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Teaching Philosophy



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The Southern Journal of Philosophy is published quarterly by the Department of Philosophy, Memphis State University. The journal is intended as a forum for the expression of philosophical ideas, and the editors welcome papers written from all philosophical perspectives. The annual subscription rate is \$5.00 to students, \$10.00 to individuals and \$14.00 to libraries and other institutions. All correspondence should be sent to *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Memphis State University, Memphis, TN 38152. The editors subscribe to the Guidelines for Handling Manuscripts as adopted by the Association of Editors of Philosophy Journals. Manuscripts to be considered for publication should be submitted to *The Editor* in duplicate together with a brief *vita* of the sort which regularly accompanies articles printed in the journal. Return postage must accompany all manuscripts.

the introduction of new technologies in medicine and other fields of professional endeavour. The book is intended to introduce the reader to the basic problems of professional ethics and to provide a framework for further study. It is also intended to help the reader to understand the nature of professional ethics and its relationship to other fields of study such as philosophy, law, and social science. The book is divided into four main parts: Part I: An Introduction to Professional Ethics; Part II: The Nature of Professional Ethics; Part III: The Problems of Professional Ethics; and Part IV: The Future of Professional Ethics.

MICHAEL D. BAYLES, *Professional Ethics*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company 1981. Pp. xi + 159. US\$10.95. ISBN 0-534-00998-0.

Professionals play an extremely important role in our lives. One reason for this is the technological complexity of modern society. Another related reason is the extensive economic, legal and political systems required for highly developed technological societies to function. Despite the many ways in which professionals influence our lives, society has until recently allowed the professions to be largely self-regulating. Unlike older more established professions such as those of the physician or lawyer, many of the newer professions have not formulated formal codes of ethics to guide their members in relationships with clients, other professionals and the public. Even the codes of ethics of the more established professions have not received a great deal of scrutiny by outsiders.

All of this is changing. Watergate, medicare fraud, corporate wrongdoing and other social evils have focused the attention of social scientists and philosophers on the roles professionals play in society. Courses in professional ethics which were a rarity a few years ago are springing up everywhere. Many of these courses are taught by philosophers who take a much broader view of ethics than the one usually taken by professionals. When professionals teach courses in professional ethics they tend to take professional codes of ethics as more or less given, restricting their attention to problems of complying with the codes. This approach ignores broader more fundamental issues such as whether a code of ethics is consistent with democratic values and serves the public interest.

Although courses in which this broad view of professional ethics is taken are being taught more frequently, instructors have had a difficult time in finding suitable material. Bayles' book is intended to fill this void. Except for Alan Goldman's book *The Moral Foundations of Professional Ethics*, published in 1980, Bayles' work is to my knowledge the only book available which provides a general introduction to the basic problems of professional ethics. Furthermore, while Goldman's book is excellent, it is not in my opinion as suitable as Bayles' book for use in introductory courses. This is not to say that Bayles only introduces readers to the problems of professional ethics without contributing to the development of a suitable framework for

evaluating them. To the contrary his book, like Goldman's, is an important contribution to professional ethics as a normative discipline.

Bayles divides professions into consulting and non-consulting, focusing most of his attention on the former. He maintains that the concept of a professional is an open one, and that it is impossible for us to formulate a set of conditions which are both necessary and sufficient to specify when a person is or is not a professional. However, he believes that three features are necessary for anyone to be a professional. These are: (1) undergoing extensive training, (2) acquiring skills which have a significant intellectual component and (3) providing an important service to society. Other features which are common but not necessary are certification, membership in associations and a certain amount of autonomy in one's work.

He argues that for the purposes of ethical analysis the most important characteristics of the consulting professions are: the ability to perform greatly needed services, a monopoly on the provision of these services and a high degree of self-regulation. He uses these characteristics as a basis for discussing the obligation of professionals. Separate chapters are devoted to obligations regarding the availability of services, obligations to clients, obligations to third parties, obligations to other professionals and problems of ensuring compliance to professional codes.

Because health and legal services are so important, Bayles argues that everyone has a positive right to them regardless of ability to pay. Professionals therefore have a corresponding obligation to help see that these services are made universally available. He believes that this obligation is violated when the medical and legal professions unduly limit their membership, maintain a monopoly of services, prohibit advertising and oppose the government playing a more active role in making these services universally available.

Some of his other major conclusions are that professional relationships should be conceived of as basically fiduciary in nature, not as one of agency, contract, friendship or paternalism, that the special relationship which professionals have to their clients cannot justify their disregarding ordinary duties such as avoiding harm to third parties and that professional practices need to be modified to provide for much more ethical review by lay persons.

The features of his book which are likely to prove most controversial are: (1) his arguments regarding the obligations of the medical and legal professions to make their services universally available and his suggestions regarding the roles government should play in distributing these services, (2) his arguments for greater lay participation in the ethical review of professionals. Conservatives and libertarians are likely to object to the first, many professionals to both the first and second. But even those who disagree with his conclusions will have to admire the clarity and precision with which he has stated the issues. *Professional Ethics* is a well written and important book which is certain to become one of the standard works in the field.

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BOUSQUET, F., BRETON, S., et al., *La croyance*. Collection 'Philosophie', Volume 7, Institut Catholique de Paris. Paris: Beauchesne 1982. Pp. 238. ISBN 2-7010. 1038-1.

Fondée en 1976, la collection 'Philosophie' publie chaque année un volume portant sur un thème de réflexion proposé par la culture actuelle à l'intelligence croyante. Les volumes précédents avaient pour titres: *Manifestation et révélation*, *Le mythe et le symbole*, *Le pouvoir*, *Le sujet et l'éducation*, *Le modernisme*, *Le rite*. Il s'agit chaque fois d'un recueil d'articles dont les auteurs sont, pour la plupart, des enseignants de la Faculté de Philosophie de l'Institut Catholique de Paris, donc des croyants engagés dans la pratique de la pensée philosophique et intéressés par les choses de la religion. Chaque année ils acceptent le rendez-vous avec un problème posé à leur foi par le monde d'aujourd'hui et, à partir de leur recherche respective, ils tentent d'apporter à ce problème sinon une réponse définitive un éclairage nouveau.

C'est à *La croyance* qu'on a décidé de consacrer le septième volume de la collection. Il comprend douze textes, regroupés sous trois thèmes: *le sol de la croyance* (textes de S. Breton, J.S. O'Leary, P. Colin, J. Greisch), *les destins de la croyance* (J.F. Catalan, P. Kaepplin, F. Bousquet) et *la raison devant l'in-croyance* (J. Trouillard, J.R. Morello, Y. Ledure, M.D. Delaunay et P.J. Labarrière). On ne m'en voudra pas si, pour donner au lecteur de ce compte-rendu une image plus précise du contenu de ce volume, je les regroupe autrement, selon la manière dont les auteurs s'y prennent pour aborder le phénomène complexe de la croyance.

Une première manière pour le philosophe croyant d'aborder ce phénomène consiste à consulter les maîtres du passé pour les interroger sur leur façon de comprendre la croyance. Six des douze textes adoptent ce procédé; les maîtres consultés sont: Proclus, Augustin, Descartes, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, et les tenants au siècle dernier de la philosophie du sens commun. (1) D'abord le bel article de J. Trouillard, *Un texte de Proclus sur la foi* (149-60) s'arrête à un passage de la *Théologie platonicienne* IV, où la foi est comprise comme 'silence unitif ... supérieur à toute activité de connaissance,' donc comme dépassement et accomplissement de la raison, et fait voir combien avec le théologien néoplatonicien nous sommes loin de Platon et de sa conception de la foi 'comme acte d'une raison incertaine parce que mêlée de sensation' (150). (2) Puis le texte de J.S. O'Leary, *En lisant le De Utilitate Credendi de Saint Augustin* (29-49), dont la contribution nous a paru beaucoup moins pertinente et dans lequel on a laissé glisser quelques fautes d'impression ou d'orthographe (34, n.2, l. 3; 39, l.29; 41, l.20). (3) J.R. Morello, *La croyance, la raison et la foi chez Descartes*. (161-87) conteste énergiquement l'image courante de la position cartésienne sur le rapport entre la raison et la foi. Dans l'œuvre du père de la philosophie moderne, il voit toute autre chose que l'exercice d'une raison trop sûre d'elle-même pour laisser place à la foi et toute autre chose que l'instauration d'une onto-théologie. Le dernier mot de Descartes serait, au contraire, l'humilité de l'esprit. La raison cartésienne, loin de 'faire justifier sous le couvert de Dieu la

victoire souveraine de la pensée humaine' (177), se reconnaît finie et limitée, impuissante à s'approprier ni elle-même, ni Dieu, dont elle montre la présence au sein de son indigence. (4) Un texte de Schopenhauer sur la *Begläubigung*, comme moment structurel de l'existence humaine permet à Y. Ledure, *Croyance philosophique et foi* (189-201) de définir les logiques respectives de la croyance philosophique et de la foi religieuse devant le transcendant irréductible que constitue pour la pensée la mort, que la croyance transforme en objet de pensée et que la foi pose comme 'l'originariaire d'une nouvelle existentialité' (201). (5) C'est à Kierkegaard que F. Bousquet, *Croire et la passion de l'existence* (131-46) demande de nous rappeler que la foi est indispensable à l'intelligence du passé puisque ce qui devient ne découle pas d'une raison, mais d'une cause et ultimement d'une cause agissant librement. (6) Enfin l'article de P. Colin, *De la philosophie du sens commun* (51-60) rappelle rapidement les principales thèses des tenants de la philosophie du sens commun, du P. Buffier au P. Garrigou-Lagrange, en passant par Jouffroy, De Bonald et Lamennais, pour montrer la difficulté à laquelle aucun n'a échappé, à savoir celle de pouvoir repérer une autorité du sens commun qui soit indépendante de la philosophie dont on se sert pour parler en son nom.

Une deuxième manière d'apporter quelque lumière sur le thème de la croyance est d'aller voir ce que la pensée actuelle nous permet d'en dire, en prenant au sérieux les questions qu'elle soulève à son propos et les ressources qu'elle offre pour les penser. Deux courants de la pensée actuelle servent d'interlocuteurs dans ce volume: la philosophie analytique et la psychanalyse. (1) Ainsi dans un très bel article, J. Greisch, *Du langage comme sol de la croyance* (61-84) s'arrête à Wittgenstein pour faire voir, de façon fort intelligente, comment sa conception du langage comme sol de la croyance — conception qu'il ne faut pas confondre avec celle de la philosophie herméneutique, malgré la parenté des deux positions — oblige à reformuler la question traditionnelle des *praeambula fidei*. (2) Quant au texte de M.-D. Delaunay, *Comprendre le croire* (202-20), c'est aux ressources logico-linguistiques du même courant de pensée qu'il en appelle pour mettre au jour l'irréductibilité du 'croire en,' par contraste avec le 'croire que,' et pour faire entrevoir l'originalité de la foi par rapport au savoir. (3) Au dialogue avec la psychanalyse sont consacrés les articles de J.F. Catalan, *Entre illusion et réalité: Croyance ou réalité?* (87-104) et de P. Kaepelin, *De l'illusion groupale au besoin de croire* (105-30), qui tous deux visent à préciser, le premier à partir de considérations théoriques, le second à partir de la pratique de la thérapie de groupe, la part incontournable de l'illusion dans la croyance, du fait que celle-ci est toujours portée par le désir. 'Comme l'indique son étymologie, écrit Kaepelin (123), l'illusion joue un double rôle par rapport à la réalité: tantôt elle l'oblète en leurrant le sujet qui s'y plaint; tantôt elle en fournit une approximation lointaine en laissant progresser le sujet dans la direction de son désir. Elle se joue de la réalité: ses représentations la simulent autant pour en détourner le désir que pour en permettre la supposition et en faciliter l'accès au sujet en mal de croyance.'

Il reste au philosophe croyant une autre manière d'aborder le phénomène de la croyance: en puisant aux sources même de l'expérience et de la raison. Les contributions de S. Breton, *Croyance et sol de la croyance* (11-28) et de P.J. Labarrière, *Croire et comprendre. Un procès d'intercohérence* (221-35) en donnent deux bons exemples. Avec beaucoup de finesse S. Breton analyse quatre modalités de la croyance, selon une hiérarchie d'intensité allant du maximum au minimum d'engagement personnel, et montre comment elle n'est possible que dans la mesure où elle repose sur un sol qui, en dernière instance, se refuse à un éclaircissement absolu. Quant à P.J. Labarrière, il s'applique à montrer comment le croire et le comprendre n'atteint chacun à sa vérité propre qu'en s'instituant comme médiation de l'autre par rapport à lui-même et comment en vertu de cette structure la croyance ne devient foi que par la grâce médiatrice d'un comprendre habité lui-même par une force qui fait croire (222).

Il ne faut pas, bien sûr, chercher dans ces douze études une problématique commune, ni par conséquent les résultats d'une recherche guidée par des questions bien délimitées. Ce que l'on y trouve en revanche, outre l'exemple d'une certaine convivialité dans la pratique de la pensée philosophique et un échantillon de la manière selon laquelle se déploie aujourd'hui *le fides quaerens intellectum*, c'est l'ouverture pour l'intelligence croyante d'espaces neufs de réflexion qui l'obligent moins à se défendre contre l'incroyance qu'à penser le sens du croire dans le devenir de l'homme.

Je n'ajouterai qu'un mot de regret, qui ne touche pas directement la qualité de ce volume. Le lecteur assidu de la collection 'Philosophie' ne peut s'empêcher d'observer dans le présent volume, comme dans le sixième, l'absence du P.D. Dubarle. Nous avions été habitués à trouver dans la plupart des numéros précédents son importante contribution, qui suffisait souvent à leur assurer une qualité remarquable. Et le lecteur de sa chronique de 1978 à la *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, 62 (1978) 589-98, consacrée à cette collection, sait quel prix il attachait à cette entreprise et quel esprit il aimait y voir à l'œuvre. La maladie ne lui permet plus de prendre part aux travaux de la collection. Puisse l'équipe qui en assume la direction maintenir vivante l'orientation qu'il lui a donnée.

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JONATHON CULLER, *The Pursuit of Signs*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1981. Pp. xii + 242. US\$15.00. ISBN 0-8014-1417-2.

This is the latest in a series of books in which Jonathon Culler encapsulates and appraises recent discussions about literature. It is wrought in a crafted, pellucid Oxonian diction, quite obedient to the ideal of a 'sober, unam-

biguous meta-language,' which it sets more generally for criticism. The book is thoughtful and thorough, and, since it exemplifies the sort of criticism it espouses, it is doubly useful for anyone who might wish to learn about the state of this particular art.

