

THE JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM

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Jude P. Dougherty, Editor

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C.R. BADCOCK, *The Psychoanalysis of Culture*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P. 1980; Totowa, N.J.: Biblio Distribution Center (for Basil Blackwell) 1980. Pp. 264. Cdn\$52.50; US\$36.50. ISBN 0-631-11701-6.

Jesus knew nothing of Christianity, and Nietzsche never heard of Psychoanalysis. Their common ignorance must absolve each man of at least full responsibility for the often doctrinaire quality of the cult that he, as either Christ or anti-Christ, certainly occasioned and perhaps fostered but did not found. It was St. Matthew who fashioned of Jesus' sayings an ecclesiastical dogma; it was Freud who restructured Nietzsche's aphorisms into a psychological creed. In the case of Christianity, the rigidities of dogma have always been tempered by the firm memory of Jesus himself and the perennial call to imitate his personal virtues, of which an accepting tolerance was only one. In the case of Psychoanalysis, however, Nietzsche has been largely forgotten. Freud even gave up reading him in an effort to validate analytical technique as a science and to keep it free of the stigma of association with the views of a man known to have died a lunatic. As a result, the personal virtues of Nietzsche as an irreverent, skeptical, subtle gadfly have not survived to leaven and renew the movement. The inert, self-congratulatory ideology of the Messianic cultist alone remains. Short of resurrecting Nietzsche what Psychoanalysis badly needs is an analyst or two to imitate him.

C.R. Badcock's *The Psychoanalysis of Culture* does not by itself establish the truth of this thesis. It does, however, provide heady evidence. The skeletal structure of Badcock's argument is thoroughly Nietzschean. Man, it insists, is the diseased animal. Mental pathology is our differentia as a species. Why this definition, first used by Nietzsche to 'sting' his reader, is true and important is that still other key Nietzschean claims are correct. We are, or were, by nature narcissistic, savage, sadistic beasts who have become self-domesticated and so subject to self-imposed moral laws whose altruistic ends are felt to be at odds with our deepest instincts. Our mental pathology is the

result of an inevitable, rigorously selective, evolutionary advance from nature toward culture. That advance, fortunately, is now nearing completion. A new era of new men — the psychoanalyzed, in Badcock's eschatology — guided by reason and a novel, pragmatic morality, has in fact begun. To encourage its growth all idols of the past must be thrown down and all heroes of the older, more primitive breed of mankind exposed for the psychopaths they were. Religion, in particular, has to be annihilated. At the same time we need to be hard with ourselves, keeping constantly in mind that our faculty of thought has pleasure, not truth, as its natural end, and that anything we want to believe is most probably false. Reading *The Psychoanalysis of Culture* is like listening to a distorted echo of *The Anti-Christ* and *The Genealogy of Morals*, which, nonetheless, are left uncited.

Although many of Nietzsche's most prominent theses survive in Badcock's book, few of his enlivening virtues do. Nietzsche's avowedly speculative genealogies that question even the possibility of truth reappear in the unconvincing guise of the codified findings of an exact science. As a result they are less provocative while being more dogmatic. The manifest unfairnesses with which Nietzsche treated the likes of Socrates, St. Paul and Luther, for example, at least had a justifying point, with some kind of goading insight as their aim. Badcock's relentless denigration of everyone from King Akhenaten to St. Francis and Karl Marx as psychopaths appears in contrast as only a mean ritual whose aim, one is led to suspect, is merely the establishment of his credentials as a disciplined realist who can see courage, humility, and intellectual fervour as the neurotic symptoms they really were. Most dismaying of all is the disappearance of Nietzsche's ability to shift his point of view and to mock even his own constructions. Badcock suffers from a severe case of seeing everything through the self-confirming lens of his analytical conceptions. What response, if any, could induce him to rethink his views on any topic is unclear. Certainly protests are idle, since they are seen as only confirming that a narcissistic nerve has been touched by an unpleasant truth. Humor would probably fail as well. What bemused parodist could extend, and so expose for reconsideration, such notions as that stone age tools were invented by men seeking surrogate penises or that agriculture was invented by women so filled with penis envy that they took to plowing and seeding the earth in an effort to gain through art and tools an erotic gratification denied them by anatomy and nature? Even the simple complaints of logic would seem incapable of penetrating Badcock's defenses. To the observation that the concept of insanity does not translate well across cultural borders he happily replies that all such protests miss the point, and that it is not madness but sanity which is the arbitrary social convention — as if what is true of one term of such a contrast needn't be true of its twin.

These dismaying qualities of Badcock's writing do not deprive his book of all interest. Anyone who would like to speculate on how Freud would have carried out a large-scale analysis of Western history can find a more or less plausible construction in *The Psychoanalysis of Culture*. Badcock does reject Freud's Lamarckian biology. He also ignores Freud's linkage of hysteria and

paranoia with the productions of art and philosophy, preferring instead to see them as responsible for the religious phenomena of totemism and Catholicism. Nonetheless, both the manner and the substance of his historiography are Freudian. Of interest, too, is the sight of one deterministic view of human behavior clashing with another. Marx's economic determinism is, Badcock urges, flatly wrong, for just as a racially primitive, infantile narcissism is responsible for animism so it is the basis of a foraging economy. Likewise, an obsessional neurosis produces not just monotheism but pastoralism; and paranoia underlies capitalism every bit as much as it does various forms of Christianity. He even ventures the qualified prediction that once Psychoanalysis has brought us all to a healthy maturity our economy will change, becoming less directed and more productive.

There is little, of course, in this historiography that cannot be argued with. All of it probably ought to be. Nothing, however, is of greater import than the millennial significance Badcock assigns to Psychoanalysis, which marks, he writes, the final achievement of realism, reason and truth in the assessment, and guidance, of human conduct. The argument in support of this incautious claim is that the patron telos of Psychoanalysis is the stark 'reality principle,' which, if followed, must lead to the truth. But how is truth to be recognized? Being an epistemological puritan Badcock acts on the assumption that the inner light of pain is its credential. Hence, when speculating about murky matters where mistakes are hard to identify it should be enough to fabricate unpleasanties to satisfy the conscience of a logical method — unless, it seems, the subject is one's own calling. But cultivating wounding thoughts, where evidence is what is needed, is surely as idle a salvational practice as the bead-counting and bell-ringing that Luther came to despise as 'works' conferring no merit at all. *The Psychoanalysis of Culture* is dismissive of reasonable protest, filled with speculations parading as established fact, and spoiled in parts by sophistry and bad history. A charitable and true conclusion would be that it fails by example to establish its case for Psychoanalysis. A less charitable but even truer conclusion would be that it threatens that case with self-refutation. The truly just conclusion, however, is that it offers a useful lesson: if one views the whole of human history as the memoirs of a mad and irrational race, one runs the acute risk of allowing oneself the meretricious pleasure of feeling superior while holding to only the feeblest standards of thought and argument. What is needed, this book makes clear, is a second Nietzsche who, even if on the verge of true madness, could make his historically untutored followers see the wisdom, and the difficulty, of being genuinely hard with themselves.

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BARUCH A. BRODY, *Identity and Essence*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1980. Pp. ix + 164. US\$ 16.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07256-6); US\$ 5.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02013-2).

The central aim of Brody's admirably clear little book is, he claims, to refute the view that 'the truth-conditions of claims concerning identity vary as the type of entity in question varies.' (4) In particular, he argues that 'truth-conditions' for all (relative) identity claims of the form

- (1) a is the same F as b

can be given by the 'Fregean analysis,' that is, by

- (2) $F(a) \ \& \ F(b) \ \& \ a = b$,

where ' $a = b =_{df} (\forall \phi) (\phi(a) \equiv \phi(b))$ ' and ' F ' is a term characterizing any sort or type of item. (7-8) Moreover, he apparently interprets 'truth-conditions' very strongly as giving (a) the meaning of, and (b) the means of verifying the claim in question. Thus the Fregean analysis is supposed to provide the means by which the truth of falsity of relative identity claims can be assessed, as well as the means by which their meaning can be understood. (12) This, at least, is the story of the first half of the book where the ramifications of this strictly classical approach to identity are explored in connection with the identity of material bodies, persons, sets and events (Chap. 3).

Brody certainly claims too much for the classical theory. It is not at all clear how classical identity (defined as above) can provide truth-conditions in sense (b) for identity claims. Verifying that a and b are identical will involve verifying that they share all their properties. While we may concede to Brody that this does not require checking every property of each (for there will, in general, be entailments between properties, which will cut down the labour), Brody has no effective way of ensuring that the labour is cut down to finite levels. He claims, e.g., that one way of verifying that they share all their properties is to 'look at some of their properties, see that they have them in common, and infer that they have all of their properties in common.' (13) But this is simply an invalid inference from 'some' to 'all' and provides no adequate assessment of the identity claim. Brody clearly hopes (maybe he requires, but he doesn't say so) that among the set of checked properties will be one or more which either can be had by only one item or would be unlikely to be had by more than one item. (13-4) In the former case, complete property sharing is assured (via the definition of classical identity); in the latter, we may 'simplify our explanatory account of things by identifying a and b .' (14) This supplementation of the original invalid argument is open to three objections: (i) In determining whether a property is one which only one item can (or, alternatively, is likely to) have we need to employ identity. Thus the at-

tempt to assess an identity claim yields further identity claims which have in turn to be assessed, thus opening up an infinite regress. (ii) If we may identify a and b in order to simplify our explanatory account of things, then whether $a = b$ will depend, not on whether a and b share all their properties, but on whether it is convenient (or 'simple') to suppose that they do. (iii) Whether ϕ is a property which only one item can (or is likely to) have will depend upon what type of item is supposed to have ϕ . Consider, e.g., the property of occupying a certain spatio-temporal position. If the item in question is a chair, it is clear that only one chair may have the specified property. However, as Leibniz pointed out long ago in answer to Locke (*Nouveaux Essais*, II, xxvii, 1), if the item in question is a shadow uniqueness is not guaranteed by spatio-temporal position, for two distinct shadows may have the same spatio-temporal position. Thus sortals are brought in to the assessment of identity claims, contrary to Brody's claim.

Brody's simple, if not terribly compelling, classical picture becomes muddled in the second part of the book, which deals with essentialism. Although Brody claims to have proven the 'adequacy' of the classical theory (6,11) as providing both necessary and sufficient conditions for identity claims, he subsequently claims that the theory is 'incomplete' (71) and proceeds to supplement it with an Aristotelian theory of essence. Quite how the Aristotelian theory fits in with the classical theory, whether the claims made at the outset that identity conditions do not depend upon the kind of item are consistent with a theory in which essential properties are natural kind properties (130-3), and indeed whether *any* substantive theory of essences can be made consistent with classical identity theory, are problems which get only the most perfunctory treatment at the end of the book. (153-5)

The argument for essentialism arises from the difficulties classical identity faces in dealing with identity through change. The initial problem is that with classical identity a man who is athletic in youth and sedentary in middle-age is a *prima facie* counter-example to the indiscernibility of identicals. The obvious solution is to index property ascriptions to times, amending the definition of identity to

$$(3) \quad a = b =_{df} (\forall \phi, t) (\phi(a) \text{ at } t \equiv \phi(b) \text{ at } t).$$

The trouble with this is that it licenses too much change, since it places no limit on what properties may be lost by an item without its ceasing to exist. Thus, e.g., a tree might survive ceasing to be a tree. The resulting theory might appropriately be called the palimpsest theory, and it has advocates (e.g. M.R. Ayers). Brody uses essentialism to restrict the palimpsest theory by specifying a range of properties, the essential ones, which an item couldn't possibly lose without ceasing to exist.¹ This policy is plausible enough, if the notion of an essential property can be properly made out (no easy matter). However, in conjunction with classical identity it leads to difficulties in the treatment of puzzle-cases.

Brody's treatment of puzzle-cases is generally unsatisfactory. He seems to be willing to take a case seriously only if it is an actual case. He dismisses, e.g., person-splitting cases devised by Parfit, Perry, Prior and others with the remark that 'since such cases do not occur, and it is only their occurrence that would cause a problem on my account, it follows that there is, at the moment, no splitting problem if my account is true.' (59) Were such cases to occur he claims, plausibly but unhelpfully, that we should adopt 'the best description and explanation of what has occurred.' (59) This high-handed attitude is buttressed by a general principle that appealing to possible counter-examples to putative necessary truths (such as those of classical identity theory) is mere counter-assertion. (20) On this principle most philosophical positions would be placed beyond rational discussion. But Brody's principle is both false and methodologically vicious. In devising counter-examples to claimed necessary truths we have to bracket the disputed claim and its entailed consequences and consider whether there are admitted truths, outside the area of dispute, which would rule out the counter-example. If the counter-example cannot be ruled out as impossible independently of the disputed claim then the claim, though it may be true, is not necessarily true. Modal logics disguise this fact, and are inadequate as models of philosophical debate, for in them all necessary truths are identified through strict equivalence. Brody's inadequate methodology leads to truncated discussions of important puzzle-cases in which he not untypically concludes that we will have to decide what is the best account when actual, rather than merely possible, cases are produced (e.g. at p. 155). Somewhat surprisingly, he claims this as a victory for classical identity theory.

Consider the case supposed by Price² in which, as the result of a brutal scientific experiment, a dog, Rover, is transformed into a mass of living protoplasm, Clover, differing from Rover right down to chromosomal structure. Is Rover = Clover, as Price contends; or not, as Brody maintains? (77) There is no way in which (3) can be used to show that they are not. Brody's rejection of the identity claim depends entirely on his claim that being a dog is an essential property the loss of which constitutes Rover's going out of existence. This plainly imposes limitations on the adequacy of the classical identity theory. Brody's unaided appeal to essential properties ignores the attractions of the identity claim — viz., spatio-temporal continuity and sameness of substance. This point can be brought out more sharply by modifying the counter-example. Brody admits that an organism may go out of existence and return the self-same organism (79-80), since spatio-temporal continuity is not for him a necessary condition for physical identity. What, therefore, for Brody, distinguishes the case Price considers from one in which Clover is incinerated and replaced by a new mass of protoplasm, Dover, grown from a tissue culture? Why is the claim that Rover = Clover so much more plausible than the claim that Rover = Dover? Neither classical identity nor Aristotelian essentialism provides an explanation. Suppose, alternatively, that, by an equally fiendish experiment, Clover is turned back into a dog, Grover. Will

Brody claim that Rover = Grover, or not? He seems to have no principle to decide either way.

What the counter-examples show is that, contra Brody, spatio-temporal continuity and sameness of substance are relevant to the assessment of identity claims — but only for certain types of items. Thus, contra Brody, the kind of item involved will affect the assessment of identity claims concerning it and also the truth-conditions and meaning of such claims. But the admission of essential properties already concedes this central point, as Brody comes close to recognizing when he notes that an object's essential properties are 'connected to the sort of an object it is.' (133) If an item's identity conditions depend upon what changes it may undergo without ceasing to exist, and if the latter depends upon its essential properties, and if essential properties are natural kind properties (all claims conceded by Brody), then an item's identity conditions will vary according to the kind of item it is. Rejection of the traditional, but usually unargued view, that essential properties come neatly nested in disjoint hierarchies, yields Geach's full relativization thesis, that *a* may be the same *F* as *b* but not the same *G*; that, e.g., Rover is the same mass of protoplasm or physical object as Clover but not the same dog or kind of animal.

