, it succeeds at neither. He argues that Conservatives do make theoretical statements claiming that something is a necessary, or sufficient, condition for something else. For example, Conservatives claim that unequal distribution of income is necessary to achieve a certain economic level. Without supporting this particular claim, one can see that the denial of general normative, economic or political theories does not imply that all theoretical statements must be rejected. Conservatives can be permitted some statements of necessary, or sufficient, conditions.

Honderich's discussions of New Right policies are much more successful. This is largely because he is assessing particular principles which Conservatives have appealed to explicitly or implicitly. The search for the one large

principle can be ignored here and does not infect the quality of his assessments of particular issues. He does a good job of identifying actual priorities of Conservatives to do with freedom, government and society. A significant unmasking takes place showing the darker side of the polite New Rightist face. We find that Conservatives are not supporters of freedom in any general sense but only of economic freedom. Social and civil freedoms are diminished by New Right governments. Democracy in government is second to property freedom. And commitment to the tradition of a society amounts in practice to commitment to a dominant racial, or cultural, group.

The most valuable work in the book is that on equality. Honderich exhibits the weaknesses in ten Conservative objections to equality. However, he is also sharply critical of most egalitarian formulations of a principle of equality. Taking equality of results to be one of the most promising formulations, he agrees with the objection that this principle guarantees only relativities wherein relational equality is valued over a better state with less equality. He is concerned to formulate a single egalitarian principle both to show what Conservatives are against and to oppose a position of principle to what he claims is their unrationalized stance. His formulation is a moderate one which takes account of human selfishness while at the same time utilizing the possibilities of altruism. In short, it is that the end of a society must be to make well-off those who are badly off (234). By being against this principle with its moderate appeal to altruism, Conservatives show that they favour selfishness.

Honderich does look at the possibility that the grounding principle for Conservatives is one of desert. Here the search for the single principle is allowed again to do too much work, and reference to desert is ruled out as giving Conservatism significant coherence just because there is no single principle to formulate such concerns. However, Honderich does not show that local principles would not be sufficient though he does give ground for suspicion that the merit which New Rightists allow is circumscribed by self-interest.

The lack of any general principle to rationalize the Conservative position generates Honderich's final verdict. 'The conclusion to which we come is not that Conservatives are selfish. It is that they are nothing else. Their selfishness is the rationale of their politics, and they have no other rationale. They stand without the support, the legitimation, of any recognizably moral principle. It is in this that they are distinguished fundamentally from those who are opposed to them' (238-9).

Honderich gives a plausible case for this conclusion by looking at what New Right governments have actually done. It is regrettable that he does not question whether the New Right remains consistent with the conservative philosophy which is anti-rationalist, anti-theoretical and largely procedural.

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Paul Humphreys

The Chances of Explanation.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1989. Pp. x+170. Index.

US \$29.50. ISBN 0-691-07353-8.

This excellent book is a study of the ontology of probabilistic causation for the purpose of better understanding its role in explanation. The particular concern of the book is the explanation of singular events, both deterministically and indeterministically caused. There are four chapters. The first is a critique of traditional views of causation and an argument for indeterminism. The second discusses probabilistic causation; it concludes with an argument for the bare existence of unobserved structures. The third chapter goes into more detail about the nature of the unobserved structures underlying chance causes. The final chapter is a discussion of the consequences for explanation. There are three technical appendices on quantitative issues.

Humphreys takes ontological issues seriously, and is a realist about causes. He takes it as axiomatic that causal explanations must be true, and that science has discovered some of the genuine causes operating in the world because of the superiority of its methods. Since events have multiple causes, our knowledge of the causes is inevitably incomplete. Humphreys' axioms imply, then, that an incomplete specification of causes can give explanatory information.

We often improve our explanations with additional causal information without overthrowing previous less complete explanations. Humphreys shows, however, that many contemporary models of explanation (especially Hempel's inductive-statistical model) fail to distinguish true and complete explanations. At least in part, this stems from taking deterministic models as the paradigm for explanation (e.g., the deductive-nomological model). Humphreys proposes to take chance seriously, and start from a model that is adequate for genuinely indeterministic cases.

Humphreys argues that ordinary language and linguistic analysis approaches to understanding causal explanations are likely to get into trouble because they draw on intuitions that come from a restricted set of largely deterministic cases. Casual explanations are something that one discovers, not constructs, and ones intuitions may have to be rejected in the face of evidence. Although I did not find Humphreys' arguments in favour of determinism and 'raw chance' convincing, I think we can grant him that a satisfactory theory of causation should allow for the possibility. Furthermore, our inevitable lack of information about complete causes will make our epistemic situation as if the world were indeterministic, so for the purpose of a practical theory of explanation we might as well allow the possibility. These pragmatic considerations do some violence to Humphreys' ontological motivations, but they also broaden the potential appeal of this approach without weakening its content. Even if the world *is* deterministic, we are going to want incomplete but true explanations.

A fundamental feature of any account of causation is that the cause should contribute to the existence of the effect. On some accounts, a cause is a factor that is sufficient for the effect. Causal overdetermination is a problem for this account, especially for probabilistic cases. The *sine qua non* approaches were developed to handle this difficulty. They hold that the cause is necessary for the effect under the particular circumstances. Unlike the sufficiency accounts, which are too broad, Humphreys finds the *sine qua non* accounts too narrow. They cannot deal with the distinction between contributing and counteracting causes, and consequently rule out some cases that should not be ruled out. These cases arise only in non-deterministic situations, whereas the *sine qua non* accounts have restricted themselves to deterministic cases. This restriction, though, is a serious limitation in practice.

Humphreys takes causes to be properties that can influence the state of a system. He rules out facts (qua linguistic entities), objects, and unactualized possibilities as causes. The last will cause some concern, since it seems to imply that the world is 'pure act' (to use an expression favoured by C.B. Martin). Humphreys' justification that only actualities can be causes in specific circumstances requires more discussion.

A central concept of accounts of causation is the neutral state, analogous to the experiment's null hypothesis. Humphreys calls his version the *contrast case*. It is the case in which the casually relevant factor is not a factor. Defining the contrast case requires system specific knowledge, and prior knowledge of relevant causes. Humphreys ably points out the difficulties with other possibilities such as the average value of the contributing factor, the normal state of affairs, the natural state of affairs and the negation of the event. For explanation to get off the ground, some prior knowledge of causes is required.

Humphreys emphasizes the importance of active interaction with the systems to be explained. He rejects the passive empiricism of the *Aufbau* because it is too liberal ontologically, it being too easy to find generalities. One must attend to generating conditions. For this reason, subjective and logical probabilities are irrelevant to causal explanation, since these are not causal. We need guidance to the underlying regularities, since universal regularities are hard to find. We get this guidance, as Hacking has pointed out, only by actively intervening to change the system. Reflecting on the phenomena is not enough. Science isn't done in an armchair.

Humphreys rejects the idea the probabilities themselves can be causes, and argues against the reification of probabilities as propensities. It is not the value of the probability that is causal, since cause can involve even small probabilities. Change itself has no explanation, and hence no causal role. Causation is grounded in the basis of physical chance, not in the chance itself.

Reichenbach's common cause analysis is deficient because it requires the variability of the cause, or else the two events are independent. But fundamental causes are likely permanent, so Reichenbach's account, according to Humphreys, encourages instrumentalism about fundamental cause. Humphreys adapts Mill's unconditionality requirement to avoid this problem. His

account of causation is basically inductive, starting with primitive causes and recursively defining more complex causes from them. These primitive causes allow causal explanation to get started.

The final chapter completes the arguments against the linguistic and passive approaches to explanation, and shows how the approach in the book deals with a number of problem issues. The whole production is tight, clear and remarkably complete.

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Philosophy of Sport.

New York: Paragon, 1990. Pp. 160.

US \$15.95. ISBN 1-55778-189-3.

This is largely an expository text which addresses issues of philosophical interest for sport enthusiasts. The book is organized into six chapters, three unstated sections of two chapters each. Topics include, in order of offering, social issues, ethical issues, self-knowledge, mind and body, art and aesthetics, and phenomenology of play. Although material offered may be thought-provoking for the philosophically uninitiated, those who deal with the philosophy of sport professionally will find nothing new here in the way of content.

The first section is by far the strongest. Clarity and accuracy of exposition is exceptional, although the distinction between a social issue and an ethical issue is not clear. Accompanying analysis of issues noted is brief and incomplete.

The second section is the weakest as well as the shortest. Clarity and accuracy of exposition are maintained. However, exposition is incomplete. Although Hyland correctly notes the need for more work in the area of knowledge, some existing studies which might add to the exposition are not mentioned. This is also a transitional section as issues addressed change from a 'group' orientation to an 'individual' orientation. However, the perspective to analysis does not shift correspondingly until the final chapter. Two things result from this rough perspective shift.

Hyland has, perhaps unintentionally, implied that philosophic reflection is subservient to a 'science' of psychology. This is surprising for a philosopher seemingly interested in phenomenological aspects of sport participation. The positivist assumption regarding knowledge mentioned in Ch. 4 'Mind and

Body' needs to be pointedly contrasted with ideas about self-knowledge contained in Ch. 3. This is especially significant as the self-knowledge discussed, given as a psychological aspect of sport, is derived from procedures based on the same assumption-sources external to the individual who has the learning experience. The brief section on Socratic Self-Knowledge at the end of Ch. 3 seems particularly deficient in this regard, although in the following chapter self-knowledge is given as the purpose of philosophy.

The third section addresses the 'sport as art' controversy, in which authors are discussing whether sport is an art form. However, in essentially a conceptual analysis, it is not clear how authors conceptualize either sport or art. Therefore, the attempted conceptual comparison is decidedly confusing. Apart from the subject being of interest to those who discuss it, the significance of arguments and conclusions for those who do not is not apparent.

The final chapter is, contrary to the expository nature of the rest of the book, an abbreviated presentation of one of Hyland's own works on phenomenology of play.

To the extent the book is intended for researchers and instructors in the area, usefulness will be determined by each according to the extent to which a particular area of interest is addressed in the book. The reader could be easily misled in taking those references cited and reviewed to be the only ones available on the topic. As a researcher and instructor in the area, I find the introduction most useful as Hyland extrapolates his reference to academic prejudice against philosophic study of sport by philosophers.

As a contribution to philosophic literature on the subject, I recommend it to all those 'thoughtful people' to which Hyland refers. I would hesitate, however, to recommend it as a primary text for course study simply because there are other works available, individual and collected, which could serve as instructor's topical requirements more poignantly. This is an applied text which could definitely initiate interesting and useful discussion. However, in promoting and developing knowledge of philosophic inquiry and skills in analysis for students, a supplementary text delineating the nature of philosophy and methods would be advised.

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Winand Klassen

Architecture and Philosophy.

Cebu City, Philippines: University of San Carlos 1990. Pp. viii-335.

US \$30.00 (cloth): US \$25.00 (paper).

This book is an enquiry into the nature of architecture. It deals with four main questions: 1. What does it mean to *make* architecture? 2. What makes a building *architecture*? 3. What is the nature of the aesthetic experience? 4. What is the relation between architecture, on the one hand, and science and art, on the other? Klassen is anxious in this enquiry to show how philosophical reflection can enrich architectural theory and practice. He has managed to create a lively and insightful dialogue between some of the most influential architects and philosophers of the 20th century.

The book is composed of two parts. The first and more important part is devoted to an analysis of the process of architecture, that is, to 'making, experiencing, and understanding of architecture' (14). In the analysis of each of these three topics Klassen is guided by Vitruvius' conception of the main elements of architecture: *firmitas* (firmness, technic), *utilitas* (function, purpose), *venustas* (beauty, form, meaning) (3). The second part is devoted to a brief treatment of the role of science and art in architecture. I shall restrict myself to the first part, because it constitutes the major part of the book and because the second part repeats much of what was said in the first part.

First, What is involved in *making* architecture? An architectural work is a building, but not every building is an architectural work. Following Heidegger, Klassen makes a distinction between building as constructing and building as cultivating. i.e., as architecture. But what makes a building a work of architecture? In his answer to this question, Klassen discusses in some detail the basic elements of architecture, *firmitas*, *utilitas*, and *venustas*. The point which he underscores is that what makes a building architecture is possession of form. Form is the vehicle of aesthetic value: it expresses meaning. Thus, unlike an ordinary building, an architectural work communicates something special to us; it speaks to us. 'Why? It has an excess ... of form and meaning. It has more form and meaning than the ordinary building, because it has more being' (39). Accordingly making architecture is essentially an act of making form. The locus of this form is the physical reality of the building. Form is, however, a function of the fusion of the basic elements of architecture. It is not imposed on but emerges from this fusion; it arises out of the logic implicit in the given space, environment, shape, material, and function of the building. This is why Klassen characterizes architectural making as an act of letting-be (Cf. Kahn, 16).

