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Oded Balaban
Subject and Consciousness: A Philosophical Inquiry into Self-Consciousness.
Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield (B&N Imports) 1990. Pp. xi+221.
US $34.50. ISBN 0-8476-7616-1.

The title of this book does not indicate the richness of its numerous polemical analyses. Rather than being a gradually developed inquiry into the notion of self-consciousness the work actually consists of fairly discrete chapters, ten in all (divided into three Parts), that address a variety of different philosophical debates from Plato to Marcuse – each of which could be read as separate papers. What serves to link the chapters is a distinction between the 'content' and the 'form' of consciousness. This distinction, in various guises, is used to resolve and/or situate the various debates. It is a closely argued but historically wide-ranging work, with a kind of Hegelian density that would, I suspect, frustrate the casual reader.

Balaban's guiding thesis is based on the phenomenological insight that consciousness is essentially intentional and can be analysed into two moments, the noematic and the noetic. The former deals with the object (or content) of consciousness, while the latter considers the 'cognitive process' (or form) by which consciousness has this object. Self-consciousness is then differentiated from ordinary consciousness, according to Balaban, in that it has for its content the *form* of consciousness (and is thereby constitutive of the human subject). These distinctions are outlined rather than argued for at the beginning of the book and their value must be judged primarily from the work they do in resolving the problems raised in the ensuing chapters.

Chapter 1 concerns the problem posed by the unconscious for an intentional theory of consciousness. It also serves to introduce Balaban's major concepts and distinctions, especially that between the 'formalists' and 'anti-formalists'. The protagonists here are Sartre and Freud, and both are found to be reductivists. Sartre is anti-formalist in that he reduces the formal component of intentionality to the content of consciousness (e.g., I do not hate an object, it is hateful). In this way Sartre ends by rejecting the whole notion of the unconscious and unconscious contents. Freud, on the other hand, is a formalist in that the intentional relation to the object is focused on at the expense of the object and is itself objectified into structures and processes. Consequently, the unconscious becomes thing-like and

separate from consciousness. Balaban's own position is to hold fast to the relationality of consciousness, with its inseparable moments of form/content, and argue for the existence of unconscious contents that are nevertheless present to consciousness in the mode of 'allusions'.

In Chapter 2 the issue is the Platonic theory of knowledge, culminating with Balaban taking a midway position on the Hintikka/Santos debate concerning the function versus the object of knowledge in Plato. Balaban's Plato is a strict anti-formalist in that he does not clearly distinguish between the form and content of knowledge, which leads him to stress only the end result of the process of knowing – the object – and to adopt an absolutist epistemology that stresses expertise. But, argues Balaban, 'the same object may be known differently by different kinds of knowledge' (26), thus introducing the effect of the overlooked formal intentional component. For those interested in the early Plato, Balaban also offers arguments in support of various controversial positions. For example, that the early Plato is neither an educator nor a moral reformer.

The next chapter balances the above by presenting Protagoras, via the Platonic dialogue and in contrast to Plato's position, as a prototypical reductive formalist. Here the object, or reality, is left out of the picture in favour of the knower-subject who determines what is known. The result is of course an outright relativism.

Part I of the book concludes by raising the discussion onto the self-conscious level with a short chapter on Spinoza's notion of Idea. Balaban does not criticise Spinoza, rather he defends an interpretation of Spinoza against various commentators. Daisie Radner, for example, claims that Spinoza distinguishes between ideas representing external bodies and ideas whose objects are external bodies, and that he rejects the second type. Balaban argues that Spinoza rejects both (58). The reason, if I follow Balaban correctly, is that Spinoza's position is situated at the level of self-consciousness, and knowledge of the objective world must be inferred from this seemingly closed starting point. Again, the issues turn, for Balaban, on confusions between the formal and objective aspects of Ideas.

Part II contains three chapters dealing primarily with Hegel and Marx. The first is a lengthy and insightful defense of the ontological argument that takes the reader through a detailed analysis of its history from Anselm, through Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, up to Hegel and, briefly, Marx. This defense relies on Hegel's refutation, in *The Science of Logic*, of Kant's celebrated claim that existence is not a real

predicate. Against Kant's view that existence is external to thought, Hegel maintains that God must be conceived as Concept that attains existence through a process of self-realization towards objectivity. Taken as a whole, claims Balaban, *The Science of Logic* 'can be regarded as Hegel's own ontological argument' (92).

The next chapter continues with an analysis of Marx's notion of consciousness as this gets articulated in his critique of Max Stirner's theory of egoism (*The Ego and His Own*). The final chapter of Part II – The Historical Development of the Form of Consciousness and the Form of Production – is expository and deals with the grounds for Hegel's historical analysis of the forms of consciousness.

Part III of the book, which I will unfortunately have to be very brief about, contains three chapters on social and political consciousness. The first is a critical appraisal of Marcuse's work. The second is an interpretation of the important though often misunderstood concept of *fortuna* in the work of Machiavelli and a consideration of his view of man. The concluding chapter deals with issues of politics and ideology: 'I try to show that the sort of consciousness that is characteristic of the public grasp of politics is anti-formalist, whereas the political consciousness of politicians is of a formalist nature. ... This accounts for the esoteric character of politics' (191).

As should be clear, this book falls within the more European tradition of philosophy of consciousness – deriving especially from Hegel. Balaban's central distinction between the form and content of consciousness yields, I believe, insightful and challenging results in his erudite examinations of a number of key philosophical texts and ideas.

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David Braine and **Harry Lesser, eds.**
Ethics, Technology and Medicine.
Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Co. 1988.
Pp. v+138. US $36.95. ISBN 0-566-05249-0.

The last essay 'Technology and Psychotherapy', in this edited volume, strongly underscores the purpose of this important collection of papers, that of confronting the invasion of the technological attitude into all aspects of health and healing, sickness and suffering. While it is relatively easy to see and justify the use of problem-solving (appropriate diagnosis, intervention and manipulation primarily by physical means) in relation to physical disease, David Smail, a psychologist, recognizes that even in practice of psychotherapy this technological attitude is foundational, an attitude that is 'widely and uncritically shared by both practitioners and patients' (130). Smail says: 'In an age when technology enjoys practically unassailable prestige, it is scarcely surprising that psychotherapists should wish to associate themselves with its benefits, and indeed it is becoming increasingly difficult for ordinary people to think of themselves as anything other than complicated machines (e.g., as bundles of programmable "skills")' (133). Psychological distress, tangible reproof for the way we treat each other, is identified as the result of failure to 'respect either the human community or the human personality' (2). The editors of this volume acknowledge that one conclusion of the book is that 'avoidance of ... psychological damage will not be achieved by technological means, but only through our developing a society in which we treat each other with greater care and kindness' informed by recognition of the human being as a 'psychosomatic unity and an animal set within an environment, and by respect for what is in this way given by nature' (5).

In contrast to such a conclusion, the assumptions underlying the pervasiveness of the technological attitude throughout everyday life (outlined in the Introduction) are that: 1) people are important because of their superior intelligence to animals; 2) education, to be successful, has to harness intelligence for the improvement of life; 3) suffering and disease are to be dealt with by diagnosis and intervention with the goal of cure; 4) the natural environment is to be manipulated to human advantage; and 5) values simply arise from human choices, and skills are used to bring about the ends set by these choices. Within such an attitude all problems are solvable by appropriate physical actions (such as, excising and replacing bits and pieces

of 'psychic' or 'cognitive' machinery). David Braine in 'Human animality: its relevance to the shape of ethics', says that ethics must rather acknowledge the wholeness of human life. Questioning the roots of the personalistic 'misconception' of dualism and physicalism, Braine gives concrete examples of ethical issues that he sees need broader discussion. For example, the use of AID or IVF to produce children needs to be questioned in light of principles which arise from our human 'psychosomatic and animal character as a member of biological nature, and not solely from the character as an intellectual being' (27). Another essential paper by Braine, 'Human life: its secular sacrosanctness', develops his ideas further – suggesting that morality has be to based on understanding the human being as a self-reflective animal within a community of human beings rooted in Nature which carry values and obligations that leave little or 'no room for individualism associated either with egoism or contract theory' (59).

Understanding the human being as animal and tied to community is what confronts the technological attitude throughout all the papers. Simon Glynn's paper challenges the goal of objectivity in which people become spectators (consumers and producers) 'alienated from', rather than participants 'at home in', the world, thus distancing people from each other and their environment. The use of the medical model in health care (Harry Lesser), and medicine's emphasis on the sanctity of life versus the evilness of death (John Hostler) are critiqued as wrongheaded emphases prevalent in medical ethics. Hostler's recognition that his two general principles, 'that life on the one hand and awareness of death on the other are both precious and important', complicate ethical decision making by doctors and nurses, as one is forced to deal with people rather than their bodies alone. David Lamb's 'Down the slippery slope', the fear of where a particular policy will lead, explores the arguments regarding euthanasia and abortion. 'Genetic improvement' (Ruth Chadwick), 'Transsexuals and werewolves: the ethical acceptability of the sex-change operation' (Heather Draper), and David Linton's 'Why is pornography offensive?' deal with specific issues involving technology for which a purely individualistic perspective will not do.

The concerns raised throughout this volume, are of significance because they arise not as a result of the failure of technology but rather the products of its very success, and can only be critiqued as one steps outside the technological attitude to see what Heidegger said, in his essay on 'The Question Concerning Technology' (*Basic Writings*, 1977), may be correct but may not yet be true. This volume is

certainly an important one for health care professionals as it clearly and comprehensively takes issue with the essence of technology through careful emphasis on the concrete examples that face those in decisionmaking positions. While the timeliness of the volume is important as technology is invading health care at a speed which most professionals can hardly comprehend, this importance has less to do with advances in the technology but rather in the overwhelming growth of the technological attitude.

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Peter Caws ed.
The Causes of Quarrel: Essays on Peace, War and Thomas Hobbes.
Boston: Beacon Press 1989. Pp. 224.
US $24.95. ISBN 0-8070-1410-9.

