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the notion of freedom and morality. In 1984 Ayer published a collection of three short papers which originally appeared in another collection, together with his own reply to comments on his paper. A second collection of shorter essays, also from 1984, contains eight supplementary pieces dealing with such topics as determinism, causality, personal identity, the nature of time, the philosophy of science, and the nature of the self. The present volume contains the first collection of Ayer's essays on freedom and morality, plus one additional paper on causality. The book is divided into two parts: 'Freedom and Morality' and 'Other Essays'. The former part contains the three essays on freedom and morality, plus one additional paper on causality. The latter part contains eight essays on various topics, including epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind.

A.J. AYER. *Freedom and Morality and Other Essays*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. 182. Cdn.\$37.50: US\$22.95. ISBN 0-19-824731-1.

'Freedom and Morality' is a general title for three short papers which were originally delivered as a series of lectures at McMaster University in the autumn of 1983 and which are published in this volume for the first time. The 'Other Essays' are eight in number and bear for the most part on various epistemological concerns; all but one of these have been previously published.

In spite of the respect accorded by most philosophers to the wisdom inherent in what is often called common sense, Ayer has never been particularly impressed, his view on the matter being pretty well summed up when he remarked of H.H. Price, some twenty-five years ago, that 'one of his great virtues as a philosopher is that he does not suffer from an overdose of common sense' (*Philosophy and Language*, 1960, p.3). While they are for the most part thematically unrelated, the articles in this collection provide ample evidence that the intervening years have provided Ayer with no cause to modify this opinion. In 'The Concept of Freedom,' for example, which is the first and perhaps the most interesting of the three essays concerned with moral issues, Ayer acknowledges that the notion of freedom, as it is commonly understood, includes not only freedom of action but also freedom of choice. Moreover, the distinction between causality and constraint, to which he had earlier appealed in an attempt to effect a reconciliation between the concept of freedom and the principles of universal determinism, cannot be here invoked:

The trouble is, that if we assume, for the sake of argument, that all our choices are causally determined, it is not clear how the nature of the causes can make so much difference; it is not as if the causes which do not come under the heading of constraint are any less efficacious than those that do.(7)

He does attempt to overcome this apparent conflict by arguing that it is possible to maintain both that our choices are caused, in the sense that they have

motives, and that they are free, in the sense that actions arising from them are not 'strictly determined' by them. Freedom of choice may then be granted a rather dubious foothold because there exists an uncertainty in the causal relationship between motive and action, an uncertainty that is reflected in the fact that our choices cannot be strictly explained, that they 'fit very loosely into a causal framework, if they are explicable at all'(14). This does not rule out the possibility that the connection between motives as causes and actions as effects may at some time be shown to be one of strict determination, an eventuality which, Ayer admits, would require him to deny the legitimacy of freedom of choice(15) and would entail further significant modifications to our concepts of responsibility and desert(16). This, he seems fully prepared to do since he is led to suspect that the ordinary concept of freedom, which he has here been analyzing, is itself the result of a 'confusion' which has arisen 'perhaps as a legacy of theology'(16).

In 'Are There Objective Values?', Ayer argues, chiefly on the basis of a passing reference to some arguments that he attributes to Mackie, that in spite of the affirmative judgement of common sense, 'the champions of objective values have failed to make their belief intelligible'(33). In 'Utilitarianism,' Ayer rejects this doctrine because of its implicit consequentialism, and this principally on moral grounds. 'I do not see how a utilitarian could consistently avoid countenancing the oppression of minorities, the suppression of unpopular opinion, the sacrificing of justice to expediency'(48). The moral point of view from which this objection is developed is not precisely stated. While opting at one moment for what he calls, after Broad, 'self referential altruism,' Ayer ultimately admits that he has 'no all purpose tool of justification,' and seems to fall back on some kind of moral sense which he likens to Bentham's so-called 'principle of caprice.'

'On Causal Priority,' which Ayer explains that he was 'stimulated to write' upon the publication of J.L. Mackie's book *The Cement of the Universe*, is the only one of the 'Other Essays' hitherto unpublished. In it, he seeks to evaluate the ordinary or common sense notion of causal priority, this notion having been explicated by Mackie 'in the way that an anthropologist might examine the concept of witchcraft which was current in some native tribe'(59). While Ayer eventually rejects Mackie's construction of the ordinary notion of causal priority as being modeled on 'the idea of human agency,' he does admit that it is generally believed that 'there is a direction of efficacy that corresponds to the march of time'(61), a belief for which no account is provided beyond the suggestion that its genesis may be found in the fact that we know less about the future than we do about the past and the present. What is clear is that the belief in causal priority, to the extent that it pervades our ordinary concept of causation, is, in Ayer's view, a fiction; it is, of course, a far less outrageous belief than that in witchcraft, but the suggestion is strong that the difference is one of degree rather than kind.

Ayer is a polished philosophical essayist and has produced some remarkably fine collections of essays in the past. It cannot be said that the present volume is their equal. Some of the essays, such as 'Self-Evidence' and

'Wittgenstein on Certainty,' contain reiterations of themes developed more convincingly elsewhere; as a result they seem superficial and, to a degree, dogmatic. Others, being transcripts of lectures, seem somewhat lacking in scholarship an example of which is 'The Vienna Circle,' an anecdotal piece wherein one finds the following rather remarkable historical reconstruction.

Among other things, James explained Hegel to Mach. One wonders what was said since he had a very strong distaste for Hegel's philosophy, but he may have enabled Mach to understand how that sort of monolithic idealism could be emotionally attractive to tender minds.(160)

Indeed, it is difficult to entirely suppress the impression that the reason for the inclusion of some of the essays is principally to fatten up an otherwise unduly slender volume. At the same time, the book does reflect, in various ways, a continuing commitment to a point of view the solitary nature of which Ayer himself acknowledges when he recognizes that 'with the possible exception of myself, no one any longer cares to be called a logical positivist'(176).

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STUART BROWN. *Leibniz*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1985.
Pp. xv + 223. US\$35.00 (Cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1390-7); US\$12.95 (Paper: ISBN 0-8166-1391-5).

How should one go about trying to understand the thoughts of an important historical figure like Leibniz, and, secondly, what was Leibniz's conception of how philosophy should be done? These two questions put by Stuart Brown produce a most illuminating, revisionist account of Leibniz's thought. The first question asks why should a given philosopher be concerned with some particular set of problems, and since these problems arise on the basis of certain assumptions, which determine the direction in which solutions are sought and which are considered solved only if the assumptions remain intact what are those assumptions? Brown takes the theory of the individual substance to be the cornerstone of Leibniz's metaphysical system. He then identifies five assumptions which Leibniz makes about what is necessary for a

thing to be counted as a substance. They concern unity, identity, autonomy, agency and completeness. These are, he maintains, nowhere questioned in Leibniz's writings, and are regarded by him as generally accepted principles. It is they which form the background of his problems and their solutions. The next question is how does Leibniz go about solving his problems? Brown deplores a custom which has grown up of putting him along with Descartes and Spinoza in a school called Rationalists. Rationalism for Brown is the view that metaphysics should be a deductive system resting on a foundation of absolute certainty. In this sense the early Leibniz was a rationalist, proposing in his own words 'a method of setting up a reasonable philosophy with the same unanswerable clarity as arithmetic,' a 'method of certainty' which would settle all philosophical disputes. Brown believes that Leibniz gave up this ideal in the early 1680's, and definitively at the time of his correspondence with Foucher. Geometry still remained for him the model for metaphysics, but like geometry it must proceed on the basis of assumptions or axioms not yet proved, but such as would be generally granted. It is in this way that the *Discourse on Metaphysics* (1686) proceeded. The *in esse* principle, *praedicatum in est subiecto*, is put forward as, coming from the scholastics, a principle which could be agreed upon by philosophers, but which he then generalized to cover both necessary and contingent truths. Brown cites a letter to Foucher in which Leibniz gives the principle of contradiction, together with the *in esse* principle, the status of the axioms of the geometers as something which he will 'suppose.' 'There is evidently,' says Brown, 'a note of sarcasm in Leibniz's remark, "I will suppose boldly that two contradictions could not be true".' I would very much doubt that it is intended as a sarcasm for this was not the only occasion on which Leibniz gave the principle of contradiction the same status as that of the geometers' axioms or assumptions (G. VII, 299), and it is, moreover, given in the same company as the *in esse* principle where no possible sarcasm could have been intended.

The *in esse* principle, so fundamental for the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, turned out subsequently to be inadequate for the solution of Leibniz's problems about substance and as a consequence it almost completely disappears except as a principle governing abstract truths. Brown argues that in the *Discourse* with respect to essential unity (*unum per se*) as a requirement of substances there is a confusion between the Aristotelian problem of explaining the nature of organic unities and the Platonic problem which assumes that only indivisible and indestructible beings are true beings. In the *Discourse* the Aristotelian concern is dominant, but after the exchange with Arnauld the Platonic begins to dominate with the result that there is a transition in Leibniz's thought from substantial forms to monads, from corporeal substances to phenomena *bene fundata*. Accordingly in the *New System* (1795-96) the unity of the simple substance having supplanted the unity of the organic substance and the communication between substances now being wholly impossible, Leibniz's problems about substance have changed. A new solution presented itself. '...I was insensibly led to adopt a view which surprised me, but which seems inevitable... that God first created the soul, and every other real unity,

in such a way that everything in it must spring from within itself, by a perfect spontaneity with regard to itself, and yet in a perfect *conformity* with things outside.' The total spontaneity and the accompanying pre-established harmony are a hypothesis and against the objections of Foucher Leibniz defends it as a hypothesis and defends also the general use of hypotheses in philosophy. It would seem, then, that Leibniz, though Brown does not remark on it, has shifted from a philosophical methodology modelled after the geometers' use of axioms as unproved assumptions to one modelled on the astronomers' hypotheses or systems designed to save appearances.

While I believe that Brown is generally right in drawing the line of transition as he does in Leibniz's thought, Leibniz himself does not always keep to that line. For example, in *De ipsa natura* (1698) where there is a fully mature account of the monad Leibniz still retains the concepts of corporeal substance and substantial form. There is no trace of phenomenism. There is the one *primitive active force* in the 'corporeal substance' functioning as a 'substantial form,' whereas according to his phenomenalist account of body there is in it an aggregation of innumerable *derivative* active forces. As for the dwindling away of the *inesse* principle which had enjoyed pride of place in the *Discourse*, it was to enjoy at least one more moment of glory as late as c. 1712, in the *Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of Reason* (Parkinson's title for it), where Leibniz gives a deductive formulation of the main doctrines of his metaphysics, including the theory of the simple substance or monad as spontaneous. The principle of sufficient reason from which all these doctrines follow is presented by Leibniz as an immediate consequence of the *inesse* principle, 'that the predicate is in the subject.'

In contrasting Leibniz's way of doing philosophy with that of the rationalists, Brown characterizes it as a problem-solving philosophy. Where the rationalist believes that 'philosophy should be concerned above all with the foundations of human knowledge,' Leibniz, although he believed that metaphysics might 'explain' principles and fundamental concepts of the special sciences, did not suppose that metaphysics might undertake to discover them. This rather overestimates the degree of modesty of Leibniz's views with respect to the role of metaphysics in science. 'I reduce all mechanics to a single metaphysical principle,' he tells Arnauld (G. II, 62), and he uses the principles of continuity and the principle of the most determined action, i.e., metaphysical principles of order and perfection, to *discover*, for example, the laws of collision in mechanics, or the sine law of refraction in optics. But despite these minor reservations I think that Brown's study should make a considerable impact on how people will re-read the texts of Leibniz.

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STEPHEN BUNGAY. *Beauty and Truth. A Study of Hegel's Aesthetics*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. x + 235. Cdn\$37.50: US\$24.95. ISBN 0-19-815540-9.

The *Aesthetics* has not been as well served as other areas by Hegel scholarship in English. There is certainly need for a thorough treatment of Hegel's theoretical claims in that work. It has to be said at once that, despite its blurb, the book under review is not that treatment. Admittedly Stephen Bungay faces a challenging task. On the one hand, Hegel himself notes the apparent gulf between abstract philosophical reflection and the concrete, sensuous presence of art. The *Aesthetics* remains the most empirical of Hegel's works (and Bungay seems most comfortable with that aspect). On the other hand, there are numerous textual and interpretative problems stemming from the lecture format (although a critical edition is yet to come, Hotho's editorial work is by and large reliable, as Bungay says in a good survey) and from the mode of address before a general undergraduate audience.

Beauty and Truth appears in a series entitled Oxford Modern Languages and Literature Monographs, founded to publish works based on theses submitted at the University of Oxford. The author states in his Preface that the text is substantially that of his thesis, completed in 1981, and adds disarmingly that 'I have had to spend some weeks working on translations, preparing the glossary, and playing my part in producing the finished article' (vi). One should perhaps not except too much, then, especially after reading the opening lines: 'Nobody really knows for sure what Hegel wanted to do, let alone whether he actually managed to do it or not. But whatever it was, if the results are anything to go by, it was not easy' (v). The chatty tone, loose style, and modest level of discussion are unfortunately an accurate foretaste of what is to come.

The author states his aims as follows: to provide a framework for a clearer understanding of Hegel, to attempt a critical analysis of his theory of art, and to examine his judgements about individual arts and works of art. The book falls into two parts, 'Principles' and 'Instances' (the reasons for which are never adequately explained). The first part is in turn divided into two chapters, on 'the determining of art' (dealing with Hegel's Introduction and his theory of the Ideal, sc. the content proper to art) and on 'the systematicity of art' (devoted to the theory of the art-form, sc. symbolic, classical, and romantic). The second part examines Hegel's theory of individual arts and genres and their history, with a separate chapter devoted to literature, 'the realm of gold' (sic).

It is in the first part that Bungay attempts to clarify Hegel's thinking, by tying it to the system as a whole and especially the Logic. Rightly in my view he sees the latter as a key to Hegel's philosophy of art (alas a key Hegel never had made); he regrets only having to omit discussion of its significance. He compares his procedure in this part to a kind of ventriloquism (189) — an unfortunate, if all too apt, choice of metaphor, since it suggests a caricature of

Hegel's voice. An interpreter of Hegel faces the twin dangers of translating his terms into common-sense nonsense or of remaining within the thickets of his jargon; Bungay avoids the second, but not the first. True, he is aiming at a philosophically naive reader. But I began to suspect a philosophically naive writer. As a result, the further aim of critical analysis never really convinces.

Bungay's organizing notion seems to be 'reconstruction' (or '*Nachbildung*', borrowed from Klaus Hartmann, with whom he studied), though it remains unexplained. Art, understood as a form of spirit, is understood as one of the topics of '*Realphilosophie*' or 'regional philosophy,' the purpose of which is to lay bare the systematic truth within pictorial thinking (*Vorstellung*), to translate the latter into pure thought (*Begriff*). Art and philosophy are alike forms of the Idea, the one as Beauty, the other as Truth; but philosophy is capable of explaining the systematicity implicit in art. The result of this, however, is to create a tension between the empirical and the theoretical, the realm of historical contingency and that of the system. Hegel tends to confuse the two poles, and the confusion plagues the whole *Realphilosophie*.

The point (or criticism) appears like a refrain through the book. Yet it is fundamentally misconceived. Bungay never gives an account of the relations between truth and beauty in other than metaphorical terms (often mixed at that). Moreover, where he (following R.S. Lucas) sees a confusion in Hegel's theory of the art-form between ethico-religious world-view and its mode of artistic representation, others might see a powerful insight into the complex links between hermeneutic and semiotic elements in cultures. Where he sees confusion of content as thematic material and content as interpreted meaning, others might see a basis in Hegel's Romantic theory of art, action, demeanor and language, as forms of human self-expression/cognition. And where he sees Truth and Beauty in abstract relation, others might see a complex historical dialectic at work. The Keatsian title lacks Keats' — or Hegel's — ironies. And by appealing — rather perversely — to Rilke's Apollo (95: 'You must change your life'), Bungay turns out to be more of a classicist than Hegel himself, who was anyway more taken with symbolic and romantic world-views than with the Greeks' cold pastoral.

In fairness there are interesting things in the book, notably an incisive treatment of the 'death of art' topos in the Hegel literature (74f.) and informative discussions of individual arts and genres — when, that is, the author is not rapping Hegel over the knuckles for his apriorism, ignorance and confusion. Hegel gets especially low marks in architecture, painting and music, while his literary judgements too often masquerade as theory. Much of this is contestable. In particular, it is doubtful whether the third part of the *Aesthetics* really is the 'instantiation,' through practical criticism, of theoretical principles (see 189f).

Why then study Hegel's work at all, given his cultural distance from ourselves? Because it discloses a tradition that sees itself as drawing to a close, and we can understand ourselves (and modern art) as the negation of that tradition (192). That is a desperate and last page defence, and quite unconvin-

cing. Unfortunately the body of the text suggest no other reason. In sum, the welcome for *Beauty and Truth* should be qualified: it offers little either to Hegel scholarship or to a more general audience.

MARTIN DONOUGHO
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RONNA BURGER. *The Phaedo: A Platonic Labyrinth*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1984. Pp. ix + 288. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-300-03163-7.

This Straussian reading of the *Phaedo* (Burger repeatedly goes out of her way to remind the reader that she is a student of Seth Benardete) certainly deserves to be called a tour de force of its kind. It is cleverly worked out and unburdened by the dense and rebarbative prose style of Burger's previous book on the *Phaedrus* (*Plato's Phaedrus: A Defense of a Philosophic Art of Writing*, University of Alabama Press 1980). It is also a complete failure as a book about the *Phaedo*, and will not manage to convince any unbiased critical reader of any of its major interpretative points. The fault, however, lies not so much with Burger as with the sterile and obscurantist Straussian approach to reading philosophical texts, especially the Platonic dialogues, that she adopts.

The basic secrets of this purported hermeneutical method have recently been conveniently unmasked, so they need only briefly be mentioned here. (See M.F. Burnyeat's review of Strauss' *Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy*, *New York Review of Books* [30 May 1985] 30-6.) The fundamental idea of the method is that Plato himself as a writer is committed to obscurantism. No dialogue means what it seems to mean: in fact Plato's real philosophical motives in writing are just the opposite of what they appear to be. Thus, for example, the *Republic* on a Straussian reading is an attack on, not a defense of, the possibility of a just society, and it turns out that Plato wants to undermine, not support, the Theory of Forms. Plato conceals his true views because it would be too dangerous politically to reveal them. So on the shallow reading, idealist metaphysical and ethical fantasies are promulgated to comfort the rabble, while Plato provides clues and hints that enable the initiated interpreter to find the deeper level on which the real message of the dialogue becomes clear.

The principal clues are supposed to be provided by the formal structure and action of the dialogue, features that are apparently accidental to its philosophical argument but actually point to why and how this is not to be taken seriously. Thus Burger notices that the *Phaedo* divides neatly into two parts surrounding as a centerpiece the discussion of misology. The significance of the misology passage is also marked by the 'deed' of Socrates touching Phaedo's hair (89d) and Socrates' subsequent declaration that the death of their *logos* is of greater concern to him than his own impending death. Burger takes this as the crucial sign of Plato's hidden intentions. Plato is not out to defend the immortality of the soul (which it is too incredible to believe that Plato actually believed, as Strauss also thought concerning the Theory of Forms) but rather to defend *logos* itself against the threat of misology, by sketching a technique of argumentation that will ward it off, the hypothetical method described at 100-103. The arguments of the first part of the dialogue are explained away as an ironical presentation of the views of the so-called 'genuine philosophers', i.e., Pythagoreans, from whom Socrates is careful to distance himself. The final argument in favor of immortality that Socrates presents is accounted for by the suggestion that Socrates implicitly rejects the conception of soul as mind put forward by the 'genuine philosophers' in favor of an understanding of soul as the immanent vital principle of an organism. This principle is 'deathless' or immortal in the sense that Socrates intends, i.e., it is essentially alive, but not in the sense that his interlocutor Cebes understands at 106d, as being everlasting. It ceases to exist at the death of the organism. But Socrates is careful to drop the hint that Cebes has been fooled, when he advises his audience (as Plato implicitly advises us) to reexamine the presuppositions of the argument (107b).

And so forth, suggesting that the whole text can be read on such lines. Burger has clearly done her homework: her reading of the final argument is based on Strato of Lampsacus' brilliant objection to it. It is characteristic of her procedure to search out the apparently best-founded objections to Plato's arguments, and then to try to find a way of reading the text that makes the fallacy intentional, and makes Plato and his character Socrates be aware of it. The effect of this is to distance Plato from all his arguments so as to leave him only with unsupported dogmatic positions, in fact precisely those positions the Straussian exegete wants to have him hold. At least the analytically oriented interpreters that Burger so despises show enough respect for Plato to take him seriously as a philosopher, not to treat him merely as a repository for unexamined opinions.

The closest we get to a defense of her interpretative method from Burger is a reference (3) to *Phaedrus* 264bc, where on her interpretation (presented more fully in her earlier book) Plato makes the claim that in a literary text every element must be present by 'logographic necessity' (cf. 264b7), i.e., it must have a role to play towards the intent of the work as a whole. But in fact Plato there says nothing nearly so strong, only that proper rhetoric requires careful overall organization (cf. 264c2-5). Curiously, both in this book (In-

tribution, n.25) and in the earlier one she seems to ally her method with Derrida's, who couldn't care less about an author's 'real' intentions.

