

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editor

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6G 2E5

Editeur associé

J. N. Kaufmann
Département de Philosophie
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières
C.P. 500
Trois-Rivières, Québec, Canada
G9A 5H7

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Published ten issues yearly / dix par an numéros

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:

Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:



academic printing & publishing

P.O. Box 4834, South Edmonton, Alberta,
Canada T6E 5G7

Second Class Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X

©1986 Academic Printing and Publishing

Vol. VI no. 1 January/janvier 1986

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T.W. ADORNO. *Aesthetic Theory*. C. Lenhardt, trans. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, eds. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1984. Pp. x + 526. Cdn\$66.25: US\$49.95 ISBN: 0-7100-9204-0.

The publication of this translation is a significant event. The event is significant both for students of the Frankfurt School and for other persons interested in recent continental philosophy. Theodor W. Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* is the most original attempt at a comprehensive philosophy of the arts within the Western Marxist tradition. First published in 1970, one year after Adorno died, this *summa aesthetica* has received little attention in North America. Nevertheless, Adorno's greatest influence in Europe has come through his writings on the arts. Now a better assessment can be made of his influence as well as his contributions.

Christian Lenhardt's translation is outstanding. Lenhardt has captured Adorno's gist in idiomatic English without missing crucial nuances. It is unfortunate, however, that the translator has not been allowed to include a glossary and an introduction. These would have provided helpful entries into the text.

No matter how excellent, the translation itself cannot remove some initial obstacles. Adorno has employed a paratactical form and a dialectical method. These make a first reading difficult. In addition, his death prevented a final revision of the text. To lessen the effect of such obstacles the reader could begin with the editors' description of the manuscript's development (493-8) and with Adorno's presentation of his leading concerns (456-92). Beginning at the end might help prepare one for the 12 chapters and 168 sections of the main text.

Adorno's aesthetics turns on a central conflict and follows a specific methodological principle. The conflict is one between modern art and advanced capitalism. Adorno's methodological principle is 'to shed light on all art from the perspective of the most recent artistic phenomena' (491-2). Interpreting modern art as the 'social antithesis' of advanced capitalist society, Adorno generates a general thesis about the arts: they derive from a larger social process, oppose it, point beyond it, and yet remain within that process.

Chapters 1 and 12 try to show how art simultaneously 'dissociates itself' from society and 'belongs to' it (358). In these chapters Adorno solidifies his positions about art's connections with politics, ideology, and social production.

Adorno's approach to 'modern art' (Picasso, Schoenberg, Beckett) is both controversial and original. Unlike Georg Lukács, Adorno defends modern art. Unlike the view sometimes attributed to Adorno, however, his defense is critical rather than apologetic. This defense assumes a dialectic between modern art and so-called popular art. Chapter 2 portrays modern art as providing a partial corrective to the ideological functions of 'popular art.' But because modern art also has ideological functions, Adorno says 'it becomes impossible to criticize the culture industry without criticizing art at the same time'(26). Furthermore, within modern art Adorno distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic works.

This distinction employs the category of artistic truth-content (*Wahrheitsgehalt*). Like many other Adornian categories, this one arises from his reading traditional aesthetics through the eyes of twentieth-century art. Because of vast discrepancies between the two, Adorno holds that 'there is only one way in which aesthetics can hope to understand art today, and that is through critical self-reflection' (467).

Adorno's critical appropriation of traditional German aesthetics is most evident in Chapters 6, 7, and 9, which concern artistic illusion (*Schein*), truth, and objectivity. In these chapters Adorno tries to move beyond Hegel and Kant by using each to correct the other. Thus, for example, Adorno combines a Hegelian notion of art as truth's semblance with a Kantian emphasis on the indeterminacy of specific works. Adorno also uses Hegel's emphasis on artistic production to correct Kant's notion of taste, but criticizes both authors for misreading the collective subjectivity expressed in authentic works of art. A similar treatment of Nietzsche and Marx occurs in the chapters on 'beauty' (Chs.3-5). Adorno appropriates traditional German aesthetics in order to determine the significance of modern art within a capitalist society.

Although not well-versed in recent English-language aesthetics, Adorno does undertake a type of metacriticism. Concepts of art criticism such as form and intention are analyzed in Chapter 8, and categories of art historiography such as genre and style are examined in Chapter 11. Crucial for both chapters is the theory of the artwork presented in Chapter 10. Adorno describes the work of art as a sociohistorical monad that calls for immanent criticism. Works of art are 'monads' in the sense that their internal tensions express the conflicts driving their society. In authentic modern works human suffering is voiced, and necessary transformations of society are made imaginable. The task of immanent criticism is to evaluate works from within but simultaneously to assess their sociohistorical significance.

Three objections to *Aesthetic Theory* have been raised by sympathetic critics. One is that Adorno's defense of modern art amounts to a retreat from any struggle for social transformation. It is said that Adorno thinks only certain politically ineffectual works can provide an agent for social transformation. A second objection is that Adorno's reflections have become so abstract

that they resist concrete testing. A third is that important changes in recent art have been ignored.

In my judgment each of these criticisms is itself problematic. There is one recurrent objection, however, that might signal a central problem. This objection concerns Adorno's method of reading art backwards. Adorno never fully explains and justifies his methodological principle. He claims instead that a method of interpreting artistic phenomena is 'legitimated in its actual use, which is why it cannot be presupposed' (489). The problem with this claim is that the 'legitimate' use of a method does not provide a philosophical rationale. In his attempt to correct abstract methodologies whose methods are seldom put to legitimate use, Adorno fails to elaborate the methodology attached to his own methods of interpretation.

That objection aside, I find *Aesthetic Theory* to be one of the most exciting and challenging works in post-war German aesthetics. Aligning aesthetics with recent art and social issues is difficult in any language. By taking on this task without flinching, Adorno has made an important contribution to contemporary philosophy of art.

LAMBERT ZUIDERVAART
Calvin College

JEAN-LOUIS ALLARD, dir. *Jacques Maritain philosophe dans la cité / A Philosopher in the World*. Ottawa: Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa/University of Ottawa Press 1985. 447p. ISBN 2-1603-1039-6.

La philosophie de Jacques Maritain est-elle dépassée? Dépassée par les nouvelles problématiques qui animent la philosophie actuelle? Dépassée par les événements qui marquent nos sociétés occidentales? Peut-elle encore aider à poser la question de l'Etre dans notre culture technologique et technologisante et donner un sens à notre métier d'homme et de femme?

Ce livre qui constitue les Actes d'un colloque international Jacques Maritain tenu à Ottawa du 6 au 9 octobre 1982 apparaît manifestement, par le biais des communications qu'il comprend, comme autant d'appels répétés invitant à jeter un regard lucide, parfois neuf, sur la richesse impressionnante de l'œuvre de ce philosophe. L'œuvre de Maritain nous est présentée comme étant profondément enracinée dans la problématique de son époque, mais également porteuse d'avenir; cela tient pour une bonne part à la lucidité de

cet intellectuel chrétien et à sa capacité de renouvellement de la pensée thomiste. Jean-Louis Allard résume bien l'intention qui anime les auteurs de l'ouvrage en écrivant: 'Il est permis de souhaiter et d'espérer que, dans notre monde incertain, s'éveille de plus en plus un désir de sagesse, un désir de se laisser interroger par les sages, parmi lesquels on trouverait certainement Jacques Maritain dont la pensée risquerait de devenir impertinente à force d'être pertinente.'(3-4)

Ce livre est divisé en sept parties d'inégale importance. On nous présente la physionomie spirituelle de Jacques Maritain par le biais de deux études qui mettent l'une et l'autre l'accent sur la dynamique de la vie intellectuelle et spirituelle de ce philosophe et sur la richesse de la 'grande amitié' qu'il a vécue avec Julien Green. On nous propose, sous le titre *Métaphysique et épistémologie*, des études touchant au type d'existentialisme promu par Maritain, à son humanisme, à l'influence de Thomas d'Aquin sur sa philosophie et à son apport créateur dans l'intelligence de la philosophie thomiste. On nous offre des exposés portant sur la théologie et la spiritualité dans l'œuvre de Maritain, sur la philosophie de l'art, et sur celle de l'éducation. Les études portant sur la philosophie sociale et politique ainsi que sur l'héritage maritain dégagent à la fois l'impact et l'actualité étonnante de son œuvre.

Les Actes de ce colloque maritainien ne sont pas à lire tout d'un trait. On ne peut pas également en faire un compte rendu au sens strict du terme. Toutefois, la lecture des textes est facilitée par le style sobre utilisé par les auteurs. Il me semble qu'on a su très bien éviter un certain ésotérisme détestable dans la présentation d'un aspect ou l'autre de cette philosophie. Peut-être est-ce dû au fait que la philosophie de Maritain elle-même ne tient pas au soliloque mais qu'elle invite au dialogue.

Ceci étant dit, cet ouvrage constitue en quelque sorte un aide-mémoire et une synthèse des principaux chantiers du questionnement de ce philosophe. La vocabulaire parfois utilisé pour présenter la personnalité de l'auteur ou attirer l'attention sur un aspect particulier de sa pensée peut gêner celui ou celle qui n'adhère pas tout de go aux fondements qui la structurent ou au noyau de convictions qui animent son questionnement.

Quelles impressions peut-on éprouver à la lecture de ce livre? La philosophie de Jacques Maritain témoigne d'une rencontre de l'intelligence et de la foi chrétienne. Et d'une intelligence engagée dans le cours de ce monde. D'une intelligence lucide, courageuse même, qui pénètre au cœur de ce que les auteurs appellent la tendresse, la douleur et la vérité que constitue la rencontre en Dieu. Voilà pourquoi, le philosophe apparaît manifestement et paradoxalement comme un homme de son temps, un paysan de la Garonne, mais aussi comme un pèlerin qui témoigne d'une quête de sagesse qui ne connaît pas de frontière ou, pour être plus juste, qui se méfie des frontières.

PIERRE FORTIN
Université du Québec à Rimouski

DANIEL C. DENNETT. *Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1984. Pp. 256. US\$19.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-04077-8); US\$10.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-54042-8).

Dennett's book is an enjoyable and thought provoking study of some of the most important questions about free will. The title suggests the central concern of the book: Does our (somewhat deterministic) picture of the world leave room for the satisfaction of such concepts as 'self-control,' 'the ability to do otherwise,' and 'responsibility'? The subtitle suggests Dennett's approach to dealing with this question. Certainly there are some senses of 'free will,' 'self-control,' and related terms that would make it false that we have free will. Just as certainly, though, there are senses of these terms that would make it true that we have free will. The question, then, is which sense is the significant one; in which sense do we (and should we) care about the truth of the claim that we have free will? This seems to me just the right question to ask.

There is a distinctive aspect of Dennett's approach that does not seem so right. That is his frequent appeal to examples from the field of robotics. The point is to show that many of the central terms in the free will debate are just as applicable in cases in which the subjects are deterministic robots. Hence, it would seem that there can be no conflict between determinism and the concepts associated with freedom. But what might be appropriate when applied to robots might not be appropriate when applied to humans. Robots are designed to serve specific functions. A good robot is effective at its task and a bad robot is not. If a robot behaves in an undesirable way it needs to be improved so that it will not behave that way again. It is part of the nature of the case that we must take a forward-looking approach to evaluation. (Indeed, in chapter 7 Dennett explicitly proposes a form of moral consequentialism, but he adds little new to the position.)

Disanalogously, when evaluating humans we are concerned with more than whether the apparatus works or not; we also want to know why it works or not. (Surely this is the point of so many of the examples that Dennett dismisses in chapter 1 as being defective intuition pumps.) Dennett emphasizes that, regardless of how we got here, we are now the sorts of creatures that can affect our environment in such a way as to satisfy most of our desires. There is no denying the importance of this property. But if we are to attribute responsibility we must also ask how we obtained this property. We might say that I am in control of my actions in the sense that I perform them because I am a rational being and they are the most rational ones to perform (this is Dennett's suggestion in chapter 3). But if it turns out that there were some events beyond my control (perhaps because they occurred before I was born), the occurrence of which determined that I now make rational choices and perform the actions most appropriate to my situation, then it seems that I cannot be responsible for performing the appropriate actions. We might make this point by saying that in some sense I was just lucky to be

the sort of person who would make rational choices and perform appropriate actions. So I do not deserve praise.

Dennett's initial reaction to this sort of criticism is to distinguish between luck and skill (see 94). Our ability to manipulate our environment is not mere luck. We have been selected out by evolutionary pressures from amongst many other creatures who lacked this skill. Someone who is merely lucky may not be lucky tomorrow, but, as Dennett points out, skill is projectible. With this distinction in hand, Dennett goes on to point out that since we have the skills of self control and deliberation it is reasonable for us to have high expectations of each other, and, hence, (I assume) reasonable to hold each other responsible.

Surely, this does not answer the objection. In the sense in which 'luck' contrasts with 'skill,' we are not just lucky, but in the sense in which 'luck' contrasts with 'responsibility' we are just lucky. In the latter sense, we are just lucky to be skilled; our becoming skilled was itself something that we had no control over. Since I now seem to have these skills, it is reasonable to expect a lot of me, but that does not make it reasonable to hold me responsible for either meeting or failing to meet your expectations. Your expectations, though reasonable, were based on a lack of detailed information — information about the very facts which lead me to either meet or fail to meet those expectations. (Dennett seems to recognize this problem on p. 98.)

It may seem that a resolution of the problem posed by a backward-looking concept of responsibility lies in Dennett's epistemic account of 'avoidability' and related terms. If I am responsible for my action it is partly because there were other actions that I could have performed instead. (Dennett does not actually accept this claim but his strongest argument against it is grounded in his presupposed consequentialism [137], and he seems to accept some closely related claims anyway.) the new and startling aspect of his theory is that 'could have' is to be understood epistemically (see, for instance, 125-6 and 148). In this case, it is irrelevant that my being the sort of person I am was forced on me by events that were beyond my control. Although those events closed off any other present possibilities we cannot know which possibilities have been closed off. Since those possibilities are epistemically open, I am responsible for not actualizing them.

As daring as this epistemic approach is, it must be doomed to failure (at least in the eyes of anyone who does not start in Dennett's corner). It is subject to some of the least complicated and most common counterexamples to compatibilism. For instance, consider the case of the mad brain surgeon who, unbeknownst to anyone else, restructures my brain to permanently alter the sorts of reasoning processes I employ. Dennett would have to say that my actions in this case are not unavoidable for me and that I am responsible for my actions. The mad surgeon cannot be dismissed as a bogey man (as suggested in chapter 1), for the point of the example is not to offer independent support of incompatibilism, but only to show what crazy things Den-

nett's form of compatibilism is forced to say. His ultimate vulnerability to such examples should have been expected, since it is a direct result of his purely forward-looking approach.

