

# Philosophy in Review/Comptes rendus philosophiques

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**Harold W. Baillie and  
Timothy K. Casey, eds.**

*Is Human Nature Obsolete?:*

*Genetics, Bioengineering, and the Future  
of the Human Condition.*

Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 2004.

Pp. x + 422.

US\$67.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-02569-8);

US\$27.00 (paper: ISBN 0-262-52428-7).

Virtually every week, in the newspapers, there is an announcement of something new on the bioengineering front. 'Licence to clone human embryos given to Dolly the Sheep scientist', one recent headline proclaimed, the news itself an instance of Pelion piled upon Ossa, for the scientist referred to is of course Ian Wilmut, leader of the team that cloned Dolly the sheep. Another recent item (this one from Edmonton, Alberta) quoted British geneticist Aubrey de Grey's claim that 'with the help of biotechnology and various therapies', 'at least 10 years of mouse trials and another 15 on humans', our species would be achieving lifespans of up to 1,000 years. *Many* additional items of comparable science journalism would be easy to cite. Clearly, a lot is going on in this sector of contemporary life. And what does philosophy have to say about all this? Philosophy rarely (if ever) speaks with one voice. But one set of recent perorations will be found in the book under review.

This is the thirteenth volume in a Basic Bioethics series which MIT Press has been producing. It comes out of a conference held at the University of Scranton in Spring 2001, three of the essays from that occasion having been already published subsequently to the conference, but prior to their appearance here. There are thirteen essays in the collection, together with an introduction by the co-editors. All of the thirteen writers are professors at tertiary institutions in the U.S., and in theology, political science, anthropology, and other disciplines or fields, as well as philosophy.

The theme of the Scranton conference, and the book it prompted, was the cluster indicated in the volume's title and subtitle. Nonetheless, there is considerable range in the issues addressed, in some cases well beyond even those the broad group title and subtitle identify. The papers vary quite considerably also in intellectual or philosophical merit, and in enduring interest. They are grouped into four clusters — Historical Perspectives, Embodiment and Self-Identity, Freedom and Telos, Social and Political Critiques — the titles of which give only a vague indication of the essays' actual contents.

Most of these thirteen papers express, directly or indirectly, concern about, and opposition to, projects, actually underway or contemplated, of genetic or bioengineered modification of human beings. In that respect, at least, this is a conservative book, not welcoming at all what might be able to be done for or to people allegedly as improvements, applying the theoretical



knowledge of the genetic structure of humans and other animals and the technological knowledge of how to change it.

Although this moral stance, and an accompanying note of alarm with respect to what is happening, or at risk of happening, in the public arena, unites most of the book's essays, in fact several are really primarily about something else, namely, their author's special research interest, and a claim (whose sincerity is in more than one case open to doubt) that that interest points the way to how best to cope with the bio-technological crisis that we allegedly confront. Thus, the essay by Harold W. Baillie (one of the book's co-editors) is really about Baillie's interpretation of Aristotle (who, for Baillie, turns out [224] to bear what one might have thought to be a surprising resemblance to Heidegger). Thomas A. Shannon's special focus is on Duns Scotus, and his paper sets out to tell us how that philosopher particularly accurately discloses human nature and provides a conceptual framework from which the wrongness of messing with human genes can most convincingly be seen. It is actually not persuasive that turning to the pages of Aristotle or Duns Scotus would do much to deter scientists or others with transhumanist visions or aspirations; or to convince or motivate outsiders to the debate to take it up in a concerned way, or with the empirical or ethical perspectives that Baillie and Shannon would wish them to have.

Another paper to which the same strictures about its author's pet research project apply was nonetheless for me one of the most fascinating and informative essays in the volume. This was Robert N. Proctor's 'Human Recency and Race: Molecular Anthropology, the Refigured Acheulean, and the UNESCO Response to Auschwitz'. Proctor provides a conceptually rich, politically nuanced account of the debates over hominid origins and evolution, together with details of the findings that have fueled (and to a significant degree settled) those debates. While valuable in itself, it is not easy to see how these matters bear on whether there is such a thing as human nature, or whether a human future is importantly at risk from what scientists have been learning about the human genome, and about interventions of different kinds that would apparently offer prospects of freedom from physiological conditions viewed by some as undesirable and prospects of enhancements of human possibilities that some view as desirable.

Some of the other papers anthologized, while certainly concerned with the social and ethical challenges posed by biotechnology and its applications to human genetics, are not strong pieces of advocacy for the stance of alarm and opposition they mean to ignite. Jean Bethke Elshtain's essay is disappointing, a lapse or fall, far below her best work. She gives here a moralizing piece, mostly bereft of serious argument; its journalistic, editorializing spirit preaches to the converted, who will already have heard the sermon.

Bernard E. Rollin's 'Telos, Value, and Genetic Engineering' begins by relating a legend that Alexander the Great sent Aristotle an elephant from North Africa, and notes that we can be sure that Aristotle wouldn't have sent the elephant on to Plato. We can indeed be sure of that, but, not, as Rollin supposes, because of doctrinal differences between the philosophers; rather,

because Plato had died before Alexander reached his eighth birthday. Further, the elephant, according to the usual story, came from India, not North Africa. This doesn't make for an auspicious beginning for Rollin's essay. These early indications aren't improved when we learn (318) that for Aristotle efficient causes and mechanistic causes are the same, which they need not be. Rollin also thinks (321) that the plural of *telos* is *teloi*. Rollin is not a serious Aristotle scholar. Rollin also sees (326), dubiously, anticipations of Darwinian natural selection in Empedocles; and thinks (*loc cit*; also dubiously) that there is nothing at all problematic, ethically, in the preventable disappearance of species.

More substantial, though nonetheless flawed, is Mark Sagoff's 'Nature and Human Nature', which draws upon a contrast to be found in Mill (in his essay 'On Nature') between 'the natural' as whatever in fact happens (or that can happen, consistent with the laws of nature), and 'the natural' as what has not involved human agency. In fact, though, pace Mill, and Sagoff, the sort of thing more usually meant as *natural* in the second sense is consonance with primary or general species behaviour, especially as it has manifested itself over many generations. It is in virtue of *that*, after all, that Roman Catholicism and other ideological stances condemn such things as birth control — but not such things as shaving, or wearing clothes — as '*unnatural*'. Other essays take more seriously than they warrant science fiction products of literature and film.

The foregoing comments notwithstanding, several of the essays in this volume are both concerned with the collection's subject and well worth reading. Four of this group particularly stood out for me. All four are well-written, carefully crafted, and informative pieces of work. Diane B. Paul's 'Genetic Engineering and Eugenics: The Uses of History' provides a useful historical survey of shifting positions on and analyses of human genetic engineering; Paul's account is both reflective and non-judgmental (unusual among these authors). Lisa Sowle Cahill's 'Nature, Sin, and Society' is written from an avowedly Catholic theological perspective, but an attractively ecumenical one that incorporates insights of the (Protestant) theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Cahill appears to miss (356), though, the fact that Niebuhr's 1939 strictures against a 'tribalism' and 'group pride' that make unconditional demands upon the members of tribes and groups were directed against then-worrisome fascism.

Le Roy Walters' empirical paper, a review of patterns of human gene transfer research, chiefly in the U.S., 1988-2003, contrasts markedly with the rest of the volume. Walters shows that the pattern of research control and review until 1995 was exemplary, and that after that monitoring agencies and their effectiveness diminished dramatically, driven, it seems, by corporate pressure for accelerated gene transfer trials and outcomes. The result was the deaths of two Americans in studies that weren't adequately monitored. Things have taken a turn toward better scientific and public scrutiny management of this research as a result. The family of at least one of the deceased individuals had brought a substantial lawsuit against the

university which had sponsored fatality-producing research (the case was settled out of court). The most striking feature of the whole pattern, which Walters seems not to highlight, is not that gene transfer research is economically driven, with quests for profits that will subvert risks to humans or careful science where they are allowed to. It is rather that actual deaths, with attendant media and legal action, are apparently the only things that are making a real difference: the companies have just to be that extra bit careful, ensure that nobody else dies, and the entrepreneurial gene transfer goals can (and evidently will) proceed untrammelled.

Finally, Langdon Winner's 'Resistance is Futile' brings out the interesting and arresting idea that a breakdown in conceptual, and as a result in *ethical*, boundaries between human and non-human, human and bio-genetically or mechanically engineered prospective quasi-human, may be traced in part to social-construction-of-reality and anti-essentialist views, and not just, or even primarily, to scientific ones. To the degree that this is persuasive, it is a striking case of some (unintended) chickens coming home to roost. If one thinks that *human*, *person*, and similar notions are just constructions that particular civilizations have been prone to devising, one will be hard pressed to see why it should be any sort of deep conceptual or ethical problem to seek to move to new conceptual alignments that might encompass both *human being as currently understood* and various sorts of possible cases of a *cyborg*, under a single normative rubric.

In summary, this collection is a mixed bag. Some of it, to be sure, is definitely worth reading. The overall impression, however, is not of a strong tide of argument to assist the honest not-yet-committed outsider, the honourable citizen seeking to come to an informed principled position on the issues at hand, or even their genuine degree of primary seriousness in our troubled and embattled world.

**Peter Loptson**

University of Guelph



**Jennifer Ann Bates**

*Hegel's Theory of Imagination.*

Albany: State University of New York  
Press 2004.

Pp. xlv + 202.

US\$50.00. ISBN 0-7914-6207-2.

This work is a detailed analysis of the role of the imagination in the works of Hegel. One of its major contributions is that it brings to the forefront a relatively neglected issue in Hegel scholarship, as well as casting light on Hegel's relation to the movements of German Idealism and Romanticism, for whom the imagination was more obviously central. Nevertheless, the scope of this work is far more broad and ambitious than such a scholarly exercise would seem to promise. Bates attempts to show that the imagination, far from being the merely peripheral issue that it appears in light of Hegel's relatively few and brief explicit comments on this topic, is the very ground of Hegel's dialectical method. In this way, Bates' interpretation recasts Hegel's entire system. For Bates, Hegel is not merely a historical figure, but rather a live philosophical possibility whose systematic approach to philosophy, when appropriately understood through his theory of the imagination, helps 'us overcome the deficiencies of modern subjectivism and skepticism' (xiv) without succumbing to dogmatism.

In order to situate the development of Hegel's concept of the imagination, Bates' introduction gives a brief overview of the theories of the imagination of Kant, Fichte and the early Schelling. The main body of the text is, 'in the Spirit of Hegel' (ix), divided into three sections, namely, 'Imagination in Theory', 'Imagination in Practice' and 'Synthesis and Disclosure'.

The first of the three sections begins with an examination of Hegel's reaction to his contemporaries' theories of the imagination in the *Differenzschrift* and *Faith and Knowledge*. Following this, Bates offers a careful and detailed explication of fragment 17 of Hegel's 1803-04 *First Philosophy of Spirit* as a foregrounding in Hegel's development of his dialectical method. Bates then gives a reading of the development of Hegel's theory of imagination through its various incarnations in the 1803-04, 1805-06 and 1830 presentations of his *Philosophy of Spirit*. The central aim of this section, aside from explicating the development and moments of Hegel's theory of the imagination, is to show how the increasing clarity of these presentations is linked to Hegel's development and realization of the dialectical method of presentation. Indeed, according to Bates, the clarity and precision of the final presentation of 1830 is due to Hegel's realization of the relation of and the distinct presentations proper to a *Phenomenology of Spirit* and philosophical psychology.

As Bates recognizes, one of the main objections to her interpretation is the relative paucity of material on the imagination in Hegel's works, particularly in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where, as she repeatedly states, the imagination is only mentioned once (in the preface to that work), and then only

negatively. Section Two partially addresses this objection by showing how Hegel's comment in the preface can be read as directed not against imagination per se, but only against German Romanticism's interpretation of it.

In the third and final section, Bates argues that the reason imagination is never otherwise mentioned in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is the following. She claims that imagination is so central to this work, and indeed to all dialectical movements, that, although it underlies all the various one-sided shapes of consciousness, it could never properly become a theme until this one-sidedness were overcome. Thus, according to Bates, we reach 'the completion of imagination in the *Phenomenology*' (150) having 'thought the imagination through to its end' (xi) and comprehended what it is. This comprehension of imagination is, for Bates, the basis of Hegel's systematic philosophy. Accordingly, Bates argues that the relative obscurity and confusion of Hegel's early versions of the *Philosophy of Spirit* were due to his failure to separate the presentation of the development up to the dialectical standpoint and the realization of the imagination from the presentation of that standpoint and the imagination itself, i.e., to separate phenomenology from philosophical psychology.

Bates' reading of Hegel will be of interest not only to Hegel specialists, but to anyone interested in the theory of imagination and continental epistemology. Those interested in Derrida will find this work especially interesting, in the light of the connection Bates draws between the imagination, the origin of language and the 'pit' or, as Bates prefers to translate it, 'mine' of consciousness. This work can be particularly recommended due to its jargon-free and clear exposition.

Nevertheless, Bates' reading of Hegel is idiosyncratic and problematic. At the root of this is the left-Hegelian bias of Bates' work that leads her to focus exclusively on the anthropological and open-ended aspects of Hegel's thought. This is particularly evident when Bates defines a system as non-dogmatic insofar as it is not only susceptible to further development, but also 'subject to decay and disappearance' (xvi). While Hegel's system may be considered open in the former sense, to attribute the latter sense to his system is to ignore strong textual evidence to the contrary, such as the conclusion of his 1821 *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. While there is a definite and perhaps undecidable tension between the left/right, subjective/objective and dynamic/static tendencies in Hegel's works, Bates simply passes over this difficulty. By deciding for one side without due consideration, she consequently distorts Hegel's position, placing the subjective faculty of the imagination at the center of his system rather than the Idea as Hegel himself does at the conclusion of his *Philosophy of Spirit*.

It seems that the Genetico-Historical procedure of Section One leads Bates to overestimate the role of the imagination in Hegel's mature works. Although Bates briefly considers this objection (see xvi-xvii), her reply is inadequate insofar as her reading simply does not fit with Hegel's own explicit self-understanding. Perhaps, however, Bates' work should be understood as an imaginative appropriation of the Hegelian system. In this case,

the apparent difficulties are, like those she finds in Hegel's early works, merely due to a methodological failure to keep clear the difference between historical development and the dialectical form promised by the tripartite division of this work. Even if Hegel does, against Bates' wishes, give priority to Truth, presence and identity, so that by his own self-understanding he gives priority to the Idea over imagination, might it not still be possible that Hegel presupposes un-truth, non-self-presence, difference and imagination as the *Abgrund* of his system? Perhaps Bates' focus upon language and the mining of the abyss of the imagination, which she connects with difference and repetition, points beyond (dare we say to a sublation of?) both Hegel and our own contemporary philosophical age.

**Charles P. Rodger**  
University of Alberta

**Mark H. Bernstein**

*Without a Tear:*

*Our Tragic Relationship with Animals.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2004.

Pp. viii + 207.

US\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-252-02911-9);

US\$25.00 (paper: ISBN 0-252-07198-0).

**Tom Regan**

*Empty Cages:*

*Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights.*

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004.

Pp. vi + 229.

US\$21.95. ISBN 0-7425-3352-2.

*Empty Cages* is a strange book. Written in earnest, it is clearly meant to attract a wide audience. Jane Goodall tells us on the jacket that everyone should have a copy on his or her bookshelf. J.M. Coetzee tells us that the book's argument for animal rights is trenchant, Martha Nussbaum that it has indelible force. In his preface, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson says that Regan's way of thinking about animals is the single best hope for our planet.

On the cover is a painting by Sue Coe, whose art, Regan says, will one day hang in the great museums. Maybe, but judgments about the vicissitudes of art appreciation are probably better left to the speculations of art curators, collectors and dealers than to the speculation of philosophers. Philosophically, the painting on the cover is as strange as the book it adorns. In an



ark-like and noble procession, animals leave behind them the darkness of their empty cages and march towards a new dawn that lights up a distant corner of the painting. Where they are marching to, and what they will do when they get there, are questions ignored by both painting and book.

To be fair to both Regan and the artist, it may be hard to say much about the promised land until one actually gets there. On the other hand, Regan's lack of attention to questions about life in greener pastures is indicative of two related flaws in the book's overall approach to what is a laudable and important end. The book is aimed at an effective social movement to end gratuitous animal suffering, its main path to this goal being an argument trenchant and accessible enough to break down current resistance to taking animal rights seriously.

The book's first flaw is not to take seriously powerful resistance to movements for social justice more generally. In a world that pervasively ignores the fundamental dignity of large sectors of its human population, worries about the dignity of animals are too liable to sound like first-world moral luxuries. Masson may not have bought the Volvo with the leather seats, but really, who cares? The book's second flaw is to take animal rights more seriously than it needs to for its immediate goal, and indeed, more seriously than its argument will bear.

Consider animal husbandry, a central example in both books under review. Regan is not only against our current cruel and utterly inhumane treatment of factory-farmed and -slaughtered animals, but against farming and eating animals under any conditions. The argument for this position is meant to convince 'muddlers' — Regan's name for those who are interested in animal rights but who need to be more fully convinced of the justice of the cause — to join in a social movement to abolish all use of animals for human purposes. In terms of the book's goal of responding immediately and forcefully to current levels of animal suffering, Regan might better have stuck to a trenchant cataloguing of the extremely inhumane conditions faced by factory-farmed animals, although even here the book falls short. His chapter on turning animals into food, like his chapters on turning them into clothes, performers, competitors and tools, is hardly thorough enough, or well documented enough, to sway the unconvinced. All told, the arguments of these practically oriented chapters, about two thirds of the book, lean too heavily on the main line of philosophical argument from the first third of the book: because animals have lives that matter to them, we should leave them alone, to lead these lives as they otherwise would.

This takes us back to the painting on the cover. Freed from their cages, what would cattle, hogs, and chickens do with themselves? They are not naturally evolved animals, with natural ecological niches to fill. The niches there are for them are fast changing, and not in ways that would support large mammals like cattle and hogs. Why is it wrong to create and maintain such animals? A central premise of Regan's argument is that, however they are maintained, the animals themselves would rather be doing otherwise — scrounging for food, running from predators, and building social relation-

ships with one another. But even if current ecological conditions were suited to such preferences, the deeper question is whether the animals themselves are suited to such preferences. Moreover, if we were not using these animals for agricultural purposes, few of them would exist, in the bright light of the new dawn or anywhere else.

And as long as we are considering preferences to be doing otherwise, we should also consider whether the same thing isn't true for large sectors of the world's human population. Factory farms and slaughter houses are part of an increasingly global corporate economy that leaves many people in economic slots they would rather not be in, from stressful first-world jobs to much more desperate third-world conditions. In his practical chapters Regan ignores this broader problem, as if corporate lack of regard for animal welfare was unrelated to its general lack of regard for anything that impinges negatively on increasing profits. Until North Americans are willing to regulate business to protect social values more generally, fretting about the ways in which agribusiness mistreats agricultural animals is not going to do much good, particularly if what one is after is the complete elimination of animal husbandry because the animals involved would rather be doing something else. Regan is right that North American regulations of agribusiness are weak and their enforcement weaker still, but treating this as an isolated case of governmental inaction is not going to advance the case for animal rights into the broad social movement the book is meant to further. The ideal of less government is general, pervasive, and powerful; it cannot be left in the background of any social movement that aims for greater social justice.

The philosophical part of *Empty Cages* is not of much help here. Regan gestures toward the argument he has developed elsewhere that, because animals' lives matter to them, their lives should also matter to us. If, though, one is a 'muddler', and this is the only book on one's shelf, its stripped-down version of the argument is not likely to be a useful tool for convincing oneself (or others) of the book's fundamental claim that animal lives are as morally valuable as human lives. Were this argument decisively made, it might go some distance toward making the regulation of agribusiness particularly urgent. But the best the argument gets is that because the lives of many animals matter to them as much as the lives of severely mentally disabled humans, we ought to respect animals as much as we respect these humans. One could again raise questions about the depth of our respect for other humans, but the deeper worry for this quick line of argument is that it has a quick line of response: we have special obligations to severely mentally disabled humans not because their lives are meaningful to them, but because of the meaningfulness of the relationships that join us to them as mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, sons, or daughters. At the far end of this argument is the worry that anencephalic infants, by themselves, may have no inherent moral worth.

Although its central line of argument faces this same problem, *Without a Tear* succeeds in an important way *Empty Cages* does not. Like Regan's book, much of Bernstein's book is taken up with practically-oriented chapters on



factory farming, hunting, the use of animals in biomedical research, and the legal treatment of animals in the U.S. For the most part these chapters are thorough and well documented, the sort of chapters one could profitably have undergraduates read and do further research on. Like *Empty Cages, Without a Tear* is written for a broader audience, but in this case the most natural audience would be undergraduates. The writing is accessible, but pedagogically oriented, and the material in the more theoretical chapters would definitely benefit from classroom discussion. One supposes this is material that Bernstein is using in his own classes in Texas, and with some exceptions, it would work equally well in other North American classrooms.

The first chapter focuses on an intuitive principle that looks much like the principle in Peter Singer's famous article on famine relief, and it is wielded in a similar manner: start with an indelibly forceful intuitive moral principle and show that it has an important and far-reaching result. In this case the bad thing we can stop from happening is gratuitous animal suffering, and, because this is an extremely bad thing (see material in the practical chapters) and it can easily be avoided (see in particular the chapter on the biomedical uses of animals), we ought to avoid it. Bernstein contrasts his version of the intuitive principle to Singer's, but the differences are largely academic. The main point of Bernstein's argument is that, because there is no inherent moral difference between animals and humans, we ought to treat animals with the same respect with which we would treat mentally compromised humans, a point that goes back to Singer's own early and important argument on animal liberation.

The book's second chapter, together with its legal chapter, will probably be less useful outside the U.S. The second chapter, a good chunk of the book, is on Christian and Jewish theological approaches to animals and their relationship to God's chosen species, us. In a multicultural classroom interest in this chapter may be limited, although it would appear to be a useful resource for students with strong Christian-Judeo beliefs. The legal chapter is helpful — it covers much of the same ground as Gary Francione's *Animals, Property, and the Law* — but the law at issue is U.S. law.