Of course, it is impossible for Burger to carry out her interpretative project in detail, for Plato is a serious philosophical writer, not an obscurantist. She attempts to find a distinction between the direct knowledge of Forms supposedly advocated by the 'genuine philosophers' and Socrates' way of investigating 'the truth of the beings' through *logoi*, a distinction that is simply not to be found at 90d (where the tight conjunction *te* ... *kai* at d6-7 requires that both *alētheias* and *epistēmēs* be taken with *tōn ontōn*; contrast Burger 118), and which is moreover excluded by 100a1-2 with 99e5-6. She makes much of the objection to the final argument that is raised anonymously at 103a, as if it were based on anything more than a simple misunderstanding that is perfectly adequately cleared up by Socrates' reply. Amazingly, Burger thinks we are to take the unnamed character who raises this objection to be Plato himself (164, n.7)! She claims that Phaedo had been 'uncertain' about Plato's absence on the day of Socrates' death at 59b10. But Phaedo there is uncertain, if at all, not about Plato's absence but about his excuse for it. In general, in fact, Burger is less than fully sensitive to the nuances of Plato's Greek. Most glaring of all is her refusal to acknowledge that the *logos* that Socrates vows not to let die at 89bc is precisely the thesis of the soul's immortality as not only he but also Phaedo understand it, and not some abstract ideal of non-self-contradiction, as Burger seems to think.

It is difficult for a non-initiate to take this book seriously. Certainly it does nothing to advance our understanding of the *Phaedo*.

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CNRS Equipe de Recherche 75 (Dir.: A. Robinet) *Recherches sur le XVII^e siècle* - 7. Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 1984. 182 p. ISBN 2-222-03522-8. ISSN 0180-0345.

Dans le texte de présentation du premier fascicule de cette série, M. André Robinet, qui la dirige, écrivait: 'L'expansion du cartésianisme au XVII^e siècle constitue le thème majeur de ces recherches.' (fascicule 1, 3) Mais il ajoutait, quelques lignes plus loin: 'Rien de forcé dans les présentes lectures: elles ne conduisent nulle part, elles mènent partout, surtout où l'on n'est

point allé.' (loc. cit.) Et effectivement, ce septième tome de la série ne dément point l'engagement pris. Car si les textes qu'il présente ont pour sujet commun la pensée au XVII^e siècle (et pas seulement le cartesianisme) un simple coup d'œil à la table des matières suffit à renseigner le lecteur sur ce qu'ils ont d'hétéroclite (M. Robinet parlait bien de cette 'errance de nos recherches'). A cela aucun mal, bien au contraire: il s'agit de rassembler autant de pièces du puzzle que possible en vue d'une synthèse ultérieure qui n'a d'idéal que ce qu'elle a aussi d'éloigné. En fait certains des articles paraissant dans ce volume ébauchent déjà les liens qui les relient aux pièces avoisinantes dans ce puzzle: c'est le cas, par exemple, de l'article d'Anne Reinbold ('Espace extérieur, espace intérieur dans la peinture du XVII^e siècle.')

Cet ouvrage se distingue donc par la variété des sujets abordés et diffère, de ce fait, de bon nombre de revues qui se fixent — c'est un usage bien établi — un thème pour chacun de leurs numéros. La variété étant donc de rigueur, elle ne caractérise pas seulement le choix des sujets abordés, mais le type même des travaux présentés: on y trouve ainsi, mises à part les exégèses et les analyses de textes, la présentation, première parution en français, d'un minuscule traité sur l'arc-en-ciel de Spinoza, des sommaires ('Vision de Descartes dans la pensée arabe contemporaine', article qui aurait gagné à être davantage un bilan qu'une compilation), des vues d'ensemble ('Libertinage, littérature clandestine et privilège de la raison') et des comparaisons ('Deux exemples de théologie post-cartésienne'); en outre, certains de ces travaux sont également des extraits de thèses. Tout comme le souhaitait donc le directeur, bon nombre de ces articles mettent au jour des éléments, des aspects jusqu'ici laissés de côté ou même insoupçonnés de la pensée au XVII^e siècle. Là encore, rien que de fort louable.

Mais si la variété est de mise tant dans le fond que dans la forme, elle affecte aussi, et c'est dommage, la teneur, la qualité de ces travaux: le volume, sous ce point de vue, est loin d'être uniforme. Dans certains cas, le raisonnement n'a pas la rigueur qu'on lui souhaiterait (surtout lorsque les thèses défendues ne manquent pas d'intérêt); dans d'autres, c'est la méthode qui est prise en défaut. Tout ceci en rend une recension homogène difficile. Mieux vaut, dans ces conditions, rendre compte de ces articles séparément, en les regroupant autant que leur variété le permet.

Il est quatre travaux qui, sous la plume d'Yvonne Toros, font bloc sur les liens entre physique et métaphysique chez Spinoza. Ce groupe se subdivise encore: il s'agit, d'abord, de la traduction française du *Calcul algébrique de l'Arc-en-Ciel pour servir au plus grand rapprochement de la physique avec les mathématiques* (ci-après, le *Traité*); cette traduction est précédée d'une notice historique et suivie d'une analyse ('Ombre et lumière chez Spinoza'). Il s'agit, ensuite, d'un article sur la conception spinoziste de l'espace.

Le *Traité* donne tous les signes d'appartenir à l'entreprise spinoziste de présentation et de développement de la pensée de Descartes. On le situerait aisément dans le sillage des *Principes de la Philosophie de Descartes*, mais on se tromperait: Yvonne Toros démontre que ce traité ne put être rédigé avant 1673, soit, au maximum, trois ans avant la mort de son auteur, à une époque

où celui-ci s'était donc déjà écarté de son prédécesseur. On pourrait donc s'attendre à ce que cet opuscule porte les marques de cette divergence, et Yvonne Toros croit pouvoir les y trouver. Cependant, le *Traité* ne fait que mettre au jour les démonstrations mathématiques par lesquelles Descartes (qui ne les dévoila pas dans *Les Météores*) en était arrivé à son explication de divers phénomènes rattachés à l'arc-en-ciel. Spinoza y affirme que son propos n'est que de présenter aux non-initiés un exemple de l'emploi possible des mathématiques en physique, non seulement pour confirmer la possibilité du programme cartésien, mais aussi pour faire voir qu'il est à la portée même de débutants. Or, les différences entre la métaphysique de Descartes et celle de Spinoza sont considérables, et cette dernière demande son compte: c'est justement l'intérêt qu'y trouve Y. Toros; car si le panthéisme spinosiste exclut les contradictions au sein de l'Attribut, le noir, envisagé comme simple opposition à *lux* (sous l'attribut d'*Etendue*), ne peut trouver place dans la physique spinosiste. A la place, Spinoza ne peut que lui substituer, avec explication idoine, le concept d'ombre relative, de cette ombre qui paraît aux bordures de l'arc-en-ciel et 'termine la lumière' (l'expression est de Descartes). Effectivement, comme le note Yvonne Toros, le noir ne paraît pas dans le *Traité* et l'ombre n'y est jamais traitée que comme 'relative,' que comme une couleur de plus. Et jusqu'ici, le *Traité* confirme la thèse de l'auteur. En revanche, il ne contient rien qui confirme les liens entre cette thèse et les présupposés métaphysiques de Spinoza. Mais c'est sans doute trop demander, et Yvonne Toros a déjà quelque mérite à avoir fait ressortir de ce petit *Traité* ce qui aurait sans doute échappé à plus d'un lecteur inattentif.

Dans son quatrième texte ('Spinoza, précurseur de l'idée moderne d'espace'), Yvonne Toros cherche à situer le concept d'espace dans le système spinosiste. Selon elle, ce concept anticipe celui que propose la théorie de la Relativité générale en ceci que l'espace n'a plus cet aspect absolu de contenant que lui confère la physique newtonienne: il dépend plutôt, et de façon fort étroite, du Corps qu'il détermine et qui le détermine. Elle aboutit à cette conclusion: 'l'espace en effet est au Corps comme l'essence objective est à l'essence formelle... de sorte que l'espace... s'anime, l'idée 'sub specie aeternitatis' du Corps nous le donnant pour identique à l'idée de Modification de la Substance sous l'attribut de l'*Etendue*... ce qui fait que l'espace pour Spinoza est... de la Vie en Dieu.' (158) Pour en venir là, Toros analyse l'emploi, tout à fait particulier, qu'aurait fait Spinoza du terme *involvere*, et en rapproche le sens du concept d'"involution," que l'on doit au mathématicien G. Desargues, et dont Spinoza aurait très probablement eu connaissance. Il s'agit, dans les deux cas, d'un rapport égal à l'unité: de sorte que 'A *involvit* B' signifierait pour Spinoza: A/B = 1. Du moins est-ce la définition qu'elle lui attribue. Mais les textes sur lesquels elle se fonde pour le faire ne l'appuient pas: au contraire, ils suggèrent qu'*involvere* a un sens rapproché de celui de l'implication logique, pas de celui de l'équivalence logique dont elle a besoin. En revanche, il est possible que Spinoza ne se soit jamais servi du terme *involvere* que lorsqu'il jugeait possible d'affirmer la réciproque (c'est d'ailleurs ce que semblent indiquer les textes cités) mais cela ne veut pas dire que cette réciprocité fait

partie du sens d'*involvere*. Néanmoins, la thèse que défend Yvonne Toros n'en est pas moins attrayante par ce qu'elle ajouterait d'ordre et de consistance à l'image que nous avons de l'univers de Spinoza. C'est une thèse qui mérite d'être reprise.

Deux autres contributions portent sur Hobbes. Celle d'Y.-C. Zarka, paraissant en dernier dans le volume, 'Espace et représentation dans le *De Corpore* de Hobbes,' présente, de façon convaincante, l'itinéraire que suit la pensée de Hobbes à partir d'un empirisme qui en aurait fait un idéaliste berkeleyen ou même kantien avant la lettre, pour aboutir au matérialisme que nous lui connaissons. C'est la représentation de l'espace dans nos idées du monde extérieur qui, selon Zarka, constitue le point tournant de cet itinéraire. Zarka montre en quoi il n'aurait pas été possible pour Hobbes de se contenter d'une notion idéelle (ou imaginaire) de l'espace, quoique tout l'y eût porté; en effet, Hobbes aurait eu à faire face au problème d'une conception objective du mouvement auquel il n'aurait pu assigner de support. C'est de cette difficulté 'que naît la nécessité rationnelle de placer hors de nous une chose douée d'une extension réelle, appelée corps.' (171) Il ne pouvait, dès lors, plus être question de se restreindre à un espace idéal ou purement imaginaire tel que celui pour lequel Berkeley devait opter quelque cinquante ans plus tard. L'article de Zarka ne prétend pas tracer un itinéraire chronologique, mais plutôt conceptuel: et ce qui en fait toute la valeur c'est justement qu'il révèle par là un autre de ces apparentements sous-jacents entre le système de Hobbes et ceux auxquels il semblerait s'opposer si radicalement, si on ne lui accordait qu'une lecture superficielle.

Le second article porte sur la pensée politique de Hobbes et tente de combler ce que l'auteur estime être une lacune dans l'explication de la formation du collectif, de l'Etat, et donc du choix du souverain. 'Le mécanisme qui produit le collectif est d'une transparence incompréhensible' écrit Christiane Frémont. Ceci est dû en partie au fait que 'les lois de la nature ne fondent aucune relation positive entre les hommes' (ce qui est tout au moins discutable), mais aussi au fait que la rivalité qui oppose homme à homme dans l'état de nature semble exclure cette admission d'égalité que requiert la formation du collectif. Pour ceci, Christiane Frémont, se basant en partie sur les travaux de René Girard, propose une analyse lumineuse des rapports entre égaux qui récusent cette égalité (analyse pour laquelle il faut préciser qu'elle ne vaut que pour le genre humain). La solution qu'offre Christiane Frémont au problème de l'instauration du souverain (chose qu'en effet Hobbes passe presque entièrement sous silence) est que le consentement à un souverain d'instauration n'est arraché que sous la menace que pose un éventuel souverain d'acquisition: c'est le danger que pose l'ennemi commun qui fait que je consens à me soumettre, en même temps que vous, à ce tiers. Cette solution — tout près de laquelle serait passé Hobbes, selon l'auteur — n'en est pas une, car elle engendre une série infinie: en effet, d'où proviendrait ce souverain ennemi? A moins d'admettre (1) qu'il n'ait pu y avoir, au Début, qu'un souverain d'acquisition et (2) que ce souverain ait pu être simple individu (ce

qui semble contradictoire), nous ne sommes pas mieux renseignés sur le processus d'instauration.

Il se pose aussi une question d'ordre plus général sur la façon dont nous devons envisager l'article de Christiane Frémont: cette tentative de combler une lacune dans le système hoblien ne peut être constituée par des conjectures sur ce que Hobbes 'aurait dit,' conjectures qui se fonderaient sur des textes; et, effectivement, l'auteur se pose la question: 'Mon hypothèse est-elle exacte, est-elle seulement légitime? Au minimum,' dit-elle, 'rien ne l'interdit.' (85). Mais au maximum? A cela, Christiane Frémont semble ne répondre qu'en intercalant les thèses de René Girard (86: '...comment se fait le transfert des forces à la Personne? Hobbes, derechef, n'explique pas ce mécanisme. C'est là précisément que l'hypothèse de René Girard est forte...'). Mais alors, quelles raisons aurions-nous d'accepter les résultats de cette synthèse? De toute évidence, il ne s'agit plus d'une lecture de Hobbes; d'autre part, ce texte n'est pas non plus une étude sociologique ou politique, car il ne se fonde sur aucune donnée empirique. Que la synthèse ainsi présentée forme un tout cohérent ne nous dit pas si, dès lors, nous avons affaire à Hobbes, ou à l'expression originale d'une pensée politique nouvelle; et dans ce dernier cas, devons-nous prendre la part qu'y contribue Hobbes pour acquise?

Trois articles portent sur Descartes ou sur le cartésianisme. (On pourrait en compter un quatrième, à la rigueur, celui de G. Brykman, dans la mesure où il se rapporte, quoique de fort loin, à Malebranche.)

Celui de Willis Doney porte sur une preuve de l'existence de Dieu que Descartes présente vers la fin des *Seconde Réponses*. Doney relève ce que cet argument a d'original: en effet, il part d'un attribut de Dieu, la toute-puissance, pour aboutir à son existence, et ceci, sans qu'il soit nécessaire de supposer, dans les prémisses, autre chose que ce seul attribut, i.e., sans qu'il y soit fait mention de Dieu (différence essentielle entre cet argument et la preuve ontologique). Doney reconnaît que l'argument, tel qu'il le reconstitue, commet des erreurs modales; mais selon lui, il est néanmoins possible, en mettant à contribution une distinction que propose Descartes lui-même, d'en minimiser les défauts de façon à y voir plutôt un argument 'persuasif.' Que cet argument soit donc une preuve originale, sans précédent connu, Doney le démontre amplement. Mais qu'il ait suffi à Descartes de ne proposer qu'un argument persuasif, voilà qui est plus difficile à accepter. Car, pour que l'argument ne remplisse que cette fonction, il faudrait que, dans l'intention de Descartes, sa conclusion ne soit que probable, ou que, joint à un autre argument (la preuve ontologique sans doute) il présente un autre biais par lequel envisager les rapports entre Essence et Existence, pour obtenir ainsi, d'un interlocuteur récalcitrant, l'assentiment voulu à la preuve ontologique. Or, d'un côté, il est fort douteux que les théologiens à qui s'adressent ces Réponses se soient contentés d'un argument persuasif à défaut de preuve ontologique valable; de l'autre, la seconde alternative contrecarre l'intention de Doney de le présenter comme preuve originale et indépendante de la preuve ontologique. De plus, le choix d'un des deux sens de 'possible' (*ex parte causa*) que fait jouer Doney pour étayer l'argument d'un côté, résorbe, de l'autre, l'un

des avantages qu'il y aurait à adopter l'interprétation qu'il propose: celui de faire éviter à Descartes la conception d'un Dieu cause efficiente de lui-même (ce en quoi Descartes suivait les conseils d'Arnauld); car autrement, la distinction dont se sert Doney n'a plus, me semble-t-il, sa raison d'être.

L'article de Joseph Beaude, remarquable de clarté et de concision, fait ressortir, pour sa part, ce que peuvent avoir de divergent deux conceptions post-cartésiennes de la théologie, et en particulier, du rôle qui y est accordé à la raison. Ce sont celles de Dom Robert Desgabets (dont les écrits ne furent jamais publiés) et de Bernard Lamy. Il ressort de cette comparaison que la différence fondamentale entre elles est que pour Desgabets, la raison doit se heurter, en principe, au mystère qui entoure la création des vérités éternelles (elles eussent pu être autres, mais la raison ne saurait révéler pourquoi Dieu choisit celles-ci plutôt que celles-là); tandis que pour Lamy, au contraire, l'activité de la raison permet de regagner, progressivement, l'état de parfaite et immédiate compréhension de Dieu qu'aurait connu l'homme avant la Chute. (Plus près de nous, Arthur Pap aurait dit que les vérités nécessaires ne le sont que de façon contingente pour Desgabets, mais de façon nécessaire pour Lamy). Que ces deux théologiens se réclament également de Descartes indique qu'il y aurait sans doute d'importants enseignements à retirer de la confrontation, à l'intérieur du corpus cartésien, des doctrines sur lesquelles chacun d'eux se fonde.

Dans un extrait de thèse, Nelly Bruyère s'emploie à mettre en évidence l'influence peu attestée de Pierre de La Ramée sur la pensée du XVII^e siècle, et en particulier sur celle des auteurs de *La Logique* dite de Port-Royal, Arnauld et Nicole. Il ressort de cette étude qu'en dépit des divergences et des critiques que ces derniers auraient adressées à leur prédécesseur, leurs conceptions des divisions de la logique et de l'unité des sciences se rejoignent. Ce travail consiste en un examen détaillé et systématique des textes mais il est regrettable que Nelly Bruyère n'ait pas expliqué l'importance de la conclusion à laquelle elle aboutit et à laquelle elle ne consacre que les quelques lignes, à peine allusives, de son dernier paragraphe.

L'article de Geneviève Brykman sur 'La notion d'*Archétype*, selon Berkeley' met en relief, non seulement le fait que pour Berkeley, ce terme n'est qu'une concession verbale destinée à recouvrir ce à quoi d'ordinaire on fait appel pour marquer l'identité et la permanence des objets perçus, mais aussi les difficultés auxquelles Berkeley doit faire face, lorsque ce terme-marque-place doit faire son apparition pour rendre compte de la Création. Qu'il puisse n'y avoir rien à quoi faire appel pour rassurer l'homme ordinaire sur la continuité des objets de sa perception n'embarrasse nullement Berkeley. Le mérite de ce texte est de montrer que les difficultés qui en résultent en ce qui concerne la Création ne le sont que pour les commentateurs et les critiques de Berkeley, et qu'en définitive, ce problème ne l'embarrasse pas non plus, ou du moins, ne l'embarrasse que dans la mesure où il est pressé par eux de se prononcer sur un sujet qu'il cherche à éviter: en effet, du moment que, selon lui, on ne peut rendre compte de la Création qu'au prix de métaphores et d'anthropomorphismes, l'image que nous nous en faisons est

essentiellement faussée; mieux vaut lui reconnaître son mystère inhérent, et s'abstenir d'en dire quoi que ce soit. D'ailleurs, Brykman démontre clairement que pour Berkeley, Dieu ne saurait s'être référé à des Idées (ou archétypes) qui lui auraient servi de modèles et qui de ce fait auraient contraint sa volonté: ne reste plus de possible qu'un acte unique où pensée et volonté ne se distinguent plus l'une de l'autre; acte, par conséquent, essentiellement incompréhensible, ce dont Berkeley s'accorde fort bien; plus aisément, en tout cas, que de tout autre modèle. Disons, en passant, que l'article de Geneviève Brykman combat ainsi une interprétation répandue des textes de Berkeley sur la notion d'archétype, interprétation qui aura fait son apparition, une fois de plus, cette année, lors des conférences tenues à Dublin pour marquer le tricentenaire du philosophe irlandais.

Le volume contient également un intéressant document par Françoise Charles-Daubert dans lequel l'auteur, rassemblant les indications fournies par divers textes de Pierre Charron, La Mothe Le Vayer, Cyrano de Bergerac et d'autres encore, présente une vue d'ensemble sur le libertinage au XVII^e siècle, et en particulier, sur les rapports qu'il établit entre fonctions de la raison, genèse et maniement du pouvoir politique et institutions religieuses; dans cette optique, c'est la clandestinité qui caractérise l'attitude que se doit d'adopter le sage, étant donnés ce privilège de la raison auquel il participe, ainsi que les dangers qu'il encourt à vouloir démythifier ceux qui n'y participent pas. L'image que trace l'auteur n'a rien de très surprenant, mais ce n'en est pas moins un travail d'une fraîcheur et d'une clarté remarquables.

