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**Bruce Anderson**

*'Discovery' in Legal Decision-Making.*

Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996.

Pp. x + 170.

US\$105.00. ISBN 0-7923-3981-9.

What are judges doing when they make legal decisions? Obviously when they decide matters before them, judges must bring together theory and practice, they must look to the law and apply the law; but just what that law is and how its application is achieved is problematic.

Bruce Anderson sees a gaping hole in the traditional analyses of legal reasoning, a hole which is glossed over in the writings of American legal realists as 'hunches' or 'intuitions' about the right decision to be made by a judge. So he picks up the fumbled ball and runs with it along the lines of Bernard Lonergan on discovery and insight. Such a hermeneutics of legal decision making, Anderson believes, will both reveal what is wrong with the *mechanical formalism* of some deductive versions of legal positivism and also clarify what the rule-sceptic realists mean in their alternative. Anderson's work is intended not merely as an analysis of the discovery process, it is also prescriptive: it provides a guide for the perplexed.

I suspect this book started life as a Ph.D. thesis. It bears hallmark traits of foot-and-note disease and overlengthy literature reviews of a very mixed crop of authors, at times provoking that 'get on with it!' feeling. Elsewhere Anderson provides some clear, critical analysis of major legal philosophers. For example, his criticism of Neil MacCormick's use of the Popperian approach to discovery in science is very good and is well taken. Anderson's rejection of Popper's method of the *Logic of Scientific Discovery* is not a wholesale rejection — he is not saying that Popper got it wrong for the physical sciences — but rather that MacCormick is wrong using it as a model of legal decision making. The appropriate scientific model, Anderson insists is cognitive psychology or medicine rather than in the hard sciences.

The book begins with the lengthy literature reviews, moves through two case-studies, one a discussion of a decision made by a Nova Scotia insurance arbitrator and one an analysis of Mme Justice Wilson's written Reasons for Judgment in *Morgentaler*, a 1988 Supreme Court of Canada decision. Anderson then goes into his positive thesis — Lonergan applied to law.

Anderson summarizes Lonergan thus: '[his] efforts ... reveal thirteen elements or basic operations that are employed in knowing and doing. In the context of human knowing, experiencing involves (1) sensitive or imaginative representations. Theoretical understanding includes (2) What-questions, (3) direct insights, and (4) formulations of definitions, explanations or interpretations. Testing includes (5) Is-questions, (6) reflective insights, and (7) judgments of fact. Practical understanding includes (8) What-is-to-be-done-questions, (9) practical insights, and (10) formulations of proposed courses of action. Testing includes (11) Is-it-to-be-done-questions, (12) practical reflec-



tive insights, and (13) judgments of value. Decision, a separate mental operation, ends practical reasoning' (103).

These elements do not come in discrete chunks; it takes skill and practice to identify them and to be able to apply them appropriately in one's own decisions. That is the practice of a good judge and this normative claim is why Anderson's approach is more than just analysis.

However a significant problem lurks: in a crucial comment, reduced to a footnote, Anderson tells us that he does not mean the same as Lonergan does by a key term, 'theoretical reasoning' (106, footnote 1). But no more is said. This leaves the perplexed really perplexed — what does either of them mean?

If Anderson's project really requires acceptance of his analogy between law and science (presented first in the form of cognitive psychology and later of medicine), it loses credibility. Unlike discovery in the hard sciences, where gravity would be what it is even if there were no-one around to unlock it, it is moot whether 'right legal decisions' pre-exist the making of them. For many of us, law is not discovered — there is no revelation or discovery involved. Yet Anderson sees nothing unusual in assimilating the professional analyses of a doctor and a judge. He writes: 'Doctors and judges follow the same general method when solving problems or searching for answers to questions ... The doctor formulates this direct insight as a diagnosis of the situation or problem such as "This person has an ulcer". The judge formulates direct insights as a tentative interpretation of the situation or case such as ... "This is a case of nervous shock" [sic]' (110-11). But surely the doctor is looking for a causal explanation of symptoms, the judge is not. In fact, when a judge determines a case of nervous shock, that term is not co-referential to a doctor's determination of nervous shock. The phrase in the legal context hovers between the medical condition and the judge's decision about negligence and *compensable nervous shock*. It is about whether a person can get damages, not whether they have suffered. The sufferer would have an ulcer or would be in nervous shock even if there were no such institution as a court of law, but they would not have a negligence action against the defendant, and they would not be deemed legally to have nervous shock.

Anderson's plea for reflection and deliberation is not lost, even if discovery is not an apposite term. Judges, in making decisions, will be affected by their beliefs about their 'law job'. Some believe themselves to be utterly constrained by past decisions, (under the doctrine of precedents and *stare decisis*); others take a social-tool approach to law, where the social ends justify the deviation from precedents and will seek to force a modification by the superior court (Lord Denning was famous for this approach). Some judges view themselves as constrained to apply mechanical jurisprudence, but not mechanically: 'I am unable to adduce any reason to show that the decision which I am about to make is right. On the contrary, if I were free to follow my own powers of reasoning such as they are, I should say that it is wrong. But I am bound by authority, which of course it is my duty to follow' (*Olympia Oil & Coke Co Ltd v Produce Brokers Ltd* [1915] 112 LT 744, per Buckley LJ).

Which is the right approach? The mistake is to assume that this question has a unique answer. But certainly Anderson presents many of the ramifications of the point that it is better to have a thoughtful, reflective judge than a mechanical jurist who simply performs.

**Glenys Godlovitch**

(Law Group)

Lincoln University, NZ

**Aristotle**

*The Politics*. Trans. Peter L. Phillips Simpson.  
Toronto: Scholarly Book Services; Chapel Hill:  
The University of North Carolina Press 1997.  
Cdn\$65.00: US\$39.95  
(cloth: ISBN 0-8078-2327-9);  
Cdn\$20.25: US\$12.95  
(paper: ISBN 0-8078-4637-6).

Peter Simpson's translation of Aristotle's *Politics* is not only an outstanding literal translation, but it is a godsend for teaching the *Politics* to undergraduates. As a literal translation, it is a noticeable improvement over the only other literal translation available in English, Carnes Lord's 1984 translation, published by University of Chicago Press. Simpson's translation is much easier to read and the flow of the sentences does not have the rough and awkward edge that the Lord translation is often accused of having. Yet, before the Simpson translation, those interested in using the only generally available literal translation often had to overlook such problems. But with the arrival of the Simpson translation, that need no longer be the case.

Simpson's translation of the *Politics* is not only more pleasant to read, but his word choice is in many ways superior than Lord's. Lord often used highly technical and awkward terminology. Lord claims to do this in the name of literalism, but he has the tendency to sacrifice readability in the process. Simpson avoids this in his translation. He tends to employ more traditional rendering of key Aristotelian concepts, yet using other renderings only when the traditional rendering vastly distorts from the Greek. An example of this is Lord's rendering of *koinonia* as 'partnership'. In using 'partnership', Lord brought in legal and conceptual baggage that is implied in the term ('partnerships' tends in Anglo-English usage to imply contractual relations) that Aristotle's use of the term does not desire to imply (in fact, Aristotle would reject the view that political community could be contractual). Simpson uses



the traditional 'association' or 'community' for *koinonia* and avoids the possible confusion in meaning that 'partnership' could suggest.

