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Editor / Directeur

David Kahane

Philosophy in Review

Department of Philosophy
4-115 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2E5
Tel: 780-492-8549
Fax: 780-492-9160
E-Mail: pir@ualberta.ca
URL: <http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/pir>

Francophone associate editor / directeur adjoint francophone

Alain Voizard

Département de philosophie
Université du Québec à Montréal
C.P. 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville
Montréal, QC
Canada H3C 3P8

Courriel: voizard.alain@uqam.ca

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Hans Achterhuis, ed.

*American Philosophy of Technology:
The Empirical Turn.*

Trans. Robert P. Crease.

Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Pp. ix + 175.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-33903-0);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21449-1).

As an emerging subdiscipline, philosophy of technology is growing in North America, but is still relatively underserved by publishers. Of course, there are many books that examine technology from the perspective of applied ethics or which discuss specific technologies in light of social and political concerns, but few that approach the question of technology as a distinctly local and philosophical one. Don Ihde's *Philosophy of Technology: An Introduction* (1994) and Mitcham and Mackey's 1972 anthology remain unsurpassed as introductory teaching texts, yet there is still a need for a volume that can acquaint readers with recent developments in this field. *American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn* is useful in terms of filling this pedagogical niche, and in drawing the attention of a wider readership to contemporary philosophy of technology outside of its more developed European context.

The American focus of this collection is one of the features that makes it appealing to those who may be less familiar with the classic works of Heidegger, Ellul, Jonas, and others on technology. As Ihde writes in his foreword to the book, the American approach to philosophy of technology differs in significant ways from the older European one, and this is emphasized because the contributors to the book write from a distanced perspective — all are on faculty at the University of Twente, in the Netherlands, and all are familiar with both the American and European literature. Another noteworthy element is indicated in the subtitle, the 'empirical turn'. While this turn builds upon the established ideas of the European 'godfathers' (Ihde's term), it also takes American philosophy of technology down a more socially and politically conscious path. Achterhuis argues that the classical philosophers of technology were more interested in historical and transcendental contexts in which technology emerged, and the more recent empirical trend is to examine concrete manifestations of particular technologies and their effects on the normative frameworks of culture.

Editor Hans Achterhuis has collected profiles of six writers who represent this empirical turn: Albert Borgmann, Hubert Dreyfus, Andrew Feenberg, Donna Haraway, Don Ihde, and Langdon Winner. Naturally, not everyone will agree that this list is representative, but it is a thought-provoking cross-section. Dreyfus is well known for his skeptical stance on artificial intelligence but he is more likely to be thought of as a philosopher of mind than technology. It is not clear that he has a theory of technology as such. Haraway's cyborg feminism certainly relies heavily on technology, but she is

known primarily as a science critic. Nevertheless, like all the writers profiled here, she takes the view that, since technology is always with us, we must recognize its effects upon us and decide how we are going to deal with them. The inclusion of both of these writers helps support the broadened perspective on technology that Achterhuis defends as characteristically American and empirical.

The six essays aim for both exposition and critique. Each does a solid job of exposition, although none is a substitute for the primary sources — all of the writers profiled here have produced substantial bodies of work worthy of further investigation. Each essay includes brief biographical histories of each writer, and a bibliography of primary and secondary sources. While there is not space here to offer a detailed evaluation of the individual essays, it is fair to say that most of the contributors offer a balanced assessment. An exception might be Achterhuis' own essay on the work of Andrew Feenberg. Feenberg has developed a fairly consistent position on technology and critical theory over the course of five books and numerous articles, although his views have evolved over time. Achterhuis seems to take Feenberg's refinements and elaborations as evasions, and is deeply suspicious of Feenberg's reliance on orthodox Marxism. Some of this critique is very much to the point, but occasionally it is rather tired. Having developed the notion of a concrete American-empirical philosophy of technology, Achterhuis then appears to fault Feenberg for not fitting into it adequately. René Munnik's essay on Haraway is also somewhat more critical than exegetical, but while his objections to Haraway's position are fairly pointed, they are couched in open-ended inquiries and are fairly gentle. Furthermore, Munnik's critique of Haraway seems to me to be largely correct, and deserves to be widely read.

Pieter Tijmes' essay on Borgmann, Philip Brey's on Dreyfus, Peter-Paul Verbeek's on Ihde, and Martijntje Smits' on Winner tend to be more straightforwardly introductory in nature. All are fairly short, averaging about twenty-four pages, and present the most salient aspects of each writer's work in clear, accessible language. All can be used as the foundation for either further study or application. In addition, the six essays taken together do more than merely establish the American school of thought that Achterhuis defends. They also demonstrate that there are several empirical turns, not just one, and that the breadth and diversity to be found in even such a small selection of writers is considerable. Some cleave more closely to the European godfathers than others, and some of them tend toward an optimistic technophilia. There may be some similarities between the ways in which, say, Borgmann and Winner account for technology, but most of these writers offer a well-developed theoretical perspective that brings different aspects of our technologized lives into relief. Furthermore, many of them encourage us to give up the tendency, common enough among students, to think of technology solely in terms of machinery with buttons to press and lights that flash. The ubiquity and invisibility of technology and its impact is a unifying thread among this diverse group of writers.

This book was originally published in Dutch for a European readership interested in learning what folks were saying about technology in the colonies. Its translation into English is a welcome addition to the literature in a field that is still much too small.

Edrie Sobstyl

(School of Arts and Humanities)

University of Texas - Dallas

Sister Prudence Allen

The Concept of Woman, Vol. II.

The Early Humanist Reformation 1250-1500.

Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans

Publishing 2002. Pp. xxiv + 1161.

US\$70.00. ISBN 0-8028-4735-8.

Sister Prudence Allen's monumental continuation of *The Concept of Woman 750BC-1250AD* promises to provide a 'genealogy of gender in western thought' (3). Rather than showing a continuous line of influence in the development of ideas about the nature of woman, it fits thinkers into a categorical framework developed by Allen in her earlier work. According to this schematism theories of gender identity fall into one or other of four types. One is a gender unity theory, according to which humanity is shared by the sexes (characterised by Plato); next a gender polarity theory of the traditional kind, in which the male is deemed fully human and the female a defective human (characterised by Aristotle) — or of the reverse form which makes the female the pure type; third, a gender complementarity theory (characterised by Hildegard of Bingen) or gender neutrality (12-19). In practice it becomes difficult to clearly separate gender unity from gender neutrality theories and Allen makes most use of a tri-partite characterisation. It is clear that her own preference is for a theory of integral gender complementarity which she identifies as a 'deep impulse within Christianity' (1089).

Much of the book relies on research carried out by others, but there are some original claims. The first is that there was something of a deterioration in the opportunities for women to engage in intellectual and academic pursuits from the twelfth to the thirteenth century. Allen represents the writings of Heloise, Herrad of Landsberg and Hildegard of Bingen, during the twelfth century, as having been part of a 'golden age of reflection on women's identity just previous to the shifting of higher education away from the Benedictine monasteries to the new academic setting of the western

university' (32). She represents the thirteenth century as one in which women were excluded from the increasingly dominant universities, in which Aristotle's texts came to provide the core curriculum.

Nevertheless, during the thirteenth century women like Beatrice of Nazareth, Hadewijch, Mechtild of Magdeburg, and Marguerite Porete continued the tradition of religious women writers. Each of these women was in some way connected with the Beguines, a movement in which lay women lived in communal houses according to a version of the monastic rule of poverty and chastity. Allen represents this movement as having been 'violently suppressed' at the beginning of the fourteenth century following the burning of Marguerite Porete in 1310. However, Beguines continued to exist in considerable numbers into the fifteenth century, and in the Morosini letters, contemporary with Joan of Arc, who Allen discusses later, Joan is referred to as a Beguine. At this point in Allen's narrative I felt that a more detailed history of the Beguines would have helped contextualise the writings discussed and perhaps have shown that overall educational opportunities for women did not markedly contract during the thirteenth century.

The long second chapter of Allen's text traces the various permutations of possible thinking about gender in the writings of the Aristotelian academics, Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, William of Ockham, Alexander the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Gilles of Rome and John Duns Scotus. It is followed by a shorter chapter that examines some satires about women, particularly that of Jean de Meun and Mathéolus. Chapter 4, 'Gender at the Beginnings of Humanism', discusses the development in the writings of Guido Cavalcanti, Dante Alighieri, Francis Petrarch and Giovanni Boccaccio of dialogues between a man and a quasi-imaginary woman concerning love, virtue and wisdom. Nearly two hundred pages separate the discussion of these authors from a chapter devoted to Christine de Pizan. This I found rather unfortunate, since it meant a lost opportunity to discuss the extent of the influence of these writers on Christine, the relationship between her poetical dialogues and these Italian models, and the details of her divergence from them.

At this point in the book Allen breaks off what had seemed like a more or less chronological development to return to the late thirteenth century in order to discuss St Mechtild of Hackeborn, who, with her abbess sister, came under the influence of the older Mechtild of Magdeburg. Their monastery at Helfta was a centre of female Latin learning, producing also St Gertrude the Great of Hefta, Allen's next subject. The chapter continues with a discussion of Meister Eckhart, Johannes Tauler, Henry Suso and his disciple Elspeth Stagel. It then turns to Briget of Sweden, Catherine of Sienna and Julien of Norwich by which time we have returned to the period of Christine de Pizan.

Before we get to the subject of Christine, there is a rather awkwardly conceived chapter on 'the deterioration of intergender dialogue in later satires and public trials.' In this chapter Allen returns to the subject of satires against women, which had been first introduced in Chapter 3, and discusses first Walter Map's twelfth century advice against marriage, then Deschamps' early fifteenth century *Miroir de Mariage* and the mid-fifteenth century

Quinze Joies de Mariage. She then turns to Margery Kempe and Joan of Arc, lumped together because they were accused of heresy, and briefly turns to the later witch-trials and the *Malleus Mallificarum* of 1486. The hypothesis of this chapter, that there was something of a 'deterioration in intergender dialogue' during the period, is highly disputable. The satires discussed in the chapter span a period which includes all the authors previously introduced, as well as Christine de Pizan, who will be represented in the next chapter as the first woman (whose work has survived) to have mounted a sustained attack on the gender polarity theories of Aristotle and the satirists. Joan of Arc appeared at the very end of Christine's life and was the subject of her last known poem (654). It would therefore be more accurate to see this as a period in which the debate about woman's nature and appropriate role continued to develop. On this matter, I thought it a pity that Allen merely mentioned Martin le Franc's *Le Champion des Dames*, but showed no sign of having read it, for this 1440 poem (which includes reference to both Joan of Arc and Christine de Pizan) captures very well the content of standard fifteenth-century debates about women's virtue. It would also have provided a background against which to discuss the originality of Isotta Nogarola's debate concerning Eve's sin, introduced later.

Following a solid chapter on the life and writings of Christine de Pizan, Allen turns to the question of the education of women as it was discussed in France and particularly Italy from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries. Vincent of Beauvais and Francesco Barbarino are mentioned as authors who 'may have influenced' Christine de Pizan (668). In both cases the evidence of influence is fairly indirect and tenuous. That Christine was herself the beneficiary of views like theirs which encouraged the education of women can hardly be gainsaid, but the evidence that she knew their works in any detail is circumstantial. Allen quickly turns to concentrate on other educators of women operating in Christine's birthplace, Italy; in particular Guarino of Verona and Vittorino of Feltre. These educationalists were the first of a new breed who taught girls and boys for civic life rather than religious retreat. The Latin education Vittorino developed was available to both the daughters and sons of important families, in particular the Gonzagas. The decision of the highly educated Cecilia Gonzaga to enter a convent demonstrates that at this period it was nevertheless still the case that religious retreat offered one of the few avenues for a woman who wanted to pursue higher studies (680-1).

The rest of this chapter and all of the next is taken up with a discussion of the lives, influence and views on gender of Leonardo Bruni, Francesco Barbaro, Albrecht von Eyb, Nicholas of Cusa, Leon Battista Alberti, Lorenzo Valla, Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. These writers, who had a much more detailed knowledge of Plato than their Medieval predecessors, developed the image of Platonic love and incorporated Pythagorean and Epicurean themes into their discussion of masculinity and femininity. Allen suggests that it is during this period that masculinity and femininity came to be thought of as gendered characteristics that can exist in both males and females. At this point the simple schematism that Allen has set up for

characterising theories of gender is sorely tested. Following in the footsteps of Plato, Boethius, Dante and Petrarch, Ficino, in particular, makes much of the allegory of Philosophy as a woman. Yet the existence of such allegories, and the related popular Medieval allegorization of the virtues as women, sits awkwardly within the simple schematism with which Allen operates. The various authors she discusses work with complex sets of metaphors that are not always consistent, and have only tenuous links to their theories of proper womanly behaviour. In this tradition, the allegorical figure of Lady Philosophy who teaches man to aspire to a spiritual wisdom that escapes the material and feminine realm, spells a complex mixed message for women.

Allen's genealogy concludes with a longish account of the works of three women whose writing emerged out of this humanist milieu. Cassandra Fedele, Isotta Nogarola and Laura Cereta were early examples of educated women who participated in public literary debate.

Overall, Allen's text provides a useful overview of representations of sexual difference in a period that is not widely studied. It has the virtue of introducing the works of a number of little known women and situating them in the context of the development of Medieval and Renaissance philosophy. However, it suffers from attempting to do too much. The various accounts of individual authors are only superficially integrated, and the framework into which Allen attempts to fit all writers prevents her from allowing the complexities, ambiguities and distinctiveness of each individual voice to emerge in its own register.

Karen Green

Monash University

Babette E. Babich, ed.

Hermeneutic Philosophy of Science,

Van Gogh's Eyes, and God:

Essays in Honour of Patrick A. Heelan S.J.

Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002.

Pp. i + 484.

US\$149.00. ISBN 1-4020-0234-3.

This constitutes Volume 225 in the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Series, and consists of articles by some thirty-eight international scholars from a variety of fields, many of whom are philosophers or scientists, sometimes both, together with a smaller number of contributors from other disciplines like anthropology, art, theology, sociology and linguistics. Notable among the first group is Patrick Heelan, Jesuit priest and philosopher-sci-

entist with doctorates in Geophysics and Philosophy and a Masters Degree in Mathematics, whose work in the philosophy of science is intended to provide the point of departure and stimulus for the articles in this volume. Heelan is uniquely positioned to understand just how the hermeneutics of science operates, and indeed could be said to personify through his work what is involved in this quite complex area. The result is a fascinating volume that contains a compelling set of perspectives on a current area of much importance in contemporary philosophy, that of hermeneutics.

Heelan's Afterward (445-59) could be usefully read first, since it encapsulates in essence his own understanding of what his work involves as a scientist-philosopher, teacher and researcher, and most significantly for him, as a Catholic priest who is concerned to situate his contributions within the Christian theological tradition. Heelan explores how this cluster of disciplines and influences has shaped his approach to the area of knowledge in which he is particularly interested, i.e., the hermeneutics of science. How one interprets data is central to this project, and this inevitably involves investigating the nature of the subjective-objective dynamics that operate in the ways in which one comes to know reality.

Among the many philosophical influences which he acknowledges, Bernard Lonergan, another Jesuit, occupies a special place. Lonergan's emphasis on the starting point of any enquiry inspired Heelan to examine the phenomenology of insight as a starting point for science. Questions like 'What do we do when we know?' and 'Why is this doing a knowing?' are particularly significant, he thinks, because the answers to them must be in some sense self-evident. This implies that the starting point for any investigation already contains within it its end point and goal, something which is suggested in the early pages of Martin Heidegger's classic text, *Sein und Zeit*. The importance of insightful intuition is thus crucial to understanding the nature of hermeneutics in particular, since our pre-analytic ways of seeing reality will significantly determine what is acceptable from a noetic point of view, especially in terms of editorial selectivity. This in turn allows subjectivity to emerge as a fundamental aspect of the noetic process, and, by so doing, poses problems for how one understands the attainment of objective knowledge. The latter is obviously of crucial importance in the scientific process.

The value of Heelan's article and of the other contributors is that the reader is repeatedly challenged to confront the nature of the subjective-objective relationship as a central factor in the acquisition of objective truth. This issue lies at the very heart of hermeneutics and has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. If one puts the emphasis on subjective perception, irrespective of how authoritative this may claim to be, objectivity inevitably tends to acquire a secondary status. Hence, the difficulties in asserting truth in a hermeneutical context. The fascination of this volume lies in the way in which this issue is considered from a variety of perspectives. The result is a better understanding of the dynamics of hermeneutics, especially in the context of scientific theory and the need for objectivity, and, more importantly, in relation to the very basic principles of knowledge.

Heelan's example of Van Gogh's painting, 'The Bedroom of Arles' (to which 'Van Gogh's Eyes' of the book's title refers), is designed to illustrate these issues. According to Heelan, this painting is not just about the architecture of the room depicted nor about its furniture as mere physical objects but instead constitutes an entry into the artist's bedroom as total world 'in a mood of peace, totality, intimacy, trust and possibly hoped-for companionship' (454) which is a gift only a prepared viewer would be capable of receiving. This conclusion sums up in very vividly the exciting depths of the hermeneutical probe, in this case with reference to perceiving a particular work of art. The question remains, however, as to how one sees, or should see, the room, the implication in the example being that there is a 'correct' way of viewing it. If that is the case, though, then that suggests hermeneutical inflexibility. This kind of issue constitutes an obstinate problem for those sympathetic to the hermeneutical approach, namely, how to assert a particular way of seeing things as being true from a subjective perspective. While we may all agree on a particular way of seeing reality, that does not, in itself, guarantee truth. The concern for hermeneutical philosophers remains what kind of evidence guarantees objective truth and whether or not, ultimately, one must settle for a relative approach. Sometimes some kind of self-authenticating form of personal intuition is invoked as a basis for certainty but that may not be wholly satisfactory either.

