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# Table of Contents • Table des matières

**Giorgio Agamben**
*The Open: Man and Animal.*
Trans. Kevin Attell.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2004.
Pp. ix + 102.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4737-7);
US$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4738-5).

Following September 11, 2001, Giorgio Agamben published a short piece, 'Security and Terror', aiming to demonstrate that 'security and terrorism form … a single deadly system in which they mutually justify and legitimate each others' actions,' with 'politics [today] secretly work[ing] towards the production of emergencies' ('Security and Terror', *Theory and Event* 5:4). This mode of political-philosophical analysis — in which the concealed historical matrix of apparently opposed terms reveals a secret connectedness — structures Agamben's work.

Similarly, in *Homo Sacer*, an arcane Roman law, wherein the sovereign designated a citizen 'sacred', stripping him of his rights as a citizen, and allowing him to be killed (though not executed) by anyone; is linked to the split between the two Greek terms for 'life', *zoē* ('bare life') and *bios* ('political life'). This link fuels a dense investigation spanning nearly twenty centuries of Western thought, revealing that the structure of 'sacred man' undergirds the entirety of Western history up to the Nazi extermination camps. *Means Without End* summarizes the conclusions reached in *Homo Sacer*, and the political-ethical task bequeathed us by them: 'The camp is the paradigm itself of political space at the point in which politics becomes biopolitics and the *homo sacer* becomes indistinguishable from the citizen. … The correct question regarding the horrors committed in the camps … is … how — that is, thanks to what juridical procedures and political devices — human beings could have been so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives to the point that committing any act toward them would no longer appear as a crime … [W]e will then have to admit to be facing a camp virtually every time that such a structure is created, regardless of the nature of the crimes committed in it … The camp … is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we still live, and we must learn to recognize it in all of its metamorphoses' (*Means Without End*, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino [Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press 2000], 41, 44, 45).

*The Open* revisits these themes from a new angle — the distinction between man and animal: 'It is as if determining the border between human and animal were not just one question among many discussed by philosophers and theologians, scientists and politicians, but rather a fundamental metaphysico-political operation in which alone something like "man" can be decided upon and produced. … Perhaps concentration and extermination camps are also an experiment of this sort, an extreme and monstrous attempt to decide between the human and the inhuman' (21, 22).

Agamben traces this trajectory, beginning with Kojève and Bataille and the problem of 'the human' at the Hegelian 'end of history'; turning back to Aristotle's original definitions of 'life' and 'animal'; reading the medieval theologians, for whom the distinction between man and animal plays itself out in the problem concerning man's animality 'at the end of time' (whether there continues to be eating and defecating, sex and reproduction in this 'time after time'); then considering various anthropologists (who were determined to classify man as distinct from apes, but also from satyrs, mythological beings, and Pygmies) and biologists; before spending nearly a third of the book analyzing several key texts and lectures by his teacher, Heidegger, for whom an abyss separates the animal, 'deprived of world' (though not simply 'worldless', like the stone), from man, who 'has a world'.

Agamben is led to conclude that even in Heidegger's far-reaching analysis the man-animal distinction still functions as a metaphysical operation, designed to *produce* 'man' out of an originary conflict (or strife) 'between the humanity and the animality of man' (73). Linking this 'originary strife' between concealedness and unconcealedness to that between 'animal' and 'man', Agamben also shows that in each (for Heidegger) something 'immediately and originarily a political paradigm' ('indeed the political paradigm par excellence') is at stake (73, 72). He concludes that '[i]n our culture, the decisive political conflict, which governs every other conflict, is that between the animality and the humanity of man. ... in its origin Western politics is also biopolitics' (80).

Agamben's other teacher, Foucault, also spent a lifetime diagnosing the hidden networks of power underlying the 'givens' of modern Western life. Foucault never provided us 'exits' from these networks he revealed, though he maintained a constant role of political activist. This activism was not in fact at odds with his philosophical conclusions: power is everywhere, and we cannot 'step outside' its networks; yet we can effect constant *shifts* in these fields, which, while not transcending power (and always susceptible to its new dangers), nevertheless open up relative 'practices of freedom'.

Agamben is not content with this Foucauldian model; he seeks an exit or escape from the structures themselves, and not merely a shift in relations. (This is the other side of Agamben's work, most fully gestured to in *The Coming Community* and *Le temps qui reste*.) What is decisive with respect to the various 'machines of production' given us by Western metaphysics (animal-man, *zoē-bios*, security-terror, etc.), is 'understanding how they work so that we might, eventually, be able to stop them' (38). What would such a 'stop' consist in? In an imaginative conclusion, Agamben posits the final arrest of this machine as a 'serenity' that can 'let something be' or can 'leave something outside of being' — a 'zone of a-knowledge ... beyond both knowing and not knowing, beyond both disconcealing and concealing, beyond both being and nothing' (91). The Latin word *ignoscere*, which means, not 'not to know [*ignorare*]', but rather 'to forgive', gestures to this possibility: 'the "great ignorance" which lets both of them be outside of being, saved precisely in their being unsavable' (91, 92).

*The Open* is a short but significant development of the themes first articulated in *Homo Sacer* — an important long essay by the most important and original political philosopher of our time.

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Alanen's book is a welcome addition to the Descartes literature. Elegantly written and well constructed, it deals with an inadequately explored area, that of the unity of mind and body in the context of the dualism of thought and extension. Her thoroughly contextual arguments cover all of Descartes' works, draw extensively on his intellectual context, and make good use of much of current scholarship. The eighty-three pages of footnotes are important; they nuance the argument, regularly relating it to predecessors or to contemporary scholars with whom she agrees or disagrees. There is a useful index, but no bibliography — the only major shortcoming.

Though interesting, neither the first nor the last chapter are novel and they are only tangentially relevant to Alanen's theme. The first offers a convincing account of the continuity of Descartes' thought. The last is an account of free will and virtue, written from the generally known if not always accepted point of view that the will is free from original determination of any kind (which would seem to imply that whatever account is given of the embodied mind it does not, in this respect, impinge on the dualism of freedom and nature). Alanen does, however, give good grounds for holding that acts of will place a person in a position to grasp the true and the good which, once held attentively in focus, in turn inexorably determine the will; and that one can always exert one's will in withdrawing attention. Thus the will is 'this active power to elicit or not elicit' its being determined and 'we ourselves bear full responsibility for how we direct our thoughts and hence for pursuing or not pursuing the true and the good' (244). This is Descartes' 'new concept of rationality, that of an autonomous agent who can set her own ends and commit herself to the laws of reason and morality unconditionally because she is not determined to do so out of natural necessity' (224). Alanen believes 'that Descartes does not raise this possibility in the *Meditations* ... which presupposes a prior commitment to the truth' (246). In *Descartes and the*

*Possibility of Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2000), I have argued that Descartes does hold this position in the *Meditations*; here Alanen's account can be made stronger than she believes to be the case.

The second chapter (with its wealth of footnotes relating Alanen's arguments to those of Bayer, Cottingham, Gouhier, Kenny, Malcolm, Radner, Rozemond, and Ryle — to mention only some of the commentators she engages) builds a strong foundation for the five following chapters. It develops the theme that for Descartes there are only two distinct realms of science, the purely intellectual and the purely material. In both, science is possible because one can achieve clarity and distinctness of the relevant concepts and of their connections. A person, however, is an embodied mind; and though embodiment is experienced as a primitive or irreducible notion, nothing about it or about a person is clear and distinct and experiences like those of pain, hunger, and thirst are thoughts of an 'irremediably confused character' (58), a confusion 'due precisely to their "hybrid" nature: they are modes of thought, but caused by the body' (64). Hence 'there is no Cartesian science of human beings, only a science of the human body' (53), and the primitive notion by which we know the mind-body union is of a 'prephilosophical character' (72) that is not an 'origin of a third kind of knowledge' (73). Nevertheless, concepts related to that of an embodied mind 'have a legitimate use in those extrascientific contexts where they are ordinarily applied' (76). The upshot is that, in respect of this third realm, Descartes is a philosopher of common sense. As such, he can be content with less than metaphysical certainty and be free to 'rely on what our finite "nature" and experience teaches us and accept that uncertainty and fallibility are part of the very nature of ... our human condition' (77).

Alanen now turns to the connections between thought, consciousness and language. After she draws attention to Descartes' redefinition of mind to include thoughts as well consciousness in general (as in willing, imagining, remembering, sensing) two of the problems on which she focuses in the third chapter are those of propositions and knowledge, and of artificial intelligence. Important to the former is her treatment of the fact that, because thought includes nonpropositional sensations, Descartes' concept of thought cannot be defined merely in terms of propositional content (83-93). (She might, at this point, have included knowledge of 'simple natures' that, as she points out on p.155, also have no 'propositional counterparts'.) On the latter, Alanen gives a convincing account of why artificial intelligence was a nonstarter for Descartes. Identifying human and machine 'intelligence' would be committing the Rylean category mistake of which Alanen shows Descartes to be not guilty (53-4): that of 'explaining thought in terms of concepts and models analogous to those applicable only to extension and its modes' (97). Descartes' position remains distinct from contemporary functionalism and identity theories because of his 'notion of the human being as a unity of mind and body, with properties that are not reducible to either mind or body but depend precisely on their "substantial" union' (98).

The next two chapters deal with the complex relations between and among ideas, sense perception, intentionality, and representation. In this area fraught with pitfalls for the interpreter, Alanen's remains an insightful and plausible account in which both the real distinction between mind and body and their substantial union play their proper roles. One position she advances is that 'representation ... [is] a general feature of all ideas even when, as with sensory ideas, there is no telling what thing they are about' (148) — which allows for illuminating the point that 'material falsity is connected with obscurity and confusion' (157).

Among the issues that remain is that of the existence of radical freewill necessary for the possibility of reason's autonomy, for developing science and thus for achieving mastery over external nature, and for mastery over the passions (the latter being the subject of the sixth chapter). How can freewill exist given the reality of an embodied mind? Alanen resolves this apparent conflict through the doctrine that experiences and accompanying beliefs arising from the mind-body union are never clear and distinct and thus cannot be used to militate against the clear and distinct experience of freewill. It is a plausible resolution, akin to that of the question concerning the possibility of co-existing human freedom and divine omniscience and omnipotence. Descartes cannot fully understand the nature of God, but when this partial understanding threatens his clear and distinct experience of freewill it is the immediacy and clarity and distinctness of that experience which carries the day and establishes the reality of the latter.

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**Larry Alexander** and **Emily Sherwin**
*The Rule of Rules:*
*Morality, Rules, and the Dilemmas of Law.*
Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2001.
Pp. viii + 279.
US$45.95. ISBN 0-8223-2736-8.

**Alan H. Goldman**
*Practical Rules:*
*When We Need Them and When We Don't.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.
Pp. xi + 210.
US$58.00. ISBN 0-521-80729-8.

Rules, rules, rules — can't live with them, can't live without them. For every time that a rule at its point of application creates unfairness, there's another time where the rule as applied realizes fairness. It's not surprising, given this duality, that rules have long fascinated and challenged social theorists of all kinds, both philosophical and empirical. In my view, the benchmark for philosophically and normatively sensitive analyses of rules has been set by Frederick Schauer in *Playing By the Rules* (OUP 1991) — as his subtitle has it, a philosophical examination of rule-based decision-making in law and in life. The two books reviewed here do not force a revision of that benchmark, but they contain much material of considerable interest. They both agree with a central theme of Schauer's analysis, that decision-making or reasoning by rule necessarily involves the opacity of rules to their background justifications. If the applicability of a rule has to be assessed for its justifiability at every point of application, then we don't have *rule*-based reasoning or decision-making at all. As a pair, the two books complement each other nicely, both overlapping and differing in scope. A&S focus primarily on rules in law; morality enters in the form of the issues of political morality which are held to underlie the role of rules in the so-called rule of law. Goldman's scope is wider: he considers the role of rules in moral, prudential and legal reasoning.

The core issue for A&S is this (3). Rules do their moral work by supplanting indeterminate moral considerations with more determinate ones. Their central function is one of moral settlement. The core puzzle then is: How can it be right for rules to supplant moral considerations? With respect to the law, the function of law is authoritative dispute settlement at the community level. In order to fulfil that function, rules must be posited, general, determinate, efficient (26). Rule-based decision-making can never achieve the perfection of accurate case by case decision-making. There will always be a 'gap' between what the rule-maker(s) in a community has reason to prescribe (and his subjects have reason to want him/them to prescribe), and what his/their subjects have reason to do all things considered (54). Ultimately, this gap can never be closed. It may be right to issue authoritative rules but sometimes

wrong to follow them. The justification for authoritative rule-making does not lie in any closure of the gap, but only in an acknowledgment by the community that giving the rule-maker the authority to settle disputes brings the advantages that follow the creation of such an authority.

This position is set up by A&S in the first three chapters. The rest of the book is based on the premise that such a view of the role in law of rules is not a theory of law but a prism through which to view theories of law (204). The most helpful way to understand law is to embrace, rather than to seek to resolve, the paradox of rules, that they both promote and frustrate morality. A&S defend this view with a discussion of a number of issues that have been prominent in legal theory in the last two or three decades — presumptive legal positivism, exclusionary reasons, interpretation, reasoning by analogy, precedent, legal principles, exclusive vs. inclusive legal positivism, and finally the fundamental opposition itself of natural law theory and legal positivism. In their view, once the basic dilemma of rules is exposed, the difference between natural law and positivism becomes a difference in perspective: the two theories are complementary rather than opposed (184). Positivism and natural law respond, from different angles, to the tension between rules and the moral reasons that motivate them (203). The thought is that natural law theory stands for the way in which sometimes the morally right thing to do is to disobey the law: legal positivism stands for the way in which obedience to law is morally right.

I need to declare an interest. A&S are kind enough to identify (7, 203-3) *Norm and Nature* (OUP 1992) as the only other contemporary theory of law which has sought to make natural law theory and positivism complementary. In that book, my main thesis is that the complementarity has a dynamic character to it — the competing theories of law interact. A&S' 'prism' image is essentially static, and indeed they embrace this aspect of it and oppose my rejection of such an approach. But they just assert that the dynamic model is mistaken; no argument is given. And this is symptomatic of the book as a whole. The text does not always track exactly how the paradox of rules is implicated in the various analyses presented. Taken piecemeal, the discussions of the different topics make useful points. But I feel we are left too often to figure out on our own how it is that the inadequacies in the positions criticized show A&S' own position to be sound.

To an extent, Goldman's text also is maculate with this dissertation-like approach of proceeding via criticism of others than by positive defence of one's own view. But he does advance a number of interesting ideas, nonetheless. His (plausible) view is that rules are of interest in moral reasoning only if they are what he calls 'strong rules', that is, rules which 'state sufficient conditions for doing or refraining from doing something'. Strong rules 'link nonmoral properties with specific injunctions for action': they 'determine action in advance of encountering particular cases' (all quotes from p. 15). Strong rules are distinguished from 'rules of thumb' ('Be honest', for example) and 'pseudo-rules', general normative requirements ('Treat others with respect'). The latter two simply direct attention to certain core or paradigm

cases, and thus are in principle eliminable in favour of those cases. Strong rules, however, are not eliminable, since they compel action against perceptions of what ought to be done in the individual case. But, since they do that, they need to have a special kind of justification, one which takes on board what would otherwise count as a reason against the normative cogency of the rule. Strong rules always represent a moral 'second best', second best to what could be achieved by perfect intuition. So respect for them has to be justified. Goldman argues in Chapter 1 that strong rules can be justified as solutions to coordination problems of the Prisoners' Dilemma kind, and he surveys a number of these to make his case.

Chapter 2 considers the possibility of prudential rules. Goldman's conclusion is that, in the domain of prudence, all that counts is the decision about the individual case. There is no need for rules of prudence. A person is better off dealing with, e.g., weakness of will, even in Odysseus/Sirens contexts, by training themselves to decide a certain way, rather than by deciding to adopt a rule. The role of rules in the law is considered in Chapter 3, and here too Goldman is minimalist. The concept of a rule is not needed as a descriptive-explanatory device to understand legal decision-making, nor is it clear that a sound normative argument can be given that judges ought to treat various kinds of legal norm as though they are (strong) rules.

Early in the book, Goldman introduces what he calls the 'Kantian constraint', namely, 'we must not judge two cases differently without being able to cite a relevant difference between them' (2). He also refers to reasoning in accord with this process as 'reasoning by analogy and difference from settled cases' (ibid.). Decision-making in accord with the constraint is not rule-based decision-making. At the end of Chapter 3 Goldman buttresses his scepticism about the role of rules in law by arguing that legal reasoning is fully explicable in terms of this constraint, and in Chapter 4 he goes on to argue that the constraint represents the core of moral reasoning as well. In the end, then, Goldman's answer to his titular question about when we need practical rules is that we don't need them very much at all. We need them only in morality, and only in the limited set of circumstances defined by certain problems in rational decision-making. The major engine of practical reasoning is the 'Kantian constraint'.

The two books directly overlap and compete, then, only in their rival accounts of law, and here there's no doubt that Goldman presents a considerable challenge to A&S. They simply take for granted that the conventional picture of law as a system of rules is more or less correct, and their working assumption is that to justify law as a social institution is to justify legal rules. Goldman prizes these two apart: he argues that the social function of law is achieved perfectly well by a normative system that proceeds according to his method of analogy and difference. Moreover, his view is that only certain limited kinds of justification are available, on a piecemeal basis, for strong rules. A&S don't consider the justification of rules piecemeal at all. A&S share with Goldman a general view that a moral assessment of the role of rules in law will consist of examining their contribution to a well-ordered and

flourishing community. But the direction of thought is different in the two cases. A&S assume law is a system of rules, and consider how law so construed contributes to community. Goldman goes the other way. Suppose we wanted a well-ordered and flourishing community with law doing its part: what would legal reasoning have to be, to achieve that? His provocative answer: it would not need to be a system of rules, and in fact would need not to be.

I want to end with a complaint, and what would be if this were the TV show *Marketplace* or a Molson Canadian ad, a rant. The complaint is this. Both A&S and Goldman frame the issue as being how to justify the deployment of rules in practical reasoning, given that rules always constitute moral imperfection. But why do they constitute imperfection? Well, goes the answer, because they result in decisions being taken in some particular cases that are not what perfect intuitive morality would prescribe for those cases. But perfect intuitive morality is impossible for us normal folks. And doesn't Ought imply Can? Doesn't the deployment of perfect intuition as a stick with which to beat rules imply that perfect intuition is possible? If it is not, then what underwrites the talk of 'second best'?

And here's the rant. Both books adduce numerous examples from constitutional law, as given their themes they well might. But the examples are all from U.S. constitutional law, and the example of a constitution is always the U.S. Constitution. The special problems of interpreting the U.S. Constitution, or of how democratic political morality works itself out under the distinctive constitutional arrangements of the U.S., are taken to be illustrative of law as such. But don't Canada, France, Germany, South Africa, Australia, … have constitutions? Why should it be assumed that the parochial concerns of legal scholars in one particular country are the issues which legal theory as a whole should revolve around? It would be nice to find legal theory written in a way that recognized there were other legal systems in the world.

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**George Boole**
*The Laws of Thought.*
Introduction by John Corcoran.
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 2003.
Pp. xxxv + 424.
US$13.00. ISBN 1-59102-089-1.


The body of this book is a replica of the 1854 edition of George Boole's great work in logic. While it has been widely available in this form for over a century, what sets this edition apart is the inclusion of John Corcoran's extensive and penetrating introduction both to the text and to Boole's logical thought more generally. The result is a valuable addition to Boole scholarship conveniently bound with Boole's major work.

Boole is best known for creating a formal analogy between logic and algebra by assigning a logical interpretation to some algebraic operations. The analogy was not perfect; the fit was partial and somewhat restrictive on the logic side. That fact, however, is of singular unimportance, for by creating even a partial analogy, Boole fundamentally changed the way logic is conceived. Since the seventeenth century logic had been taken to be a rule-bound technique without any deeper theoretical association. In Boole's hands it acquired a foundation by way of the link with its formal neighbor. *The Laws of Thought* is the mature expression of Boole's theory.

Boole's work appeared during a revival of interest in logical theory after two centuries of unremitting criticism of the subject, due largely to misunderstandings about the nature of logic. Beginning in the early decades of the nineteenth century, defenders of logic began to argue that it should be treated as a science like any other, and drew simple analogies between it and mathematics and natural science. At the same time, mathematics in England was going through its own transition. One effect of the change was an increasing emphasis on abstraction in the subject. Where algebra had, for instance, been confined to a strictly numerical interpretation, now purely formal systems were created, which could be interpreted in many different ways.

Boole's logic reflects both areas of change. The first of his two major works, *Mathematical Analysis of Logic* (1847) introduced his approach to the subject by laying out the ground for the formal analogy between mathematics and logic, and then illustrating it by recasting the common syllogistic logic of the day in algebraic terms. The final third of the work, however, is devoted to the development of more abstract equations with much broader application.

*Laws of Thought* is even further removed from the traditional logic. In it, Boole all but ignores the traditional syllogism, and instead moves to even higher levels of abstraction and generality. Where logical inference had been handled by simple algebraic elimination in earlier work, for instance, in *Laws of Thought* it was extended to reduction of entire systems of propositions to a single equivalent equation.

