Editors • Directeurs

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
4-108 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5

E-Mail: roger.a.shiner@ualberta.ca

Alain Voizard
Département de philosophie
Université du Québec à Montréal
C.P. 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville
Montréal, QC
Canada H3C 3P8

E-Mail: voizard.alain@uqam.ca

As a rule, P.I.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, C.R.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

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Michael Bauer and **John Russon, eds.**
Hegel and the Tradition: Essays in
Honour of H.S. Harris.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1997.
Pp. xv + 349.
$60.00. ISBN 0-8020-0927-1.

Though the essays in this work are meant to honor the Hegel scholar H.S. Harris, he is directly discussed in the work only infrequently. Rather the essays were written in the spirit and tradition of Harris' teaching. In the preface to the work John Burbidge talks about the unusual fusion of Hume and Hegel in Harris' thinking: '[L]ike Hume, Harris is not interested in ontology and metaphysics' (xiii). Burbidge goes on to say, that in this thinking: 'Reason and sentiment are to be integrated in a comprehensive social order. The metaphysical quest for ultimates must surrender to the dialogues and disagreements of community' (xiv). And in the introduction, John Russon claims: 'We ... understand ourselves only when we see ourselves as acting as representatives of a tradition and of having the responsibility to fulfil its expectations ... [W]e have tried throughout this volume to make the notion of tradition an explicit theme and to study Hegel in relation to the various traditions in which he could be said to belong' (13).

The work is divided into four sections. Chapters one and two are devoted to the philosophy of right; three through five to art; six through ten to religion; and eleven through thirteen to philosophy. In chapter one, Patricia Fagan argues that 'for Hegel the dialectical self-transportation of self-consciousness from skepticism to the unhappy consciousness is actualized in the transformation in spirit from ethical substance to legal status to culture' (37), and she uses the Roman empire as an example of this transformation. In chapter two, Jay Lampert discusses the notion of property from Locke, through Fichte and to Hegel.

In chapter three, John McCumber talks about the importance of language. 'I am, in Hegel's view, what I can say' (80), McCumber says. He goes on: 'Philosophy brings the language of the Concept — the ordered system of words — into identity with the language of representation — of the historical world in which we live. In doing so, it manifests a sort of incarnation by which the divine ... becomes human ...' (87). Michael Bauer, in chapter four, discusses Hegel's concern with the possibility of a modern imitation of the Greek ideal. Hegel is pessimistic about such a possibility when he labors under the influence of a Kantian moral-religious paradigm, but once he starts thinking in terms of an aesthetic paradigm he becomes more sanguine about the possibility of such imitation. In the end Hegel comes to realize that in its abstractness and detachment, modern consciousness has an advantage over the ancients, 'for it is only through such separation or alienation that we can grasp consciousness in its universality and absoluteness' (108). Martin Donougho speaks of the 'Dialectics of Narrative' in chapter five.

Jeff Mitscherling begins the section on religion by discussing the Gnostic influence in Hegel's thought, which is to be found in the latter's acceptance of the identity of the human and the divine. Mitscherling discusses Hegel's belief that religious thinking is insufficient to express this identity, and that only philosophy can adequately articulate it. In 'The Final Name of God', David Kolb argues that, given his teleological thinking, 'Hegel demands that there be a final religion and a developmental story that demonstrates that finality.' According to Kolb, however, 'such a story cannot be written' (163). In chapter eight, John Burbidge tries to reconcile the idea of an Hegelian system open to contingency with the idea of an actual incarnation, the real existence of the God-man as the final form of a teleological progression. He argues that the two can be reconciled, if we take the incarnation in form and accept that there might be 'a plurality of historical individuals, diverse in character, each one of which unambiguously unites transcendent universality with mundane particularity' (186). Nicholas Walker poses the question, 'How Theological are Hegel's Early Theological Writings?' In a strict sense, these writings are atheistic, and Hegel 'never had any doubt that faith is properly assessed and autonomously legitimated by philosophy alone as the ultimate court of appeal.' Walker goes on to say that 'Hegel rejects the traditional emphasis on the personal God ... because he wants us to reconceive the divine life as spirit ... as an interpersonal, intersubjectively experienced reality that cannot be located exclusively in one authoritative or privileged individual' (204). In chapter ten, George di Giovanni discusses the relationship of faith to reason, claiming that in the end 'For Hegel, faith is ... itself a reflective activity from the beginning ... It is none other than reason itself, in other words. And if we contrast it with knowledge, we do so only because, at some stage in the development of humanity's awareness of itself ... it still does not know itself explicitly as reason' (235).

Susan-Judith Hoffman opens the fourth section on philosophy by discussing Hegel's view that previous philosophical systems are not overturned by later systems, but are developmental stages of the one true philosophy: 'Reason does not annul or reject the deficient forms of philosophy, rather it grows away from them. In its struggle for freedom, Reason strives towards the Absolute by "outgrowing" the particular form of philosophy in which it finds itself embodied' (253). In chapter twelve, James Crooks considers Hegelian dialectic. He claims that speculative dialectic 'follows and makes manifest the ... activity of *Aufhebung*, by virtue of which what the tradition calls alternately the *logos*, being, reason, *Geist*, or transcendental subjectivity itself is constituted.' Because of this 'Hegel's is the philosophical discourse of modernity' (279). He argues that post-modernism in no way overcomes the Hegelian problematic or Hegelian discourse. In the last chapter, John Russon says that 'Hegel should be understood as responding to traditional problems in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epistemology' (287). He says that 'in Hegel this epistemology transforms itself in a way that simultaneously perfects and destroys the Cartesianism from which it arises.' Cartesianism entails dualism. 'The full development of this argument, however, leads to a

conception of reason as self-determining, which will in turn lead us to reject the mind-body dualism of Descartes and to replace it with a dialectical phenomenology of reason as self-embodying' (286).

The work concludes with an afterword by Harris himself. The essays are uneven, but for the most part they are readable and interesting.

Mark T. Conard
West Chester University

Ray Billington
Understanding Eastern Philosophy.
New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. x + 197.
Cdn$91.00: US$65.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-12964-8);
Cdn$26.99: US$18.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-12965-6).

This book advertises itself as standing midway between popular books on Eastern thoughts and serious scholarly work. However, it leans more toward the former, since each topic covered actually requires its own book in order for it to be explicated adequately. Thus the book appeals more to lay readers or to students in Eastern civilization courses, than to students wishing to delve deeper into the subject. Given its vast scope, Billington did a good job in providing a comprehensive view of the thoughts of India and China.

Understanding Eastern Philosophy is not only intended to provide a background knowledge of Eastern thought; it also contains Billington's own reflections on how the philosophies of East and West could be compared and contrasted. The first chapter discusses whether the thoughts of the East are to be classified as religions or philosophies. In the second chapter all the familiar views concerning God are delineated, including pantheism, animism, deism, theism, and others. The purpose is to find out whether the spiritual dimensions of the Eastern ways of thinking could find a place within these family of views. Then, from Chapter 3 to 14, Billington covers Hinduism, Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism, the Yin Yang School, and Confucianism. It is a credit to Billington that he manages also to include relatively minor schools such as Jainism, Mohism and Neo-confucianism into the already crammed book.

The last four chapters of the book are the most interesting ones. They cover, respectively, comparative investigations on ethics, the nature of human beings and human communities, authority and faith, and 'coexistence' (religions existing alongside one another) or 'coinherence' (religions merging

into one) of religions. The last chapter is perhaps the most original. Billington here proposes a program for a world religion containing elements from all the world's major religious traditions. His analogy for this coinherence is the ocean, into which various rivers flow (186-7).

This could provide for a starting point for an extended discussion of the place of religion in modern society. It is also interesting to see whether it will eventually work. Either this world religion is an entirely new one, complete with its own set of presuppositions and belief systems, or it remains only juxtapositions with no identity of its own. If it is the former, then the problem would not be really solved. For this new religion would just become another religion which stands on the same plane as the existing ones. Sikhism is now recognized as a separate religion. It arose consciously, through the extraordinary effort of its founder, Guru Nanak, as a result of an attempt to forge two major religions together, Islam and Hinduism. But neither Moslems nor Hindus recognize Sikhism as part of their religious heritage, so Billington's world religion would then have to include tenets from all three, and the process has to start again. However, if the new religion is just a mosaic consisting of various elements from the major religions together, then it is quite difficult to see if this kind of religious belief could take hold of the hearts and minds of its would-be followers. It is true that in such a patchwork, each follower of a particular religious tradition can see elements from their own. But they see alien elements too. Such a religion would find it difficult to present itself as a unity, which seems to be necessary for a religion to be able to capture the faith and loyalty of its potential followers.

Wouldn't it be more expeditious to solve the problem by means of coexistence, rather than coinherence? The problem arises when there are conflicts among religions which have the potential to turn violent. But then that is precisely the issue. A world religion such as Billington's could prevent violent religious conflicts only if everyone involved believes in it, only if everyone becomes its followers. But if it is the case that one's religious heritage is an essential part of one's cultural heritage, part of one's identity as a cultural group, then to ask one to become a member of the world religion would be tantamount to asking them to become cosmopolitan, not belonging exclusively to a local culture anymore. For most people that seems to be too much to ask.

Thus, it appears that something like Rawls' political liberalism is the way to go. Instead of finding one philosophical or metaphysical background for each disparate group to abide by, political solutions should be found instead which are acceptable by all parties. If they realize that their own interests are best served when joining talks rather than through violence and if it is possible that their cultural heritage would not be compromised, then there is at least a ground for optimism.

Soraj Hongladarom
Chulalongkorn University

George Grant (1918-88) was a Canadian philosopher who regarded philosophy as relevant to culture, refused to abandon belief in God, or Christianity, and who valued religiosity as a vital, human phenomenon. Not surprisingly, he has his stalwart fans and his skeptical detractors.

The George Grant Reader (hereafter *The Reader*) gathers together excerpts from his major texts and essays. Most articles and reviews are printed in their entirety. The chapters and many entries have introductory commentary, and are supplemented by quotes from lecture notes, letters and memoirs. Six chapter headings (and a 13-page index) organize the collection: 'Politics and Morality', 'Philosophy and Education', 'Thinking Their Thoughts, George Grant on...', 'Reviews and Essays', 'Technology and Modernity', 'The Beautiful and The Good'. The first chapter concerns the corrosive influences of American culture on all aspects of Canadian society. Representative excerpts from his familiar books, (e.g., *Lament for a Nation*, 1965, and *English-Speaking Justice*, 1974), have been pieced together. This necessity does not do justice to the original works. We read that 'the impossibility of conservatism in our era is the impossibility of Canada' (79), a line introducing an excerpt that is the opening paragraph of chapter six in *Lament For a Nation*. Missing from the original chapter six, is Grant's clear but despairing analysis of French-Canadian support for federalism and cultural diversity. Such disappointments are inevitable when selections are made.

Grant's writings range from political criticism to forthright arguments with Freud. Grant thought of his work as work-in-progress. 'One thing about life: how is one supposed to know that one's position at the moment is final, when one already knows so much from life and has learnt it along the way? Presumably one is going to learn more' (6). The selections in the chapter 'Philosophy and Education' reveal Grant's gritty determination to stay true to himself, and yet current. The chapter begins with his youthful enthusiasm for the close relation between philosophy and culture. 'The study of philosophy is the analysis of the traditions of our society' (157). '... It does seem to me that somebody who was a Canadian and yet knew Europe would be better in the university [Dalhousie] teaching philosophy than somebody from the United Kingdom' (174). The selections also confirm Grant's Platonism, a position from which he never wavered. For Grant, education was the pursuit of the Good. The reader, in perusing the selections, is witness to Grant's gradual and resentful but honest recognition that his vision of the Good was not that of others, in particular, those who had power over technology. His scathing letter of resignation from York University (1960), decrying the popular text being used [*The Spirit of Philosophy*, by Marcus Long] as being

'about philosophy', 'not philosophy' (188), captures Grant's struggle with the nature and purpose of a university. For Grant, the emancipation of the university from a holistic embrace of Christian values as the telos of education was crippling. (His [segmented] essay, 'The University Curriculum' (191-200), should be required reading for university administrators and technocrats.) Though the selections in chapter 2 end with his equally dark letter of resignation (20 years later) from McMaster, his time in between was spent grappling with the demons of modernity he had identified.

Grant's demons — technology, misguided liberalism, and the pagan celebration of self, all of which put him in the forefront of recent philosophical trends (see works by Will Kymlica, Charles Taylor, and James M. Jones) — became his philosophical obsessions. He argued that the worship of technology blinded us to its tendency to obliterate the fine distinctions on which concepts of nationhood, essential dualisms of rights *and* duties, individual *and* community rested. His case was not just a disguised polemical rant. In chapter 3, on other writers, and chapter 5, on technology, Grant develops his position. It is worked out through his analyses of 18th- to 20th-century philosophers, such as J.S. Mill, Kant, Marx, Simone Weil, Strauss, Kojève, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Russell. The seeds of the sellout of our collective moral conscience to technology were nurtured by the cult of individual free choice, a cult (originating with Rousseau and marketed by Dewey) that lacked a guidebook about the consequences of choice-making.

Though Grant's avowed Christianity may be irritating to the 'modern' philosopher, it does not inspire him to be kind and forgiving in his critiques of other philosophers. His assault on Russell is evidence. If Russell was skeptical about the possibility of discovering ethical principles, Grant asks, why did he write so much about fundamental questions of conduct? Furthermore, Grant chides, given Russell's skepticism, why should one 'take with any seriousness, his statements about how we ought to live? His principles must apply to himself' (323).

Grant's vision (influenced by, but not imitative of, Jacques Ellul, 394-8) that technology was not a tool but a new mode of being transfiguring our concept of the self, is still prominent in the academy at large ('Technology and Modernity', 417-34). References to his work continue to surface, either briefly but poignantly (John Ralston Saul, *The Unconscious Civilization* [Anansi, 1995], 109), or extensively and derivatively (Ian Angus, *A Border Within* [McGill-Queen's, 1997], chapters 2, 4). Critical analyses (Joan E. O'Donovan, *George Grant and the Twilight of Justice* [University of Toronto, 1984]) continue to be published.

For philosophers who may dismiss Grant because he was not rigorous, or systematic, or because he wrote with passion and with a vision — traits now considered old-fashioned and sloppy — or because he gleefully skewered Canadian household names (Harold Innis, 354-7, Northrope Frye, 257-61), *The Reader* will make it easier for them to continue their philosophical vivesection. After all, what is one to think about a philosopher who says, 'And

the fact / value distinction is the most sacred doctrine of our public religion' (193)?

For others, Grant's writings raise the sceptre of Plato. How should philosophers justify their existence in a technological world? The publication of *The George Grant Reader* with its aura of public duty should remind the philosophical academy that, we too, are public servants.

Elizabeth Trott
Ryerson Polytechnic University

Norman Daniels' *Justice and Justification* (henceforth *JJ*) consists of sixteen articles written between the late-1970s and the mid-1990s. The book is divided into two roughly equal parts, both of which are concerned with the relevance for ethics of the method of philosophical justification John Rawls calls 'wide reflective equilibrium' (henceforth WRE), a method introduced by Rawls in *A Theory of Justice* and elaborated by him in subsequent works. The first part of *JJ* is devoted to considering the ways WRE functions in ethical theory as a method of epistemic justification and a criterion of theory choice. The second part is devoted to examining how WRE can be applied as a practical strategy for resolving problems arising in various social and institutional settings, with an emphasis on issues related to health-care contexts.

Daniels' central claim in *JJ* is that WRE 'not only offers a promising account of the justification of ethical theories but also gives us guidance about philosophical method in practical ethics' (1). A method of theory choice and an aid in the resolution of practical problems, WRE involves the testing by individuals of their moral beliefs through an investigation of those beliefs' coherence with their wider system of beliefs. If a particular belief (or belief set) X is not consistent with the overall system, then it becomes necessary either to revise X, to make other changes in the system, or possibly to do both. WRE is distinguished from merely 'narrow' reflective equilibrium in that the latter merely involves the attempt to reach consistency between moral principles and judgments concerning particular cases, thus offering little

chance of correcting moral judgments which merely reflect irrational bias, ideology or personal idiosyncracy. In contrast, WRE attempts to achieve coherence 'among an ordered triple of sets of beliefs ..., namely, (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories' (22). By casting its coherence-seeking net more widely, so as to cover these different levels of beliefs, WRE allegedly has a greater chance of providing epistemic support for the moral judgments in which it culminates. At least, in the absence of a viable foundationalist approach, Daniels claims WRE to be the best justificatory method available for our moral judgments. But while this thesis has the ring of plausibility, Daniels' presentation of it fails to address the familiar epistemological problem of how coherence (or approximation to coherence) in a theory can appropriately be taken as a sign of the theory's truth. Indeed, as long as the problem of why coherence is to count as an indicator of truth remains unanswered, it would seem that although practically speaking — since we cannot live as philosophical skeptics — WRE may be the best justificatory strategy around, a skeptical denial of its (or any such strategy's) justification-conferring powers remains a theoretical threat.

Along with Daniels' insistence on the universal applicability of WRE as a justificatory method goes his rejection of rigid or unidirectional conceptions of the relationship between theoretical and applied ethics. He opposes, for instance, those models of the relationship according to which ethical theories mechanically produce answers to practical problems by merely having factual data fed to them as inputs. He likewise opposes the facile dismissal of ethical theories as 'spinning wheels' with little bearing on the resolution of practical problems. Representative of his approach is *JJ*'s memorable concluding chapter, in which Daniels attempts to make peace among the main 'warring factions' in the philosophical battles over bioethics. The combatants include (a) the 'principlists' (e.g., Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress), who founded a 'Middle Kingdom' oriented around such well-known principles as autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice; (b) their challengers from the high ground of theory, the 'Uplanders' (e.g., K. Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert), who insist that competing principles in bioethics require adjudication via background theory; and (c) an assorted bunch of 'Lowlanders' (e.g., casuists such as John Arras as well as contextualists), who have launched multi-pronged attacks on principlists and theorists alike. Daniels takes an inclusive stance, arguing that the methodological tools of each group are of value and that it often proves necessary to combine the approaches of Highlanders, Lowlanders and defenders of the Middle Kingdom in resolving ethical problems. As one might expect, he recommends the pursuit of WRE as a way of achieving this reconciliation.

Among the merits of *JJ* are its wide range of topics and their unification under a single theme. On the theoretical end, the book contains critical discussions of the moral epistemologies of John Rawls, Richard Brandt and Michael Walzer, the relevance for WRE of metaphysical beliefs (especially those surrounding the nature of persons, in connection with which Derek

Parfit's theory of personal identity comes into play), and the political dimensions of WRE and justice. In applied ethics, it treats controversies between Rawls and Amartya Sen surrounding the nature of primary social goods and social equality, as well as ethical problems related to affirmative action and ideals of meritocracy, the allocation and rationing of medical resources on the basis of recipients' age, and the provision of health insurance coverage for various kinds of psychiatric care.

Throughout *JJ*, Daniels displays an enviable clarity of expression and mastery of his material. The book would have been even more readable, however, if the collected papers had been edited so as to avoid duplication of some of their content. Greater economy would have been achieved, for example, if Daniels' lengthy definition and explanation of WRE, which appear in the introductory sections of a number of the individual articles in virtually identical form, had simply been stated in the book's introduction and referred to by notes in subsequent chapters. On the whole, however, *JJ* is a valuable contribution to the philosophical literature bridging theoretical and applied ethics. Moreover, it succeeds in its general aim of showing how WRE can serve as a fruitful method for resolving ethical problems in both theory and practice.

Daniel Silber
Florida Southern College

Hent De Vries and **Samuel Weber, eds.**
Violence, Identity, and Self-Determination.
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997.
Pp. xxi + 401.
US$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-2995-6);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-2996-4).

In a post-cold war era marred by violence carried out in the name of ethnic or national self-determination, the complex relationship between violence, identity and self-determination is a pressing philosophical concern. Is violence an intrinsic aspect of self-determination? Or can self-determination be exercised without recourse to violence? This is the motivating focus of this anthology, a collection of seventeen articles by scholars working within what we may call the Continental traditional in philosophy. Primarily the contributors here set themselves the task of reexamining and exploring the concept of violence and its moral and political implications for collective self-determination and identity. In general, the unifying thesis is that vio-

lence properly conceived is an inherent aspect of self-determination, indeed an intrinsic aspect of human life, 'a means through which the self, whether individual or collective, is constituted and maintained,' as the editors put it in their 'Introduction' (2).

De Vries's own contribution draws on the works of Derrida and Levinas among others to lend support to this idea, that 'violence is everywhere,' and that therefore 'all ethico-political decisions can be said to take place under the condition of some submission to — or at best some negotiation with — this general economy of "violence"' (27). But this, de Vries assures us, does not warrant an 'acquiescence in doing nothing at all' (42). Drawing on Derrida's discussion of God's command to Abraham on Mount Moriah, he argues that '[p]olitics, as the struggle for lesser evil, for mitigation, reduction, or even abolition of violence, the violence of the self as much as that of the other, should be considered an obligation no less than a necessity' even though politics itself is necessarily violent (42-3).

The succeeding piece, 'Monastic Violence' by M.B. Pranger, claims that even discourses, or conceptions of the good life, which renounce violence must themselves be intrinsically violent. Through an examination of literary accounts of monastic life in twelfth-century Europe, Pranger concludes that 'monastic, angelic language, which is supposedly innocent and peaceful, manifests itself in the shape of a heightened sense of violence and passion' (54-5). The 'full passionate intensity,' this 'violent love' for God, is monastic violence but violence nonetheless. In another article, co-editor Weber builds on Freud's thoughts on war and death to support the thesis that self-determination is inherently aggressive and potentially destructive. Continuing the theme of the pervasiveness of violence, Werner Hamcher's 'One 2 Many Multiculturalism' holds that violence is integral to any politics of recognition and multiculturalism. According to Hamcher, the very notion of culture 'prohibits easy identification' (284) because culture 'cannot be localized or appropriated, cannot be reserved for anyone' (286). But 'it has always been used ... as a polemical term for the distinction between culture and nonculture, culture and nature, culture and barbarism or uncultivatedness, and thus as a weapon in the struggle against other cultures' (286).

