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Editors · Directeurs

Robert Burch
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

J. N. Kaufmann
Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec
à Trois-Rivières, C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec
Canada G9A 5H7

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Rédacteur francophone: François Duchesneau, Département de philosophie, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succ. A, Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7

English-language editor: Michael McDonald, Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1

Janet Ajzenstat
The Political Thought of Lord Durham.
Kingston and Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1988. Pp. xii+137, $22.95.
ISBN 0-7735-0637-3.

'Radical Jack' has had an almost uniformly bad press in Canada: We have thought of John George Lambton, first Earl of Durham, as an arrogant Englishman who, for all he joined us in despising the 'Family Compact,' was profoundly ignorant of French Canada and its culture and thought the French should be assimilated and all speak English. Reviling him has ever since ranked with shouting abuse at hockey referees as a national pastime. Ajzenstat sets out to acquit him of the bigotry and ignorance indictments, though she believes him guilty of some other charges. Her basic thesis is this: Lord Durham understood perfectly well the capacities of the French Canadians, but he opposed what we now usually call group rights – she speaks of 'the recognition of collectivities in law' (100) – on the grounds that they infringe on the rights of individuals and inhibit creation of a prosperous society. His most basic proposals in the report which followed the technically failed but ultimately successful rebellions of 1837, owed, in Ajzenstat's view, little to his on-the-spot discoveries about life in Canada in general and Lower Canada in particular and much to principles which he held long before he left England. This flatly contradicts, as she says (73-4), Durham's own statements and makes him rather less than honest even if he acted in the good cause of maximizing the hearing which his report would receive. It also convicts him of a rather general fraud, for his report purports to be proposing a system of government based on a study of the facts and directed to the (admittedly special) conditions in Canada.

There are difficulties with her thesis. While it cannot be wholly ruled out, it seems to fit the known facts less well than the obvious alternative that he did discover something which surprised him. To find out what this might be, one must make good a fundamental weakness in the book – it makes no serious attempt to trace the currents of *thought* in French Canada in the years leading up to 1837 and, therefore, it gives us no clue as to what it was that Durham might have discovered when he arrived in Quebec. He said he found something which made him rethink at least some of his ideas. We ought at least to know what was there to be found.

One can readily accept that Durham brought with him from England the notions of democratic government which are found in the report, and even the central concern with individual rights in so far as they might conflict with the rights of various groups to social con-

tinuity. In all likelihood, however, he also supposed that the English and French bourgeoisies which had made themselves felt in 1837 had much more in common than the two aristocracies. If so, despite language, they might meet naturally on their own ground without the need for assimilation.

But Quebec had been the scene in the early 1830s of the culmination of an ideological battle between Cartesians like Jacques Odelin and the followers of Felicité de Lamennais who espoused a kind of populism in which feeling took clear precedence over reason. In the public debate – begun in a famous exchange at the Collège de St-Hyacinthe and fought out in the newspapers – Odelin was a clear intellectual winner, but the followers of Lamennais were obviously more numerous, and Papineau, the leader of the bourgeois rebels, cemented a personal friendship with Lamennais during his exile in France. The Radicals in England associated Papineau with their own cause and it seems unlikely that Durham would have known much about this struggle before he left home, but the discovery of the particular form of Lamennais' populism and ultramontanism held in Quebec would explain his shock. His reaction in 1838 was not unlike that of many English Canadians to Duplessis' populism a century later. But what Durham found in Lower Canada did not entirely repel him: he continued to have a good deal of faith in the possibilities for a liberal clergy in Quebec, a faith which Ajzenstat suggests (37) may have been too optimistic. But there were, after all, clergymen like Odelin.

In these terms, there are several reasons to clear Durham of the charges of bigotry and gross ignorance about French culture in Canada. One could also defend him from Ajzenstat's new charges. But Durham's defence does suffer a severe blow when she quotes his own words (22): 'The French are not so civilized, so energetic, or so money-making a race as that by which they are surrounded.'

Philosophers will be more interested in another problem, however: Ajzenstat also defends Durham by supposing that he was motivated by the thesis that group rights are perilous for a morally defensible society. But she herself produces facts which make this unlikely. Durham proposed various kinds of support for the Roman Catholic endowments in Lower Canada – a support which clearly recognized the French and Catholic right to cultural continuity. At the very least this committed him to the notion that there were central elements in the French culture which society ought to support. Ajzenstat spells out this story (35-6).

Either, then, Durham *did* support group rights in principle (at least 'the recognition of collectivities at law'), or his recommendations were inconsistent with his principles. The former seems more plausible, and is, in fact, not incompatible (formally at least) with his hope that linguistic uniformity would prevail. When he realized just how differ-

ent the ideologies of the two bourgeoisies really were, he came to see, I think, that the reason that the French were often unjustly excluded from the very offices for which their classical and legal educations best fitted them was associated with the language problem. There is an obvious sense in which linguistic separation runs counter to a society which has a genuine plurality of cultures: for preserving the plurality demands that the various groups should be able to understand one another. This, as we all know, creates a dilemma, for the loss of one's language tends to bring with it the loss of one's culture. But the fact that 'Radical Jack' seized the horn of the dilemma which many of us would reject does not mean that he held a different fundamental principle.

Leslie Amour
University of Ottawa

Robert Brown
Analyzing Love.
New York: Cambridge University Press
1987. Pp. vii+133. US$24.95.
ISBN 0-521-34038-1.

Emotions are in: the philosophical market has recently been flooded with offerings about love and other emotions, singly and in general. The present book is elegantly slim and classically analytic. Its four chapters raise specific questions about love, about the peculiarities of its objects, and about its relation to other emotions and attitudes. Those questions are then addressed by means of rather dry but generally plausible sets of distinctions, examples, and counterexamples.

That framework sounds neat enough, but actually the structure of this little book is far from simple. In his Introduction, Brown begins with these five questions: (a) Does love necessarily imply reciprocation, or at least necessarily demand it? (b) Does love of A imply valuing A's qualities? (c) Is love by definition non-transitory? (d) Should love be classified as an emotion? (e) If so, are the constraints on the range of its objects weaker than they are for other emotions? After giving some reasons for being interested in these questions – most particularly, the practical as well as theoretical need to understand the connection between emotions and reasons – Brown offers some more specific further questions for our meditation. The relation between the first list and this further one is unclear, for some do seem

to be more specific versions of the former, while others seem new. (f) How can we tell loving from liking and from sexual desire? (g) How can we tell when we love? (h) How does love differ from fear and anger? (cf. c: but why is this one a 'narrower question' (11)?) (i) How do emotions generally differ from attitudes? (cf. d). (j) Must we, or can we, have reasons for loving? (cf. b). Finally, Brown comes to what is, to my mind, the most interesting – because, as he points out, it is the most neglected of all his questions: (k) how exactly does love relate to character? Disappointingly, he announces at once that his book will provide only a propaedeutic to that particular question.

But in this book, as in life, questions criss-cross in untidy ways, and Brown doesn't actually organize his book according to his list. His first chapter is called 'Love and its objects,' and it addresses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (j). The second, 'Sexual desire,' is the most sharply focused. The third concerns 'identifying the presence of love.' And the fourth, on the contrast between emotions and attitudes in general, returns, from the standpoint of that question, to a number of the issues previously raised.

130 pages is rather a short space in which to tackle so many difficult questions. But Brown's aims are modest, and within the scope he allows himself he does a good deal of sensible ground-clearing. Most thought-provoking, for example, are the parallels he draws between love and sexual desire. These provide a welcome counterweight to the familiar shibboleth to the effect that the two are somehow antithetical. (The demand for a total separation between love and sexual desire, he remarks, is itself 'one important element of a modern romance – that of sensual gratification that is trouble-free, free from the cares and responsibilities of ordinary personal intercourse' [53].) He argues that both love and sexual desire are in some essential respects responses that cannot be promised even though they are not in any straightforward way involuntary; that both love and sexual desire, or at any rate their appropriate expressions, are susceptible of being taught; that both are vulnerable to belief changes even though neither is strictly belief-dependent; and that both can constitute – at least in later stages of a relationship – overall responses to the 'embodied character' of the lover (64ff.).

But Brown doesn't do very much to explain the most mysterious aspect of both love and sexual desire, which is their bewildering variety. Loving, being in love, and falling in love are sensitively distinguished, but there is little on the differences between different types of love. Indeed, Brown is at pains to reject Richard Taylor's suggestion that one can love only human objects (51). Drawing on psychoanalytic ideas, he claims that we can – sometimes legitimately – 'hold dear, and feel deep affection for' a variety of objects both abstract and concrete (23). But what he doesn't explain is that the demands and

expectations that we have for different kinds of love are so diverse. Why, for example, is the idea of exclusivity often so lethally attached to sexual love, and not at all to others froms of love? Why, for that matter, is sexual desire itself so amazingly diverse that Goldman's view of its essential nature and the contrasting view of it as 'an element in self-maintaining social systems' (51) can both have seemed plausible?

Apart from the limitations inherent in its brevity, this book illustrates the disadvantages of an almost exclusive reliance on the method of philosophical analysis. A sense of illumination will certainly accompany a good analysis much of the way, but not all the way. And when agreement breaks down, there is nothing much that can be done about the resulting intuitive deadlock. (I, for example, find myself disagreeing strongly with the suggestion that 'one can feel love for something that we believe does not exist,' and further disagree that feeling love for 'our dead child, for instance,' is a case in point [16].) But what arguments can one adduce in these cases?

What one really would like is a theory, and a sense that we know what would count as a good theory and what would not. But love is so diverse, so strange, and apparently so irrational in many of its forms that only depth-psychological hypotheses are likely to give us any real explanation of its peculiarities. And in fact, Brown does make occasional use of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic terms. But to do so is immediately to outstrip the resources of philosophical analysis. It is also to risk losing some readers, for psychoanalytic explanations are not especially favoured of analytic philosophers, and anyway they are unlikely to seem persuasive when merely roughed in, as they must inevitably be in the context of a philosophical analysis.

Ronald De Sousa
University of Toronto

J. Baird Callicott, ed.
Companion to A Sand County Almanac: Interpretive and Critical Essays.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1987. Pp. x+308. US$22.50
(Cloth: ISBN 0-299-11230-6); US$9.95
(Paper: ISBN 0-299-11234-9).

For nearly forty years Aldo Leopold's *A Sand County Almanac* has been one of the most quoted books in popular environmentalist literature. Leopold's essay, 'The Land Ethic,' which appears near the end

of the book, in fact, is often still regarded by many environmentalists as a definitive statement that says everything about environmental ethics that needs to be said. The establishment of environmental ethics as a subject area within professional philosophy over the last fifteen years has done little to alter anyone's basic attitude toward Leopold or his book. Most environmental philosophers, though somewhat less reverential, have nevertheless likewise treated the essay and book deferentially as a starting point for their own work, more often trying to defend and improve Leopold's ideas than to criticize them. As a result, despite the attention and indeed homage paid to Leopold's writings, they have rarely been critically studied, scrutinized, or analyzed. With the exception of Susan Flader's intellectual biography, *Thinking Like a Mountain*, most thoughtful and important insights into Leopold's intellectual work have appeared in papers in publications that are not generally available to scholars and are not widely indexed.

