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Anita L. Allen
Why Privacy Isn't Everything: Feminist Reflections on Personal Accountability.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2003. Pp. vii + 211.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-1408-0);
US$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-1409-9).

This book is a welcome introduction to accountability for private life. As Allen says, though the idea of such accountability seems like an oxymoron, people are regularly required to answer for their private conduct by law and morality, and do so in a variety of settings and ways (1). The primary ambition of the book is to provide a thick description of the ways in which people are accountable for their private lives, as this is currently understood in the United States, although on the way Allen proposes to provide some normative judgements too. This ambition is partly motivated by Allen's interest in the changes that feminism has brought to the ways we think about private life, and partly because she disagrees with Amitzai Etzioni that Americans over-value privacy, and do so at the expense of social solidarity and the public interest (10-11). So, after clarifying what accountability for privacy life means and involves, Allen provides chapters on accountability to family and race, accountability for health, and accountability for sex.

There is much to enjoy and learn from in this book, and its discussion of accountability in adoptions is fair-minded and illuminating. In the 1950s and '60s, the practice of 'closed' adoptions prevailed. 'The parties were anonymous; the procedures were confidential; the official records were sealed.' Moreover, public officials and agencies colluded in the fiction that the adopted parents were the child's own birth parents (80). Today, by contrast, there is a lively debate between those who favour the continued involvement of birth parents in the lives of their children, even after adoption has taken place, and those who would like to keep this an option that adopting families might choose, but need not accept (87). Allen favours the latter position on the grounds that the involvement of birth parents, especially post-adoption, may be too burdensome for some adoptive parents, and at odds with their desire to form a family of their own (92-3, 95).

Likewise, in debates over trans-racial adoption and interracial marriage, Allen is sensitive to concerns for group survival, even though she is too much of a liberal to feel wholly comfortable with them (104). She believes that there is a general duty on blacks to maintain what is valuable about their culture (106). While this duty may be more difficult for people if they have married 'out', Allen denies that exogamy generates special obligations or constitutes treachery, ingratitude or indifference to one's racial or ethnic group. However, her views on the duties of white adoptive parents of black children are unclear. She insists that there is no categorical duty to introduce them to black culture, history, and values (95), and certainly nothing to justify post-adoption supervision by birth parents or black representatives. But that

leaves plenty of scope for lesser intrusive and categorical obligations. As Allen merely states the general obligation, it is hard to determine its extent or grounds and, therefore, its implications for trans-racial adoptions or, indeed, for the rest of us. Those who are interested in the philosophical questions raised by adoption, therefore, may want to look out for a collection of philosophy papers on the subject, edited by Sally Haslanger, of MIT.

Allen's discussion of accountability in health care, by contrast, is not particularly novel, though she is certainly right to complain that while 'a degree of choice is currently vested in the individual, once a person becomes a patient, a complex of commercial and governmental forces effectively renders control over medical information a chimera' (136). Her discussion of accountability for sex is more robust - at least when it comes to the treatment of sexual harassment. She takes issue with the contention of those, like Michael Rosen, who want to treat 'quid pro quo' harassment as a moral and constitutional violation of the equality of women, but believe that 'hostile environment' harassment is merely a form of bad behaviour that should be left to tort, not constitutional, law (114). Allen's critique of Rosen is persuasive. The differences between these two forms of harassment are not as clear as Rosen assumes. The latter can be just as damaging to the spirit and material situation of women as the former, and there is no reason why women should have to choose between tort and constitutional law when harassment can count both as bad behaviour and as a civil rights offense (147-8).

Unfortunately, after this, Allen's treatment of the sexual accountability of politicians is rather bland, issuing in the largely unobjectionable, but scarcely enlightening, conclusion that 'officials who unwisely mix business with intimate pleasure must accept scrutiny of their sex lives' (186). So far as I can tell, the best work on the subject remains the chapter on 'The Private Lives of Public Officials' in Dennis Thompson's *Political Ethics and Public Office* (Harvard University Press 1987), with its attention to questions of hierarchy and institutional design.

In short, while Allen's collection of essays is helpful, it does not go very deeply into any topic, and does not build into a sustained picture of accountability for private life. Allen's conception of thick description is impressionistic rather than rigorous, so the resulting picture of what Americans do is suggestive rather than definitive. Her discussion of the concept of accountability helpfully introduces the explanatory and justificatory aspects of her topic, but her examples (30-1) suggest that she is too quick to equate being subject to punishment with being held accountable for one's behaviour. The idea of rendering accounts seems to imply the existence of some trust or mandate, even if implicit, with standards for determining whether or not it has been fulfilled. By contrast, rules against drug use, smoking and drinking may simply be commands, and imply no transfer of trust or authority at all. Moreover, while I am sympathetic to Allen's views on the ethics of recreational drug use (68), she never gets to grips with the claim that criminalisation is principally responsible for the harms we associate with drugs, or with philosophical perspectives less extreme than those of Husak and Narveson.

Finally, the book needed some discussion, at the outset, of the difference between treating accountability as part of private life, and as an exception to it, as the differences between these seems essential to the feminist and democratic conception of accountability that Allen wants, and to which her book is a useful contribution.

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Lilian Alweiss
The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl.
Athens: Ohio University Press 2003.
Pp. xiv + 306.
US$42.95. ISBN 0-8214-1464-X.

A story is commonly told in which Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* (henceforth *SuZ*) overcomes the limitations of Husserl's phenomenology, thereby affecting a return to the world Husserl had unwittingly placed beyond our ken. *The World Unclaimed* inverts this story by arguing that *SuZ* has insuperable problems of its own and that the answer to these problems lies with Husserl. Heidegger thinks he has given us back the world, but Alweiss argues that he has done no such thing — Heidegger's 'world' is a world devoid of space, corporeality and sensuousness. His neglect of the material world results in paradoxes that can be avoided only once it is recognised that each of us is an essentially embodied creature. Our embodiment is something Husserl describes at length in his *Ideen II*. Hence, it is to Husserl's phenomenology that we must look to overcome the limitations of Heidegger's project, and not vice versa, as has so often been supposed.

Alweiss' argument succeeds in denting our common conception of Heidegger's relation to Husserl. Unfortunately, Alweiss' style will make this book an intimidating read for anyone who is not already deeply enmeshed in phenomenological thought. This is somewhat counterproductive in a book that does so much to establish the importance and relevance of phenomenological ideas today.

Husserl's phenomenology studies that which is given to a subject's consciousness with complete certainty, and puts to one side any beliefs whose truth is not in this way given. It discovers that our conscious experiences do not stop short of bringing us into a relation with the objective world. Phenomenology uncovers the existence of the world that forms a backdrop

to all our experiences. It brings to light how our belief in a unified and objective world is implicit in every experience we have.

Alweiss takes the latter points to highlight the error that is made when philosophers treat Husserl as a methodological solipsist. A methodological solipsist believes that the contents of experience do not require the existence of any objects or properties in the world. Yet there is also a strand in Husserl's thinking that allies him much more closely with the methodological solipsist. In his *Ideen 1* Husserl argues that consciousness would not be 'affected in its own existence' by 'an annihilation of the world of things' (Husserl *Ideen I*: 91).

Here, Husserl repeats a key move in Cartesian philosophy: he affirms the self-sufficiency of consciousness. Alweiss argues that Husserl's attempt to make consciousness into a self-sufficient realm ultimately fails. Husserl's account of the temporalisation of consciousness leads him to the discovery of something that is not given and can never be grasped completely: consciousness as 'a standing, streaming self-presence'.

Alweiss is not entirely clear what implications she takes her argument to have for Husserl. One could read her argument as demonstrating once and for all that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: that consciousness always includes a moment of transcendence. Alternatively, her argument could be read as exposing the limits of Husserl's phenomenology. I suspect she takes her argument to have both implications. If so, where does this leave Husserl? Her arguments in the final chapter may indicate a possible way out of these difficulties for Husserl. However, the exit route she identifies, while indebted to Husserl, may not be one open to phenomenology.

Heidegger's *SuZ* describes the kind of existence distinctive of human beings, which he gives the name *Dasein*. By stressing the unity of Dasein and its world, Heidegger achieves what Alweiss describes as a 'dis-location' (*Ortsverlegung*) of subjectivity. Dasein is said to be 'in' the world through the understanding it has of the world. Dasein is not located in the world in the way that material things are physically located in space.

While Alweiss finds herself in agreement with *SuZ*'s dis-location of subjectivity, she also finds in Heidegger what she describes as a 'Resistance to Thinking Resistance' (see §56). Heidegger argues for a priority of meaningfulness over materiality that Alweiss thinks cannot be sustained. In *SuZ* he argues that we only ever become aware of a thing in its materiality after we have understood its significance. Alweiss points out that such a priority has the paradoxical consequence that something can show up as meaningful only by withdrawing from us, into the background. Anything that withdraws into the background becomes invisible. Thus, Heidegger has to say that a thing shows up for Dasein and thus becomes *visible* only by withdrawing into the background and becoming *invisible*.

Heidegger ignores Dasein's embodiment and materiality, Alweiss claims, because of the threat that acknowledgment of our embodiment would present to Dasein's primordial freedom (see §87). Dasein would always be bound to its body in the here and now, before it was projected into the future in

accordance with its possibilities. Yet the paradox just described can be avoided only if we recognise that Dasein's materiality precedes its circumspective engagement with the world.

It is this conclusion that leads Alweiss to give the last word to Husserl. Dasein, she says, is always already 'here' before it is 'there': the possibilities open to me are always preceded by my 'rootedness in the world' (165). Husserl's *Ideen II* introduces the idea of the subject as a lived body (*Leib*). Alweiss claims to have identified, in the idea of the lived body, a means of dis-locating subjectivity while at the same time recognising our existence in the material world. The lived body is always sensing the world before anything is sensed. It is that which is always experiencing a subject's experiences but is never itself experienced.

However, once we think of the sensing body as that which remains latent in consciousness, it is unclear whether it can any longer be claimed to be something available for phenomenological description. The phenomenologist describes that which is given to consciousness, but Alweiss maintains that the sensing body is always on the scene before anything is given to consciousness. Thus, the sensing body is something that is not available for phenomenological description. This is not the conclusion that Alweiss draws but it is unclear to me why not. Her arguments seem to demonstrate that phenomenology is led back to something that is not available for phenomenological description. If this is so, one wonders where this leaves phenomenology.

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Alain Badiou
Saint Paul - The Foundation of Universalism.
Trans. Ray Brassier. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2003. Pp. 111.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4471-8);
US$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4471-8).

Alain Badiou's *Saint Paul* is a striking attempt to recast Pauline theology as a radical emancipatory theory of human subjectivity. Engagements with Paul have regularly taken place in recent Continental thought - Lacan, Derrida, Lyotard and Agamben being notable examples. Badiou's book does more however than just rereading Paul for traces of an alternative picture (as Derrida does) - it proposes a full-blown theoretical position, original to

Paul, that Badiou claims to be developing in his own philosophy of the event and in his theory of the subject.

For Badiou, subjectivity is a somewhat rare state that comes about through the holding-faithful to what he calls a truth-event. Truth is an event on Badiou's account because it must supersede the social and ontological order - what Paul for Badiou calls the Law of the flesh - arriving as something new bearing a rupturing force. The holding-faithful to this new event is what gives particular subjects their *raison d'être*. Furthermore, fidelity to the event brings about a structure that Badiou holds, with other theorists such as Slavoj zizek, to be crucial in confronting both the current socio-economic and political environment and the malaise of contemporary political philosophy: that is, a claim to universality, since truth always stands outside of the regional or partisan divisions of society. For Badiou, then, Paul's writings describe the development of a unique and original Christian subject, based on faithfulness to the event of the resurrection that in turn illuminates the universality of every such truth-event.

Badiou's reading of Paul begins with the claim that Paul 'reduces Christianity to a single statement: Jesus is resurrected' (4), and the book progresses by holding to this, only after discarding the religious content of the statement (Badiou states his atheism clearly at the beginning of the book). In fact, Badiou insists that Paul goes further. Noting the well-known fact that Paul rarely invokes any features of Jesus' life, he claims that Paul deliberately discards any such content (miracles, aphoristic teaching, etc.), which *'is not what is real in conviction, but obstructs or even falsifies it'* (33).

The remaining content of the book is given to pursuing this single Christian statement with reference to the two themes noted above: the structure of subjectivity and the universality of truth. The first receives its elaboration through three famous sets of Pauline terms: grace and the law (Chapter 7), the flesh and the spirit (Chapter 6) and faith, hope and love (Chapters 8-9). Badiou demonstrates that all of these terms bear directly on the kind of subjectivity manifested by holding fast to the event of the resurrection. Thus, the flesh and the law of the flesh are accounts of the Self in its presubjective state, unalloyed with any truth event, and thus bound by all of the divisions and inequalities that characterise social life. Grace is the name for the event itself, which quickens subjectivity and casts it into the realm of the spirit, the realm of subjective life.

The second theme, concerning the universal nature of truth, is an extended meditation on the fact that, being an event that stands beyond the sectarian social world, the resurrection addresses itself to everyone both equally and universally. Abstracting the specifically religious content of this picture provides a structure of the relation between subjectivity and the event. Thus the resurrection is both singular and universal at once, the gambit of Badiou's philosophy of the event as a whole.

Badiou's use of Paul in this way calls for some critical reflection, insofar as his method of reading fails as it succeeds. The more clearly the reading demonstrates that Paul is the first theorist of a universal truth, the less like

Paul this position seems, and the more like Badiou. This strong interpretative method also characterizes his work on Beckett, and - in a different way - his book on Deleuze, both of which seem to bear out a Badiouan world-view from very diverse and sometimes unsympathetic material. The strain to be felt on the Biblical material that Badiou uses in his own fashion varies throughout the book.

To consider that an abstract structure (the generic human subject as a holding-faithful to a truth-event) can be removed from amidst these ancient writings is a perhaps overbold claim that reveals more about Badiou's debt to the formal mathematics of Cantor than St. Paul. More amusing is the attempt to vindicate Paul of the charge of misogyny. Badiou goes to great lengths (103ff) to inscribe a new set of concepts in his system, what he calls the Pauline 'theory of women' (43) in order to exonerate Paul from any and all fundamentally partisan opinions. This seems unnecessary if Paul's writings exhibit 'no transcendence, nothing sacred, perfect equality of this work with every other.' All this without any reference to the quite straightforward contextual explanations of the apparently misogynist exhortations - for wives to submit to their husbands, for example - found in Paul's writings that are offered by mainstream biblical scholarship. Likewise, his attempt to refute Nietzsche's scathing remarks addressed to Paul bring out a number of interesting parallels between the two, but lacks attention to what Nietzsche was really focused on, the *values* that motivated the Pauline text.

Badiou is ultimately an unconvincing reader of Paul. However, the power and interest of this book lies in the quite straightforward development of his own philosophy in these terms that pervade Western culture. As a result, *Saint Paul - The Foundation of Universalism* offers an interesting introduction to Badiou's valuable work

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Richard H. Bell
Understanding African Philosophy: A Cross-cultural Approach to Classical and Contemporary Issues.
New York: Routledge 2002. Pp. xv +189 .
Cdn$128.00: US$85.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-93936-4);
Cdn$ 32.95: US$21.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-93937-2).

To understand African philosophy, Richard Bell presents a five-point road map, which includes three major landmarks. The first landmark is the acceptance of the idea that philosophy is a product of an *aesthetic consciousness*; that genuinely philosophical issues arise from 'our seeing and experiencing the world in which we live.' The second is the assertion that active African philosophers understand their task of defining and refining the problems, methods and concerns of African philosophy as one of dialogue among themselves and others, including non-Africans. The third is the suggestion that, since a larger community other than professional philosophers is involved in the process (of defining and refining African philosophy), 'attention must be given to such factors that are expressive of Africa's ordinary forms of life.' These include orature, fictional literature, forms of governance and arts. These landmarks appear fairly unexceptional and uncontroversial. The juice of this book is in the details of Bell's understanding of a cross-cultural approach to African philosophy and its requirements.

For Bell, '*cross-cultural understanding*' is itself an interdisciplinary project that draws on different disciplines in order to position the reader 'to see' and 'to understand' the other's world (xi). It is tempting to deduce from this that Bell's targets are non-Africans trying to enter the world of African philosophy. But the temptation should be resisted because a similar injunction can be extended to an African trying to enter the non-African philosophical world, as well as to an African academic philosopher, trained in the Euro-American halls of philosophy, trying to enter the philosophical world of the non-literate traditional African.

Bell makes an interesting observation on page x: 'It is not that the peoples of Africa have not had the kinds of reflections about the meaning of life or how they came into being. Nor have they given less consideration to the ordering of their life in communities, to fairness and justice, or to the meaning of suffering and love than have other cultures. These are all concerns and interests in human life that are the very "stuff" of philosophical reflection.' Then he adds: 'In most of the subcontinent of Africa, however, what attention was given to such reflections in the first half of the twentieth century must be credited largely to Western social anthropologists. During the second half of the twentieth century, Africans and their philosophical reflections have been brought into dialogue with others who have longer histories of philosophy.' The shift here is from (1) 'Africans have had reflections about the

meaning of life, etc., which are the very stuff of philosophical reflections'; to (2) 'what attention was given to such reflections in the first half of the twentieth century must be credited to Western social anthropologists.' While (1) acknowledges philosophical reflections by Africans, (2) credits Western anthropologists for giving attention to it and for *midwifing* the dialogue between African philosophical reflections and others. Just as Western explorers discovered African rivers and mountains, Western anthropologists discovered African philosophical reflections.

In Chapter 1, Bell adopts the Wittgenstein-Winch view that to understand others, we have to 'work hard to determine what is significant from the point of view of its people' (1). Therefore a cross-cultural understanding of African philosophy, from the point of view of an alien, would require diligence and imagination, attentiveness to the modes of expression of the people, including the conceptual categories they use. Then the alien must translate these categories within himself or herself to see and understand them in his or her language situation. Bell discusses the Hallen-Sodipo Ordinary Language Analysis approach with appreciation. Hallen and Sodipo's experiment in African philosophy is designed to show how ordinary Yoruba language users understand and use the Yoruba correlates of 'know' and 'belief'. They discover a significant difference in the meanings of this pair and their so-called Yoruba counterparts, '*mo*' and '*gbagbo*', thus showing that 'propositional attitudes are not universal', and there are implicit alternative epistemological, metaphysical and moral systems in the conceptual systems of alien languages.

Chapter 2 is a discussion of the foundations of Modern African Philosophy, focusing on the trends isolated by the late Odera Oruka: Critical and Scientific, Ethnophilosophy, Sage Philosophy, Political and Ideological philosophy and Hermeneutic philosophy. Bell adds the Narrative trend. For him, the debate on the 'critical aspects of African thought' has been pursued in part in order to shed the '*unwanted burden* produced by a generation of *so-called ethnophilosophical* reflections,' the legacies of the 'negritude' movement, and the neo-colonial aspects of what is called 'African humanism or African socialism' (22, my emphasis). Bell's way of putting this suggests that he himself has voluntarily joined the debate. For the references to 'the unwanted burden', the 'so-called ethnophilosophical reflections', and 'African humanism' linked with neo-colonialism, suggest sub-texts that cannot be ignored. Parts of the unwanted burdens, according to Bell, include the 'universal and indiscriminate application of the animistic worldview' that is traceable to Tempels' ethnophilosophy to the whole of African thought pattern. This is of course one strain of ethnophilosophy. A second strain acknowledges differences and privileges cultural relativity between African nationalities and their world views.

Bell gives a lucid account of postcolonial and liberation philosophy in Chapter 3, observing that the literature linked to African humanism and socialism 'has produced a rich and interesting set of written texts that ... *are philosophical* as well as of social and political value' (his emphasis). This is important. For it is strange that Nkrumah's *Consciencism* can be denied the

label of philosophy on the ground that it attributes 'unanimity of views' to Africans. The sense in which, even if true, that allegation is a crime punishable by expulsion from the world of philosophy has not been demonstrated. Nkrumah or Senghor can make the case they make on behalf of an African attitude to life without implying that every African shares the beliefs or ideals attributed to them. That traditional Africans share a view of the world that may be characterized as humanist or a structure of social life that may be characterized as communal does not, by itself, suggest that every African does. 'In God We Trust' is an American slogan. It does not mean that every American believes in God. Nkrumah and Senghor do not deserve the accusation of 'the drive for a singular philosophy' and it is unclear why Bell also appears to buy into this unfair criticism.

What is interesting, if it does not appear an unfortunate example of a double standard, is that, even when the criticism of a 'unanimist worldview' is loud and clear, there is also a tendency to commend what also amounts to a unanimity of views with respect to moral concerns. This is especially the case when African moral ideals and processes are counterpoised against European ideals. For instance, in Chapter 4, Bell 'explores whether there is *a different sense* in which the concept of "justice" in the African context is being used ... ' (59, my emphasis), and he suggests that the concepts of suffering and poverty 'play a more important ethical role in the African context than in most parts of the world' (59). Obviously, he does not mean that everyone in Africa sees the matter the same way.