Such are the kinds of issues that emerge for consideration on reading this fascinating volume whose editor, Babette Babich, is to be congratulated, not only for her own insightful contributions to the debate but for her competent organisation of this exciting collection of articles on a subject which still remains elusive though compelling for contemporary thinkers.

Patrick Quinn

All Hallows College, Dublin

Ronald Beiner

Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship.

Vancouver: UBC Press 2002. Pp. 256.

Cdn/US\$85.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7748-0987-6);

Cdn/US\$27.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7748-0988-4).

Citizenship — particularly in the complex world of globalization — is a powerful idea, one whose definition is subject to continual revision. Ronald Beiner's study on the philosophy of citizenship critically engages the themes of liberalism and nationalism in a timely fashion, focusing both on how

citizenship has been defined by influential political thinkers (Hanna Arendt, John Rawls, Alistair MacIntyre, Eric Hobsbaum, etc.), and how we might conceptualize citizenship in light of the emergence of new forms of community, ones shaped by globalization and multiculturalism.

The first part of the book is devoted to the relation between citizenship and liberalism. There are two axes of inquiry here. The first is that individualist liberalism may be seen as a threat to the idea of citizenship in a more communitarian sense (as claimed, for example, in the work of Richard Flathman), while the second theme (as in the work of Michael Sandel) addresses the reverse problematic: that we must promote a 'thicker' form of civic and moral membership if a critique of liberalism is to lead to a more 'civic-republican' form of citizenship, Beiner's own preferred direction. MacIntyre's 'radical alternative' to liberalism is critically discussed in relation to his refusal to clarify how his philosophical views on the 'common good' bear on politics.

Part Two of *Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizenship* takes a closer look at the politically precarious relationship between a philosophy of nationalism and that of citizenship. The contemporary dilemmas of nationalism (for example, within the EU) can lend themselves to the erection of barriers that work toward hampering the emancipatory potential of citizenship, according to Beiner. Beiner tackles the sticky problem of Canadian nationalism, especially in light of sovereignty claims of the part of Quebec. Should certain members of a society have a privileged form of citizenship? Beiner's view here is that Canada is a 'binational' state, and that such a form of statehood does not sit comfortably within the normal definition of nationalism. However, on these terms, he might have alternatively argued that Canada is a multi-national state with deeply embedded cultural claims potentially issuing forth from various ethnic communities. In the final chapter, Beiner puzzles over the meaning of 'political community', providing an alternative to nationalism in the form of civic participation, or what he calls 'civicism'. Civicism — or being 'bound together as a civic community' — does not have to take the form of a national identity in order to serve as a practical locus for citizenship; the civic principle is that political community should be judged according to the standard of the 'vibrancy and quality of the experience of citizenship' enjoyed by its members.

As Beiner himself notes, the main thrust of the book is Arendtian; neither liberalism nor nationalism serve as comprehensive political visions because neither fully honors citizenship as a 'normative standard'. Civicism thus fulfills such a function in that, while it favors diverse political communities, it does not promote multiculturalism at the expense of the needs of citizenship. If there exists a lacuna in Beiner's study, it is that the concept he terms 'civicism' fails to address the practical problem of rights, particularly as they relate to minority groups who are expected to participate in this civic community, (although the rhetoric of liberal rights is well rehearsed in Chapter Nine). For those interested in new conceptions of citizenship (with an emphasis on the Canadian problem), *Liberalism, Nationalism, Citizen-*

ship provides both a critical perspective on standard works as well as pondering the political philosophical implications of rapidly changing conceptions of citizenship.

Joan M. Reynolds

(Department of Political Science)

University of Alberta

Seyla Benhabib

The Claims of Culture:

Equality and Diversity in the Global Era.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

2002. Pp. xvii + 245.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-04862-2);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-04863-0).

In this book Seyla Benhabib evaluates the normative legitimacy of multiculturalist views regarding the relevance of cultural distinctiveness for granting distinctive rights and privileges to ethnocultural groups. One of the virtues of Benhabib's book is that it shows an appreciation for the variety and complexity of multicultural societies. Her nuanced position is that, as long as the equality and autonomy of individuals are protected, some ethnocultural group rights, including rights to regional parliaments and multiple jurisdictional systems, are compatible with a universalistic conception of liberal democratic governance. Also central to her position is the claim that we cannot resolve multicultural dilemmas by relying solely on formal public institutions, such as legislative and judicial bodies, but that we must also rely on the informal associations of civil society. According to Benhabib, multicultural coexistence is promoted through open discussion and contestation of perspectives and claims within the cultural, civil, religious, artistic, and political associations that comprise the civil sphere. She characterizes her position as a 'dual-track' approach to multicultural dilemmas.

Benhabib identifies three conditions that must be met before systems of legal and political pluralism for a multicultural society can be deemed legitimate.

1. Egalitarian reciprocity — Individuals should not have 'lesser degrees of civil, political, economic, and cultural rights than the majority' by virtue of their membership in an ethnocultural group.
2. Voluntary self-ascription — The group membership of individuals should not be automatically determined on the basis of their commu-

nity of origin. It is up to each individual, and not the group, to determine during adulthood his or her membership status or group affiliation.

3. Freedom of exit — Ethnocultural group members should have the unrestricted freedom to exit their group, although terminating group affiliation may entail loss of certain privileges.

In general, Benhabib's three conditions are reasonable and important, for they are designed to protect individuals from internal group discrimination and oppression. It would be naïve to assume that power struggles do not occur within ethnocultural groups, or that membership rules and political rights are never used to sustain power relationships and marginalize group members.

Questions could be raised, however, regarding self-ascription. Cultural choices should not always be taken as reflecting autonomous decisions. For marginalized groups living under conditions of discrimination and oppression, the cost of preserving cultural affiliations and traditions may be prohibitively high. People may choose to reject, or dissociate from, their cultural community, not because they believe that retaining their culture is not important, but because they realize that their social status and socioeconomic opportunities will be enhanced by integrating into the majority or dominant society. Mexican-Americans in the southwestern U.S., for example, who decide not to teach their children Spanish or identify with their Mexican heritage, sometimes do so in hopes that they and their children will attain greater acceptance in a dominant society that views with suspicion speaking another language or identifying with another culture. They know full well the cost of being associated with the negative stereotypes that accompany being viewed as 'Mexican'.

Benhabib's claim that the resolution of multicultural dilemmas should involve the civil sphere is also, in general, well-grounded. She maintains that *reasoned* public deliberation, in which all groups have an equal chance to articulate and defend their needs and interests, should play a central role in shaping the perspectives of the members of the multicultural polity. For Benhabib, practicing deliberative democracy across the spectrum of civil associations makes possible the conversations and contestations that promote intercultural understanding and validate democratic decision-making. Deliberative democracy legitimizes collectively binding decisions by basing them on inclusive, reasoned agreements. The goal of public deliberation is to reach agreement on the basis of reasons that all participants in the dialogue would find acceptable. In deliberative democracy, decisions should be based on the best available argument, differences in power that provide participants with advantages in public discourse should be eliminated or minimized, and everyone should present arguments that take into account not only their own partisan interests but the public interest as well.

It is clear that deliberative democracy, with its emphasis on the common good, just decision-procedures, and the inclusion of marginalized voices, has

important advantages for multicultural democratic societies. However, two concerns could be raised here. First, how do we develop the high degree of social solidarity and civic magnanimity required by deliberative democracy? A shared commitment to abstract civic principles clearly does not seem to be enough to sustain the kind of reasoned, equitable, open, and other-regarding public deliberation advocated by deliberative democracy. Even societies such as the U.S. and Britain, that have, relatively speaking, well-entrenched commitments to principles of equality and justice, are very far from exhibiting reasoned public deliberation. On the other hand, the ostensive alternatives of national and religious solidarity are doubled-edged swords. Nationalism and religious solidarity are by definition exclusivist. While they are powerful social forces that involve strong commitments to communal interests and values, those not belonging to the proper national or religious group are at best marginalized and at worst depicted as dangerous 'Others'.

Second, Benhabib believes that deliberators can arrive at political agreements on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons. But when groups have cultural perspectives that are epistemically and normatively incommensurable, it is not likely that they can resolve their disagreements on the basis of the same reasons. Differences between groups in perceptions of reality and moral beliefs may be so great (particularly when indigenous groups and majority societies are involved) that we cannot simply assume a priori that all disagreements can be resolved on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons. It is important to note that this objection does not depend on the 'holism' assumption, according to which cultural perspectives are enclosed, homogeneous wholes with clearly delineated boundaries. Cultural perspectives are not always consistent wholes, and the adherents of different cultural perspectives often share many beliefs about the world. For the problems under discussion to arise, all we need is partial incommensurability, that is, incommensurability regarding the cognitive or moral principles relevant for resolving the disagreements at hand on the basis of common reasons. Neither does my objection depend on the claim that it is impossible to understand a radically different cultural perspective, for it is precisely when we truly understand another perspective that we realize the difficulty or impossibility of bridging our differences.

All told, however, Benhabib's book is important reading for anyone interested in the compatibility of multiculturalism and liberal democracy.

Jorge M. Valadez

Our Lady of the Lake University

Maurice Blanchot

The Book to Come.

Trans. Charlotte Mandell.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2003.

Pp. xii + 267.

US\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4223-5);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4224-3).

The Book to Come is the translation of a series of literary essays written by Blanchot for *La Nouvelle Revue Française* during the 1950s prior to their publication in book form in 1959. The collection has a kind of thematic unity, being a series of investigations that proceed from the same literary enigmas; and also a formal unity, in the particular arrangement of the essays, and the division of the book into four distinct sections.

Yet it must also be noted that as a collection, it lacks the coherence of such late works as *The Step Not Beyond*, *The Writing of Disaster*, and *The Unavowable Community*, and even *The Infinite Conversation* (which marked a transition from 'the collection' to 'fragmentary writing' of the mature Blanchot). Nonetheless, the volume remains of interest for several reasons. First, it discloses the critical seeds of Blanchot's development, both stylistically and thematically (paralleling this, it is interesting to note Blanchot's reliance on authors' notebooks, diaries, and preliminary writings in his literary readings of them). Second, each essay, on such authors as Proust, Beckett, Borges, Kafka, and Mallarmé, represents an erudite and insightful commentary that cannot but enrich our reading of these writers. Third, the themes that emerge in the course of the investigations as a whole transfix us anew, as great philosophy does. Indeed, the interpretations offered in the readings of various authors could be read as commentary on Blanchot's own work.

In the essay on Proust, for example, Blanchot uses Proust's earlier novel *Jean Santeuil* to illuminate the enigmas of *The Search for Lost Time*, the general enigmas of literature and writing, and the enigmas of time itself: 'Metamorphosis of time, it first transforms the present in which it seems to be produced, drawing it into the undefined profundity where the "present" starts the "past" anew, but where the past opens up onto the future that it repeats, so that what comes always comes again, and again, and again' (17). Blanchot's idea — also Proust's own — that the 'work' or the Book is a kind of 'calling' around which great artists never cease to circle, coming closer and closer to this quasi-Platonic essence while never reaching it, gives some determination to the title, 'The Book to Come'. The Book is both there (always, from an archaic past) and not-there (never arrived at, made present, finished): 'Proust's work is a complete-incomplete work ... The longer it takes, the closer it gets to itself. In the movement of the book, we discern this postponement that withholds it, as if, foretelling the death that is at its end, it were trying, in order to avoid death, to run back on its own course' (24). (The reader of Proust will here recall that the *Search* concludes precisely at

the point where the narrator is about to commence writing the *Search* — the 'Book to come', which we have just finished reading — and that he trembles with uncertainty as to whether there will be 'enough time left' to write it.) Blanchot also shows how this fundamental theme in Proust — a kind of *ur-theme* — is also precisely that of Melville's Ahab in *Moby Dick*: '[T]he encounter with Moby Dick ... that takes place now, ... is "at the same time" always yet to come, so that he never stops going toward it by a relentlessly and disorderly pursuit, but since it seems to have no less a relationship with the origin, it also seems to send him back to the profundity of the past ...' (9).

These motifs recur in the essay 'Prophetic Speech'. Here, the themes of the desert, of the Outside, and of the radical and strange otherness underlying everyday time — 'that *other* time that is always present in all time' — connect up with that motif discovered in Proust: the always already present, yet never arrived at, future — the 'to come': '[P]rophetic speech announces an impossible future, or makes the future it announces, because it announces it, something impossible, a future one would not know how to live and that must upset all the sure givens of existence' (81, 79). The enigma of prophetic speech is the enigma of the Book, and in this sense *all* literature is a kind of prophecy, announcing an indefinitely postponed 'to come' that is nevertheless contained within its 'work-being': 'The beyond of the work is real only in the work, is nothing but the unique reality of the work. ... It is inside the work that the absolute outside is encountered — radical exteriority ...' (90).

The title essay in this volume concerns itself with Mallarmé, especially the late poem *Un coup de dés*. This poem, which Blanchot returns to throughout a lifetime of writing, apotheosizes the thematic concerns elucidated in the other readings: the enigma of writing itself, the 'other space' it opens up ('literary space'), and the strange temporality of the Book to come: '*Un coup de dés* ... does not make the poem a present or future reality but, under the doubly negative dimension of an unfinished past and an impossible future, refers it to the extreme distance of an exceptional perhaps. ... The presence of poetry is still to come: it comes from beyond the future and does not stop coming when it is here' (233, 239).

Heidegger's late meditations on *Gelassenheit* (which inspired Blanchot to write *Awaiting Oblivion*), and also a certain reading of Nietzsche's Eternal Return are philosophical antecedents of this theme of the 'to come'. Yet Blanchot made it his own, in the early fictional work; the criticism of the middle period; and the late fragmentary work, from *The Step Not Beyond* through *The Instant of My Death*. It is the obscure center around which he has revolved, ever more closely, for nearly a century; which center has drawn many others (i.e., Lévinas, Derrida, Agamben) to it as well. *The Book to Come* represents an important period within Blanchot's lifetime of circling.

Amos Friedland

New School for Social Research / McGill University

Margaret Cavendish

Observations upon Experimental Philosophy.

Ed. Eileen O'Neill.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2001.

Pp. xlvii + 281.

US\$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-7720-4);

US\$22.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-77675-9).

This admirably edited volume introduces a relatively unknown figure of seventeenth-century philosophy, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of Newcastle (1623-1673). Cavendish appears here as a critic of Henry Power's *Experimental Philosophy* (1663) and Robert Hooke's *Micrographia* (1665), two treatises of early microscopy that had an impact on metaphysics and natural philosophy. The *Observations* were originally published in 1666, together with *The Blazing World*, a utopian fiction in which a great lady is shipwrecked when her boat slips at the North Pole from one world into another and her entire crew perishes.

Cavendish is brilliant, frequently in the worst sense of the word. She sinks a pipe into her brain and out pours a flood of imagery — jewels, fabrics, fire, birds and animals, along with her thoughts on atoms, infinity, motion, perception, and other philosophical topics. The yoking of the *Observations*, which recapitulate the descriptive passages of the two micrographies, assess their speculations, and advance Cavendish's own scientific ontology and theory of nature, with a fantasy work was yet another of the decisions made by Margaret Cavendish ensuring that not a single one of her contemporaries would take her seriously as a philosopher. She is above all a reactionary and the *Observations* attack microscopy as pointless innovation. 'The art of augury was far more beneficial than the latterly invented art of micrography ... The eclipse of the sun and moon was not found out by telescopes; nor the motions of the loadstone, or the art of navigation, or the art of guns and gunpowder, or the art of printing, and the like, by microscopes ... [I]f microscopes do truly represent the exterior parts and superficies of some minute creatures, what advantageth it our knowledge? For unless they could discover their interior, corporeal, figurative motions, and the obscure actions of nature ... I see no great benefit or advantage they yield to man' (9). Criticisms in this vein are made by Locke in the *Essay* of 1690, but Cavendish is perhaps less to be considered an early representative of British Naked-eye Empiricism than as a rationalist: 'The sense deludes more than it gives a true information, and an exterior inspection through an optic glass, is so deceiving, that it cannot be relied upon' (ibid.).

The 'Cavendish circle' in Paris in the 1640s consisted of Margaret's husband William Cavendish, a genial friend to horses and women, his brother the mathematician Charles Cavendish, and philosophers including Mersenne, Hobbes, and Descartes. Although the Duchess' participation in the salon was limited on account of her reading and understanding no language other than English, atomism and experimental science were topics

of the day. She wove what she was able to glean from English books, conversation with family members, translations, and excerpts into her writings, which eventually ran to twelve volumes of poetry, letters, plays, and treatises. In natural philosophy, after abandoning her early atomism on the grounds that an atomic world would resemble Hobbes' war of all against all, Cavendish remained a materialist, but insisted that there were three grades of matter composing the least particle: inanimate, perceptive, and directive. Rejecting the position of Descartes, she denied that nature was bound by divinely-established laws. Nature was self-moving and perceptive throughout, and worked, Cavendish thought, in improvisatory fashion, producing her effects as she saw fit. Ordinary experience, she maintained, 'proves the infinite variety in nature, and that nature is a perpetually self-moving body, dividing, composing, changing, forming, and transforming her parts by self-corporeal figurative motions' (84-5). Perception, she claims, is accomplished by the innate 'patterning out' of figures in animate substances, as in a mirror, not by films or species, or by pressure and reaction.