Despite the fact that Brody's book seems to me mistaken on all main points, it would nonetheless make a fine undergraduate text — partly because of its errors, and partly because of its clarity.

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- 1 In fact Brody's definition of an essential property is more complex, but the details need not concern us here. His attempt to define an essential property without recourse to modalities and trans-world identity is a failure. See Nicholas Griffin, 'Brody's essentialism without trans-world identity' (forthcoming).

2. M. Price, 'Identity through Time,' *Journal of Philosophy*, 74 (1977) 201-17.

JOHN POWELL CLAYTON, *The Concept of Correlation: Paul Tillich and the Possibility of A Mediating Theology*. New York: Walter De Gruyter 1980. pp. xii + 329. US\$ 49.50. ISBN 3-11-007914-3.

This book focuses on the concept of correlation in the theological programme of Paul Tillich. Clayton views his work as 'both more restricted and

more comprehensive in scope than existing studies of Tillich's theological method.' (14) The unique direction of his work may be indicated by the questions which the book answers: What are the problems that the 'concept of correlation' is designed to solve? What does this concept assume? What does it require if it is to succeed? What are its elements in Tillich's theology? And finally, does it work? These questions are answered in a 249-page footnoted text which is divided into three parts of two chapters each. Following the text lay two appendices, each containing one of Tillich's previously unpublished German pieces. One is his first known outline of Systematic Theology, dated in 1913 (15 pages); the other is his lecture notes on religious epistemology delivered during the winter semester of 1927-28 at Dresden (40 pages). Following these appendices are selected bibliographical material numbering some 160 entries on Tillich (in addition to the complete 14-volume *Gesammelte Werke*) and 265 entries of related material. The book ends with a five-page index of names.

The first two chapters that comprise Part One set the stage for the rest of the book. Without assuming prior expertise from the reader, the author briefly surveys Tillich's correlational style of theologizing that came to be known as 'the method of correlation' (and less frequently known as 'mediating theology'). Schleiermacher is introduced as the post-Enlightenment figure most responsible for establishing modern theology's agenda, including Tillich's concern with religion and culture. Briefly stated, the central issue behind Tillich's method of correlation, as well as behind all nineteenth century theology, is the question: how can the connection between Christianity and culture be understood so that a meaningful relationship between them is affirmed while preserving their respective autonomy? From his survey of Schleiermacher, Clayton formulates two criteria of successful 'mediation theology.' First, the autonomy of both religion and culture must be preserved. Second, the reciprocity between them must be posited. After a brief excursus into Troeltsch's attempt at a mediating theology, Clayton then surveys the multiple ways in which Tillich, himself, addressed the issue of Christianity and culture.

'Religion' and 'culture' are the main elements in Tillich's method of correlation. An in-depth analysis of these two notions as they pertain to the task of correlation constitutes chapters three and four respectively. The ambiguities and equivocations surrounding these terms throughout the Tillich corpus is noted.

The last two chapters focus on the models employed by Tillich to show the correlation: question and answering (chapter five) and form and content (chapter six). Clayton concludes that, as they stand, these models fail in one or the other of the two necessary criteria for successful meditation. The question-answer model fails to satisfy the autonomy condition because one autonomous realm could not satisfy the demands from another autonomous realm. Hence, e.g., Tillich believes that the questions asked by reason which revelation answers are essentially "religious questions," thereby violating their autonomous philosophical status. The form-content model is seen as failing to satisfy the reciprocity condition since religious content is supposed-

ly unaffected by cultural form and cultural forms are allegedly "immune from religious critique." (226)

Clayton concludes that, as it stands, Tillich's attempt at a mediating theology failed. Yet, he proposes a way to remedy one defect by utilizing Wittgenstein's 'family resemblance analysis' in order to dispense with the unreciprocating element in Tillich's thought, i.e., 'the unchanging content of Christianity.'

There are only two criticisms that I want to raise regarding Clayton's interpretations. First, I do not think it is correct to represent Tillich as saying that 'Jesus is the Christ' is the 'unchangeable' essence or content of Christianity. (68, 96) Although Tillich believed that there was something permanent and unchanging about the Christian message, he also believed that it could never be finally articulated, for every articulation is a culturally conditioned formulation of it. While it is true that Tillich designated 'Jesus is the Christ' as the norm of Christian theology, it was merely one form of the norm — not the unchangeable essence of Christianity as Clayton infers. The essence of Christianity has, for Tillich, changed its form several times through history (from 'eternal life' in the ancient church, to 'forgiveness of sins' in the sixteenth century, to 'overcoming estrangement' in the twentieth century). While much of the time Clayton seems aware of the impossibility of providing a permanent form for the eternal message of Christianity, there seem to be other times when his questions and line of discussion seem to forget this (cf., pp. 67-8, 96, 226, 236, 248, 249).

My second criticism is that I believe it incorrect to portray Tillich's view of cultural forms as 'immune from religious critique' (226). Tillich's essay on 'The Demonic' is clearly a religious or theological critique of some cultural forms (nationalism, capitalism, etc.).

These criticisms do not negate, however, the overall value of Clayton's work. It is an excellent contribution to Tillich scholarship and theological methodology. The overall tone and treatment is sympathetic and fair. Also, it is clearly organized and highly readable in style. The author's mastery of the Tillich corpus in both English and German is evident throughout. Not only is Clayton thoroughly abreast the enormous body of scholarship about Tillich, but he also draws upon a wide range of germane issues and thinkers from Kant to the present. The quality of his analysis is careful, methodical, and thorough: no jumps, no gaps, no *non-sequiturs*. Finally, the work offers illuminating treatment of substantive issues and excellent suggestions for progress. Particularly valuable is the recommendation that the identity of Christianity be recast with the aid of 'family resemblance analysis' so as to avoid the appearance of, and the problems associated with, having an eternal, unchanging essence.

Clayton's book deserves to be required reading for students of Paul Tillich and of theological methodology; and it promises to be enriching reading for those interested in the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, religion and culture, and modern religious thought.

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F.C. COPLESTON, *Philosophies and Cultures*. Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford U.P. 1980. Pp. 198. Cdn\$ 20.75; US\$ 16.95. ISBN 0-19-213960-6.

Western scientific doctrines have backed us into a corner, and there seems to be no way out except by punching a hole in the wall behind us. This strikes me as being the theme of F.C. Copleston's work, the first of the Martin D'Arcy Lectures given in Oxford University in 1978, and intended for a broad-based university audience. The tool for penetrating the wall is the relatively new branch of philosophy called comparative (meaning mainly comparing the East and the West) philosophy. It is an important field in our day because it can act as a strong antidote to the all-too-prevalent modern tendency to specialize, even in philosophy, and because it goes a long way in the process of reasserting the rightful place of philosophy as one of the main means for achieving mutual understanding among different peoples in the world. We cannot, states Copleston, 'leave the task of increasing mutual understanding among peoples simply to politicians and traders.' (vi)

It is also a very timely branch of philosophy insofar as we in the West seem to have by now pretty well exhausted our reserves of religious reverence, especially for the human person. Due primarily to the relentless pressures of modern science, which have slowly but surely squeezed out of us every last drop of mystery and mysticism, we in the West are desperately in need of some new reservoir of deeply felt reverence which will allow us once again to transcend our limited circle of selfish material existence. This, hopefully, is what awaits us on the other side of the wall.

Copleston, a well known historian of philosophy, thinks that one of the best ways to make use of comparative philosophy is to delve into the *history* of eastern philosophical systems. But is this really worthwhile? After all, for instance, is not mainland China 'not [read "now"] dominated by a philosophy of western origin'? (vii) The author argues that even though this is certainly true in many respects in many parts of the world, the fact remains that the effects of one's past culture cannot be so easily eliminated; that in a very real sense we are our past, and that this is as true of the East as it is of the West. Therefore it is possible and worthwhile to make a serious attempt at understanding foreign cultures and their philosophies in their historical perspectives. Such an attitude is, after all, the foundational faith of any scholar who would venture out of the present and into the past. Indeed, such a faith may be in the end the most efficient route to the future. As Copleston insists, however, this is not a work designed to promote any particular sort of 'religious uplift or to satisfy the needs of those who turn to the Orient for spiritual wisdom or mystical experience.' (ix) In this work Copleston is the objective scholar, not the prejudiced preacher. His aim is 'to see in the philosophical tradition of a culture the expression of ways of thought which persist and which outlive their more or less transient embodiments. To gain a

clear view of these persistent elements seems to be a main task of the comparative study of philosophy.' (168)

Copleston's central concern is with human nature, what it is, and the proper approach to studying it. He admits to having 'a bee in his bonnet' (170) with respect to the subject of philosophical anthropology. He sees this concern as a necessary presupposition to any advancement in the areas of social and political philosophy. What he wants to see in the world is the 'progressive formation of a world-wide pluralistic society, in which respect would be held for different cultural traditions.' (170)

But what exactly can we learn from comparative philosophy? We cannot find, according to Copleston, any significant recurrent patterns in the philosophies of the different cultures studied. By the same token, neither can we formulate anything other than trivial laws about intra-cultural philosophical developments. And even these, thinks Copleston, would be of doubtful predictive value. Saying, for instance, that pluralism is the usual reaction to monism would not be much more instructive with respect to any specific content than saying that today's liberals are tomorrow's conservatives. (163-4)

This does not, however, leave us at a complete loss. We can and do, claims Copleston, derive a great deal of important information about human nature from comparative philosophy. At the end of Chapter 5 Copleston asks whether or not philosophy can still claim to have anything to say about human nature in view of the fact that modern psychology has now come to dominate so extensively in this area. His answer is, Yes. This can be seen in several ways. One is the way in which the philosopher is still the person best qualified to deal with the issues of internal consistency and coherence within the various psychological theories of human nature, whether or not such theories originated in some past philosophy or in modern psychology. This is the role of metapsychology or the philosophy of psychology, a role which only the philosopher can properly handle.

One way of fulfilling this role, suggests the author, is via an emphasis upon the examination of ordinary language. The modern psychologist, so bound up as he is with laboratory techniques and statistical analyses, is generally in the position of missing the forest because of all the trees. Here is where the philosopher can come to the aid of the sciences.

In general, it is the task of the philosopher to take the over-view. Given the limitations of the restricted scientific disciplines, one cannot expect them to be concerned with the ultimate nature of man. Philosophers, however, can and should be so concerned. Even though, states Copleston, the psychological theories of, say, India and China, may appear to be pre-scientific and even outmoded, 'we should not shut our eyes to the possibility that the general approaches of philosophers in other cultures represent real aspects or features of the human being which should be taken into account in any overall view.' (98) Without calling into question the value of the more specialized disciplines, comparative philosophy can go a long way in correct-

ing their built-in shortcomings. In other words, the Eastern philosophies can show us the importance of the non-scientific aspects of human nature.

The same theme is repeated in Chapter 6. There he asks whether or not the speculative philosophy of history has been succeeded by the social sciences. The answer has to be both yes and no. Any speculative philosophy of history must presuppose some set of higher principles whereby actual historical events are to be judged. These presuppositions almost always derive from theological and metaphysical views of the world. When cut adrift from such presuppositions, however, speculative philosophy does, in fact, tend to end up as social science. Again, therefore, it is important to reserve a place for the philosopher, and even for the theologian, if one is to find any meaning in history. The alternative is to be left with little more than a string of names, dates, and places, a situation which even the social scientist would not find especially satisfying.

This notion is carried on in the next chapter which discusses 'Recurrence, Advance, and Historical Relativism.' As far as Copleston can see, 'it seems that there are no purely neutral criteria, if by this we mean criteria of advance which do not presuppose any value-judgement whatsoever.' (125) Nevertheless, this does not lead to some sort of absolute relativism in which no one can ever really understand anyone else in some time and place other than his own. If this were the case, thinks Copleston, we would be in a very sorry state, for it would mean that all possibility for a truly mutual understanding, and for a really harmonious world-wide co-existence in a pluralistic universe, would be eliminated in advance. 'But if a way of thought,' says Copleston, 'to speak perhaps rather absurdly, is really a way of thought at all, it is in principle understandable, whatever the practical difficulties may be.' (140) To think anything else would mean that we could not apply any descriptive terms whatsoever in a cross-cultural way, not even that of 'human being.' He trusts that not even the most radical historical relativist would be willing to accept *that* contention.

Lest we forget it, let's keep in mind that Copleston is a Jesuit, a member of a dedicated group of men who for a decade now have been gearing up for renewed missionary work in the East. The general impression I get from Copleston's work is that he is looking for philosophical points of agreement between East and West, especially with respect to human nature. It could well be that the East, despite its temporary fascination with Marxism, has retained a much greater sense of the spiritual in human nature than has the West. But then this may not be the case, at least not in a way which would be useful to those who might want to use the East as a foil to western scientism, determinism, materialism, and hyper-individualism. Confucianism, for example, *can* remind us of the importance of social responsibility, while Buddhism, *can* show us the value of ascetic monasticism. My fear, however, is that understanding all does not necessarily mean accepting all, or even forgiving all. Contrary to what Copleston hopes for, it might very well turn out in some cases that a greater knowledge of eastern cultures will only serve to show us

just how *incompatible* we and they really are, even if the 'we' happens to be the most broadminded missionary.

In all, though, this is a very worthwhile work from which much can be learned, both with respect to the content of, and to the techniques for doing, comparative philosophy. The bibliography contains general works in the field, as well as both primary and secondary works in Indian, Chinese and Japanese, and Islamic philosophy. There is also a useful chronological chart setting out the main philosophical and religious figures in India, China, and within Islam on pages 190-1. The book itself is very well printed (in Hong Kong no less).

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MAURICE CORNFORTH. *Communism and Philosophy: Contemporary Dogmas and Revisions of Marxism*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press 1980. Pp. ix + 282. US\$ 22.50. ISBN 0-7178-0326-0.

Maurice Cornforth is best known for *Dialectical Materialism* (1952-54: in three volumes), *Marxism and Linguistic Philosophy* (1965) and *The Open Philosophy and the Open Society* (1968). In all these works he has been concerned to treat Communism philosophically and to criticize contemporary philosophy from the point of view of a committed, British Communist. His latest book continues that enterprise while making explicit his changes in position.

This book is intended to be a general overview presaging a series of books on the main problems of modern philosophy which Cornforth plans. He argues here that modern philosophy must be redeveloped on a Marxist basis because 'Marxism ... offers a scientifically-based theory, or at least essential foundations for it ...' Marxism, thus, provides a means for 'comprehending the human condition' 'fully, objectively and accurately.' (1)

What Cornforth has in fact done is to present a simple, sometimes bordering on the simplistic, description of what he thinks a philosophically sound, i.e. scientific, Communism should look like. He moves step by small step from historical materialism to the image of the fully developed Communist society. In the process he examines and rejects much of what has passed for

Communist philosophy since Marx and much that is passing for it today, although his particular target is the dogmatism of 'official' Communism in the U.S.S.R.

Cornforth traces his own shift from the acceptance of the idea that Marx, Engels and Lenin had said it all to the need for this thorough reevaluation to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and, in general, the Soviet rejection of liberalization. He does not reject Marx, Engels and Lenin; they were merely sometimes unclear or misleading. He contends that historical materialism was Marx and Engels' great achievement because it provides the basis 'for the science of mankind and human society.' (12) Historical materialism was a scientific achievement comparable to the discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo, Newton or Darwin.