This collection of fifteen pieces (including two by the editor) results from a colloquium held in Washington in 1987 to mark the Bicentennial of the US Constitution, but in theme is oriented more to the quatercentenary, a year later, of Thomas Hobbes. In particular, Peter Caws, as organizer, sought to extend consideration of Hobbes' approach to war and peace beyond the national to the international scene, where the Hobbesian trinity of 'causes of quarrel' – competition, diffidence (distrust) and glory – have seemed so relevant. Caws could not have foreseen the extraordinary recent transformation in world politics, which make his book seem (one dares to hope) dated. But another, more predictable problem is more serious: the notorious difficulty of assembling a collection of consistently high-quality contributions to order for a set occasion. In this collection, unfortunately, most of the pieces are pedestrian at best, too often making heavy weather of getting nowhere in particular. Two (by Gray Cox and Steven Lee) concern themselves with the non-issue of whether peace should be conceived 'negatively' or 'positively'. Three authors (Jean Hampton, William Sacksteder, Andrew Altman) consider 'glory';

two (Paul Churchill and Margaret Chatterjee – who at least writes beautifully) discuss pacifism and non-violence; Charles Griswold contrasts Hobbes and the Founding Fathers on religion and social order; Rex Martin discourses (not very accurately) on consent and authority in Hobbes and Locke; and Anthony de Reuck discusses the general sociology of conflict but makes scant contact with the book's supposed theme. None of these advances the issues much. I shall, therefore, concentrate on the four contributors who do seem to me to raise interesting questions. These span three, obviously overlapping, general themes – human nature, the function of the state, and international relations.

What was Hobbes' view of human nature, and how valid is it? The answers are complicated by a fundamental uncertainty: is Hobbes' argument historical or prescriptive? Does *Leviathan* portray men as essentially rational egoists, or is it a passionate plea to them to become such? Only on the latter interpretation is Hobbes' theory consistent with such undeniable psychological facts as that underlined by Caws: 'the individual taste for risk and death, the willingness to kill ... *and to be killed*, on which war feeds.' Caws, who frequently makes imaginative use of the insights of great literature, drives this point home vividly by quoting Yeats' haunting poem 'An Irish Airman Foresees his Death'. He also draws interestingly on etymology, noting, for example, that 'violence' derives from *vis*, meaning natural force, whereas 'gentleness' is from *gens*, and therefore (perhaps) essentially human. This suggests that, even if primitive 'human nature' is violent, still 'becoming human' means transcending it.

A rather similar contrast recurs in Peter Henrici's contribution, on modern and medieval conceptions of man. According to Henrici, the moderns (including Hobbes), being empiricists, see man's nature as wicked (selfish?), whereas the medievals (such as Aquinas), taking an essentialist and teleological view, saw him as 'fundamentally' good even if 'empirically' corrupt. This medieval view is traced, surprisingly, to Augustine, who, it seems, preached that peace is, in a deep sense, 'universally loved' by men (even when they wage war). Henrici unfortunately does not explain how to reconcile this with the more familiar picture of Augustinian man as essentially a sinner, his sinfulnes making temporal government necessary – a rather Hobbes-like view. In any case it is obvious that war will end only when man's empirical behaviour is peaceful, regardless of his essence or deep longings.

Not that all philosophers have disliked war. To Henrici, Hobbes and Hegel are both 'moderns', but this misses the striking difference in their views on sovereignty and peace. Hobbes preached state sovereignty as the means to peace, the supreme political good; to Hegel state sovereignty is itself the supreme political good, and war (between states) is a necessary means to strengthen and sustain it. Of course, Hegel was not thinking of modern war which (despite presuming knowledge of the Absolute) he did not foresee, any more than Hobbes foresaw the totalitarian state. Do these two developments of state power show that Hobbes' defence thereof is fundamentally flawed?

Charles Landesman argues that Hobbes failed to demonstrate the superiority of the state over anarchy. To Hobbes, 'competition' (for the means of life) is a prime cause of 'quarrel'. But either there is enough for the survival of all, or not. If not, the situation is hopeless – Leviathan cannot help. If there is enough for all, why is it rational to fight over it, rather than agree on some equitable division? 'Cooperation is more rational than selfishness because it allows survival without the great costs of the war of all against all.' However, Landesman here seems to neglect the crucial 'free rider' problem, and also an equally crucial consequence of it: the sovereign state may be (in Hobbes' view, is) itself a necessary condition of economic sufficiency.

But the Hobbesian sovereign state does not, of course, mean the end of war. Sovereign princes remain in a reciprocal state of nature, and one task of the state is to defend its subjects 'from the invasion of foreigners' (*Leviathan*). However, does not the Hobbesian logic, taken to its conclusion, dictate that nations submit themselves to a single world government? Why have they not done so? Would it be rational to do so? If not, is the whole Hobbesian logic refuted? Or is the international state of nature crucially different from the war of every man against every man? Daniel Farrell argues that it is, because states are not 'roughly equal' in power: there is (was?) a balance (of terror) between superpowers, enabling smaller powers to survive. Neither category of state has an interest in the world government that (Farrell believes) world peace requires. But why is this so? I believe Farrell has not dug deep enough into Hobbes' argument, which depends, not simply on rough equality of all men, but on a specific kind of equality – universal vulnerability to violent death. States, however, are artificial not natural creatures, and wars do not (usually) kill them – it kills human beings, but, crucially, not usually (until now) the states' rulers. So it is not so surprising that, as Peter

Caws puts it, statesmen have been 'willing to use death as an instrument of policy.' Arguably, nuclear weapons have transformed this situation; but ideological division (known to Hobbes in its religious form) prevented the Hobbesian logic from working itself out. Now that too is changing – dramatically. What the future holds no-one can predict.

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Paul M. Churchland
A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1989.
Pp. xvii+321.
US $25.00. ISBN 0-262-03151-5.

Zowie! As every philosopher who has not spent the last decade in a cloister must know, there is no more thoroughly modern, no more scientifically literate philosopher of mind than Paul Churchland. And this brilliant collection of his works, each of which is (or would be) a hit single, may very well propel him to centre stage, and not merely in the philosophy of mind, but in philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and ontology as well. Though not composed as a single work, the book reads very well as a unit, with little redundancy, and no gappiness, moved by nothing less than the evolution of Churchland's thinking in the last ten years. Of the 14 chapters, 4 are original essays, and of the new work it is two longer essays, one on explanation (Ch. 10, 33 pages) and one on learning (Ch. 11, 24 pages), which I found most interesting. Together with his equally engaging, indeed ground-breaking essay on theories (Ch. 9, 44 pages), they comprise a rich, clear sonata which, in Churchland's words, takes the classic issues in the philosophy of science, and 'reconstruct[s] them within the framework of ... computational neuroscience' (188). Whether or not the reader agrees with the result, it is hard to avoid the impression that this book just *might* gain the same sort of reputation as La Mettrie's *L'Homme machine* – or at least its notoriety.

Churchland has his eyes fixed on the future, and loves what he sees. In the future, *homo sapiens* will still need philosophy. It will be the *naturalized* philosophy prophesied by the likes of Quine, Feyerabend, and Sellars. But Churchland gives this philosophy a specific face, a face the old masters did not, indeed could not, see. He draws its features in the idiom of the neuro-cognoscenti, the language of the high-dimensional phase space (each dimension represents a firing frequency of one of our 100,000,000,000 neurons – by Churchland's count), with its input (usually sensory) vectors (sets of frequencies), output (usually motor) vectors, and connectivity matrices or spaces (representing the synaptic connections between neurons). All of these ideas are gently and gracefully introduced; indeed, the book would serve graduate students well as a text. Churchland will not be happy until this new idiom – which, I agree, is a thing of power and beauty – becomes as familiar to the philosopher as classical logic now is. Its beauty and power derive from the way it permits our spatial intuitions, our ability to imagine plain old three-dimensional space, to un-boggle the mind contemplating the complexities of neural states and neural functioning. Naturally, diagrams and graphs are an integral part of the text.

The first mover of Churchland's new work is the precocious PDP (parallel distributed processing) or 'connectionist' approach to AI (artificial intelligence) and neuro-psychology, championed largely by Churchland's colleagues at the University of California at San Diego (the two-volume scripture of the movement: *Parallel Distributed Processing*, by David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland and the PDP Research Group (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1986]). Embracing PDP represents a notable retreat from the gritty empiricism of the earlier Churchland, who was anxious to wade into the sea of detail that is contemporary neurophysiology. PDP is a halfway house between bottom-up and top-down approaches. Churchland bets very heavily that this brash new West Coast paradigm, fresh from its string of impressive victories in AI, will make felicitous contact both with neurophysiology below and intelligence above. The wary philosopher may hesitate to sink too much capital into this project, as the small voice warns *in foro interno*, 'But what if the PDP approach should turn out to be wrong – or just incomplete?' According to Churchland, that voice is the merest of superficialities in any case.

Let me say, into the other ear, that Churchland has proven himself to be a very cagey venture capitalist so far. One of the most striking aspects of this book is the degree to which the many promissory

notes which were one trademark of Churchland's earlier works are now being paid off in hard cash. Here, as in the bible, the prophecies of earlier chapters have a way of being fulfilled in later chapters.

Let's look at the Churchland portfolio in a little more detail. A theory is identified with the individual's set of synaptic weights, i.e., that aspect of his/her brain mapped by its connection matrix, which, according to PDP, determines how s/he will respond to any incoming information, in particular, sensory inputs and questions. Explanatory understanding (*not* explanation) is identified with 'prototype activation', i.e., the firing up of one instance of a sort of an individual's possible brain states, namely the sort which will accommodate the *explanandum*. One hardly knows where to begin in detailing the departures with tradition! There is a deplatonizing: theories (and presumably explanations) have no reality outside of the brains of their proponents; two people never hold just the same theory, or share the same explanatory understanding; and, although Churchland doesn't point this out, there is no easy and literal sense to such familiar phrases as 'the atomic theory', or 'the relativistic explanation of orbits'. There is a corresponding shift from the objective to the subjective, from the theory or explanation as intersubjectively shared construct to the neurophysiological minutiae of a given brain. Paradoxically, there is a universalization as well: every neural structure everywhere and everywhen has a theory (since they all have a connectivity matrix): worms and madmen (and even PDP programs running on the desktop computer) have theories. There is an abandonment of prescription (or rational reconstruction) in favor of description.