Callicott's *Companion* is a collection of essays that is intended as a first step toward the kind of scholarly criticism of Leopold that has so far been lacking in environmental and environmental ethics literature. The book contains five essays that were previously published but revised and updated by their authors and seven new contributions that have not yet appeared elsewhere. It concludes with the original, unpublished foreword to *A Sand County Almanac*, which Leopold wrote in 1947 when the working title for the book was *Great Possessions*.

Strictly speaking, *Companion* is not a philosophy book. Only two of the ten contributors are philosophers and only three of the twelve essays (two by Callicott and one by Holmes Rolston, III) are philosophical. The fact that most of the book is devoted to the historical context in which *A Sand County Almanac* was written and to the literary aspects of the book, however, does not mean that *Companion* will not be of value to philosophers interested in the philosophical side of Leopold's thought. Quite to the contrary, *Companion* is just as likely to become essential reading for philosophers as those who relate to it primarily as a work of literature. A great deal of information is packed into the collection that will aid anyone in studying Leopold, regardless of his or her particular perspective or interests.

The collection is divided into four parts, each containing three essays. The first part, 'The Author,' is made up of essays by three historians who have each made important contributions to the study of Leopold's life and thought, Curt Meine ('Aldo Leopold's Early Years'), Susan Flader ('Aldo Leopold's Sand County'), and Roderick Nash ('Aldo Leopold's Intellectual Heritage'). This section will be most useful to those who know little about Leopold's life. There is, however, an interesting conflict between Callicott and Nash over Leopold's intellectual predecessors (6-7, 68-9).

The second part, 'The Book,' contains papers by a librarian, Dennis Ribbens, and two English professors, John Tallmadge and Peter A. Fritzell, that deal with the structure of the book as a whole. Ribbens' 'The Making of *A Sand County Almanac*' is especially interesting. As a result of criticism by the editors of Knopf, who eventually rejected it, Leopold's book gradually evolved from a collection of largely unrelated essays to a more complexly interrelated whole. It is this intricate structure that is extensively explicated and analyzed by Tallmadge ('The Anatomy of a Classic') and Fritzell ('The Conflicts of Ecological Conscience'). Fritzell's paper, in particular, though literary, is essential reading for anyone who wants to go on and study the philosophical aspects of the book.

Part three, 'The Upshot,' contains two essays by Callicott, 'The Land Aesthetic' and 'The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic' and an essay by another Meine, 'Building 'The Land Ethic'.' The paper on aesthetics is an important essay because it discusses elements of Leopold's perspective that have long been ignored because of the prominence of 'The Land Ethic' (in the original foreword [281] Leopold begins by stating that 'these essays deal with the ethics and esthetics of land,' thereby indicating his intention to give ethics and aesthetics equal weight). Meine's paper parallels Ribbens' reconstructing the evolution of 'The Land Ethic' out of earlier writings. Callicott's second paper is a fairly comprehensive discussion of the famous essay and the single most important philosophical analysis of Leopold's thought in the book.

The final part, 'The Impact,' contains essays by a wildlife manager, a writer, and a philosopher, Edwin P. Pister ('A Pilgrim's Progress from Group A to Group B'), Wallace Stegner ('Legacy of Aldo Leopold'), and Holmes Rolston, III ('Duties to Ecosystems'), respectively, placed at the end of the volume to help readers understand the various kinds of influence that Leopold and his writings have had. The first two are primarily testimonials about the importance of Leopold's thought. Rolston's paper is an good example of post-Leopoldian environmental philosophy.

Companion could serve well in paperback as a supplementary text in a course focused very strongly on Leopold's work. Whether it is so used or not, it is critical reading for any philosopher who plans to teach or do research in environmental ethics.

Eugene C. Hargrove
University of Georgia

Daniel C. Dennett
The Intentional Stance.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1987.
Pp. xi+388. US$25.00.
ISBN 0-262-04093-X.

Dennett's *The Intentional Stance* is a collection of post-*Brainstorms* articles that focus on the status of mental states and their contents and other major themes in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. It begins aggressively with 'Getting Off On The Right Foot': Dennett insists that although he is a mentalist he adopts the scientific point of view (unlike Thomas Nagel's *The View From Nowhere*), and declares that 'folk' psychology is vulnerable to certain problems and puzzles which put its concepts in jeopardy. The volume concludes with an interesting essay comparing his position on interpretation theory with other philosophers' (e.g., Quine, whose thesis of the radical indeterminacy of translation Dennett explicitly endorses and extends throughout the book). In between are two new essays, and six previously published articles updated with 'Reflections,' which respond to criticisms and provide yet further variations on the themes.

Folk psychology is a 'mixed bag' according to Dennett – it is normative, but it also tends to run together causal claims and conceptual ones (55). He distinguishes them, but at a price: on the grounds that 'the brain, as physiology or plain common sense shows us, is just a *syntactic engine* ... [with] entirely mechanical activities,' (61), psychology must 'divorce' into two separate theories, 'one strictly abstract, idealizing, holistic, instrumentalistic – pure intentional system theory – and the other a concrete, microtheoretical science of the actual realization of those intentional systems – ... sub-personal cognitive psychology' (57).

As a philosophical divorce attorney, Dennett counsels us on reduction. He rightly disparages the prospects for physicalist type-type identity theory (65). But in Chapter Three, 'Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology,' he expresses optimism for the *conceptual* reduction from folk psychology to his intentional systems theory. In defense of his teacher, Gilbert Ryle, Dennett denies that mental concepts are like 'autographs,' which contain a causal element (44). He claims instead that mental phenomena are *abstracta* or calculation-bound entities like the vectors we diagram forces with and that 'folk psychology can best be viewed as a sort of logical behaviorism: *what it means* to say that someone believes that *p* is that the person is disposed to behave in certain ways under certain conditions' (50).

Dennett does not think that Turing-machine or computational reductions of intentional states will work, however, for he thinks we can have the same belief without really having the same 'program.'

Chapter Six, 'Styles of Mental Representation,' also plugs Ryle, and together with its Reflection, 'The Language of Thought Reconsidered,' it criticizes the idea of explicit storage of rules and representations. He concludes that sententialist models seem 'hopelessly brittle, inefficient, and unversatile monstrosities of engineering' (229) and that alternative connectionist approaches only seem to be offering 'a variety of new, synthetic wonder tissues' with few insights into how to design them into intelligent machines (231-2). Then in Chapter 9, 'Fast Thinking,' Dennett argues that Searle is right about 'strong AI,' but for the wrong reasons. The real reason that current electronic digital computer programs are not sufficient for having a mind is that they don't work *fast* enough to keep pace with real-time demands (whereas biochemistry has the essential speed).

In fact, Dennett is downright pessimistic about reduction and thus intentional realism – he says it's 'unlikely' that the *illata* or theoretical entities of folk psychology will line up with those of 'academic psychology' (92-3). This should come as no surprise, since whether an instrumentalist or a logical behaviorist, Dennett has never maintained that when we attribute reasons to someone we are thereby making substantive claims about the local causal processes of our 'black boxes' or brains.

However, Dennett now maintains that he is a *kind* of realist about intentionality, since he holds that it is an objective fact that the patterns of behavior of some systems do sustain readings by *the intentional stance*, a predictive strategy which can successfully attribute beliefs and desires to them (15, 24-5, 34). The first Reflection, 'Real Patterns, Deeper Facts, and Empty Questions,' uses Conway's cellular-automata computer program 'The Game of Life' to illustrate what he means: there may not *really* be concrete individual beliefs (or computer-world 'gliders'), but the patterns are there. In the second Reflection, 'Instrumentalism Reconsidered,' he says 'people really do have beliefs and desires, on my version of folk psychology, just as they really have centers of gravity,' but he regards such things not as 'the furniture of the physical world' but as logical constructs or *abstracta* (72).

Dennett now considers the 'flagship expression' of his view (3) to be Chapter Two, 'True Believers,' which explains what the intentional stance is and how it works. To adopt the stance, we must 'attribute as beliefs all the truths relevant to the system's interests (or desires) that the system's experience to date has made available ... the attribution of false belief, *any* false beliefs, requires a special genealogy' (18). We must also abide by the fundamental rule to 'attribute the desires the system *ought to have* [given its needs and capacities (49)] ... the attribution of bizarre and detrimental desires thus requires ... special stories' (20), and we are to 'star[t] with the ideal of perfect

rationality and revis[e] downwards' (21). Finally, 'a system's behavior will consist of those acts that *it would be rational* for an agent with those beliefs and desires to form' (49).

Dennett claims the intentional stance works 'because evolution has designed human beings to be rational' (33) but he tempers his position on ideal rationality: 'we are not all that rational ... [but] we are *pretty* rational' (50); 'we are almost certainly nothing more than a bag of tricks, patched together by a *satisficing* Nature' (51). Dennett even embarks upon two of his own forays into evolutionary theory. Chapter 7 ('Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The "Panglossian Paradigm" Defended' and its Reflection, 'Interpreting Monkeys, Theorists, and Genes') discusses whether we should impute Gricean communicative intentions to vervet monkeys (who signal differently for different predators and act accordingly) and defends adaptationism against Gould and Lewontin. Chapter 8, 'Evolution, Error, and Intentionality,' tells a story about a Panamanian Pepsi machine and a caretaker robot and argues that we lack *original* intentionality (since computers are designed and we evolved), so all we have is the *derived* intentionality which books have. However, *intrinsic* intentionality (the system itself – not some external reader – interprets the intentional content of its own states and acts on that basis) is an important contrast to 'derived,' but Dennett conflates it with the less useful 'original' intentionality (which nothing except possibly gods *could* have).

Dennett has always been somewhat schizophrenic about cognitive science. One side researches computational and philosophical issues and helps to bridge the gaps between intentional psychology and adjacent disciplines. The other side is the moralist who uses analytic philosophy to keep folk psychology divorced from the realm of the scientifically refutable, to ensure that despite whatever the encroaching sciences might say, we truly have purposive, intentional behavior (and hence responsibility). We only get a flash of the moralist here (see *Elbow Room* for more), when he chides eliminative materialism, the view that there really are no intentions or beliefs: ' ... which do you prefer, that justice be done the defendant or that you spend your precious day in court annoying the judge with an unconvincing philosophy lesson?' (234)

This schizophrenia manifests itself in the transition between Chapters Four and Five. First, he berates realism for a while, and likens the 'cottage industry' of 'tinkerers' trying to pin down propositional attitudes to 'the late blooming of Ptolemaic epicycles' (116). But then he does some pretty serious tinkering himself on *de dicto* and *de re* belief (97 pages of it!), and reverses his previous position to offer a positive contribution of his own. In 1978, he dismissed methodological solipsism or 'narrow' psychology as 'not really psychology at all,

but just at best abstract neurophysiology – pure internal syntax with no hope of a semantic interpretation' (64). But in 'Beyond Belief' (1982) he thinks better of it. After explaining the work of Frege, Russell, Quine, Kaplan, Perry, and Field, he argues for the existence of a level intermediate between syntax and truth-conditional semantics: each of us believes in a 'notional world' (e.g., *The World According to Garp*, 152); our *notional attitudes* are 'narrow' in that they are just functions of our brains, yet they have content (they are about the objects we believe in); but they do not discriminate between Boston and Twin-Earth Boston and have something short of truth-conditions (153, 209). However, Dennett then undermines this contribution by raising difficulties with puzzling cases of ambiguous belief content.