Cornforth clearly puts his task as follows:

This enterprise which I have now commenced is an attempt, on the basis of the scientific achievements of Marx's fundamental formulations of historical materialism, to work out, in detail, a consistent philosophical position — on the criticism of current Marxist views; on the criticism of views of other philosophers, both in the past and at the present day; on scientific method, philosophical method, the social functions of science, and the achievement of a unified conception of mankind and nature by science coupled with philosophy; on questions of how we ascertain information about ourselves and our environment, and of human knowledge; on questions of logic and dialectics; and finally on questions of human values and value-judgements. (13)

To some committed Communists, Cornforth may have succeeded in all he proposed; but, of course, only committed Communists, and only those committed Communists with few ideological differences, will agree with him. At the same time, few social philosophers today will be without some influence from Marxism. Cornforth's book should, therefore, be of considerable interest to any social philosopher who wants to see how a committed Communist deals with the complexities of the Marxist traditions and the dogmatism of much that goes by the name of philosophy in Communist and non-Communist countries alike.

At times *Communism and Philosophy* seems too simple in its comments on Marxist complexities, but Cornforth is trying to develop each step as clearly as possible from the previous steps. He is aware that both his Communist and non-Communist audiences will be skeptical at best. *Communism and Philosophy* is also a political statement of considerable interest in the debates among Marxists; indeed, its political character is probably the most important aspect of the book. The points Cornforth make may be made simply, but that does not make them unimportant points.

Most basically, Cornforth makes a plea for free philosophy, arguing that this is the only position compatible with Marx or with a Communism which can remain a vital contributor to the understanding and transformation of the human situation. For Cornforth both aspects of this formula are essential. It is still important to philosophize, but it is at least equally, undoubtedly even

more, important to change the world. Cornforth is arguing, though, that Communist attempts to make philosophy serve the interests of revolution have backfired because the lack of critical inquiry has led to philosophy becoming dogma and losing touch with changing reality.

Having noted some of the general concerns of Cornforth, I wish to turn to some of the more specific issues that he raises. I shall comment on a series of related questions — empiricism, the relationship between ideology and science, and the idea of class. Each of these issues Cornforth treats at length and from a variety of perspectives.

For Cornforth, Marxism is the only theory which deserves the label empiricism. He carefully distinguishes Marx's empiricism from the 'vulgar' empiricism of daily life and the empirical 'theory' which is divorced from human experience. Cornforth contends only Marxism is truly empirical because it is both rooted in experiences and includes ways of adequately explaining experience. Historical materialism provides the basis for a true, vital empirical theory wedded to experience and capable of explaining social change and providing the tools necessary to bring about social change. Cornforth is always aware that the Marxist is not content with explanation but must also foster change.

On this basis, Cornforth develops his comments on and criticisms of contemporary revisionists. His major target, a common one today, is Althusser. He attacks Althusser by developing an interesting conception of ideology. He rejects the simple Marxist equation of ideology and false consciousness and uses a functional analysis he claims to find in Lenin. Ideology supplies 'individuals in society "a social consciousness" of their collective conditions and of their interests and aims which goes toward determining their individual and collective action.' (174) Cornforth argues that Althusser's opposition of science and ideology is false, arguing that science or scientific theory is essential to the formation of a correct Communist ideology to provide an adequate social consciousness.

Class still plays an essential role in Cornforth's Marxism, but he is intensely aware that the simple dichotomy of capitalist and worker has become more complex. He stresses that Marx never narrowly defined 'class' and that Marx's analysis was more complicated than it is usually presented. Cornforth prefers to write of 'class interests' which are produced by 'ownership-relations.' He is equally careful to argue that he is not concerned with specific individuals but with aggregates of individuals. Thus, the class struggle is still with us but individuals may not be aware of it. This is the same point made by Marx, but it needs special reinforcement today.

Cornforth is primarily concerned, as was Marx, to reject 'vulgar' Marxism in favor of a more complex, richer, more relevant Marxism. He still follows the basic tenets of Marx, Engels and Lenin as reinterpreted for twentieth century conditions. He is concerned with many problems Marx thought would not be problems, such as nationalism. He is also concerned with questions little addressed by Marx, such as racism. His greatest failure along these lines is

the rather short shrift he gives to feminism. He supports feminism but appears unaware of its potential.

Cornforth takes the Marxist utopia of an ultimate classless society seriously. He argues Communism is not the inevitable result of the automatic working out of economic laws but the achievable result of human effort.

Communism and Philosophy is, as a Marxist book should be, a political work as well as a philosophical one. It is philosophy for political purposes, as it must be if it is to be true to its origins. As such it is difficult to criticize because unless one shares fully in the commitment, it will be almost wholly wrong. For one who shares some of the commitment, the book is often too simple, begs some questions, and ignores others. But as the first of a series of books, this work may yet prove of considerable interest. And it is already of interest as part of the intellectual odyssey of modern communism.

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C. DYKE, *Philosophy of Economics*. Scarborough, Ont. and Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall 1981. Pp. viii + 184. Cdn\$ 9.55; Us\$ 5.95. ISBN 0-13-66336-6.

Philosophy of Economics is the latest addition to the Prentice Hall Foundations of Philosophy series. The editors indicate that the book is intended for an introductory course or for 'more specialized upper-level courses' where it is assumed it will be used along with other texts or collections of readings. Dyke confirms in the preface that he is attempting to do no more than lay some foundations.

As an introductory text, this book has a good deal to commend it. The style is refreshing; use of jargon and heavy academic prose are avoided; the reader is addressed directly; and the issues are considered in a simple, clear fashion.

The author appears to have two objectives in mind. First, the book is designed to introduce a number of selected issues, namely the nature and

calculation of economic value, the role played by the notion of rationality in economic explanation, the nature of property and the merits of a market economy.

Dyke's strategy in discussing these issues deserves mention here. Whenever possible, he begins with a concrete problem, one which the reader can grasp without difficulty. This problem is then analysed from an economic perspective and a solution is suggested. Then the author steps back and evaluates the results of the analysis from a philosophical perspective. Theories are introduced only to the extent necessary. No prior knowledge of either economics or philosophy is assumed. Finally, footnotes are used to direct readers to more technical or sophisticated accounts of the ideas being discussed.

Of the various issues addressed, the treatment of the nature of economic value is the most effective in part because it lends itself rather well to the strategy outlined above. Determining the value of goods and services is clearly central to economics. How is this to be done? In particular, can economic value be calculated and measured? Dyke describes the history of attempts by economists to do just this. The reader is introduced to the ideas of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham. The value of such notions as utility, marginal utility and utility as preference in quantifying economic value is assessed and found wanting. And persuasive reasons are offered for thinking that the economic value of things cannot be expressed in purely quantitative terms.

Discussion of other issues, while stimulating and provocative in many respects, is, nevertheless, not as satisfactory. Understanding the reasons for this is important for identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the book as an introductory text. The first reason lies in an assumption basic to Dyke's understanding of his task. He assumes from the beginning that the central ideas of economics can be set out in a simple, indeed, simplified form. He supports his position with a quotation from Galbraith:

In the case of economics, there are no propositions that cannot be stated in plain language . . . in economics the refinements rarely if ever modify the essential and practical points. (92)

In some respects this approach is admirable. Yet it creates real problems, as is illustrated by Dyke's analysis of the view that the market is an efficient and just method of generating and sharing economic wealth. Using such arguments as the prisoner's dilemma and Arrow's proof, this view of the market is challenged. Yet the force of the challenge is blunted just because 'refinements' offered by currently influential conservative economists are not considered. For example, Hayek, in *The Mirage of Social Justice*, agrees that in some respects the market is both inefficient and unjust. The virtue of the market lies, however, in the fact that it is less inefficient and less unjust than any available alternative.

Dyke indicates that his introduction is designed to be of value to persons confronted with economic decisions. One such decision is whether to sup-

port a political system which is built on a market approach to economics. Yet none of Dyke's arguments will be decisive or even particularly helpful here because they fail to introduce or consider the kind of 'refinements' illustrated above. As a result, while the introduction of market economics offered by Dyke is interesting from some perspectives, it is certainly not an introduction to current discussions. And while the reader is shown that intelligent evaluation of a variety of claims made by economists is possible, the problems to which the discussion is addressed are simply not those faced by someone concerned to evaluate policy proposals being debated in the political arena. In that sense the book is a good deal more 'academic' than Dyke himself would wish judging from a number of passages.

There is a second important reason for the fact that the treatment given to some of the issues taken up in the book is less than completely satisfactory. As already indicated, *Philosophy of Economics* is designed to introduce its readers to a number of philosophically interesting issues in the field of economics. But the book has a second and in some respects overriding objective, namely the defence of a particular view of the nature of explanation in economics. The author begins by asking the reader to consider whether economics is a science like physics. Are the laws to which economists refer natural laws? When an economist explains economic activity what is he doing? To these questions, Dyke offers a clear response. The laws of economics are like traffic laws. They are normative, not descriptive. This theme is central to the book. It gives the book coherence and adds a great deal to its value. Nevertheless, pursuit of the theme has its disadvantages for an introductory text. The topics, issues and theories which are discussed are introduced not because of their central place in current debates in economics, but because they are relevant to the author's pursuit of this central theme. For example, in the chapters focusing on the theories of Von Mises and Karl Marx the purpose of the discussion is not simply to introduce the reader to the ideas of these two important theorists. Rather, it is to advance the claim that the point of view that one adopts on economic questions is inevitably determined by the view of human nature one espouses. Further, disputes on this question do not seem to be open to empirical resolution. The result is a stimulating presentation but one which provides a somewhat truncated account of the topics in question.

In short, the chief limitation of this book is that it introduces simplified and at times unrealistic versions of current debates and theories. Further, the depth of analysis is governed not by the importance of a given topic in current debates but rather by the relevance of the topic to a discussion of Dyke's central theme, namely that economics is not a science, as that term is normally understood.

This is not to say that the book is neither interesting nor useful. To the contrary, given that its limitations are recognized, *Philosophy of Economics* could prove to be a valuable text in an introductory course.

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'Upon the whole, it is manifest, that there is such a thing as this impartiality and self-deceit.'

(Joseph Butler, Sermon X)

'There is no such thing as self-deception. People generally know what they are up to.' (Ivy Compton-Burnett)

If self-deception could not possibly exist, would we nevertheless have to invent it? M.R. Haight's answer is: Yes. There are two central questions that guide the argument: (1) Why can there be no such thing as self-deception? and (2) why, in any event, did we have to invent it?

(1) According to the author, there can be no such thing because '... self-deceivers can not literally be that. "Self-deception" contradicts itself' (vii), and 'Therefore it can not happen.' (73) This is startling. For it is natural to suppose that 'self-deception' is paradoxical only because we misunderstand it. And we misunderstand it because we approach it with the wrong model in mind: the model of interpersonal deception.

Haight is undaunted by such a natural view. And perhaps rightly so. For it is equally natural to insist that if self-deception is to count as deception, it has to satisfy certain conditions for deception. The author says that a necessary condition for 'A deceives B' is that 'A knows that *p* and A keeps B from knowing that *p*.' (8) So in a case of alleged self-deception we would have a subject who both knows and does not know the same proposition at the same time. And this seems contradictory.

Haight proceeds to explore various possible interpretations of the tempting 'epistemological descriptions' of the self-deceiver: A knows and does not know; A believes and does not believe. She argues that if a case is to count as a putative case of self-deception then these descriptions remain contradictory; and if these 'descriptions' are not contradictory then the case is correctly described as something else. The conclusion is that 'literal language failed us here.' The idea of self-deception is contradictory and 'so never more than a metaphor.' (129) It is always an 'incorrect' way to refer or to describe certain phenomena.

But if 'self-deception' is a metaphor then we should be able to say, in literal language, what it really means. So how are those pieces of conduct and frames of mind that are widely supposed to be typical cases of self-deception to be described? Haight's answer can be gleaned from these passages:

So legends grow and with them another kind of lie that may look like self-deception but is in fact no more than gullibility, wishful thinking and misplaced good intentions. (118)

If self-deception works as I think, it is often a lie only to other people. The self-deceiver is very well aware of the truth that he is trying to deny, but he acts as though he were not, except that he may seem to know where not to look. (108)

Lying is the simplest explanation — or pretending — and it is a thing that we can all understand: there is no paradox about a lie. (108)

A natural reading of these statements yields the theory that any case of so-called self-deception is either a case of wishful thinking, gullibility, weakness of will and the like, or a simple lie, pretense to others, hypocrisy.

(2) Now I turn to the second question: Why is it necessary for us to invent 'self-deception'? Why should we have and seem to need such a 'contradictory' concept?

The author answers: because it 'seems to be a useful and convenient label for helping us to resolve certain dilemmas in judging action: problems of freedom, responsibility, blame.' (viii) How does it seem to help us to do this? The idea is this. Self-deception is really a game that we play with and for other people. The people who play this game partake in a conspiracy: they have either made an unspoken treaty with each other or hope to. If people play, 'it may be by choice, or for many different reasons, including a wish for peace or to be kind.' (117) The aim of the game is to confuse people so as to make them unsure how to treat and how to judge the 'self-deceiver.' (109) The idea is 'to get away' with a piece of deception. Consider: 'If he does not mind being branded as a self-deceiver, a deliberate liar may get away with a lot.' (118) To deceive oneself then is simply to pretend that one is self-deceived in order to confuse others so that one gets away scot-free or with little blame for what really is a blatant lie or pretense. 'Self-deception' is a face-saving device for all concerned:

Its suggestion that the man's contrary behaviour is due to ignorance, to being deceived, will quiet the Judge in us somewhat, and will give Socratic hope to the Social Worker. The claim that such ignorance is self-induced will at least pretend to explain its (often very obvious) look of means to an end. And once we call a man a self-deceiver we can stress whichever point of view suits us at the time. He is an agent or a victim. He is an ingenious deceiver or strangely deceived. He is sincere or muddled, or he is worse than an ordinary liar. We can do all this only because 'self-deception' is contradictory and so never more than a mere metaphor; but it may be a metaphor that we need. (129)

These are the bare bones of the author's theory of self-deception. If I understand her claims and arguments correctly, then this theory of self-deception raises a number of difficulties for me that I should like to spell out. In the course of doing this, I also want to bring out some of the relevant details of Haight's argument.

(3) Let us suppose then that 'self-deception' is a metaphor. Then we should be able to say what it really is in literal language. What has hitherto been taken as self-deception is, according to the author, just wishful thinking,

weakness of will, hypocrisy or the blatant deception of other people. So when we recognize cases as typical cases of self-deception we should really recognize them as cases of the aforementioned concepts. But this is odd. For throughout the book, the author seems to acknowledge that (for example) while wishful thinking may shade into self-deception nevertheless they are different concepts. Haight herself says that 'self-deception is not mere wishful thinking.' (1) In any event, if the proposal is that what has hitherto passed as cases of self-deception are capable of being reduced to other unproblematic notions then the reader has a legitimate expectation that an account of these other notions will be forthcoming. But apart from a discussion of wishful thinking, this expectation is not satisfied.

