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Table of Contents • Table des matières

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Peter Achinstein
The Book of Evidence.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 2001. Pp. 290.
US$51.00: Cdn$91.00. ISBN 0-19-514389-2.

In *The Book of Evidence* Peter Achinstein embarks on a comprehensive re-evaluation of what is required for something to be evidence for an hypothesis. In so doing Achinstein provides new and highly original accounts of evidence, probability and various related concepts which he contrasts with current prevailing views. *The Book of Evidence* represents a very up-to-date and detailed study of its topic. As such, it will be of considerable interest to professional philosophers, and will also serve very well as the subject of a graduate seminar in epistemology or in the philosophy of science.

For Achinstein, most work in the philosophy of science on the subject of evidence is more or less ignored by scientists, and ought to be, because it rests on assumptions that are at odds with those made by scientists when they speak of evidence. To avoid this, Achinstein seeks to identify concepts of evidence that are actually employed in the sciences. He identifies four such types of evidence: what is termed 'ES-evidence' (the view that e is evidence for h relative to a given epistemic situation), subjective evidence (e is evidence for h for a particular person at a particular time), veridical evidence (e is a genuinely good reason to believe h, where h is true), and potential evidence (e is a good reason to believe h, where h is highly probable).

As Achinstein points out, scientists typically seek veridical evidence, '[t]hey want their hypotheses to be true' (34). Additionally they want to provide good reasons for believing their hypotheses, in a sense that implies the truth of their hypotheses, not just evidence given a certain situation. Nevertheless, all four concepts of evidence are employed. For example, it makes sense to talk about what a given person's evidence for a certain hypothesis is (i.e., subjective evidence), and sometimes it makes sense to say that something is usually or typically evidence for something else (potential evidence). Although, scientists seek veridical evidence, from a definitional point of view potential evidence is the most basic, since to be any other kind of evidence something must be at least potential evidence. Thus, Achinstein proposes to define all the concepts of evidence in terms of potential evidence. Moreover, Achinstein stresses that the question of whether or not something counts as evidence is always empirical in character, since all but subjective evidence suppose the truth of hypotheses. And with subjective evidence it is an empirical matter whether or not an hypothesis is believed. This distinguishes Achinstein's account of evidence from the sort of account which holds that the question of whether e is evidence for h can be determined by some a priori method.

All of the concepts of evidence (excepting only veridical evidence) rely closely on the concept of probability. And, since probability is central to the notion of potential evidence (which defines the other types), the concept of

probability must be elucidated in order to have a clear concept of evidence. Thus, Achinstein proposes to elucidate his account of evidence by providing his own account of probability. For Achinstein, this is necessary because none of the accounts that are prevalent in the literature adequately do justice to the concept as it relates to evidence. In fact, many of Achinstein's claims about evidence, and especially those concerning its empirical character, rest closely on his account of probability.

Achinstein's account of probability contrasts sharply with the predominant probabilistic theories of evidence: Baysian, frequentist, Carnap's, etc. Baysian views of probability, for example, set probability as subjective, i.e., as not independent of who believes what at a given time. They also define probability in terms of the degree of belief warranted in a given hypothesis. Frequentist theories, while objective (in the sense that Baysian views are not), define probability as the propensity for something to actually occur. For Carnap, probabilities are assigned a priori according to relations between formal languages and state-descriptions. On this view, probability, although it is objective, is not an empirical matter. While Achinstein's view has something in common with all of these, it differs in significant ways from each, allowing it to accommodate and clarify his four concepts of evidence.

For Achinstein, probability is not a measure of belief, and it is not relative to the beliefs of a specific individual, and it is a matter of empirical investigation not a priori calculation. Probability is, for Achinstein, the measure of 'how reasonable it is to believe a proposition' (95). This view, among other things, sets certain standards for evidence: a proposition, for instance, must do more than increase the probability of another for it to count as evidence. Getting in to my car, for example, increases the probability I will die in a car accident, but it hardly makes it reasonable to believe that I will do so. For e to be evidence for h, then, it must make the probability of h more than one-half.

Finally, Achinstein deploys his account of probability and evidence to resolve some perennially discussed philosophical conundrums. For example, in Hempel's familiar raven paradox, any non-black non-raven (e.g., a red shoe) is evidence for the proposition 'all ravens are black'. Achinstein contends that his account avoids this absurdity by demonstrating that such 'evidence' is invalid as it does not confer sufficiently high probability to the proposition 'all ravens are black'. A similar solution is proposed for Goodman's 'grue' problem.

Achinstein has provided a very densely packed book, and provides novel contributions to a large number of outstanding epistemological questions — more in fact than can be alluded to in a short review. Not surprisingly, there is quite a lot in this book to take issue with. His analyses of probability and the raven and 'grue' problems, for example, will quite likely engender much discussion in the literature. I, for one, was not wholly convinced by Achinstein's argument that his views are more amenable to scientific realism than anti-realism. But, of course, such controversies add to the book's interest and

not the reverse. *The Book of Evidence* represents an indispensable contribution to the philosophical literature.

Dan McArthur
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Thomas Aquinas
The Treatise on Human Nature, Summa Theologiae 1a 75-89. Trans. Robert Pasnau. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2002. Pp. xxi + 434.
US$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-614-9);
US$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-613-0).

This book has a translation of several questions drawn from Thomas' *Summa Theologiae*, a brief introduction and commentary, as well as a set of appendices on various philosophical topics touched upon in the course of Thomas' statement of questions and their resolutions. The questions fall in general within the psychology of appetite, feeling, and perception as well as an account of intellection.

It is hardly possible here to take up Thomas' psychology and its use of ancient sources and, in particular, those from within the Aristotelian tradition. I will offer, rather, some indication of the quality of the translation and the success with which it is apt to help students understand a great philosopher of the Middle Ages.

The translator, Robert Pasnau, is not only a scholar of philosophy written in the Middle Ages but also a philosopher who both helps us understand a philosophical text and mounts criticism of arguments and premises advanced by Thomas. Along with Martin Tweedale Pasnau belongs to a small class of philosophers who, as translators, retrieve thinking in the Middle Ages by means of a relaxed, clear and precise English which makes the text a part of current discussion.

The book uses many signs to help the reader notice parallel passages in other Thomist works; at the same time Pasnau breaks up the medieval *Question* in order to help the reader attend to important premises or conclusions. I have some reservations about doing this. Thomas writes with order and precision with a recurring triadic structure: arguments for and against; resolution, and returning to the arguments in making an adequate reply to them. In the true spirit of Aristotelians the return to the original arguments is also the preservation of something: the middle way invariably preserves something of the extremes.

This book is in a series 'The Hackett Aquinas'. The announcement of the series reads: 'This series offers central philosophical treatises of Aquinas in new, state-of-the-art translations distinguished by their accuracy and use of clear and nontechnical modern vocabulary. Annotation and commentary accessible to undergraduates make the series an ideal vehicle for the study of Aquinas by readers approaching him from a variety of backgrounds and interests.' This volume perfectly satisfies the aspiration of the announcement.

Richard Bosley

Catherine Chalier
What Ought I to Do? Morality in Kant and Levinas.
Trans. Jane-Marie Todd.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2002.
Pp. 197.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3709-1);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8794-3).

In this book, Chalier offers reflections on Kant and Levinas that are designed to respond to the crisis of the subject. She seeks to ground morality in the subject at a time when the subject has come under severe criticism from both scientific and philosophical angles. Although perhaps sympathetic to the critique, Chalier nevertheless believes that the moral subject is indispensable for ethics. As she maintains in the Introduction, without some notion of a freely acting subject, there would be no room for responsibility, and without responsibility, there would be no space for morality. For Chalier, this conclusion is unacceptable, and she turns to Kant and Levinas because their philosophies reveal that 'a philosophy of the moral subject remains possible and necessary' (4).

But Kant and Levinas cannot simply be combined. Although there may be a 'profound complicity between them' (5), their moral philosophies also show deep differences. They are 'complicit', as Chalier argues in Chapter 1, in the sense that they seek to emancipate morality from theoretical knowledge. She makes a great deal of that emancipation, noting, in particular, the twentieth-century combination of barbarism and culture. History belies the enlightenment faith in knowledge, especially as far as morality is concerned. Rather than ground 'ethics in knowledge', Kant and Levinas 'seek the source of morality in the subject' (24), albeit in significantly different ways. Chalier's reflection on a possible dialogue between these figures is illuminating for

moral philosophy in general, and for an understanding of Levinasian ethics in particular.

Having set out the complicity between Kant and Levinas that prompted her to place them together in this context, Chalier develops the differences. She shows that whereas Kant links morality to 'good will', that is, to the 'fundamental intention to do his or her duty whatever happens' (27), Levinas speaks of the command issuing from the face of the other (Chapter 2). While Kant's good will is governed by the subject's practical reason, and its supreme and universal principle of morality, Levinas eschews the desire to articulate a principle of morality. These differences are perhaps best captured by their respective commitment to autonomy (Kant) and heteronomy (Levinas), which Chalier develops in Chapter 4. As a representative of the tradition, Kant defends the autonomy of the subject, which, importantly in this context, precedes ethics. As a twentieth-century thinker, by contrast, Levinas reevaluates 'heteronomy as the source of morality' (84). He appeals not to a pre-existing subject acting autonomously, but argues, rather, that we become subjects as a consequence of becoming moral. Moreover, for Kant, as Chalier indicates, morality requires that an action not be informed by any external circumstances. An act has to be in accord with the law, and concerns such as the 'concrete and singular urgency of situations' (31) have no place in moral reflections. This is precisely otherwise for Levinas. His is an 'anarchical ethics' (31), an ethics, that is, that is 'sensitive to the singular names and faces of people' (31). Levinas meets Kant's commitment to universality with an equal commitment to particularity. Morality is a function of the 'response given here and now, before it is too late, to the uniqueness of faces' (83). It follows from this that the subject which functions as the source of morality is the self for Kant, and the other for Levinas.

There is, of course, much more in this book than could be conveyed in this short review. Having introduced and discussed these different attempts to ground morality in the subject, Chalier turns, in subsequent chapters, to working out the respective implications of these approaches. In Chapter 5, she deals with the privileging of reason over sensibility (Kant) and sensibility over reason (Levinas), in Chapter 6, with their different arguments for the possibility of freedom, in Chapter 7, with the connection of morality and happiness. Chalier ends with a brief reflection on the role that either Christianity (Kant) or Judaism (Levinas) plays (or does not play) in morality.

Part of what makes these reflections worthwhile is a possible dialogue between Kant and Levinas. Although the Levinasian position is inherently more appealing than the Kantian one, given the rigidity entailed by the latter, Chalier thinks that each can learn something from the other. What Kant could learn from Levinas is clear, though Kant would reject any introduction of heteronomy into morality. Kant, by contrast, could bring a moment of universality to Levinas, which is surely required if we are faced with possibly conflicting obligations imposed on us by multiple others. Heteronomy might have to be supplemented by a 'concern for justice' (83), and, with that, by universality. A middle path might have to be forged

between Kant and Levinas. That Chalier does not herself forge this path is less important than the fact that she indicates the possibility and necessity of doing so.

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Helene Cixous and **Jacques Derrida**
Veils. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2001.
Pp. 108.
US$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3794-0);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3795-9).

Both Hélène Cixous and Jacques Derrida grew up in Algeria, moved to France, and became leading intellectuals of their time. As Peggy Kamuf noted, 'although Cixous and Derrida have often signaled publicly their solidarity with each other, this book [*Veils*] conjoins their writing at an altogether new level of intensity. It is a stunningly original and moving work' (*Veils*, cover). At least one previous reviewer of this volume has dubbed it, not inappropriately, 'a 2-for-1 deal' that should not be passed up by fans of Derrida or Cixous. I'll venture to move even further along the positive continuum of this line of thinking, and point out that over and above the fascinatingly interwoven Cixous-Derrida texts, *Veils*' English translation by Geoff Bennington (who has done wonders in the past as a translator of Derrida) provides the reader with a fine — and rare — example of a translated Derrida text that is truly close to 'equivalent' or 'faithful' in English to its acrobatic French original. Although the translation is not quite as brilliant for the Cixous essay, this is presumably explained by Bennington's much greater familiarity with Derrida's language and style.

The overall structure of *Veils* (*Voiles* in French) consists of two essays, the first by Cixous entitled 'Savoir' and the second, a meditation by Derrida on the Cixous piece, entitled 'A Silkworm of One's Own'. Both essays are autobiographical in nature, and each contains textual echoes of previous work.

Derrida's essay, its French title merely 'Un ver à soie', allows Bennington full play with the English 'silkworm' — *ver à soie* as well as 'one's own' — *à soi*, echoing Virginia Woolf's 'room of one's own' and the duality of the book's French title (the plural *voiles* can refer either to 'veils' or 'sails'). Derrida's French subtitle, '*Points de vue piqués sur l'autre voile*', presents an even more

difficult problem to the translator. As Bennington explains in his Translator's Notes, '*points de vue*' more or less corresponds to the English 'points of view', but *points* is also the term for a 'stitch', and, aurally, runs into *point de vue* where the *point* can be a mildly old-fashioned intensifier of *pas* (not). Thus, given the developments to come in the text *point de vue* could reasonably be taken as 'no view at all' (*Veils*, 93). For the verb *piquer*, Bennington points out that its obvious meaning is 'to stitch', but notes that the word carries an overtone of its colloquial meaning, 'to steal, to pinch', as well, and that *voile* could be here either masculine (veil), or feminine (sail). In the context of the ambiguous plural French *voiles*, the frequent use in French of *voilà* ('there'), 'see' (from *vois là*, 'see there', but the homophone of *voile à* ..., '[a] veil on') are signaled to the reader by the translator's choice to keep the word in French. Bennington adds in his note: 'To the translator's relief and despair, some of these possibilities and difficulties are later explicitly discussed in the text, along with their untranslatability' (*Veils*, 93).

The Cixous essay, which forms the very short (13 pages) opening section of *Veils* is entitled 'Savoir' (knowledge) and focuses on an autobiographical experience, that of Cixous' lifelong extreme myopia and its so-called 'miraculous' cure through the modern technology of laser surgery. The Cixous portion of *Veils* repeats passages of an earlier Cixous text, *Messie* (des femmes, 1996), a text that could be considered its poetic double. Derrida's contribution to *Veils* could then in turn be justly termed the philosophical 'twin' or 'double' of Cixous'.

In her meditation on the passage from blindness to vision, Cixous seems to be interested as much in what we learn from non-seeing as she is in the act of seeing. Her conclusion would appear to be that blindness can only be known (and therefore mourned) after the recovery of vision. Yet even the very concept of vision becomes pluralized in Cixous, for as she has said: 'By gaining a vision, one loses a vision' (*Messie* 145). 'Savoir' is not simply the removal of the veil, allowing vision following blindness; 'savoir' simply gestures towards the presence of the 'veil' in the first place. And in Derrida's words, Cixous' text 'has parted with [*s'est défait*] the veil, that corpus knew, from the operation of the other, how to part with veiling as much as unveiling' (*Veils* 79).

Turning to Derrida's much lengthier (71 pages) portion of *Veils*, we observe that moving beyond a mere meditation on Cixous' essay, Derrida proceeds to consider the question of truth (as an example of 'vision'). Here he substitutes the thinking of the verdict, a term he then proceeds to weave in and out of Cixous' text. If the word *verdict* links 'the same word, the true of truth, or the veridicity of the veridictum ... to the semantic motifs of the veil (revelation, unveiling) ... ' (*Veils* 55), it can then be articulated via Cixous' text and her eye surgery to Derrida's thinking on the messianic: 'Savoir is indebted, recognizing its debt to an event which remains unique, forever unique, forever heterogeneous to any language, that is [à savoir] the operation which gave her sight' (*Veils* 75).

Beyond the gracefully articulate and elegant translation by Geoffrey Bennington of these two intriguingly partnered pieces by Derrida and

Cixous, *Veils* also reproduces a beautiful series of drawings by Ernest Pignon-Ernest. The book is a pleasure to read, showcasing the creative friendship of two of the world's most influential writers and thinkers.

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Dirk L. Couprie, Robert Hahn, and **Gerard Naddaf**
Anaximander in Context. New Studies in the Origins of Greek Philosophy.
SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy.
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 2003. Pp. xiii + 290.
US$81.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-5537-8);
US$27.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-5538-6).

However narrowly or broadly one might define what philosophy is about, or whichever philosophical school or tradition one might belong to, this book, for sure, does not include a single word of or on philosophy — this despite the subtitle that holds promise of 'new studies in the origins of Greek philosophy'.

Yet another misleading impression one might gain just looking at the title and the cover of the book, is about authorship: this is not a co-authored book but, as the unsigned 'Introduction' admits, it is a book consisting of three separate monographs (or lengthy essays) authored by three different scholars (1). Gerard Naddaf's contribution is entitled, 'Anthropogony and Politogony in Anaximander of Miletus' (7-69); Robert Hahn writes about 'Proportions and Numbers in Anaximander and Early Greek Thought' (72-163); and the book ends with Dirk L. Couprie on 'The Discovery of Space: Anaximander's Astronomy' (165-254).

This does not need to be a drawback, of course, and the 'Introduction' indeed claims quite to the contrary that these three studies *together* 'open up a new, broadly interdisciplinary horizon for future studies in early Greek philosophy' (1). In the current age of mass research and grant proposal writing and reading, it does not surprise one to read such bold claims. However, in the case of Anaximander, it might raise an eyebrow or two: he left us with only one (more or less) full sentence (D-K B 2, about the *apeiron*). Add to that that whatever little else we know — or think we know — about Anaximander comes from Aristotle, writing centuries later, or from doxographers writing from an even greater distance, and who, for all practical

purposes, were much in the same situation we are today — pondering about the one sentence he left us with. Yet, all three monographs in this book manage not only *not* to shed new light on this fragment, all the authors avoid even to mention it in any length save but a few side remarks here and there.

This must mean that the book is either on a very low scholarly level or that it presupposes quite a massive knowledge of and familiarity with Anaximander and early Greek philosophy generally. The latter is the case and this makes all three monographs worth reading, in spite of the deficiencies in scope, because it indeed does add to our knowledge of the context in which early Greek philosophy emerged. Of course, as I said, the reader should not expect any philosophy here.

To start from the beginning, Gerard Naddaf sets out to tackle two issues: Anaximander's views on the development and origins of organic life and, following from the latter, also his views on the development of human society. Naddaf tries to show that Anaximander's is 'the first rational/naturalistic account of the origin of humanity' (17) by arguing via doxographical evidence that (a) Anaximander defended 'a doctrine of the transformation of species rather than the immutability of species' (15), and (b) that the human development evolved in a distinctive way, 'compared to the other species' (15). This is a bold claim, as there is no evidence as to whether Anaximander is (through the doxographers) arguing about the *origin* or the *development* of species. It is a reader's pick which argument to follow.

Even scantier is the evidence on Anaximander and the origins of society. Once again, there is no evidence, and thus Naddaf builds on the constructed logic that (a) Greek society was rapidly developing in the days of Anaximander and (b) so was Greek thought on society, so thus (c) it must have been 'the thing to do' in the sixth century BC to ponder about human society, ergo (d) Anaximander must have done it too. To build such a case, Naddaf goes a long way through early Greek geography, history and politics, and this is a fascinating exercise in how to combine Greek geography, history and politics to gain insights into otherwise closed worlds of thought. However, whether it has anything to do with Anaximander is another matter entirely. Additionally, at times Naddaf's argument seems to follow the logic of Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty, switching meanings of words to fit the interpretation, or the interpretive technique Beierwaltes has attributed to Heidegger in the latter's handling of early Greek thought — first translate a Greek word into German, and then interpret the *German* word, not the Greek one (see in Naddaf's case, for English of course, e.g., 46-7 on the alphabet).

In addition, Naddaf is much too simplistic on the origins of law and the transformation of the meaning of justice in Hesiod and Solon (19-32). Written law, what Naddaf calls 'public' law, visible too all and thus arguably binding to all, is, contrary to his claims, not necessarily yet free from religious (or metaphysical) implications. Even further, to conclude that, as Anaximander published a map of the *oikumenē* (33), he must have adhered to this kind of secular understanding of the law as the basis of human living together requires quite some stretch of imagination.

Robert Hahn picks up where Naddaf ends: Anaximander and Egypt. Hahn also brilliantly connects different spheres of life and faculties of human activity, in his case cosmology and architecture. This is not only highly interesting for the context of early Greek thought (how much did originally Egyptian architecture influence Greek cosmological thought?), but also thoroughly argued, exposed, and convincing. Yet, the one philosophically intriguing and obvious question — does early Greek metaphysical thought have its origins in early Greek architecture? — is not asked. Instead, Hahn slips into what seem to be best described as numerological speculations, and gets confusing and confused. The argument that Anaximander is 'explaining the *distance* of the stars, moon, and sun from us', and in defining these distances he is 'following an architectural technique' for columns (81), is solid. To argue that these are also 'symbolic proportions derivable from Homer, Hesiod, and the archaic culture' (86) is much less solid if not a pure speculation. Moreover, this speculation seems to be grounded in the argument that numbers '9 or 10' (86; 109) have a symbolic meaning. Hahn, however, tries to prove that Anaximander's formula to measure distances is based on '9 + 1' (85; inner and outer distance respectively). To conclude from this that number 10 is just the same as formula 9 + 1 is again a Humpty Dumpty argument. One might add that in such a study, based on context building and interpreting, one strongly misses ancient theology and aesthetics.