MARK HELLER
Northern Illinois University

SARAH KOFMAN. *L'enfance de l'art. Une interrogation de l'esthétique freudienne.* Paris: Editions Galilée 1985. 290 p. 85FF. ISBN 2-7186-0261-X.

Ce volume reproduit le texte de la première édition (1970); l'auteure n'y a inseré que quelques compléments bibliographiques et l'a fait suivre d'une annexe intitulée 'Délire et fiction,' déjà publiée en 1974. Plusieurs études importantes sur l'esthétique freudienne auraient pu être mentionnées avec avantage.

Un premier chapitre propose une lecture 'symptomale,' qui fasse le partage entre ce qui est déclaré par Freud et ce qui est masqué dans son discours (18). En particulier, l'admiration manifeste de Freud pour l'art et les artistes recèle une ambivalence qui, comme telle, exige une analyse. Cette admiration est un tribut payé par Freud au 'grand homme' et au 'créateur.' En réalité, cependant, toute l'entreprise freudienne entend dénoncer 'la conception théologique de l'art,' qui 'admettait un sujet conscient libre, père de ses œuvres comme Dieu l'est de la création' (24). C'est l'une des thèses qui parcourt l'ensemble du volume.

Dans le chapitre II, l'auteure soutient que, dans ses premières œuvres, Freud succombe à la fascination de l'artiste, au point que l'art sert de modèle pour comprendre le psychisme. Mais, très tôt, dès son essai sur la *Gradiva* de Jensen, Freud fait de l'œuvre d'art un objet d'investigation. Dès lors, le savoir que possède l'artiste des processus psychiques devient une intuition divinatrice, puis une 'perception endopsychique,' qu'il partage d'ailleurs avec les primitifs et avec certains malades. Le chapitre suivant propose donc de suivre Freud dans son application de la psychanalyse à l'œuvre d'art; celle-ci devient analogue à un symptôme et donc susceptible d'une analyse du même type. L'auteure développe la méthode d'analyse des souvenirs-écrans et des fantasmes, et elle tente d'établir la relation qui existe entre l'œuvre d'art et ces deux formations.

Le chapitre suivant étudie le problème de l'art d'un point de vue métapsychologique. Il s'agit donc de rendre compte du lien entre l'œuvre d'art et les pulsions inconscientes. Le plaisir esthétique est mis en rapport avec le jeu et, par lui, avec le narcissisme: 'La structure narcissique nous paraît être la clef de l'activité artistique' (176). Et c'est par le narcissisme que l'activité artistique se manifeste comme un rejeton des pulsions de mort et des pulsions de vie; mais les premières y joueraient le rôle prépondérant. Par là est recherché le sens qu'a, dans l'économie de la vie, l'imagination, que Freud caractérise comme une 'réserve naturelle.' Enfin, le dernier chapitre aborde les questions du 'don' artistique, de la sublimation et de la relation entre l'art et la science.

Ce volume présente les textes les plus importants de l'esthétique freudienne. L'exégèse de ces textes en fonction de la problématique freudienne peut cependant soulever certaines difficultés. N'est-ce pas pousser trop loin le rôle de l'art que d'en faire, dans les premières œuvres freudiennes, le 'modèle théorique' (67) de l'explication analytique? A propos de l'antériorité des processus primaires sur les processus secondaires, et du principe de plaisir sur le principe de réalité, l'auteure affirme que Freud est 'encore victime de son langage du génétisme' (120); cependant, elle n'en tire que peu de conséquences, et surtout elle n'explique pas pourquoi Freud tient un tel langage ni non plus à quelle exigence ce dernier répond dans le développement de la pensée freudienne. La difficulté que mentionne ici l'auteure, elle se pose également pour d'autres notions qui jouent un rôle central dans ce travail. Ainsi, la notion de narcissisme ' primaire' (178sq) est prise en un sens biologique, alors qu'on rencontre un autre schéma freudien où le narcissisme, même ' primaire,' a une genèse psychologique; et cette genèse montre que le narcissisme est postérieur à l'autoérotisme. C'est pourquoi nous comprenons mal que l'auteure écrive que 'les pulsions partielles sont originellement perverses et *narcissiques*' (236). De même, le lien entre le narcissisme et la pulsion de mort ne paraît pas évident. 'Ce qui est visé, par l'art, est non pas tant le plaisir que le nirvana, c'est-à-dire le degré zéro de tension caractéristique du narcissisme primaire' (180). Si le narcissisme se caractérise par le fait que le moi se prend comme objet d'amour, n'y a-t-il pas une *liaison* de la libido, caractéristique des pulsions de vie? De plus, pourquoi l'art serait-il un 'narcissisme primaire' (178), alors qu'il est évidemment dérivé; et peut-on affirmer que l'œuvre d'art 'permet un accomplissement *hallucinatoire* du désir'? Enfin, les deux théories des pulsions s'entrecroisent constamment, sans que soit éclaircie la relation qui prévaut entre les deux.

JULIEN NAUD
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières

COLIN McGINN. *The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. 164. Cdn\$39.95; US\$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-824696-X); Cdn\$16.95; US\$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-824695-1).

This is a small book with big ambitions and an old story to tell, but McGinn's retelling of it contains much that is new. The first and second chapters express allegiance to a Lockean dispositional analysis of secondary qualities (DASQ) according to which when ' x is Q iff x standardly looks Q' is true, Q is a secondary quality; when false, Q is a primary quality. The familiar complaint of circularity is dismissed with a novel move: DASQ is not definitional, but a constitutive analysis, much like the analysis of water as H_2O . Secondary qualities are subjective in the sense that 'experience enters into their analysis' (8) and because to grasp what it is for something to have such qualities it is necessary to enjoy the relevant kinds of experiences. Indexical properties (here, there, now, then) are treated in tandem: to grasp what it is for something to have an indexical property it is necessary to 'entertain egocentric modes of presentation' (20). Secondary and indexical properties are argued to share other features: they are relative, in the sense that an object has as many such properties as it systematically appears to have; we are infallible *re* the instantiations of such properties; they are not reducible to 'internal structures' and do not add to the causal powers of things.

The novel treatment of DASQ as a constitutive analysis leads, through four central chapters, to a Kantian thesis. The mind-dependent secondary and indexical properties exhibit a pseudo-logic, the result of a subjective grid imposed on the world by the mind's own a priori necessary principles. The Kantian thesis does not cover primary qualities, which are known when the mind 'mirrors' the things-in-themselves; the objective realm is not noumenal. Our law-like subjective contribution to the world shows up in a variety of exclusions: nothing can be both red and green all over, both here and there, or happen both now and then. These necessities are subjective because their explanation lies in the make-up of perceivers. Nothing can be both of two incompatible ways because nothing can *seem* both ways to a single subject. The make-up of the world accounts for primary property incompatibilities, but secondary and indexical incompatibilities are not explicable in terms of the former. That we represent the world as having secondary and indexical properties which obey laws of subjectivity is constitutive of our having a 'point of view' on the world, but primary qualities are constitutive of the world. No conceivable point of view can fail to represent the world as having both subjective and objective features. These central chapters include the book's best pages — highly recommended discussions of Frege's work on indexicals and Berkeley's thesis of the inseparability of primary and secondary qualities.

The completion of the quasi-Kantian thesis in the sixth chapter leaves two more chapters in which to sketch consequences for other issues. Manifest and scientific views of the world are argued to be compatible; both are indispensi-

ble. Subjectivism about secondary qualities is reconciled with naive realism about perception, thus sharpening the contrast with Kant. Secondary and indexical properties are uncapturable by physicalist theories and left 'stubbornly in the mind' (141). Lastly, it is argued that moral qualities are not a part of our subjective contribution because the consequences of moral infallibilism and moral relativity cannot be seriously entertained.

The disparity between the small size of the book and the largeness of its ambitions invite the suspicion that weighty conclusions will sometimes need to hang by thin threads of argument. An eye should be kept out for the following. The central Kantian thesis hangs on the explanation of secondary and indexical property exclusions in terms of prior incompatibilities in how things can seem. The thesis is threatened by Berkeley's pail of water, which seems both hot and cold, and by tricks with mirrors, whereby things seem both here and there. Answering such counterexamples leads McGinn to retreat from the original idea that nothing can seem both ways at once to the weaker claim that no phenomenal surface or point in a visual field can appear both ways (26). As an argument to establish the 'inescapably phenomenological character' of the incompatibilities this appears to import the phenomenology to preserve the otherwise endangered laws of subjectivity. The whole Kantian flavour of the project hangs on a re-enactment of an old sense-datum argument.

The book suffers from neglect of a (possible) epistemic/nonepistemic distinction in senses of the crucial term 'looks.' This is conspicuous in McGinn's early decision to treat all 'looks ...' contexts as referentially oblique (6). The argument for this comes too late (135), after all the work is done, and is too thin. Two examples are offered to give oblique treatment appeal, but both are highly epistemic contexts ('looks like ...' and 'looks as if ...'). The 'looks' in the analysans of DASQ is nonepistemic (if any is) and there are no similar reasons to treat it as oblique. Nonetheless, arguments scattered throughout the book move to their conclusions only on the assumption that oblique treatment is mandatory.

McGinn greatly strips down the issues at the outset by discounting the role of 'standardly' in the formulation of DASQ, deciding 'to stick with the simple equation of having the quality and seeming to have it' (11) and suggesting that 'the community-based criterion of correctness is itself a superficial feature of secondary quality ascription' (12). But familiar variations of DASQ, which retain the Lockean dispositional spirit, do not clearly have the consequences which McGinn coaxes out of his formulation precisely because of the emphasis they place on the 'standardly.' Under familiar comparative formulations (e.g., ' x is Q iff x standardly looks the same as P,' where P is some member of a class of familiar salient objects) the sense in which secondary qualities are 'mind-dependent' is mitigated; the relativism is reduced to a weaker thesis of possible incommensurability of colour taxonomies across communities; and infallibilism is lost to the possibility of having one's ascriptions corrected via comparative procedures. One suspects that the subjec-

tivism, relativism, and infallibilism are not consequences of a dispositional analysis, but of McGinn's simplification.

Despite the many new tricks McGinn has to teach Locke's old dog, the suspicion lingers over the performance that the tricks are all McGinn's, and the dog was dead all along.

ROCKNEY JACOBSEN
Wilfrid Laurier University

ARNE NAESS. *A Sceptical Dialogue on Induction*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1984. Pp. vii + 70. US\$14.50. ISBN 90-232-2047-1.

This book takes the form of a dialogue with nine characters. The topic chosen for discussion is 'the status of *the problem of justifying a general principle* of induction' (9). Two types of scepticism are described in the text: Academic scepticism consists of asserting the falsity of a long list of propositions ordinarily held to be true (33), and Pyrrhonian scepticism consists of finding philosophical arguments indecisive, but admitting the possibility of decisive arguments (vii, 33, 62). The main character is Pyr, a Pyrrhonian sceptic. The other eight characters, who are named simply with the letters from A to H, take it upon themselves to present Pyr with decisive arguments for their respective views on the chosen topic.

Why is this book written in the form of a dialogue? The reasons are certainly not aesthetic: character development is minimal. This question is not explicitly addressed, but there are hints at the answer. We are told that the character F is a 'theoretician of argumentation' who uses the conceptual framework of Arne Naess' *Interpretation and Preciseness* (vii). The dialogue form is evidently an essential part of Naess' philosophical methodology. The speakers in this dialogue are not so much characters as they are technical devices. For example, Pyr acts as a moderator for the debate, and E, who says more than any speaker except Pyr, is a general purpose critic, whose method is usually *reductio ad absurdum*.

Next to Pyr and E, the speakers with the biggest roles are D and F. D is an ordinary-language philosopher, and F is usually opposed to the claims D makes. Through this device, we are exposed to the views on induction of Max Black, Nelson Goodman, P.F. Strawson, Paul Edwards, F.L. Will, and G.H. von Wright. Naess seems to be at home with the ordinary-language phil-

osophers; but other philosophers, unfortunately, are somewhat misrepresented. For example, D picks a single sentence from Goodman's *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast*: 'If the problem is to *find* some way of distinguishing antecedently between true and false predictions, we are asking for prevision rather than for philosophical explanation' (15). E then criticizes this sentence by asking what is wrong with asking for prevision. No mention is made of Goodman's grue-bleen paradox, or his notion of entrenchment. However, D does admit that 'This does not do justice to the full treatment Nelson Goodman gives to the problem of induction' (15).

It is not clear whether D's misrepresentation of philosophers outside of ordinary-language philosophy is deliberate. If Naess does this deliberately, his reasons are obscure. Perhaps he wishes to show that ordinary-language philosophers are an insular group.

Other positions are discussed by the remaining characters. B and C present Karl Popper's views (50-4) with some clarity, but then D goes on to give a Procrustean analysis of falsificationism (55). Several philosophers are mentioned in passing, but we learn little about their views.

In the end, Pyr remains a sceptic. None of the arguments presented are deemed decisive. The one conclusion seems to be that the topic's historical development is discontinuous. That is, what one generation of philosophers call 'the problem of induction' tends to be quite different from what the previous generation thought the problem was (61). This is a weak conclusion, but Naess warns us that his book 'does not try to *solve* anything, even tentatively' (v).

The foreword suggests that *A Sceptical Dialogue* 'may serve as a kind of introductory text on controversial issues' (v). There are available, I believe, better introductions to inductive inference. One problem with this book is that no work after about 1960 is mentioned. For example, some reference to Larry Laudan, Clark Glymour, or W.H. Newton-Smith would be welcome. Another problem is the unusual form of the book. Naess' methodology seems to entail some distortion of the philosophical views being treated. Too many views are presented too compactly.

This book is perhaps most interesting as a contribution to the theory of argumentation. The brief exposition by F (40-1) seems to imply that Pyrrhonian scepticism is a natural consequence of Naess' theory of argumentation. One possible improvement to the book would be the addition of an introductory chapter, describing this theory in more detail.

PETER TURNER
University of Toronto

KAI NIELSEN. *Equality and Liberty: A Defense of Radical Egalitarianism*. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld 1985. Pp. ix + 320. US\$32.50. ISBN 0-8476-6758-8.

