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Kevin M. Brien.
Marx, Reason, and the Art of Freedom.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press
1987. Pp. xvi + 260.
US$32.95. ISBN 0-87722-466-8.

Marx once said that Hegel once said that history repeats itself. This book repeats a blip on the philosophical horizon of the 1970s, the idea that the most interesting and viable parts of Marxist philosophy are about alienation. Kevin Brien's book is written in the same vein as the alienation books written 15 years ago by Bertell Ollman and Istvan Meszaros.

The project is carried out within an irritatingly jargon-laden attempt to imitate what is called 'Marx's method.' Elements of the method include: (1) Realism: social theory is to correspond to real social structures. (2) Proceeding from the abstract to the concrete: as more complexity is built into a theoretical model, it can more closely approximate the structure of some part of the world. (3) Internal relations: everything belongs to some natural kind which is defined by means of a relation to things of some other kind. (4) The concrete universal: concepts of genera and species should be devised so that the two are internally related–i.e., the genus 'implicitly contains' the species 'within itself by virtue of the fact that it means them' (32). (5) A dialectical view of laws: since the actual world is much more concrete than the abstract model of any theory, laws can at best express tendencies in the actual world; they do not eliminate all its contingency. This is a strange kettle of fish to cook on Marx's fire. Among social theorists, Marx was not the only realist, nor was he the first or only one to build an economic model out from simplicity to complexity. As to internal relations and the concrete universal, Brien gives not one important example from *Capital*, in which such examples ought to abound if they were as important as Brien would have us believe.

That leaves only the fifth element, concerning laws of nature and social interaction–that the behaviour of law-governed systems is still contingent in some respects. At face value this seems true and important enough (though whether one can make a method of it is questionable). Though Newton's second law makes it necessary that the force imparted by Cliff Thorburn's cue-ball on a red is equal and opposite to the force imparted by the red on it, the initial configuration of each ball is, in any real snooker game, contingent with respect to that of the other. Still, it doesn't follow that Newton's second law describes a mere tendency of billiard balls, rather than governing them. This move, which Brien would make on Marx, is just one of the gambits Brien employs in order to strip Marx's theory of history

of any commitment to determinism. Brien never considers the possibility that Marx and Engels were historical compatibilists, believing that in making their history humans inevitably exercise and achieve freedom.

Perhaps the most interesting of Brien's departures from Karl Marx's theory of history is his view of who will spearhead the socialist revolution, and why. The revolutionary crucible is not exploitation, or class struggle, but existential meaninglessness and alienation. While Brien admits a tendency for some of those afflicted with this condition to become lost in it, he looks for revolutionizing consciousness from 'increasingly large numbers of individuals within the capitalist societies [who] have gone through, or are going through a personal legitimation crisis concerning traditional values ... For many, this process has culminated in a partial or complete breakdown in traditional worldviews and in the capitalist form of social consciousness' (123). If people are not seriously and chronically affected with 'existential meaninglessness,' it would be a passing emotional storm, insufficient to cause the sort of commitment that is required of actual revolutionaries. If people are seriously and chronically afflicted with existential meaninglessness, however, one wonders how they could commit themselves to anything. On the other hand, every movement will attract some people who use it to work out such problems for themselves. Is that what Brien expects to draw people into revolutionary movements? To the barricades, and bring your valium!

On the ethical front, Brien proposes that socialism will uniquely enable people to treat each other as ends in themselves. This is not new; Kantian socialism goes back to the neo-Kantians in the period of the Second International, and before them perhaps to Fichte – but these antecedents are not so much as listed in Brien's bibliography, much less discussed. What is new is that Kantian ethics is combined with the theory of alienation. This interesting project gets mushed up somewhat in Brien's hands, however, especially in his treatment of 'necessary labour time.' Brien wants to hold that in unalienated life, 'economic conscious activity' does not predominate. Now 'economic conscious activity' includes (1) work time but excludes (2) creative work time, so that it predominates when work time is greater than creative non-work time, unless creative time on and off work is greater than non-creative time on the job. While this is confusing, it is not nearly so worrisome as Brien's claim that the 'quantitative' predominance of total work over creative non-work 'finds its immediate ground in' and 'is sustained by' the predominance of non-creative work over total creative time. The following underwrites his prediction that socialism will eventually give us more creative time to ourselves than uncreative time on the job: 'with the institution of ... socialism ... this

qualitative predominance is overcome. Thereby the ground that sustained the quantitative predominance of economic conscious activity is removed. Through the removal of this ground, the reduction of working time to a minimum is made possible' (154). Marx had it the other way around. The work that produces the things we need, he said, 'always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its fundamental premise' (*Capital*, 3 vols. [Moscow: Progress 1971], III 820).

I was not impressed by Brien's denunciation of ' "having" ' (he puts the word within quotation marks throughout this section of the book). In my experience, not having is worse.

Jay Drydyk
Carleton University

Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet.
Dialogues.
Tr. Hugh Tomlinson and
Barbara Habberjam.
New York: Columbia University Press 1987.
Pp. xiii+157.
US$30.00. ISBN 0-231-06600-7.

Dialogues, first published in France in 1977, is a work without a single author, a work jointly authored by Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet; it is one which contests the notion of authorship itself, the subject who delivers its intentions in language. The question that *Dialogues* poses from the start is the source of its own existence, and the elaboration of the text is the effort to trace and reconstruct the multiple points that both serve as its origin and contest traditional notions of textual origination. In the course of the text, Deleuze and Parnet recount their engagement with the work of Nietzsche and, in particular, the affirmative capacity of the will-to-power. And, like the multiple points of affirmation characteristic of that Nietzschean gesture, the text itself burgeons forth from various centers, never settling on a given line nor resolving on a certain overarching coherence. The Nietzschean break with Hegel within France is here enacted in the refusal of phenomenological teleologies that enclose the complexity articulated. The text is exuberant on many levels, and one ends up

wondering whether such an ever-resurgent *jouissance* as enacted here is ever as devoid of negativity as Deleuze and Parnet claim it to be.

At first, the text reads like something written in a great rush, as if under the influence of amphetamines, not unlike Deleuze and Felix Guatarri's *Anti-Oedipus* (1972). And then one realizes that this rush is, in fact, the theme or, rather, the multiple thematics of the text itself. Although they wrote together, Parnet seems inevitably subordinate to Deleuze, whose intellectual history is recounted time and again, and whose contribution to French Nietzscheanism becomes the invariable focus of the text. Deleuze calls himself an empiricist (vii), by which he means to defend an ontology of interrelated multiplicities: 'the minimum unit,' he writes, 'is the assemblage' (51). In opposition to positivist forms of empiricism which maintain the primacy of singular things (where 'things' is meant ambiguously to cover all manner of particular objects), Deleuze understands empiricism to suggest a particular organization of objects in which neither the objects nor their points of interrelation claim any kind of priority over the other. He suggests, in fact, that enumeration ought not to procede through the positing of external relations among self-subsisting things, i.e. 'X and Y and Z,' but, rather, as the articulation of an ontological assemblage in which a conception of pluralized beings, and the implicit metaphysics of substance, is replaced by relations of *becoming*: '... one must make the encounter with relations penetrate and corrupt everything, undermine being, make it topple over. Substitute the AND for the IS. A *and* B. The AND is not even a specific relation or conjunction, it is that which subtends all relations, the path of relations ...' (57).

As in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962), Deleuze takes issue with the conception of substantial being that haunts the history of western metaphysics and the grammar that both reflects and reenforces the mundane conceptions of things as self-subsisting entities. In its place, Deleuze suggests a notion of becoming as ontologically prior to any and all manner of being, with the consequence that whatever appears to be in the static and self-identical sense must be understood as a process, a temporalized and multiplicitous assemblage that has congealed into being; in other words, every appearance of being admits of a genealogy which would trace its construction back to a temporalized assemblage. The appearance of negative or external relations is similarly considered derivative; the negative is to be understood with Deleuze's primary ontology as a qualitative fluctuation of intensity. Whereas Hegel (and Sartre) posited *becoming* as a process with an origin and a closure (see Hegel's *Logic*, #88), as that which issues from the prior distinction between Being and Nothingness, Deleuze argues that becoming must be understood as primary, as 'an infinitive' which gives off Being and Non-Being as derivative appearances.

In an ostensible move away from the metaphysics of substance and from its corollary doctrine of negation, Deleuze appears to resuscitate forms of vitalistic plenums associated with Spinoza and, later, with 19th-century versions of *lebensphilosophie.* Combined with a focus on the pleasures of affirmation, this vitalistic and non-teleological ontology grounds an ever-proliferating set of interrelations that expands the capacity for pleasure as it articulates relationality. The human subject is placed at various points of this libidinal map and is correspondingly understood as a set of ever-enhanced relationalities. Although Deleuze has various reasons for taking issue with the metaphysics of substance, he does not articulate them forcefully in this context. And though he dismisses the hold of the substantial model of being on the philosophical imagination, he seems to rehabilitate a vitalistic plenum which, clearly, belongs to the very metaphysics he seeks to transcend.

Throughout the text, there appears a kind of ontological utopianism which makes me wonder what kind of mystified redescription of the world this text turns out to be. Indeed, if I were to characterize the utopian conceit that here poses as ontological description , I would call it *the romanticism of pleasurable plenitudes.* Occasionally, the romanticism of this notion of an experience without negativity and without fixed location becomes clear:

> Far from presupposing a subject, desire cannot be attained except at the point where someone is deprived of the power of saying "I". Far from directing itself toward an object, desire can only be reached at the point where someone no longer searches for or grasps an object any more than he grasps himself as a subject. (89)

Here Deleuze clearly collapses the distinction between subject and object into a single and all-embracing relation that recalls the conceits of romanticism and fascism alike. At such points, and many others, it is clear that Deleuze articulates as ontology a subjunctive view of the world, a protracted description in the mode of 'as if,' which announces itself nevertheless as the way in which things fundamentally are. As a text which is in many ways written against the psychoanalytic domain of contemporary French theory, Deleuze claims that pleasure is infinitely less problematic than Lacan and other defenders of negativity might claim, and that it is merely the conceptual enslavements we sustain (theorizing in the mode of slave-morality) that make us think that limits, difficulty, all manner of negativity, is an inevitable part of life. In his effort to transcend the limitations on pleasure and thought, Deleuze ends up promoting an improbable utopia in the name of ontology.