Dirk L. Couprie seems to have justifiably the last word in this book, as his argument that Anaximander is the discoverer of space and thus of the specifically Western way to understand space as depth (167), is largely based on the best scholarship worked out by the previous two authors. In addition, he painstakingly tries to avoid what he calls the 'anachronistic fallacy' (173-9) of seeing Anaximander's world with our eyes of the twenty-first century, and here Couprie is at his most successful. If one agrees with Naddaf on Anaximander's geography and with Hahn on Anaximander's measurements and model of the cosmos, then there is indeed no difficulty to follow Couprie's argument on Anaximander that '(1) the celestial bodies make full circles and pass also beneath the earth; (2) the earth floats free and unsupported in the air; and (3) the celestial bodies lie behind one another' (210). The reader, however, who picked up the book because of the subtitle, is left once again empty-handed, for there is not a word in Couprie on what the discovery of the space might mean as far as our understanding of Anaximander's philosophy or early Greek thought generally is concerned.

In sum, this is not a book for beginners in Anaximander or early Greek philosophy generally. And again, it is not about philosophy: the authors do not live up to their own promise of presenting 'new studies in the origins of Greek philosophy'. Still, the book makes interesting reading for it provides fresh and intriguing ways to see the context in which Anaximander thought.

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Frank Cunningham
Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction.
New York: Routledge 2002. Pp. vii + 248.
Cdn$128.00; US$85.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-22878-6);
Cdn$32.95: US$21.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-22879-4).

Frank Cunningham's latest book is a welcome addition to the literature on the theoretical and practical challenges confronting contemporary democracies. Like its predecessors — *Democratic Theory and Socialism* and *The Real World of Democracy Revisited* — this book is notably engaging and readable, and will be as valuable to those who are new to debates in democratic theory as to those who have had an introduction into some of these debates and are looking for a guide to the rest.

Cunningham's programmatic introduction first sketches and briefly defends his explanatory scheme, and then applies it to examples of critical problems associated with the nature and value of democracy. Cunningham adopts the perspective of John Dewey's pragmatism, which is discussed more fully in Chapter Eight, in his attempt to make sense of democracy and democratic theories. According to Deweyan pragmatism, 'practical and theoretical undertakings in politics (as elsewhere) are mainly efforts in problem solving' (1). Accordingly, subsequent chapters discuss the fundamentals of contemporary democratic theory with an eye to revealing how each of them might offer some ways of resolving the problems often thought to beset democracy. After reviewing the theories of several historical antecedents to current accounts, Cunningham then outlines the core problems of democratic functioning that serve as touchstones for the remainder of the book's discussion: tyranny of the majority, ineffective government, manipulation of public opinion, and irrational decision-making, among others.

In Chapters Two and Three, Cunningham discusses at some length the core features and problems of liberal democracy. He begins with John Stuart Mill's classical formulations in order to address the issue of the tensions that can arise from attempts to relate liberalism and democracy, primarily around matters of rights, equality, freedom, nationalism, and forms of participation. Here Cunningham usefully draws upon the distinction between 'protective' and 'developmental' democracy first made by C.B. Macpherson. While protective conceptions of democracy conceive of democracy's main function as safeguarding citizens' economic and other interests from factional conflict, developmental conceptions regard democracy's function as providing forums for citizens' participation in public affairs in order to help cultivate 'enriching cooperative behaviour' (34). The protective and developmental notions may be further associated, respectively, with negative and positive conceptions of liberty. Assorted versions of liberal democracy may then be identified according to the specific stands they take on such matters, although easy classifications are not always possible given how contestable are many of the

liberal-democratic philosophical commitments. Still, a spectrum may be devised encompassing a 'thin' view of liberal democracy — committed to individual rights, formal procedural mechanisms, and narrow limits on the public realm — as well as a 'thick' view — committed to group rights, to the political provision of resources for the exercise of such rights, and a wide view of the public realm. The end of Chapter Three also includes the first of three 'discussion' sections contained in the book, each of which provides a concentrated survey of some particularly difficult issue (in this case, the relation of liberal democracy to capitalism and socialism).

Cunningham then briskly covers extensive terrain — from classic pluralism to participatory democracy — in his characteristically forceful and lucid prose. Chapter Eight is used to explain in more detail Cunningham's own perspective of democratic pragmatism. What then are Cunningham's central theses, and why are they particularly fruitful in the discussion of democracy? In Cunningham's view democracy is not limited to the political realm narrowly defined, but is appropriate to all 'publics' — arenas of associated activity in which people recognize that their actions have consequences for each other. Democracy is also to be regarded as 'experimental' and thus variable across time and place; there is, in other words, no single form of, or path to democratic institutions, policies, and practices. Consequently, democracy is best thought of as a matter of degrees rather than as simply being either present or absent. Publics may be more or less democratic, and the concern should be with the study of mechanisms for enhancing democratic practices and institutions, even though the democratic ideal may never be perfectly realized. This conclusion conforms nicely with pragmatism's basic tenet that 'human affairs are ... problem-solving processes' (145). Democratic theorists therefore should use their knowledge and skills for the purpose of critically analyzing existing values and practices and proposing experimental methods for negotiating democracy's problems and expanding its scope to the fullest extent possible.

This is an appealing account of how we might best interrogate the values and practices of communities while both positing the democratic ideal and remaining open to alternative discourses and practices that can enhance actually existing democracy. The pragmatic orientation clearly views democracy from a developmental perspective, insofar as individuals are thought to flourish best when they are able freely to undertake collective measures to resolve the problematic situations which affect them as members of communities (although any given individual's engagement with public spheres can be manifested to different degrees). Methodologically, the ability to devise workable solutions is bolstered when society is as politically open and inclusive as possible, a point that reinforces the need for social cooperation and a democratically organized public committed to robust egalitarian policies.

Cunningham concludes with a timely discussion of democracy and citizenship under contemporary conditions of globalization. Recent years have seen lively debates on the negative and positive dimensions of globalization with

regard to democracy and state sovereignty, and Cunningham navigates deftly through the various positions. Cunningham's context-sensitive pragmatism offers a way out of some theoretical impasses since the democratic ideal is manifested not only in the state form, but also in sub-national public organizations and in interstate and non-governmental institutions and practices. One of the very few criticisms of Cunningham that I can muster does, however, emerge from this final chapter. To his credit Cunningham admits that he confines his discussion to democratic theories originating in Western Europe and North America (1). Still, given the growing connectedness and interdependence of the world signaled by globalization, it may have been worth the effort for Cunningham to engage with some of the significant work on democracy produced by political theorists in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In sum, then, I found very little in this book with which to take issue. In terms of the quality, breadth, and accessibility of the discussion, *Theories of Democracy* is first-rate.

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Jacques Derrida
Who's Afraid of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy 1.
Trans. Jan Plug.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2002.
Pp. ix + 208.
US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4294-4);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4295-2).

Comprising seven pieces dating from 1975 to 1990, *Who's Afraid of Philosophy?* is the first instalment of Jacques Derrida's *Du droit à la philosophie*. The title is deceptively frivolous, for this collection is characteristically intricate and demanding. But then part of Derrida's concern here is the relationship between the practice of philosophy and the interrelated prejudices that 'whoever wants to philosophize can do so immediately and directly' (23) without any essential 'need of ... writing or teaching apparatus' (24), and that one can rightly demand of philosophers 'immediate intelligibility' (23) (themes also explored in *Points ... Interviews, 1974-1994* [Stanford 1992]). Derrida thus objects that these ideas are not, as they often take themselves to be, voiced from outside philosophy, but are rather host to a particular

'philosophy of *langue* and *langage*' (26, cf. 32, 39) in their presupposing a universal 'formal language ... accessible to everyone' (26, cf. 44); 'a kind of originarist naturalism' (26). But in order to 'go "right to philosophy," one must at least *pass through* a language,' thereby frustrating the 'desire to go *right to philosophy*?' (28). (That philosophy might 'be studied like a dead language by a very few specialized anatomists' is, Derrida suggests, not only 'the dream of those in power' but also of 'certain university teachers' [189].) Insofar as philosophy does not constitute a homogenous activity (31), its historical-cultural particularities are 'often difficult to translate' (29). This is not to needlessly undermine philosophy — after all, 'we find *some* philosophy everywhere' (39, cf. 113) — but rather to recognise that philosophy 'stands under the law that demands that the right to philosophy never end, and that it never suspend questioning, irony, *skepsis*, *epochē*, or doubt when facing any philosopheme' (40, cf. 62, 179). In other words, one should not trust 'too quickly, the limit between the inside and the outside, the proper and the improper, what is essential and proper to philosophy and what is not' (41, cf. 104-5, 182).

A 'title is always a contract' (2), Derrida thus remarks, not only because 'it depends upon a speech act' (4, cf. 42), but also because a 'community ... is always presupposed in the value of the word and concept "title" ' (15, cf. 99). So what sort of contract is *Who's Afraid of Philosophy?* What might *we* get out of this covenant? The answer to this question largely depends on who 'we' happen to be (49). For much of this collection is situated within a specific (French) cultural context where 'the right to philosophy' has not been restricted to higher education. But France's inclusion of philosophy within the school curriculum is not without resistance. The 1975 Haby Reform, though never implemented, sought to drastically reduce 'philosophical teaching and research in France' (109). This was, according to Derrida, motivated to prevent 'high school students from exercising philosophical and political critique' (110, cf. 160). But again, such anti-philosophical gestures possess 'particular ideological contents ... a certain implicit philosophy' (110) insofar as 'the front here does not form between philosophy and nonphilosophy, but between specific philosophical practices and contents' (111, cf. 165, 172).

Derrida's involvement with (for example) The Groupe de Recherches sur l'Enseignement Philosophique bears witness to his practical anxieties concerning the 'fragmentation ... dissolution' (8) and even attempted 'destruction of the philosophy class' (158-9, 160) in France. But 'as French as it appears' (115), this theme gains broader significance in *Who's Afraid of Philosophy?* For what is arguably most interesting in this collection are those parts devoted to the question of 'institutionality', to the "performative event" ' (22, cf. 32) or 'founding violence' (5, cf. 21-2) of self-foundation that institutions both depend upon and simultaneously make '*disappear*' (5, cf. 21-2, 33) (themes developed in 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority" ' reprinted in *Acts of Religion* [Routledge 2002], 230-98). This, of course, is true of academic as much as political institutions — and perhaps especially of philosophy (21, 58-9). For, not only is the act of self-foundation itself 'emi-

nently philosophical' (178), it is the philosopher qua philosopher (including Derrida [63]) who 'authorizes himself to speak about the whole: and thus about everything' (61, cf. 62, 101, 175). The 'essential unrest of philosophical identity' (7), or what 'makes any good conscience impossible' (18, cf. 19) here, is therefore due to the fact that the 'apparent firmness, hardness, durability, or resistance of philosophical institutions betrays ... the fragility of a foundation' (10, cf. 100-1). For, Derrida maintains, 'no community will be called philosophical if it is not capable of reexamining ... its fundamental bond (title, contract, convention, institution ...)' (17). In this sense deconstruction itself becomes 'eminently philosophical'; not only because 'there is no *one* deconstruction' (103), but because '*deconstruction is an institutional practice for which the concept of the institution remains a problem*' (53). Derrida thus describes his project as 'indicating how deconstruction forces us to *think* differently the institutions of philosophy and the experience of the right to philosophy' (13, cf. 101-2).

What re-emerges throughout Derrida's writings is his quasi-prophetic tone (his speaking 'in the name of a democracy still *to come*' [42, cf. 44]) — as though he were the 'bad conscience' of philosophy itself (66). Such a role could only be played by someone never *entirely* at home 'in' philosophy, and never *entirely* reverent toward that 'eminent' (if strange, counter-institutional) institution. And yet Derrida remains deeply committed to philosophy. This 'mingling of respect and disrespect for the academic heritage and tradition in general' (*A Taste for the Secret* [Polity Press 2001], 43) may sometimes frustrate us, but then perhaps to 'consider this a contradiction ... is to understand as little about deconstruction as about philosophy' (53). Whatever the merits of responding to the alleged 'unprofitability of philosophy in this industrial society' (109) by deconstructive means, *Who's Afraid of Philosophy?* is unlikely to engender wider interest in Derrida's fascinating and often deeply humane work. This collection is best approached alongside his other writings and interviews on 'heritage' and 'institutions' in, for example, *Ethics, Institutions, and the right to Philosophy* (Rowman & Littlefield 2002) and *Echographies of Television* (Polity Press 2002).

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Jacques Derrida
Without Alibi.
Edited, translated and with an
Introduction by Peggy Kamuf.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2002.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4410-6);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4411-4).

Let me highlight from the outset that *Without Alibi* was initially Peggy Kamuf's idea, rather than Derrida's. This is one reason why Derrida, in the Preface, suggests that we can consider this book to be 'more and other than a translation' (xxi). Of course, Derrida has consistently argued that all translation involves *more* and *less* than the simple transportation of meaning from one language to another, and in which meaning is neither gained nor lost but merely changes form. It is *more* than this, because the process of translation always transforms both languages involved, and it is also *less* than this, because Derrida thinks that this transportation of meaning is *stricto sensu* impossible. As Derrida highlights in relation to the work of Plato, many terms are undecidable in their own language and translation can deprive them of this ambiguity. For example, in the *Phaedrus*, Plato uses the term *pharmakon*, which means both cure and poison in Greek, but the English translation effaces this.

But to return to the status of this book, Kamuf discerned a unity to five of Derrida's recent essays — written from 1994-2000 — that she and Derrida both agreed warranted a book-length conjunction. Earlier versions of two of the papers included here — 'History of the Lie' and 'Typewritter Ribbon' — have been previously published elsewhere. 'History of the Lie' does what its title announces and provides an interesting overview of some classical accounts of the lie. 'Typewritter Ribbon' returns Derrida to familiar territory via another analysis of Rousseau's *Confessions* — this time Derrida engages with Rousseau's famous act of perjury when he accused another of a crime he had committed. 'Psychoanalysis Searches the State of Its Soul: The Impossible Beyond of a Sovereign Cruelty' has been previously published in French. The other two papers — ' "*Le Parjure*," Perhaps: Storytelling and Lying', and 'The University Without Condition' — are published in this volume for the first time, and I will discuss the latter shortly.

According to Kamuf, the structural integrity of this book revolves around the fact that all of these essays were initially given at conferences in the US, and also responded to issues directly pertaining to the US. Now this is partly correct, but Derrida is avowedly a thinker without borders. Consider his ongoing rejection of the idea of a sovereign state and his consistent advocation of what he calls a New Internationalism. So what else, then, is particular to this book? From the above summary, it should be clear the issues of lying, perjury, and what it is to be with or without alibi, are major thematic concerns.

Related to this emphasis upon the lie though, is the issue of sovereignty that recurs throughout this book. In effect, Derrida argues that any claim of

indivisible sovereignty is inevitably a lie, a phantasm, or a form of nontruth. In this respect, he examines what he considers to be the constitutive 'as if' at work in the legal fiction of the reasonable subject, as well as in the construction of the sovereign state. Such themes are evident in all of the essays included here, and particularly in 'History of the Lie', and *'Le Parjure'*. However, Derrida suggests that while he wants to deconstruct the idea of the sovereignty of the nation-state, he nevertheless also intends to recognise the importance of something akin to the sovereign ideal, at least as it applies to responsibility and decision-making. It is the tension between these two ideas that Derrida explores at length in *Without Alibi*.

In 'The University Without Condition', Derrida argues that the university is — or more accurately should be — the privileged site from which to contest sovereignty. There are other sites that resist the phantasm of sovereignty, such as psychoanalysis, but Derrida points out that it is only the university that remains genuinely public. He also suggests that it is the Humanities, in particular, that should be the ultimate place of critical resistance. And, of course, it is deconstruction that would be at the heart of this unconditional resistance (but, as always, Derrida also acknowledges the necessity for a certain theoreticism, or a dominant consensus, for deconstruction to get underway at all).

At the same time, however, this idea of a university without condition — i.e., a university without state control, and without industry involvement — seems to presuppose a certain kind of autonomy akin to sovereignty, and Derrida admits that this notion involves a 'very particular form of sovereignty' (207). Derrida also admits that the university without condition does not exist — industry and government appropriation is everywhere — but he argues that the university should be without condition, and should involve an unconditional freedom to question, assert, and (contra Kant) to also say publicly all that is required.

Now Derrida argues that the idea of sovereign mastery is actually foreign to this idea, appearances notwithstanding. What is needed in the Humanities is questioning and deconstruction, rather than some kind of sovereign mastery that answers and thereby presumes to preclude further questions. What is needed, Derrida suggests, is a principle of resistance. Later, Derrida describes the new Humanities, or the Humanities to come, as the 'place of irredentist resistance ... a sort of principal of civil disobedience, even of dissidence in the name of a superior law and a justice of thought' (208). Of course, that superior kind of justice cannot be named, as Marxism did. Marxism described and thereby circumscribed the future, rather than remaining open to the future that is 'to come'. Deconstruction consistently insists that this is not the way to go, because the resistance thereby ends up becoming a form of orthodoxy that is itself no longer critical.

This reminds me of the later work of Albert Camus. In *The Rebel*, Camus advocates a state of perpetual rebellion, but not revolution, because the various revolutions of the twentieth century had led to such violence, and he saw this as an inevitable consequence of all absolutist thinking. Like Camus'

emphasis upon rebellion, Derrida's conception of the resistance of the Humanities also proceeds without a grand telos. It involves a perpetual openness towards the future, and towards those impossibilities that might yet come.

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David A. Duquette, ed.
Hegel's History of Philosophy: New Interpretations.
Albany: State University of New York Press 2003. Pp. vii + 232.
US$65.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-5543-2);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-5544-0).

In 1907 Benedetto Croce asked: 'What is living and what is dead in Hegel's philosophy?' Today, many scholars place Hegel's history of philosophy in the latter category. Hegel's claims regarding the meaning, progress, and 'end' of history — not to mention his notorious Eurocentrism — have not faired well. *Hegel's History of Philosophy: New Interpretations*, the most recent addition to the SUNY 'Series in Hegelian Studies', contains eleven papers that take Hegel's history of philosophy seriously. First presented at a 2000 meeting of the Hegel Society of America, this collection presents a wide range of views on a wide range of topics, and is a welcome addition to the literature. The focus throughout is on Hegel's Berlin lectures on the history of philosophy, which were conducted regularly from 1819 to his death in 1831.

Angelica Nuzzo addresses the place of the history of philosophy within Hegel's system. Her approach throughout is methodological, focusing on how the logical structure of Hegel's system relates to the historical development of reason. Nuzzo argues that Hegel's method involves a parallelism between the *Logic* and Hegel's history of philosophy, where the internal logic of development in the former mirrors the historical development in the latter. But she also argues that Hegel's method evidences a principle of synchronicity whereby the relation between history and the historical forms of absolute *Geist* are clarified.

In two complementary papers, Robert Bernasconi and Andrew Fialla address Hegel's claim that philosophy begins with the Greeks. While not disputing the ultimately Eurocentric bent of Hegel's history of philosophy, Bernasconi argues that Hegel's thoughts on India were more complex than

generally recognized. Schlegel championed Indian thought, claiming that an original revelation of truth occurred therein. For the most part, Hegel's remarks on India were his way of responding to Schlegel, and, as such, were decidedly negative. But Bernasconi argues that in his last years Hegel's reading of the *Yoga-sutras* convinced him that Indian *philosophy* did indeed exist and did have some impact on the Greeks. Fialla also acknowledges that, for Hegel, 'the flash of Greek thought is made possible by the accumulation of spiritual tinder in the East' (61). But he focuses critically on the metaphors that inform Hegel's understanding of history and the development of *Geist*, especially on Hegel's claim that an impulse or desire (*Trieb*) undergirds the logic of history's unfolding.

Five papers address Hegel's interpretation of specific figures and stages of the philosophical tradition. Robert Williams discusses Hegel's interpretation of Socratic irony, and challenges Schlegel's and Kierkegaard's claim that such irony is merely 'destructive'. Will Dudley and Tanja Staehler address Hegel's interpretation of skepticism. Against notable contemporary readings (e.g., Forster and Williams), Dudley claims that Hegel admired the 'skeptical consciousness' (i.e., recognition of the finitude and instability of the understanding) of the ancients rather than the method of equipollence. Focusing on the place of skepticism within Hegel's system of philosophy, Staehler argues that skepticism is a necessary stage wherein the *naïveté* of natural consciousness is overcome and a higher 'form' of consciousness is achieved. Two additional papers address Hegel's appraisals of Rousseau and Spinoza, respectively. Allegra De Laurentiis notes that Rousseau's notion of the will plays a pivotal role in the development of modernism. On this reading, Hegel's Rousseau is the first thinker of the tradition for whom the concept of the will is central, and who for the first time exhibits 'the speculative Concept in its form as will' (137). Last in this section of papers, Merold Westphal discusses Hegel's interpretation of Spinoza's 'infinite substance'. While Hegel criticized that notion (since we must grasp the true as both substance *and* subject), Westphal also notes that Hegel recognized the necessity of the same to the speculative project. Westphal's paper also includes a discussion of Derrida, but by far the most useful elements center on Hegel's mitigated sympathy for Spinoza's project.