The book's final chapter is on feminist approaches to animal rights; it looks tacked on, and it is not well developed. At its core is a comparison between Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' care-based approaches to ethics, but, in addition to this limited picture of feminist ethics, the chapter as a whole ignores any distinctions between feminist ethics and feminist political philosophy. The upshot of the discussion is that as potential recipients of care, animals have inherent moral worth. The chapter concludes with brief discussions of Diana Meyers' empathy-based ethics and Annette Baier's trust-based ethics.

The issue of trust may be more important to the issue of animal rights than Bernstein realizes. When we interact with animals, we do trust, or at least expect, them to respond to us in particular ways, and so too in reverse, at least for a good many of the animals we interact with. This raises an interesting question, given that the animals no doubt construe such relation-



ships differently than we do. Should the bonds of trust that join us to animals be measured by our construal of the relationship, or theirs? In the legal chapter, Bernstein discusses the case of a woman who took her sick dog to a veterinarian clinic to be euthanised. Without the woman's knowledge, two vets saved the dog's life and placed it in another home. Is this really what our pets might expect of us, given the sorts of relationships they are capable of forming and comprehending? You might save your dog from the attack of another, but do dogs really trust us to save them from things like cancer?

Animals comprehend their social relationships, and their lives, differently than we do. In his first chapter, Bernstein says that trees don't have lives that matter to them, but that, because what happens to animals matters to them, their lives must matter to them. This inference goes undefended, other than the argument from mentally compromised humans. But more argument is surely needed. Take an animal as mentally sophisticated as a chimpanzee. It certainly matters to chimps if you take something they're painting away from them before they are finished with it. And it certainly excites them if one of their number is murdered in the night. The murder matters to them, as does the loss of the murdered individual. What doesn't seem to matter to them is the thought that one day they might quietly lose their own lives, before they are finished with them.

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**Philip Cafaro**

*Thoreau's Living Ethics:*

*Walden and the Pursuit of Virtue.*

Athens: University of Georgia Press 2004.

Pp. xii + 272.

US\$39.95. ISBN 0-8203-2610-0.

Philip Cafaro undertakes two main tasks in *Thoreau's Living Ethics: Walden and the Pursuit of Virtue*. On the one hand, he presents 'the first full, rigorous account of Henry David Thoreau's ethical philosophy' (ix), showing that Thoreau actually 'went considerably further' (45) than most modern-day philosophers in his account of virtue, offering a comprehensive 'experimental' virtue ethic 'grounded in modern life and experience' (ix). On the other hand, Cafaro defends Thoreau's experimental virtue ethic as a welcome revision of both ancient and modern virtue ethics — one, moreover, that underwrites a plausible environmental ethic. Cafaro draws primarily upon Thoreau's *Wal-*

den, but he ranges over the full gamut of Thoreau's writings. Thus, a great strength of the book is its novel contribution to Thoreau studies and the compelling case Cafaro makes for Thoreau's work being valuable to ethicists today. The chief weaknesses of the book stem from its ambitiousness. In piecing Thoreau's ethic together in such detail, Cafaro raises puzzles surrounding Thoreau's position, especially meta-ethical ones, which he can only treat briefly.

In the first chapter, Cafaro argues that Thoreau's writings responded to and further developed a 'challenge' that Emerson and others had put to Americans — the challenge of utilizing individual freedoms and striving to live 'greater lives'. This chapter is an effective setting of historical context, and gives readers, and even ethicists unfamiliar with virtue ethics, an angle from which to begin critically engaging the topic. In the next two chapters, Cafaro more explicitly exposes the elements of virtue ethics that he finds within 'the challenge' and sketches how Thoreau revised them. Cafaro's Thoreau begins with the assumption that we must say 'yes' to life' (18), not despair in it, and that, once we do, it is imperative that we utilize our practical wisdom to live as well as possible. Living well, as for Aristotle, is to flourish. Similar to Aristotle, Thoreau attempted to ground his notion of flourishing objectively in human nature. However, Cafaro claims Thoreau's objectivism was far more restrained than Aristotle's: Thoreau thought human capacities to be in flux and more diverse across individuals. Thus, '[i]n the end, Thoreau insists that your particular path is up to you' (25). In this way, flourishing, our chief-ends and the good-life were more 'open-ended' for Thoreau, and he treated 'self-culture' (e.g., self-development and cultivation, etc) as more crucial to flourishing than did the ancients or 'modern-day virtue theorists'. This, in turn, broadens the list of character traits considered to be virtues.

One problem that emerges in these chapters is how to justify a Thoreauvian ethic containing both objective and subjective elements. Somewhat awkwardly, Cafaro postpones this issue until the final chapter, hinting that any *prima facie* tension may be beyond mere argument, i.e., one whose resolution we must, as Thoreau attempted, *demonstrate* through deliberate living. These opening chapters will be especially helpful in advanced courses where instructors wish to cover quickly alternative directions for and histories of virtue ethics. However, to secure the claim that Thoreau 'went considerably farther' than many modern day virtue ethicists, here Cafaro needs to expose more explicitly the views against which he contrasts Thoreau in passing.

Each of the four following chapters looks more closely at a specific element of Thoreau's virtue ethics and considers how we might apply it in our lives today. First, in 'Economy' Cafaro argues that Thoreau's analysis of economy is a two-fold consideration of how to live a virtuous life. On the one hand, materialistic concerns should be concerns only insofar as they serve the richness of our experiences and self-development. On the other hand, economic sensibilities represent skills of practical wisdom (e.g., living consciously and methodically) crucial to achieving balance in life. Cafaro also

suggests that a Thoreauvian focus on the experience of work rather than profit will help us placate the urge to dominate nature, appreciating our dependence upon and connection to 'nature's economy' instead. If this is meant merely to introduce Thoreau's environmentalism, it is effective; if it is an initial foundation for that environmentalism in any way, it needs elaboration. In any case, Cafaro's scholarship here is highly original, compelling us to re-read Thoreau's economic views under the assumption they are essential to a broader ethical system.

Second, in 'Solitude and Society' Cafaro argues that Thoreau's personalized virtue ethic entails solitude is an important desideratum for those striving to live well. He combs Thoreau's journals to warm the cold views of neighboring and friendship that Thoreau is often charged with holding. This also helpfully distinguishes Thoreau's approach to sociality from the ancients', and makes more plausible the views of Thoreau's that run counter to contemporary ones (e.g., his inegalitarianism, disdain for financial philanthropy, etc.).

Third, in 'Nature' Cafaro pledges to retrieve the details of Thoreau's environmentalism. On the one hand, he extols Thoreau's non-anthropocentrism, showing that his works on natural history form some of the first arguments for nature's intrinsic value. On the other hand, he praises the 'enlightened anthropocentrism' of Thoreau's environmentalism, i.e., the view that connecting with nature helps us to flourish. Cafaro's conclusion is that 'human excellence and nature's excellence are necessarily entwined' (161). Despite making strong separate cases for the two strands of Thoreau's environmentalism, this synthesis is not well worked out. There seems a potentially serious tension between the non-anthropocentric and anthropocentric foundations underwriting the Cafaro-Thoreau concern for nature — one that authors recently writing on environmental virtue ethics have felt obliged to address (e.g., Lisa Newton, John Barry and John O'Neill).

Fourth, in 'Politics' Cafaro turns to consider how a Thoreauvian ethic might fit into political theory. He makes impressive concessions here, detailing how Thoreau's individualism only accentuates 'problems of modern citizenship' (186), and then offers some of the book's most original work, suggesting how Thoreau should have adjusted his concept of 'patriotism' to capture the duties individuals have to the American people and lands that help them flourish (204).

Before ending the book effectively with a brief chapter on Thoreau's death, Cafaro presents the promised chapter on the ethical foundations of Thoreau's views. He admits that 'Thoreau propounds a complex or "mixed" foundationalism' (206). He is forthcoming about the unstable tension between the two main ingredients in this mix: 'naturalism' (i.e., any objectivity coming from a minimally shared human nature) and 'idealism' (i.e., the subjective way in which we each fill in the framework of our natures). Although he has some helpful discussion of the ways in which human nature lends objectivity to Thoreau's view while also being varied and ephemeral enough to necessitate his idealism, the analyses of the corresponding meta-ethical issues the reader



has come to expect never really materialize. Instead, Cafaro points out the 'impossibility of privileging either our ideals or human nature' (218). But even this point requires meta-ethical support. Without it, the conclusion that we should advocate an experiential, not rational dialectic, whereby we test the ingredients of our ethical foundations by living them, seems interesting but undeveloped.

Despite the periodic emergence of important meta-ethical issues that receive simple treatment, Cafaro has written an excellent and engaging book that is a timely supplement to the growing body of literature on virtue and environmental virtue ethics. Though I am not sure Thoreau went 'considerably further' than most modern day virtue ethicists, *Thoreau's Living Ethics* demands that philosophers take Thoreau's ethical work more seriously than they have.

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**Nicholas Capaldi**

*John Stuart Mill: A Biography.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.

Pp. xx + 436.

US\$40.00. ISBN 0-521-62024-4.

Most philosophers would say that biography is not of the essence in philosophy. Still many philosophers enjoy reading biographies, some write biographies — presumably to their enjoyment too — and an even smaller minority actually gets a biography. The happy few, such as Descartes and John Stuart Mill, actually get several biographies, but everyone who's anyone has the distinction of having his life written at least once. In the last few years, then, biographies of Isaiah Berlin, H.L.A. Hart and A.J. Ayer have been added to the list of biographies such as McGuinness's *Young Ludwig* and Mossner's *Life of Hume*. Nicholas Capaldi, previously known for his work on Hume's moral philosophy, has set out to contribute a new biography of John Stuart Mill to this impressive list — surely a daunting task.

According to Capaldi, Mill's reputation has declined in the course of the twentieth century. This decline is partly due to the rise of mathematical logic, but the main reasons for it are the steady decline in popularity of utilitarianism and the rising concern to think of freedom in other terms than pure negative freedom. Whereas it is hard to deny that traditional logic has been displaced by mathematical logic, one would do well to reconsider the pre-

sumed reasons for discounting Mill's ethical and political views. For these reasons are typically based on a caricature of what Mill actually said. Mill was not simply a utilitarian, nor did he only conceive of liberty as negative liberty. In fact, Capaldi concludes, 'Mill was the greatest of the English Romantics' (365).

Capaldi argues in his rather densely written pages that Mill forged a synthesis between the Philosophic Radicalism he inherited from Jeremy Bentham and his father James Mill, and the Romanticism of, especially, Wordsworth and Coleridge. The idea that Mill was influenced by the Romantics is not quite new, but Capaldi wants to argue that their influence was far more pervasive than it is usually made out to be. To defend his claim, Capaldi traces the life of John Stuart Mill from the cradle, or rather his first reading lesson, to the grave, or rather his obituary. It is fair to think of Capaldi's biography as primarily an argument for his conclusion that Mill was the greatest of the English Romantic thinkers. Capaldi lists Mill's Romantic influences, prominently including, amongst others, Coleridge and Kant. Capaldi shows that Coleridge's views on the nature of imagination did much to disabuse Mill of his exclusive reliance on reason. The point that Mill's idea of freedom is very close to Kant's concept of autonomy also carries conviction, but one may wonder whether it is fair to Kant to think of him as a Romantic in this respect. As Isaiah Berlin has argued in *The Roots of Romanticism*, Kant's views on autonomy surely lead to Romanticism; but it does not follow nor is it true that Kant's view was any other than an Enlightenment one. Capaldi's main point, however, is that Mill should be thought of as a towering thinker in his own right, and not as an offshoot of Benthamism. This point is well taken, but the scant explanation of some key-doctrines, such as associationism, make it hard for a general audience to appreciate it.

Arguably, the defence of Mill's Romanticism is carried out at the cost of missing other important factors in Mill's life. The emphasis in the book is firmly on a certain strand in Mill's intellectual development. It would not be quite true to say that Capaldi plays down Mill's life in favour of his intellectual development only, but it is true that he describes Mill's life as a function of his intellectual development. The point is not the story but the way it is told, or rather not quite told. Family and friends shimmer in and out of the story like ghosts. James Mill and Harriet Taylor, we are quite correctly told, were the most important people in Mill's life, but in Capaldi's exposition of their lives with Mill they come out as curiously unreal as the characters in black-and-white silent movie clips.

This is to some extent a matter of style. Capaldi is excessively given to itemization (cf. 'there are three important points here', *passim*). He is also quite fond of schematization, and, despite this, or perhaps because of it, he devotes surprisingly little space to the exposition of often fairly complicated doctrines and quite complex storylines. This is a great pity, since this book is clearly the result of many years of painstaking scholarship. There is, accordingly, much to be learned from it. Capaldi is good on the many complex debates, in economics for instance, that Mill had to deal with in his own

thinking. But as it is, though I am not for impressionism in biography, I could have done with less academicism here.

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**Stanley Cavell**

*Emerson's Transcendental Etudes.*

Ed. David Justin Hodge.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2003.

Pp. xii + 277.

US\$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4542-0);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4543-9).

This volume is an edited collection of several of Stanley Cavell's previously published studies on Emerson, as well as containing some hitherto unavailable material. Cavell's use of Emerson ultimately rests upon the latter's defence of a moral perfectionism and philosophical expression. For in his writings there is a truly philosophical struggle to find a language that can reflect what is authentically human, as well as American.

Cavell's papers begin with an early engagement with Emerson that involves reading him contrapuntally against Thoreau, Heidegger and Kant in particular, with Emerson replying to Kantian claims about epistemology and knowledge in his famous essay on 'Experience'. Thus, Cavell states in that 'Emerson's most explicit reversal of Kant lies in his picturing the intellectual hemisphere of knowledge as passive or receptive and the intuitive or instinctual hemisphere as active or spontaneous' (13).

Cavell has often related his arguments to the importance of J.L. Austin's ordinary language philosophy, as well as to Wittgenstein's discussion of what Cavell perceives of as a vision of philosophy as practice, as autonomy (110). Indeed, Emerson's search to be 'near' to the 'ordinary' leads Cavell into two principal arguments. First, he suggests that Emerson sits 'at the feet' of the familiar and the low'. Second, there is a further political point to this, whereby Cavell interprets Emerson to have been challenging American thinkers to stop imitating and praising Europe, and to look to the ordinary and the authentic in America itself (24, also 133). Emerson's notion of 'The American Scholar' has, in this respect, been fruitfully used to inform discussions of the role of 'The Philosopher in American Life'.

One of the key sources for Emerson's philosophical education, says Cavell, was Coleridge. He acted as a conduit for American transcendentalists on



their way to discovering German thought in general, and Kant in particular. And in much the same way that Coleridge thought philosophical work required inordinate amounts of time and patience, the importance of patience is a key Emersonian concern that Cavell outlines. Though this patience can make 'power look awfully like (from a certain platform, look exactly like) passiveness', Cavell's point is that 'the philosophical power of passiveness that Emerson characteristically treats in considering what he calls "attraction," [is] as important to him as gravity is to Newton.' Thus, 'the power of passiveness, say passion, is shown as mourning,' which means that 'philosophy begins in loss, in finding yourself at a loss, as Wittgenstein more or less says' (137).

Emerson's own personal sense of philosophy beginning in melancholy, coupled with the desperate times in which he saw himself as writing, are again turned into discussions of contemporary import by Cavell in his treatment of 'Hope against Hope'. This essay marries provocatively the fear of nuclear annihilation with the apparent lack of understanding in America of Emerson's own teachings; the 'quiet desperation' of Thoreau, Emerson's pupil, is exactly what is at the forefront of Cavell's own mind (172). Indeed, Cavell rescues Emerson from the critiques of his work made by Harold Bloom and John Updike, where he is transformed into a selfish promoter of individual self-interest against giving charity to the poor. For Cavell, Emerson's 'poor' are instead the scholars and seekers after truth who must often live a solitary and penniless existence. They are those who have listened to him, and so when he says he will not give them charity, he means in part that he should not further tell them what to do or think (176ff). For all this, however, Cavell had long been worried that he had not undertaken, as Judith Shklar had challenged him, to outline the politics of Emerson's writing; it was this he attempted to do in a response to George Kateb's work on Emerson at a 1993 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Finding Kateb's 'democratic' Emerson instinctively appealing, and yet feeling some distance from his interpretation, Cavell searches for the 'politics' in a more Socratic vein. Thus his later discussions of Emerson have seen him as a philosophical defender of a democratic 'city of words', as opposed to anything more obvious like a defender of the *vita activa* with which politics might otherwise be concerned (190). Questions of aesthetic and philosophical practical judgment come clearly to the fore here, and such concerns have themselves led Cavell into wider philosophical and political critiques of contemporary political thought, most notably his discussion of Rawls, an aspect of his recent work that understandably is not covered in this volume.

Yet, opposing Rawlsian liberalism with his Emersonian perfectionism and its insistence on making oneself intelligible and yet autonomous — that is, promoting a vigorous 'care of the self' — locates Emerson in a wider tradition of classical philosophy than many writers have cared to recognise. For Cavell, the Rawlsian contractual model of obligation under a liberal and just regime omits the prior question of what it means to be a member of a community, and seals the fluid nature of community through a focus on the veil of

ignorance that makes Rawls's logical conclusions quite difficult to agree with. Put simply, according to Cavell the Rawlsian model doesn't acknowledge the conversational and process-like development and adaptation of our understanding of justice and basic goods that occur thanks to our membership of a political community. To consent, one must first have a political voice, as recent favourable discussions of Cavell's criticisms of Rawls make clear. For example, according to Cavell to withdraw from a community does not mean that one withdraws one's consent from it; instead, dissent, the authentic political voice, perhaps, remains a variation on the theme of speaking for others, and it therefore still refers to questions of consent in a political community. Cavell's illustrative use of Emerson as both an historical, philosophical and contemporary political guide is exemplary in its acuity and sympathetic in its presentation. Both Cavell, and Cavell's Emerson also offer exemplary challenges to those who wish to be seen as autonomous individuals in our current political climate, and in that sense make the best practical use of philosophy as a challenge and a guide.

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**Elliot D. Cohen**

*What Would Aristotle Do?*

*Self Control through the Power of Reason.*

Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 2003.

Pp. 249.

US\$21.00. ISBN 1-59102-070-0.

The tension between emotions and reasoning is a dynamic that has intrigued writers, artists, historians, philosophers, and social scientists throughout recorded history. The overarching — and often debilitating — influences of anger, anxiety, guilt, loneliness and depression can interfere with the ability or proclivity to make sound, rational decisions. And yet any attempt to abide solely by stoic, clear-headed rationality renders human existence so boring and mundane as to make life nearly unlivable. Philosophers who have relied on longstanding algorithms of deduction and induction have found new meaning in such nonrational or extra-rational projects as existentialism and phenomenology. And psychologists have developed such techniques as rational emotive behavior therapy (REBT), cognitive behavior therapy (CBT),

and positive psychology (PP), in an effort to incorporate philosophical considerations and critical thinking skills into their social science discipline.

If there could be one basic textbook — accessible to lay-persons and professionals alike — that would cover most of the subject matter of the emerging field of ‘philosophical counseling’, Cohen’s *What Would Aristotle Do?* would probably be that textbook. If REBT, CBT, and PP represent the effort of psychologists to incorporate philosophical questions and reasoning into clinical practice, philosophical counseling represents a corresponding effort by philosophers to make applied philosophy relevant to everyday situations and struggles. And Cohen offers a comprehensive survey of the issues and techniques that form the foundation of philosophical counseling.

Borrowing his book title from a recent trend among evangelical Christians whose slogan, ‘WWJD’ (What Would Jesus Do?) can occasionally be seen on bracelets, clothing, and other emblems, Cohen reminds the reader that reason is next to godliness. He quotes the *Nicomachean Ethics* wherein Aristotle suggested that ‘if the gods have any care for human affairs, as they are thought to have, it would be reasonable both that they should delight in that which is best and most akin to them (that is, reason)’ (Book X, ch. 8, trans. W.D. Ross). And Cohen explains the philosophical, theological and spiritual benefits of striving to live more rationally, and of placing reason at the helm of one’s life. As both Aristotle and Aquinas insisted, reasonableness as an intellectual virtue is a prerequisite for moral virtues.

Cohen’s effort is organized into four sections. First, he offers an essay — with many everyday examples — on the interactions (and conflicts) between intellectual reasoning and emotions. Second, he addresses fallacies, emotional dependencies, and debilitating personal narratives that interfere with sound thinking. Third, he suggests a variety of practical techniques for identifying and refuting faulty thinking. Finally, he offers advice for dealing with the particular difficulties arising from anger, anxiety and depression. Happiness, he concludes, is too often sacrificed at the altar of faulty thinking.

Just as philosophical counseling represents a drift toward the use of philosophy as an antidote to psychopathologies, Cohen’s work emphasizes the avoidance of, or extraction from, malevolent thinking. But it is not a psychological treatment *per se*. An overly shy person, for example, might be asked by a psychologist, ‘Why do you fear other people?’ But Cohen might initiate his inquiry with questions such as, ‘What is your idea of the Other?’ or ‘What is your idea of your Self?’ or ‘What is the basis for self-doubt?’ The two approaches overlap, but applied philosophy encourages larger, and perhaps more penetrating, inquiries than does the traditional clinical approach. The power of reason is offered by Cohen as a means of resolving conflicting values, sorting out factual evidence that appears contradictory, escaping the traps of circular arguments, or rediscovering meaning in life.

The section on ‘Fallacies of Emotion’ provides an example of Cohen’s organization of his technique. There, the problem of perfectionism is included with a group of six other similar fallacies (‘Awfulizing’, ‘Terrificizing’, ‘I-Can’t-Stand-It-It is’, ‘Damnation’, ‘I Just Can’t Help This Feeling’, and ‘Thou



Shalt Upset Yourself'). Perfectionism is defined in lay-persons' terminology, and then refuted in like manner. Finally, several antidotes (e.g., setting realistic goals, learning to tolerate disappointment, and changing absolute standards to preferences) are suggested. Throughout the book, several dozen other self-imposed fallacies, bad intellectual and emotional habits, and self-defeating syndromes are addressed in a similar manner.