Perhaps 'weak' cases of self-deception can be reduced to other notions which are trouble-free. However, what about 'hard' cases? Cases where the similarities between self-deception and other-deception are so striking that we are apt to be incredulous when someone proposes that 'self-deception' is mere metaphor. Here the author assimilates self-deception to the 'simple' deception of others. This seems too simple to me. If I deceive myself, I may also succeed in deceiving others. But surely I may do the former without the latter or vice versa. If I deceive others but not myself about being in love with my wife, I know that I am not in love with her, but they don't. If I deceive myself about it successfully, I knew at one time that I no longer love her, but I no longer know this, though I may have glimmerings of the truth from time to time. To deceive oneself, it is essential to have obscured this former item of knowledge and to have persuaded oneself to believe the opposite. To remain self-deceived, it is necessary to explain away or evade recurring glimmerings or thoughts of the truth. Although I regard this to be an obvious differentiating feature between 'self-deception' and 'the deception of others,' it is necessary to remind ourselves of it.

There is an exaggerated picture of the role of other people in self-deception. Haight remarks: 'we forget that what he may dread above everything else is *having to admit to us* that *p*.' (109) My question is: Does he admit it to himself? If he does, then what is *he* deceived about? A person who admits to himself that *p* and knows that *p* but asserts not-*p* to us, is surely not a plausible candidate for self-deception. Again, the author thinks that 'self-deceivers may have clear moments in which they spell out their lying condition.' (117-8) But what are they deceived about then and there? The natural description is that such a person emerged from self-deception, if only for a short period, and then deceived himself back into his former condition.

This is not to say that there are not moments in self-deception when *the thought of p* occurs to one. But the mere thought of *p* (or glimmerings of the truth) do not amount to belief that *p* or acceptance of the truth. Such moments necessitate, if one is to stay self-deceived, the exercise of the techniques of self-deception: evasion and rationalization.

This leads me to a difficulty concerning the author's 'conspiracy' theory of self-deception. Is self-deception really a game that we always or even typically play with others? No doubt sometimes it is. There are people and

groups of people who facilitate self-deception. We all know about sycophants, though we tend not to notice this in people who love us. (This is also why we are naturally suspicious of 'schools of philosophy' or 'special interest groups' in philosophy.) But if the 'conspiracy' theory is true, how are we to make sense of the case of a shipwrecked person on a deserted island who deceives himself that he will be rescued? There is no other person to deceive. Whom did he make a pact with? Whom is he trying to confuse so as to receive a 'less harsh treatment'?

In several passages Haight says that the self-deceiver is really an incredible, clumsy, incompetent deceiver of others. Consider: 'Here is A professing not- p when p is obviously true; and we have reason to think that A knows that p is false. A is so very far from competent.' (108) But this seems more like a bare-faced lie, a case of blatant, mad, irrational belief, rather than what typically happens in self-deception. We need not worry about this though. For in other passages, the author seems to say quite the opposite of self-deceivers; namely, that they are good liars who will try to find a story that the other person would like the best. And self-deception is alleged to be that story. (123)

I am also somewhat bewildered about Haight's rationale for our alleged need to invent 'self-deception.' The aim of the self-deceiver is to confuse us so that

We may therefore not know how to judge him morally and we almost certainly will not be sure how to treat him! While we hesitate, he gains more time. (109)

The reason for my bewilderment is that we are inclined (to begin with) to look upon self-deceit (and the deception of others) as *prima facie* bad things. So, if someone has done something monstrous and if this was the result of self-deception, it is natural to condemn him *twice*: once for his monstrous deed, and once for his self-deceit. So self-deception does not necessarily exculpate; it may in fact inculcate. So I can not see how the device of 'self-deception' is supposed to prevent us from knowing how to treat and judge the self-deceiver.

Finally, throughout the book the author expresses at least momentary doubts about the idea that 'self-deception' is a metaphor. Why should 'self-deception' seem a better description than anything else? Could it be that 'self-deception' is 'too good a metaphor to be a metaphor'? (121) Why is it that the term 'matches what we feel about self-deceivers'? My view is that 'self-deception' is *not* a metaphor, but a literal and descriptive use of language. The author seems to think that it is a metaphor because it is a reflexive use of 'deceive' and because it is contradictory. But just because a verb is reflexive in some of its employments hardly shows that its reflexive use is metaphorical. Surely the expression 'Jones killed himself' is not metaphorical yet killer and killed are one and the same person.

Concerning the alleged contradictory nature of self-deception: Haight herself acknowledges that

no single description of the self-deceiver is a contradiction; it is that too many descriptions might fit, and we cannot have it all ways. And their implications clash. (120)

But let us not worry about what descriptions 'might fit.' Let us look and see what descriptions do fit. That a person has been deceived by someone into believing that *p* cannot be determined by looking at and describing his present state of mind. One has to, *inter alia*, find out how he has come to acquire his belief. Someone, through some tactic or another, brought him to believe that *p*. Juggling the evidence, making him focus on some parts rather than on others, explaining away these other parts, rationalization, evasion: these are some of the tactics of deception. But these have their recognizable analogues in self-deception. So if we distinguish between the state of self-deception, and the process or activity of which this state is the result, we can, I believe, describe the self-deceiver's knowledge and ignorance, belief and disbelief, without contradiction.

In closing I want to say that, in spite of my misgivings about the author's thesis, the book is a provocative, thoughtful and worthwhile contribution to the growing literature on 'self-deception'. The critical discussions of the theories of Freud, Sartre and Fingarette are penetrating and convincing. Haight writes as philosophy ought to be written — in a lucid, non-technical way, accessible to any thoughtful person. I noticed one amusing misprint on p. 153, footnote 85: R.D. Laing's *The Divided Self* is referred to as *The Dividend Self*.

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JEANSON, FRANCIS. *Sartre and the Problem of Morality*, trans. and with an Introduction by Robert V. Stone. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana U.P. 1980. Pp. xi + 279. US\$ 27.50. ISBN 0-253-16603-7.

This is a classic, the English translation of which is more than a decade overdue. As the first paragraph of Stone's introduction indicates, Jeanson published the original version in 1947, along with an exceptionally enthusiastic letter-foreword by Sartre himself ('I have no hesitation in recom-

mending your work to the public; it is something much more and much better than an introduction to existentialism' — p. xxxix). It was reprinted by a different publisher in 1965, along with a significant addition: a 'Postface 1965: Un Quidam nommé Sartre,' written by the author. Despite all the mutations that had occurred in Sartre's thought, in philosophical trends, and in the world at large during the eighteen-year interim, *Le Problème moral et la pensée de Sartre* still conveyed a feeling of freshness and incisiveness in 1965; today, I think that the same can be said of this new English translation.

Much of the credit for this, of course, remains attributable to Jeanson himself. A very young man when he first drafted this book, he had the lucidity to cut through the complicated terminology of *Being and Nothingness* (along with Sartre's still earlier philosophical writings) and, without oversimplifying, to raise truly central questions about Sartre's thought — e.g., how is the phenomenological method, based on the apprehension of essences, compatible with the Sartrean denial that there is any fixed human nature or essence; is there not a contradiction in asserting at once both that we are all, by virtue of being human, already 'condemned to freedom,' and yet that human liberation is an as yet unattained goal to be striven for; and, most central of all for Jeanson, can a meaningful ethic be generated within a thought framework that insists that values are created by individuals and have no independent existence?

Jeanson had realized from the outset of his undertaking that, despite Sartre's well-known postponement, until some indefinite future time, of a discussion of the possibility of an individual's 'radical conversion' from bad faith to authenticity, to which allusion is made in a footnote in *Being and Nothingness*, nevertheless the moral perspective implied by such a possibility was in fact a guiding one for Sartre's entire thought. Jeanson had also realized that the pursuit of moral issues along these lines would entail a heavier emphasis on the social and historical dimensions of human existence than was apparent in what Sartre had written up to that point. He organized his exposition of Sartre's philosophy accordingly. At first glance, the outcome was highly paradoxical; for, by using as his *leitmotif* a set of issues to which Sartre makes very little explicit reference in the works covered, Jeanson succeeded in producing a very clear and rather comprehensive summary of the main elements in the early Sartre's systematic thought. The only possible conclusion to be drawn is that Jeanson's perception of the centrality, at a deeper level, of 'the moral problem' in that thought was on target.

This was, essentially, the conclusion that Sartre himself drew when he wrote his very generous letter of introduction. Subsequently, it will be recalled, Sartre published many other writings of both a more occasional and a more rigorously philosophical variety. Most notable among the latter was his *Critique de la raison dialectique*, in which he employed an entirely new technical vocabulary and dealt primarily with social groupings within an (abstractly) historical setting. Sartre's views about the very possibility of an existentialist ethic became, to put it simply, much more skeptical than they had been when he had indicated, in the closing pages of *Being and*

Nothingness, his never-fulfilled promise to produce a work on this topic. Nevertheless, it remains noteworthy that Sartre's letter lauded Jeanson's work as one in which, unlike so many other Sartre commentaries, he could recognize his own thought. Moreover, as Sartre rightly pointed out, there is an important sense in which Jeanson's stress on the social and historical implications of a Sartrean approach to morality actually anticipated directions that Sartre's own latest thinking, not as yet reflected in any of his published works, was beginning to take in 1947.

In his 1965 Postface, Jeanson relates the story of his first encounter with Sartre (he had just completed the original manuscript and was about to send it to his publisher, but suffered a few scruples about scholarly accuracy which he decided to resolve by introducing himself to Sartre and posing a few questions) and mentions some of the subsequent history of their relationship. He also attempts to deal with the apparent rejection of his own enterprise that is implied by the later Sartre's extreme skepticism concerning ethics. By stressing the themes of openness and ambiguity in Sartre's philosophy and life (as illustrated especially by Sartre's autobiographical fragment, *The Words*), Jeanson manages to make plausible his obvious conviction that what he wrote in 1947 has not become outdated. As he says, tellingly and wittily, the general title of 'the two fat volumes I would now be tempted to write concerning Sartre' would be '*The Problem of Sartre and Moral Philosophy*.' (262) The reader is left with the sense of having placed himself or herself in the hands of a remarkably deft interpreter, someone whose understanding of Sartre may at times have surpassed Sartre's own. (The same can be said of Jeanson's *sympathy* for Sartre's philosophy, a sympathy that is tempered only by some reservations about its practical efficacy.)

But credit for the success of the present English version of Jeanson's book is not Jeanson's alone. The translator, Robert Stone, deserves a great deal. He has been meticulous in rendering both the substance and the crisp, lucid style of the original into fluent English. He has added numerous explanatory footnotes, such as his very helpful and (for reading Sartre) important discussion of the indefinite pronoun, 'autrui.' (159) In addition, he has composed a thirty-page introduction that is filled with significant background information concerning both Sartre's and Jeanson's frequently intertwined careers in the years following 1947. (Jeanson was for some time manager of the journal over which Sartre presided for so long, *Les Temps Modernes*. It was Jeanson's devastating review of Camus' *The Rebel* that occasioned the final break in friendship between Camus and Sartre. Later, when Jeanson was engaged in clandestine and, by the standards of official French patriotism and legality of the time, treasonous activities in support of the Algerian FLN, Sartre formally associated himself with these activities by contributing an article to the support group's underground newspaper. And so on.) Stone also informs us about the several stages of Sartre's later thinking about ethics. What Stone has done is not at all intrusive, but we are left with the impression of someone who was exceptionally competent to undertake this task and exceptionally dedicated to doing it well.

As for the text itself, its most serious deficiency, if such it can be termed, stems from the circumstances of its date(s) of authorship, which I have already related. It takes no systematic account of Sartre's later work, nor does it, except in some footnotes added by Stone and in the latter's introduction, mention secondary works about Sartre written after 1947. Indeed, Jeanson avoided making very much reference to other critical studies even in his original version, so that a few early allusions to a narrow and, I suspect, now seldom remembered Thomist polemic against Sartre by Luc-Jean Lefèvre, entitled *L'Existentialiste est-il un philosophe?*, make it in all probability the most frequently-cited work by anyone but Sartre himself. (The answer to the rhetorical question is supposed, of course, to be 'Non.') But excellent Sartre bibliographies are already extant, and Stone and his publishers have taken pains not to parade this book as anything but what it is, namely, a classic that has been furnished with a bridge to the recent past by virtue of the translator's introduction.

It is an enduring classic. The spate of new books and essays about Sartre, most of the former begun before his recent death but given some added interest by it, seems to be tending on the whole to reject the thesis of one or more radical discontinuities in the evolution of his thought (*that* it evolved is, of course, beyond any doubt) in favor of an effort to see that thought in its totality. (Among the most noteworthy of such books are Ronald Aronson's *Jean-Paul Sartre — Philosophy in the World*, Peter Caws' *Sartre*, and the long-delayed and very recently released Library of Living Philosophers volume on Sartre, to which Stone is one of the contributors.) In light of this interpretive tendency, which I consider sound, it is useful and instructive to revisit the pure 'early' Sartre, as depicted with such exceptional clarity by Jeanson, and to find that he still remains recognizable as — pure Sartre.

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C.B. MACPHERSON, ed. *Locke's Second Treatise of Government*. Indianapolis: Hackett 1980. Pp. xxiv + 124. US\$ 12.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-915144-93-x); US\$ 2.75 (paper: ISBN 0-915144-86-7).

To say that a new college edition of Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* is welcome is perhaps to stretch the point. Indeed, I suspect more than

a few instructors of the history of political thought would collectively sigh in relief if no such editions were easily available. Were that the case, we would feel less compelled to spend those last few seemingly precious hours before 'spring break' trying to persuade students that Locke's defense of limited government is deserving of careful study despite its ambiguities and inconsistencies and the vicious form of social relations that it (apparently) permits — all the while secretly hoping that our students have the good sense to be better spending their time re-reading *Leviathan*.

C.B. Macpherson's recent edition of the *Second Treatise* might well provide an escape-hatch. In a fifteen page introduction to Locke's major political work, Professor Macpherson provides for his reader a tightly written, meaty, and often invigorating critical assessment of Locke's argument. In it, one finds some of the best of Macpherson's now famous criticism of liberal-democratic government.

The editor's introduction includes a brief discussion of the historical significance of Locke's work and its pedagogical value, a too brief biographical sketch of Locke's life which highlights somewhat too pointedly the author's entrepreneurial tastes and holdings, and an impressive accounting of Locke's theory of human nature (as it is found in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*) in its significance for the political theory it feeds. This latter section focuses upon the competing demands of a largely Hobbesian psychology and the postulate of a peaceful and moral state of nature. How, Macpherson queries his reader, could Locke have failed to see the contradiction in holding such contrary assumptions of men?

The answer and indeed the core of the editor's introduction lies in an assessment of Locke's theory of property. The true substance of the *Second Treatise*, Macpherson intimates, is Locke's attempt to justify a state which serves best the interests of the extant propertied class to the systematic disadvantage of the wage-earner. Such a justification requires a defence of the right to unlimited accumulation of property, and it is Locke who, in Macpherson's view, is the champion of bourgeois property relations.

In a passion uncharacteristic of an introductory essay and on grounds more Rousseauian than Marxist, Macpherson proceeds to expose Locke's argument. The analysis he offers is a vigorous précis of much of his earlier work on Locke albeit with less attention paid to the individualism of Locke than is characteristic. He argues that Locke's caveats upon unlimited acquisition — the 'spoilage' claim and the 'enough and as good for others' proviso — that condition one's God-given right to acquire that with which one has mixed one's labour (or one's labourer's labour), are undermined by Locke's own treatment. Instead, what we find in the *Second Treatise*, according to the editor, is the first formal recognition and defence of the division of labour in general. Locke's arguments boil down thus to little more than a defence of inequality, an inequality which defines the state's proper role — as its defender.