In the final group of selections, three papers address respectively the systematic function of the history of philosophy and the notions of progress and the 'end' of history. Kevin Thompson claims that Hegel's history of philosophy supplies a necessary 'experiential proof', whereby the speculative development is shown to coincide with actuality (and is not, therefore, a mere speculative flight of fancy). In a wide-ranging paper, Vittorio Hösle argues that Hegel's view of the history of philosophy was a 'helicoid theory', and, more generally, that this is the *only* viable theory of the history of philosophy. While much of his paper is an overview of a theory he offers in a previous book, Hösle does offer a viable conception of how progress occurs in 'ascending circles' that exhibit the process of *Geist*'s self-recognition. Closing out the section (and the collection as a whole) is Jere Paul Surber's comments on the

'end of history'. Surber rejects 'weak' versions of the thesis, claiming that it is integral to Hegel's project. However, he argues that what 'ends' is reason's self-completion, and not 'history' proper.

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Hans-Georg Gadamer
The Beginning of Knowledge.
Trans. Rod Coltman.
New York: Continuum 2002. Pp. 148.
US$24.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-1195-9);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-1459-1).

Gadamer's introduction to ancient philosophy was through Paul Natorp, but he credits Martin Heidegger for inspiring him to read the ancient Greeks in such a way as to bring their texts to life. Ironically he has also said that he pursued a degree in classics to free himself from the overpowering intellectual force of Heidegger. We benefit from his success, as his views on the ancient Greeks provide a powerful reply to Heidegger's enormously creative, but less than accurate interpretations. Generally, if one is familiar with Gadamer and his work, one thinks of him as someone who took Heidegger's emphasis on understanding and integrated it with the history of hermeneutics elevating hermeneutics from a theory of interpretation to a central issue of philosophical anthropology. But Gadamer's first publications were in ancient philosophy and almost one-third of his collected works are dedicated to Greek philosophy. He has published six books on Greek philosophy — *Plato's Dialectical Ethics, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies in Plato, The Ideal of the good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, The Beginning of Philosophy, The Beginning of Knowledge*, and *Wege zu Plato* (recently published in Germany) — and dozens of articles on the Greeks. *The Beginning of Knowledge* is presented by Continuum as a companion piece to 1999's *The Beginning of Philosophy*, but really they are distinct volumes. *The Beginning of Philosophy* is a translation of a series of talks Gadamer gave on Parmenides in Italy in 1998. *The Beginning of Knowledge* brings together six already published essays all relating to Gadamer's interpretation of the pre-Socratics. Of the six essays included in *The Beginning of Knowledge* — 'On the Tradition of Heraclitus', 'Heraclitus Studies', 'Ancient Atomic Theory', 'Plato and Pre-Socratic Cosmology', 'Greek Philosophy and Modern Thought', and 'Natural Science and the Concept of Nature' — the first five

are included in Gadamer's *Gesammelte Schriften*. The last has been published, but is not included in the collected writings. The essays span sixty years: the earliest is 1935, 'Ancient Atomic Theory', the latest 1994, 'Natural Science and the Concept of Nature'. All are skilfully translated into English for the first time.

Gadamer's interpretation of the Greeks show three distinctive features, all reflected in the essays here. While Heidegger highlighted Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of the forms, Gadamer's view is that Plato did not hold such a theory at all. What is significant about Plato's dialogues is how the character of the subject matter becomes clear through the exchange. Thus Gadamer pays close attention to the narrative features of the dialogues and avoids seeing them as means for presenting doctrines. In the process, Gadamer argues that Plato and Aristotle are much closer thinkers than philosophers now realize. Specifically, they were united in the concern to show how it is that the nature of things shows itself to subjects through language. On this score, Gadamer is concerned with the ways Aristotle's views have been distorted in their scholastic appropriations. Finally, Gadamer thinks the pre-Socratics need to be read through the writings of Plato and Aristotle, especially Plato. His Platonic approach to the pre-Socratics dominates *The Beginning of Philosophy* as well as *The Beginning of Knowledge*, and leads to his most compelling, yet unconventional insights.

Without knowing better, one might think *The Beginning of Knowledge* is the Heraclitus counterpart to Gadamer's focus on Parmenides in *The Beginning of Philosophy*. The first two essays, over half the book, present Gadamer's Heraclitus interpretation. In the essay 'On the Tradition of Heraclitus' Gadamer takes up the case for the Heraclitean roots of a quotation in a recent fragment from Hippolytus. Gadamer interprets the saying about the relationship between a father and a son in such a way as to purge it of its Christian overtones and to return us to what it might have meant before it was overlaid with the sense of the Incarnation. In the process he provides an explicitly non-Christian reading of Heraclitus' discussion of fire, showing the connection between fire, the psyche, and self-motion. 'Heraclitus Studies' is the longest piece in the book, and is a revised transcript of a class lecture. It thus has a more casual tone than some of the more exegetical essays. In this extended discussion of the main themes in Heraclitus' essay one gets the best sense of what it would mean to use Plato as a guide to reading Heraclitus.

'Ancient Atomic Theory', the essay that impressed Heisenberg enough that it landed Gadamer his first permanent job in Leipzig, presents an alternative to the 'feast or famine' readings of ancient atomic theory. Gadamer protests that interpreters tend to either read the atomists as presenting a naïve theory of nature easily surpassed by Aristotle, or as being prescient forerunners to modern atomic theory. But, he argues, in neither case is the view appreciated on its own terms and neither can appreciate Plato's intermediary role between the Atomists and the Aristotelian critique. In 'Plato and Pre-Socratic Cosmology' Gadamer draws on insights from the *Timeaus*

to argue that the cosmogonies presented by the pre-Socratics are at the same time cosmologies.

The final two short essays stand apart from the rest as they move well beyond issues of the pre-Socratics. As such, they have the broadest appeal. In 'Greek Philosophy and Modern Thought' Gadamer shows the importance of Greek views of embodiment, ethos, and language for correcting some of the excesses of modern philosophy. In 'Natural Science and the Concept of Nature', he reveals the clear differences between Greek philosophy of nature and modern science, partly as a response to those who appeal to a continuous scientific culture running from the Greeks to contemporary Europe, and partly to show the kinds of questions that get left behind by modern science to be taken up in the human sciences.

Although the essays exhibit many of the themes of Gadamer's interpretation of the ancients, and show Gadamer's hermeneutics in practice, there are more accessible and important works by him. Those most drawn to the close textual analyses of 'On the Tradition of Heraclitus', 'Ancient Atomic Theory', and 'Plato and Pre-Socratic Cosmology' will probably find the more general meditations of the last essays unsubstantiated; and those who find the latter work appealing will be uninterested in the close textual exegesis. Still, the ability to bring these two intellectual enterprises together is one of Gadamer's main successes. Whether or not one finds Gadamer's Platonic route to the pre-Socratics to be successful, he produces stimulating insights into their views and challenges one to rearticulate why Gadamer might be wrong, if he is wrong. Such challenges are always welcome.

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Julia Kristeva
Intimate Revolt: The Power and Limits of Psychoanalysis. Vol. 2. Trans. Jeanine Herman. New York: Columbia University Press 2002. Pp. 291.
US$32.50. ISBN 0-231-11414-1.

Julia Kristeva
Revolt, She Said.
Interview with Philippe Petit. Trans. Brian O'Keeffe. Ed. Sylvere Lotringer.
Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) 2002. Pp. 139.
US$9.95. ISBN 1-58435-015-6.

Kristeva reclaims a humanist notion of 'revolt' from the excessively political inflection given to the term. Defining revolt as 'displacement' and 'return', revolt, for Kristeva, is not nihilism but rather an interrogation of values. In order to link the apparently disjunct notions of the 'intimate' and 'revolt', Kristeva undertakes a survey of these two concepts — from St. Augustine to Barthes.

Kristeva posits three 'modalities' of the timeless in analytic experience: the repetition of the memory-trace, working-through and the liquidation of transference. It is the timeless that gives us the potential of revolt — now defined as *continual* re-birth and interrogation. For Freud, the body and soul become integral parts of the intimate — which expresses itself as systems of translinguistic representations and jouissance.

Pondering on the spectacularization of evil in cinema Kristeva asks: 'does cinema wish to be an exhibition of the sadomasochistic repressed in the spectacle, an authorized perversion, a banalization ... or ... demystification?' Seeking revolt's 'imaginary of demystification' (80), Kristeva arrives at Roland Barthes. Kristeva terms Barthes a 'technician of social demystification', where he used 'eccentric' language to distance himself from established myths in order to 'reveal the schematic manipulations and exclusions' (9). Sartre's work, Kristeva argues, suggests the essential negativity of all consciousness. Kristeva seeks to puzzle out whether the imaginative experience is, as Sartre put it, ' "fatally free?" ' Kristeva argues that with contemporary developments in technology, 'the objectified imaginative consciousness no longer recognizes the impossible or nothingness' (140). The total spectacle of the virtual eliminates nothingness. The mediated universe with no 'inside' — that is, the intimate — has done away with the negativity of consciousness, which is what makes interrogation possible. Reading Louis Aragon, Kristeva argues for a new way of looking at identity. Kristeva suggests that creative work alone can provide a woman with security, *from which* a link with the man can be established. Autonomy must be acquired based on economic security, symbolic and erotic assurance. The child is central to this process. The child is an other that enables the woman to break way from him. Yet it

is also one to whom the woman gives, and who is a gift to the woman. The child continually reminds the woman that she is only separation and gift.

Kristeva states in her Preface to the second section, 'The Future of Revolt': 'today, the psychical apparatus knows that it will only be saved if it gives itself time and space of revolt: to break off, remember, refashion' (223). Kristeva argues that 'putting into question' is the essential form of speech in analysis. The analyzed person is detached from any will to control or power or unity. This is a freedom offered by psychoanalysis, and the analyzed person now *re-creates* links. Psychoanalysis begins to question value systems without being nihilistic. Kristeva's summary of the radically liberatory nature of psychoanalysis reads: 'It [revolt] is being able to take a position in order to assume a judgement in a specific situation and being capable of questioning things from the place of another subject ... ' (237).

Kristeva speaks of the foreigner and the translator in contemporary Europe. Conscious of her Bulgarian descent, she suggests that the foreigner is a translator because however well s/he blends into the host's language, there is a trace of the native/maternal language. The foreigner is a nonideal translator because the difference always seeps through. Yet the foreigner seeks the language of the host, because in a new language there is a pretext of a new birth. Speaking an 'other language' is a way of keeping the psychical apparatus alive. As translators-foreigners, it is only by abandoning the 'stereotypical codes we call national languages that we lay bare the foreignness of our inner lives' (254).

The chapter 'Europhilia-Europhobia' is devoted mainly to the reception of her work in the USA. In a later section Kristeva argues that there are two models of freedom. One sees freedom as the absence of restraint. The second sees freedom as initiative and as 'enterprising subjectivity' (262). In contemporary times freedom is seen as the ability to adapt to a cause that is exterior to the self. It is now less a moral cause than an economic one. It is the freedom to adapt to the logic of production, science and economy — that is, free to adapt to the market of freedom and profit. This form of freedom is embodied, for Kristeva, in American civilization. The other model of freedom is about the liberation of speech as endless questioning, surrendering speech and self to the other, a freedom of being. This model of freedom that valorizes the 'singular ... the intimate' is the essence of being in the world (264). If the intimate is crucial to our being — since psychical life is what allows us to handle aggression and trauma — then the second model of freedom which respects intimate space is what is necessary for us. The intimate has its imaginary in this form of freedom. The imaginary may be religion, literature or phantasms. It is in the intimate space that the politics of revolt and the revolt of politics finds its grounds.

Revolt, She Said is an extension of *Intimate Revolt*. Kristeva now defines revolt as 'the deep sense of self-questioning and questioning tradition ... sexual differences, projects for life and death, new modalities of civil society ... ' (85). She goes on to add that the individual must be the focus of change, and it is only by restoring pride in love, desire and revolt that society can

prevent itself from 'ossifying' (86). Kristeva also makes significant comments about nationalism here. Kristeva sees '"my country"' as a 'reserve of memory or an imaginary limit, rather than in terms of a religious foundation or an ultimate origin' (61). It allows one to retain the sense of being different, but allows, also, a 'public and secular space ... [in France] that stays committed to preserving the "general spirit" ... but wouldn't erase the foreignness of each of the constituent parts.' This 'subtle balance' is what we will have to achieve to maintain some degree of hospitality to the (respected) Other/immigrant while retaining the sense of '"my country"' (64). A fine summation of revolt's benefits occurs in 'What's Left of '68' in *Revolt, She Said* (11-44). Here Kristeva writes: 'it is precisely by putting things into question that "values" stop being frozen dividends and acquire a sense of mobility, polyvalence and life' (12). This state of 'permanent revolt' is the legacy of '68 — the 'freeing of subjective desires and concern for the dignity of the most disadvantaged' (14).

Kristeva's work is an intricate mix of cultural criticism — especially in her comments on contemporary Europe — and psychoanalysis. The return to the intimate space in a heavily technologised world (and Kristeva is acutely conscious of the media-ted nature of our lives and identities) increasingly contemptuous of or indifferent to psychical structures is both ironic and imperative. Kristeva's call to return to the intimate is salutory in a world given over to the dictates of production and consumption alone.

The comments on patriotism, nationalism, hospitality and cosmopolitanism are politically astute and ethically humanist. It is fascinating that two French philosophers write on these issues at the same time. Both Jacques Derrida, in his two recent works, *Of Hospitality* (trans. Rachel Bowlby. Stanford University Press 2000) and *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* (trans. Mark Dooley and Michael Hughes. Routledge 2001), and Kristeva plead for a moral stance on behalf of the disadvantaged, for newer forms of cosmopolitanism, nationalism and hospitality. Kristeva believes that it is imperative to recast — through revolt — the very definitions of freedom. It is interesting that Kristeva is firmly committed to the humanist notions of self and dignity when speaking of revolt. It is also, as she admits, impossible to speak of revolt in this way in today's times. Like Derrida, Kristeva speaks of the (fantasmatic?) impossibility as the only possibility. As she demonstrates in *Intimate Revolt*, revolt must become a fantasmatic *imaginary* that re-does our psychical structure itself. The imaginary is what makes the intimate space crave for freedom, a freedom of being rather than of economic necessity. The 'future of revolt' thus lies in the intimate psychical apparatus. This 'humanist' spin on revolt is perhaps utopian. And anyway, what's wrong with utopianism, especially as formulated by one of the most formidable minds of the current epoch?

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John Leslie
Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 2001. Pp. x + 234.
Cdn$66.50: US$39.95. ISBN 0-19-924892-3.

Einstein once said that he only desired to read God's mind, the rest was detail. If John Leslie's pantheism is correct, Einstein did both. Leslie holds that our universe is a thought-structure within a particular divine mind. 'Physical' objects, like rocks and trees, are thought-aggregates within this thought-structure. The physical is reduced to the mental in this system, but it does not follow that everything is conscious. 'Mental' objects, like our minds, are self-conscious thought-aggregates, 'sub-systems' of a particular divine mind's thought-structure. Our universe is one thought-structure of this divine mind, which contains other universes, other thought-structures. Further, the divine mind containing our universe (and others) is itself a member of an infinite aggregate of similarly structured divine minds. But there is no ultimate divine mind containing the aggregate of divine minds. It is unclear whether the thought-structures of these various divine minds overlap or whether all the divine minds are unique. Leslie regards the exact details here as rather unimportant, since the overall scheme, if correct, is impressive enough. No doubt he is right on this.

There are plenty of interesting discussions regarding this pantheism's intricacies: the relationship between the divine minds, the aggregate of divine minds' order of infinity, the relationship between a divine mind and its sub-systems and the issue of objective value. Objective value plays a large role in this system, determining what the divine minds know. In other words, the divine minds know all that is of value, or worth knowing. Leslie argues that his way of construing the nature of these minds and placing them within an infinite aggregate serves to maximize the amount of value belonging to all of reality. Leslie's discussions are in general quite clear and fair.

But there is a problem with Leslie's concept of 'divine consciousness'. A human mind, he points out, distinguishes thought, knowledge, and consciousness. A human mind can know X without being conscious of, or thinking, X. Humans always have a point of view, a perspective; spatial objects present themselves in profiles, one side at a time. Temporal objects, like music, present themselves in profile as well. The point is that the property 'having a perspective' is an essential structure of human experience. But a divine mind, Leslie stresses, does not distinguish between thought, knowledge, and consciousness. To say that a divine mind knows X is to say that it is thinking X. A divine mind simply is its collection of thoughts; it would seem that there is no perspective involved. But it would seem that sometimes the divine mind must have a perspective in its experience since a divine mind — in virtue of the pantheistic structure — must know what it is like to be a human. Now, how can a mind lacking perspective know what it is like to be a mind that essentially contains a perspective? Leslie says that

the divine mind knows our experience on different levels: how we know our experience (with its perspectival structure) and from an omnipotent point, non-perspectival point of view. So it would appear that there is a sense of perspective within the divine consciousness as well; it knows our experience from different points of view.

The problem is that there is a tension regarding perspectives in Leslie's concept of 'divine thought'. This tension surfaces when considering the charge that, since human minds are sub-systems of a divine mind, ultimately the divine mind alone truly thinks. Leslie dismisses this as an erroneous reductionism, akin to saying that, since minds are collections of atoms only atoms really think. To maintain both that the 'I' is a sub-system of a divine mind and that the 'I' is an individual forces either true perspective into the divine consciousness or the belief that the 'I' is not truly an individual. Leslie needs to offer more discussion to resolve this tension.

Overall, Leslie's version of pantheism is a mixture of a Platonic scientific realism and a Platonic creation theory. Regarding Platonic scientific realism, Leslie holds that science reveals how the world is. Anti-realists are going to be disappointed here. Leslie offers no discussion in support of scientific realism. He simply accepts it. But even those who accept the basic idea of scientific realism could be in for a surprise. In other words, there are various versions of scientific realism. Leslie's states that science studies structures and that these structures exist. The Platonism here is strong enough to say that these structures are all that really exists. Unfortunately, Leslie does not clearly explain the term 'structure'. It appears that it refers to the mathematical structure of scientific theory. Now there is no question that science couches its ideas within a (mathematical) structure, but that is not the same as saying that the structure itself is what science studies and in turn, a structure is all that the world really is. In sum, the Platonism here is strong enough to push the entire idea of 'matter' off the scientific stage. Leslie might be right that matter ultimately disappears into various elements of structure, but he really does not offer much to support this view.

Now the same could be said about Leslie's Platonic creation theory. When discussing the Platonic account of creation, he argues that it is not logically problematic to subsume an ethical sub-division under the concept 'logically possible'. That is, it is coherent to claim that an object X is not only 'logically possible', but also 'ethically required'. Now 'X being ethically required' is, again, only the concept of X. It is natural to ask: 'what Y could give this concept of X the power to actualize its object, X?' And Leslie does pose this question, although he does not directly answer it. Rather, he states that it is akin to asking: 'what Z gives a yellow after-image the power to be nearer in colour to an orange after-image than to a red after-image?' The latter, he insists, is just a misguided question and so the former is as well. In sum, Leslie is arguing that the concept 'X is ethically required' in some sense already contains 'the power' to actualize its object, X. Leslie admits that he has not established that such a class of concepts can create their objects. Nonetheless, he insists that he has provided some motivation. Indeed he has.

However, like his discussion of science and the realism of its structures, Leslie's discussion of Platonism simply presupposes the existence of ideal objects, the Platonic entities. That there are such creatures as Platonic entities or independently existing concepts is not argued for. Rather, it is taken as a beginning.

In sum, Leslie's short textual account of a large metaphysical system accomplishes much, but it does so by presupposing a lot as it goes. Those philosophers leery of various forms of realism are likely to be unmoved by this work. However, those of us with Platonic sympathies will find this a fascinating attempt to blend science and metaphysics in tacking the question why there is something rather than nothing.

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Jean-Luc Marion
Being Given.
Trans. J.L. Kosky.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Pp. xi + 385.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-3410-0);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-3411-9).

Being Given is Jeffrey L. Kosky's very capable translation of *Etant donné: Essai d'une phénoménologie de la donation*, Jean-Luc Marion's 1997 follow-up to his controversial 1989 book, *Réduction et donation: Etudes sur Husserl, Heidegger et la phénoménologie*. In order to best appreciate the significance of *Being Given*, some background information is warranted. Marion, who is professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne, is primarily known as a dean of French Descartes scholarship. More specifically, he has worked towards a revisionary conception of Descartes' metaphysics, centered not so much on the *Cogito*, but on the generative function of Descartes' methodology. The basic idea of Marion's revisionary Cartesianism is that the *Cogito* is a product generated by the Cartesian method, and not an object to be explained by that method. In turn, the Cartesian method is recursive on the intuition of the raw, extra-conceptual givenness of existence, which precedes the *Cogito* — though, obviously, unthinkable without the *Cogito*. For present purposes, what is important is to keep in mind the claim that there is something *given*, which is conceptually inexhaustible by thought.