John Dewey wrote that 'philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method ... for dealing with the problems of men' (*John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom*, ed. Richard Bernstein [New York: Liberal Arts Press 1960], 66-7). Cohen's effort serves as an example of such recovery.

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**J. Angelo Corlett**

*Race, Racism, and Reparations.*

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2003.

Pp. xi + 252.

US\$47.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-4160-9);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8889-3).

In this work Corlett pursues a large agenda of conceptual and normative issues related to race and ethnicity. He seeks to dispense with the idea of race (Chapter 1) and replace it with a conception of ethnicity useful to public policy, focusing particularly on Latino ethnic identity (Chapters 1-3). He provides an account of racism and surviving racist evil (Chapters 4 and 5). He argues for the use of the category 'Latino' in public policy, particularly affirmative action (Chapters 6 and 7), and he argues for reparations to Native Americans and African Americans (Chapters 8 and 9). For anyone interested in this constellation of issues, a work that considers them together might seem a welcome contribution. However, the book is marred by some fundamental shortcomings that limit its value.

At the outset of the book, Corlett argues against what he calls 'primitive race theories' (7-9), and persuasively, if briefly, argues that simplistic notions of race — which entail there are biological essences that differ among racial groups — do not withstand scrutiny. However, after this cursory discussion, Corlett concludes that we ought to reject not just *primitive* race theories, but the very idea of race itself. Corlett seems to think that by discrediting,

properly, the crudest accounts of race, he has done all he must to discredit the very idea, ignoring the fact that there are much more sophisticated accounts of race. Corlett's discussion makes no reference to the substantial literatures in anthropology, biology, and medicine about the nature of race — whether it exists, whether it is a useful category for research, whether it correlates with or predicts anything. Throughout the rest of the book, Corlett takes himself to have provided reasons to reject the very idea of race as an empirical phenomenon and as a coherent concept. He has not.

By the same token, Corlett's suggestion that we should 'replace' race with ethnicity is problematic. As he notes, parenthetically, 'ethnic categories such as "Latino" ... are *unlike* racial ones in that the former include social factors ... such as language proficiency, name(s), and culture, while racial categories do not' (26). Corlett is right about this: race concerns most centrally appearance, morphology, and phenotype whereas ethnicity concerns most centrally language, culture, and customs. How, then, can we simply replace one with the other, when they simply refer to (or purport to refer to) different things?

Part of the explanation for why Corlett (sometimes) thinks we can do this is that he defends an account of ethnicity that is strikingly similar to the primitive race theories that he rejects. Corlett argues that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to an ethnic group G: that one be 'a genealogical descendant of G' and that one have 'an *intentionally shared experience* with the members of G' (10, 11). Yet when examining Latino identity, the latter condition largely drops out of the argument, and we are left with what Corlett calls 'the geneological conception of Latino identity', which holds that to be Latino one only has to have descended from Latinos. In this essentialist account, and despite Corlett's protestations to the contrary (57), his analysis requires that for someone to count as Latino s/he must be able to trace their genealogy to the Iberian Peninsula. Otherwise, it is impossible to make sense of Corlett's suggestion that the child of Italian immigrants to Brazil should not be considered Latino (24n20). Similarly, Corlett suggests that the daughter of German immigrants to Mexico, who is born in Mexico and 'knows no other culture but the Mexican one' should nevertheless not be considered Latina (142). For Corlett, then, the crucial thing about Latino identity is not culture or language or 'intentional experience' but biological descent from people originating in Iberia.

This account is deeply implausible. Much of the population of Latin America is composed of (some combination of) three groups — the descendants of European immigrants (including substantial numbers from parts of Europe other than Iberia), descendants of Africans, mostly brought over as slaves, and indigenous peoples. Add to these the not-insignificant numbers of immigrants from Asia. It is very odd, given all of this, that only those with a genealogical tie to Iberia are to count as Latino (and only to the extent of that genealogical tie, in the case of those with 'mixed' backgrounds). The fact that those who share in the culture of Latin American countries come from all over the world, and are 'racially' very diverse, both undercuts Corlett's account of Latino ethnicity and further calls into question is suggestion that



we can simply replace race with ethnicity. All of the observations I have made are perfectly obvious and commonplace, and yet Corlett's position cannot accommodate them.

Similar problems plague Corlett's argument that 'Latinos' in the United States are entitled to benefit from affirmative action programs (Chapter 6). Here too, Corlett ignores the heterogeneity of the population that falls under the label 'Latino'. Corlett argues that Latinos are entitled to benefit from affirmative action because in the past 'not only have a majority of Latinos been discriminated against, we have been discriminated against *because* we are Latinos' (120). This is certainly true of many Latino groups, but it is not true of all of them, and in any case different Latino populations in the United States face very different circumstances. One might think, following Will Kymlicka, that those who were forcibly incorporated into the United States, such as Chicanos in the Southwest and Puerto Ricans, have very different (and stronger) claims than voluntary immigrants, who in turn may have different claims than refugees — particularly if the refugees are fleeing circumstances partly created by U.S. policy toward their country of origin. It is hardly plausible to claim, as Corlett does, that all Latinos in the United States are entitled to benefit from affirmative action, on the basis of the fact that some Latino groups have faced discrimination (and worse). Do the children of well-off and well-educated (and 'white') Cuban immigrants have the same legitimate claims on public policy as Chicanos? Corlett seems to think that they should, ignoring the immense differences in history, circumstance, and 'race' among those classified as 'Latinos'.

Corlett's Chapter on racism is perhaps the most interesting. There is a surprising degree of disagreement among philosophers about what constitutes racism, with some holding that certain kinds of belief are racist while others maintain that beliefs in themselves are not racist, but only feelings or normative views about how some racial groups ought to be treated. Corlett inclines toward the former view, but he adds that for someone to be racist they must act on their prejudiced beliefs, and hence he refers to his view as a 'cognitive-behavioral theory of racism'. Corlett grounds racism in the general cognitive tendency of humans to classify and stereotype. The issue then becomes, for Corlett, not whether one holds prejudiced stereotypes — we all do, in his view — but whether we seek to become conscious of them, correct them, and not act upon them. In this discussion Corlett engages the philosophical literature and makes a genuine contribution. Even if one is not ultimately persuaded by his arguments, his view does have certain virtues (it would explain, for example, why racism is always wrong), and one can benefit from engaging his arguments.

It is less clear whether the same can be said of Corlett's chapters on reparations to Native Americans and African Americans. In the case of Native Americans, for example, Corlett equivocates about whether the basis for these reparations claims is the violation of Native American sovereignty or their property rights. At times he insists that it is the former (156), and yet much of the discussion take place in terms of property rights. This is



important because the two ways of conceiving the issue may have very different implications: one may require (mere) compensation, whereas the other may require restoration of sovereignty. Corlett argues for the complete restitution of lands, plus compensation for injuries, and finds anything short of this inadequate (185-90), even though he states that this 'would surely mean the dissolution of the United States as we know it.' '[P]erhaps the United States ... deserves to be dissolved,' (171) he adds. The thirty pages of objections and replies in this Chapter make for tedious reading because they are repetitive and the outcome of each argument is always a foregone conclusion. Rather than using the objections to add nuance or depth to the argument, Corlett usually sets up straw men to be knocked down. The same can be said of the discussion of black reparations, where the arguments are even more perfunctory.

There are other troubling aspects of Corlett's discussion, such as his use of stereotypes: Jews are 'often highly exploitative business people' (97), while Native Americans are trustworthy (172). He argues that European American women should not benefit very much from affirmative action programs because 'they' participated in the oppression of African Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos (Chapter 7). He suggests that utilitarian arguments against reparations that take seriously (as Corlett does not) the legitimate claims of present-day European Americans amount to a 'might makes right' philosophy (171-3, 207). The dismissive tone of the discussion of other views throughout the book, the way Corlett's arguments often seem to presume the truth of his conclusion, and the problematic nature of many of his central claims all undermine the value of this volume. The importance of the issues under discussion makes this all the more unfortunate.

### **Andrew Valls**

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**Mario De Caro and David Macarthur, eds.**

*Naturalism in Question.*

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  
Press 2004.

Pp. viii + 340.

US\$49.95. ISBN 0-674-01295-X.

De Caro and Macarthur's ambitious collection *Naturalism in Question* is a call to arms for opponents of the set of related doctrines that constitute scientific naturalism. It includes critiques of these doctrines from such luminaries as Barry Stroud, Hilary Putnam, John McDowell, Donald David-

son, Jennifer Hornsby, and Stanley Cavell, among others. Scientific naturalism is, in a nutshell, the view that the physical sciences should be given pride of place in our ontological, epistemological, and semantic endeavors. Operationally, this involves requiring that the concepts, posits, and methodologies of disciplines outside the physical sciences be shown to be suitably related to scientific concepts, posits, and methodologies, or be judged suspect. And suitable relatedness to the physical sciences is more often than not taken to require some form of reducibility.

Because scientific naturalism is 'the current orthodoxy', the editorial decision was made to include only papers critical of this cluster of views, rather than additionally including responses from its defenders. *Naturalism in Question* thus consists of fourteen critiques of scientific naturalism, three of which — Stroud's 'The Charm of Naturalism', McDowell's 'Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind', and Davidson's 'Could There Be a Science of Rationality?' — have previously appeared elsewhere. There is also a useful introduction written by the editors. The articles are divided into sections on Science and Reality, Mind, Agency, and Ethical and Aesthetic Normativity. It is worth noting that the last section is a bit of a hodgepodge.

At the level of individual articles, *Naturalism in Question* contains a number of gems. In 'Naturalism Without Representation', for example, Huw Price defends a *subject* naturalist conception of the placement problem — the problem of reconciling various disciplines with the physical sciences — against the more familiar *object* naturalist conception. According to the latter, the placement problem is a matter of determining how moral and semantic facts and entities, for example, can be natural facts and objects. According to the former conception, in contrast, the placement problem is a matter of reconciling the various ways of talking human subjects engage in, of explaining 'what differences there are between the functions of talk of value and the functions of talk of electrons ...' (87). Price argues against the collapse of subject naturalism into object naturalism (via semantic descent) by conjoining it with a deflationist account of truth and reference and a use theory of meaning. And he argues that the representationalist theory of meaning, which underpins object naturalism, cannot be reconciled with the empirical contingency of semantic relations to which object naturalism is committed.

To my mind, the best paper in the collection is Stephen White's 'Subjectivity and the Agential Perspective'. The focus of White's discussion is the notion of a passive subject — someone who, although possessing the concept of a happening, lacks the concept of a doing. A passive subject can only hope that her body will move in such a way so as to satisfy her desires; she does not understand what you mean when you ask her to move it herself. White argues that no objective metaphysics — expressible without psychological, agential, or normative concepts — can capture the difference between a passive subject and the rest of us. White's own account of this difference invokes a theory of perceptual experience that links perceptual access to objects in the world to our basic action capacities and our demonstrative



capacities: perception requires demonstrative abilities such as the ability to point at objects we perceive; and the capacity for action requires that we be able to demonstratively pick out the 'environmental levers of action'. The difference between the passive subject and the rest of us is that she lacks demonstrative abilities — the ability to pick out such environmental levers and recognize them as such. What blocks the incorporation of this explanation of the passive subject into an objective metaphysical picture is the irreducibility of demonstrative to descriptive content.

Other papers deserving special mention include Jennifer Hornsby's 'Agency and Alienation', Akeel Bilgrami's 'Intentionality and Norms', and Erin Kelly's 'Against Naturalism in Ethics'. Donald Davidson's piece, which includes a new Afterword, is also a tasteful inclusion.

Unfortunately, the sum of the parts may be greater than the whole. The editors point out that, although most Anglo-American philosophers call themselves 'naturalists', the use of this term varies widely (2-3). The downside of this is that distinct critiques of naturalism risk being directed towards very different doctrines. And a corresponding lack of critical unity does infect *Naturalism in Question* to a certain degree. Many of the articles do seem to be focused on various forms of reductionism. On the other hand, Putnam, for example, seems at times to be rehearsing his well-known arguments against metaphysical realism (a view De Caro [200] also warns against). But Leeds (Stephen Leeds, 'Theories of Reference and Truth', *Erkenntnis* 13 [1978] 111-29), among others, has shown us that Quinean scientific naturalists, at least, need not be committed to realism. And Carol Rovane's interesting but quirky piece, 'A Nonnaturalist Account of Personal Identity', seems to be focused, not on the reducibility or irreducibility of personal identity to the physical sciences, but on the orthogonal distinction between the natural and the human/ social/ technological often remarked upon in environmental philosophy. More generally, there are a number of articles that seem only tangentially connected to the declared theme of the collection.

There is also a tendency among some of the authors to make suspect claims about the implications of the rejection of scientific naturalism. The editors go so far as to say that '... the fate of analytic philosophy is now, in large part, tied to the fate of scientific naturalism' (9), and conclude that with the rejection of the latter, philosophical methodology should be re-conceived on the model of art criticism, rather than science (16). Moreover, Putnam, Dupré, and others, argue that the rejection of scientific naturalism commits us to conceptual pluralism, which in some forms runs the risk of entailing objectionable species of relativism. But one can reject scientific naturalism — and its strongly reductionist variants probably warrant rejection — while retaining a Sellarsian methodological *telos*: '[the] aim of philosophy ... is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term' (Wilfred Sellars, *Science Perception and Reality* [Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co 1963], 1). Doing so requires no reconception of philosophical methodology, and undercuts both the relativistic and quietist undercurrents of conceptual pluralism:



contra relativism, things really do hang together; and contra quietism, an account of how they do so is required. And the articles that received special mention above did so exactly because they share in the spirit of this Sellarsian *telos*.

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**Michael N. Forster**

*Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press 2004.

Pp. xvi + 247.

US\$29.95. ISBN 0-691-11366-1.

Michael Forster is surely right that Wittgenstein's reflections on alternative grammatical principles deserve more attention (1). 'Grammar' here means a motley array of principles that the later Wittgenstein took to play an essential role in the teaching and learning of concepts (an aspect that Forster unfortunately neglects) and as 'norms of description' (*On Certainty*, §167), including (1) traditionally 'analytic' truths, (2) mathematical truths, (3) non-analytic necessities, (4) ostensive definitions, (5) criterial statements, and (6) some 'propositions of the form of empirical propositions' (*On Certainty*, §401), doubt concerning which seems unintelligible in the context of their utterance (Forster, 10-11).

Forster's style is very readable, if a bit list-like (I reserve comment on the expression 'wears the trousers' [31]). Explicit section-headings would make it easier to keep track of the many serial points that arise, as would fewer distractions in the form of lengthy endnotes (one-fifth of the book). There are few, if any, typos (though Richard Rorty, disguised as Jonathan Lear, haunts Forster's imagination at 216).

The book falls into two parts. The first aims to show how Wittgenstein can consistently think, in one sense, that principles of grammar are arbitrary, and, in another, that they are not. Forster offer four reasons to support the former contention: (I) the '*diversity thesis*' (21) says that for all six categories of grammatical principles there are actual or imaginable examples of alternatives (21-30); (II) grammatical principles admit of no justification, whether by appeals to truth in virtue of meaning (31-2), to particular empirical facts (32-9), to pragmatic considerations (40-3), or to partitionings of grammatical principles into more and less basic ones (43-6); (III) grammatical principles

are neither true nor false (47-58); (IV) the empirical propositions regimented by one grammar have no automatic claim to capture the ways of the world better than those of any other (58-64). But grammar is *not* arbitrary, in the sense that one is constrained in choosing a grammar by 'one's very *human nature* [and] ... one's upbringing within specific *social practices and traditions*' (67). Wittgenstein's treatment of meaning also (allegedly) imposes a (Kripkean-sounding) constraint that a would-be grammatical principle with no 'employment in our lives' or 'application' (70) is meaningless.

In the second part Forster argues that ostensibly contrary streams in Wittgenstein's thought do not wash away the Diversity Thesis because: (A) Wittgenstein's commitments to deflationism about truth and to thinking that a proposition is just whatever 'we apply the calculus of truth-functions to' (*Philosophical Investigations* §136) do not restrict us to classical logic (Forster 108-28); (B) passages suggesting that concepts like 'proposition', 'thought', and 'language' are expressible only in familiar grammatical systems do not represent Wittgenstein's considered position (129-52); (C) passages arguing that the literal unintelligibility of alternative grammars counts as a reason for thinking that they are not grammars at all embody the implausible and unnecessary doctrine of 'exclusive commitment' (165), according to which understanding a grammatical principle entails embracing it to the exclusion of principles that fall outside its grammatical system.

Despite effectively criticizing the views of Bernard Williams and Jonathan Lear (21-30), Forster counts Wittgenstein an 'idealist' insofar as his grammatical principles are not independent of human minds, and, more seriously, insofar as particular empirical judgments depend for their sense on grammatical principles that are in some sense arbitrary (15-16). Without those principles, particular empirical judgments would lack truth-values. Barry Allen defends this reading of Wittgenstein in *Truth in Philosophy*, and while it is not to be dismissed lightly, neither, I think, is it entailed by the arbitrariness of grammar. We suppose that gold had 79 protons before human beings arrived to describe them. That claim is itself sanctioned by our contingent norms of description for the physical world. Another grammatical system might lead to a different claim about what exists apart from our thinking about it, but there is no automatic reason that both cannot be right together.

The preceding contention does require that alternative grammars be literally intelligible, and this contradicts the doctrine of Exclusive Commitment. I doubt that Wittgenstein held it. He does speak in his early lectures of being committed by one's use of a word to using it in the same way in future cases (165), but this is akin to the system of commitments and entitlements that Robert Brandom uses to explicate the normativity of meaning. *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* and *Zettel* also say that someone committed in a 'Kierkegaardian' (234n14) sense to a principle of grammar will have difficulty understanding someone not so committed (165), but this does not entail that commitment is *necessary* for understanding the principle. Only the passages Forster cites (165-6) from *On Certainty* begin to make his case,

and I think that case is undermined by Wittgenstein's allowance that many principles of grammar belong to the soft sand of the shifting riverbed of thought. That riverbed supposedly is made also of hard rock that changes little or not at all (*On Certainty*, §99), and this may seem to undermine the Diversity Thesis. I suspect, rather, that it qualifies it. One can allow a great deal of diversity in possible grammatical systems and still insist that, for example, no grammatical system will ever embrace as a principle of 'true-false' language games that *every* proposition is simultaneously and unambiguously both true and false.

Forster at times treats Wittgenstein's quietism as a faith in ordinary language and common sense. But Wittgenstein's admonitions against philosophical theories are not simply recommendations that we acquiesce in the opinion of the folk (if there is one). He does not deny that mind, meaning, freedom of the will and so on appear to present deep puzzles to us. But this *illusion* of depth is to be dispelled by seeking a clearer view of what role these concepts play in our discourse and lives, and that is not something that we can do just because we can *use* the concepts. 'One learns the word "think", i.e. its use, under certain circumstances, which, however, one does not learn to describe' (*Zettel* §114).

Obviously, I find much to disagree with here, but I also find that disagreement fruitful, and I am pleased to be acquainted with Forster's thoughtful position, which deserves more extensive examination.

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**Steve Fuller and James H. Collier**

*Philosophy, Rhetoric, and the End of Knowledge: A New Beginning for Science and Technology Studies*. 2nd edn.

Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 2004.

Pp. 400.

US\$99.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8058-4767-7);

US\$39.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8058-4768-5).

The second edition of *Philosophy, Rhetoric, and the End of Knowledge* (*PREK*) includes a new introduction and questions at the end of each chapter. *PREK* urges the use of rhetoric through science and technology studies to break down discipline boundaries within the academy — hence, the book's subtitle *A New Beginning for Science and Technology Studies*. The book employs the



rhetoric of science to overcome the dilemma of normative approaches to the philosophy of science and empirical sociological approaches to science studies. For Fuller and Collier, social epistemology's 'relevance to rhetoric and argumentation lies in its stress on the integral role that communication, both its facilitation and impedance, plays in contemporary thinking about knowledge and power' (22).

*PREK* is a sprawling book with many innovative arguments that covers topics such as artificial intelligence, cognitivism, relativism, rhetoric of science, naturalistic epistemology, traditional epistemology, and the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). *PREK* is for both the generalist and the specialist. For the generalists, who may be advanced students, *PREK*'s questions at the end of each chapter are helpful. For the specialists, *PREK* offers a challenge of using rhetoric to address issues in philosophy of science and SSK. Since this review cannot cover all the topics, it focuses on the notion of knowledge policy, which is a core notion that Fuller and Collier promote in the book.

In *PREK*, Fuller's and Collier's social epistemology holds that the legitimation of science should be understood politically rather than epistemologically. Instead of the special status granted to scientific knowledge by epistemology or philosophy of science, political factors such as knowledge policy and a constitution play a primary role in the legitimation of scientific knowledge. Fuller's and Collier's metascience locates the legitimation of normative metascientific knowledge in political philosophy and ethics.

Fuller and Collier focus on the institution of science and introduce the notion of knowledge policy to regulate science. Fuller's and Collier's notion of regulation has two parts: one concerns the efficiency of chosen bureaucratic structures governing science as a production model; the other concerns moral and political issues regarding the larger social values to which scientists are to be held accountable.

