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Michael Bavidge
Mad or Bad?
New York: St. Martin's Press 1989.
US $24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-312-03143-2).
Newburyport, MA: Focus Info
(for Bristol Classical Press) 1989.
Pp. xi + 138.
US $10.95 (paper: ISBN 1-85399-017-5).

While some readers will not agree with the final conclusion Michael Bavidge reaches in his book, *Mad or Bad?*, all will surely agree with the series editor of *Mind Matters*, Judith Hughes, that it is 'concise, lively, inexpensive, jargon-free and above all a fascinating read'.

Bavidge's conclusion is that although 'psychopaths are mad in the popular sense of being seriously mentally abnormal...they are not accountable for their actions, because no system of human accountancy, moral or legal, can accommodate them' (136-7).

Bavidge starts his discussion with a detailed study of section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 (G.B.), which partially excuses someone who kills, 'if he was suffering from such abnormality of the mind...as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts' (17). He distinguishes the notion of responsibility at work in that section from the traditional test for mental responsibility under the criminal law. The traditional test, set out as the McNaughten rules, concentrates on what the accused knew; if the accused did not appreciate the nature and quality of the act, or know that it was wrong, the person is excused. Section 2 goes beyond that because it allows that, even though the accused knows that what was done was wrong, the accused can be convicted of manslaughter rather than murder, where the abnormality of mind substantially impairs mental responsibility.

The courts, in analyzing Section 2, connect the concepts of mental abnormality, mental responsibility, and criminal liability. The virtue of the approach, which Bavidge endorses, is that the normative question is fundamental, namely to what extent ought the accused be held responsible; factual and psychiatric findings are secondary, to be interpreted in terms of the normative problem.

Bavidge follows this approach in his more general philosophical analysis of responsibility. He seeks to provide a framework which explains and justifies the treatment of the psychopath. Space does not allow detailed discussion of the author's insightful, general treatments of responsibility, autonomy and personal knowledge. Very briefly put, the psychopath, in exercising his autonomy, may fail to produce a conception other individuals in society can authorise. What is significant for Bavidge is that, 'Acceptance of authority, not disapproval is the variable on which diminished responsibility depends' (91). The problem ultimately is moral, rather than political, factual or psychological. To the extent that a juror 'accepts' the accused's conception, to that extent the accused's responsibility is diminished.

Some reservations about Bavidge's argument must be noted. The final conclusion he reaches allows for completely excusing psychopaths. This contrasts with Section 2 of the Homicide Act which allows only for a reduction of the charge from murder to manslaughter. Also, his account focuses primarily on the accused's condition. If this is not accepted as the favoured normative approach, one might be prepared to confine psychopaths because of an equal concern one has for the plight of potential victims.

In conclusion, as well as being a 'fascinating read' this book would be a useful supplement in an introductory philosophy of law course. Starting with the interpretation of a provision in a statute, a student would be led to understand how problems of interpretation are connected to the formulation of abstract issues of philosophical outlook.

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Michael J. Coughlan
The Vatican, the Law and the Human Embryo.
Iowa City: University of Iowa Press 1990.
Pp. viii + 125. ISBN 0-87745-304-7.

Michael J. Coughlan's book should be a delight to Catholics and non-Catholics alike. To Catholics who want to be loyal to traditional Catholic moral principles, but nevertheless feel the pull of secular arguments, it offers a sympathetic criticism of present Church teaching on the status of the human embryo. To non-Catholics, it offers insight into the history of Catholic moral thought, as well as a spirited critique of recent teachings, from both within and outside the tradition itself, thus providing a context for useful debate.

The subject of Coughlan's critique is the 1987 document, *Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation* (hereafter, *Instruction*), published by the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. In keeping with the Catholic Church's 'mediation theology', the *Instruction* sees itself as informing public policy on important moral matters, in this case, the status of the human embryo, and invites response and participation from secular moralists. Given the pluralistic ear being addressed, the *Instruction* attempts to defend its claim that the human embryo is a person from conception by appealing to arguments from 'science and philosophy' rather than religion. Coughlan shows that these arguments are far from convincing, and that, furthermore, if accepted by Catholic moral theologians, constitute a significant departure from the metaphysics of the

person presupposed in traditional Catholic thought, namely the hylomorphism of Thomas Aquinas.

The goal of the *Instruction* is to persuade legislators to grant the human embryo the right to life, and to ban certain reproductive technologies involving human gametes and contractual motherhood. Coughlan's primary interest is in the argument concerning the status of the embryo. He rejects as plainly inadequate the *Instruction*'s rhetorical cry, 'How could a human individual not be a human person?', showing both that the grounds for it are contentious and that such a position, taken to support absolute protection of the embryo from conception, is inconsistent with Catholic teaching on, for instance, justified killing in self-defence and war, and the permissibility of passive euthanasia.

The *Instruction*'s argument for the personhood of the human embryo is based on the claim that from conception the embryo is a new life, a human life, and a self-identical individual. But, claims Coughlan, from the scientific point of view such claims are mere romanticism. 'A human embryo is a new life.' But how is this fact alone significant? Presumably, it is the embryo's genetic uniqueness that matters. But as well as genetic discontinuity with its parents, the embryo enjoys considerable genetic continuity. Furthermore, in emphasising the importance of the genetic newness of the embryo, the *Instruction* runs the risk of internal inconsistency. For it also argues for the right of the child to be brought up by its biological parents, a claim that surely must be underpinned by the importance of genetic continuity!

'The human embryo is a new human life.' But this is a purely biological fact unless endowed with philosophical significance. Its significance to the *Instruction* appears to lurk in claims about the radical difference in kind between human and non-human — 'It would never be made human if it were not human already' (66), but, as Coughlan points out, this is precisely what is disputed by evolutionary theory. Differences in kind are no longer plausible. Neither are appeals to the uniquely human capacities, for such capacities are clearly absent, and appeals to their presence in an immaterial, undetectable soul are both at odds with the secular approach required for 'mediation' and theologically questionable, as will be shown.

'The embryo is a self-identical individual.' But, argues Coughlan, until the appearance of the 'primitive streak' (after the sixteen-cell stage, between the seventh and fourteenth days) each cell is independent and could (and indeed, sometimes does) separate and develop into a complete human individual. In what sense, then, is the human embryo prior to the fusion of cells an individual?

The argument from the individuality of the embryo is supposed to prove, by science and philosophy, that it is implausible to deny the personhood of the embryo. This it fails to do, as Coughlan shows. But Catholics might (although the *Instruction* does not) appeal also to the 'benefit of the doubt' argument to support their claim to absolute protection for the human embryo. Coughlan pursues this line of argument on their behalf, only to find it too fails to be decisive. The 'benefit of the doubt' argument — briefly, that

we'd better grant the human embryo person-status just in case it is one — fails for Catholics on two counts. Firstly, it requires a radical scepticism impossible to employ in moral debate. For, as Coughlan claims to have shown, real doubt about the personhood of the human embryo cannot be supported on scientific or philosophical grounds. In what, but the most metaphysically radical sense of 'might', might it then nevertheless be a person? And could this radical doubt ever be morally significant enough to outweigh, for example, the moral importance of the arguments for early abortion, early embryo experimentation, or the therapeutic disposition of early embryonic tissue? Secondly, the radical doubt — the embryo might, all appearances to the contrary, nevertheless be a person — is only possible in a context of metaphysical dualism about persons, an approach Coughlan shows to be seriously at odds with Catholic philosophical tradition stemming from Thomas Aquinas. His metaphysics of personhood was based on hylomorphism, the view that the individual is a composite of matter and form. Such a view would preclude the raising of doubt about the possibility of a human soul inhabiting an inappropriate material 'host'. Souls, the bearers of rational and moral capacities, can only be individuated in virtue of their union with bodies. And the bodies in question must be appropriate for the capacities they bear. Coughlan cites an impressive list of Catholic theologians who have endorsed this Thomistic view, and speculates also upon its abandonment since the introduction of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in 1854. For whatever reason, present Catholic teaching, such as that found in the *Instruction*, has deviated from its theological origins, to its loss. For hylomorphism, in its anti-dualism and its recognition of the unfolding of the capacities associated with personhood, is much more amenable to accomodation of the scientific evidence and the secular philosophical thought surrounding the issue of the status of the human embryo. Coughlan's book, in pointing this out, challenges Catholics to return to their own philosophical roots and, in doing so, to participate in a welcome convergence with secular thought on this important issue. The invitation with which the *Instruction* began has been reciprocated!

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Gilles Deleuze
The Logic of Sense. trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin Boundas. New York: Columbia University Press 1990. Pp. xiii + 393. ISBN 0-231-05982-5.

In *The Logic of Sense*, originally published in France in 1969, Deleuze establishes a systematic opposition between sense and meaning. He does this in large measure by presenting commentaries on both the writings of Lewis Carroll and the works of the Stoic philosophers; and also by making interesting digressions on the writings of Malcolm Lowry, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Antonin Artaud and Plato. This brief review will attempt to outline the parameters of Deleuze's conceptual apparatus (these words being used advisedly) while, as much as possible, abstracting from the details of his commentaries.

Meaning or 'good sense', 'common sense', sets up enclosures and is 'inseparable from the agrarian problem' (76). It moves from the singular to the regular, from the extraordinary to the ordinary; it assigns to time the unique dimensionality of from the past to the future. It constitutes the domain of the Same, the signification of the *Lebenswelt*. Meaning identifies and recognizes; it excludes non-sense as its radical other and proceeds from identity to difference. Ultimately, it is thought under the form of God or Subjectivity — the supreme principle of identity. Deleuze tells us that 'good sense' always comes second, 'just as the problem of enclosures presupposes first a free, opened, and unlimited space — the side of a hill or knoll' (76). To speak of the domain of meaning as presupposing another register is to enter the discourse of transcendental philosophy, thus Deleuze characterizes his project as one of determining 'an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field' (102). He distinguishes his effort at transcendental philosophy from that of others, Kant and Husserl in particular, on the basis of the relationship of the transcendental field to that which it grounds. According to him, the error of all heretofore transcendental philosophy is that of thinking 'the transcendental in the image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground' (105). In taking the identity of the object — e.g., Kant's transcendental X or Husserl's form of the thing in general — as the guiding thread of reflection, previous transcendental philosophies enter into a vicious circle in which the found*ing* is conceived of in the reified image of the found*ed*. In this respect Deleuze's critique of transcendental philosophy exhibits a kinship with Foucault's critique (*The Order of Things*) of the 'modern episteme' with its unstable vacillation between the empirical and the transcendental.

According to Deleuze, Metaphysics proposes the following alternative: the ground of the given, given to common sense, is either a groundless abyss, absurdity (Camus), or the form of a supreme Self, a supreme I — God or the transcendental unity of apperception. Starting from the identity of the object one is forced to choose between absurdity or God. Deleuze's step 'beyond

metaphysics' consists of the effort to think the transcendental field as radically heterogeneous in terms of the domain of the given — to think sense as both the condition of, and in opposition to, meaning. In this respect his position is more reminiscent of Freud than of Kant. At the end of chapter seven of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud insists that his true discovery is not that there is a part of the mind that lacks the quality of consciousness, but rather that the unconscious, the primary processes, are radically heterogeneous with reference to the secondary processes. It is to this heterogeneity that Deleuze is attracted, as well as to Freud's conception of the unbound character of energy in the unconscious.

Let us attempt to clarify Deleuze's conception of the relationship between sense and meaning by turning to his article 'The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy' which was produced as an appendix to *The Logic of Sense*. This move is justified on the assumption that the reader, like this reviewer, is more familiar with Plato than with Lewis Carroll. Here the opposition between meaning and sense is presented as the opposition between the copy and the simulacrum. In an analysis that begins with identity, what possesses something in an absolute way, gives, to a copy which participates in it by means of resemblance, the quality of possessing it in a secondary way insofar as it has passed the test of foundation: for examples, 'Justice, the quality of being just, and the just men', or 'the foundation, the object aspired to, and the pretender; the father, the daughter, and the fiance' (255). (Readers of Deleuze & Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* recognize in this triad the precursor of the Oedipal formula: mommy, daddy and me.) As Deleuze reads the *Sophist*, Plato's effort is to distinguish between true and false pretenders, to make a distinction between copies founded on resemblance and simulacra 'always engulfed in dissimilarity' (257). In a footnote to this article, Deleuze points out the similarity between his reading of Plato and that of Derrida in 'Plato's Pharmacy', *Dissemination*. Indeed it is a question of the proximity to legitimacy — the son recognized by resemblance to the father and in opposition to the bastard. Deleuze's simulacrum, or sense, in many respects resembles Derrida's notion of writing.

The simulacrum is 'an image without resemblance' (257). It is not a degraded or inaccurate copy. Rather it introduces the power to produce events. 'It harbors a positive power which denies *the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction*' (262). Readers familiar with Deleuze's later works will recognize here his insistence that difference must not be thought in terms of negation as in dialectical thought. Sense, the simulacrum, is the positive power to engender a series of differences without reference to an original. It generates a series not *enclosed* in terms of proximity to, or distance from, an origin. While traditional transcendental reflection thinks the given in terms of its reference to the self-presence of the subject, for Deleuze the transcendental field is thought in terms of the metaphor of machinery. He appropriates structuralism insofar as it views the structure as 'a machine for the production of incorporeal sense' (71). Deleuze does not look for structural laws, or structural causality; but rather to the fact

that sense is produced by the displacement of 'units' which are not themselves significant, unlike phenomenology in which every sense is referred to a subjective act of 'sense-giving'. According to him, sense generates series which are nomadic, which travel in no determinate direction. Language is such a series. 'Events make language possible. But making possible does not mean causing to begin' (181). The event that renders language possible is for Deleuze a sort of ur-event; it is what separates sound from the sonorous qualities of things. Indeed it is always a mouth that speaks but this must be radically distinguished from the noise of a mouth that eats. The event of this distinction is the condition of linguistic expression. I believe that one of the things that most endears Carroll's work to Deleuze is the constant opposition of 'to speak/to eat' in *Alice in Wonderland*. In ordinary life — common sense and the philosophies based upon it — this event is occulted, thus one understands Deleuze's fascination with the extraordinary and the pathological, particularly the schizophrenic. The schizoid is, par excellence, the one who does not take the distinction of speech and noise, or of signifier and signified, for granted. In treating words as things, he makes himself present to the event that gives rise to the distinction between sound and expression, noise and meaning. For Carroll this event is lived at the surface; he is, according to Artaud, too well fed. For Artaud the wrenching out of meaning from noise is lived in unspeakable suffering, for it is 'no longer a noise, but is not yet language' (194). According to Deleuze, sense is that which disrupts the enclosed world of meaning, the 'body without organs' contests the organ of common sense; founded being is contested by the 'extra-being' of the phantom.

The Logic of Sense is an important book because in it the reader can see the genesis of the conceptual machinery that comes to fruition in Deleuze's later writings, as well as the reversals, e.g., his changed estimation of psychoanalysis. Without at all wishing to diminish the philosophical importance of this work, or worse yet, appearing to embrace the 'analysis' of Levi in *Barbarism with a Human Face*, it is not possible to end even a brief review without a critical reference to the mood, the *Stimmung*, of the book. There is to my mind a glorification of the pathological. One reads statements like: 'anything that is good and great in humanity enters...through people ready to destroy themselves — better death than the health which we are given' (160). We must ask ourselves what are the political consequences of such a serious and sustained dismissal of common sense for a democratic polity? Has not Hannah Arendt warned us of some of its possible consequences? What is one to make of being told in the most oracular tone, and in a genuine reversal of Nietzsche, that 'the revolutionary alone is free from resentment'? An ultra-left tone accompanies but does not destroy this important work.

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John Dillon, trans.
Dexippus, On Aristotle's Categories.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990. Pp. 155.
US $38.95. ISBN 0-8014-2266-3.

This translation is of Dexippus' only known work, a commentary in the Neoplatonic tradition on *Aristotle's Categories*. Dexippus is one of the more obscure figures to appear so far in the series, *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle*, with little more than Dillon's translation to shed a slender ray of light on that obscurity. Practically nothing is known of his life, so the bulk of Dillon's introduction attempts to situate him in terms of his work (written c. 310). Thus there is a brief account of the history of the commentaries going back to the Platonist Eudorus of Alexandria, with emphasis on Porphyry and Iamblichus as his sources. It is, in fact, as a witness to their lost commentaries that this short work has its major value and their loss is the grounds for the slim possibility of attributing some originality to its author. Dillon's attitude throughout the introduction and textual notes is in fact decidedly conservative about, if not hostile to, making much of Dexippus' philosophical prowess and contribution. He is, for example, more cautious than Paul Henry about the so-called oral aporiai of Plotinus that appear in Dexippus' commentary (2 8, 3 7, 3 11), but does point out two others (3 8 and 2 14) that would seem to make Henry's case stronger. All of these, however, do not arouse much excitement in him concerning the insight they give us into Plotinus' thought (9, n 5). Dexippus also presents what little we have of the commentary of the Peripatetic Sosigenes, whom Dillon fails to note as the teacher of Alexander of Aphrodisias. Here again there is the usual leitmotif of doubt about Dexippus' unique treatment of Sosigenes, given the loss of the great commentaries of Porphyry and Iamblichus. Finally, the most original of the aporiai (1 40), occurring in neither Simplicius nor Porphyry, concerns a distinctive notion of existence, with Dexippus' 'denying that adding "is" indicates anything distinct from the subject, but merely bears witness to its subsistence (*hupostasis*)'(14). Even Dillon's recognition of this as 'remarkable and important' (71, n 133) seems hedged by his underlying doubt that something this original could be Dexippus' own. While its novelty relative to Dexippus' predecessors is noted, Dillon does not discuss whether or when it is taken up again in the Greek tradition, either in this logical context or in some other, but perhaps that is not part of his task as a translator in this series.

After his introduction, one is tempted to say that the translation and accompanying notes are somewhat of a tour de force. The translation is generally fluid, making the arguments easy to identify and follow. The notes clarify the problems on many different levels, in relation to the commentary tradition, where the value of this piece can be seen as filling gaps and confirming relationships, especially between Porphyry and Iamblichus and the later Simplicius, and occasionally they are still relevant for contemporary discussions of Aristotle's categorial theory. There are a few spots, however, where it appears closer proofreading would be in order. On p. 27, for example, there is a lacuna in the English. Dillon translates line 8,26 thus: 'we shall

say that it is one thing for something to be signified by something,' without the expected other thing in 8,27. The Greek is a typical *men de* construction, with the second half going something like this in English: 'and another for the same thing to be signified as a result of something.' The argument then continues with a distinction between the voice through (*dia*) which utterances are expressed and speaking as the result of (*hupo*) the activity of the speaker, between the means and the meaning, as it were. Similarly, on p. 29, lines 9,28-10,1, where Dexippus is misquoting Aristotle: 'The thinking of individual objects (is neither true nor false, but for those things where falsity and truth apply, there) is already a combination of concepts.' The material in parentheses has been left out and, while the whole thing is not an exact quotation of the Aristotelian text, the sense is close enough. There are also two minor omissions on the same page, at lines 10,1 and 10,19, the crucial omission of a negative at line 28,27 (p. 59) and another short omission at line 43,7 (p. 78). Book 3 has fewer problems, but at line 64,16, Quantity should read Quality and line 66,5-6 might be rendered 'For instance, the nature of Quantity reveals the separateness and compositeness, the three-dimensionality and divisibility of Substance,' although that is perhaps a bit too pedantic. The references to Plotinus' *Enneads* are also not always clear: p. 68 n 129 has 6.11.16-17, which presumably is 6.1.11, and p. 120 n 27, where 6.1.5 is clearly intended.

These quibbles in no way denigrate the value of the translation and its usefulness for classicists of all types. As Dillon himself implies, this short treatise of Dexippus is not particularly profound nor does it extend our knowledge of the Greek tradition immeasurably, but I suspect that is known about a good number of the works collected in the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*. In a way, this lack of immediate significance makes the service of the translator all the more appreciated. Reading between the lines, the project was not the kind that would yield rich new insights or engender scholarly excitement, but it has been done well and with great sympathy, and its importance is not so much that it makes the single work of an obscure author accessible, but makes the richer tradition of which his work is a small but extant part that much easier to chart and understand.

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Ronald Englefield
Critique of Pure Verbiage.
La Salle, Illinois: Open Court 1990.
Pp. xvii + 115.
(cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9107-5);
(paper: ISBN 0-8126-9108-3).

Richard A. Watson
The Philosopher's Joke.
Buffalo, New York: Prometheus 1990.
Pp. 122. US $14.95.
ISBN 0-87975-601-2.

Philosophy and humor have been intertwined since at least Democritus and Socrates, and their connections run deep. Both require conceptual flexibility, especially the adopting of unusual perspectives. As William James said, philosophy 'sees the familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as if it were familiar', which is almost a definition of the comic point of view. Many philosophical questions, such as how I might know I'm not a brain in a vat, sound like premises for standup comedy routines. Indeed, the proverbial Martian observer might have a hard time distinguishing a good philosophy class from standup comedy. Since Aristophanes, too, philosophers themselves have been satirized and parodied. Long before Dennett's *Lexicon*, Socrates was poking fun at other thinkers and himself.

Though quite different in content and style, these two books are in the tradition of doing philosophy with a sense of humor. But they achieve varying degrees of success. Englefield, though not a professional philosopher, does the better job. His *Critique of Pure Verbiage* is a collection of essays guided by the insight that although language can communicate important ideas, it is frequently used to enhance writers' and speakers' status, to conceal banal thinking, and to mislead audiences in other ways. His two main targets are literary criticism and philosophy since Kant, fields where Englefield finds lots of humbug. 'There is a kind of subconscious dishonesty to which philosophers and literary men seem especially inclined' (57) — using complicated language to make their thinking seem profound. As Schopenhauer said, what is needed are ordinary words to say unusual things, but most authors provide just the opposite.