In *Equality and Liberty* Kai Nielsen aims to clarify and defend a strong or radically egalitarian account of social justice. The book is divided into five parts. The first introduces his basic egalitarian perspective and also explains the method he uses to defend moral views, a version of Rawls' 'reflective equilibrium.' In the second part Nielsen formulates his egalitarianism, presents his basic arguments for equality, and considers some central objections. The third part deals with desert and merit. He examines Rawls' attack on desert which he largely accepts, but he also argues there must be some limited room for considerations of desert and merit in an egalitarian framework. He also examines meritocratic conceptions of justice and the concept of equal opportunity. The fourth part deals with Nozick's theory that justice requires respecting people's rights or entitlements. Though he rejects Nozick's libertarianism, he concludes that there must be some limited room for entitlement in an egalitarian theory. The last part argues that equality is not only not incompatible with liberty but that liberty requires equality.

An adequate defense of egalitarianism must fulfill three interrelated tasks: the theory must be formulated and clarified; a positive argument must be given for the desirability of equality; and the arguments against equality need to be rebutted — e.g., arguments to the effect that equality overlooks legitimate claims of desert or entitlement, conflicts with liberty, is too inefficient or impossible. How does Nielsen handle each of these three tasks? Nielsen formulates his egalitarianism by two principles which are meant to be analogous to Rawls' principles of justice:

1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties and opportunities (including equal opportunities for meaningful work, for self-determination and political and economic participation) compatible with a similar treatment for all. (This principle gives expression to a commitment to attain and/or sustain equal moral autonomy and equal self-respect).
2. After provisions are made for common social (community) values, for capital overhead to preserve the society's productive capacity, allowances made for differing unmanipulated needs and preferences, and due weight is given to the just entitlements of individuals, the income and wealth (the common stock of means) is to be so divided that each person will have a right to an equal share. The necessary burdens requisite to enhance human well-being are also to be equally shared, subject, of course to limitations by differing abilities and differing situations. (Here I refer to different natural environments and the like and not to class position and the like.) (48-9)

These principles cry out for interpretation. Nielsen says that the first principle is just like Rawls' equal liberty principle, only 'more explicit about what is involved' in a commitment to equal liberty. This is not so. The principle is

really a principle of equal autonomy, equal control over one's life. For Rawls, liberty, understood as a formal structure of rights and duties which carves out an area of non-interference, is meant to produce autonomy and self-respect. For Nielsen autonomy and self-respect appear to be prior, Rawls' formalistic liberty being an essential but not sufficient means to these. His first principle might therefore be more simply put as follows:

- 1'. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive possible control over his/her life compatible with a similar control for all.

The second principle also contains many comments and qualifications. It aims for a degree of economic equality, but this commitment is qualified by several motives. First, there is the obvious point that societal well-being requires provision for public goods and the maintenance of productive capacity. This rules out an equal sharing of the total economic product. More importantly, Nielsen correctly rules out the conception of equality as sameness and uniformity, a straw man no sensible egalitarian has ever created. His own conception properly requires attention to people's differing needs and abilities, and promotes a conception of equality of life-prospects compatible with diversity of modes of life. Thirdly, Nielsen wants to avoid a monolithic egalitarianism which sees equality as the only distributive value. Instead he thinks that considerations of desert and entitlement must play some role in distributive justice. So the second principle aims for a qualified economic equality.

But how far should equality be qualified? Nielsen relevantly remarks that a 'central intent' of the second principle is 'to reduce inequalities in goods that are the source of or ground for distinctions that will give one person power or control over another.' Also it is meant to ensure that there are 'no considerable differences in life prospects between different groups of people because some have far greater income, power, authority or privilege than others' (53). Given this, the following seems a clearer formulation of his principle:

- 2'. There should be an equal sharing of economic benefits and burdens, except for inequalities justified on grounds of (a) desert, (b) entitlement, or (c) differential needs and abilities, provided that the inequalities so justified do not lead to (i.) inequalities of power and control, or (ii.) considerable inequalities of life-prospects.

This is a sensible egalitarianism which attempts to incorporate other moral values within an egalitarian framework. Will the inequalities allowed, however, get 'out of hand' and upset the egalitarian apple-cart? In his long and interesting discussion of desert (Ch. VI) Nielsen largely accepts the Rawlsian view that because of the heavy role played in desert by natural abilities and social advantages (which is not overcome by most versions of equal opportunity), appeals to desert have an arbitrariness which diminishes their moral weight. Nevertheless, he defends a subordinate place for desert con-

siderations on the ground that we can claim credit in certain circumstances for our achievements and efforts and thus deserve certain rewards; without a place for desert, he says, 'the highest level of equal well-being could hardly be achieved' (128). Further he defends a role for entitlements — i.e., claims to personal property — on the grounds that justice and fairness require such claims be met and that people want such entitlements to be met (288). But if desert and entitlement are so important, why aren't they more important than equality? Why don't they win when there is a conflict between them and equality? Nielsen does not devote enough attention to these questions.

Another problem of clarification results because Nielsen does not deal seriously with the much discussed question of whether equality should be understood as equality of satisfactions or of objective goods. The former unfairly favors those with intense and luxurious preferences while the latter overlooks legitimate needs. Nielsen is right in thinking that an adequate conception must incorporate both of these (298ff), but he gives no account of how to make the reconciliation.

I now turn to Nielsen's defense of the theory. What is so good about equality? Why is equal autonomy or equality of life prospects at least *prima facie* desirable? Egalitarians typically appeal to basic similarities between human beings as the ground for equal treatment. Nielsen appeals instead to 'a pre-analytic (pre-theoretical) conception of what fairness between persons comes to' (7). His basic intuition is that inequality of life-prospects between 'equally talented, equally energetic children from different backgrounds' is intrinsically unfair. He thinks that such inequality might be justified on grounds that attempting to remove it would make things worse because 'it would entail an onslaught on the family, the undermining of liberty, the violation of individual rights and the like.' The view that the inequality is acceptable even if it could be corrected at no great cost Nielsen finds incomprehensible, like 'a situation in which someone says that he sees nothing wrong with racial bigotry, religious intolerance or torturing people to get them to confess to petty crimes.' For Nielsen this intuition is 'so close to bedrock that it is difficult to know what to say' to someone who does not share it (7-8). Given this intuition Nielsen's main strategy for defending egalitarianism is to answer the criticisms made of it, thus showing that there are no 'costs' which would remove the *prima facie* requirement of equality.

Nielsen's fundamental intuition, however, that equally talented children should have equal life-prospects is not an egalitarian but a meritocratic one. Nielsen redescribes the intuition as the view that 'it is intrinsically desirable that *at least between equally deserving people* there obtain, if that is reasonably possible, an equality of life conditions' (8, italics added). This, too, is a meritocratic criterion. An egalitarian argument, however, might be built on this intuition. In Chapter 8 Nielsen attacks meritocracy on the ground that a fair distribution on grounds of merit requires an equal opportunity for people to develop the appropriate talents. This, however, requires an equality of economic conditions. So economic equality is necessary for a fair meritocracy. On the other hand, Nielsen, as we have seen, diminishes the im-

portance of desert because of the reduced responsibility for the desert bases we develop. This argument effectively undercuts his basic intuition. I therefore doubt this intuition can play the role in the structure of Nielsen's argument that he suggests it plays.

Nielsen's more characteristic view is that 'greater equality is desirable because it brings with it greater moral autonomy and greater self-respect for all people' (63). This invokes an intuition that people, regardless of their talents, should be treated equally. This intuition, however, is not so easy to defend as self-evident or bed rock. Further, the defense of this intuition must invoke the important ways in which human beings are alike, an appeal Nielsen wants to avoid. I doubt that an egalitarian can avoid that mode of argument.

I now turn to Nielsen's response to the criticisms of egalitarianism. Much of the book is devoted to this task; I can comment only on a few elements of his argument. I find his responses to desert, meritocratic and entitlement (libertarian) accounts of justice interesting and persuasive. His responses to the following are less effective:

1. One of the strongest anti-egalitarian arguments is that inequality is needed to provide incentives to draw out the talents of people whose efforts then benefit everyone. Nielsen's response to this point is too brief. He considers the view that inequality is needed to induce people to take up important professions like medicine or law. He responds that with changed norms and attitudes people can be moved towards such careers by their intrinsic rewards. Nielsen, does not consider, however, the claim that economic productivity requires both the taking of risks with capital and high rewards for successful risk taking. Nielsen might say that under the socialism he recommends there would be no room for such entrepreneurs. But that is precisely what critics will make socialism stagnant.

2. It is a standard (and ancient) anti-egalitarian argument that egalitarianism must lead to tyranny. An egalitarian, it is said, will want to impose equality, even against the wishes of the populace. Egalitarianism inevitably means coercion by an elite. Nielsen responds that equality is an ideal for an egalitarian and that he wants people to institute it only through discussion and democratic decision-making. There is no question of imposing it (64-5). This response is insufficient. If equality of autonomy or life-prospects is the only distributive value the egalitarian accepts, why not impose it if coercion is the only or quickest way to get it? Surely the answer must be that such an imposition will itself violate important egalitarian values. An egalitarian can make such an answer, but it must be spelled out. Spelling it out is an important part of developing a humane and liberty-respecting egalitarian theory. Nielsen has not said enough here.

3. Anti-egalitarians say that more equality means less liberty. Nielsen responds that more equality means more liberty. Greater equality means giving people more control over their lives and a greater capacity to fulfill their plans. So equality increases liberty. This argument, however, involves a substantive rather than a formalistic account of liberty — liberty as effective

choice, rather than liberty as non-interference. Most of those who think that equality destroys liberty have in mind a 'negative' notion of liberty. Such an account of liberty is inadequate. But Nielsen's argument for his view would be stronger if he gave an explicit critique of the non-interference or negative conception of liberty.

4. Nielsen holds that a capitalist economy inevitably leads to inequalities of power between people which produces unequal life-prospects and unequal autonomy. He thus thinks that greater equality and liberty requires socialism. But he does not make his critique of capitalism explicit. Nor does he discuss in sufficient depth the criticisms of socialism that it tends to be economically inefficient and requires a bureaucracy which will interfere too much. Echoing Engels' remark that in socialism 'the administration of persons is replaced by the administration of things' Nielsen says that government under socialism would perform 'essentially administrative functions' (66), a remark which seems rather ingenuous, given recent history. Nielsen also holds that a classless, statusless society is possible in advanced industrial economies organized along socialistic lines (one of his main arguments against Rawls is that Rawls assumes the inevitability of class). But again not much more is said than that this is possible. It is true that the discussion of such questions requires empirical inquiries, difficult for a philosopher. But Nielsen does not think moral or political philosophy can be 'pure'; he says it must involve sociology and social theory, and he criticizes Nozick partly on the ground of an inadequate political sociology. Nielsen does not do enough to persuade us that we can have all the things he values jointly instantiated in the real world.

In sum, this is an interesting book, full of stimulating discussions of the important questions of social justice. As one with strong egalitarian instincts, I welcome it and think it is a real contribution to the development of that perspective. I fear, however, that its failure to probe deeply enough some of the obstacles to the egalitarian argument means that it won't really persuade those who are not already egalitarians. Nonetheless it will give them pause, and make them think.

BRUCE M. LANDESMAN
University of Utah

RICHARD PATTERSON. *Image and Reality in Plato's Metaphysics*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 1985. Pp. 236. US\$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-915145-72-3); US\$12.75 (paper: ISBN 0-915145-73-1).

This is one of that recent spate of books which have contributed so much to our understanding of Plato's metaphysics. Like Teloh's *Development of Plato's Metaphysics*, White's *Plato on Knowledge and Reality* and Moline's *Plato's Theory of Understanding*, Patterson's book is a full length study of Plato's metaphysics; and to a lesser extent his epistemology. Unlike the former, Patterson concentrates on the middle dialogues, where he uses the key of image and reality to unlock the mysteries of the theory of Forms. We receive a very thorough review of the various meanings of 'image' in Plato's time and in his dialogues. Patterson sees a consistency in Platonic usage, although the notion of image which emerges is rather subtle. For instance, it rules out of court the usual types of paradigmatism in which Form and copy are said to have the same property but in different degrees — the Form of F being the perfect F and F things imperfect F's. Perhaps it is for this reason that virtually all other commentators — according to Patterson — have either not seen or not thoroughly exploited the proper notion of image.

According to Patterson, Plato's notion of image depends on the image's not being a real instance of that of which it is an image. An image of an F is not another real F; an image of a horse is not another real horse. Consequently, an image of an F does not resemble an F with respect to being F (30). This latter claim is taken to imply (or be the same as) the claim that the image does not share the property of being F with the real F (31). The consequence for the theory of Forms is that F things are not imperfect F's; they are not real F's at all — anymore than the picture of Simmias is an imperfect Simmias.

Of course, images in general share some properties with their models. While the picture of Simmias does not resemble Simmias with respect to being Simmias, it does resemble Simmias with respect to being white. But even this kind of resemblance is not included in Patterson's notion of image (60). The image of the F itself not only does not share the property of being F with F things; it need not share any of its other properties with F things. The dream image of a horse is not only not another real horse; it is not another brown thing (61). The F itself is, in fact, an abstract nature or essence (62).

At this point, one may wonder what relation can hold between image and model to justify calling one image and the other reality. Patterson says, 'The positive link that removes image and model F from the realm of bare homonyms is the image's *being an image* of its model. This relationship is not defined by Plato (or anyone else, as far as I know), and it may involve different factors in different sorts of image. For example, causal factors are paramount with shadows and reflections; artists' intentions will presumably figure in the cases of painting and sculpture.' (42) This part of Patterson's explication of image is presumably expandable without using such notions as have already been excluded from consideration. For instance, presumably we can explicate the relation between a model and a shadow without using the notion of resemblance with respect to shape. Otherwise, these instances do not illustrate this antiseptic notion of image.

In any event, Patterson still wishes to preserve self predication. Both the F itself and F things can be called F, because they are both types of F. The bed

itself is a type of bed, even though it does not share any properties with the beds you and I sleep in. Just so, the mirror image of the bed one sleeps in is a type of bed, even though one cannot sleep in it (70). As soon as we obtain this differentiation into types, the question arises as to whether 'F' is not being used equivocally. Patterson assures us that it is not, that 'F' is like a *pros hen* equivocal (42 and 70). The primary instance of F is the F itself; 'F' applies properly to the Form-model for the F things in our world because it has those properties which Forms enjoy — it is thus the real F (71). So the abstract nature of the bed — the bed itself — is the primary referent of 'bed.'

