

# Canadian Philosophical Reviews

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Jude P. Dougherty, Editor

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WILLIAM T. BLUHM. *Force or Freedom? The Paradox in Modern Political Thought*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1984. Pp. xvii + 322. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-300-03087-8.

The aim of this ambitious book is to reveal that modern political theory, from the seventeenth century to the present day, has been fraught with irreconcilable tensions and ambiguities because of the dualistic Cartesian metaphysics from which it arises, and that therefore a major reorientation in our categories of metaphysical and political thought is required. The reorientation is urged as of more than merely intellectual importance since it is part of the thesis of the book that the paradoxes of modern political theory are at the root of long-standing practical political dilemmas. A summary statement of the problems and their origins is given by Bluhm in the following:

The common currency of the diverse modern conceptions of individual freedom is found in the autonomy of Descartes's lone thinker, while the notion of force they share derives from the Cartesian view of body as mathematically structured matter whose motions are governed by general laws. Just as Cartesian dualism contains a fundamental ambiguity about the precise relationship between the free determinations of mind and will of the observer and political actor and the necessary movements of observed body (political) behavior, so there is an ambiguity about how subjective freedom of individual choice can intelligibly be related to the objective necessities of a manipulable body politic.

It should be evident from this passage that the metaphysical issue of freedom of the will as against natural determinism and the political issue of freedom of choice as against public control are deliberately taken as interwoven. That the terms of the former issue fix the terms for the latter issue is something which Bluhm partly presupposes — to the extent that he does not analytically argue for it — and partly seeks to prove in the course of exploring the Cartesian legacy. He discusses in some detail how Descartes's metaphysical dualism of subjective mind, freedom and will, on the one side, and objective body, necessity and mechanism, on the other, is meant to replace Aristotelean teleology and Christian theology in order to supply the philosophical underpinnings for the emerging scientific world-view. (A

somewhat irritating feature of the account of Descartes is the attempt to parallel the parts of Descartes's *Discourse on Method* and the seven days of creation; a parallel that founders on the fact that there are only six parts to the *Discourse*, which just leads Bluhm to remark on how much of a 'utilitarian technologist' Descartes was in not allowing the equivalent of a seventh day of rest.) It is Hobbes who first incorporates Descartes's metaphysics into a theory of politics: he begins from isolated individuals possessing absolute freedom and yet ends with their consenting to a body politic presided over by an absolute sovereign. Locke fares not much better: although he advocates tolerance and limited government, everything depends, Bluhm argues, on the freedom of natural man being systematically socialized to fit the demands of 'a middle-class pattern' (78).

But it is to Rousseau that Bluhm predictably looks for the most distinctive and disturbing paradox, or version of the paradox, of force and freedom. Rousseau identifies individual freedom with untrammelled spontaneity and yet also insists on the importance of community and even conformity. So he is led to maintain that what the general will of the community prescribes is what individuals themselves would choose were they to see what true self-fulfillment involves. Hence, in forcing them to do (or not do) something, the community, whose will is embodied in the Legislator, is serving as the vehicle of their freedom, they are just being forced to be free.

This outcome is the *reductio* of the untenable position in which two opposites are insisted upon. As practical manifestations of Rousseau's quest for the moral regeneration of the individual through society, Bluhm cites not only the programs of self-described disciples of Rousseau like Robespierre and Saint Just in the French Revolution but also those of the Ayatollah Khomeini today and those of the New Left in the sixties. These programs are instanced as at the extreme end of a continuum along which lie also the practical application of Hobbes in enterprises of behaviour modification and the political implication of Locke in oppressive majoritarianism.

From these thinkers and theories spawned by dualism Bluhm turns to four figures, Kant, Hegel, Mill and Marx, each of whom seeks to bring about a 'dialectical synthesis' of the polar opposites at issue but fails to do so. Kant's failure lies in making freedom merely *noumenal*; Hegel's failure, like that of Marx after him, lies in reducing freedom to the contemplation of historical necessity; while Mill's failure is not exactly that of a defender of dialectics but of the would-be eternal compromiser whose see-sawing from libertarianism to elitist authoritarianism and back again results in his settling down nowhere. Looking to applications, Bluhm sees in Woodrow Wilson's idealistic Fourteen Points the reflection of a Kantian ought that will not mess with what is. Hegel in practice can become extreme nationalism and Marx totalitarian Communism. Mill leads to every manner of experiment in living which in turn evokes the pressure to save society from dissensus.

In the face of all this, Nietzschean nihilism is presented as the appropriate next and in a sense last response to the metaphysics and politics of dualism. Various currents of thought in the twentieth century are then briefly canvass-

ed, existentialism, ordinary language philosophy, phenomenology and Marxist humanism, for the promise they hold out of a 'holistic approach' as the alternative to the dualism on which modernity is built, but none provides what it promises.

Bluhm does think there is a way out and his final chapter is entitled 'Towards an Unparadoxical Way of Ideas.' Although he warns that he is only pointing out a direction to follow, rather than pursuing it far along, the gesturing is bold. Bluhm thinks that we must get back to the idea of universal human norms, to be discovered through examining 'the public world that Descartes attacked' which will disclose an 'embodied mind,' in effect the consensus of the ages. There are, Bluhm believes, basic values and norms which are shared across a broad range of societies and these can become the foundation of a new view of politics. 'The work of politics in such a view would consist of prudent experimentation of a pragmatic sort, directed by universal agreement as an expression of the moral sense of mankind.' What norms does this moral sense of mankind yield? Bluhm mentions from Aristotle prohibitions against envy, adultery, theft and murder which recur in the Ten Commandments; and more generally claims that 'principles that are virtually identical with those of the Ten Commandments' are universally held or very nearly so. What exactly does all this have to do with the force-freedom paradox? The idea is that given the appropriate moral foundations in truly universal norms, public law and authority can be the object of a freely and rationally accepted consensus. This suggestion is buttressed by the further claim that the promptings of self-interest and the demands of objective justice are really compatible, indeed are identical.

Well, maybe. But these are surely large and controversial claims and not always entirely clear ones. The only reasonable attitude to such a catalogue of sweeping claims is skepticism or even bewilderment pending further extensive elaboration and argument. And although the integrity and humanity of Bluhm's own motives and aims are undeniable, the fear also arises that the suggested consensus may itself be used to justify enforcing parochial goals as the requisites of communal order and individual freedom.

Nor is it only regarding Bluhm's final proposals that scepticism is in order. For obviously this book, while being both thoughtful and learned, tries to cover an enormous amount of ground, too much ground, ground of too many diverse sorts. The impression one is unavoidably left with is that distinct (though likely related) problems have been piled too quickly in a single heap, that even what is called the force-freedom paradox is really the name for an array of issues, some of which are perhaps not paradoxical at all such as the need for limiting freedom for the sake of collective security.

Bluhm's general project about the consequences of Cartesianism brings to mind the recent books by Rorty and MacIntyre. Bluhm does not mention Rorty but does discuss MacIntyre and criticises him for giving in to relativism. Whether or not Bluhm is right on this, or any other specific matter, the general project in which he and others are engaged, a broad inquiry into the origins and implications of modernity, is important and potentially il-

luminating, especially for getting our political bearings, provided we realize we may also lose our bearings in the very sweep of the enterprise.

HILLIARD ARONOVITCH

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DAVID BOLTER. *Turing's Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1984. Pp. xii + 264. US\$19.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8078-1564-0); US\$8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8078-4108-0).

David Bolter's objective is to discuss 'the impact that electronic logic machines are having on our culture' (4). The considerable economic and social effects of computers are already well documented. But this is not the sort of impact that Bolter proposes to examine. Instead, he is interested in computers as a 'defining technology.' By this he means the influence of this technology on our view of human nature and the natural world. The specific influence that Bolter seeks to establish boils down to a single assertion: computers have led some 20th century thinkers (i.e., 'Turing's men') to claim that *we* are really computers.

Bolter begins with a historical survey of past 'defining technologies.' He discusses the role of hand crafts such as spinning, carpentry and pottery as metaphors in Plato's explanations of the nature and origin of the cosmos. Later the clock and then the steam engine came to play similar roles as models for understanding natural systems. Today, Bolter contends, the computer serves as such a model. In particular, the computer is now seriously advanced as a model for the operation of the human mind, the last bastion of resistance to earlier technological models.

In the process of describing the cultural impact of computers, Bolter includes elementary discussions of the inner workings of computers, computer memory, central processing units, programs, data, etc. Bolter's purpose in presenting such basic material is to introduce just enough information to enable the novice reader to grasp his comparisons between the influence of today's computer technology and the effects of technology in bygone eras. He wisely makes no attempt to explain how to operate or program a computer. Less wisely, Bolter supplements his discussion with diagrams of electronic circuits without including an explanation of the notation in the diagrams.

From a philosophers's point of view, the main issue of interest in Bolter's book is his contention that the advent of the computer has led contemporary thinkers to take seriously the picture of man as computer. As evidence of this trend, Bolter cites A.M. Turing's paper 'Computing Machinery and Intelligence' where Turing argues that intelligent human behavior can in principle be duplicated on a computer. In Bolter's view, 'by making a machine think as a man, man recreates himself, defines himself as a machine' (13). Besides researchers in artificial intelligence (hereafter, AI), Bolter thinks that most cognitive psychologists must be counted among Turing's men. 'When the cognitive psychologist begins to study the mind's "algorithm for searching long-term memory," he has become Turing's man' (13).

Anyone seriously involved with simulation work on computers will detect a suppressed premise in Bolter's reasoning. Bolter assumes that any system that can be successfully simulated on a computer is itself a computer or at least a machine of some sort. The premise is dubious in view of the fact that systems as diverse as storms, falling bodies in space, the stock market, and even the atmospheric consequences of nuclear war have been simulated on computers with varying degrees of success. There is little temptation to classify such systems as machines. They are of course *like* machines in being governed by lawlike processes. It would be interesting and useful to provide an analysis of just what (if anything) distinguishes a machine from any system governed by lawlike processes. Unfortunately, Bolter seems unaware of the problem since he never addresses (much less defends) the suppressed premise noted above. Turing, on the other hand, did address the issue. Turing provided a lengthy description of a class of machines which he referred to as 'discrete state machines.' According to Turing's conception, all digital computers are discrete state machines. Turing held that 'being regulated by laws implies being some sort of machine (though not necessarily a discrete state machine)' ('Computing Machinery and Intelligence,' in *Minds and Machines*, A.R. Anderson, ed., Prentice-Hall 1964, 23). As Turing saw it, the distinction was important because 'the nervous system is certainly not a discrete state machine' (Anderson, 22). It is not entirely clear, therefore, that Bolter is right in considering Turing to be one of 'Turing's men.' Turing was certainly not so indiscriminating as to claim that human beings are computers.

Bolter is not particularly sympathetic with the goals of AI. In fact, he asserts that the discipline is not really a science at all. Most practitioners of AI have abandoned neural modeling and instead claim to be modeling 'higher level' structures of the mind. Unfortunately, Bolter maintains, 'beyond the level of neurons, there *is* no science of mind' (207). The so-called higher level structures are actually just metaphors. This is a criticism that would warm the heart of any eliminative materialist. However, Bolter does not follow through with arguments to support his claims. The reality or unreality of higher level structures and processes is an empirical issue which rests on whether the structures in question adequately explain any significant body of data. Bolter makes no attempt to discuss the data which drives serious research in AI and cognitive psychology. Indeed, there are places in this book where Bolter

leaves one with the impression that he simply opposes any attempt to shed light on the issues AI is concerned with. He complains that Turing's man has lost the 'Faustian concern with depth.' 'The goal of artificial intelligence is to demonstrate that man is all surface, that there is nothing dark or mysterious in the human condition, nothing that cannot be lit by the even light of operational analysis' (221). It appears that Bolter has his dark mysteries and desperately wants to hang onto them.

In sum, Bolter may be correct in claiming that the computer has an influence on the way we think of ourselves. But his book does not adequately explore the conceptual issues raised by the attempt to characterize that influence in precise terms.

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R.G. FREY. *Rights, Killing, and Suffering: Moral Vegetarianism and Applied Ethics*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. xii + 256. Cdn\$49.95. ISBN 0-631-12684-8.

'Vegetarianism,' wrote Sir Robert Hutchison, 'is harmless enough, although it is likely to fill a man with wind and self-righteousness.' The meat-eater who shares this sentiment might conclude that the best policy to follow with respect to so-called 'moral vegetarianism' is one of benign neglect philosophically and respectful tolerance socially. But in an era of militant animal rights activity and — more important for our purposes — of proselytizing animal liberationist philosophers, it may be agreed that a more significant response is called for from those who would defend traditional dietary preferences. Relatively few have taken up this challenge even though some moral vegetarian arguments deserve to be taken seriously. The uniqueness of R.G. Frey's book is that it confronts and exhaustively attempts to refute each of these arguments. In my judgment he succeeds very well at his chosen task and in showing that meat-eaters who are concerned about animal suffering occasioned by modern intensive livestock rearing methods ('factory farming') are in as good a position (if not a better one) to help ameliorate the condition of food animals as are vegetarians.

There are two peculiarities about Frey's book that should be noted at the outset. One is that it strikes the reader that there are two books here: one on

*Rights, Killing, and Suffering* (the main title), and the other on *Moral Vegetarianism and Applied Ethics* (the subtitle). In both certain topics are dealt with at length that seem to have little or no bearing on the principal focus of the work, which is to undermine the arguments for moral vegetarianism. As examples, one might mention Part III, which is devoted to a very detailed destructive analysis of the concept of rights and of rights-talk; Chapter 13 in Part IV, which exposes the deficiencies of the doctrine of double effect; and Chapter 14 in Part IV, which considers and rejects (on very sound grounds) the possibility of an environmental ethic. These sections make for interesting and valuable reading, but their function in the book is puzzling. The purpose of Frey's discussion of rights, he might reply, is to demonstrate that the concept of animal rights is dubious and unproductive because the concept of human rights is similarly defective. But within the context of his argument a much briefer treatment of the subject might have sufficed; or to put it differently, all this baggage seems unnecessary for the journey to follow.

