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## Editor / Directeur

*Jeffrey Foss*

Department of Philosophy  
University of Victoria  
P.O. Box 3045 Stn. CSC  
Victoria, BC  
Canada V8W 3P4

Tel: 250-721-7512

Fax: 250-721-7511

E-Mail: [pir@uvic.ca](mailto:pir@uvic.ca)

Website: <http://www.uvic.ca/philosophy/pir/index.html>

## Associate Editor / directeur adjoint

*David J. F. Scott*

Department of Philosophy  
University of Victoria  
P.O. Box 3045 Stn. CSC  
Victoria, BC  
Canada V8W 3P4

Tel: 250-721-7512

Fax: 250-721-7511

E-Mail: [pir@uvic.ca](mailto:pir@uvic.ca)

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**Giorgio Agamben**

*The Time that Remains:*

*A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans.*

Trans. Patricia Dailey. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2005.

Pp. 197.

US\$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4382-7);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4383-5).

What is the messianic time? Does Paul's *Letter to Romans* help us to better understand it? Giorgio Agamben attempts to reply to these questions with this book that reports a six-day seminar wholly aimed at restoring Paul's letter and re-discovering its messianic value. Agamben begins commenting *ad litteram*, in every sense of the word, the *incipit* of the Letter, composed of ten words, well aware that the understanding of the *incipit* entails the understanding of the text as a whole.

First of all, let's remember that Paul's letters are written in a very effective and particular language, 'being neither Greek, nor Hebrew, nor *leson ha qodesh*, nor secular idiom, but it is that which makes his language so interesting' (5). Agamben's exegesis lingers over the name, Paulos, that is a Roman name, or surname, over the name Sha'ul, written Saoul or Saoulos, over the word *doules* (=slave), frequently used by Paul. For this see 'the syntagma "slave of the Messiah" defines the new messianic condition for Paul, the principle of a particular transformation of all juridical conditions' (13).

Then, in his timely and acute analysis, Agamben ponders the word *ekklēsia*: 'the messianic community is literally all *klēseis*, all messianic vocations' (22), and the components of *ekklēsia* are men who choose to live in the messiah, expropriated of each and every juridical-factual property. After, he deepens the relation between *klētos* and Marxian *klasse*, and continues with the term *aphōrismenos*, that is the past participle of *aphorizō*, whose meaning is separated. The exact meaning of the term leads to the problem of Pauline universalism and the Catholic vocation of the messianic community. *Aphōrismenos* is nothing more than the Greek translation of the Hebrew term *parush*, or the Aramaic *p<sup>e</sup> rish*, that is, Pharisee. The Pharisees distinguished themselves from Judaists; they believed that the law did not solely consist of the written Torah, but also of the oral Torah. The division between Hebruh and not Hebruh, between circumcised and foreskin, is not unique or the last.

The term *apostolos*, which grammatically depends upon the term *aphōrismenos* and defines the specific function of *aphōrismenos*, has a particular significance. It comes from Greek verb *apostellō* and signifies an emissary', in this case an emissary of the Messiah Jesus and God the father. What is the difference between the apostle and the prophet? The prophet is a man with an immediate relation to the breath of Yahweh; he announces the coming of Messiah and his message; he is always about a time to come, the

future. The time of apostle, instead, is the present; he begins to speak when the Messiah is already come and when prophecy must remain silent. In other words, the Pauline representation of time is as follows: 'On first place, things seem simple. First, you have secular time, which Paul usually refers to as *chronos*, which spans from creation to the messianic event ( ... the resurrection of Jesus). Here time contracts itself and begins to end. But this contracted time, which Paul refers to in the expression *ho nyn kairos*, "the time of now", lasts until the *parousia* (the second coming of Jesus), the full presence of the Messiah.'

Another question: Is there an aporia between *euaggelion-pistis* and *nomos*? The expression *Eis euaggelion theou* (the good news) includes the triplex communities of sense, *euaggelion-pistis-parousia*, but only on condition that the messianic law is the law of faith and not the negation of the law. The word *katargein*, derived from the verb *katarge*, really a key word in the Pauline messianic vocabulary, may be helpful. The meaning of *katargein* is 'made unoperative', or in our case de-activated, no-longer-at-work in the law. Messianic *dynamis* is, in this sense, constitutively *weak*, 'but it is precisely through its weakness that it may enact its effect' (97). Messianism is not only the deconstruction, but also the de-activation of the law, and Messianic *katargēsis* does not merely abolish, rather it preserves and brings to fulfilment.

Towards the end of the seminar Agamben ponders the meaning of Paul's faith. In the Greek-Roman world faith possessed juridical, political, and religious value; it also possessed the heritage of the pre-law. The *pistis* of Paul retains something of the Roman *deditio*, the unconditional self-abandonment to the power of another, in the same way as the Hebrew *emunah*, and obliges the receiver as well. Following Paul's teaching, 'the caesura between constitutive and constituted power, a divide that becomes so apparent in our times, finds its theological origins in the Pauline split between the level of faith and the level of *nomos*, between personal loyalty and the positive obligation that derives from it. In this light, messianism appears as a struggle within the law, when by the element of the pact and constituent power it leans toward setting itself against and emancipating itself from the element of the *entolē*, the norm in the strict sense' (118-19). In this way the theme of grace emerges alongside the term of faith; here clearly appears the significance of the opposition between law and grace, *nomos* and *eupaggelia*: 'Having once been united in pre-law, in a magical indifference, faith and law now fracture and give way to the space of gratuitness' (119). The caesura between faith and obligation paves the way for the Pauline doctrine of the new covenant.

Is this dealing with a new, last reading of the *Letter to Romans*? Certainly not. Lately there is an ongoing, original, and complex debate on the messianic time and messianism. Agamben, through the close reading of Pauline letter and the comparison of W. Benjamin's philosophy of history, gives us a fruitful key to better understand Western history and civilization. Philosophers and theologians will learn a great deal from reading this book.

At the end of the seminar the Appendix reports the interlinear Translation of the Pauline Text.

**Francesco Tampoia**

**Larry Alexander**

*Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression?*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.

Pp. xii + 203.

US\$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-82293-9);

US\$24.99 (paper: ISBN: 0-521-52984-0).

Alexander's thesis is that freedom of expression is not a human right. His argument is as follows. Were freedom of expression a human right, it would follow from a principle of evaluative neutrality. Evaluative neutrality entails that neither states nor persons have the legal or moral authority to restrict the expression of a belief or way of life merely because it is false or unpopular. However, the idea of evaluative neutrality is paradoxical because no normative principle can be defended from a neutral point of view. Moreover, no state that affirms a right of expression can avoid violating 'evaluative neutrality', because even the claim that evaluative neutrality is a sound principle requires taking a stand on principle, a stand which excludes those positions which reject evaluative neutrality. Therefore, there is no human right of freedom of expression. On Alexander's view, since the right of free expression is justified on indirect consequentialist grounds, it is relative to changing cultural, political, and legal contexts. 'Justified rights regarding expression will always be limited, local, and based on hunches about consequences' (193).

The book has three parts and an epilogue. Part 1 considers various conceptions of freedom of expression. Part 2 examines a number of ways that government affects both the ways that messages are expressed and the content of messages that are received by audiences. Part 3 examines familiar theoretical perspectives on freedom of expression (e.g., consequentialist, deontological, discourse theoretical, and liberal neutralist). Finally, in the epilogue Alexander advances his indirect consequentialist conception of the right of freedom of expression.

Alexander argues that the most plausible formulation of the principle of freedom of expression is as follows: 'Freedom of expression is implicated whenever an activity is suppressed or penalized for the purpose of preventing a message from being received' (9). From a legal point of view, freedom of expression is implicated by three classes of law. Following Lawrence Tribe, Alexander distinguishes Track One and Track Two laws. Track One laws are 'content-based regulations' (82) that restrict liberty in order to prevent

harmful effects of messages, such as those that violate confidentiality. Track Two laws are those whose effects on the content of expression are unintended. For example, if a city council approves the construction of an auditorium its policy will affect the expression of messages by providing a public space for political rallies. The legal debate on freedom of expression usually focuses on Track One and Track Two laws, but Alexander claims there is a third class of laws implicating freedom of expression. Track Three laws are those that promote viewpoints without violating anyone's liberty (82). Examples of Track Three laws include governmental regulation of educational curricula, subsidizing anti-smoking campaigns, and using public monies to promote the government's own policy agendas.

Alexander claims that those who defend a human right to freedom of expression are incapable of offering a plausible account of these three kinds of laws. By offering a number of examples, some from case law, some hypothetical, Alexander tries to show that if one construes freedom of expression as a human right one will not be able to present a consistent position which illuminates and justifies these three kinds of laws. Here is one example. Those who claim that persons have a human right to freedom of expression cannot offer a principled basis for distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate Track One laws. 'Many will find it implausible that government can never forbid breaches of confidentiality, revelations of private or secret matters ... and so forth ... But we must keep in mind that the core of freedom of expression lies in the principle of evaluative neutrality. And that principle deprives us of a scale according to which we can conclude that the harm, say to client confidentiality, is or is not outweighed by the attorney's revelation of the client's confidences' (66). This passage illustrates the argumentative strategy deployed throughout the book, which is to undercut various proposals for construing freedom of expression as a human right by showing that any coherent defense of freedom of expression will be incompatible with the principle of evaluative neutrality.

Two chapters (7 and 8) are devoted to theories of justification and liberalism. Familiar objections are raised against the consequentialist attempt to establish a human right of freedom of expression. One is that the claim, that freedom of expression is the best way to promote access to the truth, is subject to numerous counter examples. For example, legal proceedings are 'regulated and circumscribed' (128) on the grounds that imposing the appropriate restrictions is a better means of discovering truth. Deontological theories fare no better because they are 'too narrow and too extreme' (134). Some libertarian conceptions of freedom of expression are incompatible with plausible Track Two laws, such as those whose aim is to establish public fora by allocating resources to make possible public spaces that enable expression.

Alexander's most controversial claim is that liberalism is inherently paradoxical, resting as it does upon a joint commitment to epistemic abstinence and evaluative neutrality. 'Yet, here is the problem. Any philosophical account of political morality will ... take a stand on what is true, right, and valuable and what is not' (148). This paradox explains why liberalism cannot

justify the claim that there is a human right to freedom of expression. On one hand, evaluative neutrality requires epistemic abstinence. On the other, Track One, Two, and Three laws either explicitly affirm the worth of some forms of expression while denying the worth of others, or have unintended effects which favor some forms of expression over others. Many liberals will respond by claiming this characterization misconstrues the moral foundation of liberalism. Alexander's most ambitious claim is that there is no non-paradoxical way of construing the moral foundation of liberalism. Much of the critical discussion of Alexander's book will no doubt focus on his claims about evaluative neutrality and the alleged paradoxes of liberalism.

**Jon Mahoney**

Kansas State University

**Alain Badiou**

*Metapolitics.*

Trans. Jason Barker. New York: Verso 2005.

Pp. xxxviii + 159.

US\$27.00 (cloth: ISBN 1-84467-035-X);

US\$15.95 (paper: ISBN 1-84467-567-X).

Alain Badiou's *Metapolitics* is paradoxical: it mounts a *philosophical* attack on political *philosophy*, based in philosophical thought about the nature and historicity of politics, that denounces contemporary theorizing about politics and its fiction that liberal-capitalist parliamentarianism is self-evidently just, fair, equal etc. The core of Badiou's concern is that, based on this presumed self-evidence, contemporary political philosophy treats parliamentarianism as the only form of political organization that is *truly* political, yet it does so — inconsistently and dishonestly — by *doxically* grounding political 'truth' on popular consent. In contrast, Badiou's political intervention, which is in truth a philosophical intervention intended to produce 'strictly philosophical effects' (118), avoids this dependence on opinion by binding itself to the traditional philosophical pursuit of truth, yet without turning to the neo-conservative thesis that political truth is natural and universal. Rather, Badiou simultaneously seeks out the truth *of* politics and the truth that emerges *from* actual and ongoing politics.

*Metapolitics* is comprised of four *types* of essays: polemical, expository, conceptual, and original (see xxxvi-xxxvii). As such, the text as a whole adopts four goals. *Metapolitics* all at once attempts to (a) denounce contemporary political philosophy, (b) draw out constructive pathways from within contem-

porary philosophy (e.g., Althusser, Balibar, Rancière), (c) elucidate the meaning and significance of traditional political concepts (e.g., equality, justice, democracy) for the contemporary political world, and, most importantly, (d) propose a novel and original understanding of politics as a militant production of truth. Ultimately, it is (d) that takes priority; the polemics, expositions and conceptual elucidations serve to occasion and inform Badiou's reconfiguration of politics and political philosophizing. However, because his originality is only intelligible against the contemporary philosophizing he rejects, I will focus on Badiou's critical response to political philosophy before turning all too briefly to some of his metapolitical theses.

Badiou's attack is 'directed against the academic, parliamentary and "anti-totalitarian" right, which works in support of our so-called "democracies" in the parochial name of "political philosophy"' (xxxvi). Though specific chapters are clearly conceived as strictly polemical (e.g., Chapter 1: Against 'Political Philosophy'), there's an important sense in which all of Badiou's essays bear a hint of the polemical. Simply put, the motto of this dimension of Badiou's text is: 'down with political philosophy'. This does not mean down with all past theorists of politics; rather, Badiou's polemical rejection is aimed at liberal-democratic apologetics couched in the ideological language of 'philosophy'. According to Badiou, political philosophy is 'the programme which, holding politics — or, better still, the political — as an objective datum, or even invariant, of universal experience, accords philosophy the task of thinking it' (10). As such, the political philosopher *qua* apologist absolves him/herself of the need to act politically, preferring instead to assume the perspective of a distant observer who provides a justification for the wisdom of popular opinion. Though not treated by Badiou, this position is perhaps best exemplified in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition by John Rawls (e.g., his *Political Liberalism*), whose work essentially provides a refinement of an already established and taken-for-granted politics by articulating the basic principles of justice already operative in a liberal democratic world dominated by the fact of reasonable pluralism. However, if political philosophy refines a politics grounded in opinion and structured by the ideal of consent, then such philosophizing can make no claims to philosophical truth and should be supplanted by what Badiou calls metapolitics, or 'the consequences a philosophy is capable of drawing, both in and of itself, from real instances of thought' (epigraph). In contrast to the concept of *the* political as a theoretical construct that facilitates the disengagement with real world politics and promotes the neutrality of removed and distant theorizing, metapolitical thinking is concerned with *a* politics, a real world political situation which both occasions truths about the political world and necessitates philosophical and militant response.

Against 'political philosophy', Badiou raises a series of objections which showcase his distrust of the doxic and his insistence that real politics produce truth and, by extension, that *only real* politics produce truth. Overall, Badiou's concern is that political pluralism, as the orienting concept of liberal-parliamentary theory, is much too broad. Though he agrees that

'plurality is the ground of being in general' (21), Badiou's contention is that politics singularizes plurality, establishing a numericality through truth procedures. In other words, politics names the plurality of the political event, making it singular and operative in the modality of truth itself; it does not leave plurality simply and generally plural as liberal pluralism contends. Only through such naming can political judgments be *judgments of truth* rather than mere opinions. This is so because political situations demand decisiveness, demand political decisions, decisions that *make political truth true* and retrospectively knowable. Insofar as Badiou rejects opinion as the ground of politics and as the object of political philosophizing (as he correctly reminds us often, *philosophy has no object*), the essence of politics can in no way be opinion; rather, it is 'the prescription of a possibility in rupture with what exists' (24). Politics and political truth are essentially and necessarily transformative, never conservative. The conservation of the state of affairs is all well and good, but it is not political. The State, which is always errantly excessive, by its nature occasions an exclusion of the subjects of politics (i.e., the militants of political events) that in turn occasions the militant truth-producing event of politics.

Alain Badiou has produced a text that cuts many ways: against the neo-conservative, *Metapolitics* proposes a non-naturalistic fidelity to truth; against the neo-liberal, it jettisons all reliance on opinion; against standard leftist thought, it rejects any natural or divine teleology. Though Badiou himself might object, in some sense *Metapolitics* appears in the strange and unexplored space where Marx and Burke meet (or rather, haven't yet met!), offering a defense of militant politics but always in fidelity to truth-making events. As Burke taught, and as has been forgotten, true conservatism is not about the status quo; it is about a fidelity to the necessarily changing and adapting roots of political truth and order. What Burke feared about the French Revolution seems to be what Badiou fears about political philosophy: namely, the inability or unwillingness to bear witness to the truth of politics.

**Edvard Lorkovic**

Grant MacEwan College

**Lee Worth Bailey**

*The Enchantments of Technology.*

Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois  
Press 2005.

Pp. viii + 250.

US\$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0252-02985-2);

US\$25.00 (paper: ISBN 0252-07232-4).

In this book Bailey takes on the various environmental and social problems created by our technological culture. The general argument is that, although modern science and technology purports to provide an objective analysis of the world ('disenchanted' in Bailey's phrase), it actually comes along with its own set of 'enchantments', i.e., unrecognised myths and motivations. These unrecognised features of our techno-culture conceal some quite destructive forces that have led to disastrous consequences such as nuclear weapons, pollution, the polarisation of wealth, and many environmental problems.

The book is highly critical of science and technological culture, but Bailey insists that he is no Luddite hoping to return to some imagined pre-modern past. His point is rather to identify the problematic and unaddressed aspects of techno-culture so that they can be ameliorated. Bailey also thinks that this can be done while still enjoying technology's obvious benefits, such as antibiotics and heated homes. There is a lot to what Bailey is saying. Nobody can turn back the clock, but modern life has created grave problems.

Bailey draws from a disparate array of humanities and psychoanalytic theory to diagnose the causes and nature of technology's unconscious 'enchantments'. These range from Heidegger's writings to Jung's notions about the collective unconscious. The argument is that technology's problems arise from western science's subject/object metaphysics that obscures the spiritual and ethical side of life. The results include a false sense of objectivity and unrealistic dreams of a techno-utopia leading to a misplaced faith in things like nuclear power that do more harm than good. It also leads to energy being wasted on things such as space exploration and harmful projects like research on artificial intelligence and robots. Rejecting the subject/object metaphysics unmasks the pretensions of these projects and opens up the possibility for a spiritual appreciation of the world that grounds a deeper ethics. Bailey's claims about modernity's bad metaphysics are familiar, and similar calls for an appreciation of the spiritual side have been made by many, such as Suzuki in *The Sacred Balance*.

Very few will deny that there are grave environmental threats and that nuclear proliferation is a very bad thing. But is Bailey's analysis sound? The book concentrates on presenting its theological environmentalism and does not really consider possible criticism. In this it will disappoint philosophical scholars who usually expect rigorous examination of possible objections. One obvious objection is that if Bailey is correct then pre-modern societies (lacking western metaphysics) ought to do better at avoiding the sorts of environmental problems that plague the modern world. But there are plenty of

examples of pre-modern societies that destroyed their environments. The ancient Mayans and Easter Islanders are cases in point. The failure to consider this is a serious weakness in the book.

Another serious problem lies with his vaguely defined 're-spiritualised' ethics. There are many well-known problems with trying to ground ethics on a religious basis. What exactly in Bailey's view justifies an action as right? Is it because his spirituality just dictates that something is right or will the spirituality judge something right because it is right? If the latter, why bother with the spirituality? This objection goes back to Plato and is ignored by Bailey. Additionally, what mandates belief in Bailey's spirituality? Bailey's case seems to rest on the fact that the actions of those that do not adopt his view have sometimes been problematic. But this is not evidence that Bailey's view is right or that the opposing view is incorrect.

Bailey's recommendations will strike many as too impressionistic. Hand waiving about 'seeing in a new way' is all well and good, but has little to say about how to regulate an international fishery or how best to structure the trading market for emissions credits. Conventional ethical approaches such as rights-theory or consequentialism can and do tackle such questions directly. Specific examples showing how Bailey's system does better seem required and yet none are offered. Worse, the few specific proposals seem debatable. Bailey categorically rejects nuclear power. But the youngest plants are now over thirty years old and the field has advanced. Is it really true that a new generation of cleaner plants has no role in a carbon reduction strategy?

Other difficulties abound. One is Bailey's adoption of a now hackneyed caricature of science. Science is identified as presupposing all sorts of specific doctrines from metaphysics to gender relations that date all the way back to Bacon and Descartes. We are also told that science cannot conceptualise the interconnectedness of things and so on. The mistake here is the identification of science with a specific set of beliefs. Of course scientific beliefs change all the time and nobody accepts Bacon's views of gender relations today (and these were never very scientific anyway). Science is rather a diverse set of methods whereby beliefs are critically assessed and replaced. Indeed, many of its current findings point in Bailey's direction. Ecology and biology hardly grant humans a privileged place in nature. Worse, Bailey's views about the place of humanity in nature and his position on the environmental crisis seem to require that these disciplines support his claims, but how can they do so if their findings are undermined by a false and misleading metaphysics?

This is not the only such contradiction. The quest for advanced robots is doomed, we are told, because robots cannot be really human. But doesn't this place humanity in a privileged place again? The Japanese seem to agree, and they cannot understand the western fear of robots. Since their main spiritual tradition rejects the western subject/object metaphysics shouldn't they agree with Bailey? Very famously, they draw the opposite conclusion.

*The Enchantments of Technology* is well intended and does have the virtue of focusing attention on some important and interesting subjects. However, the book's very worthy goal is side-tracked by unhelpful excursions into

speculative metaphysics. There is no doubt that many theologians, humanities scholars and social scientists will find Bailey's conclusions congenial, but the book's usefulness to philosophers, policy makers and environmental scientists is very limited.

**Dan McArthur**

Atkinson College, York University

**Renaud Barbaras**

*Desire and Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception.*

Trans. Paul B. Milan. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2006.

Pp. i + 176.

US\$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4645-1).