Even more relevant to this discussion, Bell contends that 'in specific African contexts (and these contexts are relatively widespread) a moderate form of communalism provides a moral background for why the concepts of identity, suffering, poverty, truth and reconciliation are each connected with justice and why they are of particular ethical significance in African philosophy and subsequently of universal importance to non-African moral thought' (60). Bell thus acknowledges communalism as an inherent social structure in traditional Africa. To hold this is not to be guilty of unanimism. But in the following section, Bell brings up Tempels' unanimism postulate in connection with his (Bell's) discussion of persons, individualism and communalism. While he appears critical of Tempels' unanimist view, which implies that Africans speak with one voice, he also appears to endorse the 'unanimistically held belief' that 'Africans do not think of themselves as "discrete individuals" but rather understand themselves as part of a community.' As he puts it, 'this is sometimes referred to as African communalism' (60). But, if 'unanimistic' conception is rejected as unphilosophical in some contexts (Tempels, Nkrumah, Senghor), it should not be endorsed as philosophical in other contexts (moral, social, political).

In his comparison of African and Western notions of justice, Bell also engages himself in illusory contrasts. First, he endorses Kwame Gyekye's interesting contrast between 'caring or compassion or generosity', which is African, and 'justice', which is Western. On this view, justice 'is related essentially to a strictly rights-based morality' and the West privileges justice

as 'relations of claims and counter-claims'. Bell sees this as 'a very thin, though, not inaccurate characterization of what "justice" *has come* to mean in some Western societies' (67). My emphasis is significant: *'has come to* mean' suggests a progression (or retrogression) from an earlier conception or practice. I suggest that this is the way to look at the matter. For in the following paragraph, Bell refers us to the work of Simone Weil, a French philosopher, who 'drew on early pre-Socratic Greek literature to recover a sense of justice that included love and compassion.' This shows that compassion and love are universal values and ideals. But more importantly, Bell suggests to us that Weil's view 'may also help us rethink the concept of justice along community-oriented and compassion-based lines'. This means that we do not have to contrast justice and compassion (as Gyekye does), but rather may explore notions of justice as compassion, justice as generosity and justice as rights. Furthermore, we need to pay attention to post-colonial Africa and the conceptions of justice that apparently now dominate the landscape. I suggest that we would find more of right-based conceptions than compassion-based. This is at the back of Soyinka's thoughts when he laments the conditions of Nigeria as *The Open Sore of a Continent*, and when he expresses concerns over the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa. Indeed, it is not clear how far-off is the cry 'Why am I being hurt?' from the emotional outburst 'Why are you violating my right (to live in peace and dignity) with impunity?'

In his discussion of the TRC, Bell has some interesting points, not all of which I intend to take up. But there is one fascinating point, which is an extension of his discussion of communitarian morality in the previous chapter. Here, again, the Gyekyeian viewpoint on traditional African morality is the point of departure. Gyekye has accused Rawls (and other Western theorists) of denying the 'intrinsic qualities of supererogatory acts' and for believing that 'moral conduct is essentially to be confined to acts that human beings can or want conveniently to perform ... ' (88). Bell seems to suggest that the TRC is an exemplar of a supererogatory action or policy.

There is no doubt, as Bell rightly observed, that President Mandela and his colleagues in the ANC acted on the basis of sound moral reasoning and generosity of spirit in setting up the TRC. They acted for the sake of the good of the community in deciding to forget their individual deprivations and forgive their oppressors. It is clear that they considered many things and were quite pragmatic about the conclusion they arrived at. It is, however, a debatable point, whether everything they did can be traced to traditional value systems. In parts of pre-colonial traditional African societies, there used to be specific ways of dealing with tyrants and those who pollute the land with the blood of innocents, all of which occurred in apartheid South Africa. It is also not necessarily true that the TRC is the best moral response to the crime of apartheid even if it was the pragmatic answer at this point in time.

The discussion on 'Narrative in African Philosophy' is Bell's most distinctive contribution. His intention is 'to extend 'the oral tradition in philosophy'

to narrative in African philosophy and the place of our aesthetic consciousness in understanding those narratives' (111). He identifies the narrative or aesthetic understanding as a key feature of understanding in African philosophy and a point of contact common to African philosophy and the Socratic tradition of oral philosophy. The village discourse or palaver is an important sample of this approach. Bell also suggests that what goes on in village councils may show that 'extensive consideration is given to the important issues concerning village life issues such as fairness, equality, kinds of punishment, general welfare, and the just resolution of disputes. These are, of course, 'the very issues of concern in all recent studies of justice in Western philosophy (i.e., by Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin, Sandel and others)' (113). This observation by Bell is significant in view of the earlier points he makes, following Gyekye, regarding the differences between African and Western conceptions of justice. What is crucial, however, is that the narrative aspects of philosophy arise from local, human narrative situations as exemplified by village palavers and village council meetings, which are critical and reflective discourses that throw up philosophically rich concepts. Bell makes an important point regarding Hountondji's contrast between art and philosophy as science: 'There are differences between the narratives of a palavering community, the narratives of literature (epic, fiction, drama), and what Hountondji calls "critical" philosophy, but their differences are not simply those between *art* and *science* as he suggested. The multiple narrative aspects of philosophy often reflect the manner in which both art *and* science are woven into the fabric of life' (117).

A second form of narrative aside from village palaver is fiction, poetry, painting and sculpture, which are 'reflective and critical' comments on human life in their own forms. Bell suggests, following Wittgenstein, that these iconic traditions be seen, not just as a 'collection of artifacts, stories, symbols and formalized ritual', but rather as 'a primary and reflective mode of human expression and, as such, is philosophical in nature ...' (119). African fictions reflect on traditional values as impacted by colonial structures and suggest a 'revaluation of traditional values in such a way that will give coherence and meaning to life in one's present situation' (123). This is a powerful point that must be taken seriously by all, especially those tempted to posit a distinctive African value system without paying a much deserved attention to the 'present situation' and to the dynamism of culture. Bell recognizes this dynamic aspect of culture, and rightly notes that understanding 'African philosophy in (the) conversational mode points to its dynamic nature and underscores the reciprocity and balance of individual identity and community, of personal struggle and hope drawn from shared traditions' (135). Post-colonial African philosophy must take this requirement of balance seriously. Bell deserves credit for his appreciation of this requirement and for bringing it to our attention.

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M.J. Cain
Fodor: Language, Mind and Philosophy.
Malden, MA: Polity Press 2002. Pp. iv + 240.
US$66.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7456-2472-3);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7456-2473-1).

Mark J. Cain's book provides a much-needed panoramic view of the intellectual work of one of the greatest living philosophers — one without whom, surely, no story of twentieth-century philosophy would be complete. Jerry Fodor has established himself during the second half of the previous century — that is, in a century of 'analytic unrest' and widespread hostility towards speculative thought — as, above all, a fresh infusion of responsible, scientific-based, philosophical speculation, and, as it will certainly transpire from Cain's book, a hugely imaginative and deeply resourceful philosopher.

Consequently, Cain's book is in itself an extended review of sorts (which, incidentally, makes my endeavour a review *of a review*). As such, there are two important points that can be made about it, right from the beginning. (a) Cain proceeds at presenting and unfolding the Fodorian construction with the utmost decorum towards what can only be catalogued as 'the received philosophical view'. That is, Cain takes as a standpoint for his whole enterprise a cluster of tacit philosophical presuppositions that, more or less, constitute what is generally known as 'the mainstream'. (b) Cain's general approach is minimally intrusive — except for a few interventions of medium length, he confines himself to simply relating the story as it unfolds, careful to represent all sides of the debate as accurately and charitably as possible. This conduct is, indeed, what one would expect from someone in this position; it also makes the job of a reviewer a bit awkward in that an attempt to take issue with most of the matters involved would ultimately turn into a critique of the received view or of Fodor himself.

In Chapter 1 ('The Fodorian Project'), Cain states Fodor's main goal, his 'major philosophical project' (19), that of 'vindicating folk psychology within a physicalist framework' (19). The description of the Fodorian project involves a concise discussion of the two basic concepts involved: folk psychology and physicalism. Chapter 2 gives a quick tour of the philosophical environment of the second half of the twentieth century, with emphasis, obviously, on developments in psychology and the philosophy of mind — the rise and fall of psychological behaviourism, the advent of cognitive psychology (which he also illustrates by sketching the main ideas of Marr's theory of vision), philosophical behaviourism, type identity theory and functionalism. Cain enumerates the usual arguments in favour and against each of these philosophical and scientific isms, and presents Fodor's attitude towards each.

Chapter 3 ('The Computational Theory of Mind') debuts with a lengthy discussion of Fodor's LOT (language of thought) hypothesis; this is followed by a short presentation of Fodor's three major arguments for CTM (computational theory of mind). Cain then goes on to examine Fodor's concept nativism — a good occasion also to quickly scrutinize his rejection of the idea

of concepts as prototypes — and his more recent attempt to retreat from radical concept nativism. The latter move, in fact, receives a great deal of Cain's focus, and is in the end catalogued as unsuccessful. The next chapter tackles what Cain regards as 'four of the most important and prominent challenges to CTM' (111) — Davidson's anomalous monism, Dennett's instrumentalism, Searle's Chinese Room and universal instantiation thesis, and connectionism. While expressing some sympathy for the latter, Cain nevertheless concludes that 'they do not fatally wound Fodor' (111).

Chapter 5 is probably the juiciest part, as it examines the intricacies and ramifications of the problem of mental content. After giving the gist of the naturalistic approach to mental content, Cain provides a concise view of Fodor's theory, described for short as 'a sophisticated development of [the] crude informational theory' (116) in the Skinner-Dretske line. He next follows the thread of Fodorian thought in dealing with the disjunction problem, all the way to his asymmetric dependency theory. Fodor's atomism is also contrasted with CRS (conceptual role semantics). Cain considers in detail Fodor's 'two main objections' (124) to CRS, the charge of holism and the charge of non-compositionality. The rest of the chapter is devoted to examining other objections to Fodor's theory of content (that is, other than the problem of misrepresentation), of which Putnam's Twin Earth is the most prominent. The chapter ends with an account of Cain's own objection — actually one of the few instances where he affords to speak for himself.

The issue of narrow content makes the subject of Chapter 6. This represents, in fact, a lengthy struggle with the threat of Twin Earth, and documents Fodor's oscillation between narrow and broad content. Of a particular interest here is the meticulous discussion of Fodor's case for individualism, especially the clear and detailed presentation of 'Fodor's most prominent argument for individualism ... the argument from causal powers' (157). Finally, Chapter 7 tackles the modularity thesis, where, among others, Fodor operates a distinction between input/output modules and central systems. Cain makes a good case against Fodor's recent abandonment of CTM as irrelevant in the study of the latter, via noticing that, in effect, it is *Fodor's* notion of a module that is irrelevant for CTM: what CTM actually works with is the weaker notion of a (sub)module/(sub)system as encountered in ordinary literature on dynamic systems. Consequently, there should be no incompatibility between CTM and Fodor's central systems.

With minor exceptions, Cain is generally sympathetic to Fodor's ideas, as he confesses in the Afterword. I find that Cain has adequately represented Fodor, while giving a fair presentation of the opposite camp as well. In short, some may find that the book constitutes a miraculous shortcut to the depths and intricacies of Fodorian thinking. For those who cannot afford the time to read Fodor himself and are in search of a map — not only a map of his work, but pretty much a map of the work done in some of the deepest metaphysical questions of the last two decades — this book is a good starting point. Reading Fodor himself, however, or at least part of his works, could

prove much more fruitful and inspiring, if not for anything else, at least for his ever fresh, never boring writing style.

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Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim Garff and **Johnny Kondrupp**
Written Images: Søren Kierkegaard's Journals, Notebooks, Booklets, Sheets, Scraps, and Slips of Paper.
Trans. Bruce H. Kirmmse. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2003. Pp. 180. US45.00. ISBN 0-691-11555-9.

The authors announce three purposes for this book. First, the book is meant to summarize the strange history of all the documents that Kierkegaard left behind from the moment of his death in 1855 to May 5th, 1945, when they were finally deposited in the Royal Danish Library. The peculiar winding path that led Kierkegaard's literary remains from one private residence to another in those intervening years is also the story of the many curators and editors who shepherded Kierkegaard's papers from place to place, and along the way left their own stamp on the collection. Second, the book offers reproductions of many of the documents from this extremely diverse collection, and here the emphasis is on treating these documents as images and not just as a collection of words. The authors are interested in exploring the ambiguous boundary between writing and images. The documents they select for reproduction and the commentary they append to each selection consistently reflects this preoccupation with 'written images'. Third, the book explores the purely material dimension of Kierkegaard as an author. This includes an analysis of the paper and ink he purchased, the assistants he employed, the schedule that he followed, even the chairs that he used when he sat down to write.

In terms of the three goals that the authors set for themselves, the book should be judged a success. The history of the collected papers takes up about two-thirds of the book, and it's told in an engaging and efficient way, weaving in memorable details about people, places and times without becoming overly trivial. Søren Kierkegaard left all of his belongings, including his unpublished papers, to his former fiancée, Regine Olsen. This was rather awkward, however, because Regine Olsen was now Regine Schlegel — married to Fritz Schlegel, the governor of the Danish West Indies. Regine requested a few

items pertaining to the engagement (mostly letters that she and Søren had exchanged), but otherwise renounced any claim on Søren's property. The papers then reverted to Søren's brother Peter Christian Kierkegaard, a bishop in the Lutheran Church, who found almost everything in the papers to be distasteful and worried that if they were published they would 'ensnare many individuals in perdition' (40). From that moment on, Kierkegaard's papers became the target of a fascinating string of eccentrics, all of whom had to find some way to gain access to the papers in spite of P. C. Kierkegaard's disdain for them. In the process all of these characters left some inscription of their own on what was already a complicated palimpsest. Perhaps the most notable example is H. P. Barfod, an unemployed former editor of a failed newspaper, who was the first to edit and publish a selection from Kierkegaard's posthumous papers. To assemble this first volume for publication Barfod cut to pieces many of the original documents, disposing of the material he did not wish to include, and pasting the rest together in a haphazard way. He also made several 'corrections' to Kierkegaard's original texts, writing with heavy black ink right over the top of the original script, so that today Kierkegaard's own writing can sometimes no longer be discerned in these documents.

It's clear from the goals that the authors have set for the book that they intend to steer clear of any evaluation of the intellectual content of Kierkegaard's papers — the arguments that were presented on those many scraps and bundles of paper. This is an understandable and in many ways laudable goal. There is certainly no shortage of texts that have taken it upon themselves to appraise the ideas that are inscribed in Kierkegaard's journals and papers. To focus instead on the inscription itself, in all of its material, historical and imaginary dimensions, is certainly an interesting and novel approach to these documents. But the way the material, historical and imaginary analysis is presented in the book does raise some very interesting questions that lead us back again to the content of the papers — to the same ideas about authorship, individuality and indirect communication that Kierkegaard's commentators have struggled with for over a century. It's hard to read this book without being constantly haunted by the idea that Kierkegaard himself would find it utterly amusing. The book treats every scrap of paper that Kierkegaard left behind almost as if it were a religious relic. The photographs of Kierkegaard's documents are very high quality, and on almost every page they crowd out most of the authors' own analysis. The book looks like it was meant to be kept on a coffee table, next to the catalogue from your favorite museum. For an author who took such great care to distance himself from the works that he published, and to argue that once those works have been appropriated by the reader in a truly personal way, the texts themselves become unnecessary and should be given no more attention, this kind of veneration is a little unnerving. For example, even an advertisement for 'Eau de Cologne' that Kierkegaard used as blotting paper is included. Cappelørn, Garff and Kondrup comment that it 'could well be called sawdust from the workshop of a genius' (155). If Kierkegaard knew

that in the twenty-first century assistant professors would dote even on his blotting paper and analyze it with the utmost reverence, would he not find it hilarious? Perhaps that's just what he was hoping for when he left his unpublished papers neatly stacked on his writing desk in a way that seemed to signal that he wanted them to be published after his death. Perhaps what he desired most of all is that someday someone would publish a book just like this one, which would bow down even before his blotting paper. The authors of this book tell us in the Foreword that they want to make 'the difficult easy', yet Johannes Climacus, author of the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (who may or may not have shared Søren Kierkegaard's own opinions), tells us that his task is to make life more difficult. By focusing so much attention on the literary remains of an author who wanted to have 'no authority', Cappelørn, Garff and Kondrup may have in fact assisted Climacus in his undertaking.

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Taylor Carman *Heidegger's Analytic. Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Heidegger's Being and Time.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xii+328.
US$60.00. ISBN 0-521-82045-6.

Carman's book analyses a range of themes from Heidegger's *Being and Time*. The connecting thread is the notion of *interpretation*. And the key claim (Chapter 1), is that Heidegger's existential analytic should be understood as identifying a set of transcendental conditions of interpretation, i.e., of our understanding something *as* something. Carman's approach is novel in drawing upon Kantian scholarship to show the parallels between this view and Allison's understanding of the Critique of the Pure Reason as identifying *epistemic conditions*.

For Carman (Chapter 2), the focus upon *hermeneutic conditions* distinguishes Heidegger from his predecessor Husserl. Carman analyses the relationship between these two approaches to phenomenology and offers a very useful reminder of some of the key features of Husserl's methodology. In marked contrast with commentators such as Føllesdal and Barry Smith, he interprets Heidegger's project as radically distinct from Husserl's. Husserl's project is characterised by an unquestioning acceptance of a notion

of intentionality characterised by the subject-object relation, while Heidegger precisely asks the question of the possibility of having an intentional stance. Carman presents biographical evidence that Heidegger viewed his project as breaking with the tradition in which Husserl was firmly rooted. This evidence is interesting, not least as it sheds light on certain aspects of Heidegger's personality, as exemplified in his ungrateful attitude to the man whom he owed much for his swift rise within German academia. However, Carman's use of this evidence in support of his interpretation is philosophically moot.

Carman does not situate Heidegger's understanding of intentionality only with respect to Husserl, but must be praised for a detailed discussion of it in relation to prominent contemporary philosophers such as Dennett and Searle (Chapter 3). He clearly shows how the latter perpetuate a tradition that fails to analyse the conditions under which interpretation is possible, although interpretation is central to the intentional stance. More specifically, any analogy between Heidegger's ontological categories and Dennett's *explanatory stances* is, *pace* Haugeland, only superficial. For Dennett is not concerned with the Heideggerian transcendental question of how something like a stance is possible; he rather assumes a causal story grounded in reductivist physicalism. Searle, on the other hand, as McGinn and Nagel, insists upon the irreducibility of the subjective point of view. Moreover, Searle assumes that a *background* encapsulating biological and social conditions is required for our mental states to function. However, Carman shows that this conception, prima facie in tune with Heidegger's ontological understanding of Dasein's world, is not given a coherent characterisation. Searle defines it as non-intentional, and thus a causal rather than transcendental condition of intentionality, although he often describes it in intentional terms.

By thus confronting Heidegger with contemporary views, Carman shows the relevance of the question of being to debates that currently prevail in the philosophy of mind. In an attempt to fit Heidegger into one of the 'isms' of analytical philosophy, he ascribes the label of 'non-reductive externalism' to his understanding of the relation of Dasein to the world. This is useful in situating Heidegger in relation to many analytical philosophers, but has its limitations since there is, strictly speaking, no cleavage between Dasein and its world, and therefore no opposition between 'inside' and 'outside', an issue that Carman acknowledges.

If Carman's whole interpretative approach is based upon a parallel between Heidegger and Kant's philosophical projects, he is keen to insist that this does not entail that Heidegger is a transcendental idealist. On the contrary, he takes issue with a number of contemporary Heideggerian commentators such as Blattner, Rouse and Olafson to defend the claim that, although being requires Dasein, entities do not depend upon Dasein for their mere existence. Carman's interpretation of Heidegger as an *ontic realist* is well argued for, but I was left unconvinced by Carman's defence of Heidegger's attempt to view occurrent entities as simply given, as though one could even talk of them meaningfully without their thereby being minimally

intelligible and therefore dependent upon Dasein. The impossibility of extricating such entities from us and our practices would amount to a holism akin to that advocated by Davidson. Whether we have no reason to consider such a challenge to our propensity to be realists would seem, *pace* Carman, to remain an open question.

Discourse and *authenticity*, the other two themes of the subtitle, are discussed in relation to the notion of interpretation. A long chapter on the topic of discourse defends the interesting claim that this expressive-communicative dimension of Dasein's disclosedness constitutes *the* key hermeneutic condition: discourse constitutes the phenomenon of truth. Carman provides a lucid account of Heidegger's difficult notion of truth in terms of *hermeneutic salience*, and shows its relation to our ordinary notion of truth as correspondence. He in particular provides a solid defence of Heidegger's conception against Tugendhat's claim that Heidegger renders falsehood unintelligible.

The final chapter of the book concentrates upon Division II of *Being and Time* and authenticity. The opening discussion of the related themes of existential death, guilt and conscience is superb, both for its clarity and depth. This constitutes a strong foundation for an interpretation of authenticity as involving both the focused engagement of *resoluteness*, and the wholehearted projection onto what are both possibilities and impossibilities, i.e., what Heidegger calls *forerunning*. Carman illustrates these themes with reference to Kafka's Joseph K, and Shakespeare's Hamlet. Whether or not one is convinced by the Heideggerian emphasis upon understanding authenticity in terms of being-towards-death, Carman provides a powerful case for understanding Heideggerian authenticity as departing from the Romantic idea of self-realisation, *pace* Guignon and Taylor's interpretations. The final reflections on the nature of subjectivity are thought-provoking in pointing to a lacuna in Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein.