Fortunately, we all benefit from the cycles of Dennett's engaging mind, for the brilliant expositor wins out, and the myriad of creative and perplexing arguments against realism that lurk in many corners of the book will undoubtedly stimulate readers into further applications and spirited defenses of a program which Dennett is after all friendly to – intentional psychology.

Unfortunately, Dennett's strategy to protect psychology backfires, for the very strength of the intentional stance (the explicit and apparently straightforward rules for attributing content to a putative believer) is also its major weakness. According to the theory, intentional systems such as ourselves are supposed to be in harmony with the world, adjusted and happy, having mostly true beliefs (over 90%! [19]) and appropriate desires and behavior. The problem with this highly normative and aprioristic conception of psychology, this 'self-consciously abstract idealization' (235), is that it fails to apply in those cases where we need psychology the most – when we diverge from ideal rationality and are thwarted by our neurotic beliefs and illusions and our all too human desires and thought processes.

For example, in 'Making Sense of Ourselves' he confesses that he is at a loss to explain familiar cases of irrationality, absent-mindedness, and mistakes – he says 'mistakes don't happen for reasons' (86). He challenges any theory to give coherent explanations in terms of beliefs and desires of such 'slips' as a child short-changing an adult, or of Dennett's 'forgetting' a lunch date, but oddly he makes no mention of the obvious rival Intentional theory that does seem to 'make sense' of such parapraxes or 'Freudian slips.' Freudians give coherent descriptions of such behavior in terms of repressed wishes or feelings of hostility and the like, but perhaps that too 'slipped his mind.'

One begins to wonder if the theory applies to anything *but* the chess and bridge computers he discusses. Dennett claims there is no fact of the matter about what beliefs and desires 'degenerate' cases have (28). However, a view that holds that intentional descriptions can-

not be brought to bear in non-optimal clinical settings seems implausible, and insofar as we diverge from the ideal his theory is deficient in the very area he claims is its virtue – its application or usefulness.

Warren Dow
University of California, San Diego

Andrew Harrison, ed.
Philosophy and the Visual Arts: Seeing and Abstracting.
Norwall, MA: D. Reidel 1987.
Pp. xvi+360. US$69.00.
ISBN 90-277-2468-7.

There should be a guiding purpose for collecting a set of papers by different authors within a single volume. Harrison's collection consists of papers delivered at the eponymous conference held by the Royal Institute of Philosophy at the University of Bristol in 1985. It has a few of the drawbacks of a conference collection: the quality is uneven, and there is some, but not a lot, that is new. I would not go here to find the latest on a given issue, or a survey of major positions. On the other hand, there are some insightful and challenging articles in the collection. And contributors are divided between art historians and philosophers, providing a useful contrast of approaches and interests on specified topics. Authors have also added references to and comments on each other's views, making the work more unified as a whole.

The first part of the book concerns relationships between abstraction and representation. As one might expect, there is considerable controversy about the term 'abstraction,' and several authors distinguish different senses of the term; in what has to be one of philosophy's minor miracles, most of them even make the *same* distinctions. Some confusion is engendered by the fact that different authors take the abstract to have different contrasts, such as the figurative, the representational, and the realistic. However, virtually every author is concerned with tracing continuities between the abstract and its contrasting notion.

Michael Podro's lead essay is a sensitive and systematic defense of the claim that recognizing what a painting represents requires familiarity with the procedures of painting. Artists restrict the extent to which the depiction affords us the experience an object itself

would have afforded (5). Podro argues that this is true of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century painters as well as of major painters of the twentieth century: it is not an activity exclusively of 'modern abstractionists.' Hence, a serious understanding of artists of those earlier periods requires our understanding *their* 'procedures of painting,' a contention which he ably illustrates with discussion of Titian and Poussin. Peter Hobbis similarly explains respects in which a response to abstract elements, such as color, line, and form, has always been a part of understanding art, but he claims, in contrast to Podro, non-abstract painting has the function of providing us with 'the sense of having just the sort of perceptual experience we would have were we looking at a real instance of a thing of that kind,' what he calls 'illusionistic spatiality' (108).

Harrison's essay is usefully read in conjunction with Podro's. Both discuss relationships between the activity of painting and what perceivers must do to see what is represented in the work. Harrison's views on these issues are familiar from his earlier *Making and Thinking* (Hackett 1978), and he extends them here. After discussing some general 'conditions of meaning' (covering ground, in a Wittgensteinian idiom, also covered by Goodman about the respects in which art is a language), he explores how one of them, detachability from situations in which it would naturally occur, applies to gestures as vehicles of meaning. These gestures are not the ones involved in sign language, but the ones where one has a 'touch,' where one knows how to handle paint, or some other medium.

Paul Ziff also provides some interesting remarks about 'touch' from his own perspective as an abstract artist ('charcoal, for example, will do nothing for me. And then if I were given an air brush, I would throw it away, at once, before it wreaked havoc with my drawings' [62].) He has a way of summing insights in a phrase, when others belabor the same point for pages with less clarity, and one suspects less understanding. Characteristically provocative, and provoking, he explains some of his own interests in time and painting, and how inadequately 'abstraction' describes the qualities in his own painting which lead others to identify him as an abstract artist.

Part III is a somewhat disparate collection of papers on representation, and contains articles by Martin Kemp on Andrea Pozzo's ceiling of the Church of Sant' Ignazio in Rome, Kendall Walton on the comparison between the process of looking at pictures and looking at real things, John Fisher on holography and perspective, and Antonia Phillips on portraiture. Kemp's discussion of Pozzo's ceiling is superb. He argues for non-arbitrary *aspects* of our reading of perspectival clues, without denying cultural influence on the development of one's ability to interpret perspectival renderings. Pozzo's ceiling provides an excellent case study, one which enables Kemp to utilize

Pozzo's own account of the theological uses to which he put his pictorial composition. Walton's piece develops his idea that pictures are props in visual games of make-believe, and distinguishes visual games from reading games (played with fiction). In visual games of make-believe one imagines oneself to be seeing something, i.e., what one is doing is seeing something, whereas when reading fiction one may imagine, while one is reading, that one is seeing something. Painting and fiction exert different controls over the process of acquiring information about what is fictionally true of a work.

The middle section of the book is on colour, and it contains five essays representing five quite different kinds of intellectual investigations one might make into colour. Bernard Harrison argues against the skepticism implicit in the 'inverted spectrum problem.' (For a more extended treatment of this issue, see C. L. Hardin, *Color for Philosophers* [Hackett 1987].) John Gage explains the colour symbolism of some early abstract artists, and Peter Lloyd-Jones adapts 'laws of good gestalt' to analyze the perceived harmony of colour relationships. Adam Morton explicates a concept he calls 'colour appearances,' and uses it in a very creative way to explain how paintings can make the world look different. In the process, he recalls major theses of the other papers on color, relating them to his own project. It is this kind of effort which has made this book useful not only because it contains several valuable papers, but also because it helps the reader see how papers within the book reinforce and supplement one another.

Susan L. Feagin
University of Missouri–Kansas City

David R. Hiley
Philosophy in Question: Essays on a Pyrrhonian Theme.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988.
Pp. ix+207 US$24.95.
ISBN 0-226-33433-3.

Hiley presents Pyrrhonism in its classic guise as a guide to happiness. 'Pyrrhonians took the aim of philosophy to be happiness [and] philosophy had promised that our happiness would be achieved through our release of ignorance... [but] the pursuit of knowledge had failed to bring happiness or produce virtue' (10). Thus the 'moral pur-

pose... the deeper challenge of Pyrrhonian skepticism... in opposing philosophy... was to restore the appearances of common life as guides for conduct... to return us to the authority of nature, custom, and tradition' (8-10). Hiley says this is similar to 'the postmodernist attempt to overcome philosophy or bring it to an end [to] releas[e] us from the Platonic illusion that our autonomy or our happiness is to be found in the philosophical escape from the finitude of our beliefs, the fallibility of our practices, and the contingency of our condition' (2). By placing the criticisms of epistemologically-based philosophy by Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, and Rorty in a Pyrrhonian context, Hiley attempts 'to recover the moral significance of the Pyrrhonian stand against philosophy' (10). Thus he argues that both the Cartesian separation of the skeptical arguments from moral or eudaemonic purposes and the Enlightenment claim that increase of knowledge would lead to social welfare are mistakes. Our failure to solve the problem of the external world and to achieve the good society through the advance of science and technology has led – through excessive concentration on the destructive aspects of skepticism – to an untenable conclusion that we must either accept some foundations dogmatically or admit that any position is relativistically as good as any other.

Hiley sees postmodernist criticism as an attempt (like Pyrrhonism) to escape this dilemma not by solving philosophical problems, but by going beyond philosophy by showing that it has reached an end (Heidegger) or is repressive (Foucault), or cannot reach closure (Derrida), or is trivial in the sense that it makes no practical difference what the answers to philosophical problems are (Rorty). Philosophy has made attempts to provide a 'metanarrative, a foundation, an Archimedean point' (37) as a basis for criticizing, evaluating, and judging philosophical systems and knowledge-claims. The crisis in contemporary philosophy is that skeptical arguments undermine all proposed foundations, making critical the question: What grounds are there for judgment? But the same charge and problem faces the postmodernists. If the search for foundations itself is misguided and its results vacuous, and if even its success would make no difference to the propagation of human happiness and virtue – if 'the relativism/dogmatism dichotomy has been undercut' (121) – then how *are* we to criticize, evaluate, and choose among competing social systems, five-year plans, and ways of life?

Bacon thought science would lead to the biblically promised conquest of nature and Condorcet thought the application of scientific methods of reaching rational consensus to the human sciences would 'undermine the authority of tyrants and tradition... [and] the only authority would be reason and truth' (53). But, Hiley says, 'the increase in power through growth of knowledge appears increasingly to contribute to our unfreedom' (63).