Not only is Simpson's translation in many areas more literal than Lord's, it is also much easier to read. Also, he does something to the text that will greatly aid students' initial exposure to the *Politics* — he divides the text analytically (much like what Terence Irwin, in his translation, did to the *Nicomachean Ethics*). Simpson not only divides up the text to allow the logic of presentation to become more manifest than it otherwise would be, but he also gives brief summaries of the text. His summaries seem not only to frame what will be said, but he also makes many difficult passages clearer than they would normally be to those approaching the text as a novice. Normally the introduction of summaries into the text of a translation can be cause for havoc, because sometimes the reader will not always know where the summaries finish and the translation begins. But this is not the problem with the Simpson translation. He clearly distinguishes between summaries and translation, by the use of different and distinctive fonts.

Some may criticize his analytic division of the text and the introduction of summaries within the text. But he suggests this is the only way to have both the virtues of a very literal translation and make that translation accessible to a vast number of readers. Whereas Lord's translation was very literal, it was not that accessible to undergraduates, who not having spent years living with the *Politics*, normally find themselves bewildered and overwhelmed by the text. Thus what was done to assist learning ends up frustrating it. Although Lord's translation was a must use for a graduate seminar, it often made teaching the *Politics* to undergraduates a frustrating and tiresome process, requiring the teacher to summarize and clarify to students lost in the text's alien quality. Some may think this was a virtue in Lord's translation, in that it made one feel as if they were indeed reading the text in Greek. In fact, I have known several political theory instructors, who predominately teach undergraduates, although preferring the literalness of the Lord translation in their own studies, decide to use the older Barker translation for the sake of their students and just correct Barker's more egregious errors. Now with the Simpson translation, instructors of undergraduates can have their very literal translation and know they are not throwing their undergraduates over their head with a text that will leave them lost and unguided. Why? Because Simpson's summaries and analytic divisions of the text makes the text more familiar and more understandable to students initially approaching the *Politics*.

The other aspects that will make this translation of the *Politics* a godsend for an undergraduate classroom are: 1) Simpson's extensive notes that are both useful and informative to novice and expert alike; 2) an extensively detailed index (12 pages) that will allow quick and accurate location of certain terms or concepts in the text; 3) a very detailed 6-page analytic outline of the text, so students can see the overall direction of the argument of the text; and 4) an extensive glossary of terms (6 pages) that will help students understand many of the key terms in Aristotle's rich philosophic vocabulary. What is also



very useful is Simpson's inclusion of *EN* X 9; this allows one to see the *Politics* as a continuation of the inquiry of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

This translation offers to an Aristotle scholar not only an improved literal translation, but the re-arranging of the books of the *Politics*, following the thesis that the last two books should, in fact, follow Book III. This is the only current translation that rearranges the books according to what most of the textual scholarship suggest it should be. For, in doing this, Simpson follows the ordering used by the great commentaries on the *Politics*, such as Newman and Susemihl and Hicks. The last translation that followed the alternative ordering was published in 1894 by James E.C. Welldon. This alone would make this book a must have for any Aristotle scholar — agree with the arrangement thesis or not.

Although they are few and mostly minor, this translation is not without its problems. Simpson does not provide the traditional numbering of the books, so people using another edition might become confused. One suggestion for a new edition of this translation is, while leaving the book order the way it is, to use the traditional numbers of the books or at least include them in brackets. Another minor difficulty is that the Bekker line numbers are incorporated into the text at the beginning of a translation block. This makes reference by use of the Bekker numbers difficult. Perhaps in the revision the publisher will follow custom and place the Bekker numbers in the outside margin. Another problem is that Simpson sometimes translates to suit his interpretation of the text — e.g., translating *politeia* as 'regime' in the generic usage, and 'polity' for the reference to the specific type of regime. If he followed his own criteria for consistency in translating a term, he should have used the same word for both usages, so that the flavor of the original text would remain. But Lord, and every other translation save one (Robinson's translation of Books III and IV, published by Oxford), does this also, so this is only a strike against Simpson's translation from my radical hermeneutic perspective.

To sum up the virtues of Simpson's translation of Aristotle's *Politics*, it is a must use for those teaching Classical Political Thought in an undergraduate environment. Not only is it the most literal translation, it is likewise the most accessible literal translation available to a wide audience. Also, it offers many useful tools (e.g., extensive index, outline, summaries, etc.) that allow students to get a better grasp of the text. Finally, it also offers a highly readable style that readers will enjoy rather than suffer through. Everyone who wishes to enjoy their adventure with Aristotle's *Politics* is advised to purchase a copy, it is well worth the rather inexpensive price.

**Clifford A. Bates, Jr.**

(*Department of History*)

Central Connecticut State University

**Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, and  
Brian Skyrms, eds.**

*The Dynamics of Norms.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1997.

Pp. ix + 222.

US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521-56062-4.

This collection of ten essays appears in the series *Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory*. The authors, predominantly economists, are in order of appearance: Robert Axelrod, Cristina Bicchieri, Pier Luigi Sacco, David Canning, Luca Anderlini and Antonella Ianni, Immanuel Bomze and Jürgen Eichberger, Vincent Crawford, J.S. Jordan, Yaw Nyarko, and Brian Skyrms. Their essays, some published earlier, form a good introduction to a growing area of research in the behavioral sciences.

The main topic is the explanation of patterns of group behavior, patterns that arise, for example, in repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas, signaling games, and evolutionary games. The theories advanced appeal to the dynamics of repeated interactions between agents. As a result, they may apply principles of game theory to nonhuman agents, and, for human agents, may discharge the strong idealizations about common knowledge and unbounded rationality often used to bring to bear principles of strategic reasoning.

The essays typically present mathematical models of agent interaction. Methods derive from the statistical mechanics of particles' orbits in phase space. A common topic is convergence, through Bayesian learning, to a Nash equilibrium of a repeated game. Although alternatives to Bayesian learning and Nash equilibrium are considered, normative principles of learning and strategic reasoning form features of the dynamics rather than primary subjects of investigation. The models include many simplifying assumptions about learning and behavior even though realism is an underlying motive for reliance on dynamics rather than strategic rationality. One expects future research to move toward more realistic assumptions.

A representative essay is Axelrod's on repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas. In these games might a rational agent cooperate in the hope that she will induce her opponent to cooperate in the future? How might she learn from earlier games about her opponent's dispositions and revise her strategies in response to what she learns? These are some questions theorists raise. The results of Axelrod's famous computer tournaments argue for a strategy called tit-for-tat, cooperation followed by replication of the opponent's previous strategy. His contribution here uses John Holland's genetic algorithm to discover strategies that evolution may generate, and finds strategies that have many traits of tit-for-tat, and in specialized environments do better than tit-for-tat. Another representative essay is Crawford's. It studies the emergence of evolutionarily stable strategies, as defined by John Maynard Smith. He shows that supplementing inheritance with learning from past interactions destabilizes equilibria involving randomized or 'mixed' strategies. Only com-



binations of 'pure' strategies are stable outcomes given individuals' abilities to adjust their strategies.

Let us examine more closely the essays of the two philosophers, Bicchieri and Skyrms. Bicchieri's essay, 'Learning to Cooperate', considers 'social dilemmas,' generalizations of the two-person Prisoner's Dilemma for the  $n$ -person case. It asks why is it rational in repeated social dilemmas to conform to social norms of cooperation. The answer in brief is that forfeiting short term gains produces larger long term gains. The essay also asks how social norms emerge. The answer proposes two steps. First, social norms emerge in small group settings where members may learn about the dispositions of others. Then they spread throughout larger groups according to an evolutionary process that operates by repetition and imitation of successful strategies. Bicchieri's proposals assume bounded rationality rather than ideal rationality (to avoid the backward induction argument), and in large groups assume knowledge of the successfulness of the members' strategies. The first assumption is a step toward realism but the second assumption is a strong idealization.