A cautionary note to investors: Churchland assumes without argument that PDP research will somehow learn how to handle cognitive states and processes which depend on structure and/or sequential order. These are currently recognized to constitute the most formidable hurdle to the completeness of the PDP paradigm. Understanding this sentence somehow involves appreciating its structure and/or the sequence of its elements. PDP approaches have been notably slow to say much about what goes on here. Do you, the reader, arrive in Churchlandish fashion at a single brain state at the end of the sentence, which constitutes your understanding of it? If so, how is the resulting state sensitive to the sequence of brain states caused by your reading of the sentence? Is there a separate brain state just in case you understand the whole paragraph, etc.? How does whatever structure a brain state has determine its cognitive significance? To put

it in Fodor and Pylyshyn's pointed way, PDP is hard pressed to account for the difference between the thought that John loves Mary, as opposed to the thought that Mary loves John (Steven Pinker and Jacques Mehler, eds., *Connections and Symbols* [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1988] 3-72). Be warned that such formerly typical Churchlandianisms as 'meaning is fixed... by the surrounding network of beliefs' (274) must now leave the ranks of the *explanantia* for those of the prospective *explananda*. Do not rule out the possibility that Churchland has insider information here. But remember too that he is subject to a rosy optimism with respect to any healthy scientific business – such as PDP.

Thus the wary investor will pore carefully over the now familiar Churchlandish bashing of the gang of four: folk-psychology, classical logic, classical AI, and classical philosophy. This band still constitutes an enigma for PDP and the Churchlandish philosophy. His portrayal of these old boys, each with his hands in the others' pockets, is charming, pointed, and full of insight. His arguments are as persuasive as ever that *homo* is not essentially a sentential calculator, and that his epistemic life is only superficially linguistic or calculational. Still, one's inner voice keeps saying such things as, for example, that science, *actual* science, the one which arose in Europe over the last few millennia, would have been impossible without language. Indeed, despite Churchland's arguments, those very things which we, and PDP networks, are so bad at, such as mathematics, logic, complex linguistic-conceptual processing, high-dimensional phase spaces, matrix multiplication, etc., and which the gang of four are so good at, still aptly capture the soul of modern science.

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Jacques Derrida
Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question.
Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and
Rachel Bowlby.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
1989. Pp. vii+139.
US $19.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-14320-1);
US $10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-14322-8).

The present volume is a translation of a previously published lecture (*De l'esprit: Heidegger et la question* [Editions Galilée 1987]) which Derrida gave in March 1987 to a conference in Paris entitled '*Heidegger: questions ouvertes*'. At the outset, he announces an ostensive theme and a conundrum: 'What is avoiding? Heidegger on several occasions uses the common word *vermeiden*: to avoid, to flee, to dodge. What might he have meant when it comes to "spirit" or the "spiritual"?' (1). In *Sein u. Zeit* (§ 10), Heidegger at first disallows the term 'spirit' as being too closely 'linked to the Cartesian position of the *subjectum*' (18). In the 1953 essay devoted to Trakl, 'Die Sprache im Gedicht', he asks unreproachfully why the poet avoids the word '*geistig*', and answers in his stead: 'Because the "*Geistige*" names the opposite of the material' (quoted, 95) and so 'remains caught in the metaphysico-Platonic-Christian oppositions of the below and beyond, of the low and the high, of the sensible and the intelligible' (33). Yet it would seem that Heidegger himself was unable to abide by his own proscription and hence to avoid what he thought must be avoided. For in the intervening twenty-five years – 'and this was not just any quarter of a century' – 'Heidegger made frequent, regular, marked (if not remarked) use of all this ["spiritual"] vocabulary, including the adjective *geistig*' (1). At the risk of sounding too cutely Heideggerian, one might then ask, 'What gives here?' and venture to guess in Heideggerian terms, 'the hidden source (*Es*) of Being itself (*gibt Sein*)'. This, roughly determined, is the topic Derrida explores.

Derrida situates his discussion with 'three preliminary arguments' (to be taken in a literal rather than a strictly logical sense). First, 'although the lexicon of spirit is more copious in Heidegger than is thought, he never made it the title or the principal theme of an extended meditation, a book, a seminar, or even a lecture' (5). Yet, for Derrida, this is not a matter simply of incidental inclusions and omissions by Heidegger himself. Rather, he suggests, what is named by the term '*Geist*' in Heidegger's thought at once both 'forces' *itself* upon

Heidegger's discourse and 'withdraws *itself*, ... as if it did not belong to a history of ontology' (5; my emphasis). Second, Heidegger nevertheless does explicitly invoke the motif of spirit and the spiritual and does so, one might say, in suspicious circumstances. 'This motif is regularly inscribed in contexts that are highly charged politically, in the moments when thought lets itself be preoccupied more than ever by what is called history, language, the nation, *Geschlecht*, the Greek or German languages' (5). Third, the 'inscription' of 'spirit' in Heidegger's work is neither strictly 'thematic' nor 'athematic,' and so amounts neither simply to a peremptory invocation *ab extra* of a purely arbitrary measure, nor to the calculated product of an explicit axiology. 'Its modality requires another category' (6), one whose meaning goes beyond the abstract classification of individual propositions to be inscribed in the context where the essential interrelations of thinking and Being, language and history are constituted. In this domain, however, the question of spirit is not simply an issue of the correctness or incorrectness, warrant or arbitrariness of Heidegger's overtly political pronouncements, but of 'the very meaning of the political as such' in his thought. Though it may not serve to 'decide' this meaning, the 'question of *Geist*' will 'in any case' grant a perspective from which to 'situate the place of such a decision' in relation to the 'great questions of Being and truth, of history, of the *Ereignis*, of the thought and unthought' (6).

By 'following the trace of Heidegger's spirituality' (*le spiritual heideggerien*, both subj. and obj. genitive) from *Sein u. Zeit* through the *Rektoratsrede* and the *Einführung in die Metaphysik* to the *Gespräch* with Trakl ('one of Heidegger's richest texts' [86]), Derrida seeks as well to approach 'in its most economical torsion' the tangled 'knot' of what is 'left hanging, uncertain, still in movement and therefore ... *yet to come* in Heidegger's text' (8-9). In this, however, *the* 'question' for Derrida is not exclusively nor straightforwardly one 'of spirit' or 'of the political,' but the 'question of the question, ... the apparently absolute ... privilege of the *Fragen*,' which Heidegger calls the 'piety' of thinking (9). Still, this issue encompasses the ostensive theme. For '*Geist* ... is perhaps the name Heidegger gives, beyond any other name, to this unquestioned possibility of the question' (10), and hence is the name of that to which a thoughtful 'piety' is owed.

Now, were Derrida a conventional philosopher, were the text under review a straightforward commentary, were it not a translation to English of Derrida's French discourse on Heidegger's German, with the two (three?) texts questioning the very meaning of translation,

were its aim to judge on familiar terms rather than to situate through the 'unspoken,' were the historiographic and philsophic issues of *l'affaire Heidegger*, upon which this text bears, not themselves in question as such, etc., etc., one might well go on here simply to summarize and evaluate arguments and conclusions. Since matters are not so straightforward, I shall limit myself instead (rather arbitrarily) to remarks on three interrelated issues that this *Gespräch* between Derrida (Bennington & Bowlby?) and Heidegger evokes.

First, Heideggerians might well attempt to situate the explicit talk of 'Geist' within Heidegger's overall strategy for an 'overcoming' of metaphysics and thus see it as concommitant with, for example, his discussions of 'essence' and truth.' Typically, Heidegger's move is to 'step back behind' the 'usual,' hegemonic interpretations of the terms in question to recover (often directly in the 'elemental words in which *Dasein* expresses itself' [*Sein u. Zeit.*, §44]) an ontologically more original and inclusive 'sense/truth'. Yet there is an important asymetry between the cases. In the consideration of the essence of truth and the truth of essence, the step by step 'deconstruction' of usual meanings and the 'original recollection' that opens the way to an essential transformation of thinking are vectors along the same path, where what is 'avoided' in one respect is engaged more essentially in another. With the thinking of spirit, however, Heidegger offers only an episodic deconstruction of the history of ontology from Descartes to Hegel and an original recollection of meaning from texts of Schelling, Hölderlin, Trakl, but does not gather these themes together 'methodically' nor recover more originally what at first was avoided. In the event, what might be 'correct' in humanism and the philosophy of the subject tends simply to be occluded. Thus, in those instances when Heidegger does venture beyond metaphysics to think 'spirit' *im Gespräch*, his discourse appears displaced, as if he has lept too far. When likewise he invokes the authority of spirit in overtly political contexts, he seems beyond the pale.

Second, though Derrida is more concerned to explore a context of philosophemes than to reach conclusions, he does venture an 'hypothesis' he seeks to 'verify,' to wit, that in Heidegger's work 'Geist...is another name for the One and the *Versammlung*' (9), which is to be understood, at a level before all metaphor and metaphysics, as '*das Flammende, Flamme*' (84). One need not decipher the content of these claims (though cf. e.g., '*En-logos-pyr*) to recognize that they are indeed what Heidegger says of spirit, though in the *Gespräch* with Trakl. Yet here, Derrida asserts, 'there is no deciding whether the

speaker speaks in his name or in correspondence with Trakl' (85). It is the language of spirit itself that ultimately rules over what is spoken between them. 'The speech [*parole*] of the two who speak, the language [*langue*] which speaks *between* them divides and gathers according to a law, a mode, a regime, a genre which can receive their name only from *the very thing* which is said here, by the language or speech of this *Gespräch*. Language speaks *in* speech' (83). By this account, then, Trakl and Heidegger do not simply deploy a language as an instrument to speak on the subject of spirit; rather the *Gespräch* is 'defined as a determinate mode of speech only from what is said of spirit, of the essence of *Geist* as *it* divides and gathers in conflagration' (83-4; my emphasis). But here too we seem beyond the pale. For however much it is the language of spirit/the spirit of language (cf. language-*logos-legein-Versammlung-Geist*) that speaks in an original sense, it is still the individual who is responsible for giving this language specific utterance in the world and who in this particular way exercises a *libertas indifferentiae* toward the gift. The rule of language, even if it cannot be escaped, must be *appropriated* in speaking and in this appropriation one also speaks for oneself.