Carman's project set out to interpret Heidegger by analogy with Allison's Kant interpretation. The result is an excellent book that, in its clarity and breadth of scope, is set to become as central to Heideggerian scholarship as Allison's work is for Kant scholars. It develops a coherent and convincing interpretation of Heidegger's enterprise in Being and Time, one that future interpretations cannot ignore.

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Simone Chambers and **Will Kymlicka, eds.**.
Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
2002. Pp. vii + 237.
US$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-7954-2);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-08796-2).

Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society is the first of a promised three volumes in the Ethikon Series in Comparative Ethics that together will aim 'to explore how various secular and religious traditions conceptualize and deal with pluralism within societies' (1). In order to narrow the scope of the project, the focus is civil society, and in this first instalment the authors have been charged with 'establishing some of the broad philosophical and spiritual presuppositions of the way different traditions think of civil society' (2). In accordance with the aspirations of the Ethikon initiative, the editors have assembled representatives of different traditions. This, of course, brings with it problems. In particular, there is the danger that contributors will talk past one another. To guard against this, the editors posed a series of questions for each 'representative' to consider from the point of view of their tradition: what are the ingredients of civil society?; how is society (and civil society) conceptualised?; what values does civil society secure?; what are the risks associated with civil society?; and, how is responsibility for well-being properly distributed between family, civil society, and the state? (3).

Answering these questions are representatives of both secular and religious traditions. Included in the former are libertarianism (Loren Lomasky), liberal egalitarianism (Michael Walzer), feminism (Anne Phillips), and critical theory (Simone Chambers). In the latter, Christianity (Michael Banner), Judaism (Suzanne Last Stone), Islam (Hasan Hanafi), and Confucianism (Richard Madsen). In addition, there is an introduction by the editors, an historical introduction (Adam Seligman), a chapter on natural law and civil society (Michael Pakaluk), and a concluding overview (Michael Mosher). The standard of contributions is in general very high, and the reasonably strict editorial control means that this is a worthwhile and coherent collection.

The substance of the book comes in four parts. In the first, Seligman offers a quick historical overview, but with the purpose of showing that civil society is an inherently problematic idea in the liberal tradition. It is problematic because it is little more than a placeholder for a number of different and competing themes: individual and social interests, rights and duties, the demands of civility and of economics, and so on. Seligman's claim is that 'all these different resonances are contained in the idea of civil society as they reflect the contradictions of modern existence.' As a result, he doubts whether 'the concept of civil society itself as either analytic idea or normative ideal can bring us any further toward their resolution' (30).

Given that this is a book about civil society, it is surprising that little more is said about Seligman's challenge. Indeed, the suspicion that the idea of 'civil society' is invoked when an argument is in trouble, and that it appears as

little more than a gesture towards the place where things get resolved in some hitherto unmentioned way, is rather reinforced by the remaining chapters in this section. In these, Michael Walzer first argues that a properly functioning civil society needs a strong and intervening state, and Loren Lomasky argues the opposite. In both cases, one or other of the many values that Seligman identifies is selected as the trump card, but, as the differing conclusions show, there is no resolution here, just the continuation of a rather old battle.

The essays that form the second part of the book offer what the editors call 'internal critiques' of liberalism. Anne Phillips sticks slightly less rigidly to the question format while offering a compelling account of why feminists have a troubled relationship with the concept of civil society. The result is an interesting broad-brush survey of some recent developments in feminist thinking. Simone Chambers's Habermasian intervention will be less clear to the uninitiated, but stands out as one of the few essays to deal seriously with 'bad' civil societies.

Parts Three and Four, in which the religious representatives feature, offer the most interesting material. Michael Banner focuses on the complex relationship of civil society and Augustinian, Thomistic, and Protestant Christianity, but he does not go on to say much about what Christianity might bring to our current understanding of civil society. Hanafi and Madsen offer moderate, or 'liberal-friendly', readings of Islam and Confucianism respectively. This allows them to develop meaningful accounts of civil society from within the traditions, although most liberals will shudder at the degree to which even these are communitarian. The outstanding paper is by Suzanne Last Stone, who manages to discuss why Judaism has not been hospitable to the idea of civil society, what consequences this has had for the politics of Israel, and how the tradition might be extended to accommodate such an idea.

In his concluding piece, Michael Mosher asks whether civil society is valued because 'it is a transmission belt for the dominant ... values' or because 'it entrenches diverse values and is consequently a barrier against concentrations of power' (208). This question returns us to the contradictions and tensions that motivate Seligman in the first essay, and to the issue of pluralism that is at the heart of the project. It is clear that the writers in this collection favour the 'transmission belt' understanding of civil society. How accommodating such a conception is to the kind of pluralism envisaged by the editors will surely have to be one of the key issues for the forthcoming volumes.

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John Cottingham
On the Meaning of Life.
New York: Routledge 2003. Pp. x +124.
Cdn$75.00: US$50.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-24799-3);
Cdn$19.95: US$12.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-24800-0).

Peter Heinegg, ed.
Mortalism: Readings on the Meaning of Life.
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 2003. Pp. 214.
US$23.00. ISBN 1-59102-042-5.

The question of the meaning of life was little discussed by analytic philosophers during most of the twentieth century; indeed, many dismissed it as devoid of content. These books reflect a welcome resurgence of interest in the question that has emerged in the last several years. Addressing this question has the potential to reshape and improve our understanding of such things as the nature of the good life, the relative importance of moral, epistemic, aesthetic, and other values, and the nature of wisdom (amongst other things). It is also an issue that the public expects philosophers to address, and we would do well to reclaim it from self-help gurus and other charlatans.

Cottingham's volume is part of Routledge's recent 'Thinking in Action' series, a series that (according to the editors) 'takes philosophy to its public. Each book in the series is written by a major international philosopher or thinker, engages with an important contemporary topic, and is clearly and accessibly written.' Cottingham's book largely succeeds on all of these counts.

The book is divided into three chapters. The first is primarily devoted to addressing whether the question is itself meaningful (Cottingham believes so), and whether a range of secular answers to the question - that often involve treating a meaningful life as simply one in which a person is involved in projects that she herself values - are adequate (he believes not). Cottingham suggests that a meaningful life will necessarily involve flourishing as a human being, a social creature with a range of abilities, needs, potentials, and so forth. Meaning is created as we engage in social practices that contribute to such flourishing, both for ourselves, and for others.

The second chapter focuses on finding a space for theistic belief in a contemporary, post-Darwinian worldview. Cottingham argues plausibly that the theist need not reject evolution, the Big Bang, and so on; nothing prevents God from making use of such mechanisms in His creation. I suspect Cottingham's arguments here will seem somewhat obvious to philosophers, but will be valuable to many lay readers who might be too quick to assume that theism and a full embrace of the sciences are necessarily incompatible.

Finally, the third chapter (the longest of the three) provides further exposition and development of Cottingham's position. Cottingham argues that theism provides us with a hope of success and a resiliency in our projects

that is absent in secular approaches to a meaningful life. Further, by engaging in the practices of a spiritual tradition our character is shaped in beneficial ways, and our life as a whole becomes more meaningful as we take part in a way of life that is focused on love, and the good. And, following Pascal, he argues that by engaging in such spiritual practices we will (typically) come to a rich faith. (Cottingham takes the question of the existence of a God to be beyond our rational capacities, but argues that this allows us room for the commitment and faith he proposes.)

Cottingham's writing is engaging and accessible, and he manages to cover a good bit of ground in a short volume. There are occasions where arguments could use further development and where the assessment of various views seems to end too soon; but this is to be expected in a short introductory volume intended for a general audience. And indeed, if one were using the book in an introductory course, there would be plenty of scope for using it as a springboard for more in-depth discussions in class.

Relatedly, Cottingham draws upon passages from an impressive array of philosophers, poets, and other writers. In some cases the background to the views presented is rather incomplete, and would need to be supplemented. For example, Cottingham mentions the views of Spinoza and Leibniz, but I worry that his explanations would not be adequate for many undergraduates or non-philosophers. Again, this would be an area where an instructor could supplement the volume with further in-class lecturing or discussion of these views.

On the Meaning of Life would serve well as a textbook for units of lower-level philosophy courses on this issue; general readers would also profit from it. It is concise and clear, and would provide an excellent starting point for discussions with students. As a short introductory text there is less for professional philosophers; still, there are several aspects that should be of interest to such. In particular, Cottingham's positive proposal will appeal to many, and provides an interesting case of a broadly theistic or spiritual account of the meaning of life that downplays the importance of an eternal life and rewards, and instead focuses on the importance of engaging in valuable practices in our daily lives.

Heinegg's anthology consists of brief selections (often a page or less) from over fifty authors, selections that in Heinegg's view argue for or express 'mortalism', the position that there is no human afterlife. The selections are organized chronologically, and draw upon a wide range of authors, including Marcus Aurelius, Shakespeare, Dickinson, Freud, Tolstoy, and Joyce.

Unfortunately, this anthology will be of limited interest to most philosophers. Many of the selections do not obviously argue for or express 'mortalism'; Heinegg seems to include many pieces that simply express fear at the thought of death, and often takes an author's mere failure to mention an afterlife as adequate reason to include a passage as an instance of mortalism. Beyond this, there is very, very little argument included in the selections. Rather, there are several poetic expressions of a fear of death, or a stubborn resistance against it; while these passages are often quite moving, one will

be hard pressed to find extended, philosophically articulate discussions in this volume.

The scope of the anthology is also rather narrow: all of the selections support or express mortalism; no other positions are included. It thus would not function well as a general anthology for classes dealing with the meaning of life. I should perhaps add that the subtitle, 'Readings on the Meaning of Life', is rather misleading; there is little or no explicit discussion of such. Again, the volume contains many poetic or fictional passages that express or reflect the belief that there is no afterlife; even in those cases where Heinegg includes passages from philosophers, he typically fails to include their arguments, and instead merely provides summary statements of their views. Only in rare instances is there any discussion of the implications of mortalism for the meaning of life, or of the different accounts of the meaning of life open to and endorsed by mortalists. Heinegg's anthology might be of interest to those looking for brief passages from poets and other writers on death; but beyond this there is little discussion of the meaning of life, little argument, and little explicit philosophical substance to this collection.

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Jürgen Habermas
The Future of Human Nature.
Cambridge, MA: Polity Press 2003.
Pp. viii+127.
US$17.95. ISBN 0-7456-2986-5.

Habermas' concern in this essay is to respond to 'debates touched off by genetic technology' (vii). Facing ferocious debates regarding biotechnology, the philosophical question of norms and morals seems to become irrelevant because it loses its own way amid the overspecialisation. Habermas is criticising not only 'deontological theories after Kant' (4) that cannot respond to the question of the necessity of being moral, but also the 'political theories' which are becoming incapable of resolving citizen's conflicts 'about the principles of their living together', as well as 'theories of justice that have been uncoupled from ethics'. Habermas' aim is vast, and his concern is to restore a philosophical possibility that will make possible 'a substantive position' (11). The need for such a position is essential, because what is really at stake is 'the ethical self-understanding of language-using agents'. But, Habermas notices also that 'today the original philosophical question con-

cerning the "good life" in all its anthropological generality appears to have taken on new life' (15).

Habermas asks us to think about various possibilities that may be conceived by a certain form of liberal eugenics that will be in harmony with an ethical understanding of human nature. Such an understanding is the main item that hypothetically constitutes, in front of the pluralism of world-views, the common denominator that will make possible a dialogue between scientists, citizens and politicians. It will be the only possible factor that will allow us to understand and to conceive ourselves as moral beings ready to face possible genetic manipulations. 'My perspective in this examination of the current debate over the need to regulate genetic engineering is therefore guided by the question of the meaning, for our own life prospects and for our self-understanding as moral beings, of the proposition that the genetic foundations of our existence should not be disposed over' (22). The philosophical problem that we must face is the following: if we manipulate those genetic foundations, how can we then as human beings direct our personal life and understand ourselves as moral beings?

In order to respond to this question, Habermas suggests that only the background of the ethical understanding of the species will help us in this task that seems, with biotechnological progress, more and more inescapable. From the ethical point of view, one of the major repercussions of these modifications is the probable loss of the understanding we once had of human species and its identity, the fact that, from the same natural coincidence, we are all born unique and equal. Yet, this argument is somehow delicate, because, on the one side, unanimous consensus of ethical understanding among the human species was never really possible. On the other side, from the biological point of view, it seems obvious that none of us possesses the same resources. In a certain way, in the face of genetic coincidence, we are all in a position of natural inequality. Nevertheless, a deep modification of 'our ethical self-understanding as members of a species' (22) is opposed to 'the essentially symmetrical relations between free and equal human beings' (23). According to Habermas, the argument of the ethical understanding of the human species is built on a natural symmetry that a genetic engineering will, sooner or later, break.

Yet, Habermas perceives a moralisation of human nature rather as a dubious sanctification, because 'by erecting artificial barriers in terms of taboos' (25) it becomes even more dangerous. However, one may question how can we maintain, bearing in mind genetic engineering, the ideal of the ethical aspect of human nature, this same ethical aspect that is not only changing its form but is even more difficult to conceive as to what it will look like in the future. For a lack of reenchantment of human nature, Habermas proposes the 'sociological concept of modernity having become reflective' (26). Given Habermas' refusal to consider 'a post-metaphysical response to the question of how we should deal with pre-personal human life' (33), and taking into account also the principle of the 'inviolability' of 'human dignity', how is it then possible to think about modernity as capable of becoming reflective

enough to answer to the ethical understanding of the human species? It may be even more interesting to question what exactly is the inviolability of human dignity, and how it can constitute the non-'post-metaphysical' response to the manipulations of the pre-personal human life, and also to question in what sense this same question of inviolability can be reconciled with the concept of modernity having become reflective.

Even though Habermas is analysing the issues as a whole, he is not really making any synthesis. Because he recognises that the uncertainty has invaded the identity of the species, Habermas notices that the 'advances of genetic engineering affect the very concept we have of ourselves as cultural members of the species of "humanity"- to which there seems to be no alternative' (40). What other anthropological concept of human species can then be conceived? The question remains open, and may be helpful for understanding the ethical comprehension of the species. As a solution, Habermas accepts a distinction between 'negative eugenics and enhancing eugenics' (44). The program of liberal eugenics affects not only the capacity of species to live without hindrances, but also creates unprecedented interpersonal relationships: ' up to now, only persons born, not persons made, have participated in social interaction' (65). This upheaval will truly reverse all known anthropological categories, and will, at the same time, modify the public sphere designed for individual evolution. But Habermas is conscious that with biotechnological progress, the fundamental questions about our future do not necessarily have an answer. It is more realistic, not to try to answer, but to better grasp and define the true problematic and issues that this question implies.

Habermas ends his analysis with a radical question concerning today's will to keep being moral in view of biotechnological upheaval: 'but why - if biotechnology is subtly undermining our identity as member of species - should we want to be moral?' (73) Does not wanting any more to be moral imply the disappearance of being moral? In his postscript, Habermas harks back to the multiple aspects of the foundations of morality for which remains still the need to extract above all a relevant common denominator.

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Russell Hardin
Indeterminacy and Society.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
2003. Pp. xii + 166.
US$29.95. ISBN: 0-691-09176-5.

Indeterminacy and Society is Russell Hardin's latest contribution to social and political theory. And it is a valuable contribution, one that brings to the fore an issue that many theorists (surprisingly) ignore — *indeterminacy*. The world we live in is full of indeterminacies. Our actions have many unintended consequences. Similarly, the policies our government pursues also have unintended consequences; in many cases large-scale policies will impose risks on someone. But these complexities are often ignored by moral and political philosophers, who attempt to make the conclusions of morality and justice determinate. Hardin does an admirable job of injecting some much-needed scepticism into these debates. He maintains that 'in a world that is inherently indeterminate, a suitable theory of distributive justice must perhaps itself be indeterminate, and its indeterminacies must accommodate those of the world where relevant' (103). Hardin's project is important, and it should compel social theorists to radically re-examine the basic assumptions of what they are trying to accomplish with their theories. Taking indeterminacy seriously is necessary if social theorists wish their abstract theories of morality and justice to have any practical import in the real world.

In *Indeterminacy and Society* Hardin does not primarily concern himself with developing a detailed theory of justice that takes indeterminacy seriously. Rather, the bulk of this short book seeks to de-bunk those theories that, as Hardin puts it, sweep indeterminacy under the rug because it is disruptive to pristine social theory (1). Hardin covers a variety of issues and theories, ranging from the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Nuclear Arms Control, and the cardinalization of welfare to deontological moral theories and Rawls' theory of justice as fairness. In each of the eight chapters Hardin effectively reinforces his general thesis — that 'problems of indeterminacy in social interaction are important, pervasive and often intractable and they often afflict social theories' (ix).

One of the central examples that Hardin refers to throughout the book concerns vaccinations. Vaccinations are a good example of what Hardin calls *stochastic problems*. 'Stochastic problems are those for which, in a sense, nature might outsmart our choice of strategy so that we get an outcome very different from what we would have wanted, at least in some cases' (2). We see this problem clearly in the case of vaccinations, where some will gain and some might lose. With the polio vaccination, for example, we prevented a great deal of human suffering by vaccinating millions of people who would have otherwise died or been permanently disabled. However, in doing so we harmed a very small number of people who, as a result of being vaccinated, suffered from paralytic polio.

In the case of the polio vaccination, our strategic action is to protect people but we inevitably harm others. Our actions, argues Hardin, are never as simple as flipping a switch to turn on a light. 'They are inherently interactions. We have reasons for taking our actions, but our reasons may not finally be reflected in the results of our actions even if hope for specific results is our reason for our choice of actions' (2-3). Hardin examines three cases where taking account of indeterminacy helps us to resolve certain problems better than if we impose determinacy. These are the iterated prisoner's dilemma, the real world prisoner's dilemma of nuclear deterrence policy, and the classical problem of how we can justify institutional actions that violate honoured principles. Hobbes emerges as one of Hardin's favoured theorists, as Hobbes grounded his social theory in indeterminacy. That assumption of indeterminacy, claims Hardin, yields his two-stage theory of government. 'First, we argue from mutual advantage for the value of government in resolving many detailed issues and making policies. Then, in the second stage, government uses various devices, including the presumption of interpersonal comparisons of welfare, to establish and effect policies' (53).

The theme of mutual advantage is developed further in the later chapters of *Indeterminacy and Society* when Hardin addresses John Rawls' theory of 'justice as fairness'. Hardin is very critical of Rawls' theory. In particular he takes issue with Rawls' account of primary goods and the least advantaged. Rawls rejects a welfarist reading of his primary goods (rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth and self-respect) and treats them as resources. But, given the complexities of issues that arise in real societies, societies that are indeterminate, Rawls' list of primary goods will provide little practical guidance. We need, argues Hardin, 'a causal theory of how these items interact as well as a principle for how to weigh them against each other' (115).

Furthermore, Rawls' difference principle, which instructs us to arrange socio-economic inequalities so that they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society, is unworkable, charges Hardin. This is so because Rawls does not adequately stipulate who the worst-off class are, the second-worst-off class, etc. 'Without a credible difference principle or some alternative device to bridge equality and mutual advantage, we almost certainly have to concede that our theory is massively indeterminate and unable to help us select between alternative social, political, and economic forms and institutions' (117). Hardin's analysis of Rawls' theory is a useful and penetrating one, one that brings the theoretical analysis of justice back into the realm of the real world. This is a welcome addition to debates in political theory, as current debates about distributive justice tend to focus exclusively on 'ideal theory', and thus one is left pondering how the theory relates to real world we live in.

So how do we face the pervasive indeterminacy of strategic interaction? Hardin believes that devices that appeal to equilibrium in complex interactive contexts, or cardinal, interpersonally comparative welfare, or aspects of Rawls' theory of justice, are unsuccessful in helping us face indeterminacy.

This contrasts with Hobbes's holistic device and the marginal device of Ronald Coase, which Hardin believes are very successful at dealing with indeterminacy. Taking indeterminacy seriously means recognising that our institutions are fallible. This fact should enter into our principles for designing them (127-8).

Hardin's *Indeterminacy and Society* is a welcome addition to social theory. Hardin does an admirable job of demonstrating why indeterminacy cannot be ignored, and helps lay the foundations of a mutual advantage theory that takes indeterminacy seriously. This short book will appeal to a broad range of philosophers working in moral and political philosophy.

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Martin Heidegger
The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Parable of the Cave and Theaetetus.
Trans. Ted Sadler. NewYork: Continuum 2002.
US$99.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-5923-4);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-5922-6).

Table. What is a table? What is the essence of the table? This is a table. What makes a proposition true? That it corresponds with the facts about which it speaks? What is the essence of truth? Can we define the truth *adaequatio rei et intellectus*? These are some questions, perhaps still actual, to which Heidegger replies in the book *The Essence of Truth*, excellently and faithfully translated into English by Ted Sadler from the original German edition of Vittorio Klostermann GmbH (Frankfurt am Main 1988).