Having elaborated this complex notion of image, Patterson uses it to lay out a fully articulated structure for all of Plato's metaphysics. The Forms become interlocking parts of an intelligible framework that stands apart from the perceptual world. Its apartness is vitally related to the role of the Good in this framework; because of the Good, this framework stands over the perceptual world not just as a source of intelligibility but as a standard of value (135). These chapters are extremely valuable because they give a consistent and clear statement of this type of interpretation of Plato's metaphysics.

Patterson, of course, defends this somewhat bloodless notion of reality and image as a faithful representation of Plato's text. There is no room here to go into textual criticism of this interpretation. However, one can offer one logical criticism which could be the departure for textual criticism. According to Patterson, 'F' can avoid fatal equivocality if it is something like a *pros hen* equivocal term. On the one hand, if we assume — what Patterson seems committed to — that the F itself is the *hen pros* or toward which 'F' is predicated, it would seem natural to assume as well that it must have the property of being F. But the F itself and F things do not share the property of being F. Then the property of being F becomes something like the property of being the abstract nature of F; thus F things do not have the property of being F. Nor does having the property of being, e.g., a bed entail having four legs. We can avoid this exceedingly odd outcome if we say that, while the F itself is the *ben pros* or toward which 'F' is predicated — the primary referent of 'F' — only F things have the property of being F; thus the primary referent of 'F' does not have the property of being F. Given these alternatives, forth-right paradigmatism might not seem so bad after all.

RICHARD D. PARRY
Agnes Scott College

DAVID PEARS. *Motivated Irrationality*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. viii + 257. Cdn.\$37.50: US\$18.95. ISBN 0-19-824662-5.

'God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of everyone's eyes,' Wittgenstein wrote. While irrationality in its various forms lies in front of our eyes, hitherto philosophical accounts of it have been fragmented and curiously shortsighted. Perhaps this is due to the fact that western philosophy has always puffed the pretensions of reason and a pervasive discussion of unreason may soil our image as 'rational animals.'

In this book David Pears sets out to give an account of motivated irrationality — of the sort where the functions of reason are usurped by wishes. Two kinds of this irrationality are examined: irrational belief and irrational action. The treatment of these seems to focus on self-deception and action against one's own better judgment (*akrasia*).

First, there are remarks about method. Should one follow the philosophers' or the psychologists' tracks to understand irrationality? Since both camps are likely to be influenced by some theory, Pears decides to follow neither. To begin with, he wants to look at the relevant phenomena *neutrally* and not through the restricting lense of a theory. So it is only after giving a characterization and classification of irrationality that the ideas of philosophers and psychologists are considered.

Irrationality is depicted as a failure to make proper use of information already in the subject's mind. It must be marked off from error caused by misperception or incompetence. For in such cases the requisite information is not in the mind and hence it cannot be misused. For example, I am not being irrational if I misread a word because of short-sightedness. Pears goes on to reject the common assumption that irrationality is caused either by a wish or by incompetence. While the cause is often a wish, as in 'hot' or motivated cases, there are also 'cold' or unmotivated cases recently unearthed by psychologists. Such cases are caused by the bad habits of reason itself, the 'perversions of reason.' There are 'a range of faults to which people are liable without the incitement of any wish, in areas in which they are quite capable of proceeding correctly and even understand the principles of correct procedure.' For instance, we tend to give more weight to salient evidence than it deserves.

And now to self-deception and to the ideas of the philosophers. Philosophers who interpret 'self-deception' literally imply that the self-deceiver believes that something is not so and yet persuades himself that it is so, just like the deceiver of another except that the self-deceiver is the victim as well as the agent. This is a short step from saying that the self-deceiver must simultaneously believe the conjunction of two contradictory propositions. Hence Pears thinks that 'self-deception, when taken literally, is an impossible achievement.' Cases which are ordinarily called 'self-deception are needlessly dramatized' by philosophers obsessed with the verbal paradox of

this flamboyant name. The denotation of 'self-deception' is really just the denotation of various milder degrees of irrational belief. Literal self-deception is merely the limiting case at the top of a scale of increasingly severe irrationality. It shows us the limit of what is possible in this sphere. And this is only of marginal interest.

The verbal paradox that philosophers generate obscures the issue of central interest, the paradox of irrationality: 'How can anyone form a belief which goes against the evidence already in his possession?' This leads to a discussion of the goals and strategies of irrational 'belief-formation.' Here the facts are common knowledge supplemented by the findings of cognitive psychologists. Truth is an important goal for us when we form beliefs. In cases where it is defeated, and incompetence is ruled out as a cause, the explanation maybe the subject's wish for some desirable ulterior goal: the safety, the comfort, the pleasantness of certain beliefs. Pears mentions three strategies to achieve these goals: controlling the input of information into the mind, biasing the processing of information already in the mind, and acting as if the desired belief were true. However, the explanation need not be the subject's desire for an ulterior goal. The cause may be one of the 'perversions of reason.'

In the chapter 'Paradoxes and Systems' Pears discusses the scope and success of two theories: the Freudian and the Functional. These theories divide a single person into main system and sub-system to explain the formation of an irrational belief that he is competent to detect and avoid. Here Pears develops his own solution to the question how a person can adopt a belief in the teeth of contrary evidence. Briefly, Pears' answer is that the wish to believe recedes from the main mental system and sets up a sub-system. The latter contains the recognition that the belief is not supported by the evidence. Hence it includes the cautionary belief that it is irrational to form the favoured belief. The sub-system behaves in a quasi-altruistic manner towards the main system. It recognizes that the main system wants to have the cherished belief but fails to prevent its formation.

And now to irrational action. Here the subject is 'conscious last-ditch *akrasia*': whether it is possible to act consciously and non-compulsively against one's own better judgment while remaining fully aware of the relevant features of the situation and fully committed to one's value judgment. Pears claims that this phenomenon is not only possible but quite common. He distinguishes between a weak and a strong sense of valuation. Weak valuation is expressed in 'any kind of preference' prompted by desire. Strong valuation is based 'on one's long-term interests or perhaps on other people's interests.' Strong valuation is the voice of reason and Pears' position is that in many cases of *akrasia*, the desire that rebels against reason's edict does not even pretend to speak with the voice of reason.

The argument is wide-ranging. In a chapter on practical reasoning the idea that intentional action is the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is discussed. On this view, conscious last-ditch *akrasia* would be a kind of self-contradiction: through his action the agent denies what he asserts in his

premises. We need not take this idea seriously however. For, as Pears argues, actions cannot be true or false.

Then there is a chapter on the alleged necessity of the 'Backward Connection': that any intentional non-compulsive action is necessarily based on a supportive value-judgment. Thus when a person appears to act consciously against his own better judgment, what really happens is that the action is supported by another value-judgment which is biased. This is the position of Donald Davidson. Pears thinks that this view is true only if 'value-judgment' is taken in the weak sense but false otherwise. He points out that it is strong valuation that has been at the core of traditional concerns about *akrasia*. So the backward connection is not really necessary.

Finally, there is a discussion of the 'Forward Connection': that a value-judgment necessarily produces a conforming action. Here the target of criticism is R.M. Hare who says that if the agent really meant his (strong) value-judgment and there was no deficiency in awareness, then he must have been unable to do otherwise. So, what appears to be conscious last-ditch *akrasia* is really a species of compulsive action. For, according to Hare, the force of strong valuation is such as 'to overcome all internal obstacles except sheer psychological impossibility.' Pears dismisses this by saying that once we realize that the psychological impossibility Hare needs is not universal, his appeal to it is 'self-evidently implausible.' Hence an agent can, consciously and non-compulsively, act against his own better judgment. 'Mere desires have independent access to non-compulsive intentional action and they do not have to pass through the check-point of strong valuation.'

So far I gave an outline of the author's arguments. Now I offer a few reflections on them.

1. Pears' method, to start with examples of irrationality untainted by theory, is attractive. But later on I was startled to read that 'when philosophers set up their own examples it is only too easy for them to project their own assumptions into characters they create.' They also tend to project their own 'cool awareness and rationality' into ordinary thought and behaviour. This prejudice is said to be a feature of bystanders who forget what it is to be a participant. After reading these passages, I asked myself: How do these insightful observations square with the proposed method? Are they reminders that we should be more Socratic when doing philosophy or are they doubts about the possibility of thought-experiments untainted by (at least some) prejudice.

2. The definition of 'irrationality' as 'a failure to make proper use of information already in the mind' seems too narrow. Sometimes we believe or act irrationally, yet we do not have in our grasp the evidence which militates against our belief or action. To be sure, the evidence is there to be had but we refuse to gather it, as in cases of wilful ignorance or impulsive action. Hence internal inconsistency does not exhaust the sphere of irrationality.

3. If self-deception is really an impossible achievement then its listed 'strategies' constitute what passes for self-deception. But acting as if a belief is

true, ignoring the evidence, being biased, seem recognizably different from self-deception. At one point Pears says that self-deception is really 'a kind of *akrasia* which avoids maximizing evidence and goes for unfair samples.' But this is true only if the latter is a case of self-deceptive *akrasia*. And this reinstates the problem instead of solving it.

4. The 'Perversions of Reason' are: the tendency to attach undue weight to salient evidence; the tendency to assume that a person's actions issue from his dispositions in a rational way; the tendency to select the most obvious disposition to explain a person's actions. I am reluctant to regard these as irrational sans phrase. Practical inferences based on salient evidence are quick and often successful. For instance, if I see a masked man pointing a gun at a bank teller, I automatically infer that the bank is being robbed. Am I irrational in making such an inference?

5. In Pears' solution of the paradox of irrationality the sub-system recognizes that the adoption of the desired belief is irrational. However, this recognition is idle. It fails to prevent the formation of the favoured belief in the main system; apparently, out of love. Doesn't this *akrasia* of the sub-system undermine its own internal rationality?

6. A propos irrational action: I wish there were more discussion of self-deceptive *akrasia* which provides the bridge between irrational belief and irrational action. The focus on conscious *akrasia* makes human irrationality seem intractable, a brute fact. When one imprudently reaches for a third drink, it may be true that one's 'desire has independent access to action.' But it is natural to ask how such access is gained. It is on rare occasions that we meet someone who says 'the worst thing I could do now is to have a third drink' and then proceeds to have it. Such behaviour is perhaps possible but essentially strange. It is likely to provoke the response: 'Is he joking or is he crazy? So Socrates and his followers need not be at a loss for words here.'

In spite of my occasional qualms, I found this book to be a wonderful contribution to philosophical psychology. The subject is of deep human interest and importance; the treatment is insightful and informed — Pears attends to the relevant works of psychologists as well as to those of philosophers; the prose is elegant and free of jargon. There is even the occasional inspired oracular utterance: 'When truth is at issue, the thing that sets the standard of fit can not be divided against itself. Truth is one.' Parmenides is alive and well and living in Oxford.

BÉLA SZABADOS
University of Regina

DONALD W. PFAFF, ed. *Ethical Questions in Brain and Behavior: Problems and Opportunities*. New York: Springer-Verlag 1983. Pp. 158. US\$22.00. ISBN 0-387-90870-6.

The goal of this collection, according to Pfaff, is to contribute to the fulfillment of two needs. One is the need to frequently introspect on and 'trade up' our morality in order to make it live. The other is the need to rethink our morality in light of recent scientific advances. These advances have extended life to the point where the brain can become diseased and dysfunctional and, in the area of neurobiology, have made possible the manipulation of the functions of mind and brain.

While I am little unclear about the substance of the first need, I have little doubt about the importance of the second need and of the urgency of carrying out the task. Unfortunately, the collection offers only disjointed insights into neurobiological research and mostly superficial hints at its relevance to ethics. And though some of the papers are interesting and thought provoking, anyone looking for a challenging or novel analysis of the ethical and social impact of neurobiological research and the application of its results will be extremely disappointed.

In most of the papers the level of ethical analysis is very low — often to the point of being trivial. For example, the article 'Making and Using Psychiatric Diagnoses: Ethical Issues,' by Jean Endicott provides an interesting and informative account of some of the contents and their rationale of the Third Edition of the *American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* (DSM-III). The ethical discussions in this paper, however, at best, will raise the ethical consciousness of those who have not reflected even in a cursory way on ethical aspects of psychiatry. Anyone even minimally aware of the ethical controversies of the last decade concerning psychiatry will find little new in Endicott's list of ethical concerns. And, anyone looking for an analysis of the issues will find no help at all in this paper. As an aside, the alarming message of the paper is that most professionals involved in making and using psychiatric diagnoses are ethically blind.

Also, the paper by David E. Levy, despite its title ('Ethical Considerations in the Care of Unconscious Patients'), provides no analysis of the ethical issues but instead offers an otherwise useful discussion of 'clinical investigation designed to learn whether an individual unconscious patient has some, albeit small, chance of recovering consciousness and whether the patient would consider the quality of that recovery worthwhile' (59). Although the phrase 'quality of that recovery' cries out for ethical analysis, Levy offers none. The relevance of this paper for ethical analysis lies in the factual information it contains and not in its advancement of ethics.

The papers of Endicott and Levy are not isolated examples. The same lack of analysis of ethical issues is a characteristic of most of the papers. The exceptions being two papers by Ruth Macklin ('Problems of Informed Consent

with the Cognitively Impaired', and Treatment Refusals: Autonomy, Paternalism, and the "Best Interest" of the Patient') both of which are useful and important analyses of ethical problems. Also a paper by H. Richard Beresford ('Legal Aspects of Ethics in the Neural and Behavioral Sciences') while primarily exploring legal issues, touches on several ethical issues (e.g., patient autonomy).

Hence, Macklin's papers aside, this collection is not the place to look for any substantial discussion of ethical issues arising from neurobiology. Despite this poverty of ethical analysis, however, many of individual papers do contain useful material about neurobiology or about the controversy over the biological basis of ethics. The latter issue is the subject of the papers in Part II.

As one might expect much of the discussion concerning the implications for ethics of studies in biology and neurobiology centre around sociobiology. Arthur Caplan leads off Part II with an excellent account of sociobiology and the difference, as he sees it, between the 'old' sociobiology initiated by E.O. Wilson's *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* and the 'new' sociobiology initiated by Charles Lumsden and E.O. Wilson's *Genes, Minds and Culture*. Caplan also sets out the ways in which sociobiology is relevant to ethics and warns of the limits of extrapolating from non-human animal behaviour to human behaviour.