Many of Cavendish's arguments against Cartesianism, which she considered a fundamentally incoherent natural philosophy, anticipate those of Leibniz, and she conceives nature, much as Newton will, as a perpetual worker. Yet, for both internal and external reasons, neither her criticisms nor her rival ontology commanded attention from her contemporaries. Devoid of natural piety, untutored in the exact sciences, scornful of experimentation, and contemptuous of predecessors and rivals alike, none of the sources of authority to which seventeenth-century philosophers instinctively turned in order to back up their pronouncements on the nature of things was available to her. Notorious for her snobbery, conspicuous consumption, and idiosyncratic costuming, Cavendish flaunted her lack of education, her poor spelling and grammar, both by way of proving what she could do by sheer inspiration and as a reproach against the society that had refused her even a basic education. Though in her other works she endorses or pays lip service to the intrinsic inferiority of women, *The Blazing World* embodies revenge fantasies against the scientific societies reminiscent of Brecht's Pirate Jenny.

Readers who can bear with her overwritten prose, the tortured debates of the author with herself over what to think and what to say, and her defiant mode of self-presentation will find that Cavendish opens a new window on English natural philosophy of the mid-seventeenth century. There is much in this text and in Cavendish's other writings that bears further analysis, with respect to the study of philosophical communication, the formation of the seventeenth-century scientific personality, the condition of women, and the fortunes of Cartesianism and experimental science in England. Not only is Cavendish a witty and sometimes savage author, she at times attains a *majesté* that is as moving and impressive as anything to be found in the history of philosophy since Heraclitus. 'Wherefore I, for my part, will rather believe as sense and reason guides me,' she declares, 'and not according to interest, so as to extol my own kind above all the rest, or above nature herself' (112).

Eileen O'Neill has provided a useful overview of Cavendish's views in the Introduction, as well as a chronology and a bibliography, comprehensive, apart from the overlooking of Laura Battigelli's excellent study. A valuable scholarly feature of the text is O'Neill's excellent set of footnotes, identifying the texts of Hobbes, Charleton, Digby, More, Descartes, Boyle, Glanvill and others to whom Cavendish is responding, as well as corresponding passages in later authors, and indicating relevant secondary literature in the history of science. This is a significant, and welcome addition to scholarship.

Catherine Wilson

University of British Columbia

Wesley Cooper

The Unity of William James's Thought.

Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press

2002. Pp. xi + 288.

US\$39.95. ISBN 0-8265-1387-5.

This is a substantial and important book about William James (1842-1910). At the center of Cooper's argument for an underappreciated unity in James' thinking lies the metaphysical doctrine of radical empiricism, first found in passages of James' *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), then developed systematically in a series of articles in 1904-5.

Radical empiricism is fundamentally the view that both minds and matter derive from a more primitive, original existence. James calls this original existence 'pure experience', and holds that psychological states and material objects are functions of it. My sense datum of the cup I hold in my hand, for example, has its place in my stream of thought; but it functions at the same time as part of the surface of the cup, with its place in a stream of pure experience that includes glazing and firing, and multiple trips through the dishwasher.

Cooper's second chapter, entitled 'Consciousness I: The Two Levels View', contains a useful summary and contrast of four critical approaches to radical empiricism: those of A.J. Ayer, Marcus Ford, Owen Flanagan, and Bruce Wilshire. Cooper hews closely to Ayer's 'neutral monist' reading of 'pure experience' (which derives from Russell, who attributes the view to James in *The Analysis of Mind*), but he concedes something to Ford's panpsychist reading in holding that 'pure experience is more akin to mind than to body' (38). One of Cooper's motives for this concession is to make room for purposes,

which in turn allows him to attribute to James a conception of an immanent God: 'a pattern of the world of pure experience rather than a being in it' (20).

Cooper has useful things to say about James' views in the philosophy of mind, with the assistance of arguments and concepts drawn from Robert Nozick, Daniel Dennett, John Searle, David Chalmers, Alvin Goldman, Colin McGinn, and others. In trying both to accommodate James' view that there is 'no psychosis without neurosis' (82) — roughly, some form of physicalism about the mind —, and his belief in the efficacy of mental causation, Cooper arrives at the claim that psychological causation is a matter of 'simultaneous nomic equivalents' between states of consciousness and bodily processes. Brain processes and thoughts are said to be 'codeterminants of behavioral effects' (88). As for freedom, Cooper argues that for James we are determined on the physical level but, possibly, free on the metaphysical level, that 'an original force in the stream of thought' may play a role in human action. Cooper argues, sensibly enough, that the most adequate version of such a view would posit an 'exception to [James'] view of the body as a reflex mechanism' (123).

Among the commentators with whom Cooper particularly wishes to take issue is Richard Gale, whose *The Divided Self of William James* posits an inconsistent James: a pragmatist on the one hand and a mystic on the other. In contrast, Cooper invokes what he calls the 'two-levels view' — according to which James posits a provisional, everyday, pragmatic account of the world, but distinguishes this from the deeper metaphysical view. Where Gale sees a conflict, Cooper often sees two levels of analysis. Cooper also mounts a strong challenge to Gale's claim that James believes we should believe what maximizes the satisfaction of desires. He holds rather than James 'offers a revisionary notion of epistemic justification, which acknowledges some weight for noncognitive reasons in rational belief that aims at the truth' (195). Cooper agrees with Gale that James is a consequentialist, but he holds that James is a pluralist about ends, of which happiness is only one. He also criticizes a premise of Gale's 'master argument' — that according to James we are free to believe or not believe most of the things we do in fact believe.

One difference between Cooper's and Gale's interpretations lies in the texts on which they concentrate. Gale ranges more widely, and he makes much more use of *Some Problems of Philosophy* and *A Pluralistic Universe* — two of James' most 'mystical' works. In these works, James stresses the nonconceptual nature of reality, and the inadequacy of any account we can give of it. This is one way in which James' philosophy is split — not between a provisional pragmatic and a deeper metaphysical truth, but between truths and something that is not 'true' — since truth requires concepts. Although he is aware of the possibility that for James 'metaphysical reality is preconceptual and pure-experiential' (70), it is not clear whether Cooper wishes to follow the line in James that embraces metaphysics but rejects metaphysical truth. It would be interesting to consider the question — pursued by John McDowell in *Mind and World* — of how to understand James' idea that the

nonconceptual constrains the conceptual, of how, as Cooper puts it, there can be 'nonpragmatic constraints on pragmatic activity' (175).

The book has a few unhappy features. One is the use of 'imminent', a word that appears fairly frequently, as in the title of Chapter 6: 'God: Imminent Purpose', and in the following sentence: 'Not a transcendent God but an imminent one, and not physically imminent like Zeus on Olympus nor mentally imminent as though there were a stream of consciousness in every atom, but rather an historical pattern ...' (2). Cooper wants to understand God as being 'everywhere' (141), as 'a pattern we can find in experience' (111) — in short, as *immanent*. He does not want to say that God is about to arrive. Another unhappiness is Cooper's uncritical reliance on John Cook's idiosyncratic reading of Wittgenstein in holding that Wittgenstein was a 'logical positivist' (23) who believed that other people's feelings and thoughts are 'given in immediate experience' (156). These are, however, blemishes rather than fundamental problems with this strongly argued, clear, and wide-ranging book.

Russell B. Goodman

University of New Mexico

Paul Crowther

The Transhistorical Image:

Philosophizing Art and its History.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.

Pp. v + 207.

US\$55.00. ISBN 0-521-81114-7.

Were the aim of this book to offer a comprehensive philosophical definition of visual art, it would be ambitious enough. But Crowther goes further than this and attempts to outline a 'normative basis of art history', a definition of visual art that depends on the justification of an objective canon of art history. In other words, Crowther argues that 'art' is a normative term, reserved for those works which form and contribute to this canon. The bulk of the book consists in a sustained attempt to prove this, based on the demonstration of the existence of fundamental a priori 'categories' which, in Kantian fashion, constitute the very possibility of making visual art. It is in relation to these categories, judged against the framework of what Crowther calls the 'trans-historical horizon' of art history, that a work's value or significance can be judged.

Beginning with the need to 'identify a concept that is *essential* to any work of visual art and that has therefore an "a priori" or "transcendental" significance' (69), Crowther argues that pictorial representation 'involves the making of three-dimensional projections on a plane surface through placing or inscribing marks upon that surface' (71). This process involves a set of categories which determine the general ways in which it can be accomplished (72). 'The categories constitute an a priori field within which any possible pictorial representation must be capable of being situated' (77). The categories are a priori because, in order for a work to be a picture — rather than some other form of visual representation — it must, by definition, 'occupy [a position] within those semantic, syntactic, and material structures which in concert define the logical scope of pictorial representation' (76).

Crowther proceeds to examine each of the categories (including their sub-categories), namely, (1) Structural (2) Instrumental (3) Historical (4) Psychological, in great detail, showing how they can be utilised empirically for the purposes of critically engaging with and understanding artworks. This part of his account, ranging across a vast array of historical periods and styles and focussing in depth on many individual works, is one of the great strengths of the book, and is often highly illuminating. The real significance of the categories, however, lies in justifying the notion of an objective canon of art history and thereby providing a normative definition of art.

Any picture, Crowther contends, can be seen to play a significant role (or not) in the way the categories are historically instituted or refined:

Those categories that define the structure and scope of pictorial representation are realized in a transhistorical horizon. Understood in relation to this developing horizon, some works can be seen as refinements or innovations *vis-à-vis* how the relevant categories are applied, whilst others will be more inert in this respect ... A picture *becomes* pictorial art — as opposed to a mere pictorial representation — when it is positioned as a positive element in this horizon. For, by virtue of its relation to the horizon, it defines itself as a new way of utilizing the categories, and thence of a new way of projecting the three-dimensional world. (123-4)

Judged against the transhistorical horizon, works may exhibit either 'paradigmatic', 'effective', 'normal', or 'neutral' historical difference depending, respectively, on whether they have revolutionary significance, say, in opening up new structural possibilities concerning the general scope of pictorial representation, great successive influence, merely individual synchronic importance, or no real significance at all. Thus, a picture is a work of art just in case it makes some significant historical difference.

An impressive case is made for the notion of such an art-historical canon, once again based on the detailed, critical analysis of many different works and artistic styles. Crowther also extends his discussion, as he must, beyond representational art to embrace the problematic phenomena of avant-garde modern art, such as abstract art and conceptual art. Demonstrating, for a

philosopher, a remarkable sensitivity to his subject matter, Crowther combines a wealth of critical insight with an admirable flexibility of approach, to show how his categories and canon can be modified and extended appropriately to develop a normative definition of modern art.

It need hardly be said that if Crowther's argument is even moderately successful, this book should swiftly assume a central place both in the 'canon' of classics in philosophical aesthetics, and in the annals of art criticism. Unfortunately, however, the success of the enterprise is actually very difficult to gauge, and although the book is immensely challenging throughout, this is not always for admirable reasons. The clarity of the argument is hindered by some tortuous prose and by the rather odd mix of grandiose, and often dogmatic theorising — characteristic of a 'continental-style' metaphysics — with the careful analytic rigour one would expect of a philosopher with Crowther's academic background. And yet even the frequent passages of impressive, and often persuasive, argument are not supported by any engagement with the contemporary literature in philosophical aesthetics. Indeed, aside from some passing notes on Flint Schier in an appendix, Crowther virtually ignores all of the immense work undertaken on visual art by analytic philosophers in the last quarter of a century. This striking disregard of recent debate not only makes it difficult to assess its overall place in the literature, but serves also to qualify the potential originality and importance of Crowther's contribution.

A deeper problem, however, concerns the most original and ambitious part of his project, namely, the a priori and exhaustive nature of the categories, which Crowther needs in order to guarantee the objective validity of his normative canon. Unfortunately, when confronting the crucial objection that these categories are simply empirical generalisations about what has in fact occurred in the history of pictorial art, Crowther does little more than reassert that they are intrinsic to the very art of making a picture. But it is difficult to see how the a priori nature of the categories could be philosophically established, except by making them so general and vague that they become vacuous as explanations. To be fair, Crowther does readily acknowledge that they could be greatly refined, and also that deciding whether and how the categories are realised in individual cases will depend upon an enormous amount of argument and interpretation. Yet, if this is the case, as surely it is, there seems to be a great danger that the necessity and complexity of interpretation involved in critical discussion of the categories, as they are instantiated in individual works, will be an effective counter to any meaningful sense of the objectivity of Crowther's canon. After all, this is simply what we find all the time in art criticism, and it is doubtful that Crowther's discussion, for all its novelty and ingenuity, does enough to establish the objectivity of the categories, and hence the normative canon of art history.

Cain Todd

University of Cambridge

John Divers

Possible Worlds.

New York: Routledge 2002. Pp. xvi + 380.

Cdn\$112.00: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-15555-X);

Cdn\$41.95: \$27.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-15556-8).

John Divers' *Possible Worlds* is an investigation into the nature of possible worlds. The book is divided into three parts. The first part is an introduction to the topic of possible worlds and a general characterization of the different views of possible worlds available in the philosophical marketplace. The second part is an extended discussion of what Divers calls 'genuine realism' (GR) which essentially is David Lewis' view of worlds. The third part is an extended discussion of what Divers calls 'actualist realism' (AR); the view that there are possible worlds and all of them actually exist as opposed to what GR claims, namely, there are some non-actual possible worlds. AR is further broken down into four different versions of AR. They are: 'Plantingan realism' (PR) based on Plantinga's writings on modality (worlds are maximal states of affairs), 'combinatorial realism' (CR) based on the writings of Skyrms, Cresswell, Quine, and others (worlds are combinations of existing entities — I should note that although Skyrms presents a version of CR, it is reported that he is an antirealist with respect to worlds), 'nature realism' (NR) based on the writings of Stalnaker, Forrest, Bigelow and Pargetter (worlds are structural universals or properties), and finally, 'book realism' based on the writings of Carnap, Jeffrey, and Adams (worlds as maximal consistent sets of propositions or state-descriptions). Divers' discussion of both GR and AR is extensive, informed, and well argued. Due to the nature and depth of the presentation of the issues, this book is not an easy read. This is not to say that Divers is unclear in his presentation, but rather the depth that Divers presents with respect to various objections, responses, replies to the responses, etc. of a given argument or position indicates that those studying philosophy at a graduate level or above will be the most appreciative of the book.

Divers' overall approach to the evaluation of the various positions of possible worlds is similar to David Lewis' approach — namely, a cost-benefit approach. Divers holds that the three main purposes for using possible worlds are conceptual, ontological, and semantic explanations. So, according to Divers, one of the main reasons for being a realist with respect to worlds in the first place is the ability to conceptually analyze various modal notions such as the notions of necessity and possibility. Another is the use of possible worlds to provide an account of other entities such as propositions and properties. This is part of what Divers calls the ontological use. Finally, there is the use of possible worlds in logic and semantics. After considering these various uses together with the objections and replies that have been raised with respect to a given position, Divers concludes that GR is better off than

AR, and hence if one is to be a realist with respect to possible worlds one should adopt some form of GR. Those philosophers who hold to some form of AR will not be persuaded by Divers' argument, but some of the issues that Divers explores and some of the questions he raises about the various forms of AR need to be discussed by those who accept AR over GR. Space limitations prevent a complete critical analysis of Divers' complex argument and different AR theorists will look to different places in Divers' argument to find fault.

One place that those who accept a form of CR might question Divers is his notion of *absolute* possibility. Divers introduces the notion of absolute modality to distinguish it from relative modality (6). According to relative modality, some truths are possible or necessary relative to some sort of restriction. So while it is not possible in some physical sense that Divers travel faster than the speed of light, in another sense it is possible (such as a logical sense). What is absolutely necessary or possible is what is necessary or possible without restriction. Those who accept some form of CR hold that what possible worlds there are is, in some way, dependent upon what actually exists and so what is possible depends, in part, upon what is actual. Divers objects to one way of viewing this position as follows: 'The natural and powerful objection to such a line of thought is that the space of possibilities so characterized cannot be the entire space of *absolute* possibilities — that an adequate account of what *absolutely* could or could not be the case simply fails if it is shaped by constraints that *absolutely* might not have been in place' (207). Here one must be careful in understanding Divers' use of the term 'absolute'. Someone who accepts CR holds that the logical space so characterized does *absolutely* present all the possibilities that there are. True, there might have been different possibilities just as there might have been different individuals (from the actual ones), but these truths do not, (on CR) by themselves, imply that there are possibilities (individuals) distinct from the actual possibilities (individuals). Such a view is not really a version of relative possibility and hence it should not be viewed as constraining absolute possibility. Of course, Divers, Lewis, and others find distinctions where the CR theorist finds none in much the same way that a Meinongian such as Richard Routley finds a distinction between what exists and what does not exist where Lewis and other non-Meinongians find none. So, Divers repeats Lewis' objection that CR conflates possibilities (277-8). But this charge assumes that there are non-actual possibilities — something a CR theorist would dispute.

In conclusion, let me say that I recommend this book to those interested in the metaphysics of possible worlds. It is a very complete study of possible worlds, and, while I cannot endorse all the conclusions that Divers reaches, they are all well considered and well argued for.

G.W. Fitch

Arizona State University

Samuel Freeman, ed.

The Cambridge Companion to Rawls.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.

Pp. xi + 585.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-65167-0);

US\$24.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-65706-7).