Bicchieri's definition of a norm is similar to David Lewis's definition of a convention. 'Let  $R$  be a behavioral regularity in population  $P$ . ...  $R$  is a *social norm* if and only if  $R$  depends upon the beliefs and preferences of the members of  $P$  in the following way. 1: Almost every member of  $P$  prefers to conform to  $R$  on the condition (and only on the condition) that almost everyone else conforms too. 2: Almost every member of  $P$  believes that almost every other member of  $P$  conforms to  $R$ ' (27). The definition makes a social norm an equilibrium in the game-theoretic sense. It rules out behavioral regularities caused by coercion, the rule of law, or moral obligations. Social norms in this technical sense form an interesting type of behavioral regularity.

Skyrms's essay, 'Chaos and the explanatory significance of equilibrium: Strange attractors in evolutionary game dynamics', extends the methods of his influential book, *The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1990). It treats finite noncooperative normal-form games, repeated and taken as evolutionary games in which future stages depend on fitness rather than strategic reasoning. Initial queries about the realization of equilibria prompt the construction of a dynamics to generate equilibria. The dynamics then suggests switching attention from equilibrium points to attracting sets. In the dynamics an equilibrium point has less explanatory importance than an attractor, or set of points attracting and capturing orbits passing through neighboring points. Skyrms uses computer simulations to argue for the existence of strange attractors in four-strategy evolutionary games. These strange attractors although outwardly stable are inwardly chaotic in the sense that small differences in orbits' starting points yield large differences later.

Skyrms's essay includes a lucid introduction to dynamical systems, types of equilibria, and convergence to equilibria. He makes a convincing case for his point about the explanatory significance of attractors. However, it is important to recall that his point applies to game-theoretic dynamics rather



than to the analysis of strategic rationality in single-play games. There equilibrium thrives, even if the appropriate type of equilibrium is a controversial topic.

For philosophers familiar with mathematical economics, this book is a good survey of research on the dynamics of social behavior. It is a sophisticated introduction to the latest techniques for explaining social norms and similar behavioral regularities.

**Paul Weirich**

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**Mario Bunge**

*Finding Philosophy in the Social Science.*

New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1996.

Pp. 449 + appendices & indices.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-300-06606-6.

This book is an original and stimulating contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences. It takes a fresh, if sometimes an unorthodox, look at the key philosophical concepts and assumptions of the social sciences. Written in the systematic style with comprehensiveness and depth — reminiscent of the methodological studies of Max Weber, Fritz Machlup, or Karl Popper — B. leaves no issue, problem, or concern in the philosophy of social science unaddressed. In short, the book is a substantial and significant contribution to the field of value, for philosophers and social scientists alike.

B. argues that the social sciences ought not to leave philosophy to the philosophers who have little expertise in or knowledge of the social sciences. Rather he urges social scientists to engage in serious philosophical reflection and philosophers to engage in social research. The two fields are interrelated and advances in each can supply tools for solving problems in the other (12).

The structure of the book reinforces B.'s theme of 'shared interests'. The book opens by introducing social scientists to the philosophical foundations of their disciplines, especially in epistemology, that they often take for granted. The book closes by introducing philosophers to several topical issues in the social sciences of which most philosophers are unaware. While this might seem an impossible task, B. has the rare skill of being able to address both audiences in a substantive way without being patronizing or distorting either discipline. I also liked that he was able to clearly distinguish what was germane to each without confusion, a fault that one finds with many transdisciplinary books of this kind.

To develop his thesis that social science and philosophy share important and significant mutual concerns, B. analyzes such basic concepts as event, cause, fact, theory, truth, meaning, and value that philosophy and the social sciences share. These discussions are aimed primarily at social scientists. He discusses assumptions and misassumptions involved in such current approaches as idealism, materialism, and subjectivism. This gets to the heart of B.'s project. He concludes that none of the best-known or most widely accepted methodological foundations helps to advance the social sciences or even to understand what social science is. In a highly critical appraisal of rational choice theories, B. insists that these models provide no solid substantive theory of society, nor do they help guide rational action. He offers ten criteria by which to evaluate philosophies of social science (103-4) and applies them consistently including to his realist position (322-5). In so doing, he proposes novel solutions to social's methodological and philosophical problems. He argues persuasively that a particular union of rationalism, realism, and systemism is the logical and viable philosophical foundation for social science practitioners. His argument, too long to develop here, provides a novel approach to justifying scientific realism that escapes some of the cul-de-sacs in the current realism-anti-realism debate. While his position is not without fault, it deserves critical consideration.

The book is organized in three basic sections of fourteen chapters. Part One ('From Fact to Theory') discusses the methodological and epistemological basis of the basic conceptual apparatus of the social sciences that constitutes the 'scientific method.' Avoiding jargon, this section is readily accessible to those not familiar with technical philosophy. Indeed many sections are so clearly written that they could be used in an undergraduate philosophy of science course. However, B. does not sacrifice intellectual accuracy or rigor. He moves carefully through the material to arrive at a fairly standard realist account of knowledge and knowledge production. This is a position that he continually fortifies in the remainder of the book.

Part Two ('From Explanation to Justification') moves from the consideration of method to the practices of method in explaining, predicting and moving toward new inquiries. Covering all of the conceptual bases, the basic argument that runs through this section is that an adequately justified method discourages 'wild conjectures' based on 'bad' science while encouraging conceptual diversity and scientific discovery.

Part Three ('General Philosophical Problems in Social Science') provides a critical examination of the positions and counter-positions involved in controversies in and over social studies: individualism and holism, idealism and materialism, intuitionism, empiricism, pragmatism, and systemism, subjectivism and realism. These explorations of topical concerns lay the foundation for B.'s criticism of rational choice theory, currently widely accepted in the social sciences.

Unfortunately B. follows the social science reference standard of internal documentation rather than the more precise Chicago style. This means readers are left awkwardly thumbing through an extensive bibliography at

the back of the book to follow his sources. However, he controls his sources well and he shows familiarity with and control of the current literature. In short, B. has written an excellent text that succeeds as both an introduction and substantive contribution to the philosophy of social science. This book would be of value in graduate seminars in social philosophy or philosophy of social science. It would also be extremely valuable as a foundational text in graduate seminars in social science methods.

**James B. Sauer**

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**J. Baird Callicott and Fernando J.R. Da Rocha, eds.**

*Earth Summit Ethics: Towards a Reconstructive Postmodern Philosophy of Environmental Education.*

Albany: State University of New York Press  
1996. Pp. xiii + 247.

US\$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3053-7);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3054-5).

**David Strong**

*Crazy Mountains: Learning from Wilderness to Weigh Technology.*

Albany: State University of New York Press  
1995. Pp. x + 253.

US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2652-1);

US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2651-3).

**T.N. Khoshoo**

*Mahatma Gandhi: An Apostle of Applied Human Ecology.*

New Delhi: Tata Energy Research Institute  
1995. Pp. 71. Np.

ISBN 81-85419-10-8.

These three books, which all fall into the category of environmental philosophy in its broadest sense, illustrate something both of the diversity and of the similarity of much of the work in this field. The books focus on very different aspects of environmental thought: educational philosophy, wilderness experience, and the work of Mahatma Gandhi. But the writers in all three books are openly driven by the belief in an impending environmental crisis, and, correspondingly by the desire to promote change in human environmental attitudes, philosophy and behaviour.