Colin Beer ('Motives and Metaphors in Considerations of Animal Nature') provides an interesting discussion of motivation and intention in animals which includes a discussion of Dawkins' 'Selfish Gene.' While interesting, however, the conclusions drawn are tentative and not compelling. For example, his claim, 'Mentality [marked by intentionality] may be a necessary condition to qualify a creature for humane consideration, but is not a sufficient condition, as man's treatment of man makes plain' (138) is difficult to accept. What does the actual inhumane way in which people treat people have to do with who *qualifies* for humane treatment? It may be true that mentality is not a sufficient condition to qualify a creature for humane treatment (though I am sceptical) but the immoral treatment of persons by persons is no justification at all for this claim. The weakness of this paper is in its application of the thesis about intentionality of ethics — an instance of a weakness present in most of the papers.

Like the two just mentioned, all the other papers from Part II are contributions to a lively debate in evolutionary biology and in philosophy of biology. They are, however, disjointed contributions and provide, at best, isolated insights. And, characteristic of the entire collection, the discussions of ethics are superficial and sometimes appear to be the least worked out aspect of a paper. Consequently, my general assessment of this collection is that it contains some very interesting papers which offer important insights but lacks unity and, with a few exceptions, provides only superficial discussions of ethics and very little analysis of ethical issues.

PAUL THOMPSON
University of Toronto

MARCEL RIOUX. *Le besoin et le désir*. Montréal: Editions de l'Hexagone 1984. 133 p. 11.95\$ CAN. ISBN 2-89006-206-2.

Marcel Rioux a toujours voulu relancer le style pamphlétaire dans ses essais, lequel depuis les écrits de Tocqueville, semble-t-il, est en veilleuse. Aussi dans son dernier ouvrage, *Le besoin et le désir*, porte-t-il à l'endroit du néolibéralisme des critiques dont le ton incisif stimule et provoque à la fois. Citons à titre d'exemple le rapprochement outré entre von Hayek, l'un des plus importants maîtres à penser des nouveaux économistes, et un diplodocus (84, 85, 101).

Par sa mise en cause radicale de l'*économisme* (c'est-à-dire de la réduction des problèmes de la société à un seul) contenu dans l'œuvre hayéenne, Rioux suscite, en fait, une discussion pertinente à propos du projet de société susceptible de s'instaurer non seulement sur les bases de l'intellection des fins économiques mais surtout sur celles des fins sociales. En somme, Rioux dénonce la tendance réductionniste du discours libéral, version Hayek, car pour un sociologue on ne peut définir la société comme une structure sociale qui fasse abstraction des individus et de leur vouloir-vivre en commun. Or, selon Hayek, l'être humain vivant en société n'aurait aucune passion; attaché à la seule poursuite de son intérêt, l'*'homo oeconomicus'* viserait uniquement à profiter des opportunités de la société du marché déifiée.

Toutefois, selon Rioux, la société du marché n'incarne pas 'la marche de Dieu dans le monde' si j'ose parodier ainsi la formule de Hegel à propos de l'Etat. Il existe d'autres fondements à l'inclusion en société que celui de 'l'individualisme possessif'; l'auteur semble suggérer qu'il y a de la part des individus la volonté de réaliser leur autonomie certes, mais outre cela ne leur faut-il pas en tant que membres de divers groupes intermédiaires en sauvegarder aussi l'autonomie? En ce contexte, la référence à la science de l'économie politique me paraît éclairante: la cohésion de la société et des groupes qui la constituent dépend autant, si ce n'est davantage, du politique que de l'économique. Réduire, tel Hayek, le politique à l'économique implique la disparition de la science de l'économie politique au profit de la science économique (laquelle et non l'économie politique comme le prétend Rioux (7) s'oppose à la sociologie). Certes, cette *science* économique par sa définition même est rigoureuse, mais il convient de souligner qu'il n'existe aucune théorie économique qui n'ait de fondements politiques et idéologiques.

Ainsi Rioux énonce dans une formule percutante que la théorie hayéenne caractérisée par un libéralisme exacerbé court-circuite la distinction entre la vérité et la méthode et considère l'individualisme méthodologique comme la solution avérée(58). En d'autres mots, la méthode de Hayek réduit la structure sociale à une addition d'individus préoccupés uniquement de leurs fins particulières, ce qui le conduit à concevoir comme valable exclusivement le modèle de société qui en découle.

Au total, cet essai a le mérite de mettre l'accent sur l'urgence d'une réplique de la gauche à cette droite si prolifique depuis quelque temps. Dans la

décennie qui va de 1970 à 1980, la gauche en général n'a pas eu de programme précis d'adaptation au contexte économique nouveau. On le sait, depuis longtemps le développement de la gauche est axé sur une revendication de justice sociale, mais constater cela ne remédie à rien. En définitive, il faudrait proposer de nouvelles solutions économiques au malaise social révélé par la crise, soit le phénomène des *nouveaux exclus* (personnes âgées marginalisées, femmes et jeunes gens non intégrés dans le cycle de production sociale et travailleurs démis de leurs fonctions). A cet égard, la référence au rôle du théoricien (ou pour mon propos du politicien) au sein même de la théorie économique me paraît suggestive, car elle conduit à rationaliser la politique économique. Ainsi, la *Théorie générale* de Keynes a montré comment la production répond aux sollicitations de l'Etat et aussi comment un surcroît de richesse naît d'un déficit budgétaire. Cet excédent de richesse peut être utilisé ou bien à des fins de dépenses militaires (comme l'administration Reagan-Bush le fait présentement; toutefois, en ce milieu des années 80, l'administration républicaine ne fait pas explicitement référence à la théorie keynésienne) ou bien à la création d'emplois et de services sociaux (s'il s'agit d'une administration qui, tel le sociologue Rioux, a une conscience sociale accentuée).

Dans le cas de la France, qui vit une crise structurelle (concurrence féroce de l'extérieur, du Japon et de la Corée entre autres, stagnation de l'économie, manque de développement causé par l'absence d'extension du marché), il s'agirait de concevoir des politiques économiques appropriées et dont il ne faudrait pas exclure d'emblée les politiques keynésiennes — même si les expériences Chirac et Mauroy n'ont pas donné les résultats escomptés. Par ailleurs, si depuis le 10 mai 1981, le gouvernement socialiste n'a pas compromis le budget des affaires sociales, il en a stoppé le développement. De plus, il a adopté des mesures conservatrices, qui ont déçu l'électorat de gauche (à titre d'exemple, la fermeture d'usines non rentables pendant la crise). Bref, la gauche a épousé ses solutions et doit se libérer de ses tendances séculaires afin de proposer une recherche de solutions novatrices.

Cela dit, il me paraît difficile de dégager l'idée centrale du livre de Rioux. Il semblerait que Rioux ait ébauché une réplique au libéralisme hayéien basée sur l'idée d'autogestion (à ce propos, l'auteur réfère à son écrit 'L'autogestion, c'est beaucoup plus que l'autogestion', publié dans *Possibles*, Montréal, v. 4, #3, 1980). Toutefois, il ne spécifie pas ici le type d'autogestion dont il s'agirait. Ce pourrait être la voie japonaise selon laquelle il existe des *cercles de qualité* dans les entreprises qui permettent aux ouvriers de collaborer à l'amélioration de la qualité et de participer aux profits, la voie de la République fédérale d'Allemagne, la voie de la Yougoslavie ou encore ce pourrait être le modèle suédois fondé sur la concertation de petites équipes. L'autogestion est à la mode mais il lui faudrait trouver en Rioux un défenseur qui aille au-delà de l'amorce journalistique.

FRANCE GIROUX
Collège de Bois-de-Boulogne

CHRISTIAN SCHMIDT. *La sémantique économique en question: recherche sur les fondements de l'économie théorique*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy 1985. 246 p. 24.00\$CAN. ISBN 2-7021-1243-9.

Le livre de Schmidt est divisé en deux parties. La première s'intitule 'Pour une méthodologie de l'interprétation en économie théorique.' On y retrouve une discussion de trois particularités de l'économique: un grand intérêt pour l'histoire de la discipline et l'importance des réécritures des théories passées (Ricardo/Sraffa, Walras/Debreu), l'écart croissant entre le raffinement de la formalisation et le caractère rudimentaire des modèles d'interprétation y étant associés, et, finalement, l'étroite imbrication du positif et du normatif.

Dans le cas des réécritures étudiées, Schmidt met l'accent sur le fait que nous n'avons pas affaire à une simple traduction dans un langage formel: dans le cas de Sraffa on a affaire à un changement d'objet scientifique, dans le cas de Debreu, il y a changement d'objet scientifique ainsi qu'une modification substantielle suite à la dissociation de la question du problème de l'existence d'une solution à l'équilibre général, et de la question du calcul de cette solution. Ces réécritures témoignent de la métamorphose des programmes de recherche en même temps que d'une métamorphose de l'objet (l'économie), qui encourage les 'mises à jour' des modèles précédents. La fécondité de ces réécritures dépend, selon l'auteur, de l'approfondissement des propriétés des modèles ainsi que de l'extension des domaines pour lesquels on considère qu'un modèle est valable.

La deuxième caractéristique de l'économique qui est examinée est la dualité approche axiomatique/approche sémantique. Il en donne comme exemple la fonction de consommation keynésienne à la Keynes (approche sémantique) versus les versions Leijonhufvud et Clower (approche axiomatique). L'auteur montre que dans ce cas, sous l'explication habituelle en termes d'alternative micro/macro, se cache l'alternative plus profonde, orientation sémantique/orientation syntaxique. Les exemples étudiés d'approche sémantique en micro-économique proviennent quant à eux de Lancaster et de Sen.

Quant à la troisième caractéristique, l'imbrication positif/normatif, l'auteur la considère au niveau des préférences: quelle est l'interprétation devant être faite des valeurs de vérité associées au calcul préférentiel, et au sens de la relation de préférence? Sur ce dernier point il conclut en montrant la non-neutralité micro-économique du sens donné à cette relation. En particulier, l'interprétation aboutissant à la formation d'un ordre (c'est tout ce dont ont besoin les économistes) serait si restrictive qu'elle entraînerait une réduction de la portée du calcul économique. De manière quelque peu semblable, la notion d'indifférence est, elle aussi, entachée de variantes interprétables ayant des conséquences importantes: on peut réussir à sauver la vie de l'âne de Buridan, en soulignant que l'indifférence de l'âne est relative mais non absolue. Cependant, encore une fois, se servir uniquement des préférences relatives à des conséquences non négligeables. Par exemple, on observe alors un problème au niveau de la traduction de l'indifférence en

termes de comportement selon qu'on a affaire à des alternatives jugées positives (l'indifférence entraîne l'action) ou négatives (l'indifférence entraîne l'abstention).

La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage est consacrée à la sémantique ambiguë du théorème significatif (Samuelson). Il y distingue l'approche de Samuelson (qu'il considère comme la position dominante) inspirée du positivisme logique, de la position formaliste (Debreu) et de celle inspirée de Wittgenstein représentée par Piero Sraffa. Schmidt examine alors les changements substantiels provoqués par l'emploi d'outils mathématiques nouveaux comme la topologie. Cependant, il concentre surtout son attention sur l'*'opérationnalisme'* de Samuelson qu'il considère, finalement, comme tout à fait inapproprié suite à une analyse de la théorie des préférences révélées, théorie prétendument issue de la méthodologie du théorème significatif. Selon l'auteur, la théorie des préférences révélées en est plutôt un contre-exemple, et les modifications du programme de recherche de Samuelson ne constituent pas des recouplements de trois programmes de recherche mutuellement contradictoires, comme le soutient Wong, mais reflètent plutôt une incompatibilité d'ordre sémantique entre deux modèles interprétatifs inextricablement liés chez Samuelson, et dont la compatibilité exigerait une hiérarchisation des modèles d'interprétation qui irait à l'encontre, dans ce cas précis, de la méthodologie du théorème significatif.

L'ouvrage se termine avec le constat de la '*'discontinuité'* des modèles théoriques et des modèles économétriques, en utilisant l'exemple du paradoxe de Leontief, dont on tira plusieurs conclusions différentes: (1) erreur dans les conditions initiales et détermination *ex post* des '*vraies*' conditions initiales (la contre-induction de Feyerabend), (2) erreur dans le modèle théorique, (3) erreur dans le modèle économétrique, (4) erreur dans l'association du modèle théorique et économétrique. Il suggère que la direction dans laquelle on devrait s'engager est l'élaboration de modèles intermédiaires entre les modèles théoriques et les modèles économétriques. Par ailleurs, l'auteur souligne que l'imbrication positif/normatif devrait également être étudiée au niveau des anticipations rationnelles où la description du système inclut la représentation que se font les agents de ce système ce qui implique à la fois la présence de probabilités subjectives et de normes préférentielles.

La spécificité de l'économique, selon l'auteur, ne se situe ni du côté de son objet ni du côté de sa méthode mais plutôt dans le projet ambitieux, mais fragile, de synthèse entre deux types d'objets scientifiques différents, la logique de la décision sociale et le système de production et d'allocation des richesses. On se retrouve donc avec des critères de validité d'ordre différents et difficilement compatibles entre eux. Après avoir mis en évidence le fouillis d'ordre sémantique, à plusieurs niveaux, qu'on retrouve en économique, Schmidt ne se prononce toutefois pas clairement sur l'impact devant en découler en ce qui concerne la méthodologie: si les méthodologies des '*sciences dures*' achoppent dans ce domaine, doit-on (a) démarquer les objets de l'économique pouvant être assimilés à ces méthodologies en considérant des méthodologies alternatives pour les autres secteurs (par exemple ceux qui

sont proches de la théorie du bien-être ou de la théorie de la décision), ou (b), forger des outils méthodologiques propres à l'économique et qui soient 'mixtes' par rapport à leurs objets.

Bref, ce livre dont les conclusions sont plutôt communes, procède à partir d'une démarche suffisamment originale, l'examen de la sémantique des modèles, pour être intéressant quoique parfois déroutant. L'ouvrage se situe à un niveau d'analyse plus élevé que les récentes études de Blaug ou de Caldwell, qui demeurent dans la problématique des théoriciens de la 'Growth of Knowledge.' On doit cependant déplorer plusieurs erreurs typographiques, notamment dans les références.

PIERRE BLACKBURN
Collège de Sherbrooke

EDWARD SHILS. *The Academic Ethic: the report of a study group of the International Council on the Future of the University.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984. Pp. 104. US\$12.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-75330-1); US\$4.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-75332-8).