Fuller and Collier hold that contemporary science is not organized in the most efficient way. There is room for improvement, and a good naturalistic theory of science should provide us with reliable knowledge about the potential efficacy of changes that might be instituted. The studies of the feasibility of introducing changes in the organization of science are known as 'knowledge policy studies'. Fuller's and Collier's social epistemology holds that structures of epistemic authority are socially constructed and maintained. Fuller and Collier write: 'Philosophers may be right. No epistemically privileged way of conferring epistemic privilege may exist. But from the assertion it does not follow that there is no *non-epistemically* privileged way' (90). What is important to note is Fuller's and Collier's suggestion that the social role of science has been granted a higher degree of epistemic authority. For Fuller and Collier, the 'thread that connects the history of science from the Greeks to present day is that people come to be convinced that particular forms of knowledge are embodied in the world — in skillful people and crafted goods — and are, in that sense, the hidden sources of power over the world' (96).

Fuller and Collier want to reconceptualize epistemology to knowledge policy, which may seem to be an odd move. An explanation can be found in the work of William Rehg, who notes that Fuller's move is that of a normative nonrelativistic multidimensional theory of argumentation (Rehg, 'Argumentation Theory and the Philosophy of Science since Kuhn: The Rationality of Theoretical Advance', 1998, <http://www.tf.uio.no/etikkk/artikler/rehgonscience.htm>). We can understand Fuller's and Collier's approach partly in terms of William Rehg's research decision-making (RDM) model, which holds that 'science is a largely informal collective method of making decisions about lines of research to be pursued by the scientific community' (Rehg 1998). Fuller and Collier note that 'as a positive research program, social epistemology proposes inquiries into the maintenance of the sort of institutional inertia that has made social epistemology's three presumptions (dialectical, conventionality, democratic) radical rather than commonplace. Why don't research priorities change more often and more radically?' (2004, 23) Rehg notes that framing the question of scientific rationality in this way has the advantage of allowing the knowledge policy analyst to see all dimensions of the argument as potential contributors to the rationality of theory choice. The RDM model thus reconceives the rationality question as a problem of research direction that it is not simply an intellectual question about which of two more or less fully formed theories is likely to be correct. According to the RDM model, a rational science policy depends on the impact of the capacity to appraise competing scientific theories on their merits (Rehg 1998).

Fuller's and Collier's use of rhetoric may not convince mainstream philosophers of science and epistemologists who can argue that to reconceptualize epistemology to knowledge policy is to change the subject to sociology and leave problems of epistemic justification unanswered. Fuller and Collier may respond that the traditional notions of knowledge and justification are contested notions and cannot be assumed to be valid. An assumption that is not stated clearly in *PREK* is that Fuller and Collier hold that knowledge is created, constructed, or designed according to the ends of those who pursue it. Hence, there is strong interdisciplinarity, which is what *PREK* preaches, if knowledge is created, constructed, or designed. This is also what allows for knowledge policy, since if knowledge is created, then knowledge production can be guided to be increased or decreased. Fuller and Collier have not provided a clear argument for the social construction of knowledge. If knowledge is given, which is what traditional epistemologists hold, or if knowledge is discovered, which is what many mainstream philosophers of science hold, then there cannot be strong interdisciplinarity. With strong interdisciplinarity, there is no need for the epistemologist to suggest justification conditions to justify knowledge, or for the philosopher of science to suggest a special logic of discovery or skills to discover knowledge.

In spite of my criticism, I recommend the book to philosophers who are interested in science and technology studies, to teachers of science and technology studies, to sociologists of science, to rhetoricians of science, to

academics who are interested in interdisciplinarity, and to those interested in knowledge policy. *PREK* provides a strong argument for promoting those areas of study.

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**Joan Delaney Grossman and  
Ruth Rischin, eds.**

*William James in Russian Culture.*

Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2003.

Pp. x + 259.

US\$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7391-0526-4);

US\$28.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7931-0527-2).

This intriguing collection of essays examines how William James' philosophy has been received in Russia. Its primary focus is the so-called 'silver age' of Russian culture in the early 1900's, when Russian interest in James was at its peak, though there is occasional discussion of the Soviet era, during which James' work was reviled as the epitome of American bourgeois decadence, and a chapter devoted to his philosophy in post-Soviet thought. The scope of the volume is broad, ranging from James' relevance to such writers as Tolstoy, Gorky, and the symbolist poets Viacheslav Ivanov and Ivan Konevskoi, to his influence on a number of philosophers, including Lev Lopatin, Sergei Kotliarevsky, and Lev Shestov. The book principally comprises a study of the interplay of philosophical ideas between two dramatically contrasting cultures, Russian and American, as their representatives struggled with profound questions posed by the dramatic political and scientific upheavals at the beginning and the end of the last century.

That Jamesian pragmatism and Russian philosophy could have something in common might seem surprising. There are, however, several potential points of contact. Many of James' Russian contemporaries sought, as he did, to find a path between hard-nosed positivist naturalism, on the one hand, and other-worldly metaphysics, on the other, and, like James, many were fascinated by how this aspiration might be fulfilled in the infant science of psychology. Again like James, the Russians conceived the question of how to live as philosophy's most fundamental and they struggled with issues of meaning and purpose, freedom and creativity, aspiring to transcend a dualistic opposition of subject and object, mind and world, by casting humanity as an active principle. But above all it was James' work on religious belief and mystical experience that captured the imagination of his Russian peers.



The translation of *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, published in 1910, was the most influential of James' writings in Russia.

The affinity, however, had its limits. Even the most sympathetic Russian readers did not care for James' 'pluralism', his emphasis on the individual, or his pragmatism about truth (though to be fair, they read him more charitably on the latter subject than many of his American or British peers). Moreover, James' influence was always rather oblique. Although he was championed by the Moscow Psychological Society, which was a vibrant centre of philosophical inquiry, and a number of his writings were translated, most of James' Russian readers interpreted his works idiosyncratically, appropriating his insights piecemeal for their own ends. One of the most interesting treatments was a little-known essay written by Shestov in 1911. Yet even here, as Brian Horowitz ably demonstrates, Shestov distorts James, using him as a catalyst for the development of his own philosophical vision with its uncompromising contrast between faith and reason. The interpretations of the lesser-known philosophers Lopatin and Kotliarevsky, discussed by Randall Poole in his outstanding chapter, were less partial, but both were inclined to subordinate James' ideas to a distinctively Russian problematic. As for James himself, apart from his admiration for Tolstoy, he took little interest in things Russian (he met Gorky twice in the United States, but didn't consider the encounters worth noting in his diary!). The volume does not exactly tell the story of a meeting of minds.

As a result, many of the chapters content themselves with exploring the presence of 'Jamesian themes' in Russian work, rather than with James' direct influence. The best of these are compelling, such as Gennady Obatin's treatment of parallels between James and Ivanov on consciousness and Barry Scherr's discussion of the God-Building movement in light of James' religious philosophy. These essays raise fascinating questions about how the *Zeitgeist* can manifest itself in parallel ways in contrasting cultures. Edith Clowes provides a thought provoking account of Jamesian ideas in the work of novelist Andrei Bitov and cultural theorist Grigory Pomerants, even if she is forced to assert that there is 'little direct response specifically to James in late-Soviet and post-Soviet thought' (213).

In some of the chapters, however, James' presence seems almost gratuitous. Robin Feuer Miller's account of Dostoevsky's treatment of conversion would be none the worse if all reference to James was cut, and this is even truer of Andrew Wachtel's discussion of representations of violence in the later Tolstoy. It was poor editorial judgement to place these papers at the opening of the volume, together with Linda Simon's essay on James' trips to Europe, which is of dubious relevance here as James never made it to Russia. One hundred pages into the book and its subject matter is hardly visible. This is a shame, since the later chapters convince the reader that the rationale for the volume is sound.

Perhaps nervous about their book's success, the editors in their introduction anticipate its conclusion with the words: 'our authors reached a collective assurance that James and Russian culture have something to say to each

other. If this dialogue has often enough been at cross-purposes, the confrontation is revealing of both parties and may help us know both of them better' (2). This rather feeble summation sells the volume short. For all its deficiencies, there is much here for students of Russian intellectual history to admire. And though serious scholars of James may think the material of mere curiosity value, many students of philosophy would profit from dipping into it. It helps reveal the breadth of James' vision and thereby stands as a corrective to those who represent the pragmatist tradition as a kind of antidote to philosophy (thinkers for whom, as David Joravsky puts it in his fine afterword, ' "pragmatism" has become a term of approval for a shallow mind-set' that James himself 'considered a disease' [228]). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the book is a valuable, if eccentric, contribution to the process of retrieving the neglected philosophical culture of pre-revolutionary Russia.

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**Leila Haaparanta and Ilkka Niiniluoto, eds.**  
*Analytic Philosophy in Finland.*  
Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of  
Sciences and the Humanities No. 80.  
Atlanta: Editions Rodopi 2003.  
Pp. 579.  
US\$202.00. ISBN 90-420-0837-7.

Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centres of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, and *Analytic Philosophy in Finland* offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. Part I of the collection outlines the historical, political and cultural setting of philosophy as a part of academic life in Finland. It includes reflection on philosophy and its method as well as original articles by four 'classics' in Finnish philosophy, Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila and George Henrik von Wright and Jaakko Hintikka. Part II discusses the contributions of Finnish philosophers to logic and philosophy of language. Part III deals with philosophy of science and Part IV with history of philosophy. Part V gives an introduction to studies on ethics and social philosophy in Finland. The Finnish dialogue between analytic philosophy and other traditions such as phenomenology, pragmatism and critical theory, for its part, is also analyzed in Part IV, while Part V and VI touch upon the problem of identifying philosophical traditions in general.



In his lead, introductory article Ilkka Niiniluoto discusses the cultural setting of philosophy in Finland. The article is historical rather than philosophical in its nature. Niiniluoto focuses on the connections and influences that Finnish philosophers have gotten from Germany (particularly Westermarck), from the Vienna Circle (Eino Kaila in the 1920s-30s) as well as Kaila's students von Wright, Erik Stenius and Oiva Ketonen, and even von Wright's student Jaakko Hintikka. This historical view to philosophy in Finland shows that the academic mentor system has a strong influence on the enforcing particular philosophical trends in Finland.

Finland has been particularly known for its research in logic and philosophy of science. In his introduction Niiniluoto tries to explain why Finnish philosophy has chosen this analytical path. Niiniluoto claims that, while Finnish mentality has its romantic side, the Northern experience and solitary struggle for survival have created a realist attitude that appreciates facts and the rational faculties of human beings. Thus, logic and analytical philosophy in general have such a strong hold in Finnish philosophical tradition. Niiniluoto's conclusion that the Finns are rational and analytical rather than emotional or interpretative seems to be supported also by the fact that even applied philosophy and ethics, another popular and important field of philosophy researched in Finland, rely mostly on rational and logical analysis rather than on experimenting with interpretative or emotivist approaches. Issues of moral and social philosophy as well as ethics have traditionally been difficult for analytical philosophy, which in general argues that ethical claims are beyond proof and testability, deriving as they do from emotions or subjective opinions, and that they are not therefore appropriate for philosophical enquiry. In general analytical philosophy, which includes logical positivism, traditionally has ruled out speculation about the supernatural ontologies and other beliefs that make up moral philosophy. In their striving for objectivity, the logical positivists, for example, rejected philosophizing about the meaning of life, which involves questions about right and wrong. Instead they advocated that the philosophical investigation of language was as far as philosophers could go, even though some recognized that this meant they could not go very far.

This seems to be the trend also in the Finnish applied philosophy and ethics. While many Finnish philosophers engage in questions of ethics and social issues, their focus is on the conceptual analysis and clarification of terms used as well as on the logic and clarity of the arguments presented, rather than in attempts to build new holistic theoretical frameworks that would engage in metaphysical and ontological speculations.

This is interesting since the present generation of Finnish practical philosophers have been recognized particularly for their work on bioethics, even if they have actively published also in other areas of applied ethics issues and political theory. Maybe bioethics takes ethics closer to the philosophy or science or analytical argumentation, though one could assume that some innovative ideas on metaphysics should be also debated in this new rapidly expanding field of applied philosophy. However, the works of many



Finnish philosophers also shows that, while the Anglo-Saxon analytic approach has been central in Finnish philosophy, particularly recently there has been more influence from continental philosophy. The latest studies in post-structuralism, phenomenology, and post-modernism have brought in new trends to the Finnish philosophical scheme.

While not widely discussed in the articles of this book, an interesting question that arises is the relationship between culture and philosophy in general. This collection does not try to directly answer this question, but rather discusses the role of analytical philosophy in Finland — as the title promises. However, it would have been interesting to ponder in more detail what makes Finnish philosophy particularly Finnish. Evidently it is not the language, since all the articles in this book are in English and the international recognition of the work of the Finnish philosophers is emphasized. Is it the cultural context and particular topics chosen that distinguishes Finnish philosophers from others in Europe or elsewhere within the Western philosophical tradition? What about non-native philosophers who are writing on Finnish philosophy and/or about Finnish philosophers? Is Finnish analytical philosophy different from analytical philosophy elsewhere? If so, how? If the reader hopes to find an answer to any of the above questions from the book, he or she will be disappointed. Finnish philosophy does not appear to be any different from any other analytical philosophy, except that you might find it be even more analytical than what you might have expected.

All in all, this collection gives a comprehensive picture of the current state of philosophical research in Finland. However, it does not provide particularly original works by many Finnish philosophers. Instead, the articles in *Analytic Philosophy in Finland* give overall summaries on the Finnish contributions to analytic philosophy worldwide. Many of its articles provide a promotion of the work of one's colleagues and contribute to the overall self-promotion of Finnish philosophy. From this book one could gain a view that Finnish philosophy is consensus philosophy done in shared understanding of the methodology and goals as well as the role of philosophy in Finland and elsewhere. The truth might be different, but unfortunately seriously critical voices are scarce in this collection.

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**Elsebet Jegstrup, ed.**

*The New Kierkegaard.*

Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2004.

Pp. xii + 266.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-253-34264-8);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-253-21623-0).

Jegstrup's collection of thirteen *deconstructive* essays originates from the International Kierkegaard Forum (Augusta State University, March 2001). Rather than examining Kierkegaard in light of his contemporaries as a father of existentialists and twentieth-century thinkers, this handsome volume selectively emphasizes reading Kierkegaard in dialogue with postmodern Continental philosophy. Jegstrup boldly contrasts the novelty of her collection with its immediate predecessors: Hannay & Marino, *The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard* (1998); Matušík & Westphal, eds., *Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity* (1995); and Rée & Chamberlain, *Kierkegaard: A Critical Reader* (1998). One strength of Jegstrup's book lies in the iconoclastic intent to correct what she perceives as a 'lack of imagination' (9) of the above works' failure to be one-hundred percent postmodern. Yet this strength contributes ironically to a certain unevenness of her collection, for she includes not only seasoned Kierkegaard specialists but also scholars who have not before seriously written on Kierkegaard.

The former group represents the best and most carefully written essays when judged by a teacher assigning secondary sources to a beginning graduate student of Kierkegaard: Caputo, Poole, Garff, Bøggild, Rumble, Dooley, and Kearney. The latter grouping — Llewelyn, Wood, Gibbs, Smyth, and Wirth — exhibits the strengths of true experts in their primary research area in Adorno, Levinas, Heidegger or Derrida, who openly engage Kierkegaard. Yet because of an unsophisticated grasp of Kierkegaard's authorship entire, they are not as reliable Kierkegaard guides for those who have not read his primary works, even for a 'new' deconstructive approach to him. Jegstrup's own essay and introduction are indicative of these strengths and weaknesses, and so her volume suffers from a certain unevenness even as it offers an otherwise fresh look at the Dane's thought.

The book might have been easily titled: 'Derrida & Kierkegaard' or 'A Deconstructive Kierkegaard' or 'Derrida's Undecidability and Kierkegaard's Either/Or'. Derrida's method of deconstructive reading sets the background for most contributors (Caputo, Poole, Garff, Jegstrup, Gibbs, Rumble, Dooley, Kearney). Derrida in his final years was an avid and earnest Jewish interpreter of Kierkegaard. He balanced Buber's, Levinas', and even Adorno's (Smyth's essay excellently corrects the critical reception of Adorno's Kierkegaard) one-sided severity toward the Dane. Jegstrup's collection builds on Derrida's achievement with some depth, and this is probably its greatest contribution. Caputo's opening piece is vintage and also among the best. We learn with clarity missing from other writings on this topic that Derrida's 'undecidability' does not mean lack of decision. Objective unde-

cidability of texts and situations is the condition for the possibility of every radical self-choice. Neither ethical nor religious life issues from some doctrine, *ergo* from a myth of some given. Doctrines, teachings, even divine command theory of ethics that some ascribe nowadays to Kierkegaard, received holy or unholy texts of our traditions — all are ‘undecidable’ when it comes to an either/or choice of what self I am and want to be. Not just Abraham, but all texts and established secular and religious orders ought to live in fear and trembling about their self-apotheosis (cf. Dooley 205-12).

Among Kierkegaard’s writings that most preoccupies the contributors is *Either/Or* (Caputo, Poole, Garff, Jegstrup, Wood, and Smyth). Other primary texts that get serious attention are *The Point of View* (Jegstrup), *Works of Love* (Rumble, Kearney), *Fear and Trembling* (Smyth, Kearney), *Practice in Christianity* (Kearney), and a rhetorical reading of Kierkegaard’s two essays on Job and St. Paul (Bøggild). Markedly absent or marginal are *The Sickness Unto Death*, *The Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, *Philosophical Fragments* and other works signed by Kierkegaard. While a single volume cannot do everything, the focus on the esthetic authorship, or the form and rhetorical styles of the entire pseudonymous and veronymous corpus, makes good sense in a self-selected collection of postmodern rereadings of Kierkegaard. Indeed, many of the literary devices and moves invented by him in order to confront the Hegelian rational system and logic have slowly and unnoticed migrated into Continental philosophy, into methods of negative dialectics, and finally into deconstruction. Among these, following undecidability, are: existential self-transformation as a corrective to philosophy’s abstraction from existence or philosophy’s logocentrism; repetition forward or the teleological suspension of the ethical as a corrective to the recollective metaphysics of presence and ontotheology; passing through the category of the singular individual as *the* corrective to the violence that all existence and history suffers in having to pass through the concept; the risk of decision as opposed to the certainty of doctrines; the subject’s confrontation with its self-reliance (the death of the subject and of the author) in fear and trembling; one’s being towards death as announcing the death of the ‘god’ and religion of Christendom; and the descriptions of sin-consciousness as despair that inspired Sartrean bad faith no less than the celebrated postmodern condition itself, a condition that no longer has a name for itself or its cure.

When pondering the ‘new’ in *The New Kierkegaard*, the focus on the form of the authorship occasions a collision affecting the volume and the postmodern Kierkegaard it features for *our* present age. When Jegstrup proclaims the joyous news, ‘Deconstruction is existential’ (2), sets the book’s task as the following either or, ‘*either existence or logocentrism*’ (I am unsure whether or not the pair of terms were meant to be reversed, *either* logocentrism or existence), promotes ‘the ethic of deconstruction’ as a form of transcendence (6) that is co-terminus with Kierkegaard’s maieutic of indirect communication (7), then the stakes are raised high. For Kierkegaard, the authorship and its form dramatize the esthetic production and its reduplication, yet both come into a collision with *the* stakes that are always-already religious. Let



me pose another either/or collision for the 'new' Kierkegaard: *either* esthetic deconstruction *or* existential deconstruction. The existential is more than epistemic undecidability (that 'I will never know how an orange tastes to you', 2), more than lonely individuality (that deconstruction celebrates singularity ... the ambiguities of human experience in the world', 2). Kierkegaard's existential stakes are religious or they are just rotating esthetically something more or less imaginative or interesting.

The postmodern collision of existential spheres affects (deconstructs?) the *new* in the book from within. Dooley emphasizes that Derrida's, by *imitatio* Caputo's, passion for the impossible must not be tied to the esthetic rotation of crops (Jegstrup seems to think it can 85f.). The radical either/or is neither a flatfooted esthetic recollection of instants, nor a cocksure social ethic of the established order, but rather it is a religiously objective uncertainty and risk of faith. Rumble accentuates a religious corrective to postmodern secular readings of Kierkegaard and Derrida. Subjectively decisive is Kierkegaard's earnestness. His Christian faith confronts the nationalist-cum-fundamentalist Christendom bereft of Christians. Likewise Derrida's messianicity (Kearney's 'new politics', 235-8) of democracy-to-come (Benjamin's ecstatic now-time, Adorno's negative dialectics, Habermas's anamnestic solidarity with the victims of history) decisively inhabits deconstructive existence as 'religion without religion' (15, 208).

### **Martin Beck Matušík**

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**Hugh LaFollette, ed.,**

*The Oxford Handbook to Practical Ethics.*

Toronto and New York:

Oxford University Press 2003.

Pp. xvii + 772.

Cdn\$225.00:US\$125.00. ISBN 0-19-824105-4.

The *Oxford Handbook* series is aimed at graduate students and researchers, unlike its rival, the *Blackwell Companion* series, which is aimed at undergraduates and persons seeking an introduction to the subject. The goal of the Oxford series is to provide 'state of the art' analyses for practitioners in the field. The articles are typically longer and more thorough than in the Blackwell series. The difference shows up well if the volume under review is compared statistically with the corresponding Blackwell *Companion to Applied Ethics*. The former has twenty-eight articles in 772 pages, while the latter has fifty articles in 720 pages.

The *Handbook to Practical Ethics* is an excellent book, a wealth of information and argument. The contributors are a 'who's who' of contemporary writers in moral, social and legal philosophy, and I hope they will forgive me not listing them all by name: their reputation is the reason for their appearance in this book, not vice versa. The individual essays strike a very fair balance between survey of the field and firm nudging towards the author's preferred viewpoint. There's real philosophy being done here, and not simply a compilation of encyclopedia entries.