In Part One, after the Introduction, Heidegger deals with the essence of truth referring to the famous allegory of the cave in Plato's *Republic* (VI, 514a-17a); in Part Two, he takes on the exegesis and interpretation of the central section of Plato's *Theaetetus*. The Greeks asked for the first time the question of truth, and called it *alêtheia*, that is to say *the unhiddenness*. Such a definition is confirmed by the famous saying of Heraclitus, 'the holding sway of beings, i.e., beings in their being, loves to conceal itself.' But in Plato's thought the essence of truth undergoes a fundamental change with the loss of experience of truth as *alêtheia* in favour of *eidos*, and of dualistic correspondence between understanding and thing.

This is where Heidegger proves masterly, by his interpretation of the famous myth. In the myth Plato means that the search for truth, moving from sense-data to ideas, must prove true within four stages with a difficult and long journey. The seeing of idea is *noêsis*, the approaching near to the truth to gather the essence of being. Only when man, having exited the cave, has arrived at the last stage of *paideia*, will he become aware of his condition of *dasein*, turned to being and truth. His descent again to the cave is not surely an agreeable diversion or amusement, but the achievement of his ex-istence of being-free. As liberator of men in chains in the cave he is exposed to risk, he may be refused and attacked, he may also die for the ideas. He is the man who, within the obvious and apparent all around, judges the choice of searching for true knowledge fundamental for human ex-istence (he is the philosopher).

Plato perceived that the truth as *a-lêtheia* (privative alpha) is negation, and that calls into play also the non-truth. He perceived that the hiddenness and the unhiddenness are closely linked together; that, in order to better understanding *a-letheia*, it is necessary to consider the *pseudos*, what distorts and hides. He perceived the disappearance of the truth-apt experience of man in comparison with being, the double and amphibious condition of man in balance and danger between being and non-being, hiddenness and the unhiddenness.

With the loss of experience of truth as *alêtheia* and the reduction of it to *eidos*, assertion, knowledge, according to Heidegger Western metaphysics has lost the sense of unity of truth and non-truth, of being and nothing.

In Part Two we read about Heidegger's interpretation of the *Theaetetus*, the most important gnosiological dialogue of Plato, in which are asked questions such as: *what is knowledge? What is epistêmê?* Starting from the first form of knowledge, perception, considered a means or passage towards the idea, the soul, supplied with the essence of referring, achieves the unification of the many sense-data (*Tht* 185), a task that Theaetetus describes thus: 'There is no special organ for this as there are for the others, but the soul itself views, through itself, what all things have in common' (*Tht* 185d; Heidegger 141).

The dichotomies of which Theaetetus has spoken, shortly before, such as being/non being, sameness/difference, must be brought back to the whole, in which is gathered what is more important. The soul, following a kind of inner understanding, sees the references of being, unifies them, picks up them, gets them together, as the term *logos* says. The soul, in its turn, is not a kind of thing to which a relationship can be attached. Since it is an ontological tension, it is in tension between non-having and having, it is *erôs*, living in the strain of what is human authentical nature (see the *Symposium*). Theaetetus adds that, on the one hand, he understands by sense, by *phusis*, nature, but on the other what is understood comes towards him as being.

At the beginning of the *Theaetetus* the question is asked if *doxa* is knowledge, with the subsequent negative reply. Yet the concept of *doxa* must be made clear and revalued, because it means 'imagine', 'appearance', and

turns towards two following gnosiological lines, the first from the subject, the second from the object. In *doxa* we discover a valid part and a distorted part (*Tht* 187-8), and Socrates in the dialogue suggests investigating before the *pseudês doxa*. Following the non-contradiction principle, the *pseudos* can be defined as void, because it thinks nothing. But, here, the relation of exclusion is not praticable, because it would lose the function of thought, of being through the knowing and not knowing. Maybe that *pseudos,* instead of thinking, changes an object for the other? In this case the soul gives assent, makes up one's mind among different realities. Is this the last turning of Theaetetus (*Tht* 191). The *pseudês doxa* brings an intermediate element that justifies the relation between sensibility and *dianoia*, through knowing and not knowing, an intermediate phenomenon called a mixture of two or more, as is said in the *Philebus*.

Plato and Western thought, for Heidegger, have interpreted the *pseudos* in an incorrect, false sense, and the truth as opposite to it. But the bifurcation of *doxa*, in the direction of being, must be interpreted, above all, in relation to the original bifurcation within the essential structure of *dasein*. Till now the classic question of being and truth presents itself in its ambiguity and allows us to think it over.

Finally a short note on the book. Ted Sadler's writing is an example to the general reader of how to read philosophical tests slowly, as one reads poems, of the encounter with'the art of going slowly _ [following] Heidegger's conviction that philosophy, genuinely undertaken and carried through, subverts the impatient "hunger for results" so characteristic of the modern age" [x-xi]. Within the world of scholarship this is a classic that will certainly stimulate any future discussion, but on Heidegger's terms.

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Jason Holt
Blindsight and the Nature of Consciousness.
Peterborough, ON and Orchard Park, NY:
Broadview Press Ltd 2003. Pp. 145.
Cdn$24.95: US$19.95. ISBN 1-55111-351-1.

The controversial and bizarre phenomenon of blindsight seems to establish that one can perceive things visually even in the complete absence of visual experience. People may lack visual consciousness yet still exhibit excellent marksmanship, or answer accurately questions about the shape, position and

even colour of surrounding objects. Such people are unaware of the visual information they possess (even when they use it); they commonly take themselves to be guessing.

Jason Holt's book is the first extensive philosophical treatment of the phenomenon. There are ten short Chapters in the book. Holt begins by discussing the nature of blindsight and a number of interesting dissociation cases in an attempt to determine how blindsight should be described. The conclusions he draws from the various arguments he discusses-using the phenomenon of blindsight in a number of ways-lead him into a defence of materialism.

His primary task is to relate blindsight to the current debate on the problem of consciousness in an attempt to resuscitate a 'thoroughgoing materialism that anchors mental properties to the world no less securely than physical properties' (17). He defines the phenomenon as 'residual vision in a blind field without concomitant awareness' (26), and he proceeds by explaining that what it is present in the cases of blindsight, deaf-hearing, numb-touch and so forth, is informational sensitivity as opposed to experiential sensitivity: 'The system gets it, but the subject does not' (36).

Holt notices correctly that even if it is the case that visual consciousness in blindsight is completely absent, which he thinks it is, the eliminative materialist claim that blindsight transmutes our notion of consciousness beyond recognition does not follow. What seems to follow, granted that there is no presence of experiential sensitivity in blindsight, is that vision does not *require* visual consciousness.

At the beginning of Chapter Four however, in discussing Dennett's view, he claims that Dennett's target is the qualitative states of one's experience and not 'consciousness *per se*'. It is true, of course, that for Dennett a functionalist account of the mental must 'quine' qualia. But it is not clear what exactly is there for one to explain if one ignores the phenomenal properties of experience. What exactly is the further explanandum Holt doesn't say.

The so-called 'hard' problem of consciousness is precisely how physical processes give rise to experience. All conscious phenomena are qualitative subjective experiences. If consciousness consists in a series of qualitative states (qualia) and you 'quine' the subjective qualitative aspect of experience it doesn't seem that there's any consciousness left over to explain. In any case, Holt is not explicit here.

In Chapter Five, Holt argues for conscious realism, namely the claim that consciousness exists and is something to be explained and not explained away. He argues for the rather intuitive idea that blindsight supports realism about qualia 'the world of difference between blindsight and normal vision can be accounted for only by admitting the existence of qualia' (70). Blindsight is precisely a disorder wherein patients lack qualia, and it cannot even be described without reference to the visual qualia it conspicuously lacks.

Holt argues also here for the stronger claim that qualia are causally efficacious in that, as he I think rightly proposes, the best explanation of the

behaviour differences between blindsight patients and normal perceivers adverts to the absence and presence, respectively, of visual consciousness. This claim however, is inconsistent only with an eliminative/functionalist version of materialism that find no place for qualia and with epiphenomenalism and Chalmers' nonreductive functionalism; and it is consistent with Searle's supervenience/emergentist/biological claim and with the different kinds of nonreductive physicalism (anomalous monism-emergentism) and dualism. Why should one adhere to the version of materialism that Holt wants to resuscitate?

This question is answered in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. Holt attempts first to establish the claim that qualia are causally efficacious by denying Chalmers' conceivability argument on familiar grounds: It is not the case that if it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there be zombies. Moreover, Mary acquires at most an ability, a new way of knowing what she already knew.

What he adds to this is that Mary, on seeing red at first, is not surprised that she has the quale and 'she *recognizes* it both as a colour quale and as the colour quale it is' (89). Her recognition is at least good evidence that she already knew what-it-is-like to see red even though she could not have known that she did. Why? Because if one has complete pure physical knowledge it is not obvious that would lack this recognitional ability. *Knowledge Argument*: Mary doesn't know what-it-is-like to see red. *Physicalist*: Yes, but when she sees red for the first time she acquires at most an ability and learns no new facts. *Holt*: She already has this ability and she doesn't know it. On what grounds exactly does he say this? Well, she actually *re*-cognizes what-it-is-like to see red.

Holt proceeds by assuming that the thesis of the causal closure of the physical is true and by arguing in favour of the type-type identity theory. It is worth noting however, that Holt, besides the 'causal efficacy of qualia' claim, does not really use blindsight to support his materialism. He argues for a need of a finer-grained typology of pain. Granted. Now how exactly is this to refute the 'multiple-realizability' argument? Holt replies that the explanation of why each of these physical states 'plays the same functional role is that it shares a common structural property' (100). What is this structural property?

Holt accepts the possibility that silicon painmakers could both function and feel like ordinary pain but, as he says that is artificial pain, which means that there may yet be a single physical, neural type onto which pain maps. But, even so, again, what kind of neural type is this? Suppose that the neural correlate of pain is C-fibre stimulation, then it does seem that a creature could have pain and not C-fibre stimulation.

In Chapter Eight, Holt argues that when we discover the NCC we solve the 'hard' problem of consciousness, since there cannot be a question of *how* physical processes give rise to consciousness. The neural correlates are consciousness. He draws the parallel with the equation [water=H_20]; as in the case of consciousness, it is not sensible to say that H_2O gives rise to water.

When talking however, about correlations, we mean a causal etc. relation between two things, compare: can H_20 be the correlate of water? Moreover, Holt does not provide any positive reason to believe that it is possible to *deduce* the properties of mental states from the properties of their physical correlates.

In the last two Chapters, Holt discusses blindsight in relation to the theories of knowledge and perception in a rather provocative way. Philosophical reflection on the phenomenon of blindsight is equally important in these fields, which are indeed in need of a more extensive treatment. Nevertheless, the book is a good source of empirical evidence about the phenomenon of blindsight and other dissociation syndromes. Holt provides a concise survey of philosophical debate over this issue. The writing is lively and clear and the book is, for the most part, accessible to the non-experts.

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Richard Johns
A Theory of Physical Probability.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2002.
Pp. 259.
Cdn/US$85.00. ISBN 0-8020-3603-1.

Probabilistic reasoning is common practice both in everyday life and in science. Probably Chris is going to come to my party, we say, or: the probability for measuring a spin component of minus one-half is close to one. Although there is a widely accepted mathematical theory of probability based on Kolmogorov's axioms, the interpretation of probabilities has been a matter of debate for a long time. Are probabilities degrees of belief, as exponents of a subjectivist approach claim, or rather objective? Is it possible to reduce probabilities to observable relative frequencies? And how are probabilities and causality related?

In his book Johns focuses on probabilities in physics, and develops an approach to answer most of the above questions. Johns argues for an objectivist conception of physical probabilities (3, 10), and develops what he calls the causal theory of chance. One of his main concerns is the claim that causation is not the same as determination.

After a short introductory chapter, Johns lays down the foundations of his theory in Chapter Two. He argues for a logical approach to probability and takes the notion of belief as basic. Possible states of affairs are then defined

as differences between epistemic states of an ideally rational (that is, logical) being. Even such a being may not be certain about everything, but rather hold partial beliefs. The (logical) probability of a state of affairs relative to an epistemic state is then defined as the degree to which it is rationally believed from the point of view of this epistemic state (26). This degree can be measured in terms of contracts the ideally rational being would enter on the base of her beliefs. This approach to probabilities can account for Kolmogorov's axioms, and Johns thinks of it as objectivist, since it is built upon the notion of an ideally rational being. For many authors, however, any logical account of probabilities such as Johns' entails the principle of indifference that leads into well-known paradoxes. To counter this objection, Johns argues that his conception only implies a weaker principle of symmetry.

If there are objective probabilities, it need not be pre-determined, which states of affairs are going to obtain in the future. As Johns argues in Chapter Three, this does not imply that future states might be uncaused. Following Anscombe, Johns suggests separating causation and determination. Whereas causation is 'the spread of concreteness' (64) in our world, determination connects abstract propositions. More generally, Johns doubts whether a concrete physical system can be fully represented in abstract terms (234).

The fourth chapter defines physical chance and probability. The physical probability that a given system is in a certain state is roughly taken to be the correct degree of the belief that this state obtains, given full knowledge about the dynamical nature of the system and its initial condition. In order to render his view more attractive, Johns shows how physical probabilities can justify belief and how they can be inferred from observed frequencies. Nevertheless, he argues that probabilities cannot be identified with relative frequencies. Altogether Johns thinks of his account as capturing a number of everyday platitudes on probabilities (5-6).

Johns goes even a step further and argues in the following chapters that his approach proves useful for understanding probabilistic physical theories. In Chapter Five he develops an axiomatic framework for what he calls classical stochastic mechanics (he thinks of Langevin equations describing Brownian motion, for instance). Unfortunately, the whole discussion suffers from a misleading piece of terminology. What Johns calls boundary conditions, for example, are mostly initial conditions; he treats different temporal parts of a system's history as different physical systems and so on. Furthermore, it is not really clear what he means by real boundary (better: initial) conditions. In consequence, the axiomatic framework he proposes lacks intuitive appeal. A closer examination of concrete examples would have been helpful at this point.

Probabilities notably play an important role in quantum mechanics, since quantum measurements have to be described probabilistically. The last two chapters of Johns' book deal with quantum mechanical systems, in particular with entangled states, which display correlations not to be found in classical systems and which thus are crucial for the interpretation of quantum mechanics. In Johns' terms the existence of entangled states means that one

of the axioms for classical stochastic mechanics has to be dropped: quantum mechanics allows for non-classical ways of combining subsystems into one larger system. Using his formalism, Johns rightly brings out crucial differences between classical and quantum physics. The last chapter focuses on the interpretation of the state vector. Johns argues for a realist, objectivist interpretation. Ultimately, he thinks of the state vector as a suitable device for predicting objective probabilities for measurements of various types. Since Johns defines states of affairs in terms of epistemic states, the common dichotomy between physical and purely epistemic aspects disappears to some extent.

Johns' book fully develops a theory of probability as it appears in physics; it is concisely written, contains a number of formal results with proofs and covers a broad range of topics. Unfortunately, Johns' terminology does not always follow scientific conventions. Furthermore, a number of important authors such as Ramsey, E. T. Jaynes, R. Cox and de Finetti are either not properly discussed or not even mentioned. In consequence, it is not quite clear to which extent Johns makes progress beyond their results. What seems to be really new and most striking is the way Johns brings together objective states of affairs and epistemic states. He takes an explanatory shortcut from belief states to objective states of affairs, and thus undermines the traditional dichotomy between objectivist and subjectivist approaches to probability. But is the recourse to a rational being enough to objectify probabilities? Some exponents of a subjective approach to probability would deny this.

Johns' book probably deserves a much more detailed discussion. But what does 'probably' mean here? It certainly does not signify a kind of physical probability, but rather indicates a guess - hopefully it's a good one.

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Aurel Kolnai
Early Writings of Aurel Kolnai.
Trans. Francis Dunlop. Burlington, VT:
Ashgate 2002. Pp. xxx + 199.
US$69.95. ISBN 0-7546-0648-1.

Several late papers of Aurel Kolnai were published in 1977, after his death, in a collection titled *Ethics, Value and Reality* edited by Francis Dunlop and Brian Klug. The collection was prefaced by a lengthy introduction by David Wiggins and Bernard Williams, both of whom had known Kolnai in London.

The introduction was very favorable. Both acknowledged the serious and penetrating quality of Kolnai's work in moral and political philosophy. Despite Kolnai's philosophical background in the phenomenological tradition, those familiar with Wiggins' and Williams' work can notice many affinities with themes in the 1977 collection.

Dunlop has now translated Kolnai's 1927 doctoral dissertation and two articles from 1928, into a comprehensively indexed collection of *Early Writings*. Kolnai said that 'almost all his later ethical writing was a development of some theme to be found in the dissertation' (xxx). This seems right. In this sense, this collection is a boon to those who are familiar with or interested in Kolnai's work, adding substantially to the stock of his work available in English. It is a more pointed question whether the collection stands well on its own. If one has an interest in the phenomenological tradition generated by Husserl, as developed ethically by Max Scheler, then the collection should be of considerable interest. Beyond these two constituencies, it seems doubtful whether the dissertation stands on its own. The accompanying articles, 'The Structure of Moral Intention' and 'Duty, Inclination and "Moral Mindedness" ', though, have the virtues of brevity and composition for journal readers rather than doctoral examiners. Anyone may profit from reading them.

Kolnai's work is distinctive in beginning from the fact of moral experience, or experience of the moral. Moral experience is on the one hand treated as like other experience, something that might be systematically described but that does not want justification. Not wanting justification, Kolnai's work is not theory-building, though it is not anti-theoretical. For this reason, Kolnai's work is a refreshing alternate course from contemporary naturalist and rationalist currents toward moral theory. Moral experience is on the other hand *sui generis* in that it is presented in Kolnai's view as urgent or compulsory, graded and limited. A recurrent quality of Kolnai's work is in the wealth of distinctions like these he makes regarding moral experience. Rarely, will he stop at making two or three distinctions. He often seems intent on vindicating experience as the primary moral datum by the variety of depth of distinctions he observes. The focus and detail he is able to bring to these distinctions is one of the chief benefits of his work.

Despite the focus on moral experience, Kolnai limits the seemingly internal character of moral experience by locating value over and over in the world as something that is cognized. He challenges the idea that one might be good by following an ethical code indifferent to the actuality of others or the world in which one finds oneself. An 'ethically approvable goal' requires the 'actual presence of *ethical need*', the availability of '*moral energy*' and must aim at a states that subsist by '*human decisions*' or '*wills*' (56). A whole chapter is devoted to elaborating how reality limits moral ends in this way. Another chapter is devoted to how reality 'grades' the 'emphasis' of ethical values into an order. This, broadly particularist, idea is that values interact with each other to form an order depending on the facts of the situation. The order determines which actions are ethically approvable. Kolnai argues that this

shows that 'moral conduct relates not only to value pure and simple, but also to a concrete totality of what is morally relevant, to a bounded moral world' (93-4).

It is not surprising then that the crux of Kolnai's work in the latter stages of the dissertation is how to relate the internal character of moral experience with value's place as part of the world. Roughly, the challenge is how to account for persons as part of moral reality and persons as makers of moral reality by their conduct. His treatment is not altogether satisfying. While acknowledging a gradation 'from primary ethical values to extra-ethical "personal" values,' he claims that giving these scare-quoted personal values inordinate importance would be 'immoral indolence' . Yet he gives no indication how an assessment of inordinate extra-ethical importance might be made (157). Fortunately this breezy obscurity is part-compensated by the careful discussion in 'The Structure of Moral Intention' where six (by my count) qualities of a genuine moral intention are distinguished (172-3). Kolnai's unwillingness to succumb to the simplifying temptations of theory-building consistently lifts his work above much moral philosophy.

My complaints are principally with the language and presentation of the dissertation. Kolnai's written English (e.g., in the 1977 collection) had a delight with ornate language that is not present in Dunlop's translation from the German. This is understandable but disappointing. More importantly, Kolnai produces volumes of jargon in the dissertation, and his collection of specialized terms sits uneasily with his use of common experience as his principal datum. Indeed, there is a dearth of examples, even where they should be easiest to supply as in his discussion of compassion (66). The proliferation of terminology is sadly not in service to the acuity of his distinctions. Most doctoral dissertations require revision prior to publication. This seems true here, as the order of presentation and the contents of the notes favors examination, not necessarily comprehension. The articles are largely free of the above defects. The introduction is helpful in orientating the reader though it might have profited from giving Kolnai some critical review and a somewhat less hagiographic style.

For a reader already interested in Kolnai's work or one with a special interest in inter-war phenomenological moral philosophy, none of my complaints will stand in the way of gaining much from reading this book. Kolnai's persistent engagement with the variety of moral experience and the problems of characterizing value's dependence on reality are always rewarding.

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Michael Mack
German Idealism and the Jew: The Inner Anti-Semitism of Philosophy and German Jewish Responses.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2003.
Pp. v + 229.
US$35.00. ISBN 0-226-50094-2.