Dans l'ensemble donc, les sujets abordés ne manquent nullement d'intérêt, bien au contraire; et je ne voudrais pas donner l'impression que ce volume ne mérite pas qu'on s'y attarde. Car, quel que soit le degré de rigueur qu'atteint chacune des contributions, il n'en est presque aucune qui ne contienne des enseignements nouveaux, des découvertes, des mises au jour qui valent par eux-mêmes et retiennent ainsi l'intérêt du lecteur: à cet égard, ce septième volume de *Recherches* est fidèle à la promesse faite par son directeur, il y a neuf ans. Mais s'il contribue ainsi à remplir les blancs qui demeurent au tableau que peignent petit à petit les historiens du XVII^e siècle, il n'en reste pas moins que cette peinture est par trop inégale.

Disons pour terminer que si la série du CNRS a évolué et fait fortune, il lui reste encore du chemin à faire sur le plan de la présentation. En effet, les premiers volumes n'étaient que des reproductions photographiques de textes dactylographiés. Le présent volume, par contre, est imprimé; mais le travail de correction laisse beaucoup à désirer. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de banales erreurs d'impression (les coquilles abondent), mais aussi de celles qui faussent le sens du texte. Parmi ces dernières, les plus fâcheuses sont celles qui affectent les figures paraissant, 126-7, dans le *Traité*, et qui en rendent la lecture difficile. J'en soupçonne d'autres, 154, (il s'agirait alors d'interversions des termes) d'être à la source de mon désaccord avec Yvonne Toros sur le sens à accorder à *involvere*.

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GILLES DELEUZE. *Kant's Critical Philosophy*. trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1985. Pp. xvii + 80. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-8166-1341-9.

The central thesis argued in this work may be stated generally as follows: the three *Critiques* form a *system* of thought. More specifically, therefore, Deleuze raises the question: what is the relationship amongst the three *Critiques*? His answer is that Kant is concerned with Reason in all its employments because his real interest is in the ends of Reason — the title of the concluding chapter of this work. Because Reason has ends, it has *interests*. But there is more than one *Critique* because these '...interests of reason...differ in nature' (7). However, 'these interests form an organic and hierarchical system, which is that of the *ends of a rational being*'. (*Ibid.*) Moreover, 'The idea of a systematic plurality (and a hierarchy) of interests...is...a true principle...of a *system of ends*' (*Ibid.*, italics mine).

Deleuze defends this thesis by presenting what he believes to be the 'real network which constitutes the transcendental method,' namely, the doctrine of the faculties (10). There are two senses to the term 'faculty' in Kant: 1) as the 'relationship of representation in general (knowing, desiring, feeling)' and 2) 'as sources of representations (imagination, understanding, reason)' (68). Because whenever we speak of a faculty in the first sense, there is one in the second sense called upon to *legislate*, 'to each faculty in the first sense... there must correspond a certain relationship between (sic.) faculties in the second sense' (10). In each of the first two *Critiques*, one of the faculties (in each sense of the term) is dominant. Thus in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is the natural speculative interest of reason (knowing in the higher sense) that is dominant with the understanding as the dominant legislator. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, it is the faculty of desire with reason as the predominant legislator. Regardless of which faculties are dominant, the others always play some role.

From this point of view, if reason in general is to be a systematic whole, which is why Kant's work is a systematic whole, then there must be some ultimate accord or harmony amongst the faculties. Deleuze is one of very few who sees clearly that '...the first two Critiques cannot resolve the original problem of the relation between (sic.) the faculties, but can only indicate it' (23). This problem is therefore *the* problem of Kant's work taken as a whole, and the first two critiques can only refer to it 'as a final task' (*Ibid.*). He writes:

This is why we must not expect from the (first two Critiques) the answer to a question which will take on its true sense only in the *Critique of Judgment*. As regards a ground for the harmony of the faculties, the first two Critiques are complete only in the last. (24)

This is why Kant's thought, contrary to most of the scholarship, is a system and why, therefore, despite the many problems and insights of the individual

Critiques which are of interest in their own right, one misses the real import of Kant's work unless it is treated as a systematic whole.

Deleuze defends this thesis in merely seventy-five pages — a virtual tour de force which could only be accomplished with such mastery by one who has mastered all the Kantian texts, who has grasped the central theme that connects those texts into a systematic whole, and sweeping aside all Kantian detail presents that thread with a simplicity that is as utterly startling to the reader as the shock of picking up such a thin volume with the title, *Kant's Critical Philosophy!*

The crucial move, i.e., the one that opens up the work of the later Kant in a way which connects it to the first two *Critiques*, is made by Deleuze at p. 39 where he states, and quite correctly in my opinion, that the most serious misunderstanding of Kant's work in ethics is to believe that 'Kantian morality remains indifferent to its own realization.' The gap between the sensible and the suprasensible is there to be filled by human action, and it is this problem which mainly concerns Kant in the *Critique of Judgment* and his two essays on history. The only other scholar I know to have seen this even earlier than Deleuze is Emil Fackenheim ('Kant's Concept of History', *Kant-Studien* 48 [1957]). If one does not see this, then one misses entirely the systematic import of Kant's thought taken as a whole because one cannot see the relationship of the later to the earlier work. Most importantly, one cannot account for (and, therefore, like Cassirer, ignores) the Appendix to the *Critique of Judgment* which is on the teleological judgment.

Deleuze, like Fackenheim, sees clearly that Kant's account of the teleological judgment is his solution to the central problem of the critical edifice. Taken together with aesthetic judgment, teleological judgment (both are reflective) 'makes possible the transition from the faculty of knowledge to the faculty of desire...and prepares the subordination of the former to the latter' (67), i.e., of the speculative to the practical interest. It thus also prepares the actualization of freedom in nature. In a word, 'the final accord of the faculties is the object of a special genesis,' and 'the final relationship between nature and man is the result of a *human* practical activity' (69).

With the appearance of recent works like those of Shell and Galston, it would seem that the later Kant is being taken seriously for a change. This translation of Deleuze's work, first written in French in 1963, is therefore a much needed, timely, and important event for the Anglo-Saxon philosophical world. Its brevity ought not to mislead anyone into thinking that it is of an introductory nature. On the contrary, it is for the Kantian scholar or for graduate courses which concern themselves with Kant's thought as a whole; for if one wishes to contest the central thesis of this book, one must be a Kantian scholar equal to the brilliance of its author.

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ILHAM DILMAN, ed. *Philosophy and Life: Essays on John Wisdom*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 1984. Pp. 345. US\$56.00. ISBN 90-247-2996-3.

This book contains an introduction and two articles by the editor, two reprinted pieces by Wisdom, and ten other essays. The latter '... were all written ... to be discussed at a conference honouring his work.'

Readers are likely to compare this collection with the earlier *festschrift*, *Wisdom: Twelve Essays*, edited by Bambrough, published ten years ago. Disregarding my contribution to the earlier book, the newer is less satisfactory in most respects: with exceptions, the essays are less good and the editing is poor. The most attractive item, as the contributors would probably agree, is a reprinting of Wisdom's talk about horse-racing, which this time, incidentally, includes the intriguing error (27) of a horse running in 'winkers.'

A collection of Wisdom's *opera minora* — articles, reviews, obituaries, prefaces, letters to newspapers — would be extremely welcome and, even more so, of course, his unpublished manuscripts and lectures. For, as the two items by him in this volume illustrate, he writes with a distinctive style and a gift for refreshing metaphors and similes which make him the most engaging writer of twentieth century philosophy. (J.L. Austin was wittier but not so humorous nor so charming). In the horse-racing article, for instance, we are shown (although we may have often seen such things, we haven't noticed them before— the 'desperate faces' of horses in the straight: the filly, 'ears pricked sweet as a debutante'; the racing touts in 'suits of inexpressible smartness.' And (elsewhere) the goat with the 'cynical gaze.') Sometimes one almost wishes that Wisdom had written *belles lettres* rather than philosophy, but then his originality and acumen as a philosopher would have been lost to us and he would not have served to relieve the tedium, the literary insensibility, of most contemporary philosophical writing. His discursive style which he has largely employed since *Mind and Matter* enrages some readers who want material presented, cut and dried, ordered and perhaps in numbered propositions. And, after an essay has been read or a lecture heard, one may hear the murmur 'Just what exactly is the point?', which overlooks the possibility that some points are best, perhaps only, conveyed by meandering. The editorial introduction frequently uses the word 'discursive' to describe Wisdom's reasoning but, that terms being both vague and very ambiguous, since it is not here defined the result is confusing. However, in this connection Bambrough's article is particularly helpful. He probably has more knowledge of Wisdom, as a teacher and colleague, than anyone now alive. First enlarging, in a literary style very Wisdomian, on his own well-known article on universals, he then dwells on the similarities between Wittgenstein and Wisdom. His most helpful point (if I understand him correctly) is that both can be re-written in forms more clear to ourselves without being false to them.

Another lacuna in our knowledge of Wisdom which is not filled in this book is the biographical. He is, as is widely known, the most prominent

English philosopher to have undertaken protracted psycho-analytic treatment and, despite the title, *Philosophy and Psychoanalysis* tells us little — indeed, one suspects the title was a publisher's lure. Brearley, taught by Wisdom and himself a practising analyst, writes interestingly about reasoning in the two areas, and that his essay has, at one stage, been commented upon by Wisdom himself adds to its value. Several philosophers have written fruitlessly about psycho-analysis (Brearley's remarks about Morris Lazerowitz illustrate this) and few have contributed to our understanding. Perhaps Brearley will find time to write more: his last sentence shows a willingness to be emphatic, 'Wisdom more than any philosopher I know acknowledges the limitations of conscious logic ...' But Wisdom's close relationships with Wittgenstein and Moore is an untouched topic which will be of great interest. For the respect in which they both held him is attested by the weekly meetings of the three over protracted periods. Moreover, unlike some great admirers of Wittgenstein, Wisdom — who very fully acknowledges his indebtedness in print — was never sycophantic. It seems that he fully understood Wittgenstein, that the latter knew it, but Wisdom pushed forward with philosophical issues in new terrain.

Readers interested in 'reasoning' will find Newell's essay most rewarding. Wisdom's most important and original contribution in philosophy will be thought by many to be his challenge to received opinion — especially Hume's — about reasoning. Whether the area is called epistemology, metaphysics, or the philosophy of logic, Wisdom's sophisticated and often disturbing statements about the very basis of inductive and deductive performances now receive direct attention and the fullest understanding from Newell. This item alone would make this book important.

The same topic plays a part in the contributions by Meirlys Lewis, McFee and Shiner. Lewis's 'The art of saying what can be imagined' is also notable for its sympathetic grasp of Wisdom's thought and is conspicuously well-written. Unlike Shiner, she pays due regard to the significance of the consideration of possible cases as well as actual cases in the 'case-by-case procedure,' and she does not say, as McFee oddly does, that this procedure is not inductive.

Another feature of Wisdom's work which makes him conspicuous among contemporaries is the catholicity of his interests, reflected in the second of his papers reprinted here under the title 'Mr. Kollerstrom's dream: Enlightenment and Happiness — a few remarks' (1973), which is an introduction to a book about a friend's religious experience. It accounts, in part at least, for the presence in this volume of a contribution on 'Wonders' by Britton and on 'Saints and Supererogation' by Melden. And it is a recurring note in papers by former students here that Wisdom tolerates on public occasions, and treats with solemn respect, questions from the audience however irrelevant, however inane. In this, good manners no doubt play a part, but human puzzlement of almost any sort is to him of interest and importance.

Two more articles concern universals, those of Peter Long and Nammour. Long opens with an arresting contrast between Bradley and Russell, which

shows correctly how much silent attention Russell gave to Bradley's views. It is a most interesting and careful piece, but it assumes a knowledge of Frege (e.g., of his use of 'concept' and 'formal relations'), and calls for a tolerance, which may be wanting in some readers, of such remarks as '... there is no expression in language for the relation of a relation's relating one thing to another!' (277) (although this very expression seems to do the trick) and '... our means of expression necessarily misrepresent what we mean to express' (280).

To say that this volume is badly edited is unfair unless supported. The title '... of my making' is arch and there is no index. No effort has been made (apparently) to secure conformity in the style of footnoting or references by the different authors. The abbreviations used are not clearly explained, e.g., (312) 'PM' and '(WFK)': the typographical format (if one can use that phrase of a book produced by some photographic process) for the different articles is not consistent and the editor's own footnotes (178), if taken as intended aids to scholars, are bizarre.

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KLAUS DÜSING, *Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. Ontologie und Dialektik in Antike und Neuzeit*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft (Coll. 'Erträge der Forschung' vol. 206), 272 p. Cdn\$21.00. ISBN 3-534-07959-0.

Chaque philosophie nouvelle entretient un rapport avec la philosophie antérieure. En effet, ou bien elle reprend le principe d'une philosophie antérieure et cherche à le développer d'une façon plus conséquente, ou bien elle part de la reconnaissance de l'insuffisance de ce principe et en propose un nouveau; quel que soit le cas, elle s'approprie les concepts de la philosophie antérieure et les intègre en elle de sorte que celle-ci continue à vivre dans la philosophie nouvelle. C'est cette considération que Hegel oppose au scepticisme ancien et moderne qui renvoie de façon privilégiée à l'histoire de la philosophie comme à un musée des opinions dont les prétentions à la vérité paraissent s'annuler réciproquement. Or loin de présenter une succession plus ou moins aléatoire d'opinions contradictoires, l'histoire de la philosophie présente en fait, selon Hegel, pourvu qu'on sache le reconnaître et qu'on fasse

abstraction des répétitions et des aberrations dues aux contingences historiques, le développement rationnel et continu de la philosophie. Cela implique que la philosophie la plus nouvelle devrait contenir la philosophie antérieure, dont elle est d'ailleurs issue, et se présenter comme la philosophie la plus riche, la plus élaborée, la plus englobante (v. *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie*, éd. par J. Hoffmeister, 3^e éd. par F. Nicolin, Hambourg 1959, p. 32, 66 et suiv., 141 et suiv.). Et si l'on fait abstraction de tout ce qui, dans l'histoire de la philosophie, est attribuable aux contingences historiques pour ne considérer que le développement de ce qui a toujours été l'objet de la philosophie — la détermination de la vérité — celui-ci devrait se montrer identique au développement que présente la science de la logique en tant que philosophie première ainsi que la conceoit Hegel (v. *Idem*, p. 34 et suiv., 120 et 223). Mais s'il est vrai que la science de la logique, qui présente le développement de l'idée philosophique — la détermination de la vérité — dans l'élément de la pensée pure, doit être présupposée pour le traitement 'scientifique,' au sens hégélien du terme, de l'histoire de la philosophie, celle-ci est en fait tout autant présupposée par la science de la logique, non pas certes tout à fait dans le même sens que la phénoménologie de l'esprit qui sert d'introduction au système de la philosophie, mais comme développement antérieur de la pensée philosophique que la science de la logique reprend et intègre tout en le parachevant. Cela veut dire que la science de la logique et l'histoire de la philosophie représentent l'instance réciproque en vue de laquelle ces deux sciences avaient à se constituer (v. *Ibid.*, p. 278).

Cette théorie de l'histoire de la philosophie, la première qui puisse prétendre être elle-même philosophique, a été exposée et développée dans les *Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie* que Hegel a prononcées à neuf reprises au cours de sa vie. Elles ont fait l'objet d'une édition dans le cadre des *Oeuvres* publiées peu de temps après sa mort grâce aux soins des amis du philosophe (*Sämtliche Werke*, vol. XIII-XV, éd. par K.L. Michelet, Berlin 1833-1836; réimpr. dans l'édition du Jubilée, t. XVII-XIX, par H. Glockner, 2^e éd., Stuttgart 1959; tr. fr. par P. Garniron, 7 tomes, Paris 1971 et suiv..) Depuis lors, ces *Leçons* n'ont pas cessé de susciter des prises de position tout en exerçant une influence considérable sur la façon de concevoir l'histoire de la philosophie, au moins jusqu'au début du siècle présent. Cette influence tend toutefois à s'amenuiser de nos jours, par suite des nombreuses études auxquelles elles ont donné lieu, dont la plupart se sont appliquées à dénoncer la violence que l'interprétation hégélienne de l'histoire de la philosophie fait subir aux textes de la tradition philosophique. Mais si l'interprétation que Hegel propose des principaux textes de la tradition nous paraît aujourd'hui erronée ou biaisée, elle garde notre intérêt dans la mesure où elle éclaire de nombreux passages cruciaux mais souvent très obscurs de la *Science de la Logique*. En outre, le traitement et la critique que Hegel a faits de la philosophie antérieure gardent dans bien des cas tout leur intérêt d'un point de vue systématique.

Dans son livre sur Hegel et l'histoire de la philosophie, K. Düsing a tenté de faire le point sur ce thème en offrant notamment un tour d'horizon de

toute la littérature qui s'y rapporte. L'ouvrage de Düsing ne se limite pas toutefois à un rapport sur la littérature abondante consacrée à l'interprétation hégélienne de l'histoire de la philosophie, mais propose en outre une étude systématique de la question. Le livre est divisé en trois parties. La première, qui est la plus brève, est consacrée à la théorie générale que Hegel a défendue au sujet de l'histoire de la philosophie. La deuxième porte sur l'interprétation hégélienne de la dialectique, de l'ontologie et de la théologie des penseurs grecs, c'est-à-dire les présocratiques (Parménide, Zénon d'Elée, Héraclite et Anaxagore), Platon, Aristote et les philosophes néo-platoniciens (Plotin et Proclus). La troisième partie porte sur la présentation et la critique que Hegel a fait de la métaphysique de la substance et de la théorie de la subjectivité dans la philosophie moderne, soit surtout les philosophies de Spinoza et de Kant.

Chaque section du livre commence par une synthèse brève mais complète de la littérature pertinente. L'auteur fait notamment état, dans la première partie, de la réception de la théorie hégélienne de l'histoire de la philosophie au XIX^e siècle, ce dont les études plus récentes font généralement peu de cas. Il est aussi à noter que les synthèses proposées par Düsing incluent, outre la littérature en langue allemande, celle en langue française, anglaise, italienne et néerlandaise.

Dans la première partie de l'ouvrage de Düsing, la synthèse de la littérature pertinente est suivie d'une étude visant à faire le point sur la question quelque peu controversée de l'évolution de la conception hégélienne de l'histoire de la philosophie. Düsing y reprend et défend (17 et suiv.) les conclusions auxquelles était arrivé H. Kimmerle dans son étude sur le rapport entre philosophie et histoire dans la pensée de Hegel ('Notwendige geschichtliche und philosophische Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von Geschichte und Philosophie bei Hegel,' in *Hegel-Jahrbuch* 1968/9, p. 135 et suiv.), à savoir que Hegel n'était pas encore parvenu à une conception dialectique de l'histoire de la philosophie à l'époque de *Foi et savoir*. Par contre, la théorie dialectique de l'histoire de la philosophie, qui pour l'essentiel ne variera pas par la suite, se trouve déjà dans les *Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie* que Hegel a lues pour la première fois à Iéna en 1805/06, ainsi que l'attestent les témoignages de Rosenkranz, de Michelet et de Gabler (Cf. l'avant-propos de K.L. Michelet dans: *Sämtliche Werke*, t. XIII, p. vi et suiv., x et xvi; K. Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, Berlin 1844, p. 201; le témoignage de Gabler a été publié dans 'Dokumente zu Hegels Jenaer Dozententätigkeit' (1801-1807), éd. par H. Kimmerle, *Hegel-Studien* 4, 1967, p. 65 et suiv.). Les principes de l'interprétation hégélienne de l'histoire de la philosophie et surtout son rapport à ce que Düsing appelle la 'métaphysique de l'histoire' (*Geschichtsmetaphysik*) y sont en outre bien mis en lumière. Mais bien qu'il ait signalé les objections de principe que cette théorie de l'histoire de la philosophie n'a pas manqué de soulever, Düsing s'est gardé de prendre position sur la question de sa validité d'un point de vue systématique, préférant l'évaluer comme l'ont fait tous ceux qui ont traité de cette théorie avant lui, c'est-à-dire en procédant à un examen critique des interprétations par-

ticulières des principaux textes de la tradition que Hegel a proposées dans ses *Leçons*.

Ce qui distingue l'étude de Düsing des études nombreuses de l'interprétation hégélienne de l'histoire de la philosophie, hormis son caractère synthétique, c'est qu'elle met en lumière dans certaines sections, notamment celles portant sur Platon, Aristote, le néo-platonisme, Spinoza et Kant, la signification que la philosophie de ces auteurs a eue à chaque stade de l'évolution de la pensée de Hegel. Les sous-chapitres consacrés à cet aspect de la question constituent sans aucun doute les parties les plus originales et les plus intéressantes de l'ouvrage de Düsing. Aussi l'étude critique qu'il propose de l'interprétation hégélienne de Platon et en particulier du *Parménide*, que Hegel considérait comme le chef-d'œuvre de la dialectique antique, est certainement la meilleure à paraître depuis celle de H.-G. Gadamer ('Hegel und die antike Dialektik,' in *Hegels Dialektik*. Fünf hermeneutische Studien, Tübingen 1971, pp. 7-30), dans la mesure où Düsing tient compte non seulement de l'histoire de la réception du dialogue, notamment son interprétation dans un sens positif et même théologique dans le néo-platonisme qui a certainement influencé la réception hégélienne du dialogue, mais également de l'interprétation hégélienne de l'histoire de l'ontologie grecque à partir de Parménide. Pour Hegel, en effet, le développement initial de l'ontologie grecque de Parménide à Platon, en passant par Zénon, Héraclite et Georgias, correspond pour l'essentiel au développement décrit dans les premiers chapitres de la *Science de la Logique*. Düsing peut ainsi très bien rendre compte des présupposés de la lecture que Hegel a faite du *Parménide* et du *Sophiste*, laquelle nous paraît aujourd'hui une mésinterprétation parfois grossière. Ce que l'on peut reprocher à Düsing, c'est de ne pas avoir suffisamment insisté dans son analyse sur la place centrale qu'occupe l'écrit de Georgias *Sur le néant* dans l'histoire de l'ontologie et de la dialectique chez les Grecs, ainsi que Hegel l'a d'ailleurs explicitement reconnu, étant sans doute le premier philosophe à considérer de façon positive la contribution de la sophistique à l'histoire de la philosophie (v. *Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie*, t. 2, tr. P. Garniron, Paris 1971, p. 267 et suiv.).