Dialogues is an interesting set of remarks that cast some light on Deleuze's own position as author and metaphysician, but it does not enhance his standing as philosopher/theorist/critic. Indeed, if nothing else, the text shows to be altogether improbable what in his earlier works seemed, at least, worthwhile to consider. The translation is highly commendable, true to the difficult style of the French, textured and full of the original's intensity.

Judith Butler
George Washington University

Hans-Georg Gadamer.
The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Pp. xxiii+191.
US$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-24178-2);
US$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-33953-7).

This book presents twelve of Gadamer's essays on aesthetics. It includes the title essay, 'The Relevance of the Beautiful'; ten essays organized in chronological order and from *Kleine Schriften, Band II and IV*; and 'Intuition and Vividness,' translated by Dan Tate. All the translations except for the final essay are done by Nicholas Walker. Robert Bernasconi has done an excellent job of editing the volume, and he provides a short introduction as well as a complete bibliography of works by Gadamer that are available in English. The essays are quite accessible and could be used as an introduction to Gadamer's work, especially to his aesthetics. There is a bit of repetition, but this serves to illustrate the format which Gadamer has selected and to show some of the developments in his thought.

The title essay raises the question that provides the direction of enquiry for all of the essays: 'Why does the understanding of what art is today present a task for thinking?' (9) The essay also presents the concepts and approach which Gadamer finds most helpful for responding to this question. Eight of the other essays were written before the title essay and can be read to see the development of Gadamer's thought and also as elaborating upon specific points which Gadamer makes very succinctly in this essay.

Gadamer contends that, at least since Plato, philosophers have perceived a need to justify art. Hegel, with his claim that art is a thing

of the past, shows us most clearly the contemporary dynamics of this task of justification. Gadamer reads Hegel's claim as meaning that art is 'no longer understood as a presentation of the divine in the self-evident and unproblematical way' (6). In the Greek world art is justified because of this presentation of the divine. The emergence of Christianity with the emphasis on the transcendence of God diminishes the role of art. Yet, art continued to be legitimated because it could convey the Christian message, albeit in an incomplete way, to those whose illiteracy made them unable to receive this message 'with complete understanding' (4). By the nineteenth century, the artist no longer functions in this way. Indeed, artists tend to make their own communities apart from a broader community. Art is in need of justification, and the presentation of the divine in even an inadequate way will no longer suffice. Faced with such a rupture Gadamer takes the task of the philosopher to be to help construct unity. He proposes no less a goal than to help modern humanity regain 'the idea of universal communication' (12). To do this he sets out a philosophical conceptual apparatus and three concepts to help us understand the anthropological basis for aesthetic experience.

The philosophical conceptual apparatus assumes a unity of past and present. Gadamer does not fully explain this assumption in these essays, and so this is a place where the reader might well need some knowledge of *Truth and Method.* (This would be particularly necessary if the book is used in conjunction with any of the deconstructionist works.) Gadamer looks to the past and discovers three important points. First, 'art ... intends the universal' (13). Second, the beautiful 'gives us an assurance that the truth does not lie far off and inaccessible to us, but can be encountered in the disorder of reality with all its confusions' (15). Third, aesthetics in its development since the eighteenth century show us that art and the beautiful have 'a significance that transcends all conceptual thought' (16). Gadamer finds Kant most helpful here. Art is not 'produced by following rules' (21), nor is it understood by 'subsuming the perceptually given under the universal' (21).

Gadamer's conceptual apparatus leads him to look more closely at the 'anthropological basis of our experience of art' (22). He finds three concepts particularly significant: play, symbol, and festival (22). Each of these concepts shows us ourselves as participating in something greater than ourselves while at the same time involved in constructive activity. In play we are part of a cooperative activity in which there is an excess. Our 'accomplishment lies in retaining what threatens to pass away' (46). Symbol facilitates recognition. In an age in which there is a 'dearth of symbol' (74) art challenges us to recognize ourselves and thereby elicit 'the permanent from the transient' (65). Festival allows no separation between people. It gives us 'the

immediate communal experience of what we are' (65). But festival is also absorption into a community which is of our making. Each of these concepts shows us that 'the work of art provides a perfect example of the universal characteristic of human existence–the never-ending process of building a world. In the midst of a world in which everything familiar is dissolving, the work of art stands as a pledge of order' (103-4).

Gadamer's conclusion is that art is justified not because it makes the divine present, but because it helps us recognize ourselves. But he cautions us not to expect too much from art for 'there is always a disturbing quality to this recognition, an amazement amounting almost to horror that such things can befall human beings and human beings can achieve such things' (153). Art shows us our finitude in terms of our possibilities to construct and preserve meaning. We should not mistake this aspect of our finitude for complete self-understanding. The final essay from the *Kleine Schriften* is well-selected. It reminds us that Gadamer does not think that aesthetic experience replaces religious experience. Gadamer suggests that we also need the Christian experience of finitude which 'shows what we cannot achieve' (153).

If Gadamer is correct in thinking that the task of the philosopher is to construct unity, then the bringing together of these two experiences and their disparate experiences of finitude is called for. This volume, like much of Gadamer's work, hints at, but does not construct, this unity.

Patricia Altenbernd Johnson
University of Dayton

Sander L. Gilman, ed.
Conversations with Nietzsche.
Don Mills, ON and New York:
Oxford University Press 1987.
Pp. xxvi+276.
Cdn$39.00: US$24.95. ISBN 0-19-504961-6.

This book is a collection of approximately ninety pieces, ranging in length from one paragraph to ten pages or more. The fifty-eight different authors of these pieces here record their personal impressions of

Nietzsche. These authors include Nietzsche's sister and mother, former school teachers and classmates, colleagues and students at the University of Basel, numerous friends and acquaintances, and several people who visited him during his ten-year period of insanity. All of the pieces were written after Nietzsche had become famous, and some of them were written as late as during the 1920s, more than two decades after Nietzsche's death in 1900. Nietzsche was, of course, a very complex and highly controversial personality. This fact, together with the fact that most of these pieces were written many years after the events being recalled, and by people who were all aware that the personality they were recalling had since become world-famous, raises the question as to how 'objective' a picture one can be getting from any such collection. As the editor himself writes in his introduction: 'Some of these reports are "true," i.e., they describe actual events; some are "false," i.e., the events most probably never happened. But most of these reports ... are neither true or false. They give a single perspective on an event, they report a half-remembered conversation filtered through the growing international reputation of the philosopher/writer ... They are the realities of mythmaking and must be understood as such' (xvi).

The book is divided chronologically, according to the dates of the events being recalled. The main divisions thus present material concerning that part of Nietzsche's life prior to his appointment in 1869 as Professor of Classical Philology at Basel, at the age of twenty-four; recollections concerning his eight-year period at Basel, from 1870-78; reminiscences from numerous people Nietzsche met during the subsequent 'migrant years' of 1879-89; and some very interesting, and deeply tragic, statements by people who were permitted short visits with Nietzsche by his sister after his confinement in the 'Nietzsche House' at Weimar. The book represents an abridged translation, by David J. Parent, of Gilman's *Begegnungen mit Nietzsche* (1981; 1985). Much of the material here presented in the Gilman volumes has never before been published, either in English or in German.

Nietzsche's students at Basel, looking back on their teacher thirty or more years later, present somewhat conflicting reports. Thus, one writes that 'on the whole we were bored' (36); others describe him enthusiastically as an excellent teacher. Rudolf Eucken, philosophy professor at Basel, writes (in 1921) that 'Nietzsche was considered very talented but a strange eccentric' (41). The illustrious cultural historian Jacob Burckhardt, of whom Nietzsche was so respectful, and whose approval and encouragement Nietzsche so much wanted and needed, is reported to have 'always remained primarily somewhat sceptical' (44), troubled by his junior colleague's declaration of war on history in his *Thoughts out of Season*. It was during his Basel years

that Nietzsche's various physical ailments became pronounced. By 1877, the 'formerly so amiable and sociable man' (50) became alienated from his acquaintances. A former student writes that 'it was almost painful to watch him lecture ... the words struggled through his lips and often his speech was interrupted by pauses which caused one to worry that he might be unable to continue reading' (62). By 1878, at the end of his Basel years, he was living in seclusion on the outskirts of town in an old and dilapidated former roadside tax-collector's house, no longer welcoming callers, like someone trying only to hide' (103).

Nietzsche's friendship with Wagner, and the break-off of their relationship, was of course crucial to Nietzsche's emotional and philosophical life. No single person had a larger impact on his overall picture towards the world. One acquaintance writes, 'I believe most firmly that the break with Wagner was a deathblow for Nietzsche, at any rate he was afterward a completely changed man' (50). Another acquaintance accounts (in 1922) for the break more in terms of problems at the level of personalities than in terms of outlook: 'Nietzsche was far too proud and far too conscious of his own intellectual importance to submit to being used as a mere instrument in the hands of a supposedly greater genius' (138). In his last years, when he spoke of Wagner, his monologues would 'begin calmly with rationally founded judgments, but soon accelerated into an avalanche of words that stirred up psychic depths and ended in tears' (194).

It was during the ten years that make up the 'migrant years,' after the resignation of his professorship at Basel, that Nietzsche wrote most of the works for which he is best known, starting with *Zarathustra*. That part of the book devoted to this period of his life contains a good many pieces by friends who knew him quite well, as well as by people who knew him only superficially. Especially interesting among the former are Malwida von Meysenbug, Lou Salomè and Ida Overbeck. These three women present us with many insights into Nietzsche's character and moods, and each addresses the complex question as to his thoughts on women. Malwida von Meysenbug, a generation older than Nietzsche, was a long-time friend, one of the very few friends with whom Nietzsche seems never to have quarreled. She speaks of the Nietzsche of the early Basel years as having an 'amiable, friendly, kindly nature' (49); she tells him, though, that :especially in regard to women, he ought to make no final pronouncements yet, since he still really knew far too few women' (88).

The volume closes with detailed and deeply disturbing accounts of Nietzsche's last months in Turin and of his pathetic years of insanity in seclusion at Weimar. Though it does not add substantially to our understanding of Nietzsche's major philosophical positions, the

book is very valuable by way of showing us what the enigmatic person who so painfully brought these positions into the world looked like to those who knew him.

Robert Rogers
University of Colorado

Robert A.H. Larmer.
Water into Wine? An Investigation of the Concept of Miracle.
Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1988. Pp. xii + 156. $22.50. ISBN 0-7735-0615-2.