Englefield has five main complaints against literary criticism (22). It lacks intelligible sequence and is often made up of meaningless sentences. Authorities are cited frequently, but the relevance of the citation is generally obscure. What lucid passages there are usually just express the critic's emotions. Current intellectual fads are alluded to simply to impress the reader, not to explain or criticize. And references are often made vague so as not to expose the author to the danger of contradiction.

Humbug in philosophy Englefield finds ubiquitous, and in thinkers as different as Kant and Ryle. A special focus is 19th- and 20th-century humbug used to counteract the effects of scientific naturalism on religious belief. Englefield shows how from the time of Coleridge the British used Kant and German idealism to shore up religion against skepticism and unbelief. Kant's popularity was based on his image as defender of the faith, not on his readers finding him illuminating or even understandable. His distinction between reason and understanding, for example, and his elaborate apparatus of mental faculties, has no relation to physiological and psychological fact (52), Englefield argues, and those like Macaulay who looked at Kant honestly admitted that his writing was 'utterly unintelligible'.

Englefield's theme and even many of his examples are not new, but his wit and bite are entertaining. More importantly, in these postmodern days when literary criticism and philosophy are fusing, and almost anything dazzling counts as a move in 'the conversation', his message can stand a little repetition.

Richard Watson's *The Philosopher's Joke* is also a collection of writings, but unfortunately, these do not hang together well. Despite the title, there is no central joke to this book, unless it was intended as a shaggy-dog story. The announced theme is form and content, but that is hard to discern. More troubling, the essays were written at different times, in different voices, and for different audiences. Some, like 'The Relation of Truth of Content to Perfection of Form in Literature', are humorless. Others like 'Hopping and Skipping' — a parody of the later Wittgenstein — are quite funny. The first chapter is a 20-page journal article, Chapter 5 a loose autobiographical essay on 'How to Die', the last chapter a five-page summary of Gregory Rabassa's *One Hundred Years of Solitude*.

The skeleton for the book is supposed to be the decades in philosophy, with five of the essays written in the dominant styles of the 1950s through 1990s. The blurb gives the impression that each essay will be a parody of writing from that period. But only 'Hopping and Skipping' works that way. The chapter for the 1990s is 'Ape Dreams', but it's hard to see what the author is up to here, or what it has to do with the 1990s. He simply traces the idea of human-chimpanzee interbreeding through lots of novels and movies, and then superficially sketches some of the scientific evidence that this might be possible. As in most of the essays, we reach the end looking for a point. Even jokes, after all, have a point.

If, as Englefield reminds us, we can cover up banal or confused thought with pomposity, we can also do it with breezy humor. And that is what Watson does. His third essay, 'What *Does* It All Mean? (The 1970s)', is a good example. He examines the sense of meaning in which things and situations are said to have meaning, and comes to the trite conclusion that meanings are subjective and relative. 'We are the source of the meanings of the various things in the world. It all means what we take it to mean' (67).

The impression I got from this book is that it was assembled from drafts and articles that didn't make it into philosophy journals. The title was added as a way of allaying criticism, in the way we say 'It was only a joke' when someone reacts negatively to some comment of ours. My overall assessment of *The Philosopher's Joke* is: I don't get it.

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Owen Flanagan
Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1991. Pp. xiv + 393. ISBN 0-674-93218-8.

This study arises in concern that contemporary ethical theory is not conversant with new work in the human sciences, particularly psychology. The keystone of the argument is a 'Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism' (PMPR): moral theories and ideals should not require people in general to have traits of character or motivation that they could not possibly have. PMPR invites referring to a considerable body of recent scientific literature and developing a broadly naturalistic account of morally desirable personalities. It also shapes the author's objective of striking an appropriate balance between realism and moral ideals.

Flanagan's approach is not entirely novel. In some ways, it resembles the argument of my own discussion in *Good Lives and Moral Education* (Peter Lang 1989), at the centre of which is an examination of emotions in light of evidence from both empirical and philosophical psychology. We agree that neither of two main models of moral excellence — the one beginning with principled reasoners, the other with the person embodying every virtue — stands up to this evidence. However, Flanagan usefully goes further, devoting his first chapter (after a prologue on the varieties and imperfections of saints) to an explicit defence of bringing ethics and psychology closer together. The argument includes a convincing rebuttal of suggestions that psychology does not matter to moral philosophy.

PMPR rules out the thesis of the unity of the virtues and act utilitarianism in 'pure form'. Continuous altruism at one's own expense is also ruled out if 'instrumental rationality ... comes with our kind of biology' (42). Flanagan never resolves the uncertainty of this 'if'. He is sensitive to the difference between traits that are impossible to acquire or suppress and those for which this is simply very difficult, as to the problem of distinguishing those traits

that are 'natural' from those that are 'social'. He regards as 'legitimate contenders for natural traits ... the six basic emotions of anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness, and surprise', but he does not consider theories of emotion as constituted entirely by social beliefs.

The uncertain scope of PMPR is evident in chapters 3 and 4, in which Flanagan defends a minimal realism against the more strongly realist view that there are strict limits on the amount of impersonality and impartiality that can be demanded by a moral theory. Minimal realism identifies as universal psychological features of persons only the facts that we have separate and distinctive points of view, that our individual projects give life whatever meaning it has, and that even the most impartial amongst us are partial to our own projects. Unlike strong realism, the latter view is consistent with demands that one aspire to ideals that would turn one into a very different kind of person.

This disagreement between forms of realism is pursued from the perspective of communitarianism and liberalism in the following two chapters. The communitarian view that the nature of persons favours certain kinds of social arrangements is found to be empirically unfounded and dubious on the basis of the evidence available. *All* the distinctively communitarian claims about connections between community and human flourishing are overstated. Liberal conceptions of moral psychology fare better because they, too, insist upon the deeply social nature of human beings without wrongly supposing that moral criticism has to be rooted within a particular form of life. To these authorial judgments it might not be unfair to reply, however, that many liberal philosophers appear to have discovered their deep commitment to community only under the duress of communitarian arguments. It is not easy to imagine critics of the liberal self being much swayed by Flanagan's advocacy of this conception.

At this point the discussion moves to an examination of the findings and claims of cognitive psychologists who are interested in moral development. Chapter 7 is primarily a description of Jean Piaget's studies of moral judgment in children, while chapter 8 reviews Lawrence Kohlberg's extension of Piaget's theories into a six-stage account culminating in a perspective on justice capable of resolving all moral problems. The primary upshot is that 'the heterogeneity of the moral' makes it 'unbelievable that there could be a single ideal moral competence and a universal and irreversible sequence of stages according to which moral personality unfolds and against which moral maturity can be unequivocally plotted' (195).

Flanagan adopts a topical way of elaborating this point, contrasting Kohlberg's views with Carole Gilligan's and her suggestions that a feminine ethics of care and concern exists alongside masculine moralities of rules and rights. Chapters 9 through 11 focus upon questions surrounding these putative gender differences in human moral psychology. The discussion shows convincingly that people generally are capable of thinking in terms of both justice and care in their moral deliberations, but these chapters also argue that moral personality is many faceted. In addition to justice and

care, Flanagan thinks, there is 'the voice of *intrapersonal* moral concern' (210), along with others less clearly specified. Most of the work of distinguishing these other voices remains undone, partly because Flanagan does not consider it very profitable to continue the discussion of such high-level orientations. Instead, for the last part of his book he prefers a more fine-grained and substantive approach, further stressing the heterogeneity of moral personality.

Chapter 12 explores some of the particular kinds of temptation and licence that undermine specific traits of character. Responses to such situations reveal that there is much less unity in the moral personality than philosophers have often supposed. Drawing on linguistics and cognitive psychology, Flanagan develops the idea of moral modularity, with moral competence consisting in 'a multifarious set of competencies, each ... with its own learning story' (269). Among the implications are that people commonly display gaps in these capacities; that good lives, healthy lives, and happy lives do not necessarily coincide; that virtues may not ready one to withstand the pressures of temptation. Much of this discussion is speculative: as Flanagan notes, 'the causal story is fairly opaque' (271), and the data (e.g., the results of Milgram's experiments in obedience) are subject to a variety of interpretations. However, the discussion is also consistently interesting, and it should encourage further inquiry in this relatively new territory.

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Jerry Fodor
A Theory of Content and Other Essays.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1990. Pp. xii + 270.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-262-06130-9.

This book is a collection of previously published essays which appeared between 1984 and 1989. The exception is the title piece, a major essay aimed at extending, clarifying and defending the theory of content first espoused in Fodor's *Psychosemantics*. I will first briefly review the older essays and then turn to 'A Theory of Content', which is undoubtedly the book's main point of interest.

The book is divided into two parts. Part One, which includes the eponymous essay, is labelled *Intentionality*, and focusses primarily on problems of representation, linguistic and/or mental. Here we find the well known 'Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation', which remains a valuable survey of philosophical approaches to representation. The guide is rounded out by

the following essay, 'Semantics Wisconsin Style', which considers the so-called information based semantics pioneered by Fred Dretske. This essay includes a very nice discussion of the problem of error. Crudely put, the problem is that if *what* a symbol represents is a function of the information it carries, it will be hard to distinguish cases of erroneous symbol production from correct productions, for even where there is error there is still information, simply because *any* event carries information about its causes. Information based theories of representation are thus driven towards the consequence that any symbol represents the disjunction of all its causes, which consequence is, of course, a *reductio* of the theory. Resolving this problem is the primary motivation for Fodor's own theory of content, which is expounded in the following two essays, and to which we will turn later.

The final three essays of Part One have no unifying theme. 'Making Mind Matter More' develops a theory of the causal efficacy of intentional mental states that does not demand any kind of reductionist materialism and which avoids an old problem recently revived: epiphenomenalism. Many current views of content, notably Donald Davidson's, appear to make the content of mental states causally irrelevent — mere epiphenomena — with respect to the production of actions. Such an obviously unpalatable consequence demands a response, and Fodor's is interesting and, I think, probably along the right lines. The next essay, 'Substitution Arguments and the Individuation of Beliefs' attempts to defend and exploit the seemingly bizarre doctrine that there is nothing more to meaning than denotation, concentrating on how this doctrine can handle the infamous failures of co-referential substitutivity within belief contexts. Part One ends with a review of Stephen Schiffer's *Remnants of Meaning*.

Part Two defends 'modularity', the Galtonian view that the mind is composed of several more or less independent functional units, each responsible for a distinct component of cognition. The only modules that are considered at any length are those underlying vision and linguistic processing, and Fodor retreats from full modularity — 'higher' cognitive functions are not modular but rather richly interconnected in many ways. The arguments in 'A Précis of *Modularity of Mind*' and 'Why Should the Mind be Modular?' are largely summaries or extensions of those in Fodor's book, for which the précis serves as an excellent introduction. In 'Observation Reconsidered' Fodor argues for the fundamental neutrality of observation with respect to background theory and there finds an honest philosophical job for the doctrine of modularity, a main thesis of which is that visual perception is not cognitively penetrable. The final essay is a very narrow reply to objections raised by Paul Churchland against Fodor's linking of perceptual modularity to observational neutrality. It is polemical, amusingly written and perhaps successful.

Let us turn now to the book's centrepiece. 'A Theory of Content' begins with a long criticism of extant information based approaches to semantics. Here we see new versions of the arguments against Dretske's approach as well as a delightful and powerful attack on the 'teleological' approaches

recently advanced by the likes of Millikan, Papineau, Dennett and Dretske himself. Fodor manages to raise several very serious objections against teleological approaches to the problem of error.

But does Fodor's theory fare much better? The basics of Fodor's theory are extremely simple. Very roughly, X means Y if (1) X's cause Y's, (2) some non-X's also cause Y's, and (3) any non-X that causes a Y would not cause that Y if X's didn't cause Y's. (3) is labelled the 'asymmetrical dependence' condition. Fodor calls (2) the 'robustness' of meaning: the fact that any meaningful item can maintain a specific meaning even though such items are produced in a huge range of circumstances only some of which reveal the actual meaning (for example, under the 'right' conditions — say, at twilight — a horse can elicit the word 'cow'). As Fodor shows, without robustness his theory falls victim to pansemanticism, the idea that everything is literally meaningful, which would be mysticism or absurdity, but not cognitive science.

Here's a worked example. The word 'cow' means cow. Fodor's theory can explain this. First, cows cause 'cow's. Take a child to a dairy farm and you will see that this is correct. Secondly, (2) holds, for sometimes non-cows cause 'cow's. Verify this by giving the child a picture book about dairy farming on the prairies. Finally, these non-cow caused 'cow's would not be caused except for the fact that cows cause 'cow's. Verify this by counterfactual imagination. Suppose that cows didn't cause 'cow's, perhaps because the word 'cow' meant tree. Then the picture book alluded to above would no longer cause 'cow's (since you will recall it was about farming on the prairies, where there are no trees).

The bulk of Fodor's explication of his own theory consists of detailed replies to a number of objections, and he shows that the theory can provide intuitively correct answers to a surprising number of questions about meaning and content. But frankly I cannot see how he can respond to the possibility of 'semantically deviant term production'. A trivial example: I ask you for a three letter word beginning with 'c' that rhymes with 'bow'? You will certainly reply with 'cow'. Yet this occurrence of 'cow' is not asymmetrically dependent upon cows causing 'cow's, for no matter what 'cow' *meant*, it would still be the right answer to my question. Of course, such semantically deviant productions are instances of robustness and thus I fear that robustness avoids pansemanticism at the cost of semantic nihilism.

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Gordon Graham
Living the Good Life: An Introduction To Moral Philosophy.
New York: Paragon House 1990. Pp. xvi + 207.
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 1-55778-235-0).

William N. Nelson
Morality: What's In It For Me? A Historical Introduction To Ethics.
Boulder: Westview Press 1991. Pp. xvi + 166.
US $36.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-7939-3);
US $10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-7940-7).

Both of these introductions to moral philosophy are meant to be accessible to students who have read little or no philosophy. They both aim at accurately presenting ideas and arguments from historical Western philosophers, but not at being exhaustive or chronological. They both discuss Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Bentham and Mill. Nelson alone examines Epictetus, Hobbes, Butler, Rawls and T.M. Scanlon, while Graham deals with Plato, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre and Richard Taylor. This difference in philosophers is partly explained by Graham's including the topics of existentialist ethics and religious ethics, whereas Nelson instead includes contractualist ethics. Both aim to give contemporary perspective and relevance to the traditional positions.

The thesis of Nelson's book is prominent and influences much of his presentation of the other thinkers. He candidly states at the beginning that he writes 'from a distinctive viewpoint' (ix). On the other hand, Graham's study is governed not so much by a thesis as by a search for what is the good life. Let us begin with a description of Nelson's book via his thesis.

Nelson's thesis is that the requirements that we be fair and impartial, respect rights, do our part and follow rules form an aspect of morality which can only be explained and justified by contractualism (145-8). Moreover, these ideas of impartiality and fairness are likely the most difficult to understand or justify. The contractualist explanation and justification, then, provides an essential framework for the operation of the other aspects of morality (122).

Two points of clarification are needed. First, Nelson enumerates three aspects of morality. In addition to 1) the concern for impartiality and fairness, there are 2) the concern for developing those attitudes and character traits needed to live well, and 3) the concern for being kind, compassionate and caring (121). Second, the justification in which Nelson is interested is primarily in terms of a reason to be moral. Moral requirements could be ignored unless they can be defended to anyone who may ask 'what's in it for me?'

Nelson's basic claim about Epictetus and Aristotle is that they conceive of ethics in terms of what is best for an individual (33). The main difference between Greek moral philosophy and modern, is that Greek ethics is just the

study of one of its three aspects, the nature of individual well-being, while modern moral philosophy is more concerned with the nature of interpersonal rights and duties (34 and 55). Aristotle may call justice a virtue, but what reason can he give to someone for adopting this virtue in addition to the others? Being a just person might not contribute to living the good life in individual cases (32-5 and 120-1). Any student who reads Nelson first will surely be surprised to read near the beginning of Aristotle's *Ethics* that the good of the community is 'a greater and more perfect thing to achieve' than that of the individual (1094b7-12).

Nelson next argues that Kant fails to give us a reason for being moral. Kant's suggestion that we should be moral for the sake of rationality is rejected because rationality does not produce specific answers to moral questions, in that an action can be described truly in a variety of ways and different persons might be willing to universalize different standards (52-3). He believes that Kant rejects as moral motives acting out of other, non-rational, inclinations because Kant sees these as all self-interested motives and hence not moral (49). Nelson is mistaken. Kant rejects inclinations as moral motives because one cannot take credit or responsibility for the inclinations one happens to have. The difference between morally good action and correct action is that morally good action is praiseworthy, one can take credit for it. A correct answer on a mathematics test might not be the result of reason, but if it is not, then no one is worthy of praise for it.

Nelson is particularly strong at comparing and contrasting the different philosophers. His thesis has a better fit with the other thinkers he presents. Hume and Butler are used to illustrate the third aspect of morality, the concern for being kind, compassionate and caring. Although he believes that their considerations show egoism fails, Hobbes and the prisoner's dilemma are used to show that compassion and care cannot justify the aspect of morality concerned with impartiality and fairness. Nelson argues that while the utilitarians provide support for their claim that happiness is good they fail to support their claim that we ought to *maximize total* happiness. Why should one be impartial between one's own happiness and that of others? On contractualism Nelson prefers Scanlon to Rawls. He argues that the reason for being moral offered by contractualism depends upon our having an interest in being able to justify what we do (128-9). One wonders whether this is so different from Kant's reverence for reason.

Graham's book is very well written. His organization of the discussion around the search for the good life works well at involving the reader and moving the reader from topic to topic. Interesting biographical facts are provided where relevant. The exposition of the positions and their problems is closer to standard than Nelson's. There are a number of clear summaries and reviews of the overall argument. All of these features will make this an easier book for the student with no philosophical background.

Graham begins with the popular idea that to live well is to be rich and famous. He quickly advances to the idea that the good life is getting what you want, egoism. He includes Nietzsche's idea of 'will to power' as a

variation. When egoism is found inadequate, he considers a close alternative, hedonism. Here he includes a study of Aristotle's eudaimonism. Existentialism, unlike Aristotle, finds no stability in human nature, but rather a radical freedom. Taking responsibility for the creation of one's own values, thus avoiding bad faith, is the existentialist version of the good life presented. For Kant the good life consists in being praiseworthy rather than in faring well, a distinction not needed before this point. The problems with Kant lead to utilitarianism. Both are shown, as in Nelson, to have problems answering the question 'why be moral?'

Graham's chapter on religion and the meaning of life is most interesting. After having found each of the other theories of the good life deficient, he attempts to provide a positive account of the religious answer. Graham reviews the usual problems brought against religious ethics. Then he sketches out a role for religion to play which is designed to answer or avoid these problems. In the end, however, he admits that his account raises new problems just as serious (194). He worries that the appeal to religion goes beyond what philosophical argument can establish on its own. The search unsuccessful, Graham recommends further philosophical enquiry (196).

In short, Graham's book will be easier for the absolute beginner and better meets the goals set for the book. Nelson's book may be better suited to those having some familiarity with moral philosophy.

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Paul Grice
Studies in the Way of Words.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1989.
Pp. viii + 394. cloth: ISBN 0-674-85270-2.

Nearly all of Grice's most well known papers, including his influential William James Lectures, have been brought together in this collection. In addition, the volume includes ten essays that have not been published previously, though some of these have received wide circulation in mimeographed form.

When the main corpus of a life's work is collected in one place in this way, it becomes relatively easy to identify the principal themes. In Grice's case, two themes readily emerge into prominence. The first is the idea that communication should be viewed as a cooperative activity whose purpose is the efficient transfer of information. Ordinary conversation is most likely to achieve its objectives if people normally follow certain commonsense rules of

thumb. For example, a speaker should not make assertions for which he lacks adequate evidence. And one should be as informative as circumstances require given what one does know. Such rules, together with the assumption that speakers normally obey them, give rise to conversational implicatures. If someone asserts a disjunction '*p* or *q*', we assume that he does not know that *p* since, if he did, he would be in violation of the rule that one should be as informative as possible. Hence, someone who asserts '*p* or *q*' conversationally implicates that he does not know that *p*. Grice's theory of implicature is far-reaching in its consequences, and he exploits it at every turn. He invokes it in defence of a theory of indicative conditionals (Essay 4), a causal theory of perception (Essay 15) and even Russell's theory of descriptions (Essay 17).

Perhaps the most significant general weakness of Grice's treatment of communication and implicature is that it focuses too narrowly on rules governing assertion to the exclusion of rules governing related linguistic activities such as assent. More attention to assent would have helped Grice's analyses in some cases and would have caused him problems in others. In 'The Causal Theory of Perception', for example, Grice advocates a theory under which 'I perceive *X* to be red' implies '*X* looks red to me'. However, Grice wrestles with the worry that *assertion* of '*X* looks red' normally suggests some doubt that *X* is red. The problem disappears, however, if we focus on assent instead. If one is presented with the question 'Does *X* look red?' and it is clear that only 'Yes' or 'No' answers will be accepted, one can respond affirmatively without the worry of committing oneself to any misleading doubt about the color of *X*.

Increasing the emphasis on assent raises problems, on the other hand, for Grice's well known thesis that indicative conditionals are material. Assume I am confident that Mulroney is in Ottawa. I would violate the rules of conversation if I asserted, for this reason alone, 'Either Mulroney is not in France or he is in Paris'. Similarly, it would be inappropriate to assert on such grounds, 'If Mulroney is in France, he is in Paris'. So far, at least, the example lends support to Grice's thesis since conditions for assertion of the disjunction and the corresponding conditional are the same. However, the picture changes dramatically if we simply shift the focus from assertion to assent. Believing what I do about Mulroney's location, it does not seem inappropriate to *assent* to the above disjunction. I can assent to a claim which is weaker than what I could have asserted because assent does not carry the same danger of misleading my audience. However, it still seems quite odd to assent to the conditional. If Grice's thesis were true, one would think that disjunctions and indicative conditionals should be alike both in conditions for assertion and in conditions for assent.