Second, What is aesthetic experience? The building comes to life *qua* architecture, it acquires its *artistic* identity, in the aesthetic experience. And in order for this to happen we should view the aesthetic experience as an active, dynamic process in which the spectator participates in and contributes to the *making* of the architectural work: the building *qua* art becomes

actual in the aesthetic experience. 'The spectator, the listener, the user in architecture or the audience in general, becomes a constituent and necessary part of a work of art' (54). Klassen elucidates this view by a detailed, yet instructive, analysis of perception from the pragmatic and phenomenological standpoints. The point which merits emphasis here is that as an aesthetic object the architectural work is a *quasi-subject*, and as such it is a world of experience, of meaning (87); it has a secret life. This feature, which is implicit in the formal and physical being of the building, reveals the dynamic aspect of the art work. An active, responsive perception is a *sine qua non* for the realization of this dynamic aspect in the aesthetic experience.

Third, Under what conditions do we *understand* the architectural work? The thrust of this question is a thrust toward the truth potential in the work of art — how do we actualize or understand this truth? Following Heidegger and Gadamar, Klassen rejects the correspondence and coherence theories of truth (93 ff.). He also rejects Schleiermacher's view that the meaning of the text 'must be recovered by disciplined reconstruction of the historical situation or life context in which it originated' (101). Understanding the art work in general is not an activity of reconstruction but of *mediation*, and as mediation it is the fusion of the temporal (historical) and existential (ontological) horizons of the given work. This activity consists of raising questions about the work for the express purpose of testing its possibilities (110). Understanding is, accordingly, an experiential event in which the percipient penetrates the veil which hides the true being of the art work. Hence it is an act of knowing, indeed of *recognition*. In this act one does not dominate the art work but submits his will to it.

Let me now advance some critical remarks. First, Klassen surveys a vast array of ideas and views without evaluating them and without coming to any conclusion on whether or not they are valid. He simply assumes this validity; but a philosopher cannot stop with his assumption. Moreover, the book as a whole lacks a thematic focus; it lacks a thesis. Klassen reveals a genuine feeling and love for architecture and philosophy, but I am afraid he has not developed the wealth of information which he presented into a coherent whole.

Second, the scope of the philosophical and architectural literature which Klassen chose for discussion is limited, indeed one-sided. He admits on a number of occasions that he is selective and biased in this choice. But this admission does not in any way remedy the charge of limitation and one-sidedness; for (1) except for a brief reference to Dewey and Osborne, Klassen focused his attention almost exclusively on the phenomenological and hermeneutical schools of thought. But his analysis of the process of architecture would have been richly enhanced had he appealed to some of the major aestheticians in Europe and the U.S. who have determined the substance and direction of aesthetics during the past two centuries. (2) Klassen restricted himself to 20th century architecture. Here, too, he has relied on the authority of a few personally favored theoreticians in architecture.

Third, sorely lacking throughout the book is any reference to aesthetic evaluation and criticism in architecture. But, how can we reach an adequate understanding of architecture unless this understanding takes into serious consideration the foundation of aesthetic judgment in architecture? Yet in spite of these shortcomings I think the book is useful and should attract the attention of both philosophers and architects. It is rich with insight and suggestive ideas. The reader emerges from it with a fresh understanding of some basic problems in the philosophy of architecture.

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Kathleen Lennon
Explaining Human Action.
La Salle, IL: Open Court 1990. Pp. 176.
US \$32.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9134-2);
US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9135-0).

Is this a book on *action*, as the title intimates? Yes and no. Clearly it starts out that way. Yet somewhere less than halfway through it looks to be more like good ol' philosophy of mind: thenceforth the discussion proceeds to deal with issues of mental-to-physical reduction, mental-on-physical supervenience, functionalism, and wide/narrow content. But hey, I'm not complaining. A virtue of Kathleen Lennon's monograph is that it integrates, via her leitmotif of intentional-cum-causal explanation, work in diverse areas of philosophy of mind and philosophy of action, effecting an overview that many will find availing. It is fair to add, though, that if one were to drop a single name for purposes of locating this essay in the intellectual landscape it would have to be Donald Davidson, who has set the terms of reference for many of the issues taken up (indeed the index credits him with 30 pages, almost twice that of the runner-up).

Lennon begins with an analysis of 'reason-giving' explanations for behavior, i.e., those which show behavior (viz., intentional acts) to be rational given the agent's intentional states. Davidsonian wisdom has it that intentional states which provide reasons for an action may cause but never casually explain the action. Lennon departs from this, arguing that by virtue of the conditionals they sustain such explanations constitute a subspecies of casual explanation.

Lennon goes on to outline her conception of 'intentional theory', one of whose distinctive features is a core structure specifying the rationalizing and interdependent causal networks within which our intentional states are

located and which provides them with their individuating conditions (67). To counter worries that such a conception of intentional theory might not be genuinely causally explanatory, she considers three objections, viz., that intentional laws cannot be completed, that intentional kinds cannot be regarded as natural kinds, and that causal explanation requires an a posteriori link between explanans and explanandum (Hume's point). Very persuasively she shows these objections to be either overblown or off the mark.

'Yes, but ...' one hears from the wings. For Davidson (*inter alios*) would also require that, were intentional explanations causal explanations, reductive connections would have to obtain between the mental and the physical; that none are imminent leads him to his anomalous monism. Since Lennon too is an antireductionist, her response to this Davidsonian challenge is to decouple psychophysical law or law likeness from the notion of reduction (96-104).

Lennon also seeks to maintain a posture that is recognizably materialist and physicalist: 'It is materialist in assuming that psychological states are in some sense constituted out of physical states. It is physicalist, in the sense I am using this term, in assuming that all physical changes are susceptible to physical explanations' (85). The resultant nonreductive materialism, with the causal-explanatory role it allows to intentional descriptions, is *eo ipso* realist in construing intentional descriptions. So the big question is how do we (nonreductively, noneliminatively, noninstrumentally) characterize the way in which the physical 'supports' explanations at the intentional level? Enter supervenience.

Supervenience in gist is 'a relation of non-causal necessitation and dependency which falls short of reduction' (109) and which 'is interpreted as a relation of ontological determination and dependency between properties, the reality of each of which is accepted, but where the base properties are regarded as more fundamental' (107). Naturally this invites sundry further questions, some of which Lennon herself covers.

An interesting wrinkle to Lennon's materialism-cum-supervenience is her contention that it could be true independently of the truth of even token-token identity theories, the idea being that there is no guaranty the classification psychological theory yields will correspond neatly with the classification yielded by physical theory (117). She then suggests that a materialism free of identity claims might even be desirable: 'If we allow as a mental particular anything that is ... referred to in our true psychological descriptions, we seem committed to the existence of, for example, red after-images. In the past this has been an embarrassment for materialists, for even if we could find a plausible physical particular with which to identify the after-image, it is very unlikely that it would be red ... Within materialism characterised in terms of supervenience, however, we are under no constraint to give up our belief in after-images simply because we can find no physical particulars with which to identify them' (118). Quite. But the very idea of unreduced, uneliminated, and physically untokened mental existents prompts a rude ontological question: Why isn't all this just dualism redux?

A kindred challenge comes from the reductionist quarter, where a major contention is that supervenience is mysterious without some account of how psychological descriptions are made true by physical states. Functionalism would ostensibly make Lennon's brand of materialism intelligible by explaining psychological states in a way that makes manifest how they can be physically realized; in short, intelligibility demands reduction of intentional kinds to functional kinds. Furthermore, functionalist reduction is seen as vindicating intentional explanation (this line would seem to be a nonstarter, in the light of Lennon's aforementioned decoupling of psychophysical law from reduction). However Lennon again rises to the occasion, providing very compelling arguments against the practicability of functionalist reduction.

As a final afterthought, Lennon considers the position of intentional explanation vis-à-vis 'individualism' (roughly, the espousal of narrow content for psychological states). Here she argues that the explanatory goals of intentional theory — explaining the interactions of agents with their environment — can only be achieved with a world-dependent (wide content) characterization of thought, after the spirit of Putnam.

All in all, this is a helpful book, containing a number of fresh insights. Had I paid for my copy I would not have regretted it.

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A.C. Lloyd

The Anatomy of Neoplatonism.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1990. Pp. ix+198.

Cdn \$62.50: US \$45.00. ISBN 0-19-824229-8.

This is a book about Neoplatonism which might seem to have little to say about the more notorious features of the school: the ascent to the One, the 'mysticism', the discussions of the purification of the soul. But such an impression of Lloyd's work would be false. The truth is that he approaches his subject matter in a very unusual way, for what he writes about is the underlying substructure on which such 'notorious' features depend. But it is not about any particular Neoplatonist; it spans the school from Alexander of Aphrodisias in the late second century A.D. to Damascius in the sixth, Alexander being treated more or less as an honorary member. Its subject-matter falls more or less into two halves, the first of which is concerned with Neoplatonic attitudes to the place of logic in or before philosophy, the semantics of Porphyry, and the Neoplatonic alternative to classification by

genus and differentia: namely the use of what Lloyd terms P-series, the paradigm case of which is the series of numbers. The second half of the book deals with the underlying structures of such Neoplatonic furniture as procession and return, the nature of knowledge and what unites with the One in the mystical union.

This is not a book for beginners in Neoplatonism, unless, that is, they are logically rather sophisticated beginners. Though written with great clarity and a sparseness of style, it assumes a lot of knowledge, both philosophical and historical, about the development of the Neoplatonic tradition. Its weakness is in its strength: namely, the very attempt to see basic principles underlying *all* Neoplatonic writings. For in jumping adroitly from philosopher to philosopher, from obscure text to obscure text over a period of more than four hundred years, Lloyd invites us either to take a great deal on trust, or to spend tremendous amounts of time reading up on the details. For he has written a complicated book about a topic on which there are few intermediate books, or even elementary ones. Even among those well read in Neoplatonism, few could take such leaps in their stride without wondering whether significant details are not disappearing in the search for general principles. Furthermore, what comes out of Lloyd's analysis is a group of philosophers with strange metaphysical ideas but working in a manner at least recognizable by analytic philosophers. One might wonder whether the Neoplatonists would recognize themselves.

Nevertheless much of what Lloyd gives us about the substantive issues seems right, and can be applied to further texts from the Neoplatonist of your choice if you care to test him further. Particularly interesting are a number of discussions about the differences within a common framework between Plotinus and Proclus: a subject long deserving of more serious consideration. My only regret here is that Lloyd did not attempt to be more systematic; he constantly excites our curiosity, raises a number of very interesting problems and moves off to an only tangentially related topic. Sometimes, on the other hand, we seem, to emerge from difficult and uncharted waters to confront a puzzling but well known theme, such as the relation of Proclus' henads to possible metaphysical constructions of Plotinus. On these occasions Lloyd is particularly helpful.

Challenging too are a number of suggestions about Plotinus' 'idealism', and Lloyd hints broadly about comparisons with Berkeley and Hegel. Such passages could do with much more detailed development, if they are to be more than ideas to play with, but Lloyd says enough to suggest that such development would be well worth the attention of future historians of philosophy. What Lloyd himself says in such connections, such as that *theoria* 'means' consciousness, is not always immediately convincing, and his account of the relations between subject and object even in the *Enneads* remains at the level of a thesis to be tested. Yet as well as interesting a new kind of reader in Neoplatonism, Lloyd's aim, at least in part, is to challenge existing assumptions about the 'mentalité' of Neoplatonists and in some cases about the quality of their work in logic and semantics. Many of the more staid

interpreters, however, will probably try to reply to Lloyd by suggesting that he seems to think it does not matter what the Neoplatonists' first principles were; what matters is only what they do with them. So the charge would be that Lloyd's approach is excessively formalistic. To which he might reply that he is redressing the balance and therefore ...

All in all an infuriating, learned and fascinating book from which the patient can learn a great deal. I doubt whether any other living scholar could have written so effectively on Neoplatonism in this way. Lloyd's work will take a lot of assimilating, and the truth or falsehood of much of what he says will only finally be tested after much more pedestrian analysis of Neoplatonists other than Plotinus is widely available; and these Neoplatonists must include, of course, many of Greek commentators on Aristotle.

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Rudolf A. Makkreel

*Imagination and Interpretation in Kant.
The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique
of Judgment.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990.