Other notable contributions include Michael Dillon's study of how boundaries between the self and the Other can be blurred as illustrated in *Oedipus Rex* and hence why freedom is more freedom *from* the self than *of* the self; Susan M. Shell's defense of Kant's vision of humanity's progress towards perpetual peace even though that end itself necessarily remains unattainable; 'The Victim's Tale: Memory and Forgetting in the Story of Violence' by Peter van der Veer which explores how political regimes attempt to establish 'truth' by manipulating accounts of violence in the media and official archives; and Derrida's closing piece which tells us that the more violent aspects of self-determination and particularly religious claims are reactions to the delocalisation and deracination of 'teletechnoscience' or the global mass media (p. 331).

The scholarship of the contributors is vast and rich, drawing from a wide array of historical, ethnographical, literary, psychoanalytical, religious and philosophical sources and arguments; and the presentations are passionate and engaging. And as the editors have noted, a close philosophical study of violence and self-determination is a most timely one indeed, whose implications are 'anything but academic' (1). The editors are thus to be credited for bringing together this collection of thoughtful and very provocative papers on the subject.

Unfortunately, some of the arguments advanced here are rather elusive at crucial points. Consider the central theme of the work that violence is all pervasive and hence self-determination cannot be but violent. It is unclear, for example, how the monastic violence Pranger speaks of is not in the final analysis a violence only in a metaphorical sense, a kind of violence surely quite different from the very plain physical and psychological violence accompanying self-determination movements we are witnessing today, and the sort which warrants the book's stated concern.

This captures what I think is the main flaw of this work. It is not clear to me if defining 'violence' as expansively as some of the authors attempt to do to justify the thesis that self-determination is inherently violent does not trivialise the debate, does not render it merely 'academic'. What really matters to the innocent victims facing the brunt of the brutalities carried out in the name of self-determination is not just how scholars, past and present, have conceived violence or how violence ought to be defined, but whether the hardships and miseries they are suffering in a very vivid way are avoidable. The question of violence and self-determination would be better served if more of the contributors had paid closer attention to the idea of self-determination, specifically, whether there is scope in principle and practice for a nonviolent self-determination, and what the necessary social and political conditions are for just such a brand of self-determination.

Here the reader may wish to contrast or perhaps augment the views of these authors with those of philosophers like Isaiah Berlin, Will Kymlicka, Joseph Raz and Yael Tamir who have contemplated the possibility of a liberal and nonviolent nationalism. But this slight dissatisfaction on my part aside, the reviewed volume should serve to encourage and provoke further debate and exploration on the urgent question of violence, self-determination and identity.

Kok-Chor Tan
University of Toronto

Jérôme Dokic, ed.
Cognitive Dynamics.
New York: Cambridge University Press
(for CSLI Publications) 1997. Pp. 1 + 184.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-57586-073-2);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 1-57586-072-4).

Cognitive Dynamics is the second volume of the *European Review of Philosophy* series. It contains six interesting papers on the title topic, a helpful introduction by the editor, and somewhat curiously, a critical notice of a recent book by one of the authors (Recanati's *Direct Reference*). I'll say nothing about the critical notice, but it's worth looking at if you are interested in Recanati's book.

The term 'Cognitive Dynamics' (CD) comes from Kaplan, but the idea goes back to Frege. Consider the following kind of situation. Today I think 'Today is fine'. The problem of CD is to explain what is involved in the retention of that thought when I am no longer indexed to today. Frege noted that if I am to express the thought tomorrow, I must replace 'today' with 'yesterday' — the *Sinn* changes but the *Bedeutung* stays the same. This sounds simple, but the associated philosophical issues run deep.

In considering the above example, it is clear that the sentence changes, i.e., from 'Today is fine' to 'Yesterday was fine'. Does the thought content change? In Kaplan's terms, the Fregean response is that the *character* changes but not the *content*. Kaplan rejects this strategy based upon the Rip van Winkle case. Just before Rip falls asleep, he thinks 'Today is fine'. Upon waking (years later) he thinks 'Yesterday was fine'. The suggestion is that in this case the content changes as well. Gareth Evans argued that this does not undermine the Fregean strategy because Rip does not retain the original thought. John Perry's contribution, 'Rip van Winkle and Other Characters', aims to support Kaplan against Evans. However, in so doing, he utilizes some related ideas from Evans, and employs a modified version of Frege's strategy.

François Recanati's purpose in 'The Dynamics of Situation' is '... less to further the study of cognitive dynamics than to broaden its scope' (42). He does this by arguing that there are problems beyond the standard one of explaining retention of content through context change. Recanati characterizes Perry's framework thus: retention of content may involve either vertical or horizontal interpreting of the original sentence expressing the thought: when vertical, the degree of context-sensitivity is affected; when horizontal, context-sensitivity is unaffected (as in the above example). Recanati argues, contrary to the standard view, that vertical interpreting does involve context change. This is seen within the framework of 'Austinian Semantics' (47), where a sentential representation is sensitive to a specific 'situation' of use.

The best lead into the topic of CD is given by Michael Luntley in his 'Dynamic Thoughts and Empty Minds'. Luntley places typical studies of dynamic thoughts in Analytic Philosophy. The orthodox approach has us

explain thoughts in terms of language. The problem of CD seems to show that we must reject this. Drawing on neo-Fregeans (Gareth Evans, in particular), Luntley concludes that minds are empty of (linguistic, or language of thought) representations. Rather, thinking involves information, egocentrically drawn from the world. Minds are simply '... rationally organized patterns of behavior' (101).

Maite Ezcurdia, in 'Dynamic and Coherent Thoughts', considers Fregean theories of language, and their ability to account for 'tracking indexicals' (105) — indexicals which track referents through context change. Her two targets are Evans and Higginbotham. Both fail, she argues, because they rely on an unmodified (from Frege) understanding of the 'Dynamic Thought Claim' (DTC) (105). Ezcurdia draws a distinction between the psychological notion of *thinkings*, and the semantic notion of a (Fregean) *thought*. The conclusion is that DTC holds for thinkings, but not for thoughts, which shows that we do not need to give up Fregean theories because of tracking indexicals.

Related to the 'Today is fine' kind of example is one in which the subject, rather than thinking the same thought at a different time (or place, etc.), *changes her mind*, e.g., tomorrow thinks 'Yesterday was not fine'. The connection comes by thinking that giving an account of *change of mind* requires recourse to the notion of retention of thought. That is, a change in mind is a change in attitude towards that same thought content, previously grasped. Christoph Hoerl's paper, 'Cognitive Dynamics: An Attempt at Changing Your Mind', characterizes the conditions for a change of mind, and establishes this connection between change of mind and CD. The upshot of his paper is that dynamic thoughts are required for rational thinking. We must have some awareness of content retention if we are to use past thoughts in present or future thinking.

In 'Belief, Content, and Cause', Tobies Grimaltos and Carlos J. Moya investigate the connection between change of belief and explanation of behaviour. They argue that Perry and Lycan have not shown that the semantic properties of a belief must be distinguished from its causal powers. In so doing, they give a reasonably convincing, alternative explanation of change of belief (e.g., in Perry's spilling sugar in the supermarket case). This supports an externalist position, where externally individuated propositional contents are '... causally efficacious and explanatorily relevant ...' (160).

If you are interested in this topic, all six papers are worth reading.

Michael Fleming
University of British Columbia

The jacket blurb describes the *Oxford Readers* series as being 'for students, teachers, and the general reader, offering authoritative collections of primary and secondary sources on core issues and concepts'. Although this is a tall order, it is possible to achieve it, as some of the Readers in the series demonstrate. Peter Singer, the editor of the *Ethics* Reader (1994), for instance, manages quite well to meet the mandate of the series despite the breadth of his topic, providing ninety separate selections, including fare for novices (Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, e.g.). Feagin and Maynard face challenges similar to Singer's, but make a much weaker effort to overcome them. Unlike the ethics anthology and contrary to the explicit aim of the series, this book will not do much for a reader who knows little about aesthetics, and is generally confused about its intended audience. Several of the pieces are very interesting, however, and not readily available elsewhere. The book is quite useful for professional dabblers, but would be unhelpful to undergraduate students.

Aesthetics over-generalizes the western tradition in aesthetics, and is occasionally antagonistic to that tradition. 'An important initiative of this collection,' the editors state in the general Introduction, 'is to draw attention to the neglected field of multiple aesthetics' (5). Putting aside the awkward coinage, this statement of purpose has the effect of rationalizing the omission of 'primary ... sources on core issues': there is no Plato in the collection at all, for instance, no Shaftesbury, no Schopenhauer; nor is there any Freud, Heidegger, or Langer, not a single selection out of the Frankfurt school. Neither do the editors, however, consistently avoid the tradition, a decision which would at least have specified a graduate and professional audience. Aristotle shares with only Meyer Schapiro, Clive Bell, and Su Shih the honor of having two selections appear in the book; Hume, Edmund Burke, Kant, Hegel, Tolstoy, Dewey, and Nietzsche are all included. It is worth noting that the selection from Nietzsche is a very odd choice indeed: titled by the editors 'The Dionysian', it is taken not from *The Birth of Tragedy* proper, but from Nietzsche's 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism', added much later — and it focuses almost entirely on his criticisms of Christianity. This inconsistent, opaque vision causes some problems, especially when authors refer in selected passages to works or concepts which are not represented. A selection by Martha Nussbaum in Part 5, for instance (300-5), is a purely academic discussion of Plato and Aristotle. If the editors envision a scholarly readership, why have they bothered to include the sixth chapter of Aristotle's *Poetics*, very possibly the first thing on an undergraduate syllabus? If, on the contrary, the editors aim to help a beginning student get through the Nussbaum, why have they *not* included, say, Books II, III and X of Plato's

Republic, knowledge of which is assumed in several of the selections (see, e.g., the Kristeller [91-102])? A mysterious plan here indeed.

In the same vein, the editors have not expended much effort to help readers with the passages they have selected. They have reproduced figures and footnotes inconsistently, too often leaving readers to fend for themselves. Where Kendall Walton, for example, discusses a simple sketch by Van Gogh (295-6) which he describes in prose adequately for the purposes of his argument, the sketch is reproduced (296). Where, on the other hand, Linda Nochlin's arguments (71-8) depend upon specific elements of David's *Horatii, In Memoriam*, by Sir Joseph Noel Paton, and Gérôme's *The Artist's Model*, everything is left to our imagination. Yet, curiously, Goya's *And They Are Like Wild Beasts* is reproduced for the Nochlin selection (74; and misnumbered, as it happens). Two figures for two different selections, both labeled, 'FIGURE I', appear on adjacent pages, apparently just to momentarily confuse readers (130-1). An arcane footnote upon a claim made by Aristotle in the *Politics* is reproduced for us to no good effect (387), as is one differentiating editions of the Burke (388). It is an elite reader indeed who wants this information, but would shun a footnote for Geertz' unidentified reference to Wittgenstein (109). It hardly seems plausible, in a work of this kind, that the aim here has been to respect the original authors' intentions, nor do these decisions focus any attention on 'multiple aesthetics'; it is simply hard to imagine the editors' rationale.

Some of the confusion is attributable to uncaught careless mistakes. Notably, and inexcusably, the editors have misrepresented, both in the text and in the Acknowledgments, the passage on music education from Book VIII of Aristotle's *Politics* as the *Poetics* (300, 403). Some of the selected authors (Ziff, Hospers, Wang) are overlooked in the 'Biographical Notes' (395-402). Some of the editors' claims are false, such as that '[Nietzsche's] Dionysian is ... driven by one's individuality' (13), where this properly describes Nietzsche's *Apollonian (The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Walter Kaufmann [New York: Random House 1967], 36 ff.), etc. It is worth mentioning in passing that sensitive readers should skip the editors' Introductions.

The only really important issue in evaluating an anthology, though, is the selection of passages, and there are some choices here that make this collection worth having: the Ziff, Higgins, Davies, Cohen, Levinson, and especially the Poe are very entertaining and interesting, for instance. An academic, then, or someone prepared to make her own cuts and corrections, might well, despite its problems, want to have this book in her office. Undergraduates and general readers, or anyone looking to the editors for assistance, can do better elsewhere.

Janet McCracken
Lake Forest College

Sir John Fortescue
On the Laws and Governance of England.
Shelly Lockwood, ed.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. viii + 156.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-43445-9);
US$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-58996-7).

On the Laws and Governance of England is a collection of two works by England's foremost 15th-century political theorist, Sir John Fortescue (1394 - 1476). Edited by Shelly Lockwood, this volume forms part of the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought series.

The first work in this volume is Fortescue's *In Praise of the Laws of England*. Written in Latin as a didactic dialogue of the master-student variety between Prince Edward (son of Henry VI and Queen Margaret) and the Chancellor, Fortescue argues forcibly for the triumph of justice over tyranny, and for public over private interest. Fortescue states that the office of the King is to rule rightly and justly by means of the law which is the sacred bond between the King and the public, and which at all times, and by all people, must be respected and honoured. This view forms the cornerstone of Fortescue's central concept of *dominium politicum et regale* (the political and royal dominion). The central thesis or theme in the second work of this volume, *The Governance of England*, continues along this theme. Fortescue argues of the danger to the King — and hence the law, and finally the country as a whole — of royal poverty and debt and its potential to lead the king to tyranny. This is hardly a surprising subject for Fortescue, as the poverty of the King was a constituent part of the Royal crisis that lead to Henry VI's deposition in 1461. The King, Fortescue argues, must, more so than any other man, strive to achieve purity and wisdom, for he is the representation of justice, and if he falters, so too does the law of the land.

Lockwood's translation of *In Praise* is primarily an amended version of the 1942 Chrimes translation. Lockwood does the reader a significant favour by removing the archaic '-th' endings retained in the Chrimes version. Thus, 'perfect love casteth out fear' becomes 'perfect love casts out fear'. Similarly, many of the original Latin words and phrases preserved in the Chrimes translation have been translated into English in this edition. While this may alarm some purists who maintain that many subtleties are invariably lost in translation, Lockwood includes in a preliminary 'Note on the Translations' a brief description and explanation of which words and terms have been translated. Perhaps a better approach would have been to include such information in the rather copious footnotes that accompany the main text.

The Governance of England is a modernized version of the 1885 text edited and translated by Plummer. This modernization on Lockwood's part is a welcome relief to the reader. For example, a sentence such as 'Ffor all such thynges come of impotencie, as doyth power to be syke of wex olde' becomes 'For all such things come of impotency, as does power to be sick or to grow

old.' However, Lockwood again translates all Latin phrases retained in the Plummer translation into English without adequately noting the original.

Travis Hreno
University of Western Ontario

Gordon Graham
Philosophy of the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics.
New York: Routledge 1997. Pp. ix + 193.
Cdn$91.00: US$65.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-16687-X);
Cdn$29.99: US$20.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-16688-8).

Philosophy of the Arts is based on an introductory course Graham has taught at the University of St. Andrews for a number of years. It breaks into three components. The first three chapters address the fundamental issues in what he calls a normative aesthetics; the next four survey the valuation of music, painting, poetry, and architecture; a final chapter considers theories of art, sketching the history of philosophical aesthetics, and discussing competing theories — especially those of the last quarter century. Each chapter is concluded by a summary and suggestions for further reading.

A normative aesthetic attempts to answer the question, 'What is the value of art?' — as opposed to 'What is the work of art?' Gordon surveys three traditional answers: art gives pleasure; it expresses emotion; it enhances our understanding. He surveys the objections to all three, and finds the last most compelling, concluding that 'art can illuminate experience by making us more sensitively aware of what it [experience] contains' (59). He concedes that such a theory of art is 'much more plausible as a normative than a descriptive doctrine' (59).

The discussion is organized topically and proceeds as an argument rather than as a survey of important texts and doctrines — though Graham is careful to identify the most important historical figures with particular arguments and doctrines. The introductory chapters present a lucid and fairly comprehensive survey of the various postures taken on the topics of hedonism, expressivism, and cognitivism.

The assessment of the aesthetics of music, painting, poetry and architecture follows the same pattern, always coming back from a survey of arguments to an endorsement of a normative and cognitive aesthetic. Music and architecture are the hardest cases for him; painting and poetry the easiest. Graham lumps film with painting, though he notes in passing that 'film is the supermedium, the sort of thing that Wagnerian opera aimed (but arguably failed) to be' (106).

Graham's commitment to a normative and cognitive aesthetic provides the discussion with an heuristically useful structure, but does not bias the discussion inappropriately. Some such focus is necessary in the absence of either an historical or text-based structure. One disadvantage is that the student cannot easily extract a sense of the historical development of aesthetics, nor even its major contributors. However, all the major figures and texts are discussed opportunistically as they arise in the argument. Graham's discussion is thorough, authoritative, and accessible; one always feels in sure hands.

The final chapter is a survey of 'theories of art', that is, of efforts to define the artwork as opposed to identifying the value of those things we traditionally call 'artworks'. Here the discussion is organized more by author and text than previously. Only now does the student learn that philosophical aesthetics descends from Kant, and that it retains a difficulty Kant did not resolve: 'Are we seeking a definition or generalization about attitudes, or artefacts, or functions, or activities?' (154). Graham contends that a normative aesthetic evades this conundrum.

He then turns to those theories of art that rival philosophical aesthetics — Dickie's Institutionalism, Marxism, Levi-Strauss's structuralism and Derrida's deconstruction. Here readers will probably find more to quibble with, but Graham's hand remains firm and steady. I liked most of all his assessment of the appeal of structuralism (and hence of poststructuralism): 'The distinction [between *langue* and *parole*] at the heart of structuralism thus holds out the promise of something which in a sense all intellectual endeavour strives for — the detection of reality behind appearance — while at the same time invoking no occult or strangely metaphysical entities' (164). But Graham concludes that it is a promise not fulfilled, and further — and I think correctly — that 'some version of the Marxist idea of "false consciousness" runs through nearly all of the critical attacks on philosophical aesthetics we have been considering' (171).

Graham sums up with the claim that 'we can avoid the difficulties' of both Platonic essentialism and empirical generalization 'if we take an expressly normative approach to art, of the sort we find in Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Collingwood' — appropriately modified, it should be added (176).

There are few weaknesses in this book, however I have some difficulty with Graham's conclusion that music is cognitively challenged because it lacks a grammar, though it possesses a vocabulary (77). This seems peculiarly wrong-headed. If a grammar is understood as rules of combination, music manifestly possesses a grammar. But the meagre lexicon of bird noises and conventional applications of musical forms (marches, reveillé, and the like) hardly qualifies as a vocabulary. Another quibble is that Graham fails to indicate how his cognitive and normative aesthetic differs from the long-standing defence of the arts as having heuristic utility.

Leon Surette
(*Department of English*)
University of Western Ontario

Every April, Samuel Pepys would have a huge feast to celebrate the anniversary of his successful kidney stone operation. He describes one such meal in a 1663 diary entry: 'We had a Fricasse of rabbets and chicken — a leg of mutton boiled — three carps in a dish — a great dish of a side of lamb — a dish of roasted pigeons — a dish of four lobsters — three tarts — a Lamprey pie, a most rare pie — a dish of anchovies — good wine of several sorts; and all things mighty noble and to my great content.'

The search for the good life in fashion, food, and style charges onward at an ever-accelerating pace — a moving target that is as difficult to document as it is to define. Gronow's *The Sociology of Taste* offers generous helpings of the sociology of fashion and food in particular, and asks some larger questions, such as: 'Why does the entire material culture of the late nineteenth century create an impression of kitsch'? (42)

As a sociologist at the University of Helsinki, Gronow writes with confidence about the Finnish fashion industry and diet, and the recent Westernization of Russian culture. Interestingly, Gronow argues against the traditional notion that taste and fashion can be easily explained as the lower classes emulating the upper classes. His 'aesthetic sociology' is actually an economic sociology, focused on the increasing tempo of change in taste. Gronow makes thoughtful distinctions between genuine and artificial needs in his socio-cultural explanations of modern consumption, and he is especially clever at tracing patterns of consumption: 'A metaphor for the spread of fashion, more apt than that of the social ladder, would be the dissolution of a drop of liquid in a basin containing a liquid of a different color' (95).

Unfortunately for the philosopher, *The Sociology of Taste* is generally just that: a sociological study, enhanced with some oft-covered material regarding Kant, Schiller, and play theory. Gronow is a disciple of Georg Simmel, an important German sociologist of the early twentieth century, and Simmel (along with several other prominent sociologists) is quoted often, at length, and largely without critique.

Some interesting morsels are passed under our noses all too briefly: Gronow's overviews of the recent food scares, the current vitamin craze, and the machinations of the large Parisian fashion houses all leave us hungry for further discussion. Also, any mention of feminist concerns is missing from this volume. Given a book about the sociology of fashion and food, this is an egregious lacuna, as is the absence of any acknowledgement of the tremendous influence of gay culture in these areas. Other questions also simmer on the back burner. For example, ever since Pepys' time, Paris has been the

center of both gastronomy and fashion. Why is this? And, speaking of consumption, how do we explain the impact of a Martha Stewart and her magazine and her television show and her clothing line and her 'good things'?

Pepys' lamprey pie has been replaced by the baby veggies and tall food of California fusion cuisine, but the desire to purchase/eat/wear 'all things mighty noble' remains a vital force that is not easily circumscribed. Of course, all who would venture to put the sensuality of taste into words labor in the shadow of the great M.F.K. Fisher, who found in food the order of Nature herself: first freshness, then flavor and ripeness, and then decay.