The second peculiarity is that while Frey indicates his own allegiance to some (unspecified) form of utilitarianism, the greatest part of his critique is directed against act-utilitarianism, specifically that of Peter Singer. Frey not only keeps designating the view he opposes as '(act-) utilitarianism,' which leaves the reader unsure whether he means utilitarianism as such or just act-utilitarianism proper, but he also devastates utilitarian arguments for vegetarianism so thoroughly that one might reasonably say he shows utilitarianism to be a non-starter, or very nearly such, in relation to this whole issue, and thereby suspect as a moral theory overall.

Frey begins by distinguishing different kinds of vegetarianism in order to define the target of his major criticisms: moral and nonmoral vegetarianism (i.e., that based upon dietary preference, beliefs about what is 'natural' to our species, religious beliefs, beliefs about health, and so on); vegetarianism that centers on human welfare (worldwide) and vegetarianism that centers on animal welfare; conditional and unconditional (exceptionless) vegetarianism. Frey's concern is with moral vegetarianism of the animal-welfare-centered variety, and more specifically with what he calls 'positive moral vegetarianism,' that is, the view that meat-eating is wrong, as opposed to 'negative moral vegetarianism,' which concentrates on the case against modern methods of procuring meat.

Frey identifies and addresses himself to three moral vegetarian positions: the argument from moral rights, the argument from killing and the argument from pain and suffering. As indicated earlier, he has nothing good to say for the animal rights position. Because the grounds for rights ascriptions are unclear and highly debatable, and the adjudication of competing rights claims is an intractable problem, the appeal to rights in discussing moral issues is counterproductive. Furthermore, rights claims are superfluous in cases where unjustified suffering is the issue. 'To say that what is wrong with painful farming practices is that they violate moral rights merely introduces an extra and

unnecessary item into the picture ... . What is wrong with painful farming practices is that they are painful' (37).

Frey contends that 'many conflicts of moral rights cannot rationally be resolved' (56); but surely in the main they can be and are in practice, Frey notwithstanding. Rights claims are not typically absolute and as Frey himself suggests (77), we may (and in fact do) resolve conflicts of rights by making appeal to consequentialist considerations. However, this shows not that we are confused, vacillating and inconsistent but that our moral institutions are more eclectic and pragmatic than Frey and others, when writing as moral *theorists*, allow. Nor it is obvious that moral conflicts looked at in terms of the competing utilities and disutilities of certain acts or practices are any easier to resolve rationally. Lastly, if rights claims have the objectionable feature that intuitions are often relied upon as their ground, then the same may be said of principles like the principle of utility. Whatever difficulties inhere in moral rights-talk, it seems impossible to conceive of morality without rights, for there are so many violations of human dignity, equality, autonomy, and freedom to which we do little justice by citing only the fact that they cause suffering in some direct or, as if often happens, some more remote sense. In spite of these areas of disagreement, however, I fully share Frey's opinion that rights-talk is inappropriate in relation to animals.

With respect to the argument from killing, Frey argues that 'widespread and fundamental disagreement in ethical theory' (102) prevents the moral vegetarian from convincing his opponent that killing animals is wrong. Nor is it the case even if animals' lives can be said to have some value that they have anything like the value of human life, which is incomparably richer. Nor, Frey thinks, can any mileage be got from arguments purporting to show that animals' lives are 'valuable to them' or that animals' lives are irreplaceable (in a morally interesting sense) because they possess self-consciousness — for they do not possess it.

Hence, Frey turns to the argument from pain and suffering. Here, his view is that while the pain and suffering of commercial farm animals should concern us, they do not support an argument for moral vegetarianism of any type. The reason is that such pain and suffering do not show that meat-eating is wrong, but only that 'it is wrong to rear and kill animals by (very) painful methods.' (182) If so, then the proper response (or 'choice between tactics') — particularly if we consider the very large list of deleterious worldwide socioeconomic consequences that abolishing meat-eating would result in (Chapter 17) — is to work for the removal of those practices that produce animal pain and suffering on 'factory farms.' Frey adds that we need not be saddled with the charge of inconsistency or insincerity for continuing to eat meat while working for animal welfare in this way. Many people, he points out with great care, have worked effectively for the abolition of various abuses while remaining a part of the system that is responsible for them; indeed, they often gain credibility and (moral and political) clout by doing so.

Frey's critique leaves moral vegetarianism in tatters. Curiously, however, his arguments are not likely to faze vegetarians, much less convert them

(back) to meat-eaters. One may conclude that this shows the issue between moral vegetarians and moral carnivores to be rationally irresolvable. But it may show, rather, that moral vegetarians are not as amenable to rational suasion as their opponents, some of whom have converted to vegetarianism; or it may indicate that despite the show of arguments the real reasons for being a vegetarian are to be found elsewhere.

MICHAEL ALLEN FOX

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THEODORE F. GERAETS, ed. *l'esprit absolu/The Absolute Spirit*. Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Meaning of Absolute Spirit in Hegel, held at the University of Ottawa, November 6-8, 1981. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press 1984. Pp. 181. Cdn + 15.00. ISBN 2-7603-1036-1.

This collection of essays is a nearly perfect blend of erudition and bold reflection, controversy and debate by premiere contemporary scholars of Hegel's philosophy. Each essay addresses a different aspect of Hegel's notion of absolute spirit from a critical and independent point of view, yet with a common sense of urgency for its significance today.

H.S. Harris' imaginative opening essay ('And the darkness comprehended it not') traces the development of Hegel's central notion. In the earliest writings and even as late as the *Differenzschrift*, the *Bildung* of a new religion — the religion of Nathan and Hyperion, a universal and enlightened, aesthetic and humane society — engages the complementary activities of artist and philosopher. However, from 1803 Hegel singles out philosophers, preparing 'a new world of objective spirit,' as the leaders of a modern people. Art and religion can never return to their traditional (non-democratic) roles. Philosophy alone achieves a standpoint outside time *altogether*. This absolute standpoint also explains why Hegel separated the *Bildung* of rational consciousness from his system, though Harris contends that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* remains indispensable. Without it, there is no 'clear signpost to a perfectly determinate and unambiguous interpretation' of philosophy as science, and no mediation between the science and life. Thus, Harris concludes, Hegel in the end remained faithful to his vocation as *Volkserzieher*, even when the world engulfed in darkness cannot grasp the light.

While Harris finds some sense of absolute spirit in Hegel's earliest writings, Remo Bodei ('La transition de l'esprit objectif à l'esprit absolu') sees

an historical and political absolute in Hegel's *System der Sittlichkeit* (1802/3) where 'la vie du peuple était alors le sommet de la vie de l'esprit.' Only in 1804 (as the term 'absolute spirit' appears) do art, religion, and philosophy become autonomous. Bodei attributes this change to Hegel's conception of Christianity (though unfortunately Bodei relies on texts after 1818 to make this case). By according the individual an absolute value, independent of birth and culture, Christianity cut the umbilical cord to the state. The resulting *civitas dei* of absolute spirit is not a meditative retreat from the world but a 'dimanche de la vie ... une satisfaction conditionnée par les contradictions et teintée de renoncement, Entsagung, face à la possibilité de réaliser une vie heureuse.' In this Sunday of life we reach a level of universality unattainable by the historical particularity — and thus dissolubility — of the state. But herein lies for Bodei the 'pathos hégélien,' viz. thought's supremacy over nature, a supremacy which may be profoundly consoling — or intellectually perverse and even totalitarian (Adorno).

Pierre-Jean Labarrière's 'Le savoir absolu de l'esprit,' on the other hand, challenges ontological interpretations of the Hegelian absolute. Looking for the meaning of 'absolute' in the triad of absolute knowledge, absolute idea, and absolute spirit, Labarrière emphasizes the 'modesty' implicit in Hegel's radical critique of 'toutes les fixités d'origine.' 'Absolute' has a logical, not ontological (primarily adjectival, not nominal) significance, designating 'l'acte-de-montrer ce qu'il est.' Something is absolute if it is known to be necessary and capable of showing *outside* itself what it is *in* itself. 'Absolute knowledge' and 'absolute spirit' are joined by this logical conception of the absolute idea, such that the absolute spirit is 'le savoir de l'Idée absolue.'

Pressing his logical interpretation, Labarrière cautions: 'l'Esprit absolu, en ce lieu, ne saurait être identifié avec cet absolu de l'Esprit que la tradition religieuse nomme Dieu.' Quentin Lauer, on the other hand, gives a sharply contrasting answer to the question that is the title of his essay: 'Is the Absolute Spirit God?' 'Just what,' Lauer asks, 'would an infinite Spirit be which is not God; just what would a God be who is not "absolute spirit"?' Louis Dupre in turn takes up this challenge in 'A Religious Justification of Secular Culture' by arguing that Absolute Spirit, like Whitehead's notion of creativity, encompasses infinite and finite alike, being 'both divine and the mystical link with the divine.' In short, God is *part* of absolute spirit, but absolute spirit cannot be God. Hegel's philosophy, in Dupre's view, attempts to interpret secular culture by expanding the traditional religious notion of spirit. Yet whether this integration of the Christian with the world view is viable, Dupre adds, remains uncertain, even in Hegel's judgment.

To re-affirm the paradox of being absolute yet historical and natural in Hegel's philosophy of art is the aim of Martin Donougho's 'The Anatomy of Aesthetics.' The irony of Hegel's method, in Donougho's account, is not simply that it leaves hidden or unsaid things to be reconstructed, but that its very counterpoising of Romantic nihilism to fixed and shared norms deconstructs all determinate content and form. Art is a form of absolute spirit inasmuch as art takes up the infinite within the finite, without canceling the

latter. The ideal of the union of form and content, subject and object is sensuously made present. Therein lies the demonic seductiveness of that Romantic 'incarnation of evil,' the beautiful soul's pretensions to utter (unmediated) self-adequacy. Yet the artistic revelation is also deconstructive of art itself, in the sense that art at the same time displays its own limitations and mediations.

Does not this irony of art as a form of absolute spirit infect philosophy as well? The essays by Friedrich Hegemann ('L'idée absolue') and Robert G. McRae ('The Problem of Presentation') suggest as much. Hegemann's essay is really two papers in one, the first an exemplary exposition of Hegel's conception of the absolute idea in the *Science of Logic*. The second paper abruptly begins as Hegemann questions whether his very procedure reduces philosophy to a kind of philological erudition, especially since Hegel's 'compréhension de l'être et de la vérité n'est plus obligatoire pour nous.' To establish 'une relation adéquate avec Hegel,' Hegemann proposes that Heidegger's views on temporality be taken seriously. A distinction thus should emerge 'entre ce passé inauthentique qui est également présent anachronique et ce qui est la vérité de notre époque et qui par conséquent implique de véritables possibilités d'avenir.' From this perspective the philological approach becomes essential in order to grasp the distinctiveness of Hegel's philosophy. 'Maintenant je peux restituer au passé ce qui lui appartient, et plus je le fais, plus le présent se révèle à moi.' These remarks are certainly insightful, but the two papers in Hegemann's essay suggest more of a program than an accomplishment.

A similar programmatic plea equally motivated by a desire to bring contemporary insights to bear on the way of studying Hegel's philosophy characterizes McRae's endeavor. While acknowledging its (ambiguous) de-emphasis in Hegel's later writings, McRae interprets the absoluteness of Hegel's philosophy, not so much as timelessness, but as a meaning for 'the free, contingent happening of the spirit in the present.' Presupposing yet superceding art and religion, philosophical presentation makes this freedom possible by grasping the absolute's unfolding as its own. What concerns McRae is the textual opacity involved in this presentation, the very sort of perduring, sensuous immediacy that limit art and religion to something esoteric and passing. Warning against 'textual fetishism,' McRae reminds his audience of Hegel's own insistence on distinguishing the text from 'the infinite interest of thought.' What McRae himself is after is by his own admission somewhat 'vague,' i.e., a recognition of 'the deficiency in the language theory of speculative philosophy' (though he never says what exactly the deficiency is) and 'thoughtful mediation of the speculative sentence with current developments in language philosophy.' As indicated by Harris' and Labarrière's criticisms in the subsequent discussion, McRae's rendition of Hegel's views on language are less than perspicuous. Nevertheless, McRae's insistence on the naturalness of language remains in force. How does (or even can) the purported self-sufficiency of the absolute spirit *presented in Hegel's*

philosophy contribute to our future across the linguistic divide erected by its own old age?

Still, if the absolute spirit is getting older, this volume of essays attests that it is also becoming wiser.

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MOLTKE S. GRAM. *Direct Realism: A Study of Perception*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1983. Pp. xv + 202. US\$34.00. ISBN 90-247-2870-3.

Gram defends Direct Realism, defined as the view that 'in every case of perception we are directly aware of the perceptual object and not a deputy or representative from which we draw inferences to such an object' (5). The opposite of Direct Realism is 'Deputarianism' — the view that 'there are perceptual objects which can be perceived only by perceptual deputies and which, consequently, cannot in principle be objects of direct awareness' (146). Gram also glosses Direct Realism as 'any theory that allows us to perceive the object we take ourselves to perceive directly' (149; 'directly' here modifies the first 'perceive'), and Deputarianism as the view that 'we directly perceive only objects which are different from the objects we take ourselves to perceive' (121; cf. 136, 143, 147, 149, 151). Since we normally take ourselves to perceive material objects, it follows that 'Direct Realism... requires that there be direct perception of material objects' (122).