I will resist here the temptation to engage Macpherson's substantive analysis. More space and perhaps more passion is required. I am offended

more than anything by Macpherson's attempt to explain away Locke's theory by pointing to the author's class position, but most students will quickly see that the professor is simplifying for the sake of brevity. That Macpherson's analysis is, in the end, largely right is a conclusion that it is difficult to avoid, especially for those of us who praise the critical power of Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*. That Locke is the best advocate of bourgeois property relations is somewhat less convincing, but I leave this to the readers of Nozick and others to decide for themselves.

The question is whether Macpherson's attack on Locke is appropriately placed in an introduction meant for the college student. The *Treatise* continues to draw attention, Macpherson argues, because it provides 'an excellent subject on which students may develop their critical abilities.' If this be right, one would have assumed that the professor would leave the work of analysis to his students. In the end, I'm afraid, the text too well escapes the spring break trap. It tells students why they ought not read on.

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RICHARD M. MARTIN, *Primordially, Science, and Value*. Albany, N.Y.: S.U.N.Y. Press 1980. Pp. xiii + 331. US\$ 34.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-87395-443-2); US\$ 12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87395-444-0).

This interesting book would better be called 'Logician, Will Travel.' In it Martin, an accomplished logician, applies the machinery he has developed in earlier books, especially *Semiotics and Linguistic Structure*,¹ to issues from all corners of the philosophical sphere. The choice of topics, and Martin's treatment of them, yield an image of a sophisticated and principled thinker, but by no means an impartial one. There is an evangelical motif to the whole which surfaces as the main theme at the beginning, middle, and end of the collection, in Chapters I, VIII, XI, & XX. There Martin argues informally for philosophers to formalize their enterprise according to

Maxim 16. Use quantification theory and generalize as far as possible. Do not ride in a horse and buggy. (145)

Only when philosophers are animated by this rule will philosophy yield not only a unified theory of science and value, but a vision of the primordial as well. Reconstruction in theology is Martin's first order of business. Five of twenty chapters (II, III, IV, V, & X) are about God, in particular Whitehead's 'primordial' God (God-in-Her/Himself, so to speak). But philosophy in the jet age does not imply only such high-flown travels for Martin himself, since the remaining papers in this book are of the logician-on-assignment sort, the assignments being Plotinus' metaphysics, Peirce's reformed (pro-scientific) Hegelianism, Hartshorne's meta-methodology, Schlick's meta-philosophy, Hintikka's theory of intensions, Kant's second antinomy, Goodman's languages of art, and 'constructive idealism.'

It is Martin's logic that is supposed to enlighten these subjects. The principal generator of his logic is the 'virtual set,' or 'Logic In Wolf's Clothing' as Quine puts it.² These 'sets' have the virtue of being purely imaginary, so that the characteristic set-theoretic expression, ' $y \ni \{x : Fx\}$ ', which is normally taken to determine a set by means of the open sentence ' Fx ' is now taken as simply *another way of writing* ' Fy '. By means of these imaginary sets Martin goes on to develop a battery of logics, of which virtual (imaginary) relations, the calculus of individuals, and the logic of events, acts, states and processes³ play prominent roles in this book. So, despite Martin's claiming parsimonious brotherhood with Quine and Goodman (e.g., p. 16, 'We do not wish our logic to be responsible for *any ontology at all*'), he works with a very large expense-account nevertheless. There are problems with this pretense of riches. For one thing, it seems essential that the concept of a set and of set inclusion be *presumed* in Martin's metalanguage, as indeed it *is* presumed,⁴ or else we have no reason whatever to understand a statement of set inclusion is being made by ' $y \ni \{x : Fx\}$ ' given that *is* is introduced as merely the abbreviandum of ' Fy '. So it comes to pass that the metalanguage is free to make ontological commitment that the object language would not touch with a dungfork. If we do not assume that Martin is talking about sets in the normal sense, but about imaginary ones, then definitions such as, e.g., that of 'God' as the 'fusion of the set of all primordial valuations' (25-6), are as vacuous as the 'set' involved. Formally, the ontological austerity that is to be achieved by virtual sets comes to a prohibition against taking any such set as the value of a bound variable. But even here Martin plays fast and loose. He says (25),

'Obj e' may abbreviate '(Ee'') (e'' Fu F • ePe'')

That is, 'e is an object' means the same as 'there *exists* a fusion of a (virtual) class F of all of God's primordial obligatings, and e is not part of e''.' A fusion of a virtual class F 'is the sum of all atoms that are parts of members of F.'⁵ But such a sum is a class,⁶ and apparently *is* taken as the value of a bound variable in the above abbreviation. Martin eats lamb when he is in wolf's clothing.

Even if we are insensitive to the metaphysical disputes of the logicians, Martin's work still does not accomplish all we would like to see accomplished by a formal treatment of a subject. It *is* enlightening to see theses in full for-

mal dress. However, Martin's work, by his own admission, consists merely of a 'suitable parade of principles.' (12) Twenty-four of them stream by in the second chapter alone, supported by an even larger troupe of definitions and abbreviations. Now, we may forgive a logician for not fully formalizing such work, for choice of axioms is somewhat arbitrary, and completeness perhaps irrelevant to special applications. However, it would be nice to know whether the parade of formulae behind turnstiles is even consistent. At the very least, we should like to see the principles in action — *some* material should be derived from them to see whether it is plausible, illuminating, or even interesting. Unfortunately, Martin rarely stoops to an actual derivation, and even these are informal (e.g., p. 49). The bulk of his explication is borne by the covert semantic content of the undefined primitives. For example, the above-mentioned definition of 'God' as meaning the same as 'the fusion of all primordial obligations' derives its sense not from the principles governing it, nor from the clarity of the concept of a fusion, but from the surreptitious connotations of the undefined primitive for 'an *act or state of valuational obligating*.' (25)

The pair of chapters on Plotinus should be of interest to scholars, since the 24 definitions and 48 principles Martin provides are *a* framework within which the Plotinian metaphysics may be outlined and examined. Martin's work on Kant's second antinomy is interesting and promising, especially at first, when he recasts the antinomy *without* recourse to virtual sets (Martin tells us that we should assume his mereology, or calculus of individuals, but that part of said calculus which is used in his treatment of the antinomy does not require virtual sets). He does not notice that on this plausible reformulation the thesis and antithesis are consistent on the assumption of monism (i.e., they have a one-element model). Monists may take heart. Or pluralists, noting that monism contradicts the very presuppositions of the second antinomy, namely that there are some complex objects, may ask that Martin enter one more principle in this parade: ' $(Ex)\sim Atx$ ' (where ' Atx ' = (x is atomic)) is defined as ' $(y) (yPx \supset xPy)$ ', and where ' xPy ' (x is part of y) may be reflexive. Instead of these concerns, Martin *assumes* the antithesis, that all is continuous (' $\sim (Ex) (\sim Atx \cdot (Ey) (Aty \cdot yPx)) \cdot \sim (Ex) Atx$ ' (253), i.e., no complex, non-atomic thing is made of atoms, and there are no atoms), and having assumed it goes on to attempt a continuous ontology for 'modern set theory *sans phrase*.' (256) Not every logician is broad-minded enough to take such troubles with a system he repudiates. But Martin's heart, in this assignment, is with Peirce, not with set theory: Martin wants to reconcile Peirce's continuous ontology with the generally accepted — though not by Martin — foundations for mathematics, proving that logical convictions and systematic-philosophical convictions can be at cross-purposes even among the sophisticated.

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- 1 R.M. Martin, *Semiotics and Linguistic Structure* (Albany, N.Y.: S.U.N.Y. Press 1978).
- 2 W.V. Quine, *Philosophy of Logic* (Scarborough, Ont. Prentice-Hall 1970) 68. See also pp. 68-76.
- 3 Martin (1978), 57-72. 4 Ibid., 7. 5 Ibid., 52. 6 Ibid., 12

ANDRÉ MERCIER, *Metaphysik — eine Wissenschaft sui generis: Theorie und Erfahrung auf dem Gebiete des Inkommensurablen*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot (Erfahrung und Denken, Bd. 61) 1980. 229 p.: DM 78. ISBN 3-428-04808-3.

Après les multiples assauts que la métaphysique occidentale a subis et qui l'ont reléguée soit du côté du mysticisme où il vaut mieux contempler et se taire, soit du côté du terrain vide de pseudo-questions, et après ses diverses tentatives de renaître pour mieux être achevée par la suite et se mourir d'une mort lente mais sûre, il peut paraître audacieux de produire un livre dont le titre annonce qu'il y sera question de la métaphysique comme science qui cependant se distinguerait totalement de ce qui porte aujourd'hui ce nom. Tentative curieuse, surtout quand elle est faite par quelqu'un que l'on dit 'physicien théorique.' (préface) De quoi donc l'auteur a-t-il voulu convaincre son lecteur? Le sous-titre 'Théorie et expérience sur le terrain de l'inkommensurable' ainsi que le ch. I nous fourniront la réponse.

En guise d'introduction l'auteur récapitule dans un survol rapide les concepts-clés de la pensée métaphysique, leur formation, leur développement, et les problèmes qu'ils ont servis à formuler. Mais l'auteur sait sans doute aussi que ce n'est pas une énumération de ces thèmes qui contribuera à faire la démonstration que la métaphysique est une science *sui generis*. Il faut donc s'attaquer directement à la question 'qu'est-ce que la métaphysique?' (ch. 1) et indiquer son rapport à l'activité scientifique entendue au sens large.

A cette fin l'auteur propose de partir de la division traditionnelle des activités philosophiques en activités *théoriques* (logique, métaphysique), *pratiques* (éthique, morale), *naturelles* (sciences particulières de la nature) et *appliquées* (technique, iatrique...); il constate qu'au cours du temps l'activité théorique, à l'exception de la logique, fut récupérée par la science au sens moderne, et la métaphysique vidée de son objet propre. Qu'est-ce qui nous

autorise alors à la considérer comme science? Voici la réponse de l'auteur. En tant que quête des causes de l'être en tant que tel, l'objet véritable de la métaphysique est une *valeur* que cette discipline tente et peut découvrir. (22) On peut donc bien lui assigner un 'objet' de recherche, bien qu'il faille encore d'une part le préciser et d'autre part se demander s'il y a une expérience métaphysique qui serait identique, similaire ou radicalement différente de l'expérience dont se réclament les sciences et qui puisse garantir l'authenticité de la connaissance métaphysique au même titre que l'empirie soutient les hypothèses des sciences naturelles. L'essentiel de cette première partie du livre réside dans les deux réponses suivantes: la valeur qui est l'objet de la quête métaphysique, 'le métaphysique,' ce n'est ni le vrai, ni le bien, ni le beau, c'est le sublime que l'auteur ne veut pas confondre avec un universel qui pourrait caractériser une théorie scientifique, une oeuvre d'art ou une action exemplaire, car le sublime se situe au-delà de tout univers. Le sublime 'présuppose une opposition, une sorte d'incommensurabilité entre deux ordres de grandeur': celui d'un monde caractérisé de part en part par la finitude et l'ordre de grandeur de ce qui transcende toute limite. Le sublime est l'entre-deux, une valeur-limite. (28)

La métaphysique cerne donc 'un objet positif' (32) sans cependant en faire la théorie ou proposer une doctrine à son sujet. L'auteur se contente qu'elle soit 'quête' (Erforschung, Ergründung) dont il dit en plus qu'elle suit une procédure objective ('sie geht objektiv vor' (32)). Mais l'auteur parvient-il à caractériser un tant soit peu cette procédure ou ce type d'expérience dont peut se réclamer le métaphysicien? Ce point, crucial pourtant, et réglé en quelques phrases: c'est le *Weltschmerz* ('douleur du monde') qui est l'expérience que nous avons du métaphysique, et cette douleur est selon l'auteur une sorte d'inquiétude, de non-repos, de désir et d'insatisfaction, en somme l'expérience d'une incomptence totale, due à notre finitude, de se mesurer avec ce qui transcende toute finitude. Par contre l'auteur ne dit pas en quoi cette expérience s'articulerait en procédure objective.

Si c'est la positivité de l'objet et l'objectivité de la procédure qui autorisent à rapprocher la métaphysique de la science, il faut bien reconnaître que le peu qu'on en dit invite plutôt à mettre l'accent sur la clause 'sui generis' et à conclure à une différence totale entre les deux disciplines. La référence que fait l'auteur par la suite à des conceptions historiques de la métaphysique illustre certes les deux aspects de la question: positivité de l'objet qui se révèle à travers une variété de genres déterminés de 'réalités' inaccessibles à la connaissance sensible (tels Dieu, l'âme, le monde nouménal ou d'autres entités métémpiriques); caractère spécifique de la connaissance métaphysique (saisie absolue, intuition immédiate, connaissance par raison pure, etc.); formes particulières de 'preuves' métaphysiques (de l'existence de Dieu, de l'âme) au sens de 'Probe,' tentative ou essai (Versuch) qui ressemble, selon l'auteur, plutôt à un pari pascalien dans le sens que 'cela vaut la peine.' (46) Mais ces illustrations ne sont pas de véritables arguments pour les thèses que l'on voudrait soutenir.

Le reste du livre est un parcours de la métaphysique traditionnelle (orien-

tale, grecque, chrétienne, moderne et contemporaine), une lecture de textes métaphysiques à la lumière du point de vue présenté au départ. Mais rares sont les passages où l'on réfère à la préoccupation principale, si ce n'est dans les excursions sur les particularités du langage de la métaphysique, sur la différence entre expérience mystique et sur les courants anti-métaphysiques depuis Kant. Ce parcours de l'histoire de la métaphysique se présente comme résumés et commentaires assez libres de quelques aspects des doctrines respectives où tout y passe, aussi bien les grands auteurs (Platon, Aristote, Thomas d'Aquin, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel) que des figures mineures (p. ex. Victor Cousin, Unamuno), leur réservant un traitement plutôt inégal (p. ex. la position métaphysique de Kant est résumée en deux, trois phrases (161) et la phénoménologie mérite une demie page (199)). Si le livre devait servir le propos principal, rétablir la métaphysique comme science *sui generis*, n'aurait-il pas été préférable de se mesurer aux thèses et arguments de ceux qui l'ont dénoncée comme le lieu des pseudo-problèmes?

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WILLIAM N. NELSON, *On Justifying Democracy*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P. 1980; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1980. Pp. ix + 176. Cdn\$ 36.75; US\$ 16.95. ISBN 0-7100-0653-5.

Prof. Nelson's intention and approach are made clear at the outset. His central problem is the *justification* of democracy. What reasons have we to believe that democracy is a good system of government? His approach is that of one whose 'training is in analytical moral and political philosophy.' (1) This is abundantly apparent in the book's treatment of its subject. The discussion throughout is extraordinarily close and detailed. Indeed, one whose taste and training are different — as are mine — might be tempted to complain that the analyses of problems and doctrines are so elaborate as to be overly meticulous, issuing in distinctions without a difference. But I do not think that is the case. Prof. Nelson argues effectively that such analyses are

necessary in order to clarify the precise nature of the questions at issue and the various answers proposed to these.

A brief Introduction announces the author's assumptions and manner of approach. He regards democracy as basically a particular 'system for making governmental decisions.' (3) He assumes that laws and policies can be objectively and intrinsically just or unjust — this is not determined simply by the procedures employed in making them. Finally, he intends to justify democracy in terms of its probable consequences — by its results and the fruit that it bears. There follows a short chapter on the need for governmental decisions. The next four chapters take up different approaches to the justification of democracy. The final two chapters develop the author's own answer to this problem.