Jennifer Judkins
(*Department of Music*)
UCLA

This volume provides new essays, with Kierkegaard's best known pseudonymous works getting more treatment than do the discourses and later signed works. Newcomers to Kierkegaard's literature may be grateful for that, but the entire corpus, including the journals and papers, is heavily cited, and veteran readers of Kierkegaard will find familiar debates taking on new life. Arguments designed to show Kierkegaard's engagement with classical philosophical themes and theological dogma predominate even while the authors expound the unique power of his explorations of the inner life, which several attribute to a kind of logical or mapping power as much as to poetic fervor.

Bruce Kirmse's illuminating biographical essay is followed by Roger Poole's admirably concise survey of continental and anglo-american twentieth century receptions of Kierkegaard. However Poole's own preference for post-modern modes of reception, and his dismissal of more 'blunt' readings as merely 'risible' is virtually unsupported by argument. His is the sole voice in this volume from among the 'literary' readers of Kierkegaard, though Westphal affirms a post-modern aspect to the authorship.

George Pattison's discussion of the relations between the aesthetic as an existence sphere and the 'aesthetic' (the arts) provides an entree to *Either / Or* and other early pseudonymous works. Kierkegaard does not expect much from the arts in an 'age of reflection' but his use of Heiberg's system of genres determined by the dialectic of immediacy/reflection enables him to ascribe

some value to comedy insofar as it expresses a reflective disengagement from that immediacy which defines the 'aesthetic' as an existence sphere.

Andrew Cross examines that same dialectic in the *Concept of Irony*. Socratic irony is disengagement from the 'established order' *in toto*. But should one be ironical towards one's own ironical stance? The question generates a tragic dilemma. Immediacy cannot give what is needed but no alternative is envisioned. Cross then shows how Climacean *humor* goes beyond this impasse. Merold Westphal further dilates upon Climacus' *Postscript* in particular in a masterful analysis of Kierkegaard's relation to Hegel. Climacus Socratically disengages from the system (the established order's philosophic correlate) even as he envisages the ethical or religious as requiring unmediatizeable choices.

In Poole's terms the most 'blunt' readings of Kierkegaard take him too seriously as philosopher, so Westphal's reading is blunt. So too Stephen Evans' reading, which finds useful thinking in the *Postscript* on anti-realism (the denial of a mind independent reality) vs. realism. He concludes that Climacus finally sides with a chastened realism. Even the *Postscript's* famous claim that 'subjectivity is truth' assumes objective moral and religious truth, to which the passionate pagan fails to relate and to which the passive Christian relates. They differ in the *how* of their relation, which is crucial, for since such truths obviously have a *point* only insofar as lived, they must be reduplicated in life.

Classical philosophical preoccupations also figure centrally in Robert Roberts' account of 'passion' (ruled subjectivity) which evokes the notion of character (cf. Aristotle, Thomas). The integrating power of *essential passion* implies a teleology, as though people were meant to have a certain inner shape which would qualify them as essentially human.

Roberts reveals Kierkegaard as an invaluable source for insights on current topics in philosophical psychology and ethics. One example: emotions are portrayed in Kierkegaard's work as perceptual states, featuring an immediacy which mere thought lacks. I must not only *think* 'poverty does not matter' I must also *see it as* unimportant in order to have the appropriate emotion. Roberts' exegesis maps broadly 'logical' relations between thought, imagination, emotion, and concern.

Worries that such an approach might undermine the centrality of the 'leap' to Kierkegaard's thought are effectively dispelled by M. Jamie Ferreira, whose rich discussion of that concept includes an intriguing reference to Kierkegaard's own description of a pathos filled transition as an Aristotelian enthymeme, which generates non-necessary practical change but is still a syllogism, that is, has a discernible order or sense. Leaps generally are pathos filled transitions, but are without value when so to speak logically out of order.

Kierkegaard maintained that humans cannot move towards God, but also that they must be free to say no or yes to that which God offers. Timothy Jackson contrasts this 'Arminian' position with Calvinist/Augustinian predestination. But Kierkegaard preserves an important Augustinian distinction between the abstract possibility of being able to do otherwise (*liberum*

arbitrium) and the freedom which is a function of choosing in accord with God's ordering of life (*libertas*). The latter is complexly conditioned by passion, imagination and reason. It is in fact *libertas* to which Roberts, Ferreira and others are calling our attention.

Fear and Trembling, on Ronald Greene's account, is not so much the result of an eccentric poet's *angst* as it is the poetical working out of classical Pauline/Lutheran theological themes, for at the most fundamental level that multi-leveled work explores the limits of ethics in the face of sin. Abraham's transcendence of the moral makes him a figure for all who recognize the insufficiency of their best ethical efforts and are forced to rely entirely on God, who may return the finite to the believer as pure gift.

Green's account is happily juxtaposed to Mooney's discussion of *Repetition* for repetition must also ultimately be understood as the 'sine qua non' of that 'dogmatics' in which the return of the finite as gift presupposes the forgiveness of sin. But Mooney recognizes that the reception of the gift is active, a case of 'Arminian edification' (Jackson), conditioned by passion (Roberts).

Dogmatic concepts, sin and forgiveness, also motivate the psychological explorations of *The Concept of Anxiety* and the elaborate taxonomies of *The Sickness Unto Death*, as Marino and Hannay, respectively, show. Thus the Augustinian idea that only Adam sinned freely must be rejected since it engenders a *mood* antithetical to sin consciousness, which is necessarily earnest. Mood functions as a criteria for concepts, thus enforcing logical relations between thought and the domains of emotion (cf. Roberts). Hannay argues that all the forms of despair reduce to disavowal of the self. What self? The fully articulated, passionate self required by a position before God, such as would be impossible apart from sin consciousness.

Phillip Quinn argues that only in the distinctively Christian 'second ethics' which stretches the requirement upon humans to the point where the best performance lacks saving merit, is sin manifest. But passionate ethical striving is not thereby rendered inconsequential. Quinn cites passages in *Works of Love* and elsewhere in which the Christian is exhorted to 'see as,' for example to see even the lover as a neighbor, thus reminding us of the gestaltist perceptual aspects of the inner life (Roberts, Ferreira). Yet on Quinn's view Kierkegaard is not optimistic about the possibility of a consistent formation of character in accord with such feelings and associated thoughts. Sin is too deeply engrained.

Herman Deuser further expounds the centrality of sin consciousness in Kierkegaard's response to his theological/philosophical/cultural situation. Klaus Kodalle draws together many of the preceding essayists themes while showing how logically misplaced any utilitarian justifications of Christianity must be.

These are nearly all first rate essays. The *Companion* should not be missed by anyone interested in learning to think with Kierkegaard.

Norman Lillegard
University of Tennessee — Martin

Mette Hjort and **Sue Laver, eds.**
Emotion and the Arts.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford
University Press 1997. Pp. 302.
Cdn$79.95: US$49.95
(cloth: ISBN 0-19-511104-4);
Cdn$29.95: US$14.95
(paper: ISBN 0-19-511105-2).

In recent years there has been a steady growth of interest in philosophical problems surrounding the emotions; both within the philosophy of mind and ethics, concerning the nature and value of emotions, and within aesthetics, revolving around a cluster of problems such as the nature of emotional responses to fiction, the expression of emotion in music, and the relationship between aesthetic responses and our everyday emotional capacities. There is now considerable cross-fertilisation of ideas between these different philosophical fields. In addition, the subject attracts increasing interest from experimental psychologists and literary theorists. The present collection reflects this interdisciplinary approach by including contributions from both these fields. The essays in the collection — most of them by writers well known for their contributions to the existing literature — both indicate the advanced state of the debate and suggest the main lines along which it will develop.

The introductory essay, by Jerrold Levinson, provides an invaluable guide to the philosophical terrain. The sixteen contributions are grouped under four headings; The Paradox of Fiction; Emotion and Its Expression through Art; The Rationality of Emotional Responses to Art; and The Value of Emotion, and Levinson's essay highlights the main sources of contention in each area. The largest section of his essay, however, is rightly given over to a discussion of the Paradox of Fiction, since it is central to the concerns of the collection as a whole. The Paradox can be stated simply. In the first place, emotions require beliefs. If I pity you for the misfortune you are suffering, then I believe you are in fact suffering. Should I discover otherwise, my pity will (so it is said) evaporate. Similar points apply to other emotions. Next, it is obvious that in our dealings with art works — say, novel-reading — that I do not believe a fictional character is really suffering, for the simple reason that I know he does not exist. Lastly, given the previous two points, it seems to follow that I cannot experience emotions for characters in fiction. However, many readers apparently do have emotional responses to the fate of fictional characters. How can this be?

The essays, by Walton, Feagin, Currie, Matravers and Carroll are explicitly concerned with this problem. In fact, Levinson in his introduction points out that there are really two potential problems here rather than one. Is the difficulty with our emotional responses to fiction that it is a conceptual impossibility that such responses are examples of emotions, or is it that, whether or not these states qualify as emotions, they are nevertheless irra-

tional, since their objects do not exist? In his contribution, Walton is concerned primarily with the first of these two questions. He construes our engagement with fiction as a kind of make-believe; an imaginative exercise, a 'simulation'. During such simulations, my thoughts and emotional responses are run 'off-line', which is to say that it is characteristic of responses to fictions that they do not engage with our motivations and thus do not issue in action. For Walton, it is primarily this feature which excludes responses to fiction from the class of emotions. This is disputed by Matravers, who argues that if the objection to considering our responses to fiction is that they do not issue in motivation and action, then it will also serve to exclude responses we might have to non-fictional suffering, say, in the past. I cannot do not do anything about past suffering, nor need I even be motivated to do so, but it would surely be incorrect to insist that no reaction I might have to such a case deserves to be classed as an emotional one. The same principle would also discount reactions to events in our own past. Common ground between Walton and Matravers however, is the thought that it is fruitful and illuminating to compare real emotions and fictional ones with a view to deciding whether these form one class or two. This assumption is attacked by Feagin who argues, along lines familiar from eliminativist writers, that appeals to folk-psychological notions to demarcate the class of emotions are unhelpful, not least because the notion of a belief is itself very unclear.

Another issue raised by various contributors is the device of the implied narrator. Matravers and Walton argue that when reading fiction we imagine ourselves to be reading a narrated factual report, rather than imagining ourselves to be witnessing or perceiving the events in question. Matravers interestingly weighs up the merits of this 'report' model in his discussion of the fictional point of view in cinema. Implied character is also a key issue in Steven Davies' discussion of the expression of emotion in music. Davies considers the case for the 'hypothetical persona' in our experience of music. Do we, or must we, consider the emotion we hear expressed in music to be that of an implied character standing behind the music? If so, is there only one character, or several? In the end, Davies finds the arguments for such a view unconvincing. Taking next the rationality of our responses, when we ask, 'which emotional response is appropriate?' one possible answer, in the fictional case, is 'the one implied by the fictional narrator.' The merits of this solution are debated in the essays by Currie, Novitz and Livingston and Mele. One key question is whether our moral responses should be tied to those of a fictional narrator, or whether we can distance ourselves from and criticise these.

Lyons' essay questions the view that only an emotional response to the 'work in itself' is appropriate, and argues for the legitimacy of personal and historical bases for responses. The essay by Solomon, in the final section on the value of emotion, presents an analysis — and an unfashionable defence — of sentimentality, arguing that our hostility towards it is merely a symptom of our more general hostility towards the emotions. The collection

is more wide-ranging than this selective focus can reveal and serves as a valuable showcase for current thinking on these issues.

Paul Harkin
University of Glasgow

Eric Hoffman, ed.
Guidebook to Publishing in Philosophy.
Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation
Center (in cooperation with the American
Philosophical Association) 1997. Pp. 255.
US$30.00. ISBN 0-912632-62-3.

The purpose of this slim volume is to aid professional philosophers of all levels of experience in the fine art of getting published. Actually it provides more encouragement than detailed advice, though the advice within is sound. The first part of the *Guidebook* consists of six short essays covering book publishing, journals, preparing conference papers, and a much-needed addition regarding the merits and pitfalls of electronic journals and internet discussion groups. The last version of this guidebook was written in 1986 (reissued with minor revisions in 1996) and had gotten as far as the word processor in its treatment of the impact of technology on the business of publishing philosophy. So the revamping is welcome. However, do not expect a great deal of detail in this collection: the brevity of these pieces is extreme, and they serve primarily to provide a few useful tidbits for future reference. The overall effect of reading this guidebook is to bolster one's resolve to keep trying to get one's work in print, and for this reason alone it should (given its moderate price) be added to a departmental library's shelves, if only for the sake of improving troop morale. The Guidebook is produced by the Philosophy Documentation Center, in cooperation with the APA. Since these are the same people who produce *The Philosopher's Index* and other indispensable research tools, it should come as no surprise that this volume is heavy on lists — of journals, of publishing houses, of APA paper submission guidelines and of resources for further reading. Some of this is eminently useful, other material less so. About two-thirds of the volume, though, is comprised of such information, much of it failing to be organized into a digestible form. The six essays which constitute the bulk of the advice this guidebook has to offer form the most valuable part of the book, and I wish it had contained more advice, especially considering the ubiquity of much of the information that rounds out the book.

As for the advice, it is mostly common sense, but perhaps it bears reiteration: Samuel Gorovitz offers his wisdom in the form of anecdotes (or, if you like, horror stories) of his dealings with book publishers. His advice is to draw on the experience of colleagues in negotiating a book contract, and to protect oneself against the many contingencies (many richly illustrated by Gorovitz) that can interfere with the successful dissemination of one's work. The humorous form in which he recounts his experiences has the virtue of staying in the reader's memory. The longer piece 'General Advice About Book Publishing' by Marcia Yudkin and Janice Moulton (editors of the 1986 version) is more detailed, taking one through the steps of researching potential publishers to negotiating the contract itself. Furthermore, they provide useful advice tailored to scholarly books, anthologies and textbooks, and all this from the publishers' point of view. This is an extremely helpful kind of information, and happily the *Guidebook* provides many such insights. Knowing how those on the receiving end of manuscripts think and act is of great practical benefit, and may take some of the frustration out of the frequently mysterious process of editorial evaluation.

The advice pertaining to journal articles is less illuminating. Nancy Simco does provide some helpful tips for neophytes on how to go about generating article-length ideas, but much of her advice is rather basic: make sure the journal to which you submit your piece publishes this kind of work, read journals regularly, be clear about your topic and method, convince the reader you have something to say, etc. Proofreading gets a bit more treatment than one might think necessary — again suggestive that his essay is for those testing the waters for the first time. The remaining articles in this volume are not terribly informative, though they do bolster one's enthusiasm. 'Electronic Publishing and Philosophy' simply mentions (rather than weighs) the trade-off of the immediacy of cyber-publishing versus the traditional prestige of print. Since both are desiderata for philosophers seeking to advance their learning and professional standing, it is left to the reader to decide how to devote one's time and energy. Such brief items are indicative of the volume as a whole: they give you something to think about, and do not take much time to take in, which is arguably what such a guidebook should provide.

The annotated bibliography (located frustratingly in the middle of the book) is one of the best reference tools in this volume. It is usefully organized and thorough. A brief glance at this would enlighten veteran writers as to new resources (especially regarding electronic publishing). I would seriously recommend informing students of its contents, which include all manner of research tools: style manuals and writing guides, research indexes (philosophy and beyond), publishing guides (including a very interesting-looking sociological study — utilized in the essay by Yudkin and Moulton — of the publishing industry itself!), guides on the non-sexist use of language, and the aforementioned electronic source- and internet handbooks. Best of all, none of these lists are too long.

The only area where the information provided is not tailored for easy consumption is the list of philosophy journals. To my mind, this list is a waste

of space, although it is not lacking comprehensiveness, including as it does many foreign periodicals and several electronic journals. But the details given are not of great utility. Information about their mailing addresses and subscription rates can most often be found at a nearby departmental library or over the internet, and the descriptions of the content of the journals is too brief here to be of much use. Two examples: the purpose of the periodical *Film and Philosophy* is described as 'to publish work in the intersection of film and philosophy' (81) while *Criminal Justice Ethics'* goal is 'to focus greater attention on ethical issues by philosophers, criminal justice professionals, lawyers and judges, and the general public' (76). The point is this: many journals fall into one of two categories; those such as *Hume Studies*, whose title gives you all you need to know about its subject matter, and those general philosophy journals such as *Mind, Critical Inquiry*, etc., who are open to all areas of philosophy, but who vary greatly in prestige and ideological slant. One wants to know whether an article on Foucault has a serious chance of running the gauntlet at the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. Several of the authors wisely point out that such information is best gleaned from perusing the journals themselves, preferably the more recent issues, but this raises the question of why this guidebook is filled up with such pseudo-information. Admittedly, the notes about the rough acceptance rate and the refereeing time is not without its use, but I think the space this list occupies (137 pages, or about half of the volume!) could have been put to far better use. Next time around I would hope to see a list sorted by topic, and one that included respected periodicals outside the field. Dividing up the list by topic would be a real time-saver, and adding information about periodicals that do not primarily publish philosophical articles might prove a real boon to those trying to publish interdisciplinary or applied work, so that someone with, say, an article not quite suitable for *Film and Philosophy* might find a home for it in *Film Comment*.

The lists of U.S., Canadian and British publishers is of greater use, however. Here can be found information regarding which publishing houses publish which sorts of works, and here even the mailing addresses are something most philosophers would have to search for elsewhere with a fair amount of time and effort. Many entries have e-mail and web site addresses, and this also is a useful tidbit for those thinking about submitting a manuscript. Pursuant to the advice given in both articles on book publishing to know the kind of product a publisher is likely to turn out (and how vigorously they market those products), information on the series of works they might have published, as well as directions to the company web site, may prove indispensable.

At the end of the day, this guidebook is an attempt to do several things at once, and it succeeds in only a portion of those aims. These are primarily in informing the reader about the rather chaotic nature of the publishing business, and about how to keep up one's guard, and (equally important) one's spirits, in the face of the large and confusing world of academic publishing. The contributors remind us of the value of writing journal articles, and

conference pieces, etc., but the advice and tools they offer on this score, while sound, are so commonplace as to strike the reader as redundant. Better to work on polishing one's next paper than to look here for a reminder to check the spelling.

Matthew Stephens
University of Alberta

Jean Hyppolite
Logic and Existence.
Trans. Leonard Lawlor and Amit Sen.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1997. Pp. xx + 212.
US$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3231-9);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3232-7).

Hyppolite's *Logique et existence*, translated forty-five years after its French publication, completed the project begun with his *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. Students of Hegel, as well as those interested in French poststructuralism, owe the translators, Lawlor and Sen, a profound debt of gratitude. That debt is compounded by their including, as an appendix, a translation of Deleuze's review of *Logic and Existence*. Lawlor's preface historically contextualizes Hyppolite's book.

Logic and Existence permanently transformed the reading of Hegel in France. 'Hyppolite's non-reductionistic interpretation of the relation between the phenomenology and the logic,' Lawlor explains, 'effectively ended the simple anthropological interpretation of Hegel popularized by Kojève before World War II. Because of Hyppolite, no reading of Hegel would be able to push man up to the immodest position of being the Absolute, the end of history, the source of nothingness' (viii). Although the French repudiation of humanism was initiated by Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism,' as Lawlor observes, the contribution of Hyppolite's book was decisive: '*Logic and Existence* opened the way for the theme that would dominate French thought after Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*; the concept of difference found in the philosophies of Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault would not exist without the publication of *Logic and Existence*' (ix). Hyppolite inaugurated the anti-humanist reading of Hegel's philosophy. Paradoxically, he also made possible the poststructuralists' subsequent anti-Hegelianism.

Logic and Existence represents Hyppolite's explication of the relation between Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and his *Science of Logic*. Studying the analyses of language, reflection, and the categories in the *Science of Logic*,

Hyppolite concludes that the relation of phenomenology to logic is one of correspondence. That is, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic* mutually presuppose each other. Hyppolite demonstrates that, for Hegel, man — whether conceived as the individual person or collective humanity — cannot be equated with universal self-consciousness. Hyppolite's Hegel also opposes all attempts either to reduce experience to the concept, or to reduce the concept to experience. Intending to renounce Hegel when he insisted that objects never go into their concepts without remainder, Adorno stumbled over one of Hegel's essential insights. Its complement, Hyppolite shows, is that concepts never are incarnated fully in their objects either. This reading situates Hegel's philosophy closer to the materialism of Marx and Engels than the various idealisms of Schelling, Fichte, or Kant.

Heidegger emphasizes, as Lawlor notes, the connection between the Hegelian philosophy and Nietzsche's assertion that God is dead. Both Hegel and Nietzsche, along with Spinoza, deny that there is any transcendent realm beyond experience. All are philosophers of complete immanence. Nevertheless, Hegel distinguishes essence and appearance. Being is not self-identical, for Hegel, rather it becomes its own other. That is, being contradicts itself — internally, not externally — and so becomes otherwise than being. The infinite is not wholly other than the finite, and the finite is not completely excluded from the infinite. Rather, the infinite and the finite are internal to each other, each contains the other, and so each harbors an internal self-contradiction. A thing's difference from all other things, for Hegel, is the essence of that thing. It is its most basic quality. Yet, since a thing's essence is its difference from other things, that essence necessarily contains an implicit reference to those other things. So its essence includes something that it is not. Qualities cannot be defined in isolation from each other. Each makes internal reference to its opposite. Opposition is inevitable, Hegel argues, because all quantitative differences become qualitative differences. Hyppolite argues that this internal reference, this contradiction, allows Hegel to totalize or infinitize being.

Such subsequent philosophers as Derrida and Deleuze will reject Hegel's totalizing being, whereby difference transfigures, or transmogrifies, into contradiction. Instead, they will attempt to articulate a notion of difference than stands outside, and resists, contradiction.