Hiley agrees that certainty is impossible (129), but says 'our beliefs *are* rational insofar as, and only insofar as they are successful in coping with the world' and that we can criticize 'particular beliefs, values, and institutions, given that there are no foundations, system-independent criteria, or meta-frameworks on which to rest rational critique' only, following Davidson, on the acceptance of the general truth of our body of beliefs, 'only against the background of the unproblematical character of our beliefs as a whole' (141). In the end, Hiley most favors Rorty's shrugging off of boring epistemological problems that have no bearing on our lives (much as Hume did). Rorty achieves balance between 'the autonomous self... and a strong sense of community' (165) 'only by retaining the tension between normal and abnormal discourse' (170) on the model of 'Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science' (152): 'I have interpreted Rorty's opposition to epistemology-centered philosophy as an attempt to retain an Enlightenment hope and its commitment to social criticism, community, and progress without Enlightenment pretensions about the centrality of reason as a tribunal or philosophy as foundational' (172).

Hiley wants to keep the conversation going. He concludes by wishing that he had more reason than mere hope for his inclination to be optimistic like Dewey and Rorty rather than giving in to 'the despair of Heidegger or Foucault about the modern age' (172).

I am led to ask these questions: Is there any evidence that knowledge ever did or did not lead to happiness or virtue in the first place? Isn't it likely that the skeptical arguments themselves led to the Pyrrhonian dissatisfaction with the search for knowledge, rather than (as Hiley's thesis demands) merely being developed by them to dissuade people from claiming to have knowledge? In the presence of thriving political tyrannies based on brute force, isn't having the horrors about 'the tyranny of reason' a bit bookish? Do you think anyone who would say that 'the possibility of large-scale irrationality is unintelligible' (135) has ever followed doctors' rounds in a psychiatric hospital? Or knows about Verdun? Or the Third Reich? Isn't the deepest Pyrrhonian challenge to the sanity of anyone (Descartes, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Wittgenstein) who takes skepticism seriously? Dues anyone who follows Keith Lehrer to say that 'absolute certainty is much too strong a condition for knowing' (127) take skepticism seriously? How is *your* grip on the world? Would you like to talk about it?

Richard A. Watson
Washington University

Douglas Beck Low
The Existential Dialectic of Marx and Merleau-Ponty.
New York: Peter Lang 1987. Pp. 252.
US$36.00. ISBN 0-8204-0435-7.

In his stimulating book, Low aims to develop and elucidate a method of study of nature and history which he characterizes es existential dialectic. The respect in which the method is existential is that it proceeds to study its subject matter through a 'reflective description of the lived experience of the concrete subject' [191]. It is dialectical, because it recognizes that 'the experiencing subject influences the object and others at the same time he is being influenced by them' (ibid.). That is, subject and object are regarded as forming a whole so that neither can be comprehended without the other. There is not merely a causal interaction between the two, but a conceptual dependence of each on the other. The categories of subject and of object reciprocally refer to one another. As well, alterations of either the subject or object are accompanied by alterations of the other. Beyond this, Low provides a service to modern readers by drawing attention to Merleau-Ponty's important work *The Structure of Behaviour* (Boston: Beacon Press 1963). He attempts an exposition of the main thrust of Merleau-Ponty's work, and tries to show its similarity with some of Karl Marx's social philosophy, (especially that of the early Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts) and thereby to elucidate the philosophical structure of Marx's thought through the existential dialectical method that he finds in Merleau-Ponty. The main force of Merleau-Ponty's work lies in its demonstration of the empirical need to use structures in the study of the three main kinds of phenomena: lifeless matter, organic life and conscious, human life. By appeal to pertinent empirical observation, Merleau-Ponty persuasively shows how the study of phenomena of organic and conscious life especially cannot proceed without reference to structure. The main feature of this structure is that it defines an organization of the individual which contains a special kind of inertia. The individual will strive to maintain this organization whenever factors occur in its life that tend to disrupt it. This phenomenon of the striving to maintain structure is referred to as the attempt to preserve an 'equilibrium' of forces affecting the individual.

Part of my trouble with Low's treatment of Merleau-Ponty is that he does not make clear how Merleau-Ponty can be both a materialist, and regard the structures of the three levels of nature as not produced by matter itself. At times Merleau-Ponty suggests a position not far from objective idealism; i.e., one which presents 'the human order of consciousness' as 'the condition of possibility and [the] foundation' of

the realms of matter and organic life generally (*Structure*, 202). Furthermore, neither Low not Merleau-Ponty shows why the dialectical approach is incompatible with the mechanistic. Kant, in the *Critique of Judgement*, accepts a form of the 'dialectic of the epistemological subject and the scientific object' (*Structure*, 201). But he points out that although human beings cannot comprehend the object without holistic structures, it does not follow that these structures are not the products of a complex mechanical causation. Because the contingency of coincidence of these forms is 'so infinitely great,' it seems that they could have come into existence only through the structure preceding the development of the parts in some sort of design. But this does not prove that they are not the products of natural law and contingency.

In relating Merleau-Ponty's view to Marx, Low is on safe ground when he points out that Marx acknowledges, in his early writings, a hierarchy of matter, organic life, and human life. Moreover, Marx accepts social holism and thus acknowledges the objective reality of structures that cannot be reduced to atomic parts and mechanical organizations. Although Low thinks that it is impossible for a materialist, empirical epistemology to comprehend Marx's position, I am not convinced that Marx would regard his position as anything more than materialism which acknowledges certain dialectical laws, especially the law of the transformation of quantity into quality, e.g., in the freezing of water, and in the transition of one economic base to another. Marx would attempt to explain the contingency of the form of organic and conscious life by reference to dialectical materialism rather than any design implying that the human order of consciousness was the foundation for nature and history. This does not, as Low seems to think, exclude the possibility of human beings having a dialectical influence on the objective world. Although there can be a dialectical interaction of the categories of consciousness with the structure of society, nevertheless, the ultimate factor leading to the construction of those categories is the material economic factor. Thus, Marx does not, I think, explicitly acknowledge that there is a dialectical interaction of subject and object at all levels. This interaction appears only at the developed (but contingent) period of human history. I do not mean to suggest that Marx's position is without problems. Nevertheless, Low is suggesting an important modification of it, which might well be an improvement, rather than a correct account of it. I think the book would have been better if it had directly taken up this problem.

On one important point, Low seems to have misrepresented Marx. Low suggest that 'Marx regards the proletariat's view as the scientific one... because it is the one that is based en concrete experience' (221). In the understanding of historical materialism, the proletariat

is certainly the revolutionary class. But its position is that of a negated class whose negativity must be in turn negated. In Marx's '*Private Property and Communism*', the proletariat is represented as far from having a correct perspective on the world. If there is a significant weakness in Low's interesting book, it lies in its failing to undertake an account of the historical dialectic, and in examining how this relates to the existential dialectic that Low develops.

Leslie Mulholland
Memorial University of Newfoundland

Catherine Osborne
Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics.
New York: Cornell University Press 1987.
Pp. viii+383. US$47.50. ISBN 0-8014-2103-9.

The Introduction to *Rethinking Greek Philosophy* recommends an approach to the fragments of Greek philosophers in the context of their quotations as 'embedded texts' rather than in isolated units, and takes the evidence for the Presocratics given in Hippolytus' *Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* as an example of crucial testimony that would benefit from such an approach. Part One then explains how quotations from Aristotle and from the biographical material on the Life of Simon Magus can be used as 'controls' to support the arguments of Part Two, which is particularly concerned with Hippolytus' treatment of Empedocles and Heraclitus. The last paragraph of the brief conclusion summarises the whole:

> In one sense Hippolytus' reading has a claim to authority as well as offering us a context in which the embedded text functions. In another sense it has no claim to authority, since it is but one of many alternative readings of the text which may be represented in the ancient interpretations.

Less than half of the volume, however, is devoted to the development of this somewhat uninformative thesis. The remainder includes four appendices, the longest of which is a photographic reproduction of Westland's text of book 6 of the *Refutatio*, with an English facing translation. The last appendix gives what we have been told throughout is anathema, namely a series of key quotations in Greek that are isolated from their context. A bibliography, minimum glossary, useful Index Locorum and idiosyncratic general index are added.

Any responsible commentator on early Greek philosophy is only too aware of the need to take into account the general characteristics, interests and motivation of a quoting source, as well as the more immediate context. One normally assumes that further assistance in strengthening the foundations of text and interpretation may be found by cross-referencing the quotation to other sources and checking relevant doxography. Osborne however rejects this method. The originality, even heresy, that she claims for her work centres on a new programme of reading and interpretation of Presocratic material based on single sources *seriatim*, and finds justification for it in the results deduced from its application to Hippolytus.

To some extent Osborne is tilting at windmills. Her main targets include the Presocratic books by Jonathan Barnes and Kirk, Raven and Schofield, but, as with the ancients, such authors use excerpts for philosophical or propaedeutic purposes, and do not claim that they are presenting or can achieve unquestioned, definitive text. The principle of re-ordering fragments in modern editions can hardly be lambasted when most of the ancient sources are ultimately dependent on earlier collections of material that have been excerpted and arbitrarily classified. When the quotation is already from a compendium no amount of study of the 'embedded text' is going to throw light on the *original* context. And the paradoxical conclusion that Osborne draws from maintaining that the words recorded are merely an illustration of the quoter's interpretation, and are not to be considered apart from it, is that the longer the fragment the more it is distorted and the harder the original is to fathom.

Osborne's defence rests on the value of studying two Presocratics in the 'new' way in the embedded text of Hippolytus. Certainly, one merit of Osborne's work is a partial rehabilitation of Hippolytus as an authority to be taken more seriously than has been the case, and there is a helpful explanation of his method of countering the claim of heresies to be new and divine by aligning them with old, and human, Greek ideas. But although Osborne recognises that Hippolytus is 'no fool' she admits that he rearranges material and sometimes copies without understanding from a source which includes both error and weak argument. Moreover, the recommended method does not seem to be transferable to other authors. Diogenes, for example, whose standing as an authority might be comparable to Hippolytus, is sharply dismissed: 'what Diogenes thought was the case is no guarantee of the truth' (29).

There is further trouble when one looks at the use of Hippolytus' quotation of Aristotle as a 'control' for his treatment of the Presocratics. Osborne argues that all Hippolytus' quotations from Empedocles are from one book because no titles are given; apply this to Aristotle and *Categories, Metaphysics* and *de Anima* would be a single work.

More seriously Osborne shows that Hippolytus misquotes and misunderstands Aristotle, and that his exegesis can be 'hostile, unorthodox and perhaps even biased, but still valuable and interesting' (66). 'Interesting,' like 'informative,' is a favourite adjective, but what does it mean when applied without further explanation to interpretations that are partial, misleading and even wrong? It would have been useful too to have been told more about the second 'control,' the biography of Simon Magus, but this section consists mainly of a long direct quotation from Hippolytus briefly compared with one from Irenaeus.