There are 11 essays, dating as far back as 1975, which have been reworked to eliminate error and form a coherent whole, and which are introduced by a short preface. Most appeared in publications devoted to what is sometimes called simply 'theory,' and 'theory' is their chief concern. An overarching aim is to provide a single and basic framework for current debates in literary theory, and to supply them with a self-image and a pedagogical rationale. A special worry is whether deconstruction fits within the frame, Culler arguing that, properly understood, it does. A promising indication of how he may envisage deconstruction in his forthcoming work on the topic comes in a review of M.H. Abram's *The Mirror and the Lamp*. In Culler's story, Romantic notions of genial expression and organicist integrity don't break with the 'aesthetics' Kant initiated; they continue the master tropes of mirrors and *mimesis* by other means.

Culler would have us picture 'theory,' on the model of linguistics, as an account of literary competence. There is a 'system of literary signification drawn upon by readers,' and 'theory' aims to offer a complete description of it. Similarly linguistics tries to completely describe 'the sets of rules and conventions that constitute a language and enable linguistic communication to take place.' One consequence of the analogy would seem to be that linguistic and literary competence, (and therefore literary and 'ordinary' language) are distinct, though Culler owns that this leads to deconstructive paradox in some cases.

Culler is at pains to draw what he sees as an iconoclastic consequence from the analogy to linguistics. Linguistics studies languages, but doesn't tell us how to speak or what to say. Literary theory studies literatures, but doesn't tell us how to read or what to write. It tells us how the literary enterprise is possible, but not how to do it. Discussion of works is thus not 'applied' theory, though it employs conventions and assumptions theory is concerned to identify. It follows that courses or books that reduce theory to competing 'methods of interpretation' or 'strategies of reading' within what is often presented as a sort of *querelle d'écoles* don't have a proper idea of what theory is. It is better to organize theory courses around such topics as metaphor, narrative, or how the literary is distinguished from the non-literary — the sort of topics that figure in the 'applied' portions of *The Pursuit of Signs*. We don't need 'yet another interpretation of King Lear,' declares Culler in an arch moment. What we do need is to understand 'the conventions and operations of an institution, a mode of discourse.' For Culler 'theory' is that part of literary criticism not devoted to the criticism of literature.

He explains that the opposing view — that a theory's worth is only the interpretations it leads to — is deeply engrained, having been severely reinforced by New Criticism. Keeping to his approach, Culler tries to identify the

'rules and conventions' on which this view rests. In defining a literary work as the autonomous word-sequence on the page, New Criticism determined that the critic, or reader, was to rephrase what the sequence said or meant. It is not just that it thereby ignored the sort of conventions of reading 'theory' is concerned to identify. It bound criticism to individual interpretation of more or less canonical works. By contrast, 'theory' is able to challenge the very idea of a given or natural integrity and autonomy of particular works by showing that the idea is after all just one convention for grouping sentences, and the interpretation of those sentences, one that happened to be a useful pedagogical vehicle. In fact, Culler seems ready to be nominalist or conventionalist about any way of identifying and classifying works by author, genre, period, etc. Even De Man's 'allegories of reading' approach seems to Culler to preserve the autonomous work, and hence fuel the enslavement of theory to interpretative method. Deconstruction has become just one more teachable method for reading works. This was not, however, Derrida's intent, Culler adds. Derrida wasn't elaborating an interpretative method; he was advancing a sort of semiotics of meta-literary paradox.

Culler shifts between the claim that 'theory' is, and that 'theory' should be, such a meta-literary excercise. There are difficulties with each claim.

In the first place, we may doubt that all discussions about literature (still less the whole literary 'mode of discourse') can be placed under the sign of Sign Pursuit — whether the study of literature is contained within a single frame, and whether that is the frame of Signs. Culler offers a list of pressing problems for theory: what role literature has in 'social consciousness' and 'psychical economies,' how the literary institution works, what distinguishes literature within a 'typology of discourses.' But why assume that these diverse and interesting problems will be solved by postulating a single 'system of literary signification' and making a solution consist in identifying yet more of its rules and conventions? Maybe the definition of the system can be stretched to make this claim come out trivially true. But what happens when it is made more precise? What in fact does Culler understand by 'rules and conventions' ('operations,' 'assumptions,' etc)? While he invokes Chomskyan competence, he ignores Chomsky's early assault on the taxonomic procedures of structural linguistics. Whatever Culler's 'rules and conventions' are, they are not much like the formal rules of *Syntactic Structures*. Culler seems an unregenerate taxonomist. On page i, he declares that semiotics 'posits a zoological pursuit.' But why adopt a zoological approach to the question how the literary institution works? Are all institutions really like zoos? Analysts of institutions haven't been much taken with semiology. Even in the French context, Foucault emphatically insists that institutions should not be studied on the sign model; Bourdieu's account of the functions of group 'distinction' in art institutions is not of this kind. Maybe for the very problems Culler enumerates, a transcendental view of theory (what makes the literary possible?) is not going to be much more help than the interpretative model it is supposed to replace.

Culler is also aware that Derrida has done his best to cast doubt on the

tenability of the structuralist concepts of system and of sign, and on the very possibility of a meta-language. His reaction brings out the second sort of question — why do we *want* to pursue signs instead of interpreting works? Culler has a sort of mirror-image to Richard Rorty's Derrida (mirrors being a suspect trope for both). Rorty says Derrida hasn't got a theory of language, traces or anything else; he is playfully following out the idea that philosophy is only a kind of writing. For Culler there is a semiotic answer to the question what kind of writing philosophy is. He sees Derrida as a semiotician whose questions about theory make sense only within a system they suppose and so cannot eliminate. These two Derrida-images reflect two attitudes towards what we may hope to derive from discussion of literature — to try to understand our impulses about it by identifying the conventions that surround it and make it what it is, or to attempt to turn these impulses towards devising new vocabularies, conventions — new ways of writing. The two attitudes seem to re-enact an earlier French scenario.

Culler declares that we are in an 'age of criticism,' but not, one gathers, because our culture bestows such a pre-eminent value on the literary tradition. Perhaps what made new literary theory prominent in France was the idea that it might do what philosophy would never in principle *do* — open up new ways of writing. The new discussions of literature displaced existential philosophy when it seemed that writing contained something that couldn't be reduced within the philosophical tradition. The question as to what Writing is seemed more basic than the question as to what Being is, since writing was seen as 'anti-theological' — opposed to the notion that everything might be interpreted from first principles (such as God, Reason, or the Nature of Man), or from uniform and unexceptionable vocabularies. Heidegger was read as showing that philosophy had been possessed of the 'onto-theological' desire for first principles and uniform vocabularies. And Barthes, as usual, had a nice motto for the impulses around renewed talk about literature. For centuries, he said, there reigned among us the tyranny of *la lecture bien faite*. Once theory shows us that this is only the rule of some institutions, we are free for something else, *la lecture sans maître*. Culler has no place for this sort of *lecture*, and little of the impulse behind it survives in his attempt to provide the discussion of literature with the theoretical self-image of the pursuit of signs.

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ALPHONSE de WAEHLENS, *Le duc de Saint-Simon. Immobile comme Dieu et d'une suite enragée*. Bruxelles: Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint Louis 1981. Pp. 362.

L'Auteur déclare nettement son double intérêt pour la phénoménologie et pour la psychanalyse. C'est poussé par ce double intérêt qu'il étudie l'œuvre et la personne de Saint-Simon. Très attentif aux pièges de la psychanalyse d'un écrivain, il prendra garde de ne pas 'psychiatriser' Saint-Simon ni de l'enfermer dans des structures pathologiques. Il veut plutôt se pencher 'sur les conflits intimes, avoués ou secrets, de l'existence de Saint-Simon et sur les sources dont ils surgissent en se transformant et en le transformant' (13). Il entend éclairer l'homme que fut Saint-Simon en prenant appui, 'avec réserve et prudence' (349), sur une conception psychanalytique de l'inconscient, s'interdisant d'expliquer par là la nature de l'œuvre littéraire de l'écrivain. D'un autre côté, l'A.s'efforcera de dégager certaines lignes fondamentales d'une épistémologie implicite dans l'œuvre de Saint-Simon.

Dans la première partie, l'A. étudie les rapports de Saint-Simon avec ses proches, et il dégage progressivement les éléments qui s'unifieront plus tard dans une constellation psychique cohérente. Dans le détours des textes, il met en évidence les points où l'interprète décèle l'étrangeté de l'attitude et de l'affection de l'écrivain. Ce qui, pour l'A., rend intéressant le cas de Saint-Simon, c'est qu'il se comprend en référence à une structure psychique particulière, dont le déguisement réussit plus facilement à se dissimuler que lorsqu'il s'agit d'autres types de structures.

Louis est né du second mariage d'un père âgé avec une femme beaucoup plus jeune, mariage qui n'a pour but que de transmettre la dignité ducale, avec laquelle il s'identifiera sans réserve. Dans son discours manifeste, Louis témoigne à l'égard de son père d'une vénération excessive, d'une froideur et d'une solennité, toutes caractéristiques dont son écriture n'est pas familière. Un autre discours ne fait qu'effleurer dans des expressions incidentes, des maladresses, qui révèlent une rivalité triomphante et méprisante qui ne se sent pas coupable. Saint-Simon parle très peu de sa mère. Celle-ci prit soin de son éducation d'une façon beaucoup plus personnelle que la plupart des femmes de cette époque; elle semble avoir été autoritaire et s'être dédommagée sur son fils d'un époux par certains côtés odieux et médiocre.

Sa mère, qui pensait au duché, l'exhorta tôt au mariage. Il multiplie les démarches extravagantes auprès de Beauvillier, assorties 'de propos sans mesure et parfois quasi délirants, de raisonnements rigoureux mais absurdes, [qui] jettent une lumière révélatrice sur la sensibilité et le désir du duc à l'égard de l'amitié masculine et de l'amour de la femme' (43). Il épousa enfin Gabrielle, la fille du maréchal de Lorge. Il lui voua, sa vie durant, une grande affection, mais ses descriptions sont celles d'un témoin non concerné, sauf quelquefois une nuance d'admiration distante. Elle est pour lui avant tout une présence reconfortante et sécurisante, une conseillère qu'il suivit la plupart du temps; mais cette sécurité n'est pas sans susciter en retour des mouvements d'impatience, qui sont la reprise d'une ambiguïté plus ancienne.

De ses enfants, il parle peu souvent, sauf à l'occasion de deux mariages faits dans des circonstances assez scandaleuses. Tous trois portent la marque de la déchéance; Saint-Simon en fut profondément blessé dans son narcissisme et réagit par le mépris et la haine.

Toute sa vie, Saint-Simon fut en quête de figures paternelles, qu'il choisit avant tout parmi les amis de son père. L'A. note une caractéristique intéressante: ces différentes figures ne sont pas purement et simplement interchangeables; chacune représente plutôt un aspect de la figure paternelle qui se trouve par là décomposée. Ainsi, Beauvillier représente le père tendre, qui protège de la mère possessive, mais qui n'y réussit qu'en laissant s'introduire dans les relations d'amitié une dimension un peu trouble. La relation avec Rancé est bien différente: il est le père sublime, le Tout Autre qui lui confère une reconnaissance absolue; il est le seul qui ait su que Louis écrivait ses *Mémoires*, parce que ce dernier l'avait consulté sur la licéité du projet. Pontchartrain sera le guide admiré mais égal, qui ouvre au 'fils' la voie de la réalité.

L'amitié a pour Saint-Simon la force de la plus vive passion. Elle fait abstraction de la 'qualité' de l'ami, lui qui pourtant est si sensible à cette 'qualité.' L'amitié est immuable et se manifeste avec éclat lorsque l'ami est tombé en disgrâce. Seul un acte de trahison pourra y porter atteinte, et alors se produira un renversement d'une rare violence. Par contre, Saint-Simon ne manifeste aucune passion à l'égard des femmes. Son discours sur la beauté d'une femme le fait apparaître comme un témoin impartial et lucide, mais non concerné. L'amitié de Saint-Simon révélera plusieurs de ses traits caractéristiques dans les rapports étranges et fervents qu'il entretient avec Philippe d'Orléans. Lui qui stigmatise si volontiers les vices de la Cour, il minimise la conduite scandaleuse de son ami et tente sans cesse d'en rejeter la responsabilité sur d'autres personnes. Son amitié apparaît nettement dans le rôle qu'il a joué dans la rupture entre le duc d'Orléans et Mme d'Argenton, la seule maîtresse à laquelle Philippe s'attacha vraiment. C'est un véritable siège que Saint-Simon entreprend auprès de son ami, le convainquant, par les arguments les plus invraisemblables, que cette liaison est la cause de sa disgrâce. On y lit clairement le langage de la jalousie et de la fureur de la passion. Lorsque Philippe fut abandonné de tous, Louis se glorifie d'être 'exactement l'unique' (157) qui persista à le rencontrer en public.

Louis XIV et Mme de Maintenon tiennent une place importante dans les *Mémoires*. Ils forment l'antithèse du couple parental idéal. Louis XIV représente le 'mauvais père,' sur lequel Saint-Simon exerce une critique impitoyable et permanente: il est le tyran mal assuré et finalement dupé par son entourage. Par contre, Mme de Maintenon est la mère indigne, traîtresse et putain, qu'il s'acharne à salir; mais ses reproches se formulent en un langage éthique, qui exprime un blocage de l'expérience érotique hétéro-sexuelle.

De cet ensemble de rapports, l'A. fait ressortir la tendance à fractionner et à projeter sur des personnages différents, masculins, mais aussi féminins, les composantes de l'Oedipe; or, cette tendance est tenue généralement comme typique de la constitution paranoïaque. Dans la seconde partie, l'A. explicitera certaines attitudes et sentiments exprimés dans la vie et l'œuvre de

Saint-Simon qui, ajoutés à ceux qui sont déjà dégagés, seront compris en référence à une structure psychique particulière.

Le rapport caractéristique au regard et au temps est le trait qui nous introduit à cette structure. Le regard que Saint-Simon porte sur les personnes possède une puissance quasi magique: il fixe, il dévore, il a l'éclat de la foudre, il commande, sans réciprocité, le regard d'autrui, il dévoile absolument, il démasque les scélérats. En un mot, c'est un regard infaillible, comme celui de Dieu, qui élimine tout doute sur la rigoureuse exactitude de son jugement. Comme nous pouvons nous y attendre, cette fixation dans l'éternel s'accompagne d'une jouissance parfois très vive et proprement sensuelle. Le regard de Saint-Simon est spéculaire, il se porte sur l'image projetée dans le miroir, fixée à celui-ci. C'est donc la référence au stade du miroir qui permettra d'unifier les différentes composantes isolées de l'attitude de l'écrivain. Nous avons déjà vu que celui-ci s'identifie absolument à la dignité ducale; on peut donc penser qu'à l'égard du 'moi ducal imaginaire,' il ne peut prendre aucune distance; il se mire dans cette dignité comme dans un miroir.