This commendable effort to define and elaborate the duties of academics in 'Western universities' (2) is launched from forthright, perhaps courageous, and certainly important premises, and raises misgivings only on some (but significant) details of application. If it has throughout the odour — the abstractness and generality — of a committee report, and if it sometimes descends to officious platitude ('Jealousy and disparagement of other institutions, regardless of whether they are of approximately the same rank of eminence or higher or lower, should be avoided' [59]), it nevertheless commands respect for the vigorous defence of its assumptions, the seriousness with which it addresses its issues, and the care it takes in its formulations.

Shils (Committee on Social Thought, U. of Chicago) speaks for a study group formed at his suggestion to consider a 1969 British Academy lecture on 'The Academic Profession' by Sir Eric Ashby, a group chaired until his death by Charles Frankel and having in its original membership Ashby, Shils, Dieter Henrich, Raymond Aron, Charles Townes, and John Passmore. The committee met over a number of years and had at one time to be reconstituted, so that it is dependent on the additional submissions of Jeanne Hersch, Torstel Husen, Thomas Nipperdey, Gerd Roellecke, and Bruce Smith. The report ap-

peared as vol. 20:1-2 of *Minerva* (1983) before being reprinted by the University of Chicago Press.

'The academic ethic' is defined as 'the sum of those obligations which are involved in the pursuit and transmission of advanced knowledge and in roles and in conduct affected by the real or presumed possession of such knowledge' (8). This is seen to involve 'acknowledgment of the differences between truth and falsity and the greater value of the former over the latter' (10). The concept of 'fundamental knowledge' (75) is invoked as a criterion of the sort of research in which universities should be involved, implying not only the recognizability of truth but also the possibility of its hierachial ordering. Such hierarchy imposes structure on the university itself, a 'community' indeed, but one in which there must be differentiations of 'discoverers, teachers and learners' (103). It also defines the social role of the university: if it 'performs well the two basic tasks of teaching and research,' then it 'is going very far towards meeting its obligations to society' (76). To fulfill those social duties, the university requires 'freedom of enquiry ... , not merely a negative freedom from the constraints of church, state, and other earthly powers,' but a 'positive freedom to investigate whatever is adjudged to be intellectually significant' (78).

Seen in this light the much-bruited issues of 'publish or perish' take another complexion: 'The obligation to know is met through investigation and "open" publication' (43). This affirms not only 'the Humboldtian ideal of the unity of teaching and research' (44) but also a positive obligation to the 'free communication of results' (61). Indeed any research in which it is known in advance that the findings must be secret should be carried on in other than university facilities.

The enemies to this 'academic ethic' are seen to be the skepticisms and relativisms that deny its epistemological claims and the pragmatisms and utilitarianisms that would subvert its ideal for the advantage of particular individuals or specialized (e.g., commercial) groups. Shils feels that 'in recent decades' the ethic 'has faltered' (6) under the impact of a whole series of new developments: the mass influx of students and staff, the wide demand for 'services,' politically motivated and government dominated foundations, bureaucracy, financial restraints, open publicity, demands for specialized 'research,' the consequent sense of 'disaggregation,' and 'shaken morale' (12-40). But in particular the 'opinion' that 'hits at the very heart of the academic ethic' is one that was prevalent in the sixties and that has by no means entirely dissipated, 'that all intellectual activity is political by its nature and that the aspiration for detachment and objectivity is vain and illusory' (22).

One can enthusiastically endorse the desirability of a distinction between theory and practice, between the inquiry and instruction of the university and the practical tactics of politics, while also recognizing that the consequent division of relevant considerations is always imperfectly effected. Shils' (and the Committee's) own attitudes and formulations — predominant alarm and distaste for the ferment of the sixties (101), disquiet over 'reformed' and

'democratized' university governments (17), the perception that the argument for faculty representation of contrasting views is 'seldom' adduced for non-Marxists (22), the blanket rejection of 'subversive activities' (95), the exception made for secret research in 'cases of *national* [my emphasis] emergency' (75), the greater concern for political as contrasted with economic factors that can intrude on university administration and instructors' time (80-2, 91-6), the suspicion of affirmative action programmes (26), the respectful treatment of the standard list of 'professions' (8, 73-4), and the approval of the segregation of the 'talented' at an early age (16) — these, while all adduced in defense of the distinctively 'academic ethic,' strike me as arising from a conservative or pro-establishment political orientation. There could well be controversy over these issues among those equally committed to the ethic.

Thus I am tempted to dispute a couple of conclusions, both seemingly designed to curtail the broadly political involvements of academics. The first concerns restrictions on the expression of personal opinions in the classroom or in more public fora. The report cautions that professors should always make clear the distinction between private predilections and verified science; that in the 'huge gray areas' where such a boundary is disputed (here philosophy must be uncontestedly an *éminence grise!*) they are obligated to report impartially the state of the question (41); that, given their general intellectual status, they should observe the same restraints on expressed opinions within and without their areas of expertise (87-8); and that they ought to be even more restrained in 'public and political spheres' than in the classroom because the hearer is 'unaided by the disciplining and critical assessment of his academic colleagues' (89). Shils may overestimate the weight of professorial authority in public debate, but it is not unattractive to be scrupulous about its possible exploitations. However it is surely unrealistic to hold that the classical translator and scholar, say, who is also the committed citizen in politics must in the latter sphere restrict himself to the same sort of state-of-the-question reports that are a duty in the classroom. More strongly, the public eunuchry implied seems not only unrealistic but unhealthy. It is precisely because, as Shils maintains, in contrasting 'politicians and civil servants' with academics, 'the obligations of two are different from each other in substance' (94) and because academics are *likewise* citizens, churchmen, reformers, etc., that there are properly distinguishable roles for the professor *qua* academic and *qua* public person.

The other issue is that of unionization. The report is forthright: 'the aspirations of academic trade unions and the obligations of university teachers in matters of academic appointments are in principle antithetical to one another' (68). The closed shop is 'another obstacle to the strict application of academic criteria,' and once in place 'questions of intellectual merit are seldom raised' in disputed appointments and dismissals. Where unions cannot be avoided, they should restrict negotiations purely to salary scales (89).

These conclusions are to be rejected, it seems to me, on grounds both of general principle and of empirical observation. It may be true in trade unions that seniority has been given heavy weight, that the distinction of managers and workmen is sharp, that confrontational situations develop around that distinction, and that these concern mainly the economic division of the product. These emphases have their own justification in the history of an industrialism principally interested in securing interchangeable assembly-line 'hands.' They apply only variably to the university situation. One thing that would continue to apply is the general principle that in a social undertaking where different collective interests develop, all of those interests should be represented in the institutional government of the undertaking. This general preferability of democratic to authoritarian structures seems to be observationally confirmed in the case of universities and quite specifically in the level of priority given academic criteria. Is it not the experience of other professors besides me (now Emeritus) that it was in the older university without an organized faculty that silly criteria like dress codes, or distasteful ones like cronyism, or ominous ones like race, religion or political persuasion were too frequently operative, while it is within the newer participatory structures, requiring peer evaluations and permitting varying degrees of appeal and protest, that teachers can and do apply their most serious and concrete thought to giving substance to 'the academic ethic'?

HAROLD J. JOHNSON
University of Western Ontario

H. TARRANT. *Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. ix + 182.
\$39.50. ISBN 0-521-30191-2.

To most twentieth-century analytical philosophers Plato is still the type of a confident metaphysician, and the pressing question in Plato studies is often thought to be whether Plato ever revised his 'theory' of Forms. Recent work on ancient scepticism has done much to make us aware of the limited nature of this way of reading Plato. Certainly when the Academy, Plato's own school, turned its attention seriously to Plato's own works, it soon took him to be a sceptic — that is, to be committed to no beliefs whatsoever, to be arguing always *ad hominem*. Doing philosophy in Plato's way consisted not in

rummaging in the dialogues for doctrines, but in continuing, in contemporary terms, the dialogues' practice of arguing and exploring current positions. And this is what the most famous leaders of the sceptical Academy, Arcesilaus and Carneades, did.

The Academy, as John Glucker has demonstrated, petered out as an institution in the first century B.C. There is a historical lacuna, and over a century later we find Middle Platonism in writers like Plutarch. For the first time we find the Plato of modern Plato studies, dogmatically propounding a transcendent metaphysics (the Middle Platonists, however, did not focus as obsessively as the twentieth century on Forms).

Most scholars agree that we do have a historical gap here. The Academy folded in a chaotic period and its followers took up radical Pyrrhonian scepticism or confident dogmatism, leaving any middle ground deserted. And it also seems clear that, with the rise of Middle Platonism, we have a complete break in approach: to a lover of doctrine Plato's dialogues read differently from the way they do to someone regarding them as a stage in open-ended inquiry.

Harold Tarrant's book is an onslaught on this orthodoxy. There is, he claims, no gulf, historical or ideological, between the sceptical Academy and the Platonism of Plutarch. He does not question that the 'Fourth Academy' (the Academy under Philo of Larissa, its last head) ended its institutional life. But he finds its traditions lasting, represented by slightly later figures. And he claims that the scepticism of the Academy's last phase was so modified that we can find in it the seeds from which Middle Platonism was to grow; we should abandon the sharp dichotomy, 'Scepticism or Platonism,' and recognize a neglected half-way house. This reconstructed continuity of Academic tradition edges out Antiochus as a key figure in the return of the Academy to dogmatism. Tarrant continually stresses Academic lack of interest in Antiochus' chief concern, anchoring knowledge in *empirical* certainty; Antiochus' synthesis of Stoicism and Academic ideas appears merely as an uninfluential dead-end.

On the historical side, Tarrant's claims depend heavily on his own redating to this period of the anonymous commentary on the *Theaetetus*, which he sees as written from an Academic point of view, possibly by Eudorus of Alexandria. He supports this with other arguments, which are often speculative and press texts very heavily for implications as to their sources. He is consistently illuminating (on the neglected figure of Char-madas, for example) though the claims are densely and indigestibly presented and may repel those lacking some grounding in the period.

But the interest of filling the historical void depends on finding a coherent philosophy to be transmitted. Tarrant claims, plausibly, that Fourth-Academy scepticism had become blunted. If you argue pro and con the same basic ideas for long enough, you will inevitably come to feel that some have more to be said for them than others; some things get established by force of argument and it becomes disingenuous to say that one is in no way committed on any issue. Philo certainly claimed that some form of commitment to belief was

compatible with some form of scepticism. He continued to reject claims that the *senses* provided certainty, and Tarrant finds the core of his position to be the idea that some non-empirical *concepts* will in the end recommend themselves to any diligent inquirer. This is still a form of scepticism, because truth is found only by the inquiring mind; but it can shift easily into a form of Platonism that regards these concepts as recollected forms, distinct from our empirical world of change and decay.

This is highly ingenious; but it seems to me not to take the measure of ancient scepticism. For that is always purely *formal*; scepticism is an attitude to any belief, not an attempt to find a type of belief which just as such can be trusted. Tarrant's evidence is thin and weak on the crucial point, the alleged recognition of 'evident' things that are non-empirical. In my view he underestimates the Academy's continued (and perhaps surprising) commitment to the standard Hellenistic assumption that the mind is dependent on, and can go no further than, the senses. To find the senses faulty but the mind reliable is to abandon, rather than to restrict, a sceptical attitude. It is to have gone right over to the dogmatic Platonism which we now all find so familiar.

JULIA ANNAS
St. Hugh's College
Oxford

CHARLES TAYLOR, *Philosophical Papers*. Volume 1: *Human Agency and Language*; Volume 2: *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1985. Pp. viii + 294. Vol. I. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-26752-8); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-31750-9). Vol. II Pp. vii + 340. US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-26753-6); US\$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-31749-5).

Let me confess my ambivalence: I am no reader of the Hegelian, Hermeneutic, or apologetic Marxist literature, and I must cut down on my reviewing activities. Reviewing is excellent disciplining exercise for a beginner but may be escape for a veteran. Yet veterans, too, need discipline. It is right to exhaust a line of thought and drive it either to some conclusion or to destruction or preferably to both. But it is wise to cast a glance around now and then — especially in philosophy. When different specialties have common roots, it is possible to obtain a broader picture by going deeper. Not so in philosophy: at

root different schools are worlds apart; on the branches they may meet, as branches better relate to common, everyday concerns. I share with Taylor and most philosophers the love of peace, the concern about the ill-effects of technology, and so forth. Also, I share with him but not with all philosophers the rejection of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, its utter rejection of speculation, its illusion of utterly disinterested and objective science, its psychologistic individualism, utilitarianism and mechanism — its scientism in short. Yet I am a child of the Enlightenment and its heirs (Marx included) in holding their rationalist ideals though with difference; Taylor is not (and, like practically all contemporary Western apologist Marxists, he rejects the best in Marx, his scientific humanism) in that he regularly flirts with anti-science.

Taylor wants to convince his scientific opponents of his hermeneutic analysis of their doctrines (Introduction). Will opponents listen? Mario Bunge has argued that anti-scientific humanism, which Taylor flirts with, overlooks the service of social science to humanity even in simple matters of saving lives. True? False? No answer. Taylor has to know his opponents better. So do I.

The best Hegelian, Hermeneutic, existentialist and neo-Marxist philosophy, when put simply, is a cut above the best religious and quasi-religious sermons delivered in highbrow friendly neighborhood places of worship — but not higher. Here is a good example. Taylor cites tidbits of modern discussions of the identity theory and shows that it does not fit the traditional scientific mold (Ch. 1). True; scientism is either poor or austere, to be taken respectively as superseded or as a challenge. With no debate Taylor chooses the first option. Important self-perceptions likewise seemingly transcend the scientific image of man (Ch. 2). The theory of action as genuinely goal-directed is Hegel's revival of Aristotle (Ch. 3) in line with the theories of identity and self-perception just mentioned. This is fanciful. Classical scientism views action as instrumental, the reaction to it views action as significant. Most of us accept both views (or 'models') (Ch. 4). Psychology is either explanation or interpretation, in line with these two views respectively. Significant psychology, Freud included, is thus interpretative (Ch. 5). I leave it to Adolf Grünbaum to show that Freud endorsed scientism, and that interpretative psychology is poor. Myself, I endorse Taylor's and Grünbaum's debunking of each other's view and regret their hostile mood. (No, Grünbaum is not mentioned; those whom Grünbaum contemptuously declares 'scientophobes' are taken here as the obviously great authorities.) On p. 114 most people 'operate with a (perhaps inconsistent) combination of the two' views; on p. 161 (only) mature and intelligent people do so. Genetic psychology breaks the traditional scientific mold by replacing atomism with holistic cognitive stages which are rather inborn (Ch. 6). I ask the reader's indulgence to skip the discussion of scientific neurophysiology (Ch. 7). Cognitive psychology erroneously attempts to make explicit the knowledge which both Wittgenstein and Polanyi have shown to be tacit (Ch. 8). This attack on scientism is distinctly anti-scientific. Asking the reader's indulgence again I skip the discussion of meaning (Ch. 10) and will try hard to forget it.

