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Theodor W. Adorno

Beethoven. The Philosophy of Music.

Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Edmund Jephcott.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 1998.

Pp. v + 268.

US\$39.50. ISBN 0-8047-3515-8.

Although Adorno worked on the project of a philosophical work on Beethoven for over thirty years, he was unable to combine the wealth of his material into a completed book. He left behind a great number of preparatory notes, 'a diary of his experiences of Beethoven's music' (ix), as he put it. With a remarkable skill and erudition, Rolf Tiedemann has marshaled these fragments into a coherent volume. He has also included those texts on Beethoven that Adorno succeeded to complete. Thanks to Tiedemann's explanatory notes, the reader is able to follow and appreciate the acuteness and force of Adorno's lines of argument on both Beethoven's compositions and music in general.

In his 'diary', Adorno tells us about his childhood experience of the magical power of Beethoven's music. His first impressions did not fade away: he still views the musical language as something magical, remote from the objective world, and, at the same time, affirmative, consoling, and true. Adorno sees in Beethoven's music the same unfolding interpretation of the world as in the idealism of Hegel. The intimate and special connection with absolute idealism lies in the fact that both Beethoven and Hegel affirm the preponderance of the integral whole over each individual moment. One of the 'Hegelian categories' of Beethoven's compositions is tonality: tonality is Beethoven's absolute.

The idea of the positivity of the whole is also central for understanding the relation between music and society. Beethoven's work is an unfolding totality that resists the dictates of the established society. However, the composer's autonomy never entails a complete escape from a social context: his music 'mediates' this context through its own formal laws. 'Only Beethoven dared to compose as he wanted,' writes Adorno (26). Yet, the musical organization of Beethoven's works, its coherence and progression, is invariably based on, and stems from, the pre-existing tonal system.

In numerous notes, Adorno expresses his admiration for Beethoven's conspicuous, careful, and intelligent combination of musical elements (themes, variations, counterpoints, characters, phrases, etc.). Indeed, his compositions manifest an 'unerring' (66) and 'superb' (69) sense of form. What is more, Beethoven consciously avoids the repetition of a pattern; each composition represents a unique conception. Adorno also finds some weaknesses in Beethoven's art: the music contains unnatural, calculating elements or, occasionally, expresses unnecessary pride and ostentation. Sometimes the melody becomes rough and empty due to excessive simplification or lack of concern for details.

Analyzing Beethoven's early works, Adorno sketches his own theory about music's relation to time. The intensive type of music aims at control and contraction, preserves tensions, and establishes 'geometrical relationship to time' (89). The extensive type 'sets time free' (92), negates tensions, and favors lingering and large expanses.

The notes on the compositions of Beethoven's middle-period elaborate further on the 'famous duplexity' (116) of his works. Beyond the intensive and extensive types of music, Adorno finds in the symphonies a sharp contrast between extreme simplicity and outmost diversity, harmonization and expression, 'wonderfully rich' articulations and 'very dubious' passages. Fascinated by the remarkable integration of all these antagonistic moments, Adorno speaks of the corporeal nature of Beethoven's art: in the symphonies, the music, with both its sublime stillness and outmost tension, reveals itself as a body.

Contrary to some prevailing views, Adorno does not consider Beethoven's late works as expressions of a ruthless subjective personality. Rather, these works consist of both a series of 'emancipated' phrases, and a polyphony charged with subjective intentions. The characteristic feature of the late Beethoven is the replacement of dynamic balance and harmonic spontaneity with fragmentation and withdrawn detachment. Adorno sees in the music's 'withering of harmony' (156) and 'fractured quality' (161), a strong criticism directed against the ideas of totality and universality, and for the importance of the individual. Beethoven's late style is connected to, and reinforces, the realization that, for the individual, the idea of totality represents alienation rather than fulfillment.

The notes collected in the last chapter are of great interest. These fragments focus on some of the human categories of Beethoven. A prominent characteristic of his work is the heightened power of perception: his music has 'the gift of sight' (164). It also expresses the coexistence of the ideal humane individual and the mythical, demonic, dim regions of the human mind. By preserving the 'vocal flow' in instrumental melodies, Beethoven achieves, in addition, the 'true spiritualization of music' (173). One of the primal motifs of the early works is thanksgiving, and this act is related to the experiences of leavetaking and hope. 'Thanks are one of Beethoven's great humane categories' (175). The expression of thanks reveals the deepest and most illuminating function of his art: in the world of domination and efficiency, music is concerned with the perfection of achievement and the representation of hope.

Gabor Csepregi

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Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorell, eds.

Descartes' Meditations: Background source materials.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.

Pp. xviii + 270.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-48126-0);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-48579-7).

Background materials are no doubt important for the understanding of a text. If the background constitutes 'source materials', an interesting question presents itself when it is the 'source' of a philosophy like Descartes'. We are, in Cottingham's words, 'brought up to believe in the seventeenth-century revolution in philosophy' (8). But does not the very existence of 'sources' militate against that belief? Do not revolutionaries start anew, explicitly rejecting the past? Such rejection was Descartes' intention. His *Discourse* dictates uprooting all previous beliefs; his *Principles* are announced as different from those of all previous philosophers; and the *Passions* are written as if nothing had been published on them before. Is Descartes nevertheless not the revolutionary which he took himself to be? And if all texts have their sources beyond the text and its author, is a revolution in philosophy (assuming it requires a fundamentally new start) even possible? These are, perhaps, the most interesting questions which this collection evokes. But such evocation is far from its only virtue.

Even for those not particularly interested in Descartes this is a worthwhile book, likely immediately to attract attention to a number of its selections (almost all of which are here in English for the first time). If one's eye catches Pierre Charron's *Wisdom* (1601), its strikingly modern tones — echoed by Descartes but in elegance of formulation perhaps surpassing him — cannot fail to impress: 'No one can take away the freedom of the mind. To wish to do so is the greatest tyranny of all' (59); 'It is foolish and weak to suppose that everyone else must think, act, or live as one does in one's village or country, and that the peculiarities of this place affect and are common to the rest of the world,' for 'Partiality is the enemy of liberty and mastery' (63). David Hume, or the *philosophes*, might have found themselves at home here. Similarly for an even earlier work, Francisco Sanchez' *That Nothing Is Known* (1581): 'I do not at all promise you the truth ... But I will pursue the inquiry as best I can, and you alongside me will chase after the truth ... You should not hope ever to track her down, or grasp hold of her in full knowledge that you have succeeded; being engaged on the hunt will be enough for us both' (11). Were nineteenth-century Lessing or twentieth-century Russell more iconoclastic than this?

The collection is restricted to thirteen background authors, some of them well-known at least to Descartes scholars, others less familiar but well worth the acquaintance. The well-known are less important in their own right than others of greater fame — Bacon, Galileo, and Hobbes (xviii) — but the 'hope'

is 'to help the reader to escape from the fixed agenda of topics so often associated with the great philosophers' in order to 'generate fresh perspectives, new lines of inquiry ...' (ibid).

Realisation of this hope depends on the acumen readers bring to this volume. For the superficial reader it may cause a devaluation of Descartes' eminence. After all, one might say, if Sanches (ch. 2) already made doubting part of the method which leads to knowledge; if Clavius (ch. 3) pronounces mathematics to be useful because it is necessary for understanding the other sciences; if concepts like 'material falsity', 'formal and objective existence', and 'modal versus real distinctions' were adopted from Suárez (ch. 4); if the definition of 'intuition' as knowledge achieved 'without any affirmation or denial', the insistence on 'order' as at the heart of method, and the idea of freedom as 'the power to exercise or suspend a given act', are clearly in Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (ch. 6); if Mersenne already argued for the priority of will over reason (ch. 8); and if Jean de Silhon articulated the *cogito* (ch. 10) — if all this is so, the undiscerning reader may well ask: What is so novel, let alone revolutionary, about Descartes? Does Descartes give us more than a clever re-packaging of scholastic (or early modern?) doctrine current at the time he was a student?

Or are these superficial similarities, leading us to greater appreciation of Descartes' originality? Since the editors suggest this as one possibility (xiv), it might have been wise to give greater guidance towards such appreciation. There is some of that. The editors preface each selection, but most of these introductions are all too brief, some less than one page in length. The exceptions are Tom Sorell's contributions on 'the rhetoric of common sense' in Descartes and la Mothe le Vayer (203) and on the dissimilarity of the project of a 'universal science' in Descartes as compared with Charles Sorel (219). Other attempts (such as Cottingham's on p. 231, contrasting Descartes with Morin) lack the minimal substance required for a comparison leading to deeper appreciation.

There are, nevertheless, many points at which useful guidance could have been offered. To mention two of them. In Charron's *Wisdom*, even though there are differences with Descartes on both 'judgment' and 'method', we are perhaps closest to 'the modern mind'. Nevertheless, Charron's 'pre-modern' — anti-Cartesian — attitude shows clearly in the difference on human autonomy (see p. 62). Does this difference colour the 'similarities' as more superficial than they appear? Or take Jean de Silhon's *cogito* (199): is it Cartesian or Augustinian? Does it function in Descartes' typically-modern sense as an Archimedean point which can withstand the onslaught of devil or God, and so declares humanity's autonomy in its pursuit of indefinite progress through the project of universal science?

If (and it is meant only as an example) the matter of autonomy separates Descartes from his predecessors, then Descartes' 'background source materials' may still be as relevant as the editors claim it to be. It might have been relevant as stimulus, or as tool, to overcoming the very background to which it belongs. In that case, the editors' quoting Geneviève Rodis-Lewis (xiv) is

apt: we 'can at least glimpse the originality of the Cartesian outlook if we consider it in relation to Descartes' own contemporaries' and — so this volume then shows — his immediate predecessors.

Peter Schouls

Massey University

Dan Avnon

Martin Buber: The Hidden Dialogue.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1998.

Pp. x + 276.

US\$63.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8687-6);

US\$23.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8688-4).

This is a volume in Rowman & Littlefield's 'Twentieth Century Political Thinkers' series. However, Dan Avnon's approach to Buber's political thought is far from typical. Instead of relying primarily on Buber's well known political writings, which receive little attention, Avnon tries to get at Buber's politics by relying upon his later nonpolitical works.

Most interpreters divide Buber's thought into two parts — the early 'mystical' period, and the later 'dialogical' period which begins in 1923 with the publication of *I and Thou*. In contrast, Avnon adds a third, what he calls the period of 'attentive silence', extending from 1938-1965. While Avnon does not describe it this way, this period can be seen as combining elements of the first two. Dialogue is nearly as important here as in the middle period. It develops, however, 'along the lines of a deeper understanding of the eternal, "silent" background of being' (33). According to Avnon, the third period emerges, in part as a result of Buber's being affected by World War Two and the Holocaust. In an age of senseless violence, the mystery of historical existence becomes all the more acute. Buber aspires to make a connection with being at its most fundamental and pre-linguistic level.

The focus here is on a kind of focused attention that arises out of dialogue. After two world wars, the Holocaust, and the atomic bomb, 'Buber seemed to believe that there was no more distance to cover in man's disengagement from himself and from his essence.' The choice is clear: 'either a renewed relation to being or the annihilation of the human form of life' (119). One part of Avnon's approach is to spend considerable effort in offering up an interpretation of Buber's own hermeneutic strategy with regard to the Hebrew Bible. Ultimately, a proper reading of Scripture, for Buber, enables a listening to the silent voice that is 'in the background of creation and of Scripture'

(120). However, Avnon claims that this listening/openness is even more important than the interpretation of Scripture itself. Herein lies the unity of Buber's later thought. According to Avnon, in his religious writings, Buber regularly has recourse to the image of a 'seal' covering the 'heart', while in his philosophical writings, 'thought' is in the way of 'relation to being.' Ultimately what seem like two fundamentally different pursuits (theology and philosophy) are united by Buber in his aspiration to an insight that is prior to either systematic project. The bulk of Avnon's book ultimately leads to this claim.

So what of Buber's politics? Avnon is finally led to Buber's theory of community through an attempt to answer the question: 'What would it mean to think and speak from a place that is not thought?' According to Avnon, for Buber, 'for such an experience to transpire, we need communal conditions conducive to the life of dialogue' (147). But unfortunately the payoff here is minimal. 'Buber's theory of community emphasizes conscious individual effort as the *sine qua non* of social and political revolution' (151). This entails rejecting: (1) any external force (God, Spirit, The Law of History) as the mover of history, and (2) the political goal of replacing one structure of authority with another. Hence, Buber's 'community of communities' and vision of 'religious socialism'. Rejecting what he sees as the later Marx's emphasis on the means of attaining political power, Buber's socialistic vision is one in which community is a place of religious and spiritual renewal. In this context Buber theorizes the Israeli kibbutz. The problem for Buber is that members of the kibbutz do not see themselves as engaged in the project that he describes. Most pursue a more secular vision. How are these communities to transform themselves? Through the ideal 'genuine educator', who can inspire the correct consciousness. Here we encounter that moment in which Buber's thought is utopian in a quite negative sense. That is, such an ideal hardly represents a political strategy. Avnon points out that Buber falls into similarly unrealistic thinking when he proposes in 1947 that a council of Jews and Arabs also include 'impartial men' who can adjudicate disputes (200). Ultimately Avnon joins 'those who criticize Buber for not providing any clear direction for concrete social action' (202).

In the end, Avnon's interest in Buber lies more with such notions as 'attentive silence' than with his politics. On this basis Avnon is successful in arguing for the unity to Buber's later writings. This book will be of value to those with a substantial interest in Buber. Those who approach the book with a more general interest in political theory will probably be frustrated that Avnon does not in any way situate Buber's thought in the wider context of twentieth-century political thought.

Michael A. Principe

Middle Tennessee State University

Christine Battersby

*The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics
and the Patterns of Identity.*

New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. xiii + 236.

Cdn\$98.00; US\$70.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-92035-3);

Cdn\$26.99; US\$18.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-92036-1).

Kathi Weeks

Constituting Feminist Subjects.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1998.

Pp. 196.

US\$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-3427-0);

US\$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8447-2).

Christine Battersby and Kathi Weeks have a common goal. Both seek to move beyond the deconstructive tendencies of current feminist thought, influenced by postmodernism, in order to reconstruct the concept of subjectivity. Both authors take care to avoid essentialism as they construct a subject that is neither completely autonomous nor completely determined. Finally, both authors avoid the emphasis on epistemological issues that has been the dominant tendency in feminist thought over the past decade. The authors' paths quickly diverge, however, with Battersby taking an ontological route and Weeks moving to a political agenda.

Battersby's *The Phenomenal Woman* is guided by the question of what happens if we take the female as the norm to create a model of personal and individual identity. As a framework for consideration of this question, Battersby lays out five features of the female subject-position that make the concept of the female paradoxical if the male subject is taken as the norm. The first feature is natality — female subjects can give birth to new subjects. 'Natality considered as an abstract category allows us to think identities as emerging from a play of bodily relationships: an emergence that is not sudden, but that occurs over time' (38). The second feature of the female subject-position is that it is the female who is generally seen as filling the caregiver position in relationships that are always between unequal selves. Third, a female may simultaneously be (when pregnant) both self and not-self. This eliminates the sharp distinction between self and other without annihilation of self by other. The fourth feature is fleshiness, corporeality. The connection between female subjects and embodiment is an impediment to the idea of an autonomous mind that is ontologically separate from the flesh. Finally, the fifth feature concerns the conflicting expectations experienced by the female subject. Using 'female' to refer to sex and biology and 'feminine' to denote culture and gender, Battersby writes (11), 'all female (not "feminine") subjects in western culture have to negotiate the paradoxicality of a mode of selfhood that is positioned somewhere between freedom and

rationality, on the one hand, and passive and thing-like embodiment, on the other.'

Using these features as her guide, Battersby first offers a thorough critique of the Kantian subject, concluding that his conceptualization of the self is unsatisfactory, primarily because it is unable adequately to account for internal changes, like those that take place in pregnancy. She then moves through analyses of Bergson, Lacan, Irigaray, Butler, Derrida, Guattari, Deleuze, and Adorno, drawing on aspects of their work that are valuable in creating a conception of a persisting, though fluid, self. While each of the authors has something to offer, she demonstrates that none alone can account for all five of the features of the female subject-position.

Turning to an extended consideration of Kierkegaard, Battersby finds her hero. His work, as she shows, allows for all of the features of the female subject-position, while also presenting a view of the self that makes it neither completely self-contained nor completely determined by outside forces. After a fascinating discussion of the conceptual elements of sound, Battersby explicates the view of selfhood she finds in Kierkegaard's work. The self is formed in the process of organizing influences ('noises') into patterns. The self first absorbs the external, or others, and then patterns the absorbed elements through mood 'and the repetitions and rhythms of the embodied self' (184). Using the metaphor of a musical score to thinking of the self, Battersby suggests that 'the way in which this score is interpreted is not fixed in advance — nor is it laid down simply by external factors. Neither fully autonomous nor completely determined, the self is produced relationally: in the resonances between self and other; in a 'present' that is a generative caesura between past and future' (184). Obviously it is impossible to do justice to the complex view that is proposed here, but Battersby's construction in the book is a model of detail and clarity.

In addition to the micro-focus on conceptualizing a subject who exists in and through relationships of dependence and power inequalities, Battersby's work also works on the macro-level to discuss social formations. Taking a cue from recent scientific theories, she suggests that we view patriarchy as a dissipative system to realize the presence of instabilities. A dissipative system is one that appears stable because it tends to remain in a state of balance until energy leaking to, from, and within the system destabilizes it. This means that the boundaries of patriarchy are variable rather than concrete, with 'structures of power operating within, as well as outside, the structures that position the male as norm in the exercise of power' (123). Since this is so, the diverse structures that function to oppress are constituted by and constitutive of specific groups of humans and particular individual selves. Given the specificity and open-nature of this conception, 'there will be many different modes of patriarchy — not a single model that everywhere betrays its origins in a metaphysics of substance' (123). This, in turn, means that there will be many differing and various strategies for revolution against the oppression of any patriarchal system.

Whereas the metaphysical project of Battersby focuses on the construction of individual subjects, the political project of Kathi Weeks's *Constituting Feminist Subjects* takes the group as the unit of analysis to construct a collective feminist standpoint. Like Battersby, Weeks pulls tools from a rich and varied collection of theories, including feminist standpoint theory, socialist feminism, and poststructuralist thought to present a nonessentialist theory of feminist subjectivity. She begins by looking at similarities in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, focusing particularly on their critiques of grand unified theories of social structures and of the self. She goes on to claim that Nietzsche's work is the stronger of the two because Nietzsche's concept of eternal recurrence provides a means for positive evaluation of individual resistance and subjectivity.

In the second chapter, Weeks investigates the question of why Foucault's very specific and limited critiques of modernism have been interpreted as encompassing all aspects of modernism, such that his work has come to be seen as the paradigm of postmodern thought. She concludes that postmodernism is partially the product 'of various attempts to insert Foucault's thought into contemporary debates in Anglo-American political theory and feminist theory by casting it as a complete departure from and fundamental challenge to existing approaches' (13), a move that has resulted in the loss of the complexities in both modernism and postmodernism. This is of special concern to Weeks because her project wants to claim specific aspects from works in both areas.

In chapter three, Weeks addresses the problem of difference, trying to negotiate between the extreme determinism of accounts which prioritize oppressive social structures (Marxist thought) and the total autonomy of subjects claimed by individualistic accounts which prioritize differences and the possibility of rebellion (Nietzschean thought). To this end, she first surveys the socialist feminist systems theories of Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Heidi Hartmann, and Iris Marion Young. The main strength of these theories is their emphasis on the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy. They are limited, however, because they lean toward a functionalist model of power, which all but eliminates the possibility of meaningful change effected by relatively autonomous individuals. To remedy this weakness, Weeks expands her survey to discuss the Marxist theories of Georg Lukacs, Louis Althusser, and Antonio Negri, pulling threads from each that allow her to conceive a totality which 'does not subsume differences within the closed and predictable logic of a seamlessly unified system not deny the force of will, contingency, and conflict' (119).