Samuel Freeman assembles a rich collection of critical essays engaging various aspects of John Rawls' influential conception of justice. Overall, *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls* is thematically varied, but Freeman clusters together near the beginning of the volume the essays that focus primarily on Rawls' 1971 *A Theory of Justice*. Correspondingly, he groups together near the end of the volume those essays that primarily address Rawls' view as it evolved and is presented in his 1993 *Political Liberalism*.

Burton Dreben's contribution — designed as a public lecture — stands out as one of the most engaging and lucid discussions. He offers a helpful outline of the project of *Liberalism*, as distinct from that of *Theory* (Freeman's extensive introduction, as well as Thomas Nagel's valuable contribution, similarly outline this transition). In *Liberalism*, Rawls aims to defend liberal principles of justice as 'free standing' (i.e., without invoking any particular comprehensive doctrine), such that individuals can *in their political roles as citizens* endorse certain liberal principles of justice, whatever particular comprehensive doctrines they otherwise adhere to. Dreben notes that this political defense of liberal justice must allow for a sharp distinction between public and private — between individuals as public citizens who view liberal principles as legitimate, and individuals as private persons who are situated within various comprehensive doctrines, some of which may conflict with liberal principles (325). Nonetheless, Dreben fails to critically examine this moral ideal, which effectively accepts, for example, sexist and oppressive modes of family life (as informed by some patriarchal comprehensive tradition), so long as the female family members are, in public life, fully equal citizens. But this entirely neglects the likely fact that such an intimate exposure to sexism in 'private' life damages one's self respect in ways that make it very difficult to activate the liberties and opportunities that Rawls aims to ensure for 'public' citizens. The proposed public-private distinction, in other words, may be untenable.

Norman Daniels offers a nice defense of Rawls' 'complex, democratic egalitarianism' (a topic also engaged by Nagel) — the full implications of which, according to Daniels, can only be understood in terms of the connection between Rawls' First and Second Principles (245). Even so, Daniels contends that Rawls' egalitarianism is, as it stands, insensitive to crucial inequalities that result from disease and disability, and moreover that Rawls' own theory implicitly speaks against such insensitivity. Essentially, Daniels proposes that because of the impact of disease and disability on 'fair equality of opportunity', Rawls' theory should require the state to take positive

institutional measures to enable those with disease and disability to also realize their potentialities (256-9).

Martha C. Nussbaum addresses certain feminist criticisms that have confronted Rawls' theory of justice. She maintains that the issue of justice in the family stands out as the 'most difficult and troubling' for Rawls (515). Nussbaum convincingly contends that Rawls has sometimes carelessly advocated for the right of families to protection against state action, where in fact justice requires the protection of some family members against others (506). Nussbaum also argues that various other feminist criticisms of Rawls actually rest on misunderstandings, and have already been addressed within his theory. However, some of her remarks to this end appear dangerously dismissive. For example, Nussbaum cites Seyla Benhabib's objection that Rawls' 'original position' — as a device for monological reflection — cannot reliably achieve the sort of insight or full understanding of diverse others that is only available through processes of interpersonal dialogue that involve empathetic listening. In response, Nussbaum counter-asserts that the device of the original position in fact can yield full understandings of diverse perspectives, precisely because it requires us to imagine a wide range of possible distribution patterns and how they will affect people in different social positions (496). But Nussbaum's response fails to address Benhabib's critical challenge that monological imagining does not (because, for example, of undetected biases) adequately facilitate full understandings of the needs of diversely situated persons — that only actual dialogue can hope to achieve this.

Amy Gutmann examines the relationship between democracy and liberalism in Rawls' conception of justice. She identifies democracy with 'equal political liberty', and liberalism with 'equal personal liberty' (169). Then she argues that Rawls prioritizes neither liberalism nor democracy, since both sets of liberties are equally essential to the standing of individuals as free and equal members of society (171-80). However, Gutmann does call on Rawls to enhance the democratic aspects of his vision (as does Joshua Cohen in his essay, although from a very different angle) by expanding the scope of equal political liberty. More specifically, Gutmann wants to broaden the scope of 'public reason' so as to welcome some deliberation about controversial conceptions of the good life (195-6).

What may be one of the especially provocative and rewarding features of this collection is that various contributors offer conflicting interpretations of certain aspects of Rawls' view. These implicit debates generate an appreciation of the complexity of Rawls' position as it has developed over the years. So, for example, Nagel contends that Rawls offers a system of *pure* procedural justice, wherein the just design of the procedure and system entails that the outcomes are just whatever they may be (71). In opposition, Cohen maintains that Rawls' system is importantly one of *imperfect* procedural justice, wherein the justice of the outcomes that issue from the procedure must also be directly assessed (93).

Although there is space here to discuss only a few of the contributions, each of the essays in the volume contributes to a diverse and enriching

collection on Rawls. Charles Larmore discusses Rawls' commitment to the importance of public reason as an expression of equal respect, and very interestingly traces this commitment back to Rousseau's emphasis on mutual recognition as a crucial basis for self-respect. Both Onora O'Neill and Freeman (in his essay, as distinct from his introduction) relate Rawls to Kant — O'Neill in terms of Rawls' political constructivism, and Freeman in terms of Rawls' argument for stability in *Theory*. Frank I. Michelman, T.M. Scanlon, and Philippe van Parijs assess, respectively, Rawls' views on liberal constitutionalism, on justification (in particular, on the roles of reflective equilibrium, the original position, and public reason), and on economic justice (as informed by the difference principle). Finally, the collection closes with contributions that relate Rawls' liberal conception of justice to certain alternative traditions of thought. Namely, Samuel Scheffler investigates how Rawls' views both converge with and diverge from utilitarianism, and Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift jointly assess Rawls' relation to communitarianism.

Amanda Coen

University of Alberta

Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich, eds.

Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?

On the Uses and Abuses of a Philosophy.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pp. xviii + 341.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-00709-8);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-00710-1).

An old anecdote has it that when Abraham Lincoln met Harriet Beecher Stowe, the author of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, he greeted her with the wry comment, 'So you're the little lady whose book started this great big war.' Proponents of the theory that ideas shake the world might nod approvingly. Historians, schooled by their craft into an awareness that events have complex causes and that one individual's ideas are hardly ever so important that they make the world tremble, might recognize the irony in Lincoln's compliment. Stowe may have been a rallying point for abolitionists, but she did not cause the American Civil War. By the same token, no one could seriously believe that Nietzsche was the 'godfather of fascism'.

What then motivates fifteen scholars, all of them serious and respected, to raise such a question about Nietzsche? The short answer, as several of them reiterate, is that the question remains out there. Jacob Golomb and

Robert S. Wistrich review the history of the charge in their introductory survey. Or rather, the charges, for there are at least three distinct yet related issues at stake, namely Nietzsche's own political attitudes, his anti-Semitism, and the degree of influence that he had on the rise of Nazism and of Italian fascism.

In the brief space of a review, it is not possible to summarize the contributions, which are all thorough, up-to-date in terms of the secondary literature, interdisciplinary where required, and stimulating. A listing of the contents must suffice as an indication of the comprehensive sweep of the collection: Jacob Golomb, 'How to De-Nazify Nietzsche's Philosophical Anthropology?'; Berel Lang, 'Misinterpretation as the Author's Responsibility (Nietzsche's fascism, for instance)'; Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, 'Experiences with Nietzsche'; Alexander Nehamas, 'Nietzsche and Hitler'; Menahem Brinker, 'Nietzsche and the Jews'; Yirmiyahu Yovel, 'Nietzsche contra Wagner on the Jews'; Robert S. Wistrich, 'Between the Cross and the Swastika: A Nietzschean Perspective'; Daniel W. Conway, '*Ecce Caesar*: Nietzsche's Imperial Aspirations'; Stanley Corngold and Geoffrey Waite, 'A Question of Responsibility: Nietzsche with Hölderlin at War, 1914-1946'; Robert C. Holub, 'The Elisabeth Legend: The Cleansing of Nietzsche and the Sullyng of His Sister'; Mario Sznajder, 'Nietzsche, Mussolini, and Italian Fascism'; David Ohana, 'Nietzsche and the Fascist Dimension: The Case of Ernst Jünger'; Kurt Rudolf Fischer, 'A Godfather Too: Nazism as a Nietzschean "Experiment" '; and Roderick Stackelberg, 'Critique as Apologetics: Nolte's Interpretation of Nietzsche'. The quotations are all translated into English and there is a good bibliography, making the volume useful to a wider audience.

Although all the articles will be of interest to everyone concerned with the history of Nietzsche's reception and with the current state of the debate on his image, relatively few of the contributors engage with Nietzsche philosophically. In the first part of his essay, Golomb carefully analyzes key terms relevant to Nietzsche's political theory (power / *Macht*, force / *Kraft*, violence / *Gewalt*). On the basis of those distinctions, he then argues that Nietzsche operates with two typologies, one of positive, one of negative, power.

Less convincing is Berel Lang's claim that, because Nietzsche did not build enough blocks into his writing to prevent being misappropriated, he somehow does bear a responsibility for being misused. This strange argument is heard at various points elsewhere in the collection, echoing Derrida's influential claim that 'there is nothing absolutely contingent about the fact that the only political regime to have *effectively* brandished his name as a major and official banner was Nazi' (190, quoting *The Ear of the Other* [1985], 30-1). Against this, at least two objections must be raised. First, it is an error of hermeneutics to blame the text for blatant and demonstrable misappropriations. Second, it would be a miscarriage of justice to hold the victim responsible on the grounds that without the victim there would have been no crime. The Nazis were quite capable of assimilating everyone to their purposes, not excluding a 'Germanic Christ'.

Conversely, Menahem Brinker lucidly and persuasively shows that Nietzsche cannot be exonerated from his fundamental anti-Semitism simply because he reviled against specific instances of anti-Semitic prejudice. Nietzsche's absolute opposition to equality, whose origins he sought in Judeo-Christian values, led him to condemn both Judaism and Christianity.

Despite the fact that the contributors are international in origin (coming from the USA, Israel, Germany and Austria) and cosmopolitan in outlook, at the end one is struck by a certain parochialism of the discussions. This becomes apparent in the diluted concepts of fascism operating throughout, which shape the research agenda. Rather than examining Nietzsche's purported influence on thugs such as Hitler and Mussolini or on nihilists such as Ernst Jünger, we need to investigate whether and how captains of business and industry, the people in power, read Nietzsche. Nor is there any real sense here of how Nietzsche's indifference to the cause of civil society was typical of Germans who had long since grown accustomed to absolutist governments. Nietzsche as a political thinker is trivial when compared to Hobbes, Locke, Kant, or Hegel. Ultimately, Nietzsche was not a 'godfather of fascism' as much as he was a child of his times. According to Holub, Nietzsche 'railed against democracy, parliamentary systems, the feminist movement, and socialism: he incessantly lauded hierarchy and declared himself, if necessary, in favor of slavery' (231). Even Harriet Beecher Stowe did better than that.

Arnd Bohm

(Department of English)

Carleton University

William Hirstein

On The Churchlands.

Toronto: Wadsworth 2003. Pp. ii + 96.

Cdn\$15.95. ISBN 0-534-57627-3.

Over the past twenty-five years, the Churchlands have worked together, and separately, to bring mainstream brain science into the philosophical fold in order to solve traditional problems including the nature of mind and consciousness. However, talk of the Churchlands sends chills down most philosophers' spines. If we take neuroscience seriously, say the Churchlands, it means the elimination of the mind (beliefs, desires, fears, etc.). For many philosophers, the eliminativist doctrine appears to be not only foolhardy but also mistaken.

Not so fast! William Hirstein's book *On the Churchlands* presents a compelling explanation of why eliminativism is the most logical conclusion

for these scientifically-minded philosophers. Written in a clear and succinct style, this slim introductory volume offers a generous exposition of their views making it easily accessible to undergraduates and professionals. *On The Churchlands* is broken into four chapters: folk psychology, elimination, neurophilosophy and consciousness. This review will focus exclusively on the first three chapters.

In Chapter 1, Hirstein asks two important questions: 1) What is folk psychology?, and 2) Is folk psychology a theory? Answering the first question is simple enough. Humans attribute mental states (beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc.) to other people to explain and predict their behaviour. Answering the second question is more difficult. As Hirstein explains, the Churchlands believe folk psychology is like a scientific theory. Contemporary paradigms for theories include those in physics, biology and chemistry. Under such paradigms, theories seek to explain regularities in phenomena which are assumed to be governed by laws. The Churchlands think human behaviour also conforms to general causal laws which allows us to predict and explain action by virtue of propositional attitudes.

Although drawing strict parallels between folk psychology and scientific theories is controversial, Hirstein argues, 'it is too early to tell exactly which ways folk psychology is and is not similar to typical scientific theories' (14). Unfortunately, he fails to consider an important functional difference between the two if we make a distinction between reasons and causes. Take sleep for example. To explain sleep we need to make a distinction between the reasons people sleep, or *why* questions, and deeper scientific causes of sleep, or *how* questions. Scientists can explain the *causes* of sleep by citing a decrease in bodily temperature and changes in brainwave patterns. Common folk offer explanations of *why* people sleep by citing *desires* about being well rested, *wanting* to get up early the next day, and so forth. Although such common sense reasons may have acted as a springboard to deeper scientific causal investigations, our folk explanations of why people sleep have a different purpose altogether. Folk psychology suffers from a certain kind of shallowness based on *reasons* which makes its very different from scientific theories based on *causes*; something Hirstein and the Churchlands fail to recognize.

In Chapter 2, Hirstein outlines why the Churchlands think folk psychology will be replaced. Replacement is warranted because folk psychology has failed to make progress; it fails to integrate with other scientific theories; and finally, it cannot explain phenomena such as perception, learning, sleep, mental illness and memory. So just as the false caloric theory of heat was replaced by the theory of kinetic energy, so folk psychology will be replaced by a more robust scientific account of mind. It's here that Hirstein offers the most interesting objections against the Churchlands, but they are brief and should be put more forcefully.

First, Hirstein is correct in arguing that lack of progress, compared to scientific theories, is insufficient to make folk psychology false, and hence susceptible to replacement. Expanding on this idea, I suspect folk psychology's apparent lack of progress has to do with how slow change within cultures

take place. Cultures seem to change at a snail's pace, contrary to science. Take, for example, morality. Moral standards against slavery, subordination of women, discrimination, sexual harassment, and so forth, have changed, but it's taken decades, if not hundreds of years, to alter people's moral sentiments. It's possible, as neuroscience begins to reveal the secrets of our mind, some of its findings will be absorbed into our belief/desire psychology. But lack of progress alone does not warrant the elimination of mental states.

Second, the Churchlands argue that, if we center our attention on phenomena folk psychology cannot explain, we discover it does a lousy job. Take sleep again, for example. When we consider how utterly ignorant we are of the true nature and psychological functions of sleep, belief/desire psychology offers hopelessly inadequate insight. Most people explain the need for sleep by flippant answers such as 'for rest'. But if we want a true physicalist/materialist picture of mind, then these types of answers will be insufficient. And if folk psychology offers an insufficient explanation, perhaps we should eliminate it altogether. Hirstein correctly rejects such claims. Even if folk psychology fails to offer a proper physiological explanation of sleep, this itself does not guarantee elimination. After all, as mentioned above, folk psychology seems to work on a much different (and shallower) level than scientific explanations which itself is not evidence of its falsity. In fact, the reasons we give for sleep (e.g., getting up early; not wanting to be tired) are as perfectly legitimate as deeper scientific explanations. In this sense, they are not lousy at all.

The greatest strength of Hirstein's book comes in Chapter 3 when he outlines why eliminativism is the most logical conclusion for the Churchlands. What the Churchlands have done, he says, is revolutionary. They were the first philosophers to break the philosophical mould by recognising, indeed incorporating, current neuroscientific literature into their positions (see specifically *Matter and Consciousness* and *Neurophilosophy*). The result is eliminativism.

Although I have serious doubts about the eliminativist doctrine, this should not distract from the significant impact the Churchlands have had on the philosophy of mind. As Hirstein writes '... it is difficult to exaggerate the magnitude of what they have accomplished. Contemporary science and philosophy on their own are difficult, but to formulate a consistent worldview which spans both requires a heroic mental effort' (87-8). And perhaps most importantly, according to Hirstein, they '... have helped to keep both scientists and philosophers informed about each other's work, and to open up dialogue between the two groups' (43). Indeed, the Churchlands attempt to solve the mind/body problem via neuroscience has helped countless philosophers understand the brain and hence understand the mind. Hirstein's book itself makes a valuable contribution in explaining why the Churchlands are so philosophically important for those who study the mind.

David Ohreen

Mount Royal College

Ted Honderich

Philosopher: A Kind of Life.

New York: Routledge 2001. Pp. 441.

Cdn\$75.00: US\$50.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-273697-5);

Cdn\$22.95: US\$14.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-27631-4).

Ted Honderich points out that his book, *Philosopher: A Kind of Life*, 'is not another autobiography' (5). His goals are loftier. First, he tells us that he wants to open a view into a *kind* of life: that of a modern, academic philosopher. Second, he wants to explain why his life — from how he came to his philosophical commitments and became Grote Professor at University of College London (UCL) to the complex course of his personal life — has unfolded as it has.

Honderich begins by describing his life as a boy in rural Ontario, and his early ambitions to be a writer before being inspired by A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic* to study philosophy at UCL (where Ayer was then Grote Professor). Honderich tells us about becoming a lecturer at UCL and the political maneuvering he engaged in to succeed his mentor to the Grote chair. We learn how certain books came to exist, including his renowned *Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, and gain an understanding of the unpleasant world of academic politics.