It is essential that Gram define 'directly perceive' precisely. For what this notion selects as the objects of direct perception depends on how it is defined. For example, if it is defined simply as 'perceiving without conscious inference,' then it allows us to directly perceive material objects; while if it is defined in terms of indubitability or infallibility, then whether we directly perceive material objects becomes highly problematic.

Gram obviously takes direct perception to exclude inference. But this is ambiguous, because the 'inference' excluded could be a conscious process of reasoning, or an unconscious process of association, or a justificatory argument from epistemic foundations to objective claims. Unfortunately, it is impossible to extract a more precise definition of direct perception from Gram's book. Early on, he interprets this notion as requiring that we perceive every part of a thing or surface simultaneously (2, 51, 53, 56-57), but later he rejects

this interpretation (59). At another point, he interprets direct perception in terms of indubitability (51). But then he declares that 'we can be immediately aware of something the existence or characteristics of which we can doubt' (53). Subsequently, he introduces a notion that brings indubitability back into the picture. This is the thesis of 'Descriptive Neutrality,' which states that the descriptions under which we directly perceive objects are non-committal with respect to whether the objects are real or hallucinatory. (118, 121; cf. 62-3) In light of this thesis, Gram can say that the view that 'whatever we directly perceive is ... infallible,' as well as the view that it is indubitable, 'does not imply that what we perceive must be something other than the surface of a material object' (63). Unfortunately, however, 'Descriptive Neutrality' seems to trivialize Direct Realism. For if the descriptions under which we perceive material things or surfaces are neutral with respect to the real/hallucinatory distinction, then how can we *know* that what we are perceiving *is* a material thing or surface, save by some sort of inference from neutrally described objects? But how does this differ from traditional 'Deputarianism?'

Gram seeks to disassociate his Direct Realism from two theses that he rejects: (1) 'Physicalism,' which asserts that acts of awareness are really physiological states of the perceiver, and (2) Adverbialism. Gram's main objection to 'physicalism' is that such a theory cannot distinguish between perceiving the proper object of perception and perceiving the penultimate link in the causal chain involved in perception. (7, 8, 10, 15, 18) Although Gram insists that this distinction cannot be made out in terms of any characteristics of that causal chain itself (e.g., à la Chisholm), I could find no argument to show this. Gram's basic argument against Adverbialism is that the adverb in 'S senses *F-ly*' modifies an adjective that assigns to a substantive 'act of awareness' a property that can sensibly be assigned only to material objects (21-2). But an adverbialist would reply that the adverb '*F-ly*' modifies only the verb 'senses,' and that the only 'substantive' involved is the perceiving subject, S.

Gram's defense of Direct Realism consists mainly in arguing that the theory can accommodate various phenomena that have been thought to pose difficulties for it. Thus, Chapter III on 'Qualitative Appearing' contains a survey of how several different forms of realism would account for the phenomenon of perceptual relativity, and a revision and defense of the view of appearing Broad called the 'Multiple Relation Theory.' I found this to be a fairly clear, interesting section.

The rest of the book, in my opinion, fails to advance the discussion of the issues addressed. One reason is that much of the exposition is tortuous and murky. Occasionally, an infelicity of expression becomes ruinous, as when Gram purports to refute the time-lag argument with the tautology that 'the object we see can still be seen simultaneously with our act of perception.' (141) The other reason, aside from the difficulties mentioned above, is that the book contains numerous mistakes. Space remains to mention only a few of these. Gram says that the argument from illusion mistakenly 'assumes that

things perceived as mental must be perceptually indistinguishable from things perceived as physical' (115). But surely the argument denies, precisely on grounds of indistinguishability, that we can perceive things either 'as mental' or 'as physical.' Gram counters the time-lag argument by saying that only the *medium* of perception takes time to reach us; whereas the *object* 'does not travel at all' (141). But this is just irrelevant: the problem stems from the fact that we can *see* an object only after light reflected from it has reached us (and can be solved, I would suggest, by admitting that at time *t* we see an object in a state in which it *was* before *t*). In the final chapter, Gram badly misinterprets phenomenism. He equates Mills's 'permanent possibilities of sensation' with (Russellian) 'unsensed sensations' (164-5), and claims that the categorical propositions that are alleged to be equivalent to complex hypotheticals do not imply any existential claims (164). He ends by proposing an obscure 'revision' of phenomenism (169).

There are numerous mangled sentences, including some key ones; misprints abound; some lines are printed twice; two footnotes are misnumbered, and three contain erroneous references.

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MARTIAL GUEROULT. *Descartes' Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order of Reasons*. Volume I: *The Soul and God*. Roger Ariew, trans. With the Assistance of Robert Ariew and Alan Donagan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1984. Pp. xxi + 328. US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1257-9); US\$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1258-7).

The work of Martial Gueroult is sufficiently important, and sufficiently well-known, that it need not be discussed at length. Some of his articles have already appeared in English, and his major works have played a central role in Descartes scholarship for over thirty years. One can only be delighted, therefore, at the prospect of having the most important of these works made available in English. Unfortunately, however, that prospect has not been fulfilled.

Translation is a very detailed and painstaking task which is almost impossible to accomplish to the satisfaction of all readers. One must therefore be careful not to be unduly critical in evaluating it. Yet there are certain basic

principles which must be observed, and which stand as unavoidable criteria by which such work can be legitimately judged. For example, the translator is responsible for providing a finished text that reads smoothly in the new language. In the present case, the reader is quickly aware that Ariew has been unable to satisfy this criterion: not simply because he has carried French constructions over into English, but apparently because he lacks the necessary command of English itself. Even without referring to the French text, the reader will realize that what is presented is not the product of a master craftsman. From the very beginning there is an awkwardness that cannot be ignored. At first it is noticeable in the choice of words or constructions which seem questionable (e.g., 'as wishes Descartes,' xix, lines 31-32). But then the awkwardness is aggravated by expressions which are clearly ungrammatical. In English, one does not confer *to*, but *upon* (30, line 1; 283, line 13; 289, line 20); one does not pit *with*, but *against* (282, lines 34-35); one does not impose *to*, but *upon* (208, line 38). It is equally painful to read: 'the ideas we have in our thought are completely similar to the objects of which they proceed' (304, lines 30-31). And these prepositions are joined by pronouns in a similar unhappy state, e.g., ideas 'refer to objects outside of us, of whom they would be a copy' (304, lines 19-20). In addition to such grammatical problems, a number of liberties are taken with the text: Punctuation is often revised; an inconvenient Greek word is simply eliminated (20, line 25); italics are revised (e.g., 209, line 14); and Gueroult is left with a seeming contradiction that could easily have been eliminated (16, lines 11-13). The reader has good reason already to be suspicious that the translator is not a native speaker of English.

It is not surprising, therefore, that when a detailed examination of the original French is brought into consideration, the translation itself is found to be inept. Many phrases completely change their meanings: 'Need for absolute rigor' becomes 'exaction [*exigence*] of absolute rigor' (4, line 40). 'A certainty that is not itself controlled' becomes 'a certainty that has not itself been verified [*contrôlée*]' (15, line 16). 'Truths of connection' becomes 'connected truths [*vérités connexes*].' The list could go on at considerable length. But it is the degree of ineptitude that is most difficult to comprehend. A rank amateur would recognize that '*jamais*' had to be rendered 'ever,' rather than 'never,' in note 5, p. 288. And could *anyone* translate '*aussitôt*' as 'also soon' (33, line 21)? At this point it would seem that our translator has neither English nor French as native language. But we are told on the final page of the book that 'Robert Ariew, assistant professor of French at Pennsylvania State University, checked the translation for linguistic accuracy.'

Most important of all, however, is the fact that the translation is permitted to destroy the philosophic significance of Gueroult's work. There is no indication that the translator has any understanding of the subtleties of Descartes' thought, and there is a consequent confusion of subtle points in the text. It makes a difference, for example, whether we speak of 'what we know *as* intuition,' or, as Gueroult writes, 'what we know *through* [*par*] intuition' (14, line 36). And part of Descartes' argument depends explicitly

upon the source of deception when he writes: 'it is impossible that he [God] ever deceive me.' Instead, the translation reads: 'it is impossible that I ever be deceived' (318, note 13). These problems become systematic when Ariew curiously chooses to translate '*valeur*' as 'validity.' This begins early in the text (e.g., 29, line 1; 30, line 3), and immediately suggests a problem. For in the same context (29, line 10), the word '*validité*' occurs, as well — and it also is translated 'validity.' The reduction of these two different terms to a single translation is problematic, of course, but when the objective value of ideas is given an intensive examination at a later stage in the book, important distinctions are lost. On pages 113-15, for example, objective validity (*valeur*) occurs at least fifteen times; objective validity (*validité*) occurs twice; and for some reason, '*valeur objective*' is once translated 'objective reality' — a technical term in Descartes' work demanding very careful use. Gueroult's intentions can only be obscured.

All of the philosophic errors in the text are not so subtle, however. On page 204, Gueroult is attempting to set up a distinction between the idea as material component in our search for truth (which had already been dealt with) and judgment as the formal component. But for '*matière*' the translation gives us 'subject' (line 27), and the matter-form distinction is entirely obliterated. This occurs once again on page 209, where '*matière*' is translated 'grounds' (line 16), but here the consequences are less significant. In any case, it would seem that the translator lacks philosophic background. Of course, once again, this should not matter, since we are informed that 'Alan Donagan, who reviewed the philosophical aspects of the translation, is Phyllis Fay Horton Professor of the Humanities and professor of philosophy at the University at Chicago' (final page). Something is radically wrong. Descartes would be the first to remind us that one competent person would do a better job than three who are not committed to the task.

These are a small sample of the problems encountered in examining the text closely over 40-50 pages. (It is difficult to believe that the additional 275 pages are unflawed.) Other matters of equal significance would be more difficult to present clearly in brief form. But even these few problems should make it clear that this translation cannot be used for research purposes without consulting the original at every point. Thus the needs of the scholar will not be met. And the student who lacks French will still be denied access to the subtleties of Gueroult's thought — and will perhaps even be misled. It is therefore difficult to understand what purpose the translation might serve.

After such a negative evaluation, it must surely seem insincere to end on a positive note. Yet it is important to acknowledge that, while the translation was badly executed, it was at least well-conceived. Gueroult's Latin notes have been translated, which will be a great help to many students who lack a classical background. The text is careful to take account of the misprints in the original French version. Helpful bibliographical data has been added to the notes. And, finally, the book has been extremely well printed as far as can be determined (forcing one to reject the possibility that the many errors are typographical, rather than textual, in origin). The only thing missing is an in-

dex, which would make the work much more useful for the research scholar. But, of course, there was no index in the original French, either, and perhaps it was intended that a complete index would be included in the second volume. Since the second volume is supposed to appear in 1985, one can only hope that there is still time to bring the text up to the high standards of the printing process.

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ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, *L'économie comme science morale et politique*. Préface de François Furet. (Collection 'Hautes Etudes'), Paris: Gallimard/Le Seuil 1984. 111p. 65 FF. ISBN 2-02-006823-0.

'Avec de bons sentiments, on fait de la mauvaise littérature' selon l'adage français cité par A.O. Hirschman. En introduisant en fraude dans le savoir économique des notions qui, tels les sentiments et la morale, outrepassent le modèle traditionnel de l'intérêt particulier, Hirschman conçoit le risque de voir accuser son activité analytique d'un moralisme suspect au plan scientifique. Dans la culture occidentale, il existe de fait une tension inévitable entre science et éthicité. En ce contexte, A.O. Hirschman se demande dans quelle mesure il peut exister en économie un savoir positif de la dimension éthico-politique et comment à partir d'un tel savoir pourrait-on transcender l'approche économique, qui réduit l'activité humaine au prosaïque calcul de son intérêt par chaque individu.

En bref, cet ouvrage novateur s'inscrit en faux contre les prétentions réductionnistes de l'économisme, c'est-à-dire contre la réduction des problèmes d'une société à un seul. A titre de spécialiste de l'économie du développement, l'auteur s'insurge contre la vision simpliste à l'œuvre dans les thèses tiers-mondistes selon laquelle il suffit de promouvoir dans les pays sous-développés le développement économique en laissant au pis aller les domaines social, politique et culturel.

Autrement dit, les pays sous-développés sont censés n'avoir qu'un grand problème, la pauvreté, qui est la clef de tout; on s'attend donc qu'une fois remontés comme autant de jouets mécaniques, ils n'aient d'autre idée en tête que de franchir bien sagement, une à une, les étapes prévues par les

schémas de développement... En somme ces pays auraient *seulement des intérêts et pas de passions*.

Nous voici détrompés, une fois de plus. (66)

Dans *Stratégie du développement économique*, A.O. Hirschman avait pertinemment montré que le processus des pays en voie de développement repose non sur la théorie classique de l'équilibre mais sur la politique de la croissance non équilibrée et de la résolution séquentielle des problèmes.

Dans son ouvrage récent, Hirschman présente ce modèle de croissance 'antagoniste' cette fois non seulement comme un modèle spécifique aux pays sous-développés mais aussi comme un paradigme utile aux démocraties des pays avancés. En ce qui concerne les pays riches, ce paradigme permet de 'concilier leur politique pluraliste avec la réalisation de multiples objectifs sociaux' (94). Quant aux pays pauvres, cette invention sociale ne doit en aucun cas servir de justification à l'amputation des libertés politiques. Hirschman cite le cas de l'Argentine où une telle application de ses idées sur la croissance non équilibrée l'horrifiait. Ses multiples travaux en économie visent, au contraire, à concilier les impératifs de la croissance avec une plus grande justice distributive et une plus grande liberté. A cause de l'ampleur de ses vues, de la clarté de ses schémas et de l'avant-gardisme des essais qui le composent, cet ouvrage remarquable vaut certes la peine d'être lu.