The second important theme of Grice's work is his analysis of meaning in terms of intention (mainly in Essays 5, 6, 14 and 18). Passing over much detail, the strategy is to analyze what a speaker means by an utterance on a particular occasion in terms of what the speaker intends on that occasion. Similarly, the unrelativized (timeless) meaning of an utterance is analyzed in terms of the intentions speakers standardly have in producing the utter-

ance (350). It is significant that Grice presents his views as *analyses* or *definitions*. Grice is not interested in merely identifying a relationship between meaning and intention. Intention, in his view, is the more fundamental concept in terms of which meaning is to be understood.

The general strategy of Grice's analysis is fraught with difficulties which are by now generally well known. For such an analysis to be enlightening, we need some way of telling what a speaker's intentions are which is independent of any appeal to the meaning of the speaker's utterances. Yet our most common actual method of discovering a person's intentions is to consider what he says. Further, if we focus on creatures who lack language altogether, there is serious doubt that we have any prospect of attributing fine-grained intentions of the kind we normally attribute to language users. There seems to be no way, in principle, of distinguishing between a lion who intends to kill a creature with a kidney and a lion who intends to kill a creature with a heart. Finally, there is the problem that intentions and thoughts of the type we attribute to humans may in fact be comprised of inner states which are essentially linguistic in nature. If that were so, the Gricean analysis would succeed only in replacing the problem of speaker meaning with the problem of the meanings of expressions in the inner language of thought. In his 'Retrospective Epilogue' Grice finally acknowledges the quandary posed by this latter possibility, and it leads him to briefly advance a suggestion (358-9) which is eminently worth pursuing. It may be that what is needed is neither an analysis of linguistic meaning in terms of intention nor an analysis of intention in terms of linguistic meaning. What is needed is perhaps a unitary theoretical framework within which both semantic and mental concepts can be understood.

Though this latter suggestion is floated too briefly to be subject to serious critical discussion, it is typical of one of the better aspects of Grice's approach to philosophical problems. In almost all of his thinking, Grice is a committed practitioner of the Oxford tradition of analysis. Yet Grice is candid in acknowledging the limitations of this approach, and he occasionally even manages to anticipate successors to the Oxfordian approach. Another example of this occurs in his discussion of the causal theory of perception. Grice toys briefly with the problem of how to link a physiological account of perception to an Oxfordian analysis. The Oxford analyst, he suggests, may simply have to refer to the physical process involved in perception by citing typical examples such as the process that occurs when I perceive my hand in good light. He then conjectures, 'I see nothing absurd in the idea that a nonspecialist concept should contain, so to speak, a blank space to be filled in by the specialist' (240). Such suggestions are commonplace today due mainly to the influence of Putnam's important 1975 paper 'The Meaning of Meaning'. What is stunning about Grice's suggestion is not its content but the fact that it was advanced in 1961.

An understanding of Grice can be critical in grasping much of what goes on today in philosophy of language and mind. For readers unfamiliar with his work, this collection will no doubt serve as the definitive introduction.

For readers already acquainted with Grice, the book offers useful refinements and reconsiderations of earlier positions. The new essays do not, however, develop any substantial new theses that we have not heard before.

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Lawrence J. Hatab
Myth and Philosophy: A Contest of Truths.
La Salle, Ill.: Open Court 1990. Pp. xiv + 383.
US $34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9115-6);
US $18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9116-4).

Unlike other 'from myth to philosophy' projects, this work presents classical Greek myth in its own terms rather than as proto-philosophic gropings toward truths revealed in Plato and Aristotle. Its avowedly philosophic treatment of the relationship of myth and classical philosophy, though, draws attention to the self-imposed limits of philosophy and to the residues of myth in the genesis of rationality.

The tools for such a self-critique, Hatab suggests, are found in Nietzsche and Heidegger. Both thinkers describe the historical emergence of philosophy in terms that explain how subsequent philosophic difficulties are generated by excluding mythic insights from claims of truth. Rather than saying that philosophy displaces myth as a truer expression of the nature of existence, Nietzsche and Heidegger highlight the process by which rationality and science establish themselves as attempts to confront existence. Because classical Greek myths *disclose* existence rather than explain the how or why of existence, they provide a contrasting backdrop for understanding the nature of philosophy itself. Insofar as the procedures of intelligibility of mythic thought are incommensurable with rationality, they express the limit of explanation and thus adumbrate the sacred, mysterious, and transcendent alternative to philosophic truth.

The purpose of the first half of Hatab's book is to clear out a space for this alternative notion of truth. Central to that project is his account of the emergence of the self as an individual conscious of an independent world. In chapters on the epic world of Homer, the archaic culture of the lyric poets (e.g., Sappho, Solon), and the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, Hatab traces the transformation of the epic hero (a function of divine power) into the tragic hero who guides his or her own destiny in the midst of Dionysian mystery.

In the epic, he claims, the sacred disrupts consciousness; it simply appears in the passing form of social responsibility, ethical command, or internal debate. Even when these divine actions become more internalized in lyric poetry or in Hesiod's works, they mark the significance of the divine in a community of individuals. Likewise, in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles, personal suffering comes about through the growing awareness of a self whose individual existence is unintelligible in the context of Dionysian formlessness. Only by seeing Apollonian individuality as correlated to this Dionysian element can the Euripidean hero remember the mysterious 'other' that relegates truth to a perspectival pluralism.

As Nietzsche notes, philosophy errs in adopting the Apollonian to the exclusion of the Dionysian. The move to exclusion, documented in the second half of Hatab's book, begins in the pre-Socratic emphasis on profane experience. Thales, Hesiod, Xenophanes, Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, however, search for a conceptual account of the 'positive fatalism' of myth. Unlike in later philosophy, they do not try to explain away the mystery of the sacred; rather, they present it as the nonsubstantiality of form.

By giving primacy to form over formlessness, and conscious knowledge over mystery, Plato inverts the tragic wisdom of sheer temporality. Though he retains shamanlike features in describing inspired states of the soul, Plato subordinates the immediacy of lived experience as having extraordinary, mythic features; and when he eliminates even these, Aristotle completes the process by which rationality forgets the Dionysian presuppositions of individuation.

As Hatab remarks, though, Plato's own use of myth recognizes how existence presumes the disclosure of the nonobjectivity of objectivity itself, the nonrationality of reason itself, the unphilosophical character of philosophy itself. Myth reveals truths about the world that cannot be accommodated by reductionist or foundationalist strategies because those strategies are expressed by myth. From this Hatab concludes that a philosophical ('phenomenological') analysis of reason retains the background meaning of mythic disclosure 'and in fact is able to *explicate* that meaning' (326).

This is where the tension of Hatab's joint use of Nietzsche and Heidegger threatens to subvert his entire project. To be able to explicate the meaning of mythic disclosure is possible in a Heideggerian phenomenology precisely because myth and philosophy are united temporally in the historicizing of thought. If reason characterizes philosophy, and if reason is inherently historical or temporal, then philosophy's appropriation of myth as its historical other is not only permissible but required. Thus the 'gradual ascendancy of consciousness and rational reflection over the elusive transcendence of myth' (260) accepts history as meaningfully continuous in the Aristotelian sense of time specifically undermined by myth. Talk of 'the emergence of rationality' (294) appropriates myth just when it is about to escape with the help of the Platonic model of the philosophic dismissal of myth as itself a mythic performance.

Instead of the early Heidegger to whom Hatab appeals, what myth requires is the later, poetic Heidegger and the Nietzsche who worries about the historiographic continuity of ascendencies, transitions, and connections. Certainly the import of mythic expression cannot be retrieved in a phenomenology that authorizes this kind of historicism: 'The *historical* nature of self-consciousness and rationality (as well as the connections with myth exhibited in the historical transition from myth to reason) undermine the presumption of their absolute priority or status' (303). Such a claim masks the way that myth challenges the prospect of a historical transition. The displacement of myth by philosophy, as Hatab earlier shows, must be a rupture rather than a transition.

From a mythic standpoint, Hatab's chronological arrangement of chapters presents a narrative performance in a distinctly philosophic historiography. Breaches in his narration (often in his insightful notes) signal the discontinuity that marks the insistence of mythic expression within and in spite of the continuous development of an argument. Like his favorite Plato, Hatab thus recommends his position less by what he says than by how he says it.

One final comment: much of this book's charm lies in the endnotes buried in the back. Because wordprocessing programs can easily place footnotes in the text, there is no longer any reason why publishers should continue to subject readers to the constant flipping back and forth required to read a scholarly book like this one. Perhaps if enough readers and reviewers complained, something would be done.

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Göran Hermerén
Art, Reason, and Tradition.
Almqvist & Wiksell International 1991.
Pp. 115. n.p. ISBN 91-22-01420-9.

Göran Hermerén states the main themes of the book in the abstract. 'The purpose of this book is to discuss the role of rationality in interpretations and explanations of art. The focus of interest is on the possibility of rational dialogues across different research traditions' (6). Two research traditions are used to explore this theme, and they 'concern studies of influences and intertextuality' (6). So, the book really has two purposes. Besides the specific issue involving the two particular traditions, there is the general question concerning rational dialogues across traditions.

The book includes a brief introductory chapter (Minerva, Apollo and Dionysis). In this chapter Hermerén claims that deconstructionism has lost much of its influence. He suggests a sociological explanation for this but also notes that he would regret it if it were correct. 'For this would mean that reason and rationality play a much more limited role in theoretical controversies in the arts ... than many of us would like to believe' (11).

Chapter two (Rationality in Normative Debates) opens the discussion of reason's role in normative debates. Hermerén contrasts 'thin' and 'thick' rationality. Rationality 'in the "thin" sense is purely instrumental' (24). He then advances a specific thesis. '(RT1) "Thin" rationality is possible in normative debates over interpretations and explanations in the sense that if the aims of interpretation are made explicit, then the methods of criticism used can be criticized for being inconsistent or for not leading to the desired aims, or for not being the best way (in one sense or other) to achieve these aims' (25). In contrast, rationality 'in the "thick" sense is not merely instrumental. It presupposes that the ends can be evaluated in a rational way' (25). 'Thick' rationality requires that 'it must be possible to show that some actual preferences are irrational' (27). Hermerén discusses two strategies for achieving this goal but concludes that 'there could be basic and unresolvable conflicts concerning fundamental values, etc.' (33).

The research tradition involving studies of influence is discussed in the third chapter (Aspects of Influence). Hermerén proposes that if 'studies on influence are to be rewarding, they should in my view be done with an interest in the creative process in mind and against the background of theoretical studies of such processes' (44). After a theoretical discussion of the creative process, he suggests that there may be 'a close connection between influences and creativity' (52). Three models of influence (linear model, field model, action-theoretical model) are considered in this context. The chapter concludes with the suggestion that 'there is perhaps elbowroom for a fresh look at the notions of tradition and influence' (68).

In chapter four (Traces of Intertexts) Hermerén examines the research tradition of studies of intertextuality. The chapter begins with a discussion of Julia Kristeva's account of this notion. Much of the chapter is devoted to presenting and discussing the views of various literary scholars in the intertext tradition. In the last section Hermerén distinguishes three accounts of intertextuality, and argues that a failure to keep these accounts distinct generates confusion in many discussions. He also considers the relationship between studies of influence and intertexts, and suggests that these studies are not in competition with each other. 'Studies of influence focus on genetic aspects of the creative process, whereas studies of intertexts focus on the description and interpretation of the meaning and meaning potentials, especially from the point of view of the readers, of the work in question' (85). This does leave the question unanswered as to how far rational debate between these two traditions would be possible if they did stand in competition with each other.

The last chapter (Traditions and Rationality) returns to the issue of whether rational dialogues are possible between different traditions. The early discussion focuses on the notion of tradition, what constitutes a tradition, and how to identify a tradition. The notion of tradition is understood as involving that of influence. With this discussion in place, Hermerén examines the work of Alastair MacIntyre (*Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*), and attempts 'to demonstrate the relevance of the perspective suggested by MacIntyre for the possibility of rational dialogues within and between research traditions' (102).

The discussions of the third and fourth chapters certainly support the claim that rational dialogue is possible between the research traditions concerning studies of influences and intertextuality. Since they do not stand in competition with each other, according to Hermerén, such dialogue is possible on the basis of (RT1). So, Hermerén has accomplished the first purpose of the book. However, concerns remain about the second purpose. His discussions of the more general question involving the possibility of rational dialogues across traditions, and his rejection of the possibility of 'thick' rationality, need further examination. Still, Hermerén's efforts at synthesis between the two traditions, as well as his rich discussions of the literature, are thought provoking and insightful.

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Richard Hudelson
Marxism and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: A Defense of Vulgar Marxism.
New York: Praeger 1990. Pp. xv + 251.
US $45.00. ISBN 0-275-93593-0.

This book delivers as much as its title promises. A great variety of issues in Marxist philosophy are discussed, including the distinctions between determinism and fatalism, realism and materialism, correspondence and instrumentalist theories of truth, trends and laws, the origin of ideas or values and their justification. Hudelson generally presents the views of both Marxist and non-Marxist theorists with exemplary fairness. He then defends his own views with arguments that are models of clarity and concision.

Two main themes warrant special emphasis. They concern the nature of Marxist science and the relationship between Marxist politics and philosophy.

One view on the nature of Marxist science insists that it follows the same methodology as other sciences and is to be judged by the standard criteria of empirical adequacy. The theorists of the Second International at the beginning of the present century (Bernstein, Kautsky, the Austro-Marxists) shared this view, which Hudelson terms 'vulgar Marxism'. For Marxist-Leninists, in contrast, Marxist science is 'dialectical' and thus distinct from ordinary science. Many non-Marxist positivists have agreed with Marxist-Leninists that Marxism is committed to something called dialectics, but have concluded that this undermines any claim to scientific status. Finally, from the perspective of Marxist-Humanism it is a mistake to claim that Marxism is a science in the first place. It is instead a call to emancipation.

In Hudelson's view the central theses of the Marxist theory of capitalism (the tendency for concentration and centralization of capital, the tendency for unemployment to increase, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall) are all scientific claims in the ordinary sense. They are derived from the unintended consequences of social action in capitalism, and the method to be used here is no different from that found in other types of social science. Hudelson thus feels that the 'vulgar Marxist' position is the most compelling.

It is worth noting that for Hudelson the labor theory of value is not essential to Marxist science. Also, he does not consider historical materialism to be a science of history or even a research agenda for such a science. It is instead a philosophical claim about the sort of approach that should be avoided (Hegelian idealism) when attempting to understand social history.

A second major concern is the connection between Marxist politics and philosophical commitments. The vulgar Marxist position here is that there is no essential connection between the two. For Marxist-Leninists, revolutionary politics depends upon dialectical materialist philosophy. Humanist Marxists agree on the close connection between politics and philosophy, but generally reject dialectical materialism in favor of a normative philosophy of human nature.

Hudelson argues that a variety of positions in epistemology and metaphysics are compatible with a Marxist political outlook. He does grant that a commitment to socialism requires the acceptance of moral principles distinct from the descriptions of empirical social science. However in his view these moral principles are uncontroversial. The crucial matter regarding the commitment to Marxist politics is not moral philosophy. It concerns the set of scientific descriptions of capitalism provided by Marxism. Here too Hudelson holds that the vulgar Marxist viewpoint is the most defensible.

The book concludes with some remarks regarding a possible convergence of Marxist and non-Marxist philosophy. Hudelson is surely correct in noting that the rise of analytical Marxism in the former and the move from reductionist positivism to emergent materialism in the latter have brought the two camps much closer.

In a book of this scope, it would be all but impossible for a few errors not to creep in. Habermas does not have a 'humanist' reading of Marx; in Habermas's view there is a technological determinism in Marx's position

incompatible with humanism. Hudelson also asserts that the Second International disappeared after the first world war. But the Second International tradition continues in the so-called 'Socialist International' to which most social democratic parties belong. And Hegel did not accept the absurd thesis that all predicates applicable to an entity can be a priori derived. Hegel explicitly noted the existence of accidental properties on numerous occasions. Finally, much more sense can be made of the notion of dialectical derivations than Hudelson is willing to consider. As a result his dismissal of the dialectical dimension of both Marx and Hegel can be questioned in a number of respects.

These shortcomings ought not to prevent an appreciation of Hudelson's accomplishment. Anyone interested in Marxist philosophy will profit from studying this work closely.

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Nicholas Jolley
The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes.
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1990. Pp. ix + 209.
Cdn $68.95. ISBN 0-19-824443-6.

Jolley has written a rich and useful book. Its concerns are important and he presents them in a remarkably accessible fashion. However problematic or controversial his claims may be, Jolley makes them clear (often by repeating them in other language that somehow both illuminates and sustains interest). What is more, the book is successful at several levels. Very seldom does a book like this appear that will be of serious interest both to the most advanced, sophisticated researchers in the field and to those with only passing knowledge of the basic texts.

Essentially, what we have is a book about rationalist philosophy of mind. The thrust is to correct the misapprehension propagated by people like Rorty that in this area the seventeenth century saw a philosophical monolith that included both Locke and Descartes. Jolley's principal thesis is that even within rationalism there was a deep cleavage between Malebranche on the one hand, and Descartes and Leibniz on the other, with respect to the analysis of mind. The issue dividing them might be described as the mind's cognitive self-sufficiency. In theological language, Malebranche's view is that the mind is utterly in need of divine illumination — of the true light that illumines every man coming into this world, as John's Gospel puts it. For Descartes and Leibniz, on the other hand, the mind is nearly self-sufficient in its cognitive resources. For, as Genesis puts it, man is created in the image

and likeness of God, which is why, according to Jolley's thesis, Descartes uses the term 'idea', previously used to refer only to God's perceptions, to refer to human perceptions.

These two theological perspectives (which are captured by the ambiguity in the book's wonderful title) serve to focus a great number of important and familiar issues in seventeenth-century philosophy with the result that the sub-title of the book belies its full compass. Certainly, we find in it much by way of analysis of ideas, intentionality, representation, innateness, etc. But there is also discussion of freedom, immortality, sensation, judgment, skepticism, self-knowledge, the modal and causal status of eternal truth, the primary-secondary quality distinction, and much else that yields a book about rationalist philosophy of mind in a very large sense.

It is an engaging book, in both senses of the term. Its style and method of argument are not only prepossessing, but they also draw one into the dialectic, and in a philosophically productive way. If there is a problem here it is the failure to distinguish clearly enough between an author's arguments, or even reconstructions or corrections of them, on the one hand, from arguments on behalf of that author, or in the style of that author, on the other. For example, when we are told that Malebranche 'has powerful criticisms to make of the Cartesian doctrine of ideas', (59) we might expect that Malebranche actually did make all of the criticisms that are then discussed. But this is true only of the last of them, *viz.* that the mind's modifications are not essentially representative, which in fact was the gravamen of the long polemic with Arnauld. The first three criticisms, *viz.* that Cartesian ideas are hard to individuate, solipsistically unique to perceivers, and existent only when perceived, may all be good criticisms and have certainly figured in the literature. But they are not to be found, at least not obviously, in Malebranche.

Much of the book proceeds, and is thus able to engage the reader, by a method of objection and reply, posing one author against another, or Jolley himself for or against them. Despite the caution above, this procedure is almost invariably illuminating. Along the same lines, I shall here raise just one criticism.

A weakness of the work is its failure to make use of any but the English-language literature. The sole exception in an anyway rather thin bibliography is Gueroult, who is referred to only briefly. An important example where the work suffers badly as a result (and one where Gueroult in fact makes a rare appearance) is Malebranche's view that ideas have causal properties. According to Jolley, it is 'futile to make a real defense of Malebranche's claim', (77) but he seems not really to have investigated the claim or what has been said about it. In his 1965 book *Système et existence dans l'oeuvre de Malebranche*, which is arguably the most important single work in the literature, Robinet drew attention to the notion of the *idée efficace* and its importance for Malebranche. Roughly, the claim is that ideas in the mind of God are the formal cause of our perceptions: as Malebranche puts it, 'not only is God's power the efficacious cause of our perceptions, but His wisdom

is their formal cause, illuminating us immediately and without the mediation of any creatures' (Malebranche, *Oeuvres complètes*, XII-XIII, 190). With no such analysis of the *idée efficace* (or even a mention of the expression), Jolley not surprisingly taxes Malebranche, not only with an indefensible claim, but with problems about ideas representing changing qualities (96), the vision in God as an unpacked metaphor (98), and a claim that is 'not the happiest of his thoughts' (148). The *idée efficace* is not an easy notion, but in a book about illumination it is very disappointing that Jolley has not done something with it. Indeed, he asserts that the notion is not to be found in *The Search After Truth*, where to explain sensory perception that involves primary qualities Malebranche is alleged to invoke 'a pre-established harmony between vision in God and the psychophysical laws' (110). Only in the *Christian Conversations* is the idea of extension supposed to affect, modify or touch the mind with its perception. In fact, however, Robinet showed that the *idée efficace* is made explicit by Malebranche in his work beginning around 1691; it therefore appears in later editions of the *Search*, and unmistakably at the end of a passage quoted by Jolley himself (85) as 'one of the famous formulations of the [representative theory of perception].'

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Hans Joachim Krämer
Plato and the Foundations of Metaphysics, edited and translated by John R. Catan. Albany: State University of New York Press 1990. Pp xxx + 311.
US $54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0433-1);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0434-X).