Marion's 1989 book, *Réduction et donation*, was greeted by a good deal of controversy in France, because of its promotion of the so-called 'theological

turn' in phenomenology. The main arguments of that book may be summarized as follows. First, there is non-conceptual content in our experience of the world, which Marion calls 'givenness' ['*donation*' in French, '*Gegebenheit*' in German]. In the modernist tradition of philosophy, which Marion so admirably channels through Descartes, we may understand such content in terms of the primitives of intellectual intuition — canonically, the intuition of one's own existence. Second, the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger are the latest attempts to come to terms with this non-conceptual content. Third, once confronted by givenness, however, both Husserl and Heidegger attempt to subordinate givenness under derivative analyses based on their respective methods. Husserl subordinates givenness under 'objecthood' ['*Gegenständlichkeit*'] or the semantic-value of propositions, whereas Heidegger subordinates givenness under 'Being' ['*Sein*']. Fourth, Marion's essential claim is that neither approach can rid of the priority of givenness, but are entirely saturated by it. In a sense, Husserl and Heidegger, much like the standard interpretations of Descartes, wind up confusing the tools of explanation with *the* explanandum. Finally (and this is the controversial part), Marion goes on to suggest that givenness should be acknowledged as the *revelation* of the divine. After a fairly brief overview of the main exegetical points from *Réduction et donation*, Marion devotes most of *Being Given* to this last, controversial claim.

Marion's core argument rests on a kind of inverted version of Descartes' causal proof of God's existence from the *Third Meditation*, so that he can reverse 'the hierarchy of cause and effect so that one is referred to metaphysics, the other to phenomenology' (165; also, 275-8). For Marion, phenomenon (which is a term that can, according to Marion, 'trade places' with givenness [119]) is the cause of metaphysics, so that the metaphysical thought of God is the effect. Marion writes: 'The temporal privilege of the effect — it alone arises to and in the present, gives *itself* — implies that all knowledge begins by the event of the effect; for without the effect, there would be neither meaning nor necessity to inquiring after any cause whatsoever' (165). However, the cause that is then stipulated to precede the effect is not given at all, since transcendent or phenomenally unavailable. Instead, the cause is a theoretical construct: 'The cause remains an effect of meaning, assigned to the effect by the will to know, or rather, imposed on the event to compensate for its exorbitant privilege ... with an epistemological dependence' (166). Since Marion is committed to the claim that givenness is non-conceptual, insofar as a causal explanation must remain conceptual, a causal explanation cannot provide an exhaustive account of givenness. Accordingly, Marion writes: 'Inasmuch as it is a given phenomenon, *the event does not have an adequate cause* and cannot have one' (167: his italics).

What justifies Marion's inversion of Descartes' causal proof of God's existence just is the claim that givenness exceeds all conceptualization (207, 212). If, when confronted by the given, no conceptual repertoire can exhaust that given, then that given must exceed what is thinkable (227, 271-5). *Contra* Descartes, it is not as though we must specifically think of the infinite,

which exceeds the finitude of our modes of thought, to infer a greater cause with an infinite formal reality (i.e., the Cartesian God from the *Third Meditation*). Instead, if we can confront the given at all, we would be confronted by that greater, divine cause — or, as Marion literally has it, *causa sui* (160). Since the *epochē*, or the phenomenological reduction, is supposed to be the method by which one brackets the determination of the world by the application of concepts — causal or otherwise — in order to get to phenomena as such, Marion seems to think that the *epochē* is the way by which to confront givenness and, a fortiori, the divine. Phenomenology, accordingly, becomes a kind of '*revealed* theology' (72-3, 241-5, 321-4), such that givenness winds up amounting to *revelation* in the very literal, Christian sense (4, 234-41). In a slogan, Marion revises 'the principle of all principles' of phenomenology as follows: 'so much reduction, so much givenness' (14).

Being Given is a dense and difficult display of erudition by a world-class scholar, and the present review surely comes no way close to doing it full justice. Nevertheless, though Marion's display may count sufficient as a *phenomenological interpretation* of certain theological strains of modern philosophy, it cannot be construed a *justification* of those strains. But that is, of course, what Marion is after. Since, in turn, his conversion of phenomenology into a kind of theology (or at least into a method of worship) depends for its plausibility on that interpretation of just those theological strains, the transition from 'so much reduction' to 'so much (*divine*) givenness' (my interpretive addition) cannot be defended without circularity.

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Martin Beck Matustík and **William L. McBride, eds.**
Calvin O. Schrag and the Task of Philosophy After Postmodernity.
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 2002. Pp. xix + 339.
US$89.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1874-2);
US$27.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8101-1875-0).

'In the last analysis, this book should be regarded as a milestone, not as a conclusion' [xix]: the editorial intention and ambition behind *Calvin O. Schrag and the Task of Philosophy After Postmodernity* have been fulfilled.

Projected on April 01, 2000, at an all-day symposium in West Lafayette, as a tribute to the seventy-year old scholar apparently too 'young to retire' (cf. Don Ihde, xix), this volume has been brought to light by Martin Beck Matustík

and William L. McBride, whose editorial skills and collegial collaboration stand as exemplary. They masterfully orchestrate eighteen highly original essays by a group of engaging philosophers, Schrag included, who are exploring in various ways post-phenomenological philosophy, especially of post-critical *inter*subjectivity. Evidently, all the contributors are inspired, directly or indirectly, by this American Socrates; his life-long attempts to think with and after, not simply against, the postmodern, an endeavor concretized in a series of solid, ground-breaking monographs — *Existence and Freedom: Towards an Ontology of Human Finitude* (1961), *Experience and Being: Prolegomena to a Future Ontology* (1969), *Radical Reflection and the Origin of the Human Sciences* (1980), *Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity* (1986), *The Resources of Rationality: A Response to the Postmodern Challenge* (1992), *Philosophical Papers: Betwixt and Between* (1994) and most accessibly, the recent *Self after Postmodernity* (1997) — that aptly singularizes *the* question of how to work, not just 'think', with the remains of the modern Cartesian self at this point in time when the various moves to 'decentralize' it radically, whether Heideggerian or Sartrean or Derridian or Foucauldian, leave us in want of alternatives from which to choose and work. Schrag and company come along with a suggestion, ready to deal with the postmodern vertigo that is nearly physical as well as metaphysical.

Read against this background that is at once historical and biographical, the anthology as a whole — divided into four thematic parts preceded by Gary Madison's useful overview as well as Matustík and McBride's introduction — readily reveals the post-Schragean praxiological ontology of communicative *inter*action at work. 'American Continental' in its ethos and praxis, it is distinct, subtly yet clearly, from any Germanic-Habermasian model, on the one hand, which tends to privilege hermeneutic action over pragmatic interaction, and from any Franco-Levinasian-Derridian model, on the other hand, which has a tendency to romanticize the introverted pessimism or 'excess' of the post-Cartesian stranger; Also worth noting is that it differs from the Rortean philosophy of radical contingency in that, not content with 'randomly pluralized horizontality' [13], it promotes a focused, contextualized 'transversality'. All eighteen pieces, thus put together, expand and deepen the leader's searching position of 'in-between-ism', contribute, colorfully, to the given task of re-specifying the locus of the post-postmodern self that cannot and must not be simply jettisoned or hastily expanded; stitched at the end by the pioneer's 'Response to Contributors', all the small contributions end up creating a quilt of thoughts; even here, Schrag remains a quiet go-between. A notable achievement it is.

Whether the Schragean position, strengthened and complemented by its tutored variants, is tenable at all is a debatable matter that need not and cannot be discussed closely here. What the reasonably delighted reviewer can and must show, however, is the multi-faceted modalities of pro-Schragean efforts manifest in this text that serves a dual function: both as the standard-bearing frame of reference for Schrag scholarship and, more openly, as a field of 'transfigurative' interaction that, in the true Deweyan

spirit of transformative experimentalism, tests its viability 'on site', on and on. As the organizational logic behind the volume shows just this twofold structure, force rather, of the Schragean project yet to come, the rest of this review will explicate it briefly in summary, following the order in which the essays are introduced and linked; by 'order' what is meant is the 'four Schragean figures' [xvi]: transversal rationality [Part 2], the self after post-modernity [Part 3], the fourth cultural value sphere [Part 4] and communicative praxis [Part 5].

Part 2 begins, quite appropriately, with Descartes, more precisely, with a remembered problem, ' "Where Are You Standing ...? ": Descartes and the Question of Historicity', in which Robert Scharff sets out to destabilize our 'postmodern' assumptions about Cartesian Rationality, recalling Schrag's classroom adventures into transversalism. The four essays that follow it are by Sandra Bartky on Foucault's repressive demarcation of modernity; by Hwa Yol Jung on transculturally-projected ethical ecologism; by Edward Casey on the powerful instantaneousness, clarity even, of an ethical glance as a formative condition of affective community (this piece, frankly, is the most fascinating of all, but another truth be told, it makes no single reference to Schrag, which, for having proven that things do escape or else compromise editorial attention, is disconcertingly comforting); and finally by Bruce Wilshire on the genocidal capacity of the 'rational animal', the thinking self.

Part 3 opens seamlessly with a close analysis of the post-deconstructive dynamics of the Schragean self: so we have Bernard Dauenhauer focusing on 'discourse, action and community', a much-rehearsed thematic trio of pragmatism that, properly played, can still work as a useful reminder of the pitfalls of transcendentalism, some 'actual' political implications of which, e.g., feminist, have been articulated by the subsequent essays, first, by Linda Bell, 'Calvin Hears a Who', and then by Martin Dillon, 'Romantic Love'.

Part 4, the weakest link, bears the strongest topical relevance to today's global situation, where the inseparability of religion from culture has become a pressing everyday issue. Merold Westphal's timely reflection on the religious dimension of ethical responsibility and John Caputo's re-reading of Kierkegaard in light of Derrida's ethico-theological intervention both leave the reader wanting more, seriously more — another minor flaw.

Part 5, which approaches that question of culture-formation from a linguistic, specifically rhetorical, point of view is relatively substantial: Michael Hyde, the post-Heideggerian, on 'fitting' communication, David Crownfield, the post-Derridian, on the topological interplay between Derrida and Schrag, Lenore Langsdorf, the revisionary Aristotelian, on the 'making' of a discourse, and Victor Kestenbaum, the Socratic pedagogue, on the revival of Socratism in the work of Schrag — each shows that the task of philosophy after Calvin Schrag is not in a certain notion it projects, but in the very interaction it promises.

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Raymond A. Morrow and **Carlos Alberto Torres, eds.**
Reading Freire and Habermas: Critical Pedagogy and Transformative Social Change.
New York: Teachers College Press 2002.
Pp. xi + 211.
US$58.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8077-4203-1);
US$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8077-4202-3).

What could be more unlike than reading Paulo Freire and Jürgen Habermas? The style of the one is graceful and romantic, that of the other dense and Teutonic. Freire's work is primarily informed by educational practice and religion, Habermas' by philosophical and political theory. They write from third- and first-world perspectives, respectively. For these and other reasons, the authors' attempt to demonstrate intellectual relationships through a common conception of 'the dialogical and developmental subject' is interesting and potentially useful. Their basic thesis is that the work of their two subjects is strongly complementary, providing a framework for developing and deepening themes that bring philosophy, education and deliberative democracy together in the interest of egalitarian social change. By reading Freire through Habermas, Freire's theoretical depth can be better appreciated. By reading Habermas through Freire, the practical relevance of Habermas' work to education and social movements should be revealed.

The founding metaphor of the book is the Hegelian account of the origins of self-consciousness in mutual recognition. The master-slave dialectic lends itself to explication in terms of theories of critical hermeneutics and communicative action that show how social agents can escape relationships of domination and subordination and realize universal human potentialities. Chief among these potentialities are those that emerge from education as enlightened teachers work with children, illiterate adults, colonized peoples, oppressed groups and manipulated citizens in order to realize individual autonomy.

The philosophical usefulness of this study is limited. It proceeds through a series of high abstractions, identifying 'isms' of many kinds without carefully exploring distinctions and differences. The following phrase is fairly typical: 'a philosophy of social science, or a conception of metatheory, that attempts to mediate between the polarization of subjectivism and positivism (or idealism and materialism)' (15). Philosophical rigor is sometimes absent. Thus, at one point it is noted that 'Habermas accepts the logical force of Hume's fact-value distinction' (60); at another, we read of Habermas that 'if human beings have certain innate potentials, and a given form of society systematically inhibits their realization, then this factual characteristic logically entails a negative value judgment' (93). For the most part, the book consists of sketchy outlines of theories of history and society, social psychology, pedagogy, modernism and postmodernism, among others. These

sketches can be good starting point for discussion but are not themselves original philosophical contributions.

In reading Freire through Habermas, the authors may be led to overstate Freire's philosophical depth and play down some potentially basic differences from Habermas. The most striking of these lies in the role played by love in Freire's thinking. Without love and caring relationships, effective pedagogical practices and revolutionary leadership can hardly be accounted for within his way of thinking. By contrast, Habermas' theory of communicative action seeks to rest upon presuppositions of discourse that are nowhere colored by emotion. It would be interesting to explore the question whether this is a matter of complementarity in their thinking or a fundamental divergence. A related question is whether the notable absence of theology from Habermas' work weakens its capacity to account for many contemporary social movements and much popular culture.

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Samir Okasha
Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 2002. Pp. 144.
Cdn$15.95: US$9.95. ISBN 0-19-280283-6.

This is a wonderful little book. If what you need is a very short introduction to the discipline, you will not do better.

Okasha's book begins with five chapters that address an unsurprising list of general issues about scientific reasoning and progress. The first chapter, which includes a brief history of the origins of modern science, concerns the question 'What is science?' This is followed by four chapters that deal with induction and related issues, explanation, realism and anti-realism, and scientific change and revolution. Although most of the book is devoted to such methodological issues, the sixth chapter samples philosophical problems from special sciences: physics, biology, and psychology. There is no sample problem offered from the philosophy of chemistry, as one might expect given the relative lack of attention given by philosophers to chemistry. The final chapter addresses scientism, the relationship between science and religion, and values in science.

The success of Okasha's book is not in the rather predictable topics chosen but in the interesting and brilliantly clear way in which it addresses them. It is rare to find anything this well written and summary about the philosophy of science, though there are a few lengthier introductions to the philosophy of science that are comparably well written (e.g., Peter Kosso's fine *Reading the Book of Nature*).

Okasha's book has a specific niche, one that is perhaps atypical for a textbook in the philosophy of science. The text is so brief that it is not going to be a main text in many philosophy of science classes, though it could be used by students reviewing for exams and perhaps as a brief first look at the discipline. The text is, in any case, well suited to introduce students to the philosophy of science with great efficiency in many contexts, e.g., in any general introduction to philosophy class that covers different subdisciplines in philosophy. Students could also be directed to the text as something they could tackle on their own, outside of any class. As a fast tool for introducing people to the discipline, the text is going to be far better in most cases than alternatives, like an entry in an encyclopedia or other general reference source about the philosophy of science. Such entries are generally dense and cryptic; they do serve well as annotated bibliographies, but Okasha's text offers a lot more than this.

I have a few criticisms, though they hardly damage my overall positive reception of the text. One criticism concerns Okasha's treatment of science and religion. Okasha mentions a few wrong-headed arguments against evolution, leaving the reader with the impression that the only issues worth addressing in the realm are about public policy concerning education and concerning proper procedures for mediating disputes between scientists and religious fundamentalists (p. 129, for example). There is no mention of live issues in, say, methodology, that are addressed by respected philosophers: e.g., by Alvin Plantinga, who would shape scientific views in light of revelation, or by John Earman, who addresses whether the scientific method can be employed to undermine religious belief in miracles. Because many college students (in the United States, anyway) are interested in the relationship between science and religion, philosophers take advantage of an opportunity to bring students to appreciate the interest and value of philosophy of science or philosophy in general by bringing discussion of religion into their teaching. Okasha shows sensitivity to such opportunities by including his discussion of religion and also his other topics of the final chapter.

In sum, Okasha has written a terrific very short overview of the philosophy of science. There are important uses to which this valuable little book can be put.

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Robert T. Pennock, ed.
Intelligent Design Creationism and its Critics: Philosophical, Theological and Scientific Perspectives.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1997.
Pp. xx + 805.
US$110.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-16204-0);
US$45.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-66124-1).

If you thought the battles of the Enlightenment were over, then please read on. This enormous book, over eight hundred pages long, contains thirty-seven essays distributed over nine topic sections, and all devoted, in one way or another, to the revival of the theological argument from design in the context of the latest version of creation science known as *intelligent design theory*. Confronted with so much quantity covering such diversity of subject matter, it is impossible to do more here than provide the reader with the general flavor of the enterprise. This book will be a valuable research resource for those seeking to understand the curious twists and turns taken by creation science as it has gradually mutated and evolved into intelligent design theory. There is a helpful index which facilitates the tracking of issues across the boundaries set by the section topics.

Why should reasonable people care about intelligent design theory? Intelligent design theory is the name given to a branch of pseudoscience that has descended with modification from the American creation science movement. Intelligent design theory is what you get when you take Ockham's razor to creation science and shave away the bristles of fundamentalist absurdity (such as creation of the universe six to ten thousand years ago, Fred Flinstone scenarios involving the co-existence of humans and dinosaurs, the tale of Noah's Ark as the true source of contemporary biodiversity, and so on).

This exercise in conceptual shaving reveals a two-faced monster. One face consists of claims (typically based on misunderstandings) critical of the outlook of modern science (and evolutionary biology in particular). The other face consists of attempted 'scientific' justifications for the old argument from design. While this is mostly the old wine of natural theology served up in new designer label bottles, the end result is something with a growing appeal to the aging baby-boomers who sit on school boards and in State legislatures, and who have to make decisions about what gets taught in schools. As Barbara Forrest makes clear in this volume, the intelligent design movement is media-savvy and well-organized. The poverty of its scientific claims is thus well-hidden from public scrutiny.

The first section concerns the so-called 'Wedge Strategy' adopted by advocates of intelligent design. Wedges have thin ends and fat ends. At the thin end of the Wedge are complaints about evolutionary theory rooted mainly in appeals to ignorance. Though little explicit mention of God can be found here, the Wedge strategist seeks to widen epistemic gaps into which God can later be inserted. The thin end of the Wedge masquerades as genuine

scientific criticism, almost secular in tone. Perhaps the intelligent designers of life are space aliens. At the thin end, Wedge strategists are careful to be noncommittal. As the Wedge thickens, however, a bloated and pretentious Christian metaphysical agenda gradually emerges.

In the second section essays concerning the thin end of the wedge are devoted to the critique of scientific naturalism that has been advocated by lawyer Phillip Johnson, one of the leading lights of the intelligent design movement. Johnson argues that science is committed to materialism on philosophical grounds (always bad grounds for anything, it would seem), and thus unfairly excludes hypotheses about the supernatural from consideration at the outset. As a matter of fact many scientists are skeptical of supernatural claims, not because of philosophical bias but rather because of a complete lack of any decent evidence to support such claims and bolster our interest in them. Even a cursory examination of the medical literature on the therapeutic efficacy of prayer and related religious activities would have shown Johnson that scientists have considered supernatural hypotheses and have found them wanting for lack of good evidence. Section four continues the discussion of scientific issues at the thin end of the Wedge.

In sections three and five, by contrast, the focus is on the work of Alvin Plantinga, who, perhaps more than any other contemporary philosopher, has labored strenuously to turn back the clock of ideas to the twelfth century. That Plantinga's work can generate so many intelligent responses is testimony to the claim that old ideas neither die nor fade away, and that even those who know history are condemned to repeat the past. In this sense, the battles of the Enlightenment continue unabated.

Section six concerns theistic evolution — a collection of ideas aimed at reconciling science and religion through the claim that God might work his wonders, beautiful to behold, through evolutionary mechanisms. Many folk find this idea attractive. Creationists hate it because it shows that the choice between Godless evolution and fundamentalist Christianity constitutes a false dilemma. Scientists are apt to be skeptical too, since the cake of evolution hardly stands in need of such theological icing.

Section seven concerns the use of ideas rooted in information theory to bolster claims about evidence for design in nature that have become the stock-in-trade of intelligent design theorists. Such theorists claim to have discovered ways to detect information in natural phenomena. Such information, they claim, cannot result from natural causes and must have been placed there by the hypothetical intelligent designer, God. As you might expect, these information-theoretic claims rest on errors about the nature of information, and about what can be inferred from observed patterns in natural phenomena.

Section eight contains essays concerning, among other things, whether intelligent design theory involves recourse to magic. Given that intelligent design theorists make such a to-do about seeing design in nature, but refuse, at least at the thin end of the wedge, to say anything illuminating about the designer (for fear that the appearance of science, in what is in reality a shoddy

theological agenda, should be compromised), this is hardly surprising. That puzzling things should be attributed to intelligent design concerning which nothing can be said is hardly better than a magician's utterance of the magic word, 'Abracadabra'. At the fat end of the Wedge lies an appeal to the God of Christianity. Only by long-standing social conventions do we refrain from designating this appeal as a craven appeal to magic. This section is also a fitting place, perhaps, to reprint the late Stephen J. Gould's ill-conceived attempted reconciliation of science and religion through the idea of *non-overlapping magisteria*. Section nine contains essays on creationism and education policy.

Notwithstanding the length of the present volume, there is no discussion of cosmological intelligent design arguments, for example those rooted in various anthropic principles and which concern the Big Bang and the alleged fine tuning of nature's basic physical constants. It is not just biology that is at stake in these debates. Moreover, the odious social agenda behind intelligent design theory escapes scrutiny here. For example, intelligent design theorists such as John G. West and Nancy Pearcey (who receive only brief references in the present volume) have made it clear in their own writings that intelligent design theory has implications for such matters as social welfare programs, the status of gays and women, abortion and voluntary euthanasia. The debates here have implications that go well beyond the faculty common room or the school board.

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Richard H. Popkin and **Avrum Stroll**
Skeptical Philosophy for Everyone.
Amherst, NY: Prometheus 2002. Pp. 342.
US$35.00. ISBN 1-57392-936-0.