Pp. x + 187. US \$24.95. ISBN 0-226-50276-7.

Transcendental philosophy and modern hermeneutics may seem to have nothing in common; they may even appear to be incompatible. The Kant of the first *Critique* from whom we usually take our bearings when we speak of transcendental philosophy proceeds from a priori starting points that are not relativizable to given historical perspective nor in need of re-evaluation in the light of changes; hermeneutics sees the world as a human world in which understanding is as fluid as that towards which interpretation is directed. Makkreel does not question that such a contrast can be drawn. But if we do so, he rightly points out, we ignore the third *Critique* and work with an incomplete Kant and thus a truncated notion of transcendental philosophy. Reading Kant from the vantage point of the *Critique of Judgment* is essential for a viable view of Kant's philosophy as a whole, and this, Makkreel claims, reveals also the important hermeneutical implications in Kant's mature work. The third *Critique* 'can be used to arrive at theoretical presuppositions that have not been uncovered in the *Critique of Pure Reason* — without, however, undermining any of the first *Critique*'s cognitive claims' (3).

By concentrating his analysis of the role of imagination in Kant's philosophy, Makkreel can demonstrate his theses in detail and show the development of Kant's view opens up a rich potential for hermeneutical exploration of 'reflective interpretation' of our world. He is careful not to ascribe such a theory of interpretation explicitly to Kant; yet he finds in the *Critique of Judgement's* turn from determinant to reflective judgement a basis for regarding this *Critique* not, as is the orthodox reading, as bridging the gap between nature and morals, but as providing an interpretive framework for the first two *Critiques*. This is in line with Kant's own contention that the third *Critique* makes no addition to doctrinal philosophy but is wholly devoted to judgement in its reflective mode.

The first part of the book traces Kant's conception of the imagination through the precritical period to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the latter, imagination functions as an aid to the understanding in the constitution of experience. It produces schemata to categories so that the manifold of sense can be grasped as objects in nature. Imagination in its synthesizing function is thus subservient to the understanding; it serves to construct the world of nature as we experience it, and it mainly does so by making possible the application of the categories to sense.

The second part, in three closely-argued chapters, presents the role imagination plays in reflective judgement in the third *Critique*. For the readers mainly interested in Kant, these chapters will be of the utmost importance. They add immeasurably to the standard commentary on the *Analytic of the Beautiful* and the *Analytic of the Sublime* by keeping the reflective nature of the aesthetic judgement firmly in focus and thus allowing for a reading that brings to light many unexpected cognitive implications. For despite his explicit denial that aesthetic judgements can make knowledge claims, Kant upheld their relation to 'cognition in general' and reinforced it by the reference to the harmonious play of all cognitive powers. Makkreel draws heavily on Kant's *First Introduction* to the third *Critique* for illumination, and his success in doing so should earn him the gratitude of many Kant students who have found the style and substance of the long and unremittingly technical essay too remote from the body of the text it introduces to be of much help. Makkreel also argues a powerful case for the categories remaining applicable to aesthetic judgments while being used there differently than in cognitive judgements (52-8). These sections (but not only these) are deeply thought-provoking and should do away with the misunderstandings often arising from Kant's saying that the aesthetic judgement is 'independent of concepts'. The chapter on the sublime (*The Regress of the Imagination*) is a superb interpretation of an area of Kant's thought that has been much neglected until very recently. Makkreel finds that both the beautiful and the sublime are necessary to understanding the scope of the aesthetic judgement: as the judgement of beauty reveals the purposiveness in the object judged, so the judgement on the sublime, in its regress, reveals the purposiveness of the subject.

The third of the chapters in Part 2 (*The Life of The Imagination*) opens up a perspective on the unity of the *Critique of Judgement* that explicitly links judgements on aesthetic and judgments on biological phenomena via the 'feeling of life' (*Lebensgefühl*) which Kant introduced in the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement* (§1) as characterising the subjective nature of the judgement on beauty. Makkreel speaks of this specification of the subject as having gone 'largely unnoticed' by commentators (88). 'Not exploited' might have been more accurate: many have noticed, but lacked the perspective on the reflective functions of the imagination with which Makkreel approaches the text. This perspective yields not only a richer understanding of the aesthetic feeling of life but an understanding of how Kant saw the life of the mind exemplified in the felt response to the world. This chapter is a brilliant piece of Kant interpretation. It convinces by its textual integrity and delights by the boldness of its vision. A reader having finished Part 2 of this book is likely to return to the *Critique of Judgement* with a renewed sense of excitement and a heightened awareness of Kant's greatness.

The remaining Part 3 is the most controversial part of the book. It links what has been gained from the probing and highly original reading of the third *Critique* explicitly with the aims of hermeneutic understanding. Makkreel claims to have presented a case for Kant's last *Critique* establishing 'a reflective framework within which the relationship between the natural and human sciences can be clarified' (166). This case, now on the table and looking very impressive indeed, will have to be debated and possibly contested. But this is a task for the wider philosophical community and not for a short review which can only draw attention to a challenging and very important book.

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**John Matthews, Kenneth Goodpaster,
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*Policies and Persons: A Casebook in Business
Ethics, Second Edition.*

New York, NY: McGraw-Hill 1991.

Pp. xix+633. Cdn \$50.90. ISBN 0-07-0409994-4.

This book includes approximately sixty cases. Although the cases vary in length from a couple of pages to twenty or more, they typically provide a sufficient foundation for initial analysis of the issues. They are specifically selected to be most useful in situations where business ethics is taught through the case study method. All have been tested in various classes at the

Harvard Business School. A selected bibliography of material in business ethics and moral philosophy is appended at the end of the text.

The structure of the book is straightforward. A brief introductory chapter gives an analysis of the history, nature, and purpose of the case study method. The remainder of the book is divided into four parts, each part dealing with cases involving certain types of values. The first part is titled *Personal Values*, and deals with dilemmas of ethical choices individuals face on the job. For example, the first case involves a new employee being urged by a superior to give an unwarranted discount to a key account. The second part, moves to cases that involve values internal to the corporation rather than individual values. Cases involving alcoholism, insider trading, behavior guidelines, sexual harassment policy, exemplify the range of issues covered. The third part, considers corporate values in relationship to the wider community or external stakeholders. Issues such as product safety, pollution, and the ethical dimensions of advertising are involved in these cases. Together with many classic cases, such as the Pinto gas tank affair, there is much new material, including a case that deals with company responsibilities with respect to race. The final part extends the discussion of values to the international level. Material varies from issues such as disinvestment in South Africa, to sales of pesticides banned in the U.S. to third world countries. There is usually enough empirical data provided with each case to provide a reasonably rich factual context for the application of ethical analyses.

Although a very brief account of how ethical analysis might be applied to the cases is given in an appendix, it seems so summary as to be of limited use. Utilitarianism, for example, is dealt with in less than half a page! Another appendix illustrates the application of the case method by applying it to one of the cases in the text itself. This too, while of some help, is more along the lines of a sketch as to how one would proceed than an in-depth look at the methodology involved. While the authors do note that the case study method has its weaknesses, for example, that it is no substitute for actual experience, they do not seem to realise the method may also lead to inadequate treatment of the more general and theoretical questions in business ethics.

The main value of this book is in the collection of cases themselves. The orientation of the book, as the preface admits, is towards managers and students of management. There is no treatment of the more general normative and ethical questions of the type one would find in the usual texts on business ethics. Although the collection could be used as a text, if so used, most instructors would probably wish to supplement it with other material. Rather than impose high text costs on students many instructors may prefer to include this collection in a list of recommended readings. In conclusion, Matthews, Goodpaster, and Nash have provided an excellent and extensive collection of case study material which will be of use to all those who work in the field of business ethics.

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Joseph McCarney

Social Theory and The Crisis of Marxism.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
(Verso) 1990. Pp. x+217.

US \$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-86091-231-0);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-86091-948-X).

A book on the crisis of Marxism is bound to invite scepticism: not because 'crisis' in this case is an exaggeration and a cliché, but because for once it is a stupefying understatement. As a theory, Marxism long ago passed from crisis to *rigor mortis*; the convulsive events of the last two years are the liberating results of finally burying dead ideas. The past decade or so did produce a series of fascinating attempts — by Cohen, Habermas, Elster, and others — at philosophically resurrecting Marx through creative reinterpretation, but these would-be revivals typically concede fundamentals or are soon forsaken even by their authors.

It is a measure, therefore, of the independent-mindedness of McCarney that he seeks in this book a return to the basics of Marx in support of understanding a central notion that has plagued Marxism from the start, namely the claim of an intimate and special link between theory and practice. Marx viewed his theory not merely as an explanatory account of capitalism but also as an instrument for its transformation to socialism. McCarney wants to restore and defend Marxist social theory conceived in this traditional way.

Unfortunately, McCarney circumscribes his challenge such as to leave some of his toughest opponents on the sidelines. He bypasses completely the strict determinist view of Marxism, associated with the Second International, which asserted historical inevitability and so in effect eclipsed human agency. Although that view may be foreign to Marx's main intent, much of Marx does tend towards it, and McCarney never addresses this underlying difficulty. More troubling, however, is that McCarney treats main tenets of Marxism, such as the belief that capitalism contains devastating structural contradictions, as essentially evident (190), and inquires only into how they are to be understood. Hence, the root reasons that have made Marxism incredible or indefensible remain untouched.

But this book is by no means without significant philosophical interest. The target of attack throughout is 'Western Marxism', which McCarney contends has systematically misrepresented and distorted 'classical Marxism' through failing to understand the practical and dialectical nature of Marxist theory. While the doctrinal labels are less than clear and far from uncontroversial (Lukacs, for example, is placed not within 'Western Marxism' but in the honorific camp of 'classical Marxism' along with Marx and [some of] Engels), the particular thinkers and issues discussed are nonetheless treated carefully and with conceptual sophistication.

Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and the Frankfurt School generally are shown to have elaborated a notion of critique which, in spite of the claims to

its being part of a larger 'emancipatory' theory, never really makes contact with the practical and transformative element it seeks.

The most argumentative and interesting portions of this book, though, are those in which McCarney considers other, quite different interpretations or applications of Marx's notion of a practically oriented or dialectical theory: ones drawing on the resources of analytical philosophy. These sections include discussions of Jon Elster, Roy Bhaskar, Roy Edgley, and Richard Norman and Sean Sayers. The issue in all cases is the nature and implications of contradictions — in thought, action, or institutions. What McCarney is thus tracking is the intuition that contradictions of a certain sort, or the uncovering and confrontation of them, are the key to the idea of a dialectical theory: a theory that can somehow simultaneously explain phenomena and, in more than a hortatory way, be a factor in constructively changing them. McCarney culls for his purpose useful things from these various analyses, but concludes that we are left always with an answer that is incomplete, or at least incompletely Marxist.

Elster, for example, has identified two kinds of situation which appear inherently unstable because of the structural contradictions they involve. One kind of contradiction, exemplified by a Prisoner's Dilemma, he calls 'suboptimality', and the other, following Sartre and the illustration of peasants each cutting down trees to get more land which produces in sum less land through deforestation and erosion, he labels 'counterfinality'. McCarney concludes however, that the allegation of instability assumes an empirical tendency to overcome perceived contradictions and that the contingent character and outcome of any such tendency are inadequate to what Marx is all about. Further help comes from Edgley's emphasis on the logical fact that seeing the contradictory nature of one's beliefs or circumstances already puts one in a position outside or beyond them. Still, capitalism, its presumed untenability, and the prospect of socialism seem remote from such abstract logical facts.

So by stages McCarney is led back to Marx and the original Marxian idea of tying together a Hegelian-like phenomenology of inherently precarious self-understanding with a definite historical subject, or agent, such as the working class. The impression that what is thus being presented as a resolution of the book's problem begs all the key questions is perhaps hard to avoid. To temper the impression, it is worth remembering how much of Marxism has moved away from one or the other of these two things, either from the Hegelian method or from the proletariat, or some variant of it, as a potentially self-conscious, progressive agent, and that McCarney's theme is in large part about Marxism's loss of focus.