Having gathered her tools from the various theories examined, Weeks uses them to construct a theory of a collective feminist subjectivity — capable of political agency — that avoids both voluntarism and determinism by focusing on women's laboring practices. She then adds Judith Butler's model of gender performativity to her repertoire of tools to allow the conception of subjects as active political agents. Combining the structuralist analyses with the more individualistic approach of Butler produces a collective subject that

shapes and is shaped by socioeconomic structures. The subject is connected to the structure by Weeks's conception of labor: 'the structural divisions of labor organize various laboring practices upon which standpoints, conceived as active collective subjects, can be constructed' (153).

No matter the position one takes in regard to the author's claims, both Christine Battersby and Kathi Weeks have written books that are admirable for tight argumentation well grounded in the history of philosophy. The books will be of particular interest to people working in the area of feminist thought, but will also appeal to those looking for a way beyond the narrow options of the modernism/postmodernism debate.

Pam R. Sailors

Southwest Missouri State University

George Boolos

Logic, Logic and Logic.

Introductions and afterword by

John P. Burgess; edited by Richard Jeffrey.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

1998. Pp. x + 443.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-674-53766-1.

The untimely death of George Boolos at the age of 56 was a great loss to logic and philosophy. The present book is a posthumous collection of his essays. He designed the book shortly before his death, but did not have time to provide introductory notes to the pieces; these have been supplied instead by John Burgess, who has done a fine job of providing a context for the papers and relating them to the wider literature.

The volume provides a generous and representative selection of Boolos's work. The items that have been omitted are his early technical papers on the fine structure of the hierarchy of constructible sets, his reviews and (most notably) his numerous papers on provability interpretations of modal logics (these account for nineteen of the thirty-five publications other than reviews and abstracts listed in the complete bibliography of his work given here).

These last-mentioned papers constitute Boolos's most notable work in pure logic. They were omitted from the collection because Boolos's own book, *The Logic of Provability* (Cambridge 1993) is the best source for this material. To make up for this omission, Burgess supplies a very clearly written afterword in which he lucidly summarizes the history of this area and describes Boolos's own substantial contributions.

The collection is divided into three parts, the first consisting of studies on set theory and the nature of logic, the second studies on Frege, and the last made up of various logical studies and lighter papers.

In the first part, there are two main topics, the iterative conception of set, and Quinean themes of ontological commitment and the demarcation between logic and set theory. The iterative conception of sets seems so familiar now that it takes a little mental effort to think back to the early 1970s when Boolos's article on this topic must have seemed a revelation to many philosophers who (according to Boolos in 1971) were mainly unaware of it. In this well known piece, Boolos provides an elegant demonstration of all of the postulates of Zermelo set theory from an axiomatic theory of stages, with the exception of the axiom of extensionality. Notably missing, in addition, are the axioms of replacement and choice, and Boolos argues convincingly that these simply do not follow on the basis of the simple iterative conception. In a successor to this article, published in 1989, Boolos states a stronger view. The axioms of replacement and choice appear clearly true on the basis of a modified version of Frege's view of sets as the extensions of concepts. Hence, it seems arguable that the axioms of set theory are based on diverse and not clearly compatible intuitions.

The remaining essays in the first part include a vigorous defence of the claim that second-order logic really deserves the name of logic, and is not just set theory in disguise, as Quine has repeatedly claimed. Boolos rightly points to the common semantical foundations of first-order and second-order logic, and argues that despite Quine's claims to the contrary, second-order logic is not disqualified by its existential commitments (since it is not committed even to the existence of a two element set). Two other essays in this part are somewhat dutiful and dull meditations on the well-worn Quinean theme of ontological commitment in the context of grammatical constructions of ordinary language.

The second part is devoted to Boolos's work on Frege. Boolos has been the leader in the recent, very welcome trend to the close analysis of Frege's work in formal logic, as opposed to his famous philosophical essays, to which a huge secondary literature has already been devoted. This recent revival of work on Fregean foundations was stimulated by Crispin Wright's remark that the system of the *Grundgesetze der Mathematik* appears to be consistent, if you replace the inconsistent Basic Law V (essentially, the unlimited comprehension axiom) by the axiom stating that if two sets are equinumerous (that is, there is a one-to-one correspondence between them), then they have the same cardinal number (called 'Hume's Principle' here). This conjecture of Wright turns out to be correct (there is a fairly easy consistency proof), so that the *Grundgesetze*, even though inconsistent, contains embedded within it a consistent system, and it is in fact within this system that Frege develops the system of natural numbers. Thus with hindsight we can attribute to Frege the result that arithmetic can be developed completely within a system of higher order logic together with Hume's Principle — this result is dubbed 'Frege's Theorem' by Boolos.

It is surprising, given his earlier essays on ontological commitment, that Boolos persists (like other writers in this area) in calling 'Hume's Principle' a 'contextual definition'. Of course it is nothing of the sort. To add this principle to higher order logic is to make a considerable 'ontological commitment'. By adding it we commit ourselves to the existence of infinitely many natural numbers, while higher order logic by itself cannot prove the existence of infinitely many things. The principle fails to be a definition because it does not satisfy the principle of eliminability.

It is very likely this confused identification of 'Hume's Principle' with a definition that has led some philosophers to believe that with the rediscovery of 'Frege's Theorem' the logicist programme has finally been achieved. Boolos, of course, in spite of his careless nomenclature, knows quite well that it is not a definition, and argues convincingly against Crispin Wright that it is not even an analytic truth in any well-defined sense.

The essays of the final section are a mixed bunch, but they include some of my favourite pieces by Boolos. In the two earlier sections, Boolos is a little on his best behaviour, doing obeisance to the current demi-gods of analytic philosophy and engaging in somewhat constipated axiomatic exercises in the Frege section. The final essays include his delightful short proof of Gödel's theorem based on Berry's paradox, and some intriguing and provocative essays on the complexity of proofs.

Many people contributed to this volume, and as the editor states in his acknowledgments, for all of them it was a labour of love. George Boolos was a fine logician and a lovely man, I miss him a lot. It is good to have this volume of essays to remember him by.

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David Braybrooke

Moral Objectives, Rules, and the Forms of Social Change.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1998.

Pp. xvi + 364.

\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-4169-8);

\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-8031-6).

This collection is comprised of selections from David Braybrooke's many publications over the period of 1955-1995. These selections include a variety of journal articles, critical notices, book reviews, monograph contributions, and one previously unpublished paper, 'Liberalism, Statistics, and the Presuppositions of Utilitarianism'. The intended audience, and its level of sophistication, varies greatly between papers. Most of the essays are written for an advanced audience that is accustomed to discussing moral and political issues through formal logic. But some of the essays are written for a general audience with no background in either logic or political philosophy.

Those familiar with Braybrooke's work may be disappointed to find that the collection's final piece is the only one on social choice theory. Moreover, Braybrooke's extensive criticisms of David Gauthier's social contract theory are absent.

The papers are grouped under the three themes noted in the book's title. Eleven of the seventeen selections are found in 'Part I Moral Objectives'. Here, Braybrooke takes up needs, productive activity, and preferences, concluding with papers on justice and the common good. The discussion of needs contains an introductory piece for a general audience and a paper on Marx's conception of needs. In the latter piece, Braybrooke takes up the issue of whether Marx thought human needs and interests would be transformed under the social conditions of post-capitalist society.

The section on productive activity includes a paper on Marx's concept of alienation, an essay on the value of participation in social decision making, and a piece on the importance of work. The essay on participation should probably be avoided unless one shares Braybrooke's enthusiasm for the ordinary language approach to philosophy. His treatment of work is far more interesting. He defines the notion of satisfying work as a 'useful' vocation, one that contributes to the well-being of other persons in society. But, as he notes, increasing technology may block access to this kind of satisfaction, even if society pursues egalitarian patterns of income and wealth distribution. Many of us may be forced to content ourselves with refined amusements, rather than productive activity.

The section on preferences contains two papers. First, Braybrooke takes on the inadequacies of economists' standard accounts of consumer behaviour. Complaints about economists' narrow focus on preferences are now familiar. But Braybrooke's treatment of the issue is somewhat distinctive. He argues that, even if economists appeal to a second level in the hierarchy of preferences, they will still be unable to account for some of the grounds commonly

invoked in rectifying preferences. The second paper defends preferences that are disfavoured in market economies. Here Braybrooke takes up the case of Grasshoppers, whose preferences for singing and dancing are ill served in market economies which favour Ants, who gear themselves towards frugality and the accumulation of capital.

Braybrooke's discussion of moral objectives stands out somewhat amongst the work of liberal theorists. He does not specifically address the contemporary debate over cultural membership and its supposed status as a vital human interest. In this respect, his discussion is somewhat dated. However, his appreciation of Marx and his interest in social evolution leads Braybrooke to discuss important issues that liberals often ignore. He takes on questions about the way in which increasing technology and material prosperity may impact on human well-being. Moreover, his paper on the value of work is as sophisticated a treatment of the issue as one can find.

The discussion of justice and the common good contains two papers in which Braybrooke describes an approach to thinking about justice that he thinks other theorists have not pursued. On this approach, we determine those actions that all discussants regard as departing from justice, and then determine the social arrangements that will minimize the frequency and impact of such departures. In 'Liberalism, Statistics, and the Presuppositions of Utilitarianism', Braybrooke argues that a theory which sanctions victimization should not be attributed to the classical utilitarians. This section also includes an introductory piece on the notion of the common good.

'Part II Rules' contains two papers. 'No Rules without Virtues; No Virtues without Rules' is a must read for anyone with an interest in virtue ethics. Here Braybrooke argues not just that ethics requires rules and virtues, but also that neither can be given pride of place over the other in a satisfactory account of ethics. The second paper is a piece on the relation between social regularities and genuine social rules.

'Part III The Forms of Social Change' contains the collection's most technically challenging papers. First, there is a discussion of Marx's account of the rules governing capitalist economies, and the way in which these rules lead to social breakdown. Next, Braybrooke examines the development of the modern British Civil Service through changes in social rules. This paper is an early precursor to Braybrooke's ambitious collaborative work, *Logic on the Track of Social Change* (with B. Brown & P.K. Schotch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995 [cf. *PIR* 17.1 (February 1997) 3 (Ed.)]). Also included is a paper that defends incrementalism as a strategy for social change. Finally, Braybrooke turns a critical eye towards the enterprise of social choice theory as it is exemplified in the work of Kenneth Arrow. Arrow's discussions of social choice functions assume that we have complete descriptions of our alternatives as well as complete accounts of societal preferences. According to Braybrooke, these 'heroic' assumptions blind us to the way in which redefining alternatives and investigating social preferences helps break up real life deadlocks over social issues.

This volume is, on the whole, a fine representation of Braybrooke's contributions to political philosophy. Throughout this collection, his prose is lucid and entertaining, and he gives difficult issues a clear and straightforward explanation. Even the older papers, particularly Braybrooke's piece on Marx's account of alienation, are worthy of fresh attention. In fact, those with an interest in Marx should make it a point to read all three papers on Marx in this volume.

I conclude with one small criticism. The introductory pieces on needs and the common good do not fit in with the other papers. Those who are sophisticated enough to appreciate Braybrooke's more technical pieces, which dominate the volume, will find little of substance in these papers. They should have been sacrificed to make room for another of Braybrooke's substantial contributions to political philosophy.

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Jocelyne Couture, Kai Nielsen and Michel Seymour, eds.

Rethinking Nationalism.

Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press 1998.

Pp. viii + 703.

\$30.00. ISBN 1-919491-22-7.

Rethinking Nationalism is a work consisting of seventeen original essays, a case study, and an informative introductory essay and a thoughtful afterword by the editors. It also contains a comprehensive bibliography of classical and contemporary studies of nationalism. This is, indeed, a very valuable book for anyone, in the humanities or the social sciences, undertaking serious studies on the topic of nationalism. The essays are divided into the following five groupings: I Methodological Turnings, II Probing the Orthodox Dichotomy, III For and Against Nationalism, IV Some Consequences of Nationalism, V A Case Study. Due to the breadth and scope of the work, I am unable to provide an overview of its many significant contributions and beg forgiveness for my indulgence in highlighting certain discussions.

The first two groupings of essays are especially helpful in providing a mapping of, what at first sight appears to be, a conceptual wasteland of the different forms of nationalism and the various related concepts, including those of 'nation', 'state', 'country' and 'a people'. In the essays by Van de Putte, De Wachter, and Schnapper, we find a sustained challenge to the two

traditionally recognized forms of nationalism based on the 'ethnic' and 'civic' conceptions of the nation after Hans Kohn et al. The former is characterized as the 'kulturation', identified with Eastern nationalism. The latter, based on liberal ideals of a union under a doctrine of human rights and the ideals of the enlightenment, is identified with Western nationalism. The challenge itself presents us with an ambiguity. Are we encouraged, in the interest of philosophical clarity, to abandon the civic and ethnic conceptions of nationalism as muddying the waters or as failing to be philosophically or normatively significant, or are we invited to add a new conception of nationalism to our existing repertoire?

The arguments that sustain this challenge focus on two problem areas for the ethnic/civic bifurcation. The first is that the civic form of the nation does not, by itself, create loyalty to the nation-state, a willingness to sacrifice oneself for the nation and its fellow citizens, sufficient to secure social stability. In this connection we are all familiar with the communitarian criticism of pure (Rawlsian) constitutional liberalism. Loyalty is not felt to an abstract set of principles. Furthermore, it is argued that the civic state is an ideal in search of a concrete interpretation. It is not any actual existing state. For instance, the constitutional democratic state is not a mere collection of individual subscribing to democratic principles and a constitution; it exists, where it exists, as a 'democratic culture'. The ideals of democracy are always culturally interpreted. So we have a reason now for positing a new conception of nationalism which does not just take bits and pieces from civic and ethnic nationalism, but forms a new synthesis in which the ideals of a civic state are integrated in a concrete cultural arena. De Wachter's conceptualization of nationalism as '... the ideology which pursues congruity between both the political and the prepolitical' (198), avoids the two stools of the ethnic and civic conceptions. It opens the door to a certain kind of cultural/multicultural nationalism, which recognizes a public sphere in which exists '... the possibility of all forms of attachment by all sorts of people in a multicoloured life-world' (214). Civic nationalism may be seen as transcending itself, giving birth to a 'culture of democracy', viz., to 'cultural nationalism'. Such themes are further developed in both Tamir's and Miller's essays, who both argue for revamping the old conceptual geography.

Should we buy into this new conceptualization of cultural nationalism? It is tempting to answer in the affirmative, but there are questions that we may raise. First, is cultural nationalism, broadly conceived, really different from civic nationalism. In the case of the United States (which arguably is a paradigm of civic nationalism), we find a strong sense of loyalty among its citizens, which involves, what is described as, a 'quasi-religious worship of the Constitution' (reminiscent of Jurgen Habermas' 'constitutional patriotism'). This suggests, that it is not the culture of democracy which promotes loyalty to the civic state, but rather, loyalty is secured through a kind of 'constitutional ideology'. On the other hand, we may find that 'constitutional patriotism' is not an intelligible notion apart from some cultural expression of it, some practice of democracy at work or, indeed, a variety of practices

relative both to geography and time. It is not clear, however, that such a discovery would lead us to reject civic nationalism as a useful concept, both in explanatory and normative endeavours. The further question remains, why the civic conception of a nation cannot accommodate a set of practices, or a cultural expression, of such practices.

Secondly, Martha Nussbaum, in her short but much discussed essay, 'Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism' (in Joshua Cohen, ed., *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* [Boston: Beacon Press 1996]), raises some issues which may undermine cultural nationalism. Her arguments for cosmopolitanism and 'world citizenship' lead us to question whether the ideal of cultural nationalism is internally consistent. Citizens of modern constitutional democratic states which adopt doctrines of human rights based on some conception of natural or human rights, find themselves asking Nussbaum's question: '... are ... (we) above all citizens of a world of human beings?' The political doctrine, here, by its very nature, viz., by its commitment to human rights, makes a universal appeal. The liberal multicultural democratic state exercises sovereignty over a geographical region (this, after all, is the *sine qua non* of its very existence as a state), but its commitment to a doctrine of human rights pulls it towards, what Nussbaum calls 'the substantive universal values of justice and right,' in a word, to 'world citizenship'. But what, then, keeps the political state in continued existence; where does the sense of the oneness (unity) come from? As De Wachter has pointed out, loyalty to the state (the totality) must be stronger than that to its 'intermediate structures', its religions, professions, and in the context of the multicultural state, to the polyglot of its cultural minorities. How does the liberal democratic multi-cultural state (in this context, we may recognize a multiplicity of democratic cultures), which takes seriously its political and social doctrines preserve, its stability and continuity, given its commitment to universal values? What stops it from becoming the global community?

In the third and fourth groups are found insightful normative reflections of nationalism in its various forms. That there is a need to undertake serious and systematic studies in the normative aspects of nationalism needs no argument. The state of the world speaks for itself.

In closing, let me draw attention to one area of dispute which has received little attention, but which needs to be addressed. As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a number of national groups have asserted sovereignty, roughly over their pre-war territories. However, as a result of post-war occupation, forced exile of large segments of the population, and a policy of Russification (both as a cultural and linguistic policy) with the imposition of Marxist-Leninism, the indigenous political cultures were destroyed. Subsequently, the Baltic Nations of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia invoked, what may be termed as, an appeal to 'historical contingency', in justifying the right of the nation states to restrict the 'political culture' of the large Russian ethnic minority, and to reject the status of Russian as a second official language in these states. Nootens, drawing upon the work of Will Kymlicka and others, helps us see that the resolution of problems such as

those that face the Baltics do not lend themselves to being resolved in a purely philosophical perspective alone, but requires a disinterested historical context. Let me end with Van de Putte's words: 'Although we live in a particular world, we can still aim toward a juridical ethic that would function as a *critical authority* against the history which determines us so deeply' (191).

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Cynthia Freeland, ed.

Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle.
University Park: Pennsylvania State
University Press 1998. Pp. xiv + 369.
US\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01729-5);
US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01730-9).

This collection of essays takes on the tricky task of reading Aristotle through the lens of contemporary feminist theory. There is no common theme, but the book is divided into a Part on Theoretical Knowledge and one on Practical and Productive Knowledge. In the first Part, two essays address Aristotle's epistemology directly, and four focus more specifically on the relationship between Aristotle's theoretical thought and the status of women in his writings. In the second Part the most common theme is the relationship between a feminist 'ethics of care' and an Aristotelian 'virtue ethics'. In addition, two essays consider the *Poetics*, and one the *Rhetoric*. The authors generally position themselves somewhere between the most extreme feminist attacks on the western intellectual tradition and a vigorous defense of Aristotle against such attacks.

Among the more interesting arguments one encounters here: [1] Marjorie Hass' too brief but provocative discussion of how Aristotle's delineation of types of opposition might be of use in thinking about the distinction male/female; [2] Charlotte Witt's well-developed argument that Aristotle's normative (because functional) conception of form is not inherently gendered, and in fact challenges both modern science and feminist attacks on objectivity with a Nature which imposes on us its own objective values. [3] Marguerite Deslauriers' subtle argument that while '... male and female as principles and as attributes ... are radically different, male and female animals ... are not radically different.' She argues that Aristotle's metaphysics and biology offer no grounding or justification for his view of the capacity and role of women. This is the only article in this collection that explicitly recognizes

that Aristotle's ethics and politics are not derivative from his metaphysics, and that Aristotle works from both ends, sometimes, perhaps, missing in the middle. [4] Ruth Groenhout's notes for a nuptial agreement between a feminist 'ethics of care' and '... an Aristotelian "virtue ethics"' which promises to yield 'a middle way between universal, timeless laws and absolute relativism.'

One continuing theme in the essays on Aristotle's practical thought is the appreciation of the ways that Aristotle's treatment of human emotion might enrich and expand feminist thought. Martha Nussbaum and others point out that reason and emotion are not simple opposites for Aristotle as they are for enlightenment thought, but rather each emotion includes a judgment which can be critiqued or justified, based on its adequacy to real circumstances. Barbara Koziak brings this theme home, arguing that founding all political arrangements on 'care' is falsely monotone. Aristotle offers a form of philosophical argument useful in finding the appropriate configuration of the full range of emotions. The considerations of Nussbaum and Koziak seem to be leading to cooperation between 'masculinist' universal logic and feminist appreciation of the truth of particular circumstances, which is in part apprehended through our emotions. Emotions have a rational component, and every political regime is at bottom a configuration of human emotions. In order to constitute a regime, then, reason and passion must become partners in the process of assessment and reconfiguration.