Popkin and Stroll describe this introduction to philosophy as 'both historical and analytic' (14). It focuses on Western Philosophy by way of an informal critical discussion of key philosophers from Socrates to Derrida. Oriental philosophy, for example, is set aside. The book is composed of eight chapters which address the following questions: 1) Why do people philosophize? 2) Do humans possess knowledge of the external world, including knowledge of the minds of others? 3) What is the relationship between mind and body? 4) Is there a supreme being? 5) What is the good for human beings? 6) Is an ideal society possible? In each case, the problem is presented in the context of the

historical setting in which it arose, then traditional philosophical responses are laid out, and, finally, criticisms of these responses are discussed. What is new or distinctive about the book is its emphasis on the *skeptical challenges* that have been raised against such philosophical theorizing throughout the history of philosophy.

Both authors have written extensively on the topic of skepticism, and Popkin has produced a ground-breaking work on the history of modern skepticism (*The History of Skepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza* [University of California Press 1979]). It is fitting that in the final chapter, Popkin and Stroll engage in a debate about the contemporary relevance of skepticism. Stroll advocates that 'argumentative skepticism is, and always has been, a paper tiger' (308), a position that is contested by Popkin's conviction that 'the problem of justification is not just one that was cooked up by skeptics to badger dogmatists but is a life problem for most people at some time' (319).

The very idea of a *skeptical* history of philosophy is promising and highly suggestive of a much more intimate relation between skepticism and philosophy than has so far been articulated within analytic philosophy. As Popkin and Stroll point out, 'philosophical skepticism ... is unquestionably one of the fundamental traditions in Western thought' (31); and it is 'one of the driving forces behind the major [philosophical] theories' (292). These observations suggest that skepticism and philosophy are two sides of the same coin. Unfortunately, the authors seem not to have made this connection. Instead of providing a *philosophical* motivation to explore the history of philosophy from a skeptical perspective, they treat skepticism as no more closely related to philosophy than any other of the so-called 'big questions' such as the problems of universals, free will or personal identity. No attempt is made to explain or explore why philosophy engenders skepticism, or why philosophy endlessly attempts to answer the skeptic, or why these attempts always give rise to further incarnations of skepticism.

The authors' unwillingness to question the relation of skepticism and philosophy is reflected in their endorsement of fairly standard analytic conceptions of each. Considering skepticism: Apart from a too brief discussion of Pyrrhonism (55-7), the general position adopted by Popkin and Stroll is that skepticism challenges the possibility of (certain) knowledge of any sort (193). This understanding does not serve them particularly well. In the first place, the focus on knowledge and certainty fails to account for the important Ancient Pyrrhonist tradition of skepticism (e.g., Sextus Empiricus). Secondly, this view tends to trivialize skepticism by making available the mitigated position that concedes the skeptical conclusion that there can be no (certain) knowledge, while at the same time asserting that we can conduct our practical and theoretical affairs perfectly well by employing instead the notion of reasonable or probable belief. The authors are, of course, aware that *radical* skepticism challenges whether any belief is more reasonable or justified than any other (57), but this kind of skeptic receives surprisingly little attention.

Considering philosophy: It is peculiar that a book emphasizing the skeptical tradition in philosophy should avoid skepticism about the analytic style

of philosophizing it endorses. For the most part, philosophy is presented as overcoming initial perplexity by arriving at a theory or 'a system of principles' (27) by rational argument. No doubt this is the dominant tradition today. However, within Western Philosophy there is also a dialectical tradition of philosophizing, which is more concerned with self-transformation than with the rational defense of doctrine. This tradition — which includes Pyrrhonist Skepticism — is misrepresented as being simply anti-theoretical. The idea of philosophy as a way of life goes missing in the strong emphasis on argument. This attitude is also evident in the rather superficial discussion of Wittgenstein's quietism (122-33), the unsympathetic treatment of Derrida (133-42), and the dismissive approach to continental philosophy (138). In general, there is a blindness about those philosophical texts in which the form of the text is internal to its purpose, in which the readers' relation to the text is meant to be an analogue of the readers' relation to him- or herself.

This is a serviceable introduction to Western Philosophy in the analytic style through its skeptically charged history. Its non-technical presentation will suit it to both undergraduate courses in philosophy and the general reader. But the work might have been of more interest had its authors attempted to do justice to the thought that skepticism and metaphysics *both* spring from what Kant calls a 'peculiar fate' of human reason.

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Mark Redhead
Charles Taylor. Thinking and Living Deep Diversity.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2002. Pp. x + 261.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-2126-5);
US$25.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-2127-3).

Charles Taylor. Thinking and Living Deep Diversity is Mark Redhead's first book; for this he is well prepared, one might add, through his doctoral thesis and many articles on the subject of Charles Taylor. It is one of the rare monographs — besides Ruth Abbey's *Charles Taylor* (Princeton University Press 2000) — that provides an overview of Taylor's thought, political and philosophical.

With this book, Redhead undertakes the difficult task of capturing the unity of Charles Taylor's thought. His Ariadne's thread through the many facets of Taylor's work can be summed up with the following thesis: Taylor

continuously confronts the problems of fragmentation, to which he proposes 'deep diversity' as a solution. Redhead analyzes this confrontation and its proposed solution from three distinct perspectives:

1. From a *theoretical* or *intellectual* vantage-point, where fragmentation is interpreted as a 'malaise of modernity' resulting from atomism and instrumental rationality. Overcoming fragmentation is seen here as a prerequisite to addressing 'enframing technology' — a form of instrumental rationality that objectifies human beings — and as a means of solving other malaises of modernity.

2. From a *political* vantage-point, where Taylor's involvement in Canadian politics, especially as an NDP candidate and party administration, is considered as a fruitful context for the emergence of later ideas. Here, Redhead often adopts a genetic approach that equates earlier notions with later concepts for which Taylor became known. For instance, 'democratic control' in the 1960s became 'participatory society' in the 1980s and 1990s, whereas 'dialogue society' became 'deep diversity'.

3. From a *biographical* or *personal* vantage-point, in which his Roman Catholic faith and his bilingual upbringing are regarded as relevant for the forming of his theoretical ideas as well as his political commitment. As the title of the book indicates, Taylor not only 'thought' deep diversity, he 'lived' it. In this context, Redhead identifies, besides the concept of *agapē*, unsuspected sources for Taylor's thought, such as Mounier's personalism.

Although identifying one single thesis unifying the various aspects of Taylor's political and philosophical thought makes for a well-structured text that is easy to follow, it at times seems a stretch. Indeed, the concept of fragmentation does not have the same meaning in a political context as it does in an ontological-anthropological context. And unity in the latter sense is no guarantee of unity in the former. For example, even though Quebec shares common moral sources with English Canada, both being informed by a specifically modern identity and modern values, this has not prevented political fragmentation. So, while Redhead does well to point out the links — or potential links — between these two levels of conceptualization, he has also, at times, completely blurred their distinctiveness.

Redhead's book, however, is not simply descriptive in nature. It comprises a strong critical strain. Three main criticisms directed against Taylor stand out: 1. Redhead contends that Taylor's critique of procedural liberalism — and proceduralism's insistence on rights — is too harsh. Redhead argues that 'rights can provide and promote two morally significant common goods — the dignity of each individual and the equal respect to be accorded her' (222), thus contributing to deep diversity. To defend this thesis, Redhead relies mainly on Habermas' discourse theory but, unfortunately, his treatment of this question is somewhat cursory. Indeed, Habermas and Taylor are not as opposed as Redhead would seem to believe. For one thing, they both share a Hegelian background that informs their conceptions of socially formed identities. Furthermore, even though Kantian and liberal components are preeminent in Habermas' thought, Redhead could have pointed out that

Habermas' concept of 'ethical permeation' could serve as a basis for the idea of linguistic rights.

2. Redhead also argues that while trying to find a balance between commonality and distinctiveness, Taylor puts too much emphasis on the recognition and survival of a culture, which could perpetuate stagnant cultural forms. Here, Redhead takes up the critique that Habermas formulated in *Multiculturalism*, even though it seems rather clear that Taylor had no such thing in mind. Redhead should have turned his critique against Habermas himself: when Taylor recognizes the importance of preserving cultural goods, such as the French language, he never speaks of any specific cultural form within the Québécois culture. According to the Gadamerian model of the fusion of horizons that Taylor favors, the 'transvaluation' of a culture is not simply identification with or assimilation to another culture, but an integration that results in a form different from both the original and the encountered culture. So, while a Québécois culture should be preserved in its distinctiveness from other cultures, its form remains open. There is no need, here, for the oxymoronic hypothesis of a 'rooted cosmopolitanism', as Redhead puts it, since this simply restates Taylor's position in other words.

3. Redhead's third criticism challenges the ontological character of the moral foundation for shared values. Here, Redhead's suggestion for improving on Taylor's thought is quite puzzling. Instead of attempting to demonstrate that there is no inescapable moral structure, as Taylor believes, Redhead simply postulates that it does not exist. He suggests instead a 'practical, non-ontological approach' in which a human subject can draw upon some moral sources, but can also decide to do otherwise. As an argumentative step, this volitional approach to moral sources makes as much sense as maintaining that gravity should be non-ontological and subject to an individual's approval since it is problematic. In his account of moral sources, Taylor is strongly influenced by the Heideggerian and Gadamerian notions of *Geschicklichkeit* and of *Seinsgeschehen*, which posit an ontological — and thus non-volitional — sphere of human existence. Redhead's suggestion is not a minor revision; it is not a mere tweaking of Taylor's thought that would improve on it, as he seems to believe; rather, it would constitute a radical transformation of Taylor's thought.

Finally, the formal structure of the text can be somewhat tedious. Many pages contain quotations that take up more than half the page, giving the impression of a patchwork of quotations interrupted by short comments. In all, there are 726 footnotes. Nevertheless, Redhead's book is worth reading, especially for its descriptive portrayal of Taylor's thought.

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Nicholas Rescher
Fairness: Theory & Practice of Distributive Justice.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers
2002. Pp. xiii + 134.
ISBN 0-7658-0110-8.

This book was written in response to what Rescher takes to be an improper usage by contemporary economic theorists of the notion of fairness. Rescher aims at spelling out the principal role that fairness plays for distributive justice and thereby to 'recover' the concept of fairness, which, he argues, is 'closer to justice and natural law than to economics or conflict resolution' (ix). What Rescher is referring to is the growing body of literature in economics which aligns fairness with the idea of preference satisfaction. Starting from the late 1960s, economists have been pursuing the thesis that a division of goods is equitable and fair when none of the agents involved would prefer someone else's allocated share (i.e., the division is 'envy-free'). Rescher insists that the issue here is not one of mere lexicography, that a greater battle is to be fought, between those who would link fairness to the idiosyncrasies of taste and preference and those who wish to assert its normative roots in the rational, impartial, and objective coordination of shares with valid claims. Rescher fights admirably for the latter cause, yet in presenting his case, he offers little evidence as to why this is a worthwhile battle in the first place. One may wonder what could be wrong with the thesis on envy-freeness, seeing as it must be the prerogative of the economist to analyze procedures of allocation in whichever way he or she wishes. Why not let them call this state of envy-freeness 'fair', however odd it may seem? The answer appears to be that while the work done on the part of economists in analyzing scenarios of envy-freeness does not in itself spell trouble, the problem emerges if and when this work is performed in aid of *replacing* normative conceptions of justice (e.g., Rawlsian contractualism, Nozickean entitlement, etc.) with the procedural account of fairness as envy-freeness. But is this replacement thesis what the economists actually have in mind? Rescher himself does not try to prove that this is the case. Yet, such engagement with the economics literature would more than likely add to his account, not merely by affirming that this tactical element exists (in fact, it does stand out as one of the motivators of the literature) but more so by strengthening his own thesis on the relevant distinctions between the project of justice and that of economics.

All the same, Rescher's account of fairness is well crafted and insightful in its attention to detail. In eight quick chapters, this book takes the reader through the ins and outs of fair processes of division, relying heavily upon example problems of share allocation (inheritance division, e.g.) to bear the argumentative load. The intuitive appeal of these examples is given as sufficient, since for Rescher, the idea of fairness is itself a natural intuition.

'A sense of fairness,' he writes, 'is a basic human reality, manifested even by the youngest' (xi). And for the most part, this approach works well. The main argument of the book is that fairness is a measure of the proportionate honouring of claims. It is a procedural norm that impartially adjudicates the allocation of goods, solely by reference to the status of the relevant claims. What this means is that fairness has little to do with how well served are the agents' preferences by the allocation and everything to do with the validity of their respective claims. Fairness, then, cannot be preference satisfaction, but it also cannot be equated with egalitarianism, since people come to the distributive table with different claims, stemming from the nature of the context of distribution. Intuitively, this must be so, since only the winner of the race (and not every participant) has a legitimate claim to the first place trophy. Rescher uses this strategy of intuitive appeal throughout: in Chapter 2, he discusses the order in priority of fair procedures of allocation (e.g., dividing the goods is preferable to timesharing, which is preferable to randomizing); Chapters 3 and 4 investigate the differences between fairness and paternalistic benevolence; and Chapters 5 to 7 debate the merits of proportionalism versus those of predominantism.

The last chapter begins with more of the same strategy, whereby we learn that, in the case of epistemic versus moral enterprises, fair allocations of credit/discredit are worked out differently. The intuition is that while a team effort in arriving at a new discovery in science, say, means that credit can be allocated collectively, the same cannot be said for moral credit, which always falls to agents individually. The difference, Rescher asserts, is brought out by looking at the divergent functional objectives of the enterprises of morality and epistemology: morality is concerned with intention and process, and epistemology is concerned with product and output. With this distinction, we see the mark of Rescher's career-spanning theme of methodological pragmatism. Every sphere of life (ethics, law, scientific inquiry, and so on) serves its own function and thus possesses its own objectives. The validity, truth, and now *fairness* of entities within each sphere are determined with reference to the procedures that most successfully advance these disparate objectives. Thus, we know we have the correct procedure for determining fairness by appeal to the unique functional objectives of the enterprise at hand. In one sense, this approach provides the perfect, measured counter to any and all attempts at pigeonholing a concept like fairness (as preference satisfaction, as egalitarianism, etc.) But it also means that we should acknowledge the inherent contestability of all attempts at defining the functional natures of fields such as ethics and justice, something Rescher does not do here. He instead concludes where others might wish to begin, i.e., with a quick list comprised of simple, intuitive definitions of the functional natures of ethics, law, and so on. Economists are mistaken in their conception of fairness, this book claims, because they misjudge the functional nature of distributive justice. This is a worthwhile argument to pursue, yet it pivots around the rich and complex issue of the essential nature of justice. And so, the task of

successfully countering the economists' use of fairness is consequently not as simple as this book makes it out to be.

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Joseph Rouse
How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2002.
Pp. ix + 383.
US$49.00. ISBN 0-226-73008-5.

In *How Scientific Practices Matter*, Joseph Rouse embarks on an examination of philosophical naturalism with the aim of defending his own variant. Although the book primarily contributes to current debate in the philosophy of science, it also aims to be of interest to philosophers working in the more general field of epistemology. Naturalism, for Rouse, is the view that philosophy is continuous with (or part of) the empirical sciences. Rouse defines a wide body of doctrines as 'naturalist', ranging from the writings of Nietzsche, Neurath and Heidegger to the more recent studies of David Stump and Larry Laudan.

Rouse contends that naturalism exists in two broad streams: 'metaphilosophical' naturalism and 'philosophical' naturalism. The first, a thesis *about* philosophy, recommends that it pattern its methods after those of the sciences. The second represents a thesis *within* philosophy about the relation between scientific knowledge and other domains (moral, social etc.). For a philosophical naturalist, 'normative domains', such as moral theory, derive their authority from their relation to the 'natural world disclosed by the sciences' (2).

Rouse claims that these two strains of naturalism can be united under a comprehensive view and that a naturalistic account of the world must emerge as part of the world that it describes. Given the continuity of the scientific and philosophical understanding of the world, Rouse imposes two strong constraints that any plausible naturalism must follow. First, philosophy must impose no top-down 'arbitrary' constraints upon science (3). Second, no account of the world (scientific or philosophical) can appeal to 'supernatural' or 'mysterious' forces (3). The main line of argument, then, is to develop a comprehensive naturalistic philosophy that satisfies these two constraints.

For Rouse, naturalism is to be contrasted with a variety of early twentieth-century philosophies that deny science's ability to ground its own validity. Rouse contends that it was not the specific content of the sciences that

led philosophers to deny their normative content but the 'contingent' and shifting nature of that content (6). Thus, philosophers like Frege postulated immutable and timeless forms that mapped on to science in order to provide their normative force. However, in Rouse's reading, such foundationalist projects foundered in the latter half of the century under the critique of philosophers like Quine, Heidegger, Sellars and Wittgenstein. For Rouse these critique share the general notion that 'meaning ... no longer comprised a distinctly philosophical domain of inquiry ... that could disclose the necessary structures demarcating the legitimacy of empirical science' (6-7). The decline of foundationalist projects, Rouse argues, makes naturalism viable again and serves as the source for a plausible and comprehensive view.

Rouse finds his main inspiration in commonalities that he finds in Neurath and Heidegger. In spite of their obvious differences, Rouse finds, in both thinkers, a rejection of necessary structures that are imposed on science in abstraction from actual practice. Each, in their own way, shifts the focus of our understanding of science from a priori conceptions to practical involvement in the world. Rouse follows this insight, conceiving of science in terms of its practical engagement with the world, what he terms 'interaction'. Thus, Rouse rejects views of science which adhere to vestigial forms of the foundationalism which still apply a priori interpretations, abstracted from actual practice. For example, Rouse finds much to be desired in many current conceptions of scientific concepts, such as 'cause'. Causation is frequently presented in an a priori form (nomologically, counterfactually etc.) rather than as 'practically constituted components of repeatable phenomena' (313). Cause, for Rouse, ought to be understood in practical terms not in terms of some a priori form that it is always supposed to take.

This practice-oriented naturalism is in keeping with Rouse's ban on imposing philosophical conceptions on science and also with his ban on invoking 'mysterious' forces that are not described by science's account of the world. Indeed, for Rouse, the world described by science is in a large measure created by science in terms of the practical possibilities that it provides. This is also the location of its normative force, science provides both the possibilities of, and limitations on, what can be done.

Rouse sees his view as having affinities with some feminist philosophies of science as these also emphasise a practical (specifically bodily) element of scientific knowledge. However, his view is also close to some accounts now prevalent in the sociology of science. Andrew Pickering's 'performative' realism, for example, presents a similar understanding of scientific knowledge in terms of practical engagement. Nevertheless, while Rouse certainly has a point in emphasising the continuity of science and philosophy and the difficulty in imposing global a priori conceptions onto the myriad practices that comprise science, his arguments leave much to be desired.

One difficulty that plagues the whole book is that Rouse presents all of his analyses, historical or substantive, in very broad and impressionistic terms. While he speaks much of 'practical involvement', 'experimental interaction' and so on, the book does not provide any sustained case studies of

actual instances of scientific practice. This is a considerable weakness because one is often at a loss as to exactly how Rouse's view differs from similar views (like Pickering's) when applied directly to specific cases. Similarly, Rouse's historical comparisons (his views about the convergence between Heidegger and Neurath for example), while designed, no-doubt, to be controversial, are far too general to persuade an informed reader.

To make matters worse, some of Rouse's key concepts, like 'normativity', are used quite loosely, often at odds with the way the concept is usually employed. To provide one example, Rouse's naturalism purports to provide the 'normative' force for disciplines like moral theory. Only a poor moral theory demands behaviour that is inconsistent with what science describes as possible, true, but how many current moral theories actually do this? What moral theorists typically mean by 'normative' is what *ought to* be done, not what science says is doable, even if the latter is necessary for the former to be plausible.

However, the most serious problems for Rouse's arguments lie with his two central criteria for any naturalist account. Rouse rejects any a priori conceptions imposed on science, yet his own accounts of practice, cause, etc. amount to just that. It seems unclear, for example, how Rouse could analyse an instance of scientific practice where a view substantially different from his own plays an important practical role, and examples abound. Rouse's ban on 'mysterious' forces is too vaguely defined and, as a result, is difficult to sustain. If all Rouse means is that appeal cannot be made to entities not included in the corpus of science, one wonders how new concepts could enter into science. A more substantive reading is also difficult to sustain as this requires a clear demarcation between science and metaphysics, and that project has been long abandoned. Even if these concerns are set aside, troubles remain. Rouse provides no sufficiently detailed account of how the two criteria are to adjudicate between competing naturalist accounts.

While Rouse has succeeded in reiterating the now common view that no a priori conception of science will account for all instances of scientific practice, his arguments cannot be said to succeed in advancing our understanding of philosophical naturalism. In arguing against a priori views of science, Rouse mistakenly re-imposes such a view of his own, and an implausible one at that. *How Scientific Practices Matter* delivers considerably less than what it promises.

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Tad M. Schmaltz
Radical Cartesianism:
The French Reception of Descartes.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.
Pp. ix + 288.
US$65.00. ISBN 0-521-81134-1.