But the troubled state of Marxist theory is not without good reason, and McCarney's optimism that the above elements still can and should be melded in a truly dialectical theory is odd indeed. He appears to admit to some of the essential troubles in stressing that the abstract aspect of Western Marxism reflects its lack of a rooted agency (180), but does not count this lack in reality as challenging the core of the theory. He suggests the need to expand or alter

Marx's conception of (First World) workers as the appropriate revolutionary agency but does not call the latter concept into question. He remains convinced of the structurally contradictory nature of capitalism, as seen in and from the standpoint of a particular class, and refuses moreover any construal of the situation in fundamentally and distinctively moral terms: such that issues of justice, and so forth, regarding socialism and the means of moving to it are set aside. Yet the problems with these various assumptions, convictions and refusals are among the things have caused Marxism to be in a state worse than crisis. And consequently it is not for illumination on such problems that one can look to this book. What interest it has lies in exhibiting the logic, the dialectical logic, of a theory seen from within.

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Edward F. McClennen

Rationality and Dynamic Choice.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1990.

Pp. xiv + 311. US \$39.50. ISBN 0-521-36047-1.

McClennen's book is a highly interesting and valuable contribution to the growing literature on the nature of reason. He aims not only to clarify but also to revise the expected utility theory of rationality commonly accepted today. There are three main reasons for philosophers and social scientist to be interested in this book.

First, in the course of making his argument McClennen gives a (relatively non-technical) explication of the received view in a way that will be useful to those readers who want to know more about expected utility theory. He develops precise statements of the axioms of expected utility theory, a review of a literature many philosophers will not know, and intriguing presentations of problems discussed in that literature bearing on his project. While the book is too advanced to serve as an effective introduction to decision theory, it should be welcomed by those who are already introduced and want to know more about the issues and theoretical players in the field today.

Second, McClennen's philosophical instincts prompt him to respond to the expected utility literature with an important but little asked foundational question: namely, 'How can we justify the components of the received view of rationality?' He asks this question primarily because he wants to modify the received view, and thus feels he needs to develop a method of licensing the modifications he wishes to make. But the tone of the book also suggests that he is interested in the question for its own sake. This and several other recent works on reason constitute a new area of inquiry, which might be called

'meta-reason-theory' — the analogue of meta-ethics, exploring the foundational warrant for judgements about rationality. McClennen defends what might be called a 'consequentialist' approach to rationality, in which axioms or principles of rationality are to be accepted only in view of the consequences they have for us as we pursue the satisfaction of our preferences.

Third, readers should find intriguing McClennen's arguments for his proposed revision of the received view. According to that view, each player would be rational (assuming standard probability judgements) to choose the uncooperative action in a prisoner's dilemma (PD), given that the consequences of not cooperating yield higher expected utility than the consequences of cooperating. However, McClennen proposes to switch the 'direction of justification' of actions; whereas the received view of rationality tells us that it is rational for us to intend to do an action in virtue of the long-term consequences of that action, McClennen is proposing that in PD or PD-like situations it is rational for us to do an action based upon what it is rational for us to *intend* to do, in virtue of the long-term consequences of the *intention*. When we reason in this way, we are 'resolute choosers' who recognize the rationality of intending to cooperate, and who actually do cooperate because we (rationally) intended to do so. McClennen defends this justification switch by arguing that in PD or PD-like situations, those who use it will do better than those who use expected-utility reasoning. But note that this defence uses the standard direction of justification, that is, it treats resolute choice as a kind of action which we are rational to 'do' in virtue of its utility-maximizing consequences, and for that reason (alone) something we are rational to intend to do.

McClennen's way of dealing with the PD is an attempt to provide a genuine solution to this game, and not a way to resolve it into another, more easily solved game. When a person engages in resolute choice, she doesn't change her preferences: if she did, the PD character of the game would be destroyed, and McClennen could not claim to have come up with a genuine solution for that game. Hence, the temptation to choose the non-cooperative action in the PD for the resolute chooser is real, in virtue of the fact that she understands that this action has a higher expected utility than the cooperative action. Moreover, when a player resolutely chooses to cooperate, she does nothing to make it impossible (psychologically or otherwise) not to cooperate, because if she did, once again resolution would merely be a way of transforming the PD game into another, more easily solved game, and not a genuine solution to that game. (So resolute choice is not the same as pre-commitment.)

McClennen's resolute choice is akin to David Gauthier's notion of 'constrained maximization' (developed in *Morals by Agreement* [Oxford U.P. 1986]. I find McClennen's the more interesting of the two concepts, because unlike Gauthier he develops and defends it without any covert appeal to reputation effects (which have the effect of changing preferences, and thus transforming the PD into another, more easily solved game). But I remain unconvinced by his defence. Suppose there are two players in a sequential PD, both of whom resolve to cooperate. Further suppose that the first player

acts on his resolution. If, as McClennen insists, resolute choice doesn't remove the possibility of not cooperating, the second player can still decide whether or not to cooperate. If we believe McClennen's argument, resolute choosing can create a reason for acting which otherwise wouldn't exist: so in this case, he has a reason to cooperate because he resolved to do so. However, he also has a reason for not cooperating: not cooperating yields higher expected utility than cooperating. McClennen would have us believe that the reason to cooperate deriving from resolute choice should 'win' over the utility-maximizing reason. But recall that he justifies resolute choice by arguing that such choice maximizes utility in the long run. So he grants that expected utility reasoning is the *real* authority, and resolution is a feigned authority — feigned for reasons of utility-maximization.

The second player therefore faces a decision between acting from an authority that is feigned, and acting from the authority that is real, and McClennen is arguing that in this case the former would be more authoritative than the latter (and hence the rightful master of action). But even if we believe McClennen that it is possible to create a feigned authority with the psychological power to motivate action, it is difficult to understand how it could compete with and win against utility-maximization, which McClennen admits is the ultimate authority over our action. So it seems that, of the two, the second player's *better* reason is the utility-maximizing reason telling him not to cooperate.

Even if I am right that the central idea of this book is wrong, the questions raised in the book about the nature of reason are deep and important. Moreover McClennen's discussion of a wealth of central ideas and issues in decision theory bearing on his defence of resolute choice (to which I cannot hope to do justice in this review) takes the reader through some fascinating territory. The journey is well worth the price of admission.

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Volker Meja and Nico Stehr, eds.

Knowledge and Politics: the Sociology of Knowledge Dispute.

London and New York: Routledge 1990.

Pp. viii + 327. US \$75.00. ISBN 0-415-02881-7.

Anyone familiar with the theoretical debates surrounding the emerging field of 'Science & Technology Studies' will know that its focus, like the one in this book, is 'the Sociology of Knowledge Dispute': To what extent are the content and validity of knowledge claims determined by the social circumstances

from which they arise? The two leading antagonists in the recent debates, Larry Laudan and David Bloor, have both claimed to be taking their cue from the dispute chronicled in this volume. That reason alone would be enough to applaud Meja and Stehr for assembling the original papers for an anglophone audience. However, intellectual historians of the 20th century should find much to chew on here, for it is clear that the sociology of knowledge sparked the critical imagination of many of the young Central European scholars who would go on to make their mark on the intellectual landscape of post-war North America.

After a couple of programmatic statements about the research agenda of the sociology of knowledge, by Max Scheler and Karl Mannheim, Meja and Stehr present Mannheim's 1928 address to the German Sociological Association, 'Competition as a Cultural Phenomenon' and critical responses, which initiated the 'Sociology of Knowledge Dispute'. This is followed by a series of reviews of Mannheim's seminal *Ideology and Utopia*, published in 1929. Although focused debate on the Mannheim program was truncated after less than five years by the rise of Nazism, a testimony to the program's wide-reaching significance was the range of thinkers who took an interest in responding to the young Mannheim. The volume includes contributions by Alfred Weber, Werner Sombart, Norbert Elias, Paul Tillich, Ernst Curtius, Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, Hannah Arendt, and several others. Finally, Meja and Stehr draw out the relevance of the Sociology of Knowledge Dispute for the contemporary debates over relativism in the philosophy and sociology of science.

As someone who has himself been involved in the latest round of the sociology of knowledge dispute, I am struck by several turns that the dialectic has taken since Mannheim first met his critics. For whereas today's sociologists of science tend to define themselves as *opposing* philosophy, Mannheim usually tried to blur the difference between the two disciplines. In fact, one way in which he displayed his sympathy with the classical philosophical aspiration to universal truth was by explicitly opposing relativism, and proposing instead the doctrine of *relationism*, which states that social conditions determine which truths are epistemically accessible. This doctrine was elaborated in a discussion of the social significance of the sort of synthetic thinking championed by Hegel. According to Mannheim, Hegel was part of a generation that was in a position to pull together strands of thought that were left unraveled by earlier generations. Although Mannheim certainly did not consider the Hegelian synthesis as final, he seemed to think that it marked a genuine progress in thought that would not have been possible, had Hegel not had specific precursors, and had he not lived in the time and place that he did. The idea, then, seems to be Hegel's very own, namely, that universal truths may be glimpsed only at certain moments in history. Or, to put it as a question: If there are, indeed, universal truths, then why have we not always known them? An interesting way to read Mannheim, which some critics picked up on, is as claiming that if one takes *very seriously* the idea that certain things are true for all times and places, then sociology of

knowledge simply takes up the traditional tasks of epistemology by explaining the differential access that we have had to those truths.

Today's debates over the sociology of knowledge often question what one exactly learns about the nature of knowledge from the many empirical case studies of 'science in action'. By contrast, it is interesting that Mannheim's critics generally took for granted that the social conditions of thought were fit for empirical study, even though virtually all of Mannheim's own 'cases' were drawn from traditional scholarly sources that did not require any of his proposed disciplinary innovations. The doubts that the critics tended to raise turned on whether the sociology of knowledge was equipped to subsume the philosophical enterprise of epistemology. In retrospect, Mannheim's strategy seemed very much like Quine's 'naturalization' of epistemology. Both hold that the relevant special science — be it sociology of knowledge or behavioral psychology — can subsume epistemology by showing that the sorts of positions which traditionally distanced epistemology from the science (i.e., absolutism, foundationalism) are empirically untenable. Perhaps more than Quine, Mannheim took this to be not a capitulation of philosophy to the special sciences, but rather a consistent application of philosophical reasoning to the point of transcending the disciplinary boundary separating philosophy from the special sciences. Indeed, Mannheim periodically cast his own interest in the 'existential connectedness of thought' as continuous with that of Heidegger's search for existential structures in *Being and Time*.

In dealing with his interlocutors, Mannheim generally reveals himself to be philosophically surefooted, hardly the relativist that he is often taken to have been. However, the Frankfurt School critics, Marcuse and Horkheimer, succeeded in catching Mannheim's latent relativism by observing the sociology of knowledge's failure to specify the sense in which a form of thought 'reflects' its social conditions. After all, a body of thought, such as Marxism, may be very much a product of its time, yet it may serve, not to reproduce the existing social order, but to radically transform it so as to enable a completely different sort of thought to be generated in the future. In other words, Mannheim's implicit functionalism dampened the prospect of substantially different consequences following from the political options available in a given time and place. Not surprisingly, then, Marxists have tended to distrust the surface radicalism of the sociology of knowledge as masking a fundamentally anti-political worldview.

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David Miller

Market, State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1989. Pp. ix + 359.

Cdn \$81.50: US \$59.00. ISBN 0-19-827340-1.

Miller seeks to reconcile two views he finds compelling. The first is that markets are morally attractive, both for their efficiency and their capacity for distribution according to desert. The second is an attachment to the communal ideas he associates with socialism. Miller hopes to show that market socialism holds out the promise of reconciling these competing positions.

The book opens with a discussion of libertarian defences of the market. Hayekian arguments defending markets on grounds of freedom and procedural justice are laid out, and well-worn criticisms of them rehearsed, including the difficulties in providing the neutral accounts of liberty or ownership such arguments require. Lockean accounts of property acquisition are also scrutinized and rejected. So too is the claim that markets can be neutral between competing conceptions of the good life. Miller points out that *arguments* concerning market institutions may well be neutral, but markets, like any other institutions, must favor some conceptions of the good at the expense of others. For example, responding to Nozick's claim that if workers wanted control of their workplaces they would have bought out their employers, Miller shows why worker co-operatives fare badly in a predominantly capitalist economy. A co-operative would make investment decisions based on maximizing the return to each (working) member, rather than expanding until the marginal return on each additional unit is zero. As a result, they would be less inclined to expand. This, in turn, would lead banks to regard co-operatives as bad risks, further disadvantaging them. Thus an appealing conception of the good must suffer in a capitalist market. Miller also cites familiar examples of market failure, focussing in particular on the problems of private charity as a mechanism for allowing altruists to distribute their resources effectively.