*Earth Summit Ethics: Towards a Reconstructive Postmodern Philosophy of Environmental Education* forms part of a State University of New York Press series, edited by David Ray Griffin, on constructive postmodern thought. Griffin's introduction to the series explains constructive postmodernism as a revision of 'modern premises and traditional concepts' to produce a 'new unity of scientific, ethical, aesthetic and religious intuitions', which 'transcend individualism, anthropocentrism, patriarchy, mechanisation, economism, consumerism, nationalism and militarism' (xi). It is in this context, therefore, that the rest of the book is intended to be viewed. *Earth Summit Ethics* is a collection of papers, most of which were given at an international pre-conference to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, on Ethics, University and Environment in Porto Alegre in May 1992. The book contains an introductory chapter by the editors Da Rocha and Callicott, followed by a series of papers by European environmental ethicists (Sosa, Brennan and Larrère), American ethicists (Callicott, Rolston and Madsen), a former Brazilian environment minister (Lutzenberger) and an environmental educationalist (Lemons). The book concludes with the Porto Alegre Declaration on University, Ethics and Environment, a short statement signed by most of the contributors; and a selected bibliography on university-level environmental education.

Such a range of contributors lends diversity and sometimes inner tension to the collection, which is certainly enriched by having French, Spanish and Brazilian contributions alongside the more usual Anglo-American-Antipodean work in environmental ethics. However, the degree of diversity manifested in this collection is also puzzling, as some of the papers, whilst clearly concerned with environmental ethics, fail to mention environmental education at all, whilst others make the merest gesture in an educational direction by tacking on the odd paragraph about universities. But if one is prepared to put the educational theme to the back of one's mind for much of the book, there is some interesting material here. In particular, Sosa's paper 'The Ethics of Dialogue and the Environment' develops some thought-provoking ideas relating Habermas and Rawls to an environmental ethic of solidarity, while Larrère in 'Ethics, Politics, Science and the Environment' intelligently and critically engages with Serres' important book *The Natural Contract*. The contributions of Callicott and Rolston are clear and forcefully argued, providing 'bite-sized' introductions to their key ideas about environmental ethics.

Those specifically looking for material on the philosophy of environmental education would be best to concentrate on Madsen's 'What can Universities and Professional Schools Do to Save the Environment?' and Lemons' 'University Education in Sustainable Development and Environmental Protection'. The former paper explores the meaning of 'environmental awareness' and expounds an extremely optimistic range of ways in which universities and professional schools might develop it amongst students and in the community. (Brennan's paper on 'Incontinence, Self-Deception, Shallow Analysis, Myth-making and Economic Rationality', which follows, provides a timely antidote.) Lemons' paper gives a helpful overview of different

approaches to environmental education in universities, and the problems and challenges which environmental education faces.

*Earth Summit Ethics* is a mixed bag of philosophical, ethical, environmental and educational reflections in a range of combinations. It is probably of more interest to those looking for a diverse range of perspectives on environmental ethics than for those hoping to develop their understanding of the philosophy of environmental education.

*Crazy Mountains* by David Strong is an idiosyncratic, but engaging, personal exploration of wilderness experience. The title of the book, *Crazy Mountains*, is derived from the range of mountains in Montana near which Strong grew up and which shaped his understanding of and passionate love for wilderness. The name fortuitously provides a rich seam for Strong's discussion of philosophical ideas which, he maintains, may 'seem crazed to many people aligned with the dominant culture of our time' but which may, in their turn craze (shatter, or crush) the 'older vision of domination and materialism' (7). Such affirmations make it clear that this book is written from a position of firm philosophical commitment; indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that it burns with missionary zeal.

Strong's profound sense of connection with the Crazy Mountains shapes his book, in a way consciously reminiscent of other North American wilderness writing such as Thoreau's *Walden* (which he discusses at some length), Leopold's *A Sand County Almanac* and Muir's *My First Summer in the Sierra*. He begins with a discussion of the geological, ecological and (human) historical context of the Crazy Mountains before outlining his own personal relationship with the range — and the horror he feels at threats to its integrity from development and logging. These threats to wilderness areas raise questions for Strong about the kind of culture which views wilderness destruction as the 'price of progress'. A substantial proportion of the book is devoted to reflection on the ways in which technology is used to dominate nature and the kind of worldview which must underpin such an understanding of technological progress.

In the course of this reflection, he considers (although in abbreviated and unsophisticated form) several existing approaches to environmental ethics: Leopold's land ethic and the work of the environmental philosophers Rolston (a contributor to *Earth Summit Ethics*) and Sagoff. Whilst accepting that such ethical approaches may be of value, Strong argues that environmental ethics is not, in itself, enough to achieve a fundamental change in human attitudes to wilderness. Environmental ethicists, he maintains, may argue effectively that the boundaries of value, of what is 'morally considerable', should be extended to include nonhuman individuals, ecosystems, species and wild areas. However, even if many people were persuaded to accept this, it would not necessarily prevent wilderness destruction in a consumption-driven technological society. People would still say 'Sure, nature counts; but what we want counts even more' (58). It is the culture of dominating technology which needs to be challenged, rather than the boundaries of moral considerability: 'the task confronting our age is not, fundamentally, to extend



altruistic ethical regard to nature and natural beings; rather our problem is to confront the guiding vision of technology' (72).

Strong's rejection of technological culture is based on his view that it is ultimately unsatisfying to us. He accepts that some kinds of technology are liberating or in other ways useful (medical technology, for instance). But he contests the widespread assumption in Western industrialised societies that technology allows people to live 'genuinely free and good lives' (21) and that consumption creates happiness. Rather, he argues, true happiness and freedom are found in communion with wildness, and in engagement or *correlational co-existence* with 'things' in the world. Drawing heavily on Heideggerian concepts (in a way potentially puzzling to anyone unfamiliar with Heidegger's work in this area) Strong argues that, if we allow it, these 'things' will disclose themselves to us, and exert an emotional tug on our being. Such relationships can provide true fulfilment in a way impossible in technological culture and from the 'devices' which humans create in an attempt to satisfy their desires to consume.

Strong's book is on the whole interesting and thoughtful, although the latter chapters of the book reinforce rather than develop ideas presented earlier. It is, however, not intended to be (and certainly is not) a rigorous work of academic philosophy; and does not, for instance, address the complex current debate about the nature and place of wilderness which is so prominent in environmental philosophy. (Callicott's paper in *Earth Summit Ethics*, for instance, provides one important, and contrasting, perspective on wilderness.) However, for those seeking a gentle lead-in (students just starting work in philosophy of environment or technology, perhaps) *Crazy Mountains* might be a good place to start.

Finally, Khoshoo's *Mahatma Gandhi: An Apostle of Applied Human Ecology* resonates with Strong's advocacy of simpler living and technology. This little book uses a variety of (unsourced) quotations from Gandhi's thought as the starting point of a series of reflections on nature, development and lifestyle. It is emphatically not an academic study of either Gandhi's thought or environmental philosophy (Khoshoo doesn't engage with any environmental or Gandhi scholarship), and on occasions the text creates the impression that Gandhi quotations are being used as a hook on which to hang Khoshoo's own environmental views. In places, the book is poorly organised and repetitive, and Khoshoo offers as unproblematic deeply controversial statements such as 'Ethically, all species have a standing and all have equal right to live' (12). Having said all this, there is some interesting material here for those who are interested in Gandhi's thought on self-sufficiency, local democracy, the treatment of women, the nature of development and respect for nature. As with Strong's book, whilst this is not the place to stop if you are interested in Gandhi, there may be worse places to begin.