Philosopher is also the story of a life of dinners with the intellectual elite, battles with tenants, and relationships both plentiful and complex. Honderich's private life is characterized by a series of failed relationships, three open marriages, and countless 'connections', some of them with his students. These women come off the page as extensions of him, rather than persons in their own right. He is happily a libertine and '[cares] less about having been a man of many women than about having not taken the philosophical world by storm' (28).

More fascinating — though perhaps less entertaining — are the story of his intellectual development and discussions of his philosophical and political commitments. In the opening movement of the book he indicates that 'the philosophical furniture of his mind' (7) consists of his belief in determinism, the subjectivity of consciousness, equality and socialist politics, and his sympathy for civil disobedience. This furniture seems to be as fixed and unchanging as his penchant for 'plain speaking' Anglo-American philosophy. He casually dismisses thinkers like Marx, Hegel and Freud, and gives the impression of being academically rigid and lacking in a chief philosophical virtue: broadminded intellectual curiosity.

The first third of the book is absorbing, intimate and honest. Yet by the time he comes to relate less compelling tales about the minutia of publishing an article or a book or political maneuverings among real or imagined rivals, one begins to disengage from the project. It is not that such mundane matters are not a part of philosophical life, or any kind of life for that matter, but

when reading such details, described at great length in a 'plain-spoken' way, one wishes that Honderich would report less and reflect more. Once safely ensconced as professor at UCL, he comes to seem more one-dimensional.

That being said, one of the chief virtues of the book is the manner in which Honderich alternates between life narrative and philosophical reflection on that narrative. In doing so he offers some lucid discussions of his philosophical commitments and uses these to reflect upon why his life might have taken the shape and form it has. He is selective about which aspects of his life he will subject to the scrutiny of his first-class analytical mind (for example, he devotes comparatively little ink to the pattern of failed relationships; the ethics of having sex with students; or his seemingly strained relationships with colleagues and his children) but even in those things he leaves out, he is revealed.

Central to *Philosopher* is the question of whether it is possible to explain a life, and in the final chapter, he offers nine possible understandings or summaries of his life. Honderich indicates that 'for the purpose in question, trying to get a hold of a life, exactly what is needed is a summary', but upon realizing that no understanding 'seems indisputably closer to the truth' he acknowledges that a human life 'has a fullness that can seem greater than that of any other single subject-matter' (389). He concludes — and it is by no means a startling conclusion — that a human life challenges perception and judgment in a way that problems in philosophy do not, and thus cannot be summarized in an adequate way. Perhaps such a conclusion will be most surprising to those as analytically inclined as Honderich.

I have given some reasons to doubt the ultimate success of Honderich's autobiography, but it is notable for its honesty and the agile movement between life narrative and philosophical reflection. In it there is some instruction as to how we might begin to understand our own lives. Moreover, he does carry through the two things he promised. He gives us a view into a kind of life: we know better what it means to have spent a life as a philosopher. And, Honderich may not have explained his life but has, in a meaningful way, struggled with the question of whether it is possible to do so. As a philosopher, he knows this is often the closest one can get to an answer.

Elizabeth Panasiuk

University of Alberta

Mark Kingwell

Practical Judgments:

Essays in Culture, Politics and Interpretation.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2002.

Pp. vii + 344.

Cdn/US\$29.95. ISBN 0-8020-3675-9.

A cursory glance at the index of Mark Kingwell's lively and thought-provoking *Practical Judgments* is enough to demonstrate the wide range of academic and cultural influences upon which he draws. This collection of essays, which surveys a decade of work, takes in *The Simpsons*, *Frazier*, and Bruce Springsteen through to Gadamer, Habermas, and Husserl, touching on cricket and home furnishings along the way. Throughout, a sense of wonder at the ambiguity and variety of a world that defies neat classification, that resists grand system-building and the imposition of metanarratives, suffuses Kingwell's observations and ruminations on popular culture, mass media, and philosophy. As the title suggests, Kingwell is concerned to bring lofty academic theories and disputes to bear on typically mundane affairs and to make accessible the great works of philosophy in this context. Most of all, however, the works surveyed can be understood in the context of, and as a contribution to, a long and complex line of deep philosophical thought.

Some of the essays on display here were originally published in non-academic periodicals or given as lectures. As such, much of the text purchases accessibility at the expense of philosophical rigour: to be sure, the format used works against any attempt at the careful and precise explication of difficult and historically convoluted philosophical traditions. This complaint, however, is rendered almost redundant, for Kingwell's animated and pleasantly informal style makes for an enjoyable read. As Aristotle once said, after all, some discussions do not demand or allow for the same degree of rigour of others.

Two concepts guide Kingwell's musings throughout the book, and require explication: *wonder* and *phronesis*. First, in 'Husserl's Sense of Wonder', the basic philosophical inclination towards the search for meaning and truth is conceived in terms of the sense of wonder we experience in the face of a complex world that initially, it would appear, resists proper and rigorous explanation. The child asks, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' Whilst some are trained not to ask such questions or to forget them (they are supposedly the province, sadly, of the child and the philosopher), the experience of wonder and the wonderful is still a vital aspect of philosophy and science, but yet is in danger of being overshadowed by the imposition of strict scientific criteria of measurement, exactness, and infinite perfectibility (78), as Husserl once pointed out. The crisis of the European sciences, to use the title of Husserl's most well known work, is precipitated by the latter's abstraction from the contexts of everyday experience. 'The ideal world of geometry and mathematics,' Kingwell reminds us, 'is not the world in which we live' (77). In fact, our attempts to fit the world into such rigorous systems

ironically lead us *away* from the truth of experience. We must be *modest*, open to new experiences, and recover that sense of awe and openmindedness toward the world. Many, if not all, of the essays here can be viewed as an attempt to implore us to rediscover that childish impulse to naively and excitedly philosophise. Thus, in 'Tables, Chairs, and Other Machines for Thinking', we are brought to wonder at the objects surrounding us that, without a second thought, we habitually sit on and at.

Second, *phronesis* refers to the social actor's knowledge and appreciation of the particulars of a specific situation demanding some action or moral awareness. In short, it is a matter of amassing *practical knowledge* and of knowing how to *apply* moral and political know-how appropriately. To use Habermasian jargon, ethical-political and ethical-existential discourses require just this kind of practical knowledge and know-how: such discourses revolve around questions relating to specific socio-historically situated individuals and collectivities. We ask, 'Who are we? What is good for us?'

In '*Phronesis* and Political Dialogue', a definition of *phronesis* is proposed before the concept itself is put to use, first, as a corrective to the universalism of Habermasian discourse ethics and, second, in a consideration of political dialogue. To put it rather simplistically, Habermas' theory of discourse ethics draws a counterfactual model of discursive practice from the pragmatic presuppositions of colloquial language-use, in which participants are oriented to mutual understanding and anticipate, as it were, a condition (to which the ideal speech situation refers) in which the unforced force of the better argument holds sway. The concept of *phronesis* is brought to bear here, for although ethical-political and ethical-existential concerns together constitute one of three 'prongs' of the basic taxonomy of discourse ethics (along with pragmatic and moral discourses), they are, in fact, subordinated to the demands of specifically *moral* discourses, which revolve around questions of justice and are universalisable. The possibility of recourse to universals, Kingwell argues, is fast diminishing in the face of pluralism, but hope remains in the form of a conversational or deliberative collective search for agreement among social actors, drawing for support on their own experiences and conceptions of the good: 'The details of ourselves and our situation matter deeply in normative discourse' (111). As such, Kingwell argues in 'Two Concepts of Pluralism', we need to be less foundationalist and strongly rationalistic, and more interpretive and detailed (166) in our search for agreement on the political level. Such attention to critical theory and hermeneutics in certain essays reveals the text to be deeply concerned with the development of a social-democratic political project.

Although it is impossible to do justice to the richness of the book here, we can say that Kingwell implores us to think critically, to think of our everyday experiences as vital to and constitutive of the realm of practical discourse, and to think with a sense of wonder. But most of all, we are compelled by *Practical Judgments* to think with a sense of enjoyment, inquisitiveness and *modesty*. If we rediscover that childish and curious, yet judicious and critical, stance that we can and, perhaps, should take towards the world, even the

most mundane and trivial experiences take on new meaning and significance. Kingwell is an able philosopher: he utilises a variety of concepts to the best advantage, and encourages independent critical thinking with a social-democratic edge. As such, in some important respects, his new collection of essays is best viewed as an enjoyable and important addendum to work of the great Hans-Georg Gadamer who said, paraphrasing here, that each new generation understands *anew* if it understands at all: 'Rethink for yourselves!'

Charles A. Robinson

(*Department of Government*)

University of Manchester

Eva Feder Kittay and Ellen K. Feder, eds.

The Subject of Care:

Feminist Perspectives on Dependency.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2002.

Pp. ix + 382.

US\$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-1362-9);

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When discussion turns to feminist contributions to moral and political philosophy, the term 'ethics of care' quickly surfaces. Drawing attention to the importance of the often invisible practices and values of caring in human lives stands alongside the focus on gender equality as one of the most significant aspects of feminist work in the field. But despite the importance of the articulation of the ethical qualities of caring relations, many feminists have worried that emphasis on the virtues of what is conventionally considered women's work and usually practiced in conditions of subordination, simply reinforces that subordination. From this perspective interest in an ethics of care is frequently and dismissively associated with endorsement of a retrogressive gynocentric, maternalist and cultural feminism. Kittay and Feder's anthology provides an overdue and highly important corrective to this view.

The essays included in the volume are related through the contribution they make to unravelling and counteracting the complexity of the contexts of inequality and dependency in which caring activities are practised. All are convinced of the central inevitability of human dependency, our necessary dependence on others for care, and about our vital needs in infancy, illness, frail old age and disability — a fact that seems so obvious as to be trivial. That it needs to be said over and over again by these writers, however, is evidence of its failure to register significantly in the moral, economic, legal

and political frameworks of our lives, and of the exploitative appropriation of the labours of socially subordinate and marginalised women in its name.

Just as the central fact of human vulnerability is shown to be indisputable by the collection, so too, are the inequitable social circumstances of the practice of caring and dependency work. Human dependency and the vital work of care are invisible, precisely because the latter is carried out by those who have little voice in ensuring that their work, their agency and their selves are treated with dignity and justice. This book is not a place for the confirmation of whinging victims, however; nor do the papers produce dismay and impotency in face of the unmasking of profound structural constraints on justice. Rather the astute analyses bring readers many conceptual and practical suggestions for re-thinking, subverting and inverting, taken-for-granted understandings and policies concerning social organization relating to human vulnerability, the unappreciated work of care, and the stigmatisation of welfare and dependency. Most of these turn on the point — owing much to Kittay's earlier work but most artfully explained by Bubeck in the current volume (160-85) — that in light of our fundamental human vulnerability, social justice requires social support for carers as well as those they care for. Conceptually, some of the most interesting relate to the unpicking of layers of gender, racial, class and pathological meanings carried by notions of dependency, autonomy, choice and independence, in the particular contexts of women's caring, while Kittay's moving account of the potential for dignity in the face of extreme mental retardation (257-76), Roberts' analysis of the distortions wrought by a blinkered 'nuclear family' approach to kinship foster care in black communities (277-93), and Spelman's incisive discussion of the 'social reproductive shadow work' of maintaining notions of innate white supremacy (334-47), are full of insight. Among my favourites in more practical terms are McCluskey's inversion of neo-liberal economic rationality that challenges the WTO to see cuts to state support for care, as 'anticompetitive "dumping" or unfair protectionism in violation of free-trade policy' (130), West's optimistic reading of the US constitution as authorizing rights to care and supported caregiving (99-111) and Bubeck's proposal for mandatory 'universal caring service' along the lines of (national) defence service (180).

About half of the papers have been published elsewhere, but the value of a volume like this one is that it brings together for readers related work from different fields — philosophy, law, history, economics, sociology and policy studies — that may otherwise be difficult to assemble. It is a tribute to the editors that their judicious selection also demonstrates the collective interdisciplinary force of this new direction in thinking about the intertwined issues of human vulnerability, an ethics of care, and gender, or as they put it, 'a meaningful sense of freedom grounded in human dependence' (3). Inevitably, as in any anthology, there is some unevenness in the writing but this is more than made up for by the overall high quality work. Papers of many stellar contributors to feminist work in philosophy, history and law — Fineman, Fraser, Gordon, Nussbaum, Young, for example, as well as those

already mentioned — are included. Readers from outside the US may be disappointed that only two of the sixteen essays have been sourced from non-US academics, and may find some of the more detailed accounts of US policy less interesting, but the conceptual work that drives all of the papers is relevant wherever the labour of necessary caring is exploited.

While the work is highly recommended for the way that it assists in creatively moving on the debate over an ethics of care, it is also successful in provoking reflection on wider issues. Among these are the central tensions it highlights for liberalism. Is the liberal focus on freedom and individuality more important than building moral and political understanding on the inevitability of human dependency and relatedness? Does an emphasis on the former always run the risk of overlooking the latter? Or can understandings of individuality and freedom be reconfigured in such a way that they can successfully substitute for the centrality of our dependence on care?

For those more interested in the further development of understanding the practices and value of care and dependency in our lives, much work remains to be done in integrating the perspectives of those cared-for, into considerations both of the ethical quality of care and dependency work, and the socio-economic context in which such practices are carried out. It is beyond the limits of this volume to pursue perspectives other than those of (characteristically subordinate, female) carers but a more encompassing understanding requires incorporation of the perspectives of those cared-for, both those who are marginalised by their dependency and those who are able to take advantage of it.

Peta Bowden

Murdoch University

Chandran Kukathas

The Liberal Archipelago:

A Theory of Diversity and Freedom.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 2003. Pp. xii + 292.

Cdn\$75.00: US\$45.00. ISBN 0-19-925754-X.

With his new book, *The Liberal Archipelago*, Chandran Kukathas has made an impressive, distinctive, and hugely controversial contribution to the ever-expanding literature on liberalism and cultural diversity. The main contention of the book is that liberals have wrongly come to believe that justice is the main subject of political philosophy. Instead Kukathas argues

that liberalism should return to its original concern with the problem of political authority: who should have power, and how should that power be exercised? The answer, for Kukathas, is that power in a liberal society should be dispersed across multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, and that power should never be exercised in order to force people to act against the dictates of their conscience. Thus for Kukathas the first virtue of liberalism (indeed its only virtue) is not justice, but liberty of conscience, and the guiding value of a liberal society should therefore be toleration.

The book presents liberalism-as-toleration largely by contrasting it with an alternative vision of liberalism that emphasises autonomy, justice, and social unity. Kukathas rejects the metaphor of the state as a ship in need of unity and purpose, and instead argues for the metaphor of the liberal archipelago: a sea of toleration where there are many different islands. There is no ultimate authority governing relations between the islands, only a political agreement to tolerate each other's ways of life, and to respect the right of exit of each individual. This view of liberalism is shaped by its universality and its commitment to individualism. Following Hume, Kukathas claims that humans are motivated to act by one of (or some combination of) three reasons: self-interest, affection for others, and principle. Principle, however, is the central framework within which the other two motives operate. If there is one universal human interest, Kukathas claims it is the interest we all have in living according to our conscience — to act as we think we ought to.

Armed with this understanding of what we have in common, Kukathas argues that liberalism should aim to ensure that no one is forced to live a life they cannot, in good conscience, accept. What this means in practice is that a liberal state will be comprised of many different associations, any of which can be internally illiberal, so long as everyone is always free to exit. Freedom of association, for Kukathas, is the only basic right that we all have, with the important corollary of freedom of disassociation. Kukathas is thus strongly critical of the other values that contemporary liberal philosophers have tried to place at the centre of their theories: autonomy, fairness, equality, stability, or community. A liberal state, Kukathas emphasises, can have no moral purpose other than to provide a framework for the peaceful co-existence of its citizens. His theory is thus at the minimalist end of the political liberal spectrum. For Kukathas, cultural and ethical diversity is a fact to be neither celebrated nor deplored, only accommodated, and so there is no need for special multicultural rights of any kind. Whether cultures live or die, and which ones become dominant, is of no concern. People are free to associate and disassociate as they see fit.

There is much that is attractive and even more that is repellent in Kukathas' vision of liberalism. On the attractive side, Kukathas has provided an excellent and sustained critique of the idea that liberalism should be founded on an ideal of personal autonomy. There are many lives and situations, Kukathas rightly argues, that we would describe as good and worth living that have nothing to do with being autonomously chosen — indeed

Kukathas argues that in many instances autonomy can be a positively damaging goal. This critique is all the more valuable because it is made without any unnecessary and embarrassing communitarian baggage.

That said, Kukathas' own theory of liberalism is profoundly unappealing, to say the least. His account of freedom of exit, for example, is highly implausible, and simply cannot bear the normative weight he has placed on it. Kukathas tries to draw a distinction between being free to exit an association, and the costs that one has to bear in order to leave, but there is plenty of reason to doubt the viability of this distinction. Although leaving some situations may be very costly, Kukathas wishes to claim that this does not alter the fact that you are free to do so, but he never clearly spells out when you are unfree to leave a situation. And how else is unfreedom going to be defined other than in terms of costs? The only way to draw a line between freedom and unfreedom is to decide that some kinds or levels of constraint are so costly that we do not think the agent is at liberty to act in the specified way. This, if correct, undermines the distinction entirely. If, despite this problem, one tries to maintain a distinction between a formal notion of freedom and opportunity costs, it still makes little sense to then hold agents normatively responsible for failing to exercise this formal right of exit, yet this is exactly Kukathas' position. He wants to derive a weak idea of consent from the right of exit, but this seems unacceptable when exit is defined independently of any costs the agent may have to bear.