To conclude with a pedagogical comment, *Logic and Existence* is a crucial work, as much for the reading of Hegel that it advances as for the subsequent philosophical emphasis on difference it makes possible. It is not, however, an easy book to comprehend. In part, this is because of the intrinsic difficulty of its subject. As Hyppolite perceives, 'this passage from history to absolute knowledge, the passage from the temporal to the eternal, is Hegelianism's most obscure dialectical synthesis' (188). There are other impediments as well. Hyppolite presumes that readers are thoroughly conversant with Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Science of Logic*, and the history of their interpretation: Kojève's *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, which Hyppolite opposes, as well as Mure's *Study of Hegel's Logic* and Kroner's *Von*

Kant bis Hegel. He also assumes that readers have studied such philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, and Bergson. For these reasons, *Logic and Existence* would not be suitable, in general, for undergraduates or even beginning graduate students. However, it would be appropriate in graduate seminars.

J.M. Fritzman
Southwest Missouri State University

In choosing to re-issue an unrevised edition of Karl Jaspers' controversial 1936 study on Nietzsche, the publishers at Johns Hopkins seek not only to pay homage to the skillful 1965 translation of Wallraff and Schmitz, but also, and more importantly, to exhibit the ongoing relevance of this often neglected work. Jaspers' *Nietzsche*, while subject to some idiosyncrasies in interpretation, nevertheless stands as a testament to a balanced and scholarly approach to Nietzsche's thought often lacking in other more celebrated accounts. Indeed, as its most outstanding virtue, Jaspers' book offers the reader of Nietzsche a clearly articulated and well-thought out methodology appropriate for the interpretation of this often misunderstood thinker.

Central to Jaspers' methodological counsel is his claim that reading Nietzsche well is a meditative process into which the would-be interpreter must enter along with Nietzsche himself. As Jaspers argues, 'Nietzsche does not want believers' (21); rather, his intended audience are those few who are able to enter into critical dialogue, 'constantly taking issue with him' (458). Such a critical encounter requires that the reader acquire a comprehensive familiarity with the entire Nietzsche corpus — a familiarity which Jaspers himself had clearly achieved. What Jaspers' erudite approach reveals are a number of principles of interpretation which he maintains must steer any competent treatment of Nietzsche's thought. Essentially, these principles offer the reader a means by which to reconcile an initial frustration over the apparently capricious contradictions in Nietzsche's thinking with the intuition that his thought can be understood as a coherent *philosophical* whole. Such a reconciliation can be effected only when careful reading and sustained

reflection has revealed the fact that the self-contradiction, which Jaspers maintains 'is the fundamental ingredient of Nietzsche's thought' (10), constitutes the *'real dialectic'* (11) by which his thinking can be comprehended as a whole. This whole, however, is not disclosed *in toto* as 'a concept, a world-view, or a system' (11); rather, according to Jaspers, a coherent, albeit mutable picture of Nietzsche's thought emerges out of a study of the (broadly construed) *'systematic interrelations'* (13) of his thinking, undertaken with a constant awareness of the intimate relation between these thoughts and their unfolding in the context of Nietzsche's life. Armed with these principles, Jaspers claims to offer the reader a presentation, which, 'unlike a mere critical evaluation, undertakes to present the subject itself, and, unlike a narration ... aims at bringing out its essential features' (13-14).

According to Jaspers, such a presentation is characterized by an attempt to 'efface its own thinking in favour of that which is presented', resisting the temptation to 'use its subject for any philosophizing of its own' (14). Yet, in calling on the interpreter to 'yield completely to the thinking of the other person' (14), Jaspers does not deny that in approaching a thinker as passionate and complex as Nietzsche, the interpreter necessarily adopts a certain distinctive disposition towards the subject. Indeed, Jaspers' own allegiance to the philosophy of *Existenz* accounts for his idiosyncratic (and some would say anachronistic) treatment of Nietzsche's thought. Rather, what Jaspers' balanced approach cautions against are those 'plundering soldiers', whom Nietzsche recognized amongst his readers in his *Mixed Opinions and Maxims*, who 'pick up a few things they can use, soil and confuse the rest, and blaspheme the whole' (§130). Such readers — most notably the National Socialists, whose attempts at misappropriating Nietzsche for their own ends Jaspers found particularly pernicious — fail to appreciate the 'self-education' available 'by thinking Nietzsche's thoughts with him' (454), and 'sink into either doctrinaire *narrowness* or to *sophistry'* (455).

In turning to an evaluation of Jaspers' presentation of Nietzsche's thought, one ought quite naturally to be bound by those principles which Jaspers himself prescribes for determining the adequacy of any interpretation. Such an evaluation must certainly recognize Jaspers' encyclopaedic knowledge of the Nietzsche corpus — a knowledge which he demonstrates through the profusion of quotations skillfully integrated into the text. Furthermore, Jaspers is in large measure successful in overcoming the temptation to steer Nietzsche's thinking in a particular direction, allowing Nietzsche's thoughts to unfold freely from within the framework of his own life and philosophy. Yet, even while acknowledging his willingness to allow Nietzsche to speak for himself, it is important to recognize that as Nietzsche's interlocutor, Jaspers brings to the conversation elements of his own thought upon which he builds the foundation for the discourse. That is, certain central concepts in Jaspers' thought, most notably notions of *'Existenz'* and 'transcendence' occupy a central place in his presentation of Nietzsche. These ideas, familiar to most with at least a casual acquaintance with mid-20th-century philosophy, are, in spite of this familiarity, complex and technically specific

notions requiring more than cursory knowledge to be adequately understood and appreciated in their role in Jaspers' interpretation of Nietzsche. The difficulty with Jaspers' *Nietzsche* is not his appeal to these notions in his presentation; for such input is essential to the dialogical character of his analysis. Rather, Jaspers' principal failing is the omission of any comprehensive explanation of these terms and their distinctive role in his study. While it may, at one time, when Jaspers' work was more widely read, have proved unnecessary to include an exegesis on the basics of Jaspers' thought, the readers of the re-issue of *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of his Philosophical Activity* would have benefited greatly by the editor's offering a revised Introduction, providing at least some guidance in steering through Jaspers' regrettably neglected thought.

Klaus Michael Jahn
University of Toronto

David Farrell Krell and **Donald L. Bates**
The Good European:
Nietzsche's Work Sites in Word and Image.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1997.
Pp. ii + 255.
US$55.00. ISBN 0-226-45278-6.

When I was first asked to review *The Good European*, I was amused at the concept of a coffee-table book about a man who described the sedentary life as the actual sin against the Holy Spirit. Given its size and weight, the book is unlikely to be hoisted into a wanderer's backpack. Its pleasures invite one to sit and admire, confining one's exertions to turning the pages. Yet unless the still more ironic innovation of a 'Nietzsche tour' becomes common, this book offers a closer glimpse than is otherwise easily available at the physical world with which Nietzsche was intimate. In sum, this is an admirable book, with much to recommend it besides the pictures, enjoyable as these are in their own right.

The book is beautifully produced and interestingly constructed. It consists of four photo-essays chronicling aspects of Nietzsche's life, each followed by a portfolio of mainly color photographs. The sense in which Nietzsche was a 'good European' is rather apolitical in this presentation. Nietzsche was a good European in that he interacted with landscapes in a number of European nations, admiring the unique features of their beauty with little concern for the burgeoning nation-states that controlled them.

The photo-essays draw extensively on Nietzsche's own reports, often from letters and unpublished autobiographical sources. Through the addition of color and the dominance of photos over text, the portfolios give a heightened sensory impression of the landscapes through which Nietzsche moved. The portfolio images are also less mediated than the photo-essays, for the texts are typically passages from Nietzsche himself, without commentary by the authors.

The literary presentation is somewhat cinematic, not only through juxta-positions with photographs, but also through verbal close-ups on details of Nietzsche's physical experience. Our visual and tactile attention is directed toward the green sun-visor Nietzsche used to protect his eyes (86-7) and his preference for green wallpaper (86 and 152), the red nightcap he received as a Christmas present to help prevent migraines (98), the invitation he received from the town of Tautenburg to put brass plaques on some newly installed benches in the wood he frequented (132). Krell and Bates even engage the olfactory imagination, remarking on the scent of larch needles that Nietzsche would have encountered in one of his favorite hiking spots (155). The reader's sensory imagination is also stimulated by the occasional employment of 'making-it-strange' technique; for example, a picture on p. 62 is captioned, 'The long-necked fox brandishing a magic wand is actually a repair to the padded linoleum on a stair.'

Such manipulation of focus underscores some of the ironies of Nietzsche's life. A particularly striking case is the report that Nietzsche's first purchase with the money he received from a publisher as a result of a court settlement was a tombstone for his father, inscribed with a passage from Paul 1 *Cor.* 13:8: 'Die Liebe höret nimer auf' ['Charity never faileth' or 'Love never stops']. Indicating that Nietzsche bought the tombstone some thirty-six years after his father's death, Krell and Bates remark, 'As far as we know, it was also the son, the budding Antichrist, who designed the stone. ...' (15).

Krell and Bates take a fresh approach to the story of Nietzsche's life by resisting strict chronology. The first photo-essay, which chronicles his child-hood until his acceptance of a professorship at Basel, concludes with a detailed account of Nietzsche's years of madness. The facts of Nietzsche's final years are thus presented before discussion of the philosophical output of his mature years in the later photo-essays. K&B thereby cast a poignant shadow on the vivid story that follows, but avoid the sensationalistic distrac-tions from the rest of his life that often mar chronological accounts of Nietzsche's story.

In impact, if not argument, Krell and Bates take issue with the rather common view among Nietzsche scholars that despite the fascination of Nietzsche's works and internal life, his external life was rather pathetic. K&B describe a Nietzsche who is an avid swimmer, who regularly takes hikes of several hours despite his physical ailments, who burns bonfires on beaches and admires wildflowers, who was 'finicky to mythic proportions' about food (184), and whose friends had a different view of him than we are likely to gain through reproductions of his mad countenance. Malwida von Meysen-

bug, for instance, describes Nietzsche's nature as generous and amiable, and continues, 'How cheerful he could be, how heartily he could laugh' (98).

Even those who know Nietzsche's biography well may look at Nietzsche rather differently as a result of this telling. Other academics may be as startled as I was to read that Nietzsche's colleagues at Basel 'elected him dean of the faculty in 1874' (68), or that Nietzsche strategized about teaching effectiveness: 'Whenever a pupil failed to recite adequately the matters that we had treated in the previous class, I always publicly blamed myself — I said, for example, that everyone had a right to demand of me further elucidation and commentary if what I had said was too cursory or too vague. A teacher had the obligation to make himself accessible to every level of intelligence. ...' (67).

Although the text does not delve into scholarly debate, it takes stances on some of the issues. Nietzsche's reference to 'this accursed telegram style' (123) of notebook jotting (a strategy developed because his eyes were too bad for sustained essay-writing) suggests that Nietzsche was not a celebrant of disorganized pastiche, as is sometimes supposed; and Krell and Bates stress Nietzsche's craftsmanlike attention to the sequence of sections in his aphoristic works. The last of the book's chapters, focusing on Nietzsche's enthusiasm for the sea and water, implicitly disputes Luce Irigaray's analysis of Nietzsche in terms of hydrophobia. K&B also contend that the cause of Nietzsche's madness was definitely syphilis (against Claudia Card and others who contend that he willfully chose madness and those who, like Ronald Hayman, question the diagnosis on the basis of symptoms).

Krell and Bates take issue as well with the tendency of many scholars to treat some of Nietzsche's notions, including eternal recurrence, as doctrines: 'The earliest public appearance of Nietzsche's most stirring doctrine occurred in his most dogmatically antidogmatic book — a happenstance that suggests that eternal return is not a doctrine or theory at all but a thought, one of those things that comes on dove's feet but moves the world' (127).

At times Krell's and Bates' interpretations of the psychological significance of details in Nietzsche's life are also debatable. For example, they describe Nietzsche's acceptance of the 'go-fer' role for Wagner as 'in retrospect ... difficult to understand — unless one accepts that Nietzsche was himself in love with Cosima, nine years his elder but as enchanting to him as she was to the Meister' (70). This scarcely seems the only possible explanation. K&B also make much of the discrepancies between reports of childhood dreams that Nietzsche took as premonitions and the actual layout of his childhood environs (17n), though this might be read as the consequence of the dreamwork analyzed by Freud.

At first I was surprised by *The Good European*'s lack of maps. But I suspect that this omission was a deliberate decision based on the notion that the maps of our era are often literalistic and evoke literalistic attitudes from those who use them. Krell and Bates's book, instead, affords an avenue for imaginative re-engagement with the human being Friedrich Nietzsche. At a time when Nietzsche's works have almost disappeared under the interpre-

tations (as Nietzsche himself says of Scripture), *The Good European* is timely as well as beautiful.

Kathleen Marie Higgins
The University of Texas at Austin

John Locke
Political Essays.
Edited by Mark Goldie.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. xl + 409.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47269-5);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47861-8).

Most philosophers are familiar with the canonical works published by John Locke in his lifetime. His *Essay*, the *Two Treatises*, and the *Letter Concerning Toleration* are standard undergraduate fare. However, much of what Locke wrote was never published until after his death, and much of this is salient to the formation of any nuanced understanding of his thought, and especially his political views. Scholars have made much of Locke's posthumous writings, both published and unpublished. In this century Locke has been read variously as a proto-capitalist (Macpherson), a communist (Tully), a deeply religious thinker (Dunn) and a closet atheist Hobbist (Strauss, *et al.*). The proliferation of interpretations is due in part to the study of writings other than the *Two Treatises*; for without his other writings, one would be unable to make a plausible defense of any of these interpretations against the others.

Mark Goldie has performed a truly valuable service to those who are interested in Locke's political thought by providing convenient access to some of these 'non-canonical' writings. This collection includes things previously published posthumously; things unpublished but available in the collection of manuscripts in the Lovelace Collection of Bodleian Library at Oxford (or from collections at a couple of other libraries); and some items previously published but not in their entirety. Some of the previously published texts have been corrected by Goldie. It does not include any of Locke's correspondence, which will constitute another (forthcoming) volume in the Cambridge series.

The significance of this collection is not that it reveals previously undiscovered thoughts that might contradict the previous ascription of views to Locke. The dispute about Locke's views on the nature of marriage, for example, or the dispute about the depth of Locke's religious commitments, are not likely to be settled by anything in this volume. However, until now it

has been difficult for those who are interested in evaluating these competing glosses to do so, because the relevant writings have been so scattered. Locke is no longer interpreted in a univocal fashion as a liberal capitalist with views easily adapted to the secular political climate of 20th-century Western democracies. For those who teach Locke and refuse to overlook this, this volume will be invaluable. For those who study Locke, such a collection eases the burden of weighing the (vast) evidence enormously. While settling such interpretive issues is not a goal advanced by Goldie, it will go a long way towards doing just that.

There is another collection of Locke's political writings: *Political Writings of John Locke*, edited and with an introduction by David Wooton (New York: Penguin 1993). However, that collection is aimed at the first-time Locke reader, and focuses on the canonical writings while omitting the more polemical works. Goldie's collection has a different focus. The non-canonical texts appear here, with elaborate documentation of the original sources: for this reason, it is hard to imagine using it in a lower-level political philosophy course. There are references to the original manuscripts (where they exist), as well as indication as to whether the piece has been published before, and if so, where. Longer pieces of text include a brief précis. Those who are concerned not only with the minutiae of what Locke wrote, but when he wrote it and where, will not be disappointed.

The introductory essay is lucid and gives a brief biography of Locke and a history of the general development of his political views. Goldie does not gainsay the nearly standard view of Locke as a conservative turned revolutionary Whig. Rather, he indicates how certain of the texts printed in the volume help to illustrate that development. Some of the texts (especially those longer ones previously published elsewhere) certainly do help to do this. In particular, the *Two Tracts of Government* help to provide a more complete picture of the development of Locke's religious thought. *Essays on the Law of Nature* will surely help to make the interpretation of Locke-as-Hobbist more difficult to defend — although the deck is certainly stacked in that the von Leydon edition is reproduced here, not the Straussian re-translation produced by Horowitz, Cox, and Strauss.

However, some of the texts printed for the first time (and even some of those that have previously appeared in print) are fairly opaque 'teasers', causing one to wonder why they were selected for publication out of the myriad Lockeana. Locke writes in 'Pietas,' a piece from the Lovelace collection, 'Education not generation gives the obligation and the affection for the children taken prisoners when men make war against their parents and country as heartily as any [Sagard, p.] 454. We see the same in the Janissaries. JL'. Granted that the sentence is a short one (especially for Locke!), we could surely use some guidance. Goldie does tell us that Locke is referring to Gabriel Sagard, and that Janissaries were Turkish foot soldiers made out of renegade prisoners and the 'tributes of Christian children.' Still! Is Locke using 'obligation' here to refer to duty, or to a feeling of duty? (Perhaps this can only be up to the reader to determine.) Similarly opaque remarks on, e.g.,

native Americans, could use more gloss. On the whole, though, the very existence of a collection of this breadth with this sort of documentation is so remarkable that it seems wrong to criticize it. It is an excellent idea well executed.

Ruth Sample
University of New Hampshire

Beatrice Longuenesse
Kant and the Capacity to Judge.
Trans. Charles T. Wolfe.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1998. Pp. xv + 420.
US$59.50. ISBN 0-691-04348-5.

The relationship between the table of judgments in the Transcendental Analytic and the table of categories has always been one of the more problematical issues in the study of the first *Critique*. And among those issues, none is more puzzling perhaps than that of the role of the 'modal concepts'. While promising to examine in the minutest detail the arguments that Kant deploys to link the categories to the logical form of the judgments, Longuenesse deftly defers the clarification of Kant's view of the modal categories to 'another work' (13). That postponement notwithstanding, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* is a very focused attempt to clarify the evolution of the Transcendental Deduction from the A to the B edition and to elucidate the uniqueness of Kant's analysis as it attempts to supervene the conventional limits imposed by scholastic thought that were attacked by Hume; either a causal theory of sensation or some form of idealism.

Longuenesse has opted to make her case by treading continuously between the A edition and the B edition versions of the Deduction. This has the advantage of clarifying the evolution of Kant's thought and the refinement of his language as he struggles to articulate the notion of the transcendental logic with clarity. The method has the slight disadvantage of stopping the reader all too frequently in the murky areas of the A edition where the exposition is far too redolent of the rational psychology that he was frequently misinterpreted as doing. It may be fair to say that those who do not quite grasp the notion of the transcendental logic are still prone to read the *Critique* as a form of rational psychology. Longuenesse claims that the main reason for rewriting the Deduction was because of the difficulty that he encountered in correlating two models of thinking which she refers to as 'the discursive-

reflective' model of logic and the 'intuitive-constructive' model of mathematics. In the A deduction, the first is privileged and in the B version, the logical form, the *a priori synthesis* of the sensible given is decisive (33). While the process of evolution between the first version and the second is important and illuminating, there can be little argument that the second represents Kant's matured thought on the problem. While Longuenesse acknowledges as much, 'The present work ... will give pride of place to the Transcendental Deduction in its second edition' (9), the manner of exposition of her thesis forces the otherwise elegant formulation of the second edition to compete with its own predecessor before emerging as a distinct formulation that makes all synthesis contingent on the transcendental unity of apperception.

This is not an easy book to read, even by the standards of the Kant literature. That may be in part due to the fact that this is a translation from her book first published in French. But it is also due in great part to the fundamental structure of the book and the author's style. Longuenesse cleaves to her argument with a single minded tenacity, only very occasionally relaxing into a reflective discussion of her findings. It is however an illuminating piece, and it is worth the effort for a Kant scholar. With this study, Longuenesse establishes her credentials as a committed paleo-interpreter of Immanuel Kant. Her references in the introduction to some of the more cavalier criticisms of Kant by Strawson and Heidegger underscore the motive for her painstaking fidelity to the literal sense of the arguments deployed by Kant and their place in the total context of his thought. The possibility of a lucid analysis in the future by Longuenesse of the modal concepts or of the relationship of the teleological judgement of the third *Critique* to the rational judgement of the first would be events worth looking forward to.

The book is well manufactured, and attractively designed in Times Roman.

James F. Caron
Utica College of Syracuse University

Robert N. McCauley, ed.
The Churchlands and Their Critics.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1996. Pp. 318.
US$24.95. ISBN 0-631-18969-6.

This book is bittersweet. On the one hand, you get what you want: a lively and informative dialectic on the issues in philosophy of mind and science (and, to a degree, ethics) discussed through the years by the Churchlands. On the *other* hand, sedulous study of every contribution and every exchange leaves the reader fundamentally perplexed about this duo.

As a first example, consider: Are the Churchlands proponents of eliminative materialism, and if so, what, exactly, does their brand of this doctrine amount to? In a chapter entitled 'Do We Propose to Eliminate Consciousness?' there is no answer; read and reread it, and on the question that gives the chapter its title you will, alas, come up utterly empty. Patricia Churchland (PSC) defines eliminative materialism in this chapter as the doctrine that 'as science advances, certain "natural" categories that figured in an earlier theory turn out to have no role and no place in the replacing theory that is taken to provide a correct account of a certain range of phenomena' (297). She then goes on to admit that though theories come and go, 'the world remains the same' (297). So 'anyone who thinks that eliminative materialism means that some part of the *dingen an sich* — say, whatever it is that we now think of as "qualia" or "propositional attitude" — is eliminated by mere tinkering with theory is certainly confused' (297). This *sounds* like a revelation: You mean the Churchlands are *not* claiming that qualia are unreal? Interesting! But the next thing we read is that 'molecular biology can explain biological phenomena perfectly well without appeals to vital spirit. Thus, no serious biologist thinks vital spirit is real' (297). So, by the lights of the Churchlands, are qualia and propositional attitudes in the same category as vital spirit? Scour this chapter and, indeed, the entire text, up and down and inside out to the last syllable, and you will move not one millimeter toward an answer.