With all of these criticisms in place, one might wonder what Miller actually *likes* about markets. Three sets of arguments are advanced. The first claim on their behalf is that they allow scope for consumer sovereignty, however imperfectly existing markets accomplish this. The second, more striking claim, is that markets are distributively just because they reward desert. Because markets gravitate towards competitive equilibrium, they tend to value goods on the basis of perceived benefit to their purchasers. Although the ability to produce highly valued goods may depend on abilities that are not themselves deserved, Miller insists that this feature is unavoidable in any attempt to reward desert in any arena. Further, such factors need not lead to exploitation (which Miller identifies with non-equilibrium exchange).

The third argument is the most interesting. Miller maintains that markets alone provide the solution to what Marx saw as the deepest problem of capitalism: alienation. Markets are unique in allowing 'people to assess the relative contributions they would make in different lines of work, and so to balance their social contribution against their personal needs' (217). As such they provide the solution to the 'one-sidedness' Marx blamed capitalism for, and hold out the possibility of a 'many-sided' individual who is more than a dilettante.

The final portion of the book is devoted to the politics of democratic socialism. Socialism is identified with state regulation of the market and expression of the common will. Politics itself is seen largely in terms of expressive activity. Many of the discussions are interesting, though their relevance to questions about the market is not entirely clear. Miller supposes that socialism would bring a stronger sense of community and solidarity, within which individuality and tolerance would flourish.

The book has two difficulties. First, the central arguments in favor of markets depend on the way in which markets allow agents to compare courses of action by signalling their value via prices. We might ask, though, whether rewarding effective demand provides an interesting measure of desert, or an appropriate way for an individual to decide how to divide her activities. Prices might help one to strike a balance between 'income' and 'leisure'. But what about a choice between personal relationships and challenging work, or any of the myriad of other problems someone aspiring to be 'many-sided' might face? *Other people's* preferences shape the prices of such choices; how exactly am I better off if they shape mine?

The second difficulty is more significant. Miller treats workplace democracy as essential to political democracy. He is silent, though, about domestic democracy. In a footnote, (p. 324, where he also declares his attachment to traditional canons of English usage) he says, 'it goes without saying that this equality extends to women as well as to men ... All of the arguments of this book, for instance, are intended to apply without distinction to of sex ... socialism and feminism are orthogonal creeds' (*creeds?*). Yet one might have thought that the existence of unpaid labor in the home vitiated any claims on behalf of market efficiency, or that the great promise of socialism was its capacity to reduce the dominance of economic pressures over other areas of culture. Miller says nothing about the significance of socialism to enabling programs such as day care and job sharing to put an end to the domestic feudalism on which market societies, capitalist or socialist, have always rested.

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Kitarō Nishida

An Inquiry Into the Good, trans Masao Abe
and Christopher Ives.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1990.

Pp. xxxiv+184. US \$22.50. ISBN 0-300-04094-6.

Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) is recognized as Japan's pre-eminent modern philosopher, and this new translation of his earliest book is an important event. The only other English translation of *Zen no kenkyū* entitled *A Study of Good* (trans. V.H. Viglielmo), was published back in 1960, and has been out of print for many years. This new edition makes Nishida's best known book available again in an exceptionally *accessible*, accurate, and readable translation by the well-known Zen Buddhist scholar, Masao Abe, and Christopher Ives.

Nishida employed the methods and the 'problems' of Western philosophy, whose subtleties he understood in remarkable depth, in order to explicate his own philosophical position. Thoroughly Eastern in his outlook, the late Zen Buddhist scholar, D.T. Suzuki wrote in the *Preface* to the earlier translation that Nishida's aim was 'to make Zen intelligible in the West.' It is less clear now, than when Suzuki wrote, that Nishida's many volumes of philosophical exploration (several of which are now available in English) are quite so single mindedly 'Zen' in focus. Nishida's philosophic interests were quite broad, spanning problems both Eastern and Western, from Plato and Aristotle, to Kant, Hegel and William James in the West, and Confucius, to Zen and Mahayana Buddhism, and the salient characteristics of Japanese culture specifically, in the East.

The pivotal insight which Nishida obtained from his reading of William James' was the concept of 'pure experience'. 'Pure experience', at least as Nishida's appropriation of that term makes evident, is experience prior to, or which is more fundamental than, ordinary everyday experience. It is awareness *prior* to the distinction between subject and object, without which ordinary experience is strictly impossible. Pure experience is awareness prior to the differentiation of consciousness into knowing, feeling and willing aspects, and as such, mirrors the state of ultimate reality. Such *unitive* awareness is both the occasion for religious awareness, and the 'intellectual intuition' of, or 'deep grasp of life', on which all intellectual and moral knowledge is based, as well.

The present translation is an improvement over the earlier one, primarily because of its clarity and elegance. Because of space limitations, one example will have to suffice. In the earlier translation (134-5) one reads: 'Beauty is felt in the circumstance wherein things, like ideals, are realized. To be realized like an ideal means that a thing brings forth its basic characteristic of nature. Thus, just as when a flower has expressed a flower's basic characteristic is it most beautiful, so too when man has expressed the basic characteristic of man has he attained the summit of beauty. Good is precisely beauty.'

The new Abe/Ives version reads, 'Beauty is felt when things are realized like ideals are realized, which means for things to display their original nature. Just as flowers are most beautiful when they manifest their original nature, humans attain the pinnacle of beauty when they express their original nature. In this regard, the good is beauty' (125).

The new text is easier to understand, affords a 'smoother' read in English, and is sharp and crisp philosophically, where it is needed. There is also an *index* in this new edition, and a select *bibliography* of English language translations of Nishida's work, together with a brief list of secondary sources which discuss his work.

Last but not least in importance, there is an *Introduction* by Abe and Ives. The issues raised include the inseparability of philosophy and religion in Far Eastern cultures, the Zen Buddhist influence on Nishida's life-project, his attempt to transform 'Zen into philosophy,' and 'Western philosophy into a Zen-oriented philosophy,' and the Western background (Wundt, James, Fechner and Ernst Mach) to Nishida's theory of 'pure experience.' Abe and Ives conclude that Nishida's attempted synthesis of Eastern and Western philosophical ideas 'created a new world philosophy,' as evidenced not only by the quality of his own work, but also by the influence Nishida has had in generating an entire school of philosophical thought in Japan — the 'Kyoto school' — which finally seems to have begun to fire the imagination of Western scholars as well.

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Donald Peterson
Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1990.
Pp. xi+204. Cdn \$40.00. ISBN 0-8020-2770-9.

Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy offers us a new reading of the *Tractatus* or at least a new organizing principle. Peterson contends that 'what is most striking about the work is its obscurity' (3) which arises because 'the book's conceptual scheme — which provides the matrix within which all the particular points of argumentation are made — is not made explicit' (3). At the center of this treatment is the metaphor of language as a great mirror which Wittgenstein uses at T 5.511 and Peterson argues that it provides a complete organizing structure. We must distinguish what is reflected in the mirror — the factual world — from features of the mirror itself — the syntactical — which may well be mistakenly thought to be features of the world. Finally

there is what lies behind the mirror and so cannot be reflected in it — the mystical. This structure yields two sets of threefold divisions: representational language, non-representational language, and nonsense which correspond the facts of the world, the syntactical and the mystical. Given this organizing structure, the *Tractatus* divides into three unequal sections: the early passages which deal with the world and representational language, the extensive middle sections which develop a diverse set of themes all relating to the syntactical or internal nature of various fields including logic, mathematics, philosophy and the structure of science, and finally the concluding sections which deal with the mystical. Throughout the real opponent for Wittgenstein's thought is what Peterson calls 'Naive Representationalism' which would reduce the whole theory of representation to only one side of the mirror, namely its reflective side in which the world is presented.

The structure of the three sides of the mirror also organizes Peterson's book so that there are, after an introduction, three major sections that examine the sides of the mirror. However, the overwhelming focus of the book is on the syntactical side — more than half of the work deals with that and this is both its strength and weakness. What receives detailed development are Wittgenstein's ideas about the nature of logic and 'other things syntactic', (Chapter 8) and there the analysis is fresh, interesting and very helpful. At the same time, the discussion of Tractarian ontology and the picture theory is a bit superficial and at times positively misleading as I will develop in a moment. But the real weakness of the book is to be found in its treatment of the third side of the mirror — the mystical.

In Part IV, Chapter 9 'The Mystical', Peterson gives almost no attention to what Wittgenstein actually says in the final sections of the *Tractatus* much less to the extensive materials in the *Notebooks*. He merely points out that the claim that the artistic and the religious are in some important ways inexpressible is, after all, a common sense view. However, even given this, he makes no reference to the connection Wittgenstein actually develops between art, ethics, and religion. (See, for example, *Notebooks* p. 72ff, of special interest are the entries dated 7.10.16 and 8.10.16) Given the stress on the conceptual scheme with its three sides, the thinness of this discussion most unfortunate. In fact, it is by no means clear that the mystical can be treated merely as one aspect among others for the the question of the perspective from which the *Tractatus* itself is written — and thus of the status of the propositions of the *Tractatus* itself — can only be answered if a great deal more attention is given to this 'side of the mirror'.

Part II offers a straightforward development of the now quite familiar ontology of facts and objects and the picture theory of meaning which points up the parallels with Hertz's *Mechanics*. While there is nothing startling or new in these sections, they do provide a streamlined introduction to this aspect of Wittgenstein's thought without unnecessary frills and subtleties of interpretation. There is, however, a misleading comparison of Wittgenstein's atomism with that of Leucippicus and Democritus (21). The problem is that physical atoms, unlike Tractarian objects, can exist independently of the

complexes that they constitute. Wittgenstein is quite explicit on this point when he says at *T* 2.0122, 'Things are independent [of states of affairs] in so far as they can occur in all *possible* situations, but this form of independence is a form of connection with state of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear in two different roles: by themselves, and in propositions.)' It is this idea that objects are given prior to the states of affairs that they constitute that leads Peterson astray later in the book (100) where he complains about Wittgenstein's use of the term 'logic' as applied to combinations of objects. If objects just are the 'possibilities of states of affairs' as Wittgenstein contends (see *T* 2.0141) then there is an appropriate sense in which we can talk about logical form in that context. Only if objects are conceived of as analogous to physical atoms that have their character independently of the wholes they constitute will there be a problem of the kind that Peterson sees.

As I said the center and strength of this work is the third section which offers a careful and detailed exposition of Wittgenstein's contention that logic among other things is syntactical. Beginning with the 'Grundgedanke' — what Wittgenstein calls his 'fundamental thought' — 'that the 'logical constants' are not representatives' (*T* 4.0132), Peterson elaborates a persuasive reading of the middle sections of the *Tractatus*. He sets forth in clear terms a number of lines of argument that Wittgenstein uses to support the 'fundamental thought' including the argument from equivalence which contends that 'for example $(p > q)$ and $(\neg p \vee q)$ are identical in truth conditions, and so they say the same thing, although the first uses only ">" and the second uses "<." and "V"' (53). If the two are equivalent but involve different logical constants, the constants cannot represent since if they did each sentence would represent a different state of affairs. The same holds for p and $\neg p$. If ' \neg ' represented an object then the second proposition would represent a different state of affairs from the first. Wittgenstein also argues for this key claim by developing an alternate notation in which the so called 'logical constants' don't even appear. Instead of writing $(p \vee q)$, we can merely write (TTTF) (p, q) (*T* 4.44 and following).

Given the 'Grundgedanke', Peterson moves in Chapter 6 to the treatment of logic as syntactical. He contrasts that view with two others which he calls the 'Scientific View' held by Russell (at least at one time) and the 'Axiomatic View' (80). On the first view there are logical facts which are necessary while on the second the status of logical truths is 'taken care of' by their being derived from self-evident axioms. Against this Wittgenstein insists that 'Logic takes care of itself' (*NB* p.11) which can only be true if logic is given a completely syntactical treatment. As Peterson says, 'Being syntactic, logic is independent of facts: and being internal, logical properties and relations are independent of such external factors as the derivability of theorems from primitive, self-evident axioms' (79). In this and the succeeding chapter Peterson presents in clear and well motivated terms some of the most technical aspects of the *Tractatus*.

I have already commented on the final section of the book that deals with the mystical, but a few remarks about the overall format of the book would be useful. Each chapter contains a summary of main points which makes the book easy to use. Finally it contains a concluding chapter that outlines the major points of the book in a straightforward form. Again this is useful. However, there are two epilogues, one dealing with cognitive science and the other with abstract art, which are rather disconnected and without sufficient detail although the points made are promising.

Finally this book offers a valuable overview of the *Tractatus* does not completely fulfill its promise. The middle sections of the volume do provide a clear and interesting exposition of difficult parts of Wittgenstein's early philosophy.