There is also a very strong, and in my view false, dichotomy presented in the book, on which much of its persuasive force relies. This dichotomy is between a justice-based version of liberalism-as-autonomy, and Kukathas' own political version of liberalism-as-toleration. In many places the book depends on presenting a forceful and compelling critique of the former model, and then explaining that, despite its potential for oppression and injustice, all we are left with is liberalism-as-toleration. Kukathas is specifically critical of Rawls and Kymlicka, claiming that their attempts to present theories of liberalism that are somewhere between these two poles are ultimately incoherent. But this claim is never convincingly argued. In particular, Kukathas ignores what has been one of the most powerful conceptions of liberalism presented in recent years: liberalism-as-impartiality. This model of liberalism strives to be 'political' in the same sense as Kukathas' own theory, but it offers much more than mere toleration or some form of *modus vivendi* amongst disparate associations. It still places justice and fairness at its core, and thus is far more attractive than Kukathas' brand of libertarianism that is indifferent to all moral values other than toleration.

Jonathan Quong

University of Manchester

Robert C. Miner

Vico Genealogist of Modernity.

Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame

Press 2002. Pp. xvi + 215.

US\$37.50. ISBN 0-268-03468-0.

'Vico, genealogist of modernity' is the title and, in short, the thesis of this book. But what is genealogy? And was Vico really a genealogist? Aside from the vexed issue of 'modernity', the answer to the second question obviously depends on the answer to the first, as then would the book's main thesis. So the basic question is: what is meant by 'genealogy'?

Miner writes that 'genealogy is a species of historical explanation that privileges linguistic and etymological evidence', and that 'what defines a genealogist is simply a commitment to explaining cultural phenomena by advertent to their genesis' (xi-xii). If we accept this characterisation, then there is no doubt that Vico was an authentic genealogist, and much before Nietzsche. In all of his work, especially his masterpiece, *La Scienza nuova*, he seeks the genesis of things by means of etymology, working with the history of words in order to understand the essence of the phenomena of the 'civil world' in their beginnings and the sense of their history. For Vico this is almost an obsession, one clearly visible in many of the titles of his books, which speak always of 'origins' and 'principles' in the broad sense of beginnings — of sources, commencements, origination. For example: *De antiquissima italorum sapientia ex linguae latinae originibus eruenda*; *De universi iuris uno principio et fine uno*; *Principi di scienza nuova*. Thus, Vico is easily described as a philosopher of origins, or — as he has been called — the 'first philosopher of beginnings' (Said), or 'the poet of daybreak' (Capograssi). It is not surprising then that Miner should follow suit and characterise Vico principally as a 'genealogist', especially in the light of Vico's own claim in *La Scienza nuova* that 'the nature of things is nothing but their coming into being at certain time and in certain guises' and that 'doctrines must begin from where the matters they treat begin.'

In its own way, Miner's analysis is itself genealogical, divided into three parts that correspond to three periods in Vico's development. In the first part, Miner shows that Vico's critique of modern rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza) in his early works is already to begin with genealogical. In the second part, he discusses Vico's *Diritto universale*, which in exploring the essential elements of a genealogy of right, constitutes an important step toward the full genealogical awareness that Vico realises in *La Scienza nuova*. It is to an examination of this last and most important of Vico's works that Miner devotes the third and most important part of this book.

The result is a reading of Vico that considers virtually the full range of Vico's texts. But unfortunately it discusses only some 'American' Vico scholars (e.g., Mazzotta, Verene and few others), and almost none of the Italians (even Croce is quoted only three times and only in the footnotes). So, why is there this obvious deficiency in a book that, for many reasons, is nevertheless

well structured and stimulating? Perhaps in Miner's mind the belief persists that Italian scholars of Vico are in some way still historicists, and so still linked exclusively to the Crocean hermeneutical paradigm that imposes a particular Crocean view on Vico's texts. But that belief would reflect a lack of familiarity with the recent Italian literature on Vico, a literature that is very rich, diversified and of increasing interest, especially on the question of genealogy. Moreover, looked at more closely, Miner's way of interpreting Vico is not so different from Croce's, for he too tries to impose his own ideas on Vico's texts. According to Croce, Vico is nothing but the 'nineteenth century in embryo', as he says, a forerunner of Romanticism and in a sense also of Hegel. According to Miner, Vico is a sort of precursor to Nietzsche and Nietzsche's idea of genealogy. Different result, but the same methodological principle, the same precursor theory. Or is it? Might it not be claimed that in truth, every interpretation imposes its own predilections and prejudices on the examined text, and must do so deliberately, if it wants to be a creative and innovative (i.e., a good) reading? In his interpretation of Vico, Miner seems worried only that he not appear too anachronistic, ascribing to Vico aims that were not his own. But this is not the real issue. Instead, in all hermeneutical work, the problem is to be honest and self-critical about one's inevitable 'prejudices'.

Yet the question remains, what is genealogy, what does this idea contain? Are we really sure that Vico's genealogy is perfectly comparable to Nietzsche's, or that genealogy is compatible with metaphysics, or more to the point, that it is compatible with an onto-theological standpoint centered on providence, as it is in Vico? Miner is fully aware of the difficulties in this regard. Nevertheless, with his idea of genealogy he continues to believe in the similarity between Vico and Nietzsche's approaches. Vico, Miner concludes, 'finds himself capable of affirming divine providence, without sacrificing his commitment to genuinely historical investigation' (141). And yet doubt on this issue remains, above all about the centrality of the religious in Vico's thought. In truth, although there are many different possible interpretations of Vico, only those that take account of the religious are plausible. For the religious standpoint is the central standpoint of Vico's entire thought, on which he builds his entire metahistorical system. A real genealogist, whether Nietzschean or post-Nietzschean, does not pursue through genealogy the chimera of 'true' origins to be recovered as hidden *truths*, does not believe in the metahistorical project of *ideal* meanings and above all in providential teleology. If Vico does, can he still be called genealogist? If genealogy can be defined as the consciousness of how things came to be what they are, it entails the consciousness that things can never return to be what they were.

Giuseppe Patella

University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'

Mechthild Nagel

Masking the Abject. A Genealogy of Play.

Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2002.

Pp. x + 130.

US\$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7391-0307-6);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7391-0308-3).

It would be fair enough to say that, over the last several decades or so, play, playfulness and, in general, *homo ludens* have not, with very few exceptions (Mihai Spariosu is certainly one of them), troubled too much the philosophically-minded people in the English-speaking world. As it were, philosophy is too serious a business to waste its time with such self-discrediting topics as play, games or humans' ludic 'cultural behaviour'. Not only is philosophy to be done in a serious manner, but it must above all be dedicated to serious topics. This is why Mechthild Nagel's recent book *Masking the Abject. A Genealogy of Play* has to be greeted as a needed contribution and as coming at the right moment. Yet, it is not only the current scholarly context that makes this book valuable. The book has its own intrinsic merits and accomplishments, some of which I will be trying to point to in this review.

Nagel's primary intention is to 'develop a genealogy of play within Western philosophy and analyze how play has come to be the Other of reason' (3). And she does so by focusing her research on how play was regarded, thought of, and valued in archaic Greece (more particularly in the works of Homer, Hesiod, and Heraclitus), in the plays of Euripides and Aristophanes (all this makes the object of Chapter One), in Socrates and Plato (Chapter Two), in Aristotle (Chapter Three), then in the European Enlightenment, more precisely in Kant and Schiller (Chapter Four), and in Hegel (Chapter Five). Besides, a special attention is being paid throughout the book to the works of Nietzsche, Derrida, Gadamer, Delueze, Eugen Fink, and others. The use that Nagel has, to various degrees, made in this book of the tools provided by comparative literature, classical philology, German and French scholarship undoubtedly cast a very good light on the 'strictly philosophical' problems dealt with. Certainly, one of the merits that this book has comes from the excellent balance it acquires when approaching the topics of play and playfulness between the philosophical understanding and the literary expertise: the two are always taken as sophisticatedly interwoven and mutually dependent.

The chapters dedicated to Plato and Hegel are, in my view, the best chapters of the book. Plato's dealing with the play is seen from multiple perspectives. There is, for example, an unmistakable element of play in the very dialogical form of the Platonic writings: 'In Plato's dialogical style we see a surfacing of Dionysian playfulness, which carries over into his use of myths and masquerades; these gives us a different, less polarized conception of his play' (108). Yet, this is only one level of the Platonic play. There are also several others. For instance, Mechthild Nagel deals in detail with what has been called 'theologia ludens' — the philosophizing clustered around

Plato's insight, put forth in the *Laws* (654d), that the human being 'is made to be the plaything of God, and that this, truly considered, is the best of him' (41). Similarly, Hegel's philosophy is being discussed from the perspective of the peculiar play theory that, in Nagel's view, he brings forth, especially in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The notion of play is simply seen as one of the factors making possible a proper understanding of some of the principal tenets of the Hegelian philosophy: 'without understanding the centrality of play in Hegel, one cannot really grasp his concept of dialectic or of truth' (81). Moreover, Hegel's insights are skillfully placed within a broader cultural context and taken as the starting point for a number of subsequent major developments in the field of the theories of play: Hegel's 'usage of play and seriousness as mockery of philosophy foreshadows the tactics of the artist-metaphysicians (Nietzsche, Fink, Gadamer) to intertwine, rather than use to contrast, the opposites play-seriousness' (83).

I would have only two or three criticisms of this book. First, despite the fact that she ambitiously conceives of her book as 'a genealogy of play within Western philosophy' (3), Nagel does not discuss at all some other major philosophers in whose works the idea of play played an essential role. The names Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein come naturally to one's mind, but there are also others: for example, it is difficult to realize a 'genealogy of play' making absolutely no reference to Erasmus' *Ecomium moriae id est Laus stultitiae* (*Praise of Folly*). Then, the topics of play and playfulness are, philosophically speaking, in close relationship to some kindred topics: the world as a narrative (*mundus est fabula*), as a theatre (*theatrum mundi*) or even as a dream (*la vida es sueño*). These are topics one certainly should not overlook when coming to talk about 'theologia ludens'.

Costica Bradatan
(*The Knight Institute*)
Cornell University

Ludwig Nagl and Chantal Mouffe, eds.
*The Legacy of Wittgenstein:
Pragmatism or Deconstruction.*
New York: Peter Lang 2001. Pp. 164.
US\$26.95. ISBN 0-8204-4796-X.

This slim book is a collection of nine essays on Wittgenstein's legacy by well known scholars, and is the product of a 1999 conference on the title theme. A number of the essays are excellent and provide insightful examinations of

some of the broader ramifications of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The collection is only loosely linked by topic, and is in the main a transcript of conference proceedings. It was clearly not intended to be a heavily edited, consistent 'volume' in the style of other works in the field, but rather a loose assortment of speculative conference presentations, polished essays, and everything in between. It has no substantive introduction, no thematic organization or cross-referencing of chapters, and no index or bibliography. In a brief preface the editors remark that their collection represents a Wittgensteinian 'alternative to the dominant rationalistic framework' (7). Why the blurry dichotomy between pragmatism and deconstruction epitomizes the contemporary debate around Wittgenstein's legacy is to be deduced from the essays themselves, as the editors don't provide a developed rationale. Pragmatism is Anglo-American, and deconstruction is continental, we are told, and if Wittgenstein links the two traditions it must somehow be through this dualism. But recent interdisciplinary Wittgenstein scholarship could equally be categorized as poststructural, genealogical, anti-essentialist, and so on. Thus an initial skim of this book will not reveal its underlying principles, which implies that the value of the volume rests entirely on the philosophical contributions of the individual essays rather than on their organization into a single volume.

In his lead essay 'Rules, attunement, and "applying words to the world": the struggle to understand Wittgenstein's vision of language', Hilary Putnam argues against an interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of rule-following defended by Stephen Mulhall. The latter contends that we never have judgments without criteria that provide justification extending beyond the specific case in which they are employed. Putnam argues instead that 'going on' is made possible not by prior and independent rules but by 'attunements' (the '*preconditions of intelligibility* of our utterances' [18]): 'our ability to — often instantaneously — arrive at the proper understanding of what is said in a context is ... a manifestation of our attunement with one another, not of "rules" ' (20). Thus skepticism cannot be deflated (as many interpreters of Wittgenstein claim) by suggesting that the skeptic is only talking nonsense — i.e., that she is using words that fulfill their criteria for meaning, while claiming that they do not apply to the world. Instead, Putnam suggests, we need to look at words in their context and examine particular usages, connecting Wittgenstein with the Socratic tradition. This is an interesting and complex argument, although as the lead essay in the volume it is philosophically intriguing but provides no transparent entrée to the book's project of situating Wittgenstein with regard to pragmatism and deconstruction. James Conant's later essay (which makes up nearly a quarter of the volume) also offers a clever and detailed argument, arguing for the continuity of Wittgenstein's thought *contra* those who construct a break between the early and late philosophy. One suspects that Conant took the opportunity to present closely related work at this event — fair enough for him, but not so useful for this book.

Linda Zerilli, on the other hand, follows a brief, and argues in a beautifully composed essay that Wittgenstein's 'practice of thinking exemplifies a conception both of plurality, which is not reducible to the (deconstructive) notion of undecidability, and of judgment, which is not reducible to the (pragmatist) understanding of "form of life" ' (25). Plurality and judgment are linked by Wittgenstein's view of the ordinary, which Zerilli links to questions of community — of what is shared. She identifies a misguided tendency to reduce such questions to issues of undistorted communication, and concludes that Wittgenstein incites us to 'incessant talk', to an ethical willingness to hear the other's different perspective. In 'Wittgenstein's critical hermeneutics: from physics to aesthetics', Allan Janik also rejects the pragmatism-deconstruction dichotomy, going on to suggest a third 'hermeneutic' reading. Drawing from Wittgenstein's preoccupation with the methods of the philosopher of science Heinrich Hertz, Janik describes Wittgenstein's anti-metaphysical project as requiring a creative hermeneutics with an important aesthetic undercurrent.

Two of the essays seek to strengthen Wittgenstein's connection to deconstruction. Henry Staten argues provocatively that philosophers have tacitly resisted 'Wittgenstein's deconstructive legacy' in favor of a pragmatic reason that refuses full reflexivity. Performing a 'textual operation,' Staten 'reveals that both language games and the language in which we speak of language games have a more complex topography or topology than that supposed by orthodox Wittgenstein commentary' (49). In his 'Deconstruction and the ordinary', Stephen Mulhall offers a novel rapprochement between Derridean deconstruction and ordinary language philosophy that draws on Cavell's reading of Austin against Derrida as well as on the *Philosophical Investigations*.

There are also two reflections on Wittgenstein's contribution to more explicitly political debates. Chantal Mouffe invokes Wittgenstein to suggest that his philosophy speaks against the claims of 'rationalist-universalists' and that 'liberal democratic principles can only be defended as being constitutive of our form of life and we should not try to ground our commitment to them on something supposedly safer' (134). Advocating a practice-based account of rationality, Mouffe asserts the inescapability of ethical reflection and responsibility. In a related but much more substantial essay, David Owen presents Derrida and Cavell's reflections on democracy as Wittgensteinian in spirit through their commitment to becoming intelligible to ourselves. Cavell's moral perfectionism meets Derrida's experience of undecidability to further the claim that Wittgenstein's relation to political philosophy consists not in advancing theses but of dissolving pictures whose existence we have forgotten and which have thus become oppressive.

Ludwig Nagl concludes the volume with a short series of cryptic notes that allude to difficulties in describing Wittgenstein's philosophy as either pragmatic or deconstructive. This is a collection that will be of interest primarily to Wittgenstein scholars in philosophy departments who are perennially interested in what the likes of Conant and Putnam have to say. Although it

doesn't *survey* the issues in any organized or challenging way, the book certainly provides several intelligent proposals about Wittgenstein's relation to the traditions of pragmatism and deconstruction, and his legacy more broadly.

Cressida J. Heyes
University of Alberta

James Otteson

Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.

Pp. + 338.

US\$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81625-4);

US\$26.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-01656-8).

James Otteson's *Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life* will appeal mostly to the growing band of Adam Smith specialists and those interested in reception of Hume's moral theory. In addition, though, those that want to understand why, despite considerable recent scholarly revisionism (e.g., Spencer Pack's *Capitalism As a Moral System: Adam Smith's Critique of the Free Market Economy* [Edward Elgar 1991], or Emma Rothschild's *Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment* [Harvard University Press 2001]), Smith continues to appeal to thinkers of Libertarian, religious and/or free-market orientation will find a sophisticated, albeit accessible, exposition. It is, despite occasional repetitiveness, very clearly written and offers useful introductions to important elements of Adam Smith's thought. The first three chapters contain an especially lucid and insightful treatment of the foundations and appeal of Smith's moral theory, including useful comparisons to Hume's approach. While Otteson does not attempt to situate Smith's theory in contemporary debates in ethics and meta-ethics or the broader history of philosophy, Otteson offers a careful discussion and occasional defense of Smith's approach to Sympathy, the Impartial Spectator Procedure, the role of Conscience, and Smith's broader views of human nature. Nevertheless, the Humean will not find all of Otteson's arguments compelling since he does not respond to Hume's criticism of Smith's understanding of sympathy. (Cf. David Raynor's 'Hume's Abstract of Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 22 [1984] 51-79.) Other notable treatments in Otteson's book are the frank discussion of the role God plays in Smith's moral philosophy (239-57), and, especially, his original treatment of Smith's essay, 'Considerations Concern-

ing the First Formation of Languages, and the Different Genius of Original and Compounded Languages' (first published in 1761, later attached by Smith to *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* [hereafter TMS] from the third edition onward), which is largely neglected in scholarly literature (258-74; sadly, Otteson, in turn, neglects David M. Levy's provocative 'Adam Smith's Rational Choice Linguistics', *Economic Inquiry* 35 [1997] 672-8).