Such promising suggestions are not developed, and the book is more a commencement than a full outbreak of Feminist-Aristotelian dialogue. The essays which defend Aristotle and the pre-feminist western tradition often devote disproportionate space to acknowledging possible feminist criticisms, space stolen from the more interesting positive project. This choice obscures the main point of some essays.

One of the strengths of Feminist thought is the attention it gives to the real-world contexts and consequences of abstract thought, and its suspicion that if a concept walks and talks like it has a gender, it probably does. While this marriage of sociology of knowledge with philosophy is fruitful in generating hypotheses, it has more uncertain effects when used as a tool for evaluating theories. The mere analogy or similarity between one of Aristotle's arguments and some facet of traditional masculinity, does not, in itself, constitute an argument. For instance, Irigaray's claim that the idea of a unitary essence derives from the male's possession of a unitary sex organ (110), even if true, does not give us reason to deny Aristotle's theory of essences. Nor does subsequent employment of a theory refute the theory. Deborah Modrak concludes that the historical use of Aristotelian essences in '... advancing ... dominant gender and class interests' buttresses the feminist charge that '... his ontological commitments are an expression of his phallic sexuality.' Nor does the selective accessibility of a goal demand the dismissal of that goal. That *theoria* is only available to those with leisure neither makes Aristotle's ethics '... inherently elitist, hierarchical' (178), nor does it show the unworthiness of the goal. Noticing such connections is legitimate, but if

sociology of knowledge is to be committed, it should be done carefully and completely, and not casually inserted at convenient points in philosophical arguments.

Last, some of these essays could give greater regard to the Principle of Charity, both as a specific requirement that we 'recreate the author's intended text with maximal coherence and plausibility' (Freeland) and as a general call to treat those we disagree with generously. Luce Irigaray is the prime offender, using Aristotle merely as a straight-man. Freeland characterizes Irigaray's piece as a 'lampoon', a term which captures (with a hint of approval) the palpable lack of respect Irigaray affords her alleged subject. While Freeland admits that 'some may hold, with reason, that Irigaray is unnecessarily uncharitable to Aristotle,' Freeland herself slips too easily into a violation of minimal rules of intellectual respect when she translates Ruth Groenhout's undefended complaint that communitarians like Sandel and MacIntyre endorse traditions that have been oppressive to women (176) into the wild accusation that they are 'notorious for their sexism.' Every reasonable reader would bristle if Freeland had as casually accused Sandel and MacIntyre of racism. If sexism is a serious offense, then such unsupported indictments are offensive.

The most enlightening essays here are those which not only 'interrogate' Aristotle, but submit current thought to his reciprocal interrogation. These offer Aristotelian thought as a coherent other perspective from which to view modernity, and they expand feminist scholarship. The body of essays that attempt to explore the compatibility between Feminist and Aristotelian ethics are notable examples of an attempt at such cross-fertilization. They suggest a surface accord between the two theories, and give us a number of ad hoc points of juncture and mutual aid to investigate. One hopes that they are merely a prelude to a fuller investigation of whether the marriage of an 'ethics of care' and 'virtue ethics' could be accomplished at the level of deep structure.

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Trudy Govier

Social Trust and Human Communities.

Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press

1997. Pp. xi + 289.

\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-1622-X);

\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7735-1680-8).

Martin Hollis

Trust Within Reason.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.

Pp. viii + 170.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-58346-2);

US\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-58681-X).

The problem of trust in epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy has caught the attention of a great many philosophers of late. In epistemology, the problem is to explain how, given that so much of what we believe is based ultimately on testimony, we can be said to know any of those things so based. In ethics and political philosophy, the problem is to explain how, given that we have to trust one another to engage in joint projects, it can be rational to subordinate your own good for the common good. The core problem is that we need to trust each other, but it is at best risky to do so.

Govier's book, *Social Trust and Human Communities*, is an extended treatment of both the pervasiveness of the need for trust and the dangers of the interdependence it gives. The first chapter explains at some length both how important trust is and how easily it can be disrupted. Chapter Two gives empirical reasons for thinking that it is usually more or less safe for us to trust one another, including an analysis of how both trust and distrust can be self-reinforcing. Chapter Three is a summary and defense of the notion that trust is necessary not only for joint action, but also for any significantly rich knowledge of the world. Chapter Five gives an account of how that trust extends even to strangers, both familiar (e.g., media personalities) and unfamiliar. This point is important because if such generalized trust is justified, it shows that we can be justified even with very limited evidence of trustworthiness. Chapter Six explores, again with the use of empirical data, what happens to a society that has given up the social glue of mutual trust. Chapters Seven and Eight give accounts of how generalized social trust is either fortified or undermined by various political institutions. Chapters Nine and Ten extend the notion of trust from the individual and collective cases to the case of groups and nations; they defend an idea of group trust and distrust that is not reducible to the sum of individuals' mental states. The final chapter discusses what justification, in the light of the previous discussion, there could be for an attitude of optimism. It also explores the uses of cynicism in a general system of trust. There follows a full set of notes to each chapter; there is also a full index, and a thorough bibliography.

Govier, who has been struggling with the epistemology and ethics of trust for some time, has produced a thoroughly useful book on the subject. Its chief virtue is that it is crammed with discussion of empirical studies, both psychological and sociological. The student of social philosophy frequently finds philosophers making empirical claims, or claims with empirical consequences, without evidence; Govier has made a thorough study of what evidence there is, and presents it in a clear and organized way. She is also very careful in her application of empirical results to particular cases. The result is a philosophical position well informed by facts.

The only flaws in the book are minor ones. First of all, the discussions can be both overlong and redundant. For example, the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale (a psychological instrument designed to give a measure of how trusting a subject is) is introduced and discussed in the first chapter, and a lot of that same discussion is repeated in Chapter Five. Also, the Chapter Five discussion of our *de facto* reliance on the testimony of experts goes on longer than is necessary. Where a few examples would suffice to make the point, Govier supplies us with nine. But tastes will differ on how much is too much.

There is one philosophical point that deserves mention. Govier says more than once that justified trust is based on evidence of trustworthiness, and in support of this claim gives two kinds of examples: cases in which we trust someone close to us, and are prepared to say why if asked, and cases in which we lose trust in someone because of something they have said or done. If she is right, then testimony is not a basic source of knowledge, and trust is not justified in the absence of evidence. The second kind of case does not show that trust is in fact based on evidence; such cases show only that justified trust is defeasible, which might be true even if trust generally needed no justification. The first kind of case does support her claim, but another interpretation of such cases is available. When asked why I trust my wife or my friend, I may well produce general claims for which I believe I have evidence, based on past experience. When asked why I trust the man in the street to tell me the correct time when I ask, it seems to me that I have no such evidence. Govier analyzes such impersonal trust ('scatter' trust, she calls it) as derivative from the personal kind, which is based on evidence. Another possibility is that the impersonal kind of trust is basic, and the personal kind is derivative; our 'default' mode is to trust, and we are usually justified to do so, but when defeating conditions exist, that *prima facie* justification is overridden. Even in the case of my wife or friend, I do not trust because I have learned they are trustworthy, but rather trust until they prove untrustworthy. The fact that I have a disposition to produce beliefs as supporting evidence when I am asked why I trust them does not show that my trust for them is based on or inferred from those beliefs. This view of trust as a basic belief-forming practice gets inadequate attention from Govier.

Hollis's *Trust Within Reason* takes a different approach to the problem of trust. His starting point is with the Enlightenment project of founding all our justified practices on reason, and reason is understood as individual and instrumental. In other words, how can it be rational for self-interested people

to trust one another? Chapter One sets out the problem of trust in decision-theoretic terms; if we are all egoistic utility-maximizers, how can we ever justify trusting one another? The problem is starkly set in terms of prisoner's dilemmas and other decision-theoretic problems as one in which rationality seems to require that we choose what we know to be less than the best. The second chapter adds Hobbesian and Humean insights, asking if the trust can be justified if we consider our choices in the light of sentiments like fear and sympathy. Chapter Three argues that even with this addition, trust still remains irrational. Chapter Four tries to rehabilitate the rationality of trust by invoking Rawlsian fairness; if we can be made to see that, abstracting away from our actual situation, we would ourselves endorse a system in which promises are kept, and so trust is justified, we can see that trust is rational. Chapter Five explores Kantian ways of universalizing reason to the same end. Chapters Six and Seven illustrate the shortcomings of the various options so far discussed, and so sharpens the problem of how trust, so necessary for social life, can be rational at all. Chapter Eight announces Hollis's preferred solution to the problem: the conception of rationality basic to decision theory is what is at fault. If we start with purely self-interested agents, even if we add sentiment, fairness, and universality, we will still have intractable coordination problems which decision theory is impotent to solve. What is needed is a communal sense of rationality, a sense of joint intentions and preferences not reducible to individual intentions and preferences. There follows a bibliography and an index.

Hollis has produced an energetic and interesting book. It lays out the problem in a clear way, and deals fairly with all the historical figures invoked. The only thing wrong with it is that it makes a fairly general suggestion at the end, where we might reasonably hope for something more worked-out. But the task of explicating communitarian rationality is a big one, and this book at least makes a sound contribution to its beginning. Together with Govier's book, it provides a good introduction to the critique of individualism, and so to the motivation for more communitarian approaches to both epistemology and political philosophy. Both books are well worth reading on their own, and would also make interesting texts for courses and seminars in which the confrontation between individualism and communitarianism is highlighted.

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Vivienne J. Gray

The Framing of Socrates: The Literary

Interpretation of Xenophon's Memorabilia.

Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 1998. Pp. iv + 202.

DM76. ISBN 3-515-07313-2.

The Framing of Socrates is a defense of Xenophon's merit as an information source on Socrates and as an author. The received interpretation of Xenophon is that his representation of Socrates is not as accurate as that of Plato (apparently lacking in references to Socratic irony, definition, elenchus, etc.); he presents in the *Memorabilia* a patchwork of unorganized information, much of which is unreliable because Xenophon had not experienced it first hand. The merit of Gray's book is to show how the *Memorabilia* is organized through the development of Socratic themes based on stylistic techniques common to contemporary rhetorical writing, but expanding on these by the introduction of Socratic methods towards the end of the book, by which time the Socratic innovations would be more palatable to the audience.

Gray challenges the received view on a number of fronts. The 'Framing' of Socrates by Xenophon consists in developing a picture of the master through amplification, the restatement of a Socratic belief at ever greater levels of generality, and placing his statements and deeds within the tradition of the wise men. The recurring theme of Socrates' philosophical views is that one must be useful (*ophelimos*). Usefulness is identified with honor and virtue. Early in the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon ties Socrates' defense on charges of impiety to the foolishness of those who don't recognize the usefulness of the Gods to men, particularly for advice about actions (1.1.6; 30). In an amplification of usefulness later in the book, the point is made that the pursuit of studies in whatever 'strange' gods, astronomy or other sciences Socrates might have done is rejected by him because it is not useful for the management of one's own affairs; rather, one must still seek divination in matters beyond our grasp (4.7.0-10; 156). Similar amplifications occur with respect to the charges of corrupting the young. Socrates believed that he could improve his apprentices by helping them control their desires (1.2 ff.p 41ff.); this is amplified later by the need for self-control in actions, particularly because this promotes law-abiding behavior and statesmanship (4.2.3-4.5; 50-6). Socrates is thus taken to be pre-eminently useful to his society for helping prospective statesmen develop the qualities of character they need. That he failed in the cases of Alcibiades and Critias is because they were no longer under his influence (1.2.17-18, 46).

The middle books appeal to Socratic conversations to convince people of virtue. They answer some anonymous accusers who charge that Socrates was able to turn men to virtue (*protrepsasthai*) while he was unable to lead them to practice it (*proagagein*) (1.4.1; 74). Gray defends the need to distinguish in these conversations various speakers (Socrates, Xenophon as 'authorial ego', 'dramatized voice') and audiences (arrogant young men, Sophists, anonymous accusers) to which the conversations were directed. The manner

of the examination varies accordingly, between elenchus, challenge and response, induction, thought association and significantly, reminiscence (*apomnemeuma*) of sayings, and *chreia*, wise sayings or question and answer discussions about actions or words which can be attributed to a wise and noble source (109; see also pp. 120-1), such as Simonides or Thales. Later amplifications add to earlier by allowing the definitions of terms, so lacking in the Platonic presentation. The use of these variations in speaker, audience and conversational technique permits Xenophon to develop on topics examined earlier in defense of Socrates' character. The use of sayings from the wisdom literature places Xenophon's work and Socrates' character firmly within a rhetorical tradition common at the time of his writing, which stood in contrast to the elenctic philosophical technique emphasized in Plato's representation. The 'wise saying' would have been familiar to Xenophon's readers, compelling them to admit the nobility of Socrates' character, and that he is the successor to that tradition. On the reliability of Xenophon's representation of Socrates in contrast to Plato, one must recognize that the two authors wrote within different traditions. The use of dialogue and irony emphasized in Plato would not fit well within the tradition of wisdom literature although both get represented in the *Memorabilia*. But neither author presents a complete picture.

Gray's work is exemplary in literary scholarship, by appealing to international, multi-lingual sources in Xenophon exegesis, and classics in early rhetorical literature. (Interesting appeals are made to Hesiod, Isocrates, Theognis, Longinus and others.) It does not serve as a commentary on the *Memorabilia*, but is said to prepare the way for one (iv). This explains the brevity with which some of the sources are mentioned, and given that these mentions are generally for the sake of establishing the literary interpretation, philosophical justification of some of the Socratic arguments is neglected. Although not always explicit, the points of contrast between the Platonic Socrates and the Xenophonic are compelling. The book contains an index locorum to references within the *Memorabilia*, and a short subject index. More detail in the latter would be useful.

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Martin Heidegger

Pathmarks. William McNeill, ed.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.

Pp. xii + 385.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-43362-2);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-43968-X).

For those scholars with a background in Heidegger's quests first for the meaning and later the truth of Being, *Pathmarks* is indispensable. It provides critical information on the original context of many of Heidegger's central concepts, through notes and references it provides access to the historical development of those ideas, and it focuses several of Heidegger's most provocative themes.

The original context of Heidegger's ideas often provides lucid definitions. For those who have struggled through *What is Called Thinking?* looking for an answer to the title's question, the one-paragraph definition of thinking in 'Phenomenology and Theology' is a relief. The notions of 'fallenness' and 'being lost in the "They" ', which appear without warning in *Being and Time*, make much more sense in light of Heidegger's well-developed perspective of *Dasein*'s fascination with beings in 'From the Last Marburg Lecture Course'. Similarly, after Heidegger's carefully developed notion of being-in-the-world in 'The Essence of Ground', the version in *Being and Time* seems like shorthand.

This series of essays also provides the opportunity to see how critical ideas first emerged. One discovers in this collection, for example, that a cursory version of the careful analysis of causality in *The Question Concerning Technology* first emerged in 'On the Essence of the Concept of "Natura"', where Heidegger develops the pivotal relation of 'responsibility' to 'causality'. The evolution of ideas is also documented in the edition changes carefully catalogued by the editor. In this regard, the interlinear references are particularly helpful, as are the references at the end of the book that give basic bibliographical information. The essays could be improved, however, with more interlinear translations of Greek terms. Although German and Latin phrases are translated, many Greek words are neither translated or naturalized. As those who have little Latin and less Greek know from reading *Being and Time*, this is usually not an insurmountable handicap. The one exception is 'Plato's Theory of Truth' which is virtually inaccessible without a Greek lexicon ready at hand.

The most provocative aspect of the book is the emergence of themes that become more powerful when they are seen together from slightly different perspectives in several essays. For example, by the end of *Pathmarks*, one is left with a profound sense of the rising horror Heidegger seemed to feel with the possibility that Being will not be thought and logic and ratio will prevail. Similarly, one senses the frustration with being misunderstood both in the interminable conflict over whether the 'turn' represented an abandonment

of *Being and Time* or an evolution, and the lack of appreciation of his analysis of 'the nothing'.

Finally, one cannot help but be amazed at the brilliance and originality of Heidegger's hermeneutics in such essays as 'Hegel and the Greeks' and 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth'. This experience alone justifies the time it takes to read this remarkable collection of reflections, for in light of the ambiguity of Heidegger's best known works, especially the later works, one risks forgetting the remarkable depth and breadth of his classical philosophical training. Encountering it again is refreshing.

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Ghita Holmström-Hintikka and Raimo Tuomela, eds.

Contemporary Action Theory.

Volume 1: Individual Action.

Synthese Library Volume 266.

Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.

Pp. xvii + 317.

US\$136.00. ISBN 0-7923-4752-8.

This is a collection of previously unpublished papers dealing with prominent issues in recent analytic discussions of individual action. (Volume 2 is concerned with social action.) The volume is particularly noteworthy in that it includes contributions by philosophers of action from Scandinavia and Germany whose work is less known in Anglo-Saxon circles. This includes the work on action by G.H. von Wright, which is at the center of three of the articles.

The volume contains several points of focus. The first is on action explanation, and is headed by von Wright's 'Explanation and Understanding of Actions'. The paper is based on a 1984 lecture and is published in English for the first time. Its content is similar though not identical to a paper under the same title published in von Wright's *Practical Reason* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Von Wright elucidates the concept of understanding explanations (explanations in terms of reasons), where the concept of reason is rich enough to encompass not only internal reasons (wishes, desires) but also external reasons (commands, requests). He argues (contra Davidson) that such explanations are quite sufficient to explain the concept of acting for a reason without invoking the idea of reasons as causes. Non-causalism is also the object of George Wilson's noteworthy contribution, which briefly

and clearly defends his version of the teleological view on the nature of reason explanations. Wilson addresses some fundamental worries about the non-causalist alternative that tend to favor at least minimalist versions of causalism.

Rex Martin's 'Von Wright and Collingwood on Causation and the Explanation of Human Action' compares the work of two well-known philosophers whose work on action is little known. In 'Metaphysical Foundations of Action Explanation', Ausonio Marras sketches not an altogether new direction for an account of mental causation, on which psychological properties are specified functionally and whose causal powers depend on the causal powers of (non-finitely enumerable) physical mechanisms.

The second focus is on action and related concepts. In an engaging paper, David-Hillel Ruben argues against both the event-causal and the agent-causal theories of action which identify actions with events. He is concerned not 'to make agency "appear" out of the mere passivity of events' (282) and proposes that actions do not involve events. He accepts the counterintuitive consequence of his account that when an agent raises his arm his arm does not rise. (A serious drawback of the paper is that it does not foresee an immediate response on the part of the criticized theories, which is in effect to deny that all events are passive in the required sense. This point is in fact made explicitly, though without reference to Ruben's paper, in Mele's contribution to the volume.)

Papers by Mele, Bishop and Adams give (causal) accounts of special kinds of actions. In 'Passive Action', Alfred Mele argues that the causal theory of action can accommodate cases where the agent lets (without actually intervening) the world take its course, as a driver might do in letting a car coast downhill. John Bishop gives a causal account of mental actions. He addresses the problem with special attention to fully autonomous actions, which, he believes, require the performance of a mental action — the formation of an intention to take a particular course of action. (It is unclear whether the account is meant to apply to such mental actions as counting in one's head.) He argues that we can understand how we form intentions for a reason by appealing to higher-order intentions (rather than higher-order motives) that 'belong to the agent qua practical agent' (262). Frederick Adams argues that tryings to *A* are bodily or mental actions done for the purpose of *A*-ing. He proposes a component theory of trying according to which tryings are the causings of a bodily or mental state by another mental state (for the mentioned purpose). Adams considers and answers a number of interesting questions about the concept of trying.

Lennart Nordenfelt's 'On Ability, Opportunity and Competence' is a detailed study of the concept of ability. Toward the end of the paper, he sketches two notions of pragmatic ability relativized to ordinary and accepted circumstances.