This short book is an excellent philosophical discussion of miracles. Larmer defends the real possibility of miracles, and the possibility of identifying an event as a miracle by evidence about that event. He also defends the use of claims about miracles in apologetic endeavors, though he does not believe that the only purpose of miracles is apologetic. In doing these things Larmer develops some insightful critiques of Hume and more recent philosophers, and makes some very interesting observations about the laws of nature, physicalism, the conservation of energy, world-views, and falsification.

Some of Larmer's most interesting argumentation involves the attempt to define 'miracle.' He rejects definitions which make a miracle a violation of a law of nature. He prefers to say that a miracle is 'an unusual and religiously significant event beyond the power of nature to produce and caused by an agent who transcends nature' (14). What is the difference? Larmer distinguishes between the laws of nature and the ininial conditions on which these laws operate. An agent who transcends nature can produce an effect which nature by itself could not produce, and without violating or altering any law of nature, by introducing new elements into the initial conditions. So the virgin birth of Jesus could be produced by God's creating, ex nihilo, a spermatozoon in Mary's body. Following that creation the normal processes of fertilization, etc., would result in the birth of a baby nine months later. In fact, Larner seems to think that all genuine miracles must have the same modus operandi. The crucial element in them is either the creation or the annihilation of a bit of mass-energy.

Would such creations and annihilations require a violation of the First Law of Thermodynamics? Larmer argues not, making a useful distinction between two versions of that law. One version, which says that mass-energy cannot be created or destroyed, would rule out the Christian doctrine of creation entirely (along with miracles, of course). But, Larmer holds, this version has no evidential support. The other version says that mass-energy is not created or destroyed *in closed systems*. Larmer thinks that this version is well-supported (perhaps he is a little hasty in this), and it allows for his sort of miracle, since God can always enter a system to create or annihilate. When that is done, the result will be different from what it would have otherwise been—i.e., a miracle occurs.

Larmer's argument here seems persuasive to me, and I think now that we should not require a miracle to involve a violation of a law of nature. But why should we commit ourselves to a single mode for the miraculous? Some miracles may well be of the sort Larmer here describes. But why may there not be others which do not involve any special creation or annihilation, but which operate by generating a violation of a law of nature?

On this point Larmer apparently accepts an argument which he attributes to Hume, the argument that on the violation view the evidence in favor of a miracle must conflict with the evidence in favor of the relevant law of nature. Since the latter body of evidence will normally be very weighty, it may be hard to see how the alleged miracle could survive (evidentially). It seems to me, however, that this will be true only if a law of nature is correctly construed either as being an exceptionless regularity of events or as entailing such an exceptionless regularity. In that case, whatever evidence supported the law would ipso facto count against the alleged exception. But if the exception were somehow to be established anyway, then that exception would simply overturn the alleged law. Construed in this way, the law cannot survive the exception. The exception is fatal, showing that the alleged law was not a true law of nature after all. And so the exception would not be a violation of a law of nature, and would not be a genuine miracle according to the 'violation' definition.

What the violation definition needs is a sense of 'law of nature' in which a law of nature does not entail a de facto exceptionless regularity. That would, in turn, permit the idea of a genuine violation of a genuine law of nature. I think that there is such a sense for 'law of nature,' and that it is the correct sense. This is not the place to go into it further, but if I am right in this then we could allow the possibility that some miracles happen according to Larmer's creation/annihilation scenario, and that some others may be violations of a law of nature. Both of these would result in effects which would

not have been produced in the ordinary course of nature and by ordinary natural agents.

This little book has in it many more suggestive, insightful, and provocative observations and arguments. It is well worth the reading.

George I. Mavrodes
University of Notre Dame

P.C. Lo.
Treating Persons as Ends: An Essay on Kant's Moral Philosophy.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1987. Pp. xx + 346.
US$30.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-6100-4);
US$16.75 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-6101-2).

This book examines and develops the second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative, the formulation frequently called the principle of humanity' (PH): 'Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.' Lo claims that PH is 'equal in status with the first formulation,' i.e., the principle of universality (PU), and that, though it has often been neglected or dismissed as unintelligible, 'it is precisely this second formulation which can serve as a rebuttal against the charge that Kant's Categorical Imperative is formalistic and empty, i.e., without any matter or content, and therefore cannot furnish a concrete guide for human conduct' (3). Despite the claim about the 'equality in status' between PU and PH—in which case one would think that if either principle is 'empty,' then the other is equally so—Lo apparently believes that even if the first formulation does fall prey to the charge of 'empty formalism,' the second formulation—when properly worked out—provides sufficient matter or content to rebut that charge.

Lo goes so far as to argue that the ultimate Categorical Imperative is not the principle of universality but rather the principle of humanity (61, 67); and he recommends that this latter principle be formulated thus: 'Pursue your own ends in such a way that you not only never thwart the obligatory (or essential) ends of any human being qua rational being, but always endeavor as far as possible to advance these ends' (179). By 'the obligatory (or essential) ends of any human being qua rational being,' Lo means one's own perfection and

others' happiness – what Kant labels 'ends which are duties.' This line of thought results in nonsense, for it yields, among other things, the duty to endeavor as far as possible to advance others' 'obligatory' end of endeavoring as far as possible to advance the 'obligatory' end of others to endeavor, etc. What has gone wrong is this: Lo has conflated 'essential ends' and so-called 'obligatory ends.' According to Kant, the 'essential ends' of a human being are self-perfection (in virtue of one's moral nature) and personal happiness (in virtue of one's sensuous nature); and 'obligatory ends' – or better, 'ends which are duties' – are one's own perfection and others' happiness. What Lo actually wants to say is that PH, once reformulated as cited just above, imposes on each of us the duty to perfect oneself and to advance 'as far as possible' the happiness of others.

To the objection that these ends 'are still general and vague ideas,' Lo responds: '... I agree that Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative in its application is still somewhat vague, but this does not imply that it is empty' (230). So we are left with a moral principle with general and vague ends, but not with a moral principle 'empty' of ends. One will surely wonder how much progress has been made toward arriving at a moral principle that can 'furnish a concrete guide for human conduct' – which, though not the same as the charge of 'empty formalism,' is just as, or more, damaging. One might include that the second formulation cannot be applied at all except when supplemented by, or construed as, the first formulation, particularly when one tries to distinguish treating someone merely as a means from treating someone as a means but not merely as a means.

Anyone who tries to give Kant's ethics a teleological twist has to face Kant's explicit claim that the end of 'every good will' has to be conceived, 'not as an end to be produced, but as a self-existent end,' hence 'it must ... be conceived only negatively – that is, as an end against which we should never act ...' (*Groundwork*, Akad. ed., IV, 427). Concerning this passage, Lo writes: 'It is highly unfortunate that ... Kant remarks that the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative is to be "conceived only negatively" ... this onesided and negative conception of the teleological Categorical Imperative not only is inconsistent with his positive conception of the very same Imperative in the *Groundwork*, but also would render his own doctrine of obligatory ends in the *Doctrine of virtue* unacceptable' (310). In other words, Kant's claim would make PH read only that we are never to treat humanity merely as a means, and not that we are to treat it as an end, and therefore not that we are to further others' happiness.

This calls for comment. First, Kant was not referring to PH when he uses 'conceived only negatively'; he was referring to the end in itself, or actually to the end of every good will. Second, there is no

inconsistency in holding that the end in itself has to be conceived only negatively, yet actions can agree both positively and negatively with that end. (Analogy: suppose freedom can be conceived only negatively, i.e., as the absence of hindrances; yet actions can agree with it both negatively–by introducing hindrances–and positively–by removing hindrances.) Third, Kant does not establish in the *Groundwork* that PH renders the duty to promote others' happiness. He *asserts* there that we have such a duty in virtue of PH, but he does not–and, I think, he cannot–successfully defend the assertion. Fourth, Kant does not put forth a doctrine of 'obligatory ends,' certainly not when such 'ends' are characterized as 'beyond' actions and that which actions are meant to bring about (cf. Lo, 43, 44). On this score, Lo conflates ends and purposes (*Zwecke* and *Absichten*), going so far as to speak of the 'essential purposes' of human beings (101)–a term nowhere to be found in the Kantian corpus. Kant does, of course, advance a theory of 'ends which are duties,' but such ends, I submit, are not purposes of actions; they are ends of maxims, i.e., ends of those general attitudes or dispositions which one cannot but adopt lest one act on maxims of action that fail the test of the principle of universality. In line with this, it should be noted that in the *Doctrine of Virtue* Kant does not try to establish the duty of beneficence on the principle of humanity but only on the principle of universality (Akad. ed., VI, 393, 451, 453).

Whether Kant's ethics is teleological or not can best be decided by examining the early pages of *Religion*, where it is said, first, that 'morality requires absolutely no material determining ground of *Willkür*, that is, no end, in order to either know what duty is to impel the performance of duty' (Akad. ed., IV, 3-4), but, second, 'yet an end does arise out of morality' (ibid., 5). And that end is the highest good, which amounts to a 'world' in which happiness is proportioned to virtue. (The same claim occurs in the essay on 'Theory and Practice,' Akad. ed., VIII, 279 n.) One may conclude then that ethics proper is not teleological, but neither is it wholly *Zwecklos* (pointless)–though 'its' end lies, not in itself, but in religion. This appears to be Kant's final word on the matter.

John E. Atwell
Temple University

Werner Marx.
Is There Measure on Earth? Foundations for a Nonmetaphysical Ethics.
Trans. Thomas J. Nenon and Reginald Lilly.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987.
Pp. xii+172.
US$22.95 ISBN 0-226-50921-4.

'Is there measure on earth?' the poet Hölderlin asks, and without hesitation replies, 'There is none.' Werner Marx interprets him metaphysically (!?). There is no measure *on earth*, since the source of all measures is 'the Heavenly,' which is 'above' the earth, i.e., 'God as the absolute' (13). In this respect, the whole metaphysical tradition from Plato to Hegel 'shared Hölderlin's view' (14). Troubled by this, Marx avows to 'demonstrate that ... there is a positive answer to Hölderlin's question' (11). He asks rhetorically: 'Is it not ... philosophy's most urgent task ... to seek a measure that can provide a means for distinguishing between good and evil and furnish a motivation for preferring good to evil?' (14) The content of good actions will be defined in terms of virtues–love, compassion, mutual human recognition–appropriated from the Judeo-Christian tradition, and 'evil' ostensibly by reference to empirical history. But it is 'measure' that is the 'ultimate determinant ... of ethics' (1). In the German idiom, a measure (*Mass*) is what guides measuring, what is found by it, and a mean. In Marx, the first sense takes precedence and informs the others.