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MARTIN JAY. *Adorno*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1984. Pp. 199. US\$5.95. ISBN 0-674-00514-5.

The writings of Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) are notoriously difficult. Translated into English, they continue their express resistance to easy consumption. Martin Jay's new book is perhaps the first introduction to succeed where earlier ones by Buck-Morss (1977) and Rose (1978) have failed. While encouraging a direct 'encounter' with Adornian texts, Jay lets us see the forest and not merely the trees.

Jay is well-known for his classic history of the Frankfurt School (*The Dialectical Imagination* 1973). For Jay, an intellectual historian, Adorno's

writings are best understood within an historical 'force field' whose 'generating energies' include 'Western Marxism, aesthetic modernism, mandarin cultural despair, and Jewish self-identification, as well as the more anticipatory pull of deconstructionism' (22). In Adorno's life and work no one of these forces was dominant. They existed in creative tension.

Chapter One tells of Adorno's 'damaged life': his training in music and philosophy; his friendships with Alban Berg, Max Horkheimer, and Walter Benjamin; his gradual alignment with Western Marxism; his North American exile from Nazi Germany; and his provocative scholarship in postwar Germany. The portrait emerges of a brilliant critic who was profoundly moved by human suffering, unflinching in his intellectual demands, and unable 'to feel truly at home anywhere in the "administered world"' (45).

Chapter Two is a masterful exegesis of 'Subject-Object,' one of Adorno's last essays. From it Jay derives the sources, targets, and central issues of Adorno's 'atonal philosophy.' Recognizing Adorno's anti-systematic thrust, Jay nevertheless summarizes crucial conceptions of truth, objectivity, reification, and rationality. His unifying theme is Adorno's double critique of 'the passive, contemplative subject of the positivists' and 'the overly active ... trans-individual constituting subject of the idealists and their Marxist offspring' (59). Adorno's alternative would be 'a dialectic of mutually supportive non-identity' among 'genuinely particularized' individuals, a liberated collective subject, and objects that are not mere objects (80). The achievement of this alternative would require not simply a new epistemology but a fundamental transformation of contemporary society and culture.

The social theory assumed by Adorno's philosophy is presented in Chapter Three. Sharing neither Marx's over-emphasis on economic production nor Lenin's stress on political praxis, Adorno examines 'culture, society, and the human psyche' (86). These he sees as parts of a 'fractured totality' to be made transparent through fragmentary dialectics. In his sociology, for example, Adorno plays Durkheim and Weber against each other. Inadequacies and potential corrections are indicated, but no global theory emerges.

What does emerge, in Jay's opinion, is the 'negative philosophy of history' underlying Adorno's psychosocial and cultural studies (104). Despite the negative course of history, Adorno hopes for fundamental transformation, but he seems unable to ground this hope in society and the psyche. Herein lies the larger significance of Adorno's cultural studies. Jay calls these 'remarkable efforts ... to detect the faint heartbeat of utopia' (110).

In Chapter Four the 'heartbeat' seems faint indeed. Most works of 'popular' culture are manufactured replicators of the status quo. Even autonomous works exposing culture-industrial palliatives are considered forms of ideology. After surveying Adorno's philosophy of music, Jay turns to Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*. This Jay calls the 'most extended expression' of Adorno's 'strategic withdrawal into aesthetics' (154). The withdrawal was 'strategic' because Adorno thought 'genuine art' contains a politically indispensable 'utopian moment' (155). Even in aesthetics, however, Adorno

recognized that there were 'no ways to derive undamaged ideas from a damaged life' (160).

Adorno's contribution, Jay concludes, has been to resist 'choosing between flawed alternatives or positing a harmonious mediation between them' (163). Adorno's resistance signals intellectual integrity and creativity in a historical situation where all of us are hard pressed to find a way out.

As a lucid introduction Jay's book is a tour de force. Written with flair and historical sensitivity, it may be recommended for anyone wishing to begin reading Adorno's texts. Readers should realize, however, that in the book's strength as a historical introduction lie philosophical weaknesses.

By treating Adorno's work as a 'force-field' of historical tensions, Jay arrives at some questionable interpretations. At one point, for example, Jay says Adorno virtually abandoned 'the Hegelian premise that within a dialectical description of the "is" there is necessarily latent the normative "ought"' (61). Although useful for introductory purposes, this statement is philosophically problematic. 'Virtual abandonment' is a puzzling concept, and neither Hegel nor Adorno could accept the implied disjunction between 'is' and 'ought.'

Other questions concern Jay's global assessments. It is doubtful, for example, that Adorno ever 'withdrew' into aesthetics. Adorno engaged in aesthetics throughout his career. Furthermore, he did not seem to consider writing about art any more strategic than addressing questions of epistemology, sociology, or education. Nor is it clear why refusing to choose between flawed alternatives should be considered a significant achievement. If Adorno's criticisms were working toward better solutions, then Jay's final assessment would seem to damn Adorno's contributions with faint praise. The fact that Jay has introduced these contributions so well not only speaks against his own evaluation but also suggests that Adorno's writings merit further reading.

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
ROBERTO MIGUELEZ, *Science, valeurs et rationalité*. Collection Sciences Sociales, no. 8. Ottawa: Editions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1984. 95p. ISBN 2-7603-3108-3.

Il s'agit d'un livre remarquable à plusieurs points de vue. Son intérêt principal est, nous en conviendrons, de traiter d'une problématique aussi complexe

que cruciale pour notre compréhension de la science, celle de sa relation aux valeurs et notamment à la valeur 'rationalité.' Dans la mesure où ces valeurs sont considérées comme des 'idéologies,' c'est-à-dire comme des idées socialement déterminées, l'ouvrage débouche en définitive sur la question générale de la détermination sociale de la science.

R. Miguelez ouvre sa recherche en posant le cadre général de son intervention: la controverse à propos de la neutralité axiologique de la science. Dans la perspective adoptée par l'A. ce débat met en présence deux thèses adverses: la thèse 'neutraliste' élaborée par les épistémologues et les scientifiques eux-mêmes et la thèse 'non-neutraliste' qu'il entend défendre en la reformulant d'abord d'une façon plus précise et rigoureuse. Le premier chapitre commence avec l'épineuse question soulevée par l'école althusserienne concernant le statut de l'épistémologie et la légitimité du niveau épistémologique où il voudrait se situer. Dans quelle mesure sommes-nous justifiés de parler de 'la' science (d'une méthode, d'une syntaxe et d'une variété d'interprétations sémantiques correspondant respectivement aux diverses spécialités scientifiques)? Miguelez propose d'accepter ce niveau, par convention, comme une décision méthodologique préalable à sa recherche: 'Acceptons cependant, ne serait-ce qu'aux fins d'une première organisation de la problématique de parler de *la* science ...' (14-5) — malheureusement, l'A. ne revient plus sur cette question pourtant fondamentale à son propos.

C'est certainement un lieu commun aujourd'hui d'affirmer que la science 'présuppose' (au sens de Bunge) une forme quelconque de la valeur 'vérité.' L'A. nous met cependant en garde contre la tentation de voir en cette reconnaissance une base solide servant à fonder sa thèse 'non-neutraliste.' En effet, combinée à des distinctions établies par les philosophes (entre les contextes de découverte et de justification) et par les scientifiques (entre les résultats théoriques de leurs recherches et leurs applications technologiques dont ils ne sont pas responsables), une telle reconnaissance, plutôt que d'invalider la thèse 'neutraliste' adverse, lui apporte un support appréciable. La subordination à cette valeur immunise pratiquement la science contre l'influence de toute autre valeur — et notamment contre des valeurs de nature plus sociologique. La thèse 'non-neutraliste' véritable doit donc se prévaloir d'une supposition auxiliaire en posant des interrelations (logiques et historiques) étroites entre le processus de construction (le choix des problèmes et des solutions) et le processus de validation (de ces solutions) de même qu'entre les résultats théoriques et les applications technologiques de la recherche scientifique. Non seulement sa thèse 'non-neutraliste' doit-elle affirmer l'intervention des valeurs dans la pratique scientifique mais encore doit-elle concevoir cette pratique comme une seule articulation complexe de plusieurs processus. A l'aide des modèles épistémologiques de Rudner, de Bunge et de Kuhn, l'A. élabore cette conception de la science comme 'activité' — la simple représentation visuelle de cette conception dans le schéma suivant sera suffisante à notre propos:



Constatons simplement que les *valeurs* interviennent aux deux extrémités de cette structure complexe dont l'*intégration* comme type d'activité *dans la société* donne une image descriptivement plus adéquate de la pratique scientifique.

Cette structure et ses relations à la société, comme voudrait le montrer l'A. dans le second chapitre, apparaissent plus clairement dans le champ des sciences humaines et sociales que dans celui des sciences de la nature — sauf peut-être en période de 'crise théorique' profonde. Dans le premier champ, les différentes 'écoles' proposent une variété de 'valeurs,' de 'paradigmes' et d' 'applications technologiques' qui mettent en relief leur correspondance étroite à des conflits d'intérêts entre les groupes sociaux. L'A. soutient que le choix d'un 'paradigme' particulier dans ce champ de recherche où la controverse sur les principes fondamentaux est chose courante (Miguelez utilise ici le terme 'paradigme' dans un sens que n'accepterait pas nécessairement Kuhn), ne réside pas uniquement en un engagement théorique et ontologique mais également en un engagement social. Par voie de la structure mise en place par l'A., un paradigme particulier conduit à des réalisations technologiques et à des actions 'rationnelles' (fondées sur le modèle du choix technologique ou instrumental) s'accordant avec des valeurs particulières que seuls pourront endosser ceux qui occupent une certaine 'place sociale.' Il apparaît ainsi clairement que la connaissance scientifique offre à certains groupes sociaux des 'instruments dans leur lutte ou dans leur conflit avec d'autres groupes sociaux' (57) et que l'acteur social est déterminé dans ses choix 'rationnels' par sa position au sein de la société.

Cette dernière constatation s'inscrit évidemment en faux contre un postulat fondamental de la recherche non-marxiste dans les sciences humaines et sociales (de même qu'en épistémologie): le postulat de l'acteur social agissant comme un agent rationnel. La critique de ce postulat constitue une autre composante essentielle de sa thèse 'non-neutraliste.' Le chapitre trois conteste la validité de ce postulat (que Miguelez impute également à la pragmatique universelle de Habermas) et pose l'agent social comme préalablement déterminé dans sa possibilité de choix et dans ses critères de rationalité instrumentale. Ainsi que Marx l'a soutenu, ce postulat est en fait une

ge erronée de l'activité sociale issue de la sphère de circulation des marchandises où chaque échangiste apparaît libre et rationnel. Cependant, si pour Marx cette idée doit être rejetée en raison de son caractère erroné comme toute 'idéologie,' Miguelez voudrait se passer de la clause de la 'fausse conscience' habituellement associée à cette notion. C'est une décision méthodologique et des raisons épistémologiques qui doivent être à la base du rejet de ce postulat. Sans le postulat contraire de la détermination sociale de l'acteur social, l'approche sociologique s'avère tout simplement impossible et les choix individuels demeurent sociologiquement inexplicables.

Il reste évidemment à montrer comment tous ces emprunts à l'épistémologie contemporaine et la saveur nettement 'conventionnaliste' de son exposé sont compatibles avec le matérialisme historique et dialectique dont il se réclame par ailleurs. Par exemple, devons-nous également considérer la 'matière' comme le résultat d'une décision méthodologique pour rendre possible le matérialisme historique?

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DAVID MILLER. *Anarchism*. (Modern Ideologies Series), London: J.M. Dent & Sons and Markham, Ont.: Fitzhenry Whiteside 1984. Pp. iv + 216. Cdn\$11.95. ISBN 0-460-11093-4.

David Miller offers his *Anarchism* 'mainly as an introduction for readers new to the subject' (i) yet readers familiar with anarchism will also find this book rewarding. Miller's point of view is fresh, his exposition is notably clear, and his criticisms of anarchism are powerful. We shall take up each of the book's three parts in turn, pointing out the philosophically significant aspects of the first two expository parts, and turning to some criticisms in connexion with the third.

Part I addresses the difficult task of defining anarchism. The problem is to relate three different lines of thought calling themselves 'anarchism.' None should be rejected because each is significant for political philosophy. The first strand is philosophical anarchism: Godwin's utilitarianism, Stirner's egoism, and Wolff's Kantianism are Miller's well-chosen examples. They present a basic moral challenge to the justification of any authority at all. Miller is highly critical of these claims and correctly points out that the more practical

branches of anarchism do not need to reject authority as such, but rather the specific authority claimed by the coercive state. The second strand is individualist anarchism, represented by the Americans Tucker, Warren, and Rothbart. Until recently, these market-oriented anarchists have been neglected by political philosophers. This was changed by Robert Nozick, whose *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books 1974) took seriously their claim to represent the most consistent natural rights ethic. For political philosophy generally, individualist anarchism's significance is its libertarian criticism of our dominant ideology: statist liberalism. Miller gives the individual anarchists their due by treating them throughout the book on a par with the third strand the better-known communist anarchists. This third strand of anarchism includes its most familiar figures: Proudin, Kropotkin, Bakunin, Emma Goldman. Miller contrasts their emphasis on social solidarity and positive freedom with the individualist's focus on individual sovereignty and negative freedom (45). In addition, they are important to political philosophy for their 'leftwing' internal criticism of Marxism.