The third group of papers addresses practical reasoning and intention. In 'Actions and Inconsistency', Douglas Walton considers the closure problem of practical reasoning. He searches for conditions under which an agent could

be said to be committed to a practical inconsistency (rather than a temporary inconsistency of the sort characteristic of *akrasia*). Robert Audi takes another look at his theory of intending, develops it and confronts some objections. Myles Brand's discussion centers around the so-called simple view, on which an intention to do something is necessary for doing it intentionally. He challenges Bratman's reasons for rejecting the view, though he rejects it himself for quite different reasons. He argues that intentional actions are more finely individuated (with view to ascriptions of responsibility) than intentions (with view to action plans). All actions that are part of a plan (intention) are intentional.

The fourth focus is on the relation between action and freedom. In a complex but interesting paper, Gottfried Seebass diagnoses Augustinian roots of the notion of freedom as the ability to do what one wants to do. He argues that the problem of free will cannot be solved using this notion. Hugh McCann defends the libertarian concept of free will from van Inwagen's recent charges. He argues that the problematic cases of action with just one motivated alternative are very rare if at all possible.

The volume contains two more formally oriented papers. Risto Hilpinen's 'On States, Actions, Omissions and Norms' develops von Wright's formal analysis of action as world-state transitions with attention to the developments in the logic of action. Ghita Holmström-Hintikka provides a syntactic framework in which she tries to capture various ways in which one agent may influence another. (It would have been interesting to have a confrontation with Belnap and Perloff's theory, on which it is impossible for one agent to see to it that another does something.) Holmström-Hintikka also offers some indication how the structures can be applied to some discussions in medieval philosophy.

The volume as a whole represents a slice in the art of philosophizing about agency. It is thus not suited for pedagogy except perhaps as a supplementary reading for advanced graduate seminars (for which its price makes it unacceptable). However, those interested in philosophy of action and the way in which it impacts related disciplines in particular philosophy of mind and ethics, are likely to find something of interest in it.

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Ghita Holmström-Hintikka and Raimo Tuomela, eds.

Contemporary Action Theory. Volume 2: Social Action.

Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.

Pp. vi + 355.

US\$125.00. ISBN 0-7923-4553-6.

The theme is « the social aspects of human action » (v). The volume is a team work; among the papers it presents, half are due to a team. It covers the recent research about social action (S.A.). It contains approaches in philosophy, the logic of action, DAI (Distributed AI), game theory, and social psychology (x). Social psychology, from the point of view of a DAist, will be found in Castelfranchi's paper (163-93), contributions from DAI in Cohen, Levesque and Smith (87-115), Woolbridge and Jennings (143-63), Rao (309-32), Santos, Jones, and Carmo (333-51). All the other contributions, due to philosophers, bear directly or indirectly on the foundations of the analysis of S.A. Bibliographies are given, and a concise description of papers (ix).

The main philosophical problem is to determine how it is possible to build a model of S.A. in terms of individual action, or of the primitives used to modelize individual action. This problem is analogous to the classical one dealt by Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau, Hume, and many others: how is a S.A. possible if everyone seeks only his own interest? Analogous does not mean identical. The differences are due first to the level of analysis (what is aimed at here is a model, a formal representation of S.A.), second to historical and theoretical factors. Two sorts of problematic sources must be distinguished to understand the interplay of the papers in the volume.

The first is a contrast between two theories: the speech act theory, (Searle, *Speech Acts*, 1969), second, the Game theory (Neumann and Morgenstern 1949). The speech act theory, through the notion of illocutionary act, puts the emphasis on the role of rules, institutions, convention. Communicative action depends on such conventions, which exist independently of any individual. On the contrary, game theory is typically an instrumentalist theory of action: every action may be understood as strategic. The Prisoner's Dilemma *may* be used to understand why it may be one's interest to cooperate. From these points of view, what make an action social would be its conformity to conventions and institution, or its instrumental rationality and strategic interest. The second lays in two discoveries about action — one during the '60s by von Wright, the very possibility of a formal logic of action, and then, very recently, the growth of DAI. Not only do DAists have to resolve problems of S.A., insofar as they wish to account for the social life of robots (boundedly rational agents) (x), but they also have to resolve them through some logical or formal model. So it is useful both for philosophers and for DAists to know their respective works. The whole volume reflects both the spring of formal researches, were they directly or not related to DAI, and the questioning about the principles of the S.A. formal analyses.

About DAI, and from a technical point of view, the contributions bear on teams, particularly from recognition of the potential for cooperation through to team action (Wooldridge, 159), the establishment or discharge of joint intention (Cohen, who attempts ... to link joint action theory with speech act theory, 111), on plans (Rao's distinction of plans as recipes, guiding decisions, and plans as constraints, which may be important when the environment is changing rapidly, 329), and finally on responsibility (Santos defining normative concepts and producing an analysis of the conditions under which a given organisation recognizes that an agent has fulfilled his responsibilities, 347).

One of the DAIsts writes as a socio-psychologist, and argues that it is impossible to build S.A. directly from individual intentions or goals, without taking into account what he coins individual social goals, which involve both delegation of goals from somebody to somebody else, and adoption of these goals (Castelfranchi, 163-93). This leads us to the main philosophical problems: what must be the principles of an analysis of S.A.? Does the theory of speech acts provide a good model? While Cohen used it in his previously quoted paper, Meggle, in his 'Communicative action' (251-73), argues that it is not a good model, and that communicative rationality has an instrumental character. But is the game-theoretic model a good one for S.A.? While Bicchieri and Green (229-51) show that there are many doubts on the P.D.'s interpretation which justifies cooperation (rational agents who play a one-shot prisoner's dilemma should choose to cooperate under some identity assumption), Nida Rümelin (295-309) shows that the fact of not optimizing consequences is not irrational, because there is some rationality (intra- and inter-personal coherence) in respecting individual rights, sticking to some rules of collective action (303). An analysis and a definition of Social norms are also proposed by Miller (224). This first problem is clearly set as bearing on rationality. The second one bears on the choice of primitives. Must we define joint goals by joint intentions (Tuomela, 1-49), or the other way round? Suppose we take as primitives the intentions: how can an intention be joint, or collective, if I am not the one who executes it, having decided it? (Bratman, 49-65). What am I committed to in a joint intention? (Gilbert, 65-86). Another difficulty lies in the weight of commitments: Robins (193-211) analyses vows as intermediates between promises and intentions; Miller and Sandu define weak commitments (273-95). The major interest of a model using belief and knowledge as primitives appears in Tuomela and Bonnevier (1-49): it covers all the field of S.A., while Tuomela and Balzer (115-43) resolve the difficulty of iterated mutual beliefs.

Even if conflicts are not treated as such, the volume proves the interest of formal approaches about rationality and S.A.

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The Ethics of Bankruptcy.

New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. 220.

Cdn\$105.00: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-17174-1);

Cdn\$32.99: US\$22.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-17175-X).

One reasonable approach to applied ethics is to adopt a moral theory and then to examine some practical implications. This is what we find in *The Ethics of Bankruptcy*. It proceeds nicely from theory to application, and is clear and interesting throughout. The theory is Kantian, and so it is not surprising to find that autonomy and promise keeping provide the foundation for Kilpi's analysis. He begins with a historical overview of bankruptcy, but moves quickly into a discussion (and defense) of Kantian moral philosophy. This constitutes about one quarter of the book. In short, the position is that promising provides the key to understanding the moral significance of going bankrupt, because in declaring bankruptcy one is breaking a promise to repay a debt. Kilpi then explores issues related to civil liability, extravagant living prior to claiming bankruptcy, and punishment for those who declare bankruptcy. The book concludes with an examination of moral issues related to corporate bankruptcy. Here the discussion touches on some of the more popular themes in business ethics, such as stakeholder theory.

Casting the analysis in terms of promise-keeping leads Kilpi to focus on the relationship of the creditor and debtor rather than social context or third parties. To the extent that a larger social picture is considered, the emphasis is invariably on the benefits reaped by society. Discussions of distributive justice, for example, are brief and restricted to fairly narrow points. According to Kilpi, 'The moral elements of lending have a concrete impact in the world: one pot on the stove turns into two!' (195). The possibility that some debt is accrued in order to pay for the necessities of life, or because an individual has succumbed to some advertising campaign is not seriously considered.

In general, the book is written from the perspective of one who believes that debt can be a good thing — anyone looking for a critique of consumerism or old fashioned objections to usury should look elsewhere. That said, the discussion is not unfairly biased towards creditors' interests. While casting the debtor who declares bankruptcy as an individual who has violated a promise imbued with Kantian moral significance, there is no strong presumption that the bankrupt has done wrong. The creditor has taken a calculated business risk, and has no moral complaint against the debtor so long as a good faith effort has been made to repay the debt. And this is so even when the debtor has lived an extravagant lifestyle.

At times the account seems strained. For example, in trying to explain why corporations should uphold contracts even though they are not moral agents, Kilpi asserts that 'a corporation denies its own existence if natural

persons acting on its behalf refuse to participate in the projection of obligations that the web of the contracts they are serving demands' (189). More importantly, Kilpi's sanguine perspective on debt may be appropriate only in a limited range of cases. The claim that taking on debt benefits both the creditor and the debtor is most plausible in a business setting, where the credit is extended in order to invest and create new wealth, which is subsequently shared with the creditor. It is less plausible when a debt is acquired by an individual to pay for groceries, or medical bills, or rent. Promising is a salient moral feature in both situations. But the promise seems to be of greater moral significance when both the creditor and debtor share a similar motivation, to increase their own wealth, and have equal freedom to accept or reject the contract. When the motives are different, or one party has no viable alternative to accepting debt, the situation seems morally different. Perhaps two distinct accounts of the morality of lending and bankruptcy are needed in order to distinguish purely voluntary business activity from other situations where there is no possibility that the debtor will make a profit. This would provide a means of distinguishing mutually beneficial lending from, for example, debt acquired because the individual has no other means of providing for necessities, or has had their autonomy subverted through advertising.

The Ethics of Bankruptcy will be of interest to anyone curious to see how deeply theoretical considerations can be brought to bear on practical moral concerns. It is an unusual book, both because of the topic and because of the extent to which this topic is explored. It is clearly written, with carefully developed arguments. We ask better questions after reading this book, and that alone makes it worthy of reading.

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Alexander Miller

Philosophy of Language.

Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press
1998. Pp. xviii + 348.

\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7735-1708-1);

\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7735-1709-X).

This modestly-sized textbook manages to outline many of the key arguments in the philosophy of language from Frege onwards including the work of Russell, Carnap, Quine, Kripke, Lewis, Grice, McGinn, Fodor and Davidson. This is no mean feat in a book of this size as some of the issues are extremely dense and difficult, even for those working in the area. Yet the style of the book is clear and accessible and written predominantly for an audience of second-year undergraduate students for which it undoubtedly fills an important niche.

Chapter 1 begins with an outline of the key elements of Frege's account of sense and semantic value, covering the role of logical operators, syntax, truth conditions, the notion of reference or semantic value, predicates, connectives and quantifiers. Frege's theory is presented as a number of connected theses which are treated separately with concrete examples. Where formal notation is used, the expressions are very clearly explained to aid the uninitiated.

Chapter 2 offers a short discussion of a number of problems with Frege's theory: 'the problem of bearerless names', 'the problem of substitution into belief contexts' and 'the problem of informativeness'. Each of these problems trade on the need to appeal to some other semantic property other than 'semantic value'; namely, 'sense'. It is persuasively argued that his notion of semantic value does not overcome the problem that speakers of a language might be using different senses to their words (and thus not really be communicating). A further problem is that, because Frege's account assumes an account of analysis in terms of relations among senses, it offers no scope for informational analysis of terms in a language. Hence, the very kind of philosophical analysis which Frege is widely seen to have 'fathered' does not seem possible on his own theory of meaning! The chapter then looks closely at Russell's theory of descriptions as a means of countering some of these difficult objections.

Chapter 3 introduces the verificationist principle and the logical positivist slant on meaning. The usual distinction between the 'analytic' and the 'a priori' is presented, as is Carnap's distinction between 'internal' and 'external' questions and 'logical' and 'factual' ontological frameworks. This discussion leads naturally to holism via a discussion of Ayer's account of ethical language, and to a sustained treatment of analytic meaning.

Chapter 4 continues the holism discussion via a rehearsal of Quine's arguments in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'. The verificationist story is rebuffed on Quinian grounds because it assumes individual statements admit of confirmation or disconfirmation. The carefully made distinctions of the

previous chapter are dismantled piece by piece, and scepticism about sense is introduced as a serious theme in the philosophy of language. None of this is new material, but it is well-presented and clearly argued. This scepticism is, of course, fuelled by a discussion of the 'indeterminacy of translation' thesis (a major support for Quinian holism) and Miller makes the connections here very explicit. Arguments are then presented which seem to justify the claim that there is 'no fact of the matter which renders ascriptions of meaning true or false' (149). Miller resists this conclusion by making an interesting connection with Quine's behaviourist premises, a discussion which relies for support on the work of Gareth Evans and Christopher Hookway.

The scepticism theme is continued in Chapter 5 which introduces Kripke's *reductio* of Wittgenstein's views on rules and private languages. Once again, there's no new meat in the sandwich: the standard examples of rules for 'plus' and 'quus', 'addition' and 'quaddition' are trotted out, and the sceptical paradox is outlined for all to see. A novel adjunct to the debate, however, is the introduction of Paul Boghossian's, Crispin Wright's and Jose Zalabardo's various responses to the sceptical thesis. None of these, in Miller's view, are entirely up to the sceptical challenge. Chapter 6 consists of various attempts to overcome the sceptic's doubts by attempting to explain the relationship between meaning and mental content. This chapter is devoted to dispositional accounts offered by Boghossian and Lewis; Fodor's obscure thesis of 'asymmetric-dependencies'; McGinn's views on normativity and the capacity/ability conception of understanding; Wright's 'judgement-dependent' account of meaning; and Wittgenstein's own 'dissolution' of the sceptical paradox, which famously 'leaves everything as it is' and provides nothing further beyond the use of language games. McDowell's work is discussed in this connection and the claim is made that, contrary to Kripke's account, Wittgenstein himself did not accept the view that meaning requires additional acts of interpretation.

The final three chapters of the book discuss of the nature of sense and the relationship of issues in the theory of meaning to wider metaphysical issues. Grice's work on speakers' meaning and sentence meaning is discussed, along with Searle's account of illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions. Davidson's extension of the Tarskian program is given a full chapter and the notion of extensional adequacy conditions and convention 'T' are discussed in considerable detail. The book concludes with detailed discussions of non-cognitivism, anti-realism and quietism.

As Miller admits, this is predominantly a book on the philosophy of meaning or 'sense' (xii); there is very little about how meaning might 'carve nature at its joints' (neither teleosemantics nor Millikan's work gets a mention, for example) so the text does seem to sacrifice completeness for thematic unity. A second mild complaint is that, despite its breadth of scholarship, the book advances no new thesis. This would not normally be a cause for concern in an introductory textbook. However, the Series Editor does boldly proclaim that: 'care has been taken to produce works that are ... not bland expositions, and as such are original pieces of philosophy in their

own right' (ii). Miller's book is certainly not a case of bland exposition — clarity in this most difficult of areas has its own rewards for the patient reader, and deserves wholesome praise — but neither does Miller's work seem an example of original philosophy.

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James J. O'Donnell

*Avatars of the Word. From Papyrus to
Cyberspace.*

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

1998. Pp. xii + 210.

US\$24.95. ISBN 0-674-05545-4.

Avatars of the Word is a loosely-organized series of essays about the impact of today's communication revolution on books, teaching and research. It attempts to assess that impact by reviewing the interconnection between reading, writing and speaking from a historical perspective based on western cultures stretching from Greco-Roman antiquity to the present. The individual essays are highly personal meditations, 'deliberately associative and informal' (x) as James J. O'Donnell (hereafter JOD) calls them, which advance no particular line of argument but do occasionally voice some very sharp criticisms.

The focus throughout is primarily on the way evolving technologies of the word have shaped cultural practices, not on philosophy. JOD's occasional forays into philosophy are trivial, tendentious or erroneous. He is not a philosopher at all but a professor of Latin — primarily late Latin literature from the fourth to fifth centuries CE — and Vice-Provost for Information Systems and Computing at the University of Pennsylvania. As such he has done ground-breaking work in developing online university courses, databases and journals like the invaluable *Bryn Mawr Classical Review* and its sibling *The Medieval Review*. The Latinist in JOD explains his tendency to view the media-induced upheavals in our contemporary print culture through analogous upheavals in late Latin antiquity. The technologist in JOD explains his (often resigned) enthusiasm for much in the communication revolution.

Of the nine chapters in the book, the first five present broad meditations on historical situations designed to stimulate thinking about our own times, while the last four contract their ambit to the state of learning and teaching

in the university. Four short discussions of special topics, which JOD calls 'hyperlinks', appear between the chapters, three in the historical section and one in the university section. Their disposition reflects the weighting of the two parts: the first has 123 pages, while the second only 72.

Unfortunately, it is this first, longer section that is of least use to those who want to understand the challenge of the new electronic technology because of JOD's decision to view the present through 'refracted comparisons with earlier revolutionary periods' as the puff on the book jacket states. These periods include the transition from oral to textual culture (ch. 1), the growing idea of a virtual library as cultures become dependent on the written word (ch. 2), the development of the codex book with its power of nonlinear access to texts (ch. 3), the rise of printing with the various reactions to it as an index to the controversies of our own time (ch. 4) and the construction of a master narrative that traces western culture directly to Greco-Roman culture (ch. 5). Most of this historical material has already been told far more accurately, lucidly and compellingly elsewhere. What JOD gives us is little more than potted history enlivened occasionally by personal reminiscence and wit; it stimulates minimal thinking. The real meat of the book is in the second part, to which I shall turn in a moment.

For those who are already conversant with the scholarship that underlies chapters 1 - 5, JOD's tour can be entertaining and occasionally enlightening. For those who aren't, however, it can be very misleading. Readers need to be on their guard. Personal prejudices are sometimes stated as fact, the most serious example occurring in chapter 1, where he claims that we need not see Jesus, Socrates, Confucius and Buddha 'as extraordinary manifestations of charisma and wisdom,' since the real message of their teachings lies in the 'platitudinous and benignly impractical nature of them' (16). There are lapses of fact, such as the allegation that both A.E. Housman and Nietzsche 'went mad because they took themselves and their classics with such deadly seriousness' (100) — though I suppose this might just be maliciousness cloaked in failed humor. Two subsequent references to Nietzsche (145 and 161) patronize him ignorantly, while his Derridean analysis of the *Phaedrus* (18-23) is trivial. Caricature often substitutes for analysis, notably in chapter 5, where his description of the master narrative of western culture is a crude parody set up only for swift demolition.

Things improve radically in chapter 6, where JOD uses contemporary academic judgements of Augustine to argue that 'the single truth is always found masked by multiple perspectives and arguments' (133). The new electronic technologies will aid this diversity by (1) slowly eliminating the single-author, linear structure monograph and (2) encouraging communal, online play with primary and secondary sources through hyperlinks: 'Instead of publication that says "This is how it is," we have a form of public performance of scholarship that *asks* "What if it were this way?" Publication of this sort becomes a form of continuing seminar, and the performance is interactive, dialogic, and self-correcting' (136). Chapter 7 makes a compelling argument for a complete rethinking of what the university is, and how it

teaches the humanities, as online interactive instruction and resource-based learning threaten to replace the old physical structure with a fluid virtual campus. JOD hopes that cyberspace will offer 'a more flexible version of institutional reality' (151) in which we can find a way to eliminate the barrier between the liberal arts and the preprofessional schools. The book really ends with chapter 8, which is a meditation specifically 'for professors only' on the need for a reorganization of the university in the face of its myriad internal problems. Of the many wise things here, perhaps the most important is the need to confront the growing consumerization of higher education by a separation of its teaching and nurturing function from its evaluating and credentials-giving function (177-82). A short coda in chapter 9 sketches JOD's personal odyssey through academia into cyberspace.

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Gary Ostertag, ed.

Definite Descriptions: A Reader.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1998. Pp. xi + 411.

US\$25.00. ISBN 0-262-65049-5.