Un tel type de regard entraîne un rapport particulier au temps. L'image spéculaire, fortement investie, n'est pas affectée par le temps et demeure immuable. Chez Saint-Simon, cette immutabilité est sans cesse projetée sur autrui, en positif et en négatif, ce qui fait que le regard immobilise le réel en une série de tableaux définitifs. Tendance narcissique à maîtriser le temps dans une vision intemporelle qui ne laisse plus aucune possibilité d'évolution ou de changement. L'A. suggère en passant la parenté entre cette structure psychique et une épistémologie implicite selon laquelle le voir devient le modèle du connaître: la vérité s'étale comme un spectacle que saisit complètement le regard de celui qui voit, de celui qui est le pur témoin impartial et désintéressé. Aucune recherche tâtonnante ne conduit à son atteinte, aucun dialogue ne peut la modifier.

Le regard de Saint-Simon s'acharne à démasquer les scélérats; on comprend que la haine a joué un grand rôle dans sa vie, et qu'elle prend un caractère aussi absolu que l'amitié. La principale vengeance est le regard de mépris qui confond le méchant et l'anéant, qui le fixe à jamais dans sa scélérité. Il est remarquable que de tels personnages se trouvent toujours dans la très proche parenté de ceux qui reçoivent admiration, attachement ou amitié de la part de Saint-Simon: ils sont comme l'image en miroir, inversée, de l'ami ou du héros. Ce renversement est un mécanisme de projection qui s'apparente au style paranoïaque, et il fonctionne selon les règles propres au stade du miroir. Tout se passe comme si le complexe d'Oedipe était entièrement modelé sur le patron de l'image spéculaire inversée.

La fixation au stade du miroir permet aussi de rendre compte du fait étrange que Saint-Simon, qui accuse constamment Louis XIV d'écartier la noblesse des affaires publiques, refusa toutes les charges que lui offrit son ami le Régent, et souvent pour des raisons qui semblent invraisemblables. C'est que, pur témoin, il se veut désengagé sur le plan de l'action; l'engagement le mettrait à la merci de l'autre et de l'image qu'on se ferait de lui; en se faisant partenaire, il perdrat la distance infinie du pur regard. De même, si Saint-

Simon s'est fait historien, c'est pour fixer à jamais le tableau de son temps; il a regardé ce qui est et l'a dit tel qu'il est, donc dans une vérité absolue. Peu importe que son oeuvre n'ait pas d'autre lecteur que lui, il écrit pour son propre plaisir, pour la jouissance de voir, pour éterniser à ses propres yeux le spectacle qu'il a pénétré dans sa totalité. L'écriture redouble l'omnipotence du regard.

L'A. démontre, dans son ouvrage, une grande familiarité avec les œuvres de Saint-Simon. Cette familiarité lui a permis d'intégrer, dans une compréhension générale, le nouvel éclairage qui lui vient de ses études psychanalytiques. Il réussit à utiliser ses connaissances analytiques sans alourdir son texte d'explications trop techniques, et sans non plus céder à une simplification trompeuse. De plus, le travail de l'A. pourrait avoir une portée qui dépasse la compréhension de l'œuvre de Saint-Simon; la structure imaginaire qu'il a décelée dans celle-ci est susceptible de servir de matériau ou d'illustration à une étude plus englobante des régimes de l'imagination humaine.

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GEORGES DUBY, *Le chevalier, la femme et le prêtre*. Paris: Hachette 1981.
Pp. 311. FF59.00. ISBN 2-01-007897-7.

Ce livre d'histoire mérite particulièrement l'attention des philosophes. On y trouve des précisions au sujet des rapports qu'entretiennent règles de parenté et infrastructure sociale. On y trouve des informations de première main au sujet du statut d'infériorité de la femme à un moment crucial de notre culture. On y trouve enfin des réflexions dispersées mais fort pertinentes sur l'histoire des mentalités. L'auteur fait remarquer que celles-ci n'apparaissent jamais que comme le non dit d'un texte ou comme la toile de fond sur laquelle se détache un document. Les trois thèmes que je relève sont abordés dans un livre d'abord consacré aux pratiques matrimoniales de la noblesse de la France du nord durant les 11^e et 12^e siècles.

Les rapports règles de parenté et culture matérielle ont fait l'objet de nombreux débats dans les cercles marxistes et anthropologiques. Duby aborde cette question avec simplicité et clarté. Il fait remarquer que le petit peuple dut se plier aux règles matrimoniales conçues par l'Eglise. En effet, ces règles faisaient l'affaire de la noblesse tant qu'elles ne concernaient que les serfs. Elles stabilisaient la main d'œuvre dont dépendaient les seigneuries. Mais les seigneurs n'acceptèrent pas aussi facilement pour eux-mêmes les règles de

l'Eglise. Au 11e siècle, au moment où se met en place l'ordre féodal, les nobles se soucient d'abord d'établir leur maison et leur lignée. Ils ont besoin d'alliances avantageuses d'un point de vue politique. Ils ont besoin d'épouses fécondes. Ils répudient celles qui ne leur donnent pas de fils ou celles qui ne correspondent plus à une alliance politique requise par la conjoncture. Il faut un héritier mâle par seigneurie. Les puînés et les filles se casent comme ils peuvent. Les chevaliers seront ou bien errants, compétitifs, bagarreurs et ravisseurs de femmes, ou bien ils se retrouveront à la tête d'une maison, poursuivant une politique dynastique, épousant et répudiant pour les besoins de la cause. De l'an 1000 à environ 1200, la famille noble se conçoit essentiellement comme un lignage vertical et l'ensemble des alliances renforçant ce lignage. Cela correspond aux nécessités de l'organisation politique et aux rapports de production du temps. Quand ceux-ci et celle-là changeront, mariage et famille changeront aussi.

L'Eglise voulait discipliner les moeurs du monde. Elle n'y arrivera qu'avec le déclin de l'ordre féodal. Mais il lui aura d'abord fallu se réconcilier avec la chair et la vie des laïcs. Il lui faudra envisager un autre idéal que la chasteté.

Vers 1200, on voit les nobles relâcher les restrictions aux mariages de leurs enfants. Les puînés s'établissent plus facilement. Le consentement des époux est désormais l'élément fondamental du mariage. C'est ce que veut l'Eglise et c'est ce que rend possible l'évolution politique et économique. Désormais, les grands lignages nobles sont bien établis et l'ordre de la noblesse se ferme. Les nobles sont donc assurés de leur statut. Par ailleurs, leurs seigneuries rapportent davantage: l'agriculture s'est améliorée, les terres cultivables se sont étendues et les serfs se sont multipliés, surtout l'instrument fiscal s'est perfectionné au profit des châteaux. Et puis la terre n'est plus l'unique ressource des nobles. Ils trouvent de nouveaux débouchés dans les grandes formations politiques qui se mettent en place. La circulation des biens et des hommes s'accélèrent avec la désagrégation de la féodalité. Enfin la coutume du parage permet à un cadet de recevoir un fief sans démembrer l'héritage lignager. Tous ces facteurs interfèrent avec les pratiques matrimoniales et les conceptions de la parenté.

Du point de vue des études féministes, Duby traite de deux questions classiques. Premièrement, la femme fut réduite à un moyen d'échange entre lignages et cela dans notre propre passé. Elle servit à la puissance des hommes et à la stabilisation de leur maison au moment où s'établissait la féodalité. Deuxièmement, l'Eglise ne se réconcilia avec la sexualité qu'en la subordonnant à la reproduction. Or la sexualité féminine parut suspecte dans la mesure où elle ne se laisse pas enfermer dans cette fonction. Au moins les hommes, qui ne songent qu'à copuler, rassurent les clercs. Ce sont les hommes qui ont une sexualité normale. Les femmes se trouvent dès lors marginalisées par la réprobation des clercs et les besoins simplistes des mâles. Evidemment, la situation n'a pas tellement changé avec les siècles. Que l'on accuse les femmes d'être sexuellement froides ou insatiables, il s'agit toujours de la même tentative de les juger — et de les éduquer — en fonction de la norme des hommes.

Au sujet de la méthode que suit l'auteur, je reprendrai ce qu'il en dit en terminant le premier chapitre de son livre. Il commence par insister sur la rareté et l'inadéquation des informations relatives aux pratiques matrimoniales. Ces informations ne concernent que les rites, le droit ou les principes. Seul est arrivé jusqu'à nous 'le plus dur de la carapace idéologique qui justifie les actes que l'on avoue et sous laquelle se dissimulent les actions que l'on cache' (25). Ensuite, ces informations émanent de clercs, de mâles célibataires par principe. Les lacunes de ces informations exposent les historiens aux dangers d'interprétation abusive et d'anachronisme. Car 'le mariage dont je parle est le mien, et je ne suis pas tout à fait sûr de me déprendre du système idéologique qu'il me faudrait démystifier' (26).

Duby a écrit son livre à propos d'un sujet très délimité mais qui nous concerne beaucoup. Les moeurs matrimoniales de la noblesse dans le nord de la France au 11e et 12e siècles rendent compte de moeurs qui ont duré jusqu'à nous, qui commencent à se défaire aujourd'hui. Cette hypothèse fait l'unité et l'intérêt du livre de Duby. Ce livre confirme cette hypothèse.

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B.A. FARRELL, *The Standing of Psychoanalysis*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford University Press 1981. Pp. 240. Cdn\$26.95; US\$18.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-219133-0); Cdn \$14.95; US\$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-289120-0).

B.A. Farrell is an able philosopher who is thoroughly acquainted with psychoanalysis. Readers of his earlier work on the subject might expect his present book to be a good one. It is.

After making some introductory remarks, Farrell presents a brief but lucid account of Freudian theory. He then asks if the theory is testable, and concludes (46) that it seems possible, logically and in practice, to bring empirical evidence to bear on it.

In chapters four through seven he examines the clinical data. He agrees that psychoanalytic theory can render at least some of the Freudian case material intelligible but points out (62) that other (non-Freudian) psychodynamic theories can do the same. Further, making the case material intelligible is not sufficient to confirm the truth of any psychodynamic theory (66). In chapter 5, he considers attempts to bridge the gap between intelligibility and truth by developing truth criteria for psychoanalytic interpretations. He concludes (88) that such attempts have failed. In the next

chapter, he examines the claim that analytic interpretations are known to be true because they have been unearthed by use of a 'valid' method of discovery. One reason for thinking the method valid, according to some Freudians, is that some patients have improved as a result of analysis, and a necessary condition of that happening is that the patients achieved veridical psychoanalytic insight into the origin of their problems. Is veridical psychoanalytic insight necessary to bring about therapeutic improvement? Farrell cites as counter evidence the success of behavior therapists who do not generally produce such insight.

A related Freudian argument is that psychoanalytic therapy produces 'fruitful change,' and only psychoanalytic theory can account for this fact. Farrell replies by constructing a plausible alternative explanation. He concludes (100) that the reasons for thinking that analysis is a valid method of discovery are too weak to serve as a justification.

Despite its weaknesses, Farrell does find some value in the analytic case material. He claims that it offers considerable support to some low level generalizations of Freudian theory (141), and, along with other psychodynamic theories and related material, seems to be pointing to some further, more generic or fundamental psychological truth about human nature (146).

In Chapter 8, Farrell assesses the experimental evidence and again reaches mainly negative conclusions. Scientific inquiry has failed, so far, to find evidence that bears in any accepted way on a large part of what Farrell calls the 'Low Level Theory'; such inquiry also gives very little support to the 'High Level Theory' (170). However, Farrell does argue for some more encouraging conclusions: a few of the Low Level assumptions have been empirically confirmed (168); the heuristic value of the Low Level theory has been, and still is, enormous (169); and the present state of scientific play suggests that the High Level theory has great promise (170).

In Chapter 9, Farrell assesses the evidence for the effectiveness of psychoanalytic therapy. He is skeptical, but does find some ground to believe that some patients with neurotic difficulties improve as a result of the analysis they receive (187). He does not find any evidence, however, that such patients do better under analysis than they do under some other form of psychotherapy (187); in fact, for certain kinds of specific neurotic difficulties, there is some reason to think that some behavioral treatments are superior (188).

Farrell's final chapter contains solace for both the analyst and the critic. Can the impact of psychoanalysis on the West be justified on the grounds that it contains a body of reasonably secure or established knowledge about human nature? No — analysis does not contain any such body of knowledge (190). However, we would be quite mistaken, Farrell contends, to throw analytic theory as a whole into the wastebasket of human aberration, along with phrenology, mesmerism and other discarded ideas (194). He concludes: 'But for the present, and the foreseeable future, we need analysts and their work if we are to make scientific progress in this field. For this reason alone,

it is fitting that public funds should contribute to maintain the profession and its work' (209).

Most of what Farrell says is quite clear, but there are occasional lapses. One example is his use of a distinction between what he calls 'Low' and 'High' Level Freudian theory. The High Level theory is said to contain assumptions of Freud's 'Metapsychology,' but Farrell disavows the standard criterion for identifying the Metapsychological hypotheses, and offers no criterion of his own (38). Consequently, the reader is left with several examples of the High and Low Level parts of Freudian theory, but sometimes cannot tell exactly which other assumptions are to be included in each category. Another example concerns his treatment of the testability issue. He rejects the criticism that Freudian theory is untestable (37), partly on the grounds that the criticism fails to distinguish High and Low parts of the theory. The Low Level part is testable (42), but the High Level part is said to be vacuous in the same sense that Newton's theory of cohesion is vacuous; the latter was not open to validation and was untestable (44). Farrell asserts (44), however, that no important skeptical conclusion can be drawn from this claim of untestability; both Newton's theory and High Level Freudian theory have had considerable *heuristic* value. A puzzled reader might think: if High Level theory is not knowable a priori and cannot be tested, then one important skeptical conclusion that could be inferred is that we do not know that the High Level theory is true. Farrell does not explain why it would be a mistake to make this inference. He does say later, however, that the generalizations of High Level theory *are* open to empirical support, modification or rejection — despite the fact that High Level theory is empirically empty and is untestable (45). Farrell apparently distinguishes between a theory being testable and being open to empirical support, modification or rejection. He does not explain, however, what distinction he has in mind.

There are also some substantive difficulties in Farrell's account. He tries to be very fair to Freudians, but I think he fails in one important instance. After reviewing the experimental evidence, he reaches conclusions that are much more skeptical than that of certain other reviewers, but he discusses only a small part of the evidence they find confirmatory. He does make clear (149) that his review is not intended to be exhaustive and that he is offering only a 'personal' assessment, but a Freudian might still complain that some of his negative conclusions (167-8) are unwarranted given his failure to discredit many of the positive findings cited by Seymour Fisher and Roger Greenberg (*The Scientific Credibility of Freud's Theories and Therapy* [New York: Basic Books 1977] and P. Kline (*Fact and Fantasy in Freudian Theory* [London: Methuen 1972]).