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W.V. Quine

Pursuit of Truth.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

1990. Pp. x+113.

US \$17.50. ISBN 0-674-73950-7.

Quine's philosophical position has been fairly stable since at least the time of *Word and Object*. Theses such as indeterminacy of translation, inscrutability of reference, epistemology naturalized, underdetermination of physical theory and disquotational truth are always espoused. General doctrines such as empiricism, behaviorism, physicalism and holism figure prominently in the arguments. The variations that have occurred in Quine's position mark his attempts to respond to challenges. In *Pursuit of Truth*, the latest variation, Quine develops his views in new and interesting ways, and also gives a remarkably clear restatement of his general position.

A single doctrine motivates the new developments in Quine's views: empiricism. Empiricism, in Quine's work, amounts to the view that observational content is the locus of linguistic meaning and predictive accuracy the important mark of a good scientific theory. It is this doctrine, rather than physicalism or even behaviorism, that is behind Quine's new remarks on epistemology naturalized, ontology, the translation of observation sentences, belief and truth. I show this by briefly summarizing and commenting on the changes in Quine's position.

Quine was one of the first to argue that epistemologists should regard the psychology of scientific reasoning as their subject matter. Yet, in Chapter 1

of *Pursuit of Truth*, Quine takes the important epistemological work to be done by a traditional model of scientific reasoning: a falsificationist version of hypothetico-deductivism. The psychology of scientific reasoning is relegated to context of discovery (20). The focus is on saying how scientists in their decision making should choose the most empirically confirmed theory. Quine's traditional empiricist agenda leads him to overlook considerations of actual applicability and sufficiency of the hypothetico-deductive model. The latter are considerations which ought to be addressed, and are addressed extensively in the philosophy of science community (for example in the work of Nancy Cartwright, Ian Hacking and Bas Van Fraassen). Epistemology naturalized, in Quine's hands, is not now one of the various radical doctrines that others have made of it; it is merely the rejection of foundationalist projects like the *Aufbau*.

Other shifts in Quine's views are more interesting and less vulnerable to criticism. In his discussion of ontology in Chapter 2, Quine asserts that developments in quantum physics might lead to giving up the notion of objecthood altogether (35): empirical results might lead us to overthrow not only physicalistic ontology, but also the general characterization of ontology captured in traditional predicate logic. We might find that to be is *not* to be the value of a variable, and that a new concept of existence is called for (36).

In Chapter 3 one of Quine's central concerns is to argue that observation sentences are determinately translatable. The notions of empirical content, empirical equivalence, underdetermination and stimulus meaning are all essential for Quine's central empiricist claims. Determinate translatability of observation sentences is assumed by these notions. A number of difficulties with the claim that observation sentences are determinately translatable have been raised over the years. In *Pursuit of Truth*, Quine deals with the objection that the same observation sentence may have different stimulus meanings for different people, because different people have different sensory inputs. He suggests that we can tell what these inputs are, and judge their similarity to our own inputs, thus making translation possible. This does not make observational content theory-laden in the sense suggested by many philosophers of science beginning with N.R. Hanson; for Quine, the theory required for translating observation sentences is a low-level theory about what sensory input a person has, and this is not in general part of the theory under consideration in a scientific dispute.

In the chapter on intension, Quine makes the surprising claim that intensional concepts, such as 'belief', are part of scientific inquiry (71, 72). He accepts Davidson's anomalous monism on the grounds that some mentalistic concepts are indispensable. Quine defends this acceptance with his empiricism; he writes that intensional concepts are scientifically acceptable provided that 'there are observational checkpoints however tentative' (72). Thus, empirical adequacy is more important for Quine than particular choices of ontology. This is a much greater acceptance of intensional concepts than appears in Quine's earlier writing, where he at most accepts the second class status of concepts such as 'belief'.

In the final chapter on truth, Quine argues, as he has done before, that more than one theory will prove empirically adequate in the limit of inquiry. This is one component of the doctrine of underdetermination, and an important consequence of Quine's empiricism. Quine struggles, as he has before, with the issue of truth in the limit of inquiry. According to the doctrine of disquotational truth, to espouse a theory is to state that its sentences are true. Espousing one theory means rejecting other, possibly empirically equivalent ones, and this does not rest well with the empiricist reflection that the theories are equally confirmed. Quine reaches a new and uneasy resolution by claiming that human knowledge, even at its best, is limited, and different empirically adequate views represent different ways of trying to represent a world that is not fully accessible to us (101, 102). He writes that 'reality exceeds the scope of the human apparatus in unspecifiable ways' (101). The conclusion is uneasy because Quine continues to expect experimenters (who know about underdetermination) to persist in viewing their own theories as true and thus as capturing reality (100). Quine is also being pessimistic, for he asserts that there are serious limitations to human capacities to know, and does not support such assertion with any examples of the ways in which human inquiry is limited. Why, indeed, should this be 'unspecifiable'? Why not look to experimental psychology to find the scope and limits of human inquiry? Quine is departing here not only from his official views on reality and truth, but also from his empiricism. I expect and hope that Quine will modify his position on this topic again.

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Jeffrey Reiman

Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1990.

Pp. xiv + 322.

US \$30.00. ISBN 0-300-4518-2.

Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy is an important contribution to contractarianism. Reiman argues that contractarian theorizing provides the proper foundation for principles of justice, and he attempts to deduce something close to Rawls' principles of justice without using questionable intuitions about fairness and attitudes towards risk. Reiman's arguments are original, compelling, and even when they fail to persuade, unfailingly interesting.

His core idea is that principles of justice refute the charge of subjugation. Subjugation occurs whenever one party's judgment prevails over the contrary

judgment of another without adequate justification. By *justification* Reiman means proven true beyond a reasonable doubt; to avoid the charge of subjugation, one must demonstrate that the opposing party is *required* to follow the principle or judgment to which one appeals, even if the opposing party does not share a belief in or have a desire to follow the principle. Principles of justice justify this overriding of one's judgment; to discover such principles we must identify the conditions under which rational beings should be persuaded that they are not subjugated.

These conditions are not that of actual agreement, since the suspicion of subjugation is not dispelled by showing that one party accepts as true or desires to follow the principle put forth by another. Only agreement in a situation where no moral requirement is assumed to be true and people's desires are in potential conflict would defeat the charge of subjugation. As these are roughly the conditions set out in a contractarian theory — Reiman calls them the 'natural context' — they are the appropriate choice situation for principles of justice. A virtue of this approach is that the natural context is arrived at not by beginning with some imaginary situation and arguing that it has relevance for assessing present reality, but by taking present reality and eliminating those features that prevent us from accurately seeing whether subjugation occurs. In this manner, Reiman aims to justify the informational constraints in Rawls' veil of ignorance without using intuitions about fairness. If one's current situation is due to subjugation, one might accept a principle in the natural context because it will improve one's present position, rather than because it is nonsubjugating. Blocking information about one's present position in society prevents this possibility, and thus is necessary if agreement in the natural context is to defeat charges of subjugation. (Reiman also provides arguments for other features of the veil.)

Reiman argues that, in the natural context, only principles that protect everyone against the threat of subjugation would be considered nonsubjugating. This is reason's 'weak' answer to the charge of subjugation, since it identifies nonsubjugating principles but does not entail that we are required to follow such principles. Reiman's argument that we are required — reason's 'strong' answer to the charge of subjugation — rests on a nonmoral fact and a claim about rationality. The fact is that of human subjectivity, of what it is to be a human subject. Reiman argues that this fact cannot be grasped in the third-person or by observation. To know other subjects, one must identify with them and this involves 'inhabiting imaginatively the partisan practical attitude that constitutes being them' (16). Since rationality involves obtaining an accurate understanding of the relevant facts as far as possible and since identification is how one obtains accurate information about other subjects, rationality requires that one reason about one's actions as if they had to be acceptable to everyone affected by them — which means that one is required to reason in accordance with the principles adopted in the natural context.

Reiman's argument is ingenious, but problematic. Identifying with those affected by my actions could frustrate pursuit of my interests; why, in the

nonmoral natural context, should I do so? Reiman's answer is that rationality requires accurately identifying the relevant facts as *far as possible*, but this will not do, as it makes one's epistemic obligations *quite* stringent and raises the question: why be rational? Grounding moral principles in nonmoral principles of rationality is questionable if one adopts a demanding conception of rationality that may require harming one's self-interest.

As for the principles of justice, Reiman divides these into natural and social justice. The former is what people owe each other regardless of social structure; the latter is what they owe those within their social structure. Natural justice requires primarily noninterference, as giving everyone equal liberty to pursue their own interests protects everyone against the threat of subjugation. A key part of natural justice is the principle of natural ownership. This gives one a right to own one's body and labor, but only a private property right to use what one needs to survive. Reiman argues that more exclusive systems of ownership might cause nonowners to sacrifice their interests for the sake of the owners and thus raise the possibility of subjugation.

Reiman's discussion of social justice concentrates on economic systems, which he says are systems of forced labor, in a descriptive sense that ownership gives owners a possible leverage over nonowners and limits their options beyond what the principle of natural ownership would. Reiman provides two arguments that such structural force is not subjugating if the counterbalancing benefits are distributed according to the difference principle. First, since (forced) labor spent is time and energy that might have been spent pursuing one's own interests, economic systems should be primarily evaluated as distributions of labor, not money or goods. (This is the labor theory of *moral* value.) Hence the goods one receives for money should be viewed in terms of the labor-time that went into these goods; so the better off's wealth means, roughly, that they have received a greater than average share of other people's labor-time. This can only be justified if their wealth is an incentive for them to use their talents to raise as much as possible the share of the goods that the worst get for their labor. I suspect that this argument fails because the irreducible heterogeneity of labor hinders evaluating economic exchanges as labor-time exchanges.

Reiman's second argument is that gambling on the possibility of ending up in a certain socio-economic position should be excluded from the very design of the natural context; once it is excluded, the difference principle follows straightaway. Reiman's argument is a bit too complex to be summarized here, but it is a significant advance over Rawls' discussion, since if Reiman is correct the prohibition on gambling is a *necessary* feature of the original position, rather than simply being derived from ad hoc assumptions about risk aversion.

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David Reisman

Theories of Collective Action: Downs, Olson and Hirsch.

London: The MacMillan Press 1990.

Pp. vi+348. ISBN 0-333-49471-7.

Moral and social philosophers turning to this book expecting to find an introduction to the most recent social science literature on 'theories of collective action' may be disappointed; David Reisman's volume is no substitute for the recent work of, say, Jon Elster. But as the subtitle indicates, Reisman's focus is more narrow. *Theories of Collective Action* seeks to examine critically the theories of Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson, and Fred Hirsch, on whose work so much contemporary social science has been based. Given the originality and influence of this threesome, philosophers have reason to be interested in their work. Is this work the place they should turn for enlightenment?

Reisman's book is divided into three separate sections, each devoted to the work of one of his three figures. Downs' influential writings on 'the economic theory of democracy' and on bureaucracy are first explained and examined. The second part is devoted to Olson's famous account of the 'logic of collective action' and to his more recent work, presumably less well-known to readers of this journal, on 'the rise and decline of nations'. Lastly, in a section shorter than the others, Reisman discusses the late Fred Hirsch's work on positional goods and 'the social limits to growth'.

Downs' book, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), is one of the founding works of the 'public choice' research that now dominates the pages of American political science journals. (Other founding influences are Buchanan and Tullock, as well as Arrow's work in social choice theory.) Downs' original theory, influential but widely criticized today, is the first of the 'spatial theories of voting' that are used today in social scientific explanations of electoral phenomena. As the title of the work suggests, Downs' model seeks to explain in the manner characteristic of economists, by assuming that individuals are rational in the utility maximization sense and that their ends are generally self-interested. Downs' work, published a decade later, on bureaucracy, extends his 'economic' theorizing to another domain. Here his work, along with that of Niskanen and earlier work by Tullock, also initiated another line of research that preoccupies contemporary scholars.

Olson's *Logic of Collective Action* (1962) is well-known amongst philosophers. It may fairly be said to be the first general theory of collective action (after Hobbes) that focuses on the so-called free-rider problem: the situation that occurs when the individually rational actions of agents undermine their collective goals or interests. Olson's account, as well as his general explanation of successful collective action (his theory of 'selective incentives'), have been much examined and criticized in the literature. But his book remains the seminal statement of the problem. His more recent *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (1982) is presumably less well-known to philosophers, as well as

less easy for philosophers to evaluate, treating as it does of very general and comparative matters of development and growth.