Whatever the substance of our reflections may be, whatever they may affirm or deny, and whatever the nature of our reflection, whether it be philosophical or otherwise, what our thinking cannot cast into doubt is the fact that it comes to be, and persists, precisely as an experience within the context of a world. As Barbaras affirms in the introductory chapter, entitled 'The Problem of Perception', the fact that we begin with the experience of a world and live continually within the bounds of perception has a significance which is absolute, and which must be confronted (10 Fr. — where applicable, I will indicate page references first to the original French edition, published in 1999, and, second, to this English translation). In a certain sense, this book in its entirety is an attempt at such a confrontation.

For Barbaras, although one may affirm the primacy of thought over perceptual experience, and insist upon the absolute identity of thinking with itself as a prior condition to experience, such an affirmation neglects an indisputable dimension of perceptual experience in the sense that, irrespective of its truth-value, this dimension forms an integral part of our lived experience, and is, so to speak, *index sui* (9-10 Fr./1-2). Even if reflection subsequently denounces perception as illusory, such a denunciation can only ever occur *subsequently*, so that any thinking that reveals meaning within our perceptual experience invariably does not address the fact that such experience existed initially in a state of blindness to its own existence (10 Fr./2). Construing itself as the very condition of our encounter with what is given in experience, thought, or reflection, thus pulls the proverbial ladder away from underneath itself, for it can only denounce perception as depend-

ent after relying upon a perceptual experience through which the brute fact of the world's existence was initially presented to it (10 Fr./2). For Barbaras, it is in and through our experience, which is primordially perceptual, that we initially become acquainted with the thing itself — or, in other words, with what there is. Furthermore, it is, as he writes, within the 'immanence' of what we 'live' that we find a path towards transcendence, and, in this sense, the phenomenological exhortation of a return to the things themselves signifies *ipso facto* a return to perception (11 Fr./2).

For Barbaras, Husserl is not only the first thinker to have gauged accurately the demands of a philosophy of perception, he is also the first to have placed these demands at the centre of his thinking (16 Fr./8). Indeed, the work of Husserl is the principle foundation upon which the dense arguments of this book are intricately constructed. Although it quickly becomes apparent that Barbaras is painstakingly critical of Husserl, it is clear that his often far-reaching criticisms are the result of a rigorous meditation on Husserl's phenomenology, and that they represent a definite mark of respect for the depth of the fundamental intuitions harboured within Husserl's writings. In this regard, it is interesting to add that the other significant influences evident here on Barbaras' work are themselves thinkers who, with the exception of Bergson, were either close readers of Husserl or susceptible to the influence of German phenomenology generally, or both: for example, Merleau-Ponty, Jan Patočka, Kurt Goldstein, and Viktor von Weizsäcker.

The book's introductory chapter is of central importance, as it explicates succinctly those aspects of Husserl's philosophy of perception upon which Barbaras will build, and towards which he will address his criticisms. After explicating the salient features of Husserl's general views on perception, beginning with the *Logical Investigations* (16-22 Fr./8-13) before moving on to Book 1 of *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Barbaras concentrates on what he believes to be, as he will state clearly later on (152 Fr./125), Husserl's greatest discovery: that the object is presented to us in experience through a diversity of manifestations, which Husserl calls adumbrations [*Abschattungen*] (22-9 Fr./13-18). We might be tempted to call this the 'theory' of adumbrations, taking care to use the word 'theory' very loosely (22 Fr./13), and remembering that for Husserl the meticulous *description* of what appears in experience, and of the manner of its appearance, took precedence over the construction of all-encompassing theories. At the conclusion of the introductory chapter, Barbaras affirms that even though Husserl manages to lay out the ground in order to account for perception itself, and even though he thereby possesses the means to develop a conceptual framework entirely of his own, he ultimately draws away from the radical implications of his descriptions, instead calling upon categories from a tradition which has misjudged the specificity of perceptual experience. Consequently, Barbaras states that his own aim is not to examine perception as merely one region of Being amongst others, using our philosophical tools as we usually do in

a process of clarification; but, rather, he affirms his determination to hone those tools anew against perception's singularity (28 Fr./18). The task of a philosophy of perception is not therefore to understand perception by means of categories already at its disposal, but to allow itself to be reformed in and through its contact with perception. Strictly speaking, rather than thinking *about* perception, philosophy should think *according to* perception (28-9, 58-9 Fr./18, 43).

The arguments of the first chapter, and indeed of the others that follow, are as bold as its title suggests: 'A Critique of Transcendental Phenomenology'. Building especially upon the work of Merleau-Ponty and Patočka, and criticising most notably the essential elements of subjectivism that Husserl's philosophy of perception retains (39, 41, 50, 57-8 Fr./26, 28, 35, 42-3), Barbaras begins to develop two of the fundamental arguments that will be pursued throughout the book: first, that the coming to be of a subjective element within the world (in other words, of a *cogito*) is originally dependent upon the very coming to be of the world itself (44, 87 Fr./31, 67-8); and, second, that by tracing carefully Husserl's analyses of perception and his 'theory' of adumbrations, we are forced to recognise, as a phenomenological given (50 Fr./35), an essential dimension of absence (or distance, or negativity) as constitutive of our experience.

It follows from this second point that the development of a phenomenological philosophy necessitates a reconsideration of this essential aspect of negation (or absence, or distance) (50, 66 Fr./35, 48-9), and this theme is immediately taken up in the following chapter, 'The Phenomenological Reduction as a Critique of Nothingness'. Here, Barbaras addresses what he understands as the insufficiently radical nature of the reduction (75 Fr./56), and, drawing from the work of both Bergson and Merleau-Ponty, he sketches out an alternative understanding of the reduction, integrating into it an essential element of negativity, precisely as a constitutive aspect of experience, and in no wise its opposite (75 Fr./56). Barbaras then proceeds to address the essential details of the phenomenological point of view he has been developing. Beginning in the chapter entitled 'The Three Moments of Appearance [*l'apparaître*]', he provides an explication of his renewed understanding of the concept of world; and in the chapters entitled 'Perception and Living Movement' and 'Desire as the Essence of Subjectivity', he concludes with an analysis of the living subject which appears in the world's midst. The primacy of perceptual experience leads to a consideration of its essential relation to movement, and to the postulation of a constitutive motility (108 Fr./86), which leads in turn to the centrality of the concept of desire in the characterisation of the living subject (147-8 Fr./121).

In his concluding remarks, Barbaras renders explicit how the phenomenological point of view he has developed necessitates a renewal of our understanding of the concepts of space, time, and knowledge. As an attempt to grasp the specificity of the phenomenon as it comes to be, that of the world within which it appears, and that of the subject to whom it becomes apparent, *Desire and Distance* is an ambitious, dense, and rigorously argued work of

philosophy in the phenomenological tradition, certainly amongst the most original of recent years.

**Stephen A. Noble**

Université de Paris I – Panthéon — Sorbonne

**Roland Barthes**

*The Neutral: Lecture Course at the Collège de France (1977-1978).*

Trans. Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis Hollier.

New York: Columbia University Press 2005.

Pp. xxv + 280.

US\$30.00. ISBN 0-231-13404-5.

During his first lecture on 'The Neutral' in February 1978, Roland Barthes dismissed the idea that his course could ever become a book: 'People tell me: "You'll make a book with this course on the Neutral?" All other problems put aside (particularly problems of performance), my answer: No, the Neutral is unmarketable. And I think of Bloy's words: "there is nothing perfectly beautiful except what is invisible and above all unbuyable"' (13). Barthes' untimely death might have prevented him from changing his mind, but fourteen years later, under the supervision of Barthes' former student Eric Marty, the lectures were published in France. And now we have an excellent English translation.

This book will be most useful for those already familiar with Barthes' texts, although those working on the idea of the neutral (especially in Blanchot whom Barthes often cites) will find this work helpful too. Following Saussure, Barthes is interested in how meaning is created by the tension between binary terms rather than in choosing one side over the other. In the course he develops the concept of 'the Neutral' as a more robust understanding of what he had called 'degree zero' in his earliest writings.

The course was (and the text is) organized around twenty-three 'figures' or 'traits' that provide us with discursive displays of the Neutral; those figures are presented to us in random order so as not to privilege any one over the others. The text is also divided by the thirteen actual class lecture dates. The figures vary widely, and include reflections on benevolence, weariness, silence, tact, sleep, anger, and androgyny — each treated only for a few pages. Many texts and intellectual figures are associated through these figures, e.g., the discussion of benevolence brings us from Cicero to Benjamin to Baudelaire and finally to the Tao. Barthes begins several classes with 'supplements' in which he responds to written comments and student ques-

tions presented to him outside of class. An annex presents three figures that he did not have time to discuss in the course itself.

In the course summary, Barthes claims that 'we have defined as pertaining to the Neutral every inflection that, dodging or baffling the paradigmatic, oppositional structure of meaning, aims at the suspension of the conflictual basis of discourse' (211). But we can never permanently suspend conflict or even hang onto one clear concept of the Neutral. The Neutral is presented in the course as a horizon, an imaginary line that always moves away from us as we approach it. Against this horizon, we catch glimpses of what it is like to 'baffle the paradigm', that is, subvert or suspend the dualistic logic that entraps us, even if ultimately we cannot escape that logic for good. Barthes explicitly defines this search for the neutral as an ethical project, an attempt 'to live according to nuance' (11).

Barthes' ethical desire, as well as his love of language and of philosophy, is seductive. In reading these lectures, I fell in love again with Barthes (whom I had not read or written about in a decade), but then I remembered why I left him. Ultimately, his attempts to conceptually grasp the neutral, an attempt to move beyond or to subvert binary logics, seems to flounder in the very binary of gender. Is his imaginary of the neutral not in fact male, or at least the product of male desire? That is, males always claim the neutral for themselves in a world where the male is the norm. Although he briefly mentions the fact that the female is usually the marked term, that which stands apart and as 'other' from the neutral (188), he does not follow through in thinking about the implications of this for his own project. At the very least, Barthes fails to see the costs of this desire for women. He, for example, romanticizes anorexia as approaching the neutral in its 'desire for nothing' (152); but taking a neutral stand on anorexia has real consequences for women, who disproportionately suffer from the disease. While this might seem an extreme example, there are numerous places in the text where he is blind to the ways that the desire for the neutral depends on women, on those who grant such desires but cannot desire such themselves. He claims, for example, that he finds his 'quietude' when he is unqualified by adjectives that judge as they describe, and claims that only mothers provide this comfort of unqualified love (56). Yet when do mothers enjoy such quietude, given that mothers are always qualified as good or as bad — indeed would not Barthes think a mother bad if she 'qualified' her child?

Barthes' performance ultimately depends on the figure of male authority which itself is implicitly constructed over and against the corresponding figure of female passivity. In the lecture hall he playfully undermines his authority, but he can do so only because it is granted to him in the first place. Repeatedly I found myself wishing that his work was better informed by feminists who also engage in critiques of dualistic logic but are more attentive to the power of its gendered dimensions.

Physically, this is a beautiful book — it returns literal meaning to Barthes' concept of the 'pleasure of the text'. The text is printed following his own handwritten lecture notes, where he highlights key ideas, authors, and terms

in a wide left margin. Thomas Leclerc beautifully annotated Barthes' careful lecture notes with additions he learned from listening to the course tape and researching Barthes' references. The English translation maintains the beauty of the original French text, including its detailed notes and excellent indices. In addition, the English edition adds translators' notes as well as detailed bibliographies that cite all texts available in English and then list those references only available in a foreign language. The book is beautiful in spite of its visibility and 'buyability.'

**Sharon M. Meagher**

University of Scranton

**Yemima Ben-Menahem, ed.**

*Hilary Putnam.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2005.

Pp. xi + 272.

US\$70.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-8131-5);

US\$25.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-01254-6).

A philosopher as productive as Hilary Putnam cannot expect to find many readers who will have followed all the tracks of his thought for nearly fifty years, from quantum logic to ethics. As we pick and choose from his oeuvre, we will see only the vacillation for which Putnam is known. The defender of metaphysical realism settles into internal realism, only to shift ground to common sense realism; the inventor of computational functionalism becomes its critic, and the opponent of verificationism briefly embraces a verificationist account of truth.

The greatest virtue of this collection of nine essays is that it successfully vanquishes this image of Putnam; doctrinal invariants are clearly visible through the flux, and we are given a portrait of a philosopher of singular focus, who remained open to new ideas for five decades. Conscious of the image of Putnam as the great vacillator, Ben-Menahem speaks to the theme of 'intellectual transformations' in her introduction, cautioning that 'perception of change is description dependent', that 'assessment of difference and similarity is value-laden', and that Putnam's own rhetoric magnifies change while concealing continuities.

The interpretive cautions are unnecessary, and the continuity is better displayed directly, as it is in 'Realism, Beyond Miracles', by Alex Mueller and Arthur Fine, or by Ben-Menahem's own contribution, 'Putnam on Skepticism'. Perhaps the largest apparent shift in Putnam's views — the one that accompanied, or even directed, his move from metaphysical realism to internal realism, his adoption of the direct theory of reference, and his

eventual retreat from functionalism — has been the perceived shift from his early scientific realism to pragmatism. These two fine studies of the evolution of his realism make a compelling case that Putnam has been a pragmatist from the outset. Two themes consistently shaped his views: a Peircean fallibilism, and a Deweyan insistence on the primacy of practice over philosophical theory. Another constant has been his opponents. Whether operationist interpretations of quantum mechanics or postmodern deconstructions of human rights, the targets of Putnam's wrath have always been assaults on the objectivity of truth and reality. 'Realism' names the form his resistance takes. The most significant changes have been in Putnam's gradual recognition of how little we require to preserve objectivity of a sort that can be sustained without irony and without inviting skepticism. Putnam's progress has been to find ways to defend the same territory with fewer resources.

Juliet Floyd's study of Putnam's seminal essay 'The Meaning of Meaning' places semantic externalism in historical context. The essay was a reaction to the varieties of relativism that flowed from the combination of (i) a meaning-holism that defines scientific terms by the theories in which they are embedded and (ii) the Fregean idea that meaning determines reference. But the relativism these doctrines jointly imply never emerged from the combination of holism and Fregean views about reference among early analytic philosophers, who would have been as troubled by the consequences as Putnam. Floyd asks why, and her answer is found in early devotion to the aim of an ideal language, one deliberately 'divorced from particulars of the local and historically contingent situations of the thinker' (36). In order to develop 'a human and agent centered conception of meaning' (37), Putnam's incipient pragmatism compelled him to confront the consequences, which he did by abandoning both the Fregean view of reference and the limited holism of his predecessors.

Two essays explore Putnam's reaction to the lack of an acceptable interpretation of quantum mechanics. Early on Putnam promoted quantum logic and, taking up Quine's thought that logic is revisable, urged that classical logic be supplanted. In 'The Tale of Quantum Logic', Tim Maudlin argues that this was an over-reaction. Maudlin advocates a partitioning in which nonclassical connectives are restricted to quantum mechanical settings, but classical logic is retained to describe experimental results. Nancy Cartwright's essay, 'Another Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics, or What Quantum Theory is Not', urges that Putnam's account of how theoretical terms get their meaning already implies that quantum mechanics has no need of an interpretation. For those of us who need someone with stronger teeth to chew our quantum mechanics for us, Cartwright's elegant essay is welcome.

In 'The Rise and Fall of Computational Functionalism' Oron Shagrir provides a solid but routine presentation of what his title promises. Shagrir closes by taking Putnam to task for supposing that the demise of functionalism foretells the end of cognitive science; cognitive science and functionalist theories of mind are not complementary projects with comparable goals. Richard Bernstein sympathetically but unimaginatively outlines Putnam's

critique of the fact/value dichotomy, and he wholeheartedly endorses Putnam's conclusion that facts and values are 'entangled'. The entanglement concedes that epistemic norms are indispensable to our theories of what the facts are, and also that efforts to pry descriptive from evaluative components of thick moral concepts are bound to fail. But since it takes two to 'entangle', it remains unclear why Putnam's account does not preserve more of the fact/value contrast than a pragmatist should want.

Charles Travis' essay, 'The Face of Perception', is inspired by Putnam's use of the phrase in his title, but does not otherwise speak to Putnam's work. Similarly, alluding to Putnam's occasional references to individuals, John Stachel tells us in 'Structural Realism and Contextual Individuality' that, from a particle physicist's perspective, fundamental individuals are only nodes in relational structures, and so structures, not things, are real. Neither essay properly belongs in this collection.

For those who seek a clearer view of Putnam's body of work, the essays by Floyd, Mueller and Fine, and Ben-Menahem are strongly recommended. But do not be misled by the aims (stated on the back cover) of the *Contemporary Philosophy in Focus* series, of which this volume is the ninth installment. The series promises 'introductory volumes' that will 'appeal to students of philosophy and to professionals as well as to students across the humanities and social sciences'. To profit from the contributions in this volume, you will need prior training in analytic philosophy, some appreciation of its history, and a willingness to slog through (albeit informal) presentations of debates in quantum logic or theories of meaning and reference.

### **Rockney Jacobsen**

Wilfrid Laurier University

### **Paul Boghossian**

*Fear of Knowledge:*

*Against Relativism and Constructivism.*

Toronto and New York:

Oxford University Press 2006.

Pp. 139.

Cdn\$48.00:US\$24.95. ISBN 0-19-928718-X.

Paul Boghossian is struck by the fact that philosophers seem to stand alone among humanities scholars in their lack of enthusiasm for constructivism and relativism, and he wrote this book with the aim of understanding and addressing non-philosophers' growing interest in them. He assesses three popular constructivist and relativist theses: (1) facts are constructed; (2) facts

concerning justification are constructed, hence justification is culturally relative; and (3) evidence does not determine or fix belief. He systematically analyzes each thesis, assessing its merits, its alleged support, and the evidence against it, but in each case remains unconvinced. He argues that (i) there are person-independent facts, (ii) facts about justification are not culturally relative, and (iii) evidence does in fact sometimes determine or fix belief. Boghossian hopes that by showing that these claims are correct he will dampen the enthusiasm for constructivism and relativism.

There are many things to like about *Fear of Knowledge*. First, it is a genuine book, written as a unified whole, developing a series of intimately related arguments. These days, in philosophy, such books are rare. Rather, what we generally find are books that are compilations of papers thematically related, but not systematically unified. Second, the book is extremely clear. Boghossian takes great pains to lay out the views he assesses, as well as his concerns and criticisms. Third, the book contains a number of subtle and compelling arguments. I found Boghossian's arguments in defense of objective facts especially compelling. He grants that descriptions of facts are socially relative. Different communities adopt different schemes, lexicons, or frameworks, and this leads people to describe the world in different ways. But this innocuous thesis does not support the stronger constructivist thesis that facts are description-dependent. As far as Boghossian is concerned, there are no good independent arguments for the description-dependence of facts.

I do, however, have some concerns. For one thing, Boghossian's arguments become less convincing as he addresses more plausible constructivist claims. As mentioned above, he is very compelling in arguing that facts are not constructed, but his arguments against the relativity of justification are less convincing. Boghossian begins this section of the book by laying out his opponents' case as clearly and compellingly as possible. He even acknowledges that there is 'a powerful argument in support of a relativistic view of rational belief' (59). Nevertheless, he argues that 'there are absolute, practice-independent facts about what beliefs it would be reasonable to have under fixed evidential conditions' (110). Though his arguments show that *sometimes* evidence is unequivocal with respect to what claims it supports, it hardly establishes the stronger conclusion that *generally* evidence is unequivocal in its support. This stronger conclusion, however, is the claim he needs to establish if he is to alleviate our anxieties about epistemic relativism. Indeed, I found the arguments allegedly supporting relativism more compelling than the arguments intended to show that facts about justification are not relative.

I am also concerned about Boghossian's arguments that aim to address the third constructivist thesis. Here he aims to show that the relativist is mistaken to claim that 'our epistemic reasons ... can never be adequate by themselves to explain our beliefs and contingent social interests are needed to take up the slack' (112). This seems to take aim at straw opponents. This is unfortunate because the real opponents are interesting and deserve to be addressed. For example, he attributes to Kuhn a view Kuhn does not accept.

Though Kuhn claims that evidence often underdetermines theory choice when scientists are choosing between competing theories, this claim does not support the stronger claim that Boghossian purports to address. It seems philosophers are too often concerned with a straw Kuhn rather than the real and interesting Kuhn.

Boghossian also misrepresents Pierre Duhem's view, conflating it with Quine's less interesting thesis about underdetermination. Duhem rightly notes that background assumptions are implicated in every scientific experiment. Quine, on the other hand, claims that there are always conceivable alternative theories that can account for any body of data accounted for by any accepted theory. Quine's claim concerns mere logical possibilities, threats that are only as serious as Cartesian demons.

There is a general lesson to learn from Boghossian's engaging study of these constructivist and relativist theses. The claims of constructivists are most threatening when they are interpreted as asserting something strong, such as that *all* facts are socially constructed, or that evidence *never* fixes belief. But when construed this way, constructivism and relativism are easy targets, and Boghossian is very successful at hitting the mark. On the other hand, it is quite challenging to address modest constructivist claims, claims such as that evidence quite often (or generally) does not fix belief. This form of constructivism is quite plausible and interesting. Further, it is challenging to determine the implications of accepting such a modest form of constructivism. When read correctly, Kuhn is a modest constructivist of this sort, and philosophers of science have yet to reach consensus about the implications his view has for our understanding of scientific knowledge and inquiry. Hence, despite Boghossian's victories against various strong constructivist theses, there is still more work ahead in this area for philosophers.

Despite these criticisms, this is a book well worth reading. It embodies a number of virtues that make it especially appropriate for students. It is clearly written, challenging, and addresses an important set of issues.

**K. Brad Wray**

State University of New York, Oswego

**Claudia Card**

*The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil.*  
Toronto and New York: Oxford University  
Press 2005.  
Pp. xiii + 284.  
US\$74.00  
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-514508-9);  
Cdn\$43.95:US\$25.00  
(paper: ISBN 0-19-518126-3).