John Catan, having translated nearly all of Giovanni Reale's works from Italian to English, has undertaken to translate Reale's translations into English. The present volume was a likely candidate, since the German original has not been published; Krämer apparently cooperated with Reale and Catan in the two stages of the translation project. Although several people have worked over the English text, oddities remain, often stemming from a compounding of Germanic and Italianate idioms. The language of the book takes some getting used to.

Is it worth it? Parts of the book serve quite nicely as an introduction (for those who may still need it) to the Tübingen interpretation of Plato's 'unwritten doctrines', well-known since Krämer's *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles*

(1959), and Konrad Gaiser's *Platon und die Geschichte* (1961). In appendices the volume includes Plato's 'self-testimonies', passages which refer to 'unwritten' doctrines, and the chief sources of information concerning the unwritten doctrines (mainly passages from the Aristotelian corpus, Aristotle's commentators, and Sextus Empiricus). The volume also includes a bibliography in chronological rather than alphabetical order, providing a brief sketch of the history of the Tübingen interpretation and some of its critics.

Krämer's major thesis in the present book will appear somewhat odd, even esoteric, to many English-speaking readers. He argues that the 'unwritten doctrines' have been unfairly ignored for the past 175 years or so due to the influence of F. E. D. Schleiermacher. According to Schleiermacher, as presented by Krämer, Plato's dialogues must be interpreted as artistic works, that bringing in any information from outside the dialogue fails to respect the integrity of the dialogue. Schleiermacher pointed to the condemnation of written philosophical works in the *Phaedrus* and *Seventh Letter*, and claimed that Aristotle's reports of Plato's teachings were fundamentally based on Aristotle's interpretations of the dialogues, not on oral teaching in the Academy.

Krämer argues that Zeller largely follows Schleiermacher's interpretation, and that Shorey, as a follower of Zeller, is also Schleiermachean. Krämer sees most English-language scholarship on Plato as ultimately dependent upon Shorey. J. N. Findlay is for him the major exception. Those of us who have been well aware of the Aristotelian reports of Plato's teachings for many years, without thereby becoming followers of Findlay, are bound to be somewhat put off by that assessment.

Part 2 purports to summarize Krämer's own interpretation of the 'unwritten doctrines', though just 14 pages (77-91) contain the gist of it; a useful approach to this book would be to read those 14 pages with the passages in Appendix 3, pp. 203-217, then to decide whether to read the rest. Most of the remainder of the book deals with the history of interpretations of Plato, also an interesting subject, but perhaps not what the reader is looking for.

Part 3 compares Plato's 'unwritten doctrines' with various modern philosophical trends. These pages are inevitably highly selective and idiosyncratic; to some extent they detract from the value of the book. For example, Krämer gives 15 pages to a discussion of 'The Theory of the Principles in the Light of Analytic Philosophy'. He does not address the several 'analytic' scholars who have had something to say about Plato's unwritten doctrines (I think particularly of Nicholas P. White, Richard Patterson, and Terry Penner, but there are many others). Instead, he points out that Plato began an analytic impetus, for example in the *Cratylus*, then he briefly mentions the preoccupation of analytic interpretations with the Third Man Argument, and finally he argues that Plato's unwritten doctrine includes the idea of the axiomatization of arithmetic, a preoccupation of some English and American philosophers in the earlier part of this century. I expect that many will find

his treatment of the relationship between Plato and Hegel, or Plato and Heidegger, similarly superficial and fundamentally unhelpful. Yet Krämer's major point in this section, that the unwritten doctrines are just as 'hermeneutically fertile' (182) as the dialogues, is probably adequately substantiated, and true enough.

The Tübingen interpretation of Plato inevitably participates in contemporary continental philosophical discussions, yet correctly understands itself as ultimately the most traditional interpretation of Plato, especially since it is the mode of interpretation most consonant with the Neoplatonic tradition. The integration of the reports of the unwritten doctrines into the understanding of the dialogues has, in the course of the past thirty years, really been taken from the hands of Krämer and been developed into something which he may no longer recognize.

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Drew Leder
The Absent Body.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990.
Pp. x + 218.
US $34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-46999-9);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-47000-8).

There is much philosophic writing being done today to counter the Cartesian dualism that is still perceived as pervasive both in philosophical conceptuality, e.g., in epistemology and metaphysics, and in domains of practical and technical action, such as medicine and natural science. Post-modernist currents, as well as a substantial portion of feminist thinking, have been active in this. Leder's *The Absent Body* clearly shares in this effort, but it does so in an explicit and richly comprehensive assertion of the value and truth of existential phenomenology, that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty more than anyone else, in order to offer a conceptually positive and experientially rich explication of human being as an integrative arc embracing the full range of action and capability.

The duality that Leder addresses is really a pair of dualities, that of immaterial soul vs. material body, and that of intellectual mind vs. physically functioning organism — and the two dualities coincide perfectly one with the other. Against this double duality Leder invokes the necessity of a category of being and acting that is neither but comprehends both *non*-dualistically, the *lived body*. 'This notion of the lived body,' Leder writes (5), drawing from

the seminal work of Merleau-Ponty, 'provides a potential mode of escape from cognitive habits of dualism deeply entrenched in our culture.' The lived body is neither the Cartesian body nor the Cartesian mind, but rather 'the embodied self that lives and breathes, perceives and acts, speaks and reasons' (6). Thus, far from being taken exclusively at the sensorimotor level, the lived body is 'the seat of intellectual thought, no less than that of a prethematic sensory grasp' (7). It is that summative reality that shows at both 'the third-person and the first-person perspective alike, articulated by science as well as the life-world gaze, including intellectual cognition along with visceral and sensorimotor capacities' (7).

Leder's argument is brilliantly crafted. He begins in Part I by laying out the phenomenological investigations that undergird his main position, drawing from Merleau-Ponty, of course, but from the wider body of works in phenomenology as well, e.g., Erwin Straus and Hans Jonas — and he derives pivotal contributions from Martin Heidegger and Michael Polanyi. Here the lived body — this to him radically non-dualistic kind of entitative whole — is analyzed as *materialized act*, as an arc of projection the components of which, and the emergent source of which, are utterly subordinated to its aim. 'Perception and motility are modulations of a singular power, the from-to structure of bodily engagement' (20), in which whatever contributes as the 'from' is not attended to, and thus *recedes* within awareness from awareness. The result is that the lived body's 'own tendency toward self-concealment ... allows for the possibility of its neglect or deprecation'; the *intentionality* that thus operates as a 'from-to' structure 'can be attributed to a disembodied mind', given this 'self-effacement' (69). If the lived body does emerge into focal notice, it does so precisely *not as* the recessive 'from'-dimension, precisely as something *not* functioning that way, but rather in obtrusive or dysfunctional modes, as in pain or illness (Ch. 3).

The results of this explication, particularly because of Leder's ability to draw in features of the lived body that reflect the findings of medical science (Ch. 2 on the visceral), lead to the most impressive aspect of the work, namely, Part II, the hermeneutic of Descartes' dualism by which that very dualism is interpreted as confirmation of Leder's non-/anti-dualistic phenomenology of the lived body. In Leder's handling, 'phenomenology becomes not just a tool for the refutation of previous philosophical positions but for their reinterpretation and reclamation' (155). For example, Descartes' shifting between a) considering thought to include the whole field of consciousness itself and b) considering it solely as the faculty of understanding is precisely what Leder wishes to 'mine' (115) as disclosing the lived body in its recessive not-appearing and yet as the structural agency for conscious experience itself, at all levels. Chapter 4, where this is done, perhaps best displays the rich insightfulness of Leder's work; for, given the current emphasis in much of cognitive science on the brain, Leder's explication of the brain in terms of lived bodiliness is a daring tour de force, and one that *works*! If the human brain is not integrated into a treatment of thought — as, Leder contends, has typically been done in treatments of the lived body (111) — 'human mentality

can thus seem immaterial, disembodied, as if of another order of things' (115). The fact that, experientially, the brain simply does not appear, in contrast to all surface-functioning organs of perception, this 'experiential disappearance' then comes to be read in ontological terms. 'Yet ... this disappearance arises precisely from the *embodied* nature of mind. The [lived] body's own structure leads to its self-concealment' (115). In the end, Leder's thesis is that 'dualism thus reifies the absences and divergences that always haunt our embodied being' (108).

Besides the Cartesian double dualism, however, Leder wishes to address another one, namely, between self-conscious entitative being, i.e., the human self, even considered as here in material embodiment, and all else, i.e., all the world, especially the world of nature. For Leder, 'there is an intercorporeity of the blood of which the fleshly, perceptual encounter is a sublimated reflection' (67), a theme that recurs as the point of the final chapter, entitled 'To Form One Body'. The lived body's 'roots reach down into the soil of an organismic vitality where the conscious mind cannot follow', as he puts it in the last lines of the book (173). This body, he continues, 'is a way in which we, as part of the universe, mirror the universe.' Of several problematic aspects of the book, this is perhaps the most important; for it raises the question of which situation really provides the clue for ontological determination: lived bodily performance, with its vital field integration (which Leder seems to prioritize), or reflective self-discernment, with its self-assertive individuation and identity. Or must it be both, and how?

This, however, should not dim the acuity of interpretation and compelling insightfulness of Leder's book, which make it an exceptional contribution to the task of confronting the ever-repeated question, What is human being?

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Michael L. Morgan
Platonic Piety. Philosophy and Ritual in Fourth-Century Athens.
New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1990. Pp. x + 273. ISBN 0-300-04517-4.

Don't be misled by the title. *PP* is not an account of *to hosion* in *Euthyphro* or of Platonic theology in any straightforward sense. It offers instead an important reinterpretation or 'rereading' of the middle dialogues which ranges through Plato's epistemology, metaphysics, psychology, political

thought, theory of education, and views on literature and artistic imitation to explore his conception of philosophy and the philosophical life. M shows that Plato uses religious language (in particular, language associated with Orphic, Dionysiac and Eleusinian religion) to express the methods and goals of philosophy and argues that Plato (following his understanding of Socrates) interpreted philosophy as a 'rational revision of ecstatic ritual based on the conviction that human beings can attain divine status' (30).

PP is a splendid achievement — a fresh look at the dialogues from *Meno* through *Phaedrus* which situates them in their historical and religious context, while paying due attention to the fruits of philosophical scholarship. Plato is not merely the philosopher's Plato, working on timeless philosophical problems — though room remains for this Plato too. Much of Plato's middle period philosophy appears as revolutionary, prescribing alternatives to central features of Greek and especially Athenian life.

M begins with an excellent chapter, based mainly on the *Apology*, on Plato's interpretation of Socratic 'piety'. 'For Plato, Socrates viewed his goal as immortal tranquility and his method as a "philosophical" version of ecstatic initiation rites' (8) which yields personal salvation. Socrates adopted a lofty view of the nature of the human soul, as did certain cults popular in late fifth-century Athens, and for their irrational methods for curing the soul and seeking its divinity Socrates substituted his version of rational inquiry.

Essential to the book is the view that Socrates adapted features of Orphism, Bacchism etc. which run counter to 'Delphic theology', the term M uses for aspects of traditional Olympian religion, chiefly its radical separation in power and status between the human and the divine. Like these nontraditional religions, Socrates believed the separation is not absolute: humans can become divine. The key aspect of divinity is wisdom.

The first chapter defines the issues *PP* explores through the middle dialogues, including Plato's appropriation of religious language and ideas to characterize and conceptualize the philosopher and the philosopher's enterprise, and his developing views on the human soul and the nature and possibility of knowledge, its objects, and how to acquire it. Plato's further investigations raise ever more searching problems requiring increasingly sophisticated and finely tuned answers.

For example, the immortality of the soul which Socrates seriously entertained but did not clearly adopt (30), becomes in the *Meno* a precondition for inquiry (53-4), and in the *Phaedo* the object of inquiry (55). But if souls are immortal by their nature, the need to seek immortality becomes problematic. *Symposium* reestablishes the transcendental need for philosophy. The mortal person is now 'the proper subject of the aspiration to immortality' (93) and philosophy the best way to achieve the universal desire of mortals for immortality, although even thus mortals, remaining subject to death, are limited to the imperfect immortality of being loved by god (89). This unsatisfying answer is bettered in the Myth of Er. The soul's immortality is the backdrop for its successive incarnations, each one affected by the soul's experiences during the previous one, so that the pursuit of philosophy puts

'the postcarnate soul in a position to choose best its next incarnation and also provide[s] that soul with the finest interim existence' (152).

Another example: the *Meno* makes inquiry and knowledge possible by locating their objects 'in' us, but if they are so accessible, inquiry can no longer be the way to achieve divine status (54, 56). The *Phaedo* restores the need to aspire to the divine by its split between the corporeal/sensible and the spiritual/intelligible (56). The Forms are the objects of knowledge, and yet our incarnate human life is affected by the sensible world and driven by bodily desires. The immortal soul's aspiration to knowledge is attained, or best attained, only after death. The theory of Forms shows 'the results of reflection on the deficiencies of sense-perception and the divine status which wisdom or knowledge was intended to obtain' (64). Forms have the stability and purity appropriate to objects of knowledge and have other characteristics of divinity too (56). But by denigrating the body and the sensible world and elevating the Forms to a different ontological order, the *Phaedo* seems to make the gap unbridgeable (78). The *Republic* in turn solves this problem of 'how to make the cognitive transition from worldly beliefs to knowledge of the Forms' (101) by 'recognition of the complexity of believing, inquiring and knowing, and the introduction of mathematics as the device for solving the problem' (101). The key role of mathematics is worked out through a bold reading of the images of the Sun, Line and Cave (131-8).

An important further dimension of *PP* is its presentation of Plato responding in his dialogues to the troubled historical situation of the early fourth century. Another is its careful treatment of the complex religious scene and Plato's cooption and criticism of its various strands.

Still, the project is unfinished. Though *PP* gives a glimpse of Plato's late work, we want the story continued at least for the *Timaeus* and *Laws*. Also, some questions *PP* leaves open may admit of solution. To the puzzle 'when ... Plato will ask whether natural theology ... is compatible with ecstatic rites of initiation and philosophical transcendence' (116), one is tempted to explore a solution which identifies the Idea of Good with the supremely divine. Further, *PP* contains numerous leaps of faith from what Plato says to what he must mean, or rather what he must mean given M's outlook, and M's overall interpretation often guides rather than follows from his interpretation of specific passages in the dialogues. An occasional outright inconsistency can be chalked up to this cause (notably the shift from Plato presenting Socrates as possibly believing that the soul is immortal (30) to Plato's belief in Socrates' commitment to the soul's immortality (31).

Thus, there is more to be done in refining *PP*'s theses and fitting them to Plato's writings. But this is hardly a fatal flaw, rather a challenge and opportunity. *PP* is a major work which opens up exciting new possibilities in Platonic studies.

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Stephen Mulhall
On Being in the World. Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1990. Pp. ix + 206. US $35.00.
ISBN 0-415-04416-2.

This is an important book. It gives a clear exposition and an interesting comparison of Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's theories concerning the human relationship to the world. In addition to this it is of special interest for a certain breed of aestheticians. I believe the central problem of philosophical aesthetics is the following: whereas for cognitive claims to be legitimate the reports of other people may be sufficient evidence, for aesthetic evaluations we demand that the object has been experienced. Many aestheticians have fulfilled this demand mostly unwittingly, by stressing the role of perception in aesthetic experiences. But it is not clear at all how perception alone could account for the distinctiveness of the aesthetic, since we do not have aesthetic experiences continuously, although we perceive all day long. This observation has led some philosophers to the conclusion that what is involved in aesthetic experience is not normal perception. In this context the relevance for aesthetics of the Wittgensteinian notion of aspect-perception has been stated several times. However, although our understanding of this phenomenon has advanced a great deal over the years, we still seem unable to account adequately for what is distinctive about the aesthetic.

With the publication of Stephen Mulhall's *On Being in the World* this discussion of Wittgenstein-minded aesthetics will be furthered quite a bit. Not only does he explain in a very clear manner Wittgenstein's use of the relevant notions of aspect-perception, aspect-dawning, and continuous aspect-perception, and of the primary and secondary meanings of words, but he also relates these to daily life, and compares Wittgenstein's *practices* in this respect with Heidegger's *totality of references*. Wittgenstein's view of philosophical investigation as consisting solely of remarks on grammar is most important for Mulhall's critique of Heidegger's metaphysical commitments.

Mulhall starts from Wittgenstein's discussion of the duck-rabbit picture and points out that the dawning of an aspect seems to involve a paradox. Although we see exactly the same our thoughts accompanying our vision are different. We express this by using different sentences or gestures to explain what we see. E.g., we compare the picture with living ducks, or we point to what we now see as the duck's beak. It is this linguistic or gestural report that changes and which should be analysed. But what is even more important about the dawning of a new aspect, is that it implies that we already see things *as* something. Wittgenstein calls this phenomenon 'aspect-regarding' or 'continuous aspect-perception'. Its most important feature is familiarity: whenever we see a picture, we see it at once as a picture of something, and we are inclined to treat it as if it were the represented object itself: that is why we call them sad or gay. It is not normal to have to interpret the colour

stains and structures in order to understand a picture as a portrait of your neighbour.

These considerations involve a view of 'normal' perception. To illustrate this view Wittgenstein analyses the case of the aspect-blind, i.e. people unable to perceive the duck-rabbit alternately as a duck or a rabbit. All they perceive is a black line on a white background. Of course they may learn to *know* it is a duck, or a rabbit, or even both alternately, but this will involve *interpretation* on their part whereas for people perceiving normally the changing of aspects takes place with great ease and without hesitation. This is paralleled in our experience of the meaning of words as is exemplified in the loss of meaning as a consequence of repeating a word many times. We then perceive only bare sounds, which is quite anomalous: normally we perceive the meaning *through* the sounds, and do not have to infer it. The third domain that seems to unfold analogously to aspect-perception is our ascription of mental states to other minds. Wittgenstein criticises the view that the mental exists of entities that are privately accessible only. The relevant criteria *are* public: they concern the context in which the person is said to have the mental state. However, this does not exclude the existence of an internal life. So the objects of our psychological concepts may be compared with dawning aspects in that they both are public and enigmatic.

Now Mulhall connects this analysis of continuous aspect-perception with a criticism of Donald Davidson's theory of understanding. Davidson is said to show his own aspect-blindness by his allegedly cramped theory that understanding is a case of interpretation, as is our understanding of a sentence in a foreign language. According to Mulhall, Davidson is starting from the wrong examples. But I wonder if Davidson's theory may be rejected as easily as that. Aspect-blindness rather seems the essential counterpart of aspect-perception: seeing one aspect necessarily excludes the perception of another one. Everyone will sometimes be blind to some aspect, and will then be obliged to interpret his vision in terms of the descriptions or gestures of a person who does see the relevant aspect.

Subsequently Mulhall compares the views of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, who are shown similar in that they show that we are already at home in the world, but dissimilar in that Heidegger gives a metaphysical account for this homeliness, whereas Wittgenstein's investigations are confined to the grammar of our relevant expressions. Mulhall finds Heidegger's metaphysical commitments redundant. And it is with this verdict in mind that he analyses Heidegger's aesthetic opinions, as well as George Steiner's that reflect these. According to Steiner *iconicity* is the essential feature of works of art. With this term he refers first to their *irreducibility*, i.e., their absolute uniqueness, and secondly to their *inexhaustibility*, i.e., the fact that we may never stop when trying to understand them: little seems irrelevant for our assessment of the aesthetic value of a work of art. The work's iconicity emerges on the one side from the fact that it carries meaning and, on the other, from its being seemingly *identical with* this meaning: in under-

standing it we experience the work as it is in itself. In his lectures on aesthetics Heidegger describes the aesthetic value of a painting by Van Gogh representing muddy farmer's shoes by referring to the countryside and to the farmers' labour as exemplified by the way the shoes are worn and by the stuff they are made of. Now in Heidegger's terminology in this painting there is strife between 'world' and 'earth'. With 'world' he refers to the totality of references that make out the way people — farmers — experience their surroundings: we hardly ever perceive bare objects for which we must then invent a functionality; we already know their purposes; to us objects are like tools. The totality of their interrelations make up the world of the farmer, and Van Gogh's painting carries this as its meaning. But contrary to this world in a work of art there is 'earth' too, with which Heidegger refers to the materiality of the work (Steiner's 'irreducibility'). In our aesthetic experience we are confronted with meaning as well as with a facet of the work that remains hidden in itself. Works of art make us feel this strife.

According to Wittgenstein, works of art make us experience the dawning of aspects, which is to say that we are inclined to describe our aesthetic experiences in terms of something changing and staying alike at the same time. We explain the new aspect by referring to its cultural surroundings, and at the same time we are interested in the way the work enhances our experience. Wittgenstein compares these two features with gestures: we experience their meaning by way of their context, and at the same time we identify this meaning with the particular configuration of the gesture itself: any change in the gesture will change its meaning, as is the case with works of art. Now the irreducibility Heidegger and Steiner ascribe to great works of art suggests an experience of the object as it exists in itself. Wittgenstein's grammatical account does not lead to such metaphysical conclusions: according to him the work of art is like a gesture: it is through references to its context that we try to describe it. These references may include an indefinite part of the surrounding culture. Since what is at stake in an aesthetic experience is our perception of some aspect of the work of art, and since this perception is experienced as if we experience the object represented by the work, the more concepts we inform our experience with, the more determined the work seems to be, and the closer we seem to get to its object.