'When governments make decisions, they take these decisions out of the hands of individuals.' (8) Nelson identifies three areas in which it is at least desirable, and probably even necessary, for governments to do this: when individuals might make self-seeking decisions that would harm others; when there is a need to coordinate the activities of several persons; and when there is a need for an authority to decide guilt and punishment.

Nelson turns now to his examination of various justifications of democracy. He starts with theories that defend democracy on the ground that it is an intrinsically *fair* way to make governmental decisions; and it claims to be fair because, relying on the doctrine of majority rule, it gives everyone an equal voice in the decision-making process. This is rejected for the reason that it gives precedence to standards for evaluating procedures, and in fact these standards must be derived from prior ones for evaluating laws and policies. Why prefer a procedure if it makes the wrong decisions?

The author next considers theories which justify democracy as that form of government which, to the largest possible extent, 'permits and encourages participation in decision-making by those affected by the decisions.' (41) Adherents of these theories advocate a very strong form of popular rule, and they argue that democracy defined in this way is a powerful tool for fostering desirable character traits and habits: it promotes the virtue and intelligence of its citizens, encouraging them to take an active role in group affairs and control of their own lives; citizens then become committed to such a system, creating a consensus through discussion and give-and-take, and thus coming to accept even decisions to which they are opposed. Nelson accepts several features of these participatory arguments, but he also points out that such a system of government may in some respects have quite a different impact on society and the people: for instance, cool discussion may turn into acrimonious argument, exacerbating differences instead of healing them; and by participation in the system, people may become trapped by it, and thus be led to acquiesce in decisions that they regard as wrong and even immoral. Furthermore, there are numerous important contexts in which people should *not* have a right to equal participation in making decisions that affect them all: for people have quite different abilities and standings, which could result in uninformed or biased decisions.

The author turns next to theories of Popular Sovereignty, which he defines as holding, roughly speaking, that the values and preferences of the people are to be reflected in government policies and decisions. 'To say that the people are self-governing is to say that what they believe ought to be done by the state is done' (54): that is, government responds to and implements the will of the people. The basic objection to be made to this theory is its implicit assumption that there is in fact such a thing as 'the will of the people.' For what we find when we actually look at 'the people' is a vast array of different and often contradictory values and preferences: we certainly never find unanimity. So the 'will of the people' is a fiction. Various suggestions for overcoming this problem are judged to be faulty, producing nothing more than either a 'second best' choice in which people acquiesce out of necessity, or else a series of isolated wills rather than a single one.

The final school of thought considered is that in which the analysis of democracy is modeled on the methods of economists. Thus, a democratic society is composed of individuals using votes instead of money to maximize their interests; of political parties seeking power rather than profits; and of alternative policies offered to voters instead of a variety of goods offered to potential purchasers. Nelson rejects these theories on the ground that they assign equal weight — an equal voice in determining policy — to *all* values and preferences. And this kind of 'equalizing' is unacceptable to both public opinion and moral principles.

The author turns now to his own justification of democracy. Of course, this has been adumbrated in the preceding critiques; for, as he makes clear, he finds much of merit in these other theories, and he incorporates various of their ideas into his own doctrine. Chapters VI and VII deal respectively with what Nelson regards as the two central questions. Is democracy a good and desirable form of government? Are the citizens of a democracy required, or even permitted, to obey all of its laws? The first question he of course answers affirmatively; the second, negatively.

The justification that the author develops is instrumental in character, not procedural: he argues that 'democracy is desirable largely because of its *good effects* — because it tends to produce good laws and policies, or, at least, to prevent bad ones.' (96: emphasis added) This rather abstract statement, with its ambiguous 'good,' is at once given more explicit meaning with this claim: 'given certain assumptions about human nature, democracy will automatically tend to produce *morally acceptable results*.' (101: emphasis added) And this still somewhat vague definition is made more concrete in two steps. First, morality is identified as 'a system of rules or principles proscribing some kinds of harmful or dangerous conduct and enjoining certain kinds of beneficial conduct.' (102) Secondly, the author adopts John Rawls's notion of a 'well-ordered society' as one that is 'effectively regulated by a public conception of justice' (103, citing Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 5). That is, certain principles of justice are generally acknowledged by all, and social and political institutions are generally accepted as serving these principles.

The challenge now confronting Nelson is that of establishing that democracy is the system of government that is best qualified to secure these ends. He begins this task by explicating the 'certain assumptions' referred to just above. There are three of these, and they can best be given in his own words:

Given a general belief in certain fundamental constraints, and given a normal interest in the opinions of others, each will want to *appear* to limit his behavior by those constraints. But the easiest way to appear to conform to principles, usually, is to conform to them.' (107: emphasis in original)

Nelson acknowledges that these are 'empirical assumptions' which may not hold true. But he believes that they are reasonable, for 'it is hard to imagine a complete lack of consensus on principles within subgroups in a society ... The long run tendency is toward general compliance with ... principles that have the properties of an adequate morality.' (110) I shall return shortly to consider the standing — the soundness — of these assumptions. But it is best first to complete this outline of Nelson's justification of democracy.

As we have seen, the proper function — and hence the criterion — of a 'just political system' is to produce good laws and policies. Very little has hitherto been said about the distinguishing features of democracy as a political system. But it has all along been obvious how the term was being understood, and this is now made explicit: democracy is 'an open system of representative government' operating through the 'institutions of modern constitutional democracy.' (128, 129) In a word, it is the system familiar to us in contemporary Western states.

Thus conceived, democracy is desirable because, since it is a system of 'open government,' those who govern must justify themselves and their decisions in public. Such 'open debate' in turn fosters public morality and 'precludes legislation and policies contrary to the morality.' (129) Democracy requires groups to justify their claims in terms of accepted principles. It fosters citizens who participate actively in affairs and are zealous in defending their rights. And it leads, through public discussion, to the formation of principles of justice against which to test both private demands and public decisions. It is because of these desirable affects that democracy is justified.

In his final chapter, Nelson turns to the second of his central questions: Must the citizens of a democracy obey all of its laws? In answering, he advances further grounds that justify democracy, while at the same time qualifying the demands that it can make upon us and the obedience that we owe it. He starts with this definition: 'a law is morally justified if it is an essential part of system of laws which ... protects moral rights and promotes compliance with moral principles.' (133) He then poses the basic problem: Such a law, itself derived from moral principles, 'may sometimes require conduct not required by the moral principles on which it is based.' (132) Preventing some harms, or furthering some goods, may result in producing other harms or

foreclosing other goods: laws prohibiting infanticide and euthanasia, or regulations designed to protect the environment, might be cited as examples. Now, what is one's obligation in such cases? Must one forfeit his own moral independence and obey the law that he honestly regards as morally unsound and objectionable? In such situations, and they are not rare, one faces a moral dilemma.

One solution to this dilemma is that advanced by Socrates in his *Apology*; to acknowledge and benefit from a system of laws entails an obligation to obey all of the system's specific laws and to honor all of its dictates. The obligation is fundamentally to the legal *system*, and hence derivatively to its elements. Nelson accepts this as a sound general principle which should carry much weight and govern most of our decisions: if we are to violate a valid law, then we must be sure that we have good reason to do so and are acting with sincerity. But he qualifies this with what he calls the rule of 'causal relevance': this requires that the law demanding our absolute obedience must contribute to 'the production of a shared benefit or good.' (151) If this proviso is not satisfied, one may at times be justified in disobeying a law. However, he must still be sure that the law that he means to defy is one that will lead to some harm, or violate some right, that is of fundamental significance. For harms, benefits, goods, and rights are of varying degrees of importance. And Nelson concludes with a final word justifying democracy: 'The case for democracy is simply that it is more likely than other types of system to respond to these differences in degree of importance, and to respect the more fundamental rights and interests.' (156)

Now, what is one to make of all this? Some might carp that this is a disappointingly meagre result to issue from such a long and complex inquiry. However, I think that this would be a mistaken judgment. The author's close analyses and sympathetic critiques of various theories that seek to explain and justify democracy, as well as his careful statement of his own theory, do much to illuminate the nature, the strengths, and the weaknesses of democratic government. The result is a sharper and more comprehensive awareness of issues and problems that we tend to overlook or assume to have been solved. We get a better understanding of the difficulties that arise in establishing and maintaining a democracy, the weaknesses that it exhibits, and the threats and abuses to which it is subject even when it is alive and well. In a word, the ideal of democracy that we usually accept simply on faith and familiarity becomes a real thing, with all of the flaws and shortcomings of reality. This is clear gain.

The reservations that I would voice are at once more restrained and more sweeping. Given Nelson's three assumptions about human nature and its social setting, his is a cogent and persuasive argument. But the three assumptions *are* indispensable. And until they are empirically verified, *if* they are, I think that all three of them are highly questionable and some of them are extremely dubious.

At first blush, it seems reasonable to suppose that there should be 'a general belief in certain fundamental constraints.' However, such misdeeds as

murder, rape, robbery, fraud, and corruption are certainly not in short supply. Further, it is specific constraints that society needs, and people disagree vehemently on these. What constitutes libel, or obscenity, or due process and equal protection? Is abortion murder or an operation? Again, many people seem to care nothing at all for the opinion of anyone so long as legal sanctions can be avoided. If many of one's peers are doing the same thing, no opprobrium attaches. Finally, 'the easiest way to appear to conform ... is to conform' appears to be almost contrary to fact. Ours is a highly mobile and anonymous society; real wrong-doers hide behind the artificial persons created by law (corporations, labor unions, executive privilege), and the services of skilful lawyers are readily available. As a result, deception has become a fine art, and systematic non-conformity has become a way of life for vast numbers of people in many walks of life. These, of course, are purported statements of fact, and as such are as much subject to empirical test as are Nelson's hypotheses.

More important than these empirical issues are theoretical interpretations of the social conditions and modes of behavior that democratic governments, by their very nature, are apt to foster. A democracy is an open government, with power residing ultimately in the people. Given this fact, such governments exhibit a dangerous tendency to become *too* responsive to the voice of the people, and hence too permissive and relativistic. The people then grow vociferous in asserting their rights, and they clamor for freedom in their personal lives. At the same time, they grow reluctant to acknowledge any public duties, and they are contemptuous of constraints. As a result, contemporary democratic societies are experiencing and even encouraging excessive divisiveness within themselves. 'The people' is breaking up into a horde of separate groups, based on ethnic, economic, regional, and innumerable 'single interest' considerations. In short, 'society' threatens to collapse into a motley array of the 'factions' so feared by Madison and the other Framers.

But what the eventual outcome will be is uncertain. And regardless of where the truth lies, it is important that we understand the benefits that democracy offers and the dangers that it faces, and Nelson's analyses contribute largely to this end. Even accepting Aristotle's dictum that democracy is no more than the best of the 'imperfect' forms of government, it is imperfection with which we must live in this world.

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RUSH RHEES, ed., *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield 1981. Pp. x + 235. US\$ 22.50. ISBN 0-8476-6253-5.

At one point in *On Certainty*, after discussing the point that knowledge claims rest on grounds, i.e., in being in a position to know, Wittgenstein remarks, 'There is something universal here; not just something personal' (O.C. 440). Unfortunately, I cannot wholeheartedly say this about this collection. Except for M.O'C. Drury's contributions, the essays have little philosophic significance. The authors who are for the most part non-philosophers strive desperately to make sense of Wittgenstein's confusing and often hostile personality. On the one hand, he is loyal and generous; on the other, he is demanding, unforgiving, and as volatile as a small child. While the authors would object, it sounds to me as if they are often apologizing for this enigmatic and charismatic figure.

Having said this much, however, I do not want to be taken to mean that there can be no connection between the personal and the philosophic. On the contrary, especially when talking about a philosopher such as Wittgenstein who is as passionate as Kierkegaard, there is a most definite connection. In fact I take Wittgenstein to be a deeply personal philosopher; that is, his philosophizing issues from deep within his personality and is a response to his human needs as a highly educated Twentieth Century person. Wittgenstein was consumed by philosophy and I suspect that it was one of the things that kept him stable and going. He had little use for psychotherapy and apparently from his talks with Drury no inclination towards religion. Thus, the personal does have a place in understanding Wittgenstein's philosophy. Those who have not read the already available biographical material on Wittgenstein may get new insight into his philosophy from a reading of these essays. However, those of us who have already read such material elsewhere will not learn much more, except, as I have already suggested, from Drury's record of his conversations with Wittgenstein.

Unlike the other essays, Drury's notes on his conversations with Wittgenstein blend the personal and the philosophic perfectly. Indeed, they make the whole book worthwhile. Essentially, Drury's notes provide an additional source of Wittgenstein remarks, only in a more informal vein. While Drury is of course remembering and cautions the reader about this, the words he has Wittgenstein saying are unmistakably Wittgensteinisms. For example, when Drury suggests that unlike Moore, Wittgenstein seems to arrive at conclusions, Wittgenstein responds:

Yes, I have reached a real resting place. I know that my method is right. My father was a business man, and I am a business man: I want my philosophy to be business-like, to get something done, to get something settled. (125-6)

In a footnote, Rhees comments that, 'Years later Wittgenstein said to me: "You know I said I can stop doing philosophy when I like. That is a lie! I

can't.'” This exchange provides a wonderful gloss on passage 133 of the *Philosophical Investigations* where Wittgenstein talks about finding a conception of philosophy that gives him peace. In addition it helps to understand Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy. In fact, this particular conversation from the 1930’s continues with another revealing remark on Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy:

There is no one central problem in philosophy, but countless different problems. Each has to be dealt with on its own. Philosophy is like trying to open a safe with a combination lock: each little adjustment of the dials seems to achieve nothing, only when everything is in place does the door open. (126)

This passage makes plain Wittgenstein reasons for seeking ‘a perspicuous representation,’ *die übersichtliche Darstellung* (P.I. 122). Only with an overview or synoptic vision can one be in a position to simultaneously adjust the dials to solve the philosophical puzzle. A step by step or deductive procedure could never accomplish this.

Besides comments on the nature of philosophy, his conversations with Drury touch on a host of other topics such as: music, religion, the war, and Freud. Throughout the talks which span twenty-two years, from the time Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1929 until his death in 1951, the personal and the philosophic really do come together. Both Wittgenstein’s ardor and biases reveal themselves in these intellectual discussions. Also, his unusual effect on people, which all the other essays talk about, manifests itself here both from Wittgenstein’s effect on the course of Drury’s life and Drury’s candid remarks about his inability on many occasions to respond to Wittgenstein in the manner that hindsight suggested.

If you get to read no other part of this book, be sure to look at Drury’s record of his conversations with Wittgenstein. I should stress that even this essay cannot be used as an introduction to Wittgenstein; rather, the material best serves those who know Wittgenstein well. For those of us who do, I would like to conclude by quoting my favorite tid-bit from their conversations:

“No, I don’t think I would get on with Hegel. Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in shewing that things which look the same are really different. I was thinking of using as a motto for my book a quotation from *King Lear*: ‘I’ll teach you differences.’” Then laughing: “The remark ‘You’d be surprised’ wouldn’t be a bad motto either.” (171)

This would have been a wonderful motto for the *Philosophical Investigations*, since it is a book dedicated to making us recognize the differences between cases and words in order to thwart the philosophical temptation to theorize and generalize. Even the threat in Lear’s tone is not inappropriate; Wittgenstein was going to teach us differences whether we liked it or not.