I think that Farrell is also too easy on Freudianism. Despite his skepticism, he does argue for the following optimistic conclusions: (1) Freudian case material does lend *some* support to analytic theory (140), and lends *considerable* support to some of the generalizations of the Low Level theory (141); (2) There is some ground for believing that some patients with neurotic difficulties improve as a result of the analysis they receive (187); (3) The ex-

perimental evidence does support parts of Freudian theory (167-8); and (4) Psychoanalytic theory is, and will continue to be, of great heuristic value to psychologists (213). I think there are problems with all of Farrell's arguments for these conclusions, but the substantiation for this opinion cannot be provided here.

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FINDLAY, J.N., *Kant and the Transcendental Object. A Hermeneutic Study*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford University Press 1981. Pp. xxiv + 392. Cdn\$33.95: US\$24.95. ISBN 0-19-824638-2.

Le dernier ouvrage de Findlay présente une vue d'ensemble de la pensée kantienne à partir d'une idée bien précise de ce que veut et doit être le kantisme. La démarche de Findlay, tout comme dans ses livres sur *Hegel* (1958) et *Platon* (1974), est bienveillante, audacieuse parce que dogmatique, solitaire (il est très peu question des interprètes contemporains de Kant et le livre ne renferme pas une seule note en bas de page) et d'une rare profondeur philosophique.

L'intuition fondamentale de Kant réside, selon l'auteur, dans la notion d'objet transcendantal. L'objet transcendantal représente pour Kant ce quelque chose = X qui transcende la connaissance, mais qui n'en doit pas moins être *pensé* comme le fondement des phénomènes et de l'expérience. Cette notion recouvre aussi bien la chose en soi ou le noumène que le sujet transcendantal qui façonne l'expérience a priori. Chose en soi, noumène et objet transcendantal veulent donc dire la même chose. On peut néanmoins distinguer une face 'externe,' la chose existant indépendamment de nous, et une face 'interne' de l'objet transcendantal (l'aperception transcendantale, l'imagination productrice, la raison pure, bref: le sujet transcendantal). Sous ses deux visages, la notion d'objet transcendantal remplit la même fonction référentielle. Il s'agit, à chaque fois, d'une *pensée* vide, qui ne pourra jamais devenir une connaissance, mais qui n'en est pas moins indispensable, si l'on veut rendre compte de la connaissance. La connaissance, entendue au sens strict qu'elle a chez Kant, doit être comprise comme le résultat empirique de l'action réciproque de la chose en soi dans le monde extérieur et de la chose en soi qu'est le sujet transcendantal. Certains philosophes ont vu une contradiction dans le fait que Kant, tout en limitant la connaissance au donné

spatio-temporel, présente lui-même une théorie métamé-empirique de l'activité du sujet connaissant qui semble transgresser les 'limites du sens' posées par la *Critique de la raison pure*. Pour Findlay, cette difficulté disparaît dès qu'on reconnaît que la *C.R.P.* n'élève aucune prétention épistémique et qu'elle n'est rien de plus, mais aussi rien de moins qu'un exercice de pensée vide quoique nécessaire. Ce vide de la pensée philosophique n'a rien à voir avec l'absence de sens, le "nonsense" des positivistes, bien au contraire: la plénitude de la pensée de l'objet transcendental fait apparaître la trivialité de ce qui n'est que connaissance.

Selon Findlay, l'idée d'objet transcendental est modelée sur celle de la monade leibnizienne. La chose en soi 'externe' et le sujet transcendental sont conçus comme des substances simples, douées de propriétés intrinsèques particulières qui fondent les relations entre les monades. Minimisant l'influence de Hume, Findlay s'efforcera de montrer que cette conception leibnizienne de monades simples derrière les phénomènes a affecté toutes les couches de la pensée kantienne. Kant ne se distingue de Leibniz qu'en accentuant l'inconnaissabilité du monde nouméen. Or Kant, toujours selon Findlay, ne maintient pas toujours le sain équilibre qui doit prévaloir entre le visage subjectif et le visage objectif de l'objet transcendental, insistant souvent trop sur l'idée d'un sujet transcendental qui 'constitue' l'objet. L'objectivité ne peut naître que du concours de l'activité du sujet *et* de celle des choses en soi. L'imagination ne 'produit' pas l'objet, elle ne fait que traduire, pour nous, dans un idiome spatio-temporel, une régularité qui doit avoir son fondement objectif dans les choses en soi. L'exaltation du sujet dans la Déduction transcendante ne serait donc pas conforme à l'intuition première du kantisme et marquerait à certains égards un recul par rapport au Kant leibnizien de la *Dissertation de 1770*, qui affirmait que l'entendement pouvait avoir un accès privilégié aux choses en soi. L'entreprise de Findlay fait parfois penser à celle d'Eberhard qui avait soutenu que toutes les idées géniales de Kant se trouvaient déjà chez Leibniz, tandis que les thèses vraiment originales de Kant devaient être déclarées intenables. Mais Findlay tente d'éviter cette 'éberhardisation' du kantisme en misant sur le vide quasi-mystique de la pensée transcendante de la chose en soi.

On voit comment l'argument de Findlay se bat sur deux fronts à la fois. Il s'en prend, d'une part, aux interprétations idéalistes et constructivistes de Kant, celles de Fichte et des Néo-kantiens, qui, dans la mouvance des 'exagérations' de la Déduction transcendante, mettent l'accent sur l'aspect producteur de la connaissance. Ce constructivisme du moi absolu ruinerait l'idée même de connaissance. Le livre a été rédigé, souligne Findlay (p. 356), pour détruire la thèse absurde selon laquelle connaître, c'est faire. Findlay avait écrit ailleurs (*Actes du congrès d'ottawa sur Kant* [Ottawa: Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa 1976] 5) que la doctrine qui fait surgir le monde des choses à partir des états du sujet n'était digne que du ministre de la propagande Goebbels... Mais Findlay n'est pas devenu un empiriste logique. Il se bat, d'autre part, contre les kantiens positivistes qui veulent retenir les leçons immanentistes du kantisme, tout en faisant l'économie de la métaphysique

qui le supporte. Il n'y a pas de positivisme sans métaphysique. Cette position médiane entre l'idéalisme constructiviste et le positivisme aurait été celle de Kant.

Les positivistes et les idéalistes sont donc passés à côté de la véritable *métaphysique* de Kant. Ils ont cru que Kant avait une fois pour toutes sonné le glas de la métaphysique et de la théologie traditionnelles. L'auteur opère ici un changement radical de perspective: Kant ne veut pas tant récuser la théologie transcendantale (Findlay écrit 'transcendantale') que démontrer la connaissance empirique pour paver la voie à une véritable théologie fondée sur la pensée de la raison pure (227). L'idéal transcendantal, Dieu conçu à la façon de Leibniz comme la somme de tous les possibles, apparaît ainsi comme une *pensée* (et non une connaissance) essentielle et nécessaire de la métaphysique de Kant. Dieu devient donc lui-même un objet transcendantal, la monade suprême qui assure l'harmonie entre les deux autres objets transcendentaux, les choses en soi et le sujet transcendantal. L'erreur de la preuve ontologique consisterait surtout à ne pas avoir vu que l'existence de Dieu qu'elle cherche à prouver n'a rien de commun avec l'existence contingente du monde phénoménal qui, elle, peut être connue. Dieu n'est vraiment Dieu que si on le maintient dans sa nouménalité inconnaissable. Le problème de cette thèse de Findlay, c'est qu'on ne voit plus très bien ce qui distingue l'analytique de la dialectique. Les idées transcendentales semblent jouir du même statut que les concepts opératoires de l'analytique.

Le mérite des réflexions de Findlay est d'avoir mis en lumière l'arrière-fond nouménal de la métaphysique de Kant et d'avoir brillamment exploité la distinction kantienne entre pensée et connaître pour résoudre certaines apories théoriques de la *C.R.P.*. L'auteur a ainsi fait ressortir le caractère hypothétique et par là même la contemporanéité indépassable de l'œuvre de Kant. Il a cependant indûment passé sous silence plusieurs thèses décisives, sinon l'originalité même du kantisme. Sa redogmatisation de Kant ne peut faire de place véritable à la révolution copernicienne et correspond bien à l'essoufflement de la pensée critique contemporaine. Dans l'interprétation des textes, Findlay a maille à partir avec les nombreux passages de l'*Opus Postumum* de Kant qui soutiennent que la chose en soi est *posée* par le sujet comme le fondement des phénomènes.

De plus, l'objet transcendantal reste un concept ambigu. La chose en soi et le sujet sont d'abord interpellés au même titre comme des objets transcendentaux. Or, dans l'économie de l'objet transcendantal, la chose en soi externe semble l'emporter sur le sujet connaissant (lui-même une chose en soi). L'objet transcendantal externe devient lentement mais sûrement l'autorité qui doit contrôler les abus de l'imagination productrice. Finalement, le monde transcendant des choses en soi a besoin d'un fondement théologique dans une chose en soi suprême. Certes, on ne peut jamais connaître, mais seulement penser ces relations, mais force est de constater que l'objet transcendantal se transforme de plus en plus chez Findlay en objet transcendant. Le vocabulaire de l'auteur est révélateur à cet égard. Findlay confond souvent le transcendantal et le transcendant, deux termes qu'il n'a jamais distingués, se

contentant de souligner l'inconnaissabilité de l'objet transcendental ou transcendant.

Dans un dernier chapitre à caractère historique, Findlay soutient que les Post-kantiens ont eu tort de ne voir que de l'incohérence dans la théorie kantienne de la chose en soi. Ils n'ont pas vu qu'il y a, dans l'esprit de Kant, continuité entre le monde des choses en soi et celui des phénomènes, où l'on peut glaner, dans les manifestations de permanence et de simplicité, des bribes de nouméralité. L'apport positif de la notion d'objet transcendental serait donc de nous indiquer les limites de l'importance et de la portée de la connaissance objective et de nous faire sentir la nécessité de dépasser en pensée le champ trop restreint de la connaissance possible. Comme on pouvait s'y attendre — car Findlay est avant tout un platonicien, peut-être le seul de notre époque — l'auteur dresse une comparaison remarquable entre l'état de la condition humaine peint par Kant et le mythe de la caverne de Platon. Même si, pour Kant, les prisonniers ne peuvent, du moins dans cette vie, s'évader du monde des ombres phénoménales, ils peuvent et doivent par la pensée de l'objet transcendental s'astreindre à une patiente discipline de la caverne, qui n'est pas que malheureuse. C'est à cette pensée que nous convoque toute l'œuvre de Findlay, philosophe de la caverne et de sa transcendance possible.

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ANTONY FLEW, *The Politics of Procrustes: Contradictions of Enforced Equality*. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1981. Pp. 216. US\$16.95. ISBN 0-85117-204-0.

This book is a polemic directed at rejecting the ideals of (enforced) equality of outcome and socialism. It seeks to show how widespread is the acceptance of these ideals and/or assumptions underlying them by political and social philosophers, sociologists, economists, educationalists, and politicians, and to expose the inadequacy of the more serious grounds upon which they are supported today. No attempt is made to explore whether or not there are more weighty considerations upon which a case for such ideals might be based, or whether anything of importance might be salvaged from such present day political thought. This is because the work is essentially a political tract in which false doctrines are exposed as such, with their exponents (often with brief biographical notes where these are thought to make the condemnation more damning) named and documented. The style is robust, even abrasive, and reminiscent of that of Karl Marx in his political tracts, lacking however those tellingly witty, pithy turns of phrase that so adorn Marx's writings. The

list of villains is long and diverse, including as it does both great and very minor contemporary philosophers, political theorists, economists, sociologists, educationalists, politicians — Aristotle, Plato, Marx, Marcuse, Rawls, Williams, Honerich, Nielsen, Tawney, Titmuss, Donnison, Floud, Crosland, Boudon, Illych, Chomsky, Dworkin, Attlee, and very many others — but not Berlin, whose important defence of equality as an ultimate value is noted. The book nonetheless contains much of merit and importance, such that it will be a pity if those against whom it is directed are led by its tone and general character to ignore it.

The important part is the first half relating to equality (Chapters II, III, IV), where much of the valuable work that has been done in recent years by way of sorting out confusions in thinking about equality, which so commonly is ignored by egalitarians, is brought together and added to in a telling discussion. Flew distinguished factual equality from three ideals of equality, equal liberty, the inappropriately named equality of opportunity, open competition for scarce resources, (the vagueness here being left unexamined), and equality of outcome (identified with equality of conditions, result, and seemingly also, of treatment). The latter is claimed to be the dominant ideal and to be incompatible with the former two, it requiring draconian measures to be realized. Much is said about the confusion inherent in taking inequality of outcome as evidence of inequality of opportunity, when this in fact is fully accounted for by the inequality (of talents) of the competitors.

An important objection urged against equality of outcome is that once one accepts such an ideal in respect of some one thing, there is no logical limit to the demand for equality of outcome in respect of other things, wealth, power, status, respect, health, beauty, sexual satisfactions, even misery. Hence serious argument is needed in support of this ideal, the more so as it so obviously clashes with other ideals, not least that of equal liberty. Flew sees the favoured argument to lie in the contention that justice dictates equality of outcome of some kind. (My assessment is that most egalitarians of outcome base their view on a confused belief that much greater equality of outcome would result from genuine, open, unimpaired, unimpeded equality of competition.) Flew adduces many independent arguments against this contention, and, it is in part, because Rawls is seen to be the major exponent of equality of outcome, albeit, a qualified one, in part, because of his collectivism and statism, that Rawls is accorded the attention he is.

Flew's major contention, supported by historical and conceptual argument, is that justice is backward-looking to deserts and entitlements, whilst equality of outcome is forward-looking and such as to be realizable only at the cost of disregarding deserts and entitlements. Flew would seem to be right about justice here, and also in his tantalizingly brief discussions of the differences between justice and fairness, which make it impossible to argue from what holds of fairness to what is true of justice. Deserts do not dictate equality of outcome. For entitlements to do so, they would have to rest in equalities in their possessors, equalities which in fact do not occur. The latter claim is not probed at depth. As against Rawls' contention that the worst off

members of the community *who are in fact very well off* have a right in justice against the rest of the community, Flew's contention is clearly sound. On the other hand, whilst Flew makes many valuable critical points in discussing Williams' celebrated article, he fails to meet Williams' important, although more modest, claim, that much by way of equality of outcome can be founded in justice on the actual equalities between persons.