The last two decades have witnessed an awakening of interest by moral philosophers in the nature and moral significance of evil. The focus of this interest is not the theological problem of evil, but rather, secular analyses of the morally most despicable characters, acts, and events. These philosophers seek to understand large-scale atrocities such as American slavery, the Holocaust, and Rwanda, as well as the monstrous deeds of individual rapists, torturers, and murders. Some recent literature on the topic includes Laurence Thomas' *Vessels of Evil* (1993), Richard Bernstein's *Radical Evil* (2002), Joel Feinberg's chapter, 'Evil', in his *Problems at the Roots of Laws* (2003), Adam Morton's *On Evil* (2004), John Kekes' *The Roots of Evil* (2005), and Arne Johan Vetlesen's *Evil and Human Agency* (2005).

This book is, without a doubt, one of the best books on the topic to date. It stands out for its sharp analysis and thorough scholarship that draws on sources in philosophy and the social sciences. It begins with an admirable analysis of the concept of evil. According to Card's atrocity paradigm, 'evils are foreseeable intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing' (3). Intolerable harm includes severe mental and physical suffering as well as the deprivation of the basics for decent human lives, such as food, water, air, sleep, affective ties to other human beings, and the ability to make choices (16). The culpability of evil acts can take various forms, 'such as ... the aim to bring about intolerable harm, ... the willingness to do so in the course of pursuing an otherwise acceptable aim or in adhering to some other value or principle, or ... the failure to attend to risks or take them seriously' (20).

Card intends her analysis of evil to focus on the suffering of victims rather than on the motives of perpetrators. By focussing on the suffering of victims she hopes to identify and reduce evil in the world rather than focus on questions of appropriate punishment for perpetrators. She believes a focus on victims is particularly appropriate given that most evils are the result of institutions rather than individual moral monsters. Yet, to be plausible, an analysis of evil must make certain motivational states necessary for evil, otherwise it will be unable to adequately distinguish between evil and bad states of affairs, e.g. between murder and genocide on the one hand, and non-negligent accidents and hurricanes on the other. Card's notion of culpable wrongdoing makes the appropriate motivational states necessary for evil, thereby keeping the bad and the evil distinct. Yet by doing so she is not entirely successful at diverting our attention from perpetrators and their

motives. But this apparent failing is all for the good. It is one thing to offer a sound analysis of evil and quite another to decide how to respond to various forms of evil. Card's analysis of evil is sound, and she is correct that we must focus on eliminating intolerable harms rather than on understanding the states of mind of various perpetrators. However, it is not clear that her theory, in itself, forces us to focus on victims rather than on perpetrators as she intends.

Card is perhaps best known for her work in feminist moral and social theory. Thus, it is not surprising that she focuses on three examples of institutional evil that are of particular interest to those of us concerned with the oppression of women: war rape, marriage, and motherhood. Card's discussion of war rape is as enlightening as it is horrifying. But it is her contention that marriage and motherhood are also evil institutions that will spark the most controversy. 'Institutions are evil when it is reasonably foreseeable, by those with power to change or abolish them, that their normal or correct operation will lead to or facilitate intolerably harmful injustices' (140). It is reasonably foreseeable that the normal and correct operation of the institution of marriage will lead to or facilitate intolerably harmful injustices because it provides significant incentives for partners to stay in broken relationships, places obstacles in the way of escaping from broken relationships, gives perpetrators of abuse virtually unlimited rights of access to their victims, and makes some forms of abuse difficult or impossible to detect or prove. It is reasonably foreseeable that the normal and correct operation of the institution of motherhood will lead to or facilitate intolerably harmful injustices because it places the responsibility for child rearing and for a child's waywardness solely on the shoulders of the mother and father (oftentimes on the shoulders of the mother alone), which is a significant burden to bear, and because it gives parents virtually unlimited access to, and control over, the child. Although, Card makes a strong case for the evils of marriage and motherhood, the reader may wonder whether these institutions really are 'rotten to the core' (102) as she suggests, or whether they could be repaired. This question is particularly pertinent, since the alternatives to marriage and motherhood she suggests, i.e., contracts or relationships that allow for more independence and communal child rearing, are left somewhat vague and may have their own problems. But whether or not marriage and motherhood should be abolished, Card is certainly correct that these institutions are in grave need of reform along the lines she suggests.

Other points of considerable interest in this book include Card's argument that feminists and other political activists ought to prioritize the elimination of evils over unjust inequalities, her explication and extension of Kant's theory of radical evil, and her discussion of 'grey zones', situations where victims of evil are forced to take part in subjecting other victims to the evils they themselves face. Card's discussions of these topics are characteristically balanced and wise.

*The Atrocity Paradigm* is essential reading for anyone interested in the nature and moral significance of evil, especially evil caused by institutional

oppression. It is also well worth reading for moral and social philosophers more generally.

**Todd Calder**

University of Wisconsin, Madison

**Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, ed.**

*Existence, Culture, and Persons:*

*The Ontology of Roman Ingarden.*

New Brunswick, NJ: Ontos Verlag 2005.

Pp. 226.

US\$94.00. ISBN 3-937202-84-6.

In a 1959 review of Anna Teresa Tymieniecka's *Essence et Existence: Essai sur la philosophie de Nicolai Hartmann et Roman Ingarden*, Maurice Natanson complained of a shortfall in available studies in English. This collection of recent essays on Ingarden's construction of ontology, culture, and persons attempts, with some limited success, to bridge the gap in English language Ingardian scholarship between work on his aesthetics and work on his ontological and personalist writings. Ingarden himself would have lauded this endeavour as it represents an attempt to rectify a breed of 'false concretization' (152). Unfortunately the opening essay, Gregor Haeffliger and Guido Kung's 'Substances, States, Processes, Events. Ingarden and the Analytic Theory of Objects', manages to over-translate Ingarden's thought by pummeling the round peg of phenomenologically grounded ontology into the square hole of analytical theory. This tendency in Kung's influential interpretation of Ingarden's work was already in evidence in his chapter on Ingarden in Herbert Spiegelman's *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, wherein he translated Ingarden's principle realm of inquiry with the offhand remark 'Ingarden's ontology covers what in analytical philosophy is the realm of conceptual analysis'. In this more recent essay his subsumption of Ingarden's ontology into analytic terminology is even more overt and less cohesive.

Peter Simons' essay, 'Ingarden and the Ontology of Dependence', would have served as a better beginning. It faithfully lays out the conceptual framework of Ingarden's ontology by isolating his four key 'oppositions between independent and dependent things' (41) and giving a rich analysis of these oppositions by examining their relations to each other, listing 'possible cases', and providing examples ranging from God as a 'very, very independent being' to 'future events' as 'very, very dependent' beings (51).

Simons, however, is no mere acolyte; he introduces some extraordinary cases against which Ingarden's strict oppositional structure is sorely tested. Cloning, for example, problematises Ingarden's use of 'son' as a dependent object, i.e., 'a son is only a son because he has a father' (50). By drawing on lived experience, or 'empirical facts', in good phenomenological fashion, in order to 'mess up' Ingarden's 'metaphysical examples' (49), Simons is simultaneously complicit with Ingarden's method while critical of his results.

Daniel von Wachter's essay, 'Roman Ingarden's Ontology: Existential Dependence, Substances, Ideas, and Other Things Empiricists Do not Like', is the first in the volume to point out, contrary to the underlying drive of the previous two, that Ingarden only fails to provide 'more rigorous or formal definitions' because '[h]is aim is not to construe or explicate or analyze concepts but to grasp how things are in themselves' (62). After a well worked explication of what a 'purely intentional object' is for Ingarden, von Wachter inexplicably slips into an unexamined posture of scientism by concluding that, '[a]t any rate, if physics discovers that not everything is made of substances then Ingarden's ontology is false' (80). As Simons pointed out, according to Ingarden, future events, including discoveries, are 'very, very dependent beings' and therefore too unstable for von Wachter to rely on.

Amie Thomasson's 'Ingarden and the Ontology of Cultural objects' examines 'social and cultural objects such as money, churches and flags' (115). By 'denying that simple divisions into categories such as the mental, the physical and the ideal are exhaustive' (122), she challenges the view that 'purely intentional objects' are simply phantasms or illusions. These things are concrete examples of Ingarden's 'purely intentional' or 'fictional' objects, like 'little Dorrit's soft hazel eyes' (62), exactly von Wachter's 'things' that are not 'made of substances' per se.

Jeff Mitscherling's 'Concretization, Literary Criticism, and the Life of the Literary Work of Art' deals with more familiar Ingardenian themes, starting with the widely accepted layered schema that has been repeated many times, notably by Rene Wellek, to clarify his literary theory. Mitscherling's essay is an explication of Chapter 13 'The Life of a Literary Work of Art' in Ingarden's best known work, *The Literary Work of Art*. By focusing on Ingarden's description of aesthetic experience as a 'cocreation', described in terms of the 'cultural life' of a literary work of art, Mitscherling gets right into the dense phenomenological question of 'cultural', as opposed to 'transcendental', intersubjectivity. He contends that while readers are, in the first instance, informed by their cultural values, their readings, as 'widely disseminated literary criticism', can come to participate in 'the intersubjective constitution of cultural values' (156). However, some works suffer and even die as a result of being tortured into a culture in which they cannot comfortably exist — a pertinent point.

Edward Swiderski's 'Ingarden: From Phenomenological Realism to Moral Realism' makes the strongest case for Ingarden as realist by showing how his last work, a study of 'bearing responsibility' (184), led him away from the question of Realism versus Idealism and toward what Swiderski calls 'meta-

physical realism' (177). His argument is more cohesive than Haeffliger and Kung's in that it follows the Ingardian line by which specific investigations of specific problems yield different results. In this last work, Swiderski asserts, Ingarden attempted to use 'the trick responsibility appears to turn' (188) as an avenue into the 'Real' world, but that even in this late and atypical text Ingarden's 'rootedness in the phenomenological style ... which was polemical ... against psychologism, historicism, relativism and naturalism' (188), prevented him from reaching it.

The two essays in German are left aside because, given that the purpose of this collection was to open a vista on Ingarden's work to 'a contemporary' (9) — meaning analytical or Anglo/American — ontologist, their inclusion is unhelpful and perplexing. Most perplexing of all is Chrudzimski's decision to include a translated version of Haeffliger and Kung's essay yet not of his own, 'Brentano, Husserl und Ingarden ber die intentionalen Gegenstände' (83-115), nor Andrzej Poltawski's 'Roman Ingardens Ontologie und die Welt' (191-220). By beginning with an overtranslation, continuing with a re-inscription into the German language and tradition, and finishing with an untranslated reevaluation by a close follower, the effort to make Roman Ingarden's work more accessible to a wider readership undertaken in this volume is, unfortunately, largely both 'lost in translation' and the lack thereof.

### **Miles Kennedy**

National University of Ireland, Galway

### **Edward Craig, ed.**

*The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.*

New York: Routledge 2005.

Pp. xxvi + 1077.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-415-32495-5.

This 1077-page compendium evolves from two previous projects, the ten-volume *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* originally published in 1997 (now available online) and a distillation of this into one volume in the 2000 *Routledge Concise Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. The latter's articles comprise the initial introductory or summary sections of the former — roughly one tenth of the original *REP* article. This *Shorter REP* reflects the desire of many users and reviewers to have more depth, sacrificing, as the editor admits, some breadth in order to achieve this aim. It has 957 entries, compared to the 2054 included in the *Concise REP*, but 119 of them are the full entries

from the ten-volume *REP*, representing the work of important scholars such as Richard Rorty, Bernard Williams, Onora O'Neill, Timothy Williamson, and Michael Friedman.

Designed for undergraduate philosophy students and courses they are likely to meet, the *Shorter REP* contains substantial essays on all major figures in Western philosophy and a significant number of essays on major philosophical issues, including more contemporary concerns like bioethics, animal rights, feminist political philosophy, and post-structuralism, as well as treatments of Latin American, African, Arabic, Jewish, Indian, and East Asian philosophy. The book is new enough to be able to supersede older compendiums by offering lengthy treatments of philosophers who died in the twenty-first century such as Davidson, Rawls, Nozick, Quine, and David Lewis.

Despite its student orientation, it will also be of service to scholars and teachers whose range may be limited in a particular area, who would like overview essays to guide in the creation of new courses, who need to fill in knowledge gaps, or who find direction for further research. In that regard many essays have brief appendages of suggestions for further reading. There is not much new material, although there are some revisions by important contemporary scholars in their fields of expertise, including John Cooper, Paul Guyer, David Sedley, and Malcolm Schofield, to name just a few. There is also a completely rewritten essay on David Hume comprising some 18 pages.

Lengthy essays on many major philosophical figures are to be found throughout. Essays on Hobbes, Plato, Kant, Hegel, and so on average 18 pages in length, starting with a overview and an outline of subtopics to be discussed in subsequent pages. The layout is comprehensive and easy to follow. Some of the essays are rather too general and lack specificity — I found the essay on Rousseau far too general, for example, and the essay on Plotinus rather brief and unenthusiastic; the article on Analytical Philosophy, like that on Post-Modernism I found far too brief and uninformative (there is moreover no essay on Continental Philosophy). That being said, on the whole the book serves its stated purpose quite well.

A larger introduction have been useful, and perhaps a short essay on 'How to use this book' would have come in handy, given that there are some issues in cross-referencing and considerable overlap in some of the articles (although some of this is certainly inevitable). Some figures and topics referred to are in capital letters that seem intended to highlight their importance — yet while some of these capitalized items have a separate entry, others do not. For example, the section on Plato's life claims, 'Of more interest for the history of philosophy is Plato's activity in the ACADEMY' (796), but there is no entry on the Academy. Further down on the same page we learn of Plato's contemporaries, 'notably his nephew Speusippus, Xenocrates, ARISTOTLE, and the mathematician EUDOXUS.' Now one might expect the capitalization to indicate that there are at least entries on Aristotle and Eudoxus, and while there certainly is one on the former, there is none on the latter. Perhaps these

are merely typos; the method is in any case consistently unclear. On the other hand, one might ask why there is no entry on Eudoxus or Speusippus. We do know something of their work. Why no Alexander of Aphrodisias? One may excuse and recognize well the need for compromise because of issues of space, but then one may ask if it is necessary to have an entry on Ancient Philosophy and one on Presocratic Philosophy in addition to pieces on Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes.

Given that there are entries on Medieval Philosophy and Renaissance Philosophy, one wonders why there is none on modern philosophy. There are some entries that are extremely eclectic, and seem unlikely to be ever looked up without the help of a cross-reference. It seems unlikely that one would approach this text with the intention of finding entries on, for example, 'Continuants', or 'Crucial Experiments', or 'Opera, Aesthetics of' (there is no essay on Opera). The range and scope is such that one often encounters entries on small focused topics too incomplete to be of much service. Moreover the list of small focused topics is far too incomprehensive to make a search for very specific topics anything but a crap shoot. There is, however, a complete list of entries comprising some 18 pages at the beginning of the book, and a scan of these, while not aiding in a search, might nevertheless serendipitously generate some interest the briefer eclectic entries.

Of course a different reviewer would surely have other questions and comments that emanate from his or her own philosophical interests, but at least from the standpoint of the history of philosophy there is much overlap and some misdirection that might have been avoided through more thoughtful editing. Having said this, it is out of place to be too harsh with what certainly must have been a monumental organizational task freighted with choices of this sort. On the whole the entries are extremely well written, serviceable, accurate, and in the case of many major figures and topics, comprehensive.

The *Shorter REP* would be an excellent addition to a departmental library or desk reference. Given the length, it is heavy and bulky, not the nicest thing to be carrying from home to school very often, but the layout makes major topics easy to find, and the typeset is, despite the small font required for double columns, minimally straining on the eyes — a value for the price.

**G. S. Bowe**  
Bilkent University

**Jacques Derrida**

*Paper Machine.*

Trans. Rachel Bowlby. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2005.

Pp. x + 203.

US\$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-4619-2);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-4620-6).

This is a collection of occasional pieces — lectures, interviews, and newspaper articles from the last decade of Derrida's life. It is a slightly modified translation of *Papier machine*, which was published in France in 2001. Several pieces that appeared in the French edition have been removed, since they appear in other English collections of Derrida's work. In addition, the essay 'Fichus', which was published as a stand-alone book in France in 2002, has been added to the English edition. All of the pieces concern the theme of 'paper' in one way or another. In French, the term *papier-machine* refers to the sort of paper used in typewriters and computer printers. Thus the title announces a concern with reading, writing, and the technologies involved in these activities. The title also has political connotations: in France, a *sans-papiers* is someone who arrives in the country without documentation, typically an immigrant or asylum-seeker. The pieces in *Paper Machine* are neither as original nor as rigorous as Derrida's major works. Taken together, however, they offer a wide-ranging look at the concerns that occupied him during the last years of his life.

The pieces are unsystematic, but they return again and again to the topic of writing. This is not a new theme for Derrida, of course. One could argue that his entire career was a meditation on how writing makes thought possible. But *Paper Machine* is especially concerned with the ways in which new information technologies are transforming books and writing. 'The Book to Come', a lecture that Derrida delivered at the Bibliothèque nationale de France, explores the possibility that books as we know them may soon be replaced by electronic, virtual books. For Derrida, this phenomenon is linked to the larger 'end of the book' described in *Of Grammatology*, namely a loss of faith in the ideal of thought as closed and totalized. Derrida urges us not to lament the loss of physical books. There have always been multiple ways of preserving thought in writing, and the new information technologies are just the latest stage in a long development. A more immediate danger, he suggests, is the 'romantic optimism' inspired by electronic books, a 'myth of universalist transparency, of communication that is immediate, totalizing, and free of controls, beyond all frontiers, in a sort of big democratic village' (17). Whatever the book to come looks like, it will involve the same indeterminacy and the same potential for political manipulation as the old book. *Paper Machine* also makes clear that, for Derrida, the impact of new technologies on writing is a very personal matter. In an interview called 'The Word Processors', he discusses how using a computer has changed his own writing process. He regrets that the ability to produce polished texts instantly

on a screen has led him to see his writing as increasingly alien; he also regrets that when he edits on a word processor his old text vanishes, and he tends to forget that his thoughts are the result of a process. But pens and typewriters, he reminds us, are also technologies that shape how we think. Derrida is no Luddite.

Another recurring theme is globalization. Derrida devotes considerable attention to political problems involving the movements of people around the globe, and to the rise of global media such as the internet. A number of the pieces deal with immigration and citizenship. Derrida's interest in these topics is no surprise, since his ethical writings call for an unconditional welcoming of the Other. He also draws on personal experience: as a child in Algeria he was a victim of the Vichy government's revocation of French citizenship for Algerian Jews. Derrida does not just make general pronouncements about immigration, but calls for specific reforms. He urges France to increase immigration quotas, and he complains about inadequate services for new arrivals. He also calls international law on refugees 'radically out of date' (131-2). He makes equally specific complaints about global media, bemoaning their concentration in the hands of a few corporations. Yet he claims that 'it makes no sense to be "against" TV, journalists, and the media' (39), and that '[t]he internet has to be accepted' (119). As with the book to come, he calls for cautious engagement with the new technological realities.

The Derrida who emerges in *Paper Machine* is a public intellectual in the classic French mould. We see him engaging the big social and political issues of his day, issues that are sometimes well outside his professional expertise. This may be the book's biggest contribution. It is often assumed that Derrida's concerns are exclusively academic — that he wants only to engage with the canon of great philosophers, either to continue their work or to debunk it. It is valuable to be reminded that he was also a public figure, a man of letters who played an important role in French society. And it is only fitting that *Paper Machine* raises tough questions about the very idea of a public intellectual — the figure that Derrida mockingly calls 'Voltaire-Zola-Sartre' (36). But while Derrida is uncomfortable with the term 'intellectual', he continues to use it, 'so as to put that little remaining bit of credit ... *into service*,' the service 'both of those "without a voice" and of that which is approaching and offered for "thinking"' (38).

For those familiar with Derrida's work, this book contains no revelations. Its themes have already been discussed — often more rigorously — in his other books. Even the theme of the 'book to come' is given a more detailed treatment in *Archive Fever*. But in presenting Derrida as a public intellectual, the book offers a more balanced picture of him than one gets from his major works. *Paper Machine* makes no decisive contributions to Derrida's project, but it does help place that project in a richer context.

**Robert Piercey**

Campion College, University of Regina

**Henry T. Edmondson**

*John Dewey and the Decline of American Education: How the Patron Saint of Schools has Corrupted Teaching and Learning.*

Wilmington, DE: ISI Books 2006.

Pp. xiv + 134.

US\$25.00 (cloth: ISBN 1-932236-51-1);

US\$15.00 (paper: ISBN 1-932236-52-X).

The title of this book clearly indicates its thesis: Dewey's educational philosophy is largely responsible for the deterioration in academic standards that has taken place in (North) American institutions of learning over the past century, and particularly since the 1950s. The lamentable condition of public education from the elementary to the secondary and postsecondary levels represents the continuing legacy of this philosopher and other educational progressives whom he inspired, argues Henry Edmondson. It is an intriguing thesis, and one that, if true, would warrant a great deal of attention. The trouble is that the quality of scholarship and argumentation that Edmondson demonstrates in the book is so inadequate that the book completely fails in its purpose. Educational conservatives will be eager to accept its conclusion, but they, and the rest of us, require an argument.

The majority of the book provides an interpretation of Dewey's philosophy of education, and this is where the trouble begins. To say that Edmondson presents a caricature of Dewey's position on education is a kind understatement. What he presents, and easily demolishes, is a straw man so implausible that it is remarkable that a competent scholar could have constructed it. To provide a complete accounting of Edmondson's misreadings of Dewey in this review is an impossible task. I shall therefore limit myself to a small sampling of the book's errors.