Two features distinguish Boole's logic. One is a quest for generality. Boole thought that algebra and traditional logic had a common ancestor, which he called the 'higher logic', interpretations of which might include areas not ordinarily recognized as falling within the scope of logic. An example of this occurs in *Laws of Thought* in which one third of the book is devoted to a treatment of probability in (logically interpretable) algebraic terms. For all the broadening, however, Boole's logic remained essentially a term logic (a fully worked out propositional logic would not appear for another twenty five years). Hence for all its new-found formal power, his logic also maintained a connection to its forbears in the earlier syllogistic tradition.

Corcoran's commentary is valuable to those already familiar with Boole's work, but is especially helpful to those approaching it for the first time. Many existing commentaries approach Boole from a present-day perspective, i.e., as anticipating, however imperfectly, things to come (W. V. O. Quine's review of Desmond MacHale's biography of Boole [*In the Logical Vestibule*] is an excellent example of this approach). There is some justification for doing this — Boole, after all, tended to be forward-looking and had little positive to say about the tradition which preceded him. The effect of such an approach, however, is a tendency to stress what is lacking in Boole, rather than his positive contribution. Corcoran, by contrast, uses Aristotle's theory of logic as a baseline for his analysis. Starting with simple sentences and immediate inference, Corcoran clearly and accurately shows how Boole's logic covers the same ground. As he puts it, 'Boole was one of the last logicians to take [the subject-connector-predicate view of simple propositions] seriously' (xiii). The result of Corcoran's approach is a view in which Boole's logic is seen to be simpler than Aristotle's in one respect (i.e., as a unified system), and more complicated in another (extending the range of propositions covered within it). By beginning with Aristotle, Corcoran's analysis provides an exceptionally clear account of Boole's positive contributions to logic.

At the same time, Corcoran also describes things that Boole's system lacks. Thus he points out that Boole never recognized indirect inference, and he notes problems that arise when Boole attempts to use algebraic devices (such as solving equations) as a warrant for logical inference (not all algebraic operations result in logically valid inferences). By detailing both the strengths and weaknesses in Boole's theory, Corcoran provides a balanced and accurate account of Boole's proper place in the modern development of logic.

Another welcome feature of Corcoran's introduction is the inclusion of references, often to recent encyclopedia articles, at just those points at which readers with relatively little technical background encounter concepts that require some further explanation. Such an addition makes it easier for those with modest backgrounds in logic and algebra to work through *Laws of Thought*.

This year is the sesquicentennial anniversary of the publication of *Laws of Thought*. So much of what has happened in the meantime bears the mark

of Boole's influence that it is appropriate to mark the occasion with a fresh look at the work. Corcoran's excellent introduction does this with clarity and rigor.

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**Rudiger Bubner**
*The Innovations of Idealism.*
Trans. Nicholas Walker.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. x + 274.
US$55.00. ISBN 0-521-66262-1.

The twelve essays that make up this volume were originally published in German in 1995. They clearly are independent pieces, originally written for different occasions as their varying lengths and contrasting formats reflect. They all play none the less on the theme stated by the title. Together they succeed in conveying, at least impressionistically, the revolutionary nature of German Idealism. They make for an interesting and instructive reading.

The first essay is of special doxographical interest, because it documents the role that the appropriation by the young post-Kantians of Plato played in the formation of classical German Idealism. These young idealists believed that the same nature that Newtonian science was at the time dissecting mathematically had to be conceptually reconstructed — created *a priori*, so to speak — in the shape of a moral incarnation of spirit. Nature has meaning only inasmuch as it is interpreted as the home of a 'self'. This belief was one of the innovations brought about by Idealism. Schelling, Hegel, the Schlegel brothers, and Schleiermacher, drew their first inspiration from the Kant of the third Critique and the early Fichte. However, at a time when philosophical historiography was being born, they also discovered Plato, and, as Bubner shows, they used his myths and his doctrine of ideas as the conceptual medium for justifying their peculiar reading of both Kant and Fichte. Schelling especially is interesting in this regard. He read Socrates' in fact ironic treatment of the poets in the *Ion* as, on the contrary, the warrant for thinking of philosophy as a mytho-poetic work that invests nature with the meaning it ought to have. He also read the *Timaeus* as if the myth of the demiurge were a poetic counterpart of Kant's *a priori* construction of a universe of meaning out of the matter of experience. On this assumption, of course, the style of philosophical writing becomes all-important. Friedrich

Schlegel, also relying on Plato's authority, was responsible for introducing the idea of philosophy as an all-embracing work of art. This was another innovation of Idealism. Schlegel's friend Schleiermacher undertook the translation of the Platonic *corpus* as a contribution to this work. As he laboured on the translation, struggling with a mass of historical details to establish the right chronology of Plato's dialogues, Schleiermacher arrived at the hermeneutical principle that in fact was the obvious implication of his idealism. The internal intelligibility of the dialogues, rather than any amount of contingent historical evidence, ultimately determines the true progression of the dialogues.

The young Schelling discovered Plato. The old Schelling (as we learn in the second essay) discovered Aristotle, this time in an effort to counter the influence of Hegel. Just as Aristotle had added an empirical content to Plato's otherwise purely conceptual dialectic, Schelling now advocated his own *positive* philosophy in opposition to Hegel's Logic, which he took to be purely reflective and *negative*. His own philosophy was instead based on a supposed empirically ascertainable revelation of the Absolute in the mythologies of the peoples. The six following essays are dedicated precisely to Hegel. Bubner pleads for a linguistic interpretation of his Logic. The Logic wants to canonize at a second level of reflection the already reflective intentions that are deeply imbedded in ordinary discourse and which together define the structure of meaning. This is a project very much in tune with contemporary semantic theory. However, the assumption in modern theory is that the intentions at issue necessarily remain unspoken. Although they are adverted to at such turns of history when there is a shift away from the fundamental explanatory paradigm typical of a culture, even then they are only intimated at without being expressed. Hegel's Logic, on the contrary, is an attempt to canonize them systematically. So far as classical metaphysics is concerned, the project entailed at least two radical innovations. The first, already initiated by Kant, was to shift the burden of philosophical interest from physical explanation to the account of the genesis of meaning. The second, typically Hegelian, was to invest history with a new philosophical significance. Granted Hegel's claim that he had comprehended the conceptual structure of all discourse, one should then be able to understand how and why explanatory paradigms have shifted from age to age. Moreover, since logical intentions are realized only in the particular (historically conditioned) forms of discourse that they make possible, the Logic naturally devolves into a reflection on historical phenomena. Thus, where Kant was concerned with a morality based on universal laws, and still abided by the Enlightenment's belief in a teleology of history, Hegel's interest lay rather in the historically conditioned socio-political institutions that make moral praxis possible, and, instead of speculating about any supposed end of history, concentrated his attention rather on the closure that an epoch can achieve precisely by comprehending the logic of the assumptions that have governed it from the beginning.

Such are the issues that Bubner discusses, somewhat rhapsodically, in the mentioned six essays. The final four deal with aesthetics. They are again

of special doxographical interest, this time because of the light they throw on the nature of Romantic art. It is interesting to find out, for instance, how much Goethe and Hegel were conceptually in conflict despite their external harmonious relationship. One point is however especially significant because it shows how Hegel's aesthetics marked an innovation with respect to Romanticism and also provided the basis for a new, typically modern, conception of art. Romantic art had to be 'ironic'. Since it took as its vocation to express the Absolute but necessarily failed in the effort and inevitably ended up expressing itself instead of the intended Absolute, it had to practice irony on its own discourse in order to avoid falsity. For Hegel, however, the Absolute was now the Idea, and the Idea found full expression in the Logic. Thus Hegel famously proclaimed the end of art. One constructive way of interpreting this claim (which Bubner however does not explore explicitly) is to think of art as at an end only in its previously avowed vocation of expressing the truth. To be at an end in this sense, however, entails a new freedom for art, namely the freedom to take its self-expression as itself its *raison d'être*, without therefore the need of practising irony in order to avoid falsity. In this, Hegel was providing the manifesto for modern art.

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**Robert Burch** and
**Massimo Verdicchio, eds.**
*Between Philosophy and Poetry:*
*Writing, Rhythm, History.*
New York: Continuum Books 2003.
Pp. 232.
US$115.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8264-6005-4);
US$29.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8264-6006-2).

This collection of essays *Between Philosophy and Poetry* begs to be read somewhere in the between, where editor Massimo Verdicchio would locate Carlo Sini's philosophy 'at the crossroads of the problematic' (13). Like the Biblical poetry of intellectual repetition, philosophy also has its thought rhythm; this sense of rhythm, as Amitai Aviram argues in 'The Meaning of Rhythm', is continuous with history and thus with 'the subjectivity of thought' (162). The dialectic of thought is, however, always more thought and different thinking. Prepare then, as a reader of this volume where theory abounds, to enjoy your own intellectual rhythm of dissent, not in the aid of a new hegemony of corrected consent, but for the sheer delight of continual disagreement. We may value reading this collection not only for the consen-

sual counterpoint of agreement but for the reception aesthetics of repetitive disagreement: we are in turn provoked, amused, and puffed up in a poetics of noetics. Many readers who have forgotten their own theoretical pet peeves in this volume will be restored in different ways to all the pleasure of their former dislike.

My own rhythm of disagreement harps on the failure of continental language theory to take linguistics as an empirical science and thus to miss the theoretical insights of Chomsky and modern psycholinguistics. Evidence that semantics is innate as part of the language instinct distinguishes sense from reference as the immediate property of phenomena: words have meaning just as flowers have colour. Both are constructed as phenomena according to the innate capacities of human neurophysiology, but no semiotic deferral, infinite or otherwise, is involved. Without meaning or sense, an entity cannot be a word. We perceive the meaning in our perception of the word; the sensation is immediate just as our perception of colour; nothing is deferred as a sign of something else. With different interests we may pay attention to reference, what someone is referring to, which may be the same as word meaning in distal relationship to a non-phonemic environment or, through irony and allusion, something quite different. Because of human freedom, a science of reference cannot be established. A wacky theory, perhaps, or at least faulty? No doubt. But the point is not to show what the book under review would be if it were a different book but to illustrate a rhetorical analysis of the book's own poetics.

With this theory of meaning in hand, I cut through Karen Feldman's tangle of 'thinking a saying that is not a saying 'about' something' (120). Thinking a saying is the perception of its meaning; it is not the perception of something else or 'about' something. That is how Heidegger can avoid dragging Holderlin's hymn 'into a metaphysically determined distinction between a saying and what is said' (120). And because we are free according to our interests either to make this distinction or avoid it, we can allow the faithful a 'distinction between what is celebrated and the celebration' (121) and also understand that with a different focus the telling of the hymn 'is the celebration which it tells in order to celebrate' (120).

In such ways the reader is exercised in theory and different readers will have different theories to exercise. In their own experience of difference, readers read along to the fractious rhythm of an intellect entailed by disagreement in the presentation of new theory. Such disagreement cannot, as it is in the rhetoric of satire, be intended as a species of wit the reader is intended to share: the reader could not be interested in a disagreement that is not really a disagreement. Hence the high potential for interesting disagreement in this collection sincerely intended for our agreement. Other factors of this interest such as relevance of the difference, complexity and depth of error, and logic make for an interesting intellectual experience throughout the collection, even in the poetics of style itself: who would write such a phrase 'at the crossroads of the problematic', and yet who could achieve the daedal acme of such wit? Even *plaisir du texte* itself is present in the beat

of different drummers, especially Stephen Barker, whose ear for syntax delights the mind in coming to understand 'Woburn on my Mind and in My (Mind's) Eye' (105). The twelve essays in the volume provide ample exercise of difference and resulting insight, which a review can only sample.

The editors write helpful introductions to the essays grouped into four sections: (1) Ethics of Writing; (2) Truth, Texts, and the Narrative Self; (3) Poetry, Philosophy, and the Spirit of History; (4) The 'Force of Rhythm' in Life, Philosophy, and Poetry. Robert Burch introduces the volume arguing that in a relationship between A and B, A must be seen and privileged in relation to B or conversely: philosophy reduces poetic meaning to referential truth and thus occludes the 'poetic dimensions of thinking' or poetry reduces truth to meaning and thus cannot derive 'reference from sense' (2). As an ineluctable reduction in the dialectic of this relationship, poetry makes untenable the assumption of truth-telling philosophy that the 'relational juxtaposition [of philosophy and poetry] is absolute and original' (2). The interplay of poetic and philosophical discourses is thus ultimately rendered undecidable: 'Thinking between philosophy and poetry' occupies the space of this ultimate 'undecidability' (2). Burch declares 'the essays collected in this volume are intended as characteristic examples of such thinking' (2).

Whether this intention was shared by the authors of the essays must perhaps also remain undecidable. But readers who want to do some thinking in between the two discourses of philosophy and poetry will in *Between Philosophy and Poetry* have ample accommodation.

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**Claudia Card, ed.**
*The Cambridge Companion to
Simone De Beauvoir.*
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Pp. ix + 336.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-79096-4);
US$22.00 (paper:ISBN 0-521-79026-3).

This wonderful collection of articles situates Beauvoir in the company of luminaries such as Descartes, Heidegger, Husserl, and Marx, to each of whom Cambridge have devoted a volume of essays. Though Beauvoir called herself a writer, rather than a philosopher, this volume makes plain that her work is deeply philosophical. In addition to *The Second Sex*, and *The Ethics*

*of Ambiguity*, for which she is primarily known, she wrote a long treatise, *Old Age*, four volumes of autobiography, novels, reflections on her travels in America and China, as well as pieces on torture in French Algeria, and on the Holocaust.

Once seen only as a footnote to Sartre, Beauvoir is increasingly recognised as an important philosopher in her own right, with ideas about ambiguity, freedom, embodiment, agency and temporality that are of interest to analytic, as well as to continental, philosophers. In this collection, the essays by Barbara Andrew and Eva Gothlin describe Beauvoir's ideas in a way that makes them accessible to those not already familiar with her work, or with the philosophical training that she presupposed; and those by Margaret Simons, Mary Sirridge, Susan James and Monika Langer clarify the relative influence of Bergson, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty on her philosophy. Claudia Card produces a very helpful introduction that includes a brief, but sustained, discussion of the central notion of ambiguity in Beauvoir's ethics, and of its strengths and weaknesses in the face of evil (12-22).

In addition to situating Beauvoir philosophically, this volume includes interpretive appraisals and reconstructions of Beauvoir's ideas on the body and old age by Sara Heinamaa and Penelope Deutscher, on the ambiguity of evil by Robin May Schott, and on the sex/gender distinction and biology in the *Second Sex* by Debra Bergoffen and Moira Gatens. Judith Butler contributes an accessible and interesting piece on Beauvoir's surprisingly sympathetic approach to Sadean ethics, and Susan Brison provides extracts from an interview she made with Beauvoir in 1976 — published here for the first time — and reflections on the circumstances and content of that interview. Beauvoir's fiction and memoirs are examined by Sirridge, Fricker and Deutscher. Thus, the many aspects of Beauvoir's work are ably and thoughtfully covered here. The only thing I would have wished is an article situating Beauvoir's ideas within post-War French politics more explicitly, and clarifying her attitude to Marx.

Beauvoir is indelibly associated with the claim that 'One is not born, but rather becomes a woman'. But what do these words mean, and what do they imply about the relative importance of nature and society to people's sexual identities, capacities and ways of being in the world? Beauvoir has often been thought to be distinguishing sex from gender here, or the natural and social aspects of being a woman. But according to Moira Gatens, this is a misreading of Beauvoir — for it is femininity, rather than being a woman, that Beauvoir identifies as the socially sanctioned behaviour, traits and values that conventionally mark off females and males (276-7). Thus, for Beauvoir, post-menopausal women 'are no longer females', and one can be a biological female, self-identified and identified by others as a woman, and yet not be feminine (perhaps what Beauvoir was or aspired to be?). Likewise, one can be a biological female who is not feminine and is not identified by others, or herself, as a woman. So, while the female body has a crucial role to play in

what it means to become a woman, being a woman cannot be neatly divided along the nature/nurture lines implied by the sex/gender distinction. (279)

Gatens suggestion is that instead of trying to cram Beauvoir into a framework that does not fit and that, in any case, is flawed, we should adopt Natalie Stoljar's idea of woman as a cluster concept. (Natalie Stoljar, 'Essence, Identity and the Concept of Woman', *Philosophical Topics* 23 [1995] 261-94). This would enable us to account for the place of phenomenology — what it feels like to be a woman — in our attributions of womaness, as well as self-identification and the attributions of others, and female sex itself — chromosomes, sex characteristics, general morphology (280). For Beauvoir, facts about biology do not cancel human freedom and social agency, but nor are they irrelevant to what it means to be woman. However, societies with limited mastery over their environment, she thought, would be more limited in their range of possible interpretations of the biological differences between the sexes and would, therefore, present less room for choice and manoeuvre by individual men and women (274). Women's complicity in their subordination by men, Beauvoir insists, does not mean that there are no biological or social facts constraining what women can do or be: merely that these do not remove the scope for ethical choice and action, individually and, above all, collectively.

A similarly vivid sense of constrained choice underpins Beauvoir's discussion of language and politics in her interview with Susan Brison. Language cannot be created *ex nihilo*, nor can women ignore the fact that language has been dominated by men. But, according to Beauvoir, that does not mean that women should not use the languages that they have inherited — nor the bodies of knowledge that these words have transmitted — merely that they must do so with caution (190). The quest for a new language of woman's liberation — as in Cixous - Beauvoir believes will tend to limit, not foster, communication, leading to incomprehensibility and a failure to engage with the needs, aspirations and lives of real women. However, as Brison notes, Beauvoir insisted that essays by other feminists, including Cixous, appear in a special issue of *L'Arc*, devoted to her: and so it was in a volume of essays honouring Beauvoir that Cixous presented her essay 'the Laugh of Medusa' praising 'feminine writing' (200). Unfortunately, Beauvoir herself, and *The Second Sex*, have suffered a less generous fate from their critics over the years, especially in France. This collection of essays is part of a welcome effort to redress the balance and to inspire us to read — or reread — Beauvoir for ourselves.

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**David Corfield**
*Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. x + 288.
US$70.00. ISBN 0-521-81722-6.

The Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA) is a British movement 'dedicated to maintaining traditional brewing techniques in the face of inundation by tasteless, fizzy beers marketed by powerful industrial-scale breweries,' as Corfield describes it in the first pages of his introduction. In a similar vein, Corfield is promoting a Campaign for the Philosophy of Real Mathematics. By this, he means that philosophers of mathematics should pay more attention to what mathematicians actually do, rather than focussing on artificial examples derived from logic and set-theoretical foundations. It's hard to quarrel with this idea, though (as we shall see below) the details of Corfield's own proposals are not completely clear.

Corfield's great hero among philosophers of mathematics is Imre Lakatos, and two chapters of his book (7 and 8) are devoted to Lakatosian themes. His other hero is the admirable Colin McLarty, who has done fascinating work in the history of topos theory. His enemies are a somewhat more diverse crew, but logical positivists, the neo-Fregeans and (more generally) neo-logicist philosophers who see mathematics through the 'foundationalist filter' (8) come in for a good deal of stick. By the 'foundationalist filter', Corfield means a blindness on the part of philosophers of mathematics to the actual content of mathematics, apart from 'an unbalanced interest in the "foundational" ideas of the 1880-1930 period' (5).

According to Corfield's preface, philosophy of mathematics is in decline (ix), and in the grip of conservatism. He advocates reviving the discipline by imitating philosophy of science. In the 1950s, philosophy of science was often preoccupied with rather abstract considerations of confirmation, theory construction and similar rather logically-oriented ideas. Current philosophy of science has largely moved away from this, and many of the most talented writers in the area are directly concerned with theories such as general relativity and quantum theory, as well as with more sociologically oriented questions such as the development of scientific research programmes, and the role of experiment in research.

Corfield's book starts with a polemical introductory chapter advocating some of the ideas summarized above. The remainder of the book is composed of nine loosely related chapters, each discussing some topic in a style meant to illustrate Corfield's proposals for renewal.

Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to the topics of automated theorem proving and automated conjecture formation. These seem rather poorly chosen, given the very marginal roles that these activities play in current mathematics. Chapter 2 is devoted largely to the solution of the so-called 'Robbins problem' by an automated theorem prover in 1996. Corfield quotes the ridiculously

exaggerated newspaper reports that hailed this solution of an allegedly 'famous mathematical problem' (37). Since he is using reported speech, it is not clear to what extent Corfield shares these views, though he does convey a misleading impression by saying that the problem defeated 'the best efforts of Tarski and his students' (48). (For those unfamiliar with the problem, it was a rather trivial question in the axiomatics of Boolean algebras that Tarski employed to tease and tantalize his students.) Corfield would have used his chapter to better advantage if he had discussed more serious mathematical problems in which computers played a role, for example, the recent proof of the non-existence of a projective plane of order 10.

Chapter 3 is devoted to the topic of automated conjecture formation. Corfield describes his own abortive attempts to generate interesting mathematical conjectures in homotopy theory using the program PROGOL. To his credit, he reports 'outright incredulity' on the part of professional topologists (73) that this approach could produce anything of interest. The idea of automated conjecture formation is reminiscent of an executive toy popular in the 1970s. This consisted of a ball with a clear window; inside there were plastic strips inscribed with randomly chosen words. The idea was to give the ball a good shake and then observe the random words visible in its window. This allegedly would lead the ball's owner to new and fruitful combinations of ideas.

Chapter 4 is on the solider and more fruitful topic of analogies in mathematics. This is certainly an important but neglected topic in the philosophy of mathematics. Corfield provides some interesting quotes from mathematicians about the importance of analogies, and also engages in a detailed case study of the importance of an analogy between numbers and functions in algebraic number theory.