After so much preparation the conclusions reached for Empedocles and Heraclitus are brief, selective and dubious. I take one example. For her interpretation of fr. 115 of Empedocles Osborne has to break her own rule and look outside Hippolytus for the crucial third line. This comes from Plutarch, but the MS reading *phobōi* (from fear) is dismissed without discussion in favour of introducing *phonōi* (misleadingly translated 'with blood-guilt'), and then this emendation of Plutarch is used to interpret Hippolytus' 'embedded text' as a declaration that, despite the absurdity of the concept of immortals murdering each other, blood-guilt on the hands of one entails the banishment of them all, and this is what is meant by *katharmoi*.

At the end of reading Osborne's work there is a feeling of disappointment. Her grandiose claims are not justified, and the opportunity for a useful and enlightening general introduction to Hippolytus and his treatment of the Presocratics (for which there is a need) has been sacrificed in favour of a top-heavy volume, which is too much concerned with particular polemics.

M.R. Wright
(Department of Classics)
University College of Wales, Aberystwyth

Douglas V. Porpora
The Concept of Social Structure.
New York: Greenwood Press 1987.
Pp. ix+159. US$37.95. ISBN 0-313-25646-2.

The Concept of Social Structure is a contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences; its concern is what the proper framework should be for sociological (or similar) theories. It contains a definite and controversial thesis. The thesis is worked out in two parts. The first half

of the book criticizes so-called Structural Sociology, the predominant and essentially positivist approach whose roots go back to Durkheim (or a side of him). The second half of the book defends instead a 'Marxian' approach to social structure, by which Porpora means one that dispenses with determinism and false scientism, and even makes individual purposive agency fundamental, but remains centered on productive forces, economic interests, class conflicts, and systemic tendencies.

Though Porpora stresses that there are these two halves to his argument, he naturally expects them to be inseparable. In fact of course, the critical portion can be largely accepted without any commitment to the constructive portion. And taken as a whole, Porpora's endeavor – while scholarly, analytical, wide-ranging, and often illuminating – is ultimately ill-fated. The theory he wants in Marx is either not there or not true. The Marxian explanatory frame on which he wants to build is broken-backed. Porpora avoids this familiar truth by a superficial and tilted reckoning of the results of Marx's predictions (e.g., 51) and a misleading analysis of main concepts and their implications, such as that of class interests and what it would mean to act on them. For surely, insofar as Marx's main predictions are tolerably definite they have been long ago disproved, and insofar as the model of analysis on which they rest is taken seriously, it stresses not agency and ideas but objective facts and material conditions. Better, then, to concentrate on the critical half of Porpora's argument.

Porpora takes as his main exemplars of Structural Sociology Peter Blau, particularly his *Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure* (1977), and Bruce Mayhew, referring to a series of his papers. Structural Sociology, for Porpora, combines a number of claims, all of which he wants to refute. They include the idea that sociology should focus not on individual agents and aims but instead on structures – their size, shape and so forth; and the idea that the task of sociology is to formulate laws governing these structures and deduce explanations of individual instances from them. 'The lines of battle thus become clear: the true target of my argument is the N-D [Nomothetic Deductive] model itself. My argument attempts to show that the criteria of the N-D model of explanation cannot be met by sociology and that the N-D model presents a false picture of scientific explanation anyway' (5).

Porpora's preferred 'realist' model of scientific explanation we shall come to in a moment. But what first is the essence of his case against the N-D model? It is that the model stands or falls with the existence of social scientific laws. And laws, he argues, whether deterministic or stochastic, are precluded by the obvious facts of human purposive behavior. For behavior relies on open-ended strategies and intelli-

gent pursuit of goals, as with chess games or even simple actions that can be performed in a variety of ways. The inherent inadequacy of non-purposive models, whether based on Stimulus-Response Behaviorism or Cognitive Science, is the proof of this, Porpora argues (with a sharpness of focus and detail that I cannot document).

In short, mainstream positivist sociology, indeed positivist social science as a whole, cannot hope for empirical success because it is philosophically misconceived. This is not an uncommon view. But Porpora's argument continues towards its singular goal by further contending that the Humean conception of causality on which the whole N-D model rests must be replaced by a different, truly realist view of science. Porpora believes that philosophers of natural science have already largely moved to such a view. According to it, he maintains, causes are not merely conjunctions of events but actual substances with properties and tendencies; and reality consists of multiple layers of these causal powers or generative mechanisms, with diverse possibilities present at any moment.

In looking to how this sort of view can be transferred to the social sciences, Porpora comes upon Marx. Clearly, many twists and turns and tacit interpretations are needed to get there. But the line of his thinking is evident. One key bridging notion is the idea of historical narrative. Not the covering law model, but a narrativist one is needed: to reveal the emergence and tendencies of systems, ones which constitute positions and interests for persons in relation to developing productive forces.

But the more the final Marxian picture of sociological theory takes shape, the more the old problems arise for it. Take but two examples. Porpora notes Marx's claim that as capitalism expands the rate of profit tends to fall and the market tends to be saturated, and he comments, 'yet these tendencies are less inexorable laws than forces, which can be counteracted by other forces, although not without creating new predicaments' (112). Well, then, is there or is there not some essential and destructive characteristic of capitalism at work in these ways, and if so, exactly how? Worries about the vagueness and irrefutability of the whole thesis are perhaps the only unavoidable thing here.

Or consider the shifting of ground between these citations, from successive paragraphs: 'the concept of structured class interests is what connects social structure with the individual actor... Thus objective class-based interests lead to the purposive behavior of each class.' Yet: 'because it is individuals' perceptions of their interests that determine their behavior, ideas occupy an important role' (111). But how? If ideas are really to be allowed to play the important role that they obviously do play in human life and society, then thoughts and

purposive behavior cannot, in any significant sense, be simply functions of objective (material) interests.

Porpora to the contrary, the troubles lie with the very fundamentals of Marx's explanatory framework.

Hilliard Aronovitch
University of Ottawa

Michael Redhead
Incompleteness, Nonlocality, and Realism: A Prolegomenon to the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics.
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987. Pp. viii+191. Cdn$68.75: US$45.00. ISBN 0-19-824937-3.

Philosophical and quasi-philosophical books on quantum theory have become something of a growth industry in years, and the reader may well be excused for feeling a twinge of impatience as yet another is announced. But Michael Redhead has given us a fine, hard book that stands head and shoulders above the usual crop. Anyone who has a serious interest in metaphysics or the philosophy of physics will be amply repaid for the effort that will have to be expended to master this book.

It should be emphasized that the problems Readhead discusses are of very general philosophical interest, even though they have their origin in a subject that some people may think of as an arcane specialty. What Redhead is trying to do is to clarify, in a serious and accurate way, the challenge that quantum mechanics (QM) poses to a traditional realistic metaphysics of 'possessed values.' This is the view that the world may truly (and not just conventionally or to a convenient approximation) be said to be made up of spatially separate 'things' which possess distinct and definite properties and which exist independently of our perception or awareness of them. Whether this 'local realism,' as it is called, is a tenable interpretation of the quantum-mechanical facts of life 'is in fact the principle question with which this book is concerned' (47). And Redhead goes on to present very good evidence that in fact it is not. 'What we are really going to do in this book,' Redhead says (48), 'is to rule out certain metaphysical packages as possible ways of interpreting QM.'

Part of what Redhead has to do in order to accomplish this is to clarify the easily-blurred distinction between separability (the notion

that properties may be independently attributed to two parts of a physical system separated in space and time) and locality (the notion that there is no 'action-at-a-distance'). Redhead takes great care to distinguish several different possible senses of locality, and to show precisely under what assumptions they may or may not be tenable.

Redhead opens his book with a somewhat breathless account of the formalism of QM, or rather those parts of it that are most pertinent to his concerns. With his terminology and notation established, he goes on to translate the metaphysical problem that worries him into quantum mechanical terms as follows: consider a physical system which is not in an eigenstate of an observable Q. What can we say about the value of the observable before a measurement is performed on the system? Redhead says (45) that there have been three typical answers given to this question. View A (which one can imagine that Newton himself might have felt was so evident as to require no further discussion) is that 'Q has a sharp but unknown value.' View B (which might have drawn an impatient snort from Newton) is that 'Q has an unsharp or "fuzzy" value'. View C (which might have provoked Newton into an apoplectic rage) is that 'the value of Q is undefined or meaningless.'

View A is the answer given to our question by the traditional realistic metaphysics; it is the view of those who have attempted without success to construct local hidden variable underpinnings for the predictions of QM. It can be expressed by saying that a quantum system, say an electron, possesses *all* of its quantitative attributes *all* of the time. Redhead's major aim in this book is to show that View A is almost certainly untenable, but he exhibits little sympathy for Views B or C. View B is associated with Heisenberg, the early Bohm, and some others, who have suggested that before a measurement is made, a system merely has a potentiality or propensity to be found in various states. Redhead barely touches on this notion, since he feels that insofar as it can be clearly expressed at all it does not differ from a realism of possessed values in any way important to his discussion. (A 'propensity' can be thought of as a kind of property.) View C is associated with Bohr and the doctrine of complementarity. Redhead makes it plain that he likes neither Bohr's obscurity nor, especially, the unseemly dogmatism with which Bohr's Copenhagen Interpretation is tainted. But Redhead does not really give Bohr's important insights about the limitations upon the definability of physical concepts their proper due, even though his capsule summary shows that he understands them very well. One can and should ask to what extent, if any, does the very undefinability of 'location' outside of a certain experimental context render nonlocality a nonproblem? The answer to this question is not obvious. Redhead says a little about

this (77-78) but not enough, and this may be the only important weakness of his book.

It is interesting that Redhead does not even mention the 'many-worlds' interpretation of QM, the favourite of the pop quantum-philosophers. This view, according to which *all* possible states of the system plus observer actually exist, but only the particular state that any given observer belongs to is accessible to that observer, is a sort of realism with a vengeance. Perhaps Redhead just does not think that it can be taken seriously. But some very respectable thinkers, such as Bryce DeWitt, do take it quite seriously, and Redhead's overview might have been more complete had he mentioned it, if only to deride it.

Having set the stage, Redhead moves on to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, and the famous Bell Inequality that followed historically from it. This is all standard stuff, but Redhead does it very well indeed. Redhead's explication of EPR is certainly one of the best available. It will be especially useful to those who have already spent some time struggling to understand EPR's profound and cryptic paper of 1935.

Two chapters on the Kochen-Specker (K-S) Paradox comprise the heart of the book. The K-S Paradox, which is the prize result of the so-called Logico-Algebraic approach to quantum mechanics, is not nearly as well known as EPR or Bell, but it may be just as important. Redhead has rendered a valuable service by making it accessible to a wider audience. It is difficult to summarize the K-S argument in a few words, since so much mathematical groundwork is necessary to even state the result. Roughly speaking, it shows that it is impossible to consistently assign values to all possible quantum mechanical observables in all states. This in turn implies that it is impossible to maintain separability in the above sense. This therefore constitutes a further severe difficulty for View A, quite apart from the difficulties it already encounters through the failure of locality implied by the violation of the Bell Inequality. (The return to philosophical respectability of the notion of nonseparability should no doubt delight the heart of every closet Hegelian.) A possible way out (suggested by van Fraassen and explored by Redhead) is to deny any 1-1 correspondence between operators and observables. However, as Redhead shows, this attempt to salvage separability leads inevitably into one or the other of two further types of nonlocality. The punchline of the story (169) is that 'some sort of action-at-a-distance or (conceptually distinct) nonseparability seems built into any reasonable attempt to understand the quantum view of reality.' (Note that 'or' in this sentence does not necessarily mean exclusive or.) Prob-

ably the only real defence that a traditional local realist might have against this conclusion would be to somehow show that the way Redhead translated the metaphysical problem into the language of QM was illegitimate or irrelevant.