Edmondson asserts, for instance, that in Dewey's view 'the teacher should furnish an "environment" rather than particular subject matter' (40), which is partially true and partially false. While Dewey accentuated the importance of the educational environment and rejected traditional approaches that present an altogether predigested subject matter that students are expected to absorb passively, he certainly did not set up a dichotomy between environment and subject matter, as Edmondson asserts. Dewey made this particularly explicit in *Experience and Education*, although throughout his writings he emphatically rejected dichotomous thinking in general, his style of thought being consistently and profoundly dialectical. At the book's worst points, Edmondson proffers statements that are nothing short of bizarre. At one point, for example, he complains about the high quantity of texts that Dewey produced, and suggests that there is something sinister in this: 'What Dewey was not able to accomplish through the cogency of his arguments, he tried to supply by the sheer volume of his writing: his oeuvre has often overwhelmed both academic and lay readers by its bulk' (11). Elsewhere he writes: 'Dewey is not most interested in the good of students but rather the

successful promotion of a political program. If that political program also happens to be for the academic and moral benefit of students — as he undoubtedly thought it was — then that is a happy coincidence' (8). It is impossible to take such statements, and many others of their kind, at all seriously.

Several of Edmondson's charges against Dewey might well be informative were they properly measured and articulated in the detail required. For instance, Edmondson accuses Dewey of subordinating education to politics in spite of Dewey's repeated statements to the contrary. This is an interesting charge, but Edmondson is in such a hurry to press on to the next line of criticism that he fails to demonstrate it. He also faults Dewey for discounting the value of historical knowledge and tradition in general; here again is an interesting charge, yet to make it stick Edmondson would need to provide the appropriate textual evidence, and he does not. In fact, Dewey believed very much in the value of an historical education and made repeated statements to this effect, none of which Edmondson cites or appears to be aware of. If he wishes to argue that Dewey's stated commitment to historical learning is disingenuous or contradicted by other positions he holds, this would be interesting as well, but Edmondson does not demonstrate this either.

Finally, Edmondson contradicts his own thesis at several points in the book. The book's main hypothesis is that Dewey's philosophy of education is the chief cause of educational decline over the last several decades, yet Edmondson writes that 'despite his iconic status, Dewey is rarely read and his work is poorly understood in public schools and in colleges of education. Future teachers often learn a little bit "about" Dewey', rather than read and properly critique his work (4). If it is true, as it likely is, that 'Dewey's ideas ... are poorly understood, especially among the very people who run our schools', would it not follow that it may not be Dewey's actual position but its popular misinterpretation that is the source of the problem (xiv)? Edmondson also concedes in several places the impossibility of knowing with any tolerable degree of certainty the true extent of Dewey's influence on education, having already told us that it has been and continues to be the dominant influence.

After presenting Dewey as an educational extremist (was there ever a less extreme, more sober-minded philosopher?), Edmondson introduces a dichotomy in which for no apparent reason we are compelled to choose between the educational philosophies of Dewey and Thomas Jefferson. Not surprisingly, Jefferson fares well in the comparison. Still, however, if it is a properly elaborated alternative to Dewey that the reader wishes to find in the book, *one will be disappointed. What one finds instead is a straightforward return to Jefferson along with an admixture of Aristotle, J. R. R. Tolkien, and Benjamin Franklin — with an obviously Christian flavor.*

There is a growing body of scholarship on Dewey's thought, some of which is still too inclined toward discipleship but much of which is appropriately critical and measured in its criticism. This book is neither. While there is

undoubtedly much to contest in Dewey's writings on education, one will not find any such careful critique in this book, much less an original alternative.

**Paul Fairfield**

Queen's University

**Paul Edwards**

*Heidegger's Confusions.*

New York: Prometheus Books 2004.

Pp. 129.

US\$20.00. ISBN 1-59102-236-3.

Edwards' analysis of Heidegger is a short, light-hearted assessment presented in five chapters. The first chapter challenges Heidegger's alleged greatness as a philosopher and laments that his work has been taken up by 'respectable Anglo-Saxon philosophers' (13) like Rorty, who continue the tradition of producing readings 'mostly of a devotional nature' (11). The latter claim is not entirely false. Indeed, there is a cultish feel in some Heidegger circles, where readers who reject laudatory approaches may encounter resistance. Yet this is likely a response to the continuing marginalization and denigration of his work in North American academic contexts. Edwards' book is a prime example. His criticisms would be worthless if they consisted only in the *ad hominem* argument that Heidegger is not worth reading because of the 'ecstatic raptures' (13) of his 'shepherds and shepherdesses' (24 *et passim*). Fortunately, the remaining chapters attempt to engage his work more substantially.

The second chapter takes up 'his so-called quest for Being' (17). The central argument is that Heidegger mistakes existence for a characteristic of beings because he fails to distinguish the 'is' of predication from the 'is' of existence, and so takes all uses of 'is' to be existential (37). Consequently, Edwards concludes that Heidegger is an outstanding example of the 'glossogonous metaphysician' who makes no true statements about the world while lacking the 'intention of bringing relief to suffering mankind' (34), so that though he may 'fascinate those hungry for mysticism of the anemic and purely verbal variety ... rational persons will continue to regard the whole Heidegger phenomenon as a grotesque aberration of the human mind' (47). He attributes Heidegger's mistake to his failure to grasp the Kantian distinction between the real and the existent. Yet were he familiar with Heidegger's extensive treatment of Kant's thesis that being is not a real predicate in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, he could not possibly maintain that Heidegger

thinks being is a characteristic of beings. Rather, Heidegger's holds that understanding and discourse entail projection of being. This is not to say that language endows existence, but that it projects a framework of intelligibility. Thus rational persons can actually find in Heidegger a sustained analysis of thinking and language that is neither idealist nor naively realist.

The remaining chapters concern death. The third begins with arguments that his claims about its loneliness and untransferability are either true but trite (everyone dies their own death), or interesting but false (people can't die together, or surrounded by others, or in someone else's place). Edwards misses the existential significance of death for Heidegger, and thus he is working with a deficient understanding in his assessment of being-towards-death. He argues that 'the Heideggerian statement that human life is being-towards-death ... is a platitude', as it simply means that 'human beings die ... and are ... concerned about their death' (72). Heidegger is not wrong, but 'perverse' (92) in calling death 'the possibility of the impossibility of every way of existing' (89), for death 'amounts to total extinction' (92) and thus has no possibilities. Heidegger is not, however, suggesting merely that everyone is aware of their own mortality, or that there are possibilities after death. Rather, in his existential analytic, finitude is the condition for the possibility of human understanding. Edwards' reading cannot possibly make sense of the ecstases of temporality in such a way that he could begin to contribute insightful criticism.

The fourth chapter, on anxiety and the nothing, is a little more promising. Though Edwards reifies 'the nothing', he calls it a "nonnatural" phenomenon or reality, that is, one that 'could not be described in an empiricist language' (107), and he concludes correctly that the nothing cannot for Heidegger be the total absence of all things (113). Death is the absence of experience, and it 'is not just the totality of absence but the eternity of this totality which most people find so unbearable' (115). Thus anxiety is not directed at the nothing, but at the nothingness of death. Heidegger's nothing 'is not what we are "face-to-face with" in our anxiety about death' (116). This could be an interesting question: what is the relation between the anxiety of being-towards-death in *Being and Time* and the nothing that appears in other texts? To treat it, however, one would have to be clear about how finitude functions in Heidegger's existential analytic. Furthermore, one would need to understand Heidegger's equation of being and nothing, a topic that Edwards recognizes only in passing in a footnote (114). Where Edwards stumbles upon a question perhaps warranting further examination, he does not have the conceptual tools to begin to treat it.

The final chapter is extremely short, and simply notes inconsistency between Heidegger's conception of death as 'total nullity' (117) and his claim that his analysis leaves open the question of life after death. Edwards is right to say that suggesting this is an ontic question, in contrast to Heidegger's ontological analysis, is inadequate. But Edwards writes as if 'leaving it open' means deciding in its favor. One suspects rather that Heidegger found the

question philosophically trivial, but the subtleties of politeness appear lost on Edwards.

This is, then, an odd book. Why is Edwards so familiar with the 'huge masses of hideous gibberish' (46)? Given the evident breadth of his reading of both Heidegger and commentators, it must have been hard work to maintain such a thorough failure to understand him. This is not scholarship but distortion, misunderstanding and, in short, confusion. Those who already dismiss Heidegger for whatever reason will be reassured of the correctness of their choice not to engage his difficult thinking. They may wish however to reflect on whether they wish to condone this approach. For if Heidegger's 'easily intoxicated' (32) 'disciples' (*passim*) are blinded by their adoration, Edwards is the other side of the same coin. Philosophy is neither unquestioning devotion nor playground-style taunting, but critical engagement. Unfortunately, whether sympathetic to Heidegger or not, scholars will find nothing here of substance. It did make me laugh, however, though perhaps not at the places Edwards intended.

**Trish Glazebrook**

Dalhousie University

**Christian J. Emden**

*Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness,  
and the Body.*

Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois  
Press 2005.

Pp. xii + 223.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-252-02970-4.

Christian J. Emden's study is remarkable for the enormous range and diversity of sources it attributes to Nietzsche. From the sciences of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, especially those investigations concerning the body, Emden offers an intellectual back-story for some of Nietzsche's more radical or questionable claims. Embedding Nietzsche in a broad intellectual climate helps to offer new readings of some of those claims while at the same time tending to vitiate their utter originality. Through Emden's scholarship we come to see Nietzsche as a thinker adapting, aligning, and developing the work of other writers who may not have had his breadth of vision or style of expression. Emden does not intend an analysis of Nietzsche's texts (there is scant use of Nietzsche's words here) so much as he indicates how Nietzsche may have arrived at networks of significant concepts and claims. The structure of the book is the presentation of refer-

ences Nietzsche makes in his notes, fragments, and published writings followed by Nietzsche's response to them.

Contemporary initiations into neurophysiology, for example, offered Nietzsche an opportunity to enter an anthropological discourse that would characterize his creative periods of the 1870's and '80's. Emden attempts to explain how Nietzsche selected and applied insights in the sciences of the brain to traditional philosophical issues of perception, language, and philosophy of mind that were also the concerns of Locke, Hume, and especially Kant, and then their critique and abandonment in Schopenhauer. The context forwarded by Emden helps us to see more clearly Nietzsche's work as part of a wider movement away from both metaphysics and a strict empiricism.

Emden shows how Nietzsche reveals the centrality of rhetoric in philosophical thinking — the hidden dimension of metaphoricity in our seemingly literal concepts — and how it is inextricably tied to human physiology. Although Emden has Nietzsche slip too easily from rhetoric to metaphor, it is really Nietzsche's emphasis on tropes, his spectacular but counterintuitive assertion that all language is metaphorical, that occupies Emden as he offers various ways of reading that claim. The new and engaging metaphors, often constituting the paradigm shifts in Nietzsche's European air, offered Nietzsche the fuel he needed to think about consciousness. Moving metaphor to the domain of epistemology is crucial for appreciating a Nietzschean achievement. In Emden's book Nietzsche becomes part of the origin of language debates that held the interest of the previous century for such thinkers as Condillac, Rousseau, and Johann Gottfried Herder.

Given the impossibility of directly perceiving things-in-themselves (objects being a kind of conceptual fiction), one central problem occupying Nietzsche was the way images in the mind become thoughts — nervous impulses to images to language representing those images — from what is perceived to what is known. The Heraclitian dynamism, or flow of the world, that seemed to hold Nietzsche early on gained support from electrical and animal magnetism experiments (not to mention their later technological expressions in the likes of the telegraph). As there is no such thing as literal meaning, reference is neither fixed nor determined. Emden points to Nietzsche's interest in the works of Franklin, Volta, Priestley, Galvani, and other somewhat less notable scientists to explain epistemological processes and their connection with metaphor. Since metaphor is a projection or transporting of one domain of language to another, metaphor becomes a kind of explanatory model for how these links happen.

Abstraction is a major process in arriving at knowledge. Emden notes Wilhelm Wackernagel's idea that, 'all language is marked by abstraction and loses its sensual origin' (64). Abstraction requires the kind of selection, unconscious though it may be, which is required for metaphor and is intimately tied to interpretation. Images are already 'some form of interpretive activity', selections of the world they image, just as metaphors are analogical selections with their counterpart analogues. Metaphysical explanations of the fundamental structure of the world are a form of anthropomorphism —

a necessary aspect of talk about the world, but a discourse that 'projects' human attributes onto the non-human natural world and upon abstract concepts. This includes the discovery of natural laws which, '... establishes above all a metaphorical network of relations among beliefs, and this network furthermore depends on our physiological predispositions' (145). With reference to Friedrich Albert Lange, Emden says, 'At the heart of human knowledge ... stands our continuous attempt to transfer the attributes of human life to matter and nature' (82). Any discussion of metaphor as a form of human projection leads to the central role of interpretation, conscious and unconscious, which Nietzsche adopts in lieu of 'facts', and which is intimately connected to, but not identical with, his famous perspectivism.

However, there is also the creative or artistic drive, which raises questions about order in the world, interpreting a given order and changing it in specific ways. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's anthropological uses of drive (*Trieb*) and self-generation (*Bildung*), and Gustav Gerber and Wackernagel's work were sources for Nietzsche of a creative drive (*Kunsttrieb*), while Friedrich Schiller's work emphasized that drive as a link between 'the limitations of the human condition and our longing for independence from these constraints' (134). In the interpretive tension between an ordered universe and the artistic tendency to break that order, Emden finds the roots of Nietzsche's notions of the 'will to power' and 'the revaluation of values.'

Some readers may appreciate Emden's brevity (162 pages of text) as most background references are mentioned without elaboration. Given the subjects of the title, others may see a missed opportunity in bypassing the wide range of Nietzschean literary styles — aphorisms to *Zarathustra*, as it were, and the various forms of consciousness that are associated with Nietzsche's bold characterizations of human types *within* the general notion of being human. And, perhaps, with less repetition, one would expect more here on the unconscious. Still, Emden's research reveals a host of important and often surprising and relevant intellectual fields for Nietzsche's work and in so doing achieves a strong contribution to Nietzschean scholarship. It is an enjoyable and accessible read.

**David Goldblatt**  
Denison University

**Luc Ferry**

*What is the Good Life?*

Trans. Lydia G. Cochrane. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press 2005.

Pp. x + 320.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-226-24453-9.

This book consists of five parts accompanied by a prologue and a user-friendly index. Part 1 (Chapters 1 and 2) is devoted to clarifying the manner in which we understand the question of the good life in order to make clear the sort of answer it demands. It will come as no surprise to those familiar with Ferry's work that he identifies a need to expand philosophy 'after religion and beyond morality' (21). Ferry accepts that *god is dead* insofar as this means that we no longer look at religious belief as anything more than a private matter of person opinion. Further, Ferry contends that 'none' of our 'most profound existential problems' — problems related to the 'human condition itself' — would be resolved even if we were all to become perfectly moral in the post-Kantian sense of respecting others (24).

In Part 2 (Chapters 3-6) Ferry identifies Nietzsche's disenchantment with traditional ideals as the moment leading to current conceptions of the good life. Following Nietzsche, transcendent standards used to measure the good life in the past (especially the Greek notion of cosmic harmony and the religious ideal of eternal salvation) have given way to a form of *secular humanism* in which the good life is seen as a life of intensity (variously representing or resembling Nietzsche's *will of power*). The goal is to live in the 'now' and to want nothing but what is: *amor fati*. And yet, Ferry observes, we continue to search for salvation in what *transcends* our everyday lives. With this, he pushes us to search for new forms of spirituality and meaning in life.

Before moving forward, however, Ferry pauses to consider what we have learned from the theories of the past. In Part 3 (Chapters 7-9) he reports that, according to the Ancient Greeks, the good life is to be understood in relation to the values inherent in a harmoniously organized and animated cosmos. On this view, philosophy allows us to understand and accept what is ultimately good in the universe. In presenting the Greeks' theories of the good life, he focuses on the ideals of the stoics. This serves the project of setting out the history of ideas leading to Spinoza's materialism, and eventually, the Nietzschean moment. Unfortunately, Ferry doesn't always recognize the implications of this narrow focus. In Chapter 10, for instance, he sharpens the contrast between the 'Greek' and Christian views by emphasizing the stoic idea that we should detach ourselves from friends — without acknowledging the special importance many others placed on friendship in antiquity.

Part 4 (Chapters 9-11) recounts the shift to Christian ideas of the good life. Though he relies heavily on extended quotations (including more than thirty-five lines from Gilson, more than forty-five lines from Augustine, and multiple quotations from a single passage of Epictetus) to set it out, Ferry

thinks the main difference between the Christian message and the message of the Greeks is clear: faith, trust and love, rather than reason, are needed for a good life and, more importantly, a good death. Salvation requires the grace of God; we can't get there on our own.

Moving on, he points to the rediscovery of Aristotelian rationalism in the middle-ages and the scientific revolution of the sixteenth century as reasons for our disenchantment. The former (re)established the importance of philosophy and the latter marked the move away from traditional beliefs that was completed by the Nietzschean moment. By the end of Part 4, Ferry is back to the point of departure — he is ready to answer the question of the good life.

That the discussion progresses in this circular, rather than chronological, order has unfortunate consequences. One is a repetition of ideas. Another is that early chapters make reference to many ideas that are not adequately fleshed out until later in the book. Once this is recognized, however, one can work through the text quickly with the confidence that important ideas will be revisited.

In Part 5 (Chapters 12 & 13) Ferry presents his own theory of the good life. In contrast to the path traveled in the earlier parts of the book, this is done in a linear and efficient manner. The effect, however, is the illusion that Ferry is racing through the details of his own view. Despite this, he succeeds in making his position clear. Ferry argues for a *nonmetaphysical humanism* that is compatible with transcendence. As he puts it earlier in the book, 'truth, justice, beauty, and even love' are found *within us*, but are perceived as 'values that we *discover rather than produce or invent ourselves*' (41). Since humans are not privileged with the knowledge of an ultimate truth, the only way to avoid illusion is to refrain from making any metaphysical commitments. This means we must reject the materialists' denial of the metaphysical just as we reject traditional metaphysics.

Drawing on elements of the historical traditional theories surveyed, Ferry argues that the good life is a life of intensity in which we strive to enlarge our way of thinking. This requires that we exercise what he takes to be the uniquely human ability to detach ourselves from reality in order to engage in evaluative self-reflection. Detachment from the particulars of our lives gives us a universal sense of the human experience and allows us to recognize unique moments that are 'irreplaceable because they themselves are singular' (286). And this, he thinks, allows us to conquer our deepest human fears by de-emphasizing the ills (pain, fear of death, etc.) of life — the promise is of a fragile, but genuinely human, happiness.

Ferry's answer to the title query is predictable given the theses he has advanced in earlier works (especially *L'Homme-Dieu ou le sens de la vie*, Grasset 1996). This, however, doesn't make it any less interesting. I recommend this book both for its success in tracing the history of theories leading to the way in which we in the Western world now understand the question of the good life and for its presentation of Ferry's original answer to this question. *What is the Good Life?* is unquestionably the work of a capable and

engaged philosopher, and Cochrane's translation succeeds in preserving the engaging style that made the book a best-seller in France.

**Byron Stoyles**  
Trent University

**Sven Ove Hansson and Elin Palm, eds.**  
*The Ethics of Workplace Privacy.*  
New York: Peter Lang 2005.  
Pp. 186.  
US\$34.95. ISBN 90-5201-293-8.

This book stems from an interdisciplinary project on workplace privacy initiated by SALTSA, a Swedish programme for working life research, and two workshops at which the included papers were initially presented. The motivation was the need to bring together two perspectives on workplace privacy that are generally kept separate. One focuses on the effects of new genetic and biotechnological methods for screening and monitoring workers' health; the other deals with the effects of surveillance technologies, and various methods for intercepting and analyzing computer communications. The aim of the essays is to provide ethical analysis of this development, and to help identify policy responses to them.

It should be said that this perspective on workplace privacy is rather Eurocentric, although it has some brief references to North America. Moreover, as a general matter, it does little to differentiate workers and workplaces in ways that a social scientist, or a lawyer, might expect. In that sense 'workplace privacy' sometimes feels rather abstract, despite references to forms of technology and assumptions about the ownership and management of firms that hint at particular types of social, economic, and political relationships. The general assumption in this book is that workplaces are public rather than private, and therefore subject to antidiscrimination laws of various sorts and injunctions to protect worker privacy. This requires us to abstract from workplaces where this is not obviously true. Small firms, for example, are often exempt from statutory obligations that large firms have to bear. Philosophically and practically it would be good to know if this makes them private, rather than public, for the purposes of thinking about employee privacy and, if not, why not. Likewise, as Matthew Fishkin has shown, in the United States employees have stunningly little privacy because the workplace is generally conceptualized as private rather than public, and because employees can be fired for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reason at all. What should one make of these differences philosophically?

Privacy is, fundamentally, a political concept, whatever else it is. Our ideas about privacy inevitably depend on prior assumptions about the legitimate purposes and limits of government, and the proper equality and freedom of citizens or subjects. Philosophical and policy analysis that ignores the political dimensions of privacy, therefore, is likely to present privacy as a more theoretically coherent concept than it is, and to ignore the extent to which our ideas of what is 'personal' are inextricably bound up with our political convictions and commitments. One of the difficulties with this volume is that the background assumptions against which the ethics of workplace privacy are developed are left largely unstated and unexplored. Thus, the privacy of managers, employers, owners, and shareholders, for example, are treated as irrelevant to the norms of privacy that properly apply to workers; similarly, the norms of privacy properly applied to people as consumers, students, or citizens are treated as irrelevant. This is deeply problematic, particularly if one wants to develop something like a social-democratic conception of workplace privacy — as several of the authors appear to do. After all, the fact that we tend to think of workplace privacy as a problem of *worker* privacy, rather than of the privacy of *employers and owners*, not only testifies to real imbalances of power between the former and the latter, but also to an assumption that norms of reciprocity are largely irrelevant to what employers can demand of people as workers. Yet this is an assumption that we should probably reject.