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JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS, *The Sceptical Feminist*. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford U.P. 1980; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980. Pp. ix + 306. Cdn\$ 44.95; US\$ 32.00. ISBN 0-7100-0673-X

Janet Radcliffe Richards' book is intended to be a peculiarly philosophical contribution to the discussion of a number of feminist issues, a gentle scolding to feminists for having missed 'the strongest arguments,' for getting involved in 'non-essential issues,' for 'making integral to the feminist cause ideas which are either irrelevant, probably false, or actually against the interests of feminists and often everybody else as well.' (1) Prof. Richards has set out to make feminism, and feminists, more 'attractive.' Her lessons to feminists are delivered within earshot of rationally uncommitted onlookers, those who are sympathetic to the cause but just wish the girls could get the arguments right. It befits the tone of the book for a review of it to begin with the remark that despite Richards' patronizing tone, the book's facile assumptions, extraordinarily skewed emphases, and wrenching contradictions are instructive.

The 'strong fundamental case' for feminism, Prof. Richards begins, is that there are many and good reasons for the belief that 'women suffer from systematic social injustice because of their sex.' (1) This means, however, that feminists *qua* feminists are to be concerned not with any old form of injustice, but with *sexual* injustice. Hence, according to Richards, 'if, for instance, there are men and women in slavery, it is not the business of feminism to start freeing the women. Feminism is not concerned with *a group of people it wants to benefit*, but with *a type of injustice it wants to eliminate*.' (5, emphasis in the original)

This condescending reference to slavery is the only acknowledgment in Richards' book of the history of antagonism between white women and women of color over definition of feminist goals. The omission is representative of a number of serious shortcomings in her book: the narrow audience to whom the book is addressed; the extremely skimpy base of feminist writings she discusses or alludes to; and her lack of understanding of the serious issues that have divided feminists. But, the reader might think, isn't she right, after all? Surely it is one thing to be sympathetic, for example, to Black women in the United States as victims of slavery or other forms of racist oppression; but isn't it the concern of feminists as feminists — as opposed to feminists who are also, say, abolitionists, or humanists, or whatever — to be concerned with any group of women only insofar as they are victims of *sexism*? Shouldn't we keep things straight, and doesn't it make the case stronger if it is clearer? Hasn't Prof. Richards helped un muddy the cloudy, do-gooder feminist waters?

No. First of all, Richards relies on a way of making a distinction between a woman's being a woman and a woman's being, e.g., Black, and between sexual injustice and e.g., racial injustice, which, if adhered to, would make it

impossible to locate and describe, let alone eradicate, any particular injustice suffered by any particular woman or group of women. What Richards describes as sexual injustice is the sexual injustice peculiar to white-middle-class women; the sexual injustice suffered by, e.g., Black women under conditions of slavery is considerably different from that suffered by the white middle-class women about whom Richards is concerned. It would be impossible to put an end to the form of sexual injustice suffered by Black women without also putting an end to the racial injustice to which it is so intimately geared. For example, when Richards says that 'prostitution, adultery and loose sexual behavior were fiercely penalized in women, but not in men' (137), she can't be thinking of Black women under slavery. Black female slaves were severely penalized for *not* being willing to be adulterous with their white masters, and these masters rationalized their own behavior on the grounds that the Black women, unlike their wives, were 'sexually loose' anyway and tempted the men. Richards doesn't want us feminists *as feminists* to think about racial injustice suffered by Black women. But unless we can do that, it is impossible for us to see the particular shape sexual injustice against Black women has taken.

Richards' keen-edged conceptual carving knife cuts in many directions. Presumably economic or class oppression is to be kept distinct from sexual injustice too. '... [M]any injustices suffered by individual women have nothing to do with their sex, and could equally well be suffered by men.' (5) Does Richards mean by this that the oppression of the female laborer she refers to on pp. 271-2 has nothing to do with sexual injustice — that the theater of her sexist oppression is at home and that what happens to her at work has nothing to do with her sex? Has Prof. Richards not heard about salary differentials between men and women of the same class, and the connection between the idea that women don't need as much salary as men and the idea that women's place is in the home?

Richards encourages feminists to 'study history and anthropology' (38) so that we will not make the mistake of thinking that the way women are at any particular historical and geographical moment is the only way women are. But this seems to point in the direction of saying that there is no such item as 'women' *simpliciter*. If Richards herself has read much history or anthropology, not to mention any contemporary feminist journals, it doesn't show up in her depiction of the nature of sexual injustice.

Richards seems to believe that the only way to think objectively and clearly about feminist issues is to not have any particular political ideology or any particular social program in mind — we shouldn't get 'transfixed' by the idea that 'all will be well if we have universally available creches, or make men and women as much alike as possible, or get rid of capitalism, or whatever.' (34) This is the closest she comes to referring to the already large and growing body of work by socialist feminists, some of the most prominent of whom are her own countrywomen. The impression she wishes to give is of the politically uncommitted philosopher, who has no particular axe to grind, but is just there to clear the conceptual air. But her own social and political

commitments keep bleating through. 'If feminist problems are to hand, we do better to tackle them immediately than sit still and fret about not knowing how to put the world economic system to rights.' (281) Is it then news to Prof. Richards, at this late date, that it is a political viewpoint — and only one among many feminist viewpoints — which regards the position of women as separable from national and world economies? Does Prof. Richards think she is free from a political ideology of her own when she implies, on p. 251, that the freedom of women she is seeking is freedom in a capitalist state, and that capitalism does not require the exploitation of women? or of some women? or of some men? or of *somebody*? Apparently Prof. Richards cannot spend too much time on such fine points. There are more pressing issues, such as the question of whether feminists really have to look like those whom Richards euphemistically refers to as 'extreme feminists.' (185)

Indeed, Prof. Richards spends an extraordinary amount of time trying to explain why feminists ought to take seriously the fact that 'A man who would not change his woman for any other in the world might still know that she would please him more if she looked like the centrefold of the latest *Playboy*.' (189) She is worried — as is her publisher, to judge from the highly unusual book jacket — about the 'deliberately unfeminine style of dress gone in for by nearly all.' (184) It will be clear to anyone familiar with the history of reactions to the women's movement that Richards' worries here must be about feminism being stigmatized by association with a bunch of lesbians (those unattractive 'conspicuous feminists' (281)). It is too bad Richards became so preoccupied with purging the feminist visage of its lavender hue, for reflection on the treatment of lesbians would in fact bolster some of her own most radical claims about ways in which the notion of the 'feminine' functions to serve the interests of men. (Chapter 5) Moreover, the net result of her anxiety over the matter is the following message for those who want to know what the *real* priorities of feminism are:

If ... there are men and women in slavery, it is not the business of feminism to start freeing the women. (5)

Feminists must think it important that women should be in a position to choose sensually pleasing men if they want them. (198)

This is not a book which will — or any way ought to — make feminism more attractive to philosophers who aren't already feminists. It surely cannot make philosophy attractive to feminists who aren't already philosophers. Many of the most disturbing aspects of the book seem to stem from Richards' method. She says in the preface that her book 'departs from much recent feminist tradition in that it cannot be said to derive from a group of women which was its inspiration and the origin of most of its ideas.' (viii) Prof. Richards might have become aware of her own political and social biases, and much more acquainted with the depth and breadth of feminist positions, had she followed the path from which she says she deviates. With all too typical

philosophical hubris, she has assumed that she can capture the essence of a movement or a philosophy (which is in fact many movements and many philosophies) by reading a few outdated tracts and counting on her scouts for 'valuable accounts of feminism in practice' (see footnote 7 to Ch. 10 (299)). Philosophers and feminists have the right to expect more perspicacity, and more courage, from one who calls herself by their names.

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SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, *Attorney General of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Newfoundland et al.*; *Attorney General of Manitoba et al. v. Attorney General of Canada et al.*; *Attorney General of Quebec v. Attorney General of Canada*. Constitutional Decisions. September 28th., 1981.

The recent Supreme Court constitutional decisions seem on the surface to be an expression of the traditional Canadian compromise — something for everybody. For the provinces there is the pronouncement that as a matter of constitutional convention their agreement is required for amendments to the Constitution that affect them; for the federal side, there is the assurance that such agreement is not required as a matter of law. It is a neat exercise in 'on the one hand' and 'on the other hand,' and one that has roots in utterly respectable constitutional theorizing from Dicey to Hogg.¹ Nevertheless, though it can be seen as giving something to both sides and thus setting the stage for a political working out of the problems, there is something fundamentally unsatisfactory about the decision, not only as an item of practical advice to governments, but also as a piece of legal theorizing. It is the latter problem that I wish to address in this brief note: for reasons of limitations of space, I shall address myself here only to the Court's treatment of questions 2 and 3. From the point of view of legal theory the decision is confusing and even, in some respects, incoherent, and this because the old question of the nature of law, though implicit throughout, is not clearly addressed or consistently answered.

The various bits of reasoning engaged in by the Court yielded three different answers to the fundamental questions before it. Laskin, Estey and

McIntyre held that there is no constitutional convention requiring provincial consent (interpreting the latter phrase as meaning consent of *all* the provinces) nor is such consent constitutionally *required*. On the other side, and equally consistently, Martland and Ritchie took the view that there *is* a convention, *and* that consent is constitutionally required. In the middle, four justices shared the Martland-Ritchie view that there is a *convention* requiring consent (though not necessarily of all the provinces), but held with the Laskin-Estey-McIntyre group that provincial consent is not required in *law*. This then became the majority position. The basis for the claim that such a middle position can be maintained without inconsistency is the distinction between the conventional rules of the Constitution and the laws of the Constitution. The important thing about the conventions in contrast to the laws is said to be that the former are not enforced by the courts, not being judge-made common law rules and not being based on judicial precedent. The Court writes:

Perhaps the main reason why conventional rules cannot be enforced by the courts is that they are generally in conflict with the legal rules which they postulate and the courts are bound to enforce the legal rules. The conflict is not of a type which would entail the commission of any illegality. It results from the fact that legal rules create wide powers, discretions and rights which conventions prescribe should be exercised only in a certain limited manner, if at all. (88)

They give this example:

As a matter of law, the Queen, or the Governor General or the Lieutenant-Governor could refuse assent to every bill passed by both Houses of Parliament or by a Legislative Assembly as the case may be. But by convention they cannot of their own motion refuse to assent to any such bill on any ground, for instance because they disapprove of the policy of the bill. We have here a conflict between a legal rule which creates a complete discretion and a conventional rule which completely neutralizes it. But conventions, like laws, are sometimes violated. And if this particular convention were violated and assent were improperly withheld, the courts would be bound to enforce the law, not the convention. (88-9)

The Court clearly believes that the remedy for a breach of a constitutional convention lies in the political arena rather than with the courts, and this view seems to be held also by the Laskin-Estey-McIntyre minority. Indeed, the minority quotes Hogg on this point:

But where 'unconstitutionality' springs merely from a breach of convention, no breach of the law has occurred and no legal remedy will be available. If a court did give a remedy for a breach of convention... then we would have to change our language and describe the rule which used to be thought of as a convention as a rule of the common law. In other words a judicial decision could have the effect of transforming a conventional rule into a legal rule. (118)

But the minority disagrees with this last point, suggesting that courts may recognize the existence of conventions, but may not raise a convention to the

status of a legal principle. This whole argument has a very strange flavor. It is as though the minority imagines that the court, in giving a remedy for a breach of convention, would be engaging in a conscious deliberate piece of judicial legislation, but this is surely not what Hogg has in mind. Rather, we might imagine a situation in which a court makes a decision on what it takes to be a matter of law but which others may view as a matter of convention.

The point is that the view that the distinction between law and convention is precise and firm and such that we can always recognize which is which is itself a view about the nature of law which underlies much of the Court's discussion without ever being made explicit. Specifically, it is one of the tenets of legal positivism that the law is a set of rules identifiable 'by tests having to do not with their content but with their *pedigree* or the manner in which they were adopted or developed.'² Whatever does not meet this test is not part of the law, and therefore not enforceable by the courts. This is the status accorded to constitutional conventions by most of the Justices.

What seems strange is that one obvious alternative is not even entertained, despite its being at the forefront of recent discussions of legal theory, and despite wide-spread and often expressed dissatisfaction with legal positivism. This alternative is a Dworkinian theory according to which the law includes much more than just rules, and according to which it is the judge's duty to decide hard constitutional cases by working out the theory that best justifies the constitution as a whole and rendering the decision dictated by that theory (*vid.* Dworkin, especially chapter 4). Now whether such a view can actually be applied in the Canadian constitutional situation is unclear, but at least it is not obvious that constitutional conventions can be sharply separated from constitutional law. The opposite, indeed, seems to be the position taken by Martland and Ritchie; and whether or not one approves of the result they reach, there is at least the appeal of consistency in their treatment. For why can long standing constitutional conventions not be part of constitutional law, even to the point, in the case of some blatant and isolated contravention of them, of their being enforced in the courts? The problem, really, is that the concept of a constitutional convention seems to slip too readily from a mere custom of politeness and consideration to something very like a law; but if a convention of the strong sort contemplated by the court³ were violated, is it really no business of the court's to provide a remedy? To insist on this seems to me to take a very narrow view of legal reasoning and the task of judicial interpretation of the Constitution. And to say as the majority does, that conventions are part of the Constitution and that their violation is unconstitutional but not in a strict legal sense seems an unfortunate turning away from decision, not to say perpetuation of an overly passive role for the Supreme Court.

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- 1 A.V. Dicey, *The Law of the Constitution*, 10th. edn. (London: Macmillan 1962). The reference to convention appears in the first edition, 1885. Peter W. Hogg, *Constitutional Law of Canada* (Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd. 1977).
- 2 Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P. 1977) 17. It is the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart and others that Dworkin has in mind here.
- 3 They mention, for example, a situation in which 'after a general election where the Opposition obtained the majority at the polls the Government refused to resign and clung to office.' (89)

RICHARD WASSERSTROM, *Philosophy and Social Issues: Five Studies*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press 1980. Pp. x + 187. US\$ 15.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-01535-X); US\$ 6.95 (paper: ISBN 0-268-01536-8).

The challenge of writing social philosophy is to achieve relevance while avoiding mere trendiness. The number of flashy yet now dated works to appear in the last two decades suggests that this is a difficult balance to strike. Unless a philosopher's writings to some extent transcend the particularity of the circumstances in which they are written, it must be doubted whether they constitute philosophy at all. Thus, an ineradicable tension obtains between the twin demands of relevance and universality.

The five sections of Wasserstrom's book are, for the most part, versions of articles that appeared individually during the last decade. The themes, the justice of affirmative action and group preferential treatment, the obligation to obey the law, the justification of punishment, and the rules of war, although of universal interest are, not surprisingly, seen in the context of recent American social concerns. This in itself does not constitute a criticism, since, unless the subject matter of social philosophy emerges from a real environment, it is utopian in the bad sense, and is simply not engaging. To notice the historical and circumstantial context of philosophic arguments, though, is not thereby to make philosophy a victim of circumstances, nor to reduce it to a species of analytical sociology. Rather, it is to acknowledge that all social issues arise from the attempt to make sense of the relationship between the individual and the group, the particular and the general. And, since the individuals in question, persons, are historical beings, it is inevitable that the expression of issues in social philosophy will be in terms of particular

times and places. This is merely to notice that, though justice may well be an ahistorical and universal idea, it is only of social concern because individual persons are not.