Although all good anthologies on the philosophy of language contain reasonably comprehensive sections on the topic of definite descriptions, incorporating many of the papers Ostertag here reproduces, this is the first book devoted *entirely* to definite descriptions. As such it will prove a valuable resource for those already working in, or interested in studying, this central issue in the philosophy of language. Indeed, there exists such a niche for a book of this kind that Schiffer's encouraging remark at the conception of the project, noted in the preface, to the effect that 'I'm surprised no one has thought of it before!' seems entirely apt. Ostertag has collected here all of the seminal papers on definite description, including three selections from Russell, two from the neo-Russellian Neale, together with crucial papers by Strawson, Donnellan, and Kripke. However, it is also good to see important, but perhaps sometimes overlooked, selections from Carnap, Lambert, Peacocke, Schiffer and Wettstein given the prominence they deserve. There are, of course, omissions, the most surprising of which I would count as the seminal (1973) paper by Mates, 'Descriptions and Reference'. This paper, with its introduction of complex descriptions which appear to be bound by quantifiers, such as 'The daughter of every woman M.P.', instigated an

entirely new line of debate concerning definite descriptions, yet the journal it appears in (*Foundations of Language* 10, 409-418) is hard to get hold of and the article has not, to my knowledge, been reprinted in any previous collection. Despite Ostertag's stated aim to exclude papers on anaphora due to confines of length, the omission of Mates' paper must be particularly sorely felt.

Ostertag is concerned to give us the debate surrounding descriptions in its temporal order, from Russell on, and reading the selection of articles from start to finish may prove a useful exercise for contemporary readers unaware of the historical development of important themes in this area. However, there are drawbacks to this chronological ordering of material. For instance, the closely related papers of Donnellan and Kripke (Chapters 8 and 11) are here separated by Peacocke's paper (Chapter 10), despite the wider concerns of the latter. Furthermore, it is left up to the reader to decide why the chronological order has been preserved in this and other cases, even though the editor sees fit to break with it between Chapters 3 and 4, which concatenate works by Russell and Neale. Although I am sure Ostertag has good reasons for the way in which the material is presented, his intentions are not made clear. In general, this book would have benefited from some more authoritarian editorial hand imposed on the papers selected, perhaps grouping them into thematic sections or at least giving the reader a clearer overview of the arguments put forward in each contribution, and their relations to one another. Without this one might wonder about the book's suitability for the novice reader or its ability to stand unaided as a companion to undergraduate courses in this area.

Ostertag's Introduction does go some way towards playing the role of guide for the uninitiated, but unfortunately it does not go far enough. The first two sections of the Introduction (1-10) give us a historical account of the development of Russell's theory of descriptions. Here Ostertag is clear and careful, stressing the important point that Russell was concerned with denoting phrases in general, not just definite descriptions, when he wrote 'On Denoting', and drawing out the interesting (though perhaps less crucial) fact that the theory was not simply the direct response to a disenchantment with Meinong that many (including the later Russell) took it to be. However, by far the largest part of the Introduction (13-29) is concerned with problems for the theory: primarily, referential uses of descriptions and incompleteness, and here clarity suffers somewhat from the desire to cover too much ground and pack in too much detail (including, it seems, pushing the editor's own line on these problems) in too little space. For instance, the discussion of referential descriptions concentrates on a debate between Salmon and Wettstein, even though neither of the papers under discussion appear in the Reader.

Again, in a short section on descriptions as quantifiers (25-8), Ostertag contends that Russell could not accept modern reformulations of his account, like that given by Neale. He writes: 'The observation that descriptions often require, as do quantifiers generally, contextual supplementation ... allows

us to avoid the argument from incompleteness ... But now it appears that this very feature presents an obstacle to the acceptance of Russell's theory. In a nutshell, the defense of Russell that appeals to Neale's methodological principle [i.e. that when examining a phenomenon associated with descriptions, we should look for corresponding phenomena associated with other quantifiers], requires, ultimately, a rejection of Russell's theory' (27). However, this point is, I would suggest, contentious and must depend on which of Russell's aims are thought to be important or intrinsic to his theory of descriptions, and how his theory is supposed to relate to an account of other denoting expressions. The problem is that to properly establish a point like this would surely take much more time and space than Ostertag can devote to it in an introduction.

The worry here is really who the second part of the Introduction is supposed to be aimed at: for things certainly go too quickly for the novice in this area (who would do better with a more lengthy discussion of these issues, such as that to be found in the first few chapters of Neale's *Descriptions*), while skating too quickly over various lines of response for those already familiar with the terrain. Furthermore, by using the Introduction to put forward relatively detailed points of view, Ostertag loses the opportunity to give us an explicit introduction to the ensuing material. The result is that those unfamiliar with the debate surrounding definite descriptions may find themselves without any clear route through, or overview of, the material they will encounter within the Reader. Yet even with this caveat, this book will provide a useful source for scholars and students alike in this area. For though the student may need further help in digesting what is here presented, the benefit of having such material collected in one volume cannot be disputed.

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David Owen

Maturity and Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the ambivalence of reason.

New York: Routledge 1997. Pp. xiv + 253.

Cdn\$31.99: US\$22.99. ISBN 0-415-15352-2.

This work responds to Habermas' claim that the postmoderns are nihilistic and incoherent. Owen rejects Habermas' view that Hegel is foundational to modernity. Instead, Owen argues, Nietzsche provides us with an authentically modern philosophy that reaches back to critique Kant, and simultaneously rejects both Kant and Hegel. This alternative line of the philosophic development of modernity runs from Nietzsche to Weber to Foucault (2). What unites these three, according to Owen, is their focus on genealogy as a form of critique and a radical human autonomy as the fulfillment of the promise of modernity (4-6).

Owen gives us Nietzsche's account of the genealogy of the West, from the birth of slave morality to the rise of nihilism in our own post-Christian era. This nihilism provides us with the opportunity to create our own values and thereby achieve genuine autonomy as supra-moral beings. By affirming the eternal recurrence, we can replace Kantian 'moral autonomy' with 'aesthetic autonomy' (74). Nietzsche's grand politics leads him to postulate a deeply problematical world-historical *Übermensch* (80-1). Nietzsche offers us a vision of a more moderate politics in the quiet (or artistic) *Übermensch* who works on a smaller and more personal scale.

Weber uses genealogy to show us how the Protestant will to knowledge eventually undermined Christianity and left us with value-neutrality (113-16). Science can neither provide us with values nor defend the value of science itself. It is left to charismatic politicians and scientists with integrity and personality to posit and advance their own values and thereby exercise autonomy on behalf of the society (28-39). Together, they challenge the rationalizing imperative of bureaucracies that seek to reduce all men to mere instruments.

Foucault focuses on struggles involving power, ethics and knowledge. He uses an archeological method 'to uncover the "rules of formation" which govern particular configurations of knowledge' (144). His perspectival 'genealogy's moment of heroization lies in its disclosure of what we are ... while the moment of irony lies in its showing how we *become* what we are' and how we can become other than what we are (150). The task of the intellectual is to use genealogy to open up the possibility of an authentic autonomy through self-creation. Autonomy, in turn, is 'the condition of the possibility of genealogy' (212). Unlike Nietzsche, Foucault completely rejects the world-historical *Übermensch* and makes intellectuals his primary agents for change.

Owen makes a persuasive case for his view that these three thinkers represent a trajectory of philosophic thought and an alternative to the account running through Kant and Hegel. What is less clear is whether these three thinkers, and especially Nietzsche, are actually modern. Owen is

prepared to see Nietzsche as a modern given that Nietzsche understands 'modernity as the will to truth becoming conscious of itself as a problem' (3). But Nietzsche rejects modernity; he does not seek to embrace or complete it.

We can better see Nietzsche's, Weber's and Foucault's departure from modernity by examining the point of their closest political convergence to modernity: their proposals for a more authentic human autonomy. All three thinkers fall short of the modern goal of attempting to universalize autonomy. Nietzsche must resort either to a politically irresponsible 'economy of violence' (82) or to confining his *Übermensch* to private artistic self-creation. Weber restricts those capable of autonomy to scientists and charismatic politicians. In Foucault's case, intellectual leaders determine the choice and character of the autonomous spaces opened up by genealogical criticism.

Although Nietzsche's, Weber's and Foucault's definitions of autonomy are distinctively modern, their view that autonomy is confined to the few is clearly pre-modern. Plato, for example, sees philosophy as a means by which men can liberate themselves from the opinions of the city. And he believes that most men are incapable of this philosophic autonomy. The modern search for autonomy is an outgrowth of a more centrally modern view, that the *summum bonum* is an illusion and that we should instead seek to avoid the *summum malum*. Nietzsche rejects modernity because he rejects the Last Man. Weber and Foucault adopt Nietzsche's method of genealogical analysis and modify it to suit their purposes. But both advocate views of autonomy which cannot justifiably distinguish higher from lower acts of self-creation. Their views lead us to conclude that either they have exposed an incoherence at the heart of Nietzsche's view of autonomy, or they have corrupted Nietzsche's views by stripping the content and leaving only a shell of random self-creation. Owen cannot save these thinkers from the charge of nihilism.

If Owen's book does not quite give us an alternative account of modernity, it certainly gives us an impressive account of a (postmodern) alternative to modernity. Owen combines a command of primary sources with penetrating analysis. Anyone with an interest in any of the three thinkers he discusses, or in the development of postmodern thought more generally, would benefit from this work.

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Byong-Chul Park

Phenomenological Aspects of Wittgenstein's Philosophy.

Boston: Kluwer Academic Press 1998.

Pp. xi + 249.

US\$99.00. ISBN 0-7923-4813-3.

This book, published as part of the *Synthese Library*, is a revision of Park's 1995 dissertation, written under Jaakko Hintikka. Park bills his work as an extension of the phenomenological interpretation of Wittgenstein that Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka set out in *Investigating Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell 1986). Unfortunately, almost everything here was already in *Investigating Wittgenstein* or in the essays collected in Jaakko Hintikka's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Half Truths and One and a Half Truths* (Boston: Kluwer 1996). Park does not begin to cover new ground until about halfway into his book, and even then his ideas are underdeveloped. Also, Park's work is purely interpretive. He makes no effort to criticize or justify Wittgenstein's ideas, or even to relate them to contemporary debates.

The phenomenological interpretation of Wittgenstein claims that Wittgenstein was concerned throughout his life with explaining immediate experience. The simple objects of the *Tractatus* are read as objects of immediate experience, similar to Russell's objects of acquaintance. In the transition from the early to late periods, Wittgenstein abandons a pure phenomenological language founded on ostension for a physicalistic language founded on language games, but he does not give up his concern for immediate experience. He instead takes up the task of explaining difficult features of experience — colors, duck-rabbits, Necker cubes — using public language games.

The chief places where Park breaks new ground are Chapter 4, which discusses Wittgenstein's ideas on color, and the last chapter, which compares Hintikka's phenomenological reading with other readings of Wittgenstein, phenomenological or otherwise. Park's chapter on color surveys Wittgenstein's thoughts on the subject from the *Philosophical Remarks* to the *Remarks on Color*, stressing the continuity to be found. The *Philosophical Remarks* calls for an analysis of the logic of color concepts that is independent of physics, physiology, and psychology and that can answer questions like 'Why isn't yellow a kind of greenish-red, even though it is between red and green on the color wheel?' Park, rightly I believe, views the *Remarks on Color* as the fruition of this project. Unfortunately, Park does nothing to justify the possibility of such an investigation. Since Wittgenstein does nothing to justify it either, the status of the whole project is in limbo. Park is equally uncritical of the results of Wittgenstein's investigations into color, and as a result he makes Wittgenstein's ideas seem shallow and open to simple objections. For instance, in Park's version of the *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein believes that he can read the logic of color off of immediate experience. But how can assertions made on this basis be distinguished from simple dogmatism?

Park's reading of the *Remarks on Color* places a great deal of emphasis on the role of language games in fixing color concepts, but he gives us no indication of how language games could accomplish that feat. How is it that the typical use of the words 'red' and 'green' could keep me from being able to picture a reddish-green? The answer no doubt lies in the fact, which Park notes, that language games are a kind of physical system. But much more still needs to be said. Finally, Park does nothing to address the issue of cultural relativism, which is always lurking in the background of discussions of language games.

Park's discussion of other readings of Wittgenstein is equally lacking. The phenomenological reading of Wittgenstein runs into its greatest problems when it comes to the late Wittgenstein. According to Park, late in life Wittgenstein continued to believe in private sensations like color or pain. He simply thought they had to be described using a public language. But criteria for the reidentification of sensations are also part of this public language. If sensations are identified, described and reidentified using a public language, in what sense are they still private? One might expect issues like this to be dealt with in the last chapter, which replies to alternative readings of Wittgenstein. Sadly, most of Park's replies simply restate the inadequate points he made before. The chapter opens with a catalog of commentators who spoke of Wittgenstein's phenomenology before Hintikka. The chief remark made about all these writers is that they didn't view phenomenology as a lifelong concern for Wittgenstein, but they should have. The subsequent sections include an interesting discussion of David Pears and some useful contrasts between Wittgenstein's phenomenology and Husserl's more systematic phenomenology. However, nothing in this chapter amounts to a full-fledged defense of the phenomenological reading of Wittgenstein.

The remainder of this book is extremely derivative, with original ideas only coming in dribs and drabs. Topics include the roots of Wittgenstein's notion of phenomenology in the phenomenological physics debated by Boltzman and Mach, Wittgenstein's phenomenology of time, and the later Wittgenstein on seeing aspects. Readers interested in any of these topics should consult the Hintikka essays Park draws on: for the roots of Wittgenstein's idea of phenomenology, read 'The Idea of Phenomenology in Wittgenstein and Husserl'; for Wittgenstein's phenomenology of time, read 'Wittgenstein on Being and Time'; for Wittgenstein on seeing aspects, read 'Ludwig looks at the Necker Cube.' All of these essays are in *Half Truths and One and a Half Truths*. Finally, I should note that Park's prose is awkward and repetitive. *Phenomenological Aspects of Wittgenstein's Philosophy* may have been a good dissertation, but does not have what it takes to be a good book.

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Donald R.C. Reed

*Following Kohlberg: Liberalism and the
Practice of Democratic Community.*

Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press 1997. Pp. xv + 280.

US\$30.00. ISBN 0-268-02851-6.

This book is a 'revisionist introduction' (xiii) to Lawrence Kohlberg's theories of moral psychology and moral education. Among philosophers, Kohlberg is best known for his cognitive-developmental account of moral maturation, according to which every human being progresses through up to six stages of moral reasoning, never regressing to an earlier stage. Among educators he is best known for modes of stimulating advancement through this sequence, first through wrestling intellectually with abstract dilemmas about conflicting interests, later through debating real issues within what he viewed as 'just communities'. The principal task that Donald Reed sets himself is to resolve an apparent conflict between the cognitive-stage model of moral development and the just-community model of moral education.

Reed argues that the conflict arises because the *telos* of the developmental model is a set of universally valid principles of justice expressing formal properties (such as Kantian reversibility) that individuals arrive at in seeking a consistent resolution to interpersonal conflicts of interest. With the meta-ethical and metaphysical assumptions of the view coming from R.M. Hare's prescriptivism and John Rawls's contractarianism, respectively, moral reasoners appear as strongly independent agents who are primarily interested in impartial fairness rather than enhancing relationships within their communities. Just communities, by contrast, are participatory democracies. Such communities do not only replace reflection on hypothetical dilemmas with real-life injustices but also presuppose that when moral decisions emerge from discussions everyone accepts responsibility for them. Appreciation of such collective responsibility depends upon habituation to democratic norms in which interdependence and commitment to the common project replace the independence, individual rights and personal liberty that appear to be basic assumptions of the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education. Reed summarizes this tension as 'the basic incoherence in the Kohlbergian project — liberal individualism vs. communitarianism' (197).

Reed questions this supposed incoherence, noting that Kohlberg could have abandoned the structural stage model without surrendering to the relativism he feared. A broadly Aristotelian conception of human connection as prior to independence permits saying that, human beings being what they are, there is a universal need for moral principles that support just institutions, however variable the local norms of justice may be. But, more interestingly, Reed also suggests that the structural-stage model itself can be saved by reinterpreting it, developing Kohlberg's own (but little argued) contention that the just-community account extends and depends upon the structural-

stage view. On the standard interpretation of the latter view, thinkers at stage 3 and 4 move from conventionally reflecting the thinking of others to thinking for themselves at the post-conventional stages 5 and 6. On the revised interpretation, the transition to this higher level reflects the capacity of individuals to reason 'as the group' (210), changing from heteronomous agents subject to external authority to agents who are autonomous in ruling themselves as a community would rule itself.

Rather than constituting a case, I think that this contrast between liberal and democratic interpretations of fully developed moral agents defines an interesting research project that remains to be elaborated as more than a sketch. In addition to stating the rules of democratic thinking more precisely, this elaboration might proceed along a pair of lines suggested by Reed's excellent treatment of issues arising between Kohlberg and his erstwhile student and colleague, Carol Gilligan. She is famous for insisting that there is a morality of care as well as a morality of justice, thereby creating the demand to explain how these two voices of moral maturity are related to one another. Reed offers the metaphor of a fugue in which either voice may resonate on its own or accompany the other in a harmonic whole, but exploring the affective character of moral development might yield a more solid analysis. The passion for justice is associated with feelings of rectitude, such as respect for agreements and indignation at unfairness or meanness, while care is expressed in feelings of affection for friends and concern for suffering. Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory never adequately incorporated such affective-cognitive states, which often co-exist. As they are refined through experience and reflection, one learns to balance individual rights and the demands of relationship in ways whose intellectual structure is still to be thoroughly explored.

The other line of research suggested by the discussion between Kohlberg and Gilligan defines the possibility that the voices of justice and care are only parts of a more complex picture. At times, Reed expresses central issues in terms of a contrast between the right and the good that characterizes standard accounts of Kantian and Aristotelian moral philosophy and much of the liberal-communitarian debate. This distinction is then mapped onto that between justice and care. But this account does not recognize a voice of utilitarian benevolence that may at times be discordant with both justice and care. Dilemmas about the sacrifice of innocent friends for the sake of the greater good show that this third voice should also be heard, but it has not been separated out for much independent treatment. When the hybrid character of moral reasoning is completed in this way and care is not uncritically equated with utilitarian sentiments, the several voices of morality should be more fully describable.

As an introduction to Kohlberg, this essay borrows substantially from other authors, as is reflected in the substantial bibliography. The critique of his cognitive-developmental account is largely taken from work by Owen Flanagan. The account also incorporates a number of elements from Kohlberg's life, perhaps foreshadowing a future biography suggested on the

book jacket. Reed's most original contribution resides in his articulation of distinct conceptions of liberal and democratic thinking. When developed more fully they will help to unite moral psychology and political philosophy with a view of moral education that Kohlberg would have admired.

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Bernard E. Rollin

*The Unheeded Cry: Animal
Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science.*
Expanded Edition.

Ames: Iowa State University Press 1998.

Pp. xviii + 330.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8138-2575-X);

US\$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8138-2576-8).

This volume is an expanded edition of Rollin's important 1989 book, with twenty pages of new material. The core of the book remains timely and convincing, reflecting both keen insight and wide-ranging knowledge on the part of Rollin. His main target is 'scientific commonsense', a crude positivism according to which scientists simply investigate empirically verifiable facts. Questions of value are deemed irrelevant, and the study of consciousness (particularly in animals) is considered unscientific as unverifiable. This ideology allows scientists to perform experiments on living subjects without concern for the subjects' conscious suffering.

Rollin argues convincingly that this approach to consciousness arose largely as a change in scientific fashion rather than through careful reasoning. Rollin provides a series of sketches of the positions of important scientists from the nineteenth century (Darwin, Romanes), through the behaviourists (Watson, Skinner), to contemporary scientists (including Donald Griffin and Marian Dawkins, who reject the ideology of scientific commonsense).