Chapters 5 and 6 are devoted to Bayesian approaches to plausible reasoning in mathematics. In his classic work *Mathematics and Plausible Reasoning,* George Polya pointed out the importance of this theme in the development of mathematics. However, there is a seemingly insurmountable obstacle in using Bayesian probabilistic models to elucidate the plausibility of mathematical conjectures. This is the fact that a logically true statement must, on the conventional account, have probability 1. For example, let us assume that an open conjecture is deducible from the axioms of set theory. Then if we assign probability 1 to the axioms of set theory, we must also assign probability 1 to the conjecture. But this defeats the whole purpose of the model. This problem of logical omniscience stands in the way of any simple application of Bayesian ideas in mathematics. Corfield's answer to this problem is to move in the direction of the somewhat vague and heuristic suggestions of Polya, using the ideas of analogy, problem-solving strategies and enumerative induction. Chapter 6 rounds out the discussion with four case studies, KAM theory in classical dynamical systems, Navier-Stokes equations as models of turbulent flow, the Lee-Yang circle theorem in statistical mechanics, and quantum field theory as it relates to pure mathematics.

Chapters 7 and 8 are devoted to Lakatos' philosophy of mathematics. Chapter 7 is devoted to the topic of Lakatos' apparent hostility to logic and rigorous axiomatics, and points out some resultant weaknesses in his position. Chapter 8 attempts to extend Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes, using the rivalry between Dedekind's and Kronecker's approaches to ideal theory as a case study.

Chapters 9 and 10 are devoted to more concrete topics. Chapter 9 is a discussion of a generalization of groups, groupoids, and tries to analyse the reasons given by mathematicians for adopting or rejecting the new concept. Chapter 10 is on the subject of higher-dimensional algebra and $n$-categories, a new research programme advocated by the physicist John Baez. Corfield believes that this programme is on the cutting edge of new mathematics, and will be considered to be among the most philosophically significant advances in mathematics a century hence.

As should be plain from the above summaries, Corfield advocates a practice-oriented philosophy of mathematics, and a turn away from logic, set theory and 'foundational' preoccupations. The philosopher's role is perhaps more descriptive and sociological. In spite of the misgivings above, this is an interesting and stimulating book. If it were to encourage philosophers to look at some of the recent developments in mathematics, that would be an excellent thing.

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Richard Eldridge's *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art* is a lucid, nuanced, and spirited account of art theory that is shaped by three main aims: to introduce students to major theories and central issues in the philosophy of art, to criticize ideas that undermine the concept and import of art and to embody and argue for the idea that talk about artworks and the nature of art continues the edifying process initiated by the encounter with art itself. Art theory, like art criticism, is thus seen as part of what Eugenio Montale has called 'the second life of art'.

Art, or perhaps, 'art', is in trouble on many fronts. Some historicize the category itself, others see it as the servant of unworthy purposes, and some current defenders think it's just another source of pleasure. *An Introduction* is a defense of the reality and significance of art: 'artistic activity aims at the achievement of expressive freedom: originality blended with sense; unburdening and clarification blended with representation' (11). This work thus continues the project begun in Eldridge's *On Moral Personhood: Philosophy, Literature, Criticism, and Self-Understanding*, and continued in *Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism*, where Eldridge reads Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* as a dramatic work that 'presents a protagonist seeking to articulate the terms for full human self-command and self-expression' (7). What Wittgenstein did via difficult philosophical thought, art does by engaging our imaginations.

Chapter 1 addresses the big, background questions: 'who needs a theory of art?' and 'what may we hope for from the philosophy of art?' Eldridge notes that art, unlike science, technology and religion, needs theory because we do not know why it commands so much of our energy. Some would say, however, that the problem arose only in the eighteenth century when various skills were isolated from the purposes they served and then constructed as a distinct enterprise, and that the answer is simply to let the arts subside back into crafts in the service of disparate aims. The conflict between these views is expressed in the 'tension between accounts of art that focus on identification of the varieties of art and those that focus on the critical elucidation of art's functions and values. ...It reflects the deeper tension in human life generally, and especially in modernity, between the idea that humanity has a function, or at least a set of human interests to be fully realized in a 'free' human cultural life that is richer and more self-conscious than are the lives of other animals, and the idea that human beings are nothing more than elements of a meaningless, functionless physical nature, wherein accommodation, coping, and compromise are the best outcomes for which they can hope' (20). Tension there may be, but Eldridge's primer plumps unequivocally for the former view, his version of which is that 'original arrangement, freely achieved through shaping imagination and presenting a subject matter as a focus for thought distinctively fused to emotional attitude and the exploration of materials, remains a central aim of artistic making and a principal means for producing such clues to fully human life' (127). Eldridge thus attempts to connect what we might call the classical theory of art — that it consists of three primary dimensions, representational, expressive, and formal — to a single main purpose, the achievement of 'a meaningful human culture, beyond the coercions and drudgery of repetition' (126).

The classical theory is a fine place to start, and Chapters 2, 3, and 4 set forth plausible theories of representation, form, and expression, each of which can, of course, be understood in different ways. In each chapter Eldridge compares in an illuminating way a number of candidates and then offers his own view, one which ties each dimension to but then transcends our needs as creatures. The representational and the expressive are clearly

necessary to Eldridge's master notion, but it is not clear why we need to get it formally right as Flaubert and even Hollywood demand. If Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* can take us on the journey toward self-expression that Eldridge sees as central to the arts — as might Montaigne, Rousseau, and Nietzsche — then formal values and beauty might be nothing more than decoration, however spectacular or accomplished. Eldridge says in a note that 'serious narrative history is just as much a fully cultural representation that illuminates kinds of things and our interests in them as is poetry' (41). That would seem to undermine the idea that art has a distinctive purpose. Worse, beauty, which, I assume, is missing from history but not poetry, might serve to give the mimetic and expressive dimensions illusory validity: 'A successful work of art can *seem to* embody and exemplify full action and full meaningfulness as such — a meaning wholly fused to material elements in arrangement — *and promise* a human world suffused with meaningful action, rather than emptiness and coercion' (66; my emphasis). Art here looks like a comforting illusion in an often brutal and always meaningless world, i.e., religion.

Expression is the most important dimension of art for Eldridge, and his chapter on it is especially rich. His view, stated early and then confronted with other views that enrich but do no displace it, is that 'it is natural to … think that artworks are *expressive* objects, and that it is distinctive of *artistic* representations — in contrast with scientific treatises and decorations — that they have as a central function the *expression* of attitudes and emotions toward their subject matter' (68). That is plausible or better for mimetic arts, but it requires some effort to make it work for music and abstract art, which are expressive (different sense) but not about anything, like a smiling face with no context, and at times Eldridge speaks of expression (sense three) not as something found in art (and much else), i.e., an attitude toward a subject matter, but as the very purpose of human life and one which art best fulfills. That is, more or less, the romantic view.

Chapter 6, 'Understanding Art' begins with what seems like an invitation to arbitrariness of the worst sort, as various ways of understanding a work — historical, biographical, subtextual, supratextual ('visionary'), editorial, and creative ('a *Hamlet* suite for viola and string orchestra' [130]) — are offered as alternative forms of understanding with none 'being uniquely apt to its objects' (131). As well, motives (making money) and reasons ('to draw his opponent wide') are confounded in an analogy to decision-making in sports (which I think is in itself quite apt). But as the chapter proceeds a more sensible view emerges: 'To understand a work is to situate it within a network of concepts or strategies for recognition that are both in principle shareable and necessarily at least partly shared' (133), and that is followed by an argument for 'the special importance of elucidation of formal-semantic elements' (142). By attending to formal elements ' we see or hear their expressive and affective significance in the context of the work' (145). Yes, but the formal and the mimetic-expressive can pull in different directions and their coordination is not a condition of great art. I can get excited by

seeing the incredible network of relationships between meanings in *The Brothers Karamazov* (and it is incredible), or I can focus on the meanings (implied as well as explicit) themselves, which range from the noble to the nasty and the insightful to the obtuse. At the same time the formal and the mimetic-expressive can be congruent in quite minor art, e.g., Dr. Seuss. However that may be, Eldridge's main aims here are to avoid the idea that the point of an artwork is to know some truth about it, i.e., what an author intended, and to resist the subjectivism that turns dialogue into a bull session, and on those points he is both right and persuasive.

Eldridge's main method is to confront readers with dilemmas and opposed views, as can be seen in his response to the 'recent return to talk of pleasure and beauty' (246): 'The trouble with this view,' he writes, 'is that it risks assimilating art to decoration, entertainment, or whatever is successfully marketed, overlooking the significance of more difficult works that interrogate our condition. But if we then return to more difficult works that invite and encourage thought about deep longings in relation to social actuality, then we seem back in Schillerian satiric or elegiac cultivation of the human or in politicized structuralist antihumanism, tendentious or emptily provocative' (247). Then a Deweyan resolution is attempted: 'In an imperfect society artistic making that is aimed at aesthetic affirmation will inevitably and appropriately be surrounded by escapist entertainment ... as its natural penumbrae' (248).

This method is put to fine use in the chapters on 'Identifying and evaluating art,' 'Art and emotion,' and 'Art and morality,' which take up topics that are central to contemporary analytic aesthetics. Eldridge first discusses the 'identifiers' and then looks as some theories of artistic value, and his now unsurprising conclusion is that there is no identification without evaluation. The section on emotions moves from a consideration of theories that are indifferent to artistic value to a theory of 'working through' that is crucial to Eldridge's high notion of art's central purpose, and something similar happens in the chapter on art and morality where a survey of the current debates about autonomism, moralism, and moderations of each give way to a contrast between crude and refined forms of imaginative moral engagement. Eldridge argues that 'art helps us to honor in our imagination commanding moral ideals that we cannot wholly honor in our present conduct [and] is a way, even the central way, of keeping alive our full humanity in its complex directdness toward and by those ideals. Without art morality becomes either emptily abstract or conventionalistically rigoristic; with art morality becomes legible as fundamental to the complex texture of our human lives' (225). This is a romantically deepened version of pleasing and instructing.

Chapter 10 offers a very fine account of the relationship between current artistic practices and the themes of the book, and its many insights help us see how theory can be connected to practice. Thus, 'in exhaustion and impatience with critical theory and with politics [as these have come to dominate artistic practice], both artists and fans are likely often to insist that making and paying attention to art are fun' (247), and so we are offered

alternatives that diminish art's real force, which is to confer meaning in a non-theological way. I would stick with the classical theory and its awkward split between the mimetic-expressive and the formal and drop the meaning-making, which would impoverish both the book and our lives in the service of an ugly truth. The fine arts have no single purpose; they get assimilated to life at large in various ways, and Eldridge has advanced one of the most noble, but it is not intrinsic or even central to the arts, as the arts tend to take their moral values from whatever society has on offer. It is, however, near the heart of any claim that the humanities, rather than the arts as such, have upon us.

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Walter Otto once lamented the slow fizzle of Schelling's Berlin lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation, arguing that Schelling spoke at a time in which the 'spiritual world was at the point of fully losing the sense for genuine philosophy' because '*mythos* remained in an age in which poesy was lost.' Schelling's history of freedom and its careful detailing of theurgic progression must have sounded like madness. The prevailing sensibility held that myths were the infantile science of the childhood of humanity, or mere allegories, or wanton entertainments. Myths could never really mean what they said. For Schelling, however, mythology was *tautegorical*: the Gods came as themselves, ever plural, ever contrary. Yet Schelling was not nostalgic. He called rather for the ecstatic release of thinking in a 'new mythology'. Goudeli's provocative book bears witness to it.

Her study is no curatorial record-keeping on the agreements and disagreements between Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. It is an unapologetic *apologia* for Schelling's 'cosmic theurgy'. Goudeli writes of the ecstatic self, seized by forces within itself that nonetheless exceed that self and in so doing retrieves, amidst the great labyrinthine Architectonics of reason and sovereign egoities, the call for a new mythology. 'The re-enchantment of the world is not

going to come through the excavation of old temples, the dogmatic adoption of old religions, nor by means of the intellectual fabrication of 'invented' mystical doctrines' (184). She charts 'the transition from the logic to the *logogrif* of experience' (12).

Goudeli argues that Kant recoils from the very freedom that he sought to articulate. 'The problem is not one of an absolute reliance on the notion of spontaneity, but rather, contrariwise, that this notion has not been adequately expanded' (6). Kant does not find a way to altogether transcend the inertia — lack of spontaneity — of nature. 'Spontaneity has been restricted only to the realm of human Reason, while nature and intuition stand for a lifeless, inactive mass in need of external organization' (6). Reason and the understanding are the affairs of the representing subject whose formal structure endows the manifold with spatio-temporal forms. In this way, nature — and its own freedom, a freedom irreducible to the freedom of the representing subject — is kept at bay. The Kantian representing subject is secured in transcendental apperception. The self, while opaque, nonetheless holds onto itself while keeping the inscrutable forces of the world at bay, having already been schematized. In no way or place do the inscrutable energies of nature break through perception's a priori synthetic arrangement of them. Yet, as Goudeli argues, 'the requirement of the static, formal identity of the self excludes the possibility of dreams, visions, or any states where the subject does not recognize in them its continuing and absolutely same ego' (31).

Even the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, which offers so many lines of escape, in the end falls prey to Kant's commitment to the representing subject and its legislative character. The free play of form does not speak to the sovereignty of nature, but rather accords pleasurably with the architectonic structure of human subjectivity. The freedom of nature is finally a projection of *my* freedom. 'The order of pleasure gives way to the pleasure of order, since the free play proves to be but a programmed ceremony for the celebration of the principles of Reason' (63). There is no place, as there is in Schelling, for what Goudeli dubbed the 'abduction' (2) of Reason.

Fichte advanced beyond Kant by investigating the ground of the self, locating a sovereign and productive ego at the ground of auto-representation. Yet Fichte also cannot think the question of nature beyond its obdurate resistance to the demands and hopes of the representing subject. Nature opposes the free self, ceaselessly contesting its sovereignty. 'The feeling of resistance is no longer a moment of freedom, but an unbearable, infinite indication of the self's inability to be what it believes itself to be. The dominant duty for the self is now to transcend its limits, an 'ought', an infinite striving to jump beyond its shadow' (84). The sovereign subject is thereby alienated from is objects and hence the 'ego never allows a real interaction with its other' (84-5).

With Schelling the 'subject centered system' (89) shatters. 'Schelling introduces the bold statement that the subject may also be *seized* by experience' (9). As such, Reason itself confronts, without recoil, its own sovereign

and inscrutable ground. 'Schelling, by relocating logic within the realm of its origins, without dismissing logic's specificity, undermines its ability to found experience as a whole by means of an isolating, conceptual factor. For, if logical thought is a manifestation and part of cosmic spontaneity, it cannot found the realm of its genesis itself' (90-1). In the remaining chapters, culminating in the book's best chapter, namely Goudeli's performance of Reason as it dreams, this time of Schelling's remarkable 1815 account of the *Deities of Samothrace*, she recounts Schelling's 'discovery and rediscovery of the theurgy of life' (12). She finds in Schelling's middle period a 'radical rupture' with his own 'transcendental standpoint' (93), discovering 'the inexhaustible richness and multiplicity of the cosmic movement' (93). The world is not our representation. Not only are there no representations of the world, there is no representing subject. The rupture is the mortification [*Absterbung*] of the ego and the unleashing of the general economy of contrariety.

*Logogrif* is a translation of *das Wort des Rätsels*, a phrase found in a footnote within the 1809 *Freedom* essay. Goudeli deploys it to locate the secret sharer at the ground of Reason. Not only is it in play in Schelling's account of the Cabeiri, 'who utter their word more as a riddle' (182), but in the figure of *Sophia*. '*Logos* discovered that (it) is not the exclusive creator of the world, since inside it, before it uttered the word, *Sophia* was dwelling silently and meaningfully' (163). The enigma, affirming its own prodigality, reveals itself also as *Sophia*, 'versatile and contradictory' and 'mother and mistress of *Logos*' (163). Goudeli then unleashes a magical dance in which '*logogrif* becomes a form of life, an intense experience of battle or play with the riddles of the world, a real force in the field fusion between man and the cosmos which provides new dimensions in the world, rendering it, as ever, accessible and inaccessible, familiar and enigmatic' (171).

Goudeli has apologized to Walter Otto for the dullards in Berlin.

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**Nicholas Griffin, ed.**
*The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xvii + 550.
US$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-63178-5);
US$26.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-63634-5).

'The post-Russellians are all propter-Russellians.' So wrote Alan Wood (1959, 190) almost half a century ago in the preface to his unfinished monograph on Russell's philosophy, which was subsequently included in Russell's *My Philosophical Development*. Wood also noted that already then, Russell's books were becoming 'classics' in such a sense that we think we know them without having read them. The need therefore, Wood said, was not to criticize but to understand Russell. And for this purpose, 'it is essential, when reading any book by Russell, to know its place in the development of his thought' (Wood 1959, 191). In compiling the new *Cambridge Companion* volume on Russell's philosophy, its editor, Nicholas Griffin, seems to have taken these words by Wood to heart: fourteen essays anthologized here are composed and arranged so as to mirror Russell's philosophical development. In this way the volume is meant, in accordance with the main objective of the series, to provide, in a more or less self-contained manner, students and non-specialists with a helpful introduction to Russell's philosophy. The reason for adopting the developmental approach is not confined to pedagogy, however. It is also meant to vindicate the interpretive thesis held by Griffin (and the contributors to the volume) that there is a consistency of purpose and direction, and a consistency of method, underlying a wide variety of standpoints Russell championed at different times over his long career.

As with other volumes in the *Cambridge Companion* series, the current volume contains specially commissioned essays by a team of well-known scholars, together with an extensive introduction and a substantial bibliography. All but one essay dealing with Russell's moral theory are exclusively concerned with his contributions to the 'central' areas of philosophy (logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaphysics). On Griffin's account in the introduction, Russell hoped, like many of the great philosophers of the past, to produce a system of the world but believed neither in the rationalist attempt of working 'down' from metaphysical principles nor in the empiricist one of working 'up' from sense experience. Rather, Russell started his investigations in the 'middle' — with the sciences, which after all were the most reliable bodies of systematized belief in our possession. Consequently, says Griffin, for Russell, a primary task of philosophy was to build a comprehensive picture of the world agreeing with the objective reality described by science, and 'this remained a constant in his philosophical career' (18). Griffin's suggestion, then, is to view the various 'phases' of Russell's philosophy as developing out of each other as different attempts to carry forward this one single project.

Griffin describes Russell's early investigations into the foundations of the special sciences (in particular, geometry) and explains how they resulted, by 1899, in his renunciation of the idealist methodology. Griffin's essay provides us with a new way of looking at Russell's break with idealism by showing it to have as much to do with the securing of the objectivity of our scientific knowledge as with his rejection of Bradley's monism. The epistemologized picture of Russell's early project also makes it more intelligible why he welcomed G.E. Moore's anti-psychologist campaign with wholehearted enthusiasm. Richard L. Cartwright's essay characterizes the 'new philosophy' of Russell and Moore via a central doctrine: the 'single-object' theory, according to which each belief has a mind-independent object, a proposition, that has *being*, distinguished from existence, regardless of the belief's truth or falsity. Cartwright explains how Russell soon found himself trying hard to dispose implausible consequences entailed by the extreme realist view. It was while Russell was tackling these problems that he hit upon arguably the profoundest idea of the twentieth-century philosophy, the theory of definite descriptions. Peter Hylton's essay succinctly describes the theory, masterfully explaining its genesis and its general significance in Russell's thought by embedding it in the properly Russellian context; he also examines some important recent criticisms of the theory. Hylton vigorously argues that the theory of denoting concepts, which was propounded in the *Principles of Mathematics* (1903; *POM* henceforth), could not satisfy Russell ultimately because it introduced an intermediary, representational element into the direct relation between the mind and the external world. This led Russell to the theory of descriptions, which provided a means to eliminate the intermediary and made knowledge of the external world possible.

When Russell found a new method of analysis in the newly developed quantificational logic, his investigations into the foundations of mathematics took a tremendous leap forward and resulted in his logicist project, the project of deriving entire mathematics from logic. The volume contains five essays directly concerned with Russell's logicism. I. Grattan-Guinness' essay considers Russell's project from the viewpoint of the history of (the foundations of) mathematics and provides an informative account of the late nineteenth-century mathematics, of the structure and some technical details of *POM* and *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13; *PM* henceforth), and of the reception of logicism by the contemporary logicians and mathematicians, among other things. Martin Godwyn and Andrew D. Irvine summarize the work of early logicists and give a comprehensive inventory of the advances Russell and his collaborator A. N. Whitehead made in *PM* in the aftermath of the discovery of Russell's Paradox. They then set out to explore Russell's views on the ontological and the epistemic consequences of logicism. Michael Beaney explores Russell's connection with another great forefather of the analytic tradition, Gottlob Frege, especially in the area of foundational investigations. Beaney's comparison of the two logicians' definitions of number offers an illuminating exegesis of the inner workings of both Frege's and Russell's logicism. Beaney also explains how Frege anticipated many of the

strategies Russell later explored for the solution of the paradox. Gregory Landini's contribution describes the eliminativistic approach taken in the substitutional theory in its philosophical and intricate technical aspects, whereas Alasdair Urquhart's surveys various type-theoretic approaches Russell and later logicians developed.