Since the Holocaust that Emil Fackenheim rightly named 'the rupture that ruptures philosophy' (*To Mend the World*) — philosophers of the Continentalist tradition have reached an overwhelming consensus that philosophy's mission and methods must be entirely rethought. They must be rethought in the light of the (finally recognized) structural analogousness between the grandiose metaphysical constructions that compose the history of philosophy since Parmenides, and the Nazi totalitarian project that sought to purify German 'being' by annihilating the 'alien contaminants' of the system — the handicapped, Gypsies, Jews, and any other undesirable (to them) elements. While anthropological discourse, the attitudes of Christian churches and neo-Darwinist theories of cultural evolution were equally implicated in the production of a Western worldview that unfolded logically into the slaughter of non-Europeans, as well as their enslavement, exploitation and imperialism on a vast scale during the closing centuries of the second millennium, it is especially disturbing that philosophy, whose realm of inquiry focuses on the Just, the Beautiful and the Good, possesses its own troubling connections to injustice. Philosophy has its own embarrassing history of anti-Semitic propaganda, and in fact, provided the 'rational' foundation for Nazi anti-Semitism. The recognition of this discomforting link has led to a radical turn in the perceived task and appropriate methodology of the philosopher in the post-Holocaust era. Postmodern philosophers have grown far more wary of their language (resulting in the poetic opacity that so annoys philosophers of the analytic tradition), the direction of their questioning, and the certainty of their conclusions.

Nevertheless, despite general agreement on the complicity of philosophy (and Enlightenment philosophy in particular) with so many of the crimes against humanity of the last centuries (and with the Holocaust in particular), few thinkers have critically reflected upon the precise nature of this relation, and none, before now, has brought the problematic to scholarly articulation. Thus, Michael Mack's *German Idealism and the Jew* fills a grave void in philosophy's self-critical scholarship. Mack seeks to clarify how the German Idealist philosophical tradition directly served toward the burgeoning of a new, more dangerous anti-Semitism that, under the blank eye of 'civilized' nations and with the blessing of the Christian churches, resulted in the methodical slaughter of millions upon millions of European Jews.

Since one of the most baffling mysteries of the Nazi era is the degree of blind cooperation and even enthusiasm for the extermination project that Hitler received from the German populace (as well as the local non-German

populations wherever, in Europe, Jews were publicly executed), then it is clear that the phenomenon of *Nazi* anti-Semitism must necessarily be understood within the larger context of the socio-cultural realities and the philosophical ideas of the time from which the phenomenon took its rise. The arrogant rationalisms of Enlightenment philosophy can be traced back to modernist assumptions begun with Descartes (the priority of the rational, the definition of human being as the [disembodied] 'thinking thing', and the world as a [mere] machine), but they come to metaphysical — as well as hybristic — fruition in the German Idealist tradition, where anti-Semitism can now be seen, in Kant and then in Hegel, to have evolved into that 'dark riddle' that Mack calls 'a metaphysical kind of anti-Semitism' (2).

The Idealists understood the rational as oriented toward accurate observation of the empirical (Kant), or as the unfolding of a divine (and Gentile) Reason in the world (Hegel). Then it fell to Wagner simply to fabricate the binary opposition between German Idealism and Jewish realism into the polar identities of non-belonging, illegitimate Jew and *Volksgemeinschaft* (German legitimate 'community of people'). In each of these cases, Mack demonstrates, the German prioritization of idealism over realism characterized reason (and thus historical and scientific progress, or modernization) as freedom — freedom from material necessity. In order for Germans (and white Europeans in the larger, global, aspect of this problem) to equate themselves with the cultural headwaters of a progressively unfolding rationality, they required a radical 'other' to fill the role of the non-rational, empirically-bounded, 'natural', embodied peoples, tied to the earth and material property. The Jews served well this role of alien 'other' for the Germans, just as the 'savages' and 'primitives' of Africa and distant exotic isles served that role for the white Europeans in general. Hitler admitted the Jews' scapegoat status when he said: 'If the Jews had not existed, we would have had to invent them,' (raising the question whether the loss of German colonies in WWI necessitated the hunt for an internal 'alien').

German Idealism culminated in a rational universalism so complete, so totalizing, that it had no room for any kind of difference in its vision of reality, and the Jews, for the Germans, embodied that which stood in the way of history's perfection of their body politic. In this seminal work, Mack traces the creation of the new 'metaphysical anti-Semitism' as radical 'other' to Reason's purity and its dissemination through ethical, aesthetic and political ideas in the wake of Kant and Hegel.

Scapegoats arise in times of social crisis, and most scapegoats tend to be seen by their victimizers in exaggerated terms — as more powerful and more malevolent than they really are. One of the richest ironies of the Idealist reconstruction of the Jew into the impure counter-reality to their Reason was the irrationality — the empirical blindness — of the Idealists to the reality of their scapegoats. Mack assures us that the majority of European Jews were anything but materially bounded. They were disproportionately poor, materially destitute, suffering a severe lack of the worldly goods so readily attributed to them in the anti-Semitic fantasies.

German Idealism and the Jew is a work long overdue, of great importance to scholarly understandings of Nazi Germany and anti-Semitism and the larger problem of the functioning of the scapegoat mechanism in chaotic societies. If it has a weakness at all, it is in failing to articulate Nazi anti-Semitism as one facet of a grander diabolical European rational arrogance that had been slaughtering, enslaving, appropriating and exploiting its way across the globe for centuries, and ruling with an iron fist the embodied, helpless, poor, radical 'others' that got in its way.

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Mazzino Montinari
Reading Nietzsche.
Trans. Greg Whitlock. Champaign: University of Illinois Press 2003. Pp. xxi +176.
US$34.95. ISBN 0-252-02798-1.

Friedrich Nietzsche
Writings from the Late Notebooks.
Ed. Rüdiger Bittner. Trans. Kate Sturge.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xliii + 286.
US$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80405-1);
US$18.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00887-5).

The number of excellent translations of important foreign-language texts on Nietzsche continues to grow. In recent years crucial studies by the likes of Pierre Klossowski, Karl Löwith, Eugen Fink, and Gianni Vattimi have appeared, and now we have, long overdue, Mazzimo Montinari's modestly titled *Reading Nietzsche*. Comprised of ten chapters based on lectures or essays from a range of places and times, it is not a book that provides an overall argument, rather a series of interlocking and complementary studies. To state the obvious: this is the product of a man who spent many years reading Nietzsche, working closely with the original manuscripts, and is probably beyond any other in the time spent with the texts themselves.

Montinari is certainly better known for his work with the writings rather than on them. This was collaborative work pursued over several decades, as editor of the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke* (Critical Collected Works Edition or KGW) and the shorter *Kritische Studienausgabe* (Critical Study Edition or KSA). In this he was originally the junior partner with Giorgio

Colli, but following Colli's death, saw the KSA to completion, although the KGW remains in progress. As Whitlock points out in his helpful introduction, this was no minor undertaking. Several earlier attempts to create a full, critical edition of Nietzsche's writings, both published and unpublished, had failed and been abandoned. Editions that did exist were incomplete, the product of questionable editorial or political decisions, of internal feuds between members of the teams, or indeed combinations of these. Not only this, but Colli and Montinari also edited a comprehensive edition of Nietzsche's letters.

Montinari is a close reader, that much is certain. He is at his most convincing when working with the letter of the text, what Whitlock calls his 'historical-philological' or 'Germanistic' methodology (xvi). This attention to detail informs the chapters on Nietzsche's relation to Wagner and Goethe, his attitude to science, the work on the figure of Zarathustra before the book *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and through some remarkable readings of the juvenilia, the book *Human, All-too-Human*. In the chapter on Wagner, for example, Montinari points out that the fourth *Untimely Meditation*, 'Richard Wagner in Bayreuth', is actually 'an extremely adroit mosaic of quotations from Wagner's writings ... Wagner was presented and explained by Wagner' (41). Equally, Montinari disrupts the standard story that the key to the break between Nietzsche and Wagner was the religious tone of *Parsifal*: 'And I once again remind you that Nietzsche had been familiar with the outline of *Parsifal* since Christmas 1869. Certainly he was not surprised by a Wagner allegedly turning pious' (45). Equally, the madman seeking God in the marketplace (*The Gay Science*, §125) turns out to have been Zarathustra in an early notebook draft (74, 77; see KSA Vol. 14, 256-7).

If Montinari is at times less convincing, as he is in the readings of Lukács and Bäumler's critiques and appropriations of Nietzsche, that is, in tackling the thorny issue of the political, he is never less than interesting and at times entertaining. One of the most compelling parts of the work is that which demonstrates the skills that made the editions possible. There is an extremely useful analysis of *Ecce Homo,* and in particular a section Nietzsche intended for the final version which was excised by his sister's editorial hand. That the section includes critical comments on his sister (Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche) and their mother is one thing, but what is ultimately more important is that other parts of the manuscript were similarly destroyed. This segment is one instance that can be reconstructed. 'What is certain', Montinari declares, in an ironic reversal of Erich Podach (see 125 n. 35), 'is that Nietzsche left behind a finished *Ecce Homo*, but we do not have it' (120).

Whitlock notes that 'we must be readers of Nietzsche before we enter into dialogue with Montinari' (x), and I would echo and underline this. Unless readers are familiar with the works Nietzsche published in his own lifetime, and 'The Will to Power' collection assembled after his death, they will doubtless find many of the points here obscure, needlessly picky, or seemingly unimportant. It is those that have that solid grounding that will realise Montinari has much to offer - his perspective is one to which even seasoned

scholars are likely to defer, and as a guide through the thickets of the *Nachlaß* he is extremely helpful. He is damning - as many before him have been - of the work of Förster-Nietzsche and Peter Gast on the 'The Will to Power'. But in distinction to many of those other critiques, he is able to show in detail, sometimes quite painstaking detail, exactly how they distorted, cut-up and redistributed Nietzsche's notebooks for the different versions of the 'The Will to Power' they published (92-3 is particularly damning). One of the most complicated pieces revolves around a remark cited by Lukács, from Nietzsche to his sister, suggesting that the Kaiser 'would easily understand the will to power as a principle'. Citing a letter Gast wrote to Ernst Holzer where he comments on this, Montinari shows that the sentence under consideration was actually torn from a draft in the notebooks, deciphered as 'they would easily understand the will to power as a principle'. In other words, to strengthen the letter's purpose, Förster-Nietzsche, as she did on many occasions, incorporated material from other sources. But as Gast points out, the notebook reading was inaccurate, supposing *schon verständlich* in place of *schwer verständlich*: 'Isn't the joke *very good* indeed that, if Frau Förster wanted to be exact, she would now have had to print, "He [the Kaiser] would hardly understand the will to power as a principle"?!' (cited on 167).

Although the KGW and KSA have many merits, it is in their treatment of the notebooks that they are most obviously of benefit. Colli and Montinari published the material in chronological order, divided along the lines of the original notebooks themselves, rather than the thematic approach of previous attempts. As they note, this is to enable the reader to see Nietzsche's thought develop over time. In the shorter, fifteen volume KSA they take up seven volumes, while the works published in Nietzsche's own lifetime take up merely six. This is a huge amount of material. The Stanford University Press translation of the KSA, confusingly re-divided into twenty volumes, has only produced three to date, the last appearing five years ago. The Cambridge University Press edition of *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, which provides a wealth of material between 1885-88, is therefore to be welcomed, albeit as a stopgap pending the publication of the full notebooks. Indeed, for all but the specialist, this volume, which should replace Walter Kaufmann's edition of 'The Will to Power', will doubtless become the standard reference.

The texts here are from the last few years of Nietzsche's sane life, the period after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* when he was composing many of his finest works, including *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morality*. As Montinari shows in his work, although Nietzsche subsequently planned a masterwork entitled 'The Will to Power', this was abandoned around the end of August 1888 (98). Instead he decided on a selection of excerpts, eventually becoming *Twilight of the Idols* and then *The Antichrist*, part one of a projected 'Revaluation of All Values'. A number of the themes of these books are discussed in fragmentary and disjointed ways: this is an insight into a mind at work, thought in progress. We have the raw material here, but caution should be advised. Just as for many years Nietzsche

scholarship has warned against treating 'The Will to Power' as a source of equal value to the published works, the *Nachlaß* material, even when properly dated and deciphered, should carry a similar health-warning. This is not material to be plundered for a choice quotation, inflection or contrast: at the very least not without a clear indication of its provenance.

This is necessarily a limited selection, about a third of the post-Zarathustra material, taken from the last sections of part VII and the whole of part VIII of KGW, and generally it would be unfair to signal texts omitted. But it is perhaps not unfair to note that two crucial texts (12[1] and 9[3-6]) that are referenced in the introduction (x-xi) are missing. Nor does it seem unfair to caution that while Colli and Montinari made a point of *not* cutting the longer notes, as had been done in 'The Will to Power', Bittner is more willing to exercise the editorial hand. Perhaps justifiably, his logic is philosophical, not historical or biographical (xiv). The lack of a concordance with 'The Will to Power' does not help, nor does the absence of a critical apparatus that would allow comparison of material which was incorporated into Nietzsche's published works, although the most obvious of these are not included here.

Generally, though, this is a useful collection. There are some important passages about problematic topics, such as cruelty (i.e., 34[92]), Christianity (10[165]) and Wagner (5[41]), the last of which confirms Montarini's observation above. The long note entitled 'European Nihilism', from Lenzer Heide, 10th June 1887 (5[71]) is restored to completeness, as are numerous other examples. One particular sentence seems to sum up Foucault's debt to Nietzsche more succinctly than I have ever seen it before: 'Not *sociology* but theory of *structures of domination*' (5[61]). In addition, some of the passages that are in 'The Will to Power' are translated rather differently. For example, in Kaufmann and Hollingdale's translation we read 'The Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification. For the sake of a similar prize one would have to desire the anarchical collapse of our entire civilisation. Napoleon made nationalism possible: that is its excuse' (section 877). The *Notebooks* renders the last sentence 'Napoleon made nationalism possible: this is his limitation' (10[31]). The German of the key phrase is 'Das ist dessen Einschränkung'. Not only is the new rendering more accurate, it fundamentally changes the meaning - nationalism is a limit to Napoleon, rather than something that uses him as its excuse.

Writings from the Late Notebooks is therefore to be welcomed. Although it is intended for a much more general audience than the Montinari book, readers of it are very much in Montinari's debt. But until now English language readers have not really realised what that debt was.

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Onora O'Neill
Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.
Pp. xi + 213.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81540-1);
US$20.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-89453-0).

O'Neill begins by observing that recent work in bioethics and medical ethics has focussed on the importance of autonomy and individual rights, but during the same period there has been a loss of public trust in these areas of practice. Medical and scientific technologies are viewed with distrust despite improved standards of medical care, life expectancy, and environmental behaviour. Her book examines the credentials of a current familiar conception of autonomy in bioethics, and argues that a different conception of autonomy inspired by Kantian ethics is more fundamental and serves to underpin the importance of trust, and relations of trust, in medical and scientific practice.

The idea of autonomy that is assumed in many bioethical discussions refers to the natural capacity of individual agents for independent decision and action. It is sometimes explained by appeal to a Millian defence of individuality or self-development, or by reflective endorsement of desire views (e.g., Frankfurt), and emphasizes the importance of individuals pursuing their deeper values or conceptions of the good. O'Neill notes that the idea of informed consent in bioethics is often defended as upholding autonomy in this sense, and this has led some in bioethics to hold that the supreme value to be protected in health care contexts is individual autonomy.

However, O'Neill casts doubt on the claim that informed consent is best understood as preserving individual autonomy. Informed consent procedures make possible autonomous choice, but they don't in any further way require genuinely autonomous choice. Informed consent protects routine everyday choices, but it is compatible with patients choosing unreflectively or deferentially, especially where they choose from a pre-established menu of options. And many seriously ill persons may experience limited capacities for autonomy, and require care based in a more traditional ideal of a trusting relation between care-provider and patient.

Also, some supporters of autonomy in certain areas of bioethics, such as the area of reproductive autonomy, propose ambitious conceptions of autonomy that analogise it to fundamental rights to free expression and self-determination (R. Dworkin, J. Harris). They use a robust conception of autonomy to defend not only contraception and family planning, but also abortion rights and broad access to reproductive technologies to secure rights to reproduce and raise children. O'Neill thinks that these conceptions of autonomy, which focus on self-expression, individualism and self-fulfilment, are not well suited to ground ethically sound standards governing reproduction and parenting responsibilities. Reproduction is not a form of self-expression, nor is it enough to say that reproductive freedom should be permitted

provided no harm will befall the children involved. Avoidance of harm is not enough to warrant having children.

O'Neill's overall assessment of individual autonomy is that it does not offer a sound starting point for moral thinking in bioethics and medical ethics. She then argues that a Kantian idea of autonomy gives a more convincing approach to ethics. This approach starts with obligations. These are more tightly connected to actions than is the postulation of rights. Knowing our obligations requires specifying to whom we owe them, whereas rights claims are often left as indefinite claims of individuals. The language of obligation, then, takes seriously relationships between rights holders and obligation bearers, including institutional relationships.

Kant's idea of autonomy attaches to principles, reason, ethics and willing, not to individuals. Kantian autonomy is shown in a life lived according to duty, showing respect for others and their rights. It has nothing to do with individual independence or self-expression. It is a matter of acting on principles of obligation, these being principles that are universalisable and could be chosen by all. O'Neill calls this 'principled autonomy', because its core idea is that of being governed by principles that are fit to be laws for all. On her interpretation of the Categorical Imperative, a person who adopts a principle of coercion wills that everybody adopt such a principle, which will be impossible for some to do because their capacities for action will be undermined by others' coercive action. Universal coercion is therefore an incoherent project, as is universal killing, manipulation, deception, torture, intimidation, and slavery. The Categorical Imperative will also justify obligations to support and assist others. For instance, individuals cannot will that indifference become a universal law, because each of us has plans and aspirations that at times require the assistance of others. O'Neill makes a plausible case for the power of Kant's ideas in appraising a wide range of obligations, which is a nice departure from the usual criticisms levelled at Kant's Categorical Imperative.

It is O'Neill's view that principled autonomy provides a basis for the underlying rights and obligations that can structure relationships between individuals in bioethical contexts. The rejection of coercion and deception supplies a basis for informed consent requirements. It also explains other obligations such as confidentiality, truthful communication and honesty in dealing with others, and trustworthy action in general. She further uses the framework of principled autonomy to address pockets of distrust in our attitudes towards medicine and science. The proper way to respond to these is to establish and enforce standards (through legislation, regulation, and public policy) that secure high standards of professional practice. These standards can cover behaviour lying outside the scope of informed consent procedures. For instance, they may serve to regulate current non-transparent practices of insurers in determining risk pools for insurance premium decisions.

O'Neill points out that the high value we place on informed consent itself depends on its being used within a shared background of commitments to

protections for individual life and health. These background commitments are in keeping with the Kantian conception of principled autonomy; they represent basic obligations that must be respected. Without these background commitments, informed consent can be seen to have limited justificatory force, because unchecked it would permit many uses of tissues, organs, and body parts that we would think indefensible. Some of these regulatory measures will strengthen trustworthiness and accountability in the practice of medicine and science, without actually enhancing trust. Still, the best chance we have of improving public trust is through the establishment of standards that apply to all and offer a firm protection for respect for individual life and health.

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Herman Rapaport
Later Derrida: Reading the Recent Work.
New York: Routledge 2003. Pp. 168.
Cdn$128.00: US$85.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-94268-3);
Cdn$29.95: US$19.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-94269-1).

There is one very notable aspect to Herman Rapaport's book on the 'later' Derrida and his 'recent' work - most of the texts considered, perhaps with the exception of *Demeure*, are not all that recent. Rapaport accords most attention to books from the early and mid-nineties, such as *Acts of Literature*, *Archive Fever*, *Monolingualism of the Other*, *Of Spirit*, and *The Other Heading*. One should hence not be misled by the title of Rapaport's book into thinking that this is a comprehensive survey of the 'later Derrida', which we might agree with Rapaport's characterisation as denoting from the mid-eighties on. In fact, much of Derrida's most important contemporary work - like *Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas*, *Of Hospitality*, *Politics of Friendship*, *Spectres of Marx*, and *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* - is not dealt with at all, or only in minor length. That is not a simple weakness of Rapaport's text, however, but more a problem with the title. In fact, rather than offer a survey, this book's focus is reasonably narrow, and consequently also quite detailed, in its exploration of postcolonialism, monolingualism, trauma, and the question of literature.

Chapter One counterposes the pastiche and parody of Trinh Minh-ha's *Women, Native, Other* with the more 'rigorous' textual strategies of decon-

struction. For Rapaport, she plays with metaphysics, whereas Derrida's enterprise is characterised as far more serious. Of course, this cannot help but make one wonder why Rapaport does not consider the playful Derrida of *Spurs*, *Glas*, etc., but he does point to some illuminative differences between their projects, while also insisting that they aren't necessary differences.

Chapter Two begins with Derrida's dual statements espoused in *Monolingualism of the Other*: we only ever speak one language, we never speak only one language. But more interesting than the exegesis of this dual idea, is the way in which Rapaport reconstrues this formulation as being fundamental to all of Derrida's 'possible-impossible aporias', and hence reaffirms that, despite appearances to the contrary, Derrida's concerns are still avowedly to do with language. How does this follow? Well, philosophy purports to speak only one language, to establish universal truths, and this universal component, for Rapaport, has its correlate in the impossible side of the various aporias, and in which, to cite merely one example, hospitality requires the apparently impossible and unthinkable - to open one's house, or one's borders, to the unknown and the anonymous, without discrimination. Of course, the reason that this is 'impossible' is that this kind of absolute hospitality is intrinsically self-limiting. Property rights and the concomitant possibility of hosting would cease if the host did not retain some kind of control over what behaviour is acceptable, and over exactly who is to be hosted. On Rapaport's understanding of Derrida, this absolute demand of hospitality is the monolingual aspect of the aporia, and this is always counterposed against more particular political issues (the polylingual) that are in tension with these moral absolutisms.