The largest part of *Anarchism* is Part II: Anarchism as a Revolutionary Ideology. This may seem at first glance to digress from philosophers' main interests, namely the classification of Part I and the assessment of Part III. Not so. Part II is informed throughout by crucial philosophical issues raised by the connexion between political theory and practice. For example, Chapter 5 takes up the question of human nature:

[Anarchists] face a problem shared by all revolutionaries ... They must explain how the new order is possible in the light of what is known about human nature. In the anarchist case, for instance, they must explain how violence can be contained without recourse to a system of authority that would properly be called a state. But, at the same time, they cannot make assumptions about human nature that would make what is already known to have happened in human history impossible. (62)

Similarly, while the popular identification of anarchism with terrorism is mistaken, Miller points out that anarchists did condone violence for reasons that raise important questions about anarchist theory.

Miller's discussion of anarchism and revolution makes the interesting methodological point that political ideologies are open to *empirical tests* of a sort. This is not to argue, crudely, that the failure of the Spanish Revolution refuted syndicalism. Nor does Miller's empirical approach ignore the problem of the unfriendly background conditions of most radical social experiments. The discussion of anarchist armies, especially Makhno's Ukrainians during the Russian Civil War, exemplifies Miller's empiricism. He concludes that 'civil war imposes a military logic that makes it hard for the combatants to stick to their anarchist principles of organization' (107). It is an empirical question, perhaps the crucial one for anarchism, whether other situations have a compelling logic of this sort.

The final two chapters of the book assess and criticize anarchism as an ideology. Those sympathetic to various strands of anarchism will want to

reply at length to Miller's criticisms. This is not the place for such a reply so I conclude with three brief critical points that reflect my own sympathies with egoistic individualist anarchism. First, although Miller is generous with his attention to egoism, his critical treatment of it fails to satisfy. He has little patience for the claim that egoistic interests may harmonize, a view he calls 'too fantastic to be worth rebutting at length' (208 n. 6). Yet were the claim true to any extent, it would make egoism a more attractive ethical principle. In particular, it would save egoism from the criticism Miller makes of Stirner: 'It is easy to see why a union of egoists is likely to break apart: how much better if the egoist can ride on the backs of others who "religiously" keep their agreements.' (24) But the universalizing egoist faces no 'paradox' if it can be shown that egoists in fact do better *not* exploiting others. And this has been shown by Robert Axelrod's *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic books 1984). (See also my 'The Moral and Ethical Significance of Tit For Tat,' *Dialogue*, forthcoming.) Note that this empirical harmony of egoistic interests is quite distinct from one achieved by a tricky definition of 'real interests,' which I would join Miller in deriding.

My second point concerns Miller's criticism of the anarchist rejection of a uniform legal system:

The critical question now is whether legal regulation is not the price we pay for the benefits of ... an open society. ... Consider, for instance, the individualist argument that one important reason people have for keeping their contracts is that anyone who fails to do so will rapidly find himself running out of contractual partners. ... It would be a weighty consideration in a village, less weighty in a town, and less weighty still in a large society where a malefactor can move on whenever he is found out. (174)

Again, as in the case of egoism, this criticism moves too fast. It works by assuming that when the malefactor moves on he will find more victims. But this presumes either an unlikely gullibility or some moral presumption of contract-worthiness. I have argued elsewhere, against Nozick, that this presumption has no ground in natural rights theory. ('Taking Anarchism Seriously,' *Phil. of the soc. Sciences*, 8 (1978), 142f.) More relevant to Miller's approach, I add the following empirical observation: Japan is nearly as open a society as the U.S.A. or Canada, yet here there is no presumption of contract-worthiness. To rent an apartment in Tokyo, my wife and I found cash insufficient. We needed, in addition, the personal guarantees of two substantial Japanese. The point is that this Japanese institution extends the individualist's preferred device (reputation) via the institution of credentials to work in a large open society.

Third and finally, I note a recent argument for anarchism that Miller does not consider. It is a *reductio ad absurdum* linking the sovereign state, through war, to the ultimate disvalue of nuclear annihilation. The argument is put forcefully by Jonathan Schell, *The Fate of the Earth* (New York: Avon 1982). This 'anti-nuclear anarchism,' deserves the attention of political

philosophers. However, it is no criticism of Miller's fine book that he does not touch upon this late-breaking development.

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JON BARWISE and JOHN PERRY. *Situations and Attitudes*. Cambridge, MS: The M.I.T. Press 1983. Pp. xxii + 352. US\$17.50. ISBN 0-262-021189-7.

For a number of years we have been allowed occasional seductive glimpses of Barwise's and Perry's (hereafter 'B & P') new foundational semantic program. This volume, in wanton consummation, at last permits a sustained inspection. The central ideas of 'situation semantics,' as their program is called, are philosophically motivated and applied revealingly to a number of semantically interesting phenomena, such as indexicality, compositionality, and intentionality. Along the way, a number of subsidiary but still philosophically substantive issues are touched on, such as the nature of information, knowledge, and logical equivalence. The emphasis of the book is on explaining and exploring the central ideas of situation semantics within the larger context of a theory of mind and meaning. This requires the introduction of some formal technicalities: those involved in explaining these ideas. But a formally rigorous presentation of the semantics is deferred to a projected sequel (cf. x-xi). Due to the constraints imposed by a review of this nature, what follows is even less than a seductive glimpse of such rich fare. It is more on the order of two subliminal flashes, one for each noun in the title.

Situations, real ones that is, are what reality consists of: individuals having properties and standing in relations at various spatio-temporal locations (7). Since semantics is the study of relations holding between expressions of a language and reality, it follows that semantics ought to be the study of relations between expressions and situations. The leading idea of situation semantics, we are told, is that the meaning of a simple declarative sentence is a relation between utterances and *described* situations (19, emphasis mine). Meaning in general, we are told, consists simply of systematic relations of a special sort between different types of situation (94). In the case of *linguistic* meaning in particular the relations are between one type of situation, utterances, and other, typically extralinguistic, types. In the case of a simple declarative sentence the relation is between utterances of it and the situation

it describes. Situation semantics thus presents itself as 'grounded in reality,' as of this world and not other possible ones. There are no other possible worlds in the sense demanded by Kripke's possible worlds semantics, we are told, '... only other ways this world of ours might have been and might be' (xiii).

But this last remark misleads on two counts. First, it begs important questions about the relation between the formal model-theoretic apparatus of possible worlds semantics and its intended interpretation in the real world. Second, it suggests that the formal apparatus of situation semantics enjoys some particular advantage over that of possible worlds semantics, in the narrower scope of its metaphysical commitments. This is not so.

Take a simple declarative sentence. It may never be uttered, and it may be false. Clearly, then, its meaning cannot consist of relations between real utterances of it and real situations that it describes. Of what, then, does its situation-theoretic meaning consist? What B & P in fact invoke are not *real* situations but *abstract* ones. The meaning of the simple declarative sentences consists of relations between possible types of utterance and possible types of situation, appropriately abstracted from real ones. These are formally represented, in the model theory, as partial functions from locations,  $n$ -ary relations and  $n$  individuals to truth values. This appeal to the apparatus of *partial* functions marks an important departure from more familiar semantic set-ups.

B & P explain that they '... view *real* situations as metaphysically prior to relations, individuals, and locations. But relations, individuals and locations are metaphysically and epistemologically prior to *abstract* situations. The latter are built out of the former as sets of various kinds' (58). To continue, the former are in turn abstracted out as types of uniformity, invariants across real situations. *Very roughly*, then, a model-theoretic structure, in situation semantics, consists of a 'collection' of 'courses of events' satisfying certain conditions, where courses of events are, in turn, sets of 'atomic abstract situations' (my terminology), where an atomic abstract situation consists of an ordered sequence (possibly unary) of individuals having, or not having, a certain relation (property) at a certain spatio-temporal location (cf. 56-60). In effect, such a structure can be thought of as a 'partial possible world.' When such a structure is appropriately maximal it *is* a possible world (cf. 62), a way this world might have been or might be. But the worlds of possible worlds semantics can surely also be construed in this way. Indeed, B & P have shown us a way of doing so: by viewing them as appropriately constructed out of, or abstracted from, the invariants of this world. Possible worlds semantics is not, per se, committed to the 'foreign country' conception of possible worlds, or to the unactualized possible individuals of, e.g., Davis Lewis' counterpart theory. If there are advantages that situation semantics has over possible worlds semantics, they are to be sought not in differences of metaphysical commitment of the sort B & P insinuate, but in the peculiar explanatory powers, if any, of partial functions.

If (real) situations are what reality consists of, then the attitudes, if they are real, must be situational. The attitudes encompass, for B & P, those situa-

tions expressed using 'attitude verbs': roughly, verbs which embed sentences and are used to report perception and cognition, such as 'sees,' 'hears,' 'knows,' 'believes,' 'says,' etc.. Attributions made with such verbs are treated as *semantically* ambiguous, on the grounds that they can be *used* in two different ways (134-5). Sometimes they are used to attribute an internal psychological state, other times to attribute systematic relations between peoples' psychological states and (other) types of situation they are in. The logical principles governing attitude attributions vary accordingly.

B & P want a semantic theory as faithful as possible to common sense intuitions about the attitudes and attitude language. They want to return to a pre-Fregean 'semantic innocence' (175). They take this to require, among other things, the rejection of Frege's idea, in response to the apparent breakdown of the principle of substitutivity of coreferential expressions in attitudinal contexts, that expressions have different references and senses when they occur in such contexts than when they occur outside them (174-6).

For example, consider these attributions: (1) Austin saw a man get shaved in Oxford; (2) Austin saw that a man got shaved in Oxford (cf. 179). B & P claim that (1) is 'epistemically neutral': it merely reports a relation between Austin and a certain *single* situation — the 'scene' visually before Austin at the time — independently of any judgements Austin may have made about it. Therefore, if the man in question was John, Austin saw John get shaved in Oxford. A principle of substitutivity applies. Whereas (2) is 'epistemically positive': it implies judgment on Austin's part. It reports a relation between Austin and a *collection* of alternative situations, his 'visual alternatives': those compatible both with what he sees and with everything else he knows about the world. (Here B & P acknowledge a debt to Hintikka.) Given (2), then whether or not Austin saw that John got shaved in Oxford seems to depend on whether or not he realized that the man he saw was John. Substitutivity thus seems to fail. Now for certain related cases, B & P suggest that substitution *is* valid, though 'extremely misleading' (199). But in any case semantic innocence will be preserved, because we will not explain failures of substitutivity by supposing that, e.g., 'a man' and 'John' in our example above refer to anything other than what they would refer to, *ceteris paribus*, outside the attitudinal context. The explanation for the failure of substitutivity is said to be rather in the peculiar involvement of the 'visual alternatives' (cf. 204).

As semantics goes, situation semantics is relatively textured and fine-grained. It makes appeal to a rich assortment of entities and constructions, including individuals, relations, states of affairs, courses of events, indexed event-types, roles, anchors, worlds, schemata, constraints, concepts. I sometimes had difficulty keeping track of all the different sorts of unfamiliar-looking variables and constructions. But the informal exposition reads well, and includes helpful and sometimes witty examples. The pictorial representations of situations are patronizing but cute. On balance *Situations and Attitudes* is philosophically engaging and rewarding, and deserves to be widely studied.

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Richman defends the following theses: there neither are nor need be any general exceptionless principles of right conduct or practical reasoning; '“freedom” in any sense incompatible with determinism is not a presupposition of responsibility and the possibility of morality' (2); and morality cannot coherently be conceived to be 'based on divine command or divine approval,' indeed, the very existence of God, as traditionally conceived, is incompatible with morality. The various demands upon practical reason which the author rejects — that judgment requires general criteria, God's approval, or 'contra-causal' freedom — are said to lead 'ultimately' to moral skepticism or nihilism. The topics indicated in the title are thus unified by their bearing upon practical reasoning, that is, upon 'the rational evaluation of judgments concerning what persons should do...' (3).

Richman's discussion of these claims is thoughtful, engaging and often witty. But I have not been persuaded by his defense of them. This review will concentrate on the claims about free will and about the connection between morality and God.

Richman defends compatibilism in response to a 'dilemma' posed by C.D. Broad — roughly, if our actions are either causally determined or causally undetermined, we are never responsible for them. In Chapter IV, Richman criticizes both compatibilist attempts to avoid the first horn by adopting a conditional analysis of 'can,' and libertarian attempts to avoid the second horn by appeal to agent-causation. He argues that the dilemma is inescapable so long as we continue to accept the doctrine that 'ought' implies 'can.' But since he finds Broad's skepticism absurd or self-defeating, he rejects the doctrine in question.

Again following Broad, Richman prefers to pose the issues in terms of 'obligability' and 'substitutability' rather than 'responsibility' and 'can.' The term 'obligability' means roughly the conditions in which an action or agent is 'subject to' practical evaluations ('ought'-judgments) of a certain kind: namely, 'verdicts' to the effect that the overall reasons (comprising both moral and non-moral considerations) favor some course of conduct on the part of some agent (20-1). In these terms, then, Richman wishes to challenge the idea that 'obligability' implies 'substitutability,' or what he calls the 'OES supposition.' He thinks that OES lays down a requirement for obligability which is impossible to satisfy. Hence, libertariansim, which urges this requirement against compatibilism, is not a tenable position.