The theory of descriptions, according to Griffin, set in train a 'positive mania' for elimination in search for 'minimum vocabularies and minimal ontological commitments' (26). In particular, in around 1910, Russell attempted, by means of his multiple relation theory of judgment, to eliminate the apparent reference to propositions contained in the sentences expressing a propositional attitude. The project got bogged down three years later, however, when he abandoned the theory in the light of criticism from young Ludwig Wittgenstein. (This intriguing but still controversial episode in the early history of analytic philosophy is occasionally alluded to but not pursued in the volume.) It was not before 1919 that Russell came up with a new theory of propositions. On this theory, a propositional attitude such as belief is considered as primarily constituted by a content, which, in turn, is basically comprised of words and/or images. While the new account finally provided Russell with a way of dealing with such a problematic item as objective falsehood, its cost was high: given the introduction of the representational element, the direct relation between the mind and the world must be sacrificed anew. In his 1927 *The Analysis of Matter*, Russell tried to ward off skeptical consequences with what is known as 'structural realism.' William Demopoulos explicates, with meticulous care, the thrust of this position and its ultimate failure. A. C. Grayling considers Russell's subsequent turn towards a non-justificatory, descriptive account of knowledge and argues that the turn is consistent with his earlier project in continuously pursuing its aim of explaining how finite human subjectivity attains scientific knowledge. Thomas Baldwin's essay, by contrast, emphasizes the radicalness of the change Russell made in his later epistemology (both in its procedure and in its aim). It is invaluable in making Russell's later epistemology accessible by connecting it to central themes of our current debates. Apart from these chapters, there are two more chapters on Russell's later work. R. E. Tully's account of neutral monism and Bernard Linsky's discussion of logical atomism provide illuminating pictures of Russell's philosophy of mind and metaphysics, respectively.

While Russell looms large in contemporary philosophy, this is not due to the enduring influence of his philosophical doctrines. His greatest contribution to philosophy is his invention of a distinctive method of philosophizing. Russell was one of the few founders of 'analytic philosophy' who argued explicitly for philosophy as analysis; moreover, his theory of descriptions continues to serve as the best exemplar of the analytic power of modern logic. Paul Hager argues in his essay that Russell's method of analysis underlies the unity and continuity of his philosophy. Hager's essay first outlines key characteristics of this method and then shows how it functions as the linchpin of Russell's work throughout his career. Beaney's essay also bears on issues

of analysis in Russell. In his discussion of Russell and Frege, Beaney emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between analysis as rephrasal and analysis as reduction and further argues that what characterizes analytic philosophy distinctively in the history of philosophy is its use of paraphrastic analysis. Beaney's notion of paraphrastic analysis, in freeing analysis from any metaphysical commitments of its own, seems able, as the notion of analysis as reduction cannot, to provide us with a means of capturing what was inherent in Frege's and Russell's philosophical method and was later developed by the second generation of analytic philosophers. It is thus of great interest to those who find it insufficient to characterize the analytic tradition solely in terms of a single or several 'linguistic turns'.

The post-Russellians are all propter-Russellians. To understand Russell is then to understand ourselves as analytic philosophers. The developmental approach adopted in the *Companion* will not only help improve our understanding of Russell's philosophy by describing it as a dialectic process toward a single goal but also result in the broadening of what Griffin calls the 'narrow Russellian canon' by bringing his often neglected later work in to the arena of scholarly discussion. Here one can locate a missed opportunity for this volume, however. Russell is virtually alone among canonical analytic philosophers in having achieved prominence in the intellectual and political worlds beyond philosophy; indeed, Russell is best remembered outside of philosophy as a social critic. While the *Companion* does have one chapter by Charles R. Pigden on Russell's moral philosophy, the figure of Russell as technical philosopher *and* social critic is neither explored nor utilized to draw those outside of analytic philosophy into a reconsideration of Russell's work. The book will be welcomed by both specialists and non-specialists with an interest in Russell's place in the history of analytic philosophy. It is especially valuable for advanced philosophy students looking for a good reference work on Russell's philosophical achievements. Those interested in exploring connections between Russell's philosophical concerns and his social critiques will need, however, to look beyond this volume.

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This extremely readable and very comprehensive biography of Gadamer is to be recommended as essential, not only for those who are interested in philosophical hermeneutics (the philosophy of interpretation), but for anyone who wishes to understand something about the ways in which philosophical positions develop and are personified in the lives of those philosophers who propound them. The cluster of factors which cumulatively shaped Gadamer's own views and stances include the powerful influence of his father, later to be replaced by Heidegger as Gadamer's philosopher-father, the impact of World Wars 1 and 2, and, in between, the political turbulence and uncertainty in the Germany of the 1920's and 30's and later the post-World War II ideological Marxism in East Germany which exerted pressure on academic life there (including Gadamer's) — all these and more contributed in an overlapping way to how Gadamer thought through and pedagogically worked out his commitment to learning and scholarly research.

One of the most interesting images of Gadamer provided by Grondin is that of the tennis player. Gadamer enjoyed playing tennis into his eighties and, as a game that demands continuous and alert responses to how the ball falls, it uniquely captured Gadamer's own life and hermeneutical development in that he was constantly prepared to review and rethink his philosophical approach in the light of whatever challenges fell his way. Grondin rightly identifies Gadamer's love of discourse as a consequence of this attitude to life in that it enables one to respond in a considered way to the immediacy and spontaneity of speech which expresses intellectual positions that could be usefully explored and elaborated on, or serve as points of departure for further insights. Gadamer apparently, like Socrates, preferred speech to writing and his life as a teacher of philosophy, which extended well into his nineties, demonstrated this pedagogically.

The presence of Heidegger was perpetually vital in Gadamer's life from his student days onwards and retained its intellectual vigour and importance for Gadamer after Heidegger's death. This had its advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, it provided Gadamer with an intellectual focus which led him to create a philosophy of hermeneutics with an exciting and flexible perspective that allowed him to explore historical developments in ancient and contemporary philosophy and to identify a unified set of concerns that merited continued investigation. His work on Plato was crucial as a directive from the classic period which shaped his overall philosophical approach that, when informed by Husserlian and Heideggerian thought and by that of Kierkegaard and Hegel, combined to produce the depth of scholarship everywhere evident in his writings. Gadamer's expertise in philology

contributed to his deep understanding and explication of the Platonic writings. The negative side of Heidegger's presence undoubtedly lies in its oppressiveness for Gadamer and the rather grudging recognition that the master reluctantly expressed for the talents of his exceptional student. There is a strong sense from this biography which is supported by well presented evidence that Heidegger never relinquished, except perhaps towards the end of his life, his role of master to Gadamer's corresponding acceptance of *his* role as student-son of Heidegger's. This did have a restricting effect on Gadamer's own life and work and it was principally with the emergence of *Truth and Method* that Gadamer discovered his own genius and originality with greater confidence. The inextricable bond between both men lasted, at least in Gadamer's case, for a lifetime and because of this considerable light is inevitably thrown on Heidegger himself as a complex genius with serious flaws in his psychological and personal makeup, not to mention in political orientation, as well as being bestowed with great gifts of charismatic and inspiration that has left an enduring signature in philosophical thought. There are marvelous passages in this book that succinctly summarise Heideggerian thinking and indicate its importance as a point of departure for Gadamer to expound and expand on, which in a rather strange way, seems to reflect a kind of Socratic-Platonic relationship between Heidegger and Gadamer. What is undoubtedly true is that for a variety of reasons, psychological, intellectual and humanly personal, Gadamer is grounded philosophically and hermeneutically in the Heideggerian (and originally Husserlian) inspiration and this is a fundamental constitutional factor in the development of Gadamer's work.

Although it can be argued that the appreciation of philosophical views does not require as a necessary condition an understanding of the biographies of the respective philosophers that propound them, Grondin's life of Gadamer does provide an essential dimension that helps to situate our engagement with the latter's hermeneutical project by anchoring Gadamer's philosophical work to its personal foundations. Interpreting the world and our environment is, of course, fundamentally, everyone's unique individual project and, from this point of view, biography may be especially useful when it comes to an understanding of philosophical hermeneutics. It follows that knowing the biographical perspective of the relevant philosophers involved must extend our noetic horizons on the nature and thrust of their respective approaches towards a philosophy of interpretation and this is certainly true of Grondin's life of Gadamer.

It is difficult to do adequate justice to such a comprehensive and well-researched work. Chronologically, it spans the twentieth century and extends into the first three years of the twenty-first. The historical and fast moving changes that mark this period form the background panorama for the search for stability that defined Gadamer's life and work. There is a clear sense that this philosopher sought secure foundations for his life and thought in a rapidly changing era where former traditions were crumbling and disintegrating. The political, imperial, religious and theological maps that had

securely defined life and status for most people were being continuously replaced in the twentieth century by contingent sketches of how one should live and survive. What is clear from Grondin's biography is that Gadamer was a survivor, not just chronologically, but psychologically, personally, academically and intellectually. There are events in this book which might evoke the reader's wish that, at certain points in his life, Gadamer might have been less cautious and more courageous but by the end of the biography, there is the clear impression of a man philosophically gifted who tried within his limits to provide and articulate an ideal of discourse that would hopefully lead to the reconstruction and maintenance of a more enhanced human world, anchored by ancient and contemporary wisdom. This surely constitutes Gadamer as one of the great philosophers of recent times.

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I enjoyed reading Haack's latest book, though early on I felt the need for a deeper analysis of its foundational topic, the epistemology of science. Enjoyment came readily, since I find her views so plausible: that there is no such thing as *the* method of science; that scientific enquiry is methodologically continuous with everyday empirical enquiry; that popular critiques of science by sociologists like Barnes and Bloor, 'ethnomethodologists' like Latour and Woolgar, and philosophers like Harding and Rorty, are nothing more than good old-fashioned skepticism cynically yoked to the writer's social theory and advocacy; that science is not equipped to answer every question for which we want or need answers; in particular science cannot discover solutions to philosophical problems, like the nature of truth, epistemic warrant, and scientific method. I was left somewhat unsatisfied, on the other hand, because this book does little to improve our understanding of these philosophical problems themselves, with the result that the plausibility of her views remains mere plausibility, unsupported by deeper groundworks.

Perhaps it is unwise to hunger for what is not on the menu in the first place — and unfair to lament its lack. Haack's first chapter proclaims, as its subtitle indicates, a 'Critical Common-Sensist Manifesto'. If this is read as a declaration that common sense is the *basis* of her work, then it may be contumacious to ask for something deeper. Since it just is common sense to avoid extremes, as Polonius counselled Laertes, so too Haack counsels us: neither a new cynic nor a deferentialist be. 'New cynics' is her telling tag for the above-mentioned Barnes-through-Rorty group and their ilk, who portray science as a mere temporal power base, typically corrupted by sexism, racism, ethnocentrism, and so on. 'New deferentialism' denotes the camp of Carnap, Hempel, Popper, and all those who, at the other extreme, submitted to scientific authority, anticipating solutions to epistemological and metaphysical problems in the long sought (but never found) logic of science. Haack's method is constant throughout: identify the extremes (sometimes along a number of axes), and then hew to a path between. That's just common sense, and Haack's feeling for it is uncommonly profound. Commonsensical to the bone, and to her own self true, she canst not then be false to any man.

Perhaps this is why her views are presented with little argument. When Haack assures us that science 'is neither sacred nor a confidence trick' (19), it is just like saying bread is neither flour nor water: to ask for supporting argument seems vexatious. Nevertheless, I did grow uncomfortable reading her book, even as I was swept along in happy agreement. It was like a presentation of Newton's model of lunar motions, accurate in every detail — but without gravitation. The moon was in its right place, at the right time, every phase in agreement with common sense — albeit for reasons mysterious.

While she barely argues for her own views, Haack persuasively argues against the views she opposes. Her arguments against the various doctrines of deferentialism and new cynicism are valuable, and memorably expressed. Their logic is generally the same: the doctrine does not follow from the premises offered, and is moreover self-defeating. An example:

> ... a dreadful argument ubiquitous among the New Cynics [is] the Passes-for Fallacy: what has passed for, i.e., what has been accepted by scientists as, known fact or objective evidence or honest inquiry, etc., has sometimes turned out to be no such thing: *therefore* the notions of known fact, objective evidence, honest inquiry etc., are ideological humbug. The premise is true, but the conclusion obviously does not follow. Indeed, this argument is not only fallacious, but also self-undermining. (27-8)

Absolutely right.

But does Haack do any better? Consider an example. Suppose we wonder, Socrates-like, why we should accept x-ray crystallography as a method of determining the shape of DNA (one of Haack's own examples, 109-14). Since, according to Haack, there is no such thing as a general scientific method, one

cannot justify x-ray crystallography as a specific instance of it. So its reliability must depend on the particular, empirically determined, circumstances relevant to its specific use. But, this, so far as I can see, must come down to the argument, roughly put, that x-ray crystallography is reliable because it is judged reliable by those in the best position to judge its accuracy, (not usually philosophers, but) the scientists who designed and use it — assuming their evidence and reasons meet the standards Haack outlines in Chapter 3 (the longest and most technical), of the following sort: pieces of evidence must have some independent warrant; reasons should be several and mutually supporting, like the intersecting lines of a crossword puzzle (this illuminating metaphor Haack's famous trademark); and scientists should expend 'good-faith effort to arrive at the truth' (96). But note: the conclusion of reliability still *does not follow* from these premises. 'Is reliable' does not follow from 'is taken by the best informed community to be reliable' — even when the community follows Haack's methodological guidelines. This 'taken-by fallacy' is, moreover, the mirror image of Haack's passes-for fallacy.

To hasten right to the bottom of the matter, 'is continuous with everyday empirical inquiry' does not entail 'truth-yielding' either. Unless of course there is some sort of definitional linkage between them, as in pragmatism — and Haack does say 'this now seems to me the most Pragmatist of my books' (10, her capitalization). Is this a clue? Maybe. In a Peircean moment, Haack does provide an argument sketch in terms of the role of ostensive definitions in language learning (62-3). I believe, however, that a lot of reading between the lines is needed to find here much support for common sense empiricism.

I decided, then, that the way to read this book is not to seek illumination of the deep epistemological problems for which there is no generally accepted solution. Taking this approach, I found Haack illuminating — and charming — as though I were reading J. L. Austin, a philosopher she mentions approvingly, and with whom she has affinities, including, perhaps, the conviction that a little good sense can lead us out of the many confusions bred of single-minded adherence to philosophical principles. Taking this tack, I found Haack not only disentangling the many strings of argument obscuring such commonplace issues as scientific method or scientific prejudice, but breaking new ground as well. The later chapters of her book, moreover, are apt to be widely read, since they are accessible to non-professionals. Those who do read them will benefit from her acute insights, and tireless clearing up of confusions, in such topics as the place of the social sciences within the sciences (the intentional will have to be included), the possibility of a proper sociology of knowledge (as contrasted with some fashionable misconceptions), the relationship between scientific and literary texts (a perennial favorite), observations and diagnoses of some current snarls in the legal employment of scientific experts (we may hope her essay encourages further philosophical debate on this important topic), whether not science is an endless quest, will eventually become complete, or just peter out in exhaustion or bankruptcy (her crystal ball may not be more powerful than others,

but it is less cloudy). As in her previous works, Haack's view is panoramic, critical — and profoundly commonsensical.

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**John Haldane** and **Stephen Read, eds**.
*The Philosophy of Thomas Reid:*
*A Collection of Essays.*
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2003.
Pp 214.
US$36.95. ISBN 1-40510-905-X.

Annually *The Philosophical Quarterly* sets a topic and invites contributions to be published as an issue of the journal. A prestigious prize is given for the best essay. Later the issue is published as a book. In 2001 the topic set was the philosophy of Thomas Reid. The volume contains ten essays on various aspects of Reid's philosophy, an essay on the life and work of Reid by John Haldane, and an important essay by Reid, 'Of Power' that had theretofore been published only in the January 2001 issue of *The Philosophical Quarterly*, '... some 200 years after the date of its writing.'

All the essays are worthy of the volume. They range across topics such as Reid on common sense (Michael Pakaluk); the theory of human action (Ferenc Huoranszki); the geomety of visibles (Gideon Yaffe); fictional objects (Ryan Nichols); Reid's relation to Kant (Etienne Brun-Rovet), Priestley (Alan Tapper), and G. E. Moore (John Greco); primary and secondary qualities (Jennifer McKitrick); direct perceptual realism (J. Todd Buras); and naturalism in Reid's epistemology and philosophy of mind (Patrick Rysiew). The essays discussed here reflect my own interests and no invidious distinction from the others is intended.

The prize was awarded to Patrick Rysiew of the Department of Philosophy of UBC for 'Reid and Epistemic Naturalism'. It is an insightful account of the issues in naturalized epistemology and Reid's relation to them. The central issue is whether the normative enterprise of epistemology can be naturalized, i.e., made continuous with scientific psychology. The chief conundrum for this project is: how to treat the fact/value (or norm) distinction. Cognitive psychology recognizes that there is a class of beliefs that are connatural, unlearned, and universal, e.g., our beliefs in other minds, in an external world, , and importantly, our belief in the general reliability of our intellectal powers such as sense-perception, memory, and judgment. These beliefs are

normally latent and tacit, suffusing and constraining all our conscious thought and practice, and are normally brought to our conscious attention only by philosophers and cognitive psychologists. It is obvious why such basic beliefs — Reid's First Principles — as a group of natural doxastic phenomena are of interest to psychologists. But psychologists do not address normative questions such as whether we ought to, or are entitled to, believe all, or any, of these natural beliefs, and if so, under what constraints.? And how can these normative concerns be made to fit into a naturalistic psychology?

An important challenge to naturalizing epistemology has been raised by Alvin Plantinga in *Warrant and Proper Function* (Oxford University Press 1993). Plantinga's view is that it is warrant, added to belief in sufficient degree, that yields knowledge. But getting warrant requires that our faculties are functioning properly and this is a notion that cannot be given a purely naturalistic analysis. He raises an ingenious argument against 'Darwinian optimists' who believe that natural selection guarantees that at least most of our beliefs are true, upon pain of non-survival if they were not. Plantinga thinks that natural selection works to promote survival, not thought. For sheer survival as natural organisms, all we need are Patricia Churchland's 'four Fs', feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction. All we need for these are instincts and reflexes. So there is nothing in Darwinian science that makes it likely that most, or any, of our beliefs are true, or that our intellectual powers are mostly reliable.

Plantinga certainly believes that our faculties are generally reliable producers of true belief, but because this belief cannot be given a scientific justification, he thinks, it must be justified by a supernaturalistic metaphysics in which it is held that our faculties are generally reliable when they are functioning properly. Within such a metaphysics, there is no ground for doubt about this. Plantinga plumps for methodological naturalism in psychology and epistemology, underwritten by God, a providential naturalism. That is how he bridges the gap. He attributes this view to Thomas Reid.

The literature is replete with refutations of the view of Reid as a providential naturalist. Rysiew does not add to it. The rational status of First Principles is what concerns him. Reid does not attempt to bridge the fact/norm gap because, like Hume, he thinks they are indemonstrable, not derived from anything. But unlike Hume, Reid thinks our First Principles are entirely rational. As a faculty, common sense is that common degree of reason below which a person is mentally defective. As basic beliefs, common sense beliefs are dictates of reason; they have the character of being self-evident and axiomatic for us. But this is descriptive psychology. Reid knows that these features do not establish the normative authority of common sense, without which Hume's view of common sense as a set of non-rational doxastic instincts would be the right one. Reid thinks that Hume's error was to think of our First Principles as externally regulative of our thought and action, as though human thought and action might be the same under different regulations, just as, say, the intelligent driving of a car could be conducted under different regulatory rules of the road. Reid regards them as constitutive of

rationality as such. Rysiew notes that ' ... first principles create the very possibility of cognizing at all, there is a real sense in which ... we literally cannot imagine creatures [as rational] for whom those principles are nothing — creatures who do not take their ... faculties to be reliable on the whole; who do not see life and intelligence in each other; who do not think that the things which they clearly and distinctly perceive really exist; and so on' (37).As constitutive of natural reason, First Principles describe a range of human cognition and behaviour, but also as constitutive they prescribe or prohibit mandatorily certain ways of thinking and acting. Rysiew is first rate at developing and defending these views.

John Greco's 'How to Reid Moore' needs noting. He defends Moore's 'Proof of an External World', taking it to rest on several Reidian points on which 'Moore and Reid are exactly right ... ' (131). He then uses the 'Reid -Moore position' to resolve the question: how is it that one knows that one is not a brain in a vat? In a nutshell, the answer is that sense-perception is a genuine and usually reliable source of knowledge, so that anyone who can see one of his own hands thereby just sees that he is not a brain in a vat — brains in vats do not have hands. Greco's arguments are subtle, sophisticated and reasonable.

Some critics of Moore have argued that he begs the question against the skeptic, and would argue that Greco does so as well. Perhaps. But because skeptics assume the reliability of some of their own faculties, notably reason, and because reason and sense-perception 'come out of the same shop', as Reid says, and the deliverances of both must be accepted by all, until God or Nature provides us with a new set of faculties capable of sitting in judgment upon the old, the skeptic begs the question against Moore and Greco. This is clearly not a Mexican stand-off.

Ryan Nichols' 'Reid on Fictional Objects and the Way of Ideas' deals with Reid on conception. He claims that Reid adopts a Meinongian position *avant la lettre* on the status of fictional objects: when we conceive of centaurs, the direct object of our conceiving is a non-existent animal that is half-man and half-horse. The over-all form of Nichols' essay is that of a complex disjunctive syllogism in which Nichols eliminates all the alternative accounts of what it is to think of a fictional object that Reid rejects, or would have rejected had he thought of them, leaving Reid's 'Meinongianism' standing triumphant in the end. Thus, Reid rejects, for example, all analyses of thought of non-existent objects as having really existing mental entities, such as images, as the real direct objects of such thoughts. And so on.