Rapaport's following chapter examines Derrida's text, *Archive Fever*, and its exploration of the psychoanalytic drive to both archive material, as well as to be vigilant about guarding those archives. While both Derrida and Rapaport consider this inevitable, they are concerned with this excessive monitoring of the borders. Rapaport also implies that this hyper-discrimination finds its opposite and, equally problematic expression, paradoxically, in the universalising work of Slavoj Zizek, who subjects all manner of things to the Lacanian psychoanalytic mill, and apparently without discrimination.

Chapter Four contains a quite thorough and provocative discussion of Derrida's relationship to existentialism. For me, this is the most interesting part of the book. Rapaport finds Derrida to be engaged in a 'recovery of existentialism', beginning with his interview 'Eating Well', where Derrida resists Jean-Luc Nancy's denigrations of their predecessors on the French scene. Of course, Rapaport complicates any too quick conflation of deconstruction and existentialism by showing how Derrida's recent interest in the question of animality undermines the humanism of Sartre. That said, Rapaport also makes an effort to redeem Sartre from the Heideggerian denunciation of him in 'Letter on Humanism', which he suggests has been rather uncritically accepted by the French poststructuralists in their own writings on Sartre. While it is clear that Rapaport is drawing on relatively few resources in Derrida's work to get this argument about his proximity to

existentialism up and running, it is an interesting claim, and Derrida's preoccupation with the decision, responsibility, etc., do seem to owe more to Sartre than is usually acknowledged. This counter-intuitive conclusion is representative of Rapaport's book more generally, which challenges many of the usual understandings of Derridean deconstruction and in the process contributes to its reconceptualisation.

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Joseph Raz
The Practice of Value.
With contributions by Christine Korsgaard, Robert Pippin, and Bernard Williams.
Ed. R. Jay Wallace. Toronto and New York: Oxford University Press 2003. Pp. vii + 161.
Cdn$51.00: US$19.95. ISBN 0-19-926147-4.

Plato indicted the sophists for being relativists, and ever since relativism has been philosophy's bug-bear. So Joseph Raz begins his new work *The Practice of Value*, a book version of the Tanner Lectures he gave at Berkeley, with a fitting quotation from Protagoras: 'Man is the measure of all things; of what is, that it is; of what is not, that it is not' (15). The idea of *The Practice of Value*, then, is to explain that values depend on man and the way in which they do so depend. Raz is quick to emphasise that he does not mean this in a 'relativist' sense. He starts out from the common-sense point of view that for something to be a value is for it to be a value to us. It is his aim to unpack that claim. For it is not clear in what sense values depend on men, nor is it exactly clear what it is for something to be a value to us. It might seem that to say something like this is in effect to avow relativism, for, surely, if something is a value only if some men hold it to be one, then values are not objective. But this is not what Raz is saying. Raz advances two theses, the Special Social Dependence Thesis, which 'claims that some values exist only if there are (or were) social practices sustaining them', and the General Social Dependence Thesis which 'claims that, with some exceptions, all values depend on social practices either by being subject to the special thesis or through their dependence on values that are subject to the special thesis' (19). The values that are exceptions to these rules are sensual and perceptual pleasures, moral values, and the values of persons, which Raz takes to be facilitating the practice of values governed by the dependence theses. These theses are not theses about the justification of values; they concern conditions

for their existence. They are, to adopt a phrase employed by Bernard Williams - who was one of the commentators on Raz's lectures at Berkeley - to do with values' emergence conditions. A value is constituted by a standard of excellence relative to a certain type or genre. In Raz's view values are genre dependent: for a novel to be good is for it to be a good novel. The value of Bach's Second Partita for solo violin for instance only came into existence when Bach composed the partita and it could only come into existence in an environment, such as Bach's, where certain sustaining musical practices, such as writing partitas for solo violin, were established. It makes no sense, Raz holds, to think that the value of Bach's partita existed 'out there' prior to the historical occurrence of Baroque violin practice, which was itself dependent on the development of music, performance practices and the then current state of violin and bow technology. According to Raz this does not in any sense imply relativism about the value of Bach's partita; the social dependence theses concern the way values depend for their existence on our practices. In Raz's view once a value has come into existence it is there to stay, and from then on 'it bears on everything'.

Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard argue that it is not very clear what it could mean that the value of a piece of Baroque music, or, as they actually say, an example of classical architecture, bear on everything. Raz replies that values are genre-specific; the values of classical architecture he holds apply only to what aspires to be classical architecture. Korsgaard considers this to be a move by which Raz' position collapses into relativism. Raz disagrees with Korsgaard, since he says the point about genres is again a point about the emergence of value and not about their justification.

Most of the objections that are offered meet with the riposte that the existence of sustaining social practices is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for something's being a value. Thus Raz leaves open space for normative considerations. The importance of this is that it enables Raz to show the extent to which values are elements of a culture, and may therefore vary from one culture to another, without being therefore reducible to the customs of some society. I am not sure, however, if the purported gap between necessary sustaining practices such as customs and sufficient normative considerations really does obtain. Surely if something is a value then normative considerations are necessary and not merely sufficient (that is both necessary and sufficient) for its being a value. This point also introduces my main objection to Raz' proposal, which seeks to disentangle a knot that cannot be disentangled. In matters of value the social and the historical cannot be told apart from the normative and the justificatory.

The notions of genre and sustaining social practice, for instance, which set the standard for something's being a value, are supposed to be such that values depend on them for their coming into existence. However, unless one supposes that at least one genre's or sustaining practice's value is *sui generis*, any genre depends crucially on the prior being in place of the values that define that particular genre. A genre or the sustaining practice sets the standard for what counts as a good instance of that genre, but this requires

the genre itself to be in place, which would if Raz is right, require another genre for its definition. The story of emergence conditions cannot rely on an infinite regress, for, if it is right that a genre requires standards, then at minimally one point in the explanation values are not what needs to be explained, since values themselves constitute the explanation.

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Nicholas Rescher
On Leibniz.
Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press 2003.
Pp. x + 252.
US$32.50. ISBN 0-8229-4208-9.

Nicholas Rescher has been a driving force behind the revival of Leibniz' philosophy ever since writing a PhD dissertation on the latter's philosophy of science over fifty years ago. This collection of Rescher's essays, spanning the period from 1978 ('The Contributions of the Paris Period') to 2003 ('Process Philosophy and Monadological Metaphysics'), is an invaluable record of his contributions to our understanding of Leibniz' thought in the last quarter century. It is not, then, a new monograph on Leibniz, and neither does it pretend to be. Moreover, all of these essays save the last have been published before, and Rescher has chosen not to revise them in the light of more recent scholarship. Nonetheless, most of them stand up remarkably well, and are a testament to the industry and diversity of interests of both Rescher and his subject.

The first two and the fourth essays deal with the dual problems of contingency and possible worlds in Leibniz' metaphysics. The first, 'Leibniz on Possible Worlds' (1997), is a compact treatment of a complex of issues relating to possible worlds: their combinatorial exhaustiveness or completeness, their difference from the possible worlds of the atomists, of Borges and of Lewis, the Identity of Indiscernibles, differing laws and spaces for different worlds, and the urge to existence. Rescher mounts a strong defence of the consistency of Leibniz' views against various criticisms. His basic line is that, contrary to what holds for the possible worlds of Lewis, Borges and the atomists, for Leibniz existence only pertains to the actual world: 'existence is something absolute that distinguishes one world from the rest' (9). This is persuasively argued; yet it might be objected that, in the manuscripts of 1676-78 on which Rescher bases his case, existence is defined in terms of

cohering perceptions, and this would seem to make existence pertain equally to each and every possible world containing a mind. But I believe Rescher could respond along the lines taken in the sixth essay, 'The Epistemology of Inductive Reasoning in Leibniz'. For there he argues that Leibniz is properly to be seen as a thoroughgoing empiricist in his epistemology: the only criteria for the reality of phenomena are their vividness and internal coherency, and their coherence with other phenomena and the laws of nature; but this distinction between appearance and reality 'is drawn wholly within the domain of phenomenal reality,' not between phenomena and noumena (120). Thus the criterion pertains to reality within a possible world, not to which world actually exists.

The third essay, 'Leibniz on Intermonadic Relations', is still convincing, despite all the work done on this topic since it was written (1981). Not so the eighth essay, 'The Contributions of the Paris Period (1672-1676)', in which Rescher argues that the major building blocks of Leibniz' metaphysics are all present, save one only: a solution to the issue of contingency. Leibniz was therefore 'still reluctant to promulgate his system' until he had 'a secure basis for avoiding universal necessitation' (153-4), and he did not find this until (in the 1680s) he had an account of contingency in terms of infinite analysis. Now this can't be quite right. For although there is no doubt that Leibniz received 'new and unexpected light' about the nature of contingency from considerations concerning the infinite, the idea that contingency may be interpreted as a kind of hypothetical necessity is something he had already worked out in his *Confessio Philosophi* of 1672-73, and this remained the basis of his solution in his *Theodicy*.

One of the strongest essays in the collection is 'Leibniz, Keynes and the Rabbis', a fascinating investigation of the prospects for evaluating the weight of evidence by proportionate division. While giving a thorough and sympathetic account of Leibniz' own contribution to the theory of mathematical expectation and its application, Rescher convincingly demonstrates that, contrary to the hopes of Leibniz and Keynes (but in line with Rabbinical practice!), the principle of proportionate division cannot justly be applied in deciding all conflicts concerning ownership. For when it comes to cases of ownership determination, 'proportionate allocation unquestionably increases the prospect of an injustice.' Yet, as he observes, since the demonstration proceeds by comparing expected utilities and minimizing the expectations of injustice, it powerfully reinforces Leibniz' central insight regarding the utility of expected values in evaluating matters of distributive justice.

The conceptual essays in this collection are nicely balanced by two historical studies. 'Leibniz finds a niche (1676-1677)' discusses Leibniz' reluctant leave-taking of Paris to take up his position in the court at Hanover, where, contrary to his expectations, he had to settle for a post as mere court counsellor (*Hofrat*) and librarian. Nevertheless his tireless dedication to self-advancement in the form of a constant stream of petitions to the Duke — which, Rescher notes, at the same time served the advancement of

learning and the interests of the court — enabled him to carve out a unique role for himself in this all-too-provincial court as a kind of ambassador-at-large to the world of learning. In 'Leibniz visits Vienna (1712-1714)', Rescher opens up a fascinating window on Leibniz' aspirations and personal relationships in that world.

One troubling feature of this book is the repetition of material. The issue treated in the fourth essay, whether space for Leibniz was 'an all-encompassing matrix that embraced the actual and possible alike,' was already treated in its entirety in the first essay. In particular, §§6-10 (99-104) are an almost word-for-word repetition of §§10-12 (18-23), and similarly the crucial argument of the second essay (58-9) concerning the optimizing of the opposed factors of variety and order already appeared in revised form in the first (28-9). There are also numerous typographical errors, perhaps due to the scanning in of material. Still, it is moderately priced — a comparable collection of Rescher's essays, *Leibniz' metaphysics of nature: a group of essays* (Reidel 1981), at a little over half its length, sells for over four times as much — and a valuable addition to the library of anyone with an interest in the continuing relevance of Leibniz' thought.

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Naomi Scheman and **Peg O'Connor, eds.**
Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 2002. Pp. xv + 472.
US$85.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-02197-7);
US$34.50 (paper: ISBN 0-271-02198-5).

For feminist philosophers interested in the history of ideas, the release of a new volume in The Pennsylvania State University Press 'Re-Reading The Canon' series is an important event. This volume fully lives up to the series' well-earned reputation for excellence. It provides a wealth of insight and stimulation for those interested in the implications of Wittgenstein's work for de-stabilising philosophical orthodoxies as well as for those who are concerned more specifically with questions of gender.

The papers included in the volume - twenty essays plus a splendid introduction by Scheman - are all new, except for one, and offer a diverse range of perspectives. Most draw on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and other of his later works; only one paper focuses directly on the early

text, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The emphasis of these interpretations is not so much on detailed scrutiny of the texts as on taking a lead from Wittgenstein's insights with a view to further understanding and unravelling of particular feminist - and postcolonialist, queer theorist, environmentalist, and race theorist - concerns. As a result the overall impact of the work is to highlight a fascinating new set of connections between a thinker and a movement that have quite alien origins but surprisingly, shared conceptual interests.

The familiar Wittgensteinian notions of language-games, rule following, family resemblances, private language, forms of life and natural history, developed in order to undo certain philosophical misunderstandings, are mobilized in different, and sometimes conflicting, ways by these authors to re-invigorate the articulation of feminist critiques of traditional ways of conceptualising and making sense of social life. And while Wittgenstein's own work gives scant attention to the effects of power on the linguistic practices and philosophical problems he sought to clarify, his feminist interpreters find room in his understanding of the complex contexts and language-games that give words their meanings to point up the political effects with which those practices are shot through. Recognition of the concrete contextually-generated constraints on meaningful discourse also provides understanding as to how the learning and mastery of language, and the social, moral and political practices it shapes, can be more inclusive - or perhaps more exclusive, as one separatist suggests - and how new discursive possibilities might be forged.

It is impossible to do justice in this review to the full range and diversity of the collection. Instead I can only mention some of the themes that loom large and a couple of the papers that offer particularly interesting perspectives on them.

Perhaps no issues are more central to this volume and have so bedevilled feminist theory as those related to the struggle to destabilise traditional thought patterns that rely on essentialism and foundationalism. The reification and normalisation of the many concepts through which women and other marginalised peoples are identified, and the demand for certain impartial grounds of justification, have long been understood as central to the structures of thought that have rendered alternative voices mute. But at the same time, the necessity for conceptual generalisations and the aspiration for secure grounds of justification and evaluation are implicit in almost all practical, social and political action. Many of the essays find ingenious means of using Wittgenstein's understanding of the way our lives and the language-games through which we articulate our understandings of them are mutually implicative to address this conundrum. One notable example is Nelson's creative descriptions of two different language-games of the concept 'woman'. Her accounts of the political language-game of ' "Woman" as Coalition Builder' (226) and the theoretical language-game of 'the Parodic "Woman" ' (229) show how the background rules of play in these games sustain the concept of 'woman' without relying on a game-transcendent characteristic or sanctioning a game without rules. The Wittgensteinian trick Nelson's crea-

tive descriptions show us is to keep one's focus on the practices and the concept as they shape each other rather than thinking of either as independent of the other.

On a different tack, Crary's profound and subtle case for a 'wider' understanding of objectivity that can embrace the insights of partial experience, in contrast with 'narrower' notions of a detached 'point of view from nowhere' (98), also shows up the mistakes of taking epistemological and ontological concepts in abstraction from the practical contexts that give rise to them. Although it might seem that Wittgenstein offers a 'use-theory of meaning' that would reject notions of objectivity in favour of some form of epistemological and ontological scepticism, Crary argues that such an interpretation is a misunderstanding. Far from providing a theory of meaning that could issue its own 'permissions and prohibitions' (111) - independent of any context - Wittgenstein helps us to understand that making sense of anything always involves our feel for or acknowledgement of what is significant. This practice-contingent appreciation is part of everyday linguistic competence and is so deeply embedded in our meaning-making discourses that we usually fail to notice it. Once brought to our attention, however, we can recognize that our sense of things, of the objective facts of the matter, relies not on some abstractly grounded view but on the 'persuasive force' (113) of the perspectival views with which we are presented. Crary claims that, on these grounds, a 'wider' and more just form of objectivity may be achieved when one investigates the perspectives of different groups on a particular topic like social relations, for example, responding to their persuasive force in revealing similarities and differences in our lives that have previously been neglected.

Much more work is required, of course, in untangling the layers of perspectival influences and interweaving discursive practices in particular cases of the use of concepts like 'woman', 'gender', 'equality', 'inner', 'outer', 'culture', 'nature' - to name some of those investigated in the current volume - and in particular contexts of making sense of things, in order to dispel the legacies of essentialism and foundationalism without slipping into either another form of transcendence or an impotent scepticism. But the use made of Wittgensteinian themes in many of these essays provides new impetus and new possibilities for pursuing these pressing tasks.

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Gary Shapiro
Archaeologies of Vision:
Foucault and Nietzsche on Seeing and Saying.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2003.
Pp. xxi + 437.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-75046-9);
US$27.50 (paper: ISBN 0-226-75047-7).

This book is a response to a certain story about vision and visual culture that has been widely proclaimed in recent years, to the point where it is now accepted by many almost as a given. This story has two parts. The first chapter of the story is about how vision was assigned a privileged position in Western thought right from the beginning, and how that privilege has pernicious consequences that are only now coming to light. For example, at the dawn of Greek philosophy Plato equates the Form of the Good with the sun, and describes the search for knowledge as a journey of enlightenment that draws the philosopher out of the blindness of mundane, unreflective existence into a realm of pure light. In Plato's dialogues philosophy is offered as a cure for blindness, and wisdom is presented as a vision of transcendent truth. And then again at the dawn of modern philosophy, Descartes seeks to reestablish philosophy on a secure and indubitable foundation by means of a penetrating skepticism, but does not consider it necessary to challenge the elevated status of vision as he proceeds to call into question all of his previous beliefs. For Descartes, as for Plato, wisdom is described as an insight that is hidden from an otherwise blind world. According to the genealogy of the visual that has become widely accepted in contemporary philosophy, these are just two rather obvious examples of a deeply entrenched tendency to grant eyesight a dispensation over all of the other senses, even to the point where vision becomes synonymous with knowledge itself. The fact that all of us so naturally lapse into visual metaphors whenever we discuss epistemology is just more evidence of how deep the roots of this tradition go. In the paragraph that I am now concluding I did it several times, and I wasn't even trying very hard. (In the rest of this review I will try harder.)

The second chapter of this story maintains that much of contemporary continental philosophy can be read as an attempt to dethrone vision from the position of entitlement that Western philosophy and culture have ceded to it. Many recent commentators have argued that, beginning with Heidegger, continental philosophers have been inclined to see the privileged status of vision as one more vestige of the metaphysics of presence that is so deeply inscribed in the text of Western philosophy. Martin Jay's book, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought,* is representative of this argument. As Jay tells this second part of the story of the eye, the suspicion of vision's supremacy runs through most French philosophy after Heidegger, but it's especially prominent in Foucault. For Foucault this suspicion gives rise to detailed criticism of the various modes of surveillance deployed in modernity, and the disciplines and practices that

have been built around this surveillance. Perhaps the most famous example of this criticism is Foucault's analysis of Bentham's Panopticon in *Discipline and Punish*. According to Jay, Foucault saw the Panopticon not just as a perverse and peculiar application of vision, but as revelatory of the very nature of vision itself — as a faculty that is essentially about surveillance, discipline and control.

Jay's interpretation of Foucault seems to be one of the main catalysts that led Shapiro to write *Archaeologies of Vision*. Shapiro wants to contest both chapters in the story that I've just recounted. He argues that the prevailing account of the hegemony of vision in Western philosophy is too simplistic and totalizing; and he is especially interested in demonstrating that to read continental philosophers like Foucault as anti-visual thinkers is to close one's eyes to a wealth of critical insights that can help to illuminate the culture of spectacle that surrounds us in the twenty-first century.

The project of recovering Foucault's philosophy of vision leads naturally to a reassessment of Nietzsche, perhaps the single most important figure in the genealogy of Foucault's thought. As in the case of Foucault, Shapiro argues, the visual dimension of Nietzsche's thought has largely been misunderstood or ignored.

Archaeologies of Vision begins with a very provocative introduction, which juxtaposes Afghanistan's former Taliban regime with the children's television program *Teletubbies* as examples of two extremes in visual culture, neither of which we are adequately prepared to understand. The Taliban was profoundly opposed to 'inappropriate' images, which led the government to purge all the country's museums of objects it deemed offensive, and also to destroy several Buddhist statues. The Teletubbies, on the other hand, who have TV screens installed in their abdomens, from which emanate various transmissions over which they have no control, invite pre-verbal children to join them in a world that utterly blurs all boundaries between the real and the simulacrum. Almost everyone in the West expressed shock and disapproval of the Taliban's crusade against pernicious imagery, but almost no one is scandalized by the Teletubbies (except Jerry Falwell, who objected only to Tinky Winky's handbag, not to his video screen). Shapiro argues that these two examples demonstrate that visual cultures are widely diverse, not the monolith that much contemporary criticism would have us believe, and they also demonstrate how poorly equipped we are to understand the theories of vision that are inherent in all of these cultures. Nietzsche and Foucault offer critical tools to ameliorate this situation.

Most of the balance of the book is evenly divided between readings of Nietzsche and Foucault that attempt to recover the visual dimensions of their thinking that have been overlooked. But along the way there are also several rich detours into other contemporary theorists such as Bataille, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Klossowski and Danto, and many rewarding excursions into the history of art. Shapiro is one of a rare breed of writers who is skillful in explicating both philosophy and art, and one of the great charms of the book is the ease with which it moves between the worlds of philosophy, art, and

popular culture, demonstrating in the process that perhaps the boundaries between them are not as rigid as we have imagined.