The main point of Otteson's book is to resurrect and precisely re-formulate the so-called 'The Adam Smith Problem' (hereafter TASP; see also, Leonidas Montes, 'Das Adam Smith Problem: its origins, the stages of the current debate, and one implication for our understanding of sympathy', *Journal of the History of Economic Thought* 25 [2003] 63-90). TASP turns on the claim that there is a fundamental tension between the benevolence advocated in Adam Smith's TMS (first published in 1759; my references to it are by part, section, paragraph, and page-number in edition edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1984) and the diagnosis and advocacy of self-interest in Smith's (1776) *The Wealth of Nations* (hereafter WN; all my references will be by book, chapter, paragraph and page-number in the edition edited by R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, 1981). Otteson revives TASP in order to offer an original and insightful reconstruction of an invisible, conceptual structure that, on an abstract level, underlies and unifies Smith's approach to many kinds of social phenomena (285-9), including morality, the development of language, and economic activity. This model is a self-regulating market-place consisting of four features: 1) a basic motivating desire; 2) rules developed; 3) currency (i.e., what gets exchanged); 4) resulting in 'Unintended System of Order' (286-7). While Otteson does a good job in showing that, on some global level, Smith's thought may have been structured around this template, he can only do so by avoiding some of the messy, textual details of Smith's positions. For instance, it has been little noticed that Smith thinks that economic markets are rather *inexact* (WN I.v.4, 49), whereas the moral market in justice, but not the other virtues, somehow ends up producing rules that are exact (TMS III.6.10, 175). For Otteson's argument to work there needs to be some explanation of such discrepancies. Nevertheless, even if one is not persuaded by Otteson's speculative reconstruction of Smith's 'general model of a market' (102) — he admits there is no 'explicit textual evidence' that Smith intended it as the 'key' to understanding 'the development and maintenance of *all* large-scale human institutions' (258; emphasis in original) —, Otteson nicely shows (in Chapter 4) how too many of the best known commentators have not addressed the strongest possible version of TASP.

Otteson's solution to TASP is to offer, besides the general 'structural similarity' (199) of the 'general model of a market', a discussion of what he calls the 'familiarity principle'. The benevolence one properly feels toward another is a function of the knowledge one has of that other, or of one's familiarity with that other (183). This explains why different motivations may be proper in different spheres of life. In particular, it 'explains why self-interest is properly the motive people feel in economic life' (198) that, in

the modern world, is conducted among strangers. While this aspect of Otteson's argument is not very original (cf. Russell Nieli's 'Spheres of Intimacy and the Adam Smith Problem', *Journal of The History of Ideas* 47 [1986] 611-24), Otteson's treatment is a fine model of caution and argumentative rigor.

Sometimes, Otteson is not cautious enough in dealing with Smith's intricate prose. For instance, at TMS VI.ii.3.1, 235, Smith offers a diagnosis of what the world would be like psychologically to somebody. Contrary to Otteson's way of quoting the passage (151), there is no affirmation of the existence of an all-wise Being. But my main reservation about the book turns on a crucial premise in Otteson's argument for reviving TASP; it is the claim that, in WN, Smith 'only' appeals to 'self-interest.' Otteson insists that there is no evidence that, in WN, Smith thought that 'any motivation besides self-interest is active in human behavior' (156). This is in stark contrast to the complex moral psychology presented in TMS. Now, this is not a problem in logical consistency between the two books, for nowhere in WN is it suggested that the focus on self-love, which for Smith is 'the governing principle in the intercourse of human society' (154 n.30), would *rule out* other sources of motivation — none of the passages, which Otteson cites from WN (155), go quite that far. Rather, Otteson's argument relies on an incomplete analysis of the rhetoric and moral psychology that is presupposed in WN. So, for instance, he ignores *Smith's* repeated appeals to the *reader's* 'humanity' and 'reasonableness' (e.g., WN V.ii.e.6, 842; V.ii.e.19; 846, I.viii.36, 96; I.viii.44, 100) or Smith's outrage at the 'folly and injustice' of European Colonists (WN IV.vii.b.59, 588). This also means that claims about the near complete absence of benevolence (153) are misleading — WN is explicitly part of a political project that goes beyond self-interest.

Moreover, the details of Smith's economic and political analysis in WN often rely on a rather complex moral psychology not compatible with the simpler view diagnosed by Otteson. As far back as 1971, George Stigler, the Nobel Laureate, lamented that Smith abandoned *Homo Economicus* when analyzing public affairs ('Smith's Travels on the Ship of State', *History of Political Economy* 3 [1971] 265-77). Furthermore, Smith seems to imply that cartels among employers are maintained not primarily because breaking them would violate the self-interest of an individual merchant (on the contrary), but because it would diminish the merchant's popularity among his 'neighbors and equals' (WN I.viii.13, 84). While there is no mention of mutual sympathy in this passage or other passages like it in WN, something like it and the complex moral psychology of TMS, with its emphasis on the importance of our often 'childish vanity' (WN III.iv.17, 422), which is self-deceptive and undermining of our self-interest, is often explicitly presupposed in it (e.g., III.iv.16, 422; IV.iv.V.iii.1, 905; III.iii.15,407, etc.). TASP, then, ignores the subtlety and complexity of WN. That is to say, Otteson falls victim to the idea that since WN is a work in political economy its aims, message, and method are fairly straightforward. In WN, Smith is not 'ignorant of the world' (I.viii.13, 84). But these misgivings should not detract from the merits

of a fine work. Otteson's book is an important contribution to our evolving understanding of Adam Smith.

Eric Schliesser

Washington University

**Michael A. Peters and
Paulo Ghiraldelli Jr., eds.**

Richard Rorty:

Education, Philosophy, and Politics.

Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield

Publishers 2001. Pp. v + 210.

US\$72.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-0905-2);

US\$28.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-0906-0).

Peters and Ghiraldelli, the editors of *Richard Rorty: Education, Philosophy, and Politics*, collected nine essays that clarify, challenge, and sometimes support Rorty's work. The book articulates various points of view from social and political philosophers of education on the left and uses Rorty as a bridge between Analytical and Continental philosophy. The editors reinscribe illiberal neo-Nietzschean pessimism within a utopian liberalism, rethinking primarily Dewey's pragmatism. Various authors also use Rorty's faith in the cosmopolitan ideal and its supporting universalism to argue for liberal progressivism, democratic socialism, optimistic postmodernism or some other destination in-between. What unites them with Rorty against the analytical right, parochial liberal rationalism, and moralistic conservatism, is an interest in broadening philosophical discourse from within the historicist left, that is, drawing on post-Hegelian thought: neo-Pragmatism, neo-Marxism, and neo-Nietzscheanism. However, what unites them against Rorty is their suspicion of his ethnocentrism (i.e., American liberalism and its capitalist and imperialist tendencies) as well as their weapons of choice: theoretical argumentation and principled justification. Where Rorty uses expressivist 'post-philosophical' neopragmatism, that is, the edifying conversation of a strong poet, they prefer the reflexive rationalism of a moderately disciplined philosophy of education.

Whilst ranging from sympathetic therapy to trenchant critique of Rorty's position, the nine chapters are organized thematically to address (1) Rorty's 'postmodern' neopragmatism privileging rhetoric over logic; (2) his metaphysics of absence tending toward linguistic idealism; (3) his Nietzschean commitments positioned between the critical theory of Habermas and the radical postmodern left exemplified by Deleuze; (4) his American optimism

with Dewey for the utopian project of bourgeois liberalism against European pessimism, in the style of Foucault; (5) his postmodern assault on theory which problematizes and jetisons the objective foundations for knowledge and ethics; (6) his reformist political liberalism along with his anti-Marxist misunderstandings and failure to comprehend the utopian weakness of American pragmatism and Marx's critique of 'actually existing liberalism'; (7) his apologetics for American capitalism and imperialism and his defense of aesthetic enhancement for the leisured elite; (8) his flirtation with the irrational and illiberal aspects of postmodernism and the threat they pose to the philosophy of education; and (9) his incomprehensible demolition of all analytical, disciplinary and historico-political criteria and his concomitant judgment that the rich Atlantic liberal democracies stand at the apex of *historical development*. While *Chapters Two and Eight*, respectively, embrace and support Rorty, the 'Introduction' and other chapters are much less sympathetic and the last chapter captures a recurrent theme: Rorty's position inadequately articulates a utopian politics to implement specific reforms, and it lacks the kind of social facticity required for Americans to engage with the reality of international politics and their involvement in global exploitation, poverty, and pollution.

As editors, Peters and Ghiraldelli should be complemented for coordinating a distinguished collection of informed scholars whose commentary touches on a wide range of salient topics long absent in the philosophy of education that has too often been mired in methodological individualism, ordinary language analytics, and Rawlsian ethics. The book also cashes in on Dewey's rising stock, long-valued in education circles but boxed in the basement of Anglo-American philosophy. For those theorists not familiar with Dewey, the editors have provided an important entry point through Rorty to Dewey in contemporary debates.

However, Rorty's numerous ambiguities, retractions, and turns of phrase make for a difficult target, and an edited volume adds even more unevenness to the final product. This unevenness, nevertheless, does not distract from an informative and engaging read for people with some previous understanding of the work of Rorty or the kind of conversation he is promoting. Neophytes and university students should be forewarned for a test of rigor; and analytical philosophers should be prepared to think with new vocabularies. The authors use *Richard Rorty* to develop their own positions and to introduce the philosophy of education to Continental currents of thought: Hegelian, Marxian, Nietzschean, and Heideggerian.

Several weaknesses are evident. A chapter devoted to a feminist critique of Rorty would have provided welcome insights on gender and education. Similarly, race and sexual-orientation theories get short shrift. Also, the politics of recognition — as a counterpoint to identity politics — remained relatively unexplored. However, I welcomed the emphasis on class analysis (usually a lacuna in philosophy of education).

Weaknesses were also related to theme and application. The 'education' thread was not clearly articulated in each and every piece. The editors could

have given better direction to their authors to draw specific linkages between Rorty's ideas and education theory. Also, attention could have been paid to how Rorty's ascendancy parallels the decline of explanatory social science in much educational research and the current fashion for aestheticized and linguistified empiricism, now narrowly fixated on expressive forms of narrative, auto-ethnography and discourse analysis. This pseudo-radical 'research' shares more with 'anti-intellectualism', what historian Richard Hofstadter identified as America's *dominant* intellectual tradition, than it does with counterhegemonic discourse. As Cornel West writes in *The American Evasion of Philosophy*, Rorty's neopragmatism has two major shortcomings, a distrust of theory and a preoccupation with transient vocabularies. West calls for greater commitment to social facticity represented in work by Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Beauvoir, and Du Bois. However, while West's problem with Rorty also applies to much of what passes for philosophy in education, this book escapes that criticism.

Overall, *Richard Rorty* was an edifying, analytical, informative and interesting book, a task the editors set for themselves and delivered. I also share Peters' anxiety about the force of Rorty's patriotic Amero-centrism, reified in his term 'our country'. Peters writes: 'My fear as a citizen of a very small country (New Zealand) on the periphery of the world system is that Rorty's faith in consensus and in the smooth world evolution of liberal democracy, will ride over ethnic and cultural differences ... [as] "we" liberals and the rest ...' (191-2). Peters' prescient commentary was written prior to George W. Bush's new *unilateral preemptive defense policy* and it should remind 'we theorists and the rest' that Rorty's ever-expanding inclusiveness in a conversational 'we' captures American ethnocentrism not only at a national level but also at the global level, and it, this Empire Lite, is backed up by so much more than a new vocabulary.

Jerrold L. Kachur
(*Faculty of Education*)
University of Alberta

Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, eds.

Logical Form and Language.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 2002. Pp. x + 512.

Cdn\$165.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-19-924460-X);

Cdn\$60.00: US\$29.95

(paper: ISBN 0-19-924555-X).

Since Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, the notion of logical form has come to play a very important role in the analysis of logical inference and in the search for the underlying nature of language and thought. Because of their influence in logic, linguistics and the philosophy of language, one would expect this topic to be at the forefront of research in these areas. But the editors of the collection, Gerhard Preyer and Georg Peter, suggest that logical form has not received as much attention as might be expected in the philosophical literature, and have therefore brought together sixteen recent essays by philosophers and linguists to provide a partial remedy to the situation.

As expected, the first thing one notices when reading these essays is that there is no clear consensus among the authors as to what exactly the correct notion of logical form is. There seem to be at least four competing accounts. First, there is the notion of logical form understood as the general and abstract form of logically valid arguments; this conception is not discussed much in these essays. Second, there is the conception found in Russell's work where sentences are given a function-argument analysis in which the hidden quantificational nature of those sentences is revealed. Third, the logical form of a sentence can be understood as the derivation of that sentence's T-sentence from the axioms of a truth theory for the language; this is the conception that we find in Alfred Tarski and Donald Davidson. And fourth, there is the conception dealt with more often in linguistics — the LF of Chomsky's generative grammar. Several of the authors in this collection try to show the superiority of one of these conceptions of logical form over the others, while other authors try to reconcile or synthesize these differing accounts.

One of the more interesting general claims about logical form is found in Jeffrey King's essay. He argues that when philosophers make claims about the logical form of sentences, there are two sorts of things they could be claiming. On the one hand, such a claim could be about the structure of the sentence and the constituents of which it is composed; on the other hand, the claim could be about the nature of one of the constituents of the sentence (121). He convincingly argues that we need to be clear about which sort of claim we are making when we say that such-and-such is the logical form of a particular sentence. This distinction is instructive when looking at the essays by Stephen Neale and Bernard Linsky. Neale argues that we can abbreviate portions of the logical form of sentences suggested by Russell in his *Principia* to incorporate restricted quantifiers so that his insights about descriptions

and their truth-conditions can be incorporated into a semantics for natural language that we find in Tarski or LF. However, Linsky argues that such a move goes against the ontological commitments of Russell, commitments which are supposed to be displayed in the logical form itself. One way around this debate, however, would be to utilize King's distinction and allow both points of view, but to distinguish them as different sorts of claims; Neale's is a claim about the nature of the constituents of the sentence while Linsky's is a claim about the structure of the sentence itself, and what constituents compose it.

A couple of essays in the collection deal with the problem of proper names and what their treatment tells us about logical form. In their essays, Marga Reimer and Reinaldo Elugardo both recognize that there are problems with the two dominant conceptions of logical form about sentences containing proper names. According to the Millian view, in which names are individual constants, there is a problem accounting for the obvious informativeness of sentences like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. The Russellian view, in which names are disguised descriptions, faces problems with stability of meaning. Reimer suggests that we accept both and decide between them in particular contexts by appealing to the communicative intentions of the speaker. Elugardo, however, argues that we ought to abandon both of these dominant conceptions and attempts to resurrect Tyler Burge's thesis that the logical form of a name is a predicate.

All of the essays in the collection are of a high quality, and would be of interest to those doing research in formal approaches to semantics or in the interface between linguistics and philosophy. In addition to making claims about logical form in general, they address such specific issues as identity, event analyses, tense, intensionality, propositional attitudes and facts. There are, however, two minor critical points that ought to be mentioned.

First, the editors state that the aims of this collection are to present a series of essays that focus specifically on logical form and to fill what they perceive to be a lacuna in the literature. But in this they have not been entirely successful. Most of the essays do not deal with logical form directly, but rather focus on issues that have implications for logical form; and in that respect, they do not differ from most work that has already been carried out in philosophical semantics and linguistics, much of which has similar implications.

Second, the index is inadequate. Many of the names in the index direct us to the bibliographies of the essays, and not to the text where the indexed name is discussed. And frequently the indexed name is not discussed in the text at all, but is merely a reference to the editor of a book in which another author's essay is published. As well, the indexing is generally shoddy. For example, in many cases where two authors share a surname (e.g., B. Linsky, L. Linsky; J. King, T. King; etc.), the page references are mixed up. For those who treat indexes as convenient research tools, this index is of little help.

John R. Cook
Trent University

Andrew Reynolds

Peirce's Scientific Metaphysics:

The Philosophy of Chance, Law, and Evolution.

Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press

2002. Pp. xii + 228.

US\$49.95. ISBN 0-8265-1396-4.

This is a valuable book. Reynolds provides a comprehensive overview of Peirce's philosophy, a detailed historical contextualization of that philosophy, and a searching dialogue with Peirce on a variety of fundamental issues. This is the first book I would recommend to a prospective student of Peirce.

Reynolds argues that one cannot understand Peirce's cosmological metaphysics with a bottom-up approach that starts with inorganic matter and moves up to mind. Seeing himself as a logician and construing logic as the study of processes of thought, Peirce's approach is to begin with mind or 'psychics' and extend logic into the study of the world at large. He rejects the thesis of the 'unknowable' that Spencer invoked as well as Huxley's agnosticism (he coined the term) about metaphysical questions and Dubois-Reymond's acceptance of 'world riddles' about which he proclaimed '*Ignoramus, ignorabimus*', favoring instead as a very first rule of inquiry, 'Do not set up roadblocks in the path of inquiry'. The thesis of objective idealism, that the laws of mind and of nature are identical, is Peirce's solution to the world riddles. His philosophy of *pragmaticism* rejects nominalism and conventionalism, holding that we actually experience generality, a connectedness or continuity among ideas in the form of patterns and regularities that he called *Thirdness*. In place of the agnosticism, necessitarianism, and mechanical philosophy that were entrenched in the late nineteenth century, Peirce proposed synechism, tychism, and agapism. Synechism forbids explanations that posit brute atomic facts; tychism hypothesizes that the world is essentially indeterministic; and agapism posits the reality of final causes. Reynolds suggests that the example of a series of tosses with a fair coin captures 'the deep significance of the law of large numbers for Peirce's overall philosophy' (12). To say the coin is fair is to say that repeated tosses would result, on average and in the long-run limit, in a series having roughly equal proportions of heads and tails. The subjunctive mood here emphasizes the reality of a general law of behavior, a propensity that is real yet open-ended, inexhaustible by any actual series of tosses. Any such series displays an emerging pattern or regularity, and irreversible trend toward a final limit, that becomes more exact and concrete with increasing repetitions. This display illustrates 'an evolving and end-directed universal trend toward what Peirce dubbed the cosmological "growth of reasonableness" ' (12).