Wittgenstein and Mulhall are certainly correct in denying the metaphysical claim that an aesthetic experience is an experience of the thing as it is in itself. But their arguments also involve an assimilation of aesthetic experiences into our everyday experiences of aspect-dawning, as a consequence of which we seem to loose grip on the distinctiveness of the aesthetic. I feel a little uneasy about this. Now Mulhall also gives a preferential treatment of aspect-*perception* over aspect-*blindness* in his criticism of Davidson's interpretation view. But surely this implies an unjustifiable metaphysical claim concerning what is most essential in our perception, because both facets of perception seem just as important. Perhaps in

acknowledging this fact one could account for the distinctiveness of aesthetic experiences. Mulhall's analysis and comparison are very illuminating, but his conclusion that aesthetic experience just *is* a part of normal life may indeed not be the one to draw. It is for this very reason that I advise everyone concerned about the distinctiveness of aesthetics to read this book.

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Günther Neske and Emil Kettering, eds.
Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers.
Introduction by Karsten Harries, trans. Lisa Harries, with Joachim Neugroschel.
New York: Paragon House 1990. Pp. xi + 319.
US $22.95. ISBN 1-55778-310-1.

This reliable and readable translation of *Antwort: Martin Heidegger im Gespräch* (1988) has the verve to pique the bilingual reader to reach at times for the original. It gives the English reader, in a single volume, a useful and convenient compilation of some of the main texts by and about Heidegger needed to respond rationally, from a well-informed base, to the recent stormy debate generated by Victor Farías' *Heidegger and Nazism* (1987). The mainstays of this collection are not merely, as advertised, the only two very public interviews ever granted by Heidegger, since one of these, the television interview of 1969, was thoroughly 'defanged' by Heidegger himself in the interview preceding the on-screen interview. More telling for future biographers to divine, psychologically and otherwise, is this private pre-interview of Heidegger's spontaneous responses to Wisser's original list of questions, especially the double-edged question of why Heidegger remained silent on the question of the relation of politics to his thought: 'It... it is all so difficult for me... We'll cross it out' (100). 'People haven't been very nice to me!'... He draws a line... because it hurts' (117). No, more central to this collection are the *Spiegel* interview (1966, published 1976) and 'Facts and Thoughts' (1945, published 1983 with the Nazi Rectoral Address, also translated here), ergo Heidegger's two public 'Apologies' for his involvement with the Nazis, both of which disappointed his student, Max Müller (182), as it did many others. Bridging this disappointment is the real reason for the collection that supports these mainstays, in Karsten Harries' words, to respond to the task that 'Heidegger's silence' leaves us, 'the task of thinking what he himself

could not or would not think' (xxxii). Perhaps only a Plato of the dawning fourth millenium can successfully get an idealized Heidegger to break his silence in an Apology that would nevertheless take a realistic and full measure of *the man as well as* the thinker. The readings oscillate back and forth on this point of fusion. Neske's reason for this volume seems nondescript enough, to pull together the documents within his jurisdiction 'for a biography to be written later' (227). But Harries' Introduction pushes this fusion point home against notables like Arendt and Habermas, and Gadamer declares their separatist defense to be 'insulting' to the great thinker (142). On the contrary, Heidegger himself cannot claim immunity for his thought from public life and deed. His own philosophical terms dictate an inner connection between his biography and his philosophy. For had he not, already in his opus magnum, insisted on the ineluctable connection of the ontological to the ontic, so that the 'author's stance in the world' (xxxv), his ontic or factical ideal of authentic existence, guided and determined the ontological determinations of *Being and Time*? Furthermore, Heidegger himself, in the one irrevocable precondition exacted from the editors of *Der Spiegel* — his life story in return for his death (like Socrates?) — wanted a posthumous Apology. He could not bear the reactions even to the one in which he personally took part. Since he has left his literary estate fairly intact and in neutral hands (in Marbach), our future Plato and/or philosophical biographer will find plenty of material to draw from, as this comes out into the open from both the official *Nachlaß* and the many archives, public and private, scattered across Germany and the world.

Toward this future task, this informational volume, with its mix of works by and on Heidegger, on Farías, with 'positions, recollections, appreciations,' correspondence, etc., is accordingly only a beginning, albeit a core beginning. For example, even though it provides yet another English translation of the *Spiegel* interview, the fourth, it can claim to be the only version invested with the revered predicate *Ausgabe letzter Hand*, 'edition of the dead hand' of Heidegger, signed 'with his final "agreed" on 28 March 1967' (235), and so posthumously awarded this honorific seal of approval by his son and executor, who complains that *Der Spiegel* then went to press with its customary, journalistically modified magazine format (complete with captioned photos!) after his death in 1976 'without Heidegger's knowledge' (I hope so). Future Platos, take heed: avoid the arena of δόξα and οἱ πολλοί for your new Apology, allow no TV cameras in the courtroom, restrict it to a jury of Heidegger's peers from the 'nation of poets and philosophers,' include a few expatriates like Levinas and Marcuse and some international representatives, under the auspices of the UN or UNESCO. To whom, to what world, does Heidegger now belong?

The prerequisite for such a proceeding is of course full disclosure of all of the evidence. The beginning made by this volume may now be supplemented by the recent issue of the *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* entirely devoted to 'Heidegger and the Political' (14,2 - 15,1 [1991]), appended with the denazification documents of 1945, Heidegger's contributions to *Der Akademiker* in 1910-12, his correspondence with Elisabeth

Blochmann circa 1933, and a bibliography more complete than the one included in this volume. But this volume includes valuable detailed 'Notes on Contributors' (289-98) and biographical 'Translator's Notes' which give us a useful orientation to the cast of characters implicated in the 'Heidegger Affair', beginning with Heidegger's students, which reads like a Who's Who of 20th century thought. The very first Note expresses regret that Heidegger's correspondence with Hannah Arendt, 'which would certainly be very informative' (290), is not yet published. Heidegger's extracurricular liaisons with his students in fact cannot be regarded as an unrelated 'family scandal'. Moreover, both Nazi and marital scandal intertwine with a third, more posthumous scandal brewing in the German press in the eighties before it was headed off and overpowered by the Farías firestorm. Future philosophical biographers will have their hands full in deciphering the implicit connections of this scandal of error-ridden, mediocre editions of a wholly family-owned *Gesamtausgabe* with the Nazi and marital scandals: the coverups, deceptions, manipulation of editorial ground rules, intimidation, etc. which led to the transformation of an indigenously scholarly operation into a hermeneutically inept, para-military administration with concomitant disastrous results extending even to translations.

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Kai Nielsen
After the Demise of the Tradition: Rorty, Critical Theory, and the Fate of Philosophy.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1991.
Pp. x + 278. US $38.50. ISBN 0-8133-8044-8.

Richard Dien Winfield
Overcoming Foundations: Studies in Systematic Philosophy.
New York: Columbia University Press 1989.
Pp. 309. ISBN 0-231-07008-X.

Nominally, these two books might seem to share a common 'anti-foundationalism'. But one still cannot judge a book by its cover. It turns out that in Nielsen's sense, Winfield is a foundationalist of the most audacious sort, whereas Nielsen's sympathy for Wittgenstein and Rorty make him in Winfield's terms a foundationalist of the transcendental sort, while Winfield

enlarges upon the improbable 'nonmetaphysical antifoundational character of Hegel's philosophy' (77).

Nielsen's book collects his papers on two related questions: First, How shall we measure Richard Rorty's critique of epistemology-based philosophy? Is the argumentation of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* what it has to be to sustain his most important claims — his metaphilosophical claims about foundational philosophy? Nielsen believes that it is; he is 'in essential agreement with the core of Rorty's claims about the end of philosophy as an autonomous disciplinary matrix' (127). He supports this by considering (usually at chapter-length) several of Rorty's critics on the Right, i.e., establishment analytic philosophy (Bennett, Kim, Goldman, Hacking), as well as on the margins (MacIntyre, Bernstein, Taylor). Nielsen shows how these criticism fail either seriously to engage the assumptions Rorty puts in question or to establish why philosophy remains a serious discipline.

So what, then, is 'the fate of philosophy' after 'the demise of the Tradition'? Nielsen canvasses three possibilities:

The first is what Nielsen takes Rorty to be now freely practicing in his recent work, which (in a phrase that is not meant pejoratively but remains perhaps not entirely unambivalent) he summarizes as 'learned and witty kibitzing' (9). In an effort to introduce some critical distance between himself and Rorty, Nielsen endorses Bernard Williams' banal claim that Rorty's ' "pragmatism without method" hermeneutically enmeshes us in a web of words' (191) — as if the difference between word and thing were more solid and clear than that between analytic and synthetic truth (which, like Rorty, Nielsen too puts into question).

A different and to Nielsen not unattractive idea about where philosophy might go after Rorty would be to re-establish philosophical practice in the politically active context where Dewey situated it. (Richard Bernstein has suggested this.) Nielsen does not find this option finally satisfying, although his reasons are curious indeed. He objects that it offers no distinctive identity for a 'philosopher,' involving no work that is distinctly 'philosophical'. Yet elsewhere Nielsen disparages the idea that there is any such identity to be had anymore and does not himself seem to care about whether what comes next is 'philosophy' or something else. Also, Dewey-style social reconstruction 'is too much like social engineering' (131). It cannot satisfy an urge Nielsen believes all normal human beings have for what with studied vagueness he describes as 'reflectively taking a comprehensive look at things' (148) and 'the endeavour to see things in a comprehensive way in an attempt to make sense of our lives' (158). That impulse 'is in part what it is to be rational and reflective and, in [a] broad and untechnical sense, philosophical.' This philosophy-impulse survives 'the death of epistemology and metaphysics and can remain perfectly intact even if it is clearly seen that there is no genuine profession to be professional about designated by the word "philosophy"' (131).

Nielsen's best idea of where philosophy should go is in the direction of critical theory. 'As a successor subject to philosophy', critical theory 'is our best hope for answering to some of the traditional concerns, human and explanatory, of philosophy after the end of philosophy' (148). This promises to satisfy that philosophy-impulse without returning to any of the discredited foundational claims of the Tradition. Five chapters outline how he conceives this. I won't summarize them. It's not exactly Habermas, though not very different; it's open to Foucault and Gadamer as well as Marx and Durkheim; it is emphatically not 'a fancy word-picture — a grand philosophical-social vision or metanarrative — but rather an empirical-cum-theoretical theory that must meet empirical constraints' (211), and can even be empirically disconfirmed, Nielsen claims, if after three or four decades its 'emancipatory thrust' comes to nothing impressive.

Winfield's book contains excellent pages on the relation between phenomenology and logic in Hegel, and meticulous and interesting studies of Hegel's ethical and political thought, but I focus on 'overcoming foundations'. Since Heraclitus, what distinguished the *philosophoi* was that unlike others who claimed to be wise their path to wisdom was through the *askesis* of truth. For Winfield, too, 'thinkers assume the mantle of philosophy by enjoining reason to advance beyond opinion to truth'. He defines philosophy by contrast to the 'unexamined opinion it seeks to surmount' (117), and writes, 'Philosophy's quest for wisdom can be guided by but two things: recognition of our own ignorance, and an opined understanding that there is a difference in meaning between opinion and truth. There can be no other rational grounds for taking up philosophy' (130).

The traditional approach to understanding this fundamental difference between truth and opinion has been 'foundational'. Philosophy is foundational when it seeks to ground the possibility of truth either by relating it to something that is simply *given* (as for Aristotle nature was simply given) or by the modern strategy of construing knowledge as the effect of a privileged determiner, a 'transcendental condition' that is supposed to make knowledge (or in post-Kantian variations, meaning and reference) possible. Understood in this way, Winfield is adamantly anti-foundationalist. 'The justification of truth cannot be sought outside of truth, any more than justice can be valid by virtue of what is not just. In other words, neither can be ascribed foundations without cancelling its normativity by conditioning it upon what is neither true nor right.' Yet this 'does not mean that knowledge claims and conduct can never be justified'; for between ancient and modern foundationalism there is 'a third option', adumbrated in Hegel, whose key idea is 'self-determined determinacy'. 'Both truth and justice can only possess their constitutive normativity by being self-grounding. This, however, can only be achieved if what is true and what is just are determined by themselves rather than by any separate determiner or ground. In effect, truth and justice must have self-determined determinacy' (244). If one really wants to be anti-foundational in philosophy, one has to be unconditionally 'systematic,' which means demonstrating how truth is *self*-determining, autonomously grounded

in *itself*, not in anything different. That's the promise of dialectical logic: 'a logic consisting in the self-presentation of the categories through which self-determination constitutes itself' (79).

Elaborating on the fallacy of transcendentalism, Winfield writes, 'Whether the transcendental condition takes the form of the structures of consciousness, intentionality, *Dasein*, ordinary language, or the hermeneutic situation, it always provides the privileged determiner that determines what is valid or knowable as such' (242). Behind each of the candidates mentioned for privileged determiner stands one or more proper names whose work (it is regularly implied but never seriously documented) is hopelessly entangled in foundationalism. Consider his list: structures of consciousness (Kant), intentionality (Husserl), *Dasein* (Heidegger), ordinary language (Wittgenstein and indirectly Rorty), hermeneutic situation (Gadamer). Not only does Winfield massively assimilate these heterogeneous authors; he does so under the category of *foundational* argumentation. Elsewhere Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, Apel, Marx, Lukács, MacIntyre, Wittgenstein and Rorty are said to 'agree that intersubjectivity ... is an epistemological and normative foundation, juridically conditioning all knowledge and values ... providing the medium of access to being and the good' (92).

I cannot speak for every name on this smorgasbord, but Heidegger would perhaps dismiss this as a banal misreading of the *Seinsfrage*: To anticipate a medium of access to being, one must fail to appreciate that being (*Sein*) is accessability (*Zugänglichkeit*) itself, the self-disclosive presencing (*Anwesen*) of what is, and nothing which we need media to access. As for Wittgenstein, by the regular implication of his references (yet never formulated as a definite claim), Winfield assumes that he as much as Apel and Husserl seeks the conditions that determine truth and knowledge. Winfield does not consider whether Wittgenstein's interest might be elsewhere. 'Ordinary language' is not a name for something Wittgenstein supposes has any remarkable power to 'determine' what is true or known. As psychoanalysis teaches you a way of hearing what you say that makes you want to speak differently, so Wittgenstein aims at making one no longer want to ask about what 'makes' the difference between truth and opinion or otherwise play the language-game Winfield and the foundationalists have in common.

This is Rorty's aim too. In opposition to the 'foundationalism' that would ground truth in intentionality, ordinary language or any other privileged determiner, Winfield maintains 'the basis of determinacy [must] be self-determined' (64). Rorty would not disagree. He simply rejects the question both 'foundationalism' and Winfield's neo-Hegelianism address, rejecting the ontological assumptions about 'determinate being' (and philosophy) they share. For Rorty, '"determinacy" is not what is in question.' He suggests one 'throw out the whole cluster of concepts (e.g., "fact of the matter," "bivalence," etc.) which are used to make us think that we understand what "the determinacy of reality" means' (*Collected Papers* 1, 6). Perhaps he would say the same about the cluster of concepts that make us think there is as profound a difference as

Winfield needs between truth 'itself' and what passes for true in practice. Were Winfield to reply that Rorty's discourse is therefore (in his sense) not philosophy at all, Rorty would probably agree. That was the point. As Nielsen observes, 'Rorty really got out of the flybottle, not Wittgenstein' (10).

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Friedrich Nietzsche
Unmodern Observations,
ed. William Arrowsmith.
New Haven CT: Yale University Press 1990.
Pp. xix + 402. US $40.00. ISBN 0-300-04311-2.

William Arrowsmith' edition of Nietzsche's *Unmodern Observations* should be a boon to anyone who reads Nietzsche in English. Not only are the translations eminently clear. Arrowsmith has provided, for the first time in English editions of these works, an excellently indexed and annotated volume, with thorough introductions to each of Nietzsche's essays. In addition, for the first time in English, Nietzsche's notes for his unfinished 'We Classicists' are included as the last of the *Unmodern Observations*, so that this incomplete essay is situated in the context of the work of which it was to be a part.

Aesthetically, the volume's closing with 'We Classicists' is a bit unsatisfying. Although Arrowsmith's translation and annotation are not to be faulted, Nietzsche's unpolished, sometimes incoherent, and occasionally juvenile notes on the role of the classicist fall somewhat flat after translations of his finished essays. Nevertheless, 'We Classicists' includes genuine gems of insight; and even the more puerile notes (e.g., lists of insulting terms to describe the modern era in opposition to lists of positive terms to describe the Greeks) are amusing.

The inclusion of 'We Classicists' makes *Unmodern Observations* more obviously a contribution to classical philology, and hence of greater interest to classicists than would be the case if the volume omitted it. Arrowsmith, a classicist himself, was most likely concerned to make the book appealing to other members of his profession. The introductory essays to each of Nietzsche's 'Unmodern Observations' tend to encourage the reader to recognize Nietzsche's admiration for antiquity as opposed to modernity and his attentiveness to contemporary classical debate. Indeed, the book can be read as a series of meditations on the status of classical philosophy and education, and on the relevance of classics to contemporary concerns. Even

'Richard Wagner at Bayreuth' and 'Schopenhauer as Educator' fit this description. Wagner is analyzed as a 'dithyrambic dramatist,' while modern Europe's failure to appreciate Schopenhauer, portrayed as an individual whose greatness justifies his culture, renders it wanting by comparison with ancient Athens.

Perhaps the editor's concern to present these essays as works in classics motivates the new translation of the title *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen*, usually translated as 'Untimely Meditations'. The difference in tone between that translation and Arrowsmith's 'Unmodern Observations' is striking. 'Unmodern' as rendering of 'Unzeitgemässe' is not as literal a translation as 'Untimely', and the difference is considerable. 'Untimely, conveys an image of Nietzsche taking a distanced look at his own time, but not clearly of his being located in an alternative time. 'Unmodern' suggests Nietzsche's polemical opposition to his own time, presumably in favor of antiquity. The insinuation of Nietzsche as polemicist is reinforced by Arrowsmith's choice of 'observations' to render '*Betrachtungen*'. Both possibilities are literal translations of '*Betrachtungen*'; but 'observations' suggests that Nietzsche is making these remarks for an audience, while 'meditations' does not. Nietzsche does seem to prefer many aspects of ancient Greek culture over those of his own; but the image suggested by the new title underplays the extent to which Nietzsche is eager to bring his classical knowledge to bear on contemporary problems. Not only is this the central theme of 'History in the Service and Disservice of Life'; Arrowsmith himself emphasizes Nietzsche's concern that classics enliven modern culture. (See Arrowsmith, p. 318; see also Nietzsche, 'We Classicists', Section 64, p. 339.)

Although the different 'Unmodern Observations' have various translators (Herbert Golder translates 'David Strauss: Writer and Confessor', Gary Brown translates 'History in the Service and Disservice of Life' and 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth'; and William Arrowsmith translates 'Schopenhauer as Educator' and 'We Classicists'), the volume maintains an impressive stylistic unity along with its high caliber translations. Golder's translation of 'David Strauss: Writer and Confessor' deserves particular comment. Nietzsche's essay on Strauss is very 'timely' in its barbs and conceits, for it refers to many of Nietzsche's contemporaries whose fame has fled. Golder addresses the problem this poses for the reader by providing detailed footnotes on each of the individuals mentioned in Nietzsche's barrage of name-dropping.

Golder also accepts the unprecedented challenge of translating the many bizarre passages from Strauss that Nietzsche subjects to ridicule, which means, as Golder remarks in a footnote, that he aspired 'to write badly well' (64n). The result is a tour-de-force, climaxing in a litany of Straussian malapropisms, each of which is followed by a sarcastic Nietzschean remark. Besides providing a comic avalanche of professional prose, this climax reveals a precedent for the technique Nietzsche later uses in *Antichrist* to undermine the force of oft-quoted passages in the New Testament. (See Nietzsche, *Antichrist*, Section 45). Nietzsche's attacks on Strauss may be unfair; he extracts passages out of context, and he equates Strauss with his own

caricature of 'the philistine'. But Golder's translation allows the English reader to recognize and enjoy Nietzsche's acerbic wit.

In general, these new translations enable the reader of Nietzsche in English to appreciate the subtlety of Nietzsche's discussion (e.g., the evident tension in his 'praise' of Richard Wagner) and the presence in these early essays of themes developed in his later works (e.g., the value of the great individual, perspectivism, and even elements of eternal recurrence). They also cast interesting light on Nietzsche as a philosophical personality. For example, the essays on Schopenhauer and Wagner indicate what Nietzsche valued in these figures before he had moved away from their influence. Certainly, Nietzsche admires in his heroes traits that others rarely see in them. He applauds Schopenhauer's 'genuinely cheering cheerfulness' (171) and sees Schopenhauer as expressing his need for 'love above everything else' (176). Nietzsche also praises (not entirely ironically) Wagner's emphasis 'in everything he thought and wrote' on 'the image and problem of fidelity' (258).

The Nietzsche who emerges from *Unmodern Observations* is a kind of existential classicist, plagued by the unfulfilled need to see his professional work as addressing the central spiritual problems of his era. He is capable of verbal viciousness. The essay attacking the elderly David Strauss is perhaps, despite Nietzsche's disclaimer, the exception to his principle, ' ... I attack only things that are triumphant ... I never make personal attacks' (Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 'Why I Am So Wise', Section 7). But while always trenchant in his criticisms, Nietzsche is capable of admiration that is equally deep. The fervor for which Nietzsche is notorious often expresses itself in these essays as fervent appreciation and love for his heroes — and for that which might become heroic in his age. In this respect, Nietzsche is not only a contrarian polemicist against contemporary trends. He is also, when himself motivated by 'love above everything else,' a model for classicists, and for philosophers as well.

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R.G. Peffer
Marxism, Morality and Social Justice.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1990. Pp. xiv + 526.
US $49.50. (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07789-4);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02298-4).