Si les sections du livre de Düsing portant sur la réception hégélienne de la philosophie d'Aristote et de Kant n'apportent rien de très nouveau, puisqu'elle a fait l'objet de nombreuses publications, du moins ont-elles le mérite de faire le tour de la question. Les sections sur la réception hégélienne du néo-platonisme et du spinozisme sont particulièrement instructives en ce qui a trait à la question de l'importance et de la signification de ces deux philosophies dans l'évolution de la pensée de Hegel.

On peut regretter que l'ouvrage de Düsing ne comporte aucune section traitant de façon particulière la réception hégélienne de la philosophie de Descartes ou de Leibniz, mais comme celles-ci n'ont qu'une importance subordonnée dans l'interprétation hégélienne de l'histoire de la philosophie, cela est certes excusable. La même chose vaut a fortiori pour la philosophie du Moyen Age.

Pour qui s'intéresse à l'interprétation hégélienne de l'histoire de la

philosophie, le livre de Dusing devrait s'imposer comme l'ouvrage de référence indispensable.

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JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, *Anatomie du pouvoir*, trad. Daniel Blanchard. Paris: Editions du Seuil, L'histoire immédiate 1985. 187 p. 78FF. ISBN 2-02-008605-0.

Dans ce livre qui s'adresse d'emblée à un vaste public et dont Daniel Blanchard a rédigé une excellente traduction, J.K. Galbraith nous propose une analyse de la nature et des structures du pouvoir. L'auteur évite donc de manière explicite 'de porter un jugement sur la pratique du pouvoir — mis à part le rôle si inquiétant du pouvoir militaire — car ce n'est pas là un phénomène dont on puisse traiter avec un détachement analytique' (171).

Toutefois, dans la mesure où elle vise à disséquer le phénomène, l'analyse rend repérables les procédés d'exercice et les sources du pouvoir. Ces procédés nommément la dissuasion, la rétribution et la persuasion sont utilisés par les trois sources de pouvoir que sont la personnalité, la propriété et l'organisation.

Or, ces séries de trois éléments desservent une étude du pouvoir qui se veut exhaustive, car elles sont incomplètes. Ainsi, comment expliquer la domination de la femme par l'homme? On ne le peut ni par la source de pouvoir qu'est la personnalité ni par les trois procédés d'exercice ci-haut mentionnés. En effet, on conçoit aisément que les personnalités s'équivalent chez l'un et l'autre sexes. En outre, on ne peut situer le centre du pouvoir masculin dans l'un de ces trois instruments de pouvoir à moins d'inclure dans la catégorie de la persuasion les normes sociales; en fait, le pouvoir masculin ne provient-il pas des normes de la société, de la tradition et des notions greffées artificiellement à la différence des sexes? La méthode de Galbraith se révèle donc insatisfaisante dans la mesure où elle manque, en regard de certains pouvoirs, d'éléments explicatifs.

De plus, son approche abstraite de la question du pouvoir le conduit à omettre une dimension non négligeable du phénomène, soit celle de la soumission volontaire. Une explication de cette soumission serait l'adhésion, de la part de celui qui se soumet, à certaines conceptions traditionnelles. Il est

donc regrettable qu'un auteur aussi intéressant que Galbraith n'ait pas traité de l'idée selon laquelle on peut se représenter le pouvoir comme une pyramide qui va non seulement dans le sens du sommet vers la base mais aussi dans le sens contraire. Car l'absence de la dimension de la *servitude volontaire* (selon les termes de La Boétie) ou de la *tyrannie volontaire* (ainsi nommée par Rousseau) ou encore de l'obéissance généralisée dans nos sociétés démocratiques rend impossible la prise en compte de ces millions d'individus qui, motivés par le désir de se soumettre, deviennent des esclaves heureux.

En outre, sa critique de la pratique du pouvoir militaire se limite au simple constat suivant: le pouvoir militaire aux Etats-Unis contrôle seul les politiques de l'armement, car il exclut le contrôle civil sous prétexte de son ignorance en la matière. Or, cette exclusion manifeste du contrôle civil dans la gestion des politiques militaires est un épiphénomène. En effet, il en serait autrement si l'opinion publique américaine n'avait pas cautionné par la voie électorale ces politiques favorables à l'armement. En fait, il aurait fallu que Galbraith explique le *comment* et le *pourquoi* de la tendance actuelle de l'opinion publique américaine plutôt que de réduire la problématique à des luttes entre organisations, en l'occurrence l'organisation du pouvoir civil et celle du pouvoir militaire.

Cependant d'une façon générale, la mise en évidence par l'auteur de l'*importance accrue de l'organisation* dans nos sociétés permet de saisir les conséquences de cette nouvelle structure sociale sur la gestion du pouvoir. Ainsi, selon Galbraith, les grandes organisations centralisent le pouvoir seulement pour mieux le disséminer ensuite: elles n'accordent donc qu'un pouvoir diffus à leurs membres. Dans les médias, par exemple, le rôle des journalistes se résume à servir les fins de l'organisation. En ce contexte, il aurait été pertinent de se demander pourquoi les journalistes acceptent de se conformer aux directives de l'organisation qui les emploie au point de présenter les faits sous l'angle qu'elle leur prescrit. De fait, ceci compromet la liberté d'expression indispensable à la formation de l'opinion publique en régime démocratique.

Bref, l'auteur ne semble pas estimer qu'il faille discuter des questions de fond portant sur ce que pourrait être une société meilleure, ni des questions polémiques/politiques en regard de la distribution du pouvoir et de ses conséquences plus ou moins égalitaires. En somme l'auteur se limite à l'étude des pouvoirs perceptibles dans différents domaines tels ceux de la politique, de l'industrie et de la presse. Bien que Galbraith mentionne que personne ne reste neutre face à la question du pouvoir et de son exercice, il s'est contenté, comme il l'avait annoncé d'ailleurs, d'en présenter une étude caractérisée par ce 'détachement analytique' propre à l'approche épistémologique. Quoiqu'il en soit, l'ouvrage est d'autant plus décevant que l'analyse se révèle peu approfondie. Pour dire la chose simplement, il semble que, malgré la promesse du titre, l'étude ne soit pas exhaustive.

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WAYNE GRENNAN. *Argument Evaluation*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1984. Pp. xiv + 406. US\$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-4266-2); US\$16.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-4267-0).

This is a text-book aimed at first year students taking a class in critical thinking or elementary non-symbolic logic. It covers the standard deductive and inductive argument forms and the common fallacies, and discusses various types of statements and how to assess their truth. The text provides techniques for the analysis and evaluation of arguments, including a variation on the standard Venn diagram test.

Given its orientation, the book must be judged in terms of whether it succeeds in taking the student through the material in a clear and systematic manner and whether it engages the student in useful deliberations on the more difficult features of argumentation, of assessing truth and the like. The inclusion of exercises, with answers to selected problems, and the provision of summaries at key places certainly aid the reader. Grennan is also correct to begin with good arguments rather than with fallacies and to work initially from constructed examples rather than difficult natural prose passages found, for example, on the editorial pages of newspapers. The evaluative techniques suggested are relatively thorough and introduce useful critical criteria for a variety of different types of arguments. Grennan deals with deductive arguments by a version of the test for invalidity by the assignation of truth-values. To handle standard form categorical propositions he provides an original interpretation of these by considering what each states about membership in the cells of a Venn Diagram. Since his interpretations employ only the logical operators already familiar from the discussion of the propositional logic, students can test for validity without having to master another mechanical technique. With this case, as with the detailed treatments of arguments throughout, I found many interesting things to consider and some novel ideas about how to introduce material to a class.

The student, however, will have difficulty with this text because the discussions that introduce central ideas or topics are frequently unclear, misleading (often because incomplete) or come too late. An example of the first occurs in Chapter Two when the reader is told that there are three sources of knowledge: experience, personal observation and authority or testimony of others (9). But 'experience' can include what 'you know at second hand,' which makes it look like accepting the testimony of others. 'Personal observation' is discussed in terms of an example which again invites the student to confuse first-hand experience with the testimony of others. Moreover, it cannot be differentiated from 'experience' except that, as I interpret these passages, 'experience' must refer to past experience while 'personal observation' refers to future attempts to get the experience necessary for determining the truth of the claim in question. But even then we do not have two distinct 'sources' of knowledge.

An example of a misleading discussion occurs in the treatment of standard

form categorial propositions. We are told that the quantifier in I or O propositions can be interpreted as 'most,' or 'a few' as well as 'some' and that 'the validity of arguments remains unchanged when any of these expressions are substituted in place of "some" in All occurrences in an argument' (220). This principle is certainly false. The argument 'All M is P, Some M is S, Therefore some S is P' is valid on the standard interpretation of 'some.' But substituting 'most' for 'some' here does not render a valid argument. With 'most S is M' in the second premise instead of 'most M is S' we get an inference that would appear valid, but now it is clear that propositions with these quantifiers are not convertible as is a standard form categorical I proposition as it is usually interpreted. An immediate inference such as the conversion of an I proposition is clearly valid and immediately refutes Grennan's principle. Perhaps more complete treatment of these phrases both here and in the earlier discussion of them (sec. 2.10) might have straightened this out.

The most obvious example of a belated discussion occurs in the initial exposition of arguments employing disjunctive propositions. Concrete examples are offered for the reader's consideration, the task being to decide whether the argument offered is or is not valid by the technique of counter example (177). The discussion of 'or' will not come for five more pages. The problem is that to agree with Grennan's claims about the examples the reader must *already* have decided to read a disjunctive assertion as stating an inclusive alternation. The two examples are both of the form: p or q , p , therefore not q . Whether this is valid depends on the interpretation given the logical operators. Grennan incorrectly claims that the propositions ' p or q ' is true when at least one of its parts is true' (177). For some uses it will be true if *only* one of the disjuncts is true. The problem is that Grennan has decided the reading he wants and thereby selects a counter-example — 'George Washington was the first president of the U.S. or a general' — which can be expected to be interpreted in an inclusive manner given that the facts about Washington are common knowledge. But we are supposed to be discussing claims and arguments found in everyday use and it would be quite reasonable for students to hold that the exclusive reading is the one they meet more frequently in natural contexts.

Students will also have trouble with technical terms used without explanation, such as 'predicate expression' (19). And students will face the problem of Grennan's non-standard employment of certain technical terms if they are looking at other texts on the subject. The most obvious case is 'valid.' There is no universal agreement on restricting 'valid' to deductive inferences, and one is free to stipulate uses for one's own purposes. Yet the use of 'evidential validity' to refer to the problem of inductive cogency (50) seems less than felicitous, especially since it is followed, on the next page, by a discussion of evidence, thereby beginning to cloud the distinction between truth and validity. The application of the same evaluative symbols both to premises and to inferences opens up further opportunities for confusion and mistakes. And the attempts to quantify the interpretations of the symbols in percentage terms, or in fractions, gives what are, at best, awkward results.

For example, we are told that if the truth of a premise, A 'makes the probability of B at best 3/4' then we are to judge that the inference from A to B is valid (42). I'm not sure we want 'probability' and 'valid' juxtaposed in this way.

In the final analysis, the book is not one I could see using with a class. There are too many chances for confusion and too many incomplete or questionable discussions of central items. Moreover, the publisher must be held responsible for foisting on the public a book that is filled with typographical errors and grammatical mistakes. It needed a good proof reader and a good editor. We can forgive a few minor typographical errors but 'able' for 'unable' (54) is not minor. We may also forgive the numerous split infinitives but not serious grammatical errors (e.g., 11, 18, 19, 38, 70, 181) that affect clarity of expression and meaning. A text attempting to teach students to think carefully and clearly must itself be an example of unblemished clear and precise writing.

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JAMES M. GUSTAFSON. *Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective. Volume Two: Ethics and Theology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1984. Pp. x + 326. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-226-31112-0.

In the first volume of this work (see *CPR/RCCP* 2 (1982) 173 [Ed.]), Gustafson developed and justified a theocentric perspective. The object of this second volume is to articulate the view of morality which follows from this perspective. The basic theoretical question which it sets out to tackle is: What difference does theism make to morality? The most general practical question of a theistic ethics, as Gustafson sees it, is: 'What is God enabling and requiring us to be and do?'; where by 'God' is meant the ultimate ordering power in the universe. The general form of the answer to both questions appears to be, that we are to deal with ourselves and with everything else in a manner which is in conformity with our and their relations to God as ultimate ordering principle. Gustafson emphasises that this is not just a matter of attending to anthropocentric concerns, and then looking for theological principles to justify them; rather we must think of human activity within the wider realm of nature of which we form a part. To sum the matter up, he formulates an im-

perative in the tradition and manner of Kant: 'Act so that you treat all things never only as means to your own ends, or even to collective human ends.'

Gustafson sets out his position by reference to four theologians, suitably chosen to represent the Catholic and the Protestant traditions of the past and present — Karl Barth, Thomas Aquinas, Karl Rahner and Paul Ramsey. He also uses as benchmarks the ethical systems of Kant and the Utilitarians. Wisely refusing to confine himself to generalities, he applies his results to four particular areas of ethical concern — marriage and the family, suicide, population and nutrition, and the allocation of biomedical research funding.

Gustafson is concerned throughout to place emphasis on our status as agents who form parts of inclusive wholes with which we are interdependent; not only are we members of institutions and communities, but our species inhabits an ecosphere, and our planet is within a cosmos. The interventions in these interdependent systems which have the widest consequences, especially when these are irreversible, 'require grave reflection and the strongest possible justification before power is exercised; and those that are irreversible ought not to be done except for very powerful reasons that support compensating laudable ends.' As Gustafson sees it, thought on the use of power tends to be dominated either by optimism or by pessimism, in both of which he detects dangers and undesirable consequences. In some areas of human activity, persons of capacity and good will are hampered because their critics take a Hobbesian view of human nature; while in other cases, like that of the possibility of nuclear war, it seems proper to take into account the worst conceivable case of misuse.

Our valuing of ourselves has repercussions on our valuing of other persons and of nature at large. If we believe that we are the center of value in our world, either as individuals, or as nations, or even as a species, other individuals or nations or species will be liable to become simply means to our interests and desires. Conversely, we may underestimate ourselves as individuals or communities or as a species, and thus refuse to accept our 'distinctive place in the wider ordering, with its possibilities for sustaining, cultivating, and developing the world of which we are part! The sin of pride seems largely a matter of excessive confidence in human capacities rightly to order life; the sin of sloth a matter of minimising our abilities and responsibilities in this direction. Gustafson's biblical exegesis conforms to the general pattern one might expect from all this. The disordering of life alluded to in the third chapter of the Book of Genesis is due to a false evaluation of the place of human life in the ordering of the world; while the ire of the Hebrew prophets was directed against the failure of the people to acknowledge the divine laws which order history.

I think secularist as well as religious readers should be impressed by Gustafson's sanity, scholarship and good sense; but they might press the common secularist objection to religious morality, that it is difficult to see what difference belief in God actually makes. Cannot one relate oneself to the order in the cosmos as well, if not better, if one is not distracted by such irrelevances? The suspicion that this was the real direction of Gustafson's

ethical system might be strengthened by his own admission that he takes the Bible as less authoritative than most of his predecessors in theological ethics.

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VINCENT HOPE, ed. *Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment*, Columbia University Press for Edinburgh University Press 1984. Pp. xii + 261. US\$22.50. ISBN 0-85224-477-0.

It were perhaps better not to honour exceptional achievements of scholarship and the mind which has fostered them. Honour the man, certainly; if an indebtedness is felt, repay with appreciation, and possibly even affection. But to dedicate a collection of essays, as diverse in style and content as in interest, to a fathering intellect whose seed continues to spring up in foreign as well as more likely places is to invite troublesome questions of progeny and a rightful heir. Imagine, too, the feelings of the honoured one as he stumbles, unexpectedly, into an entire volume of such claimants. Perhaps only a Rousseau would understand.

The author of *The Democratic Intellect* (1961) is no stranger to controversy or the family squabble. Those strong lines of insight into Scottish Philosophy have made George Elder Davie a painter whose vast canvases of socio-religious as well as intellectual history escape neither the attention nor the indignation of his critics. These latter have now entered upon a self-styled campaign of 'demythologising.' The once legendary, because seemingly so persuasive, viewpoint is to be exposed as a 'historiographic' blunder of the first magnitude. The tale of the Scottish Enlightenment — whether sad or inglorious or even truly Scottish — must be written anew. Is the present volume, ironically, a first chapter in the retelling?

Some are indeed exploratory of new ground, but in just such a manner as to earn, in Vincent Hope's phrase from the Preface, the honoured scholar's 'pleasure and approval.' They emerge, that is, not only from the ferreting out of original source materials, but also from a careful reading of the texts themselves. In this sense, the work of James Moore and Michael Silverthorne on Gershom Carmichael's pivotal role as the disseminator, albeit a critical one, of Pufendorf's *de Officio* to a waiting audience of eighteenth-century

natural jurists deepens our awareness of those sources whence sprang, for example, Thomas Reid's later preoccupation, in his lectures at Glasgow on Jurisprudence and Politicks, with the rights and duties of men. To this latter issue, Melvin Dalgarno turns a deft and penetrating hand, reaching well into Reid's soon-to-be-published lecture materials on Jurisprudence to assess that Scottish thinker's claim that, 'What I have a right to do, it is the duty of all men not to hinder me from doing ... And what I have a right to demand of any man, it is his duty to perform.' His analysis of the language of *vinculum juris* and of *reflex* rights and obligations, and of the respective positions of Hobbes, Reid, and J.S. Mill, is particularly illuminating. So too, but in a somewhat different vein, is Knud Haakonssen's thesis concerning the gradual 'dissolution' or eroding away of Adam Smith's 'science of a legislator' — a science in which history works in concert with theory — at the hands of Common Sense philosophy, both in its laboured adherence to an academic plan and in its utter failure, even through an astute Dugald Stewart, to understand what Smith was saying. Haakonssen rightly senses that the late-century philosophical ground is shifting; that Stewart for all his 'atomisms' is looking towards the whole, particularly towards those factors which might be effective in sustaining it. The utility of cultured learning in relation to the well-being of society had become the favoured off-spring of Enlightenment thought.

In a style now that is Davie's at its best, Neil MacCormick's study of James Lorimer's *The Institutes of Law: a Treatise on the Principles of Jurisprudence as determined by Nature* (1872) is spirited, provocative and, in the finest sense, thoughtful. If, as Hope rightly suggests, Davie plunged mind and reader into the 'clash of personalities and values, always implying their present relevance,' then MacCormick has followed suit, and with equal intensity. In part a plea on behalf of a '*reasonable* wish' for a reasonable liberty, and thence a '*reasonable* way [or "plan" à la Rawls] of life,' in part also a caution against the sort of egalitarianism endemic to Lorimer's argument that all men are 'equally men,' but not necessarily 'equal men,' MacCormick's discussion ranges from Reid (on law, although less than adequately) to Rawls, from Hart to Dworkin, and from Weber to Solzhenitsyn. All this is highly stimulating; more importantly, it ties Lorimer (and MacCormick himself) to the tradition of the Democratic Intellect — 'a system of education which secures to each the opportunity for fullest development of his or her natural gifts, and a regime of careers open to talents rather than hereditary privileges' (or, we might add, political patronage). The idea here is not so much honoured as made deeper and more lasting.

George Davie was preeminently a reader of Hume, more latterly of Smith, and now again of Reid. Hume and Smith are very well, if unevenly, represented in this volume. Hume fares moderately in essays on his (and, to a limited extent, Reid's) account of 'promises' (Páll S. Árdal); on his diffuse, but plainly worthwhile, handling of 'volitions' (John Bricke); on his view of 'sympathy' as a 'principle of communication' (John J. Jenkins); on his 'crafting' of 'Philo' as a 'certain philosophical type' (M. Pakaluk); and finally on the fundamental misunderstanding by German (and even Austrian) thinkers of the

'science of man' (R. Lüthe). Smith, on the other hand, is fairly flattered by a very substantial assessment of Smith's surprisingly solid credentials as a 'proto-EAL' (Economic Analysis of Law) thinker by T.D. Campbell; by Vincent Hope's brief, but important, reconsideration of Smith's 'demigod,' sc. 'the man within'; and lastly by George Morice's analysis of the ambiguities inherent in Smith's concept of 'approval' (of *'other people's* sentiments and opinions'). In addition to the above catalogue, Timothy Duggan has contributed a sometimes plausible, but often curious and again limited discussion of Reid's deference towards the *possibility* of prescience, or foreknowledge, on the analogy of memory experiences. (The limitation is merely a function of untapped, but very extensive, resources available in connection with Reid's views of memory.) Not least among these efforts is a singular, and highly suggestive, account by Peter Jones of James Hutton's role not only as a founder of geological science, but also as the vehicle, interpreter, and critic of the premises and principles of Locke, Hume, and Smith. But it is Jones' cast of *dramatis personae* which intrigues, and which returns us once more to the sheer ubiquity of Davie's own intellect; for there we may find Gregory and Montesquieu, Erasmus Darwin and Monboddo, even a Shaftesbury or a Hogarth.