Yet, third, it is not language but *a* language, local and 'historical', that rules the *Gespräch*. 'An extraordinary authority accrues to [*revenir à*] this motif of spirit or of the spiritual *in its German language*' (5; my translation). In contrast to the abstract and avowed universality of metaphysics, this language is 'parochial' in a literal sense, that is, it delimits (*para*) in essence a community, a home (*oikos*). This suggests the place where the 'political' in Heidegger's work gets decided, that is, in the *'seinsgeschichtlich'* domain of the essential interconnexion of 'language' and 'home' that gathers a people as one. Now, under the hegemony of contract liberalism, where justice (or 'English-speaking justice', as George Grant says) lies in the 'rational' calculations of free and equal individuals who in all essential respects are indifferently the same, any attempt to link justice *essentially* with language and homeland as what is properly 'one's own' is apt to seem fascist. (Witness Pierre Trudeau's arch-liberal rejection in *Federalism and the French Canadians* of Québecois separatism as 'fascist', or the current liberal reaction to the discourse of 'language and homeland' in Zionist denials of a Palestinian state). It may well be (as George Grant 'laments') that in the modern world there is no place for a conservative vision that acknowledges the claims of 'nations' along with the rights of individuals. Yet it may also be (as Heidegger thought) that only such a vision can respond

to the anomie and rootlessness that accrue from the essence of our present world-situation, conditions which, in severing autonomous individuals from any essential belonging, leave them open against the very spirit of liberality to the worst sorts of *Führers*, the most violent denunciations of the 'Other', and the most malignant appeals to 'blood and soil'.

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Steve Fuller
Philosophy of Science and Its Discontents.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1989.
Pp. x+188. US $32.95. ISBN 0-8133-0611-6.

Philosophy of science is written, F. observes, as if scientists were autonomous rational individuals. Like Kant's autonomous moral agent, the autonomous scientist reasons independent of the influences of society and inclination (7-8). While Kant's concept was normative, not empirical, it is obvious that philosophy of science needs both dimensions. Drawing on experimental psychology, F. argues that the notion of autonomous rationality is neither empirically adequate nor normatively applicable to science. Any philosophy which defines science in terms of autonomous rationality, therefore, has 'an imaginary locus of inquiry, [which he calls] *internal history of science*' (7).

Even externalists, sociologists of science, accept the primacy of the internalist reading of scientific texts. Hence, they unintentionally presuppose the mythical cognitive domain, thereby putting themselves on the defensive (25-6). The *offensive* externalist (11-2, 27-9), F. claims, would study science from the third-person perspectives of experimental psychology and evolutionary biology (59-61, 131-5).

In Chapter 1 of the book's three F. argues that internalist assumptions lead to mythical history, which produces an 'anemic normativism' (7ff). Philosophers shift deftly between modalities, from what *did* happen, to what *ought to have* happened, and what *ideally would have* happened. Thus, most of their *history* of science is normative rather than descriptive (8-10), and this in turn renders their avowed

normative positions either too modest or unclear. For one thing, philosophers *evaluate* without *prescribing*. They conjecture about what kind of research *should have been done* in past, unchangeable episodes, but won't say what kind of research *should be done* in the future (10). For another thing, all of the most influential contemporary philosophies are justified in terms of what a scientific community would be like at some logically ultimate state of inquiry. The normative implications of such positions for the currently practicing individual scientist are at best unclear (36-42).

F.'s remedy is *social epistemology*, which merges theory of knowledge with normative social philosophy (3). In Chapter 2 he argues for conceiving of knowledge in terms of scientific communities rather than autonomous individuals (53-65). Although we might expect him to abandon autonomous rationality altogether, he claims that the problem of rationality is to 'resolve' [sic] the first – and third-person perspectives (4), and criticizes Laudan for abandoning the individual scientist (and hence the hope of finding rationality) too quickly (54). But one must not, like Giere, take the individual scientist's accounts too literally (58-60). Psychological findings render Giere's practice suspect. Students, even scientists, cannot employ canonical strategies of rationality: They 'confirm when they should falsify ... fail to see how sample size affects statistical reasoning ... do not make consistent expected utility assignments; and so on' (70). Training helps very little and doesn't transfer to new tasks (72). Some of the psychologists claim that 'our actual cognitive processes are not merely suboptimal by some preferred normative standard but are downright dysfunctional' (78). F. claims only that we should not take scientists' accounts, which are Giere's primary source of data, at face value (63-5, 70-2).

There are several ways to conceive of knowledge in terms of the community without abandoning the individual altogether. Here are two. (1) Philosophies generally tell us either how to avoid false beliefs (narrow inductivism) or to get rid of them (falsificationism). We can take seriously the material culture in which an idea is embedded (books, lectures, memories, even speech habits) and realize that it might be both impossible and undesirable to avoid having, or 'get rid of', a belief. At most beliefs shift from one discipline to another, a once fashionable scientific theory becoming a theme in history or humanities (77-82). (2) Epistemologies typically instantiate knowledge in individual intellects. Instead we could let the 'narrative structure' implicit in the top articles in the *Citation Index* define the

knowledge produced by a discipline (82-4, 88-90). While these strategies take seriously the epistemological role of the community, F. seems to intend to allow that the individuals could be rational participants. I believe, however, that he fails to do this.

The remedy for the anemic normativism of internalism, which F. recommends in Chapter 3, is unexpected. Shapere advocates studying science 'on its own terms', but F. takes this to be ambiguous. One approach, typical of contemporary philosophies of science, is Giere's: 'The study of science should capture the scientists' own level of reflectiveness about their activities...' It looks for meaning in, but not causes of, scientists' behavior. F. argues instead for 'employing the methods of science itself,' which means looking for causal relations (124-31). He contends that the fulfillment of Giere's approach requires analysis of historical episodes in terms of the counterfactual and subjunctive generalizations and, hence, presupposes the third-person, nomothetic approach (126-35). Furthermore, the goal of Giere's approach is to make individual scientists more methodologically self-consistent. F. maintains that training scientists to practice *reflective equilibrium* has not been shown to be *desirable* (to promote better science) (151-6). The real constraints on scientists' behavior are 'largely self-imposed by individuals who realize that their social survival depends on the recognition they can gain from others' (150), and methodology may play only an incidental part in succeeding within such constraints. Nor is reflective equilibrium even *feasible*. People are much better at maintaining good self images by overlooking inconsistencies than they are at changing their behavior or modifying their principles (156-8). But even if it were conceded that scientists need to become better 'self-regulators,' F. would question the extent to which this involves anything other than biofeedback or behavior modification, which are objects of experimentation rather than contemplation (158).

F. is right in charging that (1) philosophers of science often overlook the relationship between the individual and the community and (2) fail to indicate the level at which theories of rationality are instantiated. But his view leaves very little that could edify and guide a scientist's work. Anyone could learn something about what it means to *do* science *well* by reading Popper, Hempel, or Feyerabend, even if these philosophers are not in all respects correct. If nothing else, they provide vocabularies and strategies for discussing science, of which F. frequently avails himself uncritically. Psychological experiments seem irrelevant to this. What appears to remain in F.'s view

for the practising scientist is that science is sophistry. While he stresses the *community* he deemphasizes *dialogue*, replacing it with 'the *manipulative* character of negative sanctions' (149). Thus, doing science well seems to reduce to remaining in the limelight. But, then, that is the perennial weakness of social science: It mistakes explaining *away* for *explaining*.

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Mary Louise Gill
Aristotle on Substance.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1990. Pp. xi+284.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-691-07334-1.

This book addresses a basic issue in Aristotle's metaphysics, namely, substantial unity. Gill is concerned to determine whether or not Aristotle is consistent in his accounts of the unity of a substance at a given time and its unity through change, what she calls 'vertical' and 'horizontal' unity, respectively. The problem dealt with is posed in the following way: 'If matter persists throughout the generation, career, and destruction of a composite, thus providing horizontal unity, then the matter has a nature distinct from that of the form whose temporary presence gives the composite its particular identity. But if so, then the composite lacks vertical unity: its nature is determined in two ways, by its form and by its matter, each of which is conceptually prior to it. Yet if composites are primary substances, they must be conceptually primary entities, and so must be vertical unities. Thus, the kind of unity needed to account for change conflicts with the vertical unity required of those entities that are primary substances' (5-6).

Gill undertakes to solve the problem by means of a wide-ranging study of the concept of matter both as principle of change and as constituent of composite substantiality. The titles of the seven chapters in the book give a fair indication of the territory covered: 'Matter and Subjecthood', 'The Elements', 'Generation', 'Matter and Definition',

'The Unity of Composite Substances', 'The Cause of Becoming', 'The Cause of Persistence'. The work is completed with an appendix on prime matter, a bibliography limited mainly to recent English-language scholarship, and indices.

The central thesis of this book is that 'Aristotle solves the paradox of unity, not by weakening the demand for vertical unity, but by reinterpreting the demand for horizontal unity. He argues that the matter from which a composite is generated survives in the product potentially but is actually destroyed. This single modification within the theory of generation allows him to argue that composites whose constituent matter is potential are vertical unities' (241). More precisely, it is argued that the traditional conception of prime matter as pure potency is mistaken and that instead 'the pure matter at the foundation is not an indeterminate potentiality but a set of simple elements – earth, water, air, and fire in the lower cosmos, aether in the higher sphere' (242).

The approach taken by Gill in establishing her interpretation is to attempt to extract a coherent account of matter and substance from all the treatise taken together. What this amounts to in practice is intense concentration on the central books of the *Metaphysics* along with relevant passages from the works on nature. These are all taken as elements of a single account. There is some danger in proceeding in this way, for the principles of the science of metaphysics are not identical with the principles governing the physical sciences. Accordingly, when Aristotle examines sensible substance in the *Metaphysics*, he is doing so from the perspective of being, not from the perspective of the physical sciences and the type of knowledge it seeks. Since Gill is primarily concerned to understand the 'horizontal unity' of sensible substances or how they remain identical throughout change, it is important to stress that questions about change as such are not metaphysical questions, at least not for Aristotle. This does not mean that what he says in the *Metaphysics* and elsewhere should be assumed to be contradictory, but rather that a *mélange* of what he says in the *Metaphysics* and elsewhere is in danger of not being authentically Aristotelian.

For Gill, the key move in making the central books of the *Metaphysics* and the physical treatise commensurable occurs early in the work. She rejects the traditional interpretation of Z 3, 1029a27-b33 according to which the priority of form to both the composite and matter is firmly established. Instead, she argues that form and the composite have equal claims to substantiality (16-18). Thus, she can go on

to argue that what Aristotle says about the composite in the remainder of the central books is meant to be included in the final account of primary substance. Indeed, since, on her interpretation, the composite *is* primary substance, whatever Aristotle says about composites elsewhere is part of the single, coherent account. The interpretation of the *Metaphysics* passage is implausible and casts a shadow on the remainder of the work.