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**Stephen R.L. Clark**

*How to Live Forever: Science Fiction and Philosophy.*

New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. vii + 223.

Cdn\$104.95: US\$74.95. ISBN 0-415-12626-6.

Science Fiction, which Clark describes as 'the careful imagining of alien or future worlds sufficiently different from this world-here to raise ethical or metaphysical questions' (5), can contribute much to philosophy. Through SF, philosophical puzzles 'could be explored through the imaginings of people less constrained than academics' (5). Clark sees SF's contribution, however, as more than providing examples where such puzzles are 'brought to life'. Many SF works are thought-experiments (9) which, in addition to supporting deliberation about what is possible, also reveal complexities; facilitating debate, for example, about the desirability of certain alternative ways of living. Furthermore, SF can expand our field of view: 'opening oneself to what is described, imagined, gestured at within the genre allows one to catch sight of possibilities that professional philosophy has too long neglected' (5). In this book Clark guides the reader through SF literature that supports and/or engages in a philosophical exploration of immortality, detailing the ways the literature explores the various forms of immortality, illustrates their complexities, raises interesting questions, and expands the boundaries of what we see to be possible.

The first chapter discusses SF stories and novels which explore practical and ethical problems with wishing for different forms of immortality; including whether or not, and how, one should so wish. The succeeding chapters detail the SF material which imagines the mechanisms by which we could become immortal and the different forms of immortality, and which raises and illustrates problems and questions accompanying such mechanisms. He begins with the suggestion that we may achieve a further continuance of our bodies (Ch.2) through anti-aging drugs, operations, and cyborg-style prosthetics. Alternatively, we could forsake our bodies, achieving a continuance just of our minds (Ch.3), uploaded into a computer system, for example. Unsurprisingly, with both of these ideas, problems of self-identity emerge: what would ensure that the resulting cyborg, or the uploaded intelligence, is *me*?

Rather than continuance of our present life, however, we'd perhaps prefer a transformation, into something (arguably) better, such as a vampire (Ch.4), maybe even into a permanent, representative artifact (Ch.5). But there's a risk: would these be preferable to our present condition? 'The hope for immortality,' Clark concludes on p.185, 'is the hope for transformation, or awakening, or opening out, and in its nature cannot be fulfilled for those who want to keep themselves secure.' Chapter Four also raises interesting questions about what a society in which some members had no fear of death would be like.

Rather than being transformed, however, immortality may be achieved by reidentifying ourselves (Ch.6) with something more permanent, such as with the star-dust from which we're made, with Nature, with humanity, with our descendants, with the 'mark' we make on the world, with our creations, even, quizzically, with some known Truth, or with our most private — yet possessed by all — sense of self-identity.

We may even, without realising it, already be immortal; our 'selves' only loosely or temporarily attached to our mortal flesh. Perhaps the same 'self' is reincarnated over and over (Ch.6), or it may one day be resurrected, either in the 'same' body, or in a 'new' one (Ch.8), or it may continue to exist in a world beyond death (Ch.9). (But, again, what would make these resurrected, reincarnated, or continued existences the *same* self?)

Alternatively, we may be nothing but the imaginings of a master storyteller, or figments of someone's dream (Ch.8). Or the life we live at present may be our own dream, from which we will one day 'awaken' (Ch.10). We might even 'wake' to discover ourselves to be (or be part of) some sort of 'Overmind' (Ch.11): the One Cosmic Self, 'the one central life of all lives there are and have been' (154). Or we may discover ourselves to be aspects of a 'many bodied' being with a Groupmind (Ch.11).

We might even become immortal by transcending time itself: by encompassing all time, or all possibilities, in our imaginations (Ch.7), or by 'shifting' to 'No-space' where all places and times are perpetually present (Ch.8). The three envisaged models of time travel (Ch.12) each have implications for what it might mean to transcend time: by time-travelling, we may either participate in but not change the past, or by altering the past we might travel to 'the road not taken', to alternative time-lines, or we may literally 'make it didn't happen', there being only one 'real' time-line of many possible ones. With the first, we can transcend time, becoming aware of our lives and of all time 'all at once', as we might be aware of a picture. The second, and to some extent the third, affords the unusual possibility of *non-linear* immortality: transcendence to 'seeing' in this way all places, times, and possibilities.

And what of endings? (Ch.13) Will there be an end to Time itself? And what of our relation to the present, given that endings are, perhaps, inevitable? With all the above themes, questions and possibilities, the reader is skillfully guided through relevant SF novels, stories, and even poetry, making this a useful teaching aid for instructors wishing to include SF readings relevant to classroom topics.

SF and philosophy, Clark concludes, are both ways of exploring our condition, and exploring worlds 'a little distant from the common sense of respectable society.' Clark thinks 'it right, not just fun, to do so' (184). I find this mildly ironic; one criticism is that in forging it into an analytical tool, Clark removes some of the fun from reading SF. Clark often baits his reader by describing the basic premise of an inviting novel or story. But he frequently — and often unnecessarily — gives away the plot twists and ironic endings that would delight and surprise the first-time reader. So SF fans, beware! Although this is a revealing and enjoyable guide to both philosophi-



cally illuminating and philosophically inclined SF literature, Clark's book is perhaps *too* revealing for those who read SF, not specifically or solely for any academic value it may have, but because it's fun.

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**Philippe Descola and Gísli Pálsson, eds.**  
*Nature and Society: Anthropological Perspectives.*

New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. x + 310.

Cdn\$97.95: US\$69.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-13215-0);

Cdn\$31.95: US\$22.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-13216-9).

In January 1989, the European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA) was established in response to a widely felt need among European anthropologists for a professional organization to foster and facilitate co-operation in research and teaching. The third conference of the EASA was held in Oslo in June 1994, and the articles contained in the present volume are revised versions of papers that were presented at that conference. The overall theme of both the conference and the book is the relation between nature and society in anthropological theory and social discourse. More specifically, most of the articles contained in *Nature and Society* are united by the common purpose of challenging the coherence and/or usefulness of any conceptual distinction between nature and society. Such a distinction, we are told, 'has been a central dogma in anthropology, providing a series of analytical tools for apparently antithetical research programs as well as an identity marker for the discipline as a whole' (2). However, there is a consensus among the contributors to the present volume that the time has come to deconstruct this dualist paradigm and open up an entirely different intellectual landscape (12).

*Nature and Society* contains fourteen articles in total as well as a general introduction from the editors, both of whom also contribute their own articles. The articles are organized thematically into three sections, the first of which contains papers that are comparatively theoretical in nature. Thus, in 'Ecology as Semiotics: outlines of a contextualist paradigm for human ecology', Alf Hornborg tries to connect two recurrent themes in ecological anthropology. 'One is the epistemological polarisation between "dualist" and "monist" approaches to human ecology. The other is whether or not tradi-



tional, pre-industrial human societies have something to tell us about how to live sustainably' (45). And in 'Human-Environmental Relations: orientalism, paternalism, and communalism', Gísli Pálsson distinguishes three paradigms — corresponding to the names given in the title of the paper — each of which represents a particular stance with respect to human-environmental relations. Pálsson seeks to defend the paradigm of communalism over the others on the grounds that it alone rejects the radical separation of nature and society (65). The other contributors to this first section are Philippe Descola, Roy Ellen, and Tim Ingold.