The troubling thing about Nichols' type of analytical procedure is that it is always a trifle tendentious, and leaves standing the position being defended *faute de mieux*. In this case, however, Nichols could scarcely do any other. The fact is, Reid has no theory, Meinongian, or less anachronistically, proto-Meinongian, of our ability to think of fictional objects. This is hardly surprising since he regards it as a plain dictate of common sense that we all do conceive of 'objects', in a wide sense, that do not and never have existed; nor do they 'subsist' Meinongianly either, as Nichols concedes. Reid refuses

to multiply the senses of 'exists' in order to construct a theory of fictional objects.

Reid is right about this little bit of common sense, so he probably never gave it much thought for a reason Nichols provides, viz., that it is consistent with the rest of his philosophy, and no alternative he was aware of, such as the Locke-Hume 'Way of Ideas' representational account is. He also probably thought that it is no more problematic than our ability to conceive objects that do exist since he regards all our conceivings as 'simple apprehensions', i. e., as 'bare conceptions' containing no true or false beliefs about the things conceived, including judgments about their existence or non-existence. It is only within judgments that the names/descriptions of our bare conceptions either have or lack referents. We judge that horses and men exist, and that centaurs do not. As 'bare conceptions' in which there is no admixture of truth, falsehood, or judgment, 'horse', 'man' and 'centaur' are all on a par, and one is no more problematic than the others.

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**Nicholas Hammond, ed.**
*The Cambridge Companion to Pascal.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xvi + 287.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80924);
US$23.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00611).

The editors of the *The Cambridge Companion* series have now turned to Pascal. But it is in no way an easy task to edit such a volume for the English-speaking world. While Pascal the mathematician or the physicist earned a distinguished place in the histories of the respective disciplines, both the theologian and the philosopher have an ambiguous status. The last contribution of the volume, McKenna's 'The reception of Pascal's *Pensées* ... ' makes obvious why. Even the theologically-minded philosophers from the eighteenth century onward accepted the rationalistic critique on Pascal initiated by Malebranche and Bayle. The Pascalian upheaval of the all too human systems of contemporary philosophy could not but appeal to some deconstructivist theologico-philosophers — difficult to find in Anglo-Saxon philosophy. The affiliations of the contributors show this clearly enough: only four of the fourteen have a job in a philosophy department, most of them belong to departments of French literature. I.e. Pascal engages historians of

ideas rather than philosophers — at least in the contemporary English-speaking philosophy, where these two professions — in contrast to France, for example — are sharply distinguished. Another clear sign of this circumstance is the nationality of the main secondary sources. The great books of Pascal scholarship were written by the eminent French historians of philosophy of the mid-twentieth century, Mesnard and Gouhier. Pascal has not yet been appropriated in English-language philosophy in the form of authoritative commentaries: the books of Hammond, Parish or Pugh are not yet referred to even by the other contributors of the present volume.

Nevertheless there is hardly any exaggeration in the *dictum* that this volume edited by Nicholas Hammond is on the way to becoming a real reference book. The editor must have realized that he cannot take for granted that sort of familiarity with Pascal's writing which he might well have presupposed in case of any of the great names of the history of European philosophy. As a consequence of this he composed the book out of two rather heterogeneous parts: the first part — with the exception of Elster's piece — provides the reader with the general historical contexts of Pascal's life, his 'reading and inheritance of Montaigne and Descartes', his 'work on probability' and his physics. The contribution of Fouke treating 'Pascal's physics' shows up the basic features of the 'close reading' in drawing the main lines of Pascal's seldom-read physical treatises. With Elster and Clarke, however, the philosophers best known in the English-speaking world, begins the other part of the volume, which can be recognized from the other volumes of the same series: the authors' own philosophical conviction gets into play contrasting Pascal's views either with independently gained historical knowledge — Bouchilloux, Force, Hammond, McKenna — or with today's views in philosophy of science or decision theory. The contributions of Elster and Clarke, representatives of this last-mentioned genre, leave behind the ideal of the purely interpretive essay: they are outspokenly critical in some of their conclusions. 'The culminating argument in Pascal's second major work will work only if we accept the doctrine he spent so much energy demolishing in the first' (71). Elster alludes to the Wager Argument that seems to fit better in a reasoning with a Jesuit metaphysics of will in the background than in a work, where some main views are distinct but not different from the deterministic views of the Calvinists — as he claims in agreement with Kolakowski. This is tantamount to a serious criticism if we take into consideration that Pascal's main concern in his first major work, the *Provincial Letters*, is nothing else than demolishing the Jesuit doctrine seen from a point of view influenced by the disgust of 'the lax Jesuitical practices' for him indissociable from the doctrine itself. And as for the affinities between Pascal and Calvinism, a certain echo of the Elster-Kolakowski view can be found in Richard Parish's study on the *Lettres provinciales*. He takes to be the 'essential achievement of the letters as a whole ... to inculpate the Society of Jesus, rather than to exculpate Port-Royal.' As for the relation between Port-Royal and Protestantism he even notes that 'the proximity in certain sacramental practices

... must render such an accusation potentially the most damaging to which Port-Royal was subject' (195).

Clarke's departure point is a Pascal whose 'method is evidently a foundationalist one, even if it recognises that the relevant foundations may vary from one person to another and that may be few in number' (105). However mitigated by sceptical views this sort of foundationalism implied the conviction of the possibility of crucial experiments. Now Clarke shows clearly that the Duhem-Quine thesis excluding crucial experiments was already known among seventeenth-century scientists: he refers to Boyle who 'was more likely to blame his equipment, or his assistants, than to suspect the fundemental hypothesis about "the spring of the air, which most of my Explications suppose" ' (108). And in fact, Clarke's analyses shows that Pascal was willing to make use of the thesis that there are no such 'experiments that conclusively disprove hypotheses' (107), when at stake was his own hypothesis, while on the other hand he claimed the possibility of an absolute proof in case of an experiment confirming his hypothesis. 'He claims that, if the experiment works ... , that confirms his theory. But if it fails ... , that must be due to some defect in the experiment' (117)! It was Pascal's foundationalist attitude too that made him neglect the possible application of probabilistic approach from mathematics to physics. Instead he endorsed two opposite options within scientific research: the 'positivistic' option, which consisted in not going behind the experimental level, and the, say, 'demonstrationalist' option that consisted in reconstructing scientific knowledge in the form of demonstrations. Clarke maintains that the symbiosis of the two options was in no way successful: Pascal 'fudged the distinction between observation and theory to his own advantage, and borrowed on the alleged certainty of the former to protect his scientific theories from criticism' (115).

One of the great merits of the volume is that the editor apparently refused to create a forcedly harmonious image of Pascal scholarship. In contrast to Clarke's article Daniel Fouke treats Pascal's relation to physics in general, and to his experiments in particular, in a much more sympathetic way. He considers Pascal as a characteristically original physicist, especially 'in the only complete treatises that have come down to us — the *Traités de l'équilibre des liqueurs et de la pesanteur de la masse de l'air*' (99). Fouke stresses the visual imagination to which Pascal accorded a very important role in determining the relationships between the elements of complex phenomena. In this he even recognizes a methodological means used by Pascal not only in physics but also in projective geometry. His assessment of the problem of the Pascalian experiments is almost opposite to that of Clarke: 'Some have suggested that Pascal did not actually perform a good number of the experiments he described, and that may be the case. But that does not detract from their ingenuity or penetration. Pascal's experiments, whether real or imagined, build one upon the other, like chains of reasoning' (100).

Another highly important point of divergence is the interpretation of the most famous Pascalian term, the 'heart'. On the one hand we find Pierre Force boldly asserting that 'when Pascal identifies the heart as the organ

that perceives the first principles, he means that there is something inherently bodily and physical about this perception' (224). In this way he identifies the two meanings of the term 'heart', the bodily organ and the faculty of knowing the principles of our reasoning. Hélène Bouchilloux in her deep analysis on 'Pascal and the social world' speaks about a terminological problem, 'that Pascal also uses the word *heart* to designate our capacity to identify first principles' (208), and 'also', i.e., beside 'the heart, or the capacity to love' (207). Hammond too, in his elegantly written analysis of the *Pensées* 'as a self-help or self-educating manual' (240) is quite explicit about 'the role of the heart (*'coeur'*) [in attributing to religion something supernatural], which has nothing to do with sentimental feelings but rather closely tied to intuition' (247). In the end, McKenna gives an interesting twist to the pair *sentiment - coeur* ending up perhaps not far from the standpoint of Force. 'Whereas Pascalian *sentiment* designated a function of the *heart*, and thus founded a Gassendist psychology opposed to the intellectual intuition of Descartes' *cogito*, the Port-Royal theologians suggest that Pascal's *sentiment* is no more than a *sentiment d'évidence ...*' (254).

As a conclusion I would like to repeat my conviction that this elegant volume edited by Nicholas Hammond is going to be an indispensable handbook of English-language Pascal scholarship.

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**Jonathan Hodge** and **Gregory Radick**, eds.
*The Cambridge Companion to Darwin.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xiii + 486.
US$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-77197-8);
US$26.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-77730-5).

This is a welcome addition to the *Cambridge Companion* series that focuses on important figures in the history of philosophy. Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection has had a profound impact on our understanding of the natural world and our place within this world. It is therefore appropriate that Darwin has been given a position among the ranks of influential thinkers in the history of philosophy.

The purpose of the *Cambridge Companion* series, as I understand it, is to provide an accessible introduction to the work of a particular philosopher by

presenting a series of essays written by prominent philosophers and historians. Rather than commissioning one author to write a definitive summation of the figure to whom each volume is devoted, the *Companions* collect a range of perspectives from various authors and allow each author to address his or her own special interest in the philosophy of the figure in question. This format prevents the *Companions* from being of much use to early undergraduates in need of a clear narrative path through the material, but the strength of the series lies in the fact that the *Companions* reflect the diversity of interpretations that exist for each figure in the history of philosophy. This is a worthwhile objective and one that is difficult for a single author to achieve without the text coming across as scattered or indecisive.

My view is that the anthology format is a great strength of the *Companion* series because it provides competent non-specialists with an introduction to important historical figures that is otherwise not available. Cambridge has carved out a well-deserved niche in academia for those curious souls who venture beyond their area of specialization but are underwhelmed by the brevity of the '...a very short introduction' series and insulted by the cartoonish (mis)representations in the '... for beginners' series.

I emphasize this formatting strength of the *Cambridge Companion* series because it is especially noticeable in the volume devoted to Darwin. The details surrounding the genesis of Darwin's theory of 'descent with modification' are complicated, yet they are easily oversimplified and presented in a way that perpetuates the myth that Darwin came up with his theory in a sudden flash of insight that was independent of all external social influences. Similarly, the relationship between Darwin's original thesis and our modern understanding of evolutionary theory is complex and vulnerable to oversimplification. It is easy to attribute anachronistically too much knowledge to Darwin out of respect for his achievement, but the truth is that Darwin struggled with certain necessary components of natural selection (e.g., the source of ongoing variation and the mechanism of inheritance) of which we now have a better understanding after the 'modern synthesis' of Darwinism and Mendelian genetics. The collection of essays in this *Cambridge Companion* does an excellent job of avoiding oversimplifications of this kind. It appropriately provides those new to Darwinism with a variety of perspectives and opinions that reflect the complexity of Darwin's contribution to philosophy.

In fact, if there is one overriding theme that runs through the essays themselves, it is the aim of breaking down convenient myths and false generalizations. A number of the historical essays (e.g., the contributions from Waters, Hull, Brooke and Paul) demonstrate that the relations between Darwin's theory and the existing scientific and religious views of his time are too intricate to be captured by quick generalizations. Similarly, the essays dealing with the philosophical issues raised by Darwinism (particularly the contributions by Rosenberg, Ruse and Kitcher) demonstrate that there is no clear-cut way to apply the empirical insights derived from Darwin to philosophical areas like ethics, theology or the philosophy of mind.

The text is divided into four sections: *Darwin's Theorizing, Historical Contexts, Philosophical Themes* and *Ways Forward*. The division between Sections Three and Four is unnecessary: both of these sections deal with contemporary philosophical themes and I see nothing unique about the rather contrived 'Ways Forward' section. The inclusion of so much historical material in Sections One and Two, however, was a good decision on the part of the editors. The material covered here is intriguing, of course, but the decision to include so much historical material was smart because it keeps the anthology focused on Darwin rather than allowing it to reach beyond its mandate and become just another collection of papers in the philosophy of biology.

It is impossible, in a short review, to cover each piece of an anthology of this size, so I will focus on those essays that I think deserve special praise or censure.

The first essay in the companion is, 'The Making of a Philosophical Naturalist' by Phillip R. Sloan. In the essay, Sloan traces Darwin's early educational history through medical school in Edinburgh and training to be a clergyman at Cambridge, before dealing with Darwin's voyage on the *Beagle*. In each period, Sloan captures the broad sense of scientific curiosity that led Darwin to appreciate the work done by thinkers like William Whewell, Adam Sedgwick, John Herschel and Charles Lyell without ever himself settling on a definite career path. Darwin is often portrayed as being simply aimless until he reached the Galapagos Islands; Sloan nicely dispels this myth and paints Darwin as a thinker so genuinely interested in the workings of nature that he lacked the ambition to commit to a single discipline that might keep him from his naturalist pursuits. Sloan's essay is a great start to the anthology: it is clearly written and passes on to the reader some of Darwin's enthusiasm about science as it tells us something about his life.

Unfortunately, the next essay by Jonathan Hodge may prevent some readers from continuing any further. The essay deals with Darwin's years in London after his time on the *Beagle*. It is full of valuable information about Darwin's notebooks from this period, but Hodge's writing style virtually impenetrable. With its casual use of technical terms like 'ramifying reiterations' and 'arboriform diversification', the essay has no place in what is allegedly an accessible introduction to Darwin. Those new to Darwin will already be intimidated by the scientific concepts required to explain his philosophical impact, and Hodge's writing style offers too little help for these readers to catch up.

Jim Endersby's essay on Darwin's hypotheses concerning generation, pangenesis and sexual selection is a fun and informative look at how Darwin struggled with some of the details related to variation and inheritance. The essay exemplifies the advantage of the *Companion* format: it is an overview, accessible to non-specialists, of a very specific component of Darwin's thought that would not be included in a broad summary. It gives a tangible sense of how Darwin wrestled with the finer points of his theory. In doing so, it gives

the reader a snapshot of Darwin's thinking that is difficult to capture in anything but a self-contained essay of this kind.

Robert Richards provides a short sample of his book *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior* (University of Chicago 1989). David Hull and C. Kenneth Waters each provide useful essays analyzing the arguments in the *Origin of Species* and how Darwin's peers received these arguments. Diane Paul gives a summary of the sordid history of social Darwinism and eugenics. (Her essay is another example of an introductory essay that reflects the complexity of the subject matter — it appropriately informs the reader that there is no simple way of connecting Darwin to the myriad of social causes that have taken up his name.) John Hedley Brooke points out that the relationship between Darwin and Christianity is more diverse than the image of intransigent conflict that arises when we imagine the famous public debates involving Thomas Huxley.

Elliott Sober opens the section of the anthology devoted to philosophical themes with an essay that addresses the 'Metaphysical and Epistemological Issues in Modern Darwinian Theory'. The essay contains good material but lacks cohesiveness because the topics Sober deals with are diverse (e.g., the role of chance in natural selection and the testing of adaptive hypotheses) and not obviously related except by the fact that they are topics in which Sober is interested. The essay by Kim Sterelny also contains worthwhile content but a disjointed format. Sterelny astutely summarizes the ways that Darwinism affects our understanding of mental symbols, language development and shared features in human psychology, but his attempt to steer the discussion towards standard issues in the philosophy of mind (e.g., compatibilism, functionalism) is sometimes awkward. The essay by Daniel Dennett, on the other hand, seems to me to be not structured enough. It is a distilled version of his thesis from *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (New York: Simon & Schuster 1996) that the blind, mechanistic process of natural selection is able to produce spectacular levels of complexity, including our own creative imagination. But the essay is *so* distilled that I wonder if uninitiated readers will be able to follow it without more clarifications and signposting.

Finally, the essays dealing with the ethical implications of Darwinism ought to be stimulating for those not already familiar with the merits and limitations of evolutionary ethics. The essay by Owen Flanagan outlines a Darwinian genealogy of morals and then defends the idea that we can use this information to generate a Darwinian conception of human flourishing and the good life. I think his proposal is deeply problematic, but it is clearly articulated and a representative example of current attempts to blend evolutionary theory and normative ethics. Moreover, the essays by Alex Rosenberg and Philip Kitcher present more cautious interpretations of the link between Darwin and ethics and balance out Flanagan's bold speculations. In fact, Kitcher's contribution is a fitting way for the anthology to end because his theme of 'cautious exploration' (419) reflects the message that I think one ought to take away from the companion as a whole: if we take the time to recognize the complexity of Darwin's legacy then we ought to adopt

a cautious optimism with respect to the philosophical implications of his groundbreaking theory.

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**David M. Kaplan**
*Ricoeur's Critical Theory.*
Albany: SUNY Press 2003.
Pp. xii + 223.
US$68.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-5695-1);
US$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-5696-X).

David Kaplan's aim is to pick up where John B. Thompson left off in his *Critical Hermeneutics* (1981), and to 'show how Ricoeur's more recent studies on narrative, ethics, and law further contribute to the tradition of critical theory' (3).

Chapters 1 through 5 constitute an explicative summary of those of Ricoeur's views which intersect with the concerns of critical theory. Kaplan shows that there is a coherent critical-theoretical strand to Ricoeur's thinking, which is sustained throughout his career from his earliest work to his latest, and which maintains both an internal consistency and a consistency with his more general philosophical-hermeneutic position. The specifically critical nature of Ricoeur's hermeneutics is shown to lie in its mediation between Gadamerian and Habermasian versions of tradition (Gadamer sees tradition as a repository of truth, whereas Habermas suspects the 'truth' of tradition to be an ideological prejudice). For Ricoeur, the presumed truth of tradition is submitted to 'rational validation' (43) through discourse; hence it is an internal facet of (Habermasian) communicative action that validity claims be tested by speakers. It is this practical, rather than theoretical, activity which constitutes 'argument' as a force for increasing understanding and building consensus.

The chapter on 'Narrative' links *Time and Narrative* with the contemporary, but much less discussed, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*. For Ricoeur, 'ideology can be identified and criticised on the basis of utopia, and utopia on the basis of ideology. They form a circle' (64). So, 'the critique of ideology carried out by utopia and utopia by ideology' is transformed, as is the hermeneutic circle (this is a common theme in Ricoeur), into a spiral of heightened understanding through its being a discourse of 'interpretation as the distanced moment of reflection and critique' (65). Recounting tradition is

a form of narrative, and as such is understood through interpretation, which is a form of reading. When readings are compared (this constitutes 'argument'), the truth-claims of a tradition are validated. Moreover, this is the case for all actions in general, which can equally be 'read' as 'texts' (68).

The chapter on 'Selfhood' traces *Oneself as Another*'s celebrated distinction between *idem*-identity and *ipse*-identity back to Ricoeur's 1950's work *Freedom and Nature*, showing how the distinction is only made possible by Ricoeur's earlier phenomenology of action as something participated in rather than merely observed. This allows Ricoeur's theory of selfhood to be constitutionally intersubjective and interlocutionary, providing a 'thicker, subtler, embodied notion of self-identity unavailable to Habermas' (99). The second half of *Oneself as Another*, meanwhile, 'retains the advantages of discourse ethics while contextualising it within a broader conception of the self and its relation to historical communities and shared notions of the good life' (101), thus mediating both between Aristotle and Kant, and between political liberals and communitarians. Hence 'Ricoeur's discourse ethics preserves the requirement of impartiality associated with a universal point of view yet is responsive to the substantive bonds that form the ethical life of particular communities' (115). It pulls off this trick by distinguishing between discourses of justification, where Habermas' law of 'performative contradiction' holds (the speech act of disagreeing with the claim that there is a universal ethical norm of understanding attaching to communication is performed with the presupposition that there is precisely such an ethical norm), and discourses of application. In these latter, which equate to the exercise of practical wisdom in discourse, or the use of discourse to effect practical wisdom, Ricoeur effectively reverses Habermas' position: it is not that argument is a procedure for generating convictions, but rather that our convictions dictate what we should do in particular situations. Ricœur is allowed this intellectual reversal through his belief in *conscience* as that which dictates our convictions, which are tested in 'tragic situations', i.e. situations where a choice must be made between the lesser of two evils.

Kaplan rightly states that 'Ricoeur's main contribution to political philosophy is his notion of the "political paradox" ' (125); however, Kaplan's readers might be unaware that Ricoeur developed this concept in the 1950's, in some of the essays collected in his *History and Truth* (although this work is referenced elsewhere in the book). Actually, after sketching the reasons for Ricoeur's preference for a liberal state based on the rule of law given in his 1983 essay 'Ethics and Politics', most of the 'Politics' chapter is devoted to summarising the practical consequences in the application of law that, for Ricoeur, would follow for an ethical state, specifically in the sphere of criminal law, where Ricoeur proposes that a life sentence is unethical, since it carries within it a denial of the possibility of rehabilitation, and that rehabilitation itself should be conducted by people other than those responsible for security — all of this follows from Ricoeur's basic idea that 'justice is not vengeance'.