Given its centrality to his themes, Richman is remarkably casual in his characterization of the suspect requirement. He initially refers to it as the 'ought' implies 'can' principle, and then as the 'Obligability entails Substitutability (OES) Supposition.' He goes on to put this principle in various ways, none of which is really equivalent to the idea that 'ought' implies 'can.' But the general idea is this: an action is not obligable 'if there are sufficient

conditions for the action which result from factors outside the agent's control' (28). Or again: OES is said to involve the 'twin claims [i] that if an action is to be up to an agent, the sufficient conditions of that action must not be traceable to factors outside the control of the agent, and [ii] that if an action is to be accounted obligable it must be up to its agent' (71).

The classical argument for incompatibilism is this: if determinism is true, then all of our actions are causally necessitated by events over which we had no control. But we are 'obligable' only if we could have done otherwise (our action was 'substitutable'). Skepticism results when it is seen that this last premise can be employed against libertarianism as well. Richman does not make the once-popular criticism that undetermined events are 'random' and hence such that no one is responsible for them. He recognizes that some libertarians insist that actions undetermined by other events and states of affairs may be caused by their *agents* and thus are not random in a sense that precludes responsibility. Rather, he argues that if immanent causation is a distinct category of causation, necessary for responsibility, then the OES requires that 'an agent is responsible for his actions only if he is the cause of himself. And this is absurd' (56). 'If we trace back the chain of causes of an action', he concludes,

we must ultimately reach a link which is outside the causal control of the agent since clearly not caused by him, namely, either an event which occurred before his birth, an uncaused event, or the agent himself. (56)

This argument is inconclusive. In the first place, to assume that this application of OES is a proper one is question-beggingly to assimilate event-causation to agent-causation. Agent-cause theorists do not think that agents are sufficient *conditions* of their acts. They think free actions have *no* sufficient conditions which are not in the control of the agent. The cause (author, agent) is 'the man himself.'

The argument does indicate a serious problem for libertarianism. For how agent-causation is to be understood, if not in terms of sufficient conditions, is of course the rub. If agent-causality is really a kind of causality, then why doesn't a principle such as OES apply to it? If it is not genuine causality, then what are libertarians talking about, and how does it salvage responsibility? Richman's reasoning is another challenge to the libertarians to clarify the notion of agent-causation in such a way the OES can be seen to be inapplicable.

In the second place, however, not all libertarians appeal to agent-causation. There *are* no sufficient causes (immanent or otherwise) for free actions, some insist. Here OES does not even nominally come into play. This does not mean that such actions are not intelligible, for they may be so in ordinary teleological terms, which need (and must?) not take the form of causally sufficient antecedent conditions. On this version, the question of the agents' responsibility for or control over the sufficient causes of their free actions does not arise. Of course, such a libertarian faces the difficulty of explaining how

all this adds up to responsibility and control, but this familiar point has nothing to do with OES.

In Chapter V, Richman considers the attempt to avoid the dilemma of obligability by denying that the relation between reasons (motivating factors such as desire and belief) and action is a causal one. (This line is compatible with the second version of libertarianism distinguished above.) He sees no reasons to believe this, but even if it's true, he thinks, the dilemma remains so long as one accepts OES. For still there will be some sort of sufficient conditions of actions over which the agents have no control. Suppose:

at some time *t*, an agent has the ability, the opportunity, the awareness of this ability and opportunity, and the desire to do A. He has, moreover, no stronger (conflicting) desire at *t*. Under the conditions described, the agent does A: the conditions are sufficient for his doing A. (69)

To the objection that these conditions are trivially sufficient, Richman says it makes no difference: 'one doesn't show that an agent "could" have done otherwise by showing that his action was not causally necessitated by conditions ... but (merely!) logically necessitated by these' (70).

Now, supposing these conditions were 'logically' sufficient for the action, Richman's claim that these conditions are not up to the agent *in the way* that a free action is is mistaken. For they are made to be sufficient only because the notion of the strongest desire here is just the notion of *what moves the agent to do A*. But in that case it *is* up to the agent whether D (the desire to do A) is the stronger desire in exactly the same way in which it is up to the agent whether or not to do A. If it is up to the agent whether or not to do A, the agent can make it false that the specified conditions are sufficient simply by refraining from doing A (if he can). While it is true that one's desires and abilities are not up to one in the same way one's actions are, the question is whether the sufficiency of the combination of these for action is up to one in the same way. Since the criterion of 'strongest desire' is whether the agent acts on (in fulfillment of) that desire, my strongest desires are (trivially) up to me in the same way my actions are. And this is exactly what the libertarian typically wishes to say: it *is* up to me whether I act on that desire. Therefore, it is up to me whether that desire is the strongest desire in any sense which ensures sufficiency.

I agree with the author that libertarianism is a mistake. But it is a profound mistake, I suspect, involving scarcely articulated issues about the nature of the self. Without further articulation, no headway will be made on the free will problem, and Richman's arguments give libertarians no fresh reasons for doubting the tenability of their position.

Richman is right to take OES to be the crux of incompatibilism. Unfortunately, Richman offers no effective counter-examples to this idea. He makes the familiar point that inability is not always an excusing condition; you may now be obligable for not paying your debt if you are now unable to pay it because you earlier gambled away the money. But against a refined form of

the principle, according to which an agent is obligable only if at some point she could have so arranged things that she now does the action for which she is obligable, Richman is content to observe: 'in extreme circumstances we may be justified in disallowing as an excusing condition even non-substitutability of the sort indicated in the principle' (87-8). Richman's idea seems to be that the standards of 'obligibility' involve both consequentialist considerations, as well as considerations of justice or fairness. He thinks the latter considerations can in certain circumstances be overridden by the former.

In such cases, incompatibilists are likely to respond, we hold people obligable only in the sense that we treat them for certain purposes and in certain respects as though they were obligable. Richman suggests that to be justifiably treated as though one were obligable *is to be* obligable. What is needed here are developed examples of the cases the author has in mind. If the examples are analogous to cases of reasonable strict liability in law, say, or to our treatment of very small children as though they were responsible (as part of a process of their becoming responsible agents), then the examples will not be telling. There may be very convincing examples here, but without them, the bare point that it may in extreme circumstances be useful to blame or punish or admonish or reward those who have no control over their actions should not convince us that such control is not a condition of full-fledged responsibility.

This discussion indicates some of the dangers of working with the technical term 'obligability' rather than 'responsibility.' Responsibility seems to have an intimate connection with concepts of *control* and *autonomy* which is not apparent in the case of obligability. To employ a notion that is not bound up with these concepts is to risk changing the subject.

A similar point applies to Richman's dismissal of skepticism as self-defeating. Skeptics hold that 'the notion of obligability has no application, and this is tantamount to the conclusion that there can be no practical claims' (81). Since their argument appeals to OES, which is itself a practical claim, Richman suggests that skeptics are in effect claiming 'that one *ought* to be held responsible only for those actions which he is able to perform or to refrain from performing' (79). Thus, the argument for the conclusion that the notion of obligability has no application applies that very notion. Moreover, 'if [skepticism] is to be taken seriously at the practical level, it translates into the claim (or the recommendation) that while "ought" and "ought not" are in fact used, they ought not to be. And this statement, however it is analyzed, is to say the least infelicitous, if not absurd' (29).

These arguments raise serious issues about skepticism. But they are not decisive. The problem lies again with Richman's unrefined notion of practical evaluation. 'In denying that anyone is ever responsible,' the skeptic will want to say,

I was not saying that no one ever has an overriding reason for (or against) doing anything. More than this is implicated in many of

our "practical evaluations" and our judgments of praise and blameworthiness. If I say that we ought not to persist in these practices and attitudes, I do not mean that we are blameworthy or responsible for not doing so, but that our practices are wrong-headed and unfounded.

It takes a finer-grained account of practical judgment than Richman provides to come to terms with skepticism.

In Chapter X, the author is concerned with the connections between morality and traditional theism. First, he challenges the idea that moral rightness depends upon God's will, or approval or commands. For: '... it would be self-contradictory for [an omnipotent] being to desire or to will something to happen, and for it not to happen' (168). Hence, the consequence of the command-theory is that whatever ought to be done is done, and conversely, 'thereby destroying the normal *point* of practical judgments...' (168).

This argument is unpersuasive. It is perhaps contradictory to suppose that anything comes to pass contrary to God's will, where 'will' implies intending or choosing; God does not suffer *akrasia*. But it is not obviously incompatible with omnipotence to 'wish' or 'hope' for certain outcomes which ultimately fail to occur. Of course, it is hard to understand *why* an omnipotent being would not ensure that others do what He or She 'wishes' them to do. But this is just (one aspect of) the problem of evil: to understand why a providential and almighty being doesn't arrange things so that creatures live up to divine 'hopes' for them. It may be doubted whether the concepts of wishing and hoping apply to an almighty being. But if that is the source of skepticism, it goes much deeper than Richman's thesis — it challenges the very intelligibility of the belief in a providential omnipotent deity.

Richman's second claim is that 'the existence of God and a meaningful system of morality' are incompatible. One can rationally believe in God only if one is a moral skeptic. For if one admits to the existence of such evil as appears to exist in the world, one cannot take the belief in an almighty and loving creator to be well-founded. It is *possible* that such a being has reasons for permitting such evil, but this mere possibility doesn't make it rational to affirm the existence of God. So the rational believer must regard the appearance of evil as an illusion. But the denial of evil leads to skepticism, for 'without the possibility of evil, the fundamental ethical distinction of the morally permissible and the morally impermissible has no possible application' (178). Further,

any adequate theodicy will have the effect of denying the reality of evil ... For if there is an adequate theodicy ... then God has morally sufficient reasons for permitting ... everything that happens in his creation. But if God has such reasons, then there are such reasons, and any action or other event for which there are morally sufficient reasons is *ipso facto justified* and involves — at worst — a merely *prima facie* evil. (178-9)

Hence, 'with God, all is permitted.' This is what Richman calls the new problem of evil, namely, that if the old problem of evil has a solution, moral skepticism results.

As he acknowledges, this argument is too compressed; it is unconvincing as it stands. It is not generally true that if A is morally justified in permitting *e*, then *e* is morally justified and hence not evil. It doesn't follow from the fact that someone is morally justified in permitting a state of affairs in which A wrongs B, that A is morally justified in wronging B (or that A didn't really *wrong* B). Someone may have morally sufficient reasons for not preventing one person from wronging another. Why may it not be so for God? The reasons which apply here to mortals do not seem applicable to God (for example, that preventing A from wronging B would be too risky to the person). Some theodicies attempt to explain this. Richman is rightly scornful of certain answers to this question (that preventing rape, for example, would violate rapists' freedom of action). But Richman's argument purports to abstract from the content or success of any particular theodicy; in this it fails. It does not point to a new problem of evil; it merely expresses skepticism about the possibility of solving the old one.

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HUSAIN SARKAR. *A Theory of Method*. Berkeley: University of California Press 1983. Pp. xviii + 229. \$US\$25.95. ISBN 0-520-04730-3.

This is a pretty good book about scientific methodology conceived as an investigation of 5 problems, namely, how to evaluate theories at particular points in time, how to evaluate them over time, how to evaluate the rationality of decisions to accept or reject theories, how to evaluate the rationality of a scientist and of a society. The author is very much at home with the writings of Popper, Lakatos and Laudan, and people interested in their research programs should read this book. Sarkar is an able expositor and critic.

He argues against making history the final arbiter of good methods and urges multiple methods. He is clearly a pragmatist, but does not seem to be aware of his historical roots or his contemporary home team. Against what he calls a 'backward-looking view' of the assessment of methods, he recommends a 'forward-looking view.' According to the latter, 'given ... that we

wish our theories to achieve the goal of truthlikeness, we should use a method in our practice that claims to lead us to that goal more effectively than any other method; we should make decisions of acceptance, rejection, and modification of theories in accordance with its claims and norms' (6). Again, he writes, 'The frequent success of our decisions in accepting or rejecting (in various senses) a theory is our evidence that the method yielding such decisions is effective or true' (14). Or, '... one way of evaluating methods is by *experimenting* with them' (147).

All of these views were thoroughly developed, of course, by Peirce, James, Dewey and Lewis years ago, and more recently by Rescher in several worthwhile discussions. There is one citation of Peirce, but no references to the others.

The author quotes Lakatos' remark that 'A theory of rationality ... has to try to organize basic value judgments in universal, coherent frameworks...' (81). But there is no mention of Perry's *General Theory of Value* or Rescher's *Coherence Theory of Truth*, in which attempts to construct such frameworks were made.

The author's appeal to an unknown theory of group rationality that will make sense of individual rationality is a bit Peircean in its emphasis on the community. But it's unclear what Sarkar will do with this approach. It is too much to say, as he says on p. xiii, that 'we do not have a single concept to discuss the rationality of a group.' We have more than enough of such concepts, e.g., from Arrow, Luce, Raiffa, Fishburn, Harsanyi and Sen, to mention a few. None of these household names in rational decision theory appears in the author's bibliography, although he does see similarities between his program and Rawls'. It is far too little to say, as he says on p. 148, that 'a group is rational if, and only if, it is organized in subgroups, each of which adopts a distinct method for pursuing its goals.' If a tidy division of labour were necessary and sufficient for group rationality, then practically any group of self-serving lunatics would be rational.

The only avowed pragmatist that gets explicit billing is Nelson Goodman, and it's not clear that Sarkar endorses his views about justifying inferences (170). I suspect not. Sarkar claims that '...when a particular scientific community of reasoners agree, at a given time, ... that agreement constitutes neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the heuristic claim to be true or correct.' Here I think the author has not seen how deep the pragmatic knife must cut. Without agreement on what is to count as a fact, a thing of any sort to be studied, a hypothesis, a test, criteria of acceptance, etc. by a community, there is no science. Without prior legislation, there logically cannot be later discovery. That's why in other places I have said and I repeat here that what we traditionally call scientific discovery is seriously misleading. Such talk completely hides the logically necessary conditions of alleged discoveries. We should talk instead of scientific legislation, which although still an oversimplification, begins to focus attention on exactly what goes on in science.