Apart from Rudolf Luthe's excursion into German thought, and its myopic responses to Hume (in spite of themselves, German thinkers could find no depth in him), this volume denies its object of dedication his extensive travels into Continental thought — not merely through the chronicle of French responses to Reid (Jouffroy, Cousin, &c.) or to Berkeley and Reid (Chastaing), but through the by-ways of Husserlian phenomenology. The omission is telling, and ultimately damaging. For this was, and remains, a truly 'democratic intellect,' reaching out to all sectors and parties, careless of philosophical 'privilege,' but ever attentive to sound insight. George Davie will go out like the 'Scottish Enlightenment' he made his home:

Elsewhere the Enlightenment may have gradually faded out, leaving behind an honoured though very controversial memory. In Scotland it went out not with a whimper but a bang and was by a sort of common consent almost instantly forgotten.

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DAVID HUMPHREY. *Consciousness Regained: Chapters in the Development of Mind*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. xi + 222. Cdn\$9.95; US\$5.95. ISBN 0-19-286052-6.

This book is a delightful collection of essays on human consciousness and its place in evolutionary development. Our intelligence is based on strategies we developed as a species in response to evolutionary pressures favoring successful socialization. One of these intellectual strategies is abstract reasoning; the other is an innate ability to understand others, to size them up, figure out what they are likely to do. Human survival is more likely in stable communities, but interpersonal stresses in communal life require and — on the generational scale of evolutionary time — elicit psychological sophistication. We must be clever at reading signs in others' faces 'and equally the lack of signs' (5). Mastery of the gift of 'natural psychology' enables us to have what we want for ourselves while retaining the good will of our fellows.

Being oriented to others in a social group is not unique to humans. Humphrey arrived at his insight while reflecting on the practice of isolating laboratory primates from one another. He noticed that those who lived together in large cages were absorbed in one another. Our intelligence is manifested most strikingly in our linguistic and interpersonal behavior;

social primates are required by the very nature of the system they create and maintain to be calculating beings; they must be able to calculate the likely behavior of others, to calculate the balance of advantage and loss — and all this in a context where the evidence on which their calculations are based is ephemeral, ambiguous and liable to change, not least as a consequence of their own actions. (21)

What is unique to human beings as 'natural psychologists,' as far as we know, is the ability to understand others by using 'reflexive consciousness' to create 'a privileged picture of [one's] own self as a model for what it is like to be another person' (6). I know what goes on in me by reflection and I assume that another person 'operates on the same principles as I do.' (33) This assumption is unconscious; we find that the generalization from our own to another's experiences is quite natural as long as the other can safely be assumed to be similar to oneself. Problems arise when I lack the requisite experience from which to generalize a sympathetic analogy.

Before I can attribute such feelings to others I must, it seems, myself have had them ... often indeed it takes only a single seminal experience to add a new dimension to one's behavioral model. Let a celibate monk just once make love to a woman and he would be surprised how much better he would understand the Song of Solomon... (34)

Not all our seminal experiences need occur in real life. Dreams expose us to adventures and terrors that most of us would neither choose to endure nor likely survive in waking life. Fantasies broaden us: in imagination we can be

anybody we want to be. We thereby gain important knowledge: 'by dreaming of what he is not, the dreamer gains insight into what other people are' (90). Sports and other forms of drama expose us to exceptional, bizarre and ultimately enriching aspects of human experience.

Since Humphrey is a materialist he thinks that all this talk of experiences and inner states is really, at some level, talk of the brain and its activities. Introspection allows us to observe those activities at an 'accessible and relevant' level. Reflexive consciousness is a 'highly selective commentary' on the 'parliamentary proceedings' of our own brains. It tells us most of what we need to know in a form we are predisposed to understand (13).

Some may object that Humphrey's claim for our psychological skills seems to make us cleverer than we are. Surely we are as prone to errors in character reading as we are in abstract reasoning. Paul Churchland has argued most persuasively that our commonsense theory of persons and why they act as they do is 'radically incomplete.' There is much about human behavior that our theory does not explain. The response on behalf of Humphrey would be to admit the shortcomings and insist on the substance. We often get it wrong, but Humphrey may well be right in supposing that we get it right as often as we do because human forms of life (he does not use the term) inevitably provide each of us with a base of experience from which to build models of others.

Humphrey invites us to think of our mental concepts as 'innate ideas,' products of a long biological history of living in groups, triggered by experience to serve as exemplary psychological universals. Our success in using these universals to gain the advantage in social life will hinge on our having had the right sort of experiences. Some of the most interesting essays in the book are about the evolutionary value of aesthetic experiences; these, he argues, teach us about others by revealing powerful and usually hidden wellsprings of human feeling.

Humphrey's wit and learning will delight readers even as his arguments for the social nature of intelligence may annoy.

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DAVID HUMPHREY. *Consciousness Regained: Chapters in the Development of Mind*. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. xi + 222. Cdn\$9.95: US\$5.95. ISBN 0-19-286052-6.

Dans *Consciousness Regained*, David Humphrey regroupe une série d'articles portant sur l'évolution de la condition humaine. Des sujets aussi variés que la conscience, les rêves, les bases biologiques de l'art et de la folie nucléaire trouvent leur voie dans ce livre.

On serait tenté dans un premier mouvement de placer ce livre dans la même catégorie que les autres livres de spéculations biologiques tels le *Singe Nu* ou le *Zoo Humain* de Desmond Morris ou *African Genesis* de Robert Ardrey; cependant une lecture un peu plus attentive modifie cette première opinion.

En effet, Humphrey a réalisé une série de petits essais sur l'évolution de l'espèce humaine qui sont, malgré leur dimension de spéculation scientifique inévitable dans ce genre de réflexion, fort fouillés et intéressants du point de vue de l'ouverture sur de nouvelles hypothèses de recherches. En outre, Humphrey ne se penche que sur deux dimensions particulières du comportement — l'intelligence et la conscience—alors que les autres ouvrages s'intéressaient plus superficiellement à toute forme d'activité humaine.

Les deux premières sections 'Natural psychology and the evolution of consciousness' et 'The path to self-knowledge' sont de loin les plus intéressantes et riches en réflexions sur l'évolution de l'humanité. La thèse principale d'Humphrey est fort simple: l'évolution de l'intelligence ne provient pas de la solution des problèmes techniques proposés par le milieu mais du besoin de comprendre les autres membres de son groupe, autrement dit de vivre en société. Cette vie sociale demande à l'individu de devenir en quelque sorte un 'Homo Psychologicus' pour bien saisir les nuances du comportement de ses congénères. Or la solution apportée par la Nature à ce problème de faire de la psychologie naturelle a été de doter chacun d'une image privilégiée de sa propre individualité comme modèle de comportement. On peut alors comprendre la joie de l'autre ou sa misère en se référant à ses propres joies ou misères. La communication entre les membres de l'espèce est ainsi facilitée et le développement des sociétés peut s'accélérer pour permettre à l'espèce de s'adapter à son environnement plus rapidement. Selon Humphrey, donc, la conscience est la solution évolutive au problème de vivre en groupes sociaux et le développement rapide de l'intelligence en est la conséquence.

En effet, la technologie ne semble pas le véritable moteur de l'évolution de la pensée puisque de nombreuses observations récentes sur les grands primates ont démontré que les techniques de subsistance ne sont pas le fruit d'inventions pré-méditées mais plutôt d'apprentissages par essais et erreurs ou par imitations. Humphrey propose une analogie avec Robinson Crusoë. L'île déserte est un monde hostile dans lequel Robinson doit compter sur ses capacités de trouver rapidement de la nourriture ou un abri pour survivre. A première vue nous avons là tous les ingrédients pour le développement de la créativité. Cependant, selon Humphrey, l'île déserte de Robinson n'est qu'une description romantique de l'environnement des premiers hommes. Le monde réel ne s'est jamais présenté de la sorte et pourtant le monde des primates est peut-être encore plus exigeant intellectuellement que l'île de Robinson: C'est

l'arrivée de Vendredi qui a véritablement compliqué les choses pour Robinson.

La thèse d'Humphrey est fort originale et très élégante. Elle est d'ailleurs bien accueillie par les milieux éthologiques. Elle se base sur une longue expérience en psychologie animale et sur une profonde connaissance des données de recherches et d'observations sur la vie des grands primates. Un point cependant peut nous laisser perplexe.

La conscience et l'intelligence provenant de la rencontre quotidienne avec les membres de son espèce, il s'ensuit que tous les animaux sociaux devraient avoir développé ces deux fonctions. Humphrey sur ce point n'est pas particulièrement clair. Il admet que les animaux sociaux pourraient se montrer capables de Psychologie et, par conséquent, de conscience. Cependant le développement des connaissances à ce niveau est encore très limité et Humphrey ne prend pas position de façon absolue sur la question. On peut cependant citer ici l'excellent livre de De Waal (1982) qui fait une démonstration très convaincante de l'organisation sociale très avancée d'une troupe de chimpanzés. La thèse de Humphrey nous mènerait donc à poser comme hypothèse l'existence d'un haut niveau de conscience chez ces primates. Plus loin, Humphrey mentionne rapidement que le milieu particulièrement difficile qu'a rencontré l'espèce humaine a favorisé un développement plus rapide de l'organisation sociale qu'au niveau des autres espèces. Cependant, il reste très peu spécifique sur ces différences phylogénétiques. Si la société favorise le développement de la conscience et de l'intelligence, pourquoi seule l'espèce humaine ressort-elle à ce point du reste de l'arbre phylogénétique? Humphrey semble croire que tout individu social possède une conscience, ce qui, nous venons de le souligner, n'est pas encore exclu. Cependant les différences au niveau intellectuel paraissent, elles, clairement établies. La thèse de Humphrey ne semble pas capable en ce moment de répondre à cette interrogation.

Les deux autres parties du livre reprennent en tout ou en partie cette thèse pour exprimer certaines réflexions sur l'évolution de l'art ou des religions. Humphrey reprend ses thèmes de la première partie pour les appliquer à des institutions humaines. La démonstration est moins convaincante et ressemble nettement plus aux livres de vulgarisation cités plus haut. La dernière partie est un plaidoyer pour le désarmement nucléaire. C'est un excellent texte mais dont le lien avec le reste du livre est particulièrement tenu nonobstant quelques thèmes évolutionnistes vaguement évoqués.

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JAY KATZ. *The Silent World of Doctor and Patient*. Don Mills, ON: Collier Macmillan Canada 1984. Pp. xxi + 263. Cdn.\$23.25. ISBN 0-02-917010-9.

Jay Katz, a physician and psychoanalyst who teaches at Yale Law School, wants more conversation in the consulting room. He believes that conversations between doctors and patients would allow them to 'share' the burdens of decision making and lead to more mutually satisfactory decisions. But behind the rhetoric of conversing and sharing is the goal of putting patients in control of decision making.

The first two chapters survey writings about medicine from the time of ancient Greece to the present and the history of medicine as a political institution to demonstrate how alien the notion of patients' participation in decision making is. That patients need to trust in the authority of their physicians always has been emphasized because of the link between confidence and cure. Throughout the history of medicine, the value of patient custody or welfare has prevailed over the value of patient liberty, when the latter has been recognized at all. These introductory chapters provide a glimpse of the enormity of the battle Katz is fighting on behalf of patients.

The third chapter argues that, contrary to what one might suppose, the law has not won this battle for patients. An analysis of the leading United States cases on informed consent exposes the shortcomings of this doctrine in promoting patient self-determination. Katz charges that judges have fashioned 'a doctrine of informed consent that has secured for patients the right to better custody but not to liberty — the right to choose how to be treated.' (49) He sees the move from battery to negligence as a policy choice in favor of paternalism over patients' self-determination; supports a 'subjective' test for the disclosure of risks and alternatives because the 'objective' standard 'contradicts the right of each individual to decide what will be done with his or her body' (76); and argues that the law of negligence should be modified to recognize lack of informed consent as a harm in itself so that patients would not have to prove they have been physically harmed by a doctor's failure to disclose information.

Katz then responds to three worries raised by the notion of patient participation in decision making: that undermining the authority of physicians would erode the quality of care patients receive; that patients, in virtue of their illnesses and psychological make-up, lack the capacities to make autonomous decisions; and that physicians cannot communicate the vast uncertainty that pervades the practice of medicine to patients. The concept of autonomy receives the most attention. Katz distinguishes moral autonomy — the right to make decisions without interference — from psychological autonomy — the capacity to exercise that right — and concentrates on the latter because he believes conversation can remove some of the impediments to autonomy imposed by illness and the human psychological constitution. The insights of psychoanalysis are used to argue that the impact of unconscious and irrational factors can be mitigated through conversation. What, however, is the point of physicians and patients becoming cognizant of the irrational influences on their decisions? This awareness is a goad to further reflection: 'An appreciation of the limits of rationality would sensitize physicians and patients to the need for subjecting their thoughts and contemplated actions to prior reflection, both alone and with one another.' (121) But in Katz's hands this prescription for reflection becomes, without argument, a duty to reflect. In the interest of promoting psychological autonomy, doctors sometimes must force their patients to reflect, even if doing so violates their patients' right to privacy.

The final chapter presents what Katz regards as the most significant argument for shared decision making, namely, that doctors' failure to allow patients to participate in decision making constitutes an abandonment of them. This abandonment is psychological not physical. Being deprived of the opportunity to make decisions causes patients to feel isolated, alone, and rejected. At this point the concern for patient custody and the concern for patient self-determination coalesce: 'the idea of informed consent is grounded not only in the principle of self-determination but in good therapeutic management as well, for relief of suffering requires doctor's presence in the full sense of the word.' (208).

Despite Katz's repeated calls for shared or joint decision making, exactly what this means never is clear. Both physician and patient can participate in the process leading to a decision, but the final decision cannot be shared. Either the doctor tells the patient what will be done and the patient accepts this as a *fait accompli*, or the doctor proposes a course of action to the patient and the patient says *yea* or *nay*. Only one party can make the ultimate decision. Who should this be? Katz's answer is clear. The book is a panegyric to patient self-determination. Only in rare circumstances can a doctor overrule a patient's choice. The arguments for this position are familiar. If doctors cannot agree among themselves about the 'best' treatment, the decision should be left to the patient. It is the patient's life that is most intimately and extensively affected by a decision, so the patient should be the one to make it. Medical decisions involve value judgments about benefits and harms that only a patient is in a position to make. These are buttressed by an appeal to the

plight of a twenty-one year old, single woman who had breast cancer. Her surgeon initially favored a mastectomy but then had doubts that led him to present alternative treatments to her and allow her to choose.

This is an illuminating, comprehensive introduction to the problem of decision making in the physician-patient relationship. It persuades largely through the intensity and breadth of the case for patient self-determination. Philosophers looking for deep conceptual analysis and rigorous argumentation will be disappointed. When Katz goes beyond discussions of cases and familiar theoretical material, the meanings of key terms disintegrate, and arguments become opaque. At points arguments rest on dubious assumptions. For example, Katz's contention that physicians now are able to explain to patients what they do and do not know vastly overestimates the extent to which certainty has invaded the practice of modern medicine. Moreover, the length to which patient self-determination sometimes is stretched threatens the credibility of the overall position. One minor flaw concerns Katz's choice of examples. Dr. Christiaan Barnard's first two heart transplant patients are used to illustrate the need to promote psychological autonomy, and dying patients are used to show how patients can be abandoned. More common, prosaic cases would have been better. Katz anticipates this criticism and tries to rebut it, but his examples nevertheless do nothing to confirm the general applicability of his position.

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PETER KIVY. *Sound and Semblance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1984. Pp. 235. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-691-07282-5.

Sound and Semblance is a companion piece of Peter Kivy's earlier essay in musical aesthetics, *The Corded Shell* (1980). (See *CPR/RCCP* 1 [1981] 143 [Ed.].) It is a worthy companion, and resembles its predecessor in more than layout, typeface, and publisher. It has the same clarity, the same straightforwardness about the issues, the same absence of jargon and unnecessary technicality, and the same attention to historical views on the questions being surveyed, mined by Kivy for hints and insights in a refreshing fashion. Unfortunately, one can perhaps add as well that it shares with its predecessor a certain lack of depth or probingness on fundamental points. But of that, later.

The topic of *Sound and Semblance* is musical representation, as that of *The Corded Shell* was musical expression. Thus, between them they would appear to cover the major part of what one can call musical semantics — the theory of what music means or conveys, and how it manages to do so. (One thing *not* comprised would be what Leonard Meyer calls '*embodied*' meaning — intramusical pointings between one musical bit and another. Also not comprised would be *allusion*, e.g., reference by one piece of music to another, and *abstract symbolization*, e.g., of France by the 'Marseillaise.') Whereas musical expression is the 'meaning' by music of emotions and moods, musical representation is the 'meaning' by music of concrete objects and events which it may be said in some sense to depict or portray. Kivy is committed to viewing this latter as a legitimate aspect of musical meaning, and his book is dedicated to showing us the why and wherefore of it.

After dismissing, easily enough, the historically advanced idea that musical representation essentially is or aims at imitation or replication of its subjects — which if true would restrict musical representation to the realm of sounds — Kivy proceeds to develop a rough distinction between two types of musical representation. This distinction forms a linchpin of the book as a whole. Somewhat disconcertingly, 'illustration' is invoked at this point as naming the genus with which we are to be concerned, while 'picture' and 'representation' are employed to label the species of this genus. In this revamped terminology, the distinction is then as follows. Musical *pictures* are musical illustrations that are identified immediately without verbal indications, ones whose subjects are recognized in unaided fashion — though in most cases this requires what Kivy calls 'the minimal information' that an illustration is intended, that something or other is being represented. Musical *representations*, on the other hand, are musical illustrations whose subjects can only be aurally identified given verbal cues or titular promptings. Thus, Kivy contrasts Beethoven's ornithological passages in the 'Pastoral' symphony and Honegger's locomotive symphonic poem *Pacific 231* (pictures) with Handel's 'fly-buzzing' violin passages in *Israel in Egypt*, Bach's 'laughing' musical figures in the opening of his Cantata No. 31, and Haydn's 'dawning' section in *The Creation* (representations). Musical pictures generally depend centrally on the 'sounds like' phenomenon — that is, they manifest aural resemblance. Some musical representations do so as well, but it is a resemblance only noticed and, in a way, enabled after the verbal indication is given. Most musical representations, however, work in virtue of more abstracted connections, e.g., *analogies* between musical sounds or patterns and natural phenomena (e.g., the undulation of musical line vis à vis that of waves), or aptness of *common descriptions* between musical gestures and wordly objects or events (e.g., the common applicability of 'dense' to musical texture and evening fog). Finally, in some cases, the basis of representation — if representation be admitted — thins out to merely conventional or stipulative connections (e.g., Bach chorales, Wagnerian leitmotifs).

This is all fine and good, and one is grateful to Kivy for his efforts at initiating a typology of depictings in music, amply decked out with examples.

However, what is missing is a preliminary discussion — or even confrontation — of the issue of what musical representation *in general amounts to*, what it means to say a passage represents such-and-such, whether in the picturing way or not. Kivy does not tell us what conditions *both* Honegger's sound-picture and Bach's 'mere' representation apparently fulfil so as to count as representations. He does not tell us what the criteria for success are that make something a musical representation at all, of whatever kind. Thus, one might be in a good position, after Kivy's third chapter, to venture what *category* of representation the evocative music at the beginning of Mahler's First Symphony would fall under if it were allowed to be a representation, but one would not be in such good position to try to decide whether it was *representational or not*. This problem is perhaps ignorable at the safe center of the musical picture group, but it looms rather larger at the more woolly peripheries of the group of non-pictorial musical representations. The lack of a general analysis of musical representation is regrettable in that, involving as it would have had to have done, more attention to both artistic intent and purpose and auditorial reaction and cognition, the author would have been led, in all probability, to more reflections on the point of musical representations and on the process of understanding them than we are given in this otherwise admirable volume.