Volume II is part philosophy of the social sciences part political philosophy. I should confess to viewing Marx progressive but not his 20th century defenders (the way Marx viewed his predecessors as progressive but not their followers). (The name of Marx is dropped a few times here, but his views are discussed in no more than three or four — quite adequate, incidentally — fleeting paragraphs.) Since meaning is essential to significant action, social science must interpret (Ch. 1). This clashes with the idea that political science is politically neutral: explanatory schemata carry their own value system. Hence, concludes Taylor, the dualism of facts and decisions is refuted (Ch. 2). (Ludwig von Mises, who accepted the premise and criticized the conclusion [*Theory and History*, 1958] is not mentioned.) Science is an activity. (No; Popper and Polanyi are not mentioned.) A good social theory is a corrective of the practice it describes and is thus self-validating. Hence, self-validation is not the validation of a truth-claim; it is a pre-condition for it. The truth-claim is validated when the correction is successfully implemented (Ch. 3). God reveals Himself, said Hegel, on the battlefield. Taylor's theory of validation was revealed to me in the Marxist study group I once belonged to. We misidentified it there as Marx's theory of praxis, and we learned from Engels the English idiom about the proof of the pudding being in its eating. This theory of validation enables us to transcend ethno-centricity (Ch. 4). To me the opposite is obvious. I can skip the discussion of rationality (Ch. 5) (which I have discussed in another review) because the reader can guess that Taylor rejects the scientific view of (scientific) rationality as too narrow. Foucault is presented as an anti-Marxist author — and in error about all actions being intentional, since Lenin was thoroughly anti-democratic, though 'perhaps' not intentionally (Ch. 6). (Taylor ignores Rosa Luxemburg on Lenin.)

Political atomism, i.e. psychologistic individualism, is no-no (Ch. 7). (If Nozick did not exist we would have to invent him in order to feed him to Taylor.) Negative liberalism, i.e., psychologistic individualism, is a no-no: it sees positive liberalism as collectivist. (If Sir Isaiah Berlin did not exist,) Taylor has a point here, but he exaggerates, forgetting that most positive liberals are anti-liberal collectivists — usually clandestine or by default, seldom frankly so. Why is utilitarianism impressive? Read Bertrand Russell or Elie Halévy (no, they are not mentioned here); do not read this discussion (Ch. 9), especially if you are familiar with economics. What is the cause of the impending breakdown of advanced capitalism? (Moses Maimonides added a reaffirmation to his declaration of his faith in the coming of the messiah: even should he procrastinate, I will wait for him.) It is the affluent society. (No, John Kenneth Galbraith is absent.) Identity is integrated in the fabric of society. (Yes, Erik Erickson is recognized.) Our society is atomised. (Hegel and Young Marx are amazingly overlooked.) Self-realization thus becomes disastrously consumerist (Ch. 11). (No—no Marcuse, no Vance Packard, no Goffman.) John Rawls's theory of justice is scientific (Ch. 12). (Good that Rawls exists.) A simple, lovely (interpretative or hermeneutic) discussion of Kant's theory of freedom (Ch. 13) gracefully concludes the second volume.

When in the late 50's Taylor came to the student's socialist society of the London School of Economics to deliver their annual lecture he attacked Karl Popper. He was charming. I appreciated the courage of a journalistic attack on an academic lion conducted in his own den. Soon I was corrected: it was explained that in Oxford they regarded Taylor as a brilliant rising scholar and he was a Fellow of All Souls. My appreciation remained: both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche preferred the label of a journalist to that of a philosopher. And then he — Taylor — went and published his super-academic super-stodgy, utterly opaque books on the explanation of behaviour and on Hegel. But in the volumes at hand he is again at his journalistic best. Recommended to those who have enough patience. As a counter-weight to Taylor's left-wing-reaction, try Walter Kaufmann's right-wing reactionary writings. As against many aspects on which Kaufmann is superior, Taylor is superior in his familiarity with the current philosophic literature, and more so in his use of ideas from different schools. It is, indeed, truly amusing and also quite instructive to find right-wing hermeneuts and analysts together serving the neo-Marxist cause. Remarkably, W. V. O. Quine is saved this embarrassment. He is saddled here with another — the naming theory of language-acquisition. Gavagai!

JOSEPH AGASSI
Tel-Aviv University and
York University

JAMES E. TOMBERLIN AND PETER VAN INWAGEN, eds. *Alvin Plantinga*. Hingham, MA: D. Reidel Publishing Company 1985. Pp. ix + 420. US\$55.00 ISBN 90-277-1763-X.

Tomberlin and van Inwagen have contributed a useful addition, *Alvin Plantinga*, to Reidel's neo-Schilppian series, *Profiles*. A more useful book, history may show, could be one establishing a different view — the view that overestimation of Plantinga's obvious ingenuity has caused analytical philosophers to focus on some of the less important meanings assignable to some of the more important questions in philosophical vogue. These include questions about the wisest articulation of ideas concerning Possible Worlds; questions about analogy and the reasonableness of belief in God, as well as Other minds; questions about Probability and Theodicy.

Pages 3 to 97 are written by Plantinga himself. The autobiographical opening is a delight to read: the author's love of God, truth, philosophical dialogue, talent and inspiring people creates a cheerful radiance. It suggests a warm and happy light pouring through admirable stained glass. (One looks in vain for such quality in some of his noted writings.) In the rest of this Part I we find accounts of his evolving ideas on Evil, Calvinist Epistemology, Ontological Arguments, Necessity, Names and Possible Worlds. Part II provides essays on Plantinga by van Inwagen (Trans-World Identity), John L. Pollock (Possible Worlds), Kit Fine (Reduction of Possibilist Discourse), Diana F. Ackerman (Proper Names), Carl Ginet (Philosophy of Mind), Robert M. Adams (Evil), Tomberlin (Ontological Arguments), Philip L. Quinn (Foreknowledge and Freedom) and William P. Alston (Epistemology of Religious Belief). These are followed by Plantinga's replies and bibliography.

Van Inwagen's piece is particularly valuable, although it is meant to expound and clarify Chapter VI of the *Nature of Necessity*, not to criticize it. The criticism, we are told, is reserved for misguided critics. The Scholastic line of thrust is that judging the chapter's account of Trans-World Identity, etc., must be based on reading the text and gaining an intellectual grasp of Plantinga's 'primitive vocabulary': *possible, state of affairs, obtains, proposition*. Confused forms of pictorial thinking, which allow the imagination to usurp functions of the intellect, result in pointless questions or objections. A witty series of didactic diagrams is produced to show why critics have gone astray. There are also a few rather different comments on philosophers like David Lewis — as opposed to Plantinga, Stalnaker, Pollock, Kripke and van Inwagen — for whom possible worlds are concrete objects and 'exists in' means 'is part of.' Such philosophers are not taken to be open to the previous criticisms, but seem to van Inwagen to lack reasons for their beliefs and for their hopes of linking them with modality (119).

Neither the former group nor followers of Lewis strike me as being concerned closely enough with the actual history of philosophical systems, cultures and religions — or with the personal visions of outstanding human beings. Yet this history is what questions about Possible Worlds had *best* be meant to illuminate. Nor does either side show enough concern about ties between the structure of possible worlds and spiritual, social, moral, political or ecological objectives. The *categorial* possibilities of expressing this actual world and its ideological challenges in terms of structures with values deserve far more concern. Possible worlds are, I suspect, most fruitfully seen as (alternative) categorial forms of this actual world, *taken exactly as it and its history 'really are'*. (See my *Self-knowledge and Social Relations*). Counterfactuals should be another story. Such dissatisfaction might be directed at Pollock, Fine, Ackerman and Kripke as well. For questions about names, terms and descriptions, like ways of distinguishing states of affairs, and individuals and totalities of them should be employed, at least partly, to review ideologies and categorial assumptions. But a reading of van Inwagen's fine essay, whatever *he* might say, is a good starting point for making clear-headed attempts at finding new directions.

It might be replied that Plantinga's and Kripke's ways with modal logic and Possible Worlds are fully justified by their luminously reflecting two of our most precious philosophical intuitions — precious, whether or not they are also somewhat trivial. But Pollock writes:

The standard claim is now that a proposition is necessary if it is true at all possible worlds, and that an object is possibly such that it has a property if its having that property obtained at some world. No argument is given for these claims. They are far from trivial. It is often supposed that the identification of truth at all possible worlds provides a foundation for modal logic and allows us to justify S5. That, however, is false. As we shall see, we must already assume a quantified version of S5 in order to justify the contention that necessity coincides with truth at all possible worlds. (123)

Pollock goes on to raise some challenges which retain a profound importance even if one does not raise ideological complaints about uses of 'Possible Worlds.'

Plantinga in his *Replies* devotes a generous amount of sympathy and debating space to Pollock. To Fine he also replies at length, but keeps repeatedly stressing that the commentary pertains most to something alien which he had never even begun to attempt on the road from Wayne State to Notre Dame. For Ackerman's work on Proper names and on his own account of them, Plantinga expresses profound respect in both the *Self-Profile* and the *Replies*. He also shows much respect for Kripke on the subject. But, as I noted before, all three thinkers strike me as disastrously narrow. For the ways in which the sense and use of proper names (or their analogues) are or should be analyzed will need to be systematically relativized to the right kinds of Possible Worlds — to ideologies, values, visions, categorial schemes, etc.

Plantinga's account in his *Profile* and in his reply to Tomberlin of what it is to hold a true (*or false*) premise *rationally* on matters of great importance makes his claims about accepting an Ontological Argument humanly endearing and intellectually impressive (64-71). His emphatic claims, continued over decades, that Kant was replying on this subject to Anselm, whom the author of the First Critique is unlikely to have read, are jarringly less reasonable. Plantinga's own points about Kant's irrelevance to Anselm increase the oddity of this present persistence. At any rate, his account of rationality in belief can be developed and extended naturally to apply to personal selections of Acts, Events, Probabilities and Utilities in truly rational attempts at Maximizing Expected Utility. Ginet cites W.N. Christensen's and my 'Gambling on Other Minds — Human and Divine' in his paper on Plantinga and Other Minds. Robert M. Adams discusses his own views and Plantinga's on the *personalist* interpretation of Probability when discussing Plantinga and Theodicy. (Cf. King-Farlow and Christensen, *Faith and the Life of Reason*.) But no one in this book discusses the applications of Maximizing Expected Utility to questions of Epistemology and Natural Theology. As with other matters, the power and stimulus of Plantinga's thought have impelled him

and many others towards what is valuable, then suddenly drawn them away from it into less philosophically and humanly important pathways.

Whether my dissatisfactions are justified or mere foolishness, this helpful book on such an influential and likeable thinker belongs in every campus library.

JOHN KING-FARLOW
University of Alberta

R.E. TREMBLAY, M.A. PROVOST, F.F. STRAYER, dir. *Ethologie et développement de l'enfant*. Paris: Stock 1985. 473 p. 29.95\$ CAN. ISBN 2-234-01840-4.

Ce livre est un ouvrage collectif regroupant des auteurs français, québécois et américains qui proposent leurs travaux de recherche effectués en fonction d'une approche éthologique.

Cet ouvrage présente pour la première fois en langue française, l'éthologie humaine appliquée à l'étude du développement de l'enfant de 0 à 5 ans. L'éthologie est une science relativement récente en psychologie. A ses débuts, elle était employée uniquement pour l'étude du comportement des animaux dans leur milieu naturel par opposition à l'observation artificielle en laboratoire. C'est vers le milieu des années 50 qu'apparaissent les premières publications traitant de l'avantage d'appliquer les données et les méthodes de l'éthologie à l'étude de l'humain. L'objet de l'éthologie est essentiellement l'étude biologique des comportements observés en milieu naturel. Pour comprendre dans quelles situations apparaissent certains comportements, quelles fonctions remplissent ceux-ci et comment de tels comportements se développent à travers le temps, il est nécessaire d'effectuer une exploration systématique et quotidienne du processus d'adaptation humaine. Parler d'éthologie c'est évidemment envisager l'étude des diverses formes d'adaptation qu'une espèce a su développer pour faire face aux problèmes suscités par l'environnement extérieur.

C'est pour cette raison que l'on retrouve dans ce livre, structuré en cinq parties, quatre parties nous présentant des recherches regroupées en fonction de leur intérêt pour une des diverses formes d'adaptation de l'enfant. Plus précisément, ces recherches décrivent et analysent l'adaptation individuelle du jeune enfant dans sa vie quotidienne, l'adaptation de l'enfant à l'adulte, l'adaptation de l'enfant à ses pairs ainsi que les difficultés adaptatives plus ou moins graves que peut rencontrer un enfant handicapé. Il est intéressant de souligner que les recherches décrites sont récentes et elles sont pour la majorité effectuées auprès de population d'enfants québécois. Ces recherches il-

lustrent ainsi des exemples concrets de la méthode éthologique appliquée à un domaine précis de l'adaptation du jeune enfant tout en apportant des données scientifiques récentes. La première partie du volume se veut d'ordre notionnel et technique. Dans un premier chapitre, M.A. Provost nous initie aux fondements de l'éthologie (son historique, l'origine du terme, l'éthologie humaine...). Dans le deuxième chapitre, F.F. Strayer et R. Gauthier expliquent les concepts et les méthodes éthologiques. Le dernier chapitre de cette partie est rédigé par R. Gauthier qui explique les différentes techniques d'enregistrement des comportements.

La deuxième partie du livre traite de l'adaptation individuelle du jeune enfant. Les recherches présentées nous renseignent sur le comportement exploratoire de jeunes enfants (M.A. Provost), sur la chronologie des comportements de communication et les profils de comportement (H. Montagner et al.), sur la reconnaissance des expressions faciales émotionnelles (G. Kirouac et al.), ainsi que sur la valeur adaptive de l'intelligence dans la vie quotidienne des jeunes enfants (W.R. Charlesworth et al.).

La troisième partie concerne l'adaptation de l'enfant à l'adulte. On y retrouve des recherches sur les premières adaptations mutuelles (T. Gouin-Décarie, D. Poulin-Dubois), sur la contribution olfactive à l'établissement du lien mère-enfant (B. Schaal), sur les interactions non-verbales père-fils (R.E. Tremblay, S. Larivée), sur la communication éducateur-enfant en garderie (L. Desbiens et al.), on y discute aussi de la relation éducateur-enfant (R.E. Tremblay).