Flew makes no attempt to consider whether other grounds can be adduced for greater equality of outcome. Yet, whilst Rawls may have no case in justice for his favoured social order, he may be able to defend his ideal state by reference to other values. Equally, many who, like myself, are concerned at the present gross inequalities of outcome, especially in education, favour measures directed at securing greater equality of outcome, not because they see that as an ultimate value, but because they see the present inequalities as resulting from injustices due to lack of equality either of real choice or of real opportunity for free, fair, genuine competition for resources. They see that those who are starved, rendered unhealthy, maimed in body or mind, drugged, interfered with before and during the contest, and/or who are denied facilities necessary for effective choice do not enjoy genuine equality of choice or equality of opportunity, equalities dictated by justice. Flew is right that justice does not dictate equality of outcome. However justice does dictate different, and many lesser, inequalities of outcome than now occur. Hence we cannot be as complacent about the status quo as Flew would encourage us to be.

The unevenness of the argumentation is well illustrated by the passage, 'though a Nobel Laureate recently recorded that, after ten years of trying "to discover the meaning of what is called 'social justice,'" he had concluded that, "with reference to a society of free men, the phrase has no meaning whatsoever.'" Thus it is that Flew follows Hayek in dismissing not simply the rich literature of British and American liberalism, but also the seminal writings of the Thomists and of those influenced by them, the Popes Leo XIII, Pius XI, John XXIII, who developed their impressive accounts of social justice by reference to man's possession of natural rights.

The second half of the book, which, being directed against socialism, might reasonably have been expected to be more telling, is, in the event, shallow and unimpressive. Chapter V distinguishes wants and needs, it being noted that needs, like interests, open the way to claims by experts to impose their wills on those about whose needs they are expert. The concept of need is not explored, nor is any attempt made to see what role needs ought to play in social theory. That need statements are commonly somewhat indeterminate in meaning and incomplete and such as to refer to what is necessary for some good or goal which must be specified to complete the statement, that an observer may be better placed than the possessor of the need to determine what are that person's needs, provide no grounds for rejecting needs theory as unnecessary, unimportant, or dangerous. Whilst it is true that, unless we define needs in terms of rights, there will be no right to the satisfaction of all our needs, needs are relevant to social and political theory, and

bear on the issue of the rights we possess. That members of species commonly share the same needs is not unimportant to the question of equality and justice. Given the amount of uncritical writing about false needs in recent years, the time is ripe for a serious inquiry into the concept of needs, the needs persons possess, and what morally and politically follows from these conclusions. Flew does nothing to advance thinking in this area.

Chapter VI concerning competition and the profit motive largely goes over familiar ground in an unconvincing general discussion. It is noted that state monopolies are no less monopolies, that action in one's interest need not be selfish, and that it is the basis of most political theorizing and planning, that trade is not a form of exploitation, and the like. The argument against the alleged antithesis between competition and cooperation in terms of much competition depending on cooperation within groups or in the background context, and the fact that competition directed by the competitors at their self-interest may be beneficial to others, in no way shows that the *contrast* is wrongly drawn, only that antithesis is not an exact characterisation of the distinction. To suggest from the beneficial effects of *some* competition in trade, that competitive trade is a form of cooperation, is to commit the kind of error against which Flew warns us, that of inferring motives and intentions from unintended consequences. A discussion of when trade is and is not exploitative, when competition is and is not socially desirable, and the like, would have been of value here. It would be interesting to see how Flew handled competition between drug-producers and traders for the consumer's dollar, without resort to the needs-wants distinction and to the use of coercion on the basis thereof. Or would he, like some libertarians, favour unrestricted competition for profit and exploitation of addicts and potential addicts by traders in heroin and cocaine, seeing such competition as resting on cooperation and being a kind of cooperation?

Chapter VII, with its discussion of intended actions and unintended consequences, the planners' fallacy and its converse, covers familiar ground. Flew in no way provides a justification for his swiftly drawn conclusion that planning must always be tentative and piecemeal, never 'wholesale, utopian, revolutionary.' Quite apart from the drastic, rapid, planned social and political changes needed consequent on rapid scientific and technological advances, radical, revolutionary changes are needed to secure values such as freedom and justice. Or does Flew really mean what he implies, that the Spanish people were wrong in opting for democracy on the death of Franco, that only piecemeal, non-revolutionary reform is justifiable in the U.S.S.R., China, Argentina, Bolivia, South Africa? As for utopian reforms, apart from some lingering Platonists who seem harmless enough, the dangerous utopian reformers today are Flew himself, his libertarian friends and libertarian fellow-travellers, who seek to destroy not simply the welfare state, but also the business-fostering state. They would do well to consider the implications of Chapter VII.

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MICHAEL FOX, ed., *Schopenhauer: His Philosophical Achievement*. New York: Barnes & Noble 1981. Pp. xvii + 276. US\$28.50. ISBN 0-389-20097-2.

This is a fine collection of essays, which is relatively free of the usual repetitions and conflicting interpretations generally marring anthologies of this nature. The presentations are varied in perspective, consisting of systematic, historical, and comparative approaches. Of the seventeen essays, all have been reprinted as chapters from books or journal articles with the exception of two, which were specifically written for this volume. The aim of the collection is to encourage the study of Schopenhauer by demonstrating the seminal value of his writings within the context of both nineteenth century and contemporary thought. The comprehensive and yet sophisticated competence of the articles is such that the book is well suited for beginner and specialist alike. In short, the work is admirably designed to arouse a genuine interest in this much neglected thinker. Restrictions of space permit discussion of only some of the essays.

Max Horkheimer's erudite and witty essay underlines Schopenhauer's present relevance by stressing his prophetic political insights against the modern state and concludes, despite Schopenhauer's vaunted pessimism, that his philosophic thought is not only singularly matched to grasp reality but alone offers hope in the future to the young.

Patrick Gardiner explores Schopenhauer's fascination with the never-ending question of the metaphysical clock's pendulum: why is there something rather than nothing? Schopenhauer dismisses the traditional religious and philosophical solutions as transcendent and proposes instead that the meaning of the world must 'prove itself from itself' by appealing to the 'totality of all experience' as grounded in an all-pervasive will which is apprehended immediately by self-consciousness. Accordingly, Schopenhauer transforms Kant's immanent metaphysics of phenomenal appearance into an inquiry concerning the internal meaning of reality. In this connection, Hegel's metaphysics is condemned as other-worldly because of his dependence on such vacuous and mystifying expressions as 'the Absolute.'

Maurice Mandelbaum contends that although Schopenhauer regarded all phenomenal objects as distorted expressions of an underlying reality, the will, nevertheless he believed it was legitimate to consider some empirical data as being, in principle, metaphysically relevant on the assumption that certain aspects of the phenomenal world manifest the will more clearly and explicitly than others. In this fashion, Schopenhauer conceived of the science of physiology as providing noumenal insights into the phenomenal categories of space, time, and causality, which in turn are a result of *brain* functions. Thus, it is the brain which creates the phenomenal world and mediates between the will and appearance; the world of representations is a cerebral product. And the brain, like the will, exhibits an 'inner activity.'

Richard Taylor's delightful and entertaining essay investigates Schopenhauer's ethical principles, concluding that along with man's basic egoism there are two other irreducible but antithetical human impulses,

namely, 'malice, or disinterested nastiness, and compassion, or disinterested sweetness.' Malice is an original impulse to hurt others without any compensation to oneself; and compassion is the opposite impulse, to help others, again without any advantage to oneself. These two impulses are possessed by no other living beings. It is in these impulses, and not in any rational concept of duty or law, that the human distinction between morality and immorality is to be found.

Israel Knox discusses Schopenhauer's definition of beauty as the quality of the world when contemplated, apart from all willing, for its own sake. Through aesthetic contemplation man becomes oblivious of his own selfhood and the distinctions between the subject, the object, and the process of perception are obliterated. Thus, art releases us from the bondage of life. For Knox, there is much to disagree with in Schopenhauer's theories. Accordingly, he challenges the great pessimist's contention that art is antagonistic and superior to science; that the man of artistic genius is akin to the madman; and that art is transcendent to life. In addition, there are interesting analyses of Schopenhauer's hierarchy of the arts; his anticipation of the empathy theory; and his definition of tragedy. Unlike Hegel, who defined tragedy as the conflict between two rights (e.g., *Antigone*), Schopenhauer regarded tragedy as the omnipresent conflict of the will with itself.

Illuminating comparisons of Schopenhauer to Heidegger and Wittgenstein magnify interest in Michael Fox's essay on death, suicide, and self-renunciation. Death, according to Fox, is the phenomenon which ultimately most preoccupied Schopenhauer; it is the hub of the wheel from which all of his various doctrines radiate like spokes. Because of his fear of death, man has elaborately devised a variety of evasive activities, such as religious and philosophic system-building. And man is the only animal who is self-consciously aware of his imminent destruction. For Schopenhauer, the fear of death is overcome when one realizes that the individual is mere appearance and only the species is eternal. 'We' survive not as persons or souls but in returning to an originary fund of will. Thus, Schopenhauer's doctrine of palingenesis advocates a return to a primal volitional 'stuff' by way of participation in the 'great chain of being' and Platonic essences. Reminiscent of Freud, Schopenhauer contends that the loss of the body in death is analogous to the excretions of the body in life and just as natural. Further, the irreality of time has deluded us into believing that our temporal existence is unique and important. In short, Schopenhauer concludes that death is not to be feared, that suicide is a positive affirmation of the will, and that personal identity is a conceit. And, finally, it follows that man's highest ethical goal lies in the denial of the will in himself through self-renunciation.

Arthur Hubscher's compelling essay is far too complex and rich to be handily reduced to a convenient synopsis, so I will only touch on some of the fascinating topics he treats. Schopenhauer's and Hegel's radically opposed views on history and idealism are expounded and contrasted. Thus, whereas for Hegel, history is everything, for Schopenhauer, it is a mere 'series of senseless catfights'; whereas for Hegel, the system begins (and ends) with con-

sconsciousness, for Schopenhauer, it starts 'from the body.' Hubscher also presents Schopenhauer as a 'philosopher of life' who anticipates vitalism and went on to determine the existentialism of Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger. In this respect, a positive influence can be traced from existentialism back to Schopenhauer while Hegel's effect on existentialism is rather a negative one, existentialism serving as a reaction to Hegelianism. By the same token, even politically, the roots of Nazism and Stalinism find a sympathetic albeit distant echo in Hegel whereas, by contrast, Schopenhauer is completely free of such totalitarian implications. As Hubscher pertinently declares, Schopenhauer is in fundamental agreement with the thesis that 'every Utopia, to which one aspires on an unconditional, radical basis, has the tendency to end in tyranny' (210). Consequently, today, more than ever, the voice of Schopenhauer speaks to us and

wishes to tell us that we must regain our existence, our people and our world in the same way we gained our intellectual world, not starting with the top but with the bottom, not with the idea but with the reality, not with society ... but simply and quietly with the self. ... It is not the destiny of peoples, which exists only as a phenomenon, but the destiny of the individual that is morally decisive. The (Hegelian) idea of peoples is a mere abstraction; only individuals can be said to really exist. (213)

Borrowing G.E.M. Anscombe's interpretation, S. Morris Engel supports her claim that Wittgenstein was directly indebted to Schopenhauer's theory concerning the world as idea as well as to his notions of logic — as a dialectic of illusions — and language. In fact, Schopenhauer, like Wittgenstein, considered language as inherently deceptive by virtue of its vagueness and blurred boundaries. In turn, these aspects of words have resulted in bad arguments and bad philosophy.

Other essays are by Frederick Copleston, R.K. Gupta, D.W. Hamlyn, Thomas Mann, Luis Navia and Wayne Sheek. I would strongly recommend this volume to anyone who is involved with nineteenth-century thought or with the influence of the philosophical past on the present.

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EIKE-HENNE W. KLUGE, *The Ethics of Deliberate Death*. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press 1981. Pp. 154. US\$17.50. ISBN 0-8046-9260-2.

The largest portion of this book is devoted to the criticism of various religious, utilitarian and rights-based arguments for or against euthanasia

(mercy-killing). These arguments pertain to a wide range of cases, from the severely ill or defective neonate to the permanently comatose or terminally ill adult patient. Kluge defines euthanasia as 'the act or practice of deliberately putting to death persons suffering from incurable and distressing disease' (11). This definition is intended to include both voluntary and nonvoluntary, and both active and passive euthanasia. The active/passive distinction is held to be without general moral significance, since to allow death to occur through inaction is — he thinks — to affect the course of events just as surely as by bringing it about through a positive action.

Kluge argues that most of the common arguments about euthanasia are severely flawed. Religious arguments fail because of the unverifiable nature of much religious doctrine. Utilitarian arguments fail because they wrongly presuppose that the rights and interests of society morally outweigh those of the individual, even when the latter's life is at stake. And many rights-based arguments are also invalid, e.g. because they hold that the right to life can never be overridden or voluntarily waived.

In the final chapter, Kluge sketches a partial theory of when euthanasia is morally justified, and why. The key to the problem, he maintains, is a proper understanding of the concept of a person and its moral implications. A person is a being which is characterized by 'self-awareness, rationality, symbolic awareness of reality and the capability of language, awareness of itself as a free causal agent, and volition' (126). To be so characterized, he argues, a being need not be capable of exhibiting self-awareness, etc., at a given time; all that is required is the 'constitutive potential' for these mental capabilities. This, in turn, requires (only) the possession of a human brain (or, in the case of nonhuman persons, some suitable analogue thereto) which is reasonably normal in its structure and function.

Persons, it is argued, are the only beings which can have moral rights. This is because rights are claims validated by social commitments, and such claims and commitments can only be made by or to beings which are, in C.H. Whiteley's words, 'capable of understanding the commitment, of relying on it, and of demanding its fulfillment' (118); and only persons have these capacities. From this it follows that, other things being equal, euthanasia is morally permissible whenever the patient is not yet a person, or no longer a person. First trimester fetuses, anencephalic neonates, and permanently comatose individuals are not persons, and may be euthanatized.

A second class of cases in which euthanasia is permissible is that in which a mentally competent adult, knowing the relevant facts, voluntarily requests to die. The right to voluntary euthanasia follows from the rights to life (which, like all rights, may be waived), self-determination, and freedom from torture. Nonvoluntary euthanasia is permissible in just two kinds of cases: (1) cases in which the patient is not, and will probably never be competent to decide her or his own fate, and where death is clearly in the patient's own best interests; and (2) triage situations, in which more lives will be saved if only some patients, e.g. those with the best chance of survival, are treated. In all other cases, euthanasia is wrong, and a form of murder.