For a measure to 'exist "on earth"' (61), its discovery must be an existential possibility open to us all (not merely a claim or accomplishment of metaphysics). 'We are placing our reliance on experience, in particular the experience of "attunements" [*Gestimmtheit*] as a legitimate access to "truth" ... not identical with the truth of judgments' (47). The theoretical task, then, is 'to demonstrate the possibility of an experience that would clear the way for a transformation in which one would be willing to allow measures of a nonmetaphysical ethics towards one's fellow man [*Nächstenethik*] to become effective within oneself' (5). The experience is that of 'our own mortality.' Now, for Marx, 'Heidegger's "other thinking" ... is the most radical attempt to deconstruct the metaphysics of reason' (3). Hence, the outline of the 'foundations' (*Grundbestimmungen*) of the nonmetaphysical ethics takes the form of an effort to 'think further' the 'results' of Heidegger's thought (7), toward an ethics that 'Heidegger himself did not think through' (53).

This project is ambiguous. Presumably, metaphysics holds that the measure *for* the earth is not itself *of* the earth, i.e., not finite, conventional, merely human. Existential philosophy holds that genuine

measure, though more than a human product, is only fully actual as appropriated and realised in existential choices. Nihilism declares that there are no measures, that 'everything is permitted.' Deconstruction displaces the primacy of measure and 'decentres' the concepts 'good and evil.' Marx plays with these meanings. The present age is nihilistic, characterized by the 'subjectivism' of an unbounded technological will-to-power (13-14); the rationally founded measures of metaphysics are no longer effective in life; and what is called for is a measure in experience that offers the possibility of existential 'transformation' (2-3). Yet the 'nonmetaphysical' ethics is neither a refutation, a flat denial nor (the claim to 'further thinking' notwithstanding) a radical overcoming of metaphysics. Instead, it appropriates a sedimented content of metaphysical ethics, i.e., virtues 'not substantially different from the traditional conceptions' (4), and gives it an existential foundation, i.e., a guiding measure in the experience of mortality. The foundation is both 'absolute' (57) 'in-itself' (91) and a measure *in* which we dwell, and hence is beyond the immanence/transcendence dichotomy of metaphysics (59-60).

Yet ambiguity is endemic. 'We are "condemned" to think in a realm "between tradition and an other beginning"' (7). The tradition 'believes in at least the potential rationality of "reality" and in the human faculities of the intellect and reason, in the determination of Being as substance and/or subject, and in the essence of man as freedom.' The new beginning deconstructs these presuppositions to initiate a new 'human dwelling on earth.' In between, Marx seeks to 'overcome' the diverse 'foundational' conceptions of ethics, yet takes for granted that 'authentic dwelling' turns on the differentiation of good and evil from an absolute measure (1-3); he calls into question the traditional meaning of measure as tied to the 'heavenly beings,' yet derives its essential traits from metaphysics, i.e., from Schelling's 'onto-theological view' (19-20); he seeks normative standards for responsible action in an experience that is 'unteachable' (as are the standards derived from it), yet affirms the content of traditional virtues, whose possible effects 'can be taught' as a 'canon' (6); and he attempts radically to surmount 'subjectivism,' yet to leave room for the 'miracle of [moral] freedom' (94).

From his reading of Schelling, Marx determines that measure is essentially a 'normative standard ... valid prior to any derivation of measure' (20). It is 'self-same,' 'univocal' and 'manifest,' and holds with the force of 'binding obligation.' He then quickly shows that the virtues of love, compassion and mutual recognition possess these traits. Turning to Heidegger, Marx argues that the 'clearing,' which is for Heidegger the finite occurrence of ontological truth, cannot be a measure, insofar as it is codetermined essentially by concealment and errancy. This opens the way for his central claim, that 'death ... is the

measure of man' (97). What is signaled here is not just an inevitable anthropological fact, nor a religious *memento mori*. The term 'death' functions as a cipher for the finite 'region of all regions,' the realm of 'supreme *disclosedness*,' free of all concealment, that 'mediates between Being and nothing' and is 'other' than the occurrence of Being as truth (10, 97, 116). 'Death' in this sense extends into our experience and grants measure 'on earth' through 'unsettling [*ent-setzende*] dread' in the face of our own mortality. This mortal 'attunement' can then 'awaken man from his indifference toward others' (10) and become a 'healing power' through which the measures of fellowship and neighbourly love replace the fulminatons of individual wills.

Although much could and should be said about this thesis, I shall limit myself here to two brief observations. In placing 'experience' above propositional truths and foundational methods, Marx leaves problematic the status of the esoteric discourse (much of it written under inverted commas) which does the 'placing' and takes the measure of measure 'on earth.' And in seeking a measure unsullied by concealment and errancy, Marx appropriates from metaphysics the very 'presumption' (*Anmassung*) to univocal measure (*Nietzsche*, II 171) that Heidegger explicitly debunks.

Robert Burch
University of Alberta

Alfred R. Mele.
Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception and Self-Control.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1987. Pp. 200.
Cdn$37.50: US$24.95. ISBN 0-19-504321-9.

Certain forms of irrationality boggle the mind. One such form is weakness of will. We are astonished by a person who judges that there is good and sufficient reason for his not doing something, yet he intentionally and freely does it. Another is the strange accomplishment of the self-deceiver who believes something that he has good and sufficient reason for not believing. Both are subjectively irrational: the weak-willed acts contrary to his own better judgment and the self-deceiver believes against his better evidence.

Not surprisingly, there has been a lot of discussion whether these phenomena are possible at all. According to Alfred Mele it is obvious

that both types of irrationality occur. What is not obvious and requires attention is *how* they occur. Hence Mele urges us to leave the preoccupation with paradox, the focal puzzles of weakness of will and self-deception behind and to attend to the etiology of desire – influenced irrationality. He argues that what seems to be two problems is just one affliction in the end. For contrary to the received view, weakness of will is not simply an actional matter. There is also doxastic weakness when a person's belief that *p* is motivated and free and he consciously holds a judgment to the effect that there is good and sufficient reason for his not believing that *p*. Both are possible for the same reason: a person's overall motivation can be at odds with his better judgment. In either case the subject is evidently more motivated to do or to believe what he consciously judges he should not do or believe. If we can explain how he came to have this balance of motivation, we can explain akrasia in its actional or doxastic form.

Consider Susan's stroll. It is a spring evening. Susan has been preparing for an examination. Boredom and restlessness set in. She is thinking of a solitary walk through the quad. She decides that it would be best, all things considered, to remain in her room and study. She still has a lot of work to do to pass the test and there has been a rash of muggings on campus. But later, against her better judgment, she goes for a solitary walk. How is it that Susan's reasons for her stroll are motivationally stronger than her reasons for her better judgment? Mele's theory, *The Proximity-Attentional Hypothesis*, provides the following explanation. (1) The rewards for the walk were close at hand: solitude, fresh air, exercise, escape from the dreariness of her surroundings. (2) Susan's focus of attention is fixed on the pleasures of the walk and not on her reasons for staying in. (3) Susan makes no successful effort at self-control.

How does self-deception figure in this picture? What should bother us about self-deception is what should bother us about weakness of will. In both cases there is a display of desire-influenced irrationality. In particular, to understand self-deception is to understand the influence of desire on belief formation and belief retention. The self-deceived person, due to desire, believes against his better evidence. There is nothing paradoxical about self-deception in its typical or atypical cases. Characteristic and sufficient conditions for typical self-deception in acquiring a belief are: (1) S acquires a false belief that *p*. (2) S desires that *p* and this leads him to manipulate data relevant to the truth of *p*. (3) This manipulation is the cause of S acquiring the belief that *p*. Roughly, there are four self-deceptive strategies: selective evidence gathering, selective focusing, positive and negative misinterpretation. These are motivated but typically they are not done with an intention to deceive oneself. Self-deception is typically a nonintentional affair. For example, if S wants *p* to be true

then the data apparently supporting *p* becomes more salient, more vivid for him. Now the more vivid the data, the more it dominates the subject's attentional field and the more it becomes available for confirmation and inference.

Evidently the causal influence of our desires is not wholly under our control. This is where self-control comes in as the ability to master motivation contrary to one's better judgment. Its successful exercise of skilled and brute resistance prevents such motivation from resulting in behaviour and belief contrary to one's better judgment. Techniques of self-control aim at changing the environment or our mind-set. When a smoker wants to quit and destroys his cigarettes, he changes his environment. When he announces his decision not to smoke to his friends, he is binding himself by risking the loss of their esteem in case of failure. In any event, the claim is that weakness of will, akratic belief and self-deception can be understood only with self-control as background. Furthermore, any adequate belief-desire model for explaining action must include this 'crucial executive element.'

The positive contribution of Mele's book is a unified theory of irrationality without such suspect explanatory devices as mind-partitioning, anthropomorphized subsystems, peculiar doxastic conflict and the like. Hence the chief targets of critical scrutiny are Pears, Davidson and implicitly Freud and Freudians. The book has many virtues. The writing is lively and accessible; the argument is crisp and clear. The relevant philosophical and psychological literature is at the author's fingertips. There is a wealth of instructive examples from everyday life. But a striking feature of the book is its bold and elegant appropriation of the relevant recent work in experimental psychology. It is notable that Mele's theory is based on the work of George Ainslie, an experimental psychologist. By juxtaposing and mapping the 'folk' and experimental psychology of irrationality, Mele expands our view of the terrain and deepens our understanding.

Here are some brief comments. (1) Concerning Susan's stroll: as her reasons for walking become more vivid, the more they dominate her attention. As a result her reasons for her better judgment become more faint, perhaps evanescent. Such is the power of desire and, as Mele himself says, its causal effects are not wholly under our control. This acknowledgement appears to compromise the 'free and intentional' nature of weakness of will. Alternatively, Susan walks muttering 'I regret this already. This is a mistake.' A stroll in this frame of mind is naturally described in terms of ambivalence and makes the idea of mental partitioning less 'drastic.' (2) For Mele, typical self-deception is, roughly, motivated false belief. Desire guides the gathering of evidence much like light attracts moths. But philosophical interest has focused on cases somewhat more compli-

cated. In such cases some appreciation of the implications of the evidence is highlighted. It seems to me that such cases are real enough and do not fit into Mele's typical/atypical scheme for self-deception. (3) A propos Mele's interesting pioneering treatment of self-control: if we develop and exercise the skills of self-control, we avoid impulsive behaviour and belief. The downside of this is that precisely the same techniques can lead to compulsive or rigid behaviour. Doesn't this make you yearn for spontaneity even if it includes a little impulsiveness?