While nonseparability flies in the face of the metaphysics of common sense realism, nonlocality seems to fly in the face of special relativity (SR). It may not be generally appreciated by nonphysicists how disturbing this is to most physicists, for whom the nonexistence of superluminal causation is almost a necessary foundation of scientific rationality. Redhead gives the standard and probably correct argument that there can be no superluminal 'Bell telephone' (115); but this is not enough by itself to reconcile the contradiction between the fact that SR says that there can be no superluminal causation and the fact that quantum correlations show that in some unclear sense there is. Some, such as Bell himself and Popper, are prepared to abandon or revise SR. Others look for some sort of compromise. For example, d'Espagnat would distinguish 'causes' from 'influences,' and Shimony 'action-at-a-distance' from 'passion-at-a-distance.' They claim that quantum correlations do not undermine SR because they involve only interactions of the latter sort which are, presumably, uncontrollable, and hence cannot be used to establish distant synchrony which would undermine the relativity of simultaneity.

Redhead mentions these issues, but, perhaps understandably, does not attempt to do justice to them. Obviously, though, if one is going to embrace nonlocality, the status of special relativity is open to review. This leaves philosophers of science with a special job of their own – to convince physicists that there really is a problem to be faced here.

The book suffers from one or two small typos and occasional clumsiness in mathematical notation, but it is on the whole well produced; the figures in particular are very helpful.

This is definitely not a first book on quantum philosophy (although this comment is not meant to discourage browsing by those who are not intimately conversant with Fourier integrals and measure theory). However, an excellent advanced graduate course could be structured around it, for students (and professors) who were willing to do some through preparation beforehand. One could find no better reading list for such a course than Redhead's bibliography itself.

Quantum mechanics is a difficult subject, both conceptually and technically. However, one can only approach the conceptual difficulties by working patiently through the mathematics – there is no 'royal road' to the quantum. But once some familiarity with the language of the subject is achieved, one can begin to see that QM teaches us some profound and surprising things about Nature. Very prominent among these things are the curious facts about nonlocality and

nonseparability that play central roles in Redhead's story. Perhaps if we were wiser we would see that this is just the way things must inevitably be. But in fact we do not; and today QM stands on the frontier of our scientific and philosophic understanding. Read about it, study it, learn it, and worry about it.

James Robert Brown and Kent A. Peacock
University of Toronto

Holmes Rolston III
Environmental Ethics.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1988. Pp. xiii+391. US$34.95.
ISBN 0-87722-501-X.

This is a book informed by two visions, one of the environment and one of ethics. The vision of the environment is certainly Rolston's focus, but the vision of ethics and indeed of philosophy is the deeper.

More than any philosopher I know, Holmes Rolston has an abundant knowledge of ecosystems. Thus, when Rolston writes separate chapters on duties to sentient life (chapter 2), duties to organic life (chapter 3), duties to endangered species (chapter 4), and duties to ecosystems (chapter 5), one is sure to learn much about sentient life, organic life, endangered species and ecosystems. I suspect that non-philosophers will find these chapters not only surprisingly accessible but also engaging.

Philosophers, on the other hand, are accustomed to a more abstract brew. Surely many of them will wonder why they are hearing that chemical salts on Polaroid camera film are tasty but poisonous to elk, or why they should care about Big Guy, a Florida panther hit by a car. These facts do not have the feel of premises in philosophic arguments. But Rolston's pages abound with such material, so one cannot dismiss such material as incidental to his view. Rather one must ask what kind of an argument he is attempting to develop. And it is clear that, whatever sort of argument it is, it is not the sort of argument one finds in other prominent books within environmental ethics by philosophers like Regan, Taylor, Callicott or Frey. These philosophers announce conclusions and produce sets of premises which are meant to provide some fairly tight support for those conclusions. In contrast, in Rolston's *Environmental Ethics* the argument is 'the argument of the book.' It is not a book one can judge by asking, 'Are

the premises true?' Rather, the issue is more like 'What premises should one use in thinking about an environmentally sound ethic?'

Rolston's sustained concrete environmental focus is not designed so much to inform us about the environment as to distance us from a culturally reinforced anthropocentrism while reminding us of more environmentally informed values we also feel. The importance of Rolston's work is that he is wrestling with the fundamental philosophical issue of what justifies a change of normative paradigms. If, in our culture, we incline to form evaluations about the environment as an extension of the evaluations we form about inter-human affairs, what would justify a switch to an alternative paradigm?

Chapter 6 ('The Concept of Natural Value: A Theory for Environmental Ethics'), then, is the philosophical heart of Rolston's book. And the alternative paradigm Rolston provides grows out of his understanding of evolution, the evolution of the universe, of stellar systems, of pre-life and of life. This entire evolution Rolston presents as a project, a pro-life development of centers of interconnected instrumental and intrinsic values. Within this vision there is not only the flowering of all the monumental human potentials but also the grandeur of the entire project of evolution, including the earth teeming with an abundance of species, an abundance which has multiplied throughout aeons. (Chapter 7 on environmental policy and Chapter 8 on implications for business are applications of the theory Rolston develops in chapter 6.)

The fundamental argument Rolston seems to me to be developing is as follows. Value is to be found throughout nature and throughout evolution. Value is to be found independent of self-consciousness, independent of consciousness, in life, in living individuals, in species and in environments which not only instrumentally support but ground the very possibility of life's flowering. The home of human valuing is on a continuum with animal valuing. This valuing is evolutionarily grounded in the responsive capacities of animals, the capacities of sensation and locomotion, as I have myself elsewhere argued (*The Monist*, January 1988).

The reader will not find Rolston engaged in traditional polemics against other philosophers. This book, however, challenges the methods and philosophical assumptions of Regan, Callicott, Taylor and Frey. Different as those authors are from each other, in one way and another they do not challege or they accept some variety of ethical subjectivism. Rolston, however, uses evolution to establish the capacity of subjects to value within a broader context of value. Consequently subjective capacities are for Rolston neither the whole story nor its center.

What I find missing in Rolston is the completion of the story he has set out to tell. Suppose we see subjective capacities as Rolston

urges we should. How then should we understand the existence of ethics itself? Rolston seems not to address this question. His discussions of ethics seem to me quite out of touch with the evolutionary understanding he advances. Like his philosophical competitors, he knows from his training as a philosopher what ethics is.

I believe a very different understanding of ethics itself emerges if we pursue the evolutionary understanding Rolston has begun. Clearly an ethic will evolve only within a social species. Clearly the less instinctual a social species' coordinations are, the more beneficial communication which promotes coordination will prove. Clearly the evolution of language will vastly expand the species' capacity for beneficial coordination. It will also expand individuals' goals and thus expand both the variety of goals on which to seek coordination and the variety of (social and artifactually informed) environments within which coordination could prove beneficial. (Archeologically, it also seems probable that the original technological explosion [c. 100,000 B.C.E.] immediately followed the advent of language.) Language also expands the capacities of human beings for coordinating, enabling such practices as intending, promising, contracting, deeding, inheriting and the like.

Like various other environmental philosophers, Rolston sees norms as grounded in values occurring within the natural world. But this thinking, even in Rolston, too quickly and easily separates nature from culture. Ethics then turns out to be a product of culture, not nature. But the strength of environmental philosophies is in the grounding of values in the natural world. In one way and another, Regan, Callicott, Taylor and Rolston are all advocates of a new teleological understanding in ethics. As MacIntyre observes in *After Virtue*, the power of a teleology is its ability to constrain the question 'What is the proper goal for X?' Thus the unused potential of environmental philosophy is to answer the question 'What is the proper goal of an ethic?', thereby standing on its head the anthropocentric and subjectivistic views which have dominated recent human philosophizing about values. For if an ethic can itself be understood as an evolved artifact, then it and the judgments, norms, practices and instutions it involves can be evaluated within the evolutionary, teleological framework Rolston begins to develop.

Donald Scherer
Bowling Green State University

David-Hillel Ruben
The Metaphysics of the Social World.
New York: Methuen Inc. 1986. Pp. 189.
US$29.95. ISBN 0-7100-9826-X.

This is an analytic investigation of a major problem in the philosophy of social science, the dispute between individualism and holism. The author pithily states the main theses of his book: 'Metaphysical individualism concerning social objects is false; social objects are not wholes whose parts are human individuals; social properties are not reducible to mental properties; methodological individualism, as a view about explanation in the social sciences, is false' (ix). The cornerstone of Ruben's case for his theses is a distinction between entities, which are what true statements are about, and properties, which are what statements ascribe to what they are supposed to be about. This yields two forms of metaphysical individualism, one which denies that there are social entities, the other that there are social properties. Ruben argues that there are social entities as follows: 'The belief that France is a charter member of the United Nations is literally true; this belief seems to require the existence of France as that which the belief is about; this belief is not paraphrasable by, or logically equivalent to, any belief that does not require the existence of France for its truth; there are no acceptable candidates with which France may be reductively identified; therefore there is at least one irreducible social substance, France' (paraphrase, 10). Generalizing and putting his point negatively, Ruben infers that no social entity is identical with any individual entity, or set of individual entities. Moreover, he argues that these social entities are not related to humans as whole to parts, on the grounds that supposing so violates plausible mereological principles governing the logic of parts and wholes. In particular there is the principle, 'If France is a whole and if its citizens are its parts, and if France and its citizens are spatially locatable, then the spatial location of the whole, France, at least includes the spatial locations of each of its citizens' (paraphrase, 51). But Frenchmen can live abroad, say in Iceland, without its being true that some part of France can be spatially located in Iceland. Ruben concludes that 'the French cannot ... be among the parts of France' (52). So both entity individualism and its mereological neighbor are false. But property individualism is also false. More specifically, social properties cannot be reductively identified with mental properties, even in combination with material properties. Ruben's argument begins with the premise that if an entity is irreducibly social, then no material or mental property can be true of it (87). Then property-individualism must imply that the putative social properties of social entities are either reducible or else illusory. But reduction of so-