Gill's analysis of Z 3 is the basis upon which she proceeds to explore Aristotle's account of the continuity of sensible substances elsewhere in the treatises, but particularly in *On Generation and Corruption*. Once again, she vigorously confronts the tradition in her argument that prime matter as pure potency has no part to play in that account. She believes that all of the texts that have been used to show that prime matter underlies the generation and destruction of sensible substances can be interpreted otherwise. Her lengthy discussion of these texts is not easily summarized, but it is full of interest. I think it is fair to say that Gill shows that these texts do not display a commitment to prime matter as obviously as is widely held. The appendix is especially valuable in this regard. On the other hand, she does not persuade me that Aristotle's analysis of the role of the elements in change obviates the need for prime matter in the account of generation and destruction. For without prime matter, Aristotle's general analysis of change and his distinction between substantial and accidental change are not together tenable. Without prime matter, every change would be an accidental change, which is to say that there would be no point in speaking about a distinction between accidental and substantial change.

Gill takes the substantiality of matter referred to in the *Metaphysics* as a physical claim and not the incontestable metaphysical claim that matter is substance because whatever has being in any way is substance. Since she denies that prime matter is pure potency, she is left to identify the matter in generation and destruction with the elements. In the remainder of the work she returns to the central books of the *Metaphysics* armed with this interpretation. Many familiar texts are ably dissected. A useful feature of the entire book is the continual engagement with the most recent scholarship.

I do not accept the central thesis of this book nor do I share the approach to the central books of the *Metaphysics* which treats them

as unconnected to the conception of first philosophy sketched in the earlier books. Nevertheless, there is much in Gill's work that is worth pondering.

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Will Kymlicka
Liberalism, Community and Culture.
Don Mills, ON and New York Oxford University Press 1989. Pp. 280.
Cdn $73.95; US $35.00. ISBN 0-19-827599-4.

Kymlicka's excellent book offers a defense of egalitarian liberalism, a careful discussion and criticism of communitarian attacks on liberalism, and an extended defense of the value of cultural membership and of the claims of indigenous peoples to semi-autonomous political status. Although heavily indebted to Rawls and Dworkin for its overall outlook, it breaks new ground in applying this perspective to problems about minority rights that are ignored by Rawls and Dworkin. Kymlicka shows that it is possible to take seriously the claims of minorities, nationalities and indigenous peoples within a liberal framework.

Kymlicka's 'liberalism' is that of Kant, Mill, Rawls and Dworkin. It is egalitarian and rejects moral scepticism. People have 'an essential interest in leading a life that is good' (13), and can be mistaken in their beliefs about what would constitute a good life for them. 'Respect for the liberty of others is predicated not on our inability to criticize preferences, but precisely on the role of freedom in securing the conditions under which we can best make such judgements' (10). Kymlicka's liberalism is egalitarian in requiring that governments treat people as equals. Each person has a moral claim to the liberties and resources needed to consider options, make choices and plans, and act on beliefs about what kind of life would be good for him or her (13). Individualism, however, is still part of Kymlicka's liberalism, in two ways. First, individuals must choose their life plans for themselves. '[N]o life goes better by being led from the outside according

to values the person doesn't endorse' (12). Second, liberalism's moral ontology 'recognizes only individuals'. Groups, apart from their links to the interests of individuals, have no moral standing or claims (162).

The second section of the book offers penetrating rebuttals of communitarian criticisms of liberalism. The three chapters in this section examine, respectively, (1) communitarian objections to the liberal account of the self; (2) Charles Taylor's 'social thesis'; and (3) Marx's critique of justice. Although Kymlicka is very critical of communitarianism, he also accepts and incorporates communitarian themes – e.g., the great value of cultural belonging – into his account of minority rights.

The third section of the book concerns whether liberalism can take seriously the claims of nationalities and indigenous peoples to semi-autonomous status within a larger country. This section contains seven chapters covering subjects such as the value of cultural membership, minority rights and the liberal tradition, communitarianism and minority rights, and apartheid in South Africa. Kymlicka's position here is that secure cultural membership is a primary good, closely connected with self-respect and the capacity for autonomous choice: 'Liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, not because they have some moral status of their own, but because it's only through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligently examine their value' (165). People can't be easily transplanted – against their wills – into another culture. When unwanted cultural change is too rapid and substantial, real harm results: '[W]hen the individual is stripped of her cultural heritage, her development becomes stunted ... The affront minority groups feel at [forced assimilation] is grounded in the perception of real harm' (176).

The primary good of cultural membership can be used to ground claims against actions or policies that would destroy the cultures of indigenous peoples. It can also ground claims of indigenous peoples to a substantial degree of control over matters affecting cultural survival, and can justify restrictions on the rights of members of the majority to enter, reside in, or participate in the political decisions of indigenous reserves. Kymlicka endorses claims to collective rights 'as appropriate measures for the rectification of an inequality ... which affects aboriginal people collectively' (194). He defends such rights against the charge that they give indigenous groups unfair prerogatives that the majority population does not enjoy. Here Kymlicka

relies on Dworkin's idea that it is fair to compensate people for substantial disadvantages that result from their circumstances rather than their choice: 'The English and French in Canada rarely have to worry about the fate of their cultural structure. They get for free what aboriginal people have to pay for: secure cultural membership. This is an important inequality, and if it is ignored, it becomes an important injustice' (190).

Kymlicka's approach here is fruitful; it shows where the value of secure cultural membership can be placed, and what sorts of claims it can generate, within Rawlsian liberalism. Some of the details of this account might be improved, however. For example, Kymlicka traces the problems of Inuit adolescents to the absence of a culturally-endorsed set of options for choice and of role-models instantiating those options (165). I suspect that this misconceives the contemporary problem since Inuit adolescents face not so much absence of traditional choices and role-models (those are still there to a considerable degree), but rather changed circumstances that make some of the old options less attractive and the presence of another cultural framework with its set of options and models (e.g., television, motorized vehicles, new foods provided in school lunches, alternative career choices). The key problem for choice is how to combine or integrate these options from two different cultural frameworks into a meaningful life plan that fits contemporary circumstances, and most people find such integration extremely difficult. Greater control over the areas where they live and fairer access to national resources will help indigenous peoples to cope with the problems posed by the invasion of new lifestyles and technologies, but such control won't stop or even greatly diminish the invasion and the problems for choice that it poses.

Kymlicka has provided the best philosophical treatment of minority rights issues that I know of. His book deserves to be widely read and discussed.

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Keith Lehrer
Theory of Knowledge.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1990.
Pp. xii+212.
US $35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0570-5);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0571-3).

Lehrer has reworked his earlier *Knowledge* (Oxford University Press 1974) with three ends in mind. While Lehrer's views on epistemology are essentially unchanged, his first goal was to offer refinements and clarifications of his coherence theory of knowledge. His second aim was to produce a book suitable as a text in epistemology courses. As a result, the new book is somewhat shorter, some points are presented in a slightly more elementary fashion and Lehrer includes a guide to further reading with each chapter to assist students. His third goal has been to take account of recent developments in epistemology. 'Naturalism' and 'externalism' do not appear in the index of the 1974 book. The new book devotes an entire chapter to 'Externalism and Epistemology Naturalized' and throughout the book Lehrer considers externalist challenges to his views. Lehrer is successful in realising his aims. Lehrer has succeeded in the difficult task of producing a good text for students while including enough new material to interest his colleagues.

The first two chapters introduce the basic conceptual issues of epistemology. Unlike many naturalists, Lehrer is unwilling to reduce knowledge to the storage and processing of information. Essentially he accepts the traditional view that knowledge is justified, true belief. Lehrer does propose two refinements. He prefers to speak of knowers having knowledge when they accept a claim rather than when they believe it. Lehrer draws this distinction because there is a sense in which people have beliefs whose truth they doubt. (A soccer fan may believe that 'Canada will win the 1994 World Cup'.) Knowers accept a claim when they are concerned with believing truths. Here Lehrer merely makes explicit what epistemologists have long intended. Lehrer's second departure from the traditional account of knowledge is in response to the Getier problem. Lehrer holds that a fourth condition must be met if knowledge is to be possessed. A claim must be true, accepted, justified and justified in a way that does not depend on any false statements.

Chapters three through five and eight discuss alternatives to Lehrer's theory. The first three give a fair and mainly clear presen-

tation of standard positions. Lehrer rehearses the usual, telling objections to the view that a class of indubitable, self-justifying beliefs provide a firm foundation for all knowledge. He also considers and rejects Chisholm's more sophisticated foundationalism with its self-fustified but fallible beliefs and the 'explanatory coherence theory' of writers such as Sellars and Harman. Chapter eight is devoted to fresher questions of naturalised epistemology. Lehrer fairly presents but unequivocally rejects the fashionable view that a belief becomes knowledge if its possessor stands in an appropriate (causal) relation to the external world. It is difficult to see why externalism is all the rage. As Lehrer notes, there is a 'general objection to all externalist theories which is as simple to state as it is fundamental' (162). A person's belief could stand in causal relations to the world and so, on the externalist account be, true. If, however, the knowers are ignorant of these relations, they can hardly be said to have knowledge. Only when the knower has beliefs about the cause is the belief justified and knowledge possible. Externalism and foundationalism have the same problem: knowers need to consult other beliefs before any given belief becomes knowledge.

This point leads Lehrer to adopt a coherence theory of justification. He develops his theory in two steps. First, he gives an account of how individuals can be personally justified in accepting some belief. Next, he argues that personal justification can become the complete and undefeated justification he thinks is required for knowledge. In the first step, Lehrer argues that individuals are personally justified in accepting some belief if and only if it is supported by their other beliefs. Justification is a matter of determining what is most reasonably accepted, given what is already accepted. Lehrer imagines what he calls the 'justification game'. This game involves knowers responding to a sceptic who challenges some claim they accept. Knowers win the game by showing that, given their other beliefs, it is more reasonable to accept the claim than the sceptic's alternative.

The sceptic is not defeated when knowers win a justification game: the other beliefs of the knower may be false. In Chapter Seven, the most philosophically interesting but least satisfying chapter, Lehrer tries to convert personal justification into complete and undefeated justification. Personal justification is undefeated justification just in case all the justifying beliefs are true. Lehrer imagines an 'ultra justification game'. In this game, sceptics have a new move: they can require knowers to reject any false belief. (Lehrer imagines an odd sceptic: an omniscient one.) In the ultra justification game, knowers

can only use true beliefs to justify their claims. The ultra justification game results in an 'ultra system' which contains no falsehoods. Any belief which coheres with this system will be undefeatedly justified. Any such belief is knowledge. It is accepted, justified, justified by no falsehoods and true.