Béla Szabados
University of Regina

Robert N. Moles.
Definition and Rule in Legal Theory: A Reassessment of H.L.A. Hart and the Positivist Tradition.
Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press; New York: Basil Blackwell 1987.
Pp. vii+285.
Cdn$69.95: US$45.00. ISBN 0-631-15342-X.

The history of 20th century Anglo-American jurisprudence will certainly include the following two facts: (a) H.L.A. Hart is widely credited with delivering a death-blow to John Austin's command theory of law; (b) Hart's *The Concept of Law* was a landmark, deservedly setting the tone and direction of jurisprudence in the latter half of the 20th century. The main themes of Moles' book are that Austin is alive and kicking, his purported slayer having missed the target entirely; and that Hart has provided 'an account of law which is extremely superficial, and which in terms of the historical development of ideas about law, must be seen as a retrograde step' (81). 'Hart's view of law as expressed in *The Concept of Law*, is fundamentally misconceived' (114).

In support of these serious allegations, Moles sets out first to show how badly Hart has misrepresented Austin. If Moles is to be believed, Hart's portrayal of Austin borders on sheer negligence. Austin did not, Hart withstanding, wish to distinguish positive law from positive morality, ethics and divine law, so that the latter could forever be banished from legal argument and the concern of legal philosophers. On the contrary, his hope was that the analytical distinctions he had

provided would clarify the different ways in whch these elements enter, necessarily, into well-rounded jurisprudential theories *and* decisions at law. According to Austin, judging necessarily requires an appreciation of the context in which the positive law finds its meaning, a context which includes the elements he had distinguished. But all this Hart apparently missed, thereby rendering a powerful theory a mere historical curiosity.

Much could, and needs, to be said here in response to these serious charges. But we do well to proceed to Moles' second, more important theme: that the theory with which Hart replaced the Austinian view, is 'fundamentally misconceived' and 'superficial.' Moles submits Hart's theories of social rules, the internal point of view, and the rule of recognition to critical scrutiny, and in some cases rightly points to obscurities and other sorts of difficulties (many of which had been noticed earlier by other authors, e.g., D.N. MacCormick). The bulk of Moles' effort is directed against Hart's influential doctrine of the 'core' and the 'penumbra.' On this doctrine the law consists of a set of legal norms containing a core of settled meaning. In any case where the facts fall squarely within this core, determining what the law requires is fairly automatic and requires no 'fresh judgment.' The law is easy to apply. But there are also penumbral cases where judgment – i.e., discretion – is required because the meaning of the relevant norm(s) is indeterminate. Within this 'open-textured' penumbra judicial decisions cannot amount to the simple application of clear rules. Here the judges must create, not discover, law. According to Moles this highly popular theory presents a distorted and politically dangerous picture of the 'dynamic aspect of law' – an aspect which, he assures us, was well appreciated by Austin. The latter's view was that positive law, positive morality, and ethical judgment figure prominently in *all* judicial decisions. The judgment which Hart mistakenly restricts to the penumbra is required in *all* cases.

Moles is concerned not only with the effect Hart's doctrine has had on the course of modern legal theory, but also with its impact upon judges who, through its influence, have supposedly become slaves to the core of 'settled law.' They view themselves as free to exercise informed judgment – to be *judges* – only in anomalous, penumbral cases. The result is not a judiciary with a healthy respect for law, but one ensnared within a rigid formalism and literalism which Hart, with his doctrine, had wished to counteract. The exceptions are judicial mavericks like Lord Denning, who claim to adopt a 'purposive' or 'liberal' approach to the interpretation of law, and who, because they openly acknowledge and exercise moral/political judgment, are portrayed as threats to the rule of (settled) law, as unprincipled, politically motivated usurpers all too willing to seek justice in spite of the law. According to Moles, this unhealthy situation and the mis-

guided jurisprudence upon which it is based can be overcome only if Hart's doctrines are replaced with insights of which Austin was fully aware.

As before, much can and should be said here; a few brief comments will have to do. First, Moles has been unfair to Hart, whose major concern has always been a theory of *law* not a theory of *adjudication*. The former attempts, among others things, to provide a theoretical account of what law *is*; the latter attempts to say how judges should deal with what the former identifies as law. A theory of adjudication will typically explain whether and why judges should interpret the law in one way or another, whether they should base their decisions exclusively on the law when it is clear what this is; or, alternatively, whether judicial decisions should sometimes, or perhaps even always (as Dworkin and Moles would have it) be based upon other considerations as well, e.g., positive or political morality. Moles' attack is premised on the assumption that Hart's core and penumbra doctrine is a theory of adjudication according to which judgment is neither necessary nor permissible whenever the core is in play. But this is not Hart's view at all. In core cases judgment *is* unnecessary in determining what the existing law is; but for Hart a good deal of judgment might indeed be necessary to determine whether and how to apply that law– especially if the law is unjust or is in some other way inappropriate.

A second major weakness in Moles' attack is his failure to give full measure to Hart's enlightening discussion of the competing needs for certainty and flexibility in the law (cf. ch. 7 of *The Concept of Law*). Sometimes we are better off, Hart acknowledges, not with fixed rules but with variable, highly open-textured standards requiring fresh judgment upon application. Moles' omission further enables him to portray Hart as advocating slavish adherence to narrowly interpreted legal rules. One could go on. Suffice it to say that it is far from clear that Moles, in his depiction of Hart, has avoided the sins of mischaracterization he attributes to Hart.

Despite its considerable difficulties, there are parts of this book which are instructive. The discussion of largely unfamiliar Austinian doctrines on the relations between law and morality, and of the respects in which Austin and Aquinas are not all that far apart on questions of fidelity to law, are illuminating. Nevertheless, the uncharitable characterizations and unnecessarily rude ad hominem attacks (see, e.g., 35 & 64) detract considerably from the book's appeal.

Wil Waluchow
McMaster University

Richard Norman.
Free and Equal.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1987. Pp. 178.
Cdn$58.00: US$37.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-827527-7);
Cdn$19.50: US$12.95
(paper: ISBN 0-14-827526-9).

According to Richard Norman, there are two conflicting views surrounding our notions of freedom and equality. One view sees freedom and equality as complementary values; the other sees them as incompatible values. Norman's book is a clearly written and interesting defense of the view that sees freedom and equality as complementary values.

In support of this view, Norman advances two main arguments. The first argument supports a more expansive notion of freedom. Here freedom is understood as meaningful choice rather than the absence of interference. The absence of interference is seen simply as just one (negative) condition that determines the degree of freedom a person has. Other (positive) conditions that are also said to determine the degree of freedom a person has are political power, material goods and cultural conditions such as education, knowledge and understanding.

Now if one accepts Norman's account of freedom, it seems clear that those who take freedom to be their ultimate political ideal would be led to reject a libertarian minimal state in favor of a welfare liberal or a socialist state. This is because in order to provide maximal freedom for each and every person, it would be necessary to secure positive as well as negative conditions of meaningful choice. But what if one rejects Norman's account of freedom (as libertarians tend to do) in favor of the notion that freedom is the absence of interference. As far as I can tell, Norman has no argument to show that an ideal which utilizes this notion of freedom also calls for the rejection of a libertarian minimal state.

Fortunately, an argument of this sort can be provided by first showing that particular freedoms understood as the absence of interference can conflict and then by appealing to some widely shared moral standard like the 'ought' implies 'can' principle to determine which freedoms have priority. Using such a standard, it can be shown that the share of freedoms allocated to any particular person should not be contrary to reason to ask that person to accept. Unfortunately, Norman does not resort to any argument of this sort to buttress his case against the libertarian view.

Norman's second argument for the view that freedom and equality are complementary values attempts to support a substantial ideal of equality that in turn requires equal freedom as he has defined that notion. To support this ideal of equality, Norman attempts to derive it from the notion of cooperative activity. Norman recognizes that there are forms of cooperative activity that don't presuppose his ideal of equality (someone may be beaten up, tortured and then asked 'Now will you cooperate?'), but he rejects them as not constituting genuine cooperative activities because people would not freely agree to enter them (74). But while it is true that many disadvantaged members of a society would not freely agree to enter cooperative activities that unfairly favored the advantaged members of that society, it is also true that at least some advantaged members of a society, hoping to do better, would not freely agree to enter fair cooperative activities either. What we need, therefore, is some morally privileged stance from which to determine free agreement. This is what John Rawls had sought to capture with his notion of hypothetical choice from behind a veil of ignorance. Rawls argues that from behind a suitably drawn veil of ignorance, the advantaged and disadvantaged members of a society would freely agree to fair terms of cooperation. Moreover, a commitment to a Rawlsian ideal of fairness would not seem to be in debate between welfare liberals and socialists. Both would presumably accept such an ideal while disagreeing, if at all, concerning its practical requirements. Consequently, if libertarians had been won over by Norman's earlier argument for a more expansive notion of freedom, then an argument utilizing Rawls' hypothetical veil of ignorance might have succeeded in showing that freedom and equality are indeed complementary values.

Unfortunately, Norman rejects just the hypothetical choice part of Rawls' theory, retaining only Rawls' notion of cooperative activity. But Norman's reasons for rejecting this part of Rawls' theory do not seem cogent, particularly when one considers that Norman's own view requires some hypothetical standard to determine free agreement, and thereby ground the notion of cooperative activity he borrows from Rawls. For without some such grounding, Norman's defense of his ideal of equality cannot succeed.

Yet despite these weaknesses in the two main arguments of Norman's book, there is much that is valuable in it. For example, the views of Mill and Green are subject to a penetrating analysis, and various possibilities for extending democracy are also considered. Moreover, for those interested in the vitally important project of reconciling alternative political ideals, this book is definitely required reading.

James P. Sterba
University of Notre Dame

Giovanni Reale.
A History of Ancient Philosophy, I: From the Origins to Socrates.
Ed. and trans. by John R. Catan. Albany: State University of New York Press 1987.
Pp. xxvii+425.
US$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-88706-292-X);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-88706-290-3).

Reale's book on the beginnings of Greek philosophy presents the results of the latest scholarship in the context of a retrieval of the ancient tradition's general outlook and aim. R. describes these precisely as the sense of the totality of the object and the capacity of human reason to attain truth. The sense of totality separates philosophy from the other sciences, while the confidence in reason separates the ancients from several currents in modern and contemporary philosophy.