Chapter Four takes as one of its main charges the question of whether terms used to described music drawn from other phenomenal realms (visual, emotional, geometrical) can be said to apply univocally to both music and the home phenomenon. If so, then since this would in effect grant that music and non-musical phenomena can share an important range of common properties, the case for the more indirect or subtle sorts of musical representation would be strengthened. The most extensively discussed example is that of Haydn's setting of the phrase 'and there was light' in *The Creation*. Kivy argues that sunlight and the full orchestral C-major chord used by Haydn at that juncture share a common property *brightness* — that is to say, that 'bright' is univocal between chord and sunlight when it is predicated of them. I find Kivy's argument for this, based largely on the Oxford English Dictionary and the unanalyzability of simple perceptual properties, unconvincing, and, what is more, unnecessary. Light and a C-major chord can resemble one another (thus perhaps facilitating a certain representation) without their literally possessing the *same* simple perceptual property. They can resemble one another merely through their possessing simple perceptual properties which are *themselves* highly resembling. Thus, I would prefer to say that the 'brightness' of a C-major chord in a given context is a different perceptual property from the brightness of sunlight — one is visual brightness, the other auditory 'brightness' — and yet sunlight and the chord resemble one another in virtue of visual brightness resembling auditory 'brightness.' Of course there is a *higher-order* perceptual quality, what one might dub *sensory brightness* — meaning something like vividness or clarity in comparison to other presentations in a given sensory mode — of which visual brightness and auditory 'brightness' are species or determinates. It is only *that* property,

I would maintain, and not ordinary (literal) visual brightness that light and chord can have as common attribute. Chapter Four, in addition, includes an interesting and painstaking discussion of the role of structural isomorphism in the achievement of complex representation through music. Kivy successfully shows that isomorphism supplies a kind of resemblance between musical and non-musical phenomena, whether or not the structural descriptions shared between the two (e.g., 'long,' 'ascending,' 'imitative,' 'following,' 'agitated,' 'jagged') are judged univocal. In particular, the punning character of certain musical representations is convincingly claimed to derive from structural parallels manifested in terms applying non-univocally from one context to the other, e.g., imitative counterpoint evoking imitative human behavior. The aim of the chapter as a whole, to show that music can indeed resemble its putative represented subjects even when these are non-sonic, is by and large quite adequately attained, despite Kivy's tendency to exaggerate unneedfully the extent of commonality of simple properties between musical and non-musical domains.

Chapter Five is in some ways the most enjoyable and original in the book. The merit is two-fold: rare among current aestheticians, Kivy has a knack for finding gold and not just dross amidst the discards of historical aesthetic theorizing, and, further, he is adept at refining and extending in new directions what he has uncovered. His booty in this chapter is a theory of Adam Smith's, sketched in an essay entitled 'Of The Nature of Imitation In Imitative Arts' (1795), of whose existence I was most happy to be apprised. Smith's thesis is, in essence, this: the merit of an artistic imitation (representation) is not a simple matter, but depends on a complex of three factors: (a) the *excellence* (or *success*) of the imitation (b) the *agreeableness* of the object imitated, and (c) the *unlikeness* of the medium to the object imitated. Kivy's reformulation of this last point is to note that some media are naturally more *recalcitrant* than others for certain representational purposes, the application to music in particular being this, that for the non-dimensional medium of sound to manage at all to depict a three-dimensional multi-sensory worldly event is in itself a substantial accomplishment, one which already tips the aesthetic scales in its favor, before even considering the interest of the subject or the fineness of the rendition. 'The appreciation of musical illustration, like so much else in art, is the appreciation of obstacles overcome, difficulties circumvented, success over external or self-imposed constraints' (100). It strikes me that Smith's essay would serve as a valuable pedagogical counterweight to the more restrictive notions concerning the employment of media expounded in Lessing's somewhat earlier treatise, *Laocon* (1766). Chapter Five concludes with some rather provocative and controversial remarks on the distinction between *scores* and *parts*, and on the primary function of the former, which Kivy sees as tied to analytical study and imaginative recreation as opposed to practical performance.

In Chapter Six, Kivy crosses swords with Goodman on the subject of musical notation. I confess to finding discussions of Goodman's draconian strictures on musical scoring at this point fairly tiring. Kivy takes it as his

main task to show that notated music's apparent lack of syntactic density in Goodman's sense — i.e., its not comprising an indefinitely finely splittable set of symbols or structures — may not preclude its being representational. He does this by staying within the terms of Goodman's charge. He points out, fairly enough, that if the usual non-articulate dimensions of musical works — e.g., timbre, tempo, and dynamics à la italien — are allowed to count as constitutive, as is quite reasonable, then, since these *are* dense dimensions in Goodman's sense, representationality in virtue of them would fall to at least some musical works. Now Kivy is right enough in this observation, but I would prefer a more wholesale, less accomodating repudiation of Goodman on the issue: Goodman's claim that density is prerequisite to representationality mistakes a characteristic feature of many representational systems for the central and necessary one, the enabling of a kind of perceiving-as experience. A musical work, however articulate or digital its defining structure, is *not* a description, but *may* be a representation if it aims at and sustains a certain sort of hearing-as or hearing-in.

Chapter Seven concerns itself with the thesis, popular with certain theorists and even composers of the 18th and 19th centuries, that representation in music is really just a form of, or is wholly dependent on, musical expressiveness, that the former is reducible to the latter. Kivy soundly routs this exaggerated claim, while admitting the ways in which the expressive import of a passage interacts with its illustrative function and helps characterize the subject represented. Chapter Eight is again combative, and successfully undermines the argument of Roger Scruton ('Representation In Music,' *Philosophy*, 51 [1976]) to the effect that music is not and cannot be a representational art. In particular, the only even ostensibly weighty part of Scruton's case, that most so-called representational music is fully understandable even when its representative aspect is not recognized, is adequately punctured by Kivy with a few well-chosen examples from Bach and Weber. It is worth pointing out, however, that such a critique of Scruton's position has been supplied earlier, and perhaps even more convincingly, by Jenefer Robinson ('Representation In Music and Painting,' *Philosophy*, 56 [1981]).

The ninth chapter takes up the question of music's narrative or storytelling powers, as opposed to its capacity to limn merely isolated objects or events. Whether the chain of events is largely external (Kuhnau's *Biblical Sonatas*) or internal (Berlioz' *Symphonie Fantastique*), Kivy's conclusion is the same, and a rather negative one: music at most *illustrates* (or 'illuminates') individual episodes or states of a chronicle, whereas only verbal program or text can actually *tell* the story as such. Here I feel Kivy has been too conservative and insufficiently imaginative in regard to exploring ways in which some musical progressions might constitute a narrative, or might convey an aspect of the succession or flow of occurrences. To take a very simple example, if we know that a given passage represents a man's death and a later passage represents a man's transfiguration, the music itself might be said to tell us not only that the one event occurred *after* the other but also something of the *way in which* the one evolved from the other. That *is* something in ad-

dition to the representings of the individual events, and Kivy is mistaken in completely discounting music's potential in such narration.

The final chapter of Kivy's book sketches a rough criterion of defensible, as opposed to indefensible, representational identifications in music with, again, well-chosen and entertaining examples, this time from Haydn's *The Seasons* and Bach's *Well-Tempered Clavier*. The relevance of artist's intention to this topic here gets its due, albeit belatedly and slightly. Kivy stresses, plausibly enough, that a representational reading of a work is *most* justified when adopting such a reading either solves a musical problem, or allows one to reap aesthetic rewards otherwise persistently elusive, in the music at hand.

All in all, though *Sound and Semblance* perhaps fails to clear the initial brush as well as it might have, and perhaps never quite succeeds in penetrating the far reaches of the interior, it remains a singular and worthy exploration of this musical terrain. It now surely becomes the *de rigueur* starting point for any future investigations into representation in music.

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DONALD W. LIVINGSTON. *Hume's Philosophy of Common Life*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1984. Pp. xiv + 371. US\$30.00. ISBN 0-226-48714-8.

The striking thing about contemporary Hume scholarship is not only that there is more and more of it, but that it keeps getting better and better. In the most recent past we have had three fine works, by Peter Jones, David Norton, and John Wright; each has broadened and deepened our understanding of the greatest anglophone philosopher. Livingston's book, wider in its range than any single one of them, is correspondingly rich in resources and nourishing to the intellect and imagination of Hume's readers.

Its riches comes from two things. First, there is careful attention to the merits and defects of previous interpretations, and to those aspects of Hume's intentions and methods that have given rise to such radical differences between them. Second, there is equally careful attention to the ways in which Hume's work as a philosopher and his work as a historian reflect a common vision.

Livingston presents this vision as follows. True philosophy 'presupposes the authority of common life as a whole,' and does not pretend to evaluate it (and have the right to reject it) from outside. Philosophy that attempts to do that is committed to what Livingston calls the autonomy principle — typified by Descartes' assumption that he can put aside all his natural commitments and decide whether to resume them or not. Any philosophical scheme that results from the apparent application of the autonomy principle will in fact make covert use of the very beliefs of common life it purports to put aside — a Humean thesis Livingston thinks can be generalised from his discussion of the senses, where the philosophical hypothesis of double existence borrows its credibility from the very vulgar belief it claims to replace.

Hume is a sceptic in that he holds the autonomy principle, when consistently applied, can only lead us to all-consuming Pyrronian doubt. He is also a sceptic in holding that the commitments of common life, from which we cannot extricate ourselves, include such beliefs as that in the existence of secret causal powers behind observed regularities: powers we cannot penetrate. The only viable role for the philosopher is that of internal critic and systematiser of the commitments of common life, not that of its revolutionary destroyer.

This interpretation has to be contrasted with two others: first, the chronic understanding of Hume as a positivist, for whom philosophical constructions are not merely untenable but meaningless; second, Kemp Smith's understanding of him as one who subordinates reason wholly to the passions, and is ultimately not a sceptic in any sense at all. There is much in the texts to support each of these views, so much of Livingston's book is devoted to showing their inadequacy. The positivist misreading is more radically at odds with Livingston than Kemp Smith's is, so five of the book's twelve chapters are devoted to a thoughtful and penetrating reconstruction of Hume's doctrines of meaning and causation. Hume is presented as a *dialectical* thinker: we misconstrue him fatally if we take the later parts of the *Treatise*, and the other philosophical writings, as mere deductions from principles enunciated at the outset of that book. The earlier passages have, equally, to be understood in the light of the later teachings about the centrality of social convention in common life. So viewed, Hume can be seen to have a two-sided doctrine of meaning: we can have both an external and an internal understanding of a concept, and the principle of the derivation of ideas from impressions is primarily concerned to lay down conditions for the latter. Theoretical science and metaphysical speculation fail the test of internal understanding, but are not thereby proved meaningless; and rationalistic interpretations of causation fail merely because they purport to reveal an *internal* understanding of the causal powers in natural objects, when all we have is an *external* one. Hume is an epistemological sceptic who thinks we are barred from knowledge of the secret powers that determine natural sequences, but he is not a positivist who thinks it is conceptually impossible to speak of them. A further consequence of the absence of any linguistic veto on speculation is that, according to Livingston, Hume does espouse a form of theism, namely

the vague deism put into the mouth of Philo at the end of the *Dialogues*. This is no more than a conviction that the universe is ultimately orderly through and through, and that our partial understanding of it is congruent with its hidden character.

Hume is not primarily a philosopher of science or of mind, but a moral philosopher and historian. Although Livingston does not say much about Hume's theory of the passions or of morals, he does give us a wealth of original comment on how Hume's conception of history relates to the rest of his work. The historian makes essential use of the *internal* understanding of human affairs, and his account of them is basically different from the account of events proper to the physical sciences. This comes out in two ways. The historian attempts to make human sense of past events which we can sympathetically penetrate in the way barred to us in theoretical physics. He also writes from a point of view *within* the historical process, and cannot therefore aspire to the sort of detachment proper to the physicist, and aped by the philosopher who tries to follow the autonomy principle. He is therefore subject to the same constraints that confine the philosopher. Each of them is able, at most, to criticise the beliefs and habits of common life as he participates in them in his own day and age; neither can free himself from them in *toto*. Failure to recognise this generates bogus historical theses like the Whig view of history, and foments absurd revolutionary programmes which are the political counterparts of Cartesianism in philosophy. The book concludes with a wise and satisfactorily apt presentation of Hume as the major philosopher of conservatism.

The style of the book is smooth, steady, and usually convincing. The arguments are supported by frequent textual references, but are also marked by confident and authoritative speculation when they reach topics on which the data are hard to come by. It is impossible in this short review to enter detailed debate. Instead, I will content myself with one historical suggestion. Livingston calls Hume's position 'post-Pyrrhonian,' and there is no doubt that this captures Hume's own view of himself. But it is striking that the unpretentious and non-ideological return to common life, and the relativistic conservatism, of Hume's true philosopher, are not *post*-Pyrrhonian, but simply Pyrrhonian — for they constitute the very stance that Sextus Empiricus ascribes to the Sceptic himself. Hume regularly identifies Pyrrhonism with its purely destructive features, a fact which suggests his knowledge of it was second-hand. But in following Hume in this error, Livingston manages to show yet again a remarkable capacity to enter the complex and elusive mentality of his subject. This capacity demands true scholarly maturity, of a level few interpreters, and in particular few Hume interpreters, achieve. It is this book's most obvious characteristic.

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WERNER MARX. *The Philosophy of F.W.J. Schelling: History, System, and Freedom*. Thomas Nenon, trans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1985. Pp. xviii-101. US\$24.95. ISBN 0-250-34445-X

The book consists of three excellent essays by Werner Marx on Schelling's conception of history. Schelling came upon 'history' in an effort to continue Fichte's work of ideal reconstruction of the structure of the subject. Fichte had already spoken of a pre-temporal, quasi-logical, genesis of the faculties of the subject out of a supposed original act of self-intuition. Schelling tried to show how one of the faculties, namely the will, takes shape outside the subject itself in the form of a real world. History is where he sought the solution to his problem. For history, as he understood it, is one of the possible objectifications of will. It is the progressive realization of an ideal through the free actions of individuals who are as a rule not even consciously motivated by it, yet manage to work for it just the same, often even in spite of themselves. The ideal in question is the realization of freedom in general. But since freedom is originally the freedom of finite individuals, and since the interests of these are necessarily in conflict, in order that freedom be realized precisely as the freedom of *all*, two requirements must be met. (1) The individuals must be brought under the coercive, quasi-natural, rule of legal institutions (i.e., the states). (2) The genesis and growth of these institutions must be brought about by forces that transcend the intentions of the individuals, but which act with a necessity analogous to that of nature. In other words, what is required is a *necessary* realization of freedom, or a hidden harmony between nature and freedom that allows the former to unfold itself, indeed blindly and mechanistically, yet for the sake of freedom. As Marx rightly points out, this theory obviously presupposes the classical conception of nature as animated by *telos*. But Schelling has rejected the equally classical conception of *nous* presiding over it (and the related Christian doctrine of divine providence); he understands 'intelligence' in the much more restricted sense of a principle of experience. We lack a principle, therefore, that would guarantee the required *necessary* realization of freedom. This lack constitutes the central problem of Schelling's philosophy of history. Marx's three essays all deal in one way or another with it.

Schelling's solution is not to be confused with that of Hegel. This is a point that Marx develops at length in the second essay, but is made in the first and third as well. In spite of their obvious similarities, the philosophies of the two men are radically different. Schelling's system is an attempt at expressing conceptually the content of an intuition which, as such, defies discursive treatment. The moving principle of the system lies precisely in the disproportion between concept and intuition. There is no such disproportion in Hegel. The reality that the discursive play of concepts is supposed to express is exhaustively exhibited in it, and is ultimately identified with the play itself. For Schelling this reality is freedom. The problem of how the latter can be realized with necessity thus turns into the problem of how something which is

per se unbounded can acquire limits which are truly effective, yet respect the transcendence of their supposed source. In the first essay Marx considers how Schelling dealt with it in his *System of Transcendental Idealism* of 1800. There he resorted to the metaphor of history as a play in which each of the actors plays his role in complete freedom, yet allows the play to unfold as a whole, or a play in which Spirit is the playwright working in each player. According to Marx the metaphor breaks down because it allows too much scope to the individual actors, thus injecting an element of contingency into what ought to be a necessary process. Even more interesting in this essay, however, is Marx's criticism of Habermas. His point is that, although Habermas has tried to reassert against Karl Marx the power of thought in shaping the course of history, since has has rejected, like Schelling, the classical assumptions concerning nature and *logos*, he has no more ground than he to believe that anything can be accomplished by man through reflection.

The third essay is an analysis of *Philosophical Enquiries into the Essence of Human Freedom* of 1809. There Schelling approaches his problem through the specific issue of the possibility of evil. His solution, which Marx apparently finds adequate, is to distinguish between God as the conscious ground of the created world, and another state in him in which he is still not a ground, because he is neither being nor becoming, but only an unconscious 'longing to give birth to itself.' In this state all the oppositions that make up the real world are present only in inchoate form, as an unbounded passion for being. Their emergence can be conceived only as a sudden leap. Once emerged, however, they work out with inflexible necessity the logic of the process of self-revelation that their original upsurge set in motion.

These are serious essays that deserve reading for their insight into an important aspect of German Idealism. Yet one is baffled by Marx's uncritical sympathy for Schelling. How can he say that *Enquiries* succeeds where the *System* of 1800 fails, when in fact the later essay only adds to the earlier an extra metaphor? The fact that Schelling develops the metaphor methodically does not make it any less mystifying. And how can Marx say that Schelling takes the finiteness of human freedom seriously when for Schelling the individual man is born evil, and has qua individual no freedom at all (except in the psychological sense of not feeling constrained)? Most of all, one wonders why Marx accepts unquestioningly the Idealists's assumption concerning the nature of history, or why he should be so afraid to see contingency injected into it. Surely history is more of a collection of limited stories, detailing the limited striving of individuals to achieve temporary goals, than a single grand play. Understood in this way history might not be a suitable object for the science that the Idealists wanted. But why sacrifice appearances to an ideal of science which is perhaps even non-sensical?

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MARY MIDGLEY. *Animals and Why They Matter*. Athens: The University of Georgia Press 1984. Pp. 158. US\$14.00 (cloth ISBN 0-8203-0704-1); US\$7.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8203-0756-4).

What is good about *Animals and Why They Matter* is that it steers clear of the wheel-worn ruts of contemporary animal welfare ethics. What is bad about it is that at times one wonders if Mary Midgley is steering in any direction at all or is fully cognizant of the road most other animal welfare ethicists have taken.

Her manner of argument is very much stream of consciousness or internal dialogue. Her general purpose seems less to be to provide a philosophical theory for the moral considerability of animals than to attack the historical philosophical obstacles standing in the way of our native moral sensibilities and generosity of spirit in respect to animals.

Accordingly, Midgley refutes positions which she thinks might support what she calls 'absolute dismissal' (of what exactly is never made as clear as one would wish — the moral standing of animals one may guess) and 'relative dismissal' (the view that although animals may matter, they matter relatively little). In other words, the title of the book leads one to expect to find in it something that is not there, viz., a theory of the positive moral value of animals. The book might more descriptively have been titled *Certain Philosophers Who Have Thought That Animals Do Not Matter and Why They Are Wrong*.

An indirect version of rationalism is, for example, represented today by R.G. Frey and H.J. McCloskey who connect rights with interests and interests ultimately with representational thought. Thus, being unable to think — the evidence for which is their inability to talk — animals have no interests and therefore no rights, nor can they be done any moral injury.

Midgley, in my opinion, is at her critical best in dealing with this species of 'absolute dismissal.' Frey and McCloskey have merely constructed a network of definitions, 'a verbal or conceptual argument about the proper use of terms' (55). It remains the case that some animals (for example, elephants) certainly feel, emote, desire, hope, think, and understand at some shared (with us) experiential level, although some philosophers are simply determined, counter-intuitively, to entangle these capacities with the capacity to use a language.

Another formidable philosophical obstacle to the mattering of animals is the reduction of morality to contract. According to Midgley, and I quite agree, contractarianism involves two colossal implausibilities. One is psychological egoism, the assumption that all one cares about is oneself. The other is 'the contract myth' — the perhaps once plausible, but not in a climate of thought transformed by Darwin, absurd idea that physically and intellectually fully formed human beings once lived as solitaires, observed the personal disadvantages of that condition, held a meeting, and hammered out some mutually agreeable rules to govern themselves by. Midgley argues fur-

ther that there is much more to morality than a contract among enlightened egoists. Thus, although animals cannot be literally parties to a contract, they do not, therefore, fall outside the purview of ethics.

Another major obstacle to the mattering of animals is Behaviorism and the related complaint that to attribute states of consciousness to animals is to anthropomorphize. On Positivistic grounds, Behaviorists have argued that since we cannot directly observe the states of mind of animals, they therefore have no conscious experiences. But, as Midgley points out, the problem of making reference in scientific description to the unobservable psychological states of animals is not a *special* problem of access to *animal* consciousness, it is a much more general and radical problem of access to *any* consciousness other than one's own. A consistent *ontological* Behaviorist in respect to animal consciousness — one who argues that because animal consciousness is in principle unobservable, that it is nonexistent — must also be a solipsist.

Allowing for the obvious differences, animals behave very much as we behave: they respond, more or less as we respond, to sights and sounds, dangers, threats, and gestures of affection, the presence or absence of appropriate foods, and so on. And so quite naturally and legitimately, Midgley convincingly argues, we attribute more or less similar states of consciousness to them as those we experience in our more or less similar transactions with our common natural and social environments.

As I have already remarked, *Animals and Why They Matter* is, for the most part, a rambling *critical* discussion. In sharp contrast to animal welfare ethicists, Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin, and most others, Midgley does not attempt as they do, patiently to construct and systematically to defend an ethical *theory* which will accord some definite class of animals (subjects-of-a-life, mammals, vertebrates, sentients, or whatever) some definite moral status (moral patency, inherent value, objects of duty, rights, or whatever).

She seems to say, rather, that a proper moral posture toward animals is more the work of nature and emotion than of rationally settling upon and mechanically applying a criterion. We naturally feel more loyalty to our own kind, but that doesn't prevent us from also naturally feeling some sympathy for other animals (and perhaps plants and whole species).