Hirsh's *Social Limits to Growth* (1977) achieved immediate notoriety when it appeared. It argued, as the title suggests, that there are 'limits to growth' other than those normally discussed in the popular press (e.g., non-renewable resources, pollution). Hirsh argued that the increasing importance of 'positional goods', goods that are scarce in certain ways or subject to crowding (e.g., status goods), imposes constraints on the overcoming of scarcity. Further, the very success of market mechanisms in reducing scarcity and in providing for people's needs leads to an erosion of the conditions of friendliness and trust that are conditions for the market's success.

While Reisman competently summarizes and discusses these writings of Downs, Olson, and Hirsch, the main reason that philosophers will not find the book a useful introduction to their writings is that the critical evaluations are not very well organized or thorough, and they do not take account of the recent literature. (The references are surprisingly dated, very few being to works published in the 1980s.) It would have been useful to have an introductory volume on the pioneering writing of this threesome, one which would make accessible their work to the uninitiated, as well as discuss contemporary research, but Reisman's book does not serve this purpose. As an introduction, curious philosophers would do better to read the originals, which are not, when compared to the contemporary literature or to classical social choice theory, very difficult. For relatively current surveys of the public choice literature, readers should turn instead to Peter Ordershook's *Game Theory and Political Theory* (1986) and Dennis Mueller's *Public Choice II* (1989); for developments in the economic theory of relative standing, there is the fascinating, and amusing, (hardback edition of) *Choosing the Right Pond* (1985) by Robert Frank.

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G.E. Scott

Moral Personhood: An Essay in the Philosophy of Moral Psychology.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1990. Pp. xvi+202.

US \$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0321-1);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0322-X).

This book is an interesting and useful application of recent work in the philosophy of mind to ethics; in particular, it is an application of Dennett's characterization of intentional beings to the problematic of the nature of the moral person. *Moral Personhood* is a meticulous development of a schema of what it is to be a moral person (note: not just a moral agent) through equally meticulous consideration of what it is to be a higher-order intentional system. Scott drives a wedge between the notion of a person and a moral person in order to offer what I found to be an intuitively clear and appealing description of what it is to be the subject of moral predicates. There are problems, of course. The book tends to be a bit repetitive; Scott spends too much time on natural kinds, something the importance of which he overestimates; his use of emphasis seems irritatingly arbitrary; and sentences sometimes get away from him, thanks to often distracting parenthetical remarks. But overall the book is one of those rare things: a new look at an old problem.

Scott sets out to shed light on 'the nature of moral persons and how it is that they ought to be dealt with in our daily lives' (1). He proceeds by distinguishing among living beings, persons, and moral persons, and carefully reviews the concepts crucial to these. He adopts a physicalist position, beginning to describe moral personhood by first 'seeing what it means to speak of *persons as material higher order intentional systems*' (14). One of the important insights Scott develops is that persons can come to be, and cease to be, moral persons, just as living beings can come to be, and cease to be, persons. In connection with elaborating his physicalist commitment, Scott appeals to Davidson's anomalous monism to stress that the behaviour of persons and of moral persons, while the behaviour of material systems, is not describable and/or predictable in law-like terms. In Chapter Three Scott introduces the notion of the *malleability* of persons, meaning the ways in which they may acquire and alter beliefs that underlie their behaviour. This is a crucial notion in Scott's project, for it emerges that malleability or cognitive flexibility is a defining characteristic of persons and moral persons.

On p. 55 we find a paradigm of Scott's application of intentionality-talk to the question of moral personhood. Borrowing from Dennett, Davidson, and Grice, Scott tells us that 'to say that A is morally responsible to B for performing a certain action *x* means that A believes that B ... has a definite expectation with respect to certain of A's possible voluntary actions, viz., *x*, and also that B believes that A believes this, and that anyone suitably aware of the matter would believe the same way ...'

What supervenes on otherwise description-underdetermined behaviour, and is deemed moral, is packed into the idea of moral intentional objects.

Persons, as higher-order intentional systems, are capable of having moral intentional objects. To say what it is for a higher-order intentional system to be a moral person is a matter of 'formulating some notion of an *intentional functional invariance* that would enable us to characterize as a *moral intentional kind* a certain class of human individuals,' (67) namely, those capable of having moral intentional objects. Scott's objective is to show that 'persons, as material objects possessing a certain type of intentionality, constitute a natural kind ...' (74) and that due to the possession of other intentional capacities, a subset of persons constitute *moral* persons.

The first productive move with respect to development of Scott's moral-person schema comes on p. 78 where Scott begins discussion of what he calls 'basic enabling' needs, which are conditional for the *emergence* of moral persons, and maintenance needs, which are necessary for the *continued existence* of moral persons. Complementing the discussion of needs is discussion of the central failures of akrasia and servility.

Once Scott has sketched out his moral-person schema, he tackles a number of issues: quality of life, euthanasia and suicide, rights and the law, and privacy. In doing so he continues to be eclectic, borrowing now from Boyd, Rosenberg, Wellman, and others. But what is novel is that he tackles these various issues using his intentional-system characterization of persons and moral persons. While Scott may not resolve the issues he considers, he brings to their discussion a fresh clarity by working with an appealingly tidy notion of being a moral person.

On p. 130 we find what serves as a neat summation of Scott's basic conception of a moral-person: 'a material, malleable, higher order intentional system of the Dennett type ... [who] becomes a moral person through realization that s/he possesses the capability of performing actions that may interfere with, destroy, or assist in the production or maintenance of persons ...'

The pivotal point of Scott's schema and proposals is thinking of persons as intentional systems having the capacity to have beliefs about one's own beliefs, the beliefs of others, and the consequences of action. Malleability is crucial because without it there could be no responsibility. What 'moral' adds to 'person' is that the higher-order intentional system in question has the capacity to reflect on the consequences to others, as to herself, of her actions and even beliefs and attitudes. When this capacity is teamed with recognition of the enabling and maintenance needs of moral persons, we have a higher-order intentional system with moral intentional objects, and so a moral person.

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Michael Slote

Beyond Optimizing: A Study of Rational Choice.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989. Pp. vii+192.

US\$18.00. ISBN 0-674-06918.

This book is driven by a simple but productive analogy. Given the similarity between consequentialism and self-interested rationality, criticisms of the former should generate criticisms of the latter. Slote works through these parallel criticisms in some detail, arguing for the rationality of moderation, the relevance of past actions, and the possibility of rational dilemmas. These familiar themes from the deontological critique of consequentialism generate some interesting problems when transposed to the self-regarding realm. The result is not, Slote admits, a refutation of optimizing rationality. Instead, he concludes that Sidgwick's influential distinction of three 'methods of ethics' (egoism, utilitarianism and common sense) should be expanded to admit a fourth: common-sense rationality.

Chapters one and two argue for the rationality of moderation. Slote's argument is straightforward, depending heavily on the intuitive appeal of his excellent examples. Might one not, when selling one's house, simply accept a satisfactory offer rather than hold out for the optimum price? Don't we often turn down a second dessert, saying 'No, thank you, I'm fine as I am' (37-8)? Slote concludes that 'the structure of self-regarding reasons available to a moderate individual is clearly more complex than anything to be found within an optimizing ... scheme of ... rational choice' (39). Note that the theory of rational choice accepts moderate preferences (as it accepts most other preferences). But this does not make such preferences rational. (The theory only explains or justifies means to these preferred ends.) Similarly, nothing Slote says *rationalizes* moderation. However, the received theory is an account of minimal structure (means to ends), so Slote correctly focuses on the *structure* of reasons as a crucial point of disagreement.

This brings us to the third chapter, which explores a reply to Slote's main argument. Can't the optimizer justify habits, which limit direct optimization, as indirect means to his ends? Slote rejoins that this position, which he calls instrumentalism, falls to criticisms parallel to those used against rule-consequentialism. First, common sense restrictions on optimizing do not always depend on indirect consequences. Slote's example is 'the child who keeps eating more and more cookies long past the point where most of us would be satisfied and would stop ... Apart from the question of ill effects ... the child's insatiability seems practically irrational for the way it fails to remain within more or less definite limits' (58-9). Here Slote's example works against him. As a parent, I have often argued along instrumentalist lines for restrictions on my two small cookie monsters. Why do I need an argument? Because cookie monsters are also attention, information and affection monsters. Dealing with the very young one realizes that the common sense virtue of moderation is often merely a common adult prejudice, perhaps appropriate

to our stage of life, but not self-justifying. In this case the analogy between utilitarianism and rational choice theory works the other way. Utilitarians crusaded against deontological prejudice concerning punishment, for example. Rational choice arguments commit us to identifying the agent's own preferences or good, especially when so-called common sense values are not shared by agent and evaluator. Slote also criticizes instrumentalism for failing to rationalize the connection between an optimizing habit and the particular optimizing act that it blocks. This is an important issue. Unfortunately, Slote criticizes instrumentalism *only* by analogy to rule-utilitarianism. He makes strong claims ('proponents of indirect instrumentalism ... offer us no reason' [69]) while neglecting the arguments of indirection's strongest proponent, David Gauthier.

Chapter four argues that rational choice has no place for the special pull our long-standing values have upon us. Slote's example of a person who abandons a project for no reason strikes me as compelling. Similarly, chapter six uses sensitive examples to defend the rational permissibility of wasting time.

In chapter five Slote argues that rationality is subject to dilemmas in the way that morality is. Here it becomes clear that this is a book about rationality from the point of view of moral theory. Slote's model and sources are moral theorists and he largely ignores the literature of rational choice. This weakens the book in a number of ways. For example, seeking a dilemma within rationality, Slote works very hard to generate one that parallels familiar cases in the moral literature, such as Agamemnon's tragic choice. Second, when he elaborates a science fiction case, he does not inform the reader of the received doctrine about choices over infinite alternative. Generally, had he considered the literature of rational choice, Slote might have made his argument deeper and more accessible. One of the most discussed cases in rational choice theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma, shows how rational agents fail to reach optimal outcomes precisely because they cannot make use of their symmetry, which is stressed by morality. This problem is more accessible because it has many clear practical applications (such as the Tragedy of the Commons — predicting overuse of shared resources such as the sea and atmosphere). It may also enrich the argument by it undercutting the easy triumph of deontology over consequentialism. For example, Derek Parfit's Prisoner's Lawyer's Dilemma shows that the dilemma afflicts deontological agents.

In conclusion, Slote's analogy between consequentialistic morality and self-regarding rationality is fruitful but one-sided. While the study of rational choice can be enriched by insights from moral theory, this process works both ways. Of course we should reject simple-minded theories of rationality. But common sense reasoning that declares itself to be beyond optimizing seems a poor substitute.

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Carol Smart

Feminism and the Power of Law.

New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall

1989. Cdn \$54.00; US \$45.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-03881-2); Cdn \$16.95;

US \$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-02671-7).

This book, written by English sociologist Carol Smart, is an ambitious one. As the preface informs us, the first aim is to deliver an expansive feminist perspective on the manner in which law operates, not in discrete legal subject areas like, family law, but as legal discourse constructs of broad gender specific concepts, for example women's bodies. A second objective is to make the book accessible to the general reader and not only the student. To achieve this objective, Carol Smart distills major tracts of feminist writers in the hope of providing 'an intellectual map of contemporary [feminist] debates'. The final and most challenging task that Smart undertakes is to reveal law as a form of discourse rather than a mere instrument of patriarchy. The depth and breadth of the task which Smart sets herself is the key to both the strength and weakness of this book.

The main thread throughout the book is the exposition of law as discourse. Smart draws upon the work of Foucault embracing and extending his insights concerning the disciplinary society. However, unlike Foucault she believes that law has been able not only to maintain itself as a privileged discourse but to expand its influence by adapting and appropriating the new sciences for its own ends rather than being superseded by them. Smart uses the cases of surrogacy and foetal death convincingly to illustrate this point. Law, like science, has been able to gain hegemony as truth: and it is a truth which marginalises other versions not sanctioned by it, especially feminist accounts.

This analysis supports Smart's belief that the feminist emphasis on law reform is, at best misguided, and at worst plays into the hands of the dominant vocabulary. If law is discursive rather than instrumental, attempts by the feminist voice to harness it for her own ends will only result in failure and marginalisation. The laws and institutional methods of dealing with rape and child abuse are used as proof of this thesis. Smart analyses how sexuality, or more accurately our understanding of it, is phallic-centred because men's experience of sex is dominant. And she illustrates convincingly how female sexuality that does not conform to male norms is pathologised.