The book has six Parts: Our Personal Lives (sexuality, love, family); Moral Status (children, abortion, reproductive technology, animals, environmental ethics); Equality (gender and sexual discrimination, race and racial discrimination, affirmative action, people with disabilities); The Just Society (punishment, freedom of speech and religion, legal paternalism, multiculturalism, economic justice, intergenerational justice, privacy, corporate responsibility, whistleblowing); Justice and International Relations (immigration, national autonomy, international economic justice, world hunger); Life and Death (euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, capital punishment, war). As this list shows, the scope of the volume is wide. There's a tendency, I think, to regard 'practical ethics' as including primarily issues of personal decision-making, and to forget that broader issues of the design of social institutions and the content of the law are just as much issues of 'practical ethics'. Such 'design' issues are well represented here. In particular, topics such as war, immigration, national autonomy, whistleblowing, intergenerational justice, disabilities and equality, legal paternalism typically do not find their way into anthologies on applied ethics. Surely LaFollete is right to display their relevance here. The Index is well constructed, and makes it easy to track general topics like freedom, autonomy, or law, and writers like Rawls or Nozick, in their occurrences throughout the book.

Given such an array of riches, any choice of which essays to mention in particular is necessarily arbitrary: again, I can only ask pardon from those omitted. Here are some examples of essays that I find especially illuminating.

Douglas Husak's essay on 'Legal Paternalism' deserves a wide readership. As Husak rightly notes, paternalism tends to get discussed in the context of the violation of one person's autonomy, as typified in the physician-patient relationship. The assumption is too easily made that the argumentative structure appropriate for handling paternalism of this form transfers easily to the case of supposed paternalism by the state in the enactment of legislation. Husak shows, however, that the transfer is not simple. The value of individual autonomy is not so obviously at stake. It is not clear how individual autonomy in general is violated by laws requiring crash-helmets for motorcycle riders, or compulsory contributions to state-run pension schemes: nor is it clear why the views of those who do think such laws violate their autonomy should be dispositive. Moreover, such legislative plans are easily justifiable by reference to goals that are not in any way paternalistic. The justificatory reasoning is typically consequentialist, not autonomy-based. The rhetoric of state paternalism is cheap, but is not easily substantiated.

Antony Duff has long been one of the most innovative writers on criminal punishment, and his article does not disappoint. He provides a concise survey of the traditional approaches, but spends more time on views, including his own, that frame punishment as communication. He sketches the kind of justification in communitarian terms that he has offered elsewhere at greater length. He discusses briefly the 'restorative justice' movement, but, in his view, the essential character of punishment as a response to wrongdoing and its connection with penance makes restorative justice implausible as an account of punishment, whatever its value in other ways. Duff also has a valuable section on sentencing, and on the place of sentencing in a theory of punishment.

Anita Silvers' essay on 'People with Disabilities' is an important essay. It has more of a position-driven mien than others in the book, but that is wholly understandable. The invisibility of persons with disabilities in society has been regrettably mirrored in the invisibility of the issue in philosophical discussion. But things are changing, and in no small part as a result of efforts by Silvers herself. She spends the first part of the essay showing why society's treatment of persons with disabilities is as much an issue of social equality as any of the more prominent issues in recent times such as race, gender or sexual orientation. The bulk of the essay examines the models philosophers have typically used to represent issues of disability. Silvers shows the tensions in these models, and, in an interesting section, how the tensions are reflected in the ad hoc and somewhat incoherent approach of the law to disability rights. One gets the sense that here is an area where good philosophy can pay off in good social policy.

The whole Part on Justice and International Relations is very well done, and, as (it seems) nation-states everywhere are hunkering down, closing their borders, and protecting their own, very timely. Chandran Kukathas, writing on immigration, faces in part like Silvers the task of convincing audiences that here is a real issue of practical ethics. As Kukathas notes, the ethical questions raised by immigration are numerous and complex, and the stakes are high: 'political stability, economic progress, human freedom, and individual survival all hang in the balance' (586). The main focus of his essay is on the fundamental assumption that national borders have some pre-emptive argumentative force, such that the onus is always on those who favour more immigration, and he exposes how weak that assumption is. Wayne Norman, writing on 'National Autonomy', gives a fine survey of all the fault-lines in the on-going debates about the role of nation-states in an increasingly internationalized world, and about the parameters for legitimate demands by minority ethnic and cultural groups for secession, independence and autonomy. Norman's conclusion that 'creative forms of internal autonomy provide the most realistic alternative to systematic injustice' (614) for most minority groups. He goes on to challenge philosophers to do more than they have hitherto to develop robust theories of 'federal justice' that can guide deliberation on design issues for a stable multinational state. Debra Satz' piece on 'International Economic Justice' and Nigel Dower's on 'World



Hunger' are thorough, but do not contain any especially novel ideas. But then the issue itself has not changed much for a long time, either. The cast of philosophical characters in these two essays is familiar — Singer, Rawls, Sen, O'Neill, Goodin. The patent facts haven't changed — we belong to one global ethical domain (Dower), and we are not doing enough for the world's poor (Satz). It isn't ways that are lacking, it's wills.

Part VI contains two essays that put the home country of most contributors to this book under the spotlight, Hugo Bedau writing on 'Capital Punishment' and Henry Shue on 'War'. Penal practices and military policies of the United States come out poorly if the principles explored in these essays are taken seriously. Capital punishment, though (surprisingly?), survives better Bedau's scrutiny than war survives Shue's. Bedau's enormously careful sifting of the arguments for and against capital punishment results in the conclusion that 'even the best argument against the death penalty is not beyond challenge' (730), in part because even that argument rests on empirical claims (about the brutalizing effect of the penalty, e.g.), the truth of which is not established beyond doubt. Shue makes it clear that the constraints on any moral justification for war are extremely tight, and certainly not met by (for instance) campaigns to protect the supply of oil, even if coated with layers of the rhetoric of freedom.

Anita Allen's essay on privacy is to be commended for going beyond the traditional debates over privacy that are now over a hundred years old. As she notes, the issue began to gain interest among scholars in the 1960's, and the literature has grown exponentially since. She gives a good survey and taxonomy of this literature. However, the essay is valuable for also including both a section on feminist approaches to privacy and one on privacy in relation to digital technology. Both of these, in my view, represent challenges to mainstream approaches to privacy, challenges both conceptual and practical at the level of policy.

Of the authors, 21 are based in the United States, 8 in the U.K. and 3 elsewhere (some of the essays have two authors). There is something of a U.S. tilt to the book — not so much in the selection of topics, as in the strategies by which discussion of the topics is pursued. Walter Feinberg's essay on affirmative action, for instance, and Naomi Zack's on race and racism, interesting pieces though they are, discuss the issue wholly within a context defined by a country that uses 'race' as a fundamental social category and has a history of repression of racial minorities. But the issue is of wider significance, and other nations have found other ways to approach the issue. There's ample evidence of the tendency which is widespread among U.S.-based writers on political and legal matters to regard U.S. constitutional law and its accompanying political battles as how things are *simpliciter*, not as how they are in one particular country and legal tradition. Kukathas does not write only about Australia's immigration problems, although they do serve as useful examples for him from time to time. John Harris and Søren Holm in their piece on 'Abortion' don't write only about Europe's struggles with abortion law. Brenda Almond doesn't only write about families in

Britain. Why do people in the U.S. feel that doing U.S. constitutional law is the same thing as doing philosophy? The noise you now hear is that of a hobby-horse being returned to its cupboard.

Notwithstanding the previous whinge, this *Handbook* is a fine volume, and deserves a place on the bookshelf of anyone with an interest in practical ethics — or at least (more realistically, until it appears in paperback) in the institutional library of anyone with an interest in practical ethics.

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**George Liébert**

*Nietzsche and Music.*

Trans. David Pellauer and Graham Parkes.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2004.

Pp. x + 291.

US\$38.00. ISBN 0-226-48087-9.

Conventional wisdom reduces Nietzsche's association with music to a tormented personal relationship with Richard Wagner that cuts off serious thinking whenever it intrudes into his writings. George Liébert opposes this tendency — widespread 'particularly in France' (8) — to personalize the association because in order to understand Nietzsche's *philosophy* 'it is as important to know *Tristan und Isolde*, *Parsifal* and Wagner's principal theoretical writings as it is to know the complete works of Schopenhauer, Kant or Heidegger' (viii). To evaluate this strong claim it helps to have a good knowledge of both the history of European music from Rameau to Stravinsky and traditional theories of music aesthetics (Rousseau's and Hanslick's, in particular). Still, *Nietzsche and Music* is jargon-free, smoothly translated and contains some excellent expository writing. Nietzsche scholars will be impressed by Liébert's encyclopedic grasp of what seems to be every musically relevant comment ever written by Nietzsche — in notes, letters and the published works. And many readers will appreciate the editorial decision to locate references to the latter works in English titles rather than the standard German and French critical editions, because Liébert entices one to review even familiar passages with fresh eyes. One thing seems clear. Music did exert a profound influence on Nietzsche's intellectual development that has never been adequately documented.

Liébert's more specific claims regarding the nature of this influence depend upon the cogency of his interpretation of an essential biographical

fact, namely, that Nietzsche was an enthusiastic *practitioner* of music. He had mastered pieces by Beethoven and Haydn two years after starting to play the piano at five years old, and by ten was trying his hand at composition. His youthful proficiency at music, Liébert says, is likely the source of his later 'perspectivism' because 'any musical score only offers the work in a virtual state' whereas in reality 'music exists only as interpreted' (15). The same is true of Nietzsche's habit of evaluating literary works (of his own and others) according to criteria such as rhythm and tempo. Conceiving his writings as an extension and transformation of a first craft is fascinating, but Liébert spends much more time on the psycho-physiological reality of music for a myopic Nietzsche who listened to music with an intensity that left him fatigued for days. Such an effort was required because music, he believed, was able to express insights that resisted the superficial, conceptual character of language. Music, moreover, could evoke a mystic overcoming of life's sufferings, and hence was akin to religion. In this regard, Liébert highlights the striking resemblance to Luther and Rousseau, two of Nietzsche's future antagonists. His crucial point, however, is that when the teenaged Nietzsche turned against the dead symbolism of religion, music was left as the sole vehicle of his *salvation*.

According to Liébert, then, Nietzsche's original vision of life was a classic form of German romanticism. This makes standard sense of *Birth of Tragedy*. Schopenhauer's metaphysics — music is the 'mirror of universal will' — represents Dionysus as 'the musician god' (33) Nietzsche had worshipped since boyhood. And Wagner is cast as Dionysus reborn, composing the redeeming music of the future. Yet Liébert insists that despite attempts at rebellion Nietzsche always *remained* a Romantic. This sharply contradicts Nietzsche's understanding. For he represented his break with Wagner as the moment in which he emerged as an 'opposite type' *overcoming* all romanticism after being repulsed by Wagner's rejection of Siegfried's paganism and sudden conversion to Parsifal's neo-Christian decadence. Liébert advances his own position by generalizing *Ecce Homo's* advice that whenever the name 'Wagner' appears in the fourth *Untimely Meditation* (*Wagner in Bayreuth*) the reader should replace it with 'Nietzsche'. In writing his early works, that is, Nietzsche represented in others what he aspired to become. In reading his retrospective self-representation, Liébert treats Nietzsche's criticism of 'Wagner' as a masked condemnation of his *own* Romantic temptation to treat music as an existential narcotic. And though the image of 'Nietzsche' exuberantly affirms life in all its pain and suffering, it expresses an underlying desire 'to be more Wagnerian than Wagner' (81).

Liébert's ingenious interpretive strategy is supported by a detailed account of Nietzsche's errors and exaggerations: 'in seeking to stylize his existence' through Wagner 'Nietzsche was hardly going to let facts get in the way' (126). It pays off in the book's central chapters by revealing the depth of Nietzsche's involvement in nineteenth-century music aesthetics. Still, it threatens the broader normative significance of Nietzsche's writings. For instance, the seemingly *philosophical* concept of 'overcoming ... always



signifies overtrumping' and Nietzsche overtrumps Wagner's alleged Christianity with a masochistic new variety of romanticism that Liebert calls 'hyper-Christianity' (141). This *psychological* approach is intensified by the fact that Nietzsche grudgingly accepted the judgment of music masters such as Wagner and Hans von Bülow that he was no more than a 'gifted amateur' (22) at his beloved first craft. For if Nietzsche was in fact a life-long Romantic then he must have conceived his writing as a substitute activity engaged in the impossible task of expressing insights that only music could successfully express. It follows that Nietzsche's philosophizing is motivated by Wagner envy. And given the book's focus on music aesthetics, the impression that Wagner is usually the superior theoretician also makes sense.

Above all, consider Liébert's frequent assertion that Nietzsche's writings exhibit the same flaws as his musical compositions. In a chapter entitled 'At The Piano', Liébert does give a judicious critique of Nietzsche's musical talent — excels at improvisation and the composition of *lieder* with borrowed poetry but completely lacks organizational skills — that acts as a wonderful companion to available recordings. But there is no similar body of evidence and analysis to justify this judgment of Nietzsche's literary talent. The concluding chapter does break free of the circular reasoning that provides the book's overall structure. It acknowledges that Nietzsche's later style 'gains in breadth and alacrity; its tempo is livelier, communicating to the reader a euphoria that is both at once physical and intellectual' (197). And it reiterates an earlier point regarding Nietzsche's affinity with Stravinsky's *Rite of Spring* in a way that evokes his thoroughly *non-Wagnerian* concept of 'dance' (178). Yet these intriguing comments are best developed in a context that assumes the independent philosophical value of Nietzsche's writings. *Nietzsche and Music* would also benefit from an engagement with relevant literature in English by contemporary philosophers. Nevertheless, this book is now the indispensable starting point for anyone interested in exploring the association between Nietzsche and music.

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**Anthony S.R. Manstead, Nico Frijda, and  
Agneta Fischer, eds.**

*Feelings and Emotions:*

*The Amsterdam Symposium.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.

Pp. xvi + 482.

US\$95.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81652-1);

US\$34.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-52101-7).

The Amsterdam Symposium, held in 2001, was inspired by three previous conferences on feelings and emotions held in the states in 1927, 1948, and 1969. Like its predecessors, its aim was to represent and address the most important recent research in the field, emerging from disciplines as diverse as psychology, cognitive science, philosophy, anthropology, economics, and sociology. Similarly, *Feelings and Emotion* (the 'book of the conference') will not be of interest to philosophers only, but also to those of many other walks of academic life (only two of the twenty-four essays are written by people working in philosophy), though an introductory book for the layperson it ain't.

*Feelings and Emotions* consists of twenty-four essays divided into five more or less equal parts: *The Nature of Feelings and Emotions*, *Basic Psychological processes in Feelings and Emotions*, *Feelings and Emotions, The Place of Pleasure*, *Feelings and Emotions in their Sociocultural Context*, and *Feelings, Emotions, and Morality*. Contributors include the editors themselves, as well as other scholars such as Robert C. Solomon, Jon Elster, and Antonio R. Damasio, all of whom are renowned for their work in the field. Conspicuous by their absence are Peter Goldie, Patricia Greenspan, Roberts C. Roberts, and Ronald de Sousa. Despite such omissions, there is no essay in the volume that does not merit discussion, though in this review focus only on those which will be of particular interest to philosophers.

In his essay 'On the Passivity of the Passions', Solomon argues, against the current grain (which includes Jon Elster), that many emotions and their expressions are voluntary, and that we should consequently view ourselves as *agents* of our emotions, something which in turn threatens the traditional conception of emotions as *passions*. Solomon's argument appeals to Aristotle's observations of occasions on which we would be held responsible for the emotions we exhibit (18). The examples are convincing, but what they prove is questionable, for, even if it were true that 'ought' implies 'can' (something which is itself contentious), it is far from clear that we are the *agents* of all things for which we are responsible. Responsibility may imply agency *somewhere* down the line (this was Aristotle's point about training ourselves to exhibit virtuous dispositions), but to say — as Solomon wishes to claim — that we are the *agents* of our emotions (and, indeed of our *beliefs* we might add, for we can be held responsible for these too) is to look over a very useful everyday distinction between things we do and things that happen to us. Solomon may well be right that we do things like 'work

ourselves up to a rage' (16, 18), but working oneself up to a rage is not the same as *feeling* rage. Moreover, we do not work ourselves up to a rage either voluntarily or intentionally.

Despite the 'scientific revolution on emotions' which (in their introduction) the editors tell us the volume takes stock of, Aristotle's reflections on the emotions (be they in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Poetics*, or *On Rhetoric*) make a number of favourable appearances throughout the volume. For example he is appealed to (along with Seneca) by Nancy Sherman, who (in her essay 'Virtue and Emotional Demeanor') successfully argues that emotional demeanor plays an important role in the expression of moral character (452), and by Jon Elster, who (in his essay 'Emotions and Rationality') discusses the connections between reasoning and the emotions. Elster makes a good case for the traditional view that emotions can interfere with, and consequently subvert, *instrumental* rationality, while criticising the idea (put forward by writers such as de Sousa and Damasio) that they can *ever* enhance it.

Damasio's own contribution to the volume ('Emotions and Feelings: A neurobiological perspective') is an attempt to argue that '[e]motion is as much amenable to scientific study as any other aspect of our behaviour'(49). Leaving aside the puzzling claim that emotion is an *aspect* of our behaviour (rather than something which lies behind it, possibly as a cause), we might still wonder about the sense in which emotion might be amenable to scientific investigation. This question brings us to a recurring theme among many of the essays, namely the very distinction between feelings and emotions. Solomon refers to emotion as 'a process that continues via the cerebral hemispheres' (19), and Damasio to feeling as 'the mental representation of the physiological changes that occur during an emotion ... the perception of an emotional state, as enacted in the body' (Damasio, 52), and sure enough, such characterisations make both feelings and emotions seem like the sort of entities which science concerns itself with on a day to day basis. But, as Richard A. Shweder argues in 'Deconstructing Emotions for the Sake of Comparative Research', emotions are 'something we must form an idea of, conceptualize and define, or at least elucidate, if we are to know what we are talking about when we use words to theorize about emotions and record them' (82). To use Shweder's own example, sadness is an emotion a normal person will feel 'when the things he or she wants or likes are believed to be permanently unattainable or lost' (87). But it makes no sense to say that the things we feel (or indeed suspect, believe, desire etc.) are to be located in our brains! Nor is it true that a person's feeling sad consists in their perceiving an emotional state of theirs, let alone representing any physiological change (whatever that might mean). Finally, although people often feel *emotional*, it seems to me that we do not feel our emotions anymore than we suspect our suspicions or desire our desires. Rather, an emotion *is* a strong mental feeling. To have such a feeling is to be emotionally affected, and we may share emotions such as strong feelings *of* fear, hope, betrayal etc. with others, in which case *what* we feel is not (the emotions of) fear and betrayal, but, quite simply, afraid and betrayed.



Shweder's own conclusions are somewhat different (and, in my opinion, far more radical) than mine. For example, he claims that the concept of sadness presupposes the utilitarian moral theory that it is good for people to have the things they want and like (88). Yet utilitarianism does not suggest that all desires ought to be fulfilled (think of desires whose fulfillment would cause much pain to others), and even if it did amount to such a (crazy) theory, the idea of sadness would still not imply it, but only the truism that the person who feels sad will think that it would have been a good thing for at least one of *his or her* wants and likes to have been fulfilled.

Overall this is an interesting collection of conference proceedings that touches upon many issues central to the philosophy of feelings and emotions. Given that many of the contributors were arguing against views that have been defended by some of the other contributors, it's a shame that the editors did not take advantage of this opportunity to solicit helpful replies to the essays — for example Elster could have responded to Solomon, Damasio to Elster, and so on and so forth.

### **Constantine Sandis**

The Open University

### **Joseph Melia**

*Modality.*

Montreal: McGill-Queen's University  
Press 2003.

Pp. viii + 190.

Cdn\$/US\$80.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-7735-2480-0);

Cdn\$27.95/US\$22.95

(paper: ISBN 0-7735-2481-9).

Modality is a core area of philosophical inquiry that overlaps metaphysics and the philosophy of language. Although the study of modality has a long and rich history, it endured relative neglect throughout modern philosophy and the early analytic period. In the mid-to-late twentieth century, modality enjoyed a renaissance. The renaissance was spurred by, but spread well beyond, the development of modal logics and of possible-worlds semantics.

Melia's *Modality* is a lively and accessible introduction to the topic. It presupposes familiarity with first-order predicate logic, but other than that does a rather good job of taking nothing for granted. Melia explains why modality is worthy of interest, and covers the basic requisites for literacy in the current debates. The book includes an overview of standard modal logics,

of reasons to be skeptical about modality, and some fairly comprehensive discussion of some pertinent semantic and metaphysical questions.

Chapter 1, 'Introduction to Modality', motivates interest in modal questions and lays out some basic terminology and issues. Possible worlds are the last topic to be introduced; in keeping with the last few decades of literature on the topic, Melia's book is largely focused on the solutions afforded by, and the new problems attendant upon, the use of possible worlds in philosophizing about modality.

Chapter 2, 'Modal Language and Modal Logic', compares and contrasts a quantified modal logic that does not quantify over possibilities and a model-theoretic possible-worlds semantics that does. Melia argues that the latter clearly outperforms, in terms of expressive and computational powers. However, quantification over possibilities brings with it some serious explanatory burdens.

Chapter 3, 'Quinean Skepticism', rehearses some central arguments against the intelligibility or coherence of the systematic study of modality. Melia runs through extensionality, opacity, essentialism, and quantifying in. He argues that the skeptics have not sufficiently supported any good reasons to refrain from modal inquiry. So, the explanatory burdens left off at the end of Chapter 2 must be taken up, and the main focus of the remainder of the book is on arguments for and against various options for handling them.

Chapter 4, 'Modalism', argues against the view that tries to take necessity and possibility seriously while treating these concepts as unanalyzed primitives. (Prior is the most important recent advocate of such a view.) Modalists are committed to refraining from quantifying over possibilities or making reference to possible worlds. Melia argues that modalists have insurmountable trouble interpreting even fairly tame modal claims, along the lines of 'There could have been more things than there actually are', or 'There are exactly three ways in which this system could evolve'.

Chapter 5, 'Extreme Realism', examines Lewis' unorthodox view that all possibilities exist. Melia holds that the considerable explanatory yield netted by this bold move is outweighed by 'its massive ontological burden' and 'the terrible damage it does to our tenets of common sense' (121).