One way to describe Peffer's book is as an attempt to arrange a marriage between Marx and Rawls. Harmony between such partners, however, requires a fair amount of plastic surgery to both — so the union is between a modified Marxism and a modified Rawlsianism (in essence, a somewhat altered set of principles of justice deduced from the 'original position'). The bulk of the book is, however, devoted to Marx and Marxism; according to Kai Nielsen (quoted on the jacket) it is 'the most extended textually responsible study of Marxism and ethics from a contemporary perspective that we have.' This may well be true, but is not entirely to the good — the book, while admirably careful and reasonable in tone, is prolix and diffuse in style. It comes as no surprise that it is largely based on a dissertation.

Peffer takes as the most basic likely objection to his project the view that Marx, as self-described social 'scientist' and scourge of 'ideology', was hostile to the very concept of morality, and in particular, social justice. Marxism and morality occupy Peffer for the first two Parts (almost 300 pages) of his book. After an initial chapter charting the development of Marx's 'moral perspective' through five stages (from early 'radical liberalism' to the mature works), he argues that, whatever incautiously extreme positions Marx may sometimes have adopted (out of polemical exaggeration, or perhaps sometimes from a misunderstanding — pardonable, Peffer suggests — of the nature of morality), nevertheless he was clearly committed to a moral position, based on 'three primary moral values' — freedom (negative *and* positive), human community and self-realization, for all equally. This surely is right, but one wonders if Peffer needed to devote quite so much space to elaborating and defending this not-very-original claim. True, his position is far from uncontroversial among Marxists: most of this discussion involves intra-Marxist polemics (including much lengthy direct quotation). The non-Marxist reader may or may not find himself interested by this. He will, at any rate, find that modern Anglo-Saxon academic Marxism is no monolith, but ranges from the shallow and brutal amoralism of Allen Wood (who believes 'it is irrational ... to accord justice, or anything else, a higher priority than the interests of the class with which one identifies'), to the humanitarian Kantianism of Peffer himself, and of Allen Buchanan, on whose work Peffer relies heavily. Which is truer to Marx himself? Peffer's thesis faces this difficulty: while Marx's ultimate *aim* doubtless was a society that would treat every person as an end-in-himself/herself, the *means* he envisaged — revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat — spectacularly fail to do so. (On Peffer's problems with revolution, see below.)

Part III is about Marxism and social justice (including Rawls). Here, Peffer has to admit that Marx was not interested in the subject, and to argue that

he was wrong. Marxian communism is a situation of strife-free abundance where problems of just distribution do not arise: Peffer concedes the implausibility of this scenario. The focus of his attention, therefore, is not this communism but *socialism*, to orthodox Marxists a mere transitional stage. Is Peffer, then really a Marxist? He argues that a Marxist is anyone who accepts Marx's moral position (see above); certain crucial Marxist empirical theses about capitalism and the relation of classes therein; and the normative political conclusions derived from these premises — briefly, that socialism is preferable to capitalism. Put another way: a Marxist is anyone who believes, on grounds of Marxian class analysis, that socialism is more apt than capitalism to realise the principles of justice that Rawls *ought* to have deduced from his hypothetical 'original contract'. Here Peffer keeps Rawls's principles of equal basic liberty, equal opportunity and a (modified) difference principle, modified, that is, by requiring that economic inequality not 'seriously undermine equal worth of liberty or the good of self respect.' He also adds 'an equal right to participate in all social decision-making processes within institutions of which one is a part' (for example, one's workplace). Opinions may vary as to the attractiveness of these additions for the Rawlsian rational self-interested contractor behind the veil of ignorance; but Peffer is surely right to add, as a *top priority*, a principle to guarantee everyone's basic security and subsistence rights — and to chide Rawls for failing to do likewise. This raises an interesting question (not explicitly posed by Peffer): if the risk-averse Rawlsian contractor, behind the veil of ignorance, had to choose between a society like, say, Cuba (poor, authoritarian, but dedicated to providing a social minimum for all) and one like the USA (rich, liberal, but disfigured by a large under-class ravaged by poverty, crime and drug-abuse), which would he prefer? That the answer is by no means obviously the latter should give pause to the contemporary prophets of triumphalist capitalism.

Of course, the choice between these two types of society does not, thankfully, exhaust the alternatives. The model of 'just socialism' advocated by Peffer is a 'democratic, self-managing socialism.' As between a market and a command economy Peffer is neutral (or was? — surely recent events have finally settled *that* issue). And he is well aware of the more egalitarian versions of welfare capitalism such as, notably, the 'Swedish model'. But what about 'really existing socialism' (now a rather dated expression), i.e., the 'state socialism' of the (pre-Gorbachev) USSR and Eastern Europe? Here Peffer's argument rambles and becomes unclear. He is sufficiently alive to its defects to find it morally inferior to 'Swedenized' capitalism; but he also seems to think it 'likely' that a 'reversion to capitalism within such societies' would be a step backwards. The replacement of capitalism by *any* kind of socialism, apparently, is an advance to be defended. We now know that history appears to be taking the opposite view. Peffer's book, in fact, belongs to a vanished world, where 'socialist revolution' was still seriously on the political agenda. One cannot quite say that Peffer definitely advocates this: in his final chapter, he claims that it is justified *if* the Marxist empirical

theses about capitalism are correct, but does not seem certain that they are, despite his earlier claim to be defending the 'basic normative political positions of Classical Marxism' (17). It looks as if Peffer finally could not make up his mind. Perhaps events since his book was completed will have enabled him to do so.

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Terry Penner and Richard Kraut, eds.
Nature, Knowledge and Virtue: Essays in Memory of Joan Kung.
Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing 1990. Pp. xii + 233.
Cdn $44.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-920980-34-1);
Cdn $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-920980-35-X).

Joan Kung died in 1987. At the time, she was working on a book on Plato's *Timaeus*, which was to have been entitled *Nature, Knowledge and Virtue*. Hence the title of this collection of papers in memory of Kung. The volume includes eleven papers on Plato and Aristotle, a Joan Kung Bibliography, a couple of pages called 'About Joan Kung' and three indices (Name and Subject, Interpretations, Passages Cited).

As a description of the contents the title is misleading; most of the papers are concerned with nature, only one or two with either knowledge or virtue. Three of the four essays on Plato are concerned in some way with the theory of Forms and Plato's attitude to that theory in the later dialogues. Ian Mueller claims that received opinion (post World War II) held that the theory was intended as an answer to the question 'What is the meaning of a general term?' But that, as such, the theory was incoherent; so received opinion also held that 'Plato abandoned his Theory of Forms in later life ... and began to develop a new conception of meaning' (7). On this view, the *Timaeus* cannot be a late work, and, in an influential article ('The Place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's Dialogues') G.E.L. Owen argued that the *Timaeus* should be dated much earlier than it had been. This is the set of views which Joan Kung wished to refute with her interpretation of the *Timaeus*.

Nicholas White, who has contributed a paper ('Perceptual and Objective Properties in Plato') one of the aims of which is to elucidate Kung's last research, says that Kung's work ' ... suggests the following view of Plato's aims in the *Timaeus*. ... Plato sorely needed to explain how there could be objective, perspective-independent properties corresponding to terms like "hard", "heavy", and so on. It makes sense to think that in the *Timaeus* he

undertook to do this' (63-4). According to Mueller in his paper, 'Joan Kung's Reading of Plato's *Timaeus*', '[Kung] saw Plato as postulating the real entities he felt were necessary to explain the phenomena of our world. Among these objects are the Forms, which are the real properties of things discovered by the scientist; they explain the difference between knowledge and a true account, on the one hand, and, e.g., an incorrect account on the other: a true account invokes the real properties of things, an incorrect one does not' (21-2).

Mueller and White suggest that Kung is both original and persuasive in her view of the theory of Forms (according to which it is *not* a theory of meaning) and her account of Plato's motivation in writing the *Timaeus*. She retained the traditional chronology of Plato's works, whereby the *Timaeus* is a late work, and understood the Forms to correspond to the real properties of things, rather than to something like the meanings of terms.

Mueller emphasizes the importance of the notion of reduction to Kung's view of the Forms and her interpretation of the *Timaeus*, citing as examples the reduction ' ... of physical entities and their properties to particles and their properties, to plane surfaces, to triangles' (24); and the dependence of the motions of heavenly bodies on soul (25). Both Mueller and White emphasize that Kung thought Plato wanted to *identify* perceptual properties with microstructural features of physical bodies, and that this is one of the important philosophical contributions of the *Timaeus*.

The papers on Aristotle focus on his natural philosophy. They have, for the most part, modest but worthwhile aims, and are helpful in stating problems clearly and including thorough and untangled discussions of some difficult issues. So, for example, Kathleen Cook examines the analogy in the passage in *Physics* 1.7 where some have thought Aristotle was making reference to prime matter. While her paper is unlikely to affect one's views on the prime matter debate, it is useful in its discussion of the structure and the point of the analogy and the question of whether underlying natures can only be understood by analogy. D.K.W. Modrak, relying on some of her previous work on Aristotle's psychology, has an interesting discussion of the difference between learning from experience (*ex empeirias*) and learning through abstraction (*di'aphaireseos*).

The two most interesting of the papers on Aristotle are perhaps Charlotte Witt's, 'Hylomorphism in Aristotle' and Mohan Matthen's 'The Four Causes in Aristotle's Embryology'. Witt argues that matter and form are ontologically distinct without having independent definitions. She wants to distinguish her position from that of those who say that matter and form are two ways of describing the composite substance. To do so she appeals to a level of potentiality which underlies both capacities and ends, an example of which she finds in the notion of the body as underlying the soul as first actuality. While her solution to Ackrill's dilemma is not entirely convincing, her argument to show that ' ... potential being is *dependent* on actual being in that what it is, the content of its definition, is determined by actual being' (157) allows one to see both why Aristotle thought that form and matter are a unity, and why he thought that their unity was problematic.

Matthen argues that while Aristotle's account of animal powers is 'fatally flawed' by certain of his uses of final and formal causes, 'in investigating embryological processes ... Aristotle was led ... to a breakthrough in scientific methodology,' with 'a theory that incorporates a remarkably subtle and prescient use of the four causes' (160). Both Witt and Matthen are concerned with Aristotle's use of teleological explanation. Moreover, they make similar points, though with respect to different issues. Witt remarks that, in considering the relation of form and matter, one must understand matter as potentially what it is when informed, and recognise that a potentiality is defined by reference to its actuality or end. Similarly, Matthen, in discussing animal powers, insists that 'Powers are *efficient* causes in Aristotle's scheme of things. Final causes are not additional influences over and above powers, but are built right into the specification of powers' (161). (Teleology is also the subject of Alan Gotthelf's piece on spontaneous generation, and emerges as a theme in Fred D. Miller's paper on Aristotle's *Politics*.)

Many of the authors whose work is included in this volume acknowledge the help and influence of Joan Kung. That influence is most evident in the philosophical style characteristic of the papers, a style that is conscientious and unpretentious.

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David Schmidtz
The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 1991.
US $38.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0870-4);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0871-2).

On what we might call the individualist conception, the limits of government are set by what individuals can accomplish without the dangerous device of coercion. Because individuals find it difficult to provide public goods, this becomes a central problem for the individualist. Their general strategy for limiting the state is to show that individuals can do more without the state. Nozick's Lockean and Gauthier's Hobbesian methods share this feature; each argues that morality allows individuals to provide themselves with some crucial public goods. David Schmidtz also argues for more extensive voluntary cooperation, by constructing innovative arguments that contribute to moral and political theory. His book has a wider scope than either Nozick's or Gauthier's, extending from the political philosophy (stressed by the former) to moral foundations (stressed by the latter).

The book begins with the Nozickean themes of emergent justification, and rights to property and punishment. The second chapter, on the justification of property, is remarkably fresh, considering the attention this topic has received recently. The puzzle is how taking land from the original commons could satisfy a moral requirement ('the Proviso') to leave others as much. Schmidtz's insight puts the problem in a new light: '*Leaving goods in the commons fails to satisfy the Proviso*' (21). Notice the individualism at work here: 'To decide that everyone will leave a piece of land alone would be to protect it; to decide to leave it alone oneself is merely to leave it unprotected' (22). Schmidtz's innovative application of the Tragedy of the Commons model of public goods does not merely blunt the strongest objection to original appropriation, it turns it into an argument for property.

Chapter three makes an interesting suggestion about the Lockean problem of how a state could acquire a right to punish without the consent of all who would be subject to it. Schmidtz conjectures that due to the rights of innocent bystanders, the right to punish might be limited to 'the least risky method available' (38). Thus the state might become the sole agent with the right to punish, bypassing the need for transfers of this right.

At the center of the book is a constructive argument based on a device that eases the assurance problem that would-be cooperators often face. What if too few support a public project? Chapter four proposes an assurance contract that returns the would-be cooperators' contributions in this case. Schmidtz overstates his case when he writes of having 'solved the Prisoner's Dilemma' (78); by his own admission, his proposed device has limited application. For example, the temptation to free ride, which he separates instructively from the assurance problem, remains a problem in Prisoner's Dilemmas. Nonetheless his idea is important, and, I should add, accessible. While the use of the Prisoner's Dilemma as a model necessarily involves some game theory, Schmidtz avoids the mathematical (and metaphysical) excesses one sometimes encounters. His use of game theory is firmly disciplined by his focus on the public goods problem; chapter five works out the connection between the problem and the model.

Chapter six considers innovative laboratory tests of the assurance contract device in small group situations. This chapter's title, 'Experimental Philosophy', signals Schmidtz's treatment of moral and political theory as part of social science with a strong empirical component. This component strengthens the proposal in the sense of increasing its empirical content. For example, exposure to testing forces Schmidtz to try to explain why his device is apparently less conducive to providing public goods than a rival experimenter's construction. This chapter also contains some interesting reflections on the methodological bearing of experimentation on economic theories and policies.

The final chapter sketches a moral theory that defends reciprocity as conducive to cooperation. Again the empirical element is important. Schmidtz argues that, as a matter of fact, conditional cooperators give others incentives to cooperate. This empirical connection is what makes reciprocity

a fundamental moral norm. He rightly emphasizes that 'in the real world, other people's behavior is a variable, a variable that one's own behavior can sometimes influence' (155). This suggests that what he calls 'the feedback theory' might better be labelled a *strategic* morality (using Elster's distinction to mark the contrast with the alternative approach that takes others' behavior to be parametrically fixed). While his defense of reciprocity is indebted to Axelrod's striking results, Schmidtz is well aware that Axelrod's model is limited to two-person iterated games. Schmidtz works to extend reciprocity to the more difficult case of many-person interactions but his precise proposal is not completely perspicuous. Throughout the book he is at pains not to idealize the populations of his models, assuming, for example, that all are moral or reciprocators. Here he seems to make the milder idealization that none of the agents are predators, out to exploit the reciprocators. This is just to point out what Schmidtz readily admits, that this chapter is a sketch, not a fully developed moral theory of cooperation.

These are strong and strikingly diverse arguments; it would take a powerful overarching conception to unify them as parts of a larger construction. Schmidtz does attempt this larger design, but not as clearly or forcefully as the individual arguments. The opening chapter, which contrasts teleological and emergent justification, is complex and often hard to follow. The discussion of the relation between public goods and the Prisoner's Dilemma game is longer than its conclusions warrant. Nonetheless, the good parts are very good. Schmidtz has taken elements of an individualist moral theory based on cooperation from sources as different as Nozick, Gauthier and Axelrod, made them work together and strengthened them with striking and original arguments and proposals.

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John Skorupski
John Stuart Mill.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1989.
Pp. iv + 431.
Cdn $72.00: US $59.95. ISBN 0-415-01869-2.

In this fine contribution to the Arguments of the Philosophers series John Skorupski provides a much needed in-depth analysis of the main themes of J.S. Mill's philosophy drawing primarily on the *System of Logic*, the *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, *Utilitarianism* and *On Liberty*. Of the ten substantial chapters six cover the philosophies of language, logic,

mind and knowledge, and three are devoted to Mill's thoughts on sociology, morality and politics. The first chapter provides a general overview of Mill's philosophy which places it in historical context and presents an account of its strategic aims. Skorupski carefully dissects and interestingly reworks central arguments within the framework of a continuing story of what Mill is about. The central character in the story is naturalism taken as the view that '[h]uman beings are entirely a part of the natural causal order studied by science' (5). Skorupski argues that Mill's naturalism shapes both his epistemology and his political and moral philosophy. It leads to the rejection of the view that we have a priori knowledge worthy of the name and thus bears on Mill's treatment of mathematics, logic and the status of principles of evidence, as well as on the role he gives to the general good in moral matters.

Since the seminal work of Frege Mill's writings on logic and mathematics have had a bad press. Skorupski urges us to view Mill as in important respects a precursor of Quine. The key thought is that 'Mill is the philosopher in whose work the fully empiricist consequences of naturalism are first worked out' (220). So in assessing Mill we have to balance the defects of his detailed treatment of geometry, arithmetic and fundamental logical laws against the enduring importance of what Skorupski regards as his central insight: that naturalism yields radical empiricism, the view that 'all real propositions [i.e. informative ones] and rules of inference [i.e. those licensing transitions to new information] are revisable in the light of experience' (220). Nevertheless, as Skorupski points out, it does not follow that 'no real proposition can have a rational claim on our thinking *prior* to experience' (161). Unless we may legitimately take certain presuppositions and principles for granted we are in no position to make sensible revisions to our beliefs, including perhaps revisions to some of these very presuppositions and principles. A plausible epistemology needs a weak notion of the a priori.

These themes turn out to be crucial in Skorupski's treatment of Mill's thought on principles of evidence. Here the key problem is taken to be Mill's failure to appreciate that the Hypothetical Method, inference to the best explanation, is 'an autonomous method of induction' (197), that is to say, a method which is both legitimate and yet not explicable in terms of Mill's inductive canons. This means that Mill disavows inferences to causes which are not even in principle directly observable, a position which underpins his essentially instrumentalist view of scientific theories, and in conjunction with his subjectivist assumption that the only data for knowledge are constituted by our own sensations (208), yields phenomenalism (234). Skorupski suggests that we need not follow Mill in these latter directions if we can make it plausible that inference to the best explanation, conceived as an 'autonomous method', has a legitimate claim on our thinking prior to experience. But, he argues, within the framework of naturalism we can do *that*, and make sense of the weak a priori in general, only if we abandon 'the classical pre-understanding of meaning' according to which 'grasp of a

sentence's truth-condition appears as something determined independently of a mastery of rules of evidence' (218), and adopt instead an epistemic conception which has it that grasp of truth-conditions is not thus independent. The idea is that whereas the classical pre-understanding misleads us into thinking that we need to show that our basic principles of reasoning and evidence taken as a whole track the truth, the epistemic conception enables us to see that this is not so and at the same time shows how there can be weakly a priori principles.

This bold broad picture is filled in with much exegetical detail and rich, dense argumentation. It merits close scrutiny. One reservation I have is this. Grant that the naturalist must reject the view of reasoning 'which depicts it as a non-causal tracking of logical relationships between pure meanings in a Platonic realm' (219). Grant also that we cannot establish that we have strong priori knowledge of real propositions just from the fact that we find their negations inconceivable or can derive them 'by principles whose unsoundness we find inconceivable, from premises whose negation we find inconceivable' (7). Still, a more traditional empiricism with its roots in Locke would account for strong a priori knowledge of informative analytic truths in terms of the commitments generated my mastery of the relevant concepts. Skorupski appears to have no truck with such a view. He is convinced that radical empiricism is right and he raises problems about rules, definitions and the a priori (101ff. and 150ff.) which any defence of traditional empiricism concerning the a priori would have to reckon with. I think though that we need a better theory of concepts than is available at present before we can fairly rule out the possibility that such a defence is a serious option. (It is worth noting that post-Quinean orthodoxy on these matters relies heavily on a scepticism about meaning which Mill himself would not endorse.)

Skorupski makes a case for the claim that Mill's philosophical utilitarianism is underpinned by his naturalism. Naturalism rules out substantial a priori knowledge in moral matters, as well as metaphysical conceptions of rights. The only plausible course for the naturalist moral philosopher is to account for morality in terms of 'the concept of a perfectly impartial concern for the good of all individuals' (32). For Mill this good is happiness and, on Skorupski's account, '[t]he objectivity of happiness as an end is, and can only be, grounded in reflective agreement' (286). Skorupski criticises Mill's hedonism but defends his philosophical utilitarianism and his basic stance on how the objectivity of ends must be grounded. He also argues that Mill's views on liberty would be better served if he had recognised a plurality of ends. As in the earlier parts of the book the discussion is always penetrating and provocative, and never dull. My main worry is that if reflective agreement is the touchstone of objectivity then it is at least arguable that such agreement might, or actually does, sustain a moral outlook which includes some basic non-consequentialist principles.

Skorupski obviously likes and respects Mill. Even where he reworks Mill's thought it is always in ways which are intended to reflect Mill's own

underlying aims and preoccupations and entirely free of the priggish tone which more recent developments in philosophy might tempt one to adopt in approaching a nineteenth-century thinker. I doubt if there are many philosophers who could write with the flair, analytical acumen and historical sensitivity which Skorupski brings to such a wide range of difficult topics.

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Gary Smith ed.
Benjamin: Philosophy, Aesthetics, History.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990.
Pp. xlii + 263.
US $22.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-76512-1);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-76514-8).

This is a collection composed of writings by Benjamin and on Benjamin, almost entirely based on a special issue of *The Philosophical Forum* (1983-84) prepared by the same editor. Both the Benjamin texts were already presented there; and so were all the other articles, except for Richard Sieburth's 'Benjamin the Scrivener'. Richard Wolin's 'Experience and Materialism in Benjamin's Passagenwerk', and a very brief translators' introduction by Sieburth and Leigh Hafrey to the volume's major Benjamin text. This text is a long and theoretically central fragment (designated as 'N') from his unfinished magnum opus the *Passagenwerk* to which both Sieburth's and Wolin's articles are devoted. But neither the substance nor quality of these two added articles seem to justify the special issue's republication as a book; and nothing can justify the way in which many of the pages of 'N' appear in scrambled order in (at least my copy of) this book.