The ultimate uninformativeness of the book is surprising, given its structure. The first part of the book is devoted to nine critical essays. All of these essays are *very* well written; some are considerably less critical than others. E.g., Flanagan's 'The Moral Network' is more an adjustment of Churchlandian views than an outright attack. The authors of the essays are Robert McCauley, Patricia Kitcher, Andy Clark, William Lycan, William Bechtel, Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore, Antonio and Hanna Damasio, John Marshall and Jennifer Gurd, and Owen Flanagan. In the second part of the volume the Churchlands respond to each of these authors. In the case of the most spirited attack, Fodor and Lepore's 'Paul Churchland and State Space Semantics,' we're treated to a second round. The Churchlands respond, Fodor and Lepore rebut, and the Churchlands get the last word — in which they say, not without some exasperation, that they just can't get through to Fodor and Lepore about the fact that connectionism is *not* a form of failed empiri-

cism in disguise. Unfortunately, the responses are often mysterious. For example, in perhaps the most powerful attack on the Churchlands' views, Kitcher, in her 'From Neurophilosophy to Neurocomputation: Searching for the Cognitive Forest', makes a systematic case for the view that all this Churchlandian business about neuroscience is much ado about nothing, because (so Kitcher claims) neuroscience doesn't advance philosophy. When turning to the Churchlands' reply to Kitcher, the reader's hopes rise: from pages 246 to 248 PSC enumerates a 'lucky seven' (246) of profound philosophical lessons that can be drawn from empirical progress in connectionism/neurobiology. But each of her points is either hopelessly controversial, can be divined from the armchair, or seems to impact philosophy with all the force of a feather held out to stop a raging rhino. Here, for example, is point one, verbatim:

1. The empirical behavior of neural networks, both real and artificial, illustrates that *the structure of thought* need not be the structure of language, as so many approaches, both historical and contemporary, have assumed. Classical (rule-based) cognitive architectures are not necessary for sophisticated cognition. As it happens, they are not necessary even for specifically linguistic phenomena, as Elman's grammatical net, Hinto and Shallice's semantic net, and Sejnowski and Rosenberg's phonetic net so clearly attest. Where the structure of cognition is concerned, we now have a systematic alternative to explore.

This 'lesson' for philosophers is no such thing; even many prominent neuropsychologists reject it: e.g., on pages 114-131 in his recent *How the Mind Works* (New York: Norton 1997), Steven Pinker offers a sustained empirical argument against the view that a purely connectionist analysis of human linguistic competence can be pulled off. Those philosophers who are friends of the view that mentation is computation have long known, from the comfort of their armchairs, that if thinking is computing, then, of course, at some level, thinking is the manipulation of symbols far below the propositional (because such manipulation is the essence of computation).

Here (still in reply to Kitcher) is the first half of PSC's eighth point:

8. The vector/matrix approach sustains a detailed and experimentally successful approach to the nature of *sensory qualia*, a philosophical problem much on the contemporary mind. For taste qualia and color qualia, we already possess neurally-grounded accounts that smoothly reconstruct all or most of the familiar phenomenological data ... (247)

But no philosopher grappling with qualia (other than the Churchlands) would find the 'neural grounding' involved here to be helpful. Philosophers have long assumed from their armchairs that certain brain activation is associated with certain qualia. It does no good to find and specify this activation, for the fundamental questions remain unanswered: How could qualia Q *be* a particular activation A? Why couldn't A obtain in the absence (or modification) of Q? How is it that study of third-person-couched A provides

no knowledge about what it's like to experience Q? All the *philosophical* questions about qualia are untouched by the neuroscience the Churchlands praise.

To deepen the mystery, there are some questions many will bring to the book in the hopes of finding an answer — but they will find that these questions aren't even broached in the volume. Here's an example. As they cheerfully admit, both Churchlands are connectionists: They invest heavily in a particular information-processing model — artificial neural networks (ANNs); and they make this investment to the confessedly aggressive exclusion of more 'classical' information-processing schemes, such as those involving logic. But ANNs are provably equivalent to logic-based schemes. For example, every standard artificial neural net is equivalent to some cellular automaton, which is in turn equivalent to some Turing machine, which is in turn equivalent to some set Φ of first-order formulas 'in action' on the strength of deductive inference. (The uncontroversial chain of equivalence alluded to here is explained in Bringsjord [1991] 'Is the Connectionist-Logicist Clash one of AI's Wonderful Red Herrings?' *Journal of Experimental & Theoretical AI* **3.4**: 319-349.) So what's so special about ANNs? And why do the Churchlands have reputations as — to use their self-description (219) — 'iconoclasts'? Reading this book will make you none the wiser on this question, alas. Enjoy the ride the book gives, but know now that in the end, like a roller coaster, after the thrill you will be back where you began.

Selmer Bringsjord
The Minds & Machines Laboratory
(*Department of Philosophy, Psychology and Cognitive Science*)
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Alex McIntyre
The Sovereignty of Joy:
 Nietzsche's Vision of Grand Politics.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1997.
Pp. xi + 187.
$60.00. ISBN 0-08020-4110-8.

This book is a worthwhile attempt to provide an account of Nietzsche's philosophy centred upon the affirmation of actuality — and hence upon the 'sovereignty of joy'. McIntyre's project rightly leads us away from those interpretations of Nietzsche which, at their most crude read the notion of 'will to power' as signifying an ubiquitous, domineering desire, and at their most subtle — in Heidegger's reading, for example — view his thought as the culmination of subjectivism in philosophy and the finest statement of a

nihilism that has stripped all value from the world. This book attempts rather to articulate the dimensions of Nietzsche's ambition to lead us beyond nihilism by penetrating more fully into its cultural conditions, thus to pass beyond them; and of a 'grand politics' in which the will to power appears not as a will to dominate but as a will to bestow and create. The strength of the book lies essentially in its careful reading of Nietzsche's text so as to bring to the fore this gentler and perhaps more inspirational aspect of his thought; its weakness lies in the claim made throughout (but never satisfactorily vindicated) that such inspirational writing can be the foundation of a 'grand politics'.

As McIntyre lays it out, it is essential to understanding Nietzsche's thought that we distinguish between 'grand' and 'petty' politics, the former being the attempt to recreate 'polity', as opposed to the latter 'politics' which engages the 'empirical realities of political rule' (11). Following Ricoeur, McIntyre suggests that 'politics' in the petty sense takes place within the encompassing ideality of 'polity'. In Nietzsche's philosophy, the 'polity' is to be articulated in terms of the 'sovereignty of joy', whereby a hierarchy of value flows from the capacity of an individual or, following him, a culture, to affirm what is actual. It appears that this is intended as a 'natural' order and therefore, crucially, one in which no charge of domination could be made. The capacity to 'affirm' determines a 'spiritual order of rank'; and, as Nietzsche writes in *The Antichrist* #57, the most spiritual reign over this order of rank, 'not because they want to but because they *are*; they are not free to be second in rank'. McIntyre characterizes Nietzsche's articulation of such a polity as 'atopian', 'neither utopian nor fully political' (11) and he seems persuaded not only that such a model can be stripped of the ugly fascist overtones that so often have been imputed to Nietzschean politics, but more positively, that this is a model our culture can and should embrace.

One central problem with this account of 'grand politics' as recreating 'polity' is that it seems to entirely evade or equivocate over the nature of the spiritual 'rule' in question, and hence of the relationship between 'grand' and 'petty' politics. McIntyre is so keen to avoid the interpretation of Nietzsche that would make the rule of 'noble' (and 'immoral') characters into a despotic triumph of the will, that he entirely fails to address at any point in this book such questions as the basis of the effective power of such an elite, of the grounds for its recognition or acceptance by those 'lower in rank', or indeed of its legitimacy or justice in any sense. McIntyre's interpretation recognizes that there will be major differences of political interest and desire between, for example, the 'good' and the 'noble', or the 'strong' and the 'weak', but makes no suggestions as to how they will be effectively resolved. It is in precisely such contexts that Nietzsche resorts to what are most readily read as brutal recourses, reflecting his view (at least in some of his remarks) of the entire superiority of the 'spiritual elite' and the entire worthlessness (and eliminability) of the 'weak'. Yet so convinced seems McIntyre of the essential virtue of Nietzsche's views that the citation of a passage such as #258 of *Beyond Good and Evil* where Nietzsche points to the necessity of the 'sacrifice

of untold human beings' passes entirely without comment. Likewise, McIntyre stoutly asserts that 'the principle of inequality of status as expressed in Nietzsche's concept of hierarchy has nothing in common with the principle of inequality of power as expressed in class structure or social stratification' (75). But whilst one might agree that Nietzsche is a powerful critic of the premises of modern arguments for equality, it is much less clear that his own principle of *inequality* follows from premises that are any more acceptable; nor does it become any more persuasive when McIntyre points out that Nietzsche approvingly compared his 'spiritual' ideal with the organization of the Indian caste system.

Overall, then, the argument of the book is unpersuasive unless one accepts wholesale the unquestionable accuracy of Nietzsche's terms of diagnosis, his clairvoyant capacity to penetrate to the truth of his own age and the needs of the future, and the rightness of accepting, at any price, the rule of a 'spiritual elite'. Placing faith in the redemptive power of spiritually validated leaders sounds to me too close for comfort to at least one recipe for fascism. Despite its clearly good intentions, I do not find in this book any serious answer to the question of why we should dissociate Nietzsche's 'grand politics' from a discrediting and tragic manifestation of its 'inspiration' in the world of 'petty politics', a world that — as a matter of actuality deserving its own affirmation — is occupied and organized by the all-too-human. That fact seems sadly neglected here.

Fiona Jenkins
University of Sydney

This is an important book. It is important despite the fact that its topic, the Augustinianism of Descartes, is as old as the *Meditations* themselves. Arnauld, in the fourth set of objections, published in the very first edition of that work, had already found it 'remarkable' that 'our distinguished author has laid down as the basis for his entire philosophy exactly the same principle as that laid down by St. Augustine.'

Still, to my mind, nobody before Stephen Menn has made such a bold and detailed case for saying that Descartes's mature philosophy is 'an attempt to develop from Augustinian principles a complete philosophy to replace that of Aristotle' (393). As Menn notes in this book, 'Gilson and Gouhier and

Gueroult will concede that Descartes takes over intellectual materials of various kinds (concepts, doctrines, arguments, etc.) from Augustine and from other earlier thinkers, but they all think that Descartes' philosophy is in its essence independent of these influences' (13). Menn denies that independence. According to him, Descartes, from 1630 on, 'makes it his task to exhibit the Augustinian understandings of soul and God as principles of physics, and thus of the rest of philosophy' (50). Whether or not one comes to accept this bold thesis, anyone with a serious interest in Descartes, or Augustine, will be challenged by this fresh, imaginative, and wonderfully scholarly work.

The organization of the book is simple enough. Menn begins with two introductory chapters, the second of which lays out 'Descartes' project for a new philosophy.' The statement of Descartes's project in turn invites an extensive discussion of Augustine's philosophy, and especially its Neoplatonic roots. Thus Chapter 3 is primarily about Plotinus and Chapter 4 deals with Augustine.

The second half of the book, entitled 'Descartes's Metaphysics', is essentially an extended commentary on Descartes's *Meditations*, with special reference to its Augustinian lineage. Chapter 5, 'The design of the *Meditations*', sets the stage and then concentrates on *Meditation* I. Chapter 6, 'Isolating the soul and God', deals with the next two *Meditations*, and especially with the first argument for the existence of God in *Meditation* III. Chapter 7, 'Theodicy and method', reconstructs *Meditation* IV as a theodicy that focuses on the 'cognitive evil of error'; it applies reasoning from Augustine's *De libero arbitrio* to explain the origin of this 'cognitive evil'.

Chapter 8, 'From God to bodies', presents Descartes's physics. 'Descartes takes over from Augustine,' Menn tells us in this chapter, 'the discipline for conceiving the mind and God; but his attitude toward other incorporeal principles is not benign neglect but active hostility.' He adds: 'Descartes' doctrine that God is (with the necessary qualifications) the sole cause of motion in bodies follows directly from his elimination of the rest of the Platonic system of principles' (382-3).

The sweep of Menn's discussion is grand; the scholarship is encyclopedic. Yet everything is unified by the strikingly simple thesis that Descartes took over Augustine's 'way to wisdom' to develop his own metaphysics, epistemology, and physics. How does Menn substantiate his claim of an underlying Augustinian structure in Descartes's thought that others have overlooked, or insufficiently appreciated? He doesn't offer any newly discovered letters or other manuscript finds. Rather, he rests his case on lining up significant parallels. 'We have direct evidence from Descartes' correspondence that Descartes did read Augustine,' he writes, 'but we cannot say when or how much; certainly we cannot "prove" by this type of evidence that Descartes drew on Augustine in composing the *Meditations*, the metaphysics of the *Discourse*, or the lost metaphysics of his first months in Holland' (66).

Again and again, I have to say, the parallels between Augustine and Descartes that Menn produces are indeed striking. There can be no doubt

that he has given us in this book a fresh and excitingly bold reading of Descartes. Does his reading distort Descartes? Does it distort Augustine? With such a bold thesis some distortion is, no doubt, inevitable. To make up one's mind about how serious the distortion is, and whether it can be easily compensated for, will require judicious reflection. I shall conclude by mentioning one concern that I have.

Menn's treatment of Descartes's first argument for the existence of God, in *Meditation* III, is, quite simply, a *tour de force*. He sees this argument as an elaboration on Augustine's description of a mystical ascent in Book VII of the *Confessions*. The 'argument' in Augustine, such as it is, consists in the claim that, at the height of reason's ascent, reason 'knew the immutable itself [that is, God] (for unless it had somehow known this, it could not have preferred it for certain to the mutable) ...' (*Confessions* VII, xvii, 23, Menn's own translation, 266).

On the face of it, this statement in Augustine hardly looks like an argument at all. Menn tells us that what Augustine is 'implicitly asserting' in this passage 'is that our idea of God as Nous is *cataleptic*' (268), where a cataleptic idea is one that is 'impressed and shaped by the thing it is from, with a character it could not have from anything other than the thing it is from' (234).

I must admit that I am not at all sure what it would be to assert only 'implicitly' that our idea of God is cataleptic; but it seems to me that the conceptual machinery one would need to manage that feat is misplaced in the effort to give a plausible reading of the *Confessions* passage, which, I would say, presupposes only the rather common-sense assumption that one can't recognize the mutable to be inferior to the immutable if one is ignorant of the immutable.

Finding a hidden catalepsis in Augustine's laconic description of the mystical ascent is, however, not enough to get us all the way to Descartes's highly technical argument in *Meditation* III. To get close to that argument we need to be able to appeal to a distinction between formal and objective reality and to the principle that 'for a given idea to contain such and such objective reality, it must surely derive it from some cause which contains at least as much formal reality as there is objective reality in the idea' (AT VII, 41). This rather elaborate philosophical machinery seems a long way from Augustine's simple idea that, unless reason knows the immutable, it cannot prefer the immutable to the mutable.

Does it matter that Stephen Menn's Augustinian reconstruction of Descartes moves well beyond anything that is explicit in Augustine? One could argue that Menn's highly imaginative reconstructions reveal the power latent in Augustine's ideas. And perhaps that is right. But I worry that it may also keep us from seeing how different Augustine's thought is from Descartes's, both in its aims and in its presuppositions. Thus it is an important fact that reading Descartes's *Meditations* can put one in the grip of what has come to be called 'the problem of the external world'. The above-mentioned argument for God in *Meditation* III is perhaps Descartes's

best effort to solve that problem and so get one out of solipsism. Its finicky distinctions are carefully crafted to respect the Meditator's 'egocentric predicament' and to avoid begging the question against solipsism.

Reading Augustine's *Confessions* will not put one in the grip of the 'problem of the external world'. On that important difference between the *Meditations* and the *Confessions* rest many other differences between modern philosophy and the philosophy of late antiquity, including the 'proto-modern' philosophy of Augustine. Stephen Menn's wonderful book makes Augustine's Fourth Century much less remote from Descartes's Seventeenth Century than we had thought it was. But it should not be allowed to obliterate the difference.

Gareth B. Matthews
University of Massachusetts/Amherst

Jay Newman
Inauthentic Culture and its
Philosophical Critics.
Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press
1997. Pp. 218.
$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-1676-X);
$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7735-1691-3).

Raphael Sassower
Technoscientific Angst:
Ethics and Responsibility.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1997. Pp. xv + 140.
US$42.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-2956-0);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-2957-9).

Social criticism errors when it yokes historical perception to the passage of calendric time. The ease of abstraction is thought to reflect an ease of recognition. Yet very often the events themselves are not accessible to traditional philosophical method. They lie obscured in the opposite extremes of esoteria and commonplaceness. To meet this challenge requires an effort in translation: from the specialized disciplines into the public domain; and from the exposure of daily life into the sharp awareness of social evolution.

Jay Newman's *Inauthentic Culture and its Philosophical Critics* and Raphael Sassower's *Technoscientific Angst: Ethics and Responsibility* are philosophical translations. Culture and technology have long been concep-

tual prisms for modern and postmodern thought. Newman and Sassower demonstrate that their value for reflection is far from exhausted. Indeed, they remain powerful concepts for raising perspectives which, by design or neglect, otherwise pass unnoticed.

Unlike many of his predecessors whose constructions confine themselves to elevated cultural ideals, Newman takes up the no less interesting manipulation of those ideals. He notes the ambiguity of the adjective 'inauthentic', but supports his position with the commonplace descriptions of inauthentic cultural products. Labels like 'sham', 'counterfeit', and 'deceptive' capture the sense of skepticism people register when describing a 'phony' cultural content. The dynamics of inauthentic culture make for the strongest chapter in the book, 'Plato and the Classical Analysis.' A thematic reading of *The Republic* solidly demonstrates the classical origins of cultural critique. Sassower notes that Plato's use of Socrates, Thrasymachus and others illuminates the moral and metaphysical elements of inauthentic culture. To counter its potentially destructive effects, Plato issues his by now canonical warning about poets. Willing to sacrifice propriety to persuasion, such individuals may subvert or invert (*anatropē*) a civilization's hierarchy of values. Likewise, phony cultural products have a corrupting influence because they mask a metaphysical illusion — behind the veneer of cultural substance lies a vulgar opportunism that injures the sense of an objective reality.

The thorny issue of cultural relativity makes for a fine survey of the considerable differences regarding authentic versus inauthentic cultural judgments. Newman turns to anthropological sources to advance the idea that, in some forms, cultural relativism can promote tolerance. From this position he sketches the outline of an 'intercultural dialogue.' The aim of such a dialogue is to broaden the base of cultural politics to reflect a more inclusive appraisal of human society.

The remainder of the book is somewhat inconsistent in its strength of argument and presentation. A chapter on some of the foremost philosophers of culture (Augustine, Erasmus, Voltaire and Nietzsche) is entirely too brief. In organizing the discussion in terms of an overly simple conceptual framework, Newman drains all depth and subtlety out of them. The following chapter on Thorstein Veblen and Allan Bloom plumbs the economic, educational, and theological dimensions of cultural commentary. The final chapter confronts the powerful phenomena of television and public relations as vehicles of inauthentic culture. With respect to the latter's sophisticated networks of influence, especially, the philosophical cultural critic must proceed in league with fellow reform-minded, Platonic 'craftsmen' in forwarding the aims of cultural responsibility.

Where Newman sought to translate the effects of inauthentic cultural *products*, Sassower wants to translate the efforts of technoscientific *producers*. Specifically, Sassower's interest in Hiroshima and Auschwitz lies in their insight into the 'self-policing functions of the technoscientific community' (1). By now we know the trial accounts and the death toll; but what about the

scientists responsible for bringing this technology into existence? What is their understanding of their own complicity?

Hiroshima and Auschwitz may be singular instances of humanity's will to self-annihilation (although the question of singularity is itself complex and debatable), but those responsible for them were participating in a scientific ethos with a very definite past. The first chapter 'Responsible Technoscience: The Haunting Reality of Auschwitz and Hiroshima' is devoted to the Enlightenment origins of science. The quest for control and the improvement of humanity through science were pillars of the Enlightenment project. Mastery of nature was linked to human destiny, and engineering metaphors guided universal ideals of human perfectibility. In its spirit this was a remarkable belief in adaptability and progress. However, Sassower traces out the consequences of scientific ideals stripped of ethical accountability, as illustrated by the Nazi programs for racial hygiene.

The fluid category of 'control' is discussed concerning its various philosophical treatments. The constructivist position is rejected as too reductionistic. From the premise that we in some manner 'construct' Nature, the constructivist concludes that we possess near total control over Nature. Offering a more balanced perspective is the Stoic position, which is useful in correcting the common tendency to shift into the category of controllable things those which are uncontrollable.

The thematization of this tendency makes for the genuine contribution of Sassower's premise. Technoscientific angst is the product of a lack of control written into the scientific principles of testability and falsifiability. This anxiety is further heightened by the scarcity of funding for projects whose results may not be measurable according to a calculus of utility. Robbed of financial and popular support, shamed into silence by its barbarous uses, scientific anxiety quickly turns into anguish. Seen in this light, scientists, like other concerned individuals, express a sober distress over the future of humanity. This is well illustrated by letters, diary entries and speeches of Robert J. Oppenheimer and others central to the Manhattan project. Each selection clearly expresses their daunting realization of its world-destroying capability.