Cosmological theory for Peirce is about supplying hypotheses of some likelihood, capable of being verified or refuted by future observers. Hypothesis as a form of inference is distinct from induction and deduction, termed by Peirce abduction or retroduction. Reynolds presents Peircian hypothesis

as containing the essence of the covering-law or hypothetical-deductive model of explanation, but also as anticipating Hempel's later inductive-statistical model.

Peirce's synechism interprets nature as continuous rather than atomistic. Laws of nature are continuous because they involve constants with continuous values, and this implies that experimental observation must be prone to imprecision; so a stance of fallibilism is called for. Synechism's principle of continuity also means that the most important type of explanation is an evolutionary one, one that grows.

Peirce's process-oriented philosophy replaces Aristotle's ten categories and Kant's sixteen with three. Peirce writes: 'Chance is First, Law is Second, the tendency to take habits is Third. Mind is first, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third' (19). Reynolds presents Peirce's synechism as a bridge for overcoming dualisms: 'For example, habit taking (a third) is the explanation of how the universe has evolved from chance (a first) to lawful behavior (a second). Evolution (third) is how the regular and seemingly inert properties of matter (second) have arisen from the spontaneous and free activity of mind-stuff (first)' (20).

Peirce was throughout his life 'a Newtonian of sorts when it came to understanding time (but not space). Time was, in his opinion, something absolute and real (but again, space was not)' (48). He feels obliged to explain the continuity and flow of time, doing so by appeal to the 'Law of Mind' that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility, which groups ideas into those that a given idea can affect and those that affect it, establishing a preferred direction in the flow of time. (Reynolds finds a redundancy about irreversibility, because Peirce also has an account of it that derives from the objective logic of events in the world external to our minds; this raises questions that he does not see as being resolved by Peirce [72].)

So causation, not to be confused with the dynamical notion of force, is applicable in the realm of mental action, not in physics but in psychics. He did not believe that a materialist reduction of psychics to physics would work, though he did agree that 'mind is to be regarded as a chemical genus of extreme complexity and instability' (60), because it cannot account for the properties of sensation, feeling, or consciousness (62). This is compatible with his first rule of inquiry, because chance is the one thing that requires no explanation, and 'Chance is but the outward aspect of that which within itself is feeling' (62). Instants of time are also of the category of firstness; they are spontaneous sources of novelty.

Peirce's objective idealism stipulates that physical laws are inveterate habits exhibited by matter, and that matter is mind that has become 'hidebound' with habit (52). Mind and universe function by the same principles, so the development of the individual should map onto the universe at large as a 'supersystemic mind in development' (71). If individual mind proceeds by logical inference, so too the universe: evolution proceeds by principles analogous to logical inference (71). Unlike Hegel's absolute,

Peirce's universe makes inductions and abductions as well as deductions, allowing novelty and spontaneity.

Peirce's 'Agapasticism' incorporates both the stochastic elements of Darwin's theory of evolution and the Lamarck-inspired idea that evolution purposive deployment of novel traits, whereby it becomes the engine driving 'the universe's own teleological striving for systemic orderliness' (77).

Reynolds expands on the relationship between Peirce's doubt-belief theory of inquiry and a molecular-level account of protoplasm when the nervous system, when stimulated by an irritating source of doubt, hits upon a sequence of reactions that removes the irritation (84), becoming habitual if called for often enough. This account might seem amenable to the orthodox mechanical philosophy, but Peirce argues that there is at least one large phenomenon that resists any such treatment, namely, 'that there should ever have come about such a massive aggregation of trillions of molecules as we see in the world about us' (92). The initial conditions of the universe must not be accepted as brute facts, as the mechanical philosophy would have it, but must instead be explained by reference to his law of habit taking, an evolutionary account that would provide for novelty that is not merely combinatorial but qualitatively new. Peirce wished to *Darwinize* physics, as Reynolds puts it (95), although his interpretation of Darwin was flawed, on Reynolds' view, and his agapism owes more to Lamarckian theory. But even Lamarckian teleology will not account for development of the universal mind, for the universe as a whole does not occupy an environment in the same way as an organism does. However, if we can find an intrinsic goal of inquiry, the intrinsic goal of evolution will follow. This led Peirce around 1900 to begin developing the thesis that logic is based on ethics, and ethics in turn on aesthetics, in such a way that the intrinsic goal of inquiry is revealed as a form of *beauty*. So the goals of inquiry and of evolution are states of maximum beauty, more specifically, states of 'perfectly harmonious symmetry', which he also called 'logical goodness' (111). The universal mind will eventually weld together all of its diverse systems of coordinated ideas into one continuous and general system (112). This has a social dimension, in that we ought to meld our own interests and ambitions with that of a broader community supposed to extend to the final limit of inquiry. And of course it has a dimension in nature, where in the final limit the universe will become a completely connected, continuous, coordinated and self-aware system. Law will have triumphed over chance.

Reynolds' chapter on law and chance detects at least six different interpretations of chance that are at work in Peirce's philosophy. His diagnosis of this overly rich array is that Peirce was continually attempting to fit all aspects of experience into the framework of his three categories: 'Any phenomenon weak in the characteristics of lawfulness and regularity (thirdness) or of brute resistance and force (secondness) naturally found its way into the first category' (156).

Reynolds' Conclusion mediates the dispute between interpreters of Peirce who appraise his philosophy as inconsistent and those who see it as coherent.

He follows Goudge in distinguishing a British 'Naturalistic' Peirce and a German 'Transcendentalist' Peirce, the former positivistic and concerned with the clarification of ideas, the latter highly speculative and concerned with evolutionary cosmology. 'Both tendencies in Peirce's thought, the "good" and the "bad" (as people have been wont to view them), are direct products of sound methodological principles,' Reynolds argues. The British principle is the principle of pragmatism, whose influence on such movements as verificationism and operationalism testifies to its 'philosophical sobriety'. The German principle 'of equal soundness' is Peirce's first rule of inquiry. Actually Reynolds is less sure about the Transcendental Peirce. He likens Peirce's strict realism about laws, coupled with the first rule of reason, to a snake that begins to consume its own tail. He also admits that Peirce's anthropomorphism about nature as 'even more difficult for modern readers to swallow' (177). Moreover, he does not find Peirce forthcoming about how his metaphysical hypotheses are to be verified or falsified. On the other hand, he finds the negative reaction in the twentieth century to Peirce's metaphysics unjust because it fails to consider it within its proper historical context, and because it runs counter to a professed respect for the very attitude of open-mindedness and freedom from prejudicial judgment that led Peirce to hazard his hypotheses. He recommends that Peirce's metaphysical cosmology has the appeal of a great poetic vision, and that without minds like Peirce's in science 'our scientific image of the world might be more utilitarian and more solidly rooted in established fact, but it would also be less vibrant and provocative' (183).

Wesley Cooper

University of Alberta

Nicholas Saul, ed.

Philosophy and German Literature 1700-1990.

New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.

Pp. xii + 324.

US\$65.00. ISBN 0-521-66052-1.

The title raises high expectations that are then elevated by Nicholas Saul in the introductory essay. He sets out an extremely ambitious agenda: 'This volume thus seeks for the first time, not merely to reflect philosophically on what literature is, and so make one more contribution to literary theory, but to reconstruct, analyse and evaluate how poets and philosophers in Germany really *did* interact with one another through their writings, epoch by epoch,

in the modern period as a whole' (2). It is, of course, practically impossible to realize such a program in some three hundred pages for a span of three centuries. Rather more convincing are the admissions by Ritchie Robertson that the relationships between literature and philosophy are by no means simple or self evident (151). In the event, the study is lopsided, since we get virtually no insights into how philosophers interacted with literature or poetry. A fundamental weakness of the collection is that the vantage points are entirely from the domain of literature. While we hear yet again about Kant's influence on poets, we learn nothing about the influence of poets upon him. From the more recent past, Wittgenstein appears only tangentially (96), despite his interest in contemporary poetry. Although they are all distinguished in their fields of German literature and cultural studies, none of the contributors is a philosopher or even a historian of philosophy. The promise implied by the 'and' of the title is not met in these surveys of how various ideas, concepts and events shaped and left their mark on works of German literature.

Although the essays could stand alone, they have been coordinated chronologically. John A. McCarthy deals with the German Enlightenment, arguing that 'philosophy and literature in the Age of Enlightenment were epistemic tools for exploring the self, the limits of knowledge, the vocation of man, the inner workings of nature, for explaining the body-mind problematic and for establishing the appropriate relationship between individual freedom and social duty' (21). Nicholas Saul concentrates on problems of self and subjectivity between 1790-1830, which he sees primarily as the era of Romanticism. John Walker discusses literary and philosophical realism in the nineteenth century, conceding that 'in the realist age the link between philosophical aesthetics and literary practice is both looser and more dialectical than before' (146). The essay that is most satisfying, not least because of an awareness of the limitations of the project, is Ritchie Robertson's 'Modernism and the self 1890-1924'. He masterfully reveals order and connections in one of the most turbulent periods of modern German literature, one which shifted quickly from naturalism to impressionism and then to expressionism. The two final contributions move increasingly away from both literature and philosophy and perforce become essays in German cultural studies. Russell Berman reviews 'aspiration, memory, resistance 1918-1945', touching upon thinkers as varied as Weber, Brecht, Lukacs, Benjamin and Heidegger. Robert Holub sketches 'coming to terms with the past in postwar literature and philosophy', with Jaspers on German guilt, Adorno and Horkheimer on the dialectic of *Aufklärung*, and Habermas on Luhmann representing philosophy, besides the usual cast of literary writers.

Even though the essays provide a wealth of information and are well-written, it is hard to know what audience they will serve. Those without any background will be overwhelmed by the blur of names, titles and topics, the casual reference to technical terms such as 'utilitarianism' or 'pantheism', and bewildered by the synopses of literary individual texts they will hardly be familiar with, such as Haller's *Alpen* and Stifter's *Turmalin*. But special-

ists will find little that is new and, on more than one occasion, interpretations that are too superficial or dated, always a problem with surveys. *Faust* in two pages (96-8) hardly does justice to the philosophical issues the text could and does raise.

Two important dimensions of the putative dialogue between literature and philosophy do not emerge with sufficient force and clarity. One is the challenge presented by science and technology to philosophy in the German context. There are fleeting glances of this history (83-5; 117; 156-7; 162-3), but these do not provide an adequate guide to the crisis. It is a bit scandalous that references to physics end with Mach; Einstein and Heisenberg are not even cited.

The other shortcoming is in the presentation of women as thinkers. Although some effort has been made to include women writers such as Luise Gottsched, Karoline von Günderode, Else Lasker-Schüler, and Christa Wolf, the embarrassing under-representation of German women as philosophers still defines this volume. To cite one of the most glaring instances, Ingeborg Bachmann, who had studied philosophy (her doctoral dissertation was on Heidegger) and went on to become one of the most important, most philosophically demanding German writers in the last quarter of the twentieth century, is mentioned only in passing (279). Perhaps next time at least one feminist scholar will be invited to contribute and to redress the imbalance.

Arnd Bohm

(Department of English)

Carleton University

Nicholas Smith and Paul Woodruff, eds.

Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy.

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This collection of essays is the fruit of an on-going dialogue between a group of scholars reacting to a key paper by Gregory Vlastos, first presented in 1988 and reprinted here as Chapter 4 ('Socratic Piety'). The editors have even included private correspondences between Vlastos and others from the summer of 1989 concerning this topic (Chapter 10). Some of the papers also come from a workshop held at the University of Texas at Austin in 1996; a few others were invited. Readers should not be surprised, therefore, to find discussions of Socratic philosophy (as opposed to Platonic) heavily repre-

sented, as the title suggests. Parker's chapter is from his own acclaimed survey of Athenian religion (1996).

It is impossible to overstate the role that Socrates and his trial have played, and continue to play, in the self-understanding of Western philosophy. One short piece of Plato's writing, more than anything else, has been responsible for this monumental status: namely, the *Apology*, the famous speech purportedly spoken by Socrates to defend himself (unsuccessfully) in a court of law against charges of religious impropriety. There is perhaps no more fitting memorial to this controversial man than the degree of persistent controversy occasioned by this unique text, surrounding both the facts and the interpretation of his trial and execution. Was Socrates really innocent of the charges brought against him? To this day the jury is out. Was his defense even unsuccessful? (Socrates paradoxically proclaims, on his way to being executed, that it was not). And does Plato's courtroom drama show us the real Socrates at all?

The essays in this book, several of them by top scholars in the field, cast considerable light on this pivotal event. Majority opinion has long held that the religious crimes for which Socrates was tried were just a pretext for the removal of an outspoken enemy of the democracy (the 'political rationale' for the trial). That view has been challenged in recent years, and the editors of this volume are to be congratulated for offering a much-needed examination of the rival thesis (the 'religious rationale'): i.e., that the charges were motivated by sincere public outrage over Socrates' perceived threat to traditional values. In fact, most of the book's nine essays address two main questions. First, were Socrates' religious beliefs really a threat to Athenian society? And second, did Socrates' religious beliefs compromise his commitment to rationality? The contributions are of a consistently high quality and the results span the spectrum of opinion. Readers of all stripes are bound to have their hackles raised by one or another of the articles, but will also appreciate that each author has something relevant to add to the debate.

On the question of the trial itself Kraut, Vlastos and Woodruff all assert that Socrates was guilty in that he did reject the authority of traditional gods and replace them with an incompatible religious imperative. By stark contrast Parker, Brickhouse, Smith and Reeve all argue that Socrates was innocent (and was either scapegoated, misunderstood, or just plain unlucky to be tried). McPherran agrees mostly with the former, but lets Socrates off on a technicality. Some of these arguments are refreshingly new and all are interesting. Discussions of the second question (whether Socrates' religion discredits his pedigree as a philosopher) are perhaps less satisfying. They focus mostly on the epistemological status of his famous *daimonion* and seem to be plagued by ambiguities and misunderstandings. In the end, the letters to and from Vlastos reveal a basic disagreement as to the scope of the *elenchus*, Vlastos defending the claim that Socrates' trust in his *daimonion* rests on *elenchus*, and the others rejecting that claim. Woodruff's excellent piece ('Socrates and the Irrational' — Chapter 8), however, supersedes all of those discussions and seems to put the matter to rest.

The issues affecting our understanding of Socrates' trial and death are exceedingly complex, but this collection serves as a good introduction to them. Three authors (Vlastos, Brickhouse and Smith) pronounce directly on the historical Socrates; others (Kraut, Parker and McPherran) try to distinguish between Plato's portrayal and the man himself; while three more (Woodruff, Reeve and White) limit themselves to analyzing only Plato's version of the man. Gocer's task is to challenge the whole premise of 'Socratic philosophy'; her sobering criticisms are well taken, but her conclusions are perhaps overly skeptical. While this diversity of approach might appear salutary, it is actually more limited than it seems. With the exceptions of White and McPherran, none of the authors seems willing to employ much evidence drawn from the middle and late dialogues. This is unfortunate. Other scholars have presented original and exciting theses on Socrates' religious stance that bear directly upon the theme of this book; and yet those sorts of perspectives are notably absent from this collection, presumably because their sources are too heavily 'Platonic'.

An exception proves the rule: McPherran ('Does Piety Pay?' — Chapter 6) comes close to hitting upon a way to escape the horns of the political/religious dilemma that underlies this volume. Using evidence from the *Laws*, he nicely separates what he takes to be a traditionally authentic (Socratic) and an inauthentic (Platonic) rationale for prayer and sacrifice. He then presents this as a sign of doctrinal development from the former to the latter. At the same time, his excellent analysis of Socratic piety in the *Euthyphro* seems to justify popular resentment of Socrates on personal grounds: Socrates claims to be more pious than everyone else, because his view of piety is extremely demanding. But if we were to link this more demanding conception of piety to Plato's expression of two distinct rationales for religious practice, then may we not see this instead as a synchronic division of religion into two levels of practice/piety for different people (philosophers and non-philosophers)? The religious and political rationales for the trial might then collapse into one: *i.e.*, the mistaken (public) assumption that all people must be pious in the same way. McPherran, however, like the rest of the contributors, appears to rule out such a synchronous approach to the problem.

Another exception also deserves special mention. Stephen White's paper, 'Socrates at Colonus' (Chapter 9), makes a remarkably original case for Plato's institution of a hero cult of Socrates at the Academy, clear indications of which he claims can be found in the *Phaedo* (likely composed after the institution of such a cult) and elsewhere. Here again, evidence from the so-called 'non-Socratic' dialogues opens a new door to the historical Socrates via an elucidation of Plato's own religious motivations. This exciting argument is a must-read for anyone concerned with religious issues in Socratic and Platonic philosophy.

Steven Robinson
Brandon University