The arrangement of the book follows the general pattern of indicating the peculiar characteristics that led to the rise of philosophy in the classical Greek world, and then tracing the development of philosophy to the time of Socrates. Differences from the traditional histories, however, involve the more positive account of the Sophists indicated by modern studies (Second Part, 137-90) and a more thorough account of Orphism and its influence (First Appendix, 293-304).

In turning from the aporias of the Physicists or Naturalists, the Sophists nonetheless developed some of their insights and continued to use their general method. The Naturalists, for example, had criticized the anthropomorphic conception of the gods, but the Sophists go further, rejecting the divine as in any way a principle of things. Instead, the dictum, 'man is the measure,' substitutes as their initial criterion, indicating the major shift from nature to morality. This shift, however, brings with it a whole new nest of problems, since the Sophists lack the tools for a consistent theory of human nature, leading to a situation of mutually opposed systems, an exact parallel to that of the Naturalists before them.

Socrates begins to resolve this problem in three interlocking ways: ethics, theology and dialectics. The ethical and dialectical aspects of Socratic thought are part of the common wisdom about the contribution of Socrates to the development of philosophy, but R.'s argument for a Socratic theology goes against the grain, if one anachronistically sees Socrates as some erstwhile freethinker, or prototypical secularist. R. maintains, moreover, that Socrates offers a solution to the problem of human nature, but only prepares for the metaphysical and logical discoveries of Plato and Aristotle that enable a full recovery of truth and the Divine.

It is these last issues which are at the heart of R.'s account of ancient philosophy and their enduring relevance in our contemporary scene. He lays down the challenge in the Preface, with the Second Appendix giving his summation of the case on the basis of the Presocratics, the Sophists and Socrates. R. describes the contemporary scene from the European point of view as the reduction of philosophy to scientism or political ideology, which in the context of North America might be better expressed as the tendency to a logical analysis that eliminates the possibility of poetry or a deconstructive method that reduces everything to poetry alone. For his efforts, R. notes the charge of his critics that he is an Aristotelian-Thomist, but uses this early tradition of Greek philosophy to show that faith in reason and an authentic appreciation of the speculative dimension are characteristics of the whole Greek tradition, expressed most forcefully and completely by Plato and Plotinus.

The ground of his thesis is that sense of dealing with the whole which characterizes Greek philosophical thought from its very beginnings. It is this search for wholeness within the piecemeal character of human perception and reasoning that led the Greeks to an articulation of theoria, contemplation, as that particular capacity which allows the human mind to take the multiplicity of its data and transform it into a unified whole. Contemplation is thus always of the whole of being, expressed in the nature of thought as true. Being and truth are coordinated with increasing precision throughout the history of Greek philosophy, the skeptical challenges operating as the goads to more refined reflection on the nature of truth and the methods for achieving it. Truth is never seen as the absolute possession of the human mind, but a constant quest whose success is predicated on the general reliability of what has gone before as well as its incompleteness.

Reale has given a marvelous overview of the beginnings of this unending quest, as well as some of the enduring contributions of these first philosophers. In this, his volume does not itself contain the detailed studies found, for example, in Kirk, Raven and Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press 1983) or Guthrie's first two volumes of the *History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press 1962, 1969). It does, however, rely on such close work, some of which R. himself has done in other books and articles. What he has done in this series is to present in a clear and engaging way the problems and relevance of the earliest Greek philosophers both for understanding the Greek tradition itself and its continued relevance for the modern philosopher and student of philosophy.

Gary M. Gurtler, S.J.
Loyola University of Chicago

Seppo Sajama and Matti Kamppinen.
A Historical Introduction to Phenomenology.
New York: Methuen (for Croom Helm) 1987.
Pp. vii+131.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7099-4443-8);
US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7099-5425-5).

This little book is a pleasure to read. The style is crisp and clear; the discussion is well-organized, accompanied by helpful diagrams, and documented with generous quotations from the various philosophers under review. Its intention is to introduce the reader to the phenomenology of Husserl by way of discussing various historical views of intentionality, beginning with Aristotle. The authors associate themselves with the so-called Stanford School of Husserl interpretation, which was founded by Dagfinn Föllesdal. Their darling concept is that of content (in Husserlian language, *noēma*). The ability of the human mind to refer to objects outside itself involves ideal, mental contents. The history they offer is therefore characterized as a history of Content Theory, although not all philosophers who figure in it actually held that theory.

The authors make no secret of their own philosophical preference. In fact, the historical part of the book is itself introduced by a systematic discussion of what they think are the principal contending theories: the Object Theory and the Content Theory. According to the former, epitomized by Meinong, the intentionality of mental acts consists simply in their having objects. The Content Theory, best illustrated by Husserl, holds that a mental act is intentional iff it has a content, whose function it is to pick out an object for the act. It is directed to its object, if it has one, by its content, i.e., by the way it describes that object. The historical survey which follows is not a history in the usual sense, but a series of illustrative discussions of historical figures picked as interesting for an appreciation of the issues between the two theories mentioned. Hence Sextus Empiricus, Aquinas, and Thomas Reid appear alongside Brentano and Frege, while Kant and Dilthey are not even mentioned.

Someone who knows the history of phenomenology and has a good first-hand knowledge of Husserl's philosophy as a whole, cannot avoid the conclusion that this book shows a very strong prejudice. True as that may be, as I will elaborate in a moment, it is nonetheless a book I recommend. It is helpful to be reminded of Aquinas and Reid, even if they did not figure in Husserl's historical environment. And Twardowski and Meinong have too often been ignored in studies of Husserl's background. And if Sajama and Kamppinen fail to do full justice to Husserl's philosophy, the damage done is no worse than that done by all those who have looked at Husserl through glasses coloured

by Heidegger and subsequent continental thinkers. What the former have to say about Husserl's doctrine of the *noēma* remains very worthwhile, even if their concentration on it blocks out large sections of the philosophy of which it is a part.

Phenomenology is taken by the authors to be essentially only a theory about mental acts. Husserl's philosophy is portrayed as little more than a philosophical psychology. 'Its roots lie deep in Brentano's descriptive psychology' (66). One way to discern the one-sidedness of such a portrayal is to notice their almost total silence as regards the motivations or reasons for the development of such a theory. Neither do they have much to say about the goals Husserl attempted to attain by way of such a theory. The attempt to analyze and describe mental phenomena is presented in a motivational vacuum.

It is in this connection very significant that Sajama and Kamppinen, like their predecessors in the Stanford School, have virtually nothing to say about Husserl's method of transcendental-phenomenological epoché and reduction. While the excessive preoccupation of other secondary literature with it is indeed tiresome and usually not philosophically productive, there is also reason to caution against ignoring it altogether. For Husserl's meditations on method also fill us in about the grounds and objectives of phenomenology. Was it an epistemological concern about the external world? If not, was its goal metaphysical or ontological? Or are there other problems which compel us to take the step into phenomenological reflection? In other words, what kind of work was his theory of intentionality supposed to do? Why did he, for example, introduce the concept of the *noēma*? Merely to describe and individuate mental acts?

The authors' attempt to scale Husserl down to the measure of what they themselves find acceptable becomes apparent, when they tell us, in great naiveté, that 'Husserl found little interest in the really existing things in the actual world' (66). A bit later in the text, we read that the object causes the *hylē* of the act (87), which is followed by the comment that this relation is, strictly speaking, beyond (or below) the interests of the phenomenologist, who is not interested in the external world nor in the causal genesis of sensuous *hylē* (88). That this should be presented as Husserl's actual, definitive philosophical position cannot but infuriate a serious student of Husserl. Equally infuriating is the fact that, like other members of the Stanford School, they totally ignore all commentary on Husserl which does not come from their own members. They smugly assume that that school has the monopoly on insight into his doctrine.

Since phenomenology is presented as nothing more than descriptive psychology, it is of course not surprising that the authors do not find Husserl to be an ontological idealist (89). Husserl himself was quite clear that a psychological standpoint does not permit any final

conclusion about ontology. Descriptive or phenomenological psychology is a limiting of one's interest and attention to just one domain of being, namely the purely psychical. But he construes this circumstance as a compelling ground for taking the further step to transcendental phenomenology, where ontological questions are to be decided (Cf. *Cart. Med.* par. 11). And this is where Husserl's methodological idealism *turns into* a metaphysical idealism, inasmuch as he insists that the envisaged methodology must also be used in tackling metaphysical and other philosophical issues.

To conclude, the book can serve as an introduction to phenomenology, provided only that the reader bears in mind its perspectival character.

Henry Pietersma
University of Toronto

Max Scheler.
Person and Self-Value: Three Essays With an Introduction.
Edited and partially translated by M.S. Frings. Norwall, MA: Martinus Nijhoff 1987. Pp. 00+000. US$59.50. ISBN 90-247-3380-4.

The continental drifts discernible in analytical moral philosophy during the last two decades may have created a landscape much more hospitable to Max Scheler's thought than had existed earlier, especially for readers unpreoccupied with the details and disputes of 'classical,' Husserlian phenomenology. To see how this might be so, one need only reflect on the substantive affinities between Scheler's work and the arguments in two key 'analytical' publications, Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue* and Stanley Cavell's *The Claims of Reason.*

One could say that MacIntyre succeeds in dismantling the metaethics regnant in the period from *Principia Ethica* to the early 1970s by a subtly dialectical argument, one designed to uncover the concrete or 'material' ethical commitments undergirding the putatively neutral analysis of moral propositions. The public occlusion of those commitments becomes itself a matter for historical exploration, particularly the disappearance of the theme of virtue behind the mask of formalistic rule-following. (Compare Scheler's 1913 essay 'Zur Rehabilitierung der Tugend' [*G.W.*, Band 3, 15]: 'Virtue has become so

intolerable to us above all because we no longer understand it as ... a consciousness of power freely welling up from our very being, but take it merely as a dim, unfeelable "disposition" to act according to rules of any sort whatsoever.') Scheler and MacIntyre jointly make clear that Kantian 'formalism' and rule-utilitarianism are simply the anhedonic and hedonic variants of the same ethical posture.

Equally striking are the convergences between central Schelerian themes and Cavell's disclosure that moral or existential dilemmas hide behind what have been taken as the cardinal issues of Cartesian epistemology, viz., the existence of the external world and the existence of other minds or selves. Independently of any documentary affiliation, Cavell and Scheler arrive at the analogous results that the first question has to do with the conative or emotional conviction that the 'presentness' of the world makes sense or possesses *value*, while the second concerns the embrace or avoidance of *love*. (See Scheler's essays 'Ordo Amoris' and 'Liebe und Erkenntnis,' in addition to his book *The Nature of Sympathy*.)