I said this is a pretty good book because the author does cover a lot of

material competently. If he had spent as much time among the pragmatists as he did among the other folk, he would probably have come closer to solving his most interesting problems. Then I might have said he wrote a good book.

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ZEEV STERNHELL, *Ni gauche ni droite: L'idéologie fasciste en France*. Paris: Seuil 1983, 407 p. ISBN 2-02-006340-9.

Z. Sternhell vise à définir l'idéal-type du fascisme et non un fascisme qui, exerçant le pouvoir, aurait dû se compromettre avec le possible. Il étudie le fascisme français avant la défaite de 1940, parce que celui-ci ne fut jamais que belles et pures idées de mouvements d'opposition, souvent en marge du parlement, parce qu'il fut le fruit d'une longue maturation et d'une histoire originale, parce qu'il fit toujours face à une forte tradition libérée et républicaine, et se forgea à l'encontre de cette tradition. La vigueur de l'idéologie fasciste en France serait donc fonction des forces qu'elle aurait combattues et qui l'empêchèrent de prendre le pouvoir. Elle aurait d'autant mieux développé son discours qu'elle n'avait pas à l'appliquer. Et l'auteur fait remarquer que la défaite de 1940 mit au pouvoir un régime qui n'était plus tout à fait français. Après avoir ainsi limité son sujet à l'idéologie fasciste en France jusqu'à 1940, l'auteur en poursuit un inventaire fouillé et systématique. Je critiquerai son point de vue après avoir présenté les points saillants de son inventaire.

Le fascisme est déjà préfiguré par l'alliance de l'extrême droite et de l'extrême gauche derrière le général Boulanger à la fin du 19<sup>e</sup> siècle. Il est une réponse à une crise morale et politique, une crise de civilisation aux dimensions multiples, qui amena des contestataires d'horizons opposés à s'allier. Il s'agit d'abord d'une crise du libéralisme qui isole les individus et détruit la nation en l'atomisant. Mais d'une crise du socialisme aussi, parce qu'il s'embarque, perd son élan révolutionnaire du fait d'une prospérité relative et joue le jeu parlementaire avec ses ennemis. Crise du parlementarisme également, parce qu'il semble n'aboutir à aucune décision importante et exacerbe les égoïsmes des différents secteurs de la nation. Et crise des valeurs

bourgeoises qui en viennent à symboliser la médiocrité et pervertissent toutes les classes. Ce sont ces valeurs que combattent à la fois les extrémistes de la gauche et ceux de la droite. Il faut aussi parler d'une crise du capitalisme, facteur de désordre, synonyme d'exploitation, de matérialisme et d'amoralisme. Mais le marxisme et la notion de lutte de classes se valent des critiques non moins sévères: la lutte de classes diviserait un peuple qu'il faut unir, le matérialisme historique discréditerait les idéaux qui pourraient rassembler et sauver la nation. Il y a encore la crise de la démocratie qui signifie compromis honteux, ne laisse aucun rôle aux élites ou à l'héroïsme. Et la crise du positivisme parce qu'il ruine le volontarisme et les ferveurs capables d'unir un peuple.

Toutes ces crises sont évidemment bien différentes. Mais elles sont largement ressenties en France. Le fascisme prétend y répondre et ne pouvait prétendre répondre à toutes qu'en demeurant à l'état de projet. 'Nul ne s'est jamais considéré porteur d'un avenir plus lumineux, parce que si différent de l'ordre existant, si radicalement opposé à tout ce qui est' (239). Cet avenir est évidemment ambigu, défini à l'encontre de tout ce qu'on n'aime pas plutôt que positivement. Comme il est défendu et illustré par des esprits brillants, il réussit à entraîner une vaste sympathie ou à bénéficier de la neutralité de secteurs qui auraient pu s'y opposer.

De futurs résistants ont pu être séduits par le fascisme. Encore en 1941, Mounier et la revue *Esprit* n'arrivaient pas à s'en dissocier clairement ni à échapper aux espoirs qu'il avait fait naître, tant la III<sup>e</sup> République paraissait détestable. Il s'inspire de nombreux courants de pensée et profite des prestiges de tous ces courants: éthique nietzschéenne, vitalisme bergsonien, renouveau spiritualiste et refus du matérialisme marxiste ou capitaliste... Voici trois exemples. La sociologie et l'anthropologie, en soulignant l'inhérence de l'individu à sa culture, apportaient de l'eau au moulin de l'antilibéralisme. La psychologie des profondeurs, en insistant sur les facteurs inconscients, ajoutait à l'irrationalisme à la mode. Nietzsche donne une voix à ceux qui veulent dépasser l'égalitarisme béat et l'optimisme naïf des lumières. Ni Durkheim ni Freud ni Nietzsche ne furent fascistes mais leur influence, parmi beaucoup d'autres, a contribué au fascisme. Comment, dans quelles circonstances historiques et selon quelle alchimie? Voilà des questions auxquelles l'auteur répond ou tente de répondre.

A propos de l'antisémitisme, l'auteur écrit qu'il fut exploité parce qu'il était 'le dénominateur commun capable de servir de plate-forme à un mouvement de masse contre la démocratie libérale et la société bourgeoise' (59). Ce n'était donc qu'un moyen mais c'était aussi un 'dénominateur commun' rassemblant des effectifs qui n'étaient vraiment pas à la hauteur des idéaux proclamés par les ténors du fascisme français. On voit comment peuvent s'amalgamer, évoluer et se pervertir des idéaux, des mentalités et des forces politiques. On devine aussi combien un discours qui ne parle que des idéaux et ne les situe pas dans la réalité sociale et politique est insignifiant. Mais je poursuis la présentation du livre de Sternhell.

Selon ce dernier, le fascisme français, c'est d'abord une révolte généreuse

et morale contre les faillites du capitalisme, les scléroses du parlement, les égoïsmes et les divisions d'une société atomisée, les atermoiements du socialisme. Il appelle à 'l'unité, à la communauté d'intérêts, à la responsabilité et à la solidarité des classes' (80) afin de construire une nation socialiste. Cette solidarité nationale et socialiste, elle est réclamée par une droite nationaliste et par des gauchistes impatientes d'aboutir. Les premiers exècrent la République affairiste. Les seconds reprochent à la gauche de s'être alliée avec le centre démocratique dès l'affaire Dreyfus et de s'être enlisée dans cette alliance. Les uns et les autres veulent que la nation deviennent le sujet d'une révolution que le prolétariat ne fait pas. Ils ont la nostalgie de l'union sacrée que connaissait le pays tout au long de la première guerre, dans le sacrifice et l'abnégation. Pourtant, en dépit de l'attrait moral qu'il exerce, le fascisme ne peut l'emporter en France. Car la droite classique et conservatrice y demeure forte. Elle n'a pas besoin de pactiser avec lui. Elle est assez solide pour n'avoir pas à 'recourir à des solutions extra-parlementaires' (135). Le fascisme est révolutionnaire, radical, socialisant mais la gauche parlementaire lui est plus hostile encore que la droite.

Il se présente comme une révision du marxisme, au nom de l'éthique et contre le déterminisme matérialiste. Il croit pouvoir rassembler diverses classes dans une même ferveur pour la révolution. Henri De Man est le grand théoricien de ce révisionnisme clairement et fièrement avoué. Comme Sorel, il refuse le matérialisme du marxisme pour proclamer l'importance de la volonté morale. Car 'le socialisme ne saurait combattre l'égoïsme' (151). Ce sont toutes les classes de producteurs qui sont invitées à poursuivre ses idéaux contre les parasites. Alors que la quête du seul intérêt les divise, le sacrifice pour une grande cause peut les unir. Alors que le déterminisme historique réduit le prolétariat et le socialisme à la passivité, le volontarisme force le cours de l'histoire. Mais en fait, pour De Man, la révolution se réduit à la rationalisation de l'économie de marché par un plan. Celui-ci serait imposé par un Etat fort, soutenu par un grand rassemblement centriste et nationaliste. Il veut discipliner le capitalisme parasitaire, rien de plus, et compte, pour appuyer une telle politique, sur les classes moyennes comme sur le prolétariat. Ces classes moyennes sont exploitées mais n'accepteront jamais d'être confondues avec le prolétariat. Le révisionnisme de De Man est fait pour leur plaire. Il se veut spiritualiste. Il rend à tous les travailleurs, employés, ouvriers, entrepreneurs et commerçants inclus, leur juste place en combattant les seuls profiteurs. Mais qui sont-ils? Il fait appel au corporatisme pour assurer la représentation nationale auprès de la direction du plan.

L'auteur suit de près les démêlés entre De Man et la direction du Parti ouvrier belge, entre les partisans français du planisme de De Man et la direction de la SFIO. Pour un Blum, comme pour les orthodoxes de la SFIO ou du POB, les déterminismes socio-économiques qui pèsent sur le prolétariat ne s'opposent pas à l'idéal éthique de justice mais en est le meilleur soutien, le seul garant. L'idéalisme fasciste leur apparaît pour ce qu'il est, un refus de la réalité. Mais les fascistes et surtout De Man ont du brio et érodent la crédibilité des partis établis.

Les fascistes refusent les vieilles droites et les vieilles gauches. Ils sont jeunes et veulent du neuf. Ce n'est pas tout le monde qui voit leur refus de la réalité. Ils veulent réconcilier les classes et bâtir un Etat fort. Ils veulent discipliner le capitalisme mais récusent la lutte du prolétariat pour le discipliner effectivement. L'auteur note en passant cette contradiction mais il fait surtout oeuvre d'historien. Il retrace d'interminables débats qui ne s'ordonnent évidemment pas selon un cadre théorique imaginé après coup par un philosophe. Il montre la pertinence et explique l'émergence des positions fascistes étant donné les mentalités entre les deux guerres en France. Pas seulement pour des gauchistes, mais aussi 'pour Maulnier, pour Jouvenel, le Front populaire représente l'équivalent du dreyfusisme: une fois encore le prolétariat a été mobilisé au service de la démocratie, une fois encore, la bourgeoisie a su mobiliser sa détresse et sa colère au service de l'ordre établi' (242). Jouvenel, comme jadis Proudhon, reproche à la gauche de défendre la démocratie parlementaire et la République comme des fins en soi plutôt que la justice sociale. Pour Sorel déjà, le socialisme se doit d'être révolutionnaire. Il lui faut ne pas s'allier à la démocratie. Maulnier dit la même chose mais de plus il fait aussi appel à des 'élites disciplinées et puissantes' (243) pour réussir la révolution.

Un Drie se rend bien compte que 'tout nationalisme vague est une défense du capitalisme' (244) mais cela ne suffira pas à mieux définir son nationalisme. On est surpris par l'intelligence de ces hommes mais aussi par leur volonté naïve de résoudre tout tout de suite, par leur spiritualisme et leur goût pour les méthodes fortes. 'Jamais semble-t-il, une ambiguïté plus lourde n'a pesé sur le mouvement des idées en France' (245). On ne saurait trop insister sur cette idée et cette ambiguïté est lourde de menace.

Parce que le fascisme invitait un peuple dissolu par l'individualisme à se ressaisir, parce qu'il offrait un espoir en même temps qu'une discipline et un enthousiasme collectifs, c'est aux individus et non seulement à la nation qu'il prétendait rendre sens et dignité. Il séduisait et l'on ne voyait ni le vide de son discours ni les bavures des politiques de Mussolini et Hitler. Blum 'raille ses censeurs qui lui demande de l'action, en les appelant "hautains professeurs d'énergie"' (276). Mais beaucoup d'autres, à gauche comme à droite, ne trouvent rien à reprocher aux appels fascistes à s'unir, à servir, à suivre des leaders décidés. Le refus de la facilité, l'appel à la discipline, la volonté de vivre intensément et de maîtriser l'histoire paraissent d'autant plus vertueux que l'optimisme rationaliste des lumières semble avoir échoué, qu'on ne peut plus compter ni sur la bonté naturelle de l'homme ni sur la main invisible qui ordonnerait la société.

Le fascisme français tel que Sternhell le définit paraît, en fin de compte, banal, vide et composé d'éléments disparates. Banal parce qu'il s'agit de donner une expression brillante et véhémente à des critiques largement répandues. Le fascisme est contre l'ordre établi mais cela ne le définit pas encore. Il est vide et ambigu. Sauf De Man, ses ténors n'offrent ni des solutions ni des analyses qui justifieraient leur assurance. Et le De Man dont traite Sternhell n'est pas encore fasciste. C'est dans l'action, lorsqu'il faudra rejeter ou accepter l'envahisseur nazi, que l'on pourra juger de quel bois se chauffent les

différentes tendances analysées par Sternhell. Or celui-ci, parce qu'il veut s'en tenir aux seules idées, ne parle pas de l'action politique. Il s'est expliqué sur ce point. Mais comment traiter d'une idéologie indépendamment du combat pour le pouvoir.

C'est en prenant parti qu'une idéologie se définit, c'est en se compromettant avec telles ou telles forces sociales qu'elle prend une importance historique. Je ferai trois critiques au livre de Sternhell. D'ailleurs, elles ont déjà été formulées par J. Julliard ("Sur un fascisme imaginaire," pp. 849-860 in: *Annales* 39, no 4).