cial properties lacks plausible reducing properties, given the premise denying the predicability of material and mental properties to social entities. If social properties are not reducible to mental or material ones, what other candidates are there? As for the possibility of social properties being illusory, Ruben insists that if an irreducibly social entity exists then it follows that some social property is true of it. Being an entity of the metaphysical kind *social* 'is not a basic, non-consequential property of an entity,' he says, but rather 'it is a supervenient property of an entity, which that entity possesses as a consequence of possessing some specific properties belonging to that kind' (89-90). (An elaborate anti-reductive argument is offered which does not rely on entity holism, but I shall not run through it here.) Since it is an open question how reduction and explanation are related, rejection of metaphysical individualism does not transfer directly to methodological individualism (m.i.), a doctrine about explanation which asserts that 'ultimately, everything that happens or occurs can be explained without recourse to social entities or social properties.' Ruben does reject m.i. as well, however, on the grounds that it renders impossible rationally held true beliefs about social facts. He arrives at this conclusion by way of a formulation of m.i. as stating that: 'For every explanatory chain which includes at least one social fact, there is some point in the chain at which the facts are only psychological (and material) facts, and no facts prior to that point are social facts' (paraphrase, 165). This is called 'the psychological version' of m.i. because it includes psychological facts in the category of the explanatorily fundamental, as well as material facts. Among the fundamental psychological facts are beliefs. Leading now towards Rubens' conclusion, it is assumed that the content of these beliefs will be specified by reference to social properties or entities, as in the belief that La Guardia was mayor of New York (the predicate ascribes a social property and contains the name of a social entity). But Ruben lays it down that if a person rationally believes, truly, that *o* is P, then part of the explanation of why he holds this belief is that *o* is P. So if one rationally believes, truly, that La Guardia was mayor of New York, then part of the explanation of why one holds this belief is that La Guardia was mayor of New York. But this is to admit the existence of a social fact in a position in the explanatory chain which is antecedent to the allegedly explanatorily fundamental category of psychological facts. The only way of squaring this admission with m.i. is to deny that such beliefs about social properties and entities are rational, since it is beyond doubt that they are true.

Ruben's case for holism is painstakingly argued and closely connected to the literature, virtues which undergraduates and non-philosophers are likely to mistake for hair-splitting and obscuran-

tism. Any graduate seminar on holism and individualism should have this book on its reading list. I close with a suggestion for a possible line of criticism: Ruben assumes that 'the only relation available to the entity individualist is identity. The entity individualist holds that every allegedly social entity turns out to be identical with some non-social entity' (4). I submit that this under-estimates the options available to the individualist. Ruben implicitly acknowledges this when he discusses 'eliminative' as opposed to 'reductive' individualism, on an analogy with the related contrast between kinds of materialism. Eliminative materialism does not assert an identity between the mental and the material, nor does eliminative individualism assert an identity between the social and the psychological/material. The latter asserts that there are no nations, etc., to be identified with anything else. It may be significant, and it is certainly in keeping with my suggestion of a criticism, that Ruben gives eliminative individualism short shrift, hardly amounting to more than the claim that 'eliminative individualism, like eliminative materialism, has a far smaller initial plausibility than does its reductive analogue' (12). Just as materialists have found many alternatives to asserting an identity between the mental and the physical, it seems reasonable to suppose that individualists will find alternatives to asserting an identity between the social and the psychological/material.

W.E. Cooper
University of Alberta

C.L. Ten
Crime, Guilt, and Punishment.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1987. Pp. 175.
Cdn$53.95: US$36.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-875082-X);
Cdn$26.95: US$15.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-875081-1).

This introductory book reflects Ten's belief that 'a discussion of the nature and justification of punishment is a useful introduction to other related areas of philosophy, and to issues of interest to non-philosophers' (1). His claims for the significance of the book's topic are clearly justified. Punishment is a familiar battleground for the conflict between consequentialist and non-consequentialist modes of

moral thought, and can thus introduce students to central issues in moral philosophy; since any justifying theory of punishment must at least presuppose (and should ideally explicate) a more general account of the aims of a system of criminal law, and a more general political and social theory of the nature and aims of the state, a discussion of punishment should also lead students into these broader reaches of political and social philosophy; and a discussion of the criteria of criminal responsibility leads us straight into a range of core issues in philosophy of action and philosophy of mind. Furthermore, this is one of the contexts in which philosophers should most readily be able to address the practical concerns of non-philosophers - especially at a time when (in Britain at least) a proper if belated concern is spreading about what actually goes on in our courts and prisons. The philosopher's contribution to the punishment debate is not, however, likely to be a comforting one; a philosophical theory which aims to 'specify the type of considerations which, if satisfied, will justify punishment' (3) is likely to show that present penal practices fall well short of being adequately justified.

Ten's book certainly covers the ground. In the space of 164 pages he discusses utilitarian theories of punishment (he notes the problem of finding the empirical evidence necessary to sustain a utilitarian account, and rejects any such account on the grounds that it would justify the punishment of an innocent in certain actual or imaginable circumstances). He discusses neo-Hegelian and denunciatory versions of retributivism, and Morris' account of punishment as restoring that fair balance of benefits and burdens which crime disturbs; none, he thinks, can provide a complete justification of criminal punishment. He offers his own 'Compromise Theory' of punishment, which in effect takes both retributive desert and consequential utility to be singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for justified punishment: but the desert requirement is qualified to allow for the punishment of an innocent when this would avert much greater suffering by the innocent victims of crime: and the utilitarian requirement is also qualified, on grounds of fairness, to justify the unproductive punishment of a criminal when 'punishing those who have voluntarily committed similar or lesser offences is justified on utilitarian grounds' (80).

He goes on to offer a useful development of Hart's account of the rationale of legal excuses; a discussion of strict liability (always unfair, but sometimes justified by utilitarian considerations) and of negligence (for which people can properly be punished so long as they had the capacity and opportunity to take the care which a reasonable person would have taken); a critical discussion of Wootton's proposal for the abolition of mens rea; an account of the proper scope of the insanity defence (he favours a broad version of the M'Naghten

Rules which would acquit the person who cannot grasp the 'how' or the 'why' of the wrongness of her action, as well as one who cannot grasp the 'that' of its illegality: but he rejects any wider version of the defence, and in particular any defence of 'irresistible impulse'; not because that notion is conceptually or morally untenable, but because it would in practice be too difficult to apply); a useful discussion of the treatment of dangerous offenders; and some rather schematic comments on principles of sentencing. Along the way he adds a justification of the use of fantastic examples in moral philosophy (to support his argument against utilitarian accounts of punishment), and some brief comments on the proper scope of the criminal law.

Inevitably, when so many topics are covered in so short a text, the argument is sometimes sketchy, incomplete or superficial; and one wonders whether the book should not have been either longer or less ambitious in its scope. I think, for instance, that his response to Quinton's 'definitional scope' argument (16-17) is weak; he does not really bring out the logical force of Rawls' famous account (67-71), or the conceptual incoherence of Wootton's attempt to retain the notion of the actus reus whilst eliminating mens rea; his objections to Morris do not really come across clearly or conclusively enough for an introductory book; and I suspect that that practical problems which he thinks preclude allowing a defence of 'irresistible impulse' might also threaten his broad version of the M'Naghten Rules.

On the other hand, much of the discussion is admirably clear and sensible; and the book should give any beginning student, and any interested non-philosopher, at least an initial grasp of the issues involved in this area, and of some of the philosophical resources which may help to deal with them. I am not so sure, however, that it will give the reader a feeling for the depth and seriousness of the issues. Ten rather gives the impression that what is needed, and what must be available, is a theory of punishment which will justify something not unlike our existing system of criminal justice: he does not, in his discussion of utilitarian theories, raise the issue of whether a strictly utilitarian perspective would find room for a system of criminal law and punishment at all (though this could be usefully connected to Wootton's suggestions); he does not, I think, do enough to make the reader see just how morally problematic punishment is; and his own 'Compromise Theory,' which makes explicit provision for the punishment of the innocent, should surely provoke acute moral unease not just in full-blooded retributivists, but in anyone who takes the demands of justice seriously. We may find ourselves compelled to compromise those demands in situations of tragic necessity: but Ten makes the compromise seem altogether too comfortable.

R.A. Duff
University of Stirling

Helene Vivienne Wenzel, ed.
Simone de Beauvoir: Witness to a Century.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
1986. Pp. xiv+219. US$12.95.
ISBN 0-300-03897-6.

It is a great irony that the writer of one of the most sustained and influential analyses of and attacks upon the position of women in contemporary society should have been seen for so long, by Anglo-Saxon philosophers at least, as the adjunct of a man. What makes it worse, perhaps, is that her relationship with Sartre was itself a less than amazingly novel one, for all the talk about choice and freedom. At bottom it seems that it was just the sort of relationship of which all the standard oppressions of women are made. A terrible case of, Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

Now, however, we may be entering a period when a more appropriate view of Simone de Beauvoir's thought is gaining ground. Sartre's reputation as a great thinker is not quite what it was: maybe it was always the case that his reputation depended upon something rather like academic hype; at any rate it now seems that the obscurities and inconsistencies of his thought are taken to be just that, and we no longer feel obliged to take him as the sole inventor of a great movement called 'existentialism.' When I say 'we' here, I mean we whose philosophical lives have mostly followed that path in Anglo-Saxon philosophy which was supposed to have led in a more or less straight line from Plato to Hume and then on to ourselves. For us, and here a lot of 'us' are men, it is probably thus true that our acquaintance with any other tradition in philosophy came through Sartre; and that we came to Simone de Beauvoir, if indeed we came to her at all, through Sartre, learning to see her rather vaguely as a novelist but mostly as Sartre's intellectual subordinate.

This collection of essays may help to alter that perspective. The authors do, of course, point out that for many women Simone de Beauvoir has been through her writings – particularly *The Second Sex* – a far greater influence on them than Sartre ever was. The perception of her which I have crudely (quite deliberately so) outlined above has been the perception of an intellectual world dominated by men. What some of these essays are designed to show is the content of Simone de Beauvoir's thought taken entirely on its own terms; and it is a great relief to see that they are not concerned to analyse, dissect, scrutinise and generally dig over that relationship in which de Beauvoir, whether she admitted it or not, got the rough end of the stick. The two essays in the section entitled 'Beauvoir and Sartre' deal with the relationship between their ideas, with a view to showing that Simone de Beauvoir developed philosophical ideas of her own. Similar-

ly, in the essay 'Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir's *Second Sex*' Judith Butler argues that de Beauvoir successfully attempts to overcome the notorious difficulties in the Sartrean concept of choice. This requires a distinctive account of the relation between the self and the body, one which will avoid the Cartesianism of Sartre: the argument is an interesting one, if not ultimately convincing.

In one way and another, indeed, one might say that this whole collection of essays reflects upon that vexed issue. Some of the central essays deal with the different facets of de Beauvoir's thought which in their different ways focus on the relations of women in and to the world. What comes through is a depth of thought which is always vital though not free of ambiguity; and the writers of these essays do not attempt to disguise this fact but, rather try to tease out a clear view on her behalf. Some succeed better than others, but on the whole they work well at the task. The discussions of her portrayal of the relationships of mothers and daughters bring out both the depth and the ambiguity of her thought most clearly. Motherhood seems to have been a condition about which she was in two minds, but this is a common problem within feminism and one with which feminists continue to grapple. Furthermore, the accounts and analyses given in these essays demonstrate most clearly the inadequacy of the Sartrean notions of choice and freedom; de Beauvoir grappled with these issues in a number of different contexts and the essays collected here reveal much of what she herself did not make explicit.