Anyone interested in visual culture or contemporary continental philosophy will not be disappointed by this book. The interpretations of Nietzsche and Foucault that Shapiro offers here are startlingly new, and it's never difficult to discern the value of these ideas as tools for appreciating and better understanding the many visual cultures that all of us are caught up in today.

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Wes Sharrock and **Rupert Read.**
Kuhn: Philosopher of Scientific Revolution.
Key Contemporary Thinkers Series.
Cambridge, MA: Polity Press 2002.
US$62.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-7456-1928-2);
US$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7456-1929-0).

Great minds are often misunderstood, but only rarely have perception and reality been so far apart as in the case of Thomas Kuhn. It is to rectify this problem, to set the record straight, that Wes Sharrock and Rupert Read have written *Kuhn - Philosopher of Scientific Revolution*. In it they defend Kuhn's actual insights against those ascribed to him by others (friends and foes alike). The book summarizes Kuhn's debates with Carnap, Davidson, Feyerabend, Hacking, Lakatos, Popper, Putnam and Quine, who have been his main opponents. In retrospect the controversies involved look much more benign. Sharrock and Read themselves point out that ' ... in late Carnap and Hempel one has a view which has already moved some considerable distance in Kuhn's direction ...' (215). Michel Friedman in his *Dynamics of Reason* argues that by combining the idea of Carnap's linguistic frameworks with Kuhn's scientific revolutions 'one could articulate a conception of dynamical or relativized a priori principles within an historical account of the conceptual evolution of sciences.' Internal realism as developed by Hilary Putnam in 1987 in his *Many Faces of Realism* seems to be not only neo-Kantian but to a large extent post-Kuhnian. And Feyerabend himself admitted in 1993: 'Apart from that [Feyerabend's opposition to the political autonomy of science] our views by now seem to be almost identical ... ' (*Against Method,* 3rd ed. [213]).

Now a new wave of intellectuals, among whom Sharrock and Read include ' ... the likes of Barnes, Fuller, Sandra Harding, Barbara Herrnstein-Smith,

Lyotard et al ... ' (203) are distorting and abusing Kuhn's views, appropriating them for post-modernist ideology, and presenting them as ' ... "soft" political/sociological/historical stuff.' The book, in its critical part, demonstrates clearly and convincingly that the original works of Kuhn neither contain nor directly imply the claims that these thinkers attribute to him. Sharrock and Read emphasize, however, that 'their philosophy does not entail direct ethical or political consequences' (210), and that there are many important questions about science that are not philosophical. For instance questions 'that ask about the role of science in our society, the responsibility of scientists etc.' (210) .

The book consists of two main parts. Part I , 'Exposition', combines both a synopsis of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR)* and Kuhn's two historical case studies (*The Copernican Revolution* and *Black-body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity),* as Sharrock and Read claim (rightfully) that a proper understanding of Kuhn's views is possible only if *SSR* is read in conjunction with his seminal (not to say paradigmatic) historical case studies. Sharrock and Reads' presentation, roughly correlated with sections in *SSR*, is succinct but detailed enough to serve as a companion for a reader of Kuhn's original works. Having introduced Kuhn's central concepts - 'paradigm', 'scientific revolution' and 'normal science' Sharrock and Read competently tackle the difficulties of presenting the 'strange sounding ideas of "world changes", "phenomenal worlds" and "incommensurability".'

Part II, 'Critical Issues', summarizes and adjudicates Kuhn's debates with his twentieth-century opponents. Chapter 3 contains clear descriptions of the issues in contention. Sharrock and Rupert show here first, that ' ... Kuhn's objectives are overwhelmingly philosophical' and that Kuhn did not intend or forecast that the philosophical issues of science could be ' ... handed over to sociology (of science)' (106); second, that Kuhn's use of the term 'normal science' is exclusively descriptive, and that Popper and Feyerabend ' ... want to prescribe for science' (110); third, that ' ... paradigms are not produced *de novo,* they are in important part constituted out of the prior paradigm, [and a new paradigm needs] to reconceive the prior paradigms achievements' (121); fourth, that the pre-paradigmatic disciplines of social science can only naturally acquire ' ... something like a paradigm ... ' and not by ' ... striving deliberately the trapping of one' (139).

The next two chapters (4 and 5) deal with the concept of incommensurability. Sharrock and Read are defending Kuhn against the charge of 'semantic' (conceptual) relativism put forward in different forms by Quine, Davidson and Putnam. Sharrock and Read elaborate on Kuhn's distinction between interpretation and translation to explain the process of becoming bilingual. Davidson and Quine identified understanding with translation to show that Kuhn's thesis is self-refuting. Treating untranslatability as local ('impossibilities of translation between conceptual schemas ... are partial only')(148) frees Kuhn from the charge. Next, they present different methods Kuhn adopted to resolve a tension between his desire to remain a realist and his thesis about 'world changes'. They provide evidence (50, 51) clearly demon-

strating that Kuhn introduced the idea of 'world changes' in a qualified and metaphorical way and that he himself openly stated that it need further clarification before it could become intelligible to analytic philosophers (*SSR* 121).

In this context, Sharrock and Read offer an original proposal to explain incommensurability. They invoke Ryle's distinction between 'thick' and 'thin' description, and claim that incommensurable concepts can be treated as two incompatible 'thick' descriptions. To understand both of them a scientist has to solve in practice the problem of finding a common 'thin' description.

In the last chapter (cleverly titled 'Unresolved Tension') Sharrock and Read present their own Wittgensteinian interpretation of Kuhn's views. Considering Kuhn's rejection of traditional epistemological standards for explaining change in science, his 'challenge to the fantasy of a transcendental standpoint in philosophy' and alleged inconsistency of his thought, they suggest that the peculiarities of Kuhn's views can be accurately grasped by interpreting his writing as exemplifying *Wittgensteinian therapeutic method*. Indeed, the number of affinities shown between Wittgenstein and Kuhn is such that it would be difficult to explain them solely as a result of *Zeitgeist*, even if both of them were facing crises (some would say self-triggered), in philosophy and philosophy of science respectively. Sharrock and Read's proposal requires further elaboration and scrutiny but, prima facie, it seems to offer a fourth alternative to recently presented interpretations of Kuhn's philosophy (Hoyningen-Huene's reconstruction within a neo-Kantian anti-realist framework, Bird's naturalized epistemology approach, and Fuller's politically oriented Science Studies perspective).

There is, however, one significant difference between Wittgenstein and Kuhn. Wittgenstein was fully aware that his thought meant *finis philosophiae* as it had been known. He, therefore, would probably have accepted the honorary title of 'last philosopher' with a certain nostalgic satisfaction, sad that the long-lasting, multi-faceted 'intellectual game' nears its end, but satisfied that a therapeutic art of his thought liberates us from the intellectual anxieties and confusions that characterized past philosophy.

Kuhn's objectives, in relation to philosophy of science, were different. He only attempted to free it from some false dogmas by providing a more adequate framework for combined (philosophical and historical) reflection on science. Kuhn's sentiment, expressed near the end of his life, that his lifework had been misunderstood suggests that he considered his ideas abused by postmodernist thinkers who attempt to replace the philosophy of science with sociology-based science studies. His philosophy can be recognized as therapeutic art only in retrospect.

Debating Kuhn's legacy Sharrock and Read focus exclusively on the 'big picture', and they do not mention at all works on conceptual change in science clearly inspired by Kuhn's ideas (Giere, Nersessian, Thagard and other cognitive scientists). These works are important for two reasons: first, they offer computer models useful for testing some specific hypotheses describing the mechanism of conceptual change, and, second, they seem to violate

Kuhn's belief that a successful paradigm from one discipline should not be directly transplanted to another domain.

Sharrock and Read's *Kuhn* is a pleasure to read. However, in the last section Sharrock and Read seemed to be seduced by 'the unbearable lightness of metaphor', making frequent use of scare quotes, but the topic (Wittgenstein-Kuhn affinities) escapes the language of analytic philosophy. There is also one minor factual error - Ludwik Fleck was a Polish Jew, not a German as identified on page 2.

The book fulfills its objective very well. Sharrock and Read provide a well-substantiated reevaluation of the importance of Kuhn's contributions and their new Wittgensteinian interpretation of Kuhn's philosophy is significant, not only as an observation belonging to the history of philosophy, but also as an interesting hypothesis in systematic philosophy.

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A.D. Smith
The Problem of Perception.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
2002. Pp. x + 324.
US$47.50. ISBN 0-674-00841-3.

Smith's book is a major contribution to the philosophy of perception. It provides an exposition of the main themes and problems that covers considerable ground from both the continental and analytic traditions. *The* problem at issue throughout is 'whether we can ever directly perceive the physical world' (1). Is perceptual awareness an awareness of physical objects; if it is, is this awareness immediate (direct realism) or mediated (indirect realism)? Indirect realism, Smith says, is not phenomenologically coherent. On the basis of the phenomena we do not think of the object of our awareness as a 'proxy' - perception does not seem to constitute an awareness of real things *by way of* a proxy. The only alternative to direct realism is therefore idealism. While Smith admits that most contemporary philosophers adopt some form of direct realism, he finds their arguments unconvincing. Further, they fail to see the strength inherent in two arguments against direct realism, the respective arguments from illusion and hallucination. *The Problem of Perception* is nevertheless an argument for direct realism, and, through a critical exposition of both illusion and hallucination, Smith develops a theory of perception with direct realism at its heart. The achievement of this book is

in Smith's ability to simplify the complex problems of perception and show that their solution is straightforward.

Smith breaks the book into two parts around the main arguments against direct realism - illusion and hallucination. Both arguments are similar in form, proceeding from the claim that in illusion and hallucination we are aware of sense-data or sensation. That this awareness is phenomenologically the same as ordinary perception (235) is then used to argue that all perceptual awareness is of sense-data or sensation. Smith counters both arguments by making a distinction between perception and sensation, and noting, from the phenomenology of perception, that an awareness of sensation could not suffice for perceptual awareness. This distinction is supported by two fundamental arguments of his own, which in turn provide the basis for his own view of perception: first, that perception is pre-conceptual; second, that perception has a phenomenological or 'lived' character (133). Smith's argument against 'conceptualism' is a strong one: we already need to be able to perceive things in order to develop perceptual concepts (114). Perception is distinct from sensation, and without the need for conceptualization; indeed, consideration of animal perception and its similarity to our own indicate that 'perception is more primordial than conceptualization' (109).

In the second argument Smith identifies a 'non-sensuous' aspect to perception: the phenomenological or 'lived' character of sense perception. Our perceptual experience of objects has one important aspect that cannot be found in sensation, a perspective (143). This is shown to be true by the phenomenology of perception. We perceive spatial relations, that an object stands in a certain relation to me, that I can move in relation to an object (and vice versa), and that the object perceived is the '*Anstoss*,' the not-self. (153) Self-movement, perceived spatiality, and the *Anstoss* Smith argues 'suffice for perceptual consciousness' (146).

If illusion is where something appears other than it is (23), then, when something moves towards me, its appearance changes, so it appears other than it really is. But this can be no illusion, for from the phenomenology of perception we do detect that the object itself is not changing. The 'sensations that register this movement will be changing, but the object will appear not to: only its relation to you appears to change' (180). So, if awareness were of sensations, the object would in fact change. It is, for Smith, the unchanging object that gives rise to changing sensations but this only indicates a changed relation of the object to the senses, not a change in the object itself (170-1). This 'perceptual constancy' (170) is explained by the three phenomena of self-movement, perceived spatiality, and the *Anstoss*. So too, Smith argues, is illusion.

The argument from hallucination is stronger. While it seems clear that awareness cannot be of sensation, in hallucination awareness is of something that could not be an object. On the one hand it is not possible to deny that there is an object of perception. (This is necessary for we could not do 'phenomenological justice' [256] to hallucination; if they were not phenomenologically of the same type then they would not deceive us.) On the other

hand, this object is 'non-normal', for it cannot be a physical object. In an 'extreme' proposal Smith considers that a hallucination is in fact an awareness of nothing - there is nothing before the mind (209). This is in fact true, not implausible as Smith suggests, for if there were an object before my mind it could not be a hallucination.

There are two suggestions made by Smith for a defence of direct realism against the argument from hallucination. First, while the hallucination is phenomenologically the same as veridical perception it is not ontologically the same; it has a different 'status' (236). Second, to deny that we are aware of a non-normal object in hallucination (230). There is a play on what is meant by 'normal object' here. In different contexts its use is not the same, so it is true to say that in hallucination we are and are not aware of a normal object. In one sense a normal object is an object that actually exists, in another it is that which is presented by means of the three phenomena already mentioned. Hallucination would be a normal object only in the latter sense. To say there is a contradiction misses the point.

If Smith is right in saying that it is not possible to differentiate veridical perception from hallucination phenomenologically then his argument would stand up. Any use of concepts to differentiate hallucinations from veridical perceptions would not be valid, as perception does not involve conceptualization. Still, it must be said that conceptualization may provide the only means to detection of both illusion and hallucination. In some sense concepts are fundamental to our experience of the world. It is unfortunate that Smith only hints at this, but then his concern was only with perception.

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David Stove
On Enlightenment.
Ed. Andrew Irvine. Preface Roger Kimball.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers
2003. Pp . xxxvii + 185.
US$34.95. ISBN 0-7658-0136-1.

David Stove, the late Australian philosopher and polemicist, is impossible to categorize adequately. He was a brilliant Hume scholar whose work on Hume and probability will stand monumentally there long into the future. Without the slightest tincture of religion, he valued religion for the comfort it gives sufferers who can believe it. He was also a capitalist who cared little for

money. And despite his publicly avowed belief that the intelligence of women is on average inferior to that of men, in his lifetime and after he was the recipient of generous and fond praise from his women students as a teacher and as a person.

Never just an academic, Stove was also a prominent, often crotchety, public intellectual of a conservative and, all too often, reactionary bent, many of whose views were extremist on any account, and his targets were many. Roger Kimball was right to observe that ' ... there is something to offend nearly everyone ... ' in David Stove's writings. Stove however never regarded it as a legitimate criticism to be called an extremist since sometimes extreme views are correct; mainstream views are very often comfortable complacencies, and are all-too-often thoughtless and irrational, he believed. For Stove the important question about a belief is not whether it is extreme or mainstream, but whether it is true, or probable, or has sound evidentiary and/or rational credentials. In this he was surely right.

UBC's Andrew Irvine is to be thanked for bringing together these seventeen pieces of Stove's public writings formerly buried in obscure places. These essays range over a multitude of topics - Darwinism, contraception, overpopulation, eugenics, communism, egalitarianism and democracy, education and the imperfectibility of human nature, Marx and Marxism, and tangentially many other topics. In his discussion of all of them Stove attacks what he thinks of as the consequences of the nearly universal abuse and mis-application of the values and ideals of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, principally the French Enlightenment. The Scottish Enlightenment gets no notice even though it has had vastly more influence in the English-speaking world than the French Enlightenment ever did.

Famously, the French Enlightenment promoted liberty, equality, secularism, rationalism, hostility to tradition, particularly doxastic tradition and authority, and science. Holding that experience and reason are the only legitimate sources of knowledge and of belief that falls a bit short of knowledge, the Enlightenment believed that the multitudinous horrors that have always afflicted human life can be eliminated or at the least substantially reduced by a radical redistribution of political power and an implacable application of the sciences to the problems of human life. This is obviously ambitious on a grand scale, and would require incessant social innovation and reform, and sometimes great revolutions. This project clearly assumes that there is an a priori , axiomatic, presupposition in favour of innovation and reform, what J. S. Mill called 'experiments in living', and that the conservative opponent of reform bears the burden of argument to the contrary. It also assumes, and some of its proponents argue explicitly for, the utilitarian principle that the test of correctness for individual and social actions is that they promote the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people.

Stove's wide-ranging attacks on modernity as the disastrous legacy of Enlightenment does not stem from some form of irrationalism, but from his own deep commitment to such Enlightenment values as individual liberty,

experience and reason, and to science. Nor was he absurdly opposed to innovation and reform per se. He opposes Enlightenment values and ideals from within an Enlightenment position.

The essay 'Why You should be a Conservative' together with some proleptic remarks in 'The Columbus Argument' and 'Righting Wrongs' are the philosophical, or quasi-philosophical, centre of the book. A fair sketch of Stove's case is as follows, I think:

(1) The best argument for conservatism is the one from the well-established empirical fact that our actions, individually and collectively, almost always have unforeseen and unwelcome consequences that often outweigh any beneficial consequences they may also have. Therefore, if innovative reforms are to be made, they ought to be small-scale, highly focused and local in scope, as non-coercive as possible, and very well thought out, not large-scale and/or revolutionary and highly coercive. The burden of proof therefore always lies with the advocate of reform, not the conservative opponent of reform. Every society above a very primitive level is so vastly intricate and complex as to be inadequately comprehensible intellectually, so that it is a practical certainty that any reform, even local ones, that are made will more likely than not have unforeseen consequences that are as bad as, or worse than, the evil the reform is intended to eliminate or reduce. Enlightenment optimism about the probable success of the Enlightenment project is therefore irrational because it is unfounded in human experience.

(2) Universal benevolence, or even just large scale benevolence (the utilitarian Greatest Happiness principle) is an irrational metric for evaluation the worthiness of human actions. First, there is no evidence that the sum of human happiness and well-being has increased under the Enlightenment *imperium*; for every source of human misery that has been reduced or eliminated, others have arisen, often as the unintended consequence of benevolent Enlightenment reforms, and old forms of misery such as war, pestilence, and famine have been amplified, not reduced or eliminated, since 1789 when the Enlightenment first took power in France. Second, happiness is much too subjective, individually and culturally variable, and above all much too fragile (as all forms of goodness are) to serve as a rational and reliable metric for judging the worthiness of human actions. Third, increased happiness *per se* cannot serve as the metric against which actions are judged because some forms of happiness are pathological, and should be suppressed or eliminated if possible, so that happiness itself needs judging in accordance with a metric of some other kind. Fourth, the Greatest Happiness principle requires us to do the impossible, viz., to predict each action's consequences broadly and far into the future. Even predicting the closest local consequences accurately is not within our reach, so that we just cannot ever know what actions will increase human happiness and which will not.

(3) That something is an evil does not entail that we have any obligation to try to rid the world of it. Most sources of human misery in life are permanent, and are operative in our lives because of our unchangeable

capacities for the several varieties of pain and suffering we experience. This is just a metaphysical fact against which no social project can prevail.

(4) The faith of the Enlightenment that education can perfect, or come close to perfecting, human nature would be touching were it not so ludicrous on the face of it. It implies that all our imperfections are all due to our various environments. This is plainly false as any parent of two or more children can testify. Stove might have added that the more we learn of human beings, the more 'hard-wired' we discover human behavior to be. (Christians call this Original Sin.)

Well, what are we to make of all this? In order that Stove's abstract, quasi-philosophical, arguments should be persuasive and have a useful bearing on live social issues, they need to be supplemented with actual examples of things gone unacceptably wrong with various benevolent acts or reforms. Stove knows this and offers horrendous examples throughout the book. Consider the first paragraph of 'Why you should be a Conservative':

> A primitive society is being devastated by a disease, so you bring modern medicine to bear and wipe out the disease, only to find that by doing so you have brought about a population explosion. You introduce contraception to control population, and find you have dismantled a whole culture. At home you legislate to relieve the distress of unmarried mothers, and find you have given a cash incentive to the production of illegitimate children. You guarantee a minimum wage, and find that you have extinguished, not only specific industries, but industry itself as a personal trait. You enable everyone to travel, and one result is, that there is nowhere left worth traveling to. And so on. (171)

The trouble with these examples is that they are sheer fantasies; nothing like them has ever happened outside Stove's perfervid imagination. The first has never happened because there are many more limits to population growth than disease; the increase in population in underdeveloped countries in recent decades is due more to clean water and an increase in food supplies than to modern medicine. Contraception, experience shows, is almost impossible to get primitive peoples to accept; any dismantling of their cultures is due to other factors, not the least of which is their own eager embrace of whatever aspects of modernity they can get their hands on. The great increase in unwed mothers and illegitimate children in the West has been due to a number of factors; in Europe, the weakening of religious constraints and strictures on sexual behavior is the principal cause. In the United States, where the problem is mainly a racial one, the mass migration of blacks from the South to northern cities since the first World War on, and the conditions they found there, utterly shattered the structures of the black family, resulting in the phenomena Stove complains about. The legislation Stove blames for the increase in illegitimacy in the United States (and I'd wager Australia too) was passed to deal with a long-standing problem; it did not cause it. The minimum wage has never wiped out a single industry, and there does not exist any study of workers on a minimum wage showing that most,

much less all, changed from being energetic and industrious individuals into lazy ones, nor did the minimum wage discourage their employers and make them any less industrious and rapacious. Finally, there are plenty of places worth traveling to, arguably perhaps even Australia.

These bogus examples are not anomalous. In every essay in the book where Stove invokes the supposed horrors of the unintended consequences of social reform, his examples are at best enormous exaggerations of an arguable case, and at worst (most of them) sheer fantasies. None provide empirical support for his general and abstract arguments for conservatism.