The book is rich with arguments. Central among these are arguments to the effect that (i) the denial of conscious mental states to other mammals flies in the face of evolutionary theory, and (ii) that the use of animals in experiments to model human conditions such as pain (involving a conscious component) leaves scientists with a dilemma — either the animals do not consciously suffer, etc., in which case the animals are not particularly good models for human conditions (making the point of such experiments quite unclear), or the animals do experience pain, etc. In this latter case, while the experiments may serve some purpose, the suffering of the animals involved

deserves moral consideration. Rollin calls for humane treatment — the use of anaesthetics, the provision of healthy living conditions, and so on.

Rollin considers several objections to his arguments, and deals with them convincingly. In particular, he skillfully responds to attempts to escape the aforementioned dilemma — for example, the common claim that animals provide a physical model of human conditions, but do not have accompanying conscious mental states. Rollin stresses the neurophysiological similarities between humans and other animals, and argues that the claim that animals (particularly mammals) do not consciously experience pain is unfounded.

In the newly-added material Rollin focuses on how the attitudes of scientists have changed since *The Unheeded Cry* first appeared. Rollin updates information on regulatory practices in various fields, and presents anecdotal evidence reflecting changes in attitudes towards animals within the scientific community. While interesting, the new material will be disappointing for those hoping for new arguments. Indeed, the lack of argument in the new material is striking. For example, Rollin dismisses an entire book in one sentence: 'Neo-Cartesians, such as Peter Carruthers in *The Animals Question* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), attempted to weave a philosophical cloak to cover the nakedness of claims denying consciousness to animals' (275). Rollin presents nothing in defense of this claim; surely this is inadequate.

I have provided only a bare sketch of the depth and range of Rollin's book. While the new material adds little argument, *The Unheeded Cry* remains an excellent work on the status of animals within science.

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Richard Rorty

Truth and Progress.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.

Pp. 363.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-55347-4);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-55686-4).

This collection of essays is a continuation of the work and thoughts of Richard Rorty as found in his two previous volumes of collected papers *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth*, and, *Essays on Heidegger and Others*. The seventeen papers that comprise this volume (all but four of which have been previously published) are divided into three sections titled, respectively, Truth and Some Philosophers; Moral Progress: Toward More Inclusive Communities; and, The Role of Philosophy in Human Progress. Within these three sections,

Rorty addresses the works and thoughts of a great many contemporary and influential thinkers including Annette Baier, Robert Brandon, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennet, Jacques Derrida, Marilyn Frye, Jürgen Habermas, Catherine MacKinnon, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, John Searle, and Charles Taylor.

To those familiar with Rorty's work, it will come as no surprise that Davidson, in particular, receives considerable attention. As Rorty explains, Davidson's great achievement in philosophy has been to help us to realize that the very absoluteness of truth is reason enough to abandon any inquiry into the nature of truth; simply put, no such inquiry can succeed. This, then, forms the underlying theme to this collection of papers: the view that we should not think of inquiry, in science or in any other discipline, as aiming at the truth, but rather, as simply a method for solving problems. The sooner philosophers abandon truth as a goal, the better, in Rorty's opinion.

Considering that a great many philosophers, both historically and presently, concern themselves with the pursuit of truth in one form or another, it seems fair to ask why Rorty would say such a thing. To begin with, Rorty makes clear that he is not claiming that there is no truth. Neither is he proposing that truth is a relativistic concept. As he points out in the introduction to this volume, statements such as 'true for me but not for you' or 'true in my culture but not in yours' are weird, pointless locutions. Instead, as Rorty tries to make clear in this collection, his point is that philosophy will get along better without the notion of truth as something that corresponds with the objective state of reality. Since we can never know 'nature as it is in itself' we can never know if our view of what is true is, in some way, closer to the way nature really is. Since such a project is doomed, in principle, to failure, philosophers are better off concentrating on problems that can, in principle, be resolved, such as limiting talk of truth to talk of justification. It is, of course, this rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, along with his concomitant focus on justification that has led many critics to label Rorty either a nihilist or a relativist as regards truth (is there really any difference between the two?). However, as Rorty tries to make clear, his view is not that talk about truth really is just talk about justification. Rather, his claim is that since we are epistemically (at the very least) barred from knowing nature as it is in itself, such talk becomes pointless. This becomes particularly clear in the first and third essays in this volume where Rorty argues that a culture in which we no longer took seriously the skeptics question about whether or not we are nearer to the truth would be superior to one in which we yearn for assurances that, in fact, we really are closer.

While this view of the role (or lack thereof) of truth in philosophy is the underlying theme to nearly all of the essays in this collection, it receives the most direct attention in the first section of this volume, 'Truth and Some Philosophers'. None of the eight essays that comprise this section present a theory of what truth, understood properly, actually is. Instead, Rorty argues that various conceptions of what truth is (particularly the correspondence theory) are misconceived, and that the nature of the errors of these views is

what also explains the lack of a need for a theory to replace the discredited theories. Rorty himself admits that the tone of this section is not constructive, but dismissive, and that considering the subject matter addressed, this dismissive approach is a virtue, not a vice.

Continuing along this theme, the second section of *Truth and Progress* contains four essays on moral progress. Rorty's main argument in this section is that moral progress ought not to be perceived as the convergence of human opinion to moral truth or as the achievement of greater rationality in societal intercourse, but rather, as an increase in our ability to recognize a great many differences and disputes as morally irrelevant. Rorty, always the iconoclast, repeats in this section his previously published view that it is imagination, not Reason (in his words, that truth-seeking faculty), that better helps us to understand the texture of our moral obligations, and as such, novels, not philosophical writings on ethics, are the most useful vehicles of moral education.

The third section of this volume, 'The Role of Philosophy in Human Progress', while less unified in theme than the previous two sections, is nevertheless a continuation of the views Rorty outlines in these sections. The first two essays in this section, for instance, argue that what counts as philosophy is simply a matter of who is deciding, and for what purposes, which historical figures are philosophers. The final three essays are devoted to examining the works of John Dewey, Jürgen Habermas, and Jacques Derrida.

Rorty is no doubt a very important philosophical figure of the late twentieth century. He is the sort of thinker that one either loves or hates (or loves to hate), and this book will do nothing to bridge the gap between his supporters and opponents. Simply put, much of the work in this volume is preaching to the converted. To those who are convinced by Rorty's views, the essays in this volume offer no reason to abandon their support. To those who approach Rorty's work with some degree of skepticism, however, Rorty offers no convincing arguments to abandon their opposition. While *Truth and Progress* is well written, and an interesting read (particularly his insightful discussion on the debt Habermas owes to Dewey in formulating his theory of communicative reason), those who come to this book not already converts to Rorty's particular brand of pragmatism will find neither truth nor progress. Whether this is to their credit or not remains, of course, an open question.

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Judith N. Shklar

Political Thought and Political Thinkers,
ed. Stanley Hoffmann.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1998.

Pp. xxvi + 402.

US\$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-75344-1);

US\$21.00 (paper: ISBN 0-226-75346-8).

Stanley Hoffmann has collected twenty-one essays written by the late Judith Shklar of Harvard between 1958 and 1993. The volume supplements her collected articles on American political theory, *Redeeming American Political Thought*, ed. Stanley Hoffmann and Dennis Thompson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). Shklar made her primary reputation as a political theorist of eighteenth-century French thought, and this volume fills out the picture of such earlier studies as her *Montesquieu* (Oxford University Press 1987). The volume also makes a major contribution to contemporary North American political theory as well. Two of the four essays in Part One, 'Learning About Politics', i.e., 'The Liberalism of Fear' and 'The Rule of Law', speak directly to the current debate in North America and elsewhere over the nature of liberalism. Part Two, 'Learning About Thought', speaks broadly to contemporary European and North American issues; and in Part Three, 'Learning About Thinkers', the central figures are seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European republicans. The volume ends with reflections on two contemporary North American thinkers: the German-American civic republican Hannah Arendt and the American communitarian Michael Walzer.

Surely it was no accident that Shklar chose to speak on the debate over the value of liberalism. What more authoritative voice could speak in favor of liberalism than a historian of political thought whose favorite subjects had been thinkers who throughout the eighties and even earlier were being touted as offering an alternative to liberalism: Rousseau, James Harrington, and the tradition of ancient political theory? Above all one name can sum up her strategy as she interjects herself into the debate. Montesquieu and the alternative republican liberalism that he represents becomes Shklar's sword against those critics of liberalism who had forgotten what a world without liberalism might be. Montesquieu and his tradition appear in many guises in this book, but always playing two roles: to show that liberalism has many more faces than Lockean and purely rights-based liberalism, but also to show that republicanism in the guise of Montesquieu is liberal.

For many the consistent historical and conceptual line of defense that Shklar presents against anti-liberal tendencies in republican and communitarian theory will certainly be the most significant lesson of the book. But how can Shklar square her admiration for Montesquieu's republican liberalism with her admiration for features of Rousseau's republicanism which many would find anti-liberal?

The answer is that her essays on Rousseau are concerned with a larger theme than his republicanism, what I would call oppression studies. The oppression studies in this book may hold the key to how Shklar can follow Rousseau into paths that diverge from and even conflict with Montesquieu. Shklar's oppression studies include two accounts of exile, primarily using examples from ancient political theory, with emphasis on Plutarch, her account of 'subversive genealogies', which emphasizes that when Nietzsche and Hesiod attribute cruelty to the ancient Greek Gods, they are doing so to construct a political ethics, of cruelty for the German thinker, and anti-cruelty for the ancient Greek; and a piece on Pope's 'An Essay on Man' showing that it presents the philosophical possibility of siding sometimes with nature and animals against humanity. I call these essays 'oppression studies' for the following reason. Although they are certainly unconventional when compared to typical gender, race, or even that appealed to but much more rarely seen category of class studies, and not only in their reverence for the Western classics, nevertheless their root ideal is one that many multiculturalists today might well accept: that it is subversive genealogies that are often the most important. Thus, Hesiod, mostly unread outside of classics of world literatures classes, condemns the Gods and praises the common people, and Homer, at the top of the list for those who want to restore the Western canon, is much more kindly disposed toward the Gods, and less populist than Hesiod.

It is this defense of aspects of populism that might explain how Shklar, the follower of the liberal and sometimes aristocratic Montesquieu, can also follow the populist and sometimes anti-liberal Rousseau. For the striking originality of her two late nineteen-seventies essays on Rousseau collected here is that they make a case that it was precisely as a republican committed to the same public-spirited ethics as Montesquieu that Rousseau moves away from Montesquieu in both his sometimes illiberal willingness to allow political intrusions into cultural life, and also in his populist sentiment that the health of society is in the end judged by such egalitarian criteria as whether ordinary people are secure enough to have large families. Shklar's simultaneous defense of Rousseau's egalitarian populism, Montesquieu's defense of privacy, Pope's defense of the animal world and Hesiod's critique of cruelty, define the breadth of her liberalism.

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Bert van Roermund

Law, Narrative and Reality.

Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997.

Pp. x + 236.

US\$99.00. ISBN 0-7923-4621-1.

The Law and Literature approach may have its virtues as a pedagogical tool, but in this interesting exploration in legal theory van Roermund is concerned with something much deeper. Roermund's central theoretical notion is narrativity, and he understands it as an epistemological device that can shed light on law. Narrative stands in contrast to conceptual discourse. Conceptual discourse makes ontological claims, while narrative suspends or retards such claims, holding them in abeyance, as it were. Narrative captures what conceptual discourse misses, namely, singularity or eventuality, the uniqueness of the subject. While law appears to be carried on largely through conceptual discourse, Roermund claims that it is better understood as a matter of narrative.

Stories involve an alternating logic between the event which the story is about and the interpretation of that event. In narrative there is a double hierarchy of event and interpretation. From one perspective, the event is what the story is about, hence is prior to the interpretation. From another perspective, the interpretation creates the event it relates, hence is prior to the event. The logic of narrative is a moving back and forth between these. Roermund presents the alternating logic of narrative in the form of a hypothesis, which he refers to as the 'interception hypothesis'. This hypothesis seeks to capture the logic of narrative as a moving back and forth between these two perspectives, never resting in either. Reference in the narrative either to the event 'out there' or to the interpreted event 'in here' is always intercepted and turned back, thus keeping the alternation going and suspending ontological claims. The interception hypothesis is general in that it applies broadly to our knowledge and understanding of the world. It is meant to avoid the dualism of two different forms of representationalism. In one form of representationalism, the interpretation simply copies the event, and on the other form, the event is projected from the interpretation. The avoidance of these two poles is the epistemological import of the interception hypothesis. It is the way in which narrative holds the ontological claims in abeyance.

Roermund's purpose is to apply this general epistemological insight to the law. He seeks to test the interception hypothesis by exploring its explanatory fruits in legal theory. The general point is that, while narrative, in a general sense, moves without rest between event and interpretation, law, understood as narrative, moves without rest between facts and norms (for example, between the fact of coercive power and the norms of natural law). As neither event nor interpretation is prior in narrative in general, neither facts nor norms are prior in the specific narrative(s) of law. Bad theories of law are based on either seeing facts as prior to norms or vice-versa, as bad episte-

mologies are based on seeing either the world out there as prior to our understanding of it in here or vice-versa. Bad theories do not recognize that reference is intercepted and thus end up settling on one pole or the other.

In testing the interception hypothesis, Roermund explores a variety of dilemmas in the law, discussing the work of a number of legal theorists. He has very interesting things to say about these dilemmas. One dilemma he considers is the tension between understanding human dignity, in its role in legal theory, as being constituted by a set of rights or understanding it as some foundation in human nature which undergirds and justifies those rights. A second dilemma concerns the divide that exists in our attempts to understand the nature of representation in a representative democracy. A third dilemma focuses on punishment and whether we should see it as an essential aspect of law or as an extra-legal practice that the law seeks to constrain. Finally, he discusses the dilemma in private law between understanding contracts as founded on promises (and hence *sui generis*) or understanding them as simply concerned with harms (and hence a branch of torts). In all these cases, there are well-known theoretical problems in grasping either horn, and the interception hypothesis is put forth as a way to understand the dilemmas that does not require the grasping of one horn or the other. Roermund's discussion of these dilemmas is illuminating, though this reader came away with the feeling that there was something *ad hoc* in the attempt to impose on all of them a form suitable for treatment by the interception hypothesis.

One intriguing part of the argument is Roermund's discussion of legalism. An important insight of his is that critiques of legalism are often problematic for the same reason that legalism itself is, namely, that they seek to ground legal decisions in some foundation, such as rules, similarity, consensus, forms of life, or natural law. Seeking such a foundation for legal decisions is grasping one of the horns of the dilemmas, and again the interception hypothesis shows the way out.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the argument is Roermund's attempt to show not only that, as an explanation, the interception hypothesis is descriptively adequate, but that there is much prescriptive to be said for it as well. At an early point in the text, he remarks that 'the core of the book' is that understanding law as narrative shows how law 'produces its healthy effects in society' (16). Later on (119) he suggests that the two different forms of representationalism can lead to bad political theory. In the version that thought mirrors an independently existing world lies the seeds of totalitarianism, as in Plato's *Republic*, where power is given to those who have the access to that independent world. In the version that the world is a product of our efforts to understand it lies the seeds of relativistic cynicism, the political error of our own time. Roermund, like communitarian political thinkers, seeks a way between these extremes, and he finds it in the interception hypothesis.

Despite the interest and value of Roermund's argument, some serious problems remain. First, we need a fuller account of what the interception

hypothesis is. One suspects that Roermund was able to apply it in such a diversity of legal contexts because this lack of a fuller account allows the notion to remain too protean. Second, regarding the prescriptive case for the role of narrative in legal theory, there seem to be serious problems with the approach that Roermund has not addressed. He mentions that narratives can sometimes get out of hand, as in the case of nationalism. I think that this is a larger danger than he recognizes. Stories, such as the Nazi story of master race denied its rightful place by others, seem not, as stories, subject to rational critique. According to that story, we must think with the blood. The question, more broadly, is whether narrative has the tendency to run wild in this way, and whether narrative has the internal resources to avoid such a tendency. What we want to say to the Nazis is that their ideology is an affront to universal human rights, but this requires the resources of conceptual discourse.

I end with two other quibbles. First, there is no index. Second, there are entirely too many typos in the text.

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Cathryn Vasseleu

*Textures of Light: Vision and Touch in
Irigaray, Levinas, and Merleau-Ponty.*

New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. viii + 157.

Cdn\$91.00: US\$65.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-14274-1);

Cdn\$29.99: US\$20.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-14273-3).

It seems the basic thesis of the quite interesting ten- or twelve-page article which this overlong 130-page book should be is that Luce Irigaray does not disdain the philosophical use of the imagery of light and vision quite as much as readers have generally thought, and that this can be shown by investigating Merleau-Ponty's and Levinas' theories of vision and Irigaray's responses to them. Vasseleu seems to claim that upon such an investigation one will find that Irigaray understands vision to be grounded in touch — or, similarly, that light has texture. Thus, Vasseleu implies, Irigaray avoids making an alliance between femininity and touch, as she has sometimes been accused of doing.

It seems that way, at least: although Andrew Benjamin, the series editor, discerns that Vasseleu 'challenges current conceptions of Luce Irigaray as

an antvisual theorist' (i), he apparently did not find the rationale for Merleau-Ponty's and Levinas' inclusion in the book, stating only that Vasseleu 'draws on' and 'discusses' their work (i). Indeed, though most of its pages are devoted to Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, the few pages on Irigaray which close each of the book's Parts are by far the most valuable (64-72; 109-19; 127-8).

In any event, the book not only preaches to the converted, it is of interest only to a particularly orthodox sect even among its own. For instance, one must let the first three pages of Book Seven of Plato's *Republic* (the allegory of the cave) stand for the history of Western philosophy, just to get in the door here. (The *Republic* is the only Platonic dialogue cited, despite the book's many references to Plato, including the jacket copy, which one supposes has a summary function.) Similarly, Vasseleu must be allowed to use Derrida, Foucault, Lacan and/or Lyotard as unassailable interpreters of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, and to quote liberally from them at any time. It is not at all clear, in addition, when Vasseleu means to distinguish the claims of commentators such as Martin Jay, Edith Wyschogrod, Richard Cohen, etc. from those of Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Irigaray, for the exposition of whom Vasseleu regularly relies on their scholarship.

A random example: '[T]he anarchy of the face is ... theorized by Levinas as ... always already past. The effacement of the face is a trace of an indefinable other, as Derrida elaborates in his deconstruction of the idea of origin [no citation for Derrida]' (89). Further in the same paragraph, Vasseleu writes: 'The uniqueness of the other's face is an excess which resists totalization. Richard A. Cohen lists the four component terms of this excess as follows: ... Cohen, 1986:6)' (89). Vasseleu offers no context or justification whatsoever for the Cohen paraphrase. Two footnotes elsewhere in the paragraph direct readers to a survey of 'post-Husserlian philosophers and ... a strict parallel between Levinas' and Kierkegaard's contrasting of singularity and individuality' by Mark Taylor (138), and a response by Levinas to an interview question about Derrida (138). It may well be that Vasseleu means to contrast Levinas and Derrida on this point, or Levinas and Cohen; if so, however, her intention cannot be gleaned from what's on the page, and her seeming substitution of Cohen for Levinas remains unjustified. This passage demonstrates, in addition, Vasseleu's consistent preference for obtuse phrasings like '... is theorized by Levinas as ...' over ordinary, clear phrasings like '... , which Levinas claims is ...'.

Indeed, Vasseleu almost never describes the authors she discusses as 'claiming', 'stating', or 'believing' anything; instead they 'engage', 'elaborate', [not 'elaborate on ... ,'] or even '*speak*' (50) everything; most often, they 'theorize'. Let this one very representative example illustrate Vasseleu's prose style: 'It is the question of who desires to render such an account at all that Irigaray engages in more directly in her reading of Merleau-Ponty's discussion of vision and touch in *The Visible and the Invisible*' (64). Passive voice, an absence of helpful punctuation, unrelated relatives, and particularly confusing dangling prepositions — readers must wade through this mud

on every single page. A quick skim of the Introduction and Conclusion will serve a reader much better than a full reading of this book.

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Morton Wagman

*Cognitive Science and the Mind-Body Problem:
From philosophy to psychology to artificial
intelligence to imaging of the brain.*

Westport, CT: Praeger 1998. Pp. xiv + 147.
US\$59.95. ISBN 0-275-96031-5.