These worries aside, there is much to learn from, and admire, in this volume. It provides much handy information on the latest forms of workplace surveillance, and the ILO codes which seek to constrain and regulate it. As Elin Palm shows, seemingly slight differences between one biometric test and another can make an enormous difference to the privacy of individuals, because retinal scans reveal far more about a person's health than do iris scans. In a particularly fascinating essay, Gerard de Vries claims that 'predictive medicine' has, increasingly, placed the burden of prevention, recovery, and illness on those who are 'at risk' of various diseases, and that laws and regulations have failed to alleviate this load in part because they still reflect an older, less probabilistic, view of illness. I would also draw attention to the excellent paper, 'Privacy, Discrimination and Inequality in the Workplace' by Sven Ove Hansson, which decisively rejects the idea that genetic information is somehow more private than other forms of personal information, and draws out the implications of this rejection for the protection of worker privacy and for debates on what sorts of information insurers should be allowed to use.

Three major differences between genetic and non-genetic information are normally thought to explain why the former more deeply threatens privacy than the latter. First, genetic information is thought to predict future disease to an extent, and with an accuracy, that makes it distinctive. Second, genetic testing of an individual often inescapably informs us about third parties' health, life-experiences, and life-expectancy. Third, genetic information seems to reveal fundamental and immutable individual characteristics. As

Hansson shows, these differences are often more apparent than real. Genetic information may be predictive, but its predictions are often misleading and indeterminate. Moreover, '[t]here are already cases in which genetic information can be obtained indirectly through the identification of the protein produced by the gene, or through some other phenotypic indication of the activity of the gene' (130). So, concern for genetic privacy itself requires us to protect non-genetic information too. As HIV tests suggest, genetic diseases like Huntington's are not the only ones where the status of one family member potentially implicates other members, too. Nor is it clear that genes are as essential to our personal identity, capacities, and aspirations as some have thought. It is clearly important to protect the privacy of genetic information, out of concern for social equality, as well as privacy. However, this is merely one of many types of information that can threaten the privacy and equality of individuals.

**Annabelle Lever**

University College, London

**Thomas Heyd and John Clegg, eds.**

*Aesthetics and Rock Art.*

Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing 2005.

Pp. xxviii +316.

US\$99.95. ISBN 0-7546-3924-X.

Philosophers will find *Aesthetics and Rock Art* of more interest than the title might initially suggest. Although only two of the contributors to this collection of seventeen essays are professional philosophers, the volume addresses foundational issues in both aesthetics and the philosophy of the social sciences. The other contributors are from either anthropology and archaeology or art history, except for one from psychology. One of the two philosophers, and an editor of the volume, is Thomas Heyd, who has pioneered the philosophical study of rock art, which he characterizes in the introduction to the volume as 'marks, made by human beings on rock, often perceived as pictures or representations' (1). His co-editor is John Clegg, a specialist on Australian Aboriginal rock art.

The volume is divided into three parts following distinctions that Heyd makes in his introductory remarks among meta-aesthetics, general aesthetics, and concrete aesthetics. The first of these examines the nature of aesthetics itself, the second aesthetic experience as it is 'common among human beings', and the third particular sets of aesthetic 'perspectives,

principles, and categories' as they manifest themselves '*within* a culturally moulded practice' of appreciation (5). Consequently, Part 1 of the volume focuses on the question of '*whether aesthetics can or should have a place in encounters with rock art*' and Part 2 on 'the factors that *constitute* the aesthetic values found in rock art' in general, while Part 3 consists of 'case studies in the application of an aesthetic perspective to rock art in a diversity of areas around the world' (10, 11, 13).

Although each of the three sections of the book will be of some interest to philosophers, and especially to those who work in aesthetics, it is the first part that contains the most traditional philosophical work. The philosophical issues that the book raises and faces are clearly articulated by Peter Lamarque in the opening essay, 'Palaeolithic Cave Paintings: A Test Case for Transcultural Aesthetics'. Drawing on his earlier work on the aesthetic and the universal, Lamarque addresses the fundamental question of the scope of aesthetics and the universal applicability of its concepts. He distinguishes the well-known narrow neo-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century conception of aesthetics from a broader sense involving 'the human capacity to assign qualitative values to physical properties' (25). He argues that given that the former has not completely contaminated the latter and, 'to the extent that underlying aesthetics are precisely such universally held human capacities as the ability to create intentional objects with meaning and value, and the disposition to respond imaginatively and positively to artifacts of universal human appeal', transcultural aesthetics is possible (34).

This is good news, of course, for those interested in the 'aesthetics of rock art', although there are yet problems. As Lamarque makes clear using the example of the magnificent Chauvet cave paintings, although we can justifiably describe such objects as 'intentional objects', we do not have the knowledge to take the additional step of characterizing them as 'objects of aesthetic intention' (28). Without such knowledge an internalist approach to the aesthetics of such objects, which would attempt to understand and appreciate them from within their own cultural context, is limited if not impossible. We might thus simply aesthetically appreciate them as we can other objects that are not, or are not known to be, of aesthetic intention. Lamarque concludes that perhaps 'the most we can do, in an aprioristic spirit and from the externalist perspective in the philosophy of art, is lay down in advance of further empirical work what considerations might lead us to give them the classification "art", rather than some other classification, for the people who made them' (35). Thus, an agenda is set that some of the essays in the other parts of the volume help to address.

Other essays in Part 1 are also philosophically engaging, especially Heyd's attempt in 'Rock Art Aesthetics: Trace on Rock, Mark on Spirit, Window on Land' to give additional support for the legitimacy of rock art aesthetics in the face of ethical worries about appropriation and imposition, and epistemological concerns about the limits of our ability to grasp the artifacts of other cultures. In 'Aesthetics across Time and Place: An Anthropological Perspective on Archaeology', Howard Morphy pursues the issues considered

by Lamarque and Heyd from an anthropological point of view. In addition to these more abstract theoretical problems, more specific reasons for the neglect of rock art aesthetics, such as the distinction in traditional Western aesthetics between the aesthetic and the utilitarian, are investigated by Reinaldo Morales in 'Considerations on the Art and Aesthetics of Rock Art', as well as by Heyd in the volume's introduction.

The essays in Parts 2 and 3 are, of course, of less direct philosophical interest, but all have relevance to the issues outline in Part 1. Lack of both space and expertise prevents me from commenting on, or even mentioning, each of them individually. However, in Part 2 I found art historian Michael Eastham's 'The Archaeology, Anthropology and Aesthetics of Understanding Parietal Rock Images at La Grze, Cosquer and Wangewangen', psychologist J. B. Derogowski's 'Perception and Ways of Drawing: Why Animals are Easier to Draw than People', as well as John Clegg's 'Aesthetics, Rock Art, and Changing States of Consciousness', of particular interest. These three essays focus on matters involving different ways of depicting, novel uses of perspective, and various techniques for creating visual effects. In Part 3, the case studies contain a wealth of information about specific sites and cultures. The two studies of South African San rock art by art historian Pippa Skotnes and archaeologist Sven Ouzman are especially noteworthy. The volume also has a charming forward by Jean Clottes, known for his connection with the cave at Chauvet.

In sum, Heyd and Clegg have put together an excellent set of essays that not only serves as a fine introduction to this fascinating area of research, but also makes for engaging reading for specialists and laypersons alike.

**Allen Carlson**

University of Alberta

**Helmut Holzhey and Vilem Mudroch**

*Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism.*

Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press 2005.

Pp. 408.

US\$75.00. ISBN 0-8108-5390-6.

This dictionary has two faces. One turns to the definition and elucidation of important Kantian terms, the other to a historical chronicle of Kant's contemporaries and subsequent European Kantians. These two faces do not always get along, nor are they equally well realized, but they do constitute a set of resources not previously available in English.

Holzhey and Mudroch tend to be quite comfortable with intricate, even obscure historical detail, whereas they shy away from philosophical explication, remaining formulaic, if technically accurate, in their definition of philosophical terms. Above all, this is a historical dictionary before it is a philosophical one. And yet this uneasy marriage of philosophical content and historical detail is overcome whenever the dictionary turns to Neo-Kantianism, as though that subject matter itself fuses the philosophical and the historical. In keeping with Holzhey's expertise on the Marburg School, the dictionary favors European figures and movements; in fact, it is fair to say that Holzhey and Mudroch characterize only a fairly specific set of late-nineteenth century European schools and figures as technically Kantian or Neo-Kantian. This may also help to explain their otherwise curious claim that Kant's revolutionizing of philosophy '... started to dawn on philosophers only in the 1870s ...' (3).

The dictionary's historical entries are of three main kinds: Kant's rationalist and empiricist predecessors, his German contemporaries and immediate successors, and the Neo-Kantians. Together these constitute a unique and impressive set of historical figures relevant to Kant. While Caygill's *A Kant Dictionary*, for instance, often includes historical background as part of its definition of Kantian terms, it offers no entries dedicated to historical figures per se, and relatively little by way of post-Kantian development. By contrast, Holzhey and Mudroch manage admirably to distill the significance of many historical figures to Kant and to characterize the positions of the prominent Neo-Kantians.

Of the historical entries, those covering Kant's contemporaries and immediate successors are least consistent. They include impressively many of the major and minor intellectual luminaries of the time, but perhaps because these figures are so often engaged critically with Kant, Holzhey and Mudroch sometimes fail to do them justice. The Hegel entry, for instance, begins with the following assertion. 'For Hegel, Kant's philosophy is already a historical artifact; nevertheless, his confrontation with Kant permeates his whole work' (137). This seems to imply an uncharitable stand regarding the philosophical importance of historical artifacts for Hegel. Indeed, contrary to Holzhey and Mudroch's assertion, no one seems so decisively to have acknowledged a Kantian revolution in philosophy as Hegel himself. On the other hand, the entry accurately reports formulaic Hegelian criticisms of Kant. But formulas such as '... remaining on the standpoint of the ought ...' or '... characterized by the absolute opposition of the finite and the infinite ...' or 'Kant's philosophy is a complete philosophy of the **understanding** that dispenses with **reason** ...' (137) are unlikely to be of much use to anyone not already familiar with German idealism.

The array of entries for the Neo-Kantians, on the other hand, is one of the dictionary's great strengths. These include the major figures of the Marburg and Southwestern German schools, along with their most important predecessors and successors, and even the principal figures of French and so-called realistic Neo-Kantianism. This resource is utterly lacking in other Kant

dictionaries, and provides for perhaps the first time in English a set of succinct references for the various schools of Neo-Kantianism that sprang up in Europe late in the nineteenth century. Such a resource is not so arcane as it might seem. Not only did those schools influence important twentieth-century European thinkers, they also helped set the stage for the emergence of the radical form of empiricism that would become logical positivism and were a strong current of the broad trend toward grounding the rationality of science and making philosophy itself scientific.

A Kant dictionary, though, must ultimately be judged by its definition of Kantian terms. Here again we have a mixed bag. Sometimes, as in the entry for intuition (*Anschauung*), the dictionary is concise and lucid. The entry identifies the reference of the term, indicates a drawback of the English translation, and proceeds to clarify Kant's distinction of it from the understanding, elaborating along the way three types of intuition (empirical, pure, and intellectual) identified by Kant. In sum, the dictionary provides a cohesive and accurate description of the concept and its role in Kant's account of cognition. In this context, the inclusion of a paragraph contrasting ways Hermann Cohen and Martin Heidegger transformed the role of intuition in the account of cognition is welcome. It indicates the radically divergent uses inspired by Kant's account of cognition and intuition. At its best, then, the dictionary's two faces unite to yield an informative picture of a central Kantian term.

Elsewhere, however, the inclusion of historical content turns the two faces against each other. The entry on experience (*Erfahrung*), for instance, is at once too diffuse and too laden with technical cross-reference. It strings together a series of short, dense paragraphs which, while addressing no fewer than six distinct aspects of this concept, do not hang together well. The matter of central philosophical importance, namely the role of experience in Kant's critical epistemology, is scattered throughout. Hence the entry is neither long enough nor sufficiently coherent to yield a fully developed philosophical definition of the term. Other entries, such as one for the faculty of judgment (*Urteilstkraft*), are oddly truncated. There in a few short paragraphs the dictionary discusses the role of that faculty in each of the three Critiques while also surveying its appropriation by as diverse a set of thinkers as Goethe, Fries, Arendt, and Lyotard. Mention is made only briefly of the distinction between reflective and determinant judgments, which are not at all discussed in the dictionary's entry on judgment (*Urteil*) itself. It is true that other entries help to flesh out this picture considerably, but the reader is then at best forced to piece together a comprehensive view by cross-referencing these technically accurate fragments. In this context, the inclusion of Neo-Kantian appropriations of these concepts, which accompany nearly every conceptual entry, tends to appear arbitrary. While often informative, the additions can leave the reader wondering why this Neo-Kantian as opposed to that deserves mention, a question that further erodes the coherence of the entry.

As a reference for clarifying Kantian terms, then, the dictionary compares unfavorably to Caygill. Considered on its own, the information about Neo-Kantian appropriation is new and entirely welcome, as are the frequent observations concerning translation and the conceptual development from the pre-critical to the critical Kant, not to mention the dictionary's technical specificity and faithfulness to Kant's formulations and complications. But sometimes these welcome additions work against the clarity of the entries, truncating the explication, limiting the coverage, and undermining the dictionary's use as a reference for the general philosophical reader. The specialist, one suspects, will be less in need of such a resource in the first place.

The dictionary does, however, include an additional set of resources worth mentioning. The last eighty pages or so are dedicated to a bibliography and three appendices. The first of the appendices, an exhaustive chronology of the first publication of Kant's writings, is exceptional. It includes cross-reference to the Akademie and, whenever possible, Cambridge editions, and constitutes a concise account of the appearance of Kant's works.

The bibliography is especially noteworthy. It lists twentieth-century German editions of Kant, the standard English translations, and scores of other important English editions. But its real virtue is its expansive list of secondary sources. Holzhey and Mudroch organize the secondary literature into fifteen categories, from biographies and general surveys, to specialized topics, to a section on Kantianism that is itself sub-divided into five subsections. Each of these divisions collects dozens of the finest titles published in the last several decades in German and English, as well as a massive literature on Kantianism, which includes some of the earliest responses to Kant. The bibliography is over forty pages, well organized, selective, and certainly one of the dictionary's finest features.

Ultimately, then, if one is looking for a concise explication of Kantian terms, the dictionary is not recommended as a primary resource, but as a supplement. For the specialist, its entries may serve as accurate starting points for clarifying aspects of Kant's corpus not already familiar. For anyone interested in European Neo-Kantianism, it presents an impressive cache of information regarding the leading figures and schools. And for anyone interested in further study of Kant, its bibliography alone will be a wonderful resource.

**Erin E. Flynn**

Ohio Wesleyan University

**William B. Irvine**

*On Desire: Why We Want What We Want.*  
Toronto and New York: Oxford University  
Press 2006.

Pp. x + 322.

Cdn\$31.00:US\$24.00.

ISBN-13: 978-0-19-518862-2.

The introduction to *On Desire* tells us that the book is intended as a self-help treatise for people who feel they live buffeted about by desires that they neither choose nor always approve. The book uses philosophical techniques of the analytic sort, as well as recent scientific evidence and ancient religious wisdom, but it is not, and is not intended to be, a contribution to current debates on the nature of desires, their ontological status, and their role in motivation. Irvine's book will be reviewed here on its own terms as supporting self-help in the care and maintenance of the reader's desires. On that basis, I find the book lightweight; it tends to ignore many, perhaps most, of the more interesting aspects of desire. Its greatest strength is the meticulous care it gives to the discussion of the topics it does cover.

In the first and shortest of three sections, Irvine undertakes to convince the reader that people do not create, control, or choose their own desires. Everyday desires, such as SUV envy, arise spontaneously. He aims this discussion at those who 'for the first time in [their] life [are paying] close attention to the operation of desire ...' (3).

This section also looks at the effect others have on our desires. Irvine emphasises that we all have desires for social status; we are helplessly driven by desires caused by the salaries and possessions of other people. Irvine looks only at the effect other people and their possessions have on an individual; he does not look at the effect of people's desires on the economy, society, or politics. This is perhaps a reasonable limit within the purposes of the book, but it leads Irvine to ignore major topics and literatures. Our knowledge of desires has been greatly enriched by studying the collective results of individual actions, but Irvine does not mention this approach.

In Section 2, Irvine develops a simple schema to classify desires and identify their origins. Desires are either instrumental or terminal. Most terminal desires are hedonic; these are created by our emotions. Non-hedonic terminal desires 'tend to be inconsequential' (73); Irvine gives the example of just deciding to click one's tongue. Our reason or intellect does not create any significant desires; it can only plan how to satisfy desires. Irvine attributes this view to Hume, but admits Hume's view is more complex (71); he does not go farther into Hume's views. This is unfortunate; in limiting the role of the intellect so severely, Irvine has omitted much of what Hume and other eighteenth century philosophers can contribute even to philosophical neophytes. These philosophers gave reason a significant role in structuring our desires into general self-interest and general benevolence (Butler), in controlling our emotional reactions (Hutcheson), in creating moral and

virtuous motivations (Hume), and in cooling our emotions to those of an impartial spectator (Smith). Non-hedonic terminal desires can be much more significant than Irvine allows; consider the role of reason in the desire to be a virtuous, benevolent, honest, or impartial person.

Irvine argues that most of our desires 'bubble up from' (93) our unconscious mind. What appear to be reasons for desires are often only after-the-fact rationalizations. For example, stimulation of the motor area of the brain can influence which finger a subject 'decides' to move. Irvine never gets much beyond stimulated or injured brains and finger moving. Freud gets only seven lines, and there is nothing further on the whole psychoanalytic tradition of understanding unconscious desires.

The centrepiece of Irvine's discussion of the evolution of desires is a long thought experiment on biological engineers trying to design an 'incentivised hen'. Irvine's point is that they would have to give their hen a punishment and reward system based on good and bad feelings. Irvine finally admits (141) this approach is simplistic, but there follows an entire chapter on our Biological Incentive System (BIS). Our BIS, he thinks, puts our personality 'largely beyond our control' (165). Irvine's chapters on incentives and evolution seem to me simplistic (and I found the incentivised hen example boring); he does not mine evolutionary psychology for more complex explanations of why humans have the sorts of desires and incentives that they do. He often seems only to say that since we have desires of a certain sort, those desires must have aided survival.

Irvine turns in Section 3 to possible 'cures' (188) for unwanted desires. He considers religious approaches (Buddhist meditation, Christian prayers), communities that restrict desires (Amish, Hutterite), philosophical advice (Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics), and eccentrics (Diogenes, Thoreau). In the space allotted, Irvine cannot give the reader much guidance in actually implementing any of these approaches to desire control, but he makes nearly all of them sufficiently clear that a reader can choose which to pursue further. These approaches contradict each other, so one has to choose.

Irvine's account of desire is not far off some current philosophical thinking; his BIS resembles the reward-based analysis of Schroeder, for example. Philosophical debates about desires, however, are not really part of this book. Irvine has written a self-help book for the philosophically naive who sense that their desires are out of control. As a self-help book, I think there is much about desires that a reader would benefit from, but in the end, Irvine gives very little practical advice beyond a few maxims.

Overall, I have two complaints about this as a self-help guide. First, choosing a method of desire control would appear to involve on Irvine's account a large role for reason or intellect; otherwise it would be just another desire-driven action. But Irvine has not developed a theory about how the intellect can organise or create a meta-desire like the desire to control desires. Second, Irvine's account of desire is not rich. Irvine omits completely many topics, such as the psychoanalytic view of unconscious desires and the social and economic impact of desires. For example, the advertising industry spends

billions of dollars annually, but it would be difficult for a reader who finds her desires manipulated by advertising to understand from Irvine how ads manipulate and what to do about it.

**John Douglas Bishop**

(*Business Administration Program*)

Trent University

**Joyce Jenkins, Jennifer Whiting and  
Christopher Williams, eds.**

*Persons and Passions:*

*Essays in Honour of Annette Baier.*

Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre

Dame Press 2005.

Pp. viii + 368.

US\$53.00. ISBN 0-268-03263-7.

The widely ranging essays in this volume capture perfectly the array of philosophical interests defining the career of Annette Baier, one of the ablest, most readable, and most precocious philosophers of the last thirty years or so. Books such as *Postures of the Mind* (1985), *A Progress of Sentiments* (1991), and *Moral Prejudices* (1994) have fundamentally altered the way her philosophical followers think about the history of modern philosophy, moral psychology, normative ethics, and meta-ethics. These essays written by Baier's friends and admirers (many of them her former students) are a tribute to this fine career.

The most salient and persistent feature of Baier's thinking over the years is her *naturalism*. But, as Williams points out in his introduction, this term has a distinct meaning as a description of her work. Her naturalism is a non-reductive attempt to re-evaluate the philosophical heritage of super-naturalism. She would have us appropriate the history of philosophy in a manner that allows us to make sense of our own natural history and current evaluative practices.

To that end, she has made three broad claims in her work over the years. (1) All forms of atomism ought to be resisted. This position comes out most clearly in her critique of contractarianism, with its focus on the sovereign rational deliberator, keen to avoid risk and vulnerability (think of Rawls' timid rational choosers) as the fundamental unit of moral worth. (2) Mutual dependence, and therefore trust, are fundamental features of the moral life. Many consider Baier's work on trust and distrust — specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for an attitude to qualify as trust (rather than mere reliance, for example), laying out the circumstances under which trust should

be withdrawn, and so on — to constitute her most significant contribution to moral psychology and normative ethics. (3) Emotions are positive features of moral judgement. Some of the most interesting work inspired by Baier involves a revaluation of Descartes, in particular the role he assigns to the passions in both our theoretical and moral judgements.

This is an especially cheeky claim to make of course: if one can show that the arch-rationalist in fact accords a significant place to the emotions, one will have seriously challenged the normal way of looking at the history of rationalism. And Baier's view of Descartes has indeed prevailed: more and more commentators are taking the passionate Descartes seriously, asking for example what role, if any, the emotions play in the intellectual peregrination of the famous meditator (see Lisa Shapiro's contribution to this volume). More generally, Baier holds that our emotional attachments to others can define our interpersonal relations in a way that runs contrary to the role they have traditionally been given by Kantians and contractarians. This is the basis of her abiding attachment to Hume.