It should be noted that this justification of Wasserstrom's adversion to the American context suggests that persons living outside the United States may find it more helpful to approach social philosophy through issues other than, for example, the *Bakke* case. Further, Wasserstrom, because of his level of analysis, is constrained to adopt assumptions regarding the good society implicit in the American way of life, at least to the extent that he makes moral judgements. I have in mind such views as: that social equality is equivalent to equality of opportunity, that the idea of group rights implicit in the preferential treatment of groups is an instrumentally justified fiction, and that the good society is composed of individuals who freely choose their group affiliation. Now, these assumptions are not especially offensive, but neither are they self-evident truths written in the stars. Wasserstrom's moral theory is derived from utilitarianism tempered by a Kantian respect for individual justice. Unlike utilitarians though, Wasserstrom holds that justice is not a consequentialist notion, and, indeed, claims that it conflicts with the principle of utility. He does not defend this claim, nor need he, since in contemporary America it is a commonplace that there is an inevitable conflict between individual rights and the public good. But it is pretty obvious that if this tension did not rankle, social philosophy would hardly be distinguishable from public administration. Roughly, then, Wasserstrom's arguments make sense within the assumptions of one standard interpretation of American liberalism. Now, even if, as I have claimed, Wasserstrom presupposes a given social framework, and thus begs all the fundamental questions of social philosophy, it should not be concluded that his work is trivial. For within the assumed context, he develops precise and telling arguments against those who disagree with him yet share his basic premises. He is most convincing when his conclusions are negative or tentative, for it is then that he questions the dogmatism of partisans of either side of an issue. His discussion of judicial punishment carries the debate beyond the usual text-book compromise of Kant and Bentham — i.e., retributivism tells us who we can punish while utilitarianism tells us who we ought to punish — and takes seriously the moral claim of the retributivist. Wasserstrom notes that the fact that guilty persons cannot reasonably complain for being punished only shows why it is not wrong to punish all of the guilty. But an implication of this is that arguments against punishing all offenders must come from others than the offenders themselves. The implicit paternalism suggested by this observation may be a clue as to why the retributivist position remains popular. For moral arguments against paternalism surely exist.

The author's extensive analysis of racism and sexism is useful in clarifying the issues for contemporary readers unfamiliar with Mill and de Beauvoir, but his arguments in support of affirmative action programs are not nearly as decisive as he believes. The main shortcoming of the discussion of these issues, and indeed, of the book generally, is Wasserstrom's assumption that

justice and utility are often in conflict and the parallel assumption that actions and institutions such as preferential treatment, though not features of the good society, are instrumental to its attainment. This, the radical distinction between means and ends, though appropriate to purely technical activities, is out of place when applied to social reality. Perhaps it is an exaggeration to claim with Oakeshott that the ship of state has no goal save its own perpetuation, but it is no less mistaken to distinguish radically between the goals of the good society and the instrumental means to their realization. At its worst, this leads to the sacrifice of the present in the interest of some ever-receding future state. And, always, it smacks of the kind of manipulative social engineering legitimately resented no matter how noble the goal.

Because the work assumes premises regarding social reality distinctive to the United States, this work will be of practical value mainly to American readers. For even in Canada, a society in many ways similar to the United States, issues such as racism, group rights and preferential treatment assume a significantly different vision of the good society. Thus, charges of racism are often identified, not with barriers to assimilation, but with the failure to recognize the distinctiveness and integrity of racial and ethnic groups. Also, at least some group preferential treatment here is undertaken, not to ensure that ultimately such groupings will disappear, but rather that they will survive. The image of the good society as a community of communities that grounds such practices is simply not that of the melting pot of liberal individualism. Not unrelated to these parochial limitations is a more fundamental shortcoming. In contemporary America, Wasserstrom's position is under telling attack, both philosophical and practical, by those he would term conservatives. It is apparent that, within the parameters set by American liberalism, arguments undercutting justice in terms of individual merit and free competition are not convincing. Nor, in logic, should they be. Perhaps, then, in the interests of furthering his humane goals, Wasserstrom ought to question his own assumptions. The result well might be philosophy both more timely and more universal.

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RICHARD WOLLHEIM, *Art and Its Objects*. Second Edition with six supplementary Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press 1980. Pp. 270. US\$ 29.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-22898-0); US\$ 8.95 (paper: 0-521-29706-0).

This edition of Richard Wollheim's *Art and Its Objects* ought to displace copies of the first edition on the bookshelves of philosophers interested in aesthetics. The entire text of the first edition is retained unchanged (except for the correction of some typographical errors) in this second edition, but Wollheim has appended six additional essays so that a substantial portion of the book is new.

Because the contents of the original version of *Art and Its Objects* are well known, or can be ascertained by reading reviews of the book appearing in various journals around 1969-1970, I will not mention or discuss the original content except insofar as it bears directly on material in the new essays. The titles of the following sections are also the titles of some of Wollheim's essays.

(1) *The Institutional Theory of Art*: George Dickie, and others, in reaction against a widespread skepticism about the possibility of any definition of art, has proposed an 'institutional' definition: 'A work of art ... is (1) an artifact (2) ... which has had conferred upon it the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or persons on behalf of a certain social institution (the art-world).' Wollheim presents the proponents of this definition with a dilemma: do those who confer status upon some artifact do so for good reasons, or is their act efficacious simply because of their status, even if they have no reason or bad reasons? If the institutional theorist opts for the first alternative, then surely what makes the artifact a work of art is that it satisfies these good reasons, and what the agents of the art-world do is not conferment, but confirmation or recognition of a status the artifact has prior to their action; their action is inessential to the definition of art, or, at best, 'conferment' is only a necessary condition, but not sufficient, i.e. we do not have a purely institutional theory. But if the theorist opts for the second alternative, he violates two of our basic intuitions, viz. (1) that there must be some connection between the nature of art and our standards for evaluating art, and (2) that there is something important about the status of being a work of art. The second alternative divorces our standards from the nature of art altogether, and cannot account for the importance of art.

Wollheim thinks that the institutional theorist is forced, if consistent, to opt for the first alternative since the art-world agent promotes artifacts as 'candidates for appreciation' and can hardly do so unless he has some idea of what it is that we ought to appreciate about the artifact.

Wollheim's argument, of which this is only a bare-bones sketch, is, to my mind, convincing.

(2) *Are the criteria of identity for works of art aesthetically relevant?*: Wollheim is quite insistent that answers to the apparently barren philosophical question 'what are the criteria of identity for works of art?' can

have practical consequences for the production of actual works of art. He believes that the fundamental distinction within works of art as a whole is between individuals (e.g. particular paintings or sculptures) and types (e.g. the play 'Hamlet,' which is a type, of which particular printed copies or particular performances are tokens). Accordingly, criteria of identity will depend on whether a work of art is an individual or a type, and such criteria will be essential ingredients in the concept and/or theory of art, under which the artist produces his work of art. If those parts of the artist's theory in which identity criteria figure were to change, Wollheim is sure that there would be aesthetic consequences. In support of his views he offers a wholly imaginary example (as yet, anyway) in where the means of reproduction are so developed that individual paintings, including the original in a reproduced series, become tokens of a type. Under such conditions, Wollheim argues, a painter would have his approach to his works fixed by the fineness of the reproduction process, and this is bound to affect his sensibility and alter his way of working and the aesthetic results of his work.

(3) *Criticism as retrieval*: Wollheim defends the view of art criticism as *retrieval*, i.e. reconstruction of the creative process, where the creative process is thought of as something not stopping short of, but terminating in the work of art itself. He contrasts this view with (1) criticism as *revision*, the view of T.S. Eliot who thought that the task of the critic in a given historical moment is to extract new meaning from the work of art so that it will speak 'to us, today,' and (2) criticism as *scrutiny*, the formalist view that the critic should focus only on the properties of the work of art which can be scrutinized directly. He rightly dismisses criticism as revision as simply a *pis-aller* when we are in a state of ignorance of the matters which criticism as retrieval deals with. Wollheim defends his theory of criticism as retrieval chiefly negatively by rebutting criticisms of it which can be raised from within the standpoint of the theory of criticism as scrutiny. His arguments are sophisticated, often subtle, and entirely correct. This essay is the best of the six, in my view.

The three remaining essays are less interesting. In one he deals with the physical object hypothesis that some works of art just are physical objects, i.e. that there are no 'aesthetic objects' transcendent with respect to them. In another he argues at great length for substituting the concept of 'seeing-in' for that of 'seeing-as' in dealing with pictorial representation, and in the final essay he takes a brief, unexciting, and non-committal tour of the precincts of art evaluation theory (Realism, Objectivism, Relativism, and Subjectivism).

The bibliography has been up-dated, and is very useful, and the original text is now prefaced with a very helpful six-page sketch of the argument in the text.

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RICHARD M. ZANER. *The Context of Self: A Phenomenological Inquiry Using Medicine as a Clue*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press 1981. Pp. xiii + 282. US\$ 18.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8214-0443-1); US\$ 8.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8214-0600-0).

Richard Zaner, formerly Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Southern Methodist University, at one time was involved in an effort to teach medical humanities in the medical school at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. From this experience, as he acknowledges in his 'Introduction,' he became convinced that many of the profound themes in philosophy of medicine and medical ethics centered on the body. Similarly, efforts by phenomenologists since Dilthey to overcome the relativism engendered by historical consciousness by searching for a unifying theme in the 'living organism' (Descartes) — the 'living body' (Merleau-Ponty) or even life itself (Jonas) — point to the body and its relation to self, mind, personhood, and others.

The fact that any philosophy of medicine must construct an account of the living body cannot be overstated. Pellegrino and I, in our own work on the philosophy of medicine,* have tried to link an ontology of the body with the claim that medicine's goals are intrinsically moral. It is not discussed in Zaner's work because it had not appeared before his went to press. However, he finds a similar suggestion by Engelhardt odd: '... what is peculiar is not at all that one finds so little scrutiny of the human body in ethical discussions, but rather Engelhardt's thesis concerning the essential tie between the body and moral claims.' (27)

The reason Zaner finds it odd is his resolute determination to avoid any kind of dualism. This determination is a key to the book. He finds efforts by other phenomenologists, like Jonas, ultimately unsatisfactory because they either do not surmount a fuzzy kind of dualism, or try to reduce all questions to some fundamental principle. Thus, he argues that Engelhardt artificially separates the biological realm from the metaphysical. But the great debates about life and death, with all their moral character, concern 'human life itself, and not simply its (possible) meaning or quality ... the very same life with which medical praxis is concerned.' (27)

Zaner uses the strength of the phenomenological method to good advantage throughout his discussions of body and embodiment, the integrity of self, including health and wholeness, the body as gesture, context and contexture, the nexus of consciousness, the question of self and interpreting others (Ricoeur's hermeneutics), self as wonder, efforts at possibilizing, self as related to others, and wholeness. These are not the chapter titles, but the themes of the chapters. The strength of the method is its negation of overly simplistic and artificial disjunctions which occur so often in medical ethics debates.

Phenomenologists can be characterized as philosophers' philosophers. Zaner's work is no exception. As can be seen from the contents described

above, he attacks very serious philosophical problems. Nevertheless, the thesis is hard to discover amidst all the critiques. The book's character is immediately revealed: an honest, modest, even humble attempt to take the ideas of others seriously. One is put in the presence of a fine mind. But, as is true of all phenomenologists, the realities of which they speak are clouded by almost an intense barrage of obscure terms. For example, Zaner describes Dilthey's descriptive psychology as 'a disciplined study of the textured complexus (*Zusammenhang*) of instinctual, emotive, volitional, and ideational processes (*Erlebnisse*) thanks to which subjectivity lodges itself in an equally rich and complex set of objective manifestations.' (2) The strength of the method therefore, its circularity and respect for complexity, gets in the way of clarity of expression. The book could not be read by many physicians. Because the major dialogue takes place only with significant phenomenologists, we must take it, not as a philosophy of medicine, but as a phenomenological propaedeutic to such a philosophy. This seems to be what Zaner intends. He had set out to develop some straightforward themes about the person in medicine, but found himself forced by the philosophical questions and the role of wholeness and self in medicine to extend his efforts 'to set down a full theory of the embodied self.' (xii) In this, I think he has succeeded.

If I have read him correctly, his thesis seems to be this. In the midst of an anarchy of opinions and emotions, there is a constant human need to confront the crises of our times in science; philosophy, ethics and religion. The problem is to search for some universals to ground both science and the humanities. This problematic has been detailed by Dilthey, Husserl, Scheler, and Ortega, not to mention a host of other thinkers. Essential concepts in medicine are also affected; concepts such as self, person, wholeness, normal and abnormal. How can one escape the anarchy of opinions? Zaner follows Han Jonas through these topics, finding at root that human life and the living body must be explored. Jonas recognized this, but did not properly explore how the living body was an embodying organism as a whole with parts. Examining this with a method he calls 'free-phantasy variation' (explained on p. 245), he uses cases in which certain abilities of the contextured self are *absent* (for example, brain damaged patients, autistic children). This effort parallels that of Merleau-Ponty's perception studies using the case of the phantom-limb syndrome. What Zaner emphasizes is that the absence of some function points to the possible functions of normal selves. Thus, his theory of embodying organism is that it is a whole (a contexture) built out of a field of possibilities — derived from Gurwitsch's 'field of consciousness.' And then comes the point. What we normally consider to be essences are, in fact, such contextures.

Although Zaner has succeeded in proposing a theory of the embodied self, one wonders if his theory provides an escape from relativism or 'the anarchy of opinions.' If essences are only contextures built out of possibilities, what is the source of those possibilities? With respect to the body in medicine, surely the biological functions of the body should be considered a source. If so, these functions ground the self and its relation to the world. Similarly, the

functions can be discussed in universal, scientific terms. If they are not essences-as-contextures, what are they?

Furthermore, we are offered only hints at the implications of the self as embodying organism for medical ethics and for philosophy of medicine. It would be interesting to see what Zaner would do with his theory in discussing the ethical problems posed by a persistent vegetative state or the goal of family medicine to treat the 'whole person.' Similarly, it would be important for Zaner to develop his suggestions on contexture into a theory of sociality, as he notes he has not done, not the least because medicine itself involves a relation of doctor and patient.

In sum, there are three outstanding features of Zaner's philosophical work. First, it is a well-developed contribution to Jonas' work in the philosophy of biology, issuing in a theory of the embodied self. Second, it employs medicine, medical cases, and medical ethics debates to unveil philosophical problems, thus demonstrating how medicine can aid philosophical inquiry. Third, its theses on wholeness and integrity, and their basis in the living organism, are capable of making a genuine contribution to the concepts of 'health' and 'normalcy' in medicine.

As I have already stated, however, Zaner's work is not a philosophy of medicine. As he writes in his 'Preface' a 'whole avalanche of themes' had to be explored first, before he could properly pose the question. Perhaps now he would feel comfortable enough to 'say something clear on the reasons within medicine itself which would make our prominent concern for "ethics" and "values" in it more understandable.' (xi)

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* Pellegrino, Edward D. and David C. Thomsma, *A Philosophical Basis of Medical Practice* (Don Mills, Ont. and New York: Oxford University Press 1981), reviewed in this journal, Vol. I, nos 2/3, Summer/Été 1981, pp. 109-14, by Barry Hoffmaster. [Eds.]

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