The volume's most interesting articles, apart from the Benjamin texts, are Adorno's 'Progress', Leo Lowenthal's 'The Integrity of the Intellectual: In Memory of Walter Benjamin', and Joel Snyder's 'Benjamin on Reproducibility and Aura: A Reading of "The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility" '. For those who are interested in probing the important Jewish dimension of Benjamin's thought (evident in his philosophy of history and of language), there is Stephen Moses's comparative study of Benjamin and the Jewish philosopher Franz Rosenzweig, whom Gershom Scholem regarded as an influence on Benjamin's thought. Thus, despite its concentration on philosophy, aesthetics and history, the volume gives a fair sense of Benjamin's variety and multi-dimensionality.

However, according to Smith's introductory essay, the purpose of this collection is to make a case for Benjamin as a philosopher 'by introducing the central philosophical features of Benjamin's thought' (viii). Smith's insistence on Benjamin's status as a philosopher is meant to counter Hannah Arendt's influential vision of him as 'neither a poet nor a philosopher' but 'the most important critic of [his] time' (vii-viii), and the book instead follows the line of Scholem and Adorno in advocating the primacy of the philosophical in Benjamin's thought. I doubt whether Smith's collection will convince (English) readers of this journal that Benjamin is a genuine philosopher. But I also doubt whether it is clear what a genuine philosopher is or should be; and thinkers like Benjamin are important in making us rethink this question. Part of the difficulty of seeing Benjamin as a philosopher derives from his style and the non-standardly philosophical topics to which so much of his work is formally directed. But there is also the difficulty that many of his more clearly philosophical ideas go deeply against the dominant philosophical grain. We can get an inkling of this in the two Benjamin texts provided here.

The first is a brief piece 'On the Program of the Coming Philosophy', written when Benjamin was only twenty-five. It introduces the theme of experience, which many regard as his most central philosophical theme. Here Benjamin is sharply critical of the standard philosophical use of experience as merely a tool for approaching epistemological certainty. The result is that all the quality and richness of experience get shrunk to its narrow role of epistemological verification, which in fact robs experience not only of so much of its intrinsic value but of its cognitive potential. What Benjamin here argues for is 'a higher concept of experience' (3) which would extend beyond the traditional philosophical one devoted to science and empirical consciousness, and would instead embrace also religion and metaphysical experience.

The second text, 'N [Re the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress]', bases a large part of its theory of knowledge on a cognitive idea which strongly resists the standard view of philosophical knowledge as discursive and conceptual. Benjamin's idea of 'the dialectical image' speaks of a 'knowledge [that] exists only in lightning flashes' and which is achieved and communicated not so much by conceptual formulation as by a kind of 'literary montage' of past and present, where each illuminates and criticizes the other (43, 47-9). This emphasis on the image and non-discursive grasp of truth is much more in line with the claims of art and poetry than with philosophy as it is normally practised and advocated.

The dialectical image where the past and present are superimposed together in critical contrast contributes to another central theme of 'N'. This is Benjamin's radical questioning of the idea of progress, a challenge that clearly goes against the dominant grain of philosophy of history in both bourgeois and Marxist circles. In this critique of progress, where what survives may be the fittest but need not be the best, we find Benjamin's influential theme of the barbarism of culture: 'Barbarism inheres in the very concept of culture: taken as the concept of a hoard of values that is inde-

pendent, not of the production process from which these values emerged, but of the process in which they survive. In this way, they serve the apotheosis of the latter, no matter how barbaric it may be' (56). This idea finds a more rigorous philosophical development in Adorno, as does Benjamin's idea of progress: 'Progress does not reside in the continuity of temporal succession, but rather in its moments of interference' (65).

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Stephen Stich
The Fragmentation of Reason.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1990. Pp. x + 181.
US $22.50. ISBN 0-262-19293-4.

This short and startling book proposes a radical revision in analytic philosophy's usual ways of thinking about epistemology. Stich both attacks the theory of knowledge as traditionally conceived and gives us a sketch of an alternative to it. Stich's alternative is pragmatism; viz, what's good is what works. But it is pragmatism which, in this context, is surprisingly general in two ways. First, it is concerned with what is, according to Stich, a class of cognitive states much broader than the class of belief-forming processes. '... [O]ur current cognitive processes are a tiny island in a vast unexplored computational space ... ' (119). Secondly, Stich maintains that the 'working well' in his pragmatism is to be understood as relative to a wide variety of goals. Stich questions the values implicit in goals such as having true belief's or having beliefs with protection against doubt. He says, 'If the skeptic claims that we cannot have the special sort of justified true belief that counts as knowledge, the right move to make first is to ask why we should care' (101). Stich argues that we should view systems of cognitive processes as analogous to tools or technologies, and that they should be evaluated by appeal to the 'rich and varied class of things that people take to be intrinsically valuable,' like health, happiness, and well-being of one's children (131).

The Fragmentation of Reason is a work in six chapters. The thematic Chapter One usefully previews some of Stich's major claims and contains some important background information. Chapters Two and Three are indirectly concerned with a major topic: The revision of traditional epistemology's judgements of — and categories of — doxastic assessment. Each argues more directly against the thesis that we must generally reason well, if that thesis is understood in some substantial and interesting way. Chapter Two principally addresses the Quinean idea that correct principles of interpretation

have the result that we should understand our interlocutors as by and large reasoning well. Stich argues that what is correct in the thesis is 'both Pickwickean and profoundly uninteresting' (51). According to Stich, the Quinean thesis holds true of belief ascriptions, but it places no restrictions on what we may find out about the vast number of other belief-like cognitive states and inference-like cognitive processes. Two background features heavily influence Stich's discussion of this and other topics: (1) His realism about cognitive states: they do or can exist, many of them belief-like, whether or not anyone can describe them or even conceive of them; (2) His anti-realism about beliefs: belief ascriptions are sort of one's best guesses at what's going on and, at least as far as the discussion in the present book goes, belief ascriptions have not further correctness or truth conditions. (These features will not surprise readers of Stich's earlier *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science*.) Chapter Three considers the thesis that the mere fact that we are evolutionary survivors means that we cannot be seriously cognitively defective. Stich's acute attack on this view turns the fact that it is often enough casually invoked into a professional embarrassment.

Chapters Two and Three give some point to our raising the question of whether our cognitive processes could be improved upon. Chapters Four and Five provide a sustained argument to the effect that traditional epistemology is utterly useless in answering this question. Much of the argumentation of Chapter Four can be seen as supporting the thesis that analytic epistemology is too much like a codification of the rules of etiquette; the principles it enunciates are merely matters of conventions and intuitions to which there can be preferable alternatives. This attack is not simply one on the literature; it is equally concerned with epistemic concepts such as that of justified belief. '... [T]here is no obvious virtue that distinguishes our concepts from the alternatives, apart from the fact that we happen to have inherited them' (94). Further, since our notion of justification is just one member of a large and varied family of concepts of epistemic evaluation, it strikes more people as simply capricious or perverse to have an intrinsic preference for justified beliefs' (95).

As Stich acknowledges, what distinguishes epistemology from a systematization of etiquette may seem obvious. Epistemology is interested in epistemic goals, those linked to concerns such as that of having some true beliefs. Stich anticipates this objection and addresses it in Chapter Five, entitled 'Do We Really Care Whether Our Beliefs Are True?' Stich argues that 'once we have a clear view of the matter, most of us will not find any value, either intrinsic or instrumental, in having true beliefs' (101).

Both Chapters Four and Five employ the following risky sort of reasoning: 'Current state-of-the-art philosophy plausibly implies that having justified beliefs [or having true beliefs] is really just a matter of having beliefs with feature F. But most people think it is silly to care about having beliefs with F. So when people realize what the true nature of justification [or truth] is, they stop caring about it. So traditional philosophical concerns with such matters are really irrelevant to the real world of cognizers.' Among the points

at which one might question such an argument is the first premise. Part of Stich's argument against truth rests on an account of what reference is. But Stich's account of reference is unlike that of Kripke's and the later Putnam's being individualistic (in Tyler Burge's sense), naturalistic and reductionistic. It may be that to the extent that his argument is successful, what it provides is another case in which such analyses are shown to fail to accommodate the role of mentalistic/semantical notions in normative contexts. Another problem: There are deep connections among questions in a series like the following: (1) Do I have a vote? (2) Is it true that I have a vote? and (3) Do I believe that I have a vote? A sign of this is the notorious problem of statements like. 'I do have a vote but I do not believe I do.' One's concern to have true beliefs cannot be easily pried off one's interests in the extra-mental world.

Chapter Six gives us some development of Stich's pragmatism. For Stich's sort of pragmatist, cognitive processes are to be evaluated by their consequences and these evaluations are relative both to the goals the cognizers have and to the cognitive situations in which they are operating. Among the goals Stich mentions are getting tenure, developing a new and useful technology, winning a Nobel Prize, fame (139) and, as we saw above, health, happiness, and the well-being of one's children (131). There is a problem here. Given the official position announced in the book, it is really not very likely that Stich has truth as one of his goals. Does he believe what he is saying is true? Well, of course — much of it, at least. But then, should he have made a mystery of our knowledge of this?

There are many more challenging ideas in *The Fragmentation of Reason* than I have had the space to describe. Much of what I have described or left undescribed in this very interesting work will provoke heated responses. It is hard to believe that Stich's clear, lively and stimulating work could fail to be a significant focus of philosophical discussion.

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Frederick Suppe
The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism.
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press 1989.
Pp xvi + 475. US $34.95. ISBN 0-252-01605-X.

Suppe offers a defense of the semantic conception of scientific theories while considering its ramifications for major problems in the philosophy of science, including a critique of its standard conception predecessor, its contribution to

understanding the nature of theoretical explanation, the illumination that it sheds on the instrumentalism/realism debate and its potential for obtaining a more adequate grasp of the nature and the growth of scientific knowledge. The impression that much of this work is programmatic is difficult to avoid, especially when its author makes repeated reference to a forthcoming book.

The dominant philosophy of science of the first half of the 20th century, represented by the work of figures such as Carnap, Hempel, and Nagel, provided a systematic conception of the nature of science. They drew a basic distinction between formal systems and scientific theories, where a *formal system* could be turned into a scientific theory by being provided with an *empirical interpretation*. The purpose of this interpretation was to establish links between the marks and relations of an otherwise purely abstract calculus and the physical world in order to infuse that structure with empirical content.

This account was further refined through the conception of theories as consisting of *theoretical laws* and *correspondence rules*, where the former were couched exclusively in a non-logical vocabulary of theoretical terms, while the latter were couched in a mixed vocabulary of theoretical and observational terms. The correspondence rules thus afforded a bridge for deducing *empirical laws* couched exclusively in a non-logical vocabulary of observational terms. The empirical laws thus stood as (empirically testable) theorems to the theoretical laws and correspondence principles as axioms.

The growing realization that observational language itself was theory-laden, however, tended to undermine an explication that took the theoretical/observational distinction for granted. In place of the standard conception Suppes, Sneed, Suppe and others, building on the prior work of Beth, advanced the semantic conception, according to which theories are viewed as set-theoretical structures, as configurated state spaces, or else as sets of configurated state spaces. In the simpler versions, theories now consist of *theoretical definitions* that define theoretical predicates, where *empirical hypotheses* might relate those predicates to specific portions of the world.

Giere, for example, has suggested that theoretical predicates can define different kinds of systems. A *classical particle system* might be defined as a system that obeys Newton's three laws of motion and the law of universal gravitation. The empirical hypothesis could then be asserted that the Sun and planets constitute a classical particle system. As Suppe remarks, however, these theories characteristically possess counterfactual import, because the systems to which they apply typically satisfy conditions that are idealized, such as being subject solely to gravitational forces (153-4).

If theories are counterfactual idealizations, then it would appear to be a relevant question to ask how they are related to the actual behavior of phenomena in the physical world. Suppe claims that 'auxiliary theories' should be 'used to determine how the actual situation will deviate from the idealized situation', thereby yielding accurate predictions of actual behavior (154). If these auxiliary theories are possible, however, then *less* counterfac-

tual and *less* idealized theories are obtainable, whose discovery would seem to be an altogether more appropriate aim of scientific inquiry.

If auxiliary theories are not possible, of course, the point of theories is obscure. Suppe distinguishes theories that incorporate laws of succession, laws of coexistence, and laws of interaction, which impose limits upon the behavior of 'physical systems'. A theory is said to be *true* when the class of 'theory-induced' physical systems is identical with the class of 'causally possible' physical systems, where the latter are phenomena in the world (91). But this hints that theories ought to be envisioned as sets of lawlike sentences, where a lawlike sentence is true only if it is maximally specific.

The conception of theories as sets of laws that apply within a common domain, after all, provides a more elegant account, even if it has to be supplemented by 'dictionary definitions', which might be partial or complete. Moreover, Suppe emphasizes that the semantic conception dispenses with correspondence rules which the standard conception required (19-20). Yet without some counterpart to explain the relationship between theories and evidence, his own account could not be sustained. Even the theory-ladeness of observational language does not show that observational language is 'theory laden' in specific respects that undermine its utility for testing theories.

One of the fascinating features of Suppe's study is the extent to which it reveals crucial differences between proponents of the semantic conception. Although Suppe himself abandons the observational/theoretical distinction, van Fraassen retains it. While Suppe supposes that laws are invariable elements of scientific theories, van Fraassen rejects them. And while Suppe is a special kind of realist, van Fraassen is best viewed as a neo-instrumentalist. Indeed, on van Fraassen's view, but not on Suppe's, there is no more to the adequacy of any theory than its empirical (or 'observational') adequacy.

Since both Suppe and van Fraassen adhere to the semantic conception, it should be obvious that a commitment to laws of nature is not entailed thereby. Many readers are likely to derive the conclusion that the semantic conception is nothing more than the standard conception minus correspondence rules, where the notion of satisfaction for predicates has displaced the notion of truth for propositions. Indeed, since Tarski has shown that truth is reducible to satisfaction for formalized structures of most of the kinds that appeal to semantic theorists, the benefits of an exchange may be difficult to discern.

No one should count on finding solutions for problems discussed in this book. Suppe claims 'basic breakthroughs' in handling difficult issues involving the casual modalities and probabilistic and statistical claims, but they 'arrived too recently to be included in the present volume' (297). Indeed, after surveying a variety of forms that theories might assume, he gamely explains that these 'abstract structures' do not become physical theories until they are supplied with 'physical interpretations', where these interpretations may be merely 'implicitly or intentionally specified and are liable to alteration, modification or expansion as science progresses' (422-3).

While Suppe persists in asserting that the semantic conception is more faithful to 'actual scientific practice', his own methodology goes beyond the descriptive and embraces the normative. In one of the memorable passages of this book, he explains with clarity and verve that the conception of truth that makes a difference to philosophical understanding of science must not be mistaken for the conception of confirmation that makes a difference to scientific practice (31-2). And he freely admits that his conception of theories as counterfactual idealizations goes beyond actual scientific practice.

Without doubt, this work promises far more that it delivers. Some of its most striking claims are almost completely undeveloped. Suppe says, for example, that 'one can know universal causal generalizations on the basis of *single* observational or perceptual episodes — hence can know that laws and theories are correct on the basis of singular observations' (382, original italics). He alludes to scientific practice on behalf of his position, but he advances no rational warrant for this otherwise astonishing view. Those who want to pursue these ideas will have to wait for his next book.

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Stewart R. Sutherland and T. A. Roberts, eds.
Religion, Reason and the Self: Essays in honour of Hywel D. Lewis.
McLean, VA: Books International Imports (for University of Wales Press) 1990.
Pp. xiv + 173. n.p. ISBN 0-8191-6981-1.

For those needing an introduction: Hywel D. Lewis is a Welsh-born philosopher with an interest especially in the philosophy of religion and of mind. As a pair of introductions — one of them in Welsh — to this book reminds us, his distinctions include not only notable writings spanning more than five decades, but also such honours as Presidency of The Mind Association, the Aristotelian Society and the Society for the Study of Theology. This volume is a tribute to Lewis in the form of a collection of nine papers, most of them in philosophical theology, supplemented by a bibliography of Lewis' writings, an index to the collection and a list of subscribers to its publication.

Richard Swinburne opens with 'Meaning in the Bible', in which he argues that the sense of particular elements of the Bible — and therefore the criteria for their truth — is determined not by their 'original meaning', but by their context in a canon assembled by believers who believed their selection both

inspired and revelatory of a consistent set of divine messages. In 'The Concept of Revelation', Stewart Sutherland elaborates upon the notion of religious revelation, attempting to show what is distinctive both about the content and the process represented by that concept. 'Faith and Philosophy' is a survey by Frederick Copleston of the endeavour by certain nineteenth-century Russian thinkers to think philosophically in a way consistent with, even shaped by, Christian faith. Thomas McPherson, in 'Decision and Religious Belief', argues that it makes perfectly good sense to speak of deciding to believe that *p*, partly on the grounds that this alone allows us to assign responsibility to people for their beliefs.

'Religious Experience', by T.A. Roberts, considers religious experience both as associated with public events such as public worship, and as given in solitary awareness. In the latter connection he is critical of Swinburne's argument (elsewhere), based on a 'principle of credulity', for the probative force of religious experience. Ivor Leclerc contends, in 'The issue of the Nature of Metaphysics', that modern scientific developments heighten the need to proceed from physics to 'meta-physics', i.e., the pre-suppositions underlying physical enquiry.

'The Soul and Person, in Theological Perspective' contains T.F. Torrance's thesis that Christian anthropology replaced the dualistic outlook of the Greeks with an essentially integrated view of persons. H.P. Owen defends, in 'The Sinlessness of Jesus', the 'strong' view that not only did Jesus as a matter of fact refrain from sin, but it was *impossible* that he should lapse. In the collection's final paper, 'William James and the Notion of Two worlds', D.Z. Phillips considers James' unsuccessful search for scientific evidence of 'another world', and argues that the search was misconceived. Phillips offers the orthodox Wittgensteinian diagnosis that where James looked for spirits as though they were a different kind of entity, he should have considered whether spirit-talk reflects a different way of regarding what others see as mundane particulars.

The topics of the papers, while various, do exhibit that interest in, and treatment of, theological topics which the English introduction, at least, properly celebrates as unfashionable during much of Lewis's time.

On the whole, they have the feel of departmental seminar papers. They are generally brief — 13 or so pages, and comparatively innocent of references to other work in progress in their topics. McPherson's unconvincing (to me) defense of voluntary believing, for instance, makes no reference to the considerable literature on the subject, including the work of co-contributor Richard Swinburne. Similarly, Owen's discussion of Jesus' sinlessness ignores Nelson Pike's classic treatment of divine impeccability, and leaves untouched the question of what *sort* of impossibility is supposed to attach to the idea of Jesus's sinning.

Some contributions are largely expository. Copleston's, for example, is an overview of attempts by a number of Russian philosophers to synthesize a world-view consistent with orthodox theism, with a brief discussion of the continuing relevance of their endeavours. Torrance's essay is essentially an

explication of patristic theology, and includes claims which would benefit from additional argument and illustration.

A notable exception to these general observations is Swinburne's 'Meaning in the Bible'. It is not just lengthier (33 pp.) but much more carefully constructed and thoroughly argued than its companions. His thesis that meaning and truth in the Bible are determined not by the intent of original writers but by the views of the community who assembled and use it, is interesting, and is supported step by step, in Swinburne fashion. He has notable suggestions to make concerning the constraints on metaphorical interpretation, and the way in which scripture may have more content than the doctrines that govern its interpretation. In all of this he appeals to no special rules for dealing with scripture: 'these are all very general rules for understanding works and are in no way peculiar to the Bible. It is just that they give results far from obvious to modern men when applied to this case.' This is a paper that deserves to be taken seriously even by those who wish to take quite a different view of the way in which the meaning and authority of scripture are to be understood.

Apart from Swinburne's paper, however, the value of this book as a tribute may lie more in its advertisement of themes representative of Lewis's remarkable interests and influence than in fundamental contributions to the subjects considered.

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Edmund J. Thomas and Eugene G. Miller
Writers and Philosophers: A Sourcebook of Philosophical Influences on Literature.
Westport, CT,: Greenwood Press 1990.
Pp. xiii + 269.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-313-25684-5.

The purpose of this text is to help teachers and students (green and seasoned) of significant literary works identify the implicit philosophical perspectives of their authors. Where there are explicit connections between an author's views and a philosophical source, the debt is traced. The plausible assumption is that competent literary criticism demands such awareness of the philosophical theories inevitably embedded in texts. Accordingly 123 authors are briefly presented, and their philosophical perspectives characterized. Hard evidence is offered, when it is available, of real and direct influences.

This is supplemented by anecdotal evidence concerning writers' personal encounters with philosophers, philosophical texts read, philosophical climates at educational institutions during the writers' sojourns there, etc. Each study is followed by a short bibliography of secondary literature. There are three supplementary sections: 'bio-bibliographical profiles' of 77 philosophers who had an impact on literary figures, a glossary of philosophical terms, concepts, and movements, and, finally, a general but rather idiosyncratic bibliography of works meant to stress the interrelationship between philosophy and literature. The whole is meticulously cross-referenced.