All the papers in this volume are philosophically rich and bear at least some mark of Baier's argumentative and interpretive skill, as well as her iconoclasm. The most interesting analyses emerge when a contributor resists one or another aspect of Baier's interpretive framework, while clearly benefiting from her overall approach to an issue or figure in the history of philosophy. Let's consider just two of them that best exemplify this feature.

In 'Hume and Morality's Useful Purpose', David Gauthier takes on Baier's understanding of how Hume's 'interested passion' — i.e., self-interest — can be cultivated in such a way that it encompasses more and more complex social networks. According to Baier, this happens as a function of changes in range of scarce goods available to the agent, changes that are 'brought about by the successive artifices or social conventions of property, transfer, promise, and government' (220). At each stage the agent must internalize a new and wider set of obligations. Hume thus shows us how a single passion gets 'redirected', such that it becomes increasingly socialized and can become the basis of large networks of cooperative integration among agents. Very well, argues Gauthier, so long as one is willing to allow that at each stage of this progression the redirection involves a necessary restraint on the part of the agent with respect to the goods and actions sought after in the *previous* stage. Hume, and Baier by extension, are right about the *progress* of sentiments here, but perhaps too sanguine as regards the full impact this progress will have on the moral psychology of (largely) self-interested agents. The dispute is fascinating because it goes to the heart of some very complex questions about moral motivation, and the relation between self- and other-directed attitudes.

Another fine example of a philosopher who is both indebted and resistant to Baier is Michele Moody-Adams. Baier has argued that Kant's moral philosophy is, as Nietzsche said, deeply cruel, both in the manner in which the agent is enjoined to treat her own heteronomous inclinations and in its other-directed retributivism. As Moody-Adams puts it, Baier maintains 'that Kant's conception of moral criticism embodies an inhumane demand for

moral perfection and may well damage the faulty agent's virtues as well as his vices' (282). Against Kant, Baier places Hume's broadly utilitarian and affect-based approach to moral judgement. If we follow Hume's rather than Kant's approach to moral pressure — an approach characterized by a 'light touch' rather than 'hectoring commands' — we will, says Baier, be in a better position to combat the general problem of cruelty. But in her 'Cruelty, Respect, and Unsensitimental Love', Moody-Adams argues persuasively against this view, showing that Kant comes out well ahead of Hume as regards our philosophical understanding of the nature of cruelty.

Again, there is much more in this volume — including essays from such eminent scholars as Alasdair MacIntyre, Lilli Alanen, and Janet Broughton — to delight just about anyone working in the range of fields explored so deeply and so passionately by Annette Baier.

### **Byron Williston**

Wilfrid Laurier University

### **Monte Ransome Johnson**

*Aristotle on Teleology.*

Toronto and New York:

Oxford University Press 2005.

Pp. xi + 339.

Cdn\$135.00:US\$74.00. ISBN 0-19-928530-6.

This book argues that Aristotle's teleological account of nature has regularly been applied too widely. Following several twentieth-century commentators, Johnson argues for a more restrictive, internalist account of Aristotle's teleology. On this view, the primary instances of final causes are the internal, intrinsic ends of natural substances. These ends consist in the proper exercise of these substances' distinctive capacities, and must always be determined in relation to the excellence, or completion, of that specific kind of substance. Thus, final causes explain only what benefits natural substances as members of a particular species. To the extent that the activities of natural substances benefit members of another species, these benefits are incidental and not part of the natural end of the substances producing them.

Johnson's approach rejects an externalist account, which looks at how the behaviour of one kind of natural substance benefits other kinds of things. Historically, the two most common externalist accounts are anthropocentrism, which views other natural substances as serving human ends, and those theological accounts that see the natural order as serving a divine

purpose. The goal of this book, then, is to make Aristotle's teleology more philosophically and scientifically acceptable by rescuing it from commentators who have applied it too widely. All natural substances have an end, but there is no universal teleology in the sense of some one, ultimate end that all natural substances serve.

To defend this claim, Johnson offers a comprehensive account of Aristotle's natural philosophy. He argues quite plausibly that Aristotle grounds final causes primarily in the internal functions and interests of individual natural substances. The more difficult matter, however, lies in answering the objection made most famously in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, namely that even this more modest, internal teleology still attempts to explain too much because it excludes the mechanical, non-teleological causation exercised by matter. Since the Scientific Revolution, and perhaps already in antiquity, this has been the most important problem with Aristotle's teleology, rather than the externalist misinterpretations cited above. Here Johnson's defense of Aristotle is less convincing.

Johnson correctly notes that for Aristotle the principal mark of natural substances is that they can move themselves. They can do this because the source of their distinctive behaviour is located inside them. Indeed, this internal source of change is part of what makes them to be what they are. The difficulty, however, is that, according to Johnson, Aristotle holds that all of these natural powers, or efficient causes, are directed to an end. In the first instance, this end is the good of the substance to which the natural power belongs. While some things that happen in nature do not occur for the sake of an end — eclipses are one example given by Aristotle — every change that takes place in nature is ultimately caused by a goal-directed efficient cause. It is not only that every natural substance acts for the sake of some end or other; teleology is also universal in nature in that every causal power found in natural substances is exercised for the sake of an end.

As a result, Johnson has to find some good for every efficient cause in nature, some way in which the exercise of that causal power benefits the substance to which it belongs. In the case of the sublunary elements, he argues that this benefit is the motion of these elements to their natural place in the cosmos and the eternal cycle of their generation and destruction, a pattern that resembles the eternal circular motion of the planets and stars. Still, even if these are instances of teleological causation, a problem remains. Aristotle argues that the defining capacities of these elements consist in the way in which they interact with other physical bodies, which is how he understands heat, cold, fluidity, and rigidity. It is hard to see how the exercise of these capacities produces any immediate benefit for these elements. The absence of an end is seen most clearly when no generation takes place as a result of these natural interactions; when I am cooled by the earth upon which I lie, no generation need occur in either the earth or me, and while that cooling may benefit me, it is hard to see how it benefits the earth. This case is different from natural events, such as eclipses, that do not occur for the sake of an end; eclipses are derivative occurrences, arising out of the natural

motions of the planets and stars. In the case of the sublunary elements, however, their tactile causal powers are what define them, and it is not clear what end or intrinsic good is reached through the exercise of these powers. This might explain why Aristotle suggests that final causes do not apply to the material causes of natural substances, for all perishable substances are ultimately made out of these four elements.

On Johnson's account, however, these elemental, natural powers are always exercised for the immediate benefit of the bodies that have them. Stated differently, for every natural causal power there is a corresponding virtue, or specific excellence, a better or worse way in which that causal power can be exercised. Purely mechanical, non-teleology causality does not operate in nature prior to, or along side of, these end-directed causal powers. On Johnson's account of Aristotle, there really is no independent mechanical causation in nature at all; mechanical causation is incidental to, and derivative from, the goal-directed exercise of natural powers. As a result, Aristotle's teleology is not just incompatible with anthropocentrism and teleological arguments for the existence of God; it also has no room for mechanism of any kind, whether ancient or modern. This is odd because this book ends by praising Aristotle's teleology for its affinity with modern biology, and yet the latter surely does not understand itself as incompatible with modern physics.

With respect to living organisms, the paradigm case of teleological explanation in Aristotle, Johnson has much to say that is both sound and interesting. With respect to the scope of teleological explanation, however, Johnson's account of Aristotle does not have the result that he intends, namely making Aristotle more philosophically and scientifically plausible.

**Christopher Byrne**

St. Francis Xavier University

**Martin R. Jones and Nancy Cartwright, eds.**

*Idealization XII: Correcting the Model.*

*Idealization and Abstraction in the Sciences.*

Kenilworth, NJ: Rodopi 2005.

Pp. 293.

US\$98.00. ISBN 90-420-1955-7.

This volume is a very diverse collection of eleven essays on very diverse subjects by authors from very diverse academic backgrounds. As the preface states, the contributions range 'from Chinese calendars to nineteenth century electrodynamics to options pricing' (9). 'Diverse' can often mean 'messy',

but what we have here is a well balanced mixture covering the historical, philosophical, and practical aspects of modelling, much along the lines of Morgan and Morrison, eds., *Models as Mediators* (Cambridge University Press 1999). However, as the editors point out in the preface, this book has been a long time coming, with some of the papers now being well over a decade old. This leaves some of the contributions looking a little dated, and deprived of the wealth of recent material on idealization, modelling, and abstraction.

The issue that unites (more or less: the last three essays leave the track somewhat) the essays is the following: How can our models possibly represent reality given their obviously highly ideal and abstract nature? The point is that most models in science are *so* ideal and abstract as to be true of nothing existing in reality. As Jones puts it, the systems they describe are mostly 'distant relation[s]' of real-world systems (173). Inasmuch as the real-world systems are captured at all, they are often 'systematically misrepresented' (174). More generally, the contributions deal with 'some aspect of idealization or abstraction' in some scientific field. Space prevents an overview of all of the essays, so I shall focus on the first two, which defend opposing views on econometric models. This pair gives a good indication of the quality, thematic content, and spread of the collection.

Most econometric models view macroeconomic properties (i.e. 'global', 'aggregated', or 'distributed' properties such as GNP, inflation, and so on) as *supervenient* on the behaviour of individual rational economic agents (i.e. on the microeconomic structure). The crucial question is whether or not it is possible, or indeed sensible, to attempt to build *realistic* models of macroeconomic phenomena. Hoover defends a view whereby even extremely *idealized* models ('toy models') have a crucial role to play in testing general principles. Such models serve as 'laboratories' in which to conduct 'experiments' that might otherwise be expensive or too risky to test in real economic situations (see R. E. Lucas, *Studies in Business-Cycle Theory*, Blackwell 1981). Real-world connections are bought at the price of feeding in by hand any free parameters on the basis of empirical tests or searches through the space of values that provide 'good fit' with the data (Margaret Morrison criticizes this method in her essay).

Pemberton goes in an opposite direction to Hoover. He begins by drawing a distinction between 'causal' and 'non-causal' idealized models. The former is defined as 'an idealized model that rests on simple idealized causes' (35). The latter is then an idealized model that is non-causal in the sense that it 'does not attempt to capture causes or the effects of causes that operate in reality' (37). Causal idealized models can tell us what happens in real situations, but the latter *never* can. Pemberton's argument then involves showing that in the context of economics both types of model fail to be predictive since 1) non-causal models are true of nothing *actual*, and, 2) a causal model suffers from the extreme degree of complexity of social systems such as economies. This is similar to Cartwright's notion that, e.g., a *real* projectile's motion is far too messy and complicated to represent in a mathematical model (*Nature's Capacities and their Measurement*, Cambridge Uni-

versity Press 1989, p. 187). Models in this sense are not true of anything in the real world, for the real world is always 'messy'. Hoover would largely agree with all of this, specifically that econometric models often violate the data (see 18-19), but he nonetheless insists that such models can act as quantitative guides in policy making decisions provided one inputs values of the 'key constants' gathered from '[s]ubstantial empirical work' (31) — again, see Morrison's gripe.

What I missed from this particular exchange (and in the other contributions) was any discussion of *simulation*, especially 'microsimulation' or 'agent-based' simulation (see, e.g., K. G. Troitzsch *Social Science Microsimulation*, Springer-Verlag 1996; F. Luna & B. Stefansson *Economic Simulations in SWARM*, Kluwer Academic 2000): these are understood exactly as ways of realistically modelling macroeconomic (or macro-whatever) phenomena. This omission may well be due to the time lag in the book's publication — agent-based modelling is a fairly recent innovation.

After this pair of essays there are additional essays from Amos Funkenstein (who gives an erudite examination of the reasons for the demise of Aristotelian *capacities*); James Griesemer (who discusses an example of abstraction in evolutionary biology); Nancy Nersessian (who focuses on abstraction and idealization in the construction Maxwellian electrodynamics); Margaret Morrison (who discusses modelling in physics from the practitioner's point of view); Martin Jones (who focuses on the distinction between idealization and abstraction); David Nivison (who talks about idealization in ancient Chinese calendar science); James Bogen and Jim Woodward (who criticize the view of theory testing based on the inferential relations between [evidential and theoretical] sentences and suggest an alternative); M. Norton Wise (who presents an evaluation of Giere's book *Explaining Science*, which was then just out!); and finally a response to Wise from Ronald Giere himself.

For those working in the area of modelling (not just philosophers of science), abstraction, and idealization in the sciences *simpliciter*, i.e., understood as going beyond physics to encompass the 'life' and 'social sciences' too, this is an invaluable book (though perhaps as a follow up to Morgan and Morrison's book). The main reason for the book's success is that, in many essays, one gains an 'insider's' perspective of modelling and idealization within quite different fields. I wish this format were followed more often. I have only two small criticisms: there is no index for this book, and one would have liked a more extensive introduction placing the essays into context — though there are abstracts after the fairly brisk preface, the spread of subjects demanded more.

**Dean Rickles**

University of Calgary

**Michael Lewis**

*Heidegger and the Place of Ethics.*

New York: Continuum International

Publishing Group 2005.

Pp. 232.

US\$120.00. ISBN 0826484972.

Lewis' ultimate goal in this project (which is said to be only the first stage of a threefold projected work that would bear on Heidegger and capitalism, and then on phenomenology and materialism, with each succeeding stage 'more abstract' than the previous one) is to seek a *rapprochement* between Heidegger and Marx, between the thought of the ontological difference and the thought of capitalism. The reasons for this project are perhaps not sufficiently made explicit or discussed; rather the goal is simply stated, as is simply affirmed the comparison that the author seeks to make between Heidegger and Lacanian discourse. One would wish that Lewis provided some further justification, or even a preliminary philosophical discussion of the stakes. In any case, the book does not address this comparison except for the last few pages of the conclusion, and in fact bears mostly on Heidegger's thought.

A second task involves Heidegger's relation to ethics and the question of being-with. Lewis seeks to reengage the question of what he calls the 'place of ethics', that is, the question of ethics and of its place in our world today. 'What is the place of ethics in Heidegger's thought?' he first asks, then answers: 'The place of ethics is the ontological difference' (1). This opens the further question: if the place of ethics is the ontological difference, how could such a place 'be allowed to emerge in today's techno-capitalist world', a world of 'anethical nihilism', that is, a world of economic imperatives in which ethics has been 'buried'?

The core of such an ethics, or *ethos*, is approached by the author in terms of the problematics of being-with. In Part 1 (the book comprises three parts), Lewis seeks to argue that the existentials of being-with, which is often considered to be limited to *Being and Time*, in fact undermines fundamental ontology from within and initiates what is known as the 'turn' in Heidegger's thinking, which Lewis calls the crossing or 'crossing-through' towards a rethinking of what being means. This account of the turning in Heidegger's thought (the object of Part 2), regarding the place of ethics and being-with, is a very promising avenue in Heidegger's studies: Following Jean-Luc Nancy on this point (in particular his *Being Singular Plural*, Stanford University Press 2000) Lewis claims that the 'with' was never understood at the time of *Being and Time* to be co-original with being itself, and that the 'with' does in fact occupy the very heart of Heidegger's later thought. There, the 'with' represents the ontological difference (still insufficiently thought in *Being and Time*); or rather the event of *Ereignis* as it splits apart being and beings. As Lewis puts it, 'Heidegger's later thought is a thought of being *with* beings, of

the very *differentiation* of the ontological difference which went *unthought* in his early work' (1).

Lewis further locates the origin of such ethics in death, from which alone a human community can arise. However, Lewis is careful to note the break between the early work of Heidegger, centered on man, and the later work, where man is displaced toward the event of *Ereignis*. Thus, if in *Being and Time* the origin of ethics was man's finitude — 'The site of ethics in early Heidegger was man in his repetitively assumed finitude' (77) — in the later work 'man has been decentred and swept up in the circulation of energy and the stocking up of resources, to the point at which it is impossible to attribute to him this centrality' (77). In that case, the place of ethics may be situated in what Heidegger calls the 'moment-site' (*Augenblickssttte*), and Lewis further understands this site as the withdrawal of the event of *Ereignis*, the withdrawal allowing the event of presence of all beings.

Being itself in its most authentic sense *is* the withdrawal, notes Lewis, and to find a place for ethics today and overcome nihilism, 'it is necessary to draw man's attention to the void' that the positivity of beings conceals. 'The nihilism characteristic of today is not a bleak and cold staring into the nothingness of universal values, but the very *avoidance* of the void, the losing of oneself in pure positivity' (78). This void Heidegger named 'death' in *Being and Time*. Thus, if death is the origin of ethics, it will be 'a different kind of death that things die today, different to that of 1927' (78), a sort of negativity haunting the positivity of beings. Lewis calls such the ethics of this negativity 'an ethics of the void or the Real' (this is where Lewis sees a proximity between Heidegger and Lacan).

In the third and final part, Lewis develops the relationship between such an ethics with a politics of being, and how being-with is implicated in it. As he puts it, 'in part III we shall demonstrate the way in which being-with and death must be thought *together* to stir this crossing, as the very (political) formation of the place of ethics' (129). Several interesting developments are made concerning the relation between politics and power ('*Machenschaft*'), technology and power, the question of the *Gestell* as 'counter-essence' of *Ereignis*, even the motif of the face in Heidegger, and the implication of ethics with politics. Less convincing is the way Lewis concludes with sweeping comparisons and analogies between Heidegger's thought and the work of Laclau, Žižek, Lacan, or even Levinas and Derrida. For reasons I alluded to earlier, such comparisons would first require an extensive elaboration of the possibilities and limits of the connection, a work that has not been done here. As a result, the genuine conditions for a possible encounter are not met.

As a whole, the work is written in a fairly difficult language, somewhat abstract and not always devoid of jargon, but the problematics engaged are rich and promising, making for an interesting work.

**François Raffoul**

Louisiana State University

**Ruth Garrett Millikan**

*Language: A Biological Model.*

Toronto and New York:

Oxford University Press 2005.

Pp. 240.

Cdn\$139.50:US\$74.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-19-928476-8);

Cdn\$48.00:US\$29.95

(paper: ISBN 0-19-928477-6).

Millikan is that rare kind of philosopher who is capable of carefully working out the finest technical details while simultaneously keeping a very clear view of the overall shape of her project. This makes reading her articles both very difficult and very rewarding. Difficult, as Millikan's account often seems to be either more complex than it needs to be, or the connections between her ideas are not all spelled out but rather hinted at. Rewarding, as following up on the reasons for the seemingly superfluous complexity brings you face to face with the role that detailed argumentation plays in Millikan's overall picture, and allows you to understand the numerous connections between parts of that project.

Millikan's project of naturalising philosophy of language is the theme of this latest book. Though it is a selection of articles — most of which have been published in some form before — the book as a whole remains coherent: bound together by being focussed upon an account of conventions which explains them in terms of biological, non-evaluative norms. The first three articles develop the account itself, while the remaining pages mainly cast light upon the significance Millikan's account has for a number of areas in the philosophy of language. What is particularly valuable for many is that Millikan takes the debate to traditional analytic philosophy of language, which helps to bring into sharp relief the difference between the kind of naturalised approach Millikan pursues and traditional approaches.

'Coordination conventions', on Millikan's account, 'proliferate because ... people learn from experience exactly as other animals do' (10), i.e., by noting conventional connections much in the same way as they do causal connections. The significance of basing an account of conventions upon such simple biological capacities is made clear by Millikan through the device of contrasting her view with that put forward by David Lewis in *Convention: A Philosophical Study* and in other places, where Lewis' account presumes that conventions have a substantial rational ground — thereby cutting off the possibility of a naturalist analysis. The other side of this coin is Millikan's rejection of the 'long tradition of taking conventions *as such* to involve regular conformity within a group either *de facto* or *de jure*' (11). Given a naturalist basis for convention, neither regularity is required, it being sufficient to show that following the precedent to the (possibly limited) degree that it is followed yields some gain. In such a case, any rule that arises naturally, rather than being necessarily prescriptive, will be descriptive or, though Millikan does

not state this outright, at best instrumental. This notion of descriptive norms that are nothing more than the statistical average of actual actions allows Millikan to build a thin notion of public language that avoids Chomsky's criticism, the substantive part consisting of showing the connection between conventions and proper functions, by saying that it is the function of coordinating conventions to solve coordination problems. Millikan has to do this as she wants to claim that it is a Chomskian language faculty that allows us to form conventions that are linguistic. Here, the main specifically linguistic trait of linguistic conventions is that they solve coordination problems by their semantic-mapping function.

The connection between the articles that put forward an account of conventions and the remaining articles may not be apparent at first glance. Thus, along with an article applying the conventions model to speech acts can be found another that focuses on kinds. However, the connection is there — the article on kinds helps to spell out what Millikan means by saying 'speech is just as direct a medium for the perception of objects ... as is the light reflected off objects' (117). Still, even if such a connection were lacking, the articles would be worthwhile in themselves because of the numerous comparisons they make between Millikan's work and the analytic tradition. Two, particularly, require mention in even a brief review. The first is a comparison of how Millikan and Brandom, both students of Wilfrid Sellars, have developed his philosophy of language in their two very different ways. The second, 'Cutting Philosophy of Language Down to Size', especially deserves to have a bigger impact than it has thus far due to its seminal significance for how the Anglo-American tradition is to proceed. In it, Millikan manages to characterise two very strong assumptions necessary for conceptual analysis to be considered to have a central role in philosophy, and then carefully shows why a particular kind of externalist account of reference is needed to avoid them, as well as the quite radical implications their rejection will have.

A comparison between Millikan's writing and that of Peirce may be usefully made in terms of similarities in outlook, interest, and approach, as well as in terms of certain similarities of style. Thus, just as Peirce was wont to follow a line of thought along routes not often travelled by others, Millikan's writing also commonly forces us to travel paths that cut across the standard tracks. The extra effort is well rewarded.