Dans une quatrième partie, on aborde l'adaptation de l'enfant d'âge préscolaire à ses pairs. Les recherches traitent principalement des dimensions de la dominance, de l'influence sociale, de l'activité affiliative chez l'enfant en interaction avec ses pairs.

Une cinquième et dernière partie est consacrée aux difficultés d'adaptation chez des enfants handicapés physiquement, comme par exemple chez des enfants sourds (J. Cosnier), aveugles ou mal voyants (M. Dumont et H. Markovits; L. Gariépy). R.E. Tremblay et al. décrivent aussi une recherche sur les interactions non-verbales éducateur-enfant en internat de rééducation.

Ce livre est une excellente introduction à l'éthologie autant pour les professionnels œuvrant auprès des enfants (cliniciens, éducateurs...) que pour les étudiants en psychologie.

Le langage utilisé est facilement accessible à tous; il permet d'une façon claire, simple et concrète de comprendre l'éthologie ainsi que ses possibilités d'applications.

La structure du livre est bien définie et offre l'avantage de clarifier les domaines d'étude de l'éthologie et de mettre en évidence la diversité des aspects de l'adaptation de l'enfant à ses milieux de vie. Cette diversité favorise aussi les intérêts particuliers du lecteur. Variant selon nos intérêts, il est possible que certaines recherches nous laissent sur notre faim; on souhaiterait en savoir plus long. Cependant, je crois que le but de ce livre est plutôt de nous fournir un éventail diversifié de la méthode éthologique appliquée à l'enfant,

ce qui nous permet d'élargir notre champs de connaissance et de stimuler notre soif du savoir.

A mon avis de par sa richesse d'informations concrètes et pratiques, ce volume constitue un excellent outil de travail pour tout étudiant et chercheur en science humaine.

Il est intéressant de constater une certaine diversité dans le style de présentation des recherches. Bien que la majorité utilisent le même cadre méthodologique, quelques-unes diffèrent. Plusieurs recherches procèdent par observation systématique des comportements de l'enfant en milieu naturel, dans diverses situations adaptatives. Cependant l'éthologie peut-être étudiée aussi selon une méthode plus expérimentale, en autant que la situation expérimentale procède d'une situation vécue et utilise des stimuli et des comportements qui ont un sens précis pour l'enfant. L'éthologie insiste d'abord sur la connaissance préalable du comportement en milieu naturel avant de se livrer à l'expérimentation.

Ainsi les recherches présentées au chapitre 9 par B. Schaal, et au chapitre 10 par R.E. Tremblay et S. Larivée, utilisent un cadre expérimental rigoureux. Cependant elles se situent dans un contexte où l'on étudie une situation adaptive précise du jeune enfant à l'adulte. Schaal nous montre comment les caractéristiques olfactives du nouveau-né peuvent jouer un rôle dans l'établissement du lien de la mère avec son enfant. R.E. Tremblay et S. Larivée étudient la possibilité de mettre en évidence à travers une mise en situation en laboratoire un modèle d'interaction que des dyades naturelles établissent.

En outre, deux autres chapitres présentent, sous forme de revue de documentation un domaine particulier de l'adaptation de l'enfant. Il s'agit premièrement du chapitre de T. Gouin-Décarie et D. Poulin-Dubois sur les premières adaptations mutuelles mère-enfant. Ces auteurs font une revue de l'ensemble de recherches observationnelles faites sur deux situations précises; la situation d'allaitement et la situation de face à face mère-enfant. Le chapitre 12 rédigé par R.E. Tremblay présente un ensemble de données tirées de recherches observationnelles sur le comportement parent-enfant faites auprès d'animaux.

Pour terminer, on ne pourrait oublier de faire mention de la préface écrite par R. Zazzo. Comme il le mentionne 'Je ne suis personnellement pas enrôlé sous la bannière de l'éthologie.' par conséquent il critique d'une façon tout à fait personnelle l'éthologie et la situe par rapport à la psychologie contemporaine. C'est un texte clair et incisif qui, de par la longue expérience de l'auteur, permet de bien saisir les liens et les différences existant entre ces deux approches. R. Zazzo insiste d'ailleurs sur leur interaction dynamique qui apporterait à l'étude du comportement humain un nouveau souffle créateur.

Je recommande donc fortement la lecture de ce livre qui sera sûrement utile pour tout intervenant travaillant auprès des enfants ainsi que pour les étudiants et professionnels en psychologie.

DIANE DUBEAU
(Département de psychologie)
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières

JEREMY WALKER. *Kierkegaard: The Descent into God*. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1985.

Voilà un livre de facture plutôt austère, exigeant de son lecteur beaucoup de réflexion et de concentration. Son auteur, familier des élaborations rigoureuses de Frege et de Wittgenstein auxquels il renvoie à l'occasion, nous paraît viser d'abord et avant tout à la clarification de concepts fondamentaux chez Kierkegaard. Pour autant, même si plusieurs fois il se défend de traiter à fond et exhaustivement des sujets qu'il aborde (13, 14, 24, 34 ...), il ne contribue pas moins à une sorte de propédeutique permettant d'éviter les plus lourdes distorsions dans l'interprétation de Kierkegaard. Ainsi, le lecteur de celui-ci doit-il connaître la relation que le penseur danois établit tout au long de son oeuvre entre moralité et religion, pensée et réflexion religieuse, croyance (*belief*) morale et foi religieuse, philosophie morale et théologie (3). Il doit aussi avoir une idée de ce qui le rapproche et l'éloigne dialectiquement de Socrate (4 ss), de l'importance et signification de l' 'édifiant' dans sa production (7 ss), et de sa thèse centrale: l'essence de l'existence éthique est l'examen de soi qui, en dernière analyse, conduit à Dieu (11 ss). L'A., on le sent, voudrait tenir compte autant que faire se peut de la réticence exprimée plusieurs fois par Kierkegaard vers la fin de sa vie, à ce que des *professeurs* s'emparent de sa pensée en la déformant par excès d' 'objectivité.' (Cf. *Pap.* X²A 440; X⁴A 628, 629, X₁¹A 56, 136 ...). Ce n'est pas 'du dehors' en effet que l'on peut identifier l'édifiant (16). Aussi veut-il s'efforcer de penser Kierkegaard de façon à inciter indirectement son lecteur à l'appropriation du message kierkegaardien (22).

Il réfléchit successivement sur le sens à donner aux 'croyances éthiques' (*Ethical Beliefs*) (Ch. I), sur la difficile relation entre croyance et compréhension (*Understanding*) d'une part, et croyance et preuve d'autre part (Ch. II), sur le paradoxe et la passion impliqués dans l'aphorisme percutant de Climacus: 'La vérité est la subjectivité' (Ch. III); sur l'amour (*agapé*) comme fondement de la croyance (Ch. IV). Puis il enchaîne sur le rapport qui unit l'édifiant et le Moi (Ch. V), sur ce qu'il faut entendre par 'connaissance de soi' (Ch. VI), qui implique la découverte à l'intime du Moi de l'illusion fondamentale (*radical deceit*) (Ch. VII) et qui implique également la découverte de notre propre néant (Ch. VIII). Enfin les deux derniers chapitres traitent respectivement des façons d'exister devant Dieu (Ch. IX), et du Christ comme *Vérité* (Ch. X). Ces chapitres sont d'une densité telle qu'il est difficile d'en rendre compte adéquatement dans les quelques pages qui nous sont allouées. Au grand mérite de l'A., ils sont unis l'un à l'autre de façon organique au lieu de constituer un ensemble d'essais disparates. Aussi nous est-il permis, croyons-nous, de nous en tenir à une description sommaire des trois premiers, qui nous paraissent constituer l'ossature fondamentale de toute l'oeuvre.

Pour bien interpréter Kierkegaard, il faut d'abord prendre note de la différence qu'il pose entre croyance (foi) et simples propositions. Une suite de propositions rigoureusement enchaînées dans la nécessité constitue le corpus

d'un savoir objectif. A supposer que ces propositions soient de nature empirique, dire d'elles qu'elles sont vraies, c'est enjamber, par le pont de la probabilité, le fossé qui les sépare. L'enchaînement de croyances implique toutefois un fossé psychologique franchissable par la décision volontaire (24 ss). Parler de vérité au sens kierkegaardien, c'est donc référer à l'existence, c'est se connaître soi-même en se choisissant selon la conviction exprimée par l'assesseur Wilhelm de *L'Alternative* II. Cela mène l'A. à un développement sur la double identification faite par Climacus entre vérité et subjectivité, subjectivité et vérité. En éthique, donner pratiquement son assentiment, c'est prendre un risque existentiel dans la mesure où en ce domaine la vérité est *objectivement* paradoxe.

Le caractère existentiel du vrai kierkegaardien ressort avec force d'un passage de *L'Ecole du Christianisme* où est établie l'identification Christ-Vérité (No. III, v). Plus d'une fois, du reste, Kierkegaard médite sur Jean XIV, 6: 'Je suis la voie, la vérité et la vie.' S'il en est ainsi, commente l'A., le rapport entre vérité et existence est inversé; on n'est pas vérité suite à la connaissance qu'on en a, mais on ne la connaît que dans la mesure où on la vit. Une telle conception implique l'abandon, dans l'ordre éthico-religieux, de la conception 'classique' de la vérité comme étant conformité à une réalité extérieure. Pour Kierkegaard, la croyance ne se mesure pas proprement à cette 'extériorité' que serait la révélation de Dieu, la Bible (38-9). Il ne s'agit pas pour un croyant d'adhérer à une proposition que l'on doit d'abord comprendre. Bien sûr, une certaine 'compréhension' est requise au point de départ, celle des mots qui expriment le principe moral ou religieux auquel on adhérera existentiellement (41). Mais cette compréhension, encore séparée de l'existence concrète, est vague, partielle, confuse. L'A. aurait pu s'appuyer ici sur *La Dialectique de la Communication* où Kierkegaard parle d'un moment bref de savoir dans le cheminement chrétien. Il n'en reste pas moins que la véritable présence va non pas au savoir (*Viden*) mais à la capacité (*Kunnen*); non pas au comprendre, mais au croire. La foi, dit l'A., est une précondition, non une conséquence possible du comprendre (43). La relation entre croyance et preuve est semblable. Pour Kierkegaard, toujours dans le domaine éthico-religieux, je ne puis pas prouver une assertion avant de la vivre; en somme c'est ma vie elle-même qui est pour moi 'preuve' d'une vérité de cet ordre. Mais comment peut-elle l'être? Il faut ici abandonner le sens rigoureux du mot preuve (objective) pour en faire une *épreuve* (subjective). Passer le *test*, réussir l'épreuve, n'est pas prouver objectivement et pour tous la vérité du principe qui nous habite (52), mais se laisser mesurer par elle. Lorsque Kierkegaard dit dans *Les Oeuvres de l'Amour* que 'L'amour ... est obligé de subir l'épreuve des ans,' il signifie que cet amour se mesure au degré des autres vertus qu'il informe en nous. Cette 'information' est essentiellement dynamique en contraste avec la staticité d'un critère objectif.

Puis l'A. procède à l'exégèse de passages particulièrement difficiles du *Post-Scriptum*, au chapitre 'La vérité subjective, l'intériorité, la vérité est la subjectivité (Section II, Chap. II). Climacus déclare que la vérité subjective est objectivement paradoxale, ce qui amène l'A. à distinguer deux degrés de

paradoxe. Au sens large, le paradoxe frôlerait plus ou moins ce qui est étonnant, surprenant. En ce sens, une proposition peut être à la fois vraie et paradoxale. C'est ce qui arrive quand on examine par le biais d'une froide objectivité ce qui est essentiellement subjectif, collé à l'existence. Le sens fort du mot paradoxe, par contre, impliquerait contradiction interne. Il faut comprendre 'paradoxe' au sens large dans cette affirmation de Climacus: 'La vérité éternelle, essentielle..., celle qui se rapporte essentiellement à un existant du fait qu'elle concerne essentiellement l'existence, est le paradoxe' ... Nous avons d'une telle vérité à la fois une certitude subjective et une incertitude objective. Il est paradoxal — au sens large — qu'une proposition soit à la fois objectivement incertaine et pourtant essentielle à une existence humaine. L'A. examine surtout le paradoxe au sens large qu'il attribue aux croyances morales. Et il affirme (67), que le paradoxe au sens fort de contradiction objective interne est, en gros (*roughly*), typique de la foi chrétienne. Nous aurions aimé qu'il développât davantage ce point important du *Post-Scriptum*, puisque c'est surtout là que se fondent les accusations d'irrationnalisme faites à Kierkegaard.

Tous les autres chapitres qui suivent maintiennent cet effort de clarification de concepts, examinant tour à tour des extraits de *Les œuvres de l'Amour*, *La maladie à la mort*, les *Discours Chrétiens* etc. Nous n'en rendrons pas compte ici, mais ne pouvons que louer l'A. qui, par ce beau livre, offre à la recherche kierkegaardienne internationale une contribution importante. Nous croyons que nombre de fautes d'interprétations pourront être évitées par la lecture de cette œuvre.

Du reste, l'A. manifeste dès le début de son livre son désir de s'adresser aux chercheurs de quelque langue ou nationalité qu'ils soient. C'est pour cela que mettant en pratique une suggestion faite depuis déjà plusieurs années par le professeur Alastair McKinnon, il se sert, dans ses références, de sigles tirés des titres originaux danois. Cela épargne au lecteur francophone, allemand, italien ou autre le travail fastidieux de chercher par exemple à quelle œuvre kierkegaardienne correspondrait un sigle tiré d'une traduction anglaise. Peut-être aurait-il rendu un plus grand service à son lecteur étranger en indiquant également la pagination selon l'une des trois éditions danoises.

Autre point à relever: nous n'avons pas bien compris pourquoi l'A., référant au *Journal* de Kierkegaard, renvoie à la pagination d'Alexander Dru plutôt qu'à ses numéros d'entrées, et n'indique pas les classifications des authentiques *Papirer* danois. Par exemple, à la page III, dans le renvoi qu'il fait au *Journal*, nous aurions apprécié qu'en plus d'indiquer JSK, 355, il nous ajoutât le numéro d'entrée dans Dru (1021) et la référence dans les *Papirer* danois eux-mêmes: X²A299.

Mais ces détails n'enlèvent rien à la valeur intrinsèque du livre que nous avons lu avec beaucoup d'intérêt, voire d'enthousiasme.

MAURICE CARIGNAN
Université d'Ottawa