The articles contained in the second and third sections of *Nature and Society*, are more directly tied to specific ethnographic studies. Thus, in 'Nature in Culture or Culture in Nature? Chewong ideas of humans and other species', Signe Howell presents an argument on the basis of field studies concerning the Chewong people, a small group of aboriginals of the Malay tropical rainforest. Howell's argument is that 'the Chewong include animals and other "natural" species such as trees, plants, rivers, stones, etc. in their construction of meaning about humanity and personhood' and, hence, that 'the Chewong thus constitute an empirical counterexample to several universalistic models such as those that make categorical distinctions between nature and culture, mind and body, or society and cosmos' (128). And in 'Nature, culture, magic, science: on metalanguages for comparison in cultural ecology', Edvard Hviding uses ethnographic material from Melanisia to criticize the often-presumed universal dualism of nature and culture. Hviding claims that 'the nature-culture dualism forms part of western "ethnoepistemology" and derives from a non-universal ontological basis' (165). Hviding's article also contains a discussion of the classic debate between Winch and Evans-Pritchard on the objectivity of science and the existence of witchcraft. In addition to this, there are articles based on studies of the Cree people of Muskrat Dam Lake in Northern Ontario, the Nuala of Indonesia, and the Huaorani people of the Amazon.

The various case studies that inform the articles of *Nature and Society* are independently interesting and, in my opinion, the principal strength of the book. On the other hand, with the exception of those who antecedently identify themselves as postmodern social theorists, I think that many readers will remain unconvinced by the theoretical claims that are made on the basis of these case studies. In their introductory essay, the editors consider the antithetical view, which they attribute to modernists, that the current dissatisfaction with the theoretical dualism of nature and society is simply yet another post-modernist fad that has more to do with competition on the academic labour market and trendy rhetorics than with solid evidence and reliable observations about the real world (7). However, although they consider it, they do not in my opinion succeed in completely discrediting it.

What exactly is the problem with the distinction between nature and society? Several answers to this question can be found in these essays, but one of the main claims seems to be that the nature-culture dichotomy stands in the way of a proper understanding of non-western realities, since many

non-western societies fail to draw such a distinction, at least in the way westerners do. However, there is a difference between drawing a distinction and universalizing it, and it is not clear how the fact that the distinction is absent in other cultures entails that we ought to eliminate it from our theoretical resources. Can we not acknowledge both the usefulness of the distinction (for our purposes) as well as the fact that other cultures have not found it useful (for their purposes)? The case against the distinction would be strengthened by an honest discussion of the uses it does serve and the reasons why we have until now accepted it. Another source of dissatisfaction with the nature-culture distinction comes from recent research on the ethology of primates. Thus, it is noted that studies of chimpanzees in the wild show that non-human primates use and make some of the kinds of stone tools usually believed to be a distinctive feature of *homo faber* and that this tends to invalidate such notions as a clear phylogenetic boundary between nature and culture (5). But then what exactly is being challenged? Is it a precise and categorical distinction between the concepts of nature and culture or is it the very idea of *any* such distinction? This important point is not made clear in many of the arguments against the distinction.

Nevertheless, this is a book that I would recommend to anyone interested in anthropology, ecology, or the philosophy of the social sciences. Whether or not one accepts the theoretical claims that are advanced in *Nature and Society*, the variety and depth of the research that is offered in support of these claims is undeniably impressive.

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**Michael Devitt**

*Realism and Truth*. Second edition.  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press  
1997. Pp. xii + 371.  
US\$14.95. ISBN 0-691-01187-7.

Though the second edition of *Realism and Truth* (*R&T*) is six years old, this new printing is timely. Philosophical anti-realisms of various sorts continue to enjoy tremendous popularity, and Devitt's staunchly realist book is a clear and forceful defence of an under-represented position. *R&T* argues that realism is an ontological stance affirming the existence and mind-independent nature of most common-sense and scientific entities (13-25). Since realism is not a semantic claim, no theory of truth is constitutive of it. Furthermore, realism is consistent with many conceptions of truth. Hence



Devitt rejects the contemporary tendency to frame realism debates in terms of truth (39-58).

The new printing includes an afterword which concentrates on two issues: recent work on the semantics of 'nonfactualism', and Devitt's revised views on the relation between language and the mind. Nonfactualism offers a semantic argument against realism by claiming that the sentences of a given area of discourse are non-assertoric, they fail to state facts. Since Devitt insists that realism is *not* a semantic thesis, he must dispose of this line of argument. He does this by arguing that global nonfactualism is incoherent because it suggests, implausibly, that no claims can be made at all, including the claims of the nonfactualist (311-13). Since some claims are factual, the nonfactualist must frame her disagreement with the realist as one over the *nature* of the reality under dispute. She must explain *why* the claims in an area of discourse fail to state facts, and this can only be done plausibly by disputing the ontological status of certain entities or properties (313-20). Since Devitt's book is a sustained defence of realism as an ontological stance, he feels satisfied to have reduced his dispute with the nonfactualist to one over metaphysics.

In *R&T*, Devitt insists, under the influence of methodological solipsism, that psychology should deal only with 'narrow' psychological states, i.e., states whose specification does not make reference to anything external to the thinker (93-7). Hence such 'wide' notions as truth and reference do not factor into psychology and Devitt argues that even though we don't need these notions in the explanation of *behaviour*, they do have a place in semantics, helping to explain how *linguistic symbols* aid us in our interactions with the environment (101-5). In the afterword, Devitt alters his stance somewhat, arguing that wide states are not only more in accord with folk psychology, but far more behaviourally explanatory than he previously allowed (328-30). This derives largely from his claim that we need reference to explain truth, truth to explain meaning, and meaning to explain behaviour (320-8). This is an interesting move, but ten pages of afterword is not sufficient space for anything other than dense, programmatic and suggestive remarks. There is little here to sink one's teeth into. Nonetheless, the suggestions are intriguing and Devitt finishes the book with an application of his wider semantics/psychology to Putnam's recent arguments against the causal theory of reference (330-8), a discussion which is fair and persuasive. Despite its flaws, the new afterword is a positive addition to the book.

*R&T* is an important contribution to the discussion of contemporary metaphysical and semantic disputes. It is highly recommended to anyone interested in these issues.

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**Daniel A. Dombrowski**

*Analytic Theism, Hartshorne, and  
the Concept of God.*

Albany, NY: State University of New York  
Press, 1996. Pp. xii + 247.

US\$57.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-3099-5);

US\$18.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-3100-2).

Dombrowski aims to initiate a dialogue between a very broadly construed 'analytic' tradition in philosophical theology and Hartshornian theism. To this end he considers several of the central issues in the philosophy of religion, focusing his presentation around Divine powers and attributes. He devotes chapters to the question of immutability, the relation of absolute and relative, Divine embodiment, Divine relatedness to the world, and linguistic models for description of God. The final chapter of the book considers some moral applications, notably to the issue of abortion.

The 'dialogue' involves quite detailed presentations of the work of a large number of philosophers. The chapter on immutability alone has sections devoted to articles by W. Mann and E. Stump and N. Kretzmann, and to books by A. Plantinga and R. Creel. Other chapters range at least as far; among the authors most seriously engaged are W. Alston, C. Gunton, R. Swinburne, T. Nagel, and S.R.L. Clark. Several chapters embody a sustained rereading of some material from the late Plato. Nineteen works of Hartshorne are cited within the book.