**Konrad Talmont-Kaminski**

*(Philosophy and Sociology)*

Marie Curie-Sklodowska University

**Markku Oksanen and  
Juhani Pietarinen, eds.**

*Philosophy and Biodiversity.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.

Pp. xv + 258.

US\$80.00. ISBN 0-521-80430-2.

*Philosophy and Biodiversity* is part of the *Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Biology*. It includes an introduction by Oksanen with twelve other articles from contributors in Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada (among other countries). The authors have the range of academic backgrounds needed to adequately address this interdisciplinary topic. The work is divided into four parts: the origin and historical development of the concept of biodiversity, ways it can be meaningfully understood, why it might be valued (including discussions of both instrumental and non-instrumental values (31)), and policy issues emerging in attempts to protect biodiversity.

The work highlights conceptual challenges associated with biodiversity that are of philosophical interest. In Chapter 2, Yrjö Haila outlines the emergence of the term through a process of construction. *Biodiversity* was coined in the planning for the 1986 National Forum on BioDiversity held in Washington, D.C., in the context of ecological crisis and perceived rapid species loss (1). The political framing of the concept with its 'strong normative connotations' and breadth creates tensions in its use for empirical research and developing practical responses to biodiversity loss (57). Oksanen provides a common definition of biodiversity as encompassing 'the whole variety of life on Earth and ... its physical conditions' (5). Julia Koricheva and Helena Siipi elaborate on biodiversity understood as diversity of genes, species, and ecosystems (31). Integrating the work of others, they develop a further hierarchical model associated with each, specifically *genetic diversity* (found, for example, within individuals, genomes, and chromosomes), *taxonomic diversity* (which includes the diversity of organisms, for example, at the level of genera, species, and subspecies), and *ecological diversity* (including bioregions, ecosystems, and landscapes). All three divisions contain populations as a shared element. This approach addresses an important distinction made later by Keekok Lee that 'a species or a similar population of individual organisms in two different ecosystems represents two different ecological and evolutionary potentials' (153). Koricheva and Siipi further analyse these three divisions in terms of their *compositional diversity* ('the identity and variety of elements at each hierarchical level'), *structural diversity* ('the physical organization or pattern of a system, from genetic structure to landscape patterns'), and *functional diversity* (involving 'genetic, ecological, and evolutionary processes such as gene flow, natural disturbances, and nutrient recycling' (31-2)).

The volume highlights a number of thought-provoking features of the concept of biodiversity that will appeal to philosophers beyond those with

specific interests in environmental issues and conservation biology. Oksanen notes biodiversity is a mid-level concept within a worldview that '... neither regards each individual component of reality as "bare particular" nor the system of nature as a tightly functioning whole, in which any component, or sets of components, cannot be individuated' (2). The term's inclusivity enables it to incorporate both the *entities* and *processes* that make up complex ecological systems (10). Yrjö Haila emphasizes the relative importance of the dynamic reproductive processes needed to produce biological entities (67). With these concerns in mind, Koricheva and Siipi see biodiversity as defining an approach that can bridge theoretical gaps between holism and reductionism as well as compositionism and functionalism (49).

A considerable portion of the work critically explores reasons for valuing biodiversity. This includes debating its instrumental value as well as intrinsic value (39-42). With respect to instrumental value, an important contribution of this volume is a discussion of how biodiversity contributes to ecosystem stability (47). A number of authors note the shift in understanding of ecosystem stability within modern ecology, in particular the move from an equilibrium worldview that pictures ecosystems returning to an equilibrium after perturbations, to one of dynamic stability that takes into account ongoing changes in populations within ecosystems. One such approach links stability to decreased variability in population densities (i.e., a move away from extremely low or high densities of certain populations), which, in turn, allows for greater differential responses of a community to internal or external perturbations (86-7). In this case ecosystems are valued as self-functioning systems, having 'a kind of self-regulating or autogenic power to preserve their functioning' (87, 177). Gregory Mikkelsen analyses this diversity-stability hypothesis further from the perspective of holism and reductionism (Ch. 5). For Mikkelsen, those supporting holism see 'downward' causal and explanatory relationships as more important than the 'upward' explanations of reductionists (120). In examining the three hierarchical levels in ecology of organisms, populations, and communities, Mikkelsen identifies an interesting example of downward causation where *species richness*, a property at the community level, impacts the populations that comprise the community at a sub-level (120-1). He sees these higher-level generalizations in ecology as more 'law-like' or robust than lower-level ones (124). Mikkelsen highlights from the literature ways in which diversity is thought to cause stability, which include not only competitive but also mutualistic interactions (122-3).

With respect to non-instrumental reasons for preserving biodiversity, Keekok Lee provides a powerful argument in Chapter 7. Rather than focusing on the intrinsic value of biodiversity, Lee introduces the idea of biotic and abiotic entities and processes potentially having *independent value*. Here 'an entity (or process) is morally considerable and has value if that entity has come into existence, continues to exist, and then goes out of existence — in principle — entirely independent of direct human intention, design, manipulation, or control' (159). For Lee, human consciousness is distinctive in its

ability to discern both human creativity and independent creativity found in nature (163). Lee argues we should therefore agonize over 'our destruction of existing naturally occurring biodiversity' (163). This also challenges our ability to substitute human-made diversity (seen as an artifact) for naturally occurring biodiversity. Dieter Birnbacher, however, provides several arguments in favour of anthropogenic substitutability in light of his analysis of axiological and deontological justifications for biodiversity (Ch. 9). He concludes that humans can actively improve biodiversity rather than viewing nature as sacrosanct (194). A practical policy example of this ethical debate is found in Christian Gamborg and Peter Sandøe's case study of the merits of reintroducing beavers to southern Scandinavia (Ch. 11). Kate Rawles provides a further ethical critique of biodiversity in examining whether one can justify killing sentient animals in attempts to preserve biodiversity (199). She contrasts what she sees as the more clear-cut ethical obligations humans have to individual sentient animals versus ambiguous obligations to preserve the collectives identified by biodiversity (such as species) that lack consciousness and interests (200, 204).

The book situates the topic of biodiversity within the context of the writings of a number of classical and contemporary philosophers. Keekok Lee discusses the value of naturally occurring biodiversity in light of Aristotle's view that an organism has its own natural *telos* as opposed to an artifact (165). Juhani Pietarinen discusses Plato's view in the *Timaeus* that 'the empirical world is a plenitude of living beings representing all degrees of rationality or self-regulating power', including variation within and between species, a key element of biodiversity (91). Finn Arler provides a thoughtful overview of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's interest in botany, elaborating on Rousseau's view that botany allows transcendence of one's own self-centredness to engage in 'a study of pure curiosity, free from ulterior interests' (139). Robin Attfield brings in contemporary political philosophy in examining criticisms of the universal principles used in articulating biodiversity preservation in government policy. In doing so he draws on Seyla Benhabib's critique of John Rawls' use of abstraction and generalization (238-9). Attfield argues persuasively that it is possible to meaningfully articulate universal biodiversity principles while at the same time being sensitive to context, particularly the differentiated responsibilities of developed and developing countries (241-3). From a philosophy of science perspective, Kim Cuddington and Michael Ruse examine Charles Darwin's view that the total number of species will reach an equilibrium value, a view also reflected in the works of contemporary authors such as Michael Rosenzweig and Jack Sepkoski (101, 109-10). Cuddington and Ruse see Darwin's view rooted more in older prescientific ideas of harmony and plenitude than in empirical evidence (116-7). A fruitful discussion of the popular framing of biodiversity and the limitations it places on scientific research and practical responses to biodiversity loss is presented by Yrjö Haila, particularly the limitations of the view that human population growth in itself is the cause of biodiversity loss (62).

The selections are well-written and researched, with extensive notes and bibliographies. They also point to a number of new areas for research. Yrjö Haila notes that further understanding is needed of how organisms survive in human-modified areas, the impacts of different kinds of management regimes, and the potential mismatch of political scales of decision making to ecological scales (74, 76). The emergence of the concept of biodiversity as a political construct as much as a scientific one allows for its creative and ongoing evolution akin to, for example, the concept of sustainable development. If Rousseau's insights are correct about the importance of a detached study of nature in preserving our ability to conduct curiosity-driven research, ecological models drawn from a study of biodiversity, particularly the constraints and opportunities of large-scale systems on sub-systems, may well have substantial application to other areas of philosophy and to the academy as a whole.

**Roger Petry**

Luther College, University of Regina

**Catalin Partenie and Tom Rockmore, eds.**

*Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue.*

Evanston, IL:

Northwestern University Press 2005.

Pp. xxviii + 234.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-2232-4);

US\$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8101-2233-2).

Partenie and Rockmore assembled this collection of essays in response to what they perceived to be a dearth of books dedicated to Heidegger's interpretation of Plato (xxv). However, though they suggest that this motivation arose in part from an interest in exploring Heidegger's influence on platonic scholarship, this text is (with the possible exception of Partenie's own contribution to it) far less concerned with inquiring into new ways of interpreting Plato that Heidegger opened up than with examining the place that Plato held within the broader scope of Heidegger's philosophical and political thought, both before and after his famous *Kehre*. And as a book that is concerned with discussing a particular and intriguing aspect of Heidegger's thought and work, it does a fine job — if, however, one is interested in the influence that Heidegger has had on platonic scholarship this book is not likely to satisfy.

While this book is likely to be more appealing to those interested in Heidegger than to those interested in Plato, the focus and limit that Partenie

and Rockmore have placed upon the scope of the essays included is a clear strength of the text; for it allows this collection to offer what a more general anthology, such as *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, cannot: specifically, something like a keyhole view through which one may examine some of the most dominant themes in Heidegger's philosophy as they relate to his reading of Plato and Platonism. Recognizing the complexity of this relationship and the controversy surrounding the validity of Heidegger's interpretation — and, at times, translation — of Plato, Partenie and Rockmore do an admirable job at selecting a range of essays that both illustrates this complexity and demonstrates a variety of concerns raised by and objections raised against Heidegger's work on Plato, including contributions from both those who are sympathetic with and those critical of Heidegger's project.

The centerpiece of this collection is four consecutive essays dedicated to theme of truth in Heidegger's philosophy, as this is arguably the greatest concern in his confrontation with Plato. The first of these essays, 'Truth and Untruth in Plato and Heidegger', by Michael Inwood, sets the stage by more or less uncritically laying out Heidegger's relationship to Plato and his understanding of truth. Inwood notes that Heidegger finds an ambiguity in this understanding: on the one hand Plato holds to what, according to Heidegger, was the traditional pre-Socratic understanding of truth as disclosure or un-concealment; on the other hand Plato also founded the propositional or correspondence theory of truth, 'the view that our access to things is mediated by ideas in the mind' (91). Inwood thus dedicates much of his efforts here to explaining Heidegger's reasons for giving preference to the understanding of truth as un-concealment over a propositional theory of truth, noting that Heidegger never abandons this latter conception of truth, but rather finds it to be derivative of the more primordial truth of un-concealment.

While Inwood's contribution is largely exegetical, two of the other essays dedicated to Heidegger's understanding of truth are highly critical of the philosopher. In his essay, 'Heidegger and the Platonic Concept of Truth', Enrico Berti focuses on the importance of Aristotle for Heidegger's analysis of Plato. Playing Heidegger's interpretations of these two thinkers off of each other, Berti seeks to demonstrate the incomprehensibility of Heidegger's argument in his famous *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* that with Plato there is a loss of the primordial meaning of truth as un-concealment. And in 'Heidegger on Truth and Being,' Joseph Margolis argues that, while Heidegger claims to have wrested the more primordial *alethic* meaning of truth as un-concealment from Parmenides first and foremost and that it is Plato who is guilty of having introduced the derivative propositional theory of truth into Western thought, one may in fact find this supposedly derivative understanding of truth already at work in Parmenides' poem. Margolis, thus, humorously concludes that 'Heidegger is evidently older than the pre-Socratics' (133).

The four essays on truth are sandwiched between six other essays addressing a range of themes, from Plato's influence on Heidegger's political views and reading of the *Antigone*, to an analysis of a Heideggerian conception of

authentic and inauthentic existence in Plato's *Republic*, to criticism of Heidegger's interpretive strategy of metaphysical realism and his view that Plato originated the productionist view of being. This diversity of themes works nicely in conjunction with the sustained discussion of Heidegger's writings on truth at the center of the text, as it provides an inclusive overview of the important role that Plato played in Heidegger's thought, together with an in-depth analysis of the most important aspect of Heidegger's encounter with Plato. However, there are one or two essays in this collection in which Plato is not so much given a back seat to Heidegger as he is put in the trunk. Rockmore's own contribution — which is an otherwise fine essay — offers the best example of this tendency in 'Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue'; here it feels less as if Plato is invoked for the sake of illuminating the dialogue between him and Heidegger than for the sake of playing the role of an agent provocateur, allowing Rockmore to address an aspect of Heidegger's thought (specifically his understanding of interpretation) that is not unrelated to Plato, but for which Plato does not figure prominently. This, however, detracts only slightly from the quality and fecundity of a very good book that will prove to be both highly compelling and of great importance to those interested in Heidegger's philosophy and the place that Plato held in it.

**Jeremy Bell**

DePaul University

**Jenefer Robinson**

*Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and its  
Role in Literature, Music, and Art.*

Toronto and New York:

Oxford University Press 2005.

Pp. xv + 500.

Cdn\$120.00:US\$74.00. ISBN 0-19-926365-5.

Robinson's book is a major contribution to philosophical reflection on the emotions and to philosophy of art. In the course of her book, Robinson challenges some of philosophy's most widely held assumptions about the emotions and the arts, particularly music. This volume is ground-breaking in part because it is always informed by a wide reading of psychology. Indeed, the book is a model of how philosophy can be informed by empirical investigation.

The book is divided into four parts. In Part 1, Robinson's target is the widely held cognitive (or judgement) theory of the emotions, according to

which emotions are very much like judgements. In offering an alternative, Robinson draws on William James' *Principles of Psychology*. James believed that physiological changes are essential parts of emotions. Still, Robinson thinks that there is something to the judgement theory in that emotions involve appraisal of the environment. A review of the psychological literature leads her to believe that they are not conscious cognitive judgements. Rather, they originate as 'quick and dirty' non-cognitive affective responses to things in the environment that are important to achieving an organism's goals. These responses cause the physiological changes that James identifies as essential to emotions and which give them their emotionality.

Having adopted a theory of the emotions, Robinson proceeds to apply it to questions in philosophy of art. In Part 2, she argues that literature evokes emotions in readers and some 'works of literature need to be experienced emotionally if they are to be properly understood' (101). (So Robinson adopts a version of reader response theory.) As well, some literary works have a valuable impact on one's emotional responses. For Robinson, literature is not merely valuable because it can lead to true beliefs. A close reading of Edith Wharton's *The Reef* is used to illustrate that one can also learn the proper emotional responses to particular events. Robinson argues that the formal properties of literary works are not merely valuable in themselves, as formalists believe. They also guide the process of emotional education. I very much hope that some people in literature departments read Robinson's book. She is a philosopher from whom they can definitely learn.

The view that literature evokes emotions raises a familiar question: the paradox of fiction. Why are we moved to tears by the fate of Anna Karenina? Many people hold that we cannot have an emotional response without a belief in the existence of something that affects our interests. Since Robinson has rejected the cognitive theory of emotion, which makes this assumption, she dissolves the paradox of fiction. The psychological literature reveals that we just do respond emotionally to some fictions.

In Part 3, Robinson turns to a consideration of the Romantic account of the expression of emotions in art. In particular, R.G. Collingwood's account of the expression of emotion is updated and defended. She does not argue that art is solely or mainly the expression of emotion, but that is one of things it can do. Several features of the Romantic account of emotion are retained. Each emotion expressed is regarded as *sui generis*: the emotion expressed depends on the precise form of the work of art. Expression in the arts is an imaginative process of becoming clear about an emotion. The audience imaginatively re-creates the emotion. In doing so, the audience acquires knowledge about the emotions. (This ties in to Robinson's belief that artworks can evoke emotions in audience members and that the experience of the arts is an education of the emotions.) Robinson departs from standard Romantic accounts of expression by holding that the emotion expressed in a work is not necessarily that of the artist. An artwork is regarded as evidence that a persona, who may be the author of the work, has experienced the emotion expressed.

Part 4, on music and emotion, is perhaps the most important section of the book. Robinson rejects the contour (or 'doggy' — the reference is to one of Peter Kivy's examples) theory of expression as unable to capture the way music is able to portray a complex process of emotional development. Only a close examination of particular musical compositions can reveal the full resources available to the composer who engages in the expression of emotions. Brahms' song *Immer leiser wird mein Schlummer* is discussed as a paradigm example of Romantic expression of emotion. Brahms' Intermezzo Op. 117, No. 2 is used to argue that purely instrumental music can also express changing emotions. A key move in the argument here is the positing of a persona in instrumental music. This is held to make possible the understanding of important features of musical works. It is also defended as compatible with what we know about the practices and intentions of many composers.

Crucial to Robinson's view of music is the view that it arouses emotion. Kivy, the most influential philosopher of music of our time, has famously denied that music arouses emotion. Robinson points out that Kivy's argument depends on the judgement theory of emotions, which she has rejected. She also looks at the empirical evidence collected by psychologists. As presented by Robinson, it suggests pretty unambiguously that music arouses emotions. This is, she says, 'not just Romantic myth but an established empirical fact' (376). A crucial part of the arousal of emotion is what Robinson calls the 'Jazzercise Effect' — the way music inspires motion in the body leads to emotion. Robinson goes on to argue that emotion plays a role in the interpretation of musical compositions parallel to the role it plays in the interpretation of many works of literature. In both cases, our emotional responses guide our understanding.

*Deeper than Reason* is an important book that belongs in every university and college library. Philosophers interested in art and the emotions will read it with profit for years to come.

**James O. Young**

University of Victoria

**Jay F. Rosenberg**

*Accessing Kant: A Relaxed Introduction  
to the Critique of Pure Reason.*

Toronto and New York:

Oxford University Press 2005.

Pp. xi + 312.

Cdn\$150.00:US\$95.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-19-927581-5);

Cdn\$54.00:US\$29.95

(paper: ISBN 0-19-927582-3).

The last five years have seen the addition of no less than five new introductions to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Prior to this, there was another half-dozen or so already in print. Jay Rosenberg claims warrant for adding to this number from the fact that his is 'a whole book about Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* written from a *largely* Dionysian perspective' (3), a perspective he characterizes as a problem-based approach that addresses Kant as a living contemporary analytical philosopher. This he opposes to the supposedly more familiar text-based approach that usually treats Kant as a more or less ossified historical figure, and which tends to overlook the 'Big Picture' underlying Kant's text (7). In this respect, *Accessing Kant* is more reminiscent of the work of Jonathan Bennett (minus the vitriol) or P. F. Strawson than of that of Henry Allison or Paul Guyer. In fact, much of the material for Rosenberg's interpretation, right down to his choice of the diagrams and words to express it, is adopted from the teachings of the famous American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars under whom Rosenberg studied at Pittsburgh.

This book contains thirteen chapters, eleven of which are devoted to what Rosenberg refers to as the 'constructive' parts of the *Critique*, which for him means everything prior to the Dialectic. Whether the Dialectic and the sections that follow it actually contain nothing significantly constructive is something that will concern us below. For now, it is helpful to recognize that the 'problem-space' of the book is formed by what Rosenberg calls variously the 'Pythagorean Puzzle', the problem of 'intelligibility', or 'epistemic legitimacy'. These all refer basically to the problem of how the contingent flux of a perceptual manifold can be grasped through various forms of conceptual unity (numbers, figures, cause-effect relations, etc.), a problem that Rosenberg illuminatingly equates with the metaphysical problem of the 'One and the Many' or unity in multiplicity. The upshot is just a metaphysically charged version of the basic question of epistemology, but the breadth with which it is formulated allows Rosenberg to successfully situate Kant's question of possible synthetic a priori judgments within a general story reaching back to the pre-Socratics that is still sophisticated enough to be interesting. Unfortunately, however, the picture Rosenberg sketches of the modern period ends up being far too centered on the British empiricists. The 'rationals' are swept aside as hopelessly theological, and Kant is declared to be a

'neo-Humean empiricist' (50). A more circumspect perusal of textual evidence shows, contrary to this, that Kant regarded Wolff and Crusius as having made decisive advances *beyond* Locke, and that he saw the latter, rather than the former two, as not having any 'useful story' to tell about the source of necessary concepts (cf. 26).

The centerpiece of the second chapter is Rosenberg's *teleological* formulation of the strategy of the transcendental deduction, what he calls 'Strategy K'. Rather than posit some third thing (*tertium quid*) as the ground for the validity of the link between concepts and perceptions, Kant aims to show that the synthetic unification of them is an essential end of rational subjects like ourselves, and thus that the *use* of the principles and concepts which alone make such a unity possible are themselves necessary or 'objectively valid'. The clincher to the argument lies in the following two-part justification of the necessity of this end: 1) The self-conscious identity of the thinking subject throughout many states is possible only through the representation of all these states in one unified item; 2) '[M]y being able to think of myself as the single subject of many thoughts and experiences ... is a condition of there *being* an "I" — one active agent — who is able to consider and choose *at all*, among many optional ends', and is thus not 'one of my *optional* ends', but rather 'a *constitutive* end' (59). This way of capturing Kant's strategy I find to be insightful and accurate, and Rosenberg's explanation of it is extensive and clear.