The sixth, final, chapter, on Critical Theory, moves away from exposition of Ricoeur 'to the rough ground of political concerns' (154). Ricoeurean practical solutions to the problems of identity and recognition, technology, and economic globalisation are suggested. Recognition of ethnic groups is preferred over assertion of identity, since it implies reciprocity. Here and elsewhere the call is for 'restorative justice' as a way of restoring social bonds after conflicts, conflicts on a global scale being seen somewhat analogously to tiffs between lovers — they're inevitable, but they can be made up through practical wisdom, which guides our desire 'to live well with and for others in just institutions'. Technology, meanwhile, is seen as analogous to 'tradition' as defined in *Time and Narrative*: they both mediate our experience, and they both thereby delimit our horizons of possibility and understanding, but they can also both be interpreted textually. However, Ricoeur's analyses are marred by a 'Weberian notion of "rationalisation" ' (179), which Kaplan claims to be an illusion, so that instead globalisation should be examined 'in terms of the policies, laws, practices, and sociotechnical systems that support it' (180).

Despite this reservation, on the whole the book sees the world from a Ricoeurean perspective. Hence, as with Ricoeur himself, its strength is also its weakness, namely that it adopts a 'fideist' position: faith that through argument the good will win out in the end. This surely depends on our leaders being just as decent people as Ricoeur and Kaplan show themselves to be — but such decency does not typically propel people into positions of power and authority. (Incidentally, the standard of copy editing and proofreading is extremely poor.)

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This book presents a reading and critical assessment of Peter Winch's account of the social sciences given in *The Idea of a Social Science* (ISS) and 'Understanding a Primitive Society' (UPS). Berel Dov Lerner holds, against certain readings, that there were no radical changes in Winch's views, and that they formed a continuous development. He does not concern himself with the thorny question of how faithful to Wittgenstein Winch was in his work.

The twelve chapters of the book divide readily enough into four sections. The first three chapters examine Winch's understanding of the nature of a social science. The following three chapters examine the issue of explanation in Winch's account. Chapters Seven to Nine deal with Winch's treatment of the Azande as a crucial test-case of his work, while the final three chapters offer a critical commentary on why the problems Lerner identifies in Winch arose.

Lerner begins by examining Winch's views on philosophy, holding that, *pace* Wittgenstein, Winch does attempt systematic philosophy. He notes a tendency in Winch to privilege contemplative understanding (10) over an approach to social science that focused on it as a vehicle for producing public policy, such as Popper's (11). Lerner notes the centrality of the notion of *rule* to Winch's account, and interprets Winch as holding the view that rule-following is essentially social, 'The Social Nature of Rule Following' (SNORF) (15). This focus on rules leads to two kinds of autonomy for a society. Interpretative autonomy means that participants in a mode of life determine the meanings of the actions therein, and epistemological autonomy means they also determine the rationality of such actions (22). Two big issues arise in relation to this. The first is whether meaningful action is indeed so connected to rule-following as Winch holds. The second is the possibility of cognitive relativism that epistemological autonomy seems to entail. Lerner argues that Winch is mistaken about the first issue and confused about the second.

In relation to rule-following, Lerner holds that there is indeed scope for a naturalistically-oriented social science that doesn't exclusively focus on rule-following, arguing this in Chapter Four. In cases where there is unclarity about novel applications of rules, ' "meaningless" behavioural factors such as the physiology of mood states, the mechanics of perception, and blind conditioned habit come to the fore' (49-50). 'The naturalness of human rule-following invites a naturalistic positivistic treatment' (50).

Discussing the implicit relativism in Winch's views, in Chapter Six, Lerner introduces the notion of interpretative charity to reformulate some of Winch's views. He notes that the problem of allowing for social change (identified by critics of Winch) derives from Winch's over-reliance on rule-following (66). However the core of Lerner's evaluation of Winch's supposed relativism comes in the discussion of Winch on the Azande (chs. 7-9).

The British anthropologist Evans-Pritchard had produced a study of the Sudanese tribe in his 1937 work, *Witchcraft, Magic and Oracles among the Azande*. He distinguished between empirical beliefs held by these people and 'mystical' beliefs concerning witchcraft and magic. He interpreted these latter as mistaken if considered in comparison with scientific thought. Winch was critical of Evans-Pritchard on this, arguing that this was an unwarranted ethnocentrism and that Evans-Pritchard failed to appreciate the spiritual significance of the Azande's beliefs. Lerner produces a devastating critique of Winch's position. First, how did Winch, the armchair philosopher, come to have a deeper knowledge of the Azande than the field anthropologist who spent years with them? There's a wonderful anecdote in the notes about a public discussion between Alasdair MacIntyre and Peter Winch in Oxford on the symbolic significance of cows for the Azande being unfazed by Evans-Pritchard's audience contribution that the Azande didn't have cows! (155) Second, Winch alternates between apparently defending the view that the Azande hold an 'alternative conception of rationality' and attributing to them expressivist views which have no ontological significance. As Lerner notes, 'what began with a bang as a heroic project of understanding alternative "criteria of rationality" (UPS 31) ends with a whimper, a non-realist Zande apologetic' (81). Furthermore, Lerner accuses Winch of subscribing to the 'myth of primitive piety' (101). This is the thought that such anthropological subjects of study as the Azande must have a religious or spiritual worldview. Lerner points out that Evans-Pritchard 'paints a picture of a thoroughly secular Zande culture whose members take more or less effective practical measures to protect and promote their interests … ' (105). Furthermore, he notes that since Evans-Pritchard converted to Catholicism he was hardly a model positivist, blind to the spiritual dimensions of things.

Lerner diagnoses the source of the tension in Winch between expressivism and defending alternative rationalities in his tacit acceptance of what Lerner calls 'instrumental monism', the view that 'all societies share the same basic criteria of instrumental rationality and intelligibility' (85). Against this Lerner advocates 'instrumental pluralism', the thought that there may be differences among such standards. He cites the difference between the notion of 'success' deployed in engineering and in psychotherapy as a way of noting such differences. It may be that Azande practices need to be evaluated with different instrumental criteria — perhaps keying their magic to their own 'empirical' practices, which are less developed than in the west. Also, 'it would not be surprising if a culture less concerned with the theoretical explanation of natural phenomena would be more willing to apply a mysteriously effective technology' (91). Lerner holds that Winch over-emphasizes the view of

humans as speakers rather than tool-makers (9, 124). So doing blinds him to the possibility of diversity in tool use, leads him to ignore the role of technology in social life and the possibility of using naturalized resources in social science.

Lerner's overall account of Winch is insightfully critical. Lerner's own notion of instrumental pluralism seems fruitful and would repay further study. Providing more detailed examples and investigating the relation of different criteria to each other would be a worthwhile development of this project.

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**G. E. R. Lloyd**
*The Ambitions of Curiosity: Understanding the World in Ancient Greece and China.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 2002.
Pp. xvi + 175.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81542-8);
US$22.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-89461-1).

The origin of this book was a set of lectures given at Oxford in 2000 as the Isaiah Berlin lectures. The book is an expanded version of those lectures and is now divided into six chapters; there are also a glossary of Chinese and Greek terms, a bibliography, and an index. Lloyd is a distinguished historian of philosophy and of ancient science. The book gives us insight into the recent work that he is doing in comparative studies. The comparison is primarily between scientific and philosophical thought in ancient China and in ancient Greece.

A leading question of his inquiry rests upon Aristotle's premise that humans in general desire to know. Lloyd then asks 'what happened when individuals or groups came to have some such ambition, what factors then stimulated or inhibited systematic inquiry.' The unifying theme of the book is the growth of systematic inquiry considered under the banner of six themes, each taken up in a chapter: history, prediction, the art of assigning number, the utility of inquiry, the language of inquiry, and, sixth, the individual and the institution.

There are various pairs of concepts under which Lloyd's comparisons are made. Only a few of these are to be touched upon in this review. The first (1) concerns the individual as either working on his own or working within an institution.

(1) Comparisons are made regarding history and inquiry: Lloyd discusses great historians in China who keep their records while working within the Imperial Court. We could well suppose that Sima Qian would feel more constraint for giving a favorable account of the sitting Emperor than Herodotus would in giving an account of Cyrus. Lloyd studies the force of terms used in China, on the one hand, and those used in Greece for what we're prepared, loosely speaking, to translate as 'history' or 'historian'. But in context what do those terms really mean? Lloyd is sensitive and helpful in dealing with the question.

(2) There is interesting work here on prediction and divination. Doubtless every civilization has put pressure on someone to foretell the future. In both ancient civilizations under discussion numbers became vital in prediction and divination. In both traditions the burden fell to those who claimed wisdom to know the past for the sake of understanding the present and of guiding the future. Confucius and his followers tried to advise rulers how to behave by reminding them of the behavior of their ancestors; Aristotle reviews the work of his predecessors for the sake of wisdom in thinking about questions before him. Lloyd's special study here concerns medicine and prognosis and his comparisons are interesting and illuminating. Lloyd recognizes that the chapter is sketchy and suggestive. At places in his discussion he leaves hints of further research. Philosophers are apt to be disappointed in the book's neglect of peculiarly philosophical questions, such as the emergence of a causal theory and how the two courses of development, in China and in Greece, were alike and unlike.

(3) In Chapter Five Lloyd reflects upon the roles of language in inquiry in the two traditions. In both traditions there is critical attention to language not just for the sake of clarity of communication but also to resolve puzzles and sophistry. It is disappointing that Lloyd doesn't consider the question whether comparable correspondence theories of truth emerge. If, as some scholars hold, no such theory emerged in ancient China, how do philosophers identify the basis from which a critique of language is made? It is strange that Lloyd doesn't compare the work done by Mohists, on the one hand, and Aristotle and Plato, on the other. After all, reflection upon language and moving from the primitive stage of taking language to be a series of names to that of developing a theory of the statement is worth a comparative study with respect to Mohists on the one hand, and Plato on the other. But this book simply does not flower into philosophical acuity; it remains a progress report that is of use primarily as a guide to a comparative history of scientific inquiry.

Lloyd does bring into focus Plato and Aristotle's attention to the obviation of obscurity in discourse. He turns in particular to the literal and the metaphorical. But rather than doing anything of interest to philosophy, here he somewhat reprimands Aristotle for too strict a dichotomy of the literal and the metaphorical. It would have been more useful to have taken the concept of analogy and have shown how useful analogy proved both in China and in Greece in expanding and weaving discourse together. There is a

delicate use of analogy in Mencius, for example, when he is trying to upgrade a ruler's moral understanding by analogy. It is strange in this context that Lloyd doesn't consider the work of Xunzi in comparison to Aristotle and of Mengzi in comparison to Plato. Perhaps he excuses himself here since a lot of comparative work has already been done. But a summary of it would be useful and Lloyd may himself have something to add to it.

There is a further topic that Lloyd's book touches upon and which is to be touched upon here, without claiming space enough to do it justice. There are two limits at which the use of language is interesting to consider. At one limit language is cultivated either privately or by a secret society. At the other limit thinkers aim at a universal discourse, particularly that of epistemic values such as truth and correctness and of ethical values such as wisdom and justice, a discourse in which everyone can participate. Confucians, such as Mencius, try to make the concerns of ordinary people persuasive to the ruler; Daoists, by contrast, seem to withdraw and to cultivate, if possible, a life of longevity. In both cases the same question arises: How is discourse to be perfected without becoming a secret code for the few who are masters of it? Both of the two ancient traditions give contrasting but similar answers to that question. Lloyd's book is a fine contribution to a deepening of our understanding of their answers to the question.

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**Kirk Ludwig, ed.**
*Donald Davidson.*
Contemporary Philosophy in Focus Series.
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. xiii + 240.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-79043-3);
US$20.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-79382-3).

Published in the series *Contemporary Philosophy in Focus*, this book is a collection of articles focused on Donald Davidson's influential work, which are meant individually to offer introductory presentations of his doctrines, combining 'exposition and critical analysis' (iii), and collectively to provide 'the only comprehensive introduction to the full range of Davidson's work' (i). Overall these goals are met, due to the quality of the articles the book contains, and the careful format of the collection: an extensive Introduction by the editor, followed by seven chapters each devoted to a central theme in

Davidson's philosophy, and authored by a cluster of high-calibre philosophers.

In the Introduction, Ludwig expounds lucidly most of Davidson's major theses as well as the thrusts of his central arguments, while emphasizing the strong unity of Davidson's work, whose driving force is correctly identified as his 'reflection on how we are able to interpret the speech of another' (1).

Chapter 1 by Lepore and Ludwig offers a helpful discussion of the arguments behind the claims tersely supported in 'Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages' and 'Truth and Meaning'. Davidson's initial idea of taking extensional adequacy as a criterion for an interpretive theory of truth is presented in some detail, because, arguably, the failure of this criterion prompted him to tackle questions about radical interpretation (52). Among the interesting exegetical claims of the chapter is the suggestion that Davidson's 'ambitious' work on the constitutive nature of belief and meaning is an attempt to offer 'an a priori guarantee that speakers were interpretable from the standpoint of a radical interpreter,' i.e., from a theory of truth that 'optimally fits evidence in the form of a speaker's behavior' (53-4).

Mele and Wheeler III provide sympathetic presentations of Davidson's views on action and action explanation, and respectively, on nonliteral meaning (Chapters 2 and 7). Mele's outline of Davidson's causal theory of action brings out a large spectrum of novel solutions he provides in defence of his theory, and highlights the connection between Davidson's philosophy of mind and of action. But, surprisingly, Chapter 2 makes no reference to the crucial role played by a semantic analysis of action sentences in Davidson's view of action, and thus fails to depict the real scale of his unitary methodology (160). Wheeler's presentation of Davidson's conception of communication pictures vividly the tremendous breadth of this conception, with an emphasis on the arguments surrounding the shortcomings of the notion of public language.

Davidson's arguments in the semantics of action sentences and the related ontological views of events/actions are presented in a careful, detailed manner in Chapter 5 by Pietroski, who also introduces some current disagreements surrounding the ontological commitments of a semantic analysis of action sentences in order to illustrate, among other things, the prevalent unity between claims in the semantics of action sentences and those in the ontology of events/actions. Pietroski claims that this unity is exemplarily illustrated by Davidson's work in the theory of events and actions, and in so doing, he highlights not only the reference missing from Mele's presentation, but also another crucial element of any comprehensive picture of Davidson's system of views: his 'overall conception of causal relations that includes claims about facts, explanations, laws of nature ...' (160). This latter network of claims is left uncovered in this collection, but its presence would have been doubly beneficial, given the prominent place taken here by debates on Davidson's epiphenomenalism and irrealism of the mental.

Indeed, the charges that anomalous monism and/or the doctrine of radical interpretation (RI) render the mental causally irrelevant, even inexistent,

occupy centre stage in the two most critical contributions, by Rawling and Kim (Chapters 3 and 4 respectively). While Kim provides an initially sympathetic reading of the reasoning for the thesis of the anomalism of the mental, he aims to take Davidson to task. Since, arguably, it construes the mental as causally irrelevant, for Kim, Davidson's view of the autonomy of the mind falls short of 'providing a solution to the metaphysical and moral conundrums arising out of our dual nature as agents and natural objects' (125). Chapter 4 ends with an outline of criticisms, some by now classical, against Davidson's attempts to address epiphenomenalism charges (128-31).

Rawling provides in Chapter 3 illuminating presentations of work that inspired Davidson's approach to the possibility of RI, beginning with Ramsey's influence on his construal of this issue in terms of the constraints that must be met by any mental states in virtue of their nature (86-7). Rawling's parallel presentation of Tarski's definition of truth and Davidson's use of a theory of truth is also insightful (88-9), as is his more extensive discussion of Quine's and Davidson's positions on the holism of the mental, and the location of stimulus. But in his critique of Davidson's indeterminacy thesis, Rawling helps himself to a rather unDavidsonian distinction between dispositions to behaviour and propositional attitudes (103), and from this position he cannot even begin to consider Lepore's and Ludwig's suggestion concerning Davidson's interest in an apriori argument. Furthermore, like Kim, Rawling's critique fails to take into consideration an alternative defence of realism about the mental, based on the possible relevance of Davidson's view of belief and meaning for empirical research in cognitive psychology (90).

In Chapter 6, Sosa engages in recent exchanges among Nagel, Stroud, and Davidson concerning the latter's arguments for anti-scepticism about external world. Deploying a distinction between two readings — either strong or weak — of Davidson's claim that by nature beliefs are generally true, Sosa argues not only that Davidson needs to defend the strong, anti-skeptical reading of the thesis, but also that he cannot succeed in defending the latter, while preserving the original flavour of an a priori reasoning (175). On this latter contention, there seems to be little disagreement with Davidson, and at least because of this, the dialectic of Sosa's contribution remains contrived, even confusing.

Overall the collection gives a very good sense of Davidson's unitary position on an impressively large array of issues, and provides a vivid picture of both the breath and depth of Davidson's integrated system of views.

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**José Medina**
*The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy:*
*Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity.*
Albany: SUNY Press 2002.
Pp. xii + 233.
US$62.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-5387-1);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-5388-X).

Expectations may differ, but I for one would have liked to see this book's title and subtitle exchange places. It would be far more informative to call this a book on Wittgenstein's ideas about necessity, intelligibility, etc., than about the unity of his philosophy *tout court*. Medina's focus is restricted to questions of logico-mathematical normativity and linguistic meaning. Questions about other aspects of Wittgenstein's thought, such as philosophy of psychology, questions about solipsism or religious issues are excluded from this investigation.

Medina proceeds with two aims in mind: to explore the thematic unity of Wittgenstein's writings from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations* (and those themes are expressed in Medina's subtitle), and to consider Wittgenstein's methodological constancy, perhaps a more contentious postulate. Medina certainly knows Wittgenstein's 'transitional' writings of the 1930s extremely well. His exploration of the evolution of Wittgenstein's methodology, particularly as the latter's 'contextualism' (the view that linguistic meaning is a function of the user's milieu) changes from a depiction of logical to a grammatical, and finally ending up as 'pragmatic' context, is quite thorough and persuasive. This idea of accentuating semantic context, along with Wittgenstein's deflationary approach to philosophical paradoxes, forms the core of the Wittgensteinian method.

Medina engages with the most recent Wittgenstein literature, and the arguments he explores reflect this focus. It is odd to see so much consideration of secondary literature without much mention of familiar names like Anscombe, Geach, von Wright, or McGuinness. John Koethe's book, *The Continuity of Wittgenstein's Thought* (1996) is conspicuously absent. However, the ideas brought to the table are certainly of interest.

The discussion proceeds methodically in six chapters from a brief account of necessity in the *Tractatus* to the problem that led Wittgenstein to reject the Tractarian model in his later years. Medina correctly identifies the 'color exclusion' problem (that a space in the visual field cannot simultaneously be completely blue and completely red is known *a priori*, yet our knowledge of colours is empirical) as a driving force behind Wittgenstein's rapid re-working of his ideas in 1929-1930. From there Medina moves to consider several successively abandoned or transfigured ideas, including that grammar is a form of calculus, that grammar is a series of stipulated rules, and that grammatical rules embody internal relations between concepts.

The second of these three ideas leads Medina to a sustained treatment of Frege's arguments against mathematical formalism. Frege charges formal-

ists with being unable to explain how mathematical rules find application in the world, that in important ways arithmetical laws differ from the rules of a game. Wittgenstein's taking up this problem signals not only an important development in his own thinking, Medina argues, but also a positive regard long neglected by commentators who have become accustomed to seeing Wittgenstein as reacting against Frege's work. Against those who would stress Wittgenstein's debt to the formalists, Medina argues : 'Wittgenstein's view of rules is more indebted to Frege's critique of formalism than to formalism itself. It was this critique that motivated Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations in the early 1930s; and, in part, it was also this critique that led Wittgenstein to reject the conventionalist framework of the calculus view of language when he couldn't find a satisfactory answer to Frege's challenge within it' (87).

The argumentative/exegetical support for this is rather scant. Medina describes Frege's arguments as laid out in the *Grundgesetze*, and some brief quotes from *Philosophical Remarks* and *Philosophical Grammar*. Certainly Wittgenstein's texts convey a good deal of concern with Fregean issues, not the least through the use of Frege's language and examples. However, Medina presents little of this, and what he does give us is difficult to evaluate, as his quotations from both authors are extraordinarily brief.

One feature that might produce mixed reactions is the rapid pace of the discussion. We go from the *Tractatus* to 'Some Remarks on Logical Form' to *Philosophical Remarks* in a single chapter. There is much that could have been said about Wittgenstein's discussions of the *Tractatus* with Ramsey, and the discussion in general assumes a high degree of familiarity with the *Tractatus* itself. There is no mention at all of Wittgenstein's pre-Tractarian period, and since this is a book which itself underwent significant revision, the lacuna is distinct. Moreover, Wittgenstein's development of key ideas in Frege and Russell is something one would expect in a book of this kind. The latter does not appear in the book (save for a passing mention alongside Frege), surely the first time someone has written on Wittgenstein's views on necessity and failed to include Russell!

However, Medina's goal is to display the 'inner logic' (1) of Wittgenstein's thought, so the exclusion of such biographical context may be defensible. The inner logic is developed in a way that leads us through each of the transitional works, culminating in a discussion of the mature position, expounded as much in *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* as in *Philosophical Investigations*.