For some time now many historians of philosophy have thought it worthwhile to examine the lesser figures and schools of their respective areas of research. Quentin Skinner and Frederick Beiser, among others, have pioneered a mode of philosophizing that seeks to bring into prominence the historical valleys as well as the peaks. Gone — or at least fading — is the neo-Hegelian notion of a dialectically interconnected seam of 'great philosophers', who appear to be speaking exclusively to each other. This approach depends crucially on the somewhat quaint idea that philosophers are guided in their thinking by a kind of *Geist* — connected, often across vast reaches of time and geography, by aether-like bonds of philosophical meaning. What we are coming to learn, however, is that some of these constructions might just be wishful thinking, logically clean just-so stories imposed on a much messier historical reality.

In place of this sort of thinking the new contextualists emphasize two things: the concrete cultural and social milieu in which the great minds were actually forged and the largely anonymous army of lesser-lights toiling to interpret and disseminate the thoughts of the masters. One of the benefits of this way of doing the history of ideas is that we might discover hitherto unappreciated philosophical gems. So, for example, thanks to Beiser we know much more than we did before about the place of such figures as Maimon and Schulze in the Kant to Fichte trajectory of German Idealism. Defenders of the traditional approach might argue that the old story requires no significant revision — barring the discovery of new manuscripts showing, for example, that Leibniz changed his mind about the windowless nature of monads — and that certain figures in the history of philosophy thus deserve their diminished place in the story.

However we decide the issue, Tad Schmaltz' latest book, which looks at the reception and development of Descartes' thinking among the 'Radical Cartesians' Robert Desgabets (1610-78) and Pierre-Sylvain Regis (1632-1707), is a fine example of philosophical contextualism. Schmaltz himself recognizes the dangers of this approach. But he is convinced that Desgabets and Regis have something of profound philosophical importance to say. In particular, Schmaltz is trying to locate these figures in an interpretive middle ground between two extreme assessments of them, both articulated roughly a hundred years ago. On the one hand, there is Francisque Bouillier, who argued that Desgabets and Regis did not go far enough beyond Descartes to warrant closer examination: they were mere imitators. On the other hand C. de Kirwan has maintained that these figures went much too far beyond Descartes, that their views became as a result too idiosyncratic to deserve our attention or respect. For Schmaltz, by contrast, Desgabets and Regis

represent a significant attempt to transform Descartes by reconstructing the metaphysical basis of his system (contra Bouillier); and this reconstruction has genuine, if hitherto unappreciated, philosophical merit (contra Kirwan). One of the key points of Schmaltz' interpretation is that the positions advanced by Desgabets and Regis represent a kind of third direction for Cartesianism, one that avoids both Malebranchean idealism and Spinozist monism and pantheism. And at the heart of the entire enterprise is the attempt by Desgabets and Regis to take seriously the implications of Descartes' strange views on the creation of the eternal truths. The doctrine of divine voluntarism with respect to such truths — appropriately refined and elaborated — becomes for Desgabets and Regis the new foundation for Cartesian physics.

The book is divided into three parts, the first and third of which serve as a kind of historical frame for the more philosophical material of the second. According to Schmaltz, the two figures under examination contribute significantly to the history of philosophy by developing three important Cartesian problems: the creation of eternal truths, the nature of ideas, and the union of mind and body. These are safe and approved issues: philosophers had been debating them ever since they were first put forward by Descartes in the *Meditations* and elsewhere. But if this makes Desgabets and Regis appear almost respectable, why does Schmaltz describe them as 'radical'? It is because their ways of treating the issues was highly idiosyncratic. Perhaps two examples will illustrate this claim.

The first centres on their 'realism'. They simply take it for granted that the existence of thinking proves the existence of extra-mental objects. There is a particularly impressive chapter in the book where Schmaltz compares and contrasts this view — which he calls the 'intentionality principle' — with similar views espoused by Arnauld. (It is important to note that Schmaltz argues that the intentionality principle applies only to the *substances* we conceive, not to its modes, and not therefore to particular bodies.) The upshot of the principle is that Desgabets and Regis are simply far less interested in methodological doubt than was Descartes. In fact, Desgabets explicitly rejects the doubt as a hindrance in the search for truth. Now, one way to read Descartes is to insist that the doubt is in fact too radical for Descartes' own purposes. The metaphysical reconstruction of *Meditations* Three to Six may be blocked by hyperbolical skepticism. Desgabets' way of relating mind and world, to the extent that it avoids this impasse, therefore has some merit.

The second example has to do with Cartesian dualism. Margaret Wilson has argued persuasively that the most radical aspect of Cartesian dualism is not the claim that mental and physical substances are really distinct, but that thought — i.e., intellectual thought — can happen entirely without body. Desgabets however overturns this doctrine by arguing that the union with body is essential to human thought. For him, it is not only the case that intellectual thought has (contingently) a neurological basis, but that such thought requires this kind of basis. There is, admittedly, some difficult-to-parse argumentation here — like the claim that intellection is included in

the 'formal concept' of sensation and imagination — but Schmaltz does an admirable job of leading us through the murkier bits. Along the way, we learn a good deal about the competing views of Gassendi, Foucher, and, of course, Malebranche and Spinoza.

These terribly truncated summaries should give a taste of the philosophical range and acumen displayed by Schmaltz in these middle chapters, which are by far the most interesting and arresting sections of the book. However, I am less convinced that the flanking chapters belong here. Whereas the middle part is a superb example of what is right about the new kind of contextualist history of philosophy — at the *very least* new light is cast on Descartes, on Arnauld, on Malebranche — the more purely historical material is at best a distraction and at worst pure tedium. There is for example a protracted discussion of post-Cartesian debates about the Eucharist. Evidently those who debated this issue did at the time take passionate stands on one position or another, but most of us surely find it next to impossible to sympathise with this passion. On the whole, Schmaltz' book contains philosophically sophisticated treatments of a host of philosophical problems from the period which we *should* take seriously — the nature of mentality, the reach of skepticism, the possibility of self-knowledge, the semantic and ontological status of logical truths, and so on. With perhaps a brief biographical discussion of the book's two protagonists, this middle material could without doubt have stood on its own. A lengthy excursion into debates concerning the Real Presence notwithstanding, however, the book is well worth reading.

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Charles E. Scott
The Lives of Things.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2002.
Pp. ix + 194.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-34068-3);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21514-5).

The Lives of Things is an often charming and frequently frustrating book. It frustrates for one of the same reasons that it charms: Scott writes in a manner that seems to invite but immediately withdraw from the reader, reminiscent of a good-natured but distant professor whose lectures one wants to enjoy and even to find profound but can't quite find one's way into, and which leave one waiting, past their end, for the words that will seed the crystallization of the whole. Scott seems to answer questions that themselves remain hidden

and which seem to change as the book progresses from one section to the next. Still there are rewards to be found in the attempt to follow the way Scott forges.

The book's unifying theme (though it seems increasingly forced toward the end) is *phusis*, the Greek word that Scott, following Heidegger, takes pains to differentiate from the Latin-derived 'nature' by which it is traditionally translated. Indeed, Scott follows Heidegger — and Heidegger's followers, particularly Foucault and Levinas, to each of whom a chapter is devoted — in much of what he does, sometimes more than he lets on, unfortunately more than he elucidates. The distance of Scott's writing is partly accounted for by the fact that, while it is more personable than that of some post-Heideggerians, it is also given to using idiosyncratic technical terms — Heidegger's 'ontic' and 'ontological', Derrida's 'trace' — without explaining them. I was left wondering whether some passages would have lit up more clearly for me if I were more familiar with the vocabularies of people like Levinas; I also wondered who the book is for, if not for people like me, whose grasp on continental philosophy may be competent but not magisterial. In some sour moments I was tempted to accuse Scott of merely writing notes to himself on his favorite philosophers. The latter, incidentally, also include Schelling, Schleiermacher and Nietzsche, whose work provides the focus of the book's longest chapter, which concerns the notions of immanence, transcendence, and divinity, and which feels more like a sketch of a different book than part of the present one. Somewhat more charitably — and this is part of the book's charm — I'm inclined to imagine the book as a contribution to a small community of scholarly friends who have read the same books, share the same vocabularies, and, having overcome their will to scholarly overcoming, conduct an ongoing symposium, giving to each other the gift of pleasantly formed thoughts.

But that doesn't really do justice to the book either. Some important ideas shine from the distance of the text, including Scott's notions of *astonishment* and of *memory* — each of which is treated in its own chapter, and each of which could form the basis of its own book — and his general attempt to further the still-incomplete overcomings of such dualisms as spirit and body, human being and world, and science and art.

Astonishment is for Scott something like a Heideggerian attunement, a state of being-in-the-world in which we disentangle ourselves from our abstract representations of things and open ourselves to their *phusis*, their upwelling-surging, their coming-to-presence which is the 'life of things' referred to in the title. As such it is a refreshingly positive rejoinder to the emphasis on unhappy attunements — anxiety, boredom, 'nausea' — typically privileged in the existentialist tradition. Scott's discussion of memory, meanwhile, purports to shift our conception of memory from something 'mental' and spatio-temporally confined within individuals to something physical, having to do with our kinship with the stuff of the universe. Putting together the accounts of astonishment and memory, we may venture the following synthesis on Scott's behalf: we are astonished before physical things when

we open ourselves to our memory of them, which is to say our primordial, physical connection with them, a connection which exceeds the cognitive grasp we usually think we have on them.

Thus there may be some hint of how Scott aims to subvert dualisms such as those listed above. Perhaps most intriguing for those of us implicated in the ongoing conflict of the faculties — specifically, that between what C.P. Snow called the 'two cultures' of science and the arts — is Scott's demonstration that the arts and sciences not only don't need to conflict but, at this point in our intellectual history, are called upon to make common cause. This is the point with which Scott's book begins: 'I was right,' he writes, 'when I thought that two friends, a poet and an artist, would think less well of me if I told them that facts are as effective as "poetic experiences" in occasioning astonishment and a sense of wonder' (3). At these words the reader may worry (or hope) that Scott, like Snow, is going to take the side of the sciences against the arts. In fact what he sets out to do — the poet and artist are his friends, after all, in the community of the friends of wisdom — is to show that art and science (which is to say our knowledge of physical things) are both properly founded on the sense of wonder with which, Plato tells us, the love of wisdom begins. While it is perhaps too easy to get lost along Scott's way, if that thought is strengthened by the end, Scott's purpose may be achieved.

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Yvonne Sherratt
Adorno's Positive Dialectic.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.
Pp. xi + 254.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-521-81393-X.

Theodor Adorno was a principal member of the Frankfurt School. Unlike some other affiliates of that organization his philosophical writings continue to attract the interest of scholars and students of Continental philosophy and social theory. For some this may seem surprising. Adorno's work has been consistently interpreted as unremittingly bleak. Adorno is seen by many as presenting a vision of late capitalist society as almost entirely devoid of any redemptive elements. Throughout his extensive writings, Adorno consistently portrayed life in late capitalist society as almost entirely in thrall to the instrumentally rationalised demands of bureaucratic administration and economy. His diagnosis contains little, if any, reference to how this condition may be overcome. To many of his supporters Adorno's philosophy appears to express the truth of Max Weber's doom-laden reference to the 'iron cage' of

bureaucratic capitalism. For Adorno's critics, however, his work offers little more than a prolonged sigh and lament over the course of human history. On this view, the appeal of Adorno's work appears to be more temperamental than strictly philosophical. To those attracted to Adorno's work, the proverbial glass is necessarily always half empty.

In recent years this view of Adorno has been challenged by several of his foremost contemporary supporters. Philosophers such as Hauke Brunkhorst and Jay Bernstein have sought to develop an alternative reading of Adorno. This reading focuses upon the allegedly redemptive, more constructive constituents of Adorno's critical theory. Yvonne Sherratt's book makes an important and, in places, compelling contribution to this trend. In essence, these philosophers argue that Adorno's critical theory is necessarily predicated upon a more 'utopian' account of humanity and our potentiality than has been typically recognized. Adorno's dystopian account of late capitalist society is viewed as dialectically entwined with a utopian philosophical urge, or impulse. Against his critics, it is argued that Adorno's work can be put to a far more constructively political and social use. Unlike Brunkhorst and Bernstein, Sherratt is prepared to use the term 'positive' in reference to Adorno's writings. Her accentuation of the positive takes Sherratt's reading of Adorno to the furthest extremes of this trend in Adorno scholarship and represents a distinguishing feature of this book.

Sherratt acknowledges that Adorno does not provide a model blueprint for the good society. However, she insists that 'there exists a systematic utopian dimension to Adorno's thought which has yet to be fully interpreted and understood' (2). With this as her principal aim, she proceeds to analyze Adorno's thought and pays particular attention to his account of the dialectic of enlightenment. In stark contrast to those who viewed enlightenment in unquestioningly progressive terms, Adorno argued that the emancipatory potential of enlightenment had been subverted by the predominance of a view of enlightenment reason as the means by which human beings' could take control over the material environment. This one-sided view of enlightenment as the veritable will to power was epitomised, for Adorno, by the dominance of a scientific world view and the assimilation of all animate and inanimate matter within science's classificatory schema. While the application of science and technology may have underlay many advances it also made possible the Holocaust and the continuing wholesale degradation of the material environment. Sherratt provides a highly sophisticated explication of Adorno's diagnosis of enlightenment. Through a close but wide-ranging reading of Adorno's writings she succeeds in clearly expressing Adorno's principal concern that the cold, clinical, and dispassionate gaze of the scientist or the bureaucrat has superseded other ways of viewing the world. Enlightenment, in thrall to a drive for mastery and control, ultimately serves to constrain and limit our knowledge of the world and our engagement with one another. Her own analysis of Adorno's diagnosis goes further than many previous accounts in the importance she pays to Freud's influence upon Adorno's account of enlightenment. Sherratt argues, convincingly in my opinion, that Adorno's view

of enlightenment owed much to Freud's account of the development of reason and the ego. Enlightenment's drive to mastery and control is thereby identified in the form of the Freudian ego, a subject in control of herself and her environment. Freud provides Adorno with a psychological basis for the repressive and oppressive effects of enlightenment.

The core of Sherratt's positive reading of Adorno's understanding of enlightenment is to be found in her reconstruction of Adorno's aesthetic theory. Like others before her, she argues that Adorno turns to art as a potential constraint upon the excesses of enlightenment. Art offers Adorno's critical theory with a potential resource for countering enlightenment's repressive and oppressive properties. Art offers the potential of a non-instrumentally rational relation to the material environment. Genuine art seeks to express and give voice to the sensual particularity of the material environment, in contrast to an instrumentally rationalised form of enlightenment which aims merely to know the object world so as to more effectively and efficiently control it. Sherratt argues that Adorno's aesthetic theory provides a precedent for, what she refers to as, 'a non-instrumental kind of knowledge acquisition' (149). For her, Adorno's positive dialectic calls for an aestheticization of life. Achieving it will require, among other things, a radical alteration in the current relationship between subjects and objects so that achieving that status of, an albeit refashioned, subject will no longer entail the subordination of the object-world. Taking time to stand and stare will replace the necessity of crossing any given landscape as quickly and as effectively as technology and budget will allow.

A review of this length cannot do full justice to the complexity and sophistication of Sherratt's book. It is a book which ought to be read not only by scholars and students of critical theory but also all of those interested in Adorno who, despite themselves, years to describe the glass as being half full. However, there are two areas of concern which will require greater attention if the ambition of Sherratt's book is to be fully realized. First, as others have argued before, Adorno's aesthetic theory rests heavily upon an unduly 'naturalized' model of art and the artwork. 'Nature' possesses profound normative importance for Adorno's critical theory generally, not least in the contribution it makes to his aesthetic theory. This relatively uncritical usage and understanding of nature requires greater scrutiny, particularly in times when the distinction between nature and artifice is so obscured by developments in science and technology. Second, the actualization of Adorno's positive dialectic is, ultimately, a political, rather than purely aesthetic task. Sherratt neglects to consider, even in general outline, how we can begin to challenge the dominance of instrumental reason. Since we cannot all 'be artists', how may we ultimately avoid lapsing back into an instrumentally rationalised mode of organization and action?

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John Symons
On Dennett.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth / Thomson
Learning 2002. Pp. 97.
US$15.95. ISBN 0-534-57632-X.

On Dennett is one of the latest volumes in Wadsworth's extensive Philosophers series. This volume is certainly warranted given the slipperiness of Dennett's overall stance and the popularity of his writing.

Chapters One and Two provide an introduction to the philosophy of mind in which sketches are given of reductive materialism, behaviourism, functionalism, and eliminativism. Here, and throughout the book, Symons highlights the influences that have driven Dennett, with particular emphasis on behaviourism, and the not so widely acknowledged influence of ordinary language philosophy.

In Chapter Three we begin to consider Dennett's views concerning the ontological status of intentional states such as beliefs. 'Industrial strength realists' like Fodor claim that beliefs must be robust items in the brain. Eliminativists such as the Churchlands, however, claim that with advances in neuroscience we shall come to eschew talk of beliefs and desires altogether. Interestingly, this is a view with which Dennett has much sympathy: 'strictly speaking, ontologically speaking, there are no such things as beliefs, desires and intentional phenomena' (57). Dennett, however, claims that his position is distinct from eliminativism, and that he takes a middle path between Fodor and the Churchlands.

Dennett claims that he is a realist with respect to beliefs and desires, albeit a 'moderate' one. This, then, appears to be a rejection of eliminativism. Key here are his thoughts concerning the various explanatory stances that we can take towards systems. Symons discusses these in Chapter Four. We can predict the behaviour of a system by considering its physical structure, or, the way it has been designed to work. With some systems, however, we can also adopt the *intentional stance*. We can predict their behaviour with respect to what it would be rational for those systems to do, assuming that they are the bearers of beliefs and desires. And, for Dennett, what it is to be a believer is simply to be predictable according to this stance. Symons draws out this instrumental approach and the problems associated with it.

According to Dennett, the 'patterns' that we find in the behaviour of thinkers when we adopt the intentional stance are not merely in the eye of the beholder. They are objective, 'real patterns'. And, contra Fodor, there need be nothing in the brain that underwrites the success of this predictive strategy. Beliefs, therefore, are real in the sense that centres of gravity are real. You cannot open up the Earth's core and find its centre of gravity, just as one cannot find beliefs in the brain. Centres of gravity and beliefs are abstract entities, the projecting of which enables us to successfully predict the behaviour of the respective systems of which they are a *real* part.

The instrumentalist, realist and eliminativist strands in Dennett's thinking are all covered by Symons. Symons could, however, do more to show that Dennett has a stable position. What comes over most is his eliminativism combined with an acceptance that folk psychology is 'pragmatically indispensable'. (This is also a position held by Quine, another eliminativist who has influenced Dennett.) It would have been helpful to have more in support of Dennett's realism.

Dennett's work on consciousness is addressed in Chapter Five. Symons' discussion here is illuminating. Again, there are various strands to Dennett's thought. First, he considers the nature of our own account of what we take our consciousness to consist in, our 'heterophenomenology'. Thinkers posit an inner world consisting of the subjective qualia that constitute, as Nagel famously puts it, the conscious aspect of *what it is like* to be you. Qualia are the subjective, private, ineffable properties of experience to which we have incorrigible access. As it turns out, however, this 'heterophenomenological world [has] the same metaphysical status as Sherlock Holmes' London or the world according to Garp' (70). According to Dennett, we can be persuaded of the fictional nature of what we ordinarily take to be in the mind by turning to cognitive science. This reveals to us that there are simply various modules of the brain that discriminate particular aspects of our environment. At any one time there are many discriminations being performed by different parts of the brain. Consciousness is just the sum total of these discriminatory acts or 'content fixations'. It *is* like something to look at the light reflecting off my red coffee cup. But such experience consists in the multi-track discriminations my brain makes concerning its shape, colour and texture, and not in my awareness of subjectively available qualia. I simply have brain states with the content curved, red, and shiny.

In a diagnostic spirit, Dennett identifies the Cartesian conception of consciousness as that which leads to 'the intractable problems that had haunted philosophers of yore' (13) (i.e., the mind-body problem), and he rejects this pernicious view of the mind. We should jettison the idea that there is a Cartesian theatre within which private conscious entities are paraded, and a Cartesian self that observes from the wings. Cognitive science has shown us that the Cartesian picture is mistaken: cognition simply consists in multi-track, contentful discriminations.

Symons is clearly on Dennett's side: 'Dennett will be known as the philosopher who broke "the spell of the enchanted circle of ideas that made explaining consciousness seem impossible" ' (93). He accepts Dennett's naturalistic approach: 'the philosophical naturalist believes that philosophical problems can be solved through a combination of scientific inquiry and the adjustment of our conceptual prejudices in light of empirical evidence' (12). In places, however, his acceptance of naturalism is rather too uncritical and the philosophical problems concerning cognitive science are sometimes underplayed: 'Thanks to Turing and others, certain kinds of thinking are now conducted extremely well by computers' (82). Such claims are far more controversial than Symons suggests.

Nevertheless, this little book provides a good survey of the influences on Dennett, and a clear account of his view of consciousness. Dennett's philosophy of mind is in places elusive, and some purchase can be gained on it by reading this volume.

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Janna Thompson
Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Injustice.
Cambridge: Polity 2002. Pp. xxi + 173.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7456-2884-2);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7456-2885-0).

The account of reparations presented in this book represents the first book-length work on the topic from the analytical philosophical tradition. And it is a view of reparations that takes into consideration various instances of historical injustice: from the Maori of New Zealand to the Aborigines of Australia, from the indigenous Americans of North, Central and South America to the cases of slavery of Africans in the United States. It is intended to be a general theory of reparations that seeks to draw at least part of its philosophical impetus from the tradition of political liberalism.