That should come as no surprise. It is true that every human action and every social reform entails unpredictable consequences. This is simply a standing condition of life, and it would be well if this unarguable fact were kept firmly in mind by all those who propose one or another reform, right or left; keeping it in mind will check any irrational impulse toward utopianism. Even so, whether the unintended consequences of social reforms are good or bad depends less on the nature of those reforms and their consequences than on whose ox is gored, and the judgement that some consequence has turned out to be undesirable is a political judgement. I cannot think of a single benevolently motivated social reform in the past two hundred years or so in the West whose unintended consequences have been bad for everyone concerned. Unemployment insurance, minimum wages, mandated paid vacations, universal public health care, worker health and safety legislation, mandatory school attendance laws, welfare payments to the destitute or the unemployable disabled, state regulation of the production of food and drugs, government insurance of bank deposits, and state pensions - the whole glorious range of hard fought for social-democratic reforms has had an enormous number of both unintended and intended consequences. None of them have been bad for everybody, and most of them have been good for most people concerned, and those that conservatives have judged bad have been judged good by others. These judgements are clearly political, not objectively scientific.

It is the total absence of the political dimension in social life in Stove's thought that undermines his arguments. The question of reform or not, and which reforms, how extensive they should be, and so on, are always political questions, not philosophical ones, and the *parti pris* of the proponents and opponents of reform is always a matter of whose ox is going to be fed and whose bled. It simply does not contribute a whit to the outcomes of such political conflicts to propound the sorts of general and abstract arguments outlined above. They have no political bite. I happen to think that most of Stove's criticisms of Enlightenment ideals and values are astute and mostly correct. I find them temperamentally congenial, and am happy to endorse most of them as a valuable check on utopian schemes and impulses. But the social-democratic measures mentioned above have never stemmed from utopian impulses, and moreover depend in no direct or essential ways on Enlightenment humanism, although it is clearly true that they could not have occurred in any society not strongly tinctured by the French Enlightenment, and I would add, all the more so, the Scottish Enlightenment.

Lastly, I cannot forbear to remark that I have read a good deal of Marx in my time, and I cannot recognize in any of the dozens of, mostly nasty, swipes at Marx that Stove makes, anything of the Marx that I have read. There are indeed criticisms of Marx that can be made, but Stove scarcely comes within a country mile of any of them. To use one of Stoves own favourite expressions, it's a billion to one that Stove never read much, perhaps any, Marx.

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Ananta Ch. Sukla, ed.
Art and Experience.
Westport, CT: Praeger 2003. Pp. xxii + 202.
US$69.95. ISBN 0-275-97494-8.

This collection of essays represents a serious attempt to analyze the phenomenon of experience in the domain of aesthetics. All contributors are solid scholars and provide detailed interpretations of almost all aspects of the subject. Apart from that, the book, as part of the series *Studies in Art, Culture, and Communities* by Praeger, fulfils a second task. Ananta Sukla mentions in the preface that 'the present century should also find its own modes of analysis and examination of the issues in lieu of the last century's dominating analytic style and method.' The book is thus a test case for aesthetic methods of the post-analytical style.

The general stock of quotations comes from George Dickie, Beardsley, Danto, and Nelson Goodman, which makes the volume appear to be rooted in the tradition of analytic aesthetics; however, references to Derrida, Heidegger, and Gadamer are also frequent. The question is if this combination is original enough to create a 'new style' in aesthetics. It seems instead that most authors rely on pragmatist methods and the authority of Dewey.

One of the problems with this book might be the overly general design of the project. It is possible that the subject 'Art and Experience' cannot be approached unless one has made the firm decision to defend *certain ideas* about experience in art and to reject others. A possible focus could have been a reflection of contemporary ideas on experience in art against those of the main author who has written, in the twentieth century about experience: William James. Strangely enough, James is hardly mentioned. I am not saying that James should be the starting point of any study of experience in art, but classical themes like inner experience, pre-conceptual experience, verbalization of experience, etc. could have provided a central concept with

which interested readers are already familiar; the rest could have been grouped around this center.

In the introduction, Ananta Sukla provides a brilliant survey of works on experience in the Western philosophical tradition. His presentation of Indian thought is perhaps a little too abstract and remains rather inaccessible to non-specialists. Sukla continues his compelling survey in his own contribution to the volume. His chapter is, together with Carvalho's (who discusses in a very interesting way the aesthetics of images, 'unreality', reexperience, etc.), the only chapter which I really appreciated.

Keith Yandell's contribution on religious experience does not refer to James' fundamental insights into the subject, and is far too analytical for my taste, working with symbols, equations and algebraic propositions.

The enigmatic title 'Close Reading, Distant Writing' by John Llewelyn does not become any clearer, in spite efforts to drag us away from Foucault on a more analytical field, and then push us back into Foucault and into Peirce's idea of signification. I asked myself if this is analytical philosophy made with continental elements.

T. J. Diffey's intention is 'to register the idea that since the nineteenth century both art and the theory of art have pulled away from an affinity with nature, an affinity that was long-established in European culture _ ' (55). In his chapter, things that have been said before are put into the new context represented by 'the experience of nature'. The problem is that this new context does not prevent these statements from tasting a little stale because one has heard them too often: 'that listening to a piece of music is not to be included in the same category as, say, walking in the countryside' (44); that 'beauty is no longer the aim of art' (43); that 'does not look created by human agency' is not an exact enough analysis of 'natural beauty' (49); that 'art offers aesthetic experience not available in nature' (55).

Joseph Kupfer's chapter entitled 'Experience as Art' classifies different types of aesthetic experience: 'Where the plastic arts evoke the physical performance of hanging a painting or perambulating around a sculpture, the performance of literary texts is cognitive and imaginative. We must conspire with the writer or speaker _ ' (63). All this is perfectly correct, but some at least slightly provocative thesis about the subject would have made the reading of the chapter a more valuable experience.

Richard Woodfield's chapter on 'pictorial experience' reads like a course syllabus on the thought of Alois Riegl.

Robert Stecker writes a chapter on the aesthetic experience of literature. Some interesting points can be extracted about the problem of cognition, but I wonder if these points are really new: 'It might be suggested that when statements occur within a work of fiction this often functions to make explicit what is already implicit. This is precisely the grounds on which Hardy is criticized regarding the final sentence of *Tess*' (98). Or: 'Hence the conceptions found in fictional literature (but not only there) have cognitive value not only in giving us new conceptions, in presenting them vividly to the imagination

so that we get a real sense of what it is to accept them or to live according to them ... ' (101).

At least Stephen Davis makes provocative statements, emphasizing a pragmatic tendency. In his chapter on the experience of music he opposes the idea that 'music conveys to the listener important truths that are special in not being expressible in language' (110). Here old Jamesian ideas are mentioned though not made explicit. Davis rejects Jerrold Levinson's idea that the largest part of our enjoyment of music is 'in the moment' (112), and defends his own thesis that 'the relevant differences between the pieces [are] lying not in what is expressed but in the musical means — means that are linguistically describable ... ' (111).

Graham McFee claims to talk about 'Cognitivism and the Experience of Dance', but the largest part of his contribution treats general problems of 'the ascription of beauty'.

In spite of the high intellectual level on which all studies are pursued, the general tone of the book remains rather bland and overly academic. There are very few *claims* in the book. The volume consists mainly of correct observations that seem to have been collected in order to provide a comprehensive perspective on a subject that has so far been neglected. In other words: everything the book attempts to do is rewarding but not very exciting. The largest part of the book reads a little like a textbook for a class on 'the experience of art'.

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John von Heyking
Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World.
Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press
2001. Pp. xvi + 278.
US$37.50. ISBN 0-8262-1349-9.

It takes little imagination to see that the most ready candidate for idolatry among humans is the state. But why? Simply to the extent that it embodies power — the customary aphrodisiac for males? Yes, says Augustine, whom ambition had captured during his young manhood; but there is a yet more profound root for such idolatry: our 'longing for a kind of wholeness' which Augustine recognized to be endemic to the pursuit of politics (1). Von Heyking's study intends to correct standard renditions of Augustine, which

have canonized the polarities which structure the City of God, by unveiling a corrective side: 'a right-by-nature theory of politics [which proposes] the proper way for human beings to live in the world' (3-4). Not that any society of human making can itself constitute an object adequate to our longing, but its ability (at best) to 'establish and maintain a little world of order [constitutes] politics [as] a natural good because political life forms human personhood and cultivates virtue' (51). And if that affirmation limns his positive view of the telos of human society, his oppositional rhetoric must be designed not to denigrate politics as such, but to counter our endemic penchant for idolatry with a 'salutary scepticism toward the possibilities of political life' (259).

Moreover, this tension regarding 'the political', which von Heyking proposes as a corrective to a flat-footed acceptance of Augustine's rhetoric condemning it, should resonate with anyone living in our times, while reminding us how threatening were Augustine's times to Roman attempts to safeguard their 'little world of order'. For to put too much faith in politics — in short, to cede to the idolatrous penchant — can only yield disillusion with the project itself: certainly this is the fate of all too many of us living through late capitalist liberalism. So this study is designed to address our longings as well; indeed, to show how Augustine's way of 'reconciling opposites' might lead us beyond the salutary collapse of optimism to an authentic way to hope. For the very fragility of political structures, mirrored in the poignancy of friendships threatened by mortality, can only be met clear-headedly by whose who can see their place in something larger: as part of a longing none but the One who implanted it can fulfill.

In this view, von Heyking uses Augustine's grapplings to help a generation made acutely sensitive to the lacunae of liberalism gain perspective on its virtues, specifically in relation to sacral societies, like the church, all too easily tempted to identify themselves with the 'city of God'. Specifically, 'liberalism's commitment to public, rational debate reminds the Church that God's truth is insinuated into nature and that cities share in truth,' while 'the liberal concept of equality reminds the Church of Augustine's view that there is a distinction between priestly offices and those whose priestly virtue makes them living testaments to truth. ... Natural reason ... enables a political role for the Church that nevertheless limits its ability to transform politics from the perspective of revelation alone' (221). It is in this vein that we are treated with an astute contextual exposition of Augustine's vacillation about coercing heretics, as he attempted to balance his acceptance of that policy, as a way of preserving order in the late Roman empire, with 'an inter-church reformation strategy' (256). Specifically, rigorist Donatist doctrine and practice easily resorted to violence against those who flaunted their precepts of purity, so (in Augustine's eyes) brought coercion on themselves.

In summary, 'Augustine's political thought ... reminds us of the contingency of political achievements, and that any out come will not likely endure as long as expected or longed for. Human beings are permanently caught in the tragic situation longing for true happiness, but thy face the mysterious

impossibility of not being fully capable of attaining it. This does not mean that political activity is fruitless; it means only that the fruition of our greatest longings lies elsewhere, an insight achieved only by thinking and acting in the world, and by discovering that such longing reorients our being in the world. Between our political activities and that fruition, we long and live in hope' (260-1). So far from 'giving up' on politics, the Augustine whom we meet here locates that activity within the ample space of our inbuilt longing for human fruition in its divine source: a telling example of the way in which faith in a creator who calls us individually and collectively beyond ourselves restores to us the dream of the *humanum*. Without that dream, we are delivered into the hands of a 'structural realism' which, by subverting human longing to raw power, leaves generations unable to dream and so incapable of participating in the political arena. As one twenty-five-year-old Israeli protestor remarked when I observed how the current regime was busy converting the Zionist dream into a nightmare: 'I am too young to have dreamt.' Yet unlike many of her contemporaries, her very protesting that regime vindicates the reach of this analysis, for she had not in fact lost her capacity to dream, however much the 'facts on the ground' had belied the dream her parents had once dreamt. It was that dream she had never allowed herself to dream, but so far nothing had been able to squelch the abiding longing for a political order that respects all that is human.

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George Yancy, ed.
The Philosophical I:
Personal Reflections on Life in Philosophy.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2002.
Pp. xxix + 295.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7425-1341-6);
US$27.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7425-1342-4).

The Philosophical I: Personal Reflections on Life in Philosophy is a collection of autobiographical essays by sixteen working philosophers. It joins a growing list of recent autobiographical writing by philosophers, including books by Colin McGinn, Bryan Magee, and Ted Honderich, and a tradition of earlier writings by St. Augustine, Descartes, Rousseau, Collingwood, and Russell. The editor says nothing about why these particular sixteen were chosen or whether they are meant to be representative, except that he dislikes the

distinction between 'superstar' philosophers and 'average run-of-the-mill' philosophers.

The authors collected represent a wide range of professional and life experience: Most contributors are somewhere mid-career, while the editor (who also contributes an essay) is a graduate student at time of writing. The most senior philosophers to contribute to the project are Joseph Margolis and Nicholas Rescher. The contributors come from a variety of social backgrounds. Some describe very humble or working-class origins (Linda Martín Alcoff, Sandra Harding, John Lachs, Nancy Tuana, Nancey Murphy, and Yancy). Not surprisingly, several are the children of an academic (including Lorraine Code, Charles W. Mills, and John Stuhr, the only contributor whose mother was a philosopher). Several of the authors have served in the armed forces (Richard Shusterman, Bat-Ami Bar On, and Margolis), while others were active in anti-war movements (Thomas Wartenberg, Douglas Kellner and Tuana). The tone of the essays ranges from humility to self-effacing humour to cozy self-importance.

The contributors describe a variety of paths that led them from an initial encounter with philosophy to their current professional status. Some took a single philosophy course or read a classic work of philosophy and were smitten; others drifted into graduate studies after working or completing undergraduate degrees in a different subject. Several recount personal and professional hardships and seem to bear them lightly; others, in unfavourable comparison, appear overly sensitive about relatively minor matters. (Readers may find wearying the rehearsal of various institutional political conflicts.) Several women philosophers write frankly about the drudgery of looking after small children and their frustration with circumscribed roles. A few of the narratives are quite gripping. How does Alcoff get from full-time work in a shirt factory to professor at the University of Syracuse? Will Mills confront the senior colleague who wrote a pseudonymous article in *Lingua Franca* describing his hiring as an affirmative action candidate? Many of the essays bring vividly to life experiences most readers will only be able to imagine. Paul C. Taylor's depiction of his education at an historically black men's college and Yancy's childhood in the Philadelphia projects are among these.

While the authors collected are in many ways a heterogeneous lot, they share certain similarities. All but one are associated with North American universities; the exception is Murphy, who teaches at a seminary. All completed at least some of their graduate philosophical training at North American institutions. Many stress the importance of philosophical associations and mentors in their development, and write of their former teachers and supervisors with warm gratitude. A few (including the editor) describe themselves as philosophical Pragmatists, and a number write of a journey away from their training in or former concentration on mainstream analytic philosophy, to a growing interest in continental thought or Pragmatism or both. There must be professional philosophers who turned to analytic philosophy after becoming disillusioned with continental thought, but we read nothing about it here.

A surprising number of contributors claim to feel alienated from the mainstream of philosophy, or from their colleagues, or from philosophical institutions. Even some of those who do not make explicit claims nonetheless write from a position of estrangement. Why should this be? Would a collection of autobiographical essays by academic historians yield similar results, or is there something specific to philosophers that brings out such feelings? Perhaps the choice to pursue a life of philosophy is sufficiently strange that those who do so feel alienated and unappreciated, whatever their status. Perhaps for some philosophical authenticity demands a view from the margins, rather than the center. Or perhaps those philosophers who voluntarily write about personal experience happen to be alienated.

The book is at its best when contributors describe their joy in discovering philosophy and their continued pleasure in its practice. Readers can take heart from tales of hardships overcome, job offers and graduate school admissions received, and other personal triumphs. I for one was encouraged by candid acknowledgements of philosophical deficiencies - Mills' feeling as a young professor that he should have spent his nights pouring over *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* and Margolis' confession that it was not until about ten years after completing his PhD that he began to get his philosophical bearings.

This collection will be of interest to those who have an interest in the recent history of philosophy and philosophical institutions. Some of the essays include useful summaries of the author's overall philosophical position and indications of how their various commitments are to be reconciled. Several contributors vividly bring to life the atmosphere in departments when philosophy was still largely the preserve of white males, before courses in feminist philosophy and women's studies departments were commonplace. The book also reflects the growing importance of American philosophy as a field of study and the ongoing professionalization of philosophy. Indeed, the editor writes that he conceived the book partly as a response to the professionalization of the subject. The book would be improved, nonetheless, by the addition of a short list of what each philosopher considers to be his or her most significant or favourite works.

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Dan Zahavi
Husserl's Phenomenology.
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This book is a translation and revision of a book originally published in Denmark. In presenting the work for an English speaking audience, Zahavi has managed to present a clear introduction to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl that has the dual values of being brief and thorough at the same time. Beginning at the advent of Husserl's phenomenology, not with his earlier work in the philosophy of arithmetic, and following the thread of intentionality through to Husserl's final works, Zahavi takes his reader through the fine points of the development of Husserl's thinking and shows how his thought addresses the major issues with which Husserl was confronted.

This book has many strengths and few deficiencies. Perhaps central to its strength as an introductory text is Zahavi's attempt to overcome current, widely held misconceptions about Husserl's work and his place in the history of philosophy. Often presented as a precursor to later, more prominent philosophers, e.g., Heidegger and Derrida, Husserl deserves to be returned to a prominent place in the study of twentieth-century philosophy. By tracing the development of Husserl's thought and relating it to both his contemporary and later thinkers, Zahavi shows this prominence, and demonstrates that Husserl's responses to the important philosophical questions deserve to be considered in their own right, not merely to be seen as a propaedeutic to the study of later thinkers. For readers approaching Husserl for the first time, as well as for those who have only been introduced to him incidentally through the study of other thinkers, this approach to Husserl's work will provide a more realistic portrait of Husserl's place in twentieth-century philosophy.

By beginning with Husserl's earliest phenomenological work, *Logical Investigations*, and moving through his thought as it developed towards his later works, *The Crisis of European Sciences* and *Experience and Judgment*, Zahavi slowly introduces the technical language in which much of Husserlian phenomenology is couched and that so often makes Husserl's work impenetrable. Instead of being overwhelmed when first opening the book, the reader is led through the increasingly more complicated material. Yet, the book is neither 'dumbed down' nor entirely jargon-free; thus those readers newly approaching Husserl's work will benefit when reading Husserl's texts for themselves. Not only does Zahavi present them with a clear and understandable introduction, he also introduces them to the technical language an understanding of which is necessary for fully appreciating Husserl's work. Thus, the reader can approach the otherwise daunting task of tackling

Husserl's writing with a confidence in having been lead wisely through the pitfalls of this frequently less than lucid writer.

One might object to the portrait Zahavi presents, not because it does not conform to the popular view of Husserl, but rather because it presents a particular interpretation of Husserl that is widely debated. Interpretations of Husserl generally fall within two camps. They are known as the East Coast and the West Coast (sometimes Californian) interpretations. Zahavi is a proponent of the East Coast interpretation. He does not attempt to hide this fact, and he admits as much at the end of his principal account of the status of the noema. The status of the noema can be said to be at the heart of the differences between the two interpretations, and thus it will come as no surprise that here is where Zahavi declares his loyalties. Briefly stated, Husserl's theory of intentionality uncovers two components of every intentional act: the immanent, noetic side and the transcendent, noematic side - or the noema. As Zahavi describes it: 'The noema is often identified with the object-as-it-is-intended' (58). The debate over the noema revolves around the relationship between the object-as-it-is-intended and the object-that-is-intended; are they the same thing or two distinct things? As Zahavi notes, on the one hand, the proponents of the West Coast interpretation view the two as 'quite different ontological entities' (58) . This interpretation is seen as Fregean, and claims that the noema 'is an ideal meaning or sense which mediates the intentional relation between act and object' (58) . The noema can thus be characterized as a 'representation' of the object and as that towards which the intentional act is directed. On the other hand, the proponents of the East Coast interpretation view the two as 'different perspectives on one and the same' entity (58). The noema is identified not with something intermediate between act and object, but rather with the object, not *per se*, but as intended. Yet, there is no ontological distinction to be made between the object and how it is intended. As Zahavi says: 'The noema is the perceived object as perceived, the recollected episode as recollected, the judged state of affairs as judged, and so on' (59). The noema is simply a perspective of the object-that-is-intended. Under this interpretation the noema cannot be characterized as a 'representation' at all, but must be identified with the object. On Zahavi's account, the view one takes on this issue is vital to understanding Husserl's project. If one sides with the West Coast interpretation, he argues (61), then one cannot accept an interpretation of Husserl that sees his work as addressing metaphysical questions. But, should one accept the East Coast interpretation, then no such problem exists. Instead, phenomenology is seen as 'the true and realized ontology' (61). It is this later view that is developed in this introduction. Still, though Zahavi has interpretative commitments, he does manage to provide a fair account of both interpretations while arguing for his own, favored account.

On the whole, this book can be recommended to anyone who is approaching the study of Husserl's phenomenology for the first time or to those who wish to broaden their understanding of Husserl's thought and his place in twentieth-century philosophy. Finally, while it is beneficial that the book is

concise, as a result some aspects of Husserl's thinking can only be alluded to and not fully covered. Zahavi admits as much. Still, with the introduction Zahavi provides, one will be able to fill in the gaps on one's own.

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