In this book Wagman seeks to draw together representative portions from a large body of material to demonstrate the continuing importance of discussing of the mind-body problem. He draws on fields such as philosophy and psychology, artificial intelligence, cognitive science and neural theory to urge the ongoing importance of resolving some of the practical and theoretical dilemmas of the mind-body problem. This book needs to be read in the context of Wagman's other publications on this topic. It is part of a broader endeavour in which he is seeking to develop the 'intellectual grounding for establishing the theoretical and research foundations and the psychological and philosophical implications of a unified theory of human and artificial intelligence' (p. xviii - xiv). Whether or not any kind of unified, universal, theory of this kind is possible at all is a matter of considerable debate in areas such as the philosophy of mind and epistemology. This debate is not addressed in the current volume.

The book is aimed largely at scholars in psychology, artificial intelligence and cognitive science. It seeks to make two contributions to thinking about the mind-body problem. First, Wagman endeavours to demonstrate the interrelatedness of the many issues which surround the mind-body problem. Second, he argues that the ways in which we deal with the mind-body problem at a theoretical level will largely determine the kinds of practical outcomes we can expect to develop in fields such as Artificial Intelligence.

One of the difficulties of endeavouring to cover such a vast topic, its philosophical discussion, its relevance to psychology, its applicability to artificial intelligence and the impact of new research emerging from neural science, is that one will always be accused of leaving something out or being shallow in some area or another. While Wagman does not overtly acknowledge this problem, this endeavour to draw together and summarise material

from so many different sources leaves the issue open. This is both a strength and a weakness of the book.

The vast bulk of the book consists of extracts drawn from numerous sources and held together by brief commentary and linking paragraphs by Wagman. As a means of gaining an overview of what scholars from various fields are thinking about the mind-body problem, this can be a useful approach. However, in this instance, I find that this approach presents rather more difficulties. First, it is immediately dependent on whether Wagman has selected the most important or most relevant material, and indeed whether he has managed to obtain permission to quote lengthy extracts from all of the most relevant material or whether even here compromises have had to be made. Second, there is insufficient critical discussion in the joining sections. The joining sections tend to be mainly descriptive and rarely engage the quoted author's views or position. In a book which purports to have a significant philosophical emphasis, this is weak indeed.

Psychological theory which responds to the mind-body problem, Wagman correctly locates as at least partly dependent on philosophical thinking. More recently, he recognises, psychology has also come to depend on various scientific understandings of consciousness such as those from the field of neuro-science. However, to make this point and then to give an overview of the philosophical debates on the mind-body problem, theoretical positions on the problem, theories of consciousness and systems of psychology all within ten pages is a tall order indeed! The mind-body problem in information processing systems (Chapter 2) is then covered in less than three pages, and its relationship to quantum physics (Chapter 3) in only four pages. Again, one wonders whether there is sufficient detail.

From here the book moves steadily towards Artificial Intelligence and associated concerns such as parallel distributed processing, symbolic systems and their application, imaging of the brain and neural science. The sheer breadth of topic areas indicates the enormous relevance of the mind-body problem, but offers only a cursory glance at each area rather than deeper analysis and critical discussion.

Wagman quotes Davis, Schrobe and Szolovits (1993) to indicate that the mind-body problem is at its core an epistemological problem (chapter 7). The argument is that the mind-body problem is related to the ways we represent knowledge about the world in symbols and express it through language, the kinds of ontological commitments we make, the reasoning processes we utilise, and that it makes pragmatic demands such as the need for 'pragmatically efficient computation' (p.66). He gives an extract from Davis et al (1993) — approximately seven pages in all — which discusses some of the issues that emerge out of this argument. These philosophical issues are however far more complex and far more widely debated than can be adequately summarised in seven pages.

Wagman is clearly well read and brings much valuable material to this book. However, for a book whose title and purpose indicate a major focus on philosophy and psychology, it is curiously weak in both of these areas and

especially in the critical discussion of pertinent debates. The philosophical material in the book is scant and tends to focus on pre-twentieth century thinkers. More recent debate on the mind-body problem has included philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Dennett, Putnam, Burge, Searle, Davidson, Flew and Geach to name just a few, none of whose work is referred to in the current volume. In the area of philosophy and neuro-science Churchland's work, surprisingly, is not even mentioned, neither is Chomsky's in the area of the mind-body problem and language / linguistics. While in the psychological area there is somewhat better coverage of pertinent thinkers, what is still lacking is an argument and critical commentary of how the psychological issues relate to philosophical debates and how both of these are pertinent to working out the mind-body problem in areas such as Artificial Intelligence. The assumptions of each position canvassed are taken for granted, critical interaction with each position is limited, and thus also the practical outcomes and potential of each position are insufficiently explored.

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Douglas Walton

The New Dialectic:

Conversational Contexts of Argument.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1998.

Pp. xi + 304.

\$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-4143-4);

\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7987-3).

Walton's latest of several books on argumentation claims that any meaningful account of the logical fallacies depends first upon understanding the diverse purposes which arguments serve in dialogue. At the very least, his observations suggest that 'informal logic' would do well to investigate a wider range of argument-types, and the diverse contexts in which they appear.

Walton extends Grice's idea that the content of claims depends upon a context of (presumed) agreement as to the purposes of a conversation, and related considerations of relevance. He concentrates upon six types of dialogue, starting from Hamblin's abstract model of conversation, and analyses arguments according to the role they play with respect to the purposes served by the dialogue (which purposes may range between such as persuasion, inquiry, negotiation, even quarreling). Further, Walton argues, any account of 'fallacy' must take these different purposes into consideration. This claim has two parts: first, we can only call a form of argumentation fallacious if we

understand what it does, or fails to do, as regards the dialogue-type in which it appears; and, second, different types of conversation mark off differences as to what, exactly, counts as fallacious. On the first count, the book should prove useful. Walton is probably right that logic and critical-thinking texts too often talk about fallacies too matter-of-factly, without convincing examples of the ways in which these forms of reasoning can fail to advance goal-oriented discussion or reasoning. To fill this gap, Walton references much of the literature on the various dialogue forms, and his book stands as a good jumping-off place for more detailed investigation of how they work, or fail to work, to their ends. (It should be noted, too, that no small part of this other literature is also Walton's work.)

The second part of Walton's claim — which he calls 'revolutionary', and (perhaps infelicitously) 'postmodern' — may be less convincing. At its strongest, the idea is that forms of reasoning may be fallacious in some dialogues, but perfectly reasonable in others. A dialectical fallacy consists merely in use of arguments out of proper context, illegitimately shifting a conversation away from its intended purpose. In Gricean terms, most all fallacies are fallacies of relevance. The 'new dialectic' finds places for a number of supposedly fallacious argument-forms, allowing that they contribute to different sorts of end-related language-using activity; however, some may resist this way of talking. Traditionally, the fallacies have been denigrated because they fail to achieve one particular and important goal of logical argumentation: to get from some set of true claims to some new (and likewise true) set of claims. Fallacies arise where argumentative methods either fail to lead reliably from truth to truth, or (e.g., begging the question) fail to lead to something novel. Walton argues that this feature is not of primary importance, since persons do not always use dialogue to argue to the truth of some conclusion.

Consider one of his examples. Use of argument *ad baculum*, or 'argument from threat', is generally frowned upon — that we have been threatened into agreeing with a conclusion is no guarantee that it is true. And yet, Walton argues, threats may constitute an important strategy during negotiations, and cannot be ignored just because some critical-thinking text calls them 'logically fallacious'. This is surely right, but some readers might not be convinced of the overall point. We may think that fallacies are tolerated in such contexts precisely because here we are not concerned with *argument*, after all. It could be said that some functions of conversation, as varied as they are, having nothing to do with establishing the truth of claims, and so the dialectical moves permissible there do not need to pass the logical test. Or, to put it another way, the fallacies are still bad forms of argument — it is just that certain contexts allow the insertion of bad arguments. Perhaps, however, this is just a matter of taste, and it is certainly not Walton's burden that some of us might want to restrict our interests more narrowly than his own.

In truth, Walton struggles gamely with some of these issues, as when he considers the shift from 'open-minded' dialogue into the 'eristic' or quarreling

sort of conversation, where, he admits, the presence of fallacy signals the shift to a genuinely different sort of activity.

It must be noted, lastly, that the book suffers somewhat from loose, and perhaps hasty, editing. Its structure (ten chapters, ten sections each) is artificial, and marked by what seem to be cut-and-paste revisions. Some terms ('dark-side commitments', 'maeutic') are used a number of times before an explanatory note or definition indicates Walton's meaning, and a few errors creep in (the Kripke conditions for intuitionist negation [74] should close with '... otherwise ... = T', and not '... otherwise ... = F'). The last chapter, in particular, could stand some revision, since some of its points remain unclear.

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D. Weinstein

*Equal Freedom and Utility — Herbert Spencer's
Liberal Utilitarianism.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.

Pp. xii + 235.

US\$64.95. ISBN 0-521-62264-6.

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) was another of the great liberal utilitarians, with enough theoretical twists and nuances to make his work a fit subject for careful study. Weinstein explores Spencer's views thoroughly here, including his sociological and evolutionary theorizing, both of which figured heavily in the foundations of his liberalism. Chapters are devoted to social evolution, moral psychology, equal freedom and moral rights, moral rights and utility, the coherence of his whole outlook, his ethical reasoning, and a couple of political matters, nationalization of land and the question of 'wage-slavery'. We learn a good deal from all this, as well as being left with some major puzzles.

Modern readers may well have heard of Spencer only through the criticisms of G.E. Moore, who singles him out as a prime committer of the 'naturalistic fallacy', in its evolutionary version. Weinstein defends Spencer against this charge, by pointing out that Spencer never does actually purport to be defining the term; to accuse him of this is 'anachronistic'. Moreover, he was not an evolutionary naturalist; Weinstein assesses Spencer as a 'universal hedonist' (145-7).

The most outstanding feature of Spencer's moral theorizing was his adherence to strong rights based on a Principle of Equal Freedom, yet combined with lifelong adherence to utilitarianism. In this he was closely similar to Mill, though Spencer really out-Mills Mill himself, for he held that the principle of 'equal freedom', which is arguably identical with Mill's Principle of Liberty [but see 108-9], really should do what Mill said — 'govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control' (*Essay on Liberty*, Ch. 1). Spencer regarded the Principle of Equal Freedom as making liberty 'sacrosanct'. Both saw this difference as 'the fundamental difference in their respective versions of liberal utilitarianism' (105).

Why did Spencer hold this strict view of rights? He held that the kinds of action protected by rights were ones that 'necessarily tend to produce happiness', and lack of which *necessarily* produced the reverse (105). 'Necessarily tend'? But if x necessarily produces y , then there seems no room for 'tendency' talk; and if sometimes it doesn't, that should show that x does *not* necessarily produce y . So what gives?

The principle of universal freedom specifies the 'pivotal conditions by conforming to which this greatest happiness may be attained' (*Social Statics*, p. 61). 'Given the important empirical fact that humans live socially, and given that they value happiness above all else, reason commends the principle of equal freedom as our fundamental axiom of obligation. If we wish to maximize happiness, then logical considerations supposedly dictate that we embrace equal freedom as our principal decision procedure' (157). Weinstein argues that Spencer failed to see that his theory wasn't really a non-empirical alternative to an 'empirical' account, but rather was simply an application of scientific method, laying down a hypothesis that is in principle testable against experience (164) — 'more precise, more attentive to crucial facts and more sensitive to long-term results. Still, it is wholly empirical' (166).

Spencer was a utopian capitalist anarchist, holding that when full respect for liberal rights comes into play, the state will be unnecessary and counter-productive (115). Spencer earlier argued that political rights are a crutch and fundamentally an absurdity. But that interesting chapter in his *Social Statics* was omitted from the revised edition, 41 years later, and the claimed right itself explicitly repudiated, on the ground that we are all inevitably dependent on the state for things like roads and police protection. He neither bit bullets nor probed very deep on such matters.

Spencer later went on to defend democratic rights, including extension of the suffrage — leading to more twists and turns, since he recognizes that the rights of property of the few well-to-do might be somewhat jeopardized by the political power of the large working-class. (His apprehension increased as time went by [123].)

Weinstein includes an account of Spencer's interesting dalliance with Georgism, which he thought at first followed from the Principle of Equal Freedom and from which he inferred that land should be nationalized. Later the radical inconveniences this would entail drove him to modify, then

abandon it — ‘I must wash my hands entirely of the whole of the George business’ (196). As he became more wedded to private property, in his late years, Spencer took to worrying about the wage contract for laborers, which he worried could lead to wage-slavery. In the late essay, he ‘sensed what Mill came to understand more fully, namely that the unregulated exchange of wages for labor can often be coercive’ (203). And he did flip-flops on trade unionism, which he at first saw as distorting the exchange of equivalents, and then later as restoring it. (George Lacy was amused by the fact that both Henry George and Spencer denounced each other as socialists! [205]) He came to favor strongly industrial cooperatives — provided they paid piece-work wages; but he stuck by the sanctity of contracts. He proposed that civil justice should be administered ‘without cost, in civil as well as in criminal cases’, as every citizen ought to have equal access to the courts, and later that joint-stock companies should be subject to regulatory oversight (206).

Concluding, Weinstein suggests that ‘Liberal utilitarianism is conceptually hazardous. Because Spencer’s liberal utilitarianism combines such a robust theory of moral rights with an unswerving commitment to a distribution-sensitive utilitarian theory of good, it highlights, in an incomparable way, the logical tensions of liberal utilitarianism ... even if it bootlessly tries to reconcile the theoretically irreconcilable, Spencer’s version at least helps to expose liberal utilitarianism’s vanity in all its futility’ (217). These contentions are plausible, but they are not argued with great precision. A few more pages on these important matters would not have hurt. Still, readers can learn a lot from the ones we have here.

Jan Narveson

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Howard Williams, David Sullivan and Gwynn Matthews.

Francis Fukuyama and The End of History.

Concord, MA: Paul & Company (for University of Wales Press) 1998. Pp. 203.

US\$55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-7083-1427-9);

US\$25.00 (paper: ISBN 0-7083-1428-7).

This excellent study deals with Francis Fukuyama’s high-profile, and controversial, work on ‘The End of History’. Fukuyama claims that the recent collapse of communism in Eastern Europe demonstrates the truth of two claims: 1) the complete ideological triumph of liberal democratic capitalism (LDC); and 2) the onset of a new global era of peace, prosperity and freedom.

This study is clear and comprehensive — and very coherent for a piece penned by three authors. It is organized into three parts. The first situates

Fukuyama within the modernist tradition of the philosophy of history, tracing his debt to Kant, Hegel and Marx. The second part is devoted to reconstructing the inner logic of Fukuyama's theory, while the third deals with skeptical challenges to it. The authors prove that Fukuyama's work is deeper than his critics would have us believe. While they concede that Fukuyama is not a philosophical master, they succeed in showing that he is both provocative and suggestive.

Does history have an intrinsic meaning to it? Fukuyama affirms this and claims that the *telos* of history is the victory of LDC, both in political theory and, eventually, in the world itself. History is now 'over' in that the Big Questions of governance have finally been answered: the only defensible system is LDC, characterized by the rule of law, the consent of the governed, respect for human rights and a free market economy.

Fukuyama worries, however, that LDC's success may come at the price of a mediocre citizenry, devoted to the cheap virtue of self-indulgent consumerism. The authors point to tensions here between liberal non-paternalism and conservative elitism, but stress Fukuyama's conclusion that LDC can deal with this problem by encouraging excellence in non-political activities like business.

LDC has not (yet) triumphed on the ground. Though LDC countries are rich and powerful, non-liberal societies survive and even thrive. So how to judge Fukuyama's claim about the 'eventual' spread of LDC? The open-endedness of it leads some to conclude that it is not falsifiable, and thus remains purely speculative. Too little discussion is devoted here to Fukuyama's claims about the spread of LDC. Ditto for his notion of a 'pacific union' amongst the LDC nations.

It is also unclear whether LDC has triumphed ideologically. Other ideologies, after all, still compete for attention, such as ethnic nationalism, environmentalism, Islamic theocracy, radical feminism and authoritarian capitalism. One wonders whether Fukuyama can do more than assert the truth of LDC, along with the comforting idea that the truth will set us free. How exactly is LDC the 'true' ideology, much less for the rest of time? And what grounds his confidence in our rationality to grasp the truth in this regard?

The book concludes with a sober sketch of Fukuyama's limits. The discussion of Karl Popper's trenchant criticisms of the very idea of historical teleology is excellent. Mentioning the religious roots of historical teleology is also insightful, though might have been better placed right at the start.

In the end, the authors leave one convinced of Fukuyama's importance, though not necessarily his correctness. His big-picture perspective is bracingly bold; his real-world focus fresh; his liberalism congenial; and his conceptual synthesis impressive. This book is a fascinating read, and is itself a substantive and timely contribution to the philosophy of history.

Brian Orend

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Elizabeth A. Wilson

Neural Geographies:

feminism and the microstructure of cognition.

New York: Routledge 1998. Pp. viii + 226.

Cdn\$105.00: US\$75.00

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91599-6);

Cdn\$31.99: US\$22.99

(paper: ISBN 0-415-91600-3).

Writing within and against set critical practices of psychoanalytic-deconstructive-Foucauldian-feminist cultural theory, Elizabeth Wilson demonstrates, in this provocative and original book, the productivity and pleasure of direct, complicitous engagement with the contemporary cognitive sciences. Wilson forges an eclectic method in reaction to the 'zealous but disavowed moralism' of those high cultural Theorists whose 'disciplining compulsion' concocts a monolithic picture of science in order to keep their 'sanitizing critical practice' untainted by its sinister reductionism. Her unsettling accounts of texts by Karl Popper, Judith Butler, Derrida, Turing, Ebbinghaus and Freud will send many readers back to the sources. It is no surprise that such a broad and ambitious project leaves many threads loose, and no criticism at all that it succeeds more in hinting at the promise of a new connectionist politics than in offering up this hybrid fully-formed.

In a clear, polemical introduction Wilson sketches an orientation on four central theoretical sources: critical theory, connectionism, feminist approaches to embodiment, and Derrida's skills in 'inflaming' binary distinctions. Then in Chapter One, on feminist psychology, Wilson deliberately defers 'questions about women', instead seeking sexual specificity in apparently neutral domains like perception, the brain, or memory and learning. The second chapter suggests that psychology is enabled, not damaged, by its ongoing 'crisis' of scientificity: ignoring boring demarcation disputes about genuine and pseudo-science, a productive critical psychology plays a double game, indulging in data-driven empiricism and interpretive metaphysics at once. Chapters three, four, and five then form a continuous argument, in which Wilson moves from general interrogation of both computational and neurobiological psychology to a specific dovetailing of concerns from classical psychoanalysis, connectionism, and deconstruction.

Juxtaposing the 'psychoneurology' of Freud's *Project for a Scientific Psychology* with deconstruction and cognitive science, Wilson uses, as a core test case, the concept of a memory trace: 'if it is through Derrida and Freud that we can formulate a cognitive trace that is not a present, fixed, and locatable psychical entity, then it is in connectionism that we see an instantiation of these principles in a manner that is coherent to scientific psychology' (189). The memory trace is material, but 'ungraspable' and 'unlocatable': I'll try to explain 'this resistance of the trace to empirical ambitions' (149) with a detour back through connectionist theory, by invoking a distinction (ignored by Wilson) between 'explicit' and 'implicit' representation.

In connectionist, anti-logicist theories of mind, remembering is the reconstruction of a pattern of activation across many elements in a (natural or artificial) neural network. 'Representations' in occurrent remembering aren't atomic items separately stored at fixed addresses in some memory palace, but fleeting activation vectors. No explicit representations, then, are continually present between past experience and current remembering. The word 'trace' can refer to this transient pattern of activation, of which there can be only one at a time in one network, or to the (many) enduring dispositions in the network which ground its capacities to reconstruct those various transient patterns. These learned dispositions are (not activation patterns but) changed weights on all connections between elements, such that appropriate patterns arise in particular contexts. When I actually remember my phone number, there's an explicit representation; when I am not currently remembering it, I still (dispositionally) 'remember' it, thanks (say connectionists) to my implicit representation.