The project is ambitious in design and self-consciously modest in execution. There is in fact need of a comprehensive reference source providing easy ingress into literary figures' philosophical spaces, designed, as this one is, for those more at home in literature than in philosophy. It is a difficult task requiring of its compilers considerable familiarity with a great diversity of texts. They must either be comfortable in both worlds, or the task of compilation must be a cooperative labour of literary critics and philosophers. This text seems to be unbalanced toward the literary side. Its authors are prone to derive counsel from philosophically undistinguished or even suspect sources. For example, the Edwards *Encyclopedia* is only cited once, whereas the Runes *Dictionary* has been relied upon heavily. Perhaps this tendency is responsible for the occasional strange misinformation (such as the claim that Heidegger was Husserl's pupil and that he succeeded him at Marburg in 1928.) Some of the very obvious and most useful secondary literature has been missed. For example, the by now rather substantial literature showing the Heideggerian insights of Wallace Stevens has been overlooked, and even old chestnuts like W.T. Noon's *Joyce and Aquinas* and S.P. Rosenbaums' *English Literature and British Philosophy: A Collection of Essays* do not appear in the bibliographies of Joyce, Woolf, *et al*, much less figure in the text.

Perhaps the compilers tried to do too much in too short compass — the philosophies of 123 authors in 213 pages. The 77 bio-bibliographies occupy 33 pages. Consequently their characterizations of philosophical perspectives and figures are often so rudimentary as to be only marginally useful. The consequences for their analyses of literary figures are obvious. These will interest only the greenest of the green. It will generally point the beginning student of literature in the right direction, but will sometimes merely set them off in a circle.

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Gerard Verbeke
Moral Education in Aristotle.
Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 1990. Pp. x + 243.
US $39.95. ISBN 0-8132-0717-7.

Verbeke notes that the occasion giving rise to this book was a series of lectures delivered in Italy (Catania) in 1987. In eleven chapters, Verbeke takes the reader through the chief issues and problems which we would expect to arise in connection with the theme of moral education in Aristotle. In the first three chapters, he isolates the theme of training and habit in contrast to gifts of nature, fortune, and the divine life. Chapter Four includes a discussion of the relation between what is perfectible in the individual and the social and political settings in which the individual comes to acquire the moral habits. The next five chapters tackle a variety of issues, including the role of the intellect, generally, in matters of action, and then specifically in terms of free choice and the passions. The final three chapters recapitulate the foregoing discussions under the general headings of anthropology, metaphysics, and logic.

The book relies heavily, though not exclusively, upon Aristotle's doctrine as it is found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* — which is, of course, the best known and read of Aristotle's works on these themes. In the text and in the notes, Verbeke refers to other works, but only insofar as is necessary to clarify or to amplify a particular point. Throughout, Verbeke makes an effort to compare and contrast Aristotle's philosophy of education with the Socratic and Platonic versions, as well as the Stoic, and to a lesser extent, the Epicurean programs. There are a few carefully aimed remarks (particularly in Chapter Four, on 'Man and Society') as to how Aristotle's philosophy of education might relate to modern and contemporary problems. There are even fewer allusions to medieval debates. Indeed, one of the main virtues of the book is Verbeke's way of adhering to the classical context of these ideas, and of explicating Aristotle's doctrines without the imposition of either medieval or modern lenses.

While *Moral Education in Aristotle* can be recommended as a thorough and high-level introduction to Aristotle's theory of education, the book is not a merely flat-footed survey and exposition of the material. That is to say, Verbeke does not shy away from the kind of interpretation necessary for putting the various issues into new, and sometimes deeper perspectives. Two of these are especially noteworthy, because in each case the issue is apt to disclose both how near, and yet how distant, Aristotle's philosophy is from our contemporary concerns: namely (1) the role of education in regard to the progressivity of man, and (2) the decidedly non-theological, and indeed, mundane, character of Aristotle's program.

At the outset, Verbeke points out that although 'nature is the basic element of all moral conduct' (5), human perfection is not a gift of nature, luck, or the divinity (15-6). Furthermore, while the natural perfectibility of man is summoned and shaped by the *paeideia* of a particular society, the

polis is not something, Verbeke emphasizes, that 'exists in itself and for itself' — rather, it exists 'in view of the well-being of the individuals' (14). It has as its *telos* something more than the education of individuals in terms of their societal and political functions. Verbeke does not suggest that there are, on Aristotle's view, such things as pre- or a-social individuals; but by the same token, he does not reduce the perfection of man to the status of being a societal gift; nor, for that matter, is friendship the essential constituent of happiness (40). The perfection aimed at by education requires the conjoint operation of nature, knowledge, and training (21). None of this can take place automatically, behind the back, as it were, of individual action and free choice.

Verbeke pays considerable attention (especially in Chapter Two, entitled 'Is Life Worth Living') to how Aristotle broke with the negative, and on the whole, quite pessimistic view of most ancient theorists regarding what can be accomplished by human action in contrast to what is extrinsically needed in the way of 'gifts' from fortune or the gods. The key, Verbeke points out, is Aristotle's understanding of teleology (38) which, in the case of human nature, puts the agent in potency to new achievements (43). Unlike the Platonic knower, who recollects what he already knows, the Aristotelian agent realizes something new when he actually knows, and then (in terms of practical knowledge) goes on to direct his action. The potency-act structure of human agency allowed Aristotle to reconsider, and to upgrade, the Socratic and Platonic theory of what is to be accomplished in education. Generally speaking, Aristotle's contribution was to move the focus from purification to progress. 'Virtue,' Verbeke notes, 'manifests human existence as a constant synthesis of past and future with the present' (145). Its point is not the achievement of a harmony that results from removing the material and temporal veils which encrust the soul, but rather aims to engage precisely the material and temporal media for the sake of a progressive perfection. Verbeke explains that Aristotle takes the conflict and apparent disharmony between reason and the passions as a problem, admitting of human solution (207), not as a theological problem that perhaps bespeaks the need for mystical ascent, redemption, or stoical *apatheia*.

Verbeke more than once observes that the divine substance does not know the material world; rather, it is man who introduces consciousness into the cosmos (54). Man is the center of novelty and progress. Hence, the concern of education is not the preparation of the agent for enjoying immortality (37), but for deliberating about the mundane future wherein the agent assimilates new information and acquires the practical skills of directing action with respect to contingent contexts (55). Verbeke admits that Aristotle sometimes spoke of the divinity in ways which made at least rhetorical concessions to popular theology; yet he stresses that for all systematic purposes Aristotle decisively broke not only with popular religion, but also with Platonism and Stoicism in excluding, divine providence (37), the notion of participation (210), and the conception of the divinity as a giver of laws (198-201). Although Verbeke takes some pains to indicate where, and in what respect, Aristotle's

moral humanism re-connects itself with the notion of God (208-209), the main lines of his account of Aristotle's theory of education and human perfection point to the importance of the world of becoming and the humanism appropriate to that world.

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Gerald Vision
Modern Anti-Realism and Manufactured Truth.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1989.
Pp. xviii + 308.
US $65.00. ISBN 0-415-00097-1.

Vision defends a realism that is a view about the nature of truth, to the effect that 'the truth of a statement or belief is constituted by its relation to a situation in the not-essentially mind-dependent world' (6). ('Not-essentially' is added in an attempt to allow the realist to accommodate truths about minds and their properties.) Realism in this sense, which Vision calls 'global realism', is compatible with the view that there are subject matters to which this realist notion of truth fails to have application. For example, one can be a global realist in Vision's sense — a realist about truth — while being a non-cognitivist (and, in Vision's terminology, a 'local anti-realist') about moral judgements (6,10).

Vision associates — and almost equates — global realism with the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Although his account of the exact relation between the two is annoyingly obscure (11-12), the book proceeds on the assumption that they stand or fall together. Accordingly, Vision devotes most of Part I to the defence of the Correspondence Theory, countering objections (Ch. III), criticizing rival Coherence, Pragmatist, and Redundancy theories (Ch. IV), and advocating a modified form of Austin's version of the theory (Ch. V). However, Vision does not adequately justify his association of global realism with the Correspondence Theory. On the one hand, he does not explain why global realism — the view that truth consists in a relation to a mind-independent reality — should be taken to entail the view that a substantial account of this relation can be given, although he implies that the Correspondence Theory must give a substantial account of the correspondence relation. On the other hand, it is not clear to me that Vision's Austinian version of the Correspondence Theory requires that truth be about a mind-independent world.

Whatever the relation between the Correspondence Theory and global realism, the most interesting part of Vision's project, to my mind, concerns two issues: the challenge posed by arguments purporting to show that the global realist notion of truth is untenable, and the adequacy of alternative, anti-realist, conceptions of truth. Some of Vision's discussion of these topics occurs in Part I, where he replies to Putnam's model-theoretic argument against 'metaphysical realism' and criticizes Coherence and Pragmatist theories of truth. However, the main locus of Vision's critique of anti-realism is Part II, where the principal targets are Dummett (Ch. VII), Kuhn (Ch. IX), and a Wittgensteinian anti-realism based on the notion of a language game (Ch. VIII).

Vision's chief strategy is defensive (looking for weaknesses in arguments against realism), but occasionally he goes over to the offensive and purports to find inadequacies in rival anti-realist conceptions of truth. One illustration of the second strategy is an argument that truth is prior in explanation to such 'truth-linked' notions as justification and evidence, whereas the Coherence Theory of truth (along with various other forms of anti-realism) must take the explanatory dependence to go in the other direction (97-102). This is an interesting argument, to which Vision appeals several times (e.g., 189-96), but he does not develop it in sufficient detail to make it persuasive. Also, both Vision's thesis that the realist is not committed to the complete describability of reality (76-81) and his distinction between 'inhibiting' and 'enabling' explanations (e.g., 159-66; 209-11) could have done with better elaboration.

Although I found plausible some of Vision's criticisms of the anti-realist positions that he describes (especially in the chapters on Kuhn and language-games), the quality of the argument is uneven. Take for example, his treatment of the Dummettian anti-realist's claim that understanding a sentence cannot consist in a grasp of verification-transcendent truth conditions. Vision wonders how this claim can be combined with the admission that there are meaningful sentences that are not conclusively verifiable. And he mentions some legitimate reasons for scepticism about whether the anti-realist can give an adequate account of the meanings of such sentences. But it is facile to suggest, as Vision does on pp. 172-6, that the mere admission that there are such sentences is enough to undermine the case for anti-realism, especially when both Dummett and Wright have addressed this issue in print. Elsewhere, Vision goes off the rails more dramatically. For example, his case for the Correspondence Theory opens with the bizarre assertion that evidence for the theory is provided by the fact that '[w]hile convinced that the world is not as *p* states, I cannot sincerely affirm either that *p* or that *p* is true' (22). At times I could not decide whether Vision's arguments were confused, or merely confusingly presented, as when I read his criticism of Putnam on pp. 73-81, his defence of the claim that a coherence theorist cannot take seriously the notion of reference to individuals (123), and his argument that the Redundancy Theory of truth is incompatible with realism (13-14). Even Vision's account (in the Introduction) of the relation between his usage of the term

'realism' and those of others is untidy: why, for example, does he assume (13) that behaviourism is not a form of realism, in *his* sense of realism?

Vision's book does not contain enough argument that is both novel and cogently presented for it to advance the cause of realism. But its gravest fault is its failure to provide a clear and informative guide to the debates into which it enters. This is disappointing in a book whose jacket promises that it will help to 'untangle philosophical issues that many years of discussion have left in a thoroughly confused state.'

The proof-reading has not been very carefully done (I noticed more than thirty typographical errors); there are some minor inaccuracies in quotations, references, and cross-references, and the names 'Plantinga' and 'van Fraassen' are misspelled throughout the book. Finally, I protest strongly against the system of notes and references used here, which requires the reader to go to the back of the book to consult the notes, only to find there references in the form ('Dummett (1969)', which have to be tracked down in a separate bibliography. No conscientious reader should be subjected to such cruel (and, I hope, unusual) punishment, and no author should have to acquiesce in its infliction.

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J.L. Austin.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1989.
Pp. vii + 165.
Cdn $39.95: US $33.00. ISBN 0-415-02962-7.

In the Preface, Warnock says, 'I have conceived what follows as a book about Austin, rather than about Austin and his critics and commentators. I have accordingly aimed at plain exposition and discussion of his texts, rather than at much examination of the controversial literature to which some of them have given rise.' Perhaps Warnock thought that this restricted aim is dictated by the nature of the series in which the book appears ('The Arguments of the Philosophers', edited by Ted Honderich). The book is, unfortunately, faithful to it. It contains but a few criticisms of assertions of Austin's and but a few refinements of Austin's ideas. Only two pieces of commentary on Austin's work — Ayer's on *Sense and Sensibilia* and Strawson's on 'Truth' — are given more than the barest mention, and the space devoted to them totals only eight pages. Mostly the book is plain exposition of Austin's texts. (Of Austin's published work all but two early pieces, 'The Line and the Cave in Plato's

Republic' and 'Are There *A Priori* Concepts?', are dealt with; *Sense and Sensibilia*, *How to do Things with Words*, 'Other Minds', 'A Plea for Excuses', and 'Ifs and Cans' are each given a whole chapter; 'Truth, is given most of a chapter; 'How to Talk: Some Simple Ways', '*Agathon* and *Eudaimonia* in the *Ethics* of Aristotle', 'The Meaning of a Word', 'Pretending', and 'Three Ways of Spilling Ink' are each given part of a chapter.)

This is too bad, because, unlike those of Plato or Spinoza or Wittgenstein, Austin's texts, for the most part, do not need exposition: he was an extremely lucid, non-obfuscatory, non-cryptic writer (and of course Warnock does not think otherwise). Any contemporary who can understand Warnock's exposition needs very little help in understanding Austin's. Anyone already acquainted with Austin's work will learn next to nothing from this book. Anyone who wants to find out what Austin thought on any particular topic he wrote on will do at least as well to read Austin's work as to read this book (all of Austin's published work cannot, in number of words, total much more than three times the length of Warnock's book). One who wants to find out what others have thought of Austin's work or what difficulties there may be in it will get little help here. And one who wants information about the extensive influence Austin's work has had in recent philosophy and linguistics, or who would like to get some comparison of Austin to Wittgenstein or Grice — the other major philosophers of language of this century who emphasized what we do with language — will get no help at all. The book is not as useful as one might have hoped.

The Introduction is perhaps its most useful chapter. Here Warnock tells us about some salutary features of Austin's attitude toward philosophy. Contrary to what many have supposed, he did not advocate scrupulous analysis of the nuances of ordinary usage as 'an ambitious new methodology for philosophy in general,' but rather only as 'one way of possibly doing one part of philosophy,' namely, the part he tackled in 'A Plea for Excuses' (6). Regarding the view, held by some, that theses in philosophy are 'essentially ... contestable, its questions forever open to debate,' Warnock tells us (7) that 'Austin's own view was ... less sophisticated, more austere; he thought that philosophers should simply *try much harder*. There were, he thought, failings to which philosophers were particularly prone, which where particularly liable to issue in perpetual wrangling, but which ... might ... be diminished by conscientious effort. ... They were carelessness; haste; a persistent tendency to invent and to rely on ill-defined and slippery technical terms; over-simplification; reckless and premature generalization; and perhaps above all, a predilection for ambitious either-or dichotomies.'

There are places where Warnock's exposition is likely to help one understand Austin's ideas better than Austin's own (or where it refines those ideas). For example, in the chapter on *How to Do Things with Words* (the longest in the book), Warnock renders clearer and sharper than does Austin himself, some aspects of the criteria and motivations for Austin's taxonomy of the various kinds of acts one performs in talking: locutionary (which breaks

down into a phonetic, a phatic, and a rhetic act), illocutionary, and perlocutionary (119-32).

There are places where Warnock criticizes Austin's claims. For example, he summarizes nicely (35-40) the cogent reasons there are for thinking that 'I know' is not a performative analogous to 'I promise' in the way that Austin suggested it is (in 'Other Minds'); he offers (138-43) sensible caveats regarding Austin's idea that truth and falsity are highly relative to the circumstances and purposes of making the true/false evaluation; and there are other useful criticisms.

In one place, however, Warnock shrinks from pressing an important criticism that he made in an earlier article. On p. 108 he cites Austin's claim that it is obvious that in a performative utterance like 'I promise to be there', one does not state anything true or false — in particular one does not state that one promises, one just promises. In an endnote to this part of the text, Warnock says (159) 'I have argued, in *Essays on J.L. Austin* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1973), pp. 80 ff., that Austin's assertion here is *not* all that "obvious", but it would be a distraction to pursue that particular issue here.' In fact, in the earlier piece Warnock gives interesting and excellent reasons for thinking that Austin's assertion is just *wrong* and that the way one promises by saying 'I promise' is by means of *stating* that one promises, rather than by virtue of a brute convention that uttering that form of words (in appropriate circumstances) shall count as promising. I do not understand at all why Warnock regards it as inappropriate in this book to spell out an interesting suggestion as to how one of Austin's most important and influential ideas should be rectified. If he has had second thoughts about his 'criticism' (though I hope not), it would be useful to know what they are.

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Greg Whitlock
Returning to Sils-Maria: A Commentary to Nietzsche's 'Also sprach Zarathustra'.
New York: Peter Lang Publishing 1990.
Pp. xx + 327. US $65.95. ISBN 0-8204-1198-1.

Greg Whitlock's *Return to Sils-Maria* is arguably the best commentary on Nietzsche's *Also sprach Zarathustra* to appear in English. Although Nietzsche considered *Zarathustra* to be his most important book, and despite the current level of interest in Nietzsche's thought in North American academic circles, *Return* is only the second commentary to *Zarathustra*

published in English. The other, Laurence Lampert's *Nietzsche's Teaching* (1986) was unavailable to Whitlock as he wrote *Return to Sils-Maria*: Whitlock does consult (mostly in his extensive footnotes) the standard German commentary, Gustav Naumann's *Zarathustra-Commentar*.

After an introductory essay in which he gives brief overview of Nietzsche's life and works as well as a summary of his interpretation of four 'riddles' or teachings of the character Zarathustra, Whitlock undertakes a section by section analysis of each of the four parts of *Also sprach Zarathustra*. The book also contains nine brief appendices which document the location and major action of the speeches in *Zarathustra*, the audience of the speeches, the thematic structure, the plot line, Nietzsche's plans to *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche's own comments on *Zarathustra*, readings on Nietzsche's concept of 'Dionysus', remarks on editions of Nietzsche's works, and remarks on other *Zarathustra* commentaries. The book also contains rather extensive footnotes and a bibliography which concludes a list of works 'not cited in *Returning to Sils-Maria*.'

Nietzsche scholars will find this book useful for several reasons. First, this book is a 'commentary' in the classic sense. Whitlock seems more interested in explaining Nietzsche's book than in using *Zarathustra* to grind his own axe or engage in the sort of 'creative mis-interpretation' of Nietzsche's work that has become fashionable among certain of Nietzsche's post-modernist disciples. In this sense, Whitlock's project may not be seen as very 'Nietzschean', at least in the current sense of that term, but it is scholarly. Second, Whitlock did his homework. For example, he supplies the book, chapter, and verse to each of the Biblical allusions that occur in *Zarathustra*. His first four appendices provide the sort of lists that scholars interested in *Zarathustra* will find useful for their own work. Finally, Whitlock consistently decodes the symbolism in Zarathustra in a way that allows scholars to see the systematic points that Nietzsche makes by means of images. An illustrative example from p. 125: 'Zarathustra is awakened from the first of several dreams in the book to the realization that his teachings are in danger: among his friends (=seeds), whom he has bid to follow their own paths (=scattered), are those moralists (=weeds) who would only pose as higher men (=wheat), and who now misinterpret (=distort) Zarathustra in terms of the christian notions of good and evil.' Whitlock's method of enclosing the symbolic image from the text in parentheses, a method he follows throughout his commentary, takes some getting used to. However, it does accomplish the task of turning the symbolic language of *Zarathustra* into a more conceptual account, making the philosophical content of Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* available to a wider audience.

Whitlock's main thesis is that Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* is 'a book of man's future, not of his past or present' (xi). The text itself is 'incomplete' (241), as is Nietzsche's philosophical project. 'It's conditions for verification or falsification are met only when man's fate is completed. Thus only the future will demonstrate the real meaning of Nietzsche and his works' (xvii). *Zarathustra* is a 'prophetic' work in that it predicts the appearance of certain human types

who have come to inhabit the 20th-century landscape. It is 'political' in the sense that its teaching is designed to prepare the way for a new type of human being. Whitlock does a great service in showing how Nietzsche, far from advocating a sort of proto-Fascism, predicted its unhappy occurrence. Nietzsche's infamous 'overman' is not a member of a eugenically produced 'master-race', but rather a type of being who can come to will the doctrine of the 'Eternal Recurrence of the Same'.

The question for both Whitlock and Nietzsche is how can one affirm the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence and at the same time be concerned about the 'future'? If the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence makes the notion of a linear progression of time itself problematic, then in what sense can the book which presents this doctrine be a book of the 'future'? Perhaps one could read the 'future' in *Zarathustra* and in Nietzsche's work generally as a symbol for the ontological category of 'possibility' as opposed to 'actuality'. In this way, one could argue that *Zarathustra* is a work which attempts to see human beings as essentially 'incomplete' (=possible), as beings who can only become 'complete' (=actual) when they will the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. The 'future' would be a concern only for man as the 'incomplete' animal, but not for the 'completed' overman. The 'incompleteness' of *Zarathustra* which Whitlock points out indicates a radical 'incompleteness' in Nietzsche's thought. Whitlock's claim that the conditions for the verification or falsification of *Zarathustra* 'are only met when man's fate is completed' could be restated as follows: 'Only the fully actualized human being (the one who can will the Eternal Recurrence) can determine whether a human being can be fully actualized.' One way out of such a paradox would be to re-think Nietzsche's conception of temporality in *Zarathustra*. Although Whitlock does not really undertake such an analysis, his important commentary leads the reader to the most important questions concerning *Zarathustra* and the whole of Nietzsche's work.

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Editors' Note

The anglophone editors of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

are pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

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R.A. Shiner