From there Sassower turns to postmodern philosophy for a resurrection of responsibility. Incorporating existential concepts into the analysis, he argues for a sense of responsibility that survives the postmodern attack on transcendental foundations, and that is actually heightened in the process. Joining a nuanced reading of Lyotard and Levinas with an economic program of institutional support makes a complete indictment of science indefensible. In light of the profound awareness of one's cultural context, the possibility of an ethics of technoscience depends upon expanding the horizons of our intersubjective community.

In the last chapter 'Cultural Changes: Agenda Setting', Sassower entertains a juridical theory of absolute liability for research application. Such a demanding assertion of accountability may only have a heuristic application, yet he believes it might create the conditions in which technoscientific angst,

rather than a professional heresy, is recognized as the stirring of an ethical conscience.

Jonathan Kim-Reuter
New School for Social Research

Morag Patrick
Derrida, Responsibility and Politics.
Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 1998.
Pp. xii + 169. US$59.95. ISBN 1-85972-545-7.

In this book Morag Patrick takes up again the academic imperative of speaking to the problem of Derrida's politics. Derrida's presence on the terrain of philosophy has left many commentators uneasy concerning how his philosophical works relate to the problems of ethics and politics. Patrick's book enters into this debate, first by sketching out some primary interpretations and then offering her own account, largely in opposition to what has gone on before. There are even times in the book when Derrida (whose thoughts the book is designed to disclose more clearly) becomes lost in these debates.

Many commentators have labelled Derrida as a nihilist, believing that he is arguing against all forms of intelligibility, agency and justice. Deconstruction would then lead to undecidability, blindness and paralysis. It is therefore the very antithesis of politics. But, according to Patrick, Derrida's deconstructive strategies have the opposite goal, which is to open up opportunities of thought and alternative futures by attacking the givenness of dominant ways of understanding ethics, politics, and the world.

Patrick's account stresses the concept of text in Derrida's writings. Text here does not simply mean written words. As Patrick emphasizes, text refers to 'all possible referents' (131). Deconstruction is thus political because it is a transformative practice which questions 'our protocols of reading' (19). This questioning is connected to Derrida's general 'interrogation of philosophical authority' (33) which considers what it means for someone to have a position (political, ethical, or otherwise).

As Patrick points out, one of the persistent themes in Derrida's writings in his attempt to undermine the reassurances that frequently arise from our ways of understanding ourselves and of reading the world. In ethical and political discourses these reassurances take the form of justification and authority. For Derrida, what is 'ultimate' must remain a secret, must remain beyond (but nonetheless assumed by) our modes of understanding (63).

Questioning is a crucial aspect of Derrida's politics. According to Patrick, Derrida is highly critical of those who ask questions 'hypocritically', meaning that their very asking of the question is tied to the answers they already want

to give. They do not ask questions so much as use questions to introduce their solutions. Derrida, in contrast, encourages an openness to questioning. As Patrick writes, 'for Derrida the project of overcoming or incorporating metaphysics must be repeated indefinitely' (51). There is no already existing end to questioning.

Patrick places Derrida's politics and ethics closest to the work of Levinas. For Levinas, it is from our regard for the other that we create a moral order in which responsibility makes sense. According to Patrick, however, Derrida criticizes Levinas for presupposing the very thing that this relationship creates, which is that the other is also a human being (101). Derrida, on the other hand, questions the givenness of this other as a particular kind of other. According to Patrick, therefore, Derrida is engaged in rethinking the nature of responsibility in a way that 'can no longer be reduced to that which is assumed by the autonomous moral agent' (105). However, while decentering the human subject as the sole moral agent has lead some deconstructionists to expand the moral terrain, Patrick does not do so. The moral terrain remains a human terrain.

Undecidability is another central concept for Patrick's understanding of Derrida's political strategies. Undecidability does not mean people cannot make decisions. Instead, undecidability refers to the inability of any system of justifications to justify itself. One implication that Patrick draws for politics is that people ought to relate to each other differently, specifically because 'inventiveness of a deconstructive writing aspires to make itself responsive and open to the other' (138).

This undecidability not only grounds a deconstructionist version of toleration, it also grounds human freedom. According to Patrick, 'the instant of the decision' secures responsibility while at the same time removing the decision itself from the closed systems of knowledge. With the freedom arising from human decisions and the uncertainty of our knowledge, the future becomes the crucial site of transformative politics. It is here that readers ought to look for Derrida's politics.

At the end of the book, the reader may be left wondering whether Derrida is offering a somewhat obscured variant of an existential politics. Unfortunately, after offering her account of Derrida's politics, Patrick does not step back to reflect on her own conclusions or possible criticisms of those conclusions from other readers. The book ends once Derrida has been saved from his critics and a way out has been created. Perhaps this ending is sufficient insofar as many commentators simply reject him, often for very poor reasons. However, while the book establishes that Derrida's writings have a political significance, the discussion of their importance is barely begun. Given Derrida's place in contemporary philosophical debates, the implications of his writings for political and ethical concerns are clearly important. *Derrida, Responsibility and Politics* is far from the final answer to these concerns.

Brian William Richardson
University of Hawaii

David Porter, ed.
Internet Culture.
New York: Routledge 1997. Pp. xvii + 279.
US$17.95. ISBN 0-415-91664-4.

Internet Culture is a collection of 15 articles drawn from a variety of fields (ranging from anthropology to political science and rhetoric). Although the text is broken into four themes: Virtual Communities, Virtual Bodies, Language, Writing, Rhetoric and Politics and the Public Sphere, the concepts of the on-line community and the ways people participate on the Internet are clearly the focal points.

After two deeply-engrained postmodern pieces on 'community' threaten to wear the reader down, we are told of a variety of types of on-line life. We learn that members of one usenet newsgroup have a community which seems to be based on a 'We're smarter/cooler/nerdier (pick your favourite) than you are' mentality. While this mean-spiritedness is, at first, disconcerting, the case points to the fact although the connotation of community includes a sense of inclusion, it must be defined in part by who or what is excluded.

A feature common to many of the chapters is the 'here's something that I experienced' presentation which is long on detail (thus boring the experienced) but short on analysis (thus not enlightening the novice). However, there are many interesting comparisons drawn. We find a useful piece that balances the separation and connectedness that people seek or experience on line. There's a delightful and informative parallel between historical coffee-houses and on-line communities and still another which uses the American frontier to enlighten us about the electronic frontier.

As if already immersed into the fantasy aspects of Internet gaming, Mizuko Ito speaks of being 'tightly coupled' with her keyboard, embedded in semiotic meanderings (103). While Ito argues that the demarcation between VR (virtual reality) and RL (real life), should be reassessed as a blending rather than a separation, Lockard, who strongly rejects the notion of a virtual community, draws a somewhat stretched (if not troubling) analogy stating that 'cyberspace is to community as Rubber Rita (a plastic blow up doll for men) is to human companionship' (225). Finally, there are good discussions on democracy and the impact of electronic imperialism.

Directly or indirectly we are made aware of the positive and negative elements of community life on-line. Authors discuss annoying 'spams' (e.g., mass junk mailings or repetitions of the same email message over and over), and the offensive LISTSERV flames (i.e., electronic ad hominem attacks). Is there truth in Millard's claim that perhaps 'this phenomenon (flaming) is common on academic LISTSERVs because of the high concentration of reflexive, reflective, anxious, and/or contentious personalities in academic communities'? (147) Then there are the incidents of cyber-assaults ... In other words, if the on-line culture is a community, it sure isn't an utopian one. How depressing to think that the virtual world is populated with the same people we'd like to avoid in real life!

Some of the writings seem introductory in nature, while others are more complex and stand up on continued examination. So I'm not sure who the intended audience is. There are of course, many specific examples of thought-provoking ideas and commentary that make one reflect long after putting the book down. However, I must conclude while some of the text will be of interest to many, all of it will only be of interest to a few.

Jeff McLaughlin
University College of the Cariboo

Jenefer Robinson, ed.
Music and Meaning.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1997.
Pp. xvi + 261.
US$47.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3299-5);
US$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8367-0).

The insight driving this excellent collection is that music theorists, musicologists, and philosophers of music are, often unbeknownst to each other, asking very similar questions, about, e.g., (1) the nature of musical meaning, (2) narrative in musical experience, and (3) the peculiar capacity we humans have to experience music emotionally, and moreover arriving at similar answers. To keep such work apart, not by intellectual substance but merely by disciplinary lines is clearly counterproductive; Robinson's collection shows just how productive the results of a merger can be. Because generalizations concerning the purposes and preoccupations of an author are impossible when eleven are between the same covers (and the eleven in turn represent different fields) and because I am very much in sympathy with the larger editorial effort to bring these fields together, I will try to convey at least a sense of the ground covered and the methods employed in covering it.

After a comprehensive introduction, in which Robinson sets the stage with a return to the Wagner-Hanslick debates concerning music's expressive power versus analytical formalism and showing how this oppositional legacy persists, Leo Treitler's loosely speculative essay ranges over issues in music-language analogies. Even if this essay mentions more than it explains, it does argue the fundamental position that 'Music is protean and its meanings span the range of human action and experience' (55), and thus that formalistic and narratological analyses (roughly, latter-day Hanslicks vs. latter-day Wagners) ought not present an impasse or false dichotomy. Kendall Walton, combining a speculative tone with characteristic finesse in argumentation,

relates the experience of music to his make-believe theory. He shows how the absence of the imaginative 'work world,' or fictional world, upon which we rely in many paintings and all novels, explains the abstractness of music; the music itself does not function as a prop in the game of make-believe. In looking at a painting we see a picture of a dragon and see that it calls for the imagining of a dragon; in listening to music, if we look in a parallel way to the music, we see 'just the notes, and they themselves don't call for imagining anything' (82). Yet this fact does not prevent the listening imagination from running wild — music just does not, unlike the arts of painting and fiction, direct the imagination. Kathleen Marie Higgins closes the first part of the volume with a very readable essay explaining the pernicious post-positivistic conception of the objective work and the consequent elimination of embodied sonic experience in favor of the visual score. She includes fascinating anthropological evidence, and nicely complicates the sound-vs.-score issue, ultimately giving reasons for the value of the score, but from the vantage point of subjectivized, idiosyncratic listening and performing.

Opening the section on music and narrative, a suggestive essay by Fred Everett Maus pursues the implications of overcoming the dichotomy between technical analysis and humanistic emotive description. Expanding on the concept of action in relation to musical understanding, Maus gives a persuasive analysis of an excerpt from Beethoven's *String Quartet Op. 95* incorporating agent-action descriptions. Throughout, the appropriateness of anthropomorphic description is emphasized, concluding with speculative remarks on the largely unexplored significance of narrative theory for musical experience. Anthony Newcomb furthers the discussion of agency within music, focusing on the second movement of Mahler's *Ninth Symphony* with a rich amalgamation of technical analyses and humane criticism, the latter specifically exploring the varieties of agent-presence within the work. In an extraordinarily interesting section, Newcomb identifies three distinct varieties of the presence of the agent, specifically the 'action-force,' within the music (141). He shows how one source of music's complexity of meaning is that, perhaps unlike painting or film, the nature and identity of the protagonist need not be fully revealed or finally resolved. Gregory Karl and Jenefer Robinson convincingly argue that a distinctive variety of hope is expressed in Shostakovich's *Tenth Symphony*. They make the most welcome case that formal and expressive elements are so thoroughly integrated that it is impossible to separate the two, i.e. the expressive claim is not justified by recourse to the prior formal analysis. Rather, the formal function of the work just *is* to express the cognitively complex emotion. As in some preceding essays, more can be said (as the authors readily acknowledge), particularly on the nature of the musical persona to whom we attribute hope, but the larger project of revealing the mutually integrated or noninferential nature of the relations between the formal and the expressive aspects of the work is clear and highly significant.

Charles Fisk writes a lucid miniature in which the strangeness of the trill at the close of the first phrase of Schubert's last sonata (in B-flat Major, D.

960) unfolds into a full and humanistically enriched narrative reading of the musical representation of the desire for inclusion on the part of the outsider. One fascinating element is Fisk's psychological characterization of epiphany (the kind of experience one waits for, usually in silence, that is not fully volitional, etc.) in connection with his analysis of one part of the Sonata in which he finds (in the subjectivist fashion articulated by Higgins) a portrayal of the deepening of silence *in sound*, where this provides the musical setting for the immediately subsequent musical portrayal of (or analogue to — Fisk is admirably cautious regarding representational language as a shaping force on the listener's experience) an epiphany. Marion A. Guck, questioning yet another inherited dichotomy, argues that the line between literal and metaphorical description in music is by no means clear: the concepts of musical space and musical movement — without which we couldn't do anything analytically — are fundamentally metaphorical. Guck observes that an ever-deepening engagement with, or profound hearing of, a piece is the end of figurative, metaphoric, and imagistic description of musical experience, and — although this case is not made within this essay — one is placed by it into a position from which it would be possible to ask the purist-formalists a difficult question: If you want to generate ever-deeper understandings, or hearings, of musical works, and metaphoric descriptions can be shown to achieve just this end as well or better than standard analytic methods (e.g. Schenkerian, functional harmonic, or set-theoretic analyses), then why have you not been quicker to embrace metaphoric and figurative descriptions? (The answer, in my opinion, would take us into a full reconsideration of the rather nasty effects that positivism and the corresponding image of scientific explanation have had on music theory, but that is not Guck's concern here.)

In the final section, in an essay also both forcefully argued and humanistically rich, Jerrold Levinson resolves the apparent paradox of enjoying negative emotion, e.g. loss, anguish, hopeless passion, in musical experience. Levinson considers the varying values of: the increased ability to recognize the phenomenological nuances of emotions; musical catharsis; the savoring of the emotional state; the gains in our understanding of a given negative emotion; the importance of being reassured in our very capacity to feel deep and troubling emotions; and, among others, the overcoming (although he doesn't put it in these terms) of emotional solipsism, the picture or feeling that we are isolated in metaphysical captivity with our negative emotions. It would be difficult to overemphasize this last point in accounting for our strong attraction to negative musical expressivity (indeed the very experience of musical intimacy of this distinct solipsism-refuting kind warrants its own full essay). Levinson is careful to separate his view from arousal theorists; we are put in a state *like* the emotion portrayed in the music, and *imagine* ourselves in that state, but (safely) without the full contextual beliefs and emotional objects prerequisite to the full feeling of emotions. In a remarkable concluding piece, Stephen Davies, in a distinctive philosophical voice, greatly expands the field of discourse, placing music into the broadest contexts of lived experience. Rather than analyzing the relatively specialized

problem of the curious value of negative expressivity in the arts, we should reframe the question, inquiring into both the epistemological and moral value of the varieties of pain and suffering in life and the intertwined aesthetic value of artistic representations of these varieties. Davies displays here a too-rare sensitivity to the framings, to the implicit presumptions, of aesthetic questions, and in leading us back to the very large — but also very deep — questions of the role of art in life shows how much territory has been covered in this volume.

The clear majority of problems with this collection are merely problems of insufficiency; many of the claims and issues here call out for further investigation. On this score one only hopes Robinson has a sequel in mind. This is a humanistically rich, argumentatively subtle, and music-analytically accomplished volume, engendering a fuller awareness of the conceptual legacy of the Wagner-Hanslick debate that would place formal analysis in polemical opposition to narrative and emotive content, and taking a great stride towards overcoming that pernicious dichotomy. The book well deserves an enthusiastic recommendation to everyone desiring a fuller comprehension of the complexities of musical experience.

Garry L. Hagberg
Bard College

Carol Rovane follows John Locke's advice to clarify the concept of person as a first step in explaining personal identity criteria. Rovane finds intuitions on both sides of the conflict between Aristotelian animal and Locke's pheno-menological concepts of person sufficiently reasonable to leave the dispute between them unresolved. The two-fold task of her analysis explains the concept of person, and on its basis tries to answer the problem of personal identity first posed by Locke's thought experiment of the prince and cobbler.

Rovane proposes an 'ethical' criterion of person, and in place of Locke's phenomenological criterion of personal identity, advances a 'normative' theory of personal identity. Among the advantages Rovane claims for her theory is that it answers Locke's problem in such a way as to accommodate the possibility of group persons consisting of more than one animal body and multiple alter persons occupying a single body, in addition to ordinary human-sized persons. Rovane defines persons as rational, reflective, and social

beings. To be social for Rovane entails a mutual agency-regarding recognition on the part of persons that knits them together into a social network. Agency-regard is not merely the epistemic recognition that there are agents other than oneself, but a moral recognition in which persons see one another as facing the same choice concerning whether and when to engage in such agency-regarding relations as conversing, arguing, cooperating, competing, holding one another responsible, as an ethically significant choice.

It is vital for Rovane's purposes that the ethical criterion of person be 'ethically uncontroversial' (72). Yet she loads the ethical criterion of person with a condition that many readers are likely to find ethically controversial indeed. She maintains that: '*persons are agents who can engage in agency-re-garding relations*,' which she further defines as 'the particular kind of *relation* which arises between agents when *one agent attempts to influence another, and yet aims not to hinder its agency*' (72). A person, according to this definition, need not actually hinder nor actually refrain from hindering the agency of another recognized agent, but only be potentially such that he or she can attempt or is capable of attempting to influence without trying to hinder the agency of another.

But why is it ethically uncontroversial to define a person as a being capable of not hindering another's agency? There seems to be a definite ethical bias built into Rovane's definition. If an agent has the capability not to hinder, the agent presumably must equally have the polar complementary capability to hinder. Imagine then an ultra-Hitler, who is agent-regarding only in the epistemic sense, and has no moral regard for others in the sense that he is constitutionally incapable of not aiming to hinder the agency of others. Such a monster would seem to be a person in every other respect, albeit an evil, irredeemably sociopathic person. Another even more worri-some counterexample to Rovane's ethical concept of person concerns autis-tics, who in extreme cases may not even be capable of purely epistemic agent-regard. Rovane acknowledges the implication, but merely bites the bullet when she declares that: 'autistic human beings seem to lack a capacity that even infants possess, which is the capacity to engage in any significant social relations at all. Thus, by the lights of the ethical criterion of person-hood, none of these human beings qualifies as a person' (99).

The exclusion of autistics as nonpersons and the downplaying of the problem for her analysis is remarkable (the index does not even contain an entry for 'autism' or 'autistic'), because it means that on Rovane's theory of personhood, a corporation like GM or the IRS could be a person in the true sense of the word, while an autistic child living in one's own family could not even in principle qualify as a disabled or abnormal, psychologically impaired person. The reason is that Rovane unquestioningly defines a person in active terms of what a person can do rather than in passive terms of what can be done to a person. This is also reflected in her extensive discussion of Kantian and rights view ethics and her virtual disregard of consequentialist ethics, in arguing that her ethical criterion of person is ethically uncontroversial (109-14). Yet the morally significant bias that runs through Rovane's analy-

sis is made even harder to swallow in light of her metatheoretical constraint, repeatedly urged with disconcerting aplomb, that her ethical criterion of person is 'completely ethically uncontroversial'.

The sense in which the criterion is supposed to be ethically uncontroversial is that it does not prejudge whether or not an agent in order to qualify as a person by being capable of agency-regard will actually hinder or not hinder another's agency; it is enough to be faced with the ethical choice, which nonpersons presumably do not have. It may be bad enough, though perhaps something we could live with, to exclude autistics as nonpersons. But in explaining why the ethical criterion of personhood is important, Rovane writes: 'it is natural to say that when agents wield rational, as opposed to nonrational, influence on one another, they thereby treat one another as *persons*, as opposed to mere things' (116). If we cannot regard autistics as persons according to Rovane's ethical criterion, then by the above opposition, we can only treat them as mere things. Is this startling implication of Rovane's ethical criterion of person 'completely ethically uncontroversial'? We could say, and Rovane might need to say, that classifying autistics as nonpersons or even as mere things by itself does not predetermine how we ought to behave toward them. But then what happens to her argument for the importance of the ethical criterion?

Rovane is also concerned that her ethical concept of persons explain a type of moral hypocrisy that occurs when an agent refuses to acknowledge another person as a person. This is supposed to occur in some persons' attitudes toward slaves and women, when they are denied the status of persons by others who nevertheless interact with and engage them in a mutually agent-regarding way. But hypocrisy requires agents to act in a way that is contrary to their personal beliefs, or at least or at most to their publicly professed beliefs, as when they say one thing and do the opposite. Anyone who engages in agency-regarding interactions with others while denying them the status of persons can easily avoid the charge of hypocrisy in that case simply by not accepting or publicly repudiating Rovane's ethical criterion of person. If they do not believe or do not publicly profess to believe in the ethical criterion, then, even if the criterion is correct, they will not be behaving *hypocritically* in the literal sense of the word.

I do not want to conclude on a negative note, because, despite my reservations about the theory of persons and personal identity Rovane offers, there is much to admire in her discussion. The parallelism between Paul Grice's theory of interpersonal communication and Rovane's ethical criterion of person is carefully developed, and there is a brilliant and subtly nuanced exposition of agency-regarding relations. The proposal as a whole, moreover, is challenging and provocative, and is certain to occasion lively discussion by persons interested in action theory and philosophy of mind, as well as moral and political philosophy.

Dale Jacquette
The Pennsylvania State University

Stanley Rudman
Concepts of Person and Christian Ethics.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xii + 409.
US$69.95. ISBN 0-521-587171-0.

This book constructs 'a [theological] reading of personhood that adequately reflects its past and is also able to respond to the creative changes that are taking place in a variety of disciplines that have an interest in personhood' (335), doing so in three steps. Part One, '"Person" in Contemporary Ethics', insightfully discusses recent research on and use of the concept of person in ethics, especially as regards attempted definitions of 'person' in debates in bioethics and animal rights. It emphasizes the concept's rootedness in, yet potential transcendence of, human embodiment, while also insisting that it must be understood within (though potentially transcending) the horizon of the world. Part Two, '"Person" in Christian Perspective', sketches something of the historical development of 'person' in Christian thought, and judiciously suggests that that development's current trajectory will see the further purging of the Greek philosophical alloy (abstract, ahistorical, 'substantialist') from the Christian (concrete and historical) worldview. Part Three, 'Implications for a Christian Ethic', suggests that the concept of person can importantly inform Christian ethical commitments by supporting affirmations of human rights, practices of forgiveness, and an increased concern for the environment.