The trouble is that there is no omniscient sceptic and playing the ultra justification game without one is like playing football without the ball. As Lehrer recognises, the justification game is the only game in town. It is not clear what Lehrer's introduction of the ultra justication game accomplishes. It may establish an ideal of knowledge but it is one finite knowers such as humans cannot attain. Ordinary mortals can have no guarantee that their justified beliefs are true and there can be no decisive refutation of the sceptic. Lehrer makes a virtue of this necessity: his response to scepticism is to accept an inoculating dose of the disease. The danger is that the vaccine might kill him. Lehrer is left in the position of metaphysical realists, who believe that any belief may be false even though all the available evidence suggests that it is true. Advocates of the coherence theory would do better to reject the realist conception of truth which Lehrer implicitly adopts. Suppose that truth is identified, rather, with what is justified when all the available evidence is in. Truth and knowledge are, then, attainable and a more satisfactory response to the sceptic can be given.

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Joseph Margolis
Science Without Unity.
Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1989.
Pp. xxii+470.
Cdn $63.95; US $45.00. ISBN 0-631-15173-7.

Joseph Margolis' aim in this second of three related works on contemporary philosophy is to lay waste what he takes to be the received version of the unity of science doctrine, and in the process of doing

so, to provide for a broader unity between the natural sciences and the so-called 'human sciences'. Once established, such a unity would, according to Margolis, provide the basis for coherent linkages between naturalism, phenomenology, and postmodernist deconstruction. Though Margolis brings an impressive armamentarium to the task (a few short of a thousand footnotes based on references drawn from the four corners of the intellectual globe), in the end, it is by no means clear that he has achieved the goal of establishing a grand unification of rational inquiry.

What makes Margolis' argument nonetheless important and interesting is that in attempting to make the world safe for intentional things and their intensional idiom, he avoids the usual arguments of his romanticist forbears, which leave science untouched, and rest instead on some form of mind-body dualism. Instead, Margolis attempts to recast naturalism itself in such a way that it is no longer inimical to the larger world of a larger science.

Much of Margolis' argument follows known paths. Any attempt to gain a unity based on reductionistic foundationalism will fail, he reminds us, for there is no font of epistemic privilege, no 'cognitively transparent' link with the world which might provide us with unalloyed knowledge of it. Gone as well is any ground for doctrines closely associated with the old unity movement, i.e., the assumed primacy of physicalism, extensionality (and causality defined extensionally), and correlatively, the presumed eliminability of intensional structures in nature.

Gone also, according to Margolis, is any possible justification for what he calls 'logocentrism,' i.e., 'the blind assurance that the real world cannot but accord with certain logical doctrines' (9) such as the Tarskian insistence on bivalence, or Quine's contention that science can successfully avoid any dependence on intensionality. All of science, in fact, now becomes profoundly relativised to culture, language, and history. Yet at the same time, Margolis insists that scientific realism remains unthreatened within this scheme.

Once dispossessed of any hope of attaining such a ground of primacy or privilege, and once it is recognized that the world contains much that is irreducibly intentional (including selves, minds, etc.), as well as much that binds knowledge within intension-laden contexts (including those which are linguistic, historical or social), then according to Margolis we have attained the ground common to naturalism, phenomenology, and deconstruction. With all three perspectives now on an equal footing, there arises what Margolis calls a 'symbiosis'

between world and self, one between methodology and ontology, and another between realism and idealism. What he means by this is that the members in each pair are ultimately interdependent. Thus for instance our conception of the world is inescapably relativized to the self, and the self, he argues with considerable obscurity, is what he calls 'naturally emergent,' i.e., the incarnate expression of intentional properties.

But why move heaven, earth, and, most importantly, science to accommodate minds and selves? The premisses of Margolis' argument can, and repeatedly have, been granted. Foundationalism is so dead that the belief that there is no 'fancifully fanciless basement of unvarnished mews' has become almost a commonplace. Reductionism is similarly moribund (as Ian Hacking points out, no science has ever been reduced to another science). Finally, even the most flint-hearted behaviorists now concede that the world does contain intentional phenomena.

Margolis' considerable labors are based on the belief that given these premisses, we are obliged to change our conceptions of the world and of science to properly accommodate minds and selves. Others will surely disagree, on several counts. For instance, though intentional phenomena do exist, there is not the least indication that they occupy a position of such significance to warrant any large displacement in our common understanding of things. Science's habit of speaking in the mode of third person extensionalist physicalism, though no longer a symptom of metaphysical committment, continues to pay large dividends. Margolis, by contrast, offers the benefits of a large scale unification of rational inquiry, but at a considerable price for science. Thus while realism persists in name in Margolis' scheme of things, in fact it resembles the eviscerated variety of 'internal' realism espoused by Hilary Putnam and others. Unity may have been gained, but the world may have been lost.

In *Science Without Unity*, Joseph Margolis offers interesting arguments in favor of a *rapprochement* between naturalism and phenomenology. Whether the price paid for it is too high in terms of the way he reconceives science, is another matter entirely.

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Christine Overall
Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Analysis.
Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman 1988.
Pp. viii+245.
US $39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-04-497009);
US $13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-04-497010-2).

This book discusses a wide range of issues related to human reproduction. Its nine chapters include an Introduction and a Conclusion and essays on preconceptive and prenatal sex selection of offspring; the moral status of the human embryo/fetus and the relevance of this status to several other issues, including the questions of abortion and of holding women liable for prenatal harms; childbirth and technologies now commonly used before and during childbirth; surrogate motherhood; infertility and assisted reproduction; and reproductive rights and access to reproductive assistance. There is an extensive bibliography. Although much of the material in most of the chapters has been published previously in various journals, Overall brings the material together here in a coherent, useful way that makes the book read as a book rather than as a collection of independently prepared essays.

Overall begins by laying out clearly and helpfully what she takes a feminist approach to these issues to involve, namely, a commitment to understanding and incorporating women's experiences into the analysis, thereby including a perspective founded upon and informed by an awareness that women have been and are victims of oppression under patriarchy, that is, the system of male dominance. She further makes clear that a feminist analysis of the issues she addresses pays attention to the ways that oppression of women has been maintained, and that feminist proposals on these issues will be guided by the determination to avoid perpetuating that oppression, and by a commitment to contribute to the dissolution of sexual inequality and to attend to the welfare of women and children. She nicely explains how such a perspective differs from what she calls 'antifeminist' and 'nonfeminist' perspectives on these issues, and she rightly points out that these latter perspectives have tended to dominate discussions of the topics that occupy her in this book. She says that her 'aim ... is to advance a cohesive feminist analysis of reproductive ethics' (12); and the result is an illuminating, provocative, and cohesive book that treats its subject much differently than it has been treated in most of the bioethics literature on reproduction.

Throughout the book, Overall is true to the perspective she describes and which she rightly promises issues in insights not usually uncovered by authors not writing from a feminist perspective. Although some of Overall's analyses and arguments are problematic (I shall raise some objections momentarily), she consistently teases out those aspects of the issues under discussion that often have subtle but serious implications for the well being of women and children and the societal positions of women and children. Feminists, she rightly claims, have not generally been enthusiastic about reproductive technologies, and her discussions of these technologies (including prenatal testing, technologies now commonly used in childbirth, technologies allowing surrogate motherhood, among others) make eminently clear just why feminists have not been enthusiastic about these innovations. For example, Overall's excellent discussions of the commodification of reproduction (in Chapter 3) and of surrogate motherhood (in Chapter 6) include convincing arguments that many of the new reproduction-assisting technologies serve the interests of neither women nor children well. She also raises serious questions about the traditional value of having a genetic link to children, and she shows how that value is connected to the commodification of reproduction and of children, which may serve the interests of men but (again) not the interests of women and children.

Although Overall's treatments of her topics are consistently illuminating and generally philosophically able, she does sometimes argue too quickly, drawing conclusions that need more support than she gives them. For example, she wants to place significant weight on the claim that technologies that are presented as helpful to embryo/fetuses instead may be harmful to them even though development and application of these technologies is beneficial to those (generally male) scientists and providers who develop and administer them. This is surely true. But it does not justify the surprising general position she takes in conclusion, namely, that 'the new reproductive technology [i]s a harm rather than a benefit to the embryo/fetus (48).' Also, the details of Overall's arguments occasionally are problematic. For example, her discussion of abortion concentrates not on what rights women and embryo/fetuses might have, but on what rights each does not have. That is, she holds that a woman has a right to terminate a pregnancy but not a right to the death of an embryo/fetus and that an embryo/fetus has no right to occupation of any womb. This is a novel approach to the question of abortion; but Overall's use of the approach is puzzling in its detail, since despite her claim

that an embryo/fetus has no right to occupy a woman's uterus, she also claims that it is sometimes wrong to abort a pregnancy, and she gives as examples certain cases where a pregnancy is planned and/or far along. But *why* abortion would be wrong in these cases is never spelled out; and the terms in which Overall discusses these cases naturally suggests that even if there is no *general* right of embryo/fetuses to occupy women's wombs, in some cases there might still be some *special* right to occupancy to which she is implicitly appealing. Also, although Overall claims that a woman does not have a right to kill her embryo/fetus, she also claims that sometimes it may not be wrong for a woman to do so. But if it is not wrong for someone to do X, then it would seem to follow that she has a right (i.e., is morally entitled or at moral liberty) to do X.

Such conceptual problems are, however, really minimal in this book and the perspective Overall brings to bear on her topics provides the insight and illumination she means for it to provide. That is, she ably shows again and again that there is an ominous side to the 'new' reproductive technologies that simply cannot be ignored and that needs to be far more widely recognized than it has been. Overall has made an important contribution to the contemporary bioethics literature. It should not be missed.

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Shane Phelan
Identity Politics: Lesbian Feminism and the Limits of Community.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1989. Pp. 206.
US $29.95. ISBN 0-87722-651-2.

The problem Phelan addresses has been created through the privileging of heterosexual monogamy, a privilege that has been maintained in part by discourses which label other sexualities as deviant, diseased, or immature. These discourses create the ideologies within which the emerging self defines itself, and the force of their definitions

in the fledgling psyche is the production of a negative identity in those whose sexual orientation is neither heterosexual, nor monogamous. Such persons experience the shame, anxiety, and uncertainty of those who fear that the prevailing discourses might be right. And the power of these discourses is such that those who resist their definitions nonetheless feel a profound alienation from the mainstream culture that the discourses inform.