Like most contractualist accounts of the basis of moral rights, this theory has certain counterintuitive consequences. It denies rights not only to all nonhuman animals which are not persons, and sentient human beings whose brains are not normal enough to permit the emergence of self-awareness, etc., but also to persons who have not actually been granted rights through membership in some society, e.g., lifelong hermits. Moreover, it accords to second and third trimester fetuses and neonates not only a full and equal right to life, but one which is somewhat stronger than that of adults. For Kluge unconditionally condemns second or third trimester abortion and infanticide in all cases in which the fetus or neonate has a reasonably normal brain (whatever its other abnormalities) and would not predictably lead a life of utter misery. This would seem to rule out second or third trimester abortions which are necessary to preserve the woman's life or health. Kluge appears to accept this implication, for he holds that the rights of (reasonably normal-brained) fetuses, infants, and children take precedence over those of their parents in cases of conflict; by allowing the pregnancy to progress beyond the first trimester, the woman has committed herself to providing for the fetus, however great the expense to herself or others.

The theory would also forbid the euthanatizing of second or third trimester fetuses, or neonates, which are severely ill, deformed, or defective, but not in a way which makes it possible to predict that their lives would be worse — for them — than death. (Downs Syndrome fetuses or neonates, surgically inseparable Siamese twins, limbless thalidomide victims, and moderately severe spina bifida cases might fall into this category.) No account is to be taken of the often severe costs to the family and to society of raising such children, for the fetus's or neonate's right to life supposedly outweighs any amount of 'inconvenience' to other persons.

These implications may be acceptable to those who agree that fetuses and neonates which have reasonably normal brains are persons. But Kluge's argument for this claim is questionable. It is probably true that all post-neonatal human beings whose brains are structurally and functionally normal are rightly considered persons; but it does not follow that the same is true of neonates and fetuses. For the latter differ from older human beings, including infants past the neonatal stage, in that they lack what might be called a psychological history, a history of learning, acting, and interacting with other persons; and it may be argued that it is only through such a history that personhood can emerge. Once a human being becomes a person, s/he retains that status for as long as her/his brain retains enough structural and functional integrity to permit the continuation or resumption of conscious life. But perhaps it is not the existence of a reasonably normal brain per se which justifies this generally shared conviction, but rather the fact that that brain still supports at least some of the memories, beliefs, desires, and other mental dispositions which characterize the particular person whose brain it is. If so, then the fetus' 'constitutive potential' for self-awareness, etc., is not a proof of personhood, but only of potential personhood.

It is unfortunate that Kluge confines the presentation of his own theory to

a single chapter, which is far too brief to permit an adequate exploration of the key issues. Objections such as those above are not even considered, let alone adequately answered. The chapters in which alternative views are criticized are somewhat repetitious and could well have been condensed to allow for a more extensive exposition of the author's positive suggestions. Had this been done, the book might have contributed more to the debate about personhood than just another interesting but poorly defended definition.

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ROBERT C. NEVILLE. *Reconstruction of Thinking*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 1981. Pp. 368. US\$23.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-494-7); US\$10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-495-5).

This is a very ambitious undertaking. It is no less than a full-scale reconstruction of our theory of experience, with primary attention to its distinctively human features. Traditional theories ground thinking in reason; Neville opts for its grounding in valuation. Using Plato's divided line in his own way, Neville analyzes this 'Axiology of Thinking' into four dimensions: imagination, interpretation, theory, and responsibility. This volume considers foundational issues, and traces imagination through its four stages: synthesis (religion), perception (beauty), appearance (form), and engagement (art). A later volume, or volumes, will complete the study of the other three dimensions.

Reconstruction of Thinking marks a fresh start in Neville's published philosophical endeavour. His first book, *God the Creator* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1968), argued that *any* plurality, be it the world or any set of principles describing that world (a cosmology), needs grounding in something more ultimate. This God provides. In himself God is absolutely indeterminate and unknowable, but in creating the world and its structure God also partly determines himself as its creator.

In its further ramifications this theory requires that God creates everything, including the spontaneity whereby I freely act. Because this appears to be problematic Neville undertook to explore the personal and social dimensions of freedom in *The Cosmology of Freedom* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1974), and its religious dimensions in *Soldier, Sage, Saint*

(Bronx, NY: Fordham University Press 1978). The thesis that God creates my free act, which is nevertheless truly my act, is most fully defended in chapter 5 of the second book.

The ontological theory of *God the Creator*, that God is free to create any metaphysical structure of the world he chooses, is compatible with any cosmology, provided the proper adjustments are made with respect to God. In that initial book many philosophers are mentioned, Paul Weiss most prominently. In *The Cosmology of Freedom* Neville chose to work primarily with Weiss and Whitehead on personal freedom, and with Dewey on social freedom. Since he has appropriated so much of Whitehead's cosmology, while firmly rejecting Whitehead's concept of God in favor of his own, Neville occupies an exceptionally good vantage-point from which to criticize the enterprise of process theism developed by Whitehead's followers such as Charles Hartshorne, Schubert Ogden, John Cobb, and myself. This is the burden of *Creativity and God* (New York: Seabury 1980), which could have been a very powerful critique, had Neville devoted primary attention to it by shaping it into a single, sustained argument. As it is, it is largely a reprinting of earlier essays and reviews. In my own case these were extensively revised, but in Cobb's case the critique has been rendered largely obsolete by the dramatic shift in Cobb's approach to Buddhism, a shift already heralded in his *Christ in a Pluralistic Age* (New York: Westminster 1975).

The concentration on the themes of God and freedom seems to have run its natural course, and now Neville is embarked on a new venture, analyzing the structure of thinking. Nevertheless there is a strong continuity from past concerns in that there is an ever-deepening naturalistic appropriation of Whitehead's metaphysics. This is not initially apparent, for the work is structured as an independent constructive effort, while the historical background is limited to some very illuminating reflections about Plato and Aristotle. It comes out primarily in the cosmological parts of the analysis of imagination (154-9, 193-210, 246-53), forming the backbone of this analysis.

Neville's use of Whitehead's theory is not slavish, however. For instance, he rejects subjective aim and transcendent eternal objects. The systematic rejection of these apparently essential features from one so close to Whitehead bears close examination. Subjective spontaneity plays a larger role in this axiology of thinking. Thus 'appearance as fantasy is the origin of form itself' (137). Many readers of *God the Creator* felt that a tightly coherent set of first principles was self-explanatory, and were perplexed by Neville's demand that such a set be grounded in some transcendent unity. These same readers may now feel that spontaneity is just a catch-word for those features of novelty most needing explanation, and be perplexed by Neville's claim that this is all self-explanatory. Apparently all of us have differing intuitions as to what is self-explanatory.

In accordance with the centrality Neville gives valuation, he uses this stipulative definition of 'rationality': 'that characteristic of thinking in which it is defined by norms for excellence in thinking' (85). Thinking is analyzed in terms of feeling, spontaneity, and judgment. The norms for feeling are em-

bodiment, energy, sensitivity, and purity; those for spontaneity are novelty, relevance, and presence; while those for judgment are beauty, truth, unity, and goodness (see the diagram on p. 124, summing up the discussion of pp. 105-23). If his thesis about thinking is correct, that it needs to be grounded in valuation, 'then the aspect of thinking that must be reconstructed is the judgment aspect' (124), in terms of the four features to which these norms correspond: imagination, interpretation, theory, and responsibility.

His discussion of imagination is particularly interesting. 'Creatures without imagination may respond to especially forceful stimuli by suppressing responses to other stimuli. Without imagination, however, they cannot respond to both forceful and weak stimuli as coordinated in a common field. ... It is imagination that makes it possible to respond to a subjective world with both spatial and temporal dimensions' (135).

In this view religion arises as imaginative world-making. The question whether any religious apprehension is the apprehension of the ontological foundation of reality, however, is a matter of interpretation, not imaginative synthesis. 'Determination of the ontological significance of imaginative synthesis requires moving beyond the imaginative dimension of religion into philosophy proper' (173).

These few comments simply scratch the surface of a rich and variegated work, which does not restrict itself to the usual Western thinkers. The Neo-Confucian Wang Yang-Ming (1472-1529), for instance, plays an important role. If I have stressed the relation between Whitehead and Neville, it is because Whitehead is my area of special interest and expertise. While Neville's appropriation of Whitehead may form the abstract structure of this work, it by no means obtrudes, and there is a richness of content which has been independently developed. This is a massive undertaking, which I do not feel I have sufficiently mastered to render a proper judgment. But what I understand I find most worthwhile.

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JAMES PHELAN, *Worlds from Words; A Theory of Language in Fiction*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981. Pp. xi + 259. US\$20.00. ISBN 0-226-6690-5.

What is the role of the artist's medium — his language, and in particular his style — in the art of fiction? How is it that 'badly written' novels such as *Sister Carrie* can be successful? In answering these questions Phelan, who teaches

English at Ohio State, proposes a theory of style in fiction. According to this theory language used in writing fiction has two sorts of function (actually not clearly distinguished by Phelan). There is the general function of enabling authors simply through writing their novels to create fictional worlds, 'worlds *from* words, worlds that contain the elements of character and action, which are essentially nonlinguistic and which are more central to our experience of those worlds than the words which create them' (116-17, author's emphasis). The point of talking about 'essentially nonlinguistic worlds' is that to understand a novel is to understand its 'characters, actions, emotions, and thoughts' (149) and the complex and subtle relations between them. Yet these things are in some sense objective, independent of the words used in setting them out. Apart from this general purpose an author uses language in various ways to build out his fictional situations: Henry James' complicated syntax may delicately convey something about the moral realizations of the protagonist of *The Ambassadors*, Jane Austen's subtle employments of emphasis and nuance, or careful timing of events, allow her to bring about a convincing rediscovery of deep affection in *Persuasion*. On the other hand the fact that Dreiser in *Sister Carrie* is sloppy with syntax or ungrammatical or vague is not much of a defect because he can still tell a story well. Style turns out to be less important than the world of character, feeling, circumstance, and action. Still an author must use language in various ways in creating these elements and realizing his intentions about them, and pointing all this out is just what good criticism can add to our appreciation of a novel.

Phelan is not a philosopher and is not troubled by possible implications of his views (what is the ontological status of those worlds?, e.g.). His is an essay fully within the area of literary criticism — his opponents are themselves critics, ones whose names are not familiar to philosophers (at least not to this one). What then is the interest of this book to philosophers? Well, first, it is a sensible, clear-headed, and methodologically careful presentation which really does try to do justice to competing accounts. So one can learn something about criticism and the views of language, particularly as it pertains to fiction, which theorists in the area hold. Among the views considered is a 'deconstructionist' account whose ultimate inspiration is Derrida. This outlook has had some influence on philosophy in this continent recently and it is interesting to see how it fares in other fields. Phelan's arguments are characteristically balanced and on the mark: to be able to find different meanings in a word does not imply indeterminacy of meaning, because 'our knowledge of speaker, audience, occasion, and intention stands as a bulwark between us and the abyss of indeterminate meaning' (134). In fact this would not do badly as a philosophical reply to deconstructionist claims.

There are issues of wider interest as well. Philosophers sometimes write as if theories of what words or sentences mean, or of meaning in general, are interesting only because they bear on traditional conceptual problems. Yet these theories have applications, notably in literary criticism, and this fact has important implications. Suppose it turns out that a particular set of considerations concerning language is crucial for the critic. For Phelan, among these

are the way facts about a character are independent of the words used to present them, the agreement by a linguistic community on usage, the various means language provides whereby an author can carry out his intentions vis-à-vis his readers. A theory of language or meaning which had no place, or only a very small place, for such matters would be useless to a critic. And insofar as literary criticism is a genuine branch of knowledge — which it surely is — its requirements have weight in evaluating theories of language which apply there. As suggested the sort of theory which Phelan's views tend to support is one which emphasizes 'agreement about the linguistic system made by the linguistic community' (135) and where meaning is explicated in terms of speakers, audience, context, and intention. Among philosophers such an emphasis is associated with Searle and Grice nowadays with Wittgenstein and Austin in the background. Indeed it is difficult to see how the major and perhaps generally favored alternative, a truth-conditions theory stemming from the work of philosophers such as Frege, Tarski, and Davidson, can readily accommodate the elements prominent in Phelan's proposal. The features of authors' sentences interesting to literary criticism have practically nothing to do with the truth-values of such sentences — even calling them true or false looks problematic; discussions in this tradition of semantic issues pertaining to fiction (e.g. attempts to provide a set of logical axioms dealing with sentences containing 'non-denoting singular terms') appear to be simply irrelevant to Phelan's concerns. One might regard these disparities as pointing to temporary gaps in the theory rather than as constituting major objections; still it is up to the truth-conditions advocate to account for the features of language on which the literary critic focuses. Perhaps it is not altogether unreasonable to wonder if this can be done, at least within the presently-accepted constraints on such theories.

Phelan's last three chapters raise the issue of the propriety of advocating a single theory of criticism vs. simultaneously employing different approaches — 'monism' vs. 'pluralism,' to use current terminology. He walks a fine line here, being monist in finding his theory of language superior to its competitors but pluralist in deciding that his view cannot apply to quite all works passing as novels. Here possibly a timely distinction or two ('standard' as opposed to 'experimental' fiction where these can be cashed out in terms of author's purposes) might have allowed for a more unified position. But this proposal runs up against another issue, whether the notion of literature is an 'essentially contested concept' (W. B. Gallie) reasonably defined in different ways. Matters here are quite interesting but equally complex, suggesting that the monism/pluralism issue is not going to be easily settled, either in literary criticism or in metaphysics.

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JOSEPH H. PLECK, *The Myth of Masculinity*. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press 1981. Pp. ix + 229. US\$17.50. ISBN 0-262-16081-1.

The Myth of Masculinity is a critique of one theory of the origin and social consequences of male and female sex-role behavior (80% discusses this Male Sex Role Identity, or MSRI, theory) and the proposal of a different one (20%; the Sex Role Strain, or SRS, theory). There is distressingly little 'deep' theory and too much operationalist, quantified psychological research in *MM* for it to be of interest to philosophers. For example, having rejected, as being too complex, psychodynamic explanations for men's traditional negative attitudes toward women, Pleck says 'the simplest explanation is that men hold these attitudes because to do so is in their self-interest...' (112). This will hardly do. Presumably, it is not in the interest of women to hold the traditional attitudes toward women. Yet they do, as Pleck admits. Are we to conclude that Pleck believes only men are motivated by self-interest? If not, then to defend the motivating importance of self-interest Pleck needs a distinction between apparent and real interests (a kind of distinction foreign to *MM*). Then he could claim that women hold the traditional attitudes because they are deceived about what is in their real interest, but he would also be committed to the unsavory idea that men are better able than women to perceive what is in their interest. One solution is to deny that holding the traditional attitudes is really in the interest of men, in the long run. But then Pleck loses his simple explanation.