Medina ends his book with consideration of some current criticisms of Wittgenstein's mature position, *viz.*, Edward Minar's complaint of quietism (members of a linguistic community are constrained by that community's norms), and Simon Blackburn's interpretation of Wittgenstein as a relativist (what counts as a correct norm is simply what a given community chooses to do). Here Medina's synthetic abilities come to the fore, as he marshals several points developed elsewhere to construct a plausible defense of Wittgenstein's position. Medina's expression of his middle course is apt: 'the practical

agreement of a community provides a horizon of understanding, a situated perspective for normative evaluations; but this horizon, far from being a straightjacket, can always be expanded and transformed in unforeseen ways' (191). His language shows familiarity with the current tropes of the biological sciences (the community 'constrains but does not determine the normative behavior' of its members [190]), but it is odd that his very useful gloss on the phrase "form of life" — subject of so much hermeneutic wrangling in the literature — gets relegated to the footnotes.

This book offers much of value, but like 'the force of the logical must', something about it remains inexplicable.

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**Alfred R. Mele**
*Self-Deception Unmasked.*
Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press 2001.
Pp. xii + 148.
US$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-05744-3);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-05745-1).

Self-deception was once thought of as one of the topics that showed the limits of analytical philosophy. Clearly we do deceive ourselves, and clearly to do it purely we must both believe what we are deceiving ourselves about and in becoming deceived, not believe it. Thus the analytical philosophers that began in the 1960's dwelt on the apparent paradoxes that seemed resistant to analysis. They used the subject to point beyond philosophical clarity to the puzzles of subjective self-reflection, to the moral imperative of self-knowledge, or to a lived-world only inadequately representable in concepts. Even the imperturbable David Hamlyn, whose dissolution of the paradox rested on the idea that people normally know what they are doing, invoked the mystery of love in his account.

Mele, on the other hand, analyses and conquers. He began work on self-deception some twenty years ago, and this book brings together a lucid, deflationary theory which claims that the phenomenon called self-deception 'is neither irresolvably paradoxical nor mysterious, and it is explicable without the assistance of mental exotica' (4). There are no cases (yet known) in which, 'on the model of stereotypical interpersonal deception' (3), an agent believes *p* and at the same time deliberately induces herself to believe *not-p*. One of his trump cards is empirical research from the 1990's that claims to

show that we normally want to minimize costly errors when testing hypotheses, and that we do not merely seek unbiased truth. The vividness of information and its easy availability are relevant, but the important datum is that people tend to search more carefully for confirming than for disconfirming evidence. 'For example, "subjects who tested the hypothesis that a person was angry interpreted that person's facial expression as conveying anger, whereas subjects who tested the hypothesis that the person was happy interpreted the same facial expression as conveying happiness" (Trope, Gervey, and Liberman 1997)' (29). This confirmation bias can obviously produce results that offend epistemologists (by looking irrational, biased, or self-deceptive), but in fact there is no implication of deliberate self-manipulation; these results are merely 'unmotivated manifestation[s] of a purely cognitive habit' (39).

Again and again Mele says that our questions will only be solved by empirical research and not 'by philosophical speculation' (100, e.g.). Nonetheless, he devotes Chapter 3 to an analysis of empirical studies that claim to show subjects who believe $p$ and $not$-$p$. Mele repeatedly performs adept conceptual analysis to show that in each case *intentional* deception (on the interpersonal model) cannot be meant. It seems clear enough to the reader that Mele's questions and his answers are philosophical ones, and that what counts as empirical evidence will not be left to the experimenters to determine.

Chapter 5 contains an interesting discussion of the case of Othello (though without naming him). Mele calls this 'twisted self-deception' because it is Othello's overwhelming desire that Desdemona be faithful to him (rather than a desire that $not$-$p$) that seems to cause his belief on Iago's flimsy evidence that $not$-$p$. This goes against the confirmation bias that was so helpful with 'straight' self-deception, but this case, too, Mele analyses into submission.

This is an enthusiastically detailed and accomplished work. It uses plenty of examples, both from the empirical literature and sketched from ordinary life. It may display little of the novelist's or the psychologist's sense of wonder at the intricacies of the human heart or mind, but Mele insists that 'the main source of broader, enduring interest in self-deception is a concern to understand and explain the behavior of real human beings' (4). This book should be studied by anyone who proposes to write more on self-deception.

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*Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles*, by Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking, is in equal parts (i) a negative critique of contemporary neoKantian and utilitarian treatments of the virtues of character and relational goods, such as friendship, and (ii) a positive account of their virtue-based approach to professional roles and their requirements. For many, this will be the chief source of complaint: readers interested in the development of a professional virtue ethics will feel too much time is spent critiquing alternatives, while those preferring the alternatives will doubtless feel too time is spent on a novel solution to problems of whose existence they are not persuaded. In what follows, I shall concentrate on O&C's positive account rather than the negative critique that accompanies it.

Chapter 1 begins by explicating and defending what O&C take to be six central claims any theory must make to be a virtue ethic: An act is right *iff* it is what an agent with a virtuous character would do in the circumstances; goodness is prior to rightness; virtues are irreducibly plural intrinsic goods; virtues are objectively good; some intrinsic goods are agent-relative; and acting rightly does not require that we maximize the good. The first, second, and fifth claims clearly distinguish a virtue ethic from any form of Kantian deontology. The fourth, fifth, and sixth distinguish a virtue ethic from maximizing consequentialisms such as utilitarianism (or any other subjectivist ethical theory — even Hume's). According to O&C, a theory is a virtue ethic *iff* it is either an Aristotelian ethic or a close relative. They themselves favour Aristotelian eudaimonism for which moral virtues are dispositions constitutive of human flourishing, but they acknowledge the existence of certain perfectionist alternatives (e.g., those holding that virtues contribute to perfection of either (i) special human capacities or (ii) capacities humans specially admire.)

One common objection to virtue ethical theories is that their accounts of the virtues and of human flourishing are too vague to tell us what a virtuous agent would do in particular cases, making it useless to imperfectly virtuous agents uncertain about how to act. A second objection is that virtue ethics may beguile well-meaning agents into thinking that any act is right so long as the disposition from which it is performed is virtuous. O&C argue that both objections can be overcome if we think of virtuous agents as operating in accordance with 'regulative ideals' both of human flourishing broadly conceived but also of the more specific goods and practices that constitute flourishing, e.g., the virtues, and relational goods such as friendship, parenthood, etc.

Regulative ideals are internalized standards of excellence that we try to realize in our dispositions, relations, and conduct, whose 'regulative' force

operates counterfactually: although we do not act for the sake of ideals (in the normal case we simply act from them) we are prepared to revise our characters, relations or conduct should any of these fall short of our ideals. Thus imperfectly virtuous agents can tell how to act by appeal to appropriate standards of excellence. Similarly, imperfectly virtuous agents can discover that acts they are motivated to perform by virtuous dispositions are nevertheless not what a virtuous agent would do when these fall short of the overall regulative ideal of flourishing (i.e., the act is benevolent to one but unjust to others.) *Phronesis* is essential of course, and *phronesis* takes the form of judicious appeal to the regulative ideals of flourishing and/or narrower, domain-specific ideals governing particular practices.

Chapter 2 is actually a red herring for readers interested in O&C's own virtue ethical approach to professional ethics. The chapter is based on an article, 'Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation', and is, as that title suggests, primarily a critique of consequentialist (and, in this version, neoKantian) accounts of such agent-relative goods such as friendship. It is a red herring for their own approach to professional ethics, for they reject the idea that professional-client relationships are a species of friendship, arguing that as they have specific 'entrance' and exit' criteria, they cannot properly be considered friendships.

Chapter 3 returns to the project of constructing a virtue-based account of professional roles. O&C propose that professions be distinguished from occupations not merely by sociological criteria, but also by the relation of the goals of these practices to the overall ideal of flourishing. They write: 'Good professional roles must be part of a good profession, and a good profession, on our virtue ethics approach, is one which involves a commitment to a key human good, a good which plays a crucial role in enabling us to live a humanly flourishing life' (74). This approach, they claim, not only distinguishes professions morally from occupations, but also from one another. It also helps to resolve two long-standing questions: (1) are professionals justified in privileging clients over third parties when their interests conflict? and (2) are there ethical grounds for refusing clients' requests?

First, as professions realize goods crucial to human flourishing (e.g., health, justice, etc.), these roles and their requirements often can and do outweigh the other values with which they may conflict. Whether and to what extent this is true in a given case may be settled by appeal to the ideal of human flourishing. Second, since good professionals are those acting from the ideal goal of their profession, they cannot in good *professional* (as opposed to *personal*) conscience act against it. So if the ideal of medicine is health (e.g., normal functioning), and a client requests treatment inimical to it (e.g., assisted suicide,) or enhancements beyond species norms (e.g., fertility for women over 60), a professional may ethically refuse such a request.

Chapter 4 offers a more detailed examination of O&C's virtue ethical account of professional-client relationships in medicine. Chapter 5 switches the focus to trial lawyers, allowing O&C to better develop certain complexities in professional roles and their ideals. While the GP's ideal of health may

occasionally force her to choose between serving her client's private health interests and the general (public) ideal of health, trial lawyers, who serve both as advocates in adversarial disputes and as officers of the court regulated by a more general ideal of procedural justice, regularly face such dilemmas. Focussing on lawyers' roles heightens our awareness of the potential for similar conflicts in others. Reporting requirements, medical and financial, promote *public* health and financial stability as opposed to the health or financial stability of the clients whose confidentiality (or welfare) is sacrificed. But while O&C raise the issue, they never address it theoretically. So although we get an interesting analysis of the specific form it takes among lawyers, we do not get a general account of how such public/private splits in our regulative ideals should be handled. (One might try resolving them by appeal to more encompassing ideal of human flourishing. But as it seems the same conflict could occur at any level, this strategy will not do. A further account is needed.)

Although O&C never resolve this issue, their concluding Chapter 6 complements the foregoing discussion of the nature of professional-client relationships among GPs and lawyers with an enlightening discussion of the nature and value of professional detachment in healthcare, law, and other fields. Curiously, one of these is prostitution. And this raises another question about which much more might have been said. Just what kinds of goods constituent of human flourishing are such as to constitute regulative ideals distinctive of professions? Pleasure is surely an intrinsic good — one prostitutes help clients achieve. Does this mean that prostitution could or should be a profession with a monopoly of the provision of this service? Are architects really professionals? Buildings are instrumentally valuable in various ways, but are they or their qualities constitutive of flourishing? And if so, how is this contribution to be distinguished from those of the mere trades men and women who construct the buildings that architects 'professionally' design?

These sorts of issues are neglected because O&C devote so much space to critiquing principle-based rivals, to the dismay of readers chiefly interested in a virtue-based approach. However, as there have been relatively few theoretical contributions of this caliber to the interdisciplinary literature on virtues and the professions, this book will be a welcome addition to the field.

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In *Descartes' Cogito, Saved from the Great Shipwreck*, Husain Sarkar convincingly argues that the Cartesian *cogito* as it appears in *Meditation Two* cannot be an argument but must be understood as an intuition emerging from the process of 'extraordinary' doubt. Sarkar mentions in the Preface that only the negative part of his thesis in intended to be decisive (x). However, as the book unfolds it becomes evident that his 'positive' effort — his interpretation of the *cogito* as an intuition — although not decisive, is no less important. Sarkar shows how his reading of the *cogito* can account for other aspects of Descartes' writings (memory, the will, the theory of deduction) and offers this as further proof for the correctness of his interpretation.

Sarkar maintains that the *cogito* is the first principle of Descartes' philosophy, the starting point from which all the rest of knowledge is derived. Descartes' goal in the *Meditations* is to find certainty or at least become certain that there is no certainty (AT VII, 24; CSM II, 16). Sarkar calls this *the epistemic problem* (80). Using the difficult and usually neglected *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, Sarkar argues that *the epistemic problem* is a perfect problem (as 'it is determinate in every respect and its terms are perfectly understood' [80]) and a perfectly understood problem (as there are clear criteria for recognizing its solution; the basis from which it will be deduced is known — doubt; the two aspects above are so intertwined that we cannot change one without modifying the other [81]). The *cogito* is the unique solution to this perfectly understood problem.

To show that Descartes had clear criteria for recognizing the cogito as the first principle, Sarkar uses his so called 'Sulmo principle'. The Sulmo principle states that a philosophical system can be assessed only after its author's death; that only a posthumous reconstruction of a system can give us an idea of what its author had in mind, even if she may never have expressed the thing in this manner or spelled out a lot of the theory's details (XI, 176). Bringing together passages from the *Discourse, The Principles,* and the *Search for Truth*, Sarkar concludes that Descartes' first principle must be: first in the way things come to be known; a clear and distinct notion; the most certain; the easiest to be acquainted with; simplest and a particular (61). Descartes discovered some of these six criteria before and some after the *cogito* even though all of them should have been known before the *cogito* (60); they are accepted provisionally, and being in the *cogito* state vindicates their acceptance (83). The *cogito* turns out to be the first 'existential truth' (91) and the basis for the clarity and distinctness rule, the first 'epistemological truth' and the 'insignia of truth' from then on (91).

If the *cogito* were an argument, it could not fulfill its function as first principle (183). Sarkar criticizes five ways of reading the *cogito* as an argument and Jaakko Hintikka's interpretation of the *cogito* as a performance. The cogito has been interpreted as: (1) a fully elaborated syllogism; (2) an enthymematic syllogism (with the general premise 'Whatever thinks, exists' missing); (3) an argument in quantification theory or first-order logic; (4) an argument using 'Whatever thinks, exists' not as a missing premise but as a rule of inference; and finally (5), an inference, not of a syllogistic kind but involving the relation of presupposition. According to Hintikka, however, the *cogito* 'refers to the "performance" (to the act of thinking) through which the sentence "I exist" may be said to verify itself' (170).

While Sarkar identifies several difficulties with each of the interpretations just sketched, he provides two overarching criticisms. First, had the *cogito* been intended as an argument, given the very strong presence of the evil genius in the Second Meditation, Descartes could not have claimed validity, much less soundness for it. As Sarkar points out, if the evil genius can make Descartes doubt the laws of mathematics, the same objections apply to any rules of inference we may hold at this time. Second, if the *cogito* were an argument, running it would have to rely on memory. Or, according to Descartes, memory has a bodily component; it is a certain part of the brain in which the animal spirits carve paths. Sarkar mentions Descartes' distinction between an intellectual and a sensible kind of memory (AT III, 48; CSMK 146), but goes on to contend that even intellectual memory would not be considered reliable at this time, given the sweeping nature of the process of doubt in which Descartes is engaged.

Although as a whole Sarkar's position is very plausible and has considerable philosophical merit, I have some reservations about several points. For instance, the two main criticisms can be shown to have no power against Hintikka's performative reading of the *cogito*; furthermore, some striking similarities appear when we compare Hintikka's view to Sarkar's own 'positive' interpretation of the cogito. Sarkar contends that Hintikka's position harbors a hidden argument (172), but one could reply that the argument in question is formulated only after arriving at the intuition of the *cogito*, when one reflects on and analyzes one's experience. First comes the intuition of the *cogito*; then one explains the newly gained knowledge by formulating the *cogito* as a syllogism (Sarkar, 192, 247) or by explicating self-verifiability in an argumentative form (Sarkar's Hintikka, 172).

Hintikka takes the relation between *cogito* and *sum* to be that between a process and its product. Sarkar, however, finds this analogy flawed. But it is not all easy to see how the following claim is interestingly different from what Hintikka maintains: 'This first truth, as we have seen, is elicited from performing a thought experiment: an experiment [Hintikka's context] in which the "I" [the utterer], through a thought comes to realize that in the very act of performing an experiment, devised to show that it, the "I" does not exist, it, the "I" is inevitably assured of its existence [self-verifiability]' (91)? Given the resemblances between the two positions and the vagueness

of Sarkar's constructive reading of the *cogito*, it seems that the two views must share a lot of the difficulties Sarkar himself identified.

*Descartes' Cogito: Saved from the Great Shipwreck* is a very interesting and thought-provoking book that combines a systematic presentation and critique of the main ways of reading the *cogito* as an argument with a new approach to the Cartesian writings (putting to work texts that are usually neglected, casting new light on some familiar ones). The result is, as the author intended, 'a fresh perspective' (xi).

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**Frederic Schick**
*Ambiguity and Logic.*
New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.
Pp. x + 154.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-82458-3);
US$19.00 (paper: ISBN 0-521-53171-3).

This collection of seven essays (most brand new) elaborates Schick's view that the logic of decision should take account of the way agents understand or see outcomes of their acts, that is, the way they 'disambiguate' those outcomes.

Essay 1 presents the elements of Schick's theory. It effectively argues that utilities should attach to propositions, not to the situations propositions describe (9). It deftly wards off the complaint that taking propositions as the objects of utility assignments makes utility principles vacuous (17-18). Making outcomes fine-grained weakens consistency constraints but not substantive utility principles. The essay's main point, however, is that an agent's beliefs and desires are insufficient for explaining her resolution of a decision problem. Schick contends that a full explanation includes the way she sees the outcome of her choice; besides beliefs and desires, it includes *seeings*. Essay 2 claims that the solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma depends on the partition of states an agent uses to frame her choice. Essay 3 studies selected phenomena in the psychology of choice, such as the status quo effect, and argues for a new account of them that involves seeings.

Essay 4 defends selective seeings, which focus exclusively on salient aspects of an act. The main example comes from Melville's novel, *Billy Budd*. Unjustly accused of mutiny, Billy strikes and accidentally kills a shipmate. The ship's officers consider Billy innocent of murder and desire not to hang

an innocent man. The captain convinces them that the law requires hanging Billy. According to Schick, the captain changes the way the officers see Billy's hanging without changing their beliefs or desires. According to a rival view, the officers form a new desire on balance to hang Billy because duty to the king requires hanging him. Their nagging reluctance to hang him stems from their desire not to hang an innocent man, which persists despite being outweighed. Schick fails to establish that rationality permits ignoring relevant considerations when deciding between options. Perhaps rhetoric can move an audience to put some considerations out of mind. But that is a matter of psychology, not logic and rationality. The essay rejects the principle of extensionality, a consequence of comprehensive seeings (20, 67-9, 108-9). That principle instructs an agent to assign the same utility to propositions she knows report the same outcome. Schick's case against the principle fails to distinguish between desire and desire-on-balance. It assumes that conflicts among desires end with one desire's gaining the upper hand. But such conflicts may yield a desire-on-balance that weighs together the conflicting desires. If an agent takes account of all her relevant beliefs and desires, as she should, her desires-on-balance ensure compliance with the principle of extensionality.

Essay 5 investigates the limits of self-knowledge. It claims that an agent cannot know, or even believe, ahead of time that she will choose a certain action. Then it presents implications of this claim. Schick's view is at variance with the common practice of assigning probabilities to one's own acts. His argument for his view depends on a stipulative definition of choice and so is not compelling.

Essay 6 presents novel principles for beliefs, desires, and seeings, in particular, the $D$, $B$, $S$-principle: 'If you believe $x$ and you want $y$, and if $z$ follows from $x \bullet y$ and neither $x$ nor any conjunctive component of $x$ follows from $z$ — and you make salient *In z'ing, I would y* — you must also want $z$' (109). This principle involves selective seeings and has both normative and descriptive interpretations. As a principle of rationality, it goes wrong by neglecting desires competing with the desire that $y$. As a principle of psychology, it goes wrong by overlooking cases of desire formation that irrationally ignore salient factors. Although some cases comply with the principle, it does not generalize.

Essay 7 applies Schick's account of seeings to issues concerning the meaning of life. Using Tolstoy's character Levin as an illustration, it claims that whether a person's life is meaningful for him depends on how he sees his acts — in Levin's case, as either moving toward death or as following the drift of all nature. Schick's account of seeings, however, offers at best an explanation of the way current utilities of acts depend on their currently salient features. The essay needs an argument that selective seeing is rational. Arguing that selective seeing need not involve self-deception only staves off one criticism (131). The rationality of ignoring inconvenient beliefs needs a more comprehensive defense.

Schick's critics make two points. First, taking outcomes as fine-grained does the work of seeings without changing the traditional structure of decision principles. Seeings affect the utilities of outcomes and hence the expected utilities of options. Maximizing expected utility yields a rational choice without revisions to accommodate seeings directly. Second, decision theory distinguishes normative and descriptive decision principles, that is, the logic and the psychology of decision making. Normative principles take account of all relevant ways of seeing outcomes. A rational ideal agent looks at outcomes comprehensively, not selectively. Her assessment of an option incorporates all her relevant beliefs. Schick's belief-desire-seeing theory must use comprehensive seeings, not selective seeings, to be right about rational choice.

Schick may respond to these criticisms by accepting standard decision theory and advancing a supplementary theory about the way seeings affect desire-on-balance. The supplementary theory may explain how right seeings (73) affect rational desire-on-balance. Appealing to bounded rationality may also strengthen the case for the role of seeings in rational choice. Different ways of understanding the same proposition may lead a boundedly rational agent to assign different utilities to the proposition. Principles of bounded rationality may use cognitive limits to justify selective seeings and their effect on desire-on-balance.

Schick is a highly regarded decision theorist. His essays address significant issues and are finely crafted and engaging. The collection will attract students and scholars alike and stimulate further research in decision theory.

**Paul Weirich**
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*Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism, and Feminism* by Shannon Sullivan is a project that connects some of John Dewey's descriptions of experience, and his emphases on pluralism and a pragmatic understanding of truth, to both feminist insights and other philosophies of embodiment. Sullivan relates Deweyan concepts to feminist theories on the differences among various lived experiences, and considers in this respect the importance of understanding the subject as embodied within varying discursive contexts. In conclusion, she applies the same notions to the question of race, briefly, thus indicating a new direction in which her project might continue.