Identity politics redresses the alienation produced by hegemonic discourses. It consists in the construction of counter-cultures, communities within which the negative self-identities of mainstream society are countered by the creation of positive identities. These subcultures are the source of the strength of feminism, black power, gay and lesbian movements, as well as of many radical political movements. However, they function through the creation of strict definitions in terms of which an exclusive membership is maintained. Within the feminist movement these definitions have focussed on sexuality to the point where what is perceived as women's more nurturant, connected, diffused sexuality is valorized and what is perceived as men's aggressive, powermongering, genitally-focussed 'pornographic' sexuality condemned. Radical 'anti-porn' feminism, which sees women's sexuality as incompatible with men's and which makes lesbianism a condition of membership in the feminist community, stands as the apotheosis of this political deconstruction of patriarchal sexual mores. Thus, the very core of radical feminist theory is challenged by the identity politics of lesbian sadomasochists, who show every evidence of being feminist, but who practise what appears to be the violent sexuality of the deprecated patriarchy.

Phelan does not focus either on a defence of feminist sadomasochists, or on the arguments they offer. This is disappointing, since it would seem that any healing of the split between the anti-porn feminists and the sadomasochist feminists would be based on resolutions arising from their articulated differences. It is also confusing, since Phelan believes that the sadomasochist feminist's position is a liberal one, based on the argument from consent, an appeal to tolerance, and a denial of the political significance of sexual orientation. She overlooks the very radical non-liberal aspects of sadomasochist feminist theory, which aims at confronting power and domination on a private level precisely in the interests of getting a better grasp of how it operates in the public arena. This oversight, along with her suggestion that the standoff between sadomasochist and the antiporn feminists could be healed by a reconsideration of

liberal political theory, leaves us with the misleading impression that the real issues in feminist politics no longer have to do with sexuality and power, but rather with reassimilating liberal principles.

Radical, Socialist, and Marxist Feminists reject liberal political theory for a number of reasons. First, liberal theory assumes that the private is not political, and hence that sexuality is a private matter. But feminists object that the practice of gendered sexuality reproduces public patriarchal domination in the private sphere, and hence that the private is very political indeed. Recognition of the differences that gender construction produces also lies behind feminists' rejection of 'abstract individualism', a liberal device which effectively reduces all difference to sameness, a reduction which it simultaneously masks by asserting the irrelevance, and hence the permissability of difference. Feminists argue that this tolerance effectively denies the political importance of individual differences. This false tolerance, combined with the failure of liberal theory to recognize the forms of power exercised by class structures, and by what Foucault has called the disciplines of normalization – psychoanalysis, the various psychotherapies, law, medicine, and education and religion – leave it unable to say how these forms of power can be opposed.

Shane Phelan acknowledges these objections, but identifies another which she thinks places feminists in a contradictory position. The practice of identity politics she claims, is intolerant, exclusionary, teleological, and in these senses non-liberal. This creates political difficulties within otherwise progressive political movements. For while the building of positive identities admittedly requires strong involvement within a restricted community, these restrictions ultimately stand in the way of many of the things that liberals stand for, and that turn out to be desirable after all: individualism, creativity, tolerance, rejection of dogma. Thus, while party lines serve an important function in giving feminists, gays, and lesbians, a positive identity, they ultimately end up creating a domination of their own that must be transcended, and that can only be transcended, according to Phelan, by holding onto some version of liberal theory. She does not discuss the possibility that other political theories might also value what 'liberals' stand for, and ultimately defends her appeal to liberalism on the grounds that liberalism is the American way.

Phelan's tracing of the evolution of the feminist movement, its political basis, its philosophical concerns, its splits, and its transcendances, its situation within language and within culture is informative and worthwhile. However, her ambiguous attitude

toward liberalism, as well as her desire to develop a politic of inclusion rather than exclusion would benefit from a clearer delineation of the issues. For example, her appeal to the need for liberalism does not distinguish the liberalism which is missing from the liberalism which already exists and within which identity politics is tolerated and that toleration justified. For it is an implication of liberalism that different groups, communities and clubs may voluntarily engage in as authoritarian, intolerant, and non-liberal practices as are consistent with basic human rights.

Phelan's failure to be specific is disappointing. For it ought to be clear that what is needed is not liberalism, with its refusal to theorize about class and normalization, but rather something like a refusal of the very polarities on which liberalism trades.

The first refusal would be something like a theoretical rejection of 'all or nothing' polarities. For it is the assumption that theories are either all right or all wrong which, I would suggest, underlies the difficulty that radical feminists have in accepting sadomasochists as feminists. Coalition politics shows that it is possible to work together well with people with whom we have strong disagreements, just so long as we also share strong agreements. Thus, radical feminists may agree with sadomasochist feminists on abortion, pay issues, daycare, sexual harrassment, and many other issues, and disagree with them over pornography and private sexual practices. Second, the correlative assumption that somehow heresy must be rooted out and unity achieved should be jettisoned. Differences, as feminists emphasize, are important, and the desires of the sadomasochist feminists, along with their exploration of the relation between power and domination, are challenging and intriguing. To find them so is not at all to express liberal indifference to what goes on in the private sphere. Nor is it to obliterate difference in the interests of an abstraction that asserts its irrelevance. On the contrary, it is to continue to express an intense interest in the private sphere, an interest which roundly rejects the private/public split not only in continuing to take up the issue of the relation between private domination needs and public domination structures, but also in denying the atomization which designates the different as Other, as distant, as dangerous. For the politic which denies the private/public split, which rejects atomization, asserts not identity, not the assimilation of Other to Same, but rather the lines of juncture, the lines of departure, nonclosure, non-stasis. Such a politic moves in a direction opposite to the one taken by contemporary liberal theory. While it may, in its effort

to speak across barriers in the interests of an emergent social truth, exhibit what in everyday talk we refer to as a liberal attitude, conflating this exercise with a return to liberalism reveals a disturbing oblivion to the acknowledged assumptions of liberal theory.

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Herman Rapaport
Heidegger & Derrida: Reflections on Time and Language.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press 1989.
Pp. 293. US $30.00. ISBN 0-8032-3887-8.

Traditional intellectual history is concerned with the problem of chronological filiations, influences, borrowings and references. *Heidegger & Derrida* is not such a traditional intellectual history nor is it concerned with the problem of traditional intellectual history. In fact, it calls into question the standard view of time and history and, to a certain extent, performs a Derridean history of the relationship between Heidegger and Derrida.

Those who are unfamiliar with both Heidegger and Derrida should not read this book. Although Rapaport claims that he has 'made it a point not to let literary wordplay dominate my analyses nor to let my style imitate a deconstructionist discourse too closely' (1), the book is in part devoted to a discussion of paronomasia (wordplay); it assumes that the reader is familiar with Derridean terms such as *différance*, the trace, spacing and supplementarity, and it also presupposes an understanding of deconstructive strategy. It is very much a Derridean reading that Rapaport deploys. This is not to say that Rapaport is uncritical of the Master – he does challenge him on occasion. However, his criticisms of Derrida's work are largely immanent and constructive interpolations. At one point, for example, Rapaport notes that the word '*apeiron*' is 'under erasure' in both Heidegger's reading of Anaximander and Derrida's gloss on that reading (40). But Rapaport is quick to add that Derrida compensates for this 'forgetting' in a later text.

The question of Heidegger's influence on Derrida has often been discussed. In *Heidegger & Derrida*, this topic is pursued in the context of a chronological (?) exploration of Derrida's work from the 1960s to the mid-1980s. According to Rapaport, Derrida engages two different Heideggers. One Heidegger 'did see his way to a radical temporal clue' and the other 'was not capable of seeing his way to a radical temporal clue' (66). It is the articulation (or the skewed articulation) of these two Heideggers – the proto-deconstructionist and the metaphysician – which centers Rapaport's treatment of time and language in Heidegger and Derrida. These two Heideggers later become the Heidegger who deconstructs the differences between races and the Heidegger Nazi. I shall return to these two latter Heideggers at the end of this review.

The scholarship in this book is meticulous. Rapaport has scoured both Heidegger's and Derrida's work, subjecting each to a thoughtful and, once again, largely Derridean reading. Texts which few who are not Heideggerean or Derridean will have read are masterfully analyzed for their contributions to an understanding of the Heideggerean Derrida and the Derridean Heidegger. *Heidegger & Derrida* compares favourably with Rodolphe Gasché's pathbreaking work, *The Tain of the Mirror*, in which a Hegelian Derrida is explored. Also remarkable in this book are the references to important Derridean scholars such as Barbara Johnson (whose work is generally criticised), David Krell and the aforementioned Gasché, as well as to important Heideggereans such as Kockelmans and Sheehan.

One of the gems in *Heidegger & Derrida* is the discussion of the Blanchotian interface between Heidegger and Derrida. As Rapaport himself notes, this interface has been largely neglected in the extant literature. In one of the less well-written sentences in the book (there are a number of these), Rapaport writes that 'it is already within an established French context of reading Heidegger's linguistic turn – that of Blanchot – wherein Derrida's work takes place.' Blanchot is necessary for studying Derrida's renewed interest in Heidegger in the mid-1970s (111). In the subsequent thirty-odd pages, Rapaport discusses Blanchot's Heidegger and the 'transferential relationship' (129) between Blanchot and Derrida in the 1970s. This discussion does as much to augment and amplify an understanding of the relationship between Blanchot and Derrida as it does to cast another wrench into the traditional idea of a chronological intellectual history – not to speak of history *tout court*.

What jars in this book and mars it is its acceptance of the Derridean reduction of fascism to a linguistic conundrum. Towards the end of *Heidegger & Derrida*, Rapaport signals the shift in Derrida's conception of the two Heideggers. In the later Derrida, Heidegger has become either a Nazi or the deconstructor of Nazism. But the deconstruction of Nazism is outrageously assigned to paronomasia. Rapaport muses limply on Derrida's 'political tactic of destabilizing ideological formations from within rather than through outright opposition or confrontation' (161). (One wonders about his use of the word 'outright' here.) Although 'it is not very unlikely that one of the aims of Derrida's recent thoughts on Heidegger has been to deconstruct the historical conceptual conditions whereby anti-Semitism becomes thinkable,' (243) Rapaport's soft-peddling of deconstructive manoeuvres here in the wake of, not only Hitler but also Le Pen, points to one of the major and unforgivable deficiencies in Derrida's thought. Rapaport is too much a Derridean to see his way out of this clearing. And those who have are subjected to a deconstructionist reading at the very end of the book. The 'political sense of crisis in some of the Frankfurt School thinkers' is set against 'thinkers who take their time with time or, more accurately, with history' (263) to the detriment of the former. Nazism and the new right in France (not to speak of South Africa, England and the United States) may well be the *pierre d'achoppement* that Derrideans and Derrida himself must face before they realise that, to paraphrase Rapaport, deconstruction cannot succeed where Heidegger has failed (161). 'Outright' political opposition may be the only viable tactic.