Dombrowski emphasizes that Hartshorne's theology should be understood as 'neoclassical' but also 'neoclassical'; that is, Hartshorne is aiming at a recovery and development of orthodox theological positions. In fact, he argues, Hartshorne's positions are more logically consistent than those of traditional anglo-american philosophical theism.

If this is not generally recognized, Dombrowski asserts, it is because most philosophers do not fully canvas the available positions for their strengths and weaknesses. Hartshorne's 'position matrices' are praised for their ability to show the neglected alternatives. Here this method is applied to suggest possible combinations of absolute and relative qualities in the divine.

The burden of each chapter is to show the logical problems with the traditionally accepted alternatives, and to emphasize that Hartshorne's positions are not polar opposites of these but adopt a mediating or 'dipolar' position. So for example the traditional concept of Divine absoluteness is to be contrasted not with total relativity, but with a qualified absoluteness.

Dombrowski is not a detached arbiter of the questions he treats, but takes a quite definite point of view. He is a strong partisan of process theories, sometimes even seeming to be an avatar of Hartshorne. Generally Hartshorne's positions are taken as a standard to which the other views are compared. Positions are often described as limited or inadequate to the extent that they differ from Hartshorne's views. Only once or twice in the book are others said even to have put a point more felicitously than Hartshorne.

The assurance with which such negative value judgements are expressed makes it hard to see a dialectical, dialogical, or dipolar character in Dombrowski's writing. It is more dialogical than that of his other favored author, the late Plato, in that various authors' positions are quite clearly expressed. But the 'Of course, Socrates' trope comes out very clearly in each section. Rhetorically speaking, there is not much invitation to an extended dialogue here.

Dombrowski's discussion of abortion divides religious opposition into ontological and 'perversion of Divine purpose' strands. He takes a predictable Hartshornian view on the ontological issue, arguing that relatively undeveloped fetuses do not have the complexity to warrant human moral status. This claim assumes adequate answers to some vexed questions about the relation of Hartshornian micro-sentiency to everyday sentiency.

More puzzling is Dombrowski's dismissal of the 'Divine purpose' argument merely on the grounds that few current thinkers take it seriously. Such a rationale goes against the position matrix model which he champions. Moreover, proposals to alter the creative balance ought to receive particularly cautious review within the process model, in which Divine purpose is imperfectly emergent in the darkening glass of becoming.

One of the larger issues raised by Dombrowski's book is the question of the relation between 'philosophical theism' and the religions. Dombrowski and Hartshorne are probably right that process theism lends itself to a logically consistent philosophical articulation better than traditional analytic theism. But to make logical consistency the key criterion of theism goes against the theological history of the three Abrahamic religions at least. For instance, Dombrowski stresses that the traditional mystical language of bride and bridegroom implies God's passibility. Yet the same mystics who use these terms often speak of unitive experience in monistic language which has clear connotations of impassibility. Each of the 'religions of the book' holds these terms in tension (as distinct from dipolar resolution); each takes revelation, even imperfectly understood, as ultimately greater than reason.

For all his use of position matrices, Dombrowski largely ignores this traditional 'mysterious' or 'faith' element in theological responses to the questions at issue. He very rarely speaks of the mysterious dimension of God's nature and the limitations of human understanding. Yet the mystics whom he quotes with such approval are great exponents of these ideas.

There are also more philosophical expressions of this view. One notable example is the Climacus writings of Kierkegaard. It is interesting that these works were partly a polemic against Hegel's interpretation of Christianity, which like Hartshorne's is developmental, multipolar, and panentheist. A study of Climacus's ideas on the relation of being, possibility and actuality would have made a worthwhile addition to Dombrowski's work.

Nevertheless his book is very wide ranging. A full critical understanding of all its parts would require familiarity with at least three distinct traditions: analytic philosophy, process philosophy, and Platonism. Mere mortals will be glad of the good bibliography of secondary works. It is unfortunate that



there is no index of terms, especially since the book returns to many of its themes at several points.

Dombrowski's work gives a strong statement of the problems of Divine absoluteness, and he presents the process case forcefully. Despite his occasional didacticism, those interested in these questions will find considerable stimulation here.

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**Susan L. Feagin**

*Reading With Feeling:*

*The Aesthetics of Appreciation.*

Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press

1996. Pp. viii + 260.

US\$35.00. ISBN 0-8014-3200-6.

Susan L. Feagin's monograph, *Reading With Feeling*, examines the affective dimension of reading fiction. Indeed, it might have been titled *Reading Fictional Literature With Feeling*. Yet its eleven chapters canvass an impressive range of recent work in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive and philosophical psychology, not to mention a wide range of literature. As Feagin notes late in the book (235), Henry James 'is literary brandy, to be sipped and savored.' Henry Miller 'is literary beer, meant to be swigged and gulped.' Given these options, Feagin has produced philosophical brandy.

The book is organized into two parts of roughly equal length. The second is more technical and, at times, makes for laborious reading. Following an introduction in which Feagin provides a careful summary of the argument to follow, Part One aims to *explain* affective responses to fiction. Originally inspired by the challenge of Colin Radford's arguments that emotional responses to fiction are irrational and incoherent, Feagin develops an intricate analysis and typology of affective responses to literature that might, with appropriate substitutions, explain affective responses to other art that employs fictional narratives (e.g., film). Another central theme is her analysis of the desire to appreciate a work as a 'desire to get the good out of the work,' leading to a fine discussion of the 'desire to explore' in which the reader makes appropriate 'mental adjustments' as appropriate to the work being read (53).

Part Two is generated by the fact that explanations are not justifications, so the rationality of emotional responses to fiction requires an account of *assessing* emotions and other affective responses to fiction. Instead of turning



to theories of interpretation or criticism, Feagin's 'epistemology of appreciation' draws on coherentist epistemology and recommends a model in which the warrant for an affective response depends on the reader's other beliefs and thoughts. (Oddly, W.V.O. Quine is never mentioned.) This holism is balanced against the requirement that responses be *grounded* in facts about the world; in the case of literature, in real 'elicitors' in the work (e.g., a sequence of sentences in a specific language). The book closes with a discussion of the values of developing the mental capacities necessary to appreciate fictional literature. In brief, she argues that expanding our 'affective imagination' expands our mental potential — surely as desirable as expanding our other capacities — and develops our control over our emotional lives.

Few will quarrel with Feagin's organizing premise, that genuine appreciation of fiction is affective as well as cognitive. But one of the argument's most rewarding dimensions is the careful working out of the implications of distinguishing emotions, which have a cognitive component, from the wide range of affective responses that have no propositional component. Whether appreciating literature or engaging in the activities of ordinary life, Feagin insists that affective responses (e.g., moods, desires, and a host of hard-to-classify experiences) carry no less epistemic significance than emotions (e.g., anger and fear). Particularly rich is the extended treatment, in Chapters 4 and 5, of the distinction between empathy, sympathy, and five other categories of affective responses that should not be classified as emotions, including antipathetic and second-order responses.

If Part Two's discussion of normative issues is highly speculative, Feagin acknowledges that 'we are at a very primitive stage' in making assessments of affective responses to fiction (196). Such problems aside, two central proposals demand more support than Feagin offers. One is her repeated claim that she has taken a position on appreciating fictional literature *as art*. The other is her assumption that it is not enough that an affective response be warranted; for Feagin, 'an integral part of the process' of appreciating literature is its reflective component in which readers raise questions about the warrantedness of their affective responses (146). The unexamined reading experience is not worth pursuing.