Pleck's rational reconstruction of MSRI, a set of eleven core propositions, shows that he does not understand the differences among theoretical statements, bridge principles, and testable consequences. Not one scientist holds all eleven propositions, so Pleck should argue that his reconstruction is historically and logically coherent. But at crucial places there are gaps, especially regarding the second part of MSRI Proposition 5. Pleck quotes no passages at all to justify his inclusion of this claim, and one notes clearly the absence of argument at the places where one expects them to be given (22, 79-80, 93, 134). Pleck expresses amazement that not one author in the MSRI tradition has bothered to set out the eleven propositions, and he finds it ironic that a critic (Pleck) has to do the job (15). Yet he never considers the possibility that no one has done it because there was nothing to be done.

The one philosopher of science continually appealed to by Pleck is Kuhn, but his understanding of Kuhn is deficient. (Apparently, Pleck has read nothing beyond *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.) For example, Pleck has no sense of the Kuhnian distinction between the puzzles of normal science and the anomalies which help cause paradigm replacement. In his eagerness to deal the death blow to MSRI, Pleck turns every little puzzle into a major anomaly, and so deprives the practitioners of MSRI of the fun of carrying out their normal-scientific puzzle solving.

Pleck appeals to Kuhn because he believes that the move from the older, inadequate MSRI to the superior SRS is an example of one paradigm being replaced by another, and that his proposing SRS is thereby an act of revolutionary

science. But Pleck in his innocence confuses 'theory' and 'paradigm' (see p. 133). He does not tell us which of his 'reinterpretations' involve the Gestalt change in 'seeing' which is characteristic of a Kuhnian revolution; he fails to tell us about MSRI's exemplar, a recognized achievement by which MSRI was seen to have *some* merit early in its history; and Pleck does not demonstrate that MSRI and SRS differ in the fundamentals. But he couldn't, because they don't.

That Pleck continues to speak about masculinity at all is the best sign that he has not broken any revolutionary ground. The title of the book, 'The *Myth* of Masculinity,' suggests that Pleck is about to overturn the whole conceptual apparatus of masculinity research, that he is going to claim that there is no such thing as masculinity. But what he actually argues is that there are many beliefs people have, there are many *myths* about masculinity, which are false; it is his task to explode these myths and to replace false beliefs about masculinity with true ones. Terman and Miles (the authors of *Sex and Personality* [1936], which Pleck says is the 'founding work' of the MSRI school [159]) had written: 'The purpose of the investigations here reported has been the accomplishment in the field of masculinity-femininity of something similar to Binet's early achievement in the field of intelligence — a quantification of procedures and of concepts' (vi). A truly revolutionary move, like the recent attacks on the very idea of intelligence and the measurement of intelligence, would have been an attack on the very idea of masculinity and a repudiation of the narrow quantification approach, both of which are the fundamentals of MSRI and of Pleck's SRS. The revolution is a rehash disguised by a dash of adulterated Kuhn.

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GILLIAN ROSE, *Hegel Contra Sociology*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1981. Pp. 261. US\$27.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-391-02289-X); US\$16.50 (paper: ISBN 0-391-02288-1).

Since its inception with Weber and Durkheim, sociological theory has rested, in spite of its internal divergences, on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by neo-Kantianism. It is to neo-Kantianism that sociology owes two interrelated philosophical assumptions — the separation of method from theory and the separation of fact from value. Weber and Durkheim agree that sociology can be developed as a positive science, viz. as a discipline

which, in opposition to theory, is constituted according to a neutral purely descriptive methodology. Again, these authors treat the question of validity as an autonomous question, to be considered independently from questions of fact. Rose's book points to a fundamental weakness in Weber's action theory and Durkheim's structural sociology — both suppress references to actuality understood as human transformative activity and the legal structure (property, contract, administration of justice) that is imposed on that basis. Subsequent challenges to sociological theory arising from phenomenology and Frankfurt neo-Marxism are interpreted by her as aborted efforts at avoiding the strictures of neo-Kantianism. The case of the Frankfurt School appears to her as singularly important for it has formulated its critique of neo-Kantian formalism and methodologism in terms borrowed from Hegel. Still, despite the validity of its programmatic declarations, as found in the work of Habermas, for example, the Frankfurt School has not actually completed the transition from Kant to Hegel. Rose's verdict is that it has simply ended up meeting non-Marxist sociology 'at the Fichtean station between Kant and Hegel' (36). And beyond neo-Marxism, Marx himself stands accused of a form of Fichteanism for having overlooked some of Hegel's key speculative tenets. This is what explains why Marx ultimately 'failed to develop any notion of subjectivity' (216) and why one sees missing from his work 'any concept of culture, of formation, of reformation (*Bildung*)' (218). According to Rose, what no one seems to have taken into account is that Hegel's absolute, as infinite subjective substantiality, is not an optional extra. She thus offers her book both as a critique of Marxism and as yielding a project of critical Marxism (220). Rose believes this aim can be attained not by any a-historical return to Hegel, but by concretely rereading his philosophy as a thinking of the absolute, clearing the obstacles that presently stand in the way. And the main obstacle is still Kant whose thought seems more alive today than ever. A trinity of ideas will help Rose in her intended revitalization of Hegel's absolute: the idea of absolute ethical life (which takes care of Kant's formalistic *Moralität*), the idea of phenomenology (which takes care of Kant's methodologism), and the idea of logic (which eliminates the Kantian separation of theoretical and practical reason).

I have no difficulty in accepting Rose's reading of the idea of phenomenology and the idea of logic in Hegel. However, her interpretation of Hegel's notion of ethical life I find mistaken. For, on the one hand, she admits that there can be no reference to absolute ethical life when social relationships are defined in terms of bourgeois private property. With this I cannot but agree. Exclusive private property rights, when allowed no restrictions, lead to the isolation of purely possessive individuals, to lack of identity and social integration. On the other hand, she states that Hegel's absolute eliminates the Kantian dichotomies between intuition and concept, theoretical and practical reason, thus allowing access to actuality as the social determination of our actions. Hegel's absolute constitutes his basis for defining an alternative system of property. Rose has to admit, though, that 'this alternative is never definitely explicated' (80). Now, an alternative system of

property is never explicated because Hegel simply does not envisage one. And he does not need to do so for at least in his *Philosophy of Right* of 1820 he appears to be fully committed to a bourgeois system of property. Thus, in his politico-philosophical argument as a whole, ethical life becomes instrumental to the integration of centrifugal civil society, the locus where possessive individuals interact. The complete ethical dissolution that characterizes civil society requires the constitution of a sphere that will not be drawn into its corruptive vortex. This will occur only when Hegel's ethical State is seen culminating in an absolute monarch conceived as the apex and beginning of the whole. Rose's failure to see in this but 'an inconsistency, minor in itself' (80) is due to her (not explicitly acknowledged) adherence to the position which has now been identified as the *Hegelsche Mitte*. The *Hegelsche Mitte* presents Hegel's liberalism as ultimately progressive and not in any way incompatible with democratic ideals. It is this that can explain Rose's too facile dismissal of Marx's critique. Marx, I believe, correctly saw the compatibility of Hegel's possessive liberalism with a politically conservative application.

Despite the external reservations I have indicated, I find Rose's book one of the most consistent *Hegelsche Mitte* presentations. Indeed, Hegel's philosophy has seldom been read with such elegance.

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EDWARD SHILS, *Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981.
Pp. viii + 334. US\$20.00. ISBN 0-226-75325-5.

In this book, Edward Shils, a distinguished sociologist, attempts a comprehensive, systematic analysis of tradition in the whole range of culture, social institutions, and human activities. The motivation of the book seems to be the rehabilitation of tradition in the face of the anti-traditionalism of modern progressivism, emancipationism, and efforts toward the rationalization of life and society.

While recognizing some constructive results from these movements, Shils thinks that they have tended to strip people and societies of their substantive traditions (i.e. traditions in which received beliefs, institutions, and practices are passed on because they are regarded as warranted by their traditionality) while proving, by their failures and unhappy consequences, the incapacity of rationality to take over. The drive toward collectivism, with the ever increas-

ing role and power of government, is seen as a consequence of the decline of traditionalism and an overblown faith in rationality (i.e. analytical reason and empirical science).

Shils attempts to show that traditions are ineluctable, that even modern science and progressivism have, and are dependent on, their own traditions. He also claims that traditions are always subject to change. Nevertheless, he thinks that modern anti-traditionalism has weakened the force of tradition, especially with regard to 'substantive traditions,' which he seems at times to identify with conservative religious, moral, social, and political attitudes and beliefs.

The book reflects the mind of a learned man who is able to write knowledgeably and perceptively about a wide spectrum of human history and culture, but issues are not defined and argued in a way that would clarify and support the main critical thesis of the book, namely, that our modern faith in rationality should be curbed and that greater respect for, and reliance on, traditionalism should be developed. It is true that the book is not written in an argumentative style. Shils might say that his primary purpose was to give a descriptive-explanatory account of how traditions develop, function, and change in human affairs. This is obviously part of his purpose; and with regard to it, the book is successful. But he is not content to describe and to explain the rise of modern rationalism and how it has affected the place of tradition in modern life. He is clearly critical of the development and a partisan of tradition. Reason and tradition are, he thinks, the two ways of struggling with human problems and yet traditionalism has been rejected and discredited in our modern Enlightenment civilization. This critical thesis is of special interest to philosophers, but it is here that the book is weakest.

Shils defines *tradition* simply as that which is handed down from the past to the present. So there is little to be said against the claim that traditions are ineluctable in all areas of culture and society. The past is present in everything. But traditionalism has to do with the normativity of tradition — that what is handed down is worthy of acceptance and of being passed on because of its traditionality. Although there may be something in the claim that some strands of modern emancipationism regard traditional ways and beliefs as unworthy of acceptance because of their traditionality, most strands of modern progressivism only ask that traditions be subjected to rational scrutiny to test their worthiness of continuance. In other words, modern progressivism of the Enlightenment variety holds that traditions, although they have weathered the test of experience under past conditions, are corrigible, and that every generation should try to correct the errors and to improve on the accomplishments of the past.

Although these matters are not too clearly defined and thought out in the book, I surmise that what bothers Shils most about progressivism is the form that rationality has taken in modern thought. He, like so many others, identifies rationality with logic and the methods of empirical science. There are reasons for being disturbed by the implications of this conception of rationality for the normative and spiritual dimensions of the culture. Shils, I

think, is looking to traditionalism as a corrective to this narrow, and perhaps perverted, conception of rationality, which is certainly destructive if taken as our only guide. For him, the warrant of substantive traditions seems to be that they are products of evolution within the historical community.

An alternative to Shil's approach would be to explore ways of correcting this modern restricted conception of rationality. It might be that rationality, properly understood and practiced, was not at all antithetical to traditions; indeed, traditions might be regarded as beliefs, institutions, and practices that had passed past critical tests of reason. If the warrant of traditionality should be so grounded, even traditionalism, so long as it did not exempt traditions from further rational criticism and correction, would not be antithetical to rationality and progressivism. In fact, it would be a method of reason.

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JEFFREY STOUT, *The Flight from Authority: Religion, Morality and the Quest for Autonomy*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press 1981. Pp. 307. US\$25.00. ISBN 0-268-00954-6.

Il s'agit d'une étude sur l'histoire des notions qui se rattachent à l'éthique et sur les rapports entre religion et éthique. L'auteur applique à l'histoire de la philosophie pratique l'idée de Kuhn sur les révolutions scientifiques. Il insiste sur la dépendance des nouveaux 'paradigmes' vis à vis de notions empruntées à d'anciens 'paradigmes.' Ces notions conservent dans le nouvel usage qu'on en fait des significations qu'elles eurent jadis. La pensée n'est donc jamais aussi révolutionnaire ni aussi autonome qu'elle ne l'imagine. Jamais elle ne peut se fonder hors de tout doute mais cela n'empêche pas les hommes de critiquer leur savoir et de changer d'avis raisonnablement. Tels sont les thèmes de ce livre.

Les arguments sont nombreux et parfois touffus. On a l'impression au cours de la lecture qu'une montagne de références et de discussions savantes accouche d'une souris déjà connue. Cela dit, les thèmes abordés sont d'une extrême importance et sont traités avec compétence selon la tradition analytique. Afin de présenter ce livre, je reprendrai et commenterai les grands traits de l'introduction.

Ce livre peut se définir comme un essai d'archéologie à propos de concepts tels que science et argument d'autorité, certitude absolue et probabilité,

Dieu et bien, mystère de la religion et paradoxe de la raison. Les liaisons entre tous ces concepts retiennent particulièrement l'attention de l'auteur. Ces liaisons ont changé avec les époques. Faire l'histoire des concepts, c'est comprendre comment leurs liaisons ont changé, c'est donc commencer à comprendre les limitations et le devenir de nos moyens de connaissance.

Il y a trois parties dans cet essai: une première sur la théorie de la connaissance, une deuxième sur la philosophie de la religion, une troisième sur la philosophie morale. Mais ces trois parties racontent la même histoire: la pensée moderne s'est définie à l'encontre de l'autorité des anciens, elle a gagné son autonomie en se fondant indépendamment de la tradition, toutefois elle ne s'est pas rendue compte de sa propre condition historique. L'auteur s'emploiera à montrer les illusions du foundationalisme et du transcendentalisme sans tomber dans un relativisme auto-destructeur.

La pensée moderne, ce sont les tentatives d'un savoir absolu de Descartes, Kant ou Hegel. Mais ce sont aussi les points de vue nouveaux des Huguenots et des Jansénistes. Les pratiques discursives et la logique probabiliste de Port-Royal permettent de discuter la crédibilité des autorités, de la mesurer. Quant aux Huguenots, ils fondent l'éthique et le 'contrat social' sur l'autonomie des consciences puisqu'ils ne peuvent gagner une guerre de religion, puisque l'autorité de la tradition a volé en éclats, puisque les autorités apparaissent multiples et contradictoires.

Désormais la culture va se développer indépendamment du théisme. Elle finira même par se passer de tout fondement absolu. Elle apprendra à reconnaître que toute pensée théorique ou pratique est historiquement située et conditionnée. Mais comment éviter le relativisme? Aujourd'hui, l'historicisme a définitivement ruiné les illusions du foundationalisme et peut donc trouver un ton moins polémique. Il peut reconnaître le sérieux de la quête de vérité et s'inscrire dans cette quête. C'est ce que dit et fait ce livre.