Chapter 6, 'Quiet Modal Realism', considers some more orthodox views according to which possible worlds are some sort of abstract entity (different versions of which have been defended by Plantinga, Stalnaker, and Armstrong, among others). The qualification 'quiet' signals Melia's contention that, unlike Lewis' extreme realism or the linguistic approach to be surveyed in Chapter 7, these varieties of realism about worlds remain silent on the question of what it is for a proposition to be true at a world. Melia alleges that they thereby contain an illicit unanalyzed primitive.

Finally, Chapter 7, 'Possible Worlds as Sets of Sentences', defends what Melia calls the 'linguistic approach'. Although Melia clearly holds that taking possible worlds to be sets of sentences has more to be said for it and less to be said against it than the alternatives, his avowal is qualified: since some

serious central questions still remain open, at present this approach to the metaphysics of modality is just a 'promising research program' (172).

One flaw in the book's central argument is that two crucial contentions are not sufficiently developed — specifically, the contentions that a serious problem with the varieties of quiet modal realism is that they must take 'truth at' as an unanalyzed primitive, and that a key point in favor of the linguistic approach is that it is able to define the 'truth at' relation (cf., e.g., pp. 123-6, 155-7, *passim*). As each of the contenders catalogued in Chapter 6 (e.g., Plantinga, Stalnaker, Armstrong) clearly offers a recipe for determining the truth-value of any proposition at any world, it is not clear exactly what the quiet modal realisms are alleged to lack.

It is not contentious that there are questions in the neighborhood to which Lewis does, but the quiet modal realists do not, explicitly provide answers. Crucially, though, Melia puts the linguistic approach on Lewis' side of this divide, with respect to this central 'truth at' question, and this categorization plays a key role in his argument that the linguistic approach is the most promising research program. However, this categorization is not sufficiently explained or supported, and so this central argument is likely to seem capricious to the book's target audience.

Another criticism is that it is not clear that the intelligibility or worth of possible-worlds semantics depends on comprehensive theoretical answers to some of the metaphysical questions with which Melia engages. The questions seemed urgent in the 1970s, and Lewis' work has certainly kept them relevant to a wide range of debates. However, see pp.15-20 of Kripke's 'Preface' to *Naming and Necessity* (Harvard University Press 1980) for reasons to think that some of these metaphysical worries are misguided and inconsequential. Melia's book would be improved by considering Kripke's considerations.

In any case, given the centrality of modality to much of both traditional and contemporary philosophy, and the paucity of good accessible introductions to the subject, there is definitely a niche to be filled here. Divers' *Possible Worlds* (Routledge 2002) is another recent contender, but it is significantly more thorough and advanced. This book would be very helpful reading for senior undergraduate and beginning graduate students. I have already had opportunity to recommend it to students, and I will do so again.

**Arthur Sullivan**

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**Nikolay Milkov**

*A Hundred Years of English Philosophy.*

New York: Springer 2003.

Pp. ix + 302.

US\$138.00. ISBN 1-4020-1432-5.

Nikolay Milkov's *A Hundred Years of English Philosophy* devotes a chapter each to Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Strawson and Dummett. It is a very peculiar book. The peculiarity lies in Milkov's approach to his subject matter: 'This book is a historical investigation of the leading philosophical movement in England in the twentieth century ... The book does not aim, however, at delivering a story. This means, above all, that generalizations and conclusions are reduced to a minimum — an approach adopted in an endeavour to avert the danger of subjectivism that interpreting the philosophers under scrutiny would impose ... My first objective is to cover as many themes and problems discussed by these seven authors as possible. In this way I strive to follow the main tenet of analytic philosophy: flawless analysis' (ix).

It is difficult to review such a work. Because Milkov does not attempt to 'deliver a story' — a non-attempt at which he succeeds — one cannot describe its thesis or sketch its argument. There is none to describe; none to sketch. In each chapter one gets a small dose of biographical information along with capsule summaries of many of the author's works. This is not to say that Milkov — despite his cryptic worries about the 'subjectivism' inherent in interpretation — refrains from interpretive judgments. For example, he chastises Moore's later interpreters for taking him to be a philosopher of language rather than a metaphysician (19); states that Wittgenstein's sole concern in the *Tractatus* is with language (84); draws a parallel between Ryle and Dummett, noting that both are concerned with the 'creative mind' (148n71) and concurs with the judgment that Strawson's *Individuals* is simply an elaboration of the view defended in 'On Referring' (194n34). I've selected these examples more or less at random. Their quality is uneven — the remark about the *Tractatus* is clearly wrong; the claims about Moore and Strawson quite right, and the interpretation of Ryle and Dummett intriguing — but they are representative of the work as a whole.

Naturally a work such as this one raises a host of fundamental questions. Is it a distortion to treat English philosophy in isolation from philosophical developments in the United States? Is there any justification for giving Ryle, Austin, Strawson and Dummett equal billing with Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein? Are there some figures (Dummett) who might just as well have been left out, and others (Grice) who ought to have been included? To answer any of these questions Milkov would have had to 'tell a story' and defend an 'interpretation'. Because they are absent, this work is ultimately unsatisfying.

Though unsatisfying, *A Hundred Years of English Philosophy* is not without value. Milkov is extremely generous with quotations from the writ-

ers he discusses. No one with an interest in the history of analytic philosophy will fail to have her thoughts stimulated by at least some of them. While I have my reservations about placing Ryle and Strawson on a par with Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein, I also believe that the relative neglect into which their work has fallen is unfortunate. If Milkov's book stimulates interest in their work, it will have performed a valuable service. Lastly, as I have indicated, Milkov does at times have interesting things to say about the figures under discussion. Unfortunately, his approach to the subject matter prevents him from developing and contextualizing them. Thus, they are at best suggestive.

**Max Rosenkrantz**

California State University, Long Beach

**Bryan G. Norton**

*Searching for Sustainability:  
Interdisciplinary Essays in the Philosophy  
of Conservation Biology.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2003.  
Pp. viii + 554.

US\$121.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-80990-8);

US\$42.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-00778-X).

In this collection of twenty-seven of his articles, Bryan Norton views the concept of *sustainability* through a number of disciplinary perspectives including philosophical pragmatism, policy science, economics, ecology, and environmental evaluation. Norton advances what he calls a *practical philosophy*, a problem-oriented approach that struggles with real environmental issues facing communities (8, 49-50). He distinguishes this from *applied philosophy* that develops general philosophical principles independent of local context and policy processes and then applies them to design and evaluate policies (49-50). Norton places his work in the adaptive management tradition of C.S. Holling and Carl Walters, which, in turn, traces its intellectual roots to John Dewey and pragmatism (306).

Norton's practical approach, reflected in his emphasis on adaptive management throughout the work, demonstrates a deep concern for effective protection of species and ecosystems while simultaneously increasing our limited knowledge of them (111). The three adaptive management principles he identifies (the need to be experimental, temporally and spatially multi-scalar, and place-sensitive; 520-1) each shape his approach to understanding sustainability and sustainable development (famously, if not problemati-

cally, defined in *Our Common Future* as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (WCED, *Our Common Future* [Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987], 42). Norton convincingly argues for *strong sustainability*, the need to provide a structured bequest package of natural capital (including the resilience of ecological systems) to future generations (406, 428). This is contrasted with *weak sustainability* that views all forms of capital, including natural capital, as substitutable, thereby allowing an unstructured bequest to the future with the potential for greatly diminished stocks of natural capital if offset by human-made capital.

Norton's work is essential reading for those willing to engage the issues raised by advocates of strong sustainability, taking seriously the potential constraints and opportunities for human activity if we are to sustain our ecological systems for future generations. In this light, Norton's focus on the philosophy of conservation biology is not only for specialists in this field, but is central for those making an academic study of sustainability in general. Conservation biology as both a descriptive and evaluative science (akin to medicine) is also a valuable approach to sustainability given its potential for developing descriptive/evaluative terms (such as 'ecological health') needed for articulating long-term sustainability goals (Ch. 9).

*Searching for Sustainability* creatively addresses a number of important philosophical topics related to sustainability. Norton's treatment of how to value biological resources draws upon the works of Henry David Thoreau and Aldo Leopold to affirm a non-consumptive value of nature that enables a transformation in our own self-understanding as a species (33). In so doing, Norton bypasses what he sees as a false dilemma between those who value natural resources only in terms of future human consumption and those who see nature as having intrinsic value, value for its own sake, apart from human beings. Norton is not dismissive of the possibility that species and ecosystems have intrinsic value, but sees arguments based on a concern for future generations of human beings providing an equally powerful commitment to preserve biological resources for the future. According to Norton, '... a policy of saving as many species as possible is the logical implication of either a non-human-centered value system or a human-centered value system which recognizes the full range of human values' (475). This anthropocentric focus is, by Norton's own admission, also intentionally strategic in having greater effectiveness at influencing decision makers to protect biological resources (469-70). Norton then provides a convincing philosophical justification for why we should be concerned with intergenerational equity over lengthy time horizons, a concern at the heart of sustainability (Ch. 22).

Many readers will be satisfied by Norton's ability to integrate various ethical approaches to environmental valuation. Norton rejects moral monism, 'the view that a single principle suffices to support a uniquely correct moral judgement in every situation' (47). For Norton, moral monism is an approach shared by both deep ecologists committed to inherent value in nature and economists committed to a utilitarian, preferential calculus.



Norton instead advocates a pluralistic approach that sees the potential for multiple kinds of measures of environmental values. Norton's pluralistic response to moral monism relies, in part, on his introduction of *hierarchy theory*, a method of modelling ecological systems, that assumes they 'exhibit nestedness, with smaller subsystems changing more rapidly than do the larger systems which form their environment' (405). These larger systems provide the opportunities and constraints for individuals within the nested subsystems. Different ways of evaluating are appropriate at different scales within these systems. Human economic activity focused on very short time horizons fails to take into account the larger, slower moving ecological systems in which they are embedded. For Norton, our decision-making requires, in Aldo Leopold's words, 'thinking like a mountain', taking into account these multiple geographical and ecological scales, both temporally and spatially (44). The ultimate challenge of ecological management, he argues, is then to preserve the self-organizing capacity of these larger systems, whether biological, climatological, or atmospheric, since the autonomy of these systems ensures the ongoing diversity and complexity of biological resources needed to provide future generations with a broad range of opportunities (176-8).

Part of Norton's response to moral monism throughout the work is to shift to valuing the *processes* that sustain individuals, populations, and species, as opposed to narrowly focusing on *elements* of these systems (302). This avoids needing to ascribe ontological status to ecological processes in order to see them as having moral value (58). Norton observes this focus on elements rather than processes at work in environmental management approaches that treat biological resources atomistically rather than focusing on the relationships between species and systems of species and the dynamic ecosystem processes that sustain them. Having shifted to a focus that includes the centrality of ecological processes, Norton is then able to defend *ecosystem integrity* and *ecosystem health* as key policy goals (Ch. 17) that can expand and help operationalize our understanding of the bequest of natural capital (beyond a narrow inventory of species and populations).

In addition to the valuable philosophical contributions in this work, Norton's collection of essays is timely given recent roll-backs in environmental protection policies in Canada and the United States in favour of economic development, particularly in wilderness areas. Norton addresses key economic assumptions head-on that frequently lie unstated yet assumed in policy debates. These include the idea of *consumer sovereignty*, 'the assumption that tastes and preferences are givens and that the economic problem consists of optimally satisfying those preferences' (251), and the *Principle of Infinite Intersubstitutability* assumed by economists advocating weak sustainability (170).

Norton argues that ultimately the choice of what kind of legacy a community leaves future generations is a political problem 'to be determined in political arenas' (511). He sees a need to develop 'community processes by which democratically governed communities can, through the voices of their

members, explore their common values and differences and choose which places and key values will be saved, achieving as much consensus as possible, and continuing debates about differences' (511). Norton describes this as a 'difficult and complex' task (511) but his work does not provide much guidance in how this could be achieved. This is especially a concern where democratic spaces within communities are non-existent or in decline, especially with declining powers and resources of democratic states under economic globalization. A worthwhile addition would be an exploration of how the goals of sustainability might be achieved within the context of market institutions and activities outside the scope of democratic accountability, perhaps examining more closely the concept of *sustainable livelihoods*. A promising route could also explore how the ideas of adaptive management and hierarchy theory, so central to Norton's work, might be fruitfully applied in understanding our own political and economic institutions in ways that strategically advance sustainability.

Norton's writing style is analytical, clear, and easy to understand. Some repetition of ideas is understandable given that the work is a collection of essays, yet the recurrence of themes in a variety of contexts allows the reader to see the multi-dimensional importance of key concepts. *Searching for Sustainability* is easily read as a whole, due to these recurring themes, introductory sections, and the addition of ample cross references. Norton's commitment to a practical philosophy perhaps contributes to his refreshing use of a variety of real life examples throughout the work. He is also sympathetic in his treatment of other authors while remaining passionate about the goals of sustainability.

Norton has extensively explored those areas of philosophy, economics (including ecological economics), and biology (among others) needed to convincingly address sustainability issues in an academic setting. He provides interesting avenues for future research. His work is also highly accessible for those seeking a crash course in the philosophical issues of sustainability (perhaps appropriate given the start of the United Nation's *Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, 2005-2014*) as well as those seeking to apply the concept of sustainability in policy and other practical contexts.

**Roger Petry**

Luther College

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**C.G. Prado, ed.**

*A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy.*

Amherst, NY: Humanity Books 2003.

Pp. 329.

US\$35.00. ISBN 1-59102-105-7.

According to the book's editor, C.G. Prado, the aim of this collection is to explore the differences and similarities among philosophers in the analytic and continental traditions (9). Following the hypothesis that generalities about each tradition is a less useful guide for understanding the contemporary cleft between these two camps, each of the eleven essays looks closely at seminal thinkers from each of the two traditions. Drawing from philosophers as wide ranging as, e.g., Heidegger, Russell, Foucault, Quine, and Gadamer, some of the essays even attempt to problematize the very division that characterizes 'Continental' and 'analytic' philosophy as incommensurable. For instance, in his essay 'Heidegger and Quine on the (Ir)relevance of Logic for Philosophy' (155-84), Richard Matthews argues that although Heidegger and Quine differ with regard to their account of the precise role and aim of philosophy, they do share certain similarities with respect to the status of logic and poetry within philosophical thinking (180-1). Meanwhile in Prado's own contribution 'Correspondence, Construction, and Realism' (185-212), he attempts to demonstrate that Foucault's view of truth is in fact much closer to thinkers like Davidson and Putnam than John Searle is to either of these two 'analytic' philosophers (207); moreover, Prado even goes so far as to suggest that 'if realism is understood as Putnam understands it rather than as Searle presents it, and if truth stops being accurate portrayal, the most fundamental grounds of the traditional analytic/Continental distinction evaporate' (208).

Of course not all of the essays assembled in *A House Divided* point toward a smooth convergence between these two modes of philosophical thinking. Edward Witherspoon's 'Much Ado About Nothing' (291-322) considers the structural obstacles that Carnap's interpretation of Heidegger faces given his *a priori* prejudice of 'logical' explanations over 'phenomenological accounts' of an experience that is basic to human existing (318), while Babette Babich, in 'On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy' (63-104), suggests that the 'analytic' tendency to follow and accept the lead of the natural sciences prohibits it, in advance, from ever properly undertaking an effective 'analysis' of the precise nature of scientific inquiry (66).

Of special interest in this collection is Richard Rorty's essay 'Analytic and Conversational Philosophy' (17-32) and Barry Stocker's 'Time, Synthesis, and the End of Metaphysics' (259-90) for their respective suggestions concerning possible manners in which to *rethink* the common understanding of this contemporary philosophical divide. Stocker suggests that instead of the misleading and rather unhelpful 'geographic' label of 'Continental', we would be better off with the more appropriate name 'Philosophy of Critique' (259);



he argues that this term better represents the thinkers that fall under the common 'continental' umbrella, because many of them, if not all, are engaged with certain problems stemming from Kant concerning the precise status and ground of philosophy, and more generally with the issue of how there can even be a thing like philosophy (259-60). Meanwhile Rorty's own essay is of interest for his attempt to rename the analytic-Continental divide in terms of 'analytic-conversational' philosophy (26). Rorty diagnoses the contemporary division as one that obtains between certain ahistorical and historical commitments (he points out, e.g., that students trained in 'analytic' schools are often expected to jump from Kant to Frege, and thus, by skipping the Hegel-Nietzsche-Heidegger sequence, often feel quite justified in retaining the Kantian notion that there are universal structures of thought and rationality [25]). Rorty offers the term 'conversational' philosophy in the place of 'continental' philosophy because, unlike the prejudices of many 'analytic' philosophers, thinkers that follow in Hegel's footsteps (of which he includes himself [28]) have a greater tendency to see their own thought as part of a wider cultural-literary-aesthetic conversational context (26-9). Rorty suggests that these two schools can indeed one day become part of one and the same conversation once certain metaphilosophical presuppositions are disregarded as being axiomatic, and instead become part of a genuine philosophical debate (28-9).

Now although this collection does attempt to reach a broad range of philosophical issues spanning the continental-analytic divide, there does, of course, appear to be some rather notable and unfortunate omissions. One such omission that may have been fruitful would have been a look at the different manners in which thinkers from the two schools approach emancipatory movements such as 'feminism', e.g., an examination of the different ways in which thinkers like Irigaray and Kristeva analyze the category of 'woman' could have shed some unique and interesting light in contrast to the 'analytic' approaches of a philosopher like Alison Jagger. Moreover, another area of interest that may have been rewarding would have been an examination of the phenomenological insights into ethics that Emmanuel Levinas offers in the light of the more recent efforts of contemporary analytic philosophers (e.g., Christine Korsgaard) to also think the precise source of ethical normativity.

Despite these unfortunate omissions however (which are the necessary constraints of any collection), *A House Divided* assembles an impressive assortment of insightful and informative essays. For those interested in the nature of the analytic-Continental divide, this collection of essays offers several evenhanded and measured approaches for thinking, and rethinking, this division characteristic of the contemporary philosophical climate.

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### Francis Remedios

*Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge:  
An Introduction to Steve Fuller's Social  
Epistemology.*

Lanham: Lexington Books 2003.

Pp. xii + 142.

US\$55.00. ISBN 0-7391-0667-8.

The underlying theme of *Legitimizing Scientific Knowledge: An Introduction to Steve Fuller's Social Epistemology* is identified already in Fuller's foreword when he says that Francis Remedios 'certainly has had more patience in dealing with my own and my interlocutors' arguments than I would have had' (vii). Remedios touches on this theme in Chapter 1, tracing a key motivation behind Fuller's social epistemology back to 'his impatience with traditional epistemology' (22). This tradition informs the book, and much of what makes it interesting is its author's patient attention to his object's impatience. Indeed, while Fuller finds Remedios' treatment of his work 'sympathetic' (vii) and Remedios describes his own reading of Fuller's works as 'charitable' (7), there is an enormous difference in the temperament of these two philosophers. What Remedios calls his 'important criticisms' (1) and 'best reading' (7) of Fuller's work, then, must be understood from the point of view of a project from which Fuller's social epistemology has grown increasingly estranged.

Fuller's writing generally starts *in medias res* (23), with science in its social context, because he believes analytic philosophy 'is in slow but terminal decline' as a result of a variety of strategies intended to 'conceptually immuniz[e it] from the influences of other disciplines' (vii), in short, that it has decontextualized itself right out of the race. Remedios rightly identifies this race as the defence of the cognitive authority of science — the 'legitimation project'. The book is devoted to rehearsing the arguments that situate Fuller's political approach between 'the Scylla of [analytic attempts to legitimize science epistemologically] and the Charybdis of [the postmodern] rejection of the legitimation project' (103). This, then, is another sense in which Fuller must begin 'in the midst of things', and Remedios' task is to report on Fuller's attempts to maintain his course in these troubled waters.

The book consists of a ten-page introduction and six chapters of roughly twenty pages each. Chapter 1 has the double purpose of identifying the problem of scientific legitimacy and construing Fuller's social epistemology as a development within analytic philosophy. Remedios is interested primarily in the response of analytic philosophy to the now rather well-entrenched implications of Thomas Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Fuller's work can indeed be seen as part of that response, however embarrassing this may be for both Fuller and analytic philosophy. But Remedios further identifies W. V. O. Quine as a key figure, noting that social epistemology is also an attempt to recover the normative dimension of epistemology in the wake of its naturalization and to do this by *socializing* it.

Chapters 2, 3 and 6 are each devoted a version of social epistemology: the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge (Bloor); the political version in its sociological (Fuller) and cultural studies (Rouse) variants; and the straight analytical or epistemological approach to the problem (Goldman). Chapter 4 addresses the normativity of social epistemology, and Chapter 5 tackles staple issues such as rationality and realism. Chapter 6 also does double duty as a conclusion, but this seems ill advised in its abruptness. A separate summing up would have been preferable. Nonetheless, by the end of it key positions and issues have been identified and meticulously referenced. As a survey of key trouble spots in the reception of Fuller's project by analytic philosophy, the book serves a function. One also gets a sense that Remedios envisages his own project as a peace-keeping mission: he seems like (but is he really?) a neutral observer who is patrolling a frontier, always respectful of the rights of sovereignty on both sides.

This, of course, makes for less than 'engaging' prose. Remedios enters into debates in order to effect a cessation of hostilities, not a resolution in anyone's favour. Key players serially 'hold', 'aver', 'note', and 'argue' their claims. While these positions are normally accurately reported (if too often quoted), there is a sense of exaggerated fairness which sometimes seems to grant the discussants responses where they really have nothing further to say. Remedios sometimes declares that the burden of proof has been shifted (often by Fuller) without convincingly showing us how this was accomplished. Remedios' reading is also strangely decontextualized, suggesting the authorial equality of anything that is said in these debates. He at one point (73) quotes Gary Hatfield's remarks on the HOPOS listserv along with Fuller's response, but without assessing the value of such remarks when compared with published, peer-reviewed statements, and telling us neither that HOPOS denotes the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science nor who Gary Hatfield is (who is never mentioned again). Another, more serious, example involves his citation of an episode in which 'Fuller seems to concede [a] point to [Remedios]' where two long passages are cited as 'Remedios 2000c' and 'Fuller 2000e'. Turning to the bibliography, however, we discover that these refer to emails, i.e., private correspondence between Fuller and Remedios.