Subsequent to stipulatively defining reparations and its related concepts, Thompson argues for an 'obligations-dependent theory' (opposed to a 'rights-centered theory') according to which reparations require reconciliation between the oppressed and oppressors, entail considerations of equity, and involve programs designed to 'repair' historic injustices. Reparations are based on 'past-referring obligations' wherein those responsible (accountable in a duty sense) for keeping the promise or committing the wrongs on which reparations are based are not the ones who made the promise or committed the wrongs, but are their descendants or their successors. 'Past-referring obligations' ground 'transgenerational responsibilities' to honor valid treaties. And 'transgenerational commitments create transgenerational obligations' wherein the latter are grounded in a 'respect for nations' that ought to accrue between nations. Failure to respect harmed or oppressed nations shows disrespect toward them by oppressive states. And such disrespect is immoral and wrong. Those making reparative claims against oppressive states that owe them must make 'reasonable' claims, and there is surely a moral statute of limitations on claims to reparations for historic injustices.

Such a moral statute of limitations is based on common sense and pragmatic aspects of the complexities of human life. Reparations, then, entail the collective responsibility of those within countries from which reparations are owed.

While the book is well-written, and attempts are made to explore various perspectives concerning the reparations debate, some readers are likely to have certain philosophical concerns with several points made by Thompson and/or about certain other features of the book's contents. First, no attempt is made to even say why certain groups (certain indigenous groups, for instance), and not others (mainstream majority groups, for example), qualify for reparations. Moreover, Thompson does not notice differences between arguments for and against reparations to Native Americans and African Americans, for instance, or those between Maoris and Aborigines. Furthermore, Thompson reduces reparations to 'justice as equity' which requires reconciliation (50-3), placing no real burdens on oppressive states, especially evil ones like the U.S.. Also, Thompson's view of reconciliation places the moral 'obligation' on the *victim*, not the perpetrator, to 'accept reparation that they have reason to regard as just ... ' But what is the argument for this claim as opposed to making it a moral *prerogative* of the victim to accept reparations offers? It also implies that reparations are contingent on the reconciliation of oppressed with their oppressors: reparations cannot accrue unless and until the oppressed who are due reparations based on historic injustice agree to 'accommodate' oppressors! This is counter-intuitive if one takes rights sufficiently seriously. Then again, Thompson is offering an obligations-based approach to reparations, not a rights-based approach. Furthermore, Thompson fails to give Robert Nozick's view of historical entitlement serious philosophical consideration, dismissive of it as 'doomed to irrelevancy' when it fails to generate the conclusions that the author deems 'practical' or 'common sense' (57). Practical or common sense for *whom*, and *why*?

Perhaps equally problematic, it is difficult to know if Thompson's discussion of reparations relies on a plausible conception of collective responsibility since she provides no philosophical analysis of the concept of collective responsibility (44-6) — and this in light of the fact that there exist such analyses. This prevents Thompson from delving deeply into the nuances of collective responsibilities of not only governments, but of their respective supportive businesses or other institutions that 'lobby' them in their complicity regarding historic injustices. Without a robust analysis of collective responsibility, there is unlikely to be a plausible account of reparations. Perhaps this leads Thompson to draw a dubious distinction between reparative and retributive justice (xi; 45). No explanation or argument is provided for this distinction. Yet it directly effects Thompson's notion that reparations *require* equity and reconciliation. Indeed, it reveals the fact that her idea of reparations is based on a utilitarian conception of 'justice', rather than on considerations of desert, proportional compensation, and historic harms. The result is that Thompson confuses reparations with matters of distributive justice, amounting to a category mistake. Reparations precisely *are* matters

of retributive justice from states and/or businesses to groups harmed by such states and/or businesses. So Thompson's confused notion of the nature of reparations leads her to a questionable notion that reparations requires reconciliation. Only a presumptuous version of utilitarianism could manage the gall to maintain such a view.

Still other readers might note that Thompson provides no *argument* for her claim that there is a moral statute of limitations on injustice, and this despite the fact that in U.S. law there is no statute of limitations on murder, a crime committed by the U.S. Army against many Native Americans at the command of former U.S. president Andrew Jackson, among others. Thompson ignores the fact that the *Laches* Defense (in U.S. law) does *not* apply to cases of native and African American reparations, as each group has continually approached the U.S. government for rectification of past wrongs. The claims were simply refused. This vitiates against denials of reparations for such harms to the descendants of these groups.

The book exhibits a limited range of scholarship and discussion of selected accounts of reparations, collective responsibility, and related concepts. Nonetheless, it is a well-written and helpful book, though one that makes certain presuppositions that are highly questionable.

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Mark Timmons, ed.
Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 2002. Pp. xiii + 446.
Cdn$150.00: US$75.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-825009-6);
Cdn$51.00: US$24.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-825010-X).

The 1997 Spindel Conference commemorating the bicentennial of the publication of *The Metaphysics of Morals* is at the origin of *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays*. Fourteen of the seventeen contributors to this volume presented or commented on a paper at the Spindel Conference. Seven essays were previously published in the 1997 Spindel Conference Supplement of *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*; two are expansions of comments published there too; eight represent entirely new contributions. The originality of *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals*

is therefore relative, but this should be of little consequence to readers not acquainted with the Supplement's essays.

The contributors to *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals* are leading German and Anglo-American Kant scholars. Their essays cover a wide range of topics such as Kant's perspective on contract, right, revolution, freedom, virtue, legislation, happiness, moral judgment and deception. Two more general topics are especially predominant in this book: the independence/dependence of Kant's political philosophy with respect to his transcendental idealism and moral philosophy and the perennial Kantian problem of motivation. There are many essays in *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals* and the contributors' lines of argumentation are often complex. I therefore only refer to some of these essays in this review.

Kenneth Westphal offers a reconstruction of Kant's justification of rights to possession in 'A Kantian Justification of Possession'. His reconstruction is based on a 'Contradiction in Conception' test that uses Kant's Universal Law of Right. Indifferent to motives or the moral worth of actions, this law only tests 'maxims in view of their compatibility, when universalized, with like outward behaviour of all' (97). The advantage with the Contradiction in Conception test, according to Westphal, is that it commits us to establish and support a common system of rights of possession weaker (or more minimal) than the liberal system of property rights, which entails the uninterrupted and exclusive use of objects. In 'Is Kant's *Rechtslehre* a "Comprehensive Liberalism"?', Thomas Pogge aims to demonstrate the independence of Kant's political philosophy through an analysis of Kant's definition of Right and the '*Rechtslehre*-game' metaphor. The '*Rechtslehre*-game' is governed by rules that specify juridically permissible and impermissible moves, or uses of external freedom; all these rules, including the one concerning the use of coercion, derive from Kant's definition of Right. But what reason have we, Pogge asks, to play the *Rechtslehre*-game? Is this not where Kant's concept of autonomy must be presupposed? Pogge claims that Kant 'bases the establishment and maintenance of *Recht* exclusively on persons' fundamental a priori interest in external freedom,' namely in prudential reasons (149). Bernd Ludwig takes up Pogge's *Rechtslehre*-game metaphor in his essay. Because we have no choice but to play the *Rechtslehre*-game, Ludwig says the question really should be: 'Why can no human being complain about being coerced to conform with the "Law of Right"?' (163). One cannot answer here: 'Because it is in your true interest to play this game', for this paternalism is contrary to Kant's liberalism. To answer this question, Ludwig examines the nature of the *Rechtslehre*-game's players: the 'persons'. The *Rechtslehre*-game is addressed to persons who consider themselves and others as accountable for their actions and free. How, otherwise, could they claim the right not to be coerced by others? In relation to Kant's concept of freedom, this means that these players consider themselves as noumenal causes or beings acting according to the moral law. Katrin Flikschuh takes issue with these two interpretations of the Kantian political agent. She thinks the prudential interpretation leads to 'moral schizophrenia' because according to this inter-

pretation there are two distinct and irreconcilable Kantian agents: one political and self-interested; the other moral and disinterested. The moral interpretation, on the other hand, ignores the relation between subjects and objects specific to political agency. Through an analysis of the economic function of desiring in the *Rechtslehre*, Flikschuh attempts to provide an unequivocally but not Hobbesian conception of political agency.

Thomas Hill's essay 'Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth' explores the status of mixed motives in Kant's moral philosophy by way of a comparative analysis of the fear of punishment and of the pangs of conscience. Hill claims that being motivated by conscience means ultimately to be motivated by respect for the moral law. The fear of the pangs of conscience (like that of punishment) entails indeed a *judgment* on the wrongness of our actions that reveals our commitment to morality and more importantly to others, for it is the *justified* disapproval of others we fear each time. Stephen Engstrom tackles the issue of motivational harmony from a new perspective: Kant's account of virtue as strength. A 'moral disposition in *battle*' is a stage in moral development where the will is not determined, but still *influenced* by inclinations. Virtue is the stage beyond that. It is a '*free* readiness' that involves no such influence and that is characterized by inner peace of soul. Engstrom argues that for Kant, virtue, this habit deriving from inner freedom, can also be sustained and developed. Andrews Reath attributes a social conception of morality to Kant in 'Self-Legislation and the Duties to Oneself'. The Categorical Imperative is given through each individual's reason, but how do we apply it? Reath claims that duties or moral principles are not supposed to be generated in isolation, but via social interaction and co-deliberation. This conception does not exclude duties to oneself: co-deliberation can also generate principles on how individuals should treat themselves. In 'Love and Respect in the *Doctrine of Virtue*', Marcia Baron questions Kant's description of love and respect as opposing forces. Contrary to what Kant suggests, respect requires at times that we come closer and love, that we maintain ourselves at a distance. Practical love, that is, requires respect.

Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretative Essays is the only book dedicated fully to Kant's last major work in ethics besides Mary Gregor's *Laws of Freedom* (1963). Such a book is therefore welcomed. *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals* also has an extensive bibliography on work written by German and Anglo-American scholars between 1970 to 2000 on *The Metaphysics of Morals*. This bibliography is an excellent addition, which unifies further the dispersed scholarship on this ethical work. The philosophical value of this book, more importantly, is unquestionable. Most contributors provide challenging insights into Kant's political and moral philosophy. Still, though many contributors have shown how Kant's political theory derives from his moral theory, no one has investigated the inverse relation: how Kant's political philosophy determines his moral theory. This relation certainly deserves some analysis. Also, most contributors who have tried to show Kant's relevance to contemporary political and moral philosophy have often

done so by extending to its limits the plasticity of Kant's text. This raises the following question: Why Kant absolutely?

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Richard L. Velkley
Being after Rousseau:
Philosophy and Culture in Question.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2002.
Pp. x + 192.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-85256-3);
US$18.00 (paper: ISBN 0-226-85257-1).

Despite its mere 150 pages (with 40 pages of notes), Richard Velkley's *Being after Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in Question* is a big and important book. Unlike many, if not most collections of essays, this is a genuine collection, unified by a particularly startling and compelling thesis. That thesis, that Rousseau is the hidden source and guiding spirit behind several key aspects of German philosophy from Kant to Heidegger, is apt to strike many of the official guardians of that canon as unfamiliar and implausible, in spite of a number of recent works which locate Kant's moral and political concerns at the foundation of his massive theoretical-critical project. Both in this work and in his earlier *Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Velkley is making a major contribution to this shift of focus, not least by powerfully demonstrating the pivotal influence of Rousseau on Kant. In the present work, Velkley takes his thesis further, tracing the set of concerns Kant was led to by Rousseau through several key moments in Kant's thought and beyond (i.e., in the work of Schelling and Heidegger).

Velkley knows to whom and for whom he writes. His target audience is the community of scholars of Kant and post-Kantian German Idealism. He begins by identifying a shared concern for something called culture (*Bildung*), as distinct from civilization, in German thought from Kant onward. On Velkley's account, civilization is traced to or identified with the efforts of early modern philosophers to secure 'universal foundations for the peaceful pursuit of happiness with no determinate content' (12). The twin engines of this project, a technologically powerful science and a liberal political order, however, do not satisfy 'the human need for wholeness or erotic fulfillment' (12). Thus, according to Velkley, the Platonic tension between eros and justice is recast as the tension between culture and

civilization. It is the philosopher who lives this tension to the fullest, and so struggles the mightiest to resolve it. Yet, this tripartite relationship between the philosopher, culture and civilization, which Velkley argues Rousseau is responsible for reintroducing, immediately puts both philosophy and culture in question from the vantage of civilization. Philosophy is thus once again called before the public tribunal to offer an *apologia*.

Nowhere is this tension more visible than in Rousseau's two discourses, the second of which Velkley subjects to a masterful, if partial, textual exegesis. This, it seems to me, is the brilliant centerpiece of the book. Because Velkley is primarily talking to academic philosophers (for many of whom Rousseau is barely a footnote), I doubt that the brilliance of this essay will receive its due, or that its place in the debate about the *Second Discourse* will be recognized. Nevertheless, for the courageous and open-minded reader, Velkley's thought-provoking consideration of certain puzzling features of Rousseau's work should establish grounds for reconsidering the textbook version of Rousseau's thought. I would only add that Velkley's analysis, in particular the surprising and intriguing remarks he (like Rousseau) makes in his endnotes, makes it very hard to maintain that Rousseau believed his own portrait of natural man was simply or anthropologically true.

Velkley next offers his readers a taste of the argument he presented in his previous book: that seeing the Rousseauian influence on Kant is essential to understanding Kant's endeavor and that this influence is most visible in three key questions: freedom, teleology and the justification of reason. Kant read Rousseau as identifying *the* central concern of modernity to be recovery of a place for moral freedom in the face of the materialistic determinism of modern natural science. Second, Rousseau calls into question the end or *telos* of reason, by challenging both its naturalness and its goodness. In the wake of Rousseau, then, the priority of reason requires a defense. Third, Rousseau articulates most forcefully the inability of modern natural science to satisfy man's longing for wholeness and unity. Velkley sees these concerns as well as certain aspects of Kant's attempted solutions as taken directly from his encounter with Rousseau.

At this point Velkley's presentation takes a somewhat surprising turn. Velkley pauses to consider first Kant's Socratism and then the place of logic in Kant's thought. The unifying theme in these two very different essays is Kant's discovery of transcendental logic — a discovery made possible, not to say necessary, by Kant's focus on the practical and moral dimensions of human life — which Kant himself saw as essentially Socratic. Velkley argues that, for Kant, the human being is characterized by a longing or eros which can only be satisfied metaphysically. And yet because human reasoning is and can only be discursive and conceptual, this longing can be satisfied only indirectly: through a systematic exploration of the limits of reason which allows for the possibility of 'the "practical" achievement of a "moral world" ' (77).

On this basis, then, Velkley begins his exploration of post-Kantian German philosophy with a remarkable essay on Kant's third *Critique*. This work,

according to Velkley, prepares the various attempts of subsequent German thinkers to reconcile the impulse to rational system with the contingency of the human way of being. Velkley concludes his work with a consideration of Schelling's writings, and with a brief essay on Heidegger. Throughout these final essays, the conflicting demands of systematic thinking and what Velkley calls 'metaphysical eros' are gradually found to be irreconcilable. In the face of this impasse, Schelling tried first to appeal to aesthetic experience and finally to religious and revelatory language as a way out — anticipating similar attempts by Nietzsche and Heidegger.

So, initial appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, this is not simply a work of intellectual history, tracing a thinker's inspiration to the thought of some predecessor. For Velkley, such efforts are of minor philosophic significance. Far more important is learning from the thinkers under consideration about ourselves and our inmost nature. But even beyond this, there is a provocative and rewarding critical dimension to Velkley's argument, though it proves difficult of access. Much is concealed in the notes (as in Kant and Rousseau), and only once, so far as I could see, does Velkley explicitly acknowledge that his account points towards a potential critique of the entire post-Kantian tradition. To the extent that this critique is clear to me, it is deeply bound up with the historical-hermeneutic question that the book makes most visible.

Unlike so many scholarly works taking the form of a collection of essays, one closes *Being after Rousseau* wishing there were more. A synoptic summary would have been helpful, one in which Velkley would make clearer his reservations about the German appropriation of Rousseau. And while the attentive reader can detect the occasional Heideggerian flourish, Velkley could have done more to connect Rousseau's quest to recover natural pre-social, pre-linguistic, and pre-rational man with Heidegger's quest for a purchase point beyond or before calculative thinking. And while Nietzsche figures regularly as a bit player in the analysis, a thematic treatment of his account of the relation between culture and philosophy would have been very much to the point. One might even go so far as to wish that this collection of essays had been reworked into a more tightly woven narrative. But it is a testimony to the quality of the book as it stands that my major criticism is that it leaves one hungry for more.

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Daniel M. Wegner
The Illusion of Conscious Will.
Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, The MIT Press 2002. Pp. xi + 405.
US$34.95. ISBN 0-262-23222-7.

Daniel Wegner, Professor of Psychology at Harvard University, has devoted much of his career to understanding the nature of self-control and its limitations. He is perhaps best known to the general public as author of *White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts* (New York: Viking Press 1989), which summarized research on the difficulty we have in controlling the contents of our thoughts. His new book, *The Illusion of Conscious Will*, branches out into the realm of philosophy, and surveys a wide range of phenomena and experimental work relevant to agency. It has chapters on neurophysiology, phenomenology, automatism (including automatic writing, Ouija boards, water divining, and dissociative personality), protecting the illusion of conscious agency (including posthypnotic suggestion, confabulation in split-brain patients, phenomena of 'alien control' in schizophrenia), projection of agency (including beliefs in intelligent horses and pigs, and facilitated communication), virtual agency (including possession, mediumship, multiple personalities), hypnosis, and a final chapter on the importance of our beliefs in free will and authorship. These chapters are for the most part sprawling and unfocused. Wegner examines many topics and gives his opinion of how best to interpret them. It is often unclear whether the facts he presents are meant to serve as evidence for his main thesis about the illusion of free will, whether they are meant to be consequences of his view, or whether they are merely interesting phenomena that are tangentially related to his main theme. There is repetition of ideas from chapter to chapter, but often the examination of particular topics is cursory. In short, the book reads like a rough draft rather than a finished version.

Wegner's writing style is often casual and he peppers his text with jokes and asides. There are many illustrations, from diagrams explaining his views about the will and setting out details of scientific experiments to drawings of mesmerism, a reproduction of an advertisement for the 'hypno-coin', and a photograph of Peter Sellers in the role of Dr. Strangelove. One might hope this would make the book more readable, but instead, the book fails to be either good scholarship or popular psychology, and is likely to leave both academic philosophers and psychologists and the general reader unsatisfied.

Wegner's main claim is that 'the experience of consciously willing an action is not a direct indication that the conscious thought has caused the action' (2). He defines will as a feeling (3) and says (apparently by way of explicating our concept of will) that an action is not willed if the person says it is not (4) — ignoring the possibility of error or deception on the part of the agent. Wegner then puts great weight on unusual cases where people perform

actions with no apparent experience of willing them, arguing that they are problematic for defenders of conscious free will. However, he makes no effort to prove that his initial definition of will is satisfactory or that it is a conceptual truth that will is a feeling. It remains open to a defender of free will to argue that our knowledge of willing is defeasible, and so that Wegner's many cases of action without awareness of willing fail to prove that the will is an illusion. Alternatively, defenders of free will may grant that in those unusual cases, agents do not act freely, but they could still insist that in most everyday action, we act freely.

A potentially useful distinction Wegner makes is between the *phenomenal* will — the person's reported experience of will — and *empirical* will — the causality of the person's conscious thoughts as established by a scientific analysis of their covariation with the person's behavior (14). At times, Wegner's main thesis seems to be the modest one that the phenomenal will and the empirical will are not the same, rather than a denial of the existence of will. He says we accept a simple explanation of our behavior, 'We intended to do it, so we did it' and we do not see the physical and mental processes that go to make up the empirical will (27). However, Wegner never makes a strong case that the phenomenal will is indeed generally incompatible with the empirical will, and the claim is prima facie implausible. The common sense psychology of ordinary folk assumes that the empirical will and the phenomenal will are different, and that the former explains the latter.

The most interesting argument for the illusory nature of conscious will stems from the research of Libet and others on the timing of consciousness awareness of willing relative to the action performed. The awareness of willing of finger movement occurs *after* neurophysiological activity that leads to the finger movement, and this suggests the awareness is causally irrelevant to the action. Wegner concludes from such experiments that 'consciousness is kind of a slug' (58). He seems oblivious to the need to be very careful about the interpretation of the experimental data and the risk in generalizing from such specialized experimental conditions to ordinary life. Suffice to say, he casts very little doubt on the ordinary supposition that through deliberating about our lives we can often decide what is best and then act on our decision.

The remaining discussion of the book provides a wealth of fascinating cases where a person's agency is contestable. Especially provocative is Wegner's claim that the experience of conscious will occurs only when conscious thoughts are (mistakenly) seen as causing perceived actions. Philosophers new to the psychological literature on the will should find the bibliography an excellent resource for further investigation, and Wegner's discussion does show that the psychological literature deserves attention from philosophers working on freedom of the will and personal autonomy. Psychology has shown how humans tend to be less rational than we like to suppose, and there are many cases where are self-understanding is limited. Nevertheless, just as the claims of psychoanalysis and behaviorism to undermine our central beliefs in our self-control have in the past been shown to be

overblown, so too Wegner's use of modern cognitive and social psychology to undermine our belief in conscious will is ultimately unpersuasive.

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William S. Wilkerson and
Jeffrey Paris, eds.
New Critical Theory: Essays on Liberation.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2001.
Pp. 288.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-1277-0);
US$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-1278-9).