1. Ce livre traite des idées indépendamment de leur poids social. Cela aboutit à des erreurs de perspectives. Il y a des idées brillantes qui n'eurent aucune importance et des idées ternes qui en eurent énormément.
2. Il traite d'un climat moral et politique, mais non du fascisme et encore moins de son type idéal. Il met sous un même vocable des tendances opposées parce qu'elles s'opposent à la IIIe République. Sans doute, elles sont radicales, voire révolutionnaires; elles ne sont pas pour cette raison convergentes.
3. Sternhell déclare fascistes ou sympathisants du fascisme des hommes qui ne le sont pas mais le deviendront plus tard, des idées qui ne le sont pas mais dont le fascisme tirera un certain parti plus tard. De Man par exemple optera pour la collaboration après 40. Mais ni De Man dans les années 30, ni son planisme ne sont fascistes.

Néanmoins, je considère que le livre de Sternhell est un exposé des tendances antidémocratiques dans la France de l'entre-deux-guerres. Il dérange des idées reçues dans la gauche bien pensante. Il a provoqué des controverses non seulement parce qu'il commettait des erreurs de perspective mais aussi parce qu'il corrigeait des erreurs de perspective, surtout à gauche.

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PETER VAN INWAGEN. *An Essay In Free Will*. Don Mills: Oxford University Press 1983. Pp. vi + 248. Cdn\$51.50. ISBN 0-19-824624-2.

One of the important merits of this essay is that its author is well aware of the unique elusiveness of his topic; in particular he is conscious of the degree to

which the problem of the freedom of the will is entangled with other subtle issues. As a result, the book contains substantial discussions of such subjects as fatalism, determinism, randomness, causality, laws of nature, possible worlds and others.

Van Inwagen has for instance some instructive things to say about universal determinism that should be of interest on their own. It is somewhat surprising, however, that he neglects to touch upon a rather basic point. As we know, Hempel, following an earlier exposition by Russell, has argued that given any two physical parameters, say color and temperature, their respective values at different moments can always be represented as two functions of time which 'trivially furnish laws governing the changes of temperature and color at the given place.' Clearly the same can be done for all parameters everywhere. 'Thus the course of the universe is governed by functional laws (which may however be so complex as to be beyond scientific discovery.)' Hence determinism is necessarily or trivially true.

Of course several replies may be available according to which determinism amounts to more than Hempel would have it. But clearly Van Inwagen must come up with some reply for otherwise either we take Hempel to have shown that determinism is a vacuous doctrine in which case the central problem of the book does not even arise since nothing substantial threatens our freedom, or that it is necessarily true, in which case the suggested solution that we do not live in a deterministic world cannot be right.

There are not many books on free will where we can find a basic exposition of the notion of possible worlds, however, this book includes such an exposition as well as a description of some of its application. In this context on page 79 we read:

Some philosophers have supposed that talk of possible worlds is supposed to provide us with a device for defining modal concepts in terms of non-modal concepts. Having supposed this, these philosophers proceed to point out that *possible world* itself is a modal concept. But this is simply silly. No one, so far as I know, has ever supposed that one could grasp the notion of a possible world if one had no prior grasp of the notion of possibility.

Note that Van Inwagen does not merely claim not to know of any *successful* attempt to explicate the notion of a possible world in non-modal terms, but that he knows of no attempt at all. But as a matter of fact there are several not entirely implausible suggestions. For example, a possible world might be defined in terms of possibly true statements which however need not be treated as an undefinable primitive. One could suggest: A statement is possibly true (as opposed to necessarily true) if its meaning is not logically sufficient for its truth. Alternatively, a possible world could be said to be a world fully described by a consistent set of statements (the meaning of each may be intelligibly expounded).

It may be that Van Inwagen could show that all such suggestions harbor

hidden references to modal concepts or are otherwise flawed, but it would have been instructive to hear from him something on this matter.

There is one long chapter devoted to discussing three arguments for incompatibilism and another three long chapters in which three arguments for compatibilism are described and rejected. Van Inwagen believes that Flew's argument for compatibilism may quickly be disposed of. Most of the details may be skipped and it will be sufficient to mention that Van Inwagen asks us to consider a fanciful situation where Martians have implanted in everyone's brain an undetectable device which causes us to make all our decisions as well as the desires and beliefs appropriate to these. He then argues that Flew would be forced to agree that under these circumstances we ought to be regarded as free agents and that is absurd. Hence by *reductio* Flew's basic thesis, which leads to such an absurd implication, is wrong.

Van Inwagen regards it as too obvious to require any argument at all that in the context of the situation just described we would have no free will. But is this really beyond all question true? Suppose in the story involving the Martian manipulators, in one section of society there are no external restraints against wrong doing, no punishment or admonishment for callousness and no reward for moral decency, while in the other the normal incentives for acting correctly and deterrents against unethical behaviour prevailed. Suppose also, that among the second group ethical standards are much more frequently upheld than among the first. The situation should then be very similar to the one obtaining in actuality and thus it would make no essential difference whether our acts were determined by extraterrestrials or by nature. Many compatibilists might agree that in the former case no less than in the latter, it makes sense to attribute free will to human agents.

After arguing extensively that determinism and free will are incompatible Van Inwagen concludes that since the reality of moral responsibility is not in doubt, we must deny determinism. I believe that he is well aware that the reality of moral responsibility has as a matter of fact been questioned and rejected, not only by philosophers who sometimes take pleasure in advocating bizarre positions, but also by poets, novelists and some legal authorities. I take it, however, that it is for the sake of emphasizing his passionate conviction in human freedom that he resorted to the rhetorical flourish and declared categorically the indubitable reality of moral responsibility.

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MICHAEL WALZER. *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books 1983. Pp. 345. US\$9.95. ISBN 0-465-08191-6.

Walzer's book is a healthful antidote for the reality deficiency anemia which can afflict readers of Rawls and Nozick, whose works dispense with questions of justice here-and-now in hasty references to 'partial compliance theory' and 'the principle of rectification,' each a topic for some other day. A rosy glow is bound to return to those pallid philosophical cheeks after exposure to Walzer's philosophical exploration, informed as it is, not by the abstract principles of decision theory, but by concrete historical and anthropological studies which are woven into the text at frequent intervals, in the successful style of his earlier book *Just and Unjust Wars*. There are fifty such brief studies, identified in the table of contents by titles like 'Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries,' 'A Medieval Jewish Community,' 'The World's Biggest Department Store,' 'Washing Machines, Television Sets, Shoes, and Automobiles,' 'The San Francisco Scavengers,' 'The Aztec "House of the Young Men",' 'Manchester, 1844,' 'Stalin's Stakhanovites,' and 'The Case of Pullman, Illinois.' These historical and contemporary examples sometime illustrate, and sometimes contrast with, Walzer's idea of a just society, in which no social good serves as a means of domination. Unlike more radical egalitarians like Kai Nielsen (see his *Equality and Liberty*), Walzer does not aim at an approximation to equality of wealth, status, or power. Nor does he propose more-egalitarian-than-Rawls principles of the sort that Nielsen would apply, not to this or that society, but to the whole world. Walzer accepts the nation-state as the fundamental object for a study of justice, for 'all distributions are just or unjust relative to the social meanings of the goods at stake,' and agreements about social meanings tend to coincide with the political borders of nation-states (9). Despite the obvious importance of the notion of a social meaning (alternately referred to as a common meaning or shared understanding), Walzer subjects it to very little analysis. Evidently it cannot be totally separated from convergence in individual opinions within a social group (see p. 88, where a widely and deeply felt want is said to generate a moral necessity, which could occur on Walzer's theory only if it generates *eo ipso* a social meaning), but on the other hand this sort of convergence is to be viewed as a 'reflection' of 'the social meanings that constitute our common life' (320).

In addition to the notion of social meanings, the notion of domination plays fundamental but sometimes conflicting roles in Walzer's theory. It articulates his relativism: 'Justice is relative to social meanings' (312). The social meanings in question are shared understandings of goods, understandings in virtue of which they are the goods that they are. Distributive criteria are intrinsic not to the good-in-itself but to the social good, in such a way that 'if we understand what it is, what it means to those for whom it is a good, we understand how, by whom, and for what reasons it ought to be distributed' (9). A society is free of domination therefore if its goods are held in accord-

ance with the various distributive criteria intrinsic to the social meanings of those goods. Walzer concedes that this account of domination, which I shall call the '*hermeneutic*' account, implies that a highly inegalitarian society may be free of domination, and therefore just: 'In a society where social meanings are integrated and hierarchical,' he says bullet-bitingly, 'justice will come to the aid of inequality' (313).

Exemplifying the possibility is the caste system of ancient India, in which the single value of ritual purity integrates the meaning of 'prestige, wealth, knowledge, office, occupation, food, clothing, even the social good of conversation,' an integration which subjects all of these things to the discipline of the caste system's hierarchy. But relativism can justify equality as well as inequality, and a large part of Walzer's argument is an exploration of his relativism from within his own social world. And what he thinks he finds there is an egalitarian society, 'hidden, as it were, in our concepts and categories,' and consequently 'within our own reach' (xiv). This is a society of 'complex equality' that he finds implicit in our shared understandings of social goods. Complex equality obtains when there is a plurality of relatively autonomous spheres of justice, reflecting a pluralistic conception of social goods (as opposed e.g., to the unified conception of the caste system in ancient India), so that each sphere operates according to principles of its own (as opposed to all goods being governed by over-arching, unitary principles like Rawls's two principles or Nozick's entitlement principles). Autonomy of the spheres amounts to freedom from domination, not simply in the broad hermeneutic sense of the word but rather in a determination of it which is applicable only to societies with a pluralistic conception of goods: 'I call a good dominant,' Walzer says, announcing this '*pluralistic*' determination of the hermeneutic notion, 'if the individuals who have it, because they have it, can command a wide range of other goods' (10).

Walzer occasionally scrambles the hermeneutic and pluralistic notions of domination, as when he introduces the case of the caste system in ancient India by asking the reader 'to imagine a society where dominance and monopoly are not violations but enactments of meaning' (26). But there was no domination in the caste society, by Walzer's historical hypothesis about its integrated social meanings. There is only what we would call domination — if the goods were being distributed in our societies — because of the pluralistic meanings we would attach to these goods. The caste system itself conforms to Walzer's general formula for equality in the sense of freedom from domination: 'Men and woman are one another's equals (for all important moral and political purposes) when no one possesses or controls the means of domination' (xiii). One inevitably asks how the Untouchable and the Brahmin 'are one another's equals,' and Walzer answers that each is equally a culture-producing creature, a maker and inhabitant of a meaningful world. Members of any society are treated as equals, and justice is done them, 'by respecting their particular creations,' i.e., in the case at hand, a culture of caste (314). One does not have to be a simple egalitarian to find this reply less than satisfying. Though an Untouchable inhabited a certain meaningful world and was

not hermeneutically dominated within it, he cannot properly be said to have 'made' this world, and his class may well have had less to do with making it, and less to do with maintaining it, than the Brahmin class. In consequence one might wish to speak of an ideology in need of a critique, which would reveal the domination of one class by another. As Walzer comes out of a socialist tradition, it is predictable that he wants to accommodate the thought that there may be such '*ideological*' domination. He qualifies his hermeneutic definition of domination, for instance, by characterising dominance as a way of using goods 'that isn't limited by their intrinsic meanings *or that shapes those meanings in its own image*' (11, my emphasis). But he does not have anything like a theory, or even a paragraph, on what might distinguish 'shaped' from 'unshaped' social meanings. He comes close to raising the issue, in a footnote(!), when he adverts to Marx's conception of the critique of ideology.

Aren't social meanings, as Marx said, nothing other than "the ideas of the ruling class," "the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas"? I don't think that they are ever only that or simply that, though the members of the ruling class and the intellectuals they patronize may well be in a position to exploit and distort social meanings in their own interests. When they do that, however, they are likely to encounter resistance, rooted (intellectually) in those same meanings. A people's culture is always a joint, even if it isn't an entirely cooperative, production; and it is always a complex production. The common understanding of particular goods incorporates principles, procedures, conceptions of agency, that the rulers would not choose if they were choosing *right now* — and so provides the terms of social criticism. (9)

A crucial question about 'shaping' gets glossed over here. To wit: Are we to attach a sense to the thought that the ruling class and its intellectuals exploit and distort social meanings, *apart from their encountering resistance*? There is a parallel with Rousseau's discussion in *The Social Contract* of the slave who is so inured to his bondage that he does not find it oppressive. What does Walzer want to say about the possibility of Rousseau's slave 'writ large,' as a social class unaware of its ideological domination by another class? He puts himself on record as not relying on natural rights as a moral foundation distinct from social meanings (xv), and he dismisses Rawls's ideal contractualism and Habermas's theory of undistorted communication as not being his method for dealing with questions of justice within a society (30), but it seems arguable that he needs some such theoretical resource in order to deal with the problem of ideological domination. He comes close to conceding as much in a parenthetical remark.

When people disagree about the meaning of social goods, when understandings are controversial, then justice requires that the society be faithful to the disagreements, providing institutional channels for their expression, adjudicative mechanisms, and alternative distributions. (313)

But if Walzerian relativism runs deep, one should ask: Why? Why does justice require this facilitation of an informed, free, and open discussion? We have it from Walzer that 'in matters of morality, argument simply is the appeal to common meanings' (29). Yet there is appeal in the passage to a requirement of justice that, by the description of the case, cannot be justified by appeal to common meanings. *Our* meaningful world may require the mentioned procedures and mechanisms, but *theirs* may require nothing at all, or the resolving of differences by submitting to the judgment of the Grand Poo-Bah. Or so the Walzerian relativism would suggest. But the mentioned passage suggests the moral superiority of a society which has something like a democratic forum for critical discourse about the social meanings of goods. It belies Walzer's relativism.

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