This subject is very much a topic of important and extensive current debate, and the work offers as comprehensive a survey as one can find of all the relevant literatures. As such it has considerable value. But its worth is limited by its failure to advance much beyond surveying the field. Sometimes it simply overlooks significant issues; for example, the beginning of Chapter Two states that Bernard Williams' critique of person-language is important, and suggests that it will discuss Williams' critique; but it contents itself with engaging R.M. Hare's rather more straightforward (and less interesting) critique. Elsewhere its relative weighting of topics seems problematic. For example, a six-page discussion of the role of revelation in connecting religion and morality (195-201) is vitiated by the earlier gross distinction between (A) accounts of revelation which identify it with propositions, and (B) those which see it as essentially 'various forms of personal encounter, where the propositional element is either absent or muted' (197). But the options are misdrawn; no one would affirm (A) given option (B), which accepts (A)'s interests in propositions (though 'muting' it) while admitting more. The real differences among theologians are between variations of (B); in setting up this simplistic straw-man distinction, the work obscures genuinely useful fine-grained ones.

This is especially vexing on one issue of central import to the book, namely, the comparative discussion of the concepts of 'person' and 'substance'. While the book repeats current platitudes about 'substance metaphysics', it never

discusses what 'substance', a crucial contrastative term to 'person', might mean. Discussions contrasting 'person' and 'substance' in modern philosophy — discussions extending back at least to Heidegger — are crucial for much important theological work on personhood. Rudman knows the exegetical dubiousness of ascribing substantialism to earlier thinkers; he carefully charts how Augustine, for example, is misrepresented by such criticisms (cf. 130-4). 'The primacy of "person" over "substance"' (185) may indeed make 'good theological sense,' but only if one knows what is being rejected in the term 'substance'.

Similar difficulties vex Part Three's normative proposal. Most generally, there is little articulate connection made between the earlier discussion of the concept of person and Christian ethics; while there are gestures made at such a connection, the still-unspecified account of 'person' (hampered by its vague contrast to 'substance') precludes it. Furthermore, the directly ethical positions discussed continue to be under-articulated and thus obscure. Chapter 11 attempts to find (or construct?) some middle ground between the proposals of Stanley Hauerwas and (Seyla Benhabib's version of) Jürgen Habermas, a fascinating and challenging endeavor, if only for the illumination such a project could bring to them individually. But the chapter stays at the level of discussion and remark, never actually engaging the work of the writers, but merely remarking on others' discussion of them. Perhaps the problem here is one of attitude. As I said earlier, as a survey this work has considerable success. But the virtues that served it well as a survey hinder its constructive argument. This work is deferential and careful to a fault; it seeks above all to be fair, discussing all the options it sees available. But this means that it often fails to engage its subjects, but simply talks about them. One wishes it were slightly less well-mannered, somewhat more pugnacious. It could have been more pushy, for Rudman is on to the right points. For example, he suggests that 'ethical judgements are closely related to overall views of human nature or the world' (123), a view that would get a good fight in some philosophical circles. But the work never really gets around to picking such fights, and so leaves the reader tantalized and frustrated.

Charles T. Mathewes

(Department of Religious Studies)
University of Virginia

Mark Sainsbury, ed.
Thought and Ontology.
Milan, Italy: Franco Angeli 1997. Pp. 176. Np.

Thought and Ontology is a collection of nine essays, each originally presented at a conference in Genoa (Italy) in November of 1995, by various British and Italian philosophers. Each essay focuses in a loose way on how (the intentional aspects of) mind and language bear on the world itself. I single out six as particularly interesting.

Three of these six focus on issues of mind: Jennifer Hornsby's 'Thinkables', Michael Martin's 'The Reality of Appearances', and Scott Sturgeon's 'Rational Mind and Its Place in Nature'. The first two examine the nature of thought-contents in relation to the objects and properties that make such contents true (when they are true). Hornsby approaches this theme by way of her defense of the 'identity theory of truth', which identifies the *content* of the thought that *p* with the *fact that p* (where that *p* is indeed a fact). Martin picks up on the theme of the relation between thought-content and fact by examining the bearing of *perceptual* thought-contents on the world. He suggests how proponents of the 'disjunctive [theory] of perception' (81), according to which the nature of veridical perception differs in (content)-kind from the nature *of subjectively indistinguishable* cases of hallucination or misperception, ought to respond to those who continue to have persistent anti-disjunctivist intuitions in the face of would-be arguments for disjunctivism. Finally, Sturgeon presents a striking structural parallelism between externalist theories regarding mental content and externalist theories in epistemology, which parallelism he explains by suggesting that we bring a 'dualistic ... pre-theoretical ontology' (59) when we confront issues of mind and knowledge. (He adds that this commitment 'deflates under scrutiny'.)

This collection also contains three very interesting papers on language: Diego Marconi's 'Semantic Normativity without Semantic Norms', Marco Santambrogio's 'Assertability and the Attributive/Referential Distinction', and Mark Sainsbury's 'Reporting Indexicals'. Marconi is anxious to formulate a notion of semantic normativity which neither overly idealizes this normativity (an accusation he levels at Burge; though I would question his interpretation of Burge) nor denies or minimizes this normativity (as Chomsky and Bilgrami are accused of doing). Santambrogio offers a construal of the distinction between the attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions, according to which the difference lies in 'the route the speaker takes, or envisages taking, towards discharging his obligation to ground the asserted statement' (153). And Sainsbury discusses what implications a proper account of what goes on in reporting another's indexically-expressed thoughts will have for the theory of meaning.

I would venture one critical comment about this collection. Given that the thematic connection between the papers on mind and those on language remains largely inexplicit throughout, the collection might have been well served to have included an article that made some perspicuous connections

in this regard. My opinion, for what it's worth, is that an article which took as its starting point issues of self-knowledge of content and meaning would have been well-suited to this purpose. This opinion is supported by the number of contributors on both sides for whom issues of self-knowledge are relevant to their themes. Of those writing on mind, Sturgeon points out (53-8) that a commitment to some sort of self-knowledge of content is required if content is to play its required role in reasoning (one might also add: if content is to play its role in explaining action). And Martin, defending the disjunctive theory of perception, is lead to attempt to construe (in terms consistent with that theory) the contrast between knowledge of one's own conscious states and knowledge of the world (99-102). So too we find self-knowledge issues arising in the papers on language. In her contribution 'Is Language a Natural Object?', Eva Picardi suggests that an important part of the dispute between Dummett and Davidson regarding language lies in their respective conceptions of knowledge of meaning, with one crucial difference being that Davidson's but not Dummett's theory treats a speaker's *first-person* meaning judgements as playing a decisive role in the individuation of that speaker's meanings (117-21). And, while Marconi himself does not advert to issues of self-knowledge of content, Bilgrami himself (whose theory of semantic normativity Marconi discusses at length, 136-8) has made such an appeal as a central motivation for his views on normativity. Given the clear and acknowledged importance of self-knowledge to issues surrounding both mind and language, it might have been fruitful to include one contribution which took such knowledge as its focal point. In this spirit I would speculate that we can illuminate the bearing of thought and language on the world by attending to the similarities and differences between our knowledge of thought and language (on the one side) and our knowledge of the world (on the other).

Of course, it is all too easy (and so is somewhat unfair) to criticize an edited volume of disparate papers for what it is missing: this criticism is both rather pedantic and, given the disparate interests of those participating in the Genoa conference, rather unfair. In this light I hasten to add that I would quite readily recommend this book to those who are interested in the intentionality of mind and language. The (sometimes questionable) overall thematic coherence of the collection is one thing; the excellent quality of the individual contributions themselves, on topics of central importance in contemporary philosophy of mind and language, is another.

Sanford A. Goldberg
Grinnell College

Israel Scheffler
Symbolic Worlds.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.
Pp. viii + 214.
US$49.95. ISBN 0-521-56425-5.

Harvey Siegel, ed.
Reason and Education:
Essays in Honor of Israel Scheffler.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.
Pp. 276.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-7923-4362-X.

Here is a two-part antidote for the idea that analytic philosophy is dead, i.e., that all of its worthwhile gains are past, and that we should look exclusively to its naturalized progeny for the next round of rational progress. Israel Scheffler's *Symbolic Worlds* is a masterful demonstration that there is new territory to explore and settle by looking at the world through the filter of language. *Reason and Education*, on the other hand, is a working tribute to Scheffler which focuses on the progress he and others have made by bringing the avails of analytic philosophy to bear on important problems in education. Both are engaging, valuable additions to the philosophical enterprise.

It is, of course, tempting to think that mainline analytic philosophy has run out of rail. What more, after all, is there to do after so much territory (e.g., in the areas of reference, meaning, truth, and claims to existence) has been so thoroughly explored and largely settled through the analysis of language? After Frege, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, and Quine, shouldn't we now look exclusively to disciplines such as neuroscience for the fulfilment of Hume's dream of finding a natural account of human knowledge? As Scheffler amply demonstrates in *SW*, the answer to the first question is 'lots', and the answer to the second is, therefore, 'no'.

Neither of these answers is intended to suggest that Scheffler's contribution to philosophy ignores the work of his analytic forbears, nor that the ground it breaks is so new and extreme that it renders irrelevant the results of previous philosophical debate, or of disciplinary science. In fact, he readily acknowledges his commitments, and they in turn place him in a familiar neighborhood, i.e., one defined by Goodman's work on symbols on the one hand, and on the other, Quinean parsimony, which in Scheffler's case consists of a spare logical and semantic apparatus and a rejection of entified meaning (as part of a commitment to soft nominalism, i.e. the acceptance of only 'individual referring entities and individual entities referred to' [6]). But where Quine is content to stake out both his canonical formalism and the ontological desert landscape contained in it and go no further, Scheffler sees the possibility of extending standard analysis to cover cases which have been neglected because they fall outside of the usual range of application of standard analysis.

Ordinarily, subjects which most closely fit the strictures of the standard extensionalist first order model take on a guise of normative superiority, while those that don't are simply treated as things to avoid. Thus ambiguity, metaphor, symbolic meaning, play, ritual etc. are either ignored in the analytic canon, or they are treated as nuisances to be routinely avoided. In Quine's case, for instance, the only meaning there is is that which is ultimately resolvable into differences in behavior (which in turn ultimately can be reduced to differences in the irradiation of neural surfaces). Anything which does not easily reduce to this basis is ignored.

Scheffler's goal is to bring these difficult cases into the fold by showing how they can be seen to fit within its bounds. Rather than treating, e.g., metaphor as a degenerate case and something to avoid, Scheffler shows how it and the other nuisance cases can be seen to fit within the bounds of standard analysis.

How Scheffler does it depends on refiguring the semantics of terms. He begins by noting that we answer 'it's a tree' when looking either at a tree or at a picture of a tree (or a description or other depiction), and being suitably prompted by a question 'what's that?' Since natural languages are marvelous mixes of economy and sloth, the obvious thought is that the *only* role for the term 'tree' is to denote trees, and all other uses are treated as shorthand ways of economically capturing the denotation of terms such as 'tree-picture', 'tree-description', etc. Here Scheffler demurs. 'Tree', he suggests, simultaneously denotes trees and *captions* a variety of parallel representations, including pictures, etc. Scheffler calls this extended semantic activity 'mention selection'.

Why do this, one might ask, given that mention selection does not alter received semantics in any way ('tree' still denotes only trees; pictures of trees are still denoted by 'tree-picture', etc.). The answer is that introducing mention selection is a way of picking up certain features of meaning without entifying it. This it does by focusing on the larger context of language in use rather than on language disengaged. Such a shift permits the analysis of meaning to be carried out in a broader behavioral context, which in turn allows the explanation of meaning related phenomena. For instance, Scheffler points out that it is simply not the case that language learning uniformly begins with ostention. The meaning of 'unicorn', for instance, like the meaning of many other terms, is not learned by pointing at unicorns, but rather through gained familiarity with various representations of them. In doing so, the learner becomes familiar with the use of the term 'unicorn,' and not just with the term 'unicorn-picture,' etc. In Scheffler's words: 'The learning of terms, null or not, proceeds by a variety of routes, passing through representations of diverse interlocking sorts, as well as searching for denotata of the terms themselves' (14). It is a way of broadening our approach to terms (and further to language) without forsaking basic analytic semantics.

Within this broadened context, Scheffler sets out to solve problems which vex attempts to analyze notions such as ambiguity, metaphor, play, the relation between science, religion and art, and the concept of ritual. In each

case, his general approach is the same: he seeks a satisfactory analysis, but without forsaking the standard commitments to parsimony, the inscription-alist interpretation of language, etc. Here are some examples of the results:

Recognition of the mention selective transfer of a term from its simple denotation to include companion representations permits the explanation of such diverse phenomena as idolatry, which is a case in which some parallel representation of a thing is mistaken for the thing itself, and metaphor, which is closely akin to the extension of linguistic habits involved in mention selective transfer itself.

In the case of ambiguity, after critically analyzing recent attempts to isolate its source, Scheffler offers his own solution, based on his commitment to inscriptionalism (basically, it is that if two tokens are replicas (i.e. inscrip-tionally similar) to one another, they are ambiguous if they do not denote the same things). While this dense and well argued discussion covers familiar territory, what comes next does not. Scheffler extends the analysis to ambi-guity in pictures. Since inscriptionalism is inapplicable here (there is no definitive 'spelling' for pictures), Scheffler brings in mention selection, point-ing out that its use extends to pictorial metaphor as well as to the linguistic variety.

On the general topic of metaphor, Scheffler takes on ten 'myths' about metaphor (e.g., that its author has privileged access to it, or 'once a metaphor, always a metaphor'), and again uses mention selection as a way to under-stand creativity in art and, in a delightful discussion of the work of E.H. Gombrich, play.

This is followed by a discussion of three essentially symbolic enterprises, i.e., science, religion and art, and the disparate relations which exist between them. Why is it, he asks, that science and religion are often depicted as being enemies, while art seems to get along well with both? Is it that the latter is considered to be emotive, while the former two are cognitive in intent? In an interesting discussion of the similarities and differences among the three based again on semantics as the common meeting ground, Scheffler effec-tively questions conventional thinking about the three, and concludes that the discrepancy in relations can best be understood in terms of the role of authority in science and religion.

Next there is an equally interesting analysis of ritual, which flows natu-rally from the preceding sections, and finally (except for the inclusion of a revised version of Ch. 5 of *Science and Subjectivity*), Scheffler offers a critique of Goodman's conception of worldmaking, in which he argues for a sharper divide between real world and representation than he finds in Goodman's work.

None of the main ideas contained in this book are introduced in it for the first time, but are instead drawn from a wide variety of Scheffler's earlier works. Those who have followed the development of those ideas over the years will realize, however, that *SW* is a next step in the process. Those meeting these ideas for the first time, on the other hand, will find them easily accessible without acquaintance with his earlier work.

Reason and Education, by contrast, is a collection of articles written by scholars from around the world who share an interest in Scheffler's ideas on education. Like those contained in *SW*, his ideas on education are motivated by a commitment to the virtues of analytic philosophy, i.e., to 'the rigorous, logical analysis of key concepts related to the practice of education.' Harvey Siegel includes that quotation, taken from Scheffler's early 'Toward an Analytic Philosophy of Education' (1954) as an indication of the guiding principle in his work on education. The articles, some by philosophers and others by specialists in education, reflect Scheffler's own commitments while making interesting additions of their own.

Familiar themes emerge from the seventeen articles (which originally appeared in two numbers of the journal *Philosophy and Education*). Some (i.e., those by Iris Yob, Jan Steutel and Ben Spiecher, and Ann Diller) deal with Scheffler's long-standing stress of the close proximity of the rational and the moral. The ideal (laid down in his critique of Kuhn in *Science and Subjectivity*) is the attainment of *responsible* belief, i.e., that (in opposition to varieties of subjective relativism), one ought to have a stake in the assertions she or he makes, i.e., should be able, among other things, to give a reasoned defense of assertions made. One of the more interesting articles in the volume, '(Re) Inventing Scheffler, or, Defending Objective Educational Research', by D.C. Phillips, brings Scheffler's arguments in this regard to bear on recent postmodernist and feminist attempts to justify latter-day versions of the same relativism.

The idea that belief and responsibility go together has obvious relevance when talk turns to education theory. Since students should be asked to rationally defend claims they make, says Scheffler, the education of teachers should include gaining familiarity with this (essentially philosophical) enterprise. Several papers in the volume are clustered around issues confronting attempts to bring a philosophical component into teacher education (i.e., those by Diller, William Hare, Allen Pearson, and Robin Barrow). The best of these, and the best in the volume, is William Hare's 'Reason in Teaching: Scheffler's Philosophy of Education: "A Maximum of Vision and a Minimum of Mystery"'. In it, Hare presents a particularly clear and comprehensive account of Scheffler's theory of education.

Other articles pursue topics which range from Scheffler's views on religious education (two articles which nicely connect with Scheffler's comments on the nature of religion in *SW*), to others on how Scheffler's ideas relate to recent U.S. legislation on education reform on the one hand, and to W.E. Deming's conception of total quality management on the other. Articles such as these demonstrate the practical applicability of Scheffler's ideas on education.

The volume suffers from two defects: it contains no index, and although most of the papers include a list of references, the work would have benefited from a single, amalgamated list.

Symbolic Worlds and *Reason and Education* give ever more evidence of Israel Scheffler's place of importance in twentieth-century philosophy. What sets him apart is his ability to apply the insights gained in the analytic tradition to problems in a wider world. While others are known for solving 'insider' problems, i.e., those which originate within the confines of language itself, Scheffler continues to bring clarity and insight to problems of importance which lie beyond the usual limits of academic philosophy.

James Van Evra
University of Waterloo

Nicholas Smith
Strong Hermeneutics.
New York: Routledge 1997. Pp. x + 197.
Cdn$91.00: US$65.00
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-16431-1);
Cdn$32.95: US$22.99
(paper: ISBN 0-415-16432-X).

No doubt there is some sort of connection between what kind of beings we necessarily are and what kind of beings we should be. But how to understand these two ideas, and the nature of this connection, is far from clear.

In *Strong Hermeneutics*, Nicholas Smith surveys and evaluates no less than five different schools of thought about the connection between contingency and moral identity, arguing that the school whose name is reflected by the book's title best captures the truth of the matter. The most valuable aspect of the book is the way it brings the arguments emanating from each of these camps into contact with one another, facilitating comparison of their respective merits.

The *pre-critical school* and the *Enlightenment fundamentalist school* background most of the discussion. Proponents of the pre-critical view maintain (or maintain*ed*) that human identity is grounded in an objective cosmological metaphysics. We can find meaning in our lives, because the universe itself is structured by relations of meaning. But as the rise of natural science expelled meaning from nature, Enlightenment fundamentalists began to argue that the disenchantment of nature implies the disenchantment of moral identity — since the universe is a pointless machine, so too are our lives. Note, however, that both the pre-critical view and Enlightenment fundamentalism tacitly agree that meaning (or the lack thereof) in our lives goes hand in hand with cosmological significance (of the lack thereof).

Smith explores three contemporary hermeneutical reactions to both of these positions, each of which starts from the problem of making sense of morality in a contingent world. *Weak hermeneutics*, exemplified by the work of Richard Rorty and Jean-François Lyotard, agrees with the Enlightenment Fundamentalists that there is no objective moral identity. Thus it gives up the idea that there is some order by which self-creation should be directed. But it also urges us to acknowledge that contingency is ubiquitous. On this view, *both* ethics *and* science are expressions of non-cognitive valuations, reflections of just one among many possible perspectives. Thus a marked contrast between objective nature and subjective identity is uncalled for.

Whereas weak hermeneutics challenges the Enlightenment's sharp dichotomy between moral identity and science by arguing for the contingency of the latter, *strong hermeneutics*, best exemplified by the work of Charles Taylor and Hans-Georg Gadamer, does the same by arguing for the necessity of the former. It achieves this, however, without recourse to the metaphysics of the pre-critical view. Rather, it hopes to show that rationality can apply to self-understandings in much the same way as it does to domains more traditionally associated with cognition. It argues for the cognitivity of normative beliefs in part by arguing that rationality is not the application of ahistorical and acultural rules, but is instead to be understood as an *improvement* in perspicuous articulation which discloses truth (23). That is, rationality is a comparative notion, coming on the scene when there are better and worse ways of understanding some subject matter.

Now the subject matter Smith is most concerned about is oneself. That is, as a defender of strong hermeneutics, he wants to show that there are indeed better and worse ways of understanding oneself, and, furthermore, that this is *not* a contingent fact about us. We are necessarily beings who have ideals we can fail to live up to. Smith recounts Taylor's arguments for this view, maintaining that Enlightenment fundamentalists, utilitarians, and even deconstructionists are motivated by an understanding of a self who is nobler or baser, more or less authentic. So it is a necessary fact about us that we have some self-ideal or other. And the cultural-cum-historical notion of rationality strong hermeneutics embraces enables it to say that some self-ideals are better — that is, closer to the truth than others.

Smith talks tough when he takes on weak hermeneutics, but, unfortunately, he gets cold feet when he turns back to contemporary Anglo-American figures sympathetic to Enlightenment fundamentalism. Crispin Wright, for instance, has famously argued that moral realists must hold that those with false moral views are making a cognitive mistake. Smith, however, doesn't believe that realists need be committed to this thesis. Wright's test requires a realistic discourse to be both cognitive and representational, and Smith thinks that while strong hermeneutics can attain the first of these marks, it rightly does not strive for the second (74). But Wright attempts to understand what representation is *by* focusing on cognition. For Wright, if you've got genuine cognition, you've got genuine representation, and thus you're on the

road to realism. So Smith's commitment to moral realism seems either half-hearted or confused.