This natural sympathetic bond for members of our own species and for members of other species as well, is ultimately rooted, Midgley speculates, in our sociability and participation in community life. So it turns out that there is dimly present in *Animals and Why They Matter* a positive theory of animal welfare ethics after all. It might be politely called 'philosophical sociobiology' (or less generously, 'armchair' or 'speculative' sociobiology).

As Midgley correctly points out, human communities have constantly shifted in size and structure and, paradoxically upon first hearing, have from time immemorial included non-human members! — totem animals, tethered, fenced, or caged beasts, fully domesticated cattle, sheep, and beasts of burden, and dogs and other pets. According to Midgley, and I agree, animals

'were able to do this [join human society], not only because the people taming them were social beings, but because they themselves were' (112).

I think that Midgley's positive theory for the moral status of animals, if it could be fully developed, argued and exercised, might be the best thing ever to have come along for animal welfare ethics because it might rescue animal welfare ethics from the practical absurdities which follow from a ruthless deduction of the practical consequences of Singer's Animal Liberation and Regan's Animal Rights theories, at present the leading alternatives. Animal welfare moralists, usually have in mind for ethical reform *our* treatment of domestic mammals — farm animals, laboratory animals and pets — not wild animals, and certainly not the treatment of wild animals by one another. But Animal Liberation and Animal Rights, both rational, criterion systems, provide no theoretical justification for differential moral standing for wild and domestic animals since both wild and domestic animals are equally sentient or equally rights holders. Hence, either generally to relieve animal suffering or to safeguard the rights of their victims, Animal Liberation and Animal Rights would require us — humanely, of course — to phase predators out of nature. In short, were we to *act* seriously on Animal Liberation and/or Animal Rights, as we acted seriously to emancipate slaves and enfranchise women, we would bring about an ecological nightmare.

Midgley's theory, if it is a theory and if I have got it right, would seem, at least *prima facie*, to draw a sharp distinction between domestic and wild animals since, while both form with us 'communities,' they form with us very different communities. Domestic animals are, as it were, *ex officio* persons. They merit, as such, benevolent and, as it were, person-respecting treatment and 'civil rights' even if they may be — because of their limited capacities and *raisons d'être* — forever consigned to second, third, or fourth class citizenship.

Wild animals and human beings together are equally members of a much vaster 'community' and 'economy' — the biotic community and economy of nature. The structure of the biotic community and the processes of the economy of nature are very different from the structures and processes of our variously interrelated human-domestic animal communities and economies. Because the structure of the natural community which we share with wild animals is very different from the structure of the civil community which we share with domestic animals, our duties in regard to wild and domestic animals are very different.

The organization of the biotic community and the workings of the economy of nature are described by ecology. The correlative moral precepts, duties, and responsibilities of membership in the biotic community are the subject of land or environmental ethics. Mary Midgley's incipient sociobiological theory of animal welfare ethics, with its grounding in what she calls 'the mixed community,' could provide, if appropriately generalized and developed, an embracing conceptual framework in which animal welfare and environmental ethics may be, while remaining clearly separate and distinct, related and reconciled. At present they are bitterly opposed. It is my

hope, therefore, that everyone in the philosophical community concerned with ethics and animals, from either a welfare or environmental point of view, will explore the conceptual territories which Mary Midgley has reconnoitered and follow the paths to which she has pointed in *Animals and Why They Matter*.

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JEAN MORANGE, *Libertés publiques*. (Collection Droit fondamental). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1985. 384 p. 86FF. ISBN 2-13-038981-3.

L'auteur est professeur à la Faculté de droit de Limoges. L'ouvrage qu'il nous propose comporte un index des matières, un index des noms et une table des matières très détaillée. Un sommaire, qui offre un tableau synoptique des thèmes abordés, oriente d'entrée de jeu le lecteur. L'ouvrage se compose de trois cent quinze paragraphes numérotés qui permettent un repérage facile. De plus, à la fin de chaque chapitre se trouve une abondante bibliographie répertoriant la documentation relative aux questions soulevées. Après une brève introduction, le plan de l'ouvrage s'articule en trois grandes parties dont la deuxième est la plus volumineuse. Une conclusion de quelques pages vient jeter un dernier éclairage sur les problèmes évoqués.

Dans l'introduction, l'auteur, par souci de la précision terminologique, observe que la renommée des 'Droits de l'Homme' est plutôt le fait de personnalités philosophiques, politiques ou scientifiques que des juristes eux-mêmes qui préfèrent en général parler sobrement de 'libertés publiques'.

La première partie s'attache donc à définir 'la nature des libertés publiques.' Un premier chapitre étudie la philosophie des droits de l'homme dont la théorie générale des libertés publiques apparaît plus ou moins comme la traduction juridique. C'est l'occasion de retracer brièvement la signification de la philosophie des droits de l'homme au XVIII^e siècle et son esprit individualiste, comme d'en signaler du même coup les nombreuses ambiguïtés qui ne manquent pas d'alimenter les disputes entre les écoles du droit naturel et du positivisme juridique. L'on s'arrête aussi à la contestation dont la philosophie des droits de l'homme a fait l'objet par le totalitarisme, d'une part, et par diverses critiques d'inspiration traditionaliste, marxiste ou réaliste, d'autre part. Un second chapitre examine la théorie générale des

libertés publiques à la lumière des principes constitutionnels du droit positif français contemporain. Dans ses analyses, l'auteur se réfère souvent entre autres à des arrêts du Conseil d'Etat ou à des décisions du Conseil constitutionnel. A la fin, en abordant la question des garanties supranationales, l'auteur élargit son étude au cadre européen.

La deuxième partie, qui constitue à elle seule un peu plus de la moitié de l'ouvrage, constate 'l'étendue des libertés publiques' dont jouissent les citoyens français contemporains. Elle se partage à peu près également entre un titre premier consacré à 'la liberté individuelle' et un titre second où sont passées en revue 'les libertés collectives.' Ainsi que le souligne l'auteur, l'expression utilisée au singulier pour désigner le titre premier entend marquer le caractère unitaire de la liberté individuelle qui se présente néanmoins sous plusieurs facettes. En ce sens, l'autonomie de l'individu est mise en rapport avec la liberté de circulation, avec la sûreté de la personne face à la détention et aux contrôles d'identité, avec la protection de la vie privée quant au domicile, à la correspondance et au fichage administratif. Par ailleurs, la protection des choix de l'individu renvoie à la liberté de conscience et à la libre disposition de soi. Cette dernière, notamment en raison du développement récent des techniques bio-médicales, suscite de nombreux débats philosophiques sans qu'on ait pu encore proposer des solutions juridiques invariables. Quant aux libertés collectives qui retiennent l'attention sous le titre second, l'auteur remarque qu'elles supposent la référence à l'individu et qu'elles sont interdépendantes dans leur exercice. Il s'agit de la liberté de groupement et d'association, de la liberté de la presse touchant l'information et la diffusion, de la liberté des différentes technologies de communication, de la liberté de l'enseignement et de la liberté des cultes.

La troisième partie s'occupe de présenter 'les limites des libertés publiques'. Un premier chapitre étudie ces limites dans le cadre de la société internationale. L'on s'arrête aux obstacles politiques et juridiques. L'on relève également les insuffisances du droit qui se manifestent par les ambiguïtés des différents documents internationaux, entre autres de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme de 1948 ou des Pactes de 1966, l'un relatif aux droits civils et politiques et l'autre relatif aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels. Un second chapitre fournit l'occasion de se pencher sur les limites des libertés publiques dans le cadre national français. En dépit du respect global des droits de l'homme, certaines limites semblent provenir de la logique même d'un système juridique national. Ces limites peuvent être soit particulières, lorsqu'elles touchent certaines catégories de personnes comme les femmes, les aliénés, les militaires ou les étrangers, soit générales, lorsque se posent les problèmes de la conciliation de divers impératifs sociaux. L'auteur montre toute l'importance de l'approche pragmatique dans l'ensemble de ces questions où l'on ne parvient le plus souvent qu'à des accords partiels et variables.

Dans la conclusion, l'auteur rappelle les conceptions divergentes, voire contradictoires qui s'affrontent dans la société contemporaine à propos des droits de l'homme. Pour terminer, il soutient que le droit ne saurait se

ramener simplement à une technique juridique, mais qu'il doit être porté par un élan artistique créateur dont le combat pour les droits de l'homme nous apporte peut-être la plus belle application.

L'ouvrage s'adresse d'abord à des juristes ayant plus particulièrement une connaissance du droit européen continental. Les philosophes du droit peuvent trouver un certain profit à la lecture de l'ouvrage, surtout des première et troisième parties dont la portée s'annonce plus générale. Ils n'y découvriront pas des aperçus théoriques vraiment inédits, mais ils y recueilleront sûrement des illustrations concrètes qui touchent les problèmes vécus par la société contemporaine et qui sont susceptibles d'étayer leurs réflexions.

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MARY O'BRIEN. *The Politics of Reproduction*, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1983. Pp. + 240. US\$9.95. ISBN 0-7100-9498-1.

The Politics of Reproduction can perhaps best be characterized as an argument for rewriting political philosophy — a rewriting which makes proper use of the dialectical method and which gives proper due to contemporary feminist ideology. The book itself exemplifies the dialectical process in the best sense of the Hegelian and Marxist tradition. O'Brien always advocates transcending rather than rejecting traditional thought, even when those traditions epitomize patriarchal and 'male-stream' values.

Although Classical Marxist philosophy has succeeded in producing a dialectical analysis of production, O'Brien rejects it as a feminist philosophy because of its inadequate account of the oppression of women. She attributes this inadequacy to its preoccupation with production and consequent ignoring of the entire reproductive realm. Any explanation of the conditions of women in the work force which ignores the broader context of their reproductive roles will be at best superficial, at worst misleading. O'Brien points out that 'the experience of women in communist revolutions and their aftermaths has been discouraging' (161). Furthermore, there is no place within orthodox Marxism for the insights of psychoanalysis, insights developed by such feminists as Friedan and Mitchell, which O'Brien sees as critical to our understanding of the phenomenon of sexism.

Reproduction is to be contrasted with production insofar as it is, to use O'Brien's terms, 'genderically differentiated.' That is, while everyone must eat and hence labour in the productive realm, the huge bulk of reproductive labour is borne by women. The virtual exclusion of men from the ranks of reproductive labour has been fraught with important consequences, many of which can be readily identified in our historical and philosophical traditions. For one thing, male-stream thought has defined reproduction in terms of sexuality, a definition which gives ejaculation equal if not higher billing than the contributions of the female to the reproductive process. O'Brien redefines reproduction as the entire period which begins with menstruation and ends only when the reproductive work is done, with the independence of the offspring. This depiction of a process encompassing some twenty years puts the ejaculatory instant into proper perspective! A more serious consequence of the exclusion of men from the reproductive labour force has been their deeply-rooted sense of alienation from nature and from the continuation of the species. This alienation can be detected in the instituting of social conditions which attempt to certify paternity by rigid and frequently harsh controls over the reproductive lives of women. Thus males have the choice of whether or not to acknowledge the child as theirs, and with that choice a level of freedom in the reproductive arena unknown to women. Yet it is not a freedom without a price and the price, according to O'Brien, is alienation, despair, 'angst,' in a phrase, the traditional existential preoccupation with death rather than with life. Male-stream religion, in a desperate effort to get into the forum of reproductive creativity, put forward the notion of 'being born again,' a concept which for generations enabled religious and philosophic theory to circumvent the female womb.

The concept of the political is essential to O'Brien's work. Although traditional thought has assigned reproduction to the private realm, feminist thought enables us to see the absurdity of categorizing the continuation of the species as essentially private. In fact, the whole private/public distinction is to be regarded suspiciously according to O'Brien, as an index of vested patriarchal interests rather than as a sign of some basic social category. In their struggle to restructure the conditions of reproduction, women will transform the public realm in a radical way. This is not surprising, for 'the central female experience' (91) is rooted, both materially and historically, in motherhood. In reforming the social relations that surround motherhood, it will be impossible to leave untouched any part of the grand superstructures of ecology, history, sociology, psychology, or philosophy. On O'Brien's analysis, the restructuring of the reproductive realm does not entail feminist separatism, for she views 'the reintegration of men on equal terms into reproductive process' (210) as a necessary condition of women's liberation.

The book is not without problems. All too frequently, the reader's understanding boggles, and sentences laboured over, to borrow O'Brien's own imagery, yield only a glimmer of meaning. One such sentence appears in her discussion of bad faith. She says, 'It emanates from immanence, and immanence is the transcended ground of the ontology of the individual male ex-

istent' (74). In her introduction to the first chapter, she also misuses the technical logical term 'syllogism' (20).

A more important criticism is that an entire philosophical tradition — pragmatism — is omitted from her account of the history of thought. This is a serious omission because it is pragmatism which struggles hardest with the relationship between theory and practice, a relationship which occupies much of O'Brien's attention in the book. She states very clearly that feminists must turn their attention to 'both theoretical and practical work' (200). It would have been interesting to compare O'Brien's analysis of the connection between feminist theory and practice in the reproductive realm to Peirce's careful delineation of the complementary roles of theory and practice in the process of scientific inquiry. Another serious shortcoming of the book arises in relation to O'Brien's prescription that we reintegrate 'men on equal terms into reproductive process' (200). For she gives us no indication of either the practical form this reintegration would take, or how it might affect a feminist theory of reform directed at the institution of the family. Nor is there any indication as to why we should not expect the traditional power hierarchy between the genders to simply reimprint itself on an organization of reproductive labour which men are invited to share.

Yet, in spite of these criticisms, the book marks a milestone in feminist philosophy. Its message is powerfully transmitted: As women, we must come to recognize the importance and the honour of the labour we have traditionally done — the birthing, nurturing, and bringing to independence of the next generation of human beings; as feminists, we must see that our philosophical path has brought us to a new dialectical crossroad, beyond which we can no longer confine, limit, distort, and even mutilate the reproductive mode so as to make it fit the mold of the private, the personal, the apolitical. For as feminists, our *magnum opus* must be to translate 'the feminist principle into political praxis' (115) via our own lived experience as reproductive labourers. In *The Politics of Reproduction*, O'Brien has provided us with a glimpse of the embryonic structure of a feminist politics; but more important, she has shared with us her own insights into the art of midwifery, insights which may enable us to safely deliver the feminist vision to our descendants.

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Z.A. PELCZYNSKI, ed. *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press 1984. Pp. viii + 327. US\$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-24793-4); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-28969-6).

This collection of essays by twelve specialists embraces a critical evaluation of Hegel's political philosophy based mainly on his *Philosophie des Rechts* (1820) and secondary sources. There is a concerted effort to draw a distinction between Hegel's treatment of civil society operational in an open market society in the production and exchange of goods and his account of political society or the state, at the same time not losing sight of the fact that both are spheres of ethical life which must be integrated into a unified theory of statehood. There is also an attempt by the authors to establish once and for all the relevance of Hegel's political philosophy to the present world order.

An introduction and two of the essays have been contributed by Professor Pelczynski himself, who along with Merold Westphal in 'Hegel's Radical Idealism: Family and State as Ethical Communities' addresses Hegel's state as a political community which must be understood to be ethically organized. The state is seen as primarily an ethical rather than simply a contractual community; indeed the state in its widest sense is glorified as spiritually objectified such that spiritual powers reside in it and rule over its entire destiny and culture. Civil society is defined as a network of institutions viewed as one part of a concrete political totality, and while the state for Hegel embodies a divine principle unfolding itself in the world of everyday affairs, the doctrine of state supremacy was never shared by Marx for whom bourgeois society remained basic and by whom the state was denied legitimacy as a political community. Pelczynski is of the opinion that even where complete political freedom is lacking to the individual citizen Hegel's provision for the superior character of the state may be tolerated if it forestalls the kind of marxist theorizing which would restrict all institutional life to basically an economic interpretation characteristic of civil society alone. Pelczynski is ready to make out a strong argument for a 'concrete freedom' residing in the political institutions of an ethical community, a freedom which is more to be obeyed than enjoyed by the individual concerned, all of which surely falls disturbingly harsh upon the ears of modern readers grown accustomed to the agency of free and equal participation in the affairs of political life.

There are two contributions by K.-H. Ilting, both translated from the German; Ilting and also Klaus Hartmann offer what is claimed to be a new reading of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. These essayists persist in their attempt to make Hegel's dialectic of state answer to the requirements of modern democratic principles until the freedom we would enjoy is belaboured into almost the demise of freedom for the ordinary individual. A dialectically argued freedom derived from the abstract Idea of statehood turns out to be not freedom at all, at least not the freedom for all individual citizens that everyone would wish to possess in today's democratic world. It is in the ra-

tional unfolding of dialectical truth that Hegel comes upon the sought-for freedom in political society, a freedom to be imposed upon the citizen rather than granted to him, a freedom imparted to the electorate collectively rather than a freedom that should belong to each citizen individually. In his second essay 'The Dialectic of Civil Society' Ilting strives to give meaning to Hegel's Idea of freedom actualized as the right of the individual to pursue his private interests such that the individual might yet become conscious of total freedom in the modern state. Hegel's political society, however, is expressly held to be an authoritarian state of office-holders conceived as an institutional actualization of the Idea developed from his *Logik* and ontologically derived. Ilting himself concedes that Hegel's theorizing in this regard yields no more than an explanation and that it cannot be said to furnish a philosophical proof in the strict sense.

From M.J. Petry who writes on 'Hegel's Article on the English Reform Bill' it is of interest to surmise that Hegel in his journalistic foray into British political life was entirely lacking in sympathy for the democratic process as it operated in Britain at that time and that he scorned an elected parliament as incompetent. Not that Hegel wished to lend his support to the British reform movement, but it is more likely that he drew attention to the defects endemic to the representative system in Britain in order to prove what he believed to be the superiority of the Prussian monarchical form of government which he favoured.

Seyla Benhabib, writing 'On the Significance of Hegel's Abstract Right,' emphasizes that abstract (natural) right must be made actual within the matrix of social life, a conclusion that is not at all surprising in the light of what we already know of Hegel's theory of *Sittlichkeit*. Possibly of greater interest is the observation that the norms of abstract right are realizable within a non-contractarian setting and that they do not reduce simply to an 'ideological justification' of property relations in accordance with the marxist view. The essay under the title of 'Subjectivity and Civil Society' by Garbis Kortian is worth pursuing, for granting that Hegel's state is the actuality of the ethical Idea, it is said to be not inconsistent to abstract from the Hegelian system at least the intellectually satisfying hope that in exercising the supremacy of thought over nature mankind may yet become established as autonomous subject and so work toward his own emancipation as an alternative to the threat of self-destruction.

In two essays, one by Raymond Plant entitled 'Hegel on Legitimation,' the issue of what is called 'legitimation' is dealt with in order to find some justification for state intervention in civil life. When the state finds it necessary to impose its many petty controls it could well be maintained that the very freedom of civil society as it functions in the marketplace is threatened. Hegel's ready answer, as A.S. Walton is concerned to show in 'Economy, Utility and Community in Hegel's Theory of Civil Society,' is that civil society as well as the state carries with it the expression of an ethical order which promotes harmony and which is already inherently present in all such human endeavours from the start.

Even granting the potential for a kind of token freedom rendered visible within an authoritarian state, Hegel's political philosophy is still too firmly wedded to the Prussian monarchical system of his time to afford a desirable model for statehood. In spite of the fact that Hegel incorporates both civil and political society in the dialectical unfolding of the Idea of freedom, and even though the state is designated as 'ethical substance,' his peculiar conception of nationhood embodying as it does the outmoded institutions of corporations and estates, his notorious justification of war and his advocacy of an uncompromising nationalism all militate against a pattern of state to which we might subscribe in searching for ways to remedy the inconsistencies inherent in late capitalism. After looking closely at these fourteen essays a case can hardly be made for the kind of free democracy we would choose for ourselves directly derivable from Hegel's dialectic of statehood.

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N. RESCHER, ed. *The Heritage of Logical Positivism*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1985. Pp. 186. US\$23.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8191-4470-3); US\$11.25 (paper: ISBN 0-8191-4471-1)

One expects titles to fit the books they adorn, but not so in this case.

What *can* one say about the heritage of logical positivism? Who, indeed, were the logical positivists? They were a diverse group. Some were foundationists in epistemology (Schlick), others held a coherence theory of verification (Neurath). Some were primarily philosophers (Schlick), others were more narrowly philosophers of science (Reichenbach, Carnap), others had their roots in other disciplines, mathematics (Hahn), physics (Frank), or sociology (Neurath). They are united in honouring a series of thinkers that contemporary irrationalism abhorred — Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau, Ricardo, Marx, Darwin; and in sharing a concern to defend the Enlightenment ideals of scientific rationality, the unity of science, and the idea of an objective science of man, restating these ideals in the language of Russell's logic and analyzing and assimilating such developments in physics as Einstein's.