But there's an immediate metaphysical problem about these implicit traces. On the key postulate of 'superpositional' storage which structures this account, every trace in a network is 'encoded' in the same single, global set of connection weights. How then can we individuate particular implicit representations? Superpositional holism in storage provides much-vaunted human-like patterns of blending, interference, and error in connectionist networks: but it also entails that, in a sense, there are no separate traces enduring over time. (Locke: 'our Ideas are said to be in our Memories, when indeed, they are actually no where'). If there are many 'representings', argues van Gelder, they are in one representation: and the severely potential character of implicit traces leads some to claim that they aren't representations at all.

Wilson rightly rejects the 'microfeatural' response to this problem (by which single elements do stand directly for smaller bits of the world), because it retains the troublesome, passive atomism of traditional localism (192-4). However, she confuses (deliberately but in my view unhelpfully) this defence of true superposition over local representation with a rejection of the global localization of cognitive functions. This latter 'localization', by which olfactory perception and numerical reasoning, say, are claimed to be mainly subserved by different parts of the brain, concerns the distinctness and separability of functions, not of representations. Non-local superposition, with its lovely cognitive properties, might be the mode of representation within large-scale functional modules: while connectionists may legitimately suspect some functional modularity claims, especially as increasingly invoked by evolutionary psychologists, Wilson needs a more direct critique of neuropsychological double-dissociation studies to justify her scepticism.

Without microfeatural subsymbols, connectionists are left with what Wilson calls 'the systematic and lawful play of nonpresent neurocognitive differences' (163). Because all occurrent remembering is reconstruction, not reproduction, there's no obvious source of sameness in memory, no clear possibility even of thinking the same thought twice. Wilson perhaps under-

estimates the extent to which mainstream cognitive psychologists have been grappling with this bewildering possibility for some years: her tendency to privilege the computational and neuroscientific over the experimental/statistical strands of scientific psychology leads her to neglect an increasing body of ecologically-driven experiment on distortion, source monitoring, and misinformation effects in cognitive research on autobiographical memory. The wonderful anti-atomistic message of Bartlett's *Remembering* (1932) is perhaps no longer so often 'betrayed' (175).

But since Wilson is refreshingly unconcerned about threats to realism and to truth in memory posed by reconstructive models, her targets lie elsewhere. Building malleability in from below, she mounts powerful cases against feminists who construct biological bodies as rigid and stable in order to show how culture and society infiltrate them from the 'outside', and against psychologists who locate cognition only in the brain, abandoning the rest of the body 'to brute, noncognitive mechanization' (59, 124). Perhaps this history is too conventional in blaming Descartes for endowing us with 'the untheorized body, the mechanical, tangible, artless body' (15): and perhaps Wilson neglects recent, post-connectionist cognitive science, in which dynamicists describe 'continuous reciprocal causation' between brain, body, and world, and cognitive anthropologists see distributed representation as a more flexible mechanism than the abstract 'habitus' for internalizing cultural norms. But she definitely succeeds in the perverse proliferation of surprising perspectives, avoiding the fatigue and paralysis of debates on whether to censor or applaud 'cognitive science' as a whole, in favour of a marvelously polymorphous disruption of problems about memory, body, and science.

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Richard Dien Winfield

The Just Family.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1998. Pp. xi + 273.

US\$65.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3997-6);

US\$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3998-4).

Here we have political philosophy in a grand if somewhat unusual style, another piece of Winfield's extensive reworking of Hegelian themes in *Rechtsphilosophie*, a revision of Hegel's pages on the family in the light of subsequent recognition of Hegel's own patriarchal blinkers ('he ties the family to a heterosexual monogamous union, where roles are defined by gender, dictating for the husband a privilege to represent the family in society

and state and for the wife a bondage to domestic affairs' [32]) and greater responsiveness to the structural injustices of the world ('only when social as well as kinship groups are divested of political power can citizenship become an agency of self-rule, where the will that governs derives from those who are governed' [206]). In seeking to delineate the structures of rational self-determination, Winfield is careful not to be swayed by the contingencies of human history — rational beings might reproduce asexually and feel nothing corresponding to our love or sexual pleasure so marriage should not be defined in terms of these things (42); adoptive parents need not be of the same species as their children, or indeed each other (141). In general, he has a keen eye both for the obvious contingent and for the often dubious contingent generalisations invoked to support claims about the family (as for instance Blustein's appeal to developmental psychology to ground moral preference for a nuclear heterosexual family, 135). He keeps separate the notion of marriage, a union of adult moral agents, and parenting, a relation of mature to immature moral agents.

While the negative points are often well-taken, we are not given a perspicuous reason to accept Winfield's positive account. Marriage is fundamentally a mode of association in which two or more persons 'define themselves by autonomously and directly willing the common good of the association as the already embodied structure enabling and obliging them to exercise that volition' (69). Winfield is clear that history reveals few cases where such a union of free equals can be found, but fails to make a compelling case that we should now even bother to try. His comments on legal developments in the West move between praising their freeing marriage from irrelevancies and warning that they are making it virtually indistinguishable from friendship. A logical extension of the latter aspect would be the disestablishment of marriage altogether. Lacking an ear for Hegelian reasons (offered on pp. 32-8 for instance), I could not see why Winfield would not applaud such a thing. We have abolished slaves and serfs, why not spouses?

Winfield is not afraid of social and political change. In discussing objections to the family based on its partiality, he mandates social welfare provisions more extensive than any we find, permits state abolition of inheritance (beyond what is necessary for the education of any minors in a family to adulthood — grown-up children cease to have any ethical, rather than moral, relationship with their parents) and the taxation of the surviving spouse(s) to 'reduce resultant advantages within the limits dictated by social justice' (198).

Parenting can hardly be dispensed with. But here again Winfield is too fixated on rationalizing changing legal provisions. It is only after pages in which children are not persons, not responsible for caring for parents, not co-owners of family property, and ought not to be given state resources to raise their own children that Winfield notes the impossibility of drawing a clear factual line between child and adult (152) and thus the inescapable need for discretion and the desirability of a progressive assumption of what he treats as an absolute status.

Winfield can find nothing good about the extended family or traditional kinship group. It is perhaps rather presumptuous for reason to banish so unceremoniously the contingencies upon which marriage and parenting are based. Some among a set of equally free rational beings might want to set up an exclusive family Winfield-style, just as others might want to band together as a monastic community; most, surely, would prefer a life of greater mutual but limited interactions. At one point Winfield admits that people can live unmarried, but he seems to think this a pretty desperate state: they 'may well fall into ... double bondage.... First, because single persons owe no one an accounting for their private behavior, they are slaves to their own whims in their personal life.... Second, lacking the obligation to be strictly open with any one else, unmarried individuals are strangers in the world, liable to become enslaved to those on whom their solitary domestic upkeep depends' (85). Only an 'objective, juridically binding commitment' can allegedly free them from such caprice. Winfield's line is not entirely without its own contingent psychological commitments.

Winfield covers the ground — a more determined editor might have cut some repetitions. He is careful in distinguishing issues. His book offers an uncommon perspective on them. Your Library should have a copy.

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Edith Wyschogrod

An Ethics of Remembering.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1998.

Pp. xxii + 280.

US\$47.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-092044-5);

US\$19.00 (paper: ISBN 0-226-92045-3).

This book considers a set of ethical issues which Wyschogrod maintains the historian confronts at the end of this century. These issues take the form they do in part as a result of the cataclysmic events which have marked the recent past more extensively than previous less technically 'developed' eras, in part as a result of changes in the means by which accounts of the past — and narratives in general — can be generated and transmitted to an audience. Wyschogrod displays a vast erudition in the manner in which she proposes and discusses these issues. This erudition, moreover, is no mere ornament. When she refers to Kant on the sublime, Barthes and Sontag on photography, Rorty and other pragmatists on issues of truth, Hegel on appearance, Kripke on naming, Aristotle and Sartre on community, Baudrillard on the hyperreal,

or Levinas on alterity, Wyschogrod does so to advance her central theoretical points.

As a result it is very hard for any reader to provide a just reading of this text, without a breadth of background as extensive as that of Wyschogrod herself. The irony in this is that a central theme of Wyschogrod's work is that of justice. In her view an important motive for historical communication is a desire to do justice to those who have preceded us. This desire demands a commitment to truth-telling in narrative. The obligation calls particularly strongly in the case of those eruptions of the irrational, the violent, and the inhumane into ordinary past lives which Wyschogrod calls 'cataclysms'.

To give an authentic account of these events, one which respects the concrete situations of those to whom they happened without appropriating the voice of the now-silenced individuals involved, seems to be impossible: ordinary narratives always assemble partial data, understood by historians who are never impartial, into story lines which make assumptions (and must make assumptions) about what has not been recorded. They operate through a medium of descriptive assumptions and narrative conventions which must be accepted if an account is to begin at all.

The difficulty faced in any historical recollection is magnified in the cases which exert the strongest demands on the historian: those 'cataclysms' in which historical agents are denaturalized, reduced to passive victims of events which are themselves the product of individual and collective agency but which resist representation by any system capable of presenting ordinary human desires, beliefs and intentions. To do justice to those who have confronted cataclysms, experienced their irrationality, and perhaps fallen to them requires some manner of presentation which conveys what cannot be represented in any ordinary sense.

Cataclysms can be indicated, and even described in a pallid, perhaps statistical way. The photographic image and the account from memory can indicate a there at which the event intruded. However even these sorts of record are at risk of being absorbed in a play of representation, one which now infects not only narrative but all representation — thanks to the development of techniques for manipulating images and creating a world of virtual images (which Baudrillard associates with what he calls the hyper-real). It is the nature of the cataclysm to resist integration into such apparently complete systems of presentation, and to threaten the rationality associated with such comprehensible completeness, yet to demand some articulation nonetheless.

The cataclysm has become more common as a result of the advance of human capacities. It can be encountered in Shoah in Nazi-occupied Europe, but also more recently in Bosnia or Rwanda. It stands as a challenge to our advanced capacities whether they are technical, communicative or organizational. The cataclysm challenges every attempt at a complete account of the human condition, not as a mere residual of irrationality but as a void at its heart. Wyschogrod calls attention to this deep limitation of the historical accounts called forth by the cataclysm, but claims that these very accounts

are a way to construct a community in which the confrontation of injustice and the labour for justice are made possible.

I cannot evaluate Wyschogrod's hope that human generosity can make such community possible. Instead I will offer a single observation. History is written for the living. The effort may be morally justified by what it communicates to the living. Though it fails to attain the full truth that justice to the dead might demand (if there can ever be justice to the dead), it may do good service to the living whenever it can indicate an inexpiable evil and show a way to prevent the recurrence of a similar evil. A danger sign can be posted at the abyss and those who follow us can avoid it.

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Yirmiyahu Yovel

Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews.

University Park: Penn State University Press

1998. Pp. xi + 196.

US\$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-271-01781-3);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-271-01794-5).

Yovel's *Dark Riddle* presents an interesting, insightful and thought provoking reading of two important and relevant thinkers for today. The aim of the text is to explore the place of Jews in the philosophies of Hegel and Nietzsche. Yovel classifies Hegel as an anti-Semite who denied any contributive value of Jews for modern society. Yovel then goes on in an attempt to balance this with a look at Nietzsche as an anti-anti-Semite who was able to see the creativity which Jews had to offer to modern society.

Yovel begins by situating Judaism as a philosophical question and giving a brief account of the individuals who had a foundational influence on Hegel's position — namely, Spinoza, Mendelssohn and Kant. From here, he illustrates how numerous societal influences contributed to Hegel's negative perception of the Jews as is evidenced in his early writings. This perception is seen to temper over time to result eventually in a richer and more nuanced position within his systematic philosophy. Yovel then proceeds to examine Nietzsche's works in regards to Jews and confronts many of what he sees to be mistaken interpretations of Nietzsche's true position.

Yovel makes many enlightening connections and gives generally a very good reading of Hegel. One major difficulty, however, arises in Yovel's

frequent confusion between the Jewish people as a race and the Jewish religion as a source for philosophical inspiration and metaphysical speculation. Yovel correctly points out that Hegelian dialectics recognise the value and contribution all cultures make to society, but he contends that Hegel's notion of sublation in fact negates the continued relevance of Judaism despite the continuing existence of Jews. Yovel admits that Hegel acknowledged the rights of Jews to participate as full members of society, but he argues that the denial of historical Judaic relevance creates a major difficulty for the Hegelian system. The problem with such a conclusion, however, is that it blurs the distinction between the universal and the particular on one hand, and between religious and ethnic identities on the other. This difficulty also arises in Yovel's analysis of Nietzsche, albeit with a much more charitable conclusion of the readings than was given to Hegel.

Yovel classifies Nietzsche as an anti-anti-Semite, which is true for the mature Nietzsche. Yet Yovel goes even further and argues that in fact Nietzsche assumes the much more affirmative stance of Semitism itself. But as is the case with Hegel's dialectical method, the negation of the negation does not simply return one to the original position. Indeed, Yovel makes an eloquent case for understanding the deeper and richer aspects of Nietzsche's critique of prevalent social prejudices of his time. However, Nietzsche's appreciation for the Jewish people — who were (and arguably still are) rejected and alienated from European society — must not be construed as an acceptance or even tolerance of the Jewish religion as such. Of course, as Yovel clearly demonstrates, Nietzsche on several occasions presents the Jews as a positive counterbalance to what he perceived as the infectious self-debasement of Christianity, and subsequent weakness of European society. After all, to be able to withstand rejection, humiliation, discrimination, and all other forms of degradation from a society in which you sought to assimilate yourself, while at the same time remaining true to your convictions, clearly exemplifies the very character of the superior person which Nietzsche so forcefully sought to assert as the essence of what it means to be truly human. Nevertheless, as with Christianity, Nietzsche is quite clear in his rejection of the Jewish faith as infecting the human mind with a sense of estrangement from the individual's inherent values, perception of self worth, and life force.

It is surprising that despite Yovel's good understanding of Hegel's dialectical system of sublation, and given his insightful reading of Nietzsche's social critique, he often seems to confuse the universal concept of the group involved (in this case Jews) with the particularities associated with the individuals. Both Hegel and Nietzsche recognised the inherent value of the individual, but both also saw Judaism, philosophically speaking, as an irrelevant source of inspiration for modern society. Yovel's misleading distinction between Hegel and Nietzsche fails to truly reveal a qualitative difference between them and only serves to cloud over the many close connections between the two. This is a very unfortunate result from a book that on many other accounts presents a very stimulating and insightful probe into an important aspect of two quite divergent philosophies and societal perceptions. To simply

classify Hegel as anti-Semitic and Nietzsche as anti-anti-Semitic is problematic; a point Yovel himself concedes by noting that Hegel was in favour of political equality and social integration for the Jews. The mature Hegel was not anti-Semitic, but rather perceived the Jewish religion itself as a source for philosophical insight to have become redundant. Similarly, as Yovel quite eloquently demonstrates, Nietzsche had a great appreciation for the characters of ancient Judaism, and for the indomitable spirit and perseverance of the Jewish people in modern Europe. But such appreciation for the characters and people of Judaism must not be perceived as an affirmation by Nietzsche of Judaism as such. Consequently, the wonderful contributions this work makes to the body of scholarship regarding Hegel and Nietzsche in relation to Jews is in many ways occluded by the unfortunate theses to which Yovel continues to cling throughout the text.

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Guenther Zoeller

Fichte's Transcendental Philosophy. The Original Duplicity of Intelligence and Will.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1998.
Pp. xvii + 169.
US\$49.95. ISBN 0-521-59160-0.

Since 1976, with the publication of Hans J. Verwey's article, 'New Perspectives on J.G. Fichte' (*Idealistic Studies* 6 (1976) 118-159), there has been a rapidly-growing body of English-language literature on Fichte's philosophy. Highlights of this movement include a double issue of the *Philosophical Forum* (Winter-Spring, 1987-88, Nos. 2-3) devoted to a wide-ranging discussion of Fichte's thought, a 1996 book of essays on Fichte edited by Tom Rockmore, and the publication of several translations of Fichte's work into English. In recent years, this interest in Fichte's work has moved from a focus on *The Foundation of the Wissenschaftslehre* (1794-95) to an awareness of the importance of the second or 'new presentation' of the *Wissenschaftslehre* or *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo* (1796-1799). This second presentation is Fichte's improved version of his own doctrines. Nonetheless, there has been no book-length treatment of it in English and no treatment in any language of the work's core concern: the relation between thinking and willing (6). In filling this gap, Zoeller demonstrates strong command of both the first and the second versions of Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* and *The System of Ethics*

according to the *Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre* (1798) combined with an impressive ability to compare these contributions to Kant's philosophy. The result is the first study in English that offers a comprehensive account of Fichte's philosophy, an account that does justice to Fichte's treatment of the relation between the cognitive and the volitional.

In his reevaluation of the relation between theoretical and practical philosophy in Fichte, Zoeller builds upon approaches that have emphasized Fichte's contributions to the problem of self-consciousness, Fichte's development of practical philosophy, and his theory of interpersonalitv. In particular, Zoeller analyzes the mind's duplicity or 'original duplicity' which he claims underlies the relation between the theoretical and the practical in Fichte. Zoeller's central claim is that this dual unity of intelligence and will as it is developed in the *Wissenschaftslehre*, and then refined in the *Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo* provides a key to Fichte's overall project of integrating a transcendental theory of knowledge and a transcendental theory of freedom into a comprehensive account of the principal structures of human reason (3). Throughout the book, Zoeller carefully unpacks the notion of the mutual involvement of the theoretical and the practical in Fichte's philosophy. The mutual implication of the will and the intellect means that willing involves thinking and that thinking involves willing. This is nicely summarized in Zoeller's claim that: 'The relation between thinking and willing is thus not one of ultimate identity, but one of mutual requirement' (79). This relation, in turn, is linked to Fichte's distinction between the ideal and the real activity of the mind. Indeed, Zoeller claims that the distinction between the ideal and the real is used by Fichte to capture the relation between intelligence and will.

Ultimately, Zoeller seeks to identify Fichte's original position in the post-Kantian debate about the unitary structure of subjectivity. Although Zoeller provides a compelling and detailed account of how Fichte solved the problem of explaining the unitary structure of subjectivity without falling prey to reductionist explanations, his treatment of the post-Kantian debate is sketchy.

Zoeller opens his study with a reference to *Die Bestimmung des Menschen* (1800), a popular work by Fichte which was published several years after the publication of his more technical *Wissenschaftslehre*. The title is usually translated into English as *The Vocation of Man*, but Zoeller indicates that *The Destination of Humanity* is perhaps a more accurate translation. The key term here is *Bestimmung* which, as Zoeller observes, can mean both 'determination' in the sense of an imposed limitation, and 'calling' or 'vocation' which indicates the goal of some pursuit (1). Zoeller claims that Fichte uses this term in its 'finitist-finalist double meaning' to 'address the tension between what is fixed or given in human experience, and what is open and yet to be realized about it' (1). This theme of *Bestimmung* becomes a leitmotif in Zoeller's treatment of the problem of the original duplicity of intelligence and will. Zoeller tells the story of how Fichte's understanding of the tension between what is given and what is fixed in human experience led to his

sustained reflections on the original unity of the self (72). In these reflections, Fichte came to the problem that guided his thought — how to capture the intimate relation between knowing and willing (72). This led Fichte to his ‘radical extension’ (110) of Kant’s intents and achievements. Zoeller shows how Fichte transformed Kant’s transcendental idealism, which grounds empirical reality by recourse to the cognitive forms of the subject, into a practical and ultimately ethical idealism built on the basis of rational willing (104). Kant’s transcendental investigation was limited to the sphere of theoretical consciousness, while Fichte ‘set out to expand the scope of transcendental philosophy to encompass all forms of consciousness’ (57).

After reading the eight chapters that comprise this book, the reader is in a position to understand why and how Fichte revised Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Zoeller’s sympathetic reading of Fichte brings new unity to an understanding of his thought.

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*Journal of
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of Philosophical
Research*

Editor: DAYA KRISHNA

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