The book begins with a descriptive analysis of Dewey's concepts of 'transactional bodies', 'habits', 'style', and 'sedimentation' of meaning, emphasizing the successful avoidance of dualism that these concepts facilitate. While the concepts are interrelated, the most comprehensive and inclusive is that of the 'transactional body'. Understanding bodies as transactional describes how our identities, as embodied, are both formed by our culture and also shape our experiences. Once she has outlined the benefits of this view, Sullivan applies it within the context of poststructuralist notions of 'discourse', which she takes great care in the second chapter to define. This is an extremely useful part of her discussion, since there has been much confusion over and misuse of the term. Sullivan emphasizes that a transactional body is a discursive one, but that not every bodily sense or action has to do, directly, with spoken or written language, and she argues this point well.

Following this discussion, her third chapter addresses the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Sullivan devotes the entire chapter to claiming that Merleau-Ponty depicts an anonymous, non-dialogical body, and then criticizing this characterization. This is, unfortunately, a misreading of Merleau-Ponty. On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty's discussions of ontological reversibility and his phenomenological descriptions of a communicating subject immersed in language do not presuppose a subject who silences the differences of others and interprets them in light of his or her own preconceptions, contra Sullivan's characterization. In fact, Merleau-Ponty is explicit about the possibility that one's own interpretations of another's body language or discourse are often corrected precisely through dialogue, a position which Sullivan denies him, and then criticizes him for lacking (see my 'Merleau-Ponty's Dialogical Subject and Poststructuralist Feminism', forthcoming in *International Studies in Philosophy*). Moreover, Merleau-Ponty's notions of a 'sedimented' 'habit

body' with a certain 'style' of being in the world are extremely similar to the notions by the same names which Sullivan prizes in Dewey's work, and which connote the same senses of reciprocity and 'transaction'. One really must consider the fact that, while Sullivan cites many works by John Dewey, Friedrich Nietzsche, Sandra Harding, and Judith Butler, Merleau-Ponty only receives citation for two of his works. Sullivan devotes a chapter to each of the listed thinkers. Given her careful scholarship in the project overall, it is odd that her treatment of Merleau-Ponty is relatively incautious. This is all the more curious, since Merleau-Ponty's work is largely compatible with what Sullivan is attempting to accomplish and with Deweyan concepts, which I noted above. I will leave my criticisms here, lest I appear entirely too zealous in my defense of Merleau-Ponty. My enthusiasm is the result of my perplexity that she is so critical of Merleau-Ponty when in fact his work is clearly at least as much of an ally to her project as that of John Dewey.

As I mentioned above, Sullivan's final three chapters address Judith Butler, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sandra Harding, illuminating what Sullivan sees as the valuable points of their works while considering the weaknesses of each. She systematically applies Dewey's notion of transactional bodies to each view, to show that this notion is characterized by the same strengths but avoids the weaknesses of each thinker's approach. 'Transactional bodies' emphasizes more of a reciprocity between the cultural and the bodily, which, according to Sullivan, Butler's work tends to downplay. Instead, Butler overemphasizes the power of the cultural, language, and discourse. The notion of transaction also captures Nietzsche's insights that embodiment and physiology have more to do with a subject's actions than do reason and free will. But it avoids some of Nietzsche's excesses in terms of his literal denigration of the feminine. Finally, Sullivan argues that an understanding of bodies as transactional tackles some of the epistemological problems which Sandra Harding's view seems to yield. Harding's view implies that there is an objective truth, while Dewey's pragmatist theory of truth tends to avoid the epistemological conundra associated with such a view.

Sullivan's easy writing style expresses thoughtfulness and elegance. A useful metaphor is carried throughout: that of the transactional bodied-subject within its cultural milieu as part of a 'stew', as opposed to its being part of a 'tossed salad' or 'soup'. The image of a 'tossed salad' would describe autonomous individuals in a collection, the parts of the 'soup' would have lost any discernible identity, while the ingredients of a stew, like members of a socio-cultural system with transactional bodies, affect and are effected by one another while remaining discernible. The metaphor fits nicely in the context of the discussion.

It is refreshing to read a sustained examination of John Dewey's work for his relevance to contemporary polemics having to do with identity theory and poststructuralist views of the way different individuals are formed. In addition, Sullivan's descriptions of embodiment as transactional places her firmly within the context of current feminist analysis, and as such, her work is

timely. It will find a most receptive audience among feminists, although the short discussion regarding race theory at the end will be intriguing for multiculturalists or race theorists, and the more concrete applications of Dewey's work carried throughout will be of interest to pragmatists. This work is recommended to anyone — independent reader, academic, or student — who is interested in any of these areas and their points of intersection.

**Melissa Clarke**
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The burden that an anthology devoted to the sustained critique of a single work must carry is a hefty one with respect to offering a diverse array of perspectives, insuring a fair hearing, and avoiding redundancy. The task, moreover, for Brown Travis' *Evolution, Gender, and Rape* (EGR) is made all the more difficult by the fact that the volume under interrogation is Thornhill and Palmer's *A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion* (NHR). NHR is a shoddily drafted, ideologically loaded, and poorly researched example of bad — if however popular — (pseudo-)science hailing from the beleaguered field of evolutionary psychology. Hence, the obvious worry about devoting an entire anthology to its evaluation is that the effort simply couldn't be worth it. In EGR's case this is mostly false; exposing NHR for the hackneyed science that it is *is* worth it. But it is also to some extent true; by about mid-volume, redundancy more than what is admittedly unavoidable begins to weary the reader who — even if she/he hadn't read NHR — is likely to be fully convinced that *A Natural History of Rape* belongs, if not in the compost, next to its equally shoddy cousins like *The Bell Curve*.

First to the anthology's strengths: Each of EGR's contributions attend to an aspect of Thornhill and Palmer's primary thesis, namely, that rape is not merely evolutionarily adaptive, but confers a reproductive advantage upon those who opt for it. At every imaginable level — methodologically, empirically, statistically, sociologically, psychologically — the effect of the essays as a whole is the systematic vitiation of this thesis. For instance, Drea and

Wallen's essay 'Female Sexuality and the Myth of Male Control' reveals the inadequacy of Thornhill and Palmer's 'male-centric view of reproduction by demonstrating the female's active role in controlling sexual behavior' (EGR 29). Across a range of species, they show how (a) a variety of physical, structural, and behavioral barriers prevent forced copulation thereby strengthening female prerogative, and (b) the extent to which stereotypes that represent women (and by extension females of other species) as submissive and obedient have influenced and occluded the objective assessment of Darwin's sexual selection. According to Darwin, while it is in the male's interest to copulate as frequently as possible, it is in the female's interest, given length of gestation and lactation, to be choosy about her sexual partners (EGR 30). A less biased examination of Darwin's proposal shows that while female sexual selection may proceed via avenues other than sheer force, nature has nevertheless favored reproductive strategies that preclude males perceived (consciously or unconsciously) to be unfit. Similarly, Gowaty's 'Power Asymmetries Between The Sexes' demonstrates the value of fitness to reproductive advantage in that '[v]ariation in offspring viability is a ubiquitous selection pressure that favors female resistance to manipulation of reproductive decisions' (EGR 82). Moreover, as a number of the essays stress, the success rate of rape qua impregnation is laughably low (around 2%), further diminishing its promise as a reproductive strategy.

In 'Does Self-Report Make Sense as an Investigative Method in Evolutionary Psychology' Shields and Steinke take a somewhat different approach aimed less at Thornhill and Palmer's assumptions than at their use of self-report an an investigative strategy. They show that while Thornhill and Palmer do employ other methods, they rely on self-report at crucial junctures in their reasoning (EGR 88) and hence risk depending on a type of data well-known for its flaws, particularly with respect to respondent bias. Not only, however, do Thornhill and Palmer rely on a suspect methodology, their interpretation of rape victim's accounts of their experiences reinforces NHR's operative sexist stereotypes, boosting their thesis, but at the price of a vicious circularity.

Thornhill and Palmer's penchant for systematic misinterpretation of evidence informs the critique of a number of EGR's essays including Tobach and Reed's 'Understanding Rape'. Coyne's 'Of Vice and Men', Koss' 'Evolutionary Models of Why Men Rape', Brown Travis' 'Theory and Data on Rape and Evolution', and Kimmel's 'An Unnatural History of Rape' among others. Where the opportunity for misinterpretation is not available, NHR resorts to evasion; that is, Thornhill and Palmer simply ignore counterfactual evidence. As Vickers and Kitcher show in 'Pop Sociology Reborn', (also discussed in Shields and Steinke), the core presupposition responsible for facilitating NHR's promotion of the 'rape as advantage' thesis is that biology can offer comprehensive and ultimate explanations for behavior as complex as that of human beings. But as virtually every author in EGR points out, to neglect the myriad possible cultural and social factors that affect and inform behavior is to risk the reductionistic determinism that served to discredit the

work of earlier sociobiologists like Richard Dawkins. Renamed no doubt to avoid bad press, Vickers and Kitcher refer to evolutionary psychology as 'pop sociobiology with a fig leaf' (EGR 141).

The weakest essay in EGR is Mackey's 'The Man (to) Child Affiliative Bond'. Although Mackey may be sincerely committed to showing that Thornhill and Palmer are wrong, he nonetheless shares a number of their sexist assumptions. His thinly veiled ideological concern is to preserve the patriarchal family that he rightly perceives to be threatened by acts of rape. But what he fails to acknowledge is, as feminist Sarah Hoagland shows, that threats of violence against women function to preserve the implicit predator/protector contract that characterizes institutions like marriage. According to Hoagland, and well-established in the relevant literature, male sexual predation reinforces the view that women are in need of the protection that marriage allegedly affords. Without predators — and given other prerogatives that women often surrender in marriage — protectors might seem to have less to offer. Moreover, because the institution promises exclusive sexual access by one man to 'his' woman, it insures the legitimacy of his progeny. Mackey is likely right when he insists that men are more interested in the welfare of their own children. This, however, does not detract from Thornhill and Palmer's thesis but in fact reasserts it.

Certainly the strengths of EGR far outweigh its detractions. Of these latter, my primary criticism is that by the time the reader arrives at the second main part, Critiquing Evolutionary Models of Rape, they are likely to be about as convinced as we could hope of the demerits of Thornhill and Palmer's evolutionary psychology; hence, to continue reading has the feel of beating the proverbial dead horse. This is not to say that these essays are not worth reading; indeed they are, particularly, Sanday's, Martin's, and Post's. But it is to say that the sporadic gunfire of journal publication might have accomplished more to remind us of the invaluable distinction between science done well and science done badly, not to mention the equally valuable distinction drawn by Thomas Kuhn between truth, however uncomfortable but well-evidenced, and that 'truth' whose credentials boast little more than popular citation.

**Wendy Lynne Lee**
Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania

Developed from his 1999 Carlyle Lectures in Oxford, Waldron's *God, Locke, and Equality* is primarily a first-rate piece of Locke scholarship, but also an excellent examination of the importance of basic human equality to contemporary egalitarian theories. Waldron believes Locke has provided us with 'as well-worked-out a theory of basic equality as we have in the canon of political philosophy' (1). His challenge, however, is to see if such an account from the seventeenth century, predicated on the Christian notion that all human beings were created as equals, can be defensible and worthwhile to a secular society in the twenty-first century.

Indeed, Waldron's troubles run even deeper than this. Before being able to argue for the viability of Locke's account as possessing contemporarily relevance, he is presented with a number of putative inconsistencies and problems within the Lockean corpus that has led many to question the potential success of his project. In fact, it is Waldron's reliance on Locke's entire corpus, and not merely his political writings, that helps to provide such a rich analysis of his views on equality. While Locke's argument for basic equality of moral status for all human beings (not simply specifications for equality of this or equality of that) was quite advanced and radical for its day, there are a number of roadblocks within his account that may lead us to wonder whether we should take Locke to be the liberal egalitarian he presents himself to be (e.g., his permissive attitudes towards the natural subjugation of wives, the bestial treatment of criminals, subordination to authority figures, the legitimacy of some forms of slavery, and his nominalist denial of the notion of a human species, among other important issues). Indeed, Waldron spends a bulk of the book dealing with each of these problems in turn and attempting to argue why these apparent inconsistencies and philosophical missteps can be overcome and resolved - with the exception of Locke's view on the natural subjugation of wives, which he thinks is simply irreconcilably inconsistent.

However, Waldron is far from a simple apologist for Locke. As he works carefully through each aspect of these problematic features of Locke's theory of equality, we find that a clearer picture of the grounds and justification of basic human equality begin to emerge. We begin to see that it is our nature as corporeal rational beings created by God that provide the grounds for viewing humans beings as possessing equal moral worth. It is this minimal intellectual capacity inherent in all human beings (the capacity is inherent and not actual so that we do not exclude infants and the severely mentally disabled) that allows us to have knowledge of the duties incurred by God's commandments to refrain from harming or exploiting His children. In work-

ing out the role the Christian foundations play in Locke's theory of equality (with the special status of humans being a matter of natural law), we can see a coherent unity in Locke's thought to support a reasonably consistent view concerning humanity and equality. Furthermore, we can understand why Locke's theologically-grounded position on human equality is fundamental to his whole political theory (especially his treatment of issues such as property, government, and toleration).

The most glaring problem with such an account is no doubt its explicit and unflinching foundationalist method (assuming we leave aside the question of whether Locke provides an adequate demonstration of God's existence or the truth of moralities based in natural law). While those who share Locke's Christian beliefs will find his account highly persuasive, it seems that such a foundationalist approach in modern pluralistic democratic societies will be hard to maintain, and may point to why many foundationalist approaches to equality have come into disfavour as being too unreasonable or exclusionary. Compared to contemporary approaches that have gained much favour in recent years, such as John Rawls' *Political Liberalism*, which argues for a freestanding justification that would bracket such religious considerations from providing the basis of human equality within the basic social and political structure of a well-ordered society, we might think it is possible to take a non-sectarian path to reach the road to equality. However, if Locke is correct, our egalitarian commitments may be so tied up within our religious and philosophical comprehensive doctrines that attempting to defend basic human equality with the confines of public reason may prove to be an unattainable task. 'Somewhere hard work has to be done on the question of whether basic equality can be made sense of, philosophically, in purely secular terms,' Waldron contends, and whilst our contemporary approaches to equality as a political ideal shies away from a religious foundation, 'they are still relevant to our philosophical enterprise of trying to achieve at a comprehensive grounding for and justification of our commitment to this ideal' (235).

Extremely well-written and detailed, Waldron's *God, Locke and Equality* provides a nuanced treatment that deftly handles the complexity of Locke's corpus and yet manages to provide a non-anachronistic and largely coherent version of Locke's treatment of basic equality. In many respects Waldron's treatment can be seen as a challenge to the ease with which we attempt to bracket religious conceptions and arguments from political theory and public discourse, which have been central to the historical and philosophical development of our commitment to equality. While I don't think Waldron has done enough to convenience contemporary egalitarians of the overriding value of understanding equality through a Lockean lens, I do believe he has succeeded in calling attention to the importance of how we ought to go about grounding the truth of basic human equality (a position, often taken for granted, whose presuppositions and consequences could well benefit from further scrutiny).

**Adrian M. Viens**
Oxford University

With *Veil Politics in Liberal Democratic States ('Veil Politics')* Ajume Wingo contributes a novel and vividly articulated argument to the debate on justification and legitimacy in liberal theory.

The guiding question in *Veil Politics* asks: 'How can developing nations achieve and sustain a liberal democracy?' Part of what makes Wingo's answer unique is that he draws from an experience born outside of the liberal tradition. Wingo is an African, ' ... a Cameroonian, of Royal Blood' (xiv). From this vantage point he observes that those who do not come from western culture suffer a distinct disadvantage. They lack the specific history that was so instrumental in securing the conditions which allowed the values of toleration and rational discourse to flourish in the West (33-4, 47-8). Given this disadvantage Wingo asks: 'how can we motivate individuals lacking the relevant history to consent to a liberal democratic constitution and uphold that consent over time?'

Wingo is disappointed with the answers currently supplied by liberal theory. The liberal view of political legitimacy is premised on the free consent of the members of the polity. However, that account fails to give a realistic motivational basis for such consent (33-4). Wingo's complaint is familiar. Liberal theory makes the unrealistic assumptions that: (1) humans are essentially motivated by what is rational; and, (2) it is rational to adopt liberal principles of justice (31, 41-3). However, there is a wide gulf between 'full-blooded' persons, who are also motivated by a host of non-rational sentiments, and the ideally rational citizens of liberal theory (41-3). And neither of the leading views of instrumental or absolute rationality can show that we will be motivated to be rational deliberators, or that it is always in our interest to be rational (42-3).

Wingo agrees that reason is important for justifying and upholding liberal principles (47). But liberals shouldn't assume that the conditions for reasoned consent are naturally in place. On the contrary, Wingo believes that people must *acquire* the disposition to value certain deliberative processes *as motivating*, and they must be led to that disposition through training and support and under minimal conditions of peace (i.e., modus vivendi) (53, 117-18). When these preconditions don't exist, Wingo argues for the use of *non-rational* methods to shape behavior and judgment in order to cultivate the conditions for a modus vivendi; and to prepare a context for valuing rational deliberation and persuasion as a civic virtue. When the right preconditions do exist, he argues that these methods will ensure continued political stability (54, 117-18).

The really original feature of Wingo's book is the positive thesis that a political practice called Veil Politics can accomplish this purpose (5). *Veil Politics* is the political use of veils to engage the emotions (e.g., national pride and love, sense of identity in a common past, sentiments of idealization) for the purpose of influencing individuals toward certain political ends (12). *Political Veils* are the drapery of symbolism, myth and motif. Political veils range widely over diverse objects — artifacts, civic memorials, political rhetoric, national documents, anthems, currency and uniforms — but their functions are the same: they attract attention to the object and tell a story about it in a way that flatters and draws on shared sentiments of the polity (11-14). But they also hide, distort and misrepresent the facts about the object. This is because they valorize or idealize some states of affairs and make other, more divisive states of affairs, invisible (9).

Wingo admits a tension between veil politics and theoretical liberalism. Liberal principles are justified through the process of rational deliberation in a context of political transparency: that is, free and complete access to the relevant facts (18). Yet it is in the very nature of veils to by-pass the rational process and distort the facts for political gain (4-5, 12, 15). Wingo tries to downplay this tension by stipulating liberal conditions on the use of political veils. Veils may hide, distort and misrepresent but they must not violate personal autonomy, they must be penetrable, and citizens' must consent to their use (62).

How do veil politics satisfy these conditions? Wingo begins by carving out a particular notion of autonomy. Following Mill, he associates autonomy with an individual 'exercising reason within the framework of values provided by one's own culture' (58-60). He then argues that political veils are non-coercive when they use existing cultural values to emotionally engage individuals favourably toward more controversial liberal values (59).

I think this argument mistakenly treats the idea of culture as *'framing* individual reasoning' on a par with the idea of culture as 'a political device for *circumventing* individual reasoning in the service of political (albeit liberal) ends' (58). This should raise the alarm for most liberals, because the latter idea appears to be a straight forward case of manipulation, where the former does not. And manipulative causes violate autonomy (Joseph Raz, *Morality of Freedom,* 375-7; Ronald Dworkin, *Sovereign Virtue,* 218).

One way that liberals have tried to block the manipulative use of culture is by requiring that personal conversions be genuinely endorsed by the individual. *Genuine* endorsement is distinguished from manipulated endorsement by asking: 'do the mechanisms used to secure the conversion lessen the individual's ability to consider the critical merits of the change in a reflective way? (Ronald Dworkin, *Sovereign Virtue,* 218) Can veil politics satisfy the condition of genuine endorsement? That depends. Genuine endorsement can be satisfied if we specify that veils must invite and permit deep rational analysis. (Wingo too requires that veils not be opaque [62].) But penetrability is not enough. Penetrable veils can be justified only if we also presuppose that individuals have the tools and skills to penetrate the veils.

The justification of veil politics depends on individuals having freedoms of enquiry and expression, access to information and independent media, equal resources and opportunities for training in critical reflection, and democratic rights to participate in the content of veils.

However, this basis for justification is not open to Wingo. Wingo wants veil politics to motivate citizens *prior to* an established liberal democracy (54). So, the very political infrastructure that justifies veil political practices within a liberal regime is lacking in the context Wingo wants to apply them. Wingo recognizes this problem (53), and proposes the next best thing: the conditions for transparency, autonomy and consent need not *actually* be met. Rather, veil political practices need only be *hypothetically* justified (66-71).

Unfortunately, veil politics is now is in the unenviable position of having to help itself to the very conditions required for its own justification. It is only in the imagination that we test the legitimacy of a veil, and whether it would be consented to by citizens possessing the necessary tools, capacities and information. Citizens and conditions and tools that don't, in reality, exist. Hypothetical justification begs all the necessary questions for consent, individual autonomy and transparency. Hypothetical justification is not new to liberal theory, but it is ordinarily proposed as an idealization of an existing political infrastructure; one which actually permits a process of debate and reflective equilibrium in respect of the proposed principles. Wingo's theory has no such advantage. As it stands veil politics doesn't deliver the right rational context for justification. And so veil political practices, as Wingo wants to apply them, are not justified. They merely *promise* justification. Whether the promise is realized is purely a matter of trust. And isn't that just the obstacle as regards achieving a modus vivendi?

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