This volume aims to indicate the direction in which constructively critical theory can proceed in pursuit of the practical task of establishing more just and humane societies. All of the contributors to the volume share the editors' claim that Critical theory has generally failed to realise even its founders' somewhat melancholic aspirations, epitomised in Marcuse's phrase that the purpose of Critical theory is 'to retain hope for those without hope'. This volume insists upon the continuing need for a genuinely critical perspective upon the organization of contemporary societies whilst simultaneously attempting to fashion a more effective theoretical vocabulary capable of speaking to and for those groups and communities whose struggles for genuine emancipation continue. This volume does not principally aim to add to our philosophical knowledge of critical theory. Overall, the volume reveals a bias against protracted reflection upon the disputed epistemological terrain of the very idea of critical theory and towards more practical analyses of human suffering. Thus, the twelve contributory chapters that comprise the volume all include, to a greater or lesser extent, philosophical reflections upon the question of the rational basis of the normative content of genuinely critical theorizing. However, the main focus of the volume overall is an examination of the relationship between Critical theory and political practice in contemporary societies. Separate chapters analyze groups such as the Zapatistas, the gay community in the United States, African-Americans, and women in rural Asia. What unifies the otherwise diverse and eclectic subject-matter is a consideration of both how Critical theory can facilitate the emancipatory aspirations of groups such as these and also what contribution understanding their experiences can make to the development of critical theory. This more positive dialectic is a central theme of *New Critical Theory*.

During the formative years of Critical theory until the emergence of Jürgen Habermas and the so-called 'second generation' of Critical theorists, remaining true to the spirit of Critical theory appeared to exclude the possibility of being positive about the prospects of overcoming inhumanity. The Holocaust came to be seen as speaking the truth of such times and as perversely justifying the despair of those without hope. For some, Critical theory succumbed to the thoroughly negative dialectical temper of Theodor Adorno's gloomy tirades against the world and all it contained. Critical theory appeared capable of existing only as a pure form of opposition, opposing the world for the sake of opposition and denied access to the vision of a better world. One searches in vain for any substantive visions of redemption during this period of Critical theory. Habermas attempted to rectify such problems by identifying what he claimed were existing, though increasingly abstract, norms and values he considered capable of providing the critical levers for creating more just societies. However, Habermas' reconciliatory project has lead to consistent allegations that the truly critical element has been expunged from his philosophical analyses. *New Critical Theory* aims to overcome the apparent impasse between followers of first-generation Critical theory and its more recent protagonists. The editors' ambitions are there for all to see in their description of New Critical theory as 'an emerging paradigm' (3). They proceed to describe the contributions to the volume as united in their desire to encourage both a form of radical thinking and radical action that is more epistemologically pluralist and multidimensional than many have come to expect from Critical theory. This epistemological pluralism explicitly seeks to avoid lapsing into a politically quietist post-modern 'anything goes' type of condition. It remains committed to Critical theory's necessary investment in the notion of normative truth. What it does embrace, however, is both a widening of the objects of Critical theory to include social groups that have been previously neglected by the tradition and the drawing upon a broader theoretical base that includes the usual suspects such as Marx and Hegel but also extends to include Ricœur, Derrida, and even Plato! New Critical theory seeks to philosophically bypass the habitual fixation with the writings of Kant and Hegel and aims to include philosophers who share Critical theory's normative concerns but who have not, necessarily, cut their philosophical teeth on the bone of German Idealism. New Critical theory aims to be far less canonical than previous supporters of the tradition have proven to be. *New Critical Theory* amounts to the opening statement of a project which the editors clearly hope will be capable of more adequately and usefully challenging manifestations of current human suffering and thereby restoring a recognition of the value of critical theorizing.

New Critical Theory is an important, philosophically sophisticated book that ought to be read by anyone who has felt the pull of philosophical dissonance. It is a book that ought to be read by all those who are intellectually accustomed to reading the works of those who continue to testify against continuing injustice. It is also a book that demands to be read by all of those

frustrated by the futile in-fighting that has dogged Critical theory for several decades. This book has the potential for constructing new bridges both between the various clans that comprise Critical theory and across to other intellectual traditions that have been unduly neglected by an overly canonical reading of Critical theory. Having said that, the volume refrains from providing an unambiguous and detailed account of the basis for the normative aspirations that underlie the text. Indeed one might say that the diverse and eclectic character of the contributions to this volume betray some apparent disagreement among the contributors as to the precise contours and basis of New Critical Theory. A number of the contributors point to Herbert Marcuse's interest in undeformed human sensuality as a possible means for countering the despair of other first-generation Critical theorists and the unduly abstract character of Habermas' discourse ethics. However, an undue interest in a single Critical theorist is not consistent with the overtly pluralist character of the book. What the book does need to address more satisfactorily, however, is the question of the ultimate normative basis of this emerging paradigm. The pursuit of rationally defensible and authoritative ideals and values has dogged Critical theory since its foundation. If *New Critical Theory* is to live up to its promise, this particular Herculean task will have to be adequately confronted.

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K. Brad Wray, ed.
Knowledge and Inquiry.
Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 2002.
Pp. xiv + 465.
Cdn$/US$24.95. ISBN 1-55111-413-5.

There are a great many epistemology anthologies on the market, most designed to be useful for a wide variety of courses; therefore, anyone who compiles a new one had better have a new approach or meet a different need if he or she hopes to make a dent in the already glutted market. Wray's anthology, in many ways, takes the same approach as most anthologies already on the market, but it also meets a need that few, if any, present anthologies can meet.

The book begins with a very brief Preface, outlining the book's rationale. Wray divides the subject matter into three main areas, devoting one section

of the book to each: Epistemic Justification, Knowledge and Skepticism, and New Developments in Epistemology. Each section begins with a short introductory essay explaining the issue and summarizing the readings, and ends with a short list of study questions, and suggested additional readings. The study questions are designed to focus the reader on key concepts and arguments in the reading; they are highly focused, and so should be very useful for guiding students through the material. Wray's suggestions for additional reading are also carefully chosen; they are clearly more than just 'other stuff on the same subject', but rather, readings that really do continue the discussion of the readings. These are genuinely useful pedagogical tools, not afterthoughts.

The readings themselves are a well-chosen and representative set. We find the old standards, like Chisholm, Bonjour, Goldman, Gettier, and Quine, but also some unexpected gems. For example, Audi's careful essay on Foundationalism and Coherentism is an extremely useful and often overlooked resource on that controversy, as is Conee's essay on the Gettier problem. Wray obviously brings to the task a wide and deep mastery of the literature. A few of the choices are different from ones I would have made. For example, on the question of whether epistemology can or should be naturalized, I would have used Mark Kaplan's 'Epistemology Denatured', rather than Putnam's 'Why Reason Can't be Naturalized'. It would also have been tempting to use Kaplan's 'Epistemology on Holiday' in the section on justification. Moreover, Hardwig's article, 'The Role of Trust in Knowledge', while influential, would probably have been better replaced by something with a more general thrust; there are a host of articles on testimony and trust to choose from. Choices like these are always hard for the anthologist to make, and are always debatable. It is harder to understand the absence of anything by William Alston, given his important contributions to the foundationalism/coherentism debate and to the internalism/externalism debate.

The last section, on new developments in epistemology, is the best thing about this collection. Wray includes readings on naturalism in epistemology, feminist epistemology, and social epistemology. Many anthologies have tried to include these issues, but have failed to do them justice. The selections on feminist epistemology are particularly apt. My only wish for this section was that some readings in the burgeoning Baysean literature could have been included.

On the whole, Wray has done an admirable job. The resulting collection is manageably small, but still representative of the areas he wishes to cover. As a result, he has produced an anthology that includes exceptionally good work, including not a few very recent works. It should be useful for upper-division courses in epistemology, as well as graduate seminars. Specialists in epistemology should welcome this collection as a helpful addition to their stable of textbooks, in that it provides a high level of technical work from the profession's best thinkers, but doesn't overwhelm either instructor or student with a huge number of articles. Most other anthologies available today either include too much, and are therefore too expensive to use with other texts, or

fail to include enough material to provide a good overview. Non-specialists may need to supplement it with another, single-author text, as there isn't enough explanatory material included for it to stand alone. With these caveats, I recommend this book heartily.

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James O. Young
Art and Knowledge.
New York: Routledge 2001. Pp. xi + 180.
Cdn$135.00: US$90.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-2564-6);
Cdn$40.95: US$24.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-2564-7).

Many of us believe that a work of art has taught us something profound about the world. As intuitively strong as this belief can be, it is notoriously hard to justify. How can we learn about the world by attending to, say, a novel about persons who never existed? Resolving such worries is the aim of James Young's *Art and Knowledge*. Young presents a bold case for 'aesthetic cognitivism', the idea that 'every item properly classified as a work of art can contribute to human knowledge' (1). According to Young, 'artworks can provide an understanding of aspects of reality. If so, like science and history, art must represent the aspects of the world into which it provides insight' (23). In light of this, he has two goals: to outline how artworks represent the world, and to show that such representation contributes to knowledge.

Towards the first goal, Young develops the notion of *illustrative representation*. Unlike scientific theories, which represent in virtue of semantic conventions, 'illustrations represent because an experience of the illustration has something in common with experience of the object represented' (26). In this manner, artworks can represent not only particular objects, but also types; this allows Young to class fictional works as representational. Also pivotal is his claim that there is *indirect* illustrative representation. This is crucial because important forms of illustration in literature (descriptive illustration) and music (the representation of emotion) seem to be largely indirect, depending on the association of descriptions with character types (50) and the association of forms of motion with emotional states, respectively (58). Young's theory of illustration is able to accommodate representation by many different art forms, and different sorts of representation within art forms.

Having established that the arts represent, Young argues that such representations give us knowledge. Unlike science, which provides theories about the world, the arts provide *perspectives*: ways of thinking or feeling about something. A perspective is not a set of propositions, but rather the *practice* of seeing something in a certain manner. As such, a perspective cannot be true, but it can be *right*, when it 'aids people who adopt it in the acquisition of knowledge' (69). Artworks only give us knowledge, of course, if the perspective they provide is a right one; just as scientific theories only give us knowledge if they are confirmed by evidence, so 'the perspectives provided by the arts are in need of justification' (67). But how does art provide justification for the rightness of the perspectives it offers? According to Young, artworks 'can provide illustrative demonstrations of the rightness of a perspective. That is, artworks can put audiences in a position to recognise the rightness of a perspective' (69). This is in contrast to scientific theories, which must be rationally demonstrated by (inductive) argument from empirical evidence.

So far we know that artworks can deliver knowledge, but must *all* artworks? Young argues that 'art ought to be defined in such a way that only items with cognitive value count as artworks' (1). Given that Young is a relativist about art, holding that what counts as art is what an artworld decides, this is a trivial claim. However, he also offers practical reasons why all artworlds should adopt a definition of art in terms of cognitive value. 'If everyone acted in his best interests', he says, 'only one artworld would exist and all artworks would have cognitive value' (21).

The book's final two chapters explore ramifications of this reconceptualization of art. First Young applies his conception of art to the issue of evaluating artworks. He admits that 'even the cognitive value of artworks is ... partly relative to audiences' because people may find the knowledge delivered by a work to be more or less valuable according to their different interests (120). Nonetheless, because we have 'objective interests', of which we may be unaware, works that provide knowledge serving these have a high value for us, however low we estimate their aesthetic worth. Thus the value of artworks is not radically relative: some judgements of artistic value can be wrong (117).

Young proceeds to extract 'a few generally applicable criteria of aesthetic value', including: 'works of art with a high degree of aesthetic value can contribute importantly to the knowledge of an audience', 'good artworks will not be attempts to make statements', and 'a work has high aesthetic value only if it investigates an important subject'. In the book's final chapter, Young wields these principles to argue that 'something has gone dreadfully wrong in modern art' (134). His target is 'avant-garde' art, which strives to produce something 'new and unlike what has previously been produced' (137). In seeking this, it either represents trivial or inappropriate subjects or else abandons illustration altogether for bald and often incoherent assertion. If devotees of the avant-garde are not uncomfortable by this point, they will be

after reading the book's final section, a discussion of whether it is permissible to destroy avant-garde artworks.

Yet Young can hardly be accused of philistinism. His knowledge of art, and his passion for it, is everywhere evident. He genuinely seems to want to help restore dignity, importance and purpose to artists. Perhaps to that end, he writes in a clear prose that is accessible to non-philosophers and yet never wants for rigour or depth. His book, I suspect, is intended to appeal not only to philosophers, but to the denizens of the artwork as well (after all, it is principally they who must carry out the revolution for which he is agitating). In this regard I think *Art and Knowledge* succeeds admirably.

And yet, my worries linger. According to Young, *Pride and Prejudice* justifies the rightness of the perspective 'first impressions are a poor guide to character' because we directly recognise that statements following from the perspective are true. But true where? In the artwork? Assuredly not, since the perspective of any artwork would be automatically demonstrated. True everywhere, in virtue of some necessary connection between concepts? Surely not; this is clearly an empirical matter. In our experience, perhaps? Occasionally Young seems to endorse this response (88). Perhaps, if I reflected, I would realize that statements that follow from the perspective are true in my experience. Does this give me justification for the perspective? It seems the most I can say is that the perspective rings true *to me*. Does it lead to truth in any contexts beyond the narrow confines of my daily life? Maybe, but the artwork gives me no basis for thinking so.

This criticism, based upon one example, by no means does justice to the subtlety or scope of Young's discussion of illustrative demonstration. Nonetheless, on the whole it does seem that Young's heavy reliance on this non-rational capacity to simply 'recognise' truths undermines his position. I would not speak for others, but what I can grasp without the aid of rational argument or any evidence beyond my personal experience is pretty limited and uninteresting. If aesthetic cognitivism must come to this, perhaps the game is not worth the candle.

This recalcitrance notwithstanding, *Art and Knowledge* is a wonderful read: a persuasive, erudite, and entertaining attempt to confront a problem that is too often brushed aside with empty mottos and wishful thinking. Perhaps you too have felt this problem in your bones, and wonder if it can be resolved. Read this excellent book, and find out.

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Ewa Ziarek
An Ethics of Dissensus.
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Ewa Ziarek's *An Ethics of Dissensus* takes as its starting point the proliferation of ethical discourses in contemporary thought. Drawing on the work of a diverse range of philosophers (Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, Julia Kristeva, Jean-François Lyotard, Luce Irigaray, Franz Fanon, Chantal Mouffe, Cornelius Castoriadis, Franz Fanon, Patricia Williams, and bell hooks, among others), Ziarek aims to develop an alternative ethical orientation suited to democratic political practice. The 'ethics of dissensus' (whose name builds on a neologism coined by Lyotard to indicate the conflictual character of all ethical articulations) she constructs is meant to subject the best insights of postmodern ethical theory to the challenges posed by feminist, psychoanalytic, and race theories. The encounters staged in this book between such varied approaches are informed by Ziarek's dual commitment to the practice and theory of radical democracy and to the conviction that such a democratic politics requires an ethics.

The foundation of Ziarek's ethical project consists in her efforts to put Foucauldian and Levinasian ethics into dialogue with one another. As she rightly observes, these approaches constitute the two dominant strains of ethics in postmodernity. Although Foucault and Levinas have in common the project of rethinking ethics apart from the universal, law-governed approaches of more traditional moralities, their particular contributions to contemporary ethics seem to run in divergent directions. Foucault's recuperation of ancient Greek ethical practices in the name of an ethics centered on 'the care of the self' bears little resemblance to Levinas' well-known ethical injunctions focused on the self's 'responsibility to the Other'. Ziarek provides an important contribution to recent work in ethical theory by pursuing the question of whether these two orientations have anything significant to say to one another.

Ziarek describes her engagement with Foucault and Levinas as animated by a commitment to theorize freedom and obligation in non-oppositional ways. Ziarek uses the term 'ethos of becoming' to categorize the work of Foucault, Nietzsche, and Deleuze whose orientations privilege the value of human freedom. Levinas' philosophy, in contrast, embodies an 'ethos of obligation' that posits responsibility as its primary value and is also prevalent in the thought of Lyotard and Derrida. Ziarek's readings of both Foucault and Levinas helpfully cull from their work those elements most fruitful for conceptualizing democratic politics — namely, Foucault's interest in ethics as a 'practice of freedom' involving not only resistance to existing configurations of power but also the invention of new modes of living and Levinas' understanding of the deep intersubjectivity of human existence and his

efforts to theorize non-cognitive models of human relations. Ziarek's distillation of their work culminates in her claim that freedom and obligation must be re-thought in such a way that they are neither conceived of as oppositional projects nor reconciled through Kantian symmetry. The Foucauldian project of freedom needs to be redefined 'in relational terms as an engagement in transformative praxis motivated by the obligation for the Other' (2).

Having established the importance of an 'enabling tension' between Foucauldian freedom and Levinasian responsibility for her ethical theory, Ziarek further elaborates the ethics of dissensus via readings of Lyotard, Kristeva, Irigaray and hooks, each one the focus of the book's latter chapters. Ziarek relies on Lyotard's reading of Kant's Third Critique to insist on the necessity of a theory of 'indeterminate ethical judgment proceeding without a concept' for politics (86). This emphasis on the 'predicament of ethical judgment' is in part a response to what Ziarek takes to be an inadequacy in the theory of hegemonic politics developed by Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (83). Although Ziarek never names with precision the problems she sees in the theory of radical democracy centered on hegemonic articulation, she repeatedly casts her own ethical project as a significant revision to 'agonistic politics' at large. While it is certainly debatable whether the many extant theories of 'agonistic politics' are all susceptible to the indistinct charge of lapsing into sheer antagonism that Ziarek seems to want to level at them, her interest in amending Laclau and Mouffe's work with a theory of judgment is nonetheless intriguing. It promises to address their silence on the question of how to differentiate between competing attempts to give content to democracy's empty signifiers.

Ziarek draws on Kristeva's work on 'the negativization of narcissism' to insist on the importance of theorizing political and ethical relations in terms not only of 'external struggle' but also 'the subject's conflicting relation to "the Other within" ' (117). Irigaray and Castoriadis are productively paired by Ziarek to highlight the constituting/constituted ambiguity of society, such that Irigaray's notion of radical sexual difference 'announces a possibility of a break from intertwined historical determinations of race, gender, and class, acknowledging in this way both the indetermination of history and the lack of closure in the social systems of signification' (157).

Ziarek holds bell hooks up as a model of the kind of ethico-political thinking she takes to be indispensable for democratic feminist politics today. Ziarek commends hooks for her 'unapologetic commitment' to ethics as 'the necessary framework for feminist theory and democratic politics' (184). But simply positing and affirming the necessity of ethics for politics, as Ziarek does in her celebration of hooks, without considering the costs of such a move (the substitution of moralizing discourse for genuine political debate, as evidenced in contemporary national politics, for example), leaves many questions unanswered. Among them is the question of whether a dialogic model of ethics, like the one proffered by hooks and centered on the 'subject-to-subject encounter' is adequate for conceiving of political relations among multiple actors under conditions of plurality.

The necessity of ethics for politics is a subject that Ziarek would do well to address directly. Ziarek begins her project with the unquestioned assumption that ethics is a solution to an ill-specified but crucial lack in the practice and theory of radical democracy. She asserts that politics 'cannot be based only on hegemonic consolidation of dispersed struggles' and requires ethics as a 'framework', but she provides little rationale for this claim and does not engage the compelling challenges raised against the 'ethicization' of politics, articulated in recent years by Laclau and Judith Butler, among others. Ziarek is no doubt aware of critiques that interpret the so-called 'ethical turn' as a recourse to first principles and argue against it in the name of the autonomy of the political. She gestures toward such concerns when she states that her ethics of dissensus should not be understood as a 'recovery of ethics as a new "ground" of politics' (5). But while Ziarek *announces* that this is so, she does not provide a satisfying account of the relationship that exists, or ought to exist, between ethics and politics if not a foundational one. At several points the ethics of dissensus is described by Ziarek as a 'supplement' to hegemonic politics, but the notion of supplementarity would need to be delineated and defended in order for this claim to take on significance. As it is, the ethics of dissensus often seems to be performing unacknowledged foundational work in Ziarek's theory of politics, despite her claims to the contrary. This is most evident in her description of ethics, particularly the idea of obligation, as 'bring[ing] an element of the unconditional into the radical contingency of democratic politics' (5). Although Ziarek again asserts that the turn to the unconditional ought not to be understood as an attempt to 'recover a moral foundation', she does not provide the theoretical resources that might enable an understanding of the unconditional as something other than a ground for the agonistic contest she also wants to affirm as the stuff of democratic politics (6).

The answer to the question of whether the theory of radical democracy demands a 'supplement' from ethics is overdetermined by an approach like Ziarek's which equates radical democracy with sheer antagonism and positions 'judgment', 'community', 'affect', 'responsibility', and 'passion' (plus a number of other celebrated terms) under the heading 'ethics'. That politics involves, or should involve, some notion of particularized judgment and that democracy is not a purely rational but importantly affective enterprise, for example, are claims that need not be made in the name of ethics. Responsibility and passion, to cite two more examples, might be productively theorized as immanent to politics itself, rather than importing to politics from without a much-needed treatment dubbed 'ethics'. And if the theoretical choice is made to cast ethics as an indispensable check on political thought and practice, then such a choice ought to be accompanied by an acknowledgement of the attendant risks and perhaps unintended consequences of such a move.

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