Anyone interested in Simone de Beauvoir could profit from these essays, and should not be put off by the rather breathless and cloying introduction. This unnecessary opening piece suggests that what follows is likely to be hagiography; mercifully this impression is soon dispelled. The short pieces at the end concerning de Beauvoir's death and the authors' reactions to it do not really add very much if what interests you is Simone de Beauvoir and her ideas; but the inclusion of a transcript of conversation with Simone de Beauvoir in 1984 is more interesting, for the paradoxical reason that it is, in itself, rather uninteresting. Little in the way of ideas is discussed; if the editors had really wanted to offer the readers the authentic voice of de Beauvoir, the voice which speaks of ideas and argument, then it might have been better simply to include a piece of her writing, for a writer is crucially what she was, and always insisted that she was.

S.E. Marshall
University of Stirling

Peter Urbach.
Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science: An Account and a Reappraisal.
La Salle, IL: Open Court 1987. Pp. viii+209.
US$29.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-912050-44-6);
US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8216-9015-X).

The generally unfavourable appraisal that Bacon's methodology has been given by philosophers in this century contrasts sharply and strangely with the high esteem in which practioners of science held his writings from the 17th to the 19th century. Peter Urbach suggests a simple explanation for the discrepancy of opinions: modern philosophers have failed to understand Bacon's philosophy and have created a caricature of his methods which no real scientist could (and should) ever have followed. On Urbach's reappraisal Bacon surprisingly appears as the philosopher who first correctly described the methods working scientists have ever since employed.

How did the message about the right method of science get so utterly lost? Urbach obviously takes the influence of Popper's anti-inductivist philosophy of science as partly responsible for the distorted 20th-century view of Bacon. It is one of the main points of the book to show the irony in this: according to Urbach, Bacon was 'a precursor to Popper,' anticipating many of Popper's allegedly novel insights about scientific methodology while avoiding at the same time the serious shortcomings of falsificationism. Thus the restitution of Bacon proceeds on three lines: Urbach tries to show (i) that 'the standard interpretation' of Baconian method is not compatible with the texts; (ii) that Bacon's 'real' methodology is sound according to modern standards – Bacon was a great philosopher; and (iii) that the method applied to concrete examples worked – he even accomplished something in science.

According to the traditional view, Bacon opposed speculation and hypotheses in science, the 'anticipations of nature.' The account of method for which Urbach finds textual evidence is however quite different; in fact, it looks in part like 'conjectures and refutations': start with some collection of phenomena; form a not too bold hypothesis about the causes of the phenomena; derive new predictions from the hypothesis; test them; correct, if necessary, the initial conjecture or proceed to a 'deeper' explanatory hypothesis. This is the way of 'true induction' – the 'hypothetico-inductive method' as Urbach (15) calls it – that Bacon claims will lead to knowledge of the 'forms' of phenomena, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the effects. The forms he sought in an atomistic framework, in terms of the action of the small, invisible particles that constitute matter. Following Bacon's 'true induction,' about, e.g., the form of heat,

Urbach claims that this shows the success of the method and that Bacon anticipated insights of the later kinetic theory of heat (183).

Urbach argues, however, that Bacon did *not* claim to possess a method, a 'logic of discovery,' that could generate *infallible* results. On his view, Bacon was fully aware of the importance of *testing* hypotheses to increase their 'certainty,' *after* they had been generated by his method. The trouble for Urbach here is that Bacon likes to talk about 'certainty,' 'truth,' and 'demonstration' of hypotheses. Urbach translates this vocabulary into probabilistic language: 'certainty,' e.g., becomes 'extreme degree of confidence' (43). Under this kind of 'rational reconstruction' Bacon's methodology appears pretty close to modern Bayesian confirmation theory (55f).

Here lie more problems than Urbach is willing to discuss. What was a method like Bacon's supposed to accomplish if indeed Bacon realized the fallible nature of all knowledge claims? It seems – as Larry Laudan has argued – that for the fallibilist a method for establishing hypotheses, a 'logic of discovery,' has no epistemological point. If the way of generation of a hypothesis does not somehow guarantee the truth or high probability of that hypothesis – then why bother at all about the way? Method is then mere empirical heuristics, a collection of recipes; *testing* becomes the only legitimate way of appraising theories. But this is certainly not a fair characterization of Bacon's project of providing a method for establishing hypotheses. Laudan might be wrong here, but one simply misses a discussion of these issues concerning logics of discovery in Urbach's book.

Urbach considers historical evidence from other writers of Bacon's time only rarely. His main argument in favour of his own interpretation is that it is coherent and up to date; he does not consider its historical adequacy. This marks the strength and the weakness of Urbach's approach. To substantiate the claim that Bacon was a fallibilist, I think, Urbach would have to provide more historical evidence; coherence is not enough here. The reader, he says, should not be 'unfairly biased towards the most interesting or modern-sounding interpretations that can be wrung out of a philosopher's words' (188). Without such historical substantiation, however, his interpretation will not be the 'most interesting' to the historically interested reader; and I fear that the systematic philosopher may learn nothing new from 'modern-sounding' old methodologies.

Alexander Rüger
Universität Konstanz

Jeremy Waldron, ed.
Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man.
Toronto: Methuen; New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1987. Pp. 236.
Cdn$17.95: US$13.95. ISBN: 0-416-91890-5.

This is one case where you cannot judge a book by its cover (or title). The cover suggests a collection of essays or of parts of works by three well-known antagonists of natural (or human) rights. In fact, what we get, besides these things, are the French 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen' (1789), introductory essays by Waldron to each of the four sets of texts, a general introductory essay on 'natural rights in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,' a long concluding essay (of almost sixty pages), notes that tie-in with those sections of the book that Waldron himself has written, and a very helpful bibliographical essay (of almost ten pages). Thus, we have 156 pp. of commentary, etc. from Waldron surrounding 74 pp. of original text material. In the end I do not find this to be a bad bargain.

The general introductory essay is disappointing, very thin. It gives us essentially a potted Locke, with some background in Hobbes (really quite sketchy) and no serious analysis of Rousseau as a rights theorist. The essay also has the flaw of being rather ahistorical; although it draws on Tuck's book, it does relatively little to locate Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau (or the idea of natural rights) historically. I speak here of *natural* rights, not human rights (for 'natural' is the term that was most often used then). And it is very difficult to grasp what *natural* rights meant to the thinkers of that time without a discussion of the notorious 'state of nature,' which Waldron simply neglects to provide. In sum, this part of Waldron's book is weak both historically and analytically.

Waldron's book is timely, nonetheless; for the bicentennial is upon us of two of the great documents in the tradition of 'the rights of man and the citizen': the French Declaration of 1789 (reissued with a few changes in 1791 as a preface to the new constitution) and the U.S. Bill of Rights' amendments to the U.S. Constitution (amendments which were ratified in 1791). In this regard it is unfortunate that Waldron does not reproduce the text of these amendments or of the earlier American Declaration of Independence (1776) and unfortunate that he does not discuss differences/affinities between them and the French Declaration. (For the main source of the French Declaration was Lafayette and his inspiration was Jefferson.) Moreover, the pertinent bibliographical essay does not mention the *Federalist Papers* or Morton White's two important books (or, for that matter, the long tradition of 'Lockeian' interpretations of the U.S. Declaration).

The introductions to Bentham, Burke, and Marx are all quite good: scholarly, insightful, balanced. Waldron does a good job of bringing out the ambivalence that both Burke and Marx felt about natural (or human) rights. This is especially valuable in the case of Marx – though I do think Waldron could have done more to exploit Marx' distinction between a good form of democracy (associated with social life in the 'state,' as Hegel called it) and a bad form (associated with the egoistic self-seeking of 'civil society'), a distinction that could run parallel with, and help support, the idea of good and bad forms of human rights. I also think it unfortunate that Waldron did not include Marx' *Critique of the Gotha Program* (a relatively short piece) to round out the Marxist picture more fully.

Since Burke and Marx are ambivalent about human rights, it is difficult to categorize them simply as antagonistic to such rights (though one can properly do so with Bentham). In any event, none of the texts holds up particularly well as a critique of human rights. Why should this be? Let me suggest a reason.

Waldron quotes Bentham's famous *mot*, that '*natural rights* is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights ... nonsense upon stilts' (34, whence the title of this collection). But he nowhere gives us a careful, analytic study of what Bentham (or the authors of the French Declaration) might have meant by 'imprescriptible.' Bentham, at least, is muddled here, for he sometimes means by that term that a right's *possession* cannot be altered by law and sometimes that a right's *scope* cannot be. Indeed, this whole business of 'imprescriptible' (which Bentham emphasizes as nonsense *upon stilts*) is quite pertinent to the point I want to make. For what these critics mainly objected to in talk of *natural* rights is some of the conceptual associations (e.g., state of nature) and some of the simpleminded, even cuckoo things the partisans of such rights said about them (e.g., that they are imprescriptible or that they are *all of them* absolute). This particular point is really what needed to be brought out in discussion, for the point tells us both why their criticism was so often pertinent and at the same time why it failed to undercut the notion of human rights altogether.

Indeed, we should see these critics as more opposed to certain fashionable conceptual formulations or listings of natural/human rights than as necessarily opposed to the very idea of fundamental rights. And this is a point that can be brought out only if we carefully distinguish, as Waldron conspicuously fails to do, between rights as a generic notion and natural rights as a specific case, and distinguish as well the notion of basic or fundamental rights – sometimes called 'constitutional' rights – from that of natural or even human rights (as traditionally understood). The really deep criticisms of *natural* rights (along lines I have just suggested) come ultimately, then,

from Hegel and T.H. Green. (And I have in effect identified Rawls with this particular tradition in my book *Rawls and Rights* [Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1985].)

The concluding essay (and the bibliography) are well worth the cost of the book (though I cannot say this definitively, since I didn't pay for my copy). The essay takes up two issues: first, how human rights doctrine has fared/changed in the intervening years since Marx (and here Waldron makes good use of the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, which should have been reprinted in the collection) and, second, whether and how human rights theory can meet the charges of its earlier critics and the like-minded criticisms of present-day 'communitarians.' Waldron identifies and then discusses – in a very balanced, sensitive, and sympathetic way – four such criticisms: that human rights are too abstract and universalistic, too rationalistic, too individualistic, and too unacceptably egoistic. Waldron's discussion, in what amounts to four mini-essays, ultimately defends a 'modest' version of human rights and is well attuned to contemporary issues and contemporary scholarship. Oddly, though, he fails to see that his own positive contribution toward resolving the last problem (the tension between egoistic self-seeking and community-mindedness) runs down the very track laid by T.H. Green over a century ago.

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

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