The analytic focus (even bias) is of consequence for the way social epistemology is situated in 'the postmodern condition'. Remedios does not have a very elaborate sense of the gravity of Fuller's problem here, no doubt owing to his (or his book's) unfamiliarity with so-called 'continental' approaches to the same problems. Thus, the book is concentrated on the trouble with *paradigms* rather than *discourses*, although Fuller's approach has much greater affinities with Foucault's project than Kuhn's. Foucault does not appear anywhere in the book, nor does Derrida, though these continental figures have had a significant influence on Fuller's approach. Indeed, while Fuller is said to 'deconstruct' Kuhn (4, 112), he also assures his reader that Fuller's 'notion of science ... is not deconstructionist' (118). But Remedios' sense of this other side of Fuller is limited to remarks like 'Fuller is critical



of postmodernist notions of science, for he argues that the problems surrounding institutionalization and the deconstruction of knowledge and science have led to the “postmodern condition” (118), which is less than helpful in its circularity. One supposes that Remedios here discovers the limits of his own interpretive charity.

Still, the patient reader will be rewarded with a number of points at which to enter social epistemology from the field of analytic philosophy. More importantly, the book offers exactly as many points at which to exit that field. Outside is where the action is.

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**Timothy Shanahan**

*The Evolution of Darwinism.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.

Pp. 342.

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US\$28.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-54198-0).

Timothy Shanahan's *The Evolution of Darwinism* investigates the development of the theory of natural selection since Darwin first published *The Origin of Species*. Over the nearly one hundred and fifty years that have passed since, Darwin's theory of natural selection has undergone a number of changes; it has itself evolved. Understanding exactly how Darwinism has evolved is the first goal Shanahan sets for himself. But as he notes himself, this book is not 'history for history's sake'. Since 'scientific theories are themselves historical entities,' they are 'fully comprehensible only when understood against this background' (6). Shanahan's second goal then is to develop an 'understanding of the *sort of evolution* that forms the basis for contemporary Darwinism' (7). The inquiry in which he engages is meant to clarify and illuminate what Darwinism is today by analyzing its historical and philosophical roots.

Shanahan focuses on three central issues in Darwinism to accomplish his goals: selection, adaptation and progress. For each topic, Shanahan carefully studies what Darwin himself has said. Shanahan's well-researched and even-handed scholarship reveals that even Darwin was often not always of one mind. He traces Darwin's changing opinions through the various editions of the *Origin* to explain the rationale behind them. He next investigates how

contemporary debates are the product of these very roots. Modern debates about the nature and even possibility of evolutionary progress, for example between Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins, have roots in Darwin's own musings. True to his aim, Shanahan draws the connections between the modern debates and their historical roots.

Shanahan is not merely interested in tracing the roots of modern debates about evolutionary theory; he wishes to draw some conclusions as well. Consider first the issue of units of selection. Darwin himself, Shanahan notes, 'preferred to construe selection as operating amongst individual organisms' (24). Nevertheless, when faced with certain 'special difficulties', Darwin allowed the possibility that selection may function at higher levels. One special difficulty was that of the sterile castes in certain insect species. How could natural selection produce sterile insect castes if it operated solely at the level of the individual organism? Sterile individuals do not reproduce. Darwin's solution was to suggest that there may be 'selection for characteristics beneficial to the community, even if they were of no use (and actually detrimental) to the individuals possessing those characteristics' (25). In short, when pressed, Darwin would allow instances of group selection. Shanahan believes the appeal to group selection is not necessary. The solution to this 'special difficulty' lies in the notion of kin selection. According to kin selection theorists, the goal of reproduction is to increase the representation of an individual's genes in the next generation. In such cases, an individual may have useless or detrimental characteristics that are nonetheless favored by selection (that operates only on individuals) if those characteristics increase the chance of survival of a relative with whom the individual shares genes. In this way, traits that benefit the group can evolve without the need for group selection. Of course, this type of solution rests upon the role of genes in reproduction and selection. In an effort to avoid group selection, kin selection invites one to suppose that in fact it is genes that are the true units of selection; organisms, to use Dawkin's word, are mere temporary 'vehicles' for genes. Critics, such as Gould and Richard Lewontin, have argued that genes cannot be the units of selection. Because the characteristics produced by a gene are a function not merely of the gene itself, but also of the other genes the organism carries, the environment in which development takes place, and, to some extent, pure chance, selection simply cannot directly operate on genes. When selection acts, it must operate on the individuals in a population. Shanahan's final word on this debate is not entirely decisive. While gene selectionism offers a 'powerful general perspective from which to view (virtually) all evolutionary change', it does so 'at the expense of recognizing the complex interrelations among various biological entities that characterize every actual selection event.' By contrast, while Gould and Lewontin's view 'gains in completeness' by considering those very complex interrelations, it loses 'simplicity and usefulness' (89). In the end, Shanahan opts for a pluralist approach that attempts to balance the general predictive power of gene selectionism against the 'empirical specificity' of Gould and Lewontin's approach.

Shanahan's second major topic is adaptation. Does adaptation tend toward producing perfection in individual organisms? In 1837, Darwin believed it did: 'my theory makes all organic beings perfectly adapted to all situations, where in accordance with certain laws they can live' (100). By 1859, Darwin's views had changed. By then, Darwin had realized that 'the standard of superiority is always a *local* one' (104). That is, selection only makes an organism as perfect as it need be to compete with other inhabitants of its local environment. Darwin has passed from an absolute conception of perfection to a relative one. Furthermore, Darwin realized, as in the case of vestigial organs, that not all traits of an organism need be adaptations to the local environment. Since Darwin, evolutionary biologists have debated the 'power' of selection to produce adaptations. Adaptationists contend that all, or at least most, characteristics of an organism can be given an adaptationist explanation — that is, an account can be given of how natural selection could produce the characteristic. In short, it claims that all or most characteristics are, or were, adaptations. Non-adaptationists contend that some, or even many, characteristics may have other causes. Shanahan traces the history of this debate in the decades following the publication of the *Origin*. Despite an initial period of non-adaptationist thinking, evolutionary biologists became more and more adaptationist through the middle of the last century. Hoping to end this trend, Gould and Lewontin in 1979 published their now famous critique of adaptationism ('The Spandrels of San Marcos and the Panglossian Paradigm'). Shanahan reviews their criticisms as well as Daniel Dennett's spirited rebuttal (*Darwin's Dangerous Idea*, 1995). In the end, Shanahan argues that Gould and Lewontin's criticisms were beneficial. 'No longer can biologists simply assume *a priori* that all features of organisms are optimal features produced by natural selection.' Nonetheless, adaptationism, understood correctly, is still a 'fruitful methodology' (168).

The last topic Shanahan addresses is evolutionary progress. Darwin himself, reports Shanahan, believed evolution was progressive, but in a very precise sense. As time has passed, organisms have displayed 'advancement in the organization of living things, where the latter is marked by increasing specialization of parts and division of labor' (194). This conception that evolution is progressive has not been without its critics. Gould famously attacked the idea that evolution is directed toward improving species. Gould measured progress by the level of complexity of an organism. By this standard, Gould effectively makes a case that, as a whole, increased complexity is not due to selection, but to random movement away from a fixed lower bound of complexity. In the beginning, life was very simple; as a result, any change would tend toward greater complexity, even if that change were random. Moreover, as Gould argues, since the vast bulk of the biotic world is still bacteria, for the most part life has stayed simple. But Shanahan is not convinced. He agrees with Dawkins that complexity is not the proper measure of evolutionary progress. Rather, the measure of evolutionary progress is an organism's adaptive fit to its particular environment. Shanahan understands that measuring adaptive fit is not easy. Moreover, adaptive fit is tuned



to a particular environment. As the environment changes, 'what was an improvement may even become a liability' (236). How is that progress? Shanahan's answer to such problems is a more sophisticated measure of progress. Working within the notion that progress is measured by *long term* adaptive fit to the environment, Shanahan asks what about environments remains constant over the long term? His answer: change. 'Ability to survive and reproduce despite changing environmental conditions, therefore, would be a biological property the possession of which would always be an advantage' (237). Though an interesting suggestion, I do not see how this resolves the problems facing defenders of evolutionary progress. First, it is highly questionable that there has been any such progress. Organisms are still highly dependent upon their environment. Human intelligence may be proposed as an example of such progress. Nonetheless, humans as a species would likely not survive well if our environment underwent any significant change. Second, the fact that the vast majority of species that have inhabited the planet have gone extinct suggests that such progress has not occurred. Most species, it turns out, have not been able to remain adaptively fit and have been replaced. If one objects that they have been replaced by other more adaptively fit organisms, one should be suspect. The new species may be more adaptively fit to the *new* environment, but would not have been adaptively fit to the old. This is change, not progress.

Shanahan's book is a well written and researched investigation into some of the most central issues of evolutionary biology. Its relatively non-technical approach to the subject matter should make it accessible and enjoyable for more general audiences than many philosophy of biology texts.

### **Rod Watkins**

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### **Scott Soames**

*Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume 1, The Dawn of Analysis.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2003.

Pp. xix + 411.

US\$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-11573-7);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-12244-X).

Those expecting this book to be a serious contribution to the research literature on the early history of analytic philosophy will be disappointed. It is, instead, an undergraduate textbook, of a rather schematic kind with topics arranged in chronological order. The first of Soames' two volumes deals with

a bundle of topics arising between Moore's *Principia Ethica* (1903) and Quine's 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951); the second covers roughly the period 1950-75. This disproportion is the first clue that Soames' heart is not really in the history.

If one theme runs through the book it is the increasing sophistication of the analytic philosophers' understanding of a bundle of related (and often conflated) concepts, including analyticity, necessity, apriority, logical truth, and their contrasts, which Soames rightly characterizes as one of the great success stories of analytic philosophy (xi). This naturally gives the book a somewhat Whiggish tone: earlier philosophers were either heading in the right direction or missed the boat. The book, however, ranges beyond this favoured topic, including in Part I, for example, Moore's 'proof' of the external world and his defence of common sense, as well as his arguments for the indefinability of 'good', which enable Soames to open up the issue of analyticity. Curiously, though, Soames ignores Moore's later efforts (subsequently developed by Casimir Lewy) to come to grips with the notions of necessity and entailment. In a similar way in Part II, these topics have to be excavated from Russell since he offers little by way of explicit discussion. In the *Tractatus* (Part III), however, they become central, mainly because the early Wittgenstein so resolutely ignored all the relevant distinctions. The theme then dominates the remaining two parts of the book on the positivists and Quine (except for two further chapters on ethics, dealing with emotivism and W.D. Ross). The results are somewhat odd: e.g., one would never guess from Soames' account how important science was for the positivists. Moreover, although it isn't an issue here, one wonders how Soames will be able to continue his account of the success story when he intends to avoid discussing the technical developments in formal logic and semantics which made it possible. Altogether, *The Dawn of Analysis* is a rather mixed bag — not least because only the first two of the book's five parts deal with the actual dawn of analysis: by the 1920s the sun was well and truly up.

It is as a textbook that *The Dawn of Analysis* holds up best. The exposition is unflinching clear, arguments are set out carefully with numbered premisses and conclusions, hidden assumptions are spelled out in explicit detail, explanations are often repeated in different ways, and the frequent summaries are concise and helpful. Sometimes Soames' exposition goes beyond what one would expect in an undergraduate text. For example, he develops logicism to the point where it can be shown, not merely how Peano's primitives can be defined in logical terms, but how the Peano postulates can be derived from logical principles. The system in which this is done, innocent of type theory (which is added afterwards) and employing '=' and 'ε' as primitives, is not Russell's, but the exercise is nonetheless useful. In a similar way, Soames pursues the intricacies of Wittgenstein's *N*-operator, though here the results seem distinctly less useful. Does an undergraduate really need to understand the *N*-operator with all its flaws? I doubt it, though it should be pointed out that Soames sides with Geach (*Analysis*, 1981, 1982) against Fogelin (*Wittgenstein*, 1976) in being willing to augment Wittgenstein's own account

in order to increase the expressive capacity of the operator. (It is unfortunate that Soames' account of the crucial case of multiply general quantification is marred by typos: read 'y' for the first 'x' in the last formula in the right-hand column on p. 222 and delete all the tildes on line 7 of p. 223.)

As history, however, the book fails rather badly. Like too many philosophers, Soames attempts a rational reconstruction that does scant justice to the arguments which actually dominated the debate and often influenced the outcome in ways that the reconstruction fails to capture. Positions get simplified, often to the point of travesty, and the subtlety and ingenuity of the philosophers involved, who were often fighting on several fronts at once, is lost. It doesn't help that Soames ignores virtually all the secondary literature on the philosophers he discusses. His acknowledgement of the dispute over the *N*-operator is a rare exception. Even his recommendations for further reading are remarkably parsimonious: Baldwin's important work on Moore is not mentioned, nor Hylton's on Russell, and Fogelin's is the only book cited on Wittgenstein. Indeed, even with primary sources, Soames sticks to a few well-known texts, ignoring much that would offer a more nuanced view. The rational reconstruction approach does not handle nuance well.

Unsurprisingly, Russell is especially ill-served by this approach, for the last thirty years have not only seen a great deal of new material on Russell but a mass of new material by him. Of the latter, Soames mentions only 'The Regressive Method of Discovering the Premises of Mathematics', written in 1907 and first published in *Essays in Analysis* (1974). Beyond that the texts he treats — 'On Denoting', 'Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description', *Our Knowledge of the External World*, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', and *An Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* — are all part of what can be called 'the narrow canon' — non-technical, mainly popular works written between 1905 and 1918. As a result, Soames' account of Russell is of the sort that used to pass muster in the 1960s, but which is largely untenable now. The only exception to this is the point taken from the 'Regressive Method' paper about justifying axioms by means of the theorems they can be used to prove (136n, 160) — and even that is bracketed as an unnecessary nuance on its first appearance and described (without evidence) as a late change of position on its second.

Soames' account of Russell begins with the theory of descriptions, which he presents as intended primarily to control a profligate ontology. This view, standard through the 1960s, is quite mistaken — partly because Russell already had ways to control a profligate ontology and partly because his main concern was to obviate the need for items like Fregean senses. General awareness of this second point had to wait until the publication of his *Collected Papers* (vol. 4, 1994), but clear evidence of the first has been available since 1905, but in a work ('The Existential Import of Propositions', in *Mind*) excluded from the narrow canon. At some stage, one hopes, the news of this will filter through to Princeton. Even the narrow canon, however, should have saved Soames from ascribing to Russell the view that disguised descriptions, like 'Santa Claus', may have a meaning even when they lack a



denotation (113). For Russell, it was the key achievement of his theory that it had no need of meanings. As usual with those of Russell's views which have subsequently found favour, Soames attributes it to Wittgenstein (217).

From descriptions Soames moves to logicism, thus reversing the historical order. He presents logicism somewhat as if it had been suggested by the theory of descriptions, though he avoids saying so in as many words. Russell did hope that the theory of descriptions would advance the course of logicism, in particular by helping eliminate the set-theoretic paradoxes through the substitutional theory of classes and relations. Although some of Russell's writings on the substitutional theory have been in print since 1974 (*Essays in Analysis*) and there is a substantial secondary literature, all the substitutional material is well outside the narrow canon and is ignored here. Of course, one does not expect a detailed account of the substitutional theory in a book of this kind, any more than one expects (or gets) a detailed account of the theory of types, but one wishes that Soames would more often alert the reader to the unexamined complexities of the actual historical record.

Soames' most egregious error occurs in his treatment of Russell's epistemology. He identifies Russellian sense-data with sense impressions (112) and then goes on to dismiss Russell's construction of material objects on the grounds that it either requires counterfactuals (the sense-data one would have had if ...) for which Russell's logic could supply no adequate account or else forces Russell to construct the entire material world out of the sense impressions of a single observer. There are, indeed, many problems with Russell's construction of material objects (as Russell himself came to recognize) and lack of counterfactuals is even one of them, but Soames' objection is based on a complete misinterpretation. Russell's construction is out of sensibilia, sense-data are just those sensibilia which happen to be sensed, and sensibilia are physical, but non-material, constituents of the world. A careful reading of *The Problems of Philosophy* or *Our Knowledge of the External World*, to cite only work in the narrow canon, would have made this clear.

It is a pity to have to complain about Soames' book in this way, for there is no doubting the hard work and clear thinking that he has put into his expositions, but the ideas expounded are too frequently not those of the people to whom they are attributed, and, more unfortunately still, this fact is all too rarely pointed out to the reader.

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## Gerald Vision

*Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and Its Critics.*  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2004.

Pp. xiv + 298.

US\$36.00. ISBN 0-262-22070-9.

Gerald Vision presents his version of J. L. Austin's well-known account of truth, accompanied by critical discussion of rival views and extensive responses to common objections to correspondence theories. Vision's account, in a summary formulation, reads thus (244):

A statement  $\Sigma$  is true *if and only if* there is a sentence S, tied descriptively to a type state of affairs (henceforth SOA) such that

- (1)  $\Sigma$  is made with S.
- (2) There is a concrete SOA tokening that type to which S is descriptively tied.
- (3) The token in (2) is relevant in the context.

The primary bearers of truth on this view are token utterances of sentences. To take an example, an utterance of 'the cat is on the mat' is true iff there is a state of affairs 'descriptively tied' to the sentence-type, this type of state of affairs is tokened, and furthermore this token is the one being talked about in the utterance. Vision accepts that this last matter is settled in an open-ended, contextual way (228ff); the idea is that 'the cat is on the mat' is typically used to express a salient cat's being on a salient mat and is uttered truly on a given occasion if and only if there is on that occasion one and only one salient cat on one and only one salient mat.

Vision's aim is to proffer a 'correspondence-as-congruity' theory rather than a 'correspondence-as-correlation' theory; that is, the view makes no use of the idea that true sentences are somehow isomorphic to something (223). As Vision notes, some might maintain that this disqualifies the view for receiving the appellation 'correspondence' theory at all (224). Vision is unconcerned by this, since prospects for correlational theories rightly look dim to him and absent a compelling reason to tie the term 'correspondence' to such views he is disinclined to accept such terminological legislation.

Vision recognizes that the role of states of affairs in the account may be a source of objections and devotes many pages to the topic. The basic theme is that although there might be legitimate worries about the individuation of such entities, they aren't so pressing as to prevent appeal to them in a good correspondence theory of truth. Many of Vision's remarks on the topic are very weak and I would argue that precisely the problems Vision dismisses in fact make the conception of a state of affairs explanatorily useless, but I will leave this aside here.

The basic purpose of states of affairs in Vision's account is to provide something to quantify over since it's essential to the account as stated that sentences are 'descriptively correlated' with something. 'Ways things might be' does as well as 'state of affairs' and the like for this, so one might restate

the view thus: a sentence is true iff it states things to be some way, and they are that way. Add a little substitutional quantification, and this comes to the claim that a sentence is true iff for some  $p$  it says that  $p$  and  $p$ . Since there are traditional objections to such quantification, one might prefer to get the job done with objectual quantification, and a desire to proceed in this way will result in more or less Vision's view, since one will need some *objects* for the objectually construed sentential variables to range over.

One should be struck by the similarity of Vision's view to views commonly touted as in one way or another 'deflationary', 'minimalist', 'modest' or 'austere'. To take the last two examples, the views presented at book length by Wolfgang Künne and Christopher Hill in recent years use quantification to free deflationary theories of truth from list-like specifications of truth-conditions but still explain truth in terms of expressing or being the proposition that  $p$  when  $p$ . Like these other theories of the broadly ' $x$  says that  $p$  and  $p$ ' variety, Vision's appeals to a semantic notion, in his case 'being descriptively correlated with a type of state of affairs' in order to define truth. The result is that truth is not the fundamental semantic notion; rather 'descriptive correlation' is. This might be an advantage or a disadvantage depending on one's perspective, but note that it isn't a feature shared, for instance, by an orthodox 'correspondence-as-correlation' theory, the goal of which presumably is to explain truth in terms of non-semantically characterized isomorphisms and from there to explain other semantic notions in terms of truth.

Thus Vision's account isn't as different from views called 'deflationary' as he might like — indeed, avowed deflationists might take comfort in the fact that Vision doesn't really escape from their view, despite his insistence that he does. I think part of the explanation for Vision's odd position here is that his view *really is* quite different from what he *takes* deflationism to be. Roughly, Vision understands a deflationist to be someone who defines truth by the instances of a schema such as 'the proposition that  $p$  is true if and only if  $p$ ' and reads this schema in such a way that 'worldly' truth-conditions have nothing to do with it, so that truth-conditions are somehow entirely 'internal' to language and deflationism ends up looking like some wildly implausible sort of idealism — see here remarks throughout the book but in particular the whole of the deeply confused Section 6.5. Deflationists, however, do only the first. This, I think, is the source of Vision's otherwise bizarre claims that a deflationist can't account for the fact ('Variability') that if the world were different in certain ways, the distribution of truth-values over propositions or sentences would be different, too (167) or that deflationists can't account for the fact that snow's being white determines that 'snow is white' is true and not the other way around (116ff). Deflationists have no problem with either, as Horwich argues at great length. In a longer presentation I'd argue that no deflationist has ever understood her position in the way that Vision understands it.

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**Michael J. White**

*Political Philosophy:*

*An Historical Introduction.*

Oxford: Oneworld Publications 2003.

Pp. viii + 265.

US\$19.95. ISBN 1-85168-328-3.