Despite its exceptional philosophical quality, *Accessing Kant* nevertheless fails in my mind to provide an adequate introduction to the *Critique* as a whole. First of all, its claim to have covered all of the *Critique's* constructive parts is misleading. The passages on the Dialectic and the Methodology are the barest of summaries; no mention is made of Kant's deduction of the ideas or their regulative use; and nothing is said of the clearly constructive arguments regarding freedom and the highest good. As Rosenberg himself admits, he actually says 'very little about immortality, still less about freedom, and hardly anything about God' (5). And although he 'heartily' commends 'ignoring the topic of God' as a 'healthy practice' (6n), this can hardly be accepted in a self-proclaimed introduction to the 'Big Picture', when the book it introduces *culminates* in the philosophical thesis that the ideal of God underpins the highest standpoint of human reason. Secondly, an introduction to the *Critique* must say something about the primary goal that Kant *actually* had in writing the book, and at least give some detailed consideration as to how, and to what extent, the arguments it contains fulfill this goal. But as it turns out, Rosenberg's personal outlook leads him to believe that this would be an undesirable addition of merely 'tactical' details and historical subtleties to the more important pure argumentative content of the book.

On the whole, while *Accessing Kant*, especially in the later sections, often reads like just another partial summary of selected parts of the *Critique*, in its finer passages it succeeds at being accurate, engaging, and truly illuminating. If supplemented in the appropriate ways, it should prove useful both

for its memorable examples and diagrams, as well as for the precision of its approach to the Analytic.

**Courtney David Fugate**  
Catholic University Leuven

**Paul Saurette**

*The Kantian Imperative:*

*Humiliation, Common Sense, Politics.*

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2005.

Pp. xi + 305.

Cdn\$/US\$75.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-3882-4);

Cdn\$/US\$35.00 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-4880-3).

In his book Saurette not only challenges standard interpretations of Kant's moral philosophy; he also attempts to show how certain implicit patterns of Kant's thought have left an explicit impact on the thinking of two (often opposed) leading contemporary philosophers (Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor). Moreover, in a surprising epilogue, Saurette also tries to show how the legacy of Kant's moral philosophy can help shed some provocative light on current events such as the US military scandal at Abu Ghraib.

The book is split into two parts. The first part (The Kantian Imperative) outlines his reading of certain basic underlying themes contained within Kant's moral philosophy; and the second part (The Contemporary Kantian Imperative) traces the impact of these themes within the thought of Habermas and Taylor.

In the first part, Saurette's reading of Kant's moral philosophy centers around four key 'aims, strategies, and practices' (16) that motivate Kant's moral thinking: 1) Kant's attempt to secure an 'imperative image of morality' that is composed of universal and necessary laws (25-45), 2) Kant's 'strategy of common sense recognition' employed to render apodictic those laws of morality (46-82), 3) Kant's appreciation for certain 'practices of cultivation' that can help to foster a moral disposition (83-101), and 4) the role of 'the cultivation of humiliation' within Kant's moral system (102-41).

In the second part, Saurette attempts to show how similar patterns of 'Kantian strategy' can be found at both ends of the well-known liberalism/communitarian debate. In Habermas, Saurette finds obvious parallels with Kant's 'imperative image of morality' and Kant's appeal to 'common-sense recognition' (163-74); he argues that although Habermas does not explicitly insist upon any need for 'practices of cultivation' in ethical projects, his communicative ethics must nevertheless affirm the necessity of such

practices (184-96). Meanwhile, in Taylor's thought Saurette not only notices a 'distinct predisposition toward the imperative image of morality' (199), but also finds a fruitful expansion upon Kantian 'practices of moral cultivation' and an explicit appeal to Kant's own 'strategy of common sense recognition' (204-18).

I can think of many reasons why a book such as this would be a particularly welcome addition to contemporary scholarship. Given the remarkable influence of Kant's moral philosophy over modern social-political thought, and given the overwhelming tendency to misinterpret Kant according to Hegelian outcries of 'formalism', an analysis of certain Kantian themes (such as, e.g., 'practices of ethical cultivation') and of the way in which such themes have been renewed in contemporary theory indeed warrants very careful scholarly attention. Moreover, amidst continuing global fears and dangers that are emerging from the implementation of recent American foreign policy, a scholarly investigation that looks to one of our leading moral philosophers for critical illumination would seem especially promising.

However, though I share many of Saurette's stated goals and concerns, I was not entirely convinced that his study had been completely fair to the thought of its central figure, Immanuel Kant.

Saurette's reading provocatively concludes that Kant's moral philosophy had to surreptitiously 'employ practices of *humiliation*' in order to 'capture those subjects who did not share in the common sense recognition of morality' (115). That is to say, Saurette contends that Kant recognized a deficiency within his appeal to the 'fact of reason' (*Faktum der Vernunft*), and was subsequently forced to rely upon the cultivation of certain 'practices of *humiliation*' in order to render the laws of morality binding upon ordinary human reason. Such an uncommon thesis eventually leads Saurette to the startling claim that Kant's moral philosophy would be unable to sufficiently criticize those tactics of humiliation that took place at Abu Ghraib prison (245) given that 'Kant's own philosophy forwards a logic that justifies and cultivates humiliation' (241).

As provocative and challenging as Saurette's thesis may be, I find it unconvincing when his analysis overlooks an essential component insisted upon in Kant's own presentation. Although Saurette does well to outline the significance of the 'feeling of humiliation' within Kant's moral philosophy, his reading altogether ignores Kant's contention that the 'feeling of humiliation' is always already *accompanied* by a specific 'feeling of elevation' before the moral law. That is to say, on Kant's own account, the 'feeling of humiliation' is merely the *negative* effect of our recognition of an obedience to the moral law (AK 5:74), while the *positive* effect is a 'feeling of elevation' that refers our existence away from the ends of a simple animality [*Tierheit*] toward the intrinsic ends of humanity [*Persnlichkeit*] (AK 5:79-81 and 5:86-87). In this way, given that Kant himself claims that the 'feeling of elevation' is a necessary component in the formation of a properly moral disposition, it is unclear why Saurette's analysis never once explores the Kantian possibility of cultivating such a feeling. I believe that a closer analysis of this very

point would not only help to amend Saurette's study in an important respect, but should also work to quell his concern that Kant's moral philosophy would be unable to sufficiently criticize the practices of humiliation that took place at Abu Ghraib prison (245) — such practices may indeed intensify the feeling of humiliation, but they in no way promote the feeling of elevation for humanity.

Despite my reservation about Saurette's reading of Kant, his text does highlight the need for contemporary political theory to challenge and interrogate those practices of ethical cultivation that may ultimately promote further terror and immorality. If we are ever to escape this current 'politic of humiliation and imperialism' (249), we need to ensure, at a minimum, that an alternative model does not continue to cultivate effects that can only perpetuate more violence against humanity.

### **Christopher McTavish**

Loyola University of Chicago

### **Alan D. Schrift**

*Twentieth-Century French Philosophy:*

*Key Themes and Thinkers.*

Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2006.

Pp. xxvi + 300.

US\$32.95. ISBN 1-4051-3218-3.

This is a multifaceted work. While ostensibly an historical look at French philosophy in the last century, it throws into question both the very notion of what is considered 'French Philosophy' as well as who and what might be considered 'key' in this frequently used turn-of-phrase. The result is a stimulating introduction to a rich philosophical era, and it is all the more rewarding due to Schrift's specific focus on the structure of philosophical institutions in France.

The book is many things: it is a chronology, a genealogical depiction of philosophical trends, a compilation of brief biographies of close to a hundred thinkers, a comprehensive bibliography of their works in English, and an appendix on French academic culture. The appendix is particularly important because it is around this single large theme — the culture of the academic institution in France — that Schrift weaves his story. He argues that there is not so much a unified notion of 'French Philosophy' written either *in* France or *by* the French, but rather the more definitive institutional programs that have administered how philosophy has been taught and

practiced over the last century. The institutionalization of philosophy that is peculiar to France, Schrift argues, has 'created a unique philosophical sensibility that does allow one to identify developments in "French Philosophy" that distinguish it from its German, British, and American counterparts' (81). Thus, instead of offering yet another historical overview of French philosophy, Schrift applies an interesting and insightful look at the academic developments that underlie the so-called 'master thinkers' that have emerged out of, and defined, what we think of as 'French Philosophy.'

Beginning, then, with the appendix on 'Understanding French Academic Culture', we are introduced to at least two related phenomena. First, Schrift documents the rise and fall of advanced educational platforms in France, from the founding of the University of Paris in 1200 to its fragmentation and 'reorganization' in the events surrounding May 1968. Alongside the history of the University of Paris, Schrift also details the ascendancy of various other influential institutions; such as the Sorbonne, the Collège de France, and the École Normale Supérieure. This brief overview provides just enough information to appreciate the dominance of these institutions in shaping France's academic culture. Second, perhaps more telling, Schrift also depicts the organizational structure that these institutions provide for incoming students. For example, Schrift outlines the specific procedures that philosophy students must pass through on their way to various levels of accreditation, from the required exams offered in 'lycées' (roughly equivalent to high schools), to the extremely competitive exams that students must pass in order to teach philosophy in secondary schools or universities. This account not only demonstrates the steps that all budding French philosophers must complete, but more importantly, the books that they have read and the teachers they have studied under along their way.

This final point underscores Schrift's 'unofficial' story: that French philosophy is largely the product of French academic institutions and practices. This unique perspective carries through the brief biographies of over eighty thinkers, both familiar and obscure, who are described primarily with respect to where they went to school, who they attended classes with, and under whom they studied. This perspective also applies to Schrift's genealogical look at the course of philosophy in France over the century, from its beginnings in positivism, idealism, and spiritualism, through its reception of German phenomenology, to its present state 'after structuralism'. By emphasizing each development, less appreciated movements are highlighted, such as the frequently overlooked 'epistemological' tradition, which included Bachelard and Canguilhem among others, that developed alongside Sartrean existentialism. The century is not considered solely in terms of Sartre's adoption of phenomenology and his eventual 'overcoming', as is often the case. Instead, other less recognized traditions are treated (e.g., the rise of sociology, the return to ethics and religion, the French analytic tradition), particularly with an eye toward how they influenced some of the better known philosophers of the latter half of the century (e.g., Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Irigaray).

The book is a compelling look at twentieth-century French philosophy. Many seemingly insignificant details become turning points in Schrift's hands, for he highlights institutional events that, to a greater or lesser extent, alter the course of philosophical study. This has largely to do with who is preparing students for exams, and what books the professors place on the exam list. For instance, after thirty years of near anonymity, Nietzsche was placed on the program for the *'agrégation de philosophie'* in 1958, which helps explain his exponential rise in popularity with students at the time, and their publications shortly thereafter. Another example is Althusser, who, in his role preparing students for the *agrégation* exams, influenced untold number of students during his tenure from 1948-80. Among those he prepared include Foucault, Derrida, Serres, Bourdieu, and many others. These are just two examples of how France's institutional culture — namely the role of the 'great' teachers and the texts they placed on exams — has influenced the various developments of 'French Philosophy'.

Concordant with Schrift's claim that he is painting a picture with 'very broad strokes' (56n), I often wished there was more detail. But this should not necessarily be taken for criticism, since wanting more is often the sign of a good story. If there is one criticism to make, it is the typical sort of reservation that one often has with historical overviews — namely, that certain figures are not addressed adequately enough, if at all, or that a favourite nuance in this history has been skipped over. In other words, that because a particular perspective is not addressed satisfactorily it is reason to cast a critical glance at the work as a whole. But Schrift has already anticipated this position by noting that some themes and thinkers have been omitted by necessity, since such a history, even if limited to one century, could go on indefinitely. Thus, as Schrift notes, it is 'not the whole story, by any means; but a story worth telling' (xv). After having read through this story, and having learned many things as a result, I would have to agree.

**Brett Buchanan**

Laurentian University

**David G. Stern**

*Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations:  
An Introduction.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 2004.

Pp. xiv + 208.

US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-81442-1);

US\$24.99 (paper: ISBN 0-521-89132-9).

One could say that a roughly two-hundred page introduction to one of the most important books in the history of philosophy that only makes its way through to the opening *motto* of the book by page 71 has got serious problems. One could say that — but one would be wrong. Very wrong.

This fine and lucid invitation to think seriously about Wittgenstein's later philosophy in fact provides an overview of *Philosophical Investigations*, a sense of the intellectual progress from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* to his later work, an insightful study of, indeed, the motto (suppressed in English translations: 'Anyway, the thing about progress is that it looks much greater than it really is' [Nestroy]), a close look at the problems of ostensive definition and referential theories of meaning early in the *Investigations*, an exacting survey of the rule-following considerations, and an accessible introduction to the private-language issues here seen in conjunction with the problem of private inner ostensive definition.

From the outset Stern shows subtle discernment concerning the voices at work within what he rightly identifies as the internal dialogue of *Philosophical Investigations*. And he rightly identifies one fundamental source of the wide divergence in interpretations of the book from its first wave of commentators up to the present: the taking of one of the interlocutor's voices, or — more commonly — the narrator's voice, as the privileged voice which puts forward Wittgenstein's positive theses. Stern also focuses on the voice of the commentator, who, by contrast with the interlocutors and the narrator, 'dismisses philosophical problems and compares his way of doing philosophy to therapy' (5). Interlocutor-based misinterpretations have turned Wittgenstein into a behaviorist; narrator-based misinterpretations have turned Wittgenstein into a skeptical-problem/skeptical-solution theorist. And Stern suggests that the exclusively commentator-based interpretations (while they have rightly emphasized the therapeutic dimensions of Wittgenstein's work) have failed to sufficiently attend to the narrator-commentator dialogue. Importantly, Stern sees the philosophical value — i.e., the insight made available by — the careful working through of positive theses (theses that implicitly assume the intelligibility of the question and its buried presuppositions to which the theses are an answer) in dialogical interaction with the therapeutic commentator.

Having set the stage this way, Stern is well positioned to introduce not only Wittgenstein's mature work, but also a number of the single-voice-emphasizing interpretations in close conjunction with it. Stern makes much of Robert Fogelin's distinction between 'Pyrrhonian' readings — those which

see Wittgenstein as thoroughly committed to the therapeutic project and thus bringing philosophy to an end, and 'non-Pyrrhonian' readings that see Wittgenstein replacing mistaken or misbegotten philosophical views with specific philosophical positions of his own (if in his distinct style). Stern's fundamental suggestion here — that each have found ample evidence for their views by prioritizing the one voice over the other — may seem at first glance too conciliatory. That is, it may seem to merely explain serious and substantive disagreement away by appeal to the partial-view explanation. But his analysis of the sources and what he perceives as the dogmatism of both sides deserve closer scrutiny.

Stern displays a rich awareness of the magnetic charm, or intellectual attractiveness, of the philosophical theories, and the conventionally embedded ways of thinking Wittgenstein worked through, and out of, in his philosophy. He sees that, rather than 'cutting through the knots created by philosophers' arguments', Wittgenstein committed one to 'painstakingly undoing them', indeed to 'find[ing] one's way out of philosophical error by carefully retracing the steps that led one in' (49). In *Zettel* §452, Wittgenstein wrote 'philosophizing has to be as complicated as the knots it unties'. And it is a virtue of this book that Stern also sees, and often works through, the charm or attractiveness of various interpretations of Wittgenstein's masterpiece as he shows how the false promise of explanatory simplification and the false steps encouraged by grammatical surface-similarities motivate the views Wittgenstein investigates and, ultimately, unties. Stern thus brings the interpreters of Wittgenstein's book into the dialogue as well, employing them as oppositional voices to be worked through and untangled in the interest of insight and conceptual clarification.

We are shown here how a good number of much-discussed passages invite both Pyrrhonian and non-Pyrrhonian readings, and Stern likens these passages (if rather predictably) to Wittgenstein's double-interpretation-generating duck-rabbit. And we are shown repeatedly, and helpfully, the essential role of context in word definition, in sentence understanding, and in rule following. What we perhaps need more of is a focused discussion of Wittgenstein's concern with, as he put it, changing one's way of seeing. That would provide a fuller sense of both the spirit of Wittgenstein's utterances and the distinctive nature of the conceptual liberation such a change affords — if genuinely earned through patient conceptual backtracking and disentangling (of a kind that is notoriously difficult to articulate in the idioms of contemporary analytical philosophy). But Stern's articulation of Wittgenstein's idiosyncratic process of unearthing the motivations (1) to posit inner and hidden processes, (2) to hypostasize mental entities, (3) to 'sublime' rules (in Wittgenstein's sense; Stern's discussion of Peter Winch's work on this score is particularly adept and a welcome review of Winch's distinctive contribution), and (4) to embrace a theoretical holism, performs a very valuable service. In the end, Stern comes down as what we might call (he doesn't) a quasi-Pyrrhonian: Wittgenstein's text, for him, is an interwoven dialogue of voices that, *taken together*, show the way out of a kind of

conceptual repetition-compulsion, an 'addiction to theorizing about mind and world, language and reality.' In short, for Stern, taking those differentiated voices together will lead us to see the full mosaic.

Although it may not fit the rubric of the series of introductions in which this volume is published, because Stern's book ends its detailed discussions only toward the close of the private language discussion, a second volume continuing this helpful elucidatory and interpretation-canvassing work (particularly into Wittgenstein's remarks on the picture of thinking as an incorporeal process, on understanding, on the will, on memory, and on aspect perception) would indeed be most welcome.

**Garry L. Hagberg**

University of East Anglia

**Michael Wheeler**

*Reconstructing the Cognitive World:  
The Next Step.*

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2005.

Pp. xiii + 340.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-262-23240-5.

This book articulates and defends a view of cognition that contributes to the loose network of approaches to understanding the mind that fall under the headings of situated, embedded, and dynamic cognition. Andy Clark's *Being There* (1997) is perhaps the best-known philosophical work in this tradition, and there indeed is much that Wheeler shares with Clark, including the authorship of several articles. What distinguishes Wheeler's own view is his explicit attention to the work of Heidegger, and his attempt to demonstrate the fit between developing work in the cognitive sciences that falls under the situated or embedded rubric and the philosophical perspective on cognition articulated by Heidegger, especially in *Being and Time* (1926).

The nine substantive chapters in the book divide the book roughly in three. In the first third (Chapters 2-4), Wheeler lays out a view that he calls *Cartesian psychology*, showing that it is a label appropriate in characterizing both Descartes' own views as well as those at work in traditional cognitive science, including classic AI and connectionist modeling. (For an earlier, related use of this term, see my *Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind*, 1995.) In the second third (Chapters 5-7), the focus is on Heidegger, especially on drawing the contrast between the Cartesian and Heideggerian frameworks for cognition and on

making the case for the goodness of fit between the latter framework and the new, situated direction to cognitive science. In the final third (Chapters 8-10), Wheeler engages in more explicitly constructive analytical work that takes up notions such as representation, modularity, causal spread, and cognitive technology.

While the writing is fresh and easy-going on the eyes and mind alike, some will find it a frustratingly long time for Wheeler to cut to the chase. I found the first two hundred pages or so (up until Chapter 8) largely scene-setting, with the real interest in the book lying in the development of the ideas in its last one hundred pages. That may be a partial function of having worked in the general area for some years; others with different backgrounds may find the articulation of eight theses characterizing 'Cartesian psychology' in Chapter 2 (repeated in several places), as well as the presentation of Heidegger's murkier framework, to be of use in understanding alternative ways to proceed in thinking about the mind. The general contours of this contrast, however, are already well-understood; for this reason, much of the first two-thirds of the book reads like an advanced introduction to the philosophical end of cognitive science.

On the Cartesian view, the mind is representational, perception is inferential but separate from cognition, and there is no deep sense in which the mind is either embodied or embedded in the environment. The Heideggerian view not only denies each of these claims, but paints its own positive view of cognition as a 'matter of smooth coping' (133) in which the dichotomy between subject and world, central to Cartesianism, is a barrier to understanding both the phenomenology and actuality of what Heidegger calls 'being-in-the-world'. Wheeler does supply some bells and whistles here, and it is worth conveying what these are.

By employing the contrast between two traditions of thought about thought, Wheeler (like Richard Rorty before him in epistemology and Hubert Dreyfus closer to home in cognitive science) provides a graspable framework on which much else can be hung. The most interesting, novel addition here is Wheeler's emphasis on the role that *temporal complexity* plays in the two frameworks. On the Cartesian view, time is abstracted away from in much the way that the body and the environment are: they are acknowledged to exist but primarily as distractions in the business of understanding cognition. By contrast, what Wheeler calls 'richly temporal phenomena' (135) are critical to the Heideggerian view of the mind. The temporal austerity (88) of the Cartesian framework receives its own chapter (Chapter 4), and so there is much more to be said about this feature, but the basic contrast is between conceiving of time as a sequence and cognitive processes thus as sequences of separable events, and viewing cognitive processes as dynamic feedback loops for which not just 'time' but *timing* is critical to the overall process.

This emphasis on richly temporal phenomena provides a hook into one of the tensions within the book, one that Wheeler is not only aware of but makes several attempts to address head-on (e.g., 165, 225). While the embrace of temporal richness is central to both Heideggerian *phenomenology* and to

dynamic systems *models of cognition*, there's an appreciable gap between the two. Wheeler does a good job of addressing Heidegger's putative technophobia and anti-science stance (and a less good job of drawing out the implications of Heidegger's anthropocentrism for the study of animal cognition, 157-60), but the bottom line is that while there are concepts in Heidegger that allow us to grapple towards some kind of embodied cognitive science, dynamical systems theory in the vein of Randall Beer or Tim van Gelder remains an island apart. Part of Wheeler's aim is to build a bridge between the two, but since I finished the book scratching the 'Why Heidegger?' itch, I guess I am a resistant reader.

So I count that as two related strikes: too much attention to scene-setting at the expense of more directly constructive engagement with the ideas and methods that show the way forward, and a failure to remove the suspicion that we don't really need to understand *Dasein* to do situated cognition. Even with the recent reinvigoration of interest in phenomenology via the continuing bout of consciousness-philia that philosophers of mind and cognition remain dizzy with, I don't envisage many more people slogging through *Being and Time* any time soon. For those of us sympathetic to the general perspective on cognition as an embodied and embedded phenomenon that needs to be studied as such, we might adapt the wry, ethnophobic response to multiculturalism that I grew up within in Australia: can't they just send the recipes?

**Robert A. Wilson**  
University of Alberta