All this by way of introducing a new volume of translations of three works by Scheler: 'Shame and Feelings of Modesty' (Über Scham und Schamgefühl,' written in 1913), 'Repentance and Rebirth' (reprinted from *On the Eternal in Man*) and 'Exemplars of Person and Leaders' (= 'Vorbilder und Führer,' written between 1911 and 1921). The first and third essays have been translated with penetrating skill by Manfred Frings, doyen of Schelerian studies in North America and in Europe.

Readers already acquainted with Scheler's major works of ethical and psychological analysis, *Formalism in Ethics and the Non-Formal Ethics of Values* and *The Nature of Sympathy*, will find in these three essays valuable continuations, refinements or supplements to those more extended discussions. Readers new to Scheler will be able to grasp some of the characteristic features of his philosophical style, a style finally owing less to any attachment to technical methods of phenemenology than to a peculiar, ever-changing ratio of bravura and bravado, of keenly-judged aperçus and sometimes wanton extrapolations. Gadamer's admiring sobriquet for Scheler – 'the spendthrift' (*'der Verschwender'*) finds full justification in these pages.

The phenomena Scheler addresses are by no means staples of contemporary ethical discourse, perhaps in some measure because they bear the imprint of seemingly alien or discarded moral and social sensibilities, e.g., the place of sexual modesty in personal and public lives or the history-shaping roles played by exemplary persons (the saint, the genius, the hero). One would need to recollect Nietzsche or, say, an 18th-century French aphorist such as Vauvenargues, to recapture the ambience and tone of these essays.

Those willing to enter into this ambience will be both provoked and enlightened, especially by Scheler's exposition of the 'essence' of shame/modesty and the modes of its appearance in human lives. For him shame arises not from culturally inculcated sexual prudishness or repression, but is rather the meeting-place or collision-point between a human being's 'spirit' (*Geist*) and the life of his animal drives and instincts. A human person is, for Scheler, 'a "bridge," a "transition" between two orders of being and essence in which one has such equally strong roots that one cannot sever them without losing one's very humanity' (6). In a noteworthy analysis Scheler suggests that primordial or essential shame occurs when the intention of another person towards oneself 'oscillates between an individualizing and generalizing attitude and when one's own intention and the experienced counter-intention [of the other person] have not the same but an opposite direction' (16). Specifically sexual feelings of shame and modesty are, according to him, derivative from this more originary sense of the tension between reductive generalization (as in the case of a mere sexual object) and ennobling individualization (as in the case of love between this man and this woman).

Throughout this first essay Scheler takes pains to distance himself from Freud, while relying, often insouciantly, on then-recent, but now long-forgotten ethnological, biological and psychological research.

The final essay, 'Exemplars of Person and Leaders,' will also be of interest to students of general sociology and the sociology of knowledge. (Fertile comparisons with Weber's theory of charisma and with Simmel's book *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations* will quickly suggest themselves.) The distnction between exemplars and active leaders is central to Scheler's account here: 'To lead means acting, pointing ways, initiating good or bad directions of life ("the seducer"). But "exemplar" taken as a (objective) good or bad exemplar, means much more and something quite different from this. For an exemplar amounts to the *cast of a value formed by personhood [personal geformte Wertgestalt]* and it is envisioned by an individual's or a group's soul. Depending on whether or not the soul finds itself in harmony with its exemplar, the soul grows into this exemplary cast, it forms itself into it' (139).

Frings has completed the sometimes elliptical references in the two essays originally published in Volume I of Scheler's *Nachlass*. He has also appended a bibliography of English translations of Scheler's works. (Some mention of the rather sparse secondary literature on the themes of this volume would also have been helpful; a good example would be Bruno Rotishauer's monograph *Max Schelers Phänomenologie des Fühlens. Eine kritische Untersuchung seiner Ana-*

lyse von Scham und Schamgefühl [Bern/Munich 1969].) Fring's introductory essay (xi-xxix) will be valuable to neophytes and dedicated students alike.

David R. Lachterman
Pennsylvania State University

V. Tejera.
Nietzsche and Greek Thought.
Norwall, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
1987. Pp. 157. US$34.50. ISBN 90-247-3475-4.

When reading Nietzsche on Socrates how can we be sure to which 'Socrates' Nietzsche is referring? This is the central question with which Tejera is concerned in this work. While other topics are dealt with as well, most notably, Nietzsche's readings of Anaximander, Herakleitos, Parmenides, and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle, it is the problem of Nietzsche's relation to Socrates that forms the core of the book (31). It is this problem, therefore, that will be the focus of what follows.

Tejera argues that Nietzsche failed to engage either the historical Socrates or the Platonic Socrates because they lay hidden behind more than two millennia of misunderstanding and systematic distortion, a veil that Nietzsche, in spite of his apparent qualifications for the job, never succeeded in lifting. Since the historical Socrates is only accessible through what was written about him, Tejera's case rests upon the claim that there are several different versions of Socrates. In addition to Plato's version we have the versions of Aristophanes and Xenophon as well as the later versions of Diogenes Laertius, various Platonists and, of particular interest in the present case, the German classicists of Nietzsche's own day. Not surprisingly, it is this final version that was the direct object of Nietzsche's numerous remarks. However, since this version was grounded in a misreading of Plato, Nietzsche's attack on the Platonic Socrates actually obscures a more fundamental resemblance between them. Nietzsche was, above all else, a critic of the intellectual culture within which he himself had been educated; it is in this role that he most resembles Socrates and Plato.

Tejera tries to show, first, that Plato's version of Socrates, properly understood, is superior to all others; second, that Plato's dialogues have been subjected to a long history of misreadings; and, finally, that Nietzsche attacks the distorted versions of Plato and Socrates

leaving the Platonic Socrates, and the historical Socrates, insofar as he is visible, untouched. The third claim clearly presupposes the first two which are, in turn, opposite sides of the same coin. These claims both hinge on the argument that the 'dialogical' nature of Plato's dialogues has been neglected by those who have attempted to construct from them a dogmatic system known as 'Platonism.' Platonism, according to Tejera, has its origins in the Pythagorean tendencies of Plato's nephew, Speusippus, said to have been 'doctrinally jealous of his uncle' (91). It was he who set the tone for subsequent interpreters of the Platonic corpus. Read from this perspective the dialogues lose their power to bring the reader into contact with the 'antidogmatic' inquiries of Socrates and Plato.

Even if one is prepared to grant that any attempt to understand Plato must begin from the fact that he wrote dialogues, a view that would find many supporters among those writing on Plato at the present time, it doesn't follow, either that there is no Platonic system, or that Plato's version of Socrates is any closer to the historical Socrates than anyone else's version. Tejera is not unaware of these difficulties and tries to resolve them by anchoring the first two claims noted above in an interpretation of the nature of the transition from the Classical age of Greek culture to the Hellenistic age (21ff). He argues that the various readings of the Presocratics in terms of their rival 'cosmologies' are evidence of the fact that the whole of the Classical age has been subjected to the same Pythagorean distortion that has blocked a proper understanding of Plato. By appealing to Eric Havelock's much-debated thesis regarding the consequences of the advent of literacy in Athens Tejera tries to show that Socrates and Plato are the first critics of the new forms of discourse that emerged in Athens at this time rather than the symptoms of decline that they were to Nietzsche. It is here that the dialogical form of Plato's work achieves its full significance because Plato's Socrates is a literary creation whose presence in the dialogues as a member of the traditional oral/aural culture allows Plato to make 'explicit the presuppositions of the prose modality most suited to graphic ways of communicating' (27). It is in this role as a critic of cultural presuppositions that Plato most resembles Nietzsche. Lacking the perspective made possible by the work of Havelock and others, Nietzsche failed to break free of the versions of Plato and Socrates that he acquired during his own education (29, 133). However, when read as an attack on Platonism, Nietzsche's remarks on Socrates and Plato are right on target.

Tejera's thesis is a provocative one, rich in possibilities for further development, and it would be impossible to consider his arguments in detail here. There are, however, certain features of the work that may prevent even sympathetic readers from being persuaded by it. A thesis as complex as that advanced by Tejera requires a great deal

of supporting evidence but his references are often vague and surprisingly casual. The reader is referred to three or four books, or even to collected editions, rather than to specific passages. On one occasion a footnote actually conflicts with the point it is intended to support (116). On another occasion a reference to Heidegger's *Nietzsche* suggests that there are only two volumes in the English translation (rather than four) and that the English is a complete version of the German (which it is not). Numerous other examples might be given but the cumulative effect of such casual treatment of one's sources is gradually to weaken the reader's trust in the author. This is not helped by the combative style that characterizes much of the work. In his attempt to establish the superiority of Plato's Socrates over anyone else's, Tejera tries to undercut the validity of the version by Xenophon. This means that nothing good can be said about either Xenophon or his Socrates. While I have no wish to deny that a good case can be made for preferring Plato's Socrates on both philosophical and literary grounds, although in Plato's case the two can't be separated, I am far less certain that it is justifiable to move from this to the claim that Plato's version has any greater historical authenticity. Thus, when Tejera accuses Xenophon of being '*unhistorical*' on the ground that he presents Socrates as 'a practiced reader of books' (73), while ignoring the fact that Plato also presents Socrates as a reader (e.g., *Phaedo* 98b), it is difficult to escape the feeling that in his zeal to discredit every version of Socrates but Plato's. Tejera's quest for the 'historical' Socrates has led him beyond what is warranted by the evidence. This is unfortunate, because Tejera's historical thesis gets in the way of his more interesting claims regarding the differences between Plato's dialogues and Platonism, on the one hand, and the failure of Nietzsche to distinguish between them, on the other.

S.M. Corbett
Acadia University

Garrett Thomson.
Needs.
New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall
1987. Pp. x+143.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-7102-1114-7.

The crisp title, *Needs*, refers to human needs, as distinct not so much from animal needs or from requirements of states or other corporations; rather, as distinct from human wants, desires, preferences, and the like. The author is associated with Oxford University, both by way of his graduate training (D. Phil. at Balliol) and by way of his present (or at any rate recent) position as Tutor in Philosophy at Wolsey Hall. The stamp of analytical philosophy that one associates with the 'Oxford School' is unmistakeable. Yet there is a predominance of ethical seriousness and common sense in the text which leaves me, at any rate, with a sense that the basic argument in this work merits the close attention that its rich verbal foliage requires.