Michael White argues for the rather startling claim that most modern political philosophy carries expectations that simply cannot be fulfilled. Modern political philosophers, he writes, believe that they can give 'a rich account of the proper rôle of political organization ... without any rich conception of human nature, function, or purpose' (2). White's main purpose throughout the book is to show that 'this belief is illusory' (5). This 'rich conception' is what White regularly refers to as a 'normative anthropology', and it involves 'the idea that the philosophical consideration of political concepts naturally presupposes normative ideas connected with some notion of an objective human good, end, purpose, or function (*ergon*)' (5). White does fairly well in pressing the historical and philosophical arguments for this claim, but the claim appears to have limits that are not sufficiently explored.

Rawls is an interesting case to consider in this connection. Rawls' principles of justice do not appear to be grounded on any interesting normative anthropology, but rather on the particular interests and conceptions of the good life individual citizens happen to have, coupled with an instrumental account of rationality. But White nevertheless insists that 'Rawls' liberalism cannot avoid presupposing ... a normative anthropology' (213). This is because even Rawls' liberalism involves the idea that, from the point of view of the state, an essential feature of the human good is that each citizen must be allowed to develop his or her own conception of the good. This is a *generic* normative anthropology, White admits, but no less a normative anthropology than any other.

Now, however, the concept of a normative anthropology is looking rather vague. If the concept is consistent with both (a) some fairly universal, objective account of the human good or function, and (b) the more generic idea that the human good is whatever human individuals idiosyncratically determine it to be, it becomes fairly easy, perhaps even trivial, to claim that all political philosophies require such a concept. Since politics at least minimally involves the study of humans in social settings and (power) relationships, we must at least be working with some idea or assumption of what humans care about, how this will affect their interaction, and how they can govern or be governed, etc. — even if that idea is merely that humans share no particular conception of the good or function. This latter idea, however, can be termed 'normative' only with great qualification — if it should be called normative at all.

The main thesis that White brings to his historical introduction to political philosophy is one that, I believe, most readers will find both interesting and controversial. White, however, does not intend the book to be only a polemical

work in political philosophy. It is also intended to be an introduction to the subject. In different ways, White both succeeds and fails in realizing this goal.

*Political Philosophy* is an introduction in that it describes a widely accepted set of historical themes and philosophers of the discipline. White equally attempts to engage his readers in the activity of political philosophy itself — something which, I believe many would agree, should be a feature of any good introduction to philosophy. White's particular claim about the fundamental nature and methodology of political philosophy (noted above) structures each step of his historical narrative and is clearly designed to engage readers in a reflective consideration of his narrative, and thus to involve them in the very practice of philosophy itself (see 4-5).

White's historical discussion begins with the Classical Greek sophists — with particular focus on Protagoras, along with a careful examination of the political ideas of Plato and Aristotle. Christianity and political philosophy are discussed in connection with New Testament teachings, and the ideas of Augustine and Aquinas. The modern era is examined through the contractarianism of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls (with Marx considered as a reaction to the various liberalisms associated with these thinkers). While there could be some argument about whether or not others should have been considered (e.g., non-contractarian forms of liberalism), it seems fair to say that White's list is fairly representative of most introductions to the subject.

There are some ways, however, in which *Political Philosophy* is not a standard introduction. The fact that White has a fairly specific thesis that he wants to defend obviously limits the range of his discussion. He rarely strays from any historical or thematic study that does not relate directly to his central thesis. Of course, if White's main argument is correct, this might be exactly how we should expect to find the main features of any political philosophy. But it is still worth noting that some argument could be made that a proper introduction should not be so apparently partisan. Rather, it should present those ideas in political philosophy that have simply been widely accepted as important, even if these ideas or arguments disagree with, or have no bearing on, White's main thesis.

Another concern in this regard is that White's discussion is carried on at a fairly advanced level. White, for example, consistently prefers to use original Greek or Latin words or phrases over their standardly translated English ones. For instance, 'ecclesia' is used instead of 'church', 'nomos' instead of 'law', 'aretai' instead of 'virtues', 'physis' instead of 'nature,' etc. There is, of course, some scholarly virtue to this practice: English terms may have associated meaning or connotation that the terms in the original languages may not have. This preference for scholarly accuracy, however, does not make reading this book particularly easy for someone beginning the study of political philosophy. Also, the general level of prose itself does not make this book an easy read for beginners of any sort. Particularly noticeable is White's examination of Rawlsian liberalism. There, White's seems to assume, rather than provide, a considerable understanding of many of Rawls' main concepts and arguments. All of this means, of course, that *Political*

*Philosophy*, while indeed an introduction to the subject, is nevertheless a fairly advanced introduction. Hence, as far as pedagogical considerations go, it should find its best place in upper undergraduate (or even graduate) political theory or philosophy courses.

Another point worth mentioning, which connects with both the introductory aspect of the book and its central thesis, is the notable absence of some important philosophers whose works seem both necessary to an introduction to the subject and clearly support White's main thesis. I am thinking particularly of Nicolo Machiavelli's *The Prince* and J.S. Mill's *On Liberty* and *Considerations on Representative Government*. Both of these philosophers have been influential enough to deserve consideration for this reason alone. But, interestingly, they would have added much to White's main argument. Machiavelli's account seems to make significant assumptions and claims about human beings in political contexts that tie to the good that should be pursued by political authority. And Mill's notion of individuality, and the role he thinks that the state should assume in furthering it, seems equally relevant and important.

*Political Philosophy* is a challenging book, in the best sense. White's central thesis, while controversial, is nevertheless important, consistently argued — both historically and philosophically, and presented in a thoroughly engaging manner.

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**Shaun P. Young, ed.**

*Political Liberalism: Variations on a Theme.*

Albany: State University of New York

Press 2004.

Pp. xviii + 183.

US\$40.00. ISBN 0-7914-6175-0.

One of the main topics of debate in political philosophy over the last twenty years has been whether it is possible or desirable to construct a purely political form of liberalism — one that retains at least some of the central liberal views about justice in social institutions without endorsing liberal views (or non-liberal views) about broader religious, metaphysical, or epistemological questions. Although discussion has focused on the later work of John Rawls, theories of this kind were independently developed at about the same time by Bruce Ackerman, Charles Larmore, and Judith Shklar. The



purpose of the present volume is to present the various conceptions of political liberalism that exist today. The collection includes essays by George Klosko and Donald Moon as well as Rawls, Ackerman, Larmore and Shklar (but not Thomas Nagel), an introductory essay by editor Shaun Young, and a brief but perceptive historical foreword by Rainer Forst. Law and politics are represented (Ackerman, Klosko, Moon, Shklar) along with philosophy (Larmore, Rawls). The collection includes no contributions from those who reject the very idea of a theory of justice being political *rather than* metaphysical, sticking to its aim of presenting the range of different political liberalisms.

In his introduction, Young brings out some of the main dimensions of variation along which we can distinguish these rival models:

1. Is the theory of political liberalism simply reasonable for us to accept (Rawls), or is it the morally correct response to the problem of reasonable moral pluralism (Larmore)?
2. Is political liberalism still a utopian project aiming at a robust form of social equality (Ackerman), or is it a less ambitious project focused on avoiding the worst kinds of assault on basic human dignity (Shklar)?
3. Should we develop a political conception of justice through procedures of construction that abstract from the details of existing belief, employing only very general notions of freedom, equality, personhood, and cooperation implicit in democratic institutions and a broadly shared democratic culture (Rawls), or should we look for points of convergence between existing comprehensive moral doctrines, based on the empirical study of what people today actually believe (Klosko)?
4. Must political liberalism involve a conception of reasonableness (Rawls and Larmore 'yes', Shklar 'no'), and if so what exactly is the epistemic and moral content of this notion?

Given these differences, Young is right to argue that communitarian and perfectionist liberal critics cannot claim to have dispensed with political liberalism simply on the basis of having criticized Rawls (14-16).

What unites these different versions of political liberalism, and so provides the core concept that Young's volume seeks to delineate, is the aim to elaborate a doctrine about the design of social institutions that is normative but so far as possible independent of controversial metaphysical, religious or epistemological views. What emerges from reading these essays together, however, is that there are a number of quite different reasons that one might think a conception of justice ought to be freestanding, in this way.

Political liberalism is a response to a problem of stability, Young says (2). However, there are different degrees of stability and different reasons for pursuing it. One reason for caring about stability, when elaborating a theory of justice, is simply to avoid the futility of struggling to put in place a social order that couldn't last, even under propitious circumstances. For Rawls,

however, stability always meant stability 'for the right reasons' (*Political Liberalism*, xlii, 392). One reason for valuing stability-for-the-right-reasons is simply that it is more stable — stable with respect to changes in the balance of power. Another reason for valuing stability-for-the-right-reasons, however, is that, when publicly recognized, it makes possible community under conditions of pluralism. In a society with purely strategic adherence to a political conception of justice, supporters of each comprehensive doctrine would know that were supporters of one of the other doctrines to gain secure dominance, they would impose their own comprehensive vision. This knowledge would undermine citizens' sense of being engaged in a common project; any uncertainty about the balance of power would lead them to adopt an attitude of standoffish watchfulness. In contrast, common recognition that our commitment to the political conception of justice is not dependent of the balance of power would provide the basis for mutual trust and respect despite deep ongoing disagreement about other issues.

Arguably, then, Rawls' many references in the 1985 article Young reprints to the need to find a 'shared basis of political agreement' (27, 30, 31) are still animated by his earlier aspiration to civic friendship (*A Theory of Justice*, 6). This ideal of political community amid moral diversity is quite different than Klosko's desire to avoid damaging 'social peace and stability' (136), or Shklar's desire to avoid habitual cruelty and arbitrary force on the part of political régimes (157). Admittedly, Rawls' frequent mention of practicability and workability can sound much less elevated than talk of fraternity and friendship. In any case, the fact that there are these different reasons for politically bracketing matters of deep disagreement raises the question of just how thick is the overarching concept of which Rawls *et al* are said to offer different conceptions. Rather than thinking of Larmore and Klosko as offering different theories of the same thing, for example, we should perhaps think of them simply as employing similar intellectual strategies to different ends.

Closely related to the question of the point of bracketing disagreement is the question of the range of disagreements bracketed. If one took literally Young's statement that a political conception of justice 'restricts its regulatory scope to uncontroversial matters' (3), 'matters upon which all citizens can agree' (4), the resulting conception wouldn't contain much at all. Such literalness would be unfair; what Young has in mind is not the self-refuting view that controversy as such is to be avoided, but that *certain kinds* of disagreement should be avoided, in designing social institutions. As Young puts it, a political conception of justice must not engage 'those comprehensive moral, religious, and philosophical questions for which there can never be a universally acceptable answer' (3). But which questions are these, exactly, and why must we bracket (only) these questions? None of the leading proponents of political liberalism has offered a fully satisfactory answer, yet the issue is crucial, as Larmore's essay makes clear. State neutrality between concrete descriptions of the good life expresses Kantian or Millian ideals of autonomy and individuality, and so is not a form of political liberalism, Larmore argues, whereas neutrality between ultimate ideals expresses the

norms of rational dialogue and equal respect for persons (59). The question is what makes neutrality based on respect for persons appropriately political and neutrality based on autonomy/individuality illegitimately comprehensive. Young's collection perspicuously frames such questions, posing challenges to critics and defenders of political liberalism alike.

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**Slavoj Žižek**

*The Puppet and the Dwarf:*

*The Perverse Core of Christianity.*

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2003.

Pp. ii + 188.

US\$16.95. ISBN 0-262-74025-7.

While Slavoj Žižek's *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* proposes a radical form of Christianity in answer to the cynicism dominant in today's postmodern culture, its real importance is philosophical rather than theological: the novelty of Žižek's most recent book lies in its use of theological metaphors to explain his theory of a revolutionary modernity. Indeed, the main fault of Žižek's otherwise brilliant text is its pretence to add significantly to the history of theology.

Before pursuing how *The Puppet and Dwarf* contributes to Žižek's modernist revival, it's important to indicate — as Žižek does in the chapter entitled 'The Thrilling Romance of Orthodoxy' — how the religious vision he proposes differs from what we understand for the most part by Christianity. 'Perversion', within the Lacanian psychoanalytic context embraced by Žižek, refers to those practices (particularly sexual ones) that *pretend* to be transgressive and transforming acts but actually just reinforce the social rules they apparently break. Traditional Christianity for Žižek proposes an apparent crisis for human beings, a situation in which we seem in danger of universal damnation. However, actually there is no contingency in history as a whole, since Jesus' sacrifice has 'redeemed' it. The Christian idea of the Fall, understood against such a view of history, is the most cynical possible play with the human being's illusion of self-determination. In such versions of Christianity, as Žižek puts it, 'God first threw humanity into Sin in order to create the opportunity for saving it through Christ's sacrifice' (53).



Against this orthodox interpretation of history, Žižek argues in Chapters 3 through 5 of *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, that, in its 'core', the Fall is non-perverse: rather than positing a puppet-master God toying with humanity, Žižek proposes that the Fall starts the dialectic revealing God's *non-existence*. The end here is not a perverse game played within the field of divine omniscience but rather a genuine revolution. Adam's sin for Žižek actually hides the truth revealed on the cross when Jesus in his agony calls out that God has 'abandoned' him. It is precisely the *failure* of (in this case Jesus' own) belief that becomes exemplary, to the extent that, for Žižek, 'the true *imitatio Christi*, is to participate in Christ's doubt and disbelief' (102). The death of 'God the Father' liberates us from perversion.

Now, for all the apparent radicality of this proposal for an atheistic Christianity, it is hardly new. One could come up with any number of 'existentialist' versions of the Christian story that come out equivalently opposed to the superstition or fantasy of divine omniscience, of a place from which history or reality is totalized. The interest in Žižek's account comes from the way that it proposes an answer to the ideological paralysis of our age.

Žižek's version of the 'Fall' story can stand in for a whole series of narratives in *The Puppet and the Dwarf* about modernity, its dangers and its remaining potential — the movement from Kant to Hegel in Chapter 3, the Pauline 'realization' of the Jewish Law in Chapter 4, the progression from Judaism to Christianity in Chapter 5, etc., etc. For Žižek, the point about the Fall is neither the 'perverse' one that makes our guilt at Adam's sin a mere interlude before a pre-determined redemption, nor the atheistic simple opposite in which the myth of the Fall is merely one more mistake in the long series produced by superstitious belief. For Žižek, the Fall is the necessary 'first blow' of a modern revolution that can only fully occur in two blows. Žižek's Jesus — whose insight is the 'non-existence' of the Father unable to save him on the cross — teaches that, actually, the very idea of a divine reality against which we sin is an illusion reproduced in the gesture by which we first free ourselves from it. In other words, the 'fictionality of the Other' sustaining fantasy can only first appear *as* the fantasy of the Fall — the fantasy that we are essentially the 'sinners', those who have no place in God's ordered universe. For Žižek, Jesus does not come to 'redeem us' from Adam's Fall but only to help us 'shift our subjective position', our perspective, so that we could see 'that it [redemption] is already there' in the Fall (86-7). He comes only to teach us that — rather than forming a totality from which we sinners are excluded — the universe itself is incomplete, lacking a position from which it could appear as totality.

If we today have something to learn from the Christian myth — so Žižek — it is that our real task (moral *and* political) lies in the *imitatio Christi* re-accomplishing the second blow of modernity, the 'perspective shift' that makes our *modern* guilt evaporate. Despite the fact that, at some level, we are aware today that 'the Other is a fiction', the development of the modern world nonetheless magnifies the 'puppet master' effect by *reversing* it. We

hold onto the fixity of reality all the more today in our postmodernism, though it is now a different kind of reality — homogeneous and differential rather than hierarchal. And is not this formation of a ‘modern fantasy’ the ultimate cause of cynicism, our own version of ‘original sin’ — suggesting as it does that even the modern eruption of freedom in our lives leads only to a worse debt, a deeper self-enslavement? Against this, Žižek’s theological parable in *The Puppet and the Dwarf* would return us to the possibility of liberation implicit (but perverted) in the truth of the Fall: we *can* hope to overturn the social world that limits our freedom and (at least imperfectly) re-make the world and ourselves in the image of that revolutionary act. For Žižek, what is needed is action, commitment, revolution — the furthest things, certainly, from cynical postmodern disengagement. Although Žižek’s vision itself is radically opposed to Habermas’ — and although Žižek’s view of historicity also problematizes it in basic ways — *The Puppet and Dwarf* in part renews the call to complete the ‘unfinished project’ of modernity that Habermas popularized a generation ago. As a renewal of such a call, it is certainly a valuable book.

### **Thomas Brockelman**

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### **Jack Zupko**

*John Buridan: Portrait of a  
Fourteenth-Century Arts Master.*

Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame  
Press 2003.

Pp. xx + 446.

US\$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-03255-6);

US\$40.00 (paper: ISBN 0-268-03256-4).

This work is subtitled ‘Portrait of a Fourteenth-Century Arts Master’, and that is indeed what it is, which is in itself an interesting enough topic for a book, but since this particular fourteenth-century arts master happens to be one of the world’s great philosophers, the book certainly has an added interest, at least for philosophers. Let me say at once that it is an excellent book, and will, I hope, do a great deal to make Buridan’s philosophical views more accessible to philosophers who are not mediaeval specialists.

Zupko’s Buridan ‘was a teacher’ and, Zupko suggests, this means that ‘he understood his own work as a philosopher primarily in terms of his role as a *magister artium*, an arts master’ (3). This leads Zupko to suggest further that for Buridan logic is ‘a way of doing philosophy ... a something that has

meaning only when it is learned and applied in practice' (135). Zupko makes out a persuasive case for this reading of Buridan, though, for those of us who came initially to Buridan's writings out of admiration for his skill as a logician, there remains the tendency to regard him straightforwardly as a great logician, whether or not his logical results are applied in other areas of philosophy. In particular, Buridan's work on the paradoxes of self-reference, which the mediaevals called *insolubilia*, and which Buridan referred to as the so-called *insolubilia (vocata insolubilia)*, are surely stand alone examples of philosophical work as fascinating as it is detailed and rigorous.

However, as Zupko makes clear, Buridan's interests involved many areas other than logic, and this volume is the first work that deals with all of Buridan's wide-ranging interests. Thus in addition to Part One ('Method'), which deals with aspects of Buridan's logical concerns, we have Part Two ('Practice') that deals with methodology in metaphysics, with bodies and souls, natural philosophy, and virtue and freedom. In a short closing chapter Zupko looks briefly at Buridan's subsequent influence.

A short review cannot hope to deal with every topic in a work that is so wide ranging, and I shall briefly notice only three areas.

Buridan first comes into our historical sight as Rector of the University of Paris in 1327/8, about the time when Ockham stopped working on (or at least leaving us written works in) logic. Both were self-consciously setting aside the *via antiqua* and following the *via moderna*; both were nominalists; both were extremely competent philosophers, especially in the areas of philosophy of language and in logic. Both might be considered empiricists. What then were Buridan's views on Ockham? And in what sense was Buridan an empiricist?

Zupko's answer to the first question is succinct: 'we know Buridan was acquainted with Ockham's *Summa logicae* from early in his career at Paris, so his decision not to follow the Venerable Inceptor's methods must have been deliberate, or at least as deliberate as his decision to use Peter of Spain's *Summulae Logicales* as the basis for his own *Summulae*. But whatever the reason, Buridan never mentions Ockham by name nor ever acknowledges his views as such, so it is impossible to know what he thought of Ockham's logic' (15).

On the second issue, that of Buridan's empiricism, Zupko offers a qualified defence of Moody's currently unfashionable general claim that the fourteenth century produced a philosophical climate in which 'empiricism was the prevailing philosophical position' (Zupko 204, quoting Moody). Reminding us that it is as anachronistic to see the fourteenth century through early modern eyes as it is through twenty-first century eyes, Zupko remarks that 'if we understand empiricism in terms of a cluster of broadly epistemic doctrines concerned with the methodology of knowing, and emphasizing in particular (1) the evidentness of sensory appearances and judgements ... as the primary criterion for their veridicality, (2) the reliability of a posteriori modes of reasoning, such as induction ... and (3) the utility of naturalistic models of explanation ... then much of what fourteenth-century philosophers did can count as empiricist, especially in contrast to the thirteenth century' (204).



The correct account of the human soul was a difficulty for all thinkers of the time (and, I understand, can still give rise, sometimes in different terms, to debate today), but it was perhaps especially awkward for thinkers who, like Buridan, had a 'naturalistic outlook' (106). One natural way to read Buridan is that, like Ockham, he followed reason as far as it would take him and when reasoning ran head on into truths which were to be accepted on faith (as happened to Ockham with respect to future contingents), he simply noted the impasse, and moved on. This is particularly true with regard to the human soul. Is it an immaterial form? Buridan's answer (179) is that the immateriality of the soul is on a par with the mystery of the Trinity or the Incarnation. God might miraculously explain the matter to us, but we cannot hope to have it demonstrated 'from principles having evidentness (leaving faith aside)'. Is the human soul a single thing, with precisely one soul for each human which is both animating and intellective? Or is it a different kind of thing, with (the possibility that Aristotle notoriously left unclear) one 'giver of forms' for all humans, as Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd suggested?

Zupko offers an ameliorating reading of Buridan. Buridan is not 'giving up the game because he believes that his subject matter is beyond rational comprehension.' Rather he 'is only making a negative claim about the failure of empirical knowledge in a certain field of enquiry' (180-1). We should, Zupko suggests, substitute 'outside the common course of nature' for each occurrence of "supernatural," and "not empirically evident" for "miraculous," and this will give us 'a reading ... that better reflects Buridan's thinking' (181). Well, maybe. But another reading is clearly possible. However, one does not need to be convinced on each and every point to find Zupko's work an excellent and informative addition to our knowledge of Buridan.

The main portion of the text occupies 271 pages. The notes, substantial, informative, and interesting, occupy a further 128 pages, almost half the length of the text itself. They are alas collected after the main text, rather than at the foot of the page, thus making them difficult to read in context, unnecessarily so, surely, when typesetting is wholly computerized. This is surely the fault of the publisher, not Zupko, but it would be much better to have the notes more easily available in such a work.

**J.J. MacIntosh**

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