The final school of thought Smith expounds (at some length!) and attacks is Habermas's *deep hermeneutics*. Tracing Habermas's views from the early writings on Hegel to the recent work on discourse ethics, Smith both approves of deep hermeneutics' criticism of Enlightenment fundamentalism, and yet maintains that deep hermeneutics does not go far enough to acknowledge the notion that moral thought is both substantive and rational. Habermas separates matters of truth from sources of value-orientation, and this, Smith thinks, leaves us with an insufficiently robust notion of ethical life. Smith rightly complains that Habermas' procedural ethics fails to see that its own appeals to fairness and consistency are not transcendental, as claimed, but are grounded in substantive moral sources no less than the views of others.

In the end, however, *Strong Hermeneutics* is long on exegesis and presentation of the arguments of others, and comparatively short on original argument. This would not be deadly if it made the views of the various parties more accessible to the curious reader, doing for hermeneutics what Raymond Geuss's wonderful little book, *The idea of a critical theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School* (Cambridge University Press 1981) did for critical theory. But Smith's prose is often turgid and unnecessarily laden with technical jargon. Readers interested in the arguments put forward by defenders of strong hermeneutics will do better to go to the original sources of these arguments, principally, the writings of Charles Taylor.

Eric Wiland
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

John Sutton
Philosophy and Memory Traces:
Descartes to Connectionism.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xviii + 372.
US$69.95. ISBN 0-521-59194-5.

In *Philosophy and Memory Traces*, John Sutton describes and defends two theories of autobiographical memory that depart from static archival metaphors by employing distributed representation. Attributable primarily to Descartes, the first is a bizarre view of memories as patterns in fleeting animal spirits: nervous fluids roaming in 'secret canals' throughout the porous brain and body. The second theory is new connectionism, in which memories are stored superpositionally (i.e., many traces are piled or layered in the same physical structure, where identical resources are used to repre-

sent different recallable items) and reconstructed rather than reproduced. Both models raise urgent philosophical issues about control of one's personal past and the relation between self and body. Sutton shows how animal spirits theories fueled moral controversies during a time when many struggled to find a place for personal responsibility in the face of rising mechanistic ideologies and concerns about the 'phantasmal chaos of association.'

After an introductory chapter, the book divides into four sections. Part I is primarily historical, and provides an anchor for what is to come by a long reading of Descartes' physiology of memory. Sutton questions the assumption that animal spirits were detrimental to the development of brain-mind sciences, and offers a reinterpretation of Cartesian psychophysiology. While some have dismissed Descartes' neuromechanical speculations as betraying an exuberant rationalist disdain for observation, Sutton warns that such easy vilification of Descartes does not answer well to philosophical or historical complexity. 'Descartes was a mechanical philosopher who was as interested in the motions of matter as in the supernatural realm carefully separated from it ... : although a dualist, he was uninterested in metaphysical dualism' (52). Allegedly, what emerges from a careful reading of *L'Homme* is a theory outlining the rudiments of a *distributed model of memory*, not a repository of images or an inner lexicon. Noting that the idea of trace distribution is independent of the technocomputational advances of recent years, Sutton makes a good case for his unorthodox rendition of Descartes' analysis of memory operations, and for the interpretive consequences which ensue.

The second part of the book follows the linked fates of animal spirits and neurophilosophical models of memory through the centuries after Descartes: 'I set up mysteries about why the fleeting hypothetical entities survived well into the Enlightenment despite experimental evidence against them, and about why they did eventually disappear in the eighteenth century before the development of a coherent replacement theory of neural transmission' (117). Sutton ascribes the narrowing mobilization of previously accepted physiological forces not to seventeenth century Cartesian mechanism, but to eighteenth century moralism. Specially harsh was the reaction of English critics who looked upon animal spirits as morally repugnant, denying the symmetry and stability of true thinking, and reducing all mental phenomena to the chance fusion of rummaging motions. In a selective rather than exhaustive survey, Sutton focuses on the responses of Digby, More, Glanvill, and Hooke. As in many cases, the basis for their dissatisfaction was a perceived tension between a need for the inner control of an integrated selfhood and the perpetual flux of the undisciplined spirits.

In part III Sutton contrasts criticisms of contemporary connectionist theories with attacks on earlier distributed models. He observes that the comparison uncovers shifting attributions to mechanism and associationism. Early modern scholars from Glanvill to Coleridge saw distributed models as too chaotic, their unstructured traces too prone to interference to account for the faithful preservation of past events in their proper order. But modern

complaints, from perspectives as different as Fodor's and Hampshire's, take associationism to be too passively mechanistic to capture the productivity and generativity of mental life. Nonetheless, 'the two forms of hostility are not as distinct as they seem. Both ... require the involvement of an active, autonomous, controlling self ... ' (226). Defending connectionism against its critics, Sutton reveals the extent to which old problems of the self continue to be implicated in cognitive science.

The final section challenges the cogency of wholesale refusals to countenance memory traces. Sutton applies to the case of memory some problems concerning mental representation, and goes on to argue for the postulation of distributed storage. He presents a taxonomy of the various criticisms of trace theories, and stresses that classical objections apply only, if at all, to local and not to distributed models. The justification for a systematic approach in appraising the strength of dissenting points of view is obvious: 'without clearing the ground by showing that distributed models (unlike static trace theories) do not suffer the conceptual incoherence with which critics charge them, no future and more positive interdisciplinary memory work will be secure' (277).

Philosophy and Memory Traces successfully combines lucidity with elegance of style, historical context with critical assessment. It takes the reader on a guided tour through a sometimes misunderstood segment of the history of memory scholarship, and should benefit researchers from a wide range of areas — early modern philosophy of mind, morality and ethics, psychology, cognitive science, sociology, medical history and anthropology — as well as anyone interested in the ancestral roots of present-day connectionism. Sutton is clearly well informed, his knowledge and insight noticeable in every well-expressed sentence. Each chapter helps to build his central argument and, in union with supplemental appendices and pertinent references, contributes to a provocative, highly engaging book.

It has been said that philosophical opinions are seldom free from personal dogmas and prejudices. Sutton demonstrates this simple truth insofar as it extends to the seventeenth century memory debate. Although there have been other surveys of the subject, what distinguishes the work under consideration is its novel interpretive stand, and its vivid exposition of underlying attitudes, motivations, values and fears.

The study of cognition has always been a complicated business. Sutton accordingly reminds us, with all the sympathy that comes from a shared affliction, that 'we are, inevitably, more mixed within ourselves than we know' (322).

Mazen Maurice Guirguis
University of British Columbia

F.H. Bradley once wrote that 'Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.' His analytical successors tended to take this phrase all too literally: metaphysical reasoning was uniformly bad (especially when perpetrated by the British idealists who also had rather dubious instincts, especially concerning the state) and therefore the metaphysical instinct should be fought, not indulged. Thus Peter Geach refers to the 'woolly idealists' and wrote approvingly that his hero McTaggart 'despised their bad logic, their *dirigiste* do-gooder politics, their awed tone of voice about the State as if they spoke about a deity' and that the British idealists had no care for the individual persons as the bearer of values (P. Geach, *Truth Love and Immortality*, 22, 12).

That matters have changed is amply demonstrated by the renewed philosophical interest in the work of the British idealists and their social and political philosophy. Paul Harris, John Morrow and Geoffrey Thomas have done much to rehabilitate T.H. Green, while David Boucher and others have shown the interest and importance of Collingwood's political philosophy. Interest in Collingwood also encompasses philosophy of history, aesthetics and metaphysics, whereas interest in Bradley, by contrast, has tended to focus primarily on his metaphysics and theory of truth. The major exception is in the work of Peter Nicholson, who in addition to examining Bradley's social and ethical thought, writes on Bosanquet. But hitherto he has been a lone voice. There have been no monographs on Bernard Bosanquet since Bertil Pfannenstill's *Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophy of the State* in 1936. Given this background — and the assumption that his work is worth studying — a new book on Bosanquet is much to be welcomed.

It is striking how Bosanquet's concerns have once again become ours. For instance, the new communitarian agenda (in both the ontological and the normative sense) and revived interest in the concept and practice of citizenship, have triggered a revival of interest in precisely the questions the idealists were addressing and some of the answers being developed bear a close family resemblance to those offered by the idealists.

In Sweet's view, our modern theories of human rights are inadequate and Bosanquet has a contribution to make to contemporary debates on the topic. He addresses Bosanquet's conception of rights against a background of, on the one hand, his idealist philosophy and social ontology and, on the other, the work of Bentham, Mill and Spencer. He shows how and why Bosanquet rejected the idea of natural rights and that this rejection springs from his

social ontology. Man is a social being, and hence a proper understanding of rights must be rooted in that understanding: further, rights are not attached to persons as such, but to individuals as holders of positions in society. *Pace* the advocates of natural rights, it is unintelligible to speak of individuals existing in a pre-societal condition as possessing rights.

The role of the state is explicitly related by Bosanquet to a conception of the general will which, in sharp contrast with utilitarian doctrines, is distinguished from the will of all or the aggregate of individual wills. The discussion of Bosanquet in relation to Rousseau is conducted sensitively and carefully. Bosanquet is shown as moving in a seemingly statist direction, and yet drawing back from attributing the state too many actual powers. On his Kantian side, he clearly believes that the moral worth of an action lies in its motive, and that, if the state intervenes, it takes away the moral agent's initiative, and thereby diminishes the moral worth of the action. The state has a positive role to play and yet cannot directly promote the good: from this follows Bosanquet's formula of the hindrance of hindrances to the best life. But this leads to tensions, which Sweet brings out well. For example, Bosanquet wants to argue that the state exists for the sake of the best life and therefore that it is right to impose the general will on a recalcitrant individual; at the same time he draws strict limits to state intervention in practice and is reluctant to allow the state to do anything it would be better for the agent to do him or herself. More broadly, Sweet demonstrates the tensions in Bosanquet's work deriving from different sources, for example, between the deontological Kantian side of his thought and the Aristotelian/Hegelian teleological side. He also addresses the issue of whether Bosanquet was addressing an ideal state, an actual state, or both. Sweet rightly comes down in favour of the latter.

The concept of human rights is firmly shown to be linked to the concept of the human agent, the nature of the individual, and the role individuals play in society. But there are clearly difficulties here, and Sweet does not shirk from exposing them. Thus, Bosanquet seems at times to conflate the categories of state and society, and thereby to represent the state invariably as the benevolent 'flywheel of our lives'. On this charge he is clearly vulnerable; but given his normative orientation, this objection is less damaging than his critics often take it to be. Given his teleological understanding of the individual, state and society, Bosanquet is not at all uncomfortable with the suggestion that actually existing states may deviate in fact from what they have it in themselves to be (just as individuals might be less than they could become), but that all states to some degree are what they ought to be. Another clear difficulty with Bosanquet's theory of rights is that if there are no such entities as natural or human rights independently of the state, and if a right is a claim recognised by the state, there seems to be no possibility of criticising the state for failing to recognise rights. Sweet does his best to extricate Bosanquet from this charge, and works hard on his defence; whether he is ultimately successful is less certain. But he does show that where Bosanquet runs into difficulties, they arise from his determination not to rest content

with 'theories of the first look' which do not so much solve the problems as avoid them.

This book is to be recommended: it makes out a good case for taking Bosanquet seriously, not only as a matter of philosophical antiquarianism, but of current philosophical concern.

James Connelly
(*Social Science Faculty*)
Southampton Institute

Robert G. Turnbull
The 'Parmenides' and Plato's Late Philosophy.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1998.
Pp. xii + 209.
$50.00. ISBN 0-8020-4236-8.

Robert Turnbull's *The 'Parmenides' and Plato's Late Philosophy* is a whole and noble testimony to a mature Plato with a comprehensive ideal both of the intelligible and of the visible worlds. Turnbull finds in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist* the conceptual tools for the *Timaeus*' vision of the cosmos as a living animal and for the *Philebus*' vision of the good life. The book's center is a view of the *Parmenides* where certain 'suppositions' (37) (those that involve double denials) are interpreted as being 'Parmenidean' in character and others (those involving double affirmations) as 'Platonic'. The book concludes with a vision of a Plato who, while differing in expanse, logic, and metaphysics from Parmenides, shares the same 'fundamental insight' (187) of an intelligible world in which 'it is the same that can be thought that can be' (187).

It is important to disagree with the book's central claims about the *Parmenides* while admiring its comprehension of the purpose of the mental 'exercise' which Parmenides administers to Aristoteles. Turnbull is right when he writes that the young Socrates of the dialogue, unable (with his *Phaedo*-era theory of Forms) to reply to Parmenides' first criticisms of that theory, is then given a sample of an exercise which, Parmenides claims, will train Socrates' mind so that he can define Forms and recognize them even in common and vulgar things. Turnbull sees that this exercise starts with 'fundamental Forms' (187) and combines them in positive and negative ways in a schema by now familiar. Any two fundamental forms can be treated together in a supposition ('The One is', 'Likeness is different', etc.) or separately ('The One is not', 'Likeness is not different'); the consequences for the

other Forms are then to be examined, both when the supposition obtains and when it does not, in their effects both on the Form and then on those things other than it. The result will be a set of pairs of suppositions, correctly listed by Turnbull as follows (47-8): '1 and 2: the consequences for the *one, if one is*. 3 and 4: the consequences for the *others, if one is*. 5 and 6: the consequences for the *one, if one is not*. 7 and 8: the consequences for the *others, if one is not*.' Turnbull goes on to distinguish the suppositions into 'Parmenidean' and 'Platonic' depending on whether, lacking copulas, they yield pairs of negations useless for knowledge (The 'Parmenidean' suppositions) or on whether, being combined by copulas, they yield pairs of affirmations (the 'Platonic' ones) which can be disambiguated, rendered non-contradictory, and so turn out to be useful.

It is worth noting how important this distinction between 'Parmenidean' and 'Platonic' suppositions is for Turnbull's book. Without it, as he sees the case, he cannot claim that the *Parmenides* is able to succeed as an improvement on Parmenides, and thus would feel himself unable to put the dialogue forward as the conceptual preparation for his vision of the mature Plato in *Sophist, Theaetetus*, and *Philebus*.

I would, though, like to back up and take a look at the actual practice, say, of the treatment of 'if a one is'. First, we have Being here conjoined with One, even in the double denials, contrary to Turnbull's claim that the 'Parmenidean' sections do not have sentential connectives. Otherwise 'if a one is' is not a suitable candidate as a predecessor for the *planned* treatment of 'The One is not'. Second, both the double-denying 'Parmenidean' sections of the plan and the double-positive 'Platonic' sections can be disambiguated and freed from contradictions in the same way. Why, therefore, can't it be the case that both are to be taken as serious affirmative parts of Plato's message? If the existing one in the first supposition denies all pairs of opposites, why can't those denials be rendered non-contradictory just as the affirmations of the contraries can, according to Turnbull, be disambiguated and taken in different, non-contradictory senses? In that way Turnbull's ultimate project would be advanced, not retarded, since now *every* supposition can be seen to be interpretable in the light of the sorts of distinctions drawn in the *Sophist*, and his readings of, e.g., *Timaeus* and *Philebus* will go through even more strongly, since now all of the *Parmenides* will turn out to be giving a genuinely Platonic message. And it is extremely improbable that a method of exercise so carefully designed as a whole with its positives and negatives would have different parts devoted to different *dogmatic* assertions. Moreover, the existence of what Turnbull calls the 'Coda', where assertions and denials are mixed, is *a priori* evidence against the idea that a thematic separation between double-affirmations and double-denials was ever intended; surely the differences among suppositions are simply the result of their being differently disambiguable parts of the master-plan for exercise.

I am offering these remarks only in order to make Turnbull's interpretation stronger, not to spend time on quibbles. For this intelligent and far-reaching book is the addition to Plato scholarship of a kind of comprehensive

vision across dialogues that is rare in its synopsis of that strongest and yet most fragile of all things — Platonic humanism.

Scott Austin
Texas A&M University

Iris Marion Young
Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender,
Political Philosophy, and Policy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1997. Pp. 195.
US$49.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-01201-6);
US$12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02100-8).

In this collection of seven diverse essays, Iris Marion Young takes up questions ranging from the conceptualisation of women as a social collective to policy on pregnant addicts. The first six essays are previously published and only the last — 'House and Home: Feminist Variations on a Theme' — appears here for the first time. Young states in the introduction that the essays are linked by the project of feminist critical theory, and specifically by the themes of critiques of identity, communication across difference, communicative ethics, social policy, and phenomenology and female experience. Thus Young takes up the work of canonical philosophers from across traditions (Hegel, Sartre, Habermas and Foucault, for example), and feminist theorists such as Irigaray, Benhabib and Okin. Her cross-referencing of philosophical work with social policy literature and topical issues makes for some interesting connections among themes too seldom linked, particularly between theoretical and applied questions. But it also lends a disjointed feel to the book, which seems to be conceptualised merely as the sum of Young's output over the past seven years.

Nonetheless, each of the essays has something interesting to say. 'Gender As Seriality' sets out the putative tension between the necessity for feminism of understanding 'women' as a social collective, and characterising that collective in ways that are exclusive or partial. Here Young ably summarises this literature before offering a resolution of the problem through Sartre's concept of seriality. She makes a number of useful points, including that gender is better conceptualised as 'a collective whose members are unified passively by the relation their actions have to material objects and practico-inert histories' (27) rather than as a category to which particular individuals belong. But she may be too quick to decouple gender and identity, construing

this problem in a way that seems to sideline women's own experiences of femininity, notwithstanding their diversity.

In 'Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought' Young takes up the familiar moral injunction to adopt the standpoint of another in order to see things from their point of view. She uses three case studies to illustrate the pitfalls of assuming symmetry in such situations, where the assumed viewpoint of the Other may in fact be a projection of the power-laden identity of the moral agent. Invoking a new notion of asymmetrical reciprocity, Young argues that communicative action need not give up the aspiration that different Others will reach understanding or agreement, only that this activity will require attitudes of epistemic humility and openness not captured by existing approaches. 'Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy' extends similar arguments from moral theory into the realm of democratic communication, arguing that existing norms of democratic deliberation privilege particular voices and styles of reasoning. Young's alternative 'communicative democracy' adds greeting, rhetoric, and story-telling to critical argument in order more adequately to capture the particularity and embodiedness of democratic actors. These essays are perhaps the best-executed, and both exemplify Young's ability carefully to situate herself in familiar debates, then offer a novel twist to existing arguments that often connects with important examples or case studies.

The later essays move into more explicitly policy-oriented debates. 'Punishment, Treatment, Empowerment' distinguishes three approaches to policy for pregnant addicts. Arguing against the punishment approach, Young interprets treatment as a potential instantiation of a policy approach based in a feminist ethic of care. Cautioning against its uncritical acceptance, however, she invokes Foucauldian suspicion of the individualising and disciplinary nature of treatment regimens. A third 'empowerment' approach might offer treatment situations that encourage pregnant addicts to develop a sense of collective influence over the social conditions of their lives. Here Young may be preaching to the converted. While this analysis brings together information about an issue that looms large in the public mind with a philosopher's conceptual distinctions and acumen, it does not go far in articulating a concrete alternative to obviously problematic existing approaches.

A similar critical analysis is brought to bear in 'Reflections on Families in the Age of Murphy Brown'. Focusing in particular on the institution of marriage, Young argues that '[l]aw, policy, and social practice should break the linkages that currently exist among heterosexual coupling, partnership, parenting, and property rights' (97). This essay and the next are excellent overviews of complex feminist positions that will be valuable to theorists unfamiliar with these critiques. But they are perhaps the most derivative, and risk providing neither a thorough rebuttal of popular American conservative 'family values' nor a genuinely radical feminist critique of the family. It is not feminist news, for example, that the 'institution of marriage is

irreparably unjust'; furthermore, there are better arguments for this claim than those Young advances, and more carefully developed feminist alternatives than hers. Her normative vision of pluralism of families, for example, gives very cursory treatment to the possibility of multiple domestic partnerships (which she supports) and the political significance of undercutting dyadic familial relationships. In a second essay on the family she takes on William Galston's claim that the liberal state should pursue non-neutral ends and in so doing should privilege the intact two-parent family as a means of promoting citizen virtue. Here the conversation is most US-focused, with Young taking on a family-values rhetoric that has much less political relevance in Canada or elsewhere.

'House and Home' is the last and perhaps the least developed essay. Young takes her subtitle 'Variations on a Theme' literally, weaving Heidegger and Irigaray with wrenching personal testimony, theories of housework and homemaking, and critical reviews of other feminist contributions. She concludes by offering a defence of home *contra* more sceptical feminists that stresses the value of safety, individuation, privacy and preservation. While usefully suggestive, this essay is scattered and less well organised than the others. Her personal narrative, for example, while fascinating and courageous, is not integrated into the remainder of the piece. It is hard to see exactly what Young wants us to take away from this essay, or in what way her feminist opponents would take issue with her conclusions.

In all of these essays Young makes political theory into 'the art of the possible'. It is her great strength as a theorist that she is able to identify issues in both academic literature and the public mind that philosophers have construed too narrowly, or failed to address altogether. She neatly juxtaposes organised exposition with clear alternatives, and many of these essays make great teaching tools for precisely this reason. However, her approach to many of the debates she engages risks becoming formulaic, as she neatly motivates and sews up her problem. Young is undoubtedly one of the more intelligently radical philosophers writing in the US. Given her work's broad appeal, her intended audience seems increasingly to consist of political theorists who might look to her work for feminist interventions into conventional debates, rather than of feminists looking for developed alternatives.

Cressida J. Heyes
Michigan State University

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