La première partie s'emploie à démontrer que le projet cartésien d'une *scientia* fondée hors de tout doute a perdu sa pertinence. Descartes voulait remplacer l'autorité défaillante de la tradition par un point de départ absolument certain et une suite de raisons tout aussi certaines. Il était obnubilé par la dichotomie entre certitude et scepticisme absolus. Depuis, la logique probabiliste a changé les données mais les mots savoir ou science sont encore lourds des préjugés cartésiens.

Dans la deuxième partie, l'auteur retrace l'histoire du théisme. Dès que l'autorité des écritures ou de la tradition n'allait plus de soi, du fait de la multiplication des églises rivales, on dut s'interroger sur les écritures et la tradition. Les mystères insondables de la religion se transformèrent en simples paradoxes. Progressivement, le théisme quitta le centre de la 'vision du monde.' Il est devenu tout au plus une affaire de foi privée. L'auteur insiste sur les avatars du théisme, puis du déisme et du fidéisme après le 17e siècle. Il analyse à cet égard les positions de Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard et Barth. Ce dernier a clairement distingué l'adhésion du croyant à l'autorité de la parole de Dieu et, d'autre part, le savoir reçu dans le monde. Reconnaître ainsi que différentes façons de voir le monde se succèdent dans l'histoire, ce n'est pas

affirmer qu'il y aurait plusieurs rationalités, chacune étant relative à un schème conceptuel différent. C'est plutôt comprendre la finitude de notre savoir et son devenir.

Dans la troisième partie, l'auteur critique la mété-éthique. Après Wittgenstein et Quine, l'analyse conceptuelle du langage moral ne peut plus se tenir au-dessus du propos des historiens de la morale ou des moralistes. Si la distinction entre une vérité analytique et une vérité synthétique n'est pas claire, alors on ne peut distinguer davantage entre 'the meaning and the substance of a belief.' Prétendre que les jugements éthiques sont autonomes et logiquement indépendants de la religion, c'est en fait adhérer à une position historiquement située, dont l'histoire peut rendre compte. La mété-éthique elle aussi est liée à des présupposés historiquement situés.

Comprendre les conditions dans lesquelles l'éthique s'est affranchie de la religion est un des thèmes centraux de ce livre. On a cru que l'autonomie de l'éthique était une évidence incontestable. Il convient justement de la mettre en question, de montrer qu'elle dépend d'une vision particulière qui peut être dite holistique. L'auteur définit ce dernier terme. Toute signification dépend du réseau (de significations) dans lequel elle s'insère et des usages qu'on en fait. Elle n'est ni suffisante ni éternelle mais reflète des contenus, des croyances, des attitudes et des usages variables. On parle de vision holistique, pour affirmer qu'il y a toujours interdépendance des faits relevés et des valeurs, des observations et des théories, des concepts et des croyances auxquels ils se réfèrent. Voilà ce qu'il faut savoir pour penser avec un peu moins de naïveté.

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J.E. TILES, *Things That Happen*. New York: Pergamon Press 1981. Pp. xv + 116. US\$12.00. ISBN 0-08-025724-0.

Things That Happen is primarily an examination of Strawson's view that 'a viable instrument of communication could do without concepts of particular events' (xii). In the course of developing and defending his claims about Strawson's view, Tiles discusses Davidson's views on events, the views of events defended by R.M. Martin and B.M. Taylor, the concepts of part and whole, limit and extent, spatio-temporal frameworks, and principles of identity.

Tiles begins with a discussion of Davidson's claim that sentences ap-

parently about events can best be represented by sentences that explicitly permit quantification over events. Davidson goes on to endorse a view about the identity of events according to which events are identical if and only if they have the same causes and effects. Tiles raises several objections to Davidson's view which I found neither novel nor convincing, and then moves on to Strawson's view. The connection between his discussion of Davidson and Strawson seemed tenuous to me and it was unclear why the section on Davidson was included.

Strawson argues for the conceptual dependence of events on material bodies. But his view is not a reductionist one according to which sentences about events can be paraphrased into sentences about material bodies. Rather, he holds that

...communication — including reports of happenings — would not be impossible if our language were free of such concepts (quantification). While, if our discourse lacked concepts for (quantification over) other particulars, such as material bodies, communication *would* be impossible. (xii)

Tiles goes on to explain and, eventually, to reject this view.

Two main lines of attack on Strawson's view are discussed. Tiles says that

If one wishes to deny that a creature without a grasp of principles of identity for events could report happenings, one can (A) argue that the ability to report happenings (i.e. the use of verbs) requires such a grasp, (B) argue that without such a grasp some other essential aspects of communication (e.g. a grasp of Strawson's 'single unitary framework' of reference) would not be possible. (xiii)

Tiles argues that the first line of attack can be seen to fail through consideration of what Strawson calls a 'feature-placing language.' In such a language one merely responds to stimuli in a simple way. One might respond with 'warm,' 'wet,' 'cat,' 'coal,' or whatever term is appropriate. What is important about speakers of such a language (feature-placers) is that they have no conception of individual things. They have no conception of one cat or of a cat being identical with a previously encountered cat. They are also unable to apply different predicates to the same thing. Indeed, they don't apply predicates to things at all. They merely report features as they encounter them.

The significance Tiles (and Strawson) see in feature-placers is that they have no grasp of principles of identity for things. They can, in a certain sense, respond to things in their environment, but they have no conception of the identity of these things. The same, it is said, could be true of other individuals with regard to events: they might respond to them and, in a certain sense, talk about them but lack principles of identity for them. Thus, it is possible for a being to report happenings without grasping principles of identity for them. Objection (A) fails.

Additional support for this response to objection (A) can be derived from

Tiles' discussion of what abilities a feature-placer must acquire in order to grasp principles of identity. Involved in the understanding of principles of identity for a kind of thing are, according to Tiles, an understanding of the limits and extent of things of that kind. This includes being able to tell what is a part of one of them and what is not. Tiles develops this idea through a discussion of a Calculus of Individuals of the sort developed by Leonard and Goodman and also through discussion of some elementary topological notions. Armed with the concepts derived from these theories, a feature-placer acquires principles of identity for material things. He also becomes able to report changes in material things and thus is able to respond to events, but lacks principles of identity for them. This completes the development of objection (A).

The remainder of the book is devoted to a defense of objection (B) to Strawson's view. This is the objection that without principles of identity for events speakers would be without some central aspect of communication. Tiles' argument for this is extremely complex and, I thought, obscure but its fundamental structure is as follows: the members of every linguistic community either conceive of their own movements or they don't. If they do, they must have principles of identity for movements (events). But if they don't, then in order to communicate in anything like the way we do, they must have a 'common framework of reference' and a 'unified spatial framework.' But to have a unified spatial framework they must have principles of identity for events. One of the arguments for this crucial claim goes something like this: to have a unified spatial framework speakers would have to understand the question, 'Is this *F* the same *F* as one reported earlier or is it a different one?' But to understand this question requires the ability to understand a series of reports of the movements of the first *F* after it was first reported. And this requires the ability to relate parts of the movements of the *F* to its entire movement. And this understanding of parts and wholes of movements requires a principle of identity for movements (events). So communication requires the possession of a unified spatial framework which in turn requires understanding principles of identity for events. Objection (B) succeeds.

I found much of *Things That Happen*, especially the final third, extremely obscure. Readers who come to the book familiar with and interested in Strawson's views of the conceptual priority of material objects over events may find much of interest in the book. Others, I fear, will find it difficult to understand exactly what is at issue and to follow the general argument of the book.

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F.C. WHITE, *Plato's Theory of Particulars*. New York: Arno Press 1981.
Pp. xi + 396. US\$45.00. ISBN 0-405-14055-X.

The aim of this book is well worth pursuing. Plato's dialogues contain many claims about particular sensible objects that are in need of systematic exegesis. Nothing in recent times has provided it. It would be interesting to know, too, whether Plato ever altered his views about the nature and structure of particulars.

The book attempts to trace a line of development in Plato's thought about particulars from the *Phaedo* through the *Cratylus*, the *Republic*, the *Theaetetus*, and the *Timaeus*, with a few references to other works. A number of issues having to do with particulars are treated, but the two most fully attended to are whether particulars have essential attributes, and whether particulars are or are not entirely 'dependent' on other things, notably Forms. White maintains on the first issue, in brief, that Plato began in the *Phaedo* with a belief that particulars do have essential attributes, that he was noncommittal in the *Cratylus* (which the author, relying mainly on Brandwood [237], takes to have been written near the time of the *Phaedo* and before the *Republic*), and that he abandoned the belief thereafter. On the second issue, White holds that although in the *Republic* Plato began to think of particulars as similar to Forms and even as imitations of them in some sense, it was only in the *Timaeus* (which White dates late, in accordance with the usual view) that Plato regarded particulars as images 'dependent in toto' on the Forms of which they are images. (It should be noted that although in the chapter on the *Phaedo* souls are treated as particulars, for the most part in the rest of the work it is assumed that the only relevant particulars are what Plato scholars often call 'sensible objects'.)

Although White attends to various problems that concerned Plato, he presents his study as focused on Plato's way of dealing with what he calls 'the problems of opposites' (1). Unfortunately, he never states what this problem is, but falsely assumes that the label must bring a single problem to the reader's mind (see, e.g., 63, 70, 256, 286, 288, 329-30, 334-5). The book would have been far more illuminating if this serious lack had been made good, because there are a number of problems about opposites that need, both in Plato's works and in general, to be carefully disentangled from one another. The account of the author's notion of essence, which plays a crucial role, is also extremely skimpy, and oddly postponed to p. 229. These deficiencies in clarity are accompanied by another, affecting White's descriptions of the views about the nature of particulars that Plato might have adopted or did adopt. White distinguishes three 'possible answers' to the question what sorts of things particulars are: 1) 'simply bundles of characteristics, meeting-points of forms'; 2) 'pure containers, ...themselves uncharacterized,' or 'bare particulars'; 3) things that 'in addition to being containers of characteristics, are themselves characterised' (3). None of these ideas is given sufficient explanation to make them very illuminating in the interpretation of Plato. Although such phrases as these are frequently tossed off with inadequate ex-

plantion, one would expect a book aiming to be a full-scale account of a philosopher's views on particulars to do better.

It is not possible within this space to explain fully all of the problems that result from neglecting to lay a more fully articulated philosophical substruc-ture beneath the exegesis of the texts, but one example will show what sort of work still remains to be done. In Chapter 9, White maintains that the *Timaeus* 'brings Plato's thought on physical particulars to a logical and elegant conclusion' by treating them in accordance with (1), as 'no more than clusters of qualities, totally dependent on the Forms and akin to compound reflections in one great three-dimensional mirror' (334). But of course the notion of 'cluster' here is problematical, because some Forms are (as one might say) co-clustered or coinstantiated in certain places with certain Forms but not with others, and we need some account of what this relation amounts to (or else to be shown that no account is possible, because the notion is somehow primitive). White seems to think that it is adequate to say merely that instead of 'independent particulars located in space' there are 'transient properties of Space, instantiated in this or that part of it' (315). But this is to assume without explanation a conception of the structure of space or the Receptacle, seemingly antecedent (conceptually) to the presence of objects in it, under which it can be divided into parts that can be distinguished from one another. I cannot see that the author notices either this problem or the question whether it affects the interpretation of the *Timaeus*. I am inclined to agree with a good deal of what he says here, as far as it goes, but it needs much additional work to provide a clear notion of what Plato's view of particulars in the *Timaeus* was, especially since once one notices that distinct parts of the Receptacle are being presupposed as loci for coinstantiation of Forms, this account of particulars becomes difficult to distinguish from (2).

Aside from the lack of sufficient philosophical groundwork, there are straightforward matters of interpretation that seem to me to call for demurral. One especially important one casts grave doubt on White's contention that the *Phaedo* advocates a form of essentialism with regard to particulars. Probably the principal piece of evidence adduced for this contention is *Phaedo* 102b8ff., where White takes *pephykenai* in c1 to express a notion of essence by contrast with *tygchanei echōn* in c2 (6-7), without noting that, as Hackforth and others have pointed out (though his view is controversial — see, e.g., Castañeda and Gallop in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 8 [1978]), the whole clause, *including* the clause ending with *tygchanei echōn*, is governed by *pephykenai*, so that no such contrast between essence and accident can be intended here. White has other reasons for advancing his contention, notably considerations about the final argument for the immortality of the soul (esp. 16-17), but without having space to argue the point fully here, I must say that I do not think that they can stand when the support of 102b8ff. is recognized to fail. This is just as well, because White's account of why in the *Republic* Plato dropped the *Phaedo*'s essentialism seems to me extremely weak. It is that if Plato had retained essentialism, then the Forms would not have been needed to play the major roles that they do play in the *Republic*.

(118-22). This explanation, however, simply raises the question why in the *Republic* Plato placed Forms in these roles at all, instead of simply retaining essentialism about particulars. The response that I would give is that Plato did not adopt essentialism about particulars in the *Phaedo*.

This book covers far more passages and issues than I can mention here, and it will be helpful to Plato scholars in stimulating them to take seriously the idea of focusing on Plato's view or views about particulars.

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EUGENE WEBB, *Eric Voegelin, Philosopher of History*. Seattle: University of Washington Press 1981. Pp. 330. US\$20.00. ISBN 0-295-95759-X.

This secondary work is a commentary on Voegelin's five volumes, four of which have been published, on *Order and History*. The thesis of that interpretation of Plato, Aristotle, The Bible, and the history of the ancient world, leading to the modern world and its problems, is that there are polarities, dualities, oppositions, or what Voegelin calls 'existential tensions,' which are beneath the formalisms of systems, and the reality of these existential tensions drives thinkers and history toward the unknown and unspeakable of the Ground of Being above in the Divine and below in the chthonic. This thesis is better stated by Paul Ricoeur, who pays more attention to the hermeneutics of structural linguistics with regard to existential psychology than Voegelin does, or by Paul Tillich, whose interpretations of history and psychology are radically original, while Voegelin's interpretations are admittedly derived largely from the work of Werner Jaeger. Jaeger in turn got his views from Wilamowitz, who got them, with regard to the 'Happy Greeks' who missed the 'deepness' of the Bible and the modern Germans, from Goethe.

Since Goethe, this view of the Greeks and of man's situation in the world has become humanistic philistinism, a long-winded rhetoric of comfortable obfuscations about the glorious sunshine of the Greeks and our own life of *angst*, *Dasein*, dualism, and total awareness. In Voegelin's work the world is shrouded in dark waters on both sides, above and below, like the Second Day of Creation in *Genesis*. Whatever was needed to be said on this point was said better in the one or two sentences in *Genesis* than in the hundreds of thousands of sentences in which Voegelin belabors the theme, and Voegelin is never able to get to the end of The Week. As for Eugene Webb's commentary, it is an academic humanistic exercise in praise of 'culture,' without any searching reasons why.

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