In *Mitteleuropa* where they began there is, alas, little of their heritage: even if staying had been a rational option, their ideals, unlike those of the existentialists, did not permit the moral compromises — the moral abdication —

the survival would have required. It is in America, to where so many of them went, that their heritage survives. When they arrived Dewey's instrumentalism dominated much methodological thinking in the social sciences especially. Through the work of such positivists as Carcap and Hempel this tradition has largely disappeared, and empiricism became the dominant philosophy of science; Nagel is important in taking up the positivist themes and locating them in the tradition of realism in American thought that goes back through Morris R. Cohen to Russell. The impact of such thinkers as Feigl and Bergmann in the methodological clarification of psychology was immense. Thus, Bergman was able to show how American psychology could assimilate the brilliant experimentation of the Gestalters while rejecting their neo-Kantian holistic philosophy of science; and with K.W. Spence he was to do important work in clarifying the logical structure of such psychological theories as those of Clark Hull. Other work was less influential. Thus, Carnap, almost alone among the positivists, thought the idea of an a priori inductive logic was a fruitful one, and launched a massive research programme which, however, soon petered out into technicalities and is now more history than heritage.

So what does the book deal with? One valuable essay (by A. Kamlah) deals with the neo-Kantian origins (not: heritage) of Reichenbach's views on the principle of induction. It is an interesting account of the original context of Reichenbach's work on probability, and details the shift that occurred when the positivists moved to America. It makes clear how the point of much of Reichenbach's discussion both of geometry and induction is missed if we are unaware of the original context. Another essay (by W. Diederich) defends the conventionalist doctrines of Poincaré and Reichenbach against Quine and Putnam. The points made against the latter two, though simply put, are both telling and correct. Those who think that Quine has established that we need no longer distinguish the conventional and non-conventional elements of a theory should read this essay with care.

Considerably less interesting is an essay on ethics (by G. Sayre-McCord) which argues that moral science survives the positivist critique. Moral claims are as testable by deduced observational consequences as are the best of scientific theories. This perhaps has a little force if Ayer's discussion of verifiability is in the back of one's mind, but it is clear that other approaches to empirical meaningfulness, e.g., Carnap's or the approach through translatability into an empiricist language, will in fact preclude granting scientific status to sentences which have the imperative force which (as Hume so long ago argued) is essential to moral discourse. Nor should one embarrass Schlick's memory by making too much of his crudely hedonistic theory of motivation. Perhaps more successful as an essay is one (by G. Wolters) that discusses Hugo Dingler and his somewhat tenuous connections to Carnap, but it is not clear that it is a tale worth the telling.

J. Fetzer makes a couple of correct points about Carnap's views on reduction sentences, without, however, seeming to be aware of the literature on these points. J. Kekes argues that in reading either philosophical texts or

scientific theories, one must take into account cultural context in trying to ascertain their meanings. One who has read Neurath, as Carnap had, would no doubt agree; but, contrary to Kekes, it has nothing to do with the verifiability account of meaning.

The verifiability principle is discussed by B. Skyrms in a rewrite of parts of Ch. I of his *Pragmatics and Empiricism*. If one focuses on Ayer and Carnap, his points have some force; but other positivists like Bergmann were fully able and willing to invoke the pragmatics of language in order to *defend* a version of the positivist verifiability thesis, and Skyrms' claims do not touch these alternative approaches.

The best essay is W. Salmon's which discusses whether positivists, *pace* van Fraassen, can admit to the confirmation of theories about unobservables. He argues persuasively that a reasonable positivist can do so. Alone among the essayists, he recognizes that 'within the ring' of the positivist movement, there was a very wide degree of disagreement and diversity.

Thus, J. Hanna argues that 20th century positivism is a history of trying to formulate a view of science in which all theses are decidable. The thesis is false — neither Neurath nor Frank nor Hahn nor several other positivists were bothered by the need to achieve algorithmic certainty. But Hanna, as his footnotes show, really means Carnap, and while some ideas are useful, the case is made only through a reading which narrows Carnap's scientific concern to develop rules that will help the practicing scientist into a concern to develop rules that will yield as much certainty as possible.

Carnap's scientism showed itself in its dismissal of issues concerning framework choice as merely practical: R. Creath shows how this is incompatible with the scientific realism that Carnap also wishes to defend; while A. Coffa neatly shows how this leads quite directly to the sort of idealism with which positivists ought to be unhappy. But then, there were positivists who did not follow Carnap in the facile moves that made too much a matter of non-cognitive decision. In reading Coffa we come to recognize how unwise it is to choose Carnap as representing all positivism. In fact, the emphasis in this volume is so strongly on Carnap, that its title would less misleadingly be '*The Heritage of Carnap*'.' This is perhaps understandable, since the collection originated in a symposium at the University of Pittsburgh, in the library of which now repose the Carnap papers. But to the very real extent that Carnap is not in fact representative, this volume fails to discuss the heritage of *logical positivism*.

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NATHAN STEMMER. *The Roots of Knowledge*. Don Mills, ON: Blackwell Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. vii + 200 Cdn\$49.95. ISBN 0-631-13382-8.

"How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" Kant asked himself — and what really is his answer? "By virtue of a faculty". So Nietzsche said about Kant. A similar comment can be made, *mutatis mutandis*, about Stemmer's book. As a major philosophical result he promises, and believes that he delivers, a solution to the Hempel and Goodman paradoxes. To the question how we manage to identify projectible classes, or proper cases of confirmation, he answers: By virtue of our evolutionary endowment.

The argument runs like this: 'Since the [generalizing] dispositions came to reflect part of the environment in which they evolved, this part of the environment was therefore reflected in the dispositions' (45). Consequently (and this is one of the main theses of the book) 'many terrestrial innate generalization classes of well developed species, that originated in entities that were salient for these species, were highly regular with respect to many of the properties that were represented in the classes and which were naturally expected properties for these species' (47).

Stemmer criticizes the approach to the paradoxes of Carnap, Goodman, Ackerman and Friedman on the grounds that they do not give clear definitions, that their solutions still allow counter intuitive inferences, give no satisfactory explanation of the high reliability of past inductions, and are based upon a single criterion (94 ff). This may be so, but his own answer is different *in kind* from what they attempted. No one has doubted that humans have the capacity to pick out projectible classes, and since the time of Peirce ('Unless man has a natural bent in accordance with nature's, he has no chance of understanding nature at all' 6.477), few have questioned the role of evolution in this. But the answer to the query how it is done should not be 'By virtue of our adaptation.' Rather, it should be, for instance, a piece of software that distinguishes, in general, green-type things from bleen-type things, or a mark that allows one to explain the difference to a being that keeps confusing them. Perhaps no such answer is possible; it may be that only the adumbration of a nomological *explanation*, a loose Darwinian history of our capacity, but no logical *solution* is possible. But Stemmer does not show this.

None of this is to suggest that the book does not have its virtues. It is clearly written, well organized, and introduces a number of useful distinctions. There are interesting comments on the lottery paradox, on language acquisition, analyticity, similarity and universals. Still, the naturalizing of epistemology attempted here takes some getting used to.

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PATRICK SUPPES, *Probabilistic Metaphysics*. Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press 1984. Pp. xii + 252. Cdn\$55.75 ISBN 0-631-13332-1.

Patrick Suppes' new book is a lively and spirited defense of a thoroughgoing indeterministic view of the world. In the Laplacean vision of the world (nightmare, William Blake would say), a 'vast intelligence' is capable of predicting all future states of the world given just one complete glimpse of the present. Everything, large or small, is a more or less complicated simulacrum of the celestial clockwork of Newtonian mechanics. In the vision of Suppes, though, clouds float across the sky in random patterns and unpredictable breezes ruffle the leaves while human beings (including philosophers) babble on in a highly irregular way as chance smells drift past their noses, affecting their senses in ways unknown to any deterministic theory. As the philosophers meander along the sidewalks of California, they encounter random bevyes of 'Valley Girls' who afflict the serious and staid citizens by chance outcries of 'Grody to the max!' and other remarks of indeterminate purport (170).

The main targets of the book are what Suppes calls 'tenets of *neotraditional metaphysics*' (2), namely the idea that the future determines the past, that every event has a sufficient cause, that knowledge must be grounded in certainty, that scientific knowledge can be made complete, and that scientific method can in principle be unified.

The Laplacean universe is one in which certainty in knowledge is obtainable, at least on the observational level. In the Suppes universe, things do not behave according to the deterministic scenario. Even mathematics is not immune to the general uncertainty. Suppes rightly points out that it is a matter of observation that corrections to published mathematical proofs are commonplace, but corrections of experimental papers are not common. The reason for this is not far to seek. The criterion for judging a piece of mathematics is radically empirical, in that the evidence for a claim is the published proofs themselves. No such complete presentation of evidence occurs elsewhere in science. Since mistakes in mathematics are quite common, and have been made by the greatest mathematicians in published work, mathematics cannot be considered a haven of certainty. Clearly, areas other than mathematics are still less certain, since the criteria for correctness are less clearcut. Certainty in measurement of empirical quantities is no more attainable than mathematical certainty, contrary to the Laplacean fantasy. It is important to note in this connection the existence of classically defined systems of differential equations in which predictions of the path of the system in phase space require indefinitely precise measurements (the system is unstable with respect to infinitesimal perturbations). Such systems are not mathematical fictions. The system of equations describing the weather over a part of the globe can be of this type (a swish of the philosopher's cloak leads to a thunderstorm a few days later). For the Laplacean intelligence to predict the future of such systems, infinitely precise measurements are required.

Knowledge is not only uncertain, in this picture; it is also radically incomplete. The great vision of Unified Science which was the regulative ideal of the logical positivists is a sheer fantasy. Gödel has shown our mathematical knowledge to be forever incomplete; attempts such as Einstein's at a unified field theory have failed, and in spite of optimism on the part of younger physicists such as Hawking there doesn't seem to be really convincing evidence that particle physics is heading for a final unified theory. As we dig down into the world of elementary particles, we do not find the 'building blocks of the world' but rather a strange fluid domain in which the 'basic stuff' eludes us as particles transform into each other and the 'simple particles' of the 1930's are revealed as conglomerates of quarks. It is more like Aristotelian than Democritean physics, as Suppes notes.

Not only is science not converging to a final all-embracing theory, but the sciences appear to be diverging rather than converging. In spite of what one reads in philosophy of science primers, there is no serious sense in which chemistry can be reduced to physics. This isn't to say that chemistry is completely divorced from physics, of course, but is to remark that problems in chemistry are typically solved by methods peculiar to chemists, not by just plugging in a set of parameters and then solving the Schrödinger equation for the system. The computations from first principles are just too complicated, and in the case of unstable systems (not uncommon in chemistry) simply impossible. Each special branch seems to develop its own jargon and methods, and the resulting Babel appears to be unavoidable. The Encyclopedia of Unified Science will never see the light of day (thank goodness).

Suppes ends his polemics against deterministic theories by interesting discussions of the philosophy of language and the theory of rationality, including material on probabilistic grammars and discussion of the rationality of procedures.

I find a great deal to agree with in Suppes' main theses (the negation of the tenets listed above), and in fact I am a bit puzzled by the hortatory tone of the book. According to Suppes, the old theological fantasy of an omniscient Being in the sky has been replaced in modern philosophy by the fantasy of the omniscient computer in the basement (of the Pentagon?). Now I admit to some unreconstructed determinists among my philosophical acquaintances, but I am not so sure how widespread these ideas are. I have been a convinced non-determinist in physics, at least, since learning of the quantum theory of radio-activity. The quantum theory is so much simpler than the classical theory, and involves so few arbitrary assumptions that it is surely correct. I suspect that most philosophers who have bothered to think about the issue have come to similar conclusions. In fact, Suppes doesn't document his claim but spends most of his time arguing with classical figures like Laplace, Kant, Hume and Descartes. Modern philosophers only appear in a debate between Salmon, van Fraassen and others on probabilistic causality and the principle of the common cause, a debate of a somewhat esoteric nature.

Although I agree largely with both the arguments and conclusions of the book, I think Suppes plays rather fast and loose with the distinction between

determinism and predictability. In Chapter 2, Suppes appears to conflate the two, as evinced by a passage in which he says, that 'the real test of determinism is predictability. Phenomena that we cannot predict must be judged random' (31-2). But this is not really true. Very simple deterministic systems can evince highly unpredictable and random-seeming behaviour (consider a pseudo-random number generator). Similarly, it is consistent to hold that physical phenomena are governed by deterministic equations, as in classical physics, though in practice they are unpredictable due to complexity or errors of measurement. Suppes in fact makes this point quite correctly on p. 129. The real test of determinism versus non-determinism would seem to lie more in the direction of traditional criteria like simplicity.

The book is enjoyable reading, as it is free of the rather stuffy academic atmosphere of a good deal of recent philosophy. Suppes makes his points with homely and engaging examples; for example, the discussion of rationality and justified procedures is illustrated by cooking recipes. He also shows acquaintance with experimental work in the sciences, including some experimental work of his own on modelling a child's utterances by a probabilistic grammar.

The book is well produced; if you have any leanings towards any of the deterministic theses listed above it is a salutary antidote.

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BERNARD WILLIAMS. *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy*. Harvard University Press 1985. Pp. ix + 230. US\$17.50. ISBN 0-674-26857-1.

This is a book about the relation of reflection to practice, and while practice is not limited to the ethical, the book is very largely about the ethical, especially the role of moral philosophy in relation to ethical practice. It transpires that, according to Williams, practice, including ethical practice, is so embedded in history and in culture that all attempts either to ground the ethical in ahistorical and universal reason or in the devising of ahistorical theories of ethics such as utilitarianism and contractualism, are doomed to failure. A very faint hope is left for a theory of the Aristotelian type that would attempt to derive an ethics of well-being from human nature, though even this would be in the succeed/fail (gain or fail to gain acceptance or com-

mitment) category rather than a matter of demonstration, argument, or reasoning.

This attack on abstract, ahistorical theoretical reasoning in ethics is one of the main thrusts of the book. The other, signalled at the very beginning, is a substantive individualism that recognizes the separateness and uniqueness of persons and demands that individuals be permitted by their ethical reflections to live lives that are distinctively *their own*. Thus, as before in Williams's writing, utilitarianism is rejected for, among other things, its failure to recognize the separateness of persons. Hare's amalgamation of everyone, through everyone's identification with everyone else, into a single World Agent (Williams's phrase) comes under special attack, as does the abstractness of the Kantian conception of the ethical where individual differences appear to count for nothing.

Thus moral philosophy in general is bad for two reasons: it abstracts from historical and cultural actualities, which not only place limits on possible motivations but may actually determine ethical *truths*, and it fails to allow for the importance of individual differences and the need for individual judgement in the context of a particular person's situation in life.

The book begins with a consideration of the question Socrates is reported as saying is not trivial, namely how a man should live. And while the question is directed toward individuals — inviting them to reflect upon or examine their lives — it naturally moves to the question how *anyone* should live, or what is the good life for human beings in general. That is, where we begin with a simple 'should' which, though practical is not specifically ethical, this seems to lead directly into the realm of the ethical which concerns the values we share and the life we live *together* in relation to one another:

Practical thought is radically first-personal. It must ask and answer the question "what shall *I* do?" Yet under Socratic reflection we seem to be driven to generalize that *I* and even to adopt, from the force of reflection alone, an ethical perspective.(21)

The route from this to ethical theorizing seems clear enough, and it is a route that Williams is determined to block, though in *his* good life there certainly is a role for reflection, as it transpires in the end.

Whereas the practical is broader than the ethical, and not all practical decisions are ethical ones (nor is all practical necessity ethical necessity), Williams calls the *moral* a 'sub-system' of the ethical. By 'the moral' Williams means the deontically moral, that is the system, or alleged system, of moral requirements (to do or omit doing) — he calls them *obligations* — and permissions, and the final chapter of the book is reserved for this sub-system and its demolition. The particular villain of this piece is Kant, who comes in for most of his chastisement here, though room is left, on Williams's scheme, for obligations construed as things with 'high deliberative priority.'

This leaves one in a state of some confusion, for Kant was supposedly dealt with in Chapter 4 as the paradigm of someone who tried to argue that

rational reflection itself led to ethical universalism. What actually happens in that chapter, however, is that attention is almost immediately diverted away from Kant to Alan Gewirth, whose main argument, namely that I cannot help but make rights claims which I *must* universalize, is very easily defeated. This chapter, entitled 'Foundations: Practical Reason,' fits into a scheme according to which we are first to deal with attempts to *ground* the ethical or provide *foundations* for it in reason or the rational life. (Kant is the principle grounder of one type, according to this scheme, while Aristotle, seeing the exercise of reason as the route to well-being, is the main subject of the previous chapter.) Only after the question of foundations has been dealt with is Williams to go on to consider moral theories, specifically contractualism (especially Rawls) and utilitarianism (especially Hare), and then the book is to deal with other matters, viz. linguistic analysis (whose importance is lightly dismissed) objectivity and relativism, and finally *morality* in the sense especially defined.

But alas the distinctions between *foundations* and *theories*, and that between a certain theory and the 'sub-system' morality itself, are not at all clear, and there is a tendency for things to turn into a jumble, with the central issues showing up in various places and under different headings and not at all disciplined in the way Williams's formal scheme would have them be. We are led along various paths with flair and brilliance, sometimes through some very thick forests indeed, but there is a notable absence of order and neatness, and sometimes even of clarity and coherence. Somehow one has the impression he has not really *got the thing together*.

Thus in Chapter 8, the chapter on objectivity, where non-objectivity is argued for in ethics in contrast with science where an 'absolute conception of the world' is permitted and convergence is the expected norm, an ethical outlook is virtually identified, though this identification is not signalled in any way, with an historical system of social practices or a culture that uses certain 'thick concepts,' i.e., virtue and vice words. Furthermore the entire issue is dealt with in purely general terms without a single concrete example, making it almost impossible to find one's footing. There are ethical truths and there is ethical knowledge from the non-objective point of view, in terms of the interests that shape the use of the 'thick concepts' of a particular culture.

This knowledge and these truths are clearest in the case of a 'hypertraditional' society where there is a minimum of reflection, where there is a 'cultural artifact [the people] have come to inhabit.' If I am not a member of this society, and I do not share its 'thick' concepts, I cannot use them to make judgments. Nevertheless I can recognize them as true and as constituting knowledge although it is a knowledge I do not share.

The person who begins to reflect finds himself/herself in a similar position. These truths exist only at the non-objective level, but when I begin to reflect, to ask questions, to query concepts and practices, I must do so at the objective level, that is I must search for an adequate ethical theory and no such theory is possible! There is no ethical knowledge at the objective level. Reflection can destroy knowledge and perhaps leave nothing in its place but

vain and idle groping with such 'thin' concepts as 'good,' 'ought,' and 'right.' We cannot stop or prevent ethical reflection. It has a place in a life worth living, but it must be conducted 'from the perspective of the ethical life we actually have' (171) which is something less than the objective level, and instead of ethical knowledge we should, as reflective persons, look for confidence or conviction, a social notion which is related to discussion, theorizing, and reflection.

Despite what he says about truth and knowledge at the non-objective level, Williams denies that he is a relativist, but this turns out to be a denial that one can be a *practical* relativist, that is one who can approve of and perhaps participate in the social practices of any culture. One will react strongly against certain things because of one's convictions. One cannot help but apply one's own judgments to much of the rest of the world. One cannot stand apart from one's moral convictions as relativism, in this sense, would require one to do. Nevertheless while he is not a *practical* relativist, Williams is clearly a *theoretical* relativist in holding that various and conflicting 'moral outlooks' can be (non-objectively) true, even if one does not share them.

After reading these two chapters, it ceases to be clear at all where the reflective individual is left and what on earth he is to do, although the next chapter, the one on morality as specially defined, assures us that there are certain things to which he should give high deliberative priority, a priority that is 'virtually absolute in some cases' (185). There *are* obligations (and their corresponding rights) though an obligation does not require a more pressing obligation in order to be overridden — perhaps just something very important. Does this chapter really belong in the same book?

Aside from the seeming incompatibility between substantive individualism and absolute social (cultural, historical) enmeshment, there is something else at work in this book which accounts for its tone and many of its conclusions. Socrates' question is interpreted as 'How has one most reason to live?' or 'What reasons should govern one's life?' and a reason for Williams is something that is already a part of a person's motivational system. The question becomes, in effect, 'Which of my desires should I act to satisfy?' rather than 'what should I aim at that will make my life most worth while?' If there can be no *cognition* of value at the objective level, which in turn can motivate, there obviously can be no answer, since none can be guaranteed to excite my existing motives, and every theory will fail. It will fail because it need not grip *me* by touching my desires.

Similarly, the values of a culture are just that — what its members commonly value, respect, or attach importance to. There is no further question of whether what they value really has the worth they think it has or whether about the value of some things they may perhaps be mistaken.

It seems clear to me that only critical reflection can answer these questions, and at the objective level, although, of course *one necessarily speaks and thinks from where one is*. But if there is no question, it is no surprise that there is no answer. If, at the bottom, there are only individual wants and

socially approved practices, the results of ethical reflection, which seeks the good, are bound to be nugatory.

I am as aware as Williams is of the inadequacies in Aristotelianism, Kantianism, and such theories as utilitarianism and contractualism that tend to elaborate themselves endlessly. I am also aware that deontic morality tends to gobble up ethics as a whole although there is much more to the ethical than moral requirement and permissibility. (Nor can it be got under the heading of supererogation!) But I have more faith than he has in the possibility of an ethics based on a determinate concept of well-being, one which includes an account of human nature, both individual and social. Though it could not be free of error, it would consist of truth claims, subject, of course, to correction. And insofar as it was true and recognized and accepted as such it would, by creating new motivations, contribute at least something — perhaps in the end could contribute a great deal — to the betterment of the world.

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