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Mark Richard
Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How we Ascribe Them.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Pp x+275.
US $44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-38126-6);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-38819-8).

Propositional attitudes sentences face at least two problems. One problem is that such sentences, of which belief sentences are the standard example, do not respect substitution of logically equivalent complement sentences. Thus, even if all arithmetical truths are logically equivalent, it seems obvious that one can believe, say, that 7+5 = 12 without believing that 53 is prime. If the proposition that 7+5 = 12, and the proposition that 53 is prime are the sets of worlds in which each is true, then these are the same proposition. An alternative view is that the meaning of 'believe' operates on the structure which you get by taking the meanings of the simple terms in the complement sentence. And clearly a structure formed out of 5, 7, the operation of addition, the relation of equality, and 12, is different from a structure formed out of 53 and the property of being prime. Mark Richard advocates this kind of treatment as a solution to the first problem. There are difficulties with this kind of solution. One is posed by iterated attitudes. If the meaning of 'believes' is an operation on structures, and if iterated belief sentences are possible, then it would seem that it must contain itself as an element of one of its arguments. Opinion varies on how serious this is, and Richard's position is to remain agnostic with a sympathetic nod in the direction of a hierarchical theory of belief.

But the first problem is not the only one, because an appeal to structure says nothing about the simple terms in the complement sentence, and the other problem arises because it seems we can have belief sentences which change their truth value with the substitution of co-designative names. You might believe that Twain is dead without believing that Clemens is dead, even though Twain is Clemens. Richard begins with a sympathy for a Russellian solution, by which he means that propositions are structures in which the meanings of names are just the things they name. He eschews Fregean senses or 'conceptual roles', on the ground that if they are to work such things must be more or less constant across speakers, and that on any plausible construal of these entities they are not. I think he is right

about this, and his extended discussion of these approaches repays careful study.

The main problem with a Russellian solution is that it forces a sentence like:

(1) Odile believes that Twain is dead

to be true even if Odile only recognizes Twain as Clemens and would not assent to 'Twain is dead'. Richard claims that it is up to the utterance context to determine how Odile is allowed to refer to Twain. In some contexts 'Clemens' would be a permitted representation of Twain, but in other contexts it would not. In the former contexts we can move to 'Odile believes that Clemens is dead' while in the latter contexts we may not be able to do so. In Richard's theory the context provides restrictions on what are called 'Russellian annotated matrixes' or RAM's. A RAM for the sentence 'Twain is dead' would be ⟨⟨ 'is dead' being dead ⟩ ⟨ 'Twain', Twain ⟩⟩ and its function is to provide both the Russellian meaning of the sentence, as a structure made up out of the meanings of its parts, and the way each of these meanings is represented. The constraint supplied by the context might allow ⟨ 'Clemens', Twain ⟩ as an acceptable alternative part of a RAM, or it might not.

I have little doubt that Richard's mechanism will do what he wants. This is because he permits context to stipulate just how any part of a Russellian proposition may be represented. There are costs. Not only do iterated attitude operators have to be hierarchically ordered (or some other device for dealing with self-reference assumed) in every iterated sentence, so too must the existential quantifiers and other items in RAM's. Richard is aware of this price and is willing to pay it. Indeed, one of the very pleasing features of this book is its author's sensitivity to the commitments of his theory. Nevertheless, there is, I believe, a worry about a theory which gives as much power as Richard's does to context. For it is a short step to a semantic theory which makes the very meaning of an expression something supplied by the context. Of course expressions mean what they do in a context because of the way they are being used in that context; but such a use of context can easily trivialize a semantic theory.

For that reason it is instructive to see whether Richard's theory might not reduce to one of a more traditional kind, in which its insights are preserved in a simpler way. The first observation is that a RAM supplies a linguistic representation of every element in a Russellian proposition and it is not obvious that any linguistic items

beyond proper names are involved in the problem sentences. We know that a Russellian analysis allows us to avoid the analogous problems in cases where definite descriptions are involved, and there do not seem to be any obvious problems about other parts of speech, except perhaps cases like 'Greeks' and 'Hellenes', which also involve proper names. What the context does is constrain how the believer (or subject of the attitude in question) represents the individual named in the complement sentence. Suppose the context allows 'Twain' but not 'Clemens' as a way of representing Twain. Then Richard's analysis of (1) could be expressed in the following way. The context will supply, for Odile, a list of ways in which it is permissible for her to refer to Twain. For each context c we may form the associated property F:

> (λy) y is referred to in a way which is permissible for Odile in context c.

(1) can then be analyzed as

(2) F(Twain) and Odile believes that whoever is F is dead.

To be sure (1) would now emerge as multiply ambiguous rather than as context-dependent, but that would be an advantage for those with qualms about letting context get too close to providing what might normally be thought of as part of the meaning of expressions.

The style of the book is a compromise between giving a full-dress formal semantics and an informal philosophical exposition. I think that on the whole it is successful and Richard certainly indicates which parts of the book are concerned with formal issues. For myself I found these passages necessary to appreciate just what Richard's theory amounted to, and it is an important virtue of the book that its author is aware of the formal demands that an adequate theory of the semantics of propositional attitudes must satisfy. While there may be disagreements about many of the details of Richard's solution, an area as difficult as this can always do with a contribution as solid as this one.

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Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed.
Liberalism and the Moral Life.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1989. Pp. vi+302.
US $32.50. ISBN 0-674-53020-9

The essays in this book attempt to defend, retrieve, or reclaim the resources of liberalism in the face of contemporary challenges. Its moral idealist component has been criticized as hollow, inadequate, and not truly conducive to autonomy as 'reasoned assent to substantive moral obligations' (5). Its more sober, 'modus vivendi' component, on the other hand, has been attacked from the opposite direction. That is, liberalism does not provide the neutrality and impartiality that it claims. Thus, it lacks not the substance vaunted by moral idealist defenders, but the very ground rules or procedural virtues of which it has traditionally boasted. Following Rosenblum's Introduction, I shall discuss the essays under three different categories.

Writers in the first group of essays admit 'that liberalism has failed to realize its own moral ideals, without accepting that this failure is logical or inevitable' (10). Judith Shklar's 'liberalism of fear' reminds us that although liberalism does not offer a *summum bonum*, 'It certainly does begin with a *summum malum* ... cruelty and the fear it inspires, and the very fear of fear itself' (29), against which liberalism makes both universal and cosmopolitan claims. Susan Okin argues that the 'gendered structure' (42) of private life affects women's opportunities in the public world. She suggests that a legal recasting of boundaries between personal and public life, though seemingly less neutral than the current stance of ignoring private inequalities, will operate more neutrally in providing a 'humanist liberalism' for all. Benjamin Barber emphasizes consent as participation, with its purpose 'not merely to engage in bargaining and exchange over fixed and permanent interests but to modify the notion of what those interests actually are' (63). Seyla Benhabib in her 'discourse model of legitimacy' also views public dialogue as 'not external to but constitutive of power relations' (155), a point often forgotten by liberals but worthy of their renewed attention. Nancy Rosenblum focuses on what she has elsewhere called pluralist communitarianism. Pluralism facilitates 'shifting involvements,' which function not only to promote autonomy and self-expression, but also to protect one against confining roles or a self 'too *much* constituted by attachments' (221, emphasis added). Finally, Stephen Holmes catalogues what he sees as

the major permanent features of antiliberal thought, suggesting that these critics often decontextualize liberalism and thereby risk caricaturing it.

A second approach by political theorists concentrates upon 'actively infusing liberalism with a new, positive idealism' (13). For George Kateb, rights-based individualism not only carries intrinsic value, but also is the ground or setting for democratic individuality. This calls for expressiveness or self-assertion which breaks with convention and custom, resistance to injustice on behalf of others as well as of oneself, and responsiveness or openness to experience or to 'the effort to live outside oneself' (205). Charles Taylor distinguishes ontology, or that which accounts for social life, from advocacy, or moral stance towards these factors. As individuals, we not only seek common goods that are convergent, because they are provided in common though they benefit us each as individuals, but we also enjoy 'mediately' (169) common goods, which are goods because we share them and the sharing of which makes them goods. A holist ontology allows us to recognize a shared patriotic identification with, for example, the rule of law, so that we may at once enjoy both procedural liberalism and republican solidarity.

The third approach explores the limits of liberal neutrality, acknowledging that neutrality does not always betoken moral indifference and skepticism. Richard Ashcraft concentrates upon John Stuart Mill's recognition of class conflict and efforts to resolve it within the framework of liberal constitutionalism, implying that in Mill's later thought, socialism is compatible with the constitutive values of liberalism. Steven Lukes argues that the admission of diversity, incompatibility, and even incommensurability of moral conflict need not render liberals moral skeptics or value relativists as long as they take this conflict seriously and attempt to make sense of it (142). Amy Gutmann suggests that although a democratic society must observe nonrepression and nondiscrimination restraints on its actions if it is to reproduce itself, it must also allow discretionary choices by the public on its own behalf if it is to remain democratic. Fundamentalist parents, for instance, may censor their children's reading materials at home and at church. But democrats may properly 'say that parents do not have a right to *veto* a line drawn by public schools unless that line is repressive or discriminatory' (84, emphasis added). Some types of 'undemocratic education' are 'incompatible with teaching rational inquiry and mutual understanding in a religiously pluralistic society' (85). Finally, William Galston argues against Gutmann that

although the state has an interest in future citizens who are willing to coexist peacefully and who possess 'at least the minimal conditions of reasonable public judgement,' civic education does not require 'public authority to take an interest in how children think about different ways of life' or 'foster in children skeptical reflection on ways of life inherited from parents or local communities' (99). As Rosenblum comments, 'For Galston, liberty entails the right to live unexamined as well as examined lives' (17).

Together, these essays advance liberal theory. They do not defend sacrosanct private spheres or as-yet-undiscovered neutral principles. Instead, they consider and explore specifically liberal practices, virtues, forms of moral education, and social and institutional contexts that promote moral habits and values. As the book's title indicates, they show that a moral life is possible within the liberal context.

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Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

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is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

The E-mail address of CPR/RCCP is

CPRS@UALTAMTS.BITNET

Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

R.A. Shiner