Needs is a very important concept comparatively little studied by philosophers, Thomson states at the outset; or, rather, A. Kenny does, and is quoted by Thomson with obvious approval (1). To some political theorists, myself included, the concept has a very special importance beyond the parameters discussed by Thomson: it is the key concept in any critical assessment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of states or other public institutions and policies. Structures and policies that grievously violate human needs should whenever possible be resisted, some of us argue, by way of civil or even uncivil or revolutionary disobedience, depending in part on how many people's basic needs are being ignored or otherwise violated; but depending first of all on how grievously even a single person is made to suffer.

My own normative point of departure is the axiomatic assertion that to protect human lives, health needs, and security and well-being needs is the crucial kind of aim and achievement that can justify loyalty to the state, or indeed justify any kind of voluntary support to any kind of political organization or leadership. Thomson's careful analysis of current academic and popular need-languages is therefore a most welcome contribution to modern praxis-relevant political theory (and so is also David Braybrooke's *Meeting Needs* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1987] [cf. *C.P.R./R.C.C.P.* 8 (1988) 8 (Eds.)]. Thomson explains at the outset that he has the *fundamental* needs in mind when he refers to 'needs' (16); this work is *not* an exercise in 'trivial pursuits.'

Thomson's investigation of needs-language begins with an intuitive sketch of the concept. First, needs are objective, they are matters of fact, but with an 'intrinsic bearing on what we ought to do' (it is noted that some writers argue that 'need' bridges 'is' – and

'ought'–discourse). Second, needs are 'unimpeachable' values, not chosen but acquired by people once and for all. Third, needs 'are a matter of priority. What we need is something which we cannot do without, and hence is an overriding reason' (ix). To 'explain the ways in which the concept of a need functions' is the primary aim of the book' (x).

Let me now attempt a bird's eye overview of some highlights of Thomson's inquiry into needs, before concluding with a note on where we go from here, as theorists and as would-be practitioners of institution-building toward a more humane society.

Chapter I surveys a bewildering array of need-concepts, from statements in scholarly works and some from everyday language. Having demonstrated the wide parameters, Thomson turns to the constructive task of making conceptual choices, making the pregnant observation that 'some notion of serious harm' (17) should be linked to the concept of fundamental need, and that 'harm' as an objective concept should have no logical linkage with (subjective) 'desire.'

Under the heading 'Human Nature' the author next compares 'needs' with neighbouring concepts like (Marcuse's) 'false needs,' 'dependencies,' and 'addictions.' We are told something important, if true (as I believe it is), about human nature: that fundamental needs are *natural*, and few in number (23-4). While there is no upper limit to desires in our kind of societies, perhaps meeting all of humanity's basic *needs* is not an impossible task? (Or is this, even in a whisper, a totalitarian communist vision?)

In the next chapters (III-V) Thomson reasons closely about interests, positive and negative, as the constituent elements of harm (versus well-being) as objective concepts, along with values and needs; and about how they all bear on the key subjective concept of desire.

In the subsequent chapter on 'Relativity' the concept of harm is given further attention, and we are shown by way of examples that not all categories of harm generate needs. Chapter VII, next, returns to 'Needs and Desires'; Thomson here deals effectively, in my judgment, with a familiar liberal worry (note my whisper above) lest a priority for (objective) needs over (subjective) wants and desires could encourage an authoritarian disregard for individual desires, or even for the democratic process. The following chapter, on 'Is and Ought,' extrapolates from the needs-override-desires thesis onto a familiar battleground for philosophers, one that is not likely to be abandoned by either side any time soon.

In the brief concluding chapter IX Thomson dwells a bit further on those three principal attributes of needs: Why, he asks, are they objective?; unimpeachable?; and a matter of priority? His reasons, as developed in the book as a whole, strike me some of the time as

needlessly complicated, but his answers, especially as summarized in this last chapter, are enlightened and humane.

This conclusion leads me to a heretical question: Could some of the mileage on Thomson's intellectual journey have been saved by way of proceeding from a first premise of reverence for human life, and lives, along with an affirmation of a general overriding thesis; a priority thesis favouring the dire needs of the exploited and the made-redundant people on this planet, ahead of the desires and demands of all the *not* needy people?

Only two or three decades ago, narrowly behavioural inquiries dominated the academic landscapes in the social sciences in our part of the world: beliefs and attitudes were studied on a wide scale while motives and needs were left alone by a generation of researchers, whose scale-building and survey research techniques were best suited to study readily measureable aspects of social behaviour and communication. This also led to an enthusiasm for election studies and incidentally to an uncritical conception of 'democracy' as requiring merely free elections, free speech, and governments responsive only to articulate wants and demands.

Now the 'shallow-behavioural era' has passed, and philosophers, social scientists, and psychologists are probing freely into once-forbidding phenomena such as motivations, needs, and self-concepts. There are now wide and growing opportunities for studying, for example, social justice and liberties in their connection with liberal as well as socialist and other kinds of models of democratic participation and leadership. Further advances into needs-research will reinforce further progress in the jurisprudence of human rights, and vice versa.

This is a propitious time, I believe, for many kinds of advances in the sorts of philosophical and social-sciences inquiry that can serve some of our age-old aspirations for achieving more humane and rational social institutions. Less hampered by rigid research methodologies, theorists and researchers are more free now to develop our agendas in response to the priorities we see among human and social problems.

Christian Bay
(*Department of Political Science*)
University of Toronto

Jules Vuillemin.
What are Philosophical Systems?
New York: Cambridge University Press
1986. Pp. ix+163.
US$39.50. ISBN 0-521-30540-3.

The title of this short compact book reveals the two basic lines of thought pursued by V. The first is his development of the successive achievements which eventuate in the plurality, but finite number, of philosophical systems. In addition, the title does not promise more than an indication of what systems, or possibilities of truth, there are. Rather, V. seems to say that we choose what kind of sentences will count as elementary in communicating perception and with the help of the corresponding philosophical principles we opt, consciously or not, for our philosophical systems. Put otherwise, he is claiming all philosophers have made or will make choices as to what will count as elementary sentences and thereby what will count as philosophical truth.

The four chapters which correspond to the four phases in the development of a philosophical system are devoted to perceptual organization, language, axiomatics and the resulting a priori classification of philosophical systems. Each of these phases is the necessary but not sufficient condition for the next. Actually, the importance of V.'s explication lies in how he argues his claim to be able to contradict certain widespread views as he moves through each phase. 'I deny in the first chapter that language shapes perception ... I deny that a *Weltanschauung* is a philosophy, since publicity entails neither consistency nor a wish for consistency ... I deny that strong continuity between philosophy and common sense which is advocated by many philosophers of natural language ... While they [fellow-philosophers] argue for a unique scheme of philosophical truth, I am content with saying what all of these possibilities of truth are' (viii-ix).

V. begins his defense of these claims with a graphic description of how in perception we move from qualities to substances to perceptual organization. His argument for his first denial centers around showing that 'from a synchronically missing form we cannot infer a corresponding lack of the concept, which may be borrowed or composed' (34). He claims thought is and can be prior to language and that language communicates the perceptual organization, substantiates universals and expresses subjectivity (cf. 35). First V. determines 'what are the elementary singular sentences and the categories of individuals in natural languages' (45). He then develops how concepts seize individuals and how language constructs our sensible world. His very intriguing and complex discussion, complete with

elaborate figures and expressions in symbolic logic, eventuates in a schematic illustration of the various possible elementary singular sentences.

The third chapter traces the emergence of 'free' philosophy from myth – the latter, V. argues, is correlated with the development of axiomatic method. His portrayal of myth as an attempt to picture reality is hardly surprising nor is its contrast with science. Science is seen as an open set of concepts which can and have been supplanted by new ones but 'when new concepts are introduced, a rule must be respected according to which the old concepts that are thus replaced may still be regarded as approximations valid on a coarser scale' (99). Thus truth-value assignments are possible, unlike myth, which does not admit of disconfirmation. The axiomatic method gives standards which can be used in the quest for true principles but philosophy goes beyond in that it 'intends to reform and to restore mythical ontology dismissed by axiomatics' (114). And yet, V. claims, it is impossible to have a unique scheme of philosophical truth. 'Between self-evident principles equally recommended by common sense but mutually inconsistent, a choice is imposed on philosophy which explains its divisions' (114). These choices are made with respect to the type of elementary sentence taken as fundametal. In turn, this choice determines which of the six main classes of philosophical systems are to be accepted.

This is not an arbitrary set of choices. As V. well explains, systematic ontology requires undefinable concepts and undemonstrated principles – the derivation of the rest of the world according to legitimated rules, and the explaining away of rival ontologies (cf. 116). But there are many that meet these requirements and these systems range on a spectrum from realism to scepticism.

The explication and arguments offered by V. are intriguing, and display an incredible grasp of a diverse set of interconnected issues. The final contention is that the six classifications together are complete and exhaustive of all possible systems. This gives me pause for two interconnected reasons. First, the whole result sounds like an anti-abortionist's answer to the question of what to say to people who believe in good faith that abortion is not the killing of an innocent human being. As V. says about competing systems: 'it must be recognized that they too have good reasons for choosing according to a maxim which is not ours' (133). In both cases the trouble starts from all parties in the dispute actually believing both that there is an absolute truth and yet that everyone is entitled to interpret what it is or should be. Strange metaphysics to someone who has not yet chosen.

Second, and I believe this is an answer to the first concern, V. needs to rethink his response on the last page to the puzzles posed by quantum physics as to what is the stuff of reality. V. says future classifi-

cations will merge into his present ones, but I suggest they cannot and should not. Rather, the challenge of quantum physics is to the whole enterprise of seeking to account for how we systematize perception, as if the macroscopic world of our perception were fixed and determinate, and determinable. When I make an observation at the sub-atomic level I precipitate what was possible, actualize one possibility. For this reason ontology must focus on and include the experiencer as shaping and making possible, and thereby actual, the world. In a way this affirms V. desire to neutralize his and our natural desire to know the unique system of truth–truth is inextricably bound up with activity of seeking. We need to see the tandem 'experiencer-experienced' emerge as primordial and develop our explications of our world accordingly. Indeed, this will result in a unique scheme, but not one that will merge with the set of systems V. believes are exhaustive. Our concern will not be with realism, idealism, skepticism or any other such 'metaphysics.' Instead our attention will be on describing how we come to make our choices: acknowledging our own role in the constitution of our world. This is not creative idealism nor a call to a paradox. V. needs to take seriously his claim to be using the phenomenological method throughout. He would then see his own work as not only describing 'what are philosophical systems,' but also as requiring a phenomenological description of the ontology that makes such a description possible.

Richard Holmes
University of Waterloo

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

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