As an example of the failure of law to advance the cause of women, Smart points to the feminists who deliberately strategised to take the sex out of rape expecting that there would be more convictions. Smart argues that this strategy was clearly mistaken: taking the sex out of rape covers over, rather than exposes, the phallic-centric nature of our culture which ensures that the essentials of the rape trial will continue and particularly the legal abuse of the survivor.

In the fourth chapter Smart undertakes the most difficult and controversial challenge of her book: to debunk the myth that there is such a

creature as feminist jurisprudence. Moreover she attempts to explain why it is misguided for feminists to attempt to create one. Smart's main objection is that jurisprudence by its very nature seeks a universal theory which becomes 'the truth' and that this in turn limits or silences other ways of understanding the world. Catherine Mackinnon is singled out and criticised for her insistence that only radical feminism is feminism. Smart dismisses Mackinnon's claims on the same grounds that Marx is usually criticised: essentialism and determinism. Women have different lives and experiences and any attempt to merge them into one feminine voice is not only futile but wrong. There is no universal women's voice, there is no universal feminist truth.

While I have sympathy with Smart's view, in the end it is not one which I share. Her position has counter-productive implications which if fully adopted, threatens to paralyse the continued advancement of women of all classes and races. To maintain, as Smart does, that universalizing forms of discourse are dangerous, is an important corrective. But to assert that no one can speak on behalf of women or seek knowledge of what will advance the cause of women simply entrenches the status quo because it leads to political and social paralysis. Women of all classes and races must, of course, be participants in the debate but choices and strategies must be made and alliances forged.

There may not be one universal truth which will apply in all circumstances and to all facets of the human condition, but there are truths which rank above other values that will help advance the cause of the disadvantaged and oppressed. To fall into the theoretical trap that these 'truths' do not exist is to ignore the practical and political reality of daily life.

Smart is on stronger ground when she decries the emphasis which feminists have placed on law reform. One need not accept Smart's problematic epistemology to agree with her that an emphasis on law reform rather than on other mechanisms of social change reinforces the primacy and legitimacy of law. Smart illustrates this point by analyzing the struggle over pornography and the tension between the advocates on either side of the 'pornography as violence' versus the 'pornography as representation' debate. The split represents to Smart the defectiveness of traditional law reform strategies as a way of dealing with these issues. The issues are complex and incapable of reduction to universal and detailed specification for the purposes of the criminal code or civil actions. More importantly, to the extent that feminists play the law reform game they fall into the hands of the moral right who become collaborators. In all of this, Smart makes convincing arguments. However because law reform has been unsuccessful or inappropriate in some areas, does not mean that this holds true for all aspects of women's struggles.

While some feminists may have over-emphasised the importance of law as an instrument of change, Smart errs in underplaying its significance. Law will not disappear as a major social force simply because women do not engage with it. Law reform should be one, albeit not the only, social arena in which women struggle for societal transformation.

A more convincing line of argument is Smart's discussion of the dangers inherent in using rights discourse to advance the cause of women in the 1990s and beyond. Rights claims can be a vehicle of empowerment: a demand rather than a request of a supplicant. And certainly they were successful at the beginning of this century in furthering the formal equality of woman by gaining voting rights and formal equal legal status with men. Rights discourse whilst seductive can be destructive. Even historically, equality claims have only been formulated, of necessity for legitimacy, within the existing capitalist structure with its inbuilt class, racial and gender divisions. To speak of 'equality' under such structural oppression is to accept the prevailing ideology which views law as a neutral arbiter and not as part of a system of oppression. Rights discourse over-simplifies important and complex issues. Moreover rights discourse sets up opposing rights which can become very dangerous for women. Rights to abortion run up against the rights of the foetus. Moreover the establishment of rights has often been put on the person claiming the right, for example in sex discrimination cases. Perhaps the most compelling case against the establishment of rights is that anyone can use them who has the money to pursue them. Accordingly the rich and advantaged in society end up with the most benefit from rights even though the disadvantaged fought for them.

These arguments are not new insights but they certainly bear repetition given the lack of recognition which they have received from the mainstream of the feminist movement. Smart advocates, and in this I am in complete agreement with her, the replacement of rights with the notion of welfare and collective responsibility and enforcement.

Carol Smart has written an insightful and thought-provoking book. Her analysis is clear and easy to comprehend, she makes difficult concepts and ideas accessible to a large audience. Smart has applied theory to practice and its reality very well. I do not always agree with her conclusions but I thoroughly enjoyed the intellectual stimulation it provokes: read it.

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David Spadafora

The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain.

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1990.

Pp. xv+463. US \$35.00. ISBN 0-300-04671-5.

David Spadafora's extended treatment of the idea of progress in Britain between 1730 and 1789 seeks to correct the position established by J.B. Bury in *The Idea of Progress* (1920). Bury says that progress 'means that civilisation has moved, is moving, and will move in a desirable direction' (4). Spadafora counters that 'the idea of progress will here be taken to mean the belief in the movement over time of some aspect or aspects of human existence, within a social setting, toward a better condition' (6). This broadens the idea of progress so that it is not limited to civilization, and need not be temporally indefinite or unqualified. Spadafora also rejects Bury's emphasis on progress as a predominantly French concept. 'Bury and his predecessors and successors were thoroughly wrong: the idea [of progress] grew up quite independently on the north side of the Channel, and many of the forms given to it there had a dramatically different appearance from the ones current in France during the Enlightenment' (382). He concludes: 'The idea of progress was undoubtedly *less* popular in France, where the tendency toward historical pessimism remained quite pronounced, than in England and Scotland' (322). This reassessment is justified by a focus on the religious and cultural expressions of the idea of progress in England and Scotland as well as the traditional historical and intellectual battles which occurred on both sides of the channel.

Methodologically, Spadafora defends the study of ideas as expressed in leading writers of the period. He claims: 'It is time for traditional intellectual history to reassert its legitimacy and proper place' (xii). The argument of the book begins with a re-examination of the battle between the ancients and moderns, then turns to progress in the context of religious and theological ideas. Here, too, Bury provides the opponent. Spadafora convincingly argues that some versions of progress are incorporated into Christian speculation, and in other cases, secularization is only part of the story. Either the secular is absorbed into religious life, or the Christian vision of history creates a climate which brings spiritual and secular progress together as part of the same historical process (132).

Attention is also paid to the metaphors of progress. The mind is conceived as educable. In England, the focus is psychological, growing out of the associationist psychology of David Hartley. In Scotland the focus is more upon language. In both, culture and civilization are conceived optimistically. Edmund Law, Richard Price, and Joseph Priestley are among the most prominent English advocates of cultural development. The Scots, notably Kames, Hume, Ferguson, and Millar, are viewed as less theologically influenced, but no less a part of the general movement: 'In the broadest way, the Christian vision of history did for the Englishmen what the study of language

did for the Scots: it endowed them with a strong feeling for the overall *pattern of progress*' (368).

What we have, then, is a detailed treatment of those eighteenth-century writers in Britain who in one way or another argued for a positive movement in historical development. The idea of progress is not uniform, nor is it found in all areas of culture equally. In some cases, it is qualified by other theological or historical considerations so that its effects may not be temporally indefinite or without cost. And in some areas, most notably the fine arts, the case for progress is only very provisionally made. But the net effect is to find a fundamental optimism which takes the form of positive movement, and that, Spadafora thinks, is widely present in the Britain of the mid-eighteenth century. 'Both the English and the Scots believed that the arts and sciences — as a whole and, with the partial exception of the fine arts, individually — were progressive. In the writings of each group, this opinion customarily appeared with another, that modernity had triumphed over antiquity in art and science, and comparison of the ancients and moderns often led to broader conclusions about the advance of human culture' (333).

The detail and depth of Spadafora's discussions makes this a very valuable book. It is not without limitations, however. The approach to the history of ideas is not just traditional. It is somewhat near-sighted. Spadafora notes that 'varieties of pessimism undoubtedly constituted a more than negligible portion of the historical outlook of the eighteenth century' (16). He is less successful in explaining the depth of the competition or the underlying ontological and epistemological basis for the triumph of a faith in progress over pessimism, however. For that, one must look not just at the ideas as they were advocated, but at their structure in relation to the emerging forms of empirical knowledge. Ideas have a logic which drives their development as well as an historical matrix in which they interact and find expression. If J.B. Bury and his followers moved too quickly to an explanatory scheme, Spadafora never quite manages to show what is driving the ideas of progress. Newton and Locke are acknowledged on both sides of the channel as the originators of something new. This empirical and scientific model pervades the discussions of optimism and progress, as Spadafora is aware and notes, but the epistemological and ontological possibilities opened by these models and the limitations that they impose are never adequately brought into the methodology of the history of ideas as it is practiced here.

On the other hand, in spite of the detail of the treatment, it remains selective. For example, a problem throughout is that Spadafora never contrasts the optimistic expectations of progress which are being voiced with the reality as it is developing. The ideas remain isolated from the events which all too frequently qualified the optimism being expressed. This would be less important if it were not for the interaction which failed expectations produced. In religious circles, failures of millennial and eschatological expectations produced not just revisions but changes in the forms of speculation.

Political events forced the pliability of man and the hopes for education into more cautious forms. Joseph Priestley, perhaps the most optimistic of the English writers, was driven from Birmingham by mob action and eventually immigrated to America in hopes of finding a more suitable situation for his benign view of history. This side of the story would not necessarily invalidate what Spadafora has shown about the extent and variation of the idea of progress in Britain, but it might suggest that other, more pessimistic, currents are already at work. Much of the fluidity of eighteenth-century thought hardens and becomes radicalized in class structures that eventually break apart in the cataclysm of the First World War. The seeds of the destruction of the naive optimism and faith in progress that influences a Priestley or Bentham are already at work in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, this is a valuable book, and it is highly recommended to anyone with an interest in eighteenth-century studies.

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Giambattista Vico

On The Study Methods of Our Time.

Trans. with intro. Elio Gianturco.

The Academies and the Relation between Philosophy and Eloquence.

Trans. Donald P. Verene.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1990.

Pp. 90. US \$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2543-3);

US \$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9778-7).

The reappearance of Elio Gianturco's translation in English of the *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione* (1709) is certainly a welcome event. Having first appeared in a Bobbs-Merrill paperback in 1965, now out of print, it was not available even in most libraries. Donald Verene, one of the editors of *New Vico Studies*, and with Giorgio Tagliacozzo a tireless promoter of Vico studies in North America, is to be commended for having repropounded this work with a new introduction and together with *The Academies and the Relation between Philosophy and Eloquence* a little known oration that Vico read at the Academy of the Oziosi in 1737, eight years before his death, and never before translated in English. Verene reproduces Elio Gianturco's translation as is without modifications. This was a good editorial decision since Gianturco's translation is more than adequate and something of a classic in itself, and it would not have been good policy to tamper with it. But Verene is

certainly correct that the title would have been better rendered as 'On the System of Studies of Our Time', for all the good philological and philosophical reasons that he gives in the Preface (xiii). But since Gianturco's title, 'for better or for worse', as Verene says, has always been associated with this work, it was better to leave it. Another good decision.

The *De nostri temporis* is the first major work of Vico but not always the one critics refer to on their way to explain the main work, the *New Science*. This is because the oration is not directly concerned with metaphysics but with the practical matter of education and of its role in society. Vico's concern is only partly philosophical as he attempts to debate in what fields of inquiry we can still learn from the Ancients and where the Moderns have gone beyond them. Vico is decidedly on the side of the Ancients when at stake is education. Moderns can learn from them the arts of wisdom and eloquence and, in particular, the latter which is almost ignored today. This is also Vico's way of countering the authority of the Cartesians and their 'new philosophical criticism' and their analytical geometry, neither very suitable, says Vico, for the development of the young. This is how Vico bypasses the French 'superiority' in matters of philosophy and logic which he does not explicitly criticize in this work.

More contemporary readings of Vico's work, Verene's amongst them, which privilege a rhetorical reading of the *Scienza nuova* or even a sociological or political reading (i.e., Haddock) look to the *De nostri temporis* as the text from which Vico's conception of rhetoric, especially within a social setting, began. Now that this work has been made more available in English it will no doubt generate more readings along these same lines. Gianturco's excellent introduction to his translation provides a good background to the work and is a good starting point for an understanding of this work. The oration that follows the translation of *De nostri temporis* is a short oration in which Vico once again reiterates the importance of rhetoric and of its relation to knowledge. 'For the contemporary reader,' says Verene, 'it is a plea to strike out against the problem of the fragmentation of knowledge and the development of the technical sense of knowledge to the detriment of the promotion of knowledge as a whole' (xviii).

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