There is a remarkable passage in Richard Wright's account of his Mississippi childhood, Part One of *Black Boy*, in which he describes his first exposure to fictional literature, at age seven. Wright describes how his sense of life deepened and his emotional life was forever changed by this introduction to fiction. Yet there is nothing to suggest that Wright, as a child of seven, appreciated literature as art. Instead of demanding awareness that fictional literature is art, it may be enough to suppose that some fiction is art and some is not; in the latter case, the work minimizes affective response to specifically 'verbal features' of the work, that is, 'the way language is used in the work' (132). Feagin comes very close to endorsing this view in her assertion that most mystery novels are not works of art, 'because, as a genre, they do not tend to exhibit high literary values' (244). Such works would exercise fewer of our reading capacities. Theorists, not readers, must be

aware of art-status. Or perhaps Feagin believes that identification of some literature as art characterizes a mature stage of appreciating fiction, in which recognition of a literary work's status as art conditions our affective responses in a special manner. But the plausibility of this position rests on her contention that mature appreciation has a reflective component, so that one of the things readers might reflect on is the art-status of the work. In that case, Feagin faces the challenge that readers who were the peers of early novelists would have to be judged as having gotten less of the value out of the works they read. However, it is not altogether clear that readers in the late eighteenth century were handicapped by their failure to identify novels as works of art.

Feagin offers no argument to the effect that appreciation must have a reflective component, in which readers frequently ask themselves whether their affective responses are appropriate. Requiring readers to engage in constant reflection about the warrantedness of their responses is akin to supposing that one cannot know that one is seated in a chair unless one reflects on the belief. Those who think that *reflection* on the warrantedness of specific beliefs is epistemically unnecessary — except in cases where one is aware of evidence of a non-standard situation — will question the need for such reflection in many reading situations.

The book is enlivened by flashes of wit and apt examples. If the book's production is flawed at all, it is the lack of a bibliography.

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### **O. Flanagan**

*Psychologie morale et éthique;*

traduit de l'américain par S. Marnat. Coll. philosophie morale.

Paris: PUF 1996. Pp. 486.

FF285. ISBN 2-130-4727-96.

Flanagan est bien connu pour ses travaux en philosophie de la psychologie (*The Science of the Mind* et *Consciousness Reconsidered*). Il l'est peut-être un peu moins, et à tort, pour ceux portant sur la philosophie morale. *Psychologie morale et éthique*, traduction de son *Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism* paru en 1991 chez Harvard University Press, mérite cependant qu'on s'y attarde, et cela pour plusieurs raisons. D'abord, l'auteur y trace et développe une voie médiane entre l'éthique pure et le naturalisme éthique fort. Ensuite, il offre une vision du domaine de l'éthique et de la morale plus large que celles qui le réduisent aux seuls normes et



principes régissant les échanges inter-individuels. Finalement, il y considère un ensemble de données provenant principalement de la psychologie (développementale, cognitive et sociale) qui, en plus d'avoir un intérêt intrinsèque, sont pertinentes pour quiconque réfléchit sur l'éthique.

L'ouvrage de Flanagan examine les relations entre l'éthique et la psychologie en militant plus particulièrement pour ce qu'il nomme un réalisme psychologique en éthique, c'est-à-dire une position méta-éthique qui peut-être considérée comme une forme de naturalisme faible. Sa stratégie est simple: 'Premièrement', écrit-il, 'je plaiderai de manière générale en faveur d'un réalisme psychologique accru, en affirmant que la théorie éthique doit tenir compte de ce que la psychologie nous apprend sur l'architecture de la cognition, sur la structure du moi, sur la nature des traits de caractère et des dispositions ainsi que leur sensibilité aux situations, et sur les processus réels qui régissent le développement moral. Deuxièmement, cette façon de voir plus réaliste du point de vue psychologique sera illustrée par des exemples tirés de débats qui animent actuellement la théorie éthique contemporaine et la psychologie empirique.' (19)

La première partie du livre est donc consacrée à la défense du 'principe du réalisme psychologique minimal' qui représente en fait une contrainte aux théories éthiques particulières, celles-ci devant veiller à ce que le type de personnes morales qu'elles exigent ne soit pas impossible. Ainsi formulé, le principe ne met pas en péril l'autonomie de l'éthique puisqu'il ne suppose pas aux faits psychologiques le pouvoir de déterminer une théorie morale juste, mais il leur reconnaît toutefois une certaine pertinence dans le choix de ces dernières. Reconnaisant que ce principe — comportant à la fois une dimension descriptive (en ce qu'il isole une aspiration présente dans les théories éthiques) et prescriptive (en ce qu'il peut servir à évaluer les théories selon leur degré de réalisme) — met au cœur de l'évaluation la notion de personnalité morale, Flanagan s'attache ensuite à la description du concept de personnalité minimale l'opposant à des concepts de personnalité plus forts, comme ceux qu'il attribue entre autres à Williams et Wolf, et dont un des défauts majeurs serait le conservatisme moral qu'ils impliquent.

La seconde partie reprend la discussion sur la personnalité morale, mais dans un autre cadre, celui du débat entre les conceptions communautaristes et libérales de l'éthique. L'argument communautariste, rappelons-le, concerne l'existence de liens entre certains types d'arrangements sociaux et l'épanouissement des personnes. Il repose plus particulièrement sur l'idée que certains types de communauté permettent l'acquisition de biens comme le respect de soi, la connaissance de soi ainsi que l'épanouissement. Flanagan montre qu'une partie de l'argument est basée sur une distinction entre l'identité réelle d'une personne et son identité auto-représentée (ou son 'centre de gravité narratif') ainsi que sur la distance ou la distorsion présumée que certains types d'arrangements sociaux créeraient entre les deux. Tout en reconnaissant le fait que les autres contribuent à la formation de notre identité, il rejette la thèse de la nécessité d'une communauté des

vues ou de l'existence d'une communauté homogène (plutôt qu'une communauté pluraliste libérale) pour une profonde compréhension de soi.

Flanagan consacre une autre partie de son livre aux différentes versions de la psychologie morale proposée par les psychologues développementalistes tels que Piaget, Kohlberg et Gilligan. Il y discute alors les diverses conceptions de la morale qui sous-tendent toujours ce genre de travaux empiriques. La principale critique adressée à ces modèles est leur conception étroite du domaine de la morale ou des styles moraux. L'auteur reproche en effet à Piaget et Kohlberg leur conception spectrale de la morale qui réduit celle-ci à un ensemble de règles, devoirs et obligations et qui fait de la personne morale quelqu'un qui raisonne et agit sur la base des principes de justice en tant qu'équité. Cette conception fut mise en doute par les travaux de Gilligan qui montra qu'il existait au moins deux styles de personne morale, deux voix différentes: une dont l'essence est constituée par les règles, les obligations et le souci de la justice comme équité; l'autre par la sollicitude, l'attention, le souci du développement et de l'épanouissement d'autrui. Comme le remarque Flanagan, et contrairement à ce qu'affirmait Gilligan, rien ne permet cependant d'affirmer que ces deux voix sont incompatibles, qu'elles ne peuvent caractériser la même personne, ou même avoir chacune leur mot à dire dans un même épisode de délibération morale. De plus, aucune ne semble plus importante que l'autre psychologiquement ou analytiquement.

La partie la plus intéressante du livre est, à mon avis, celle portant sur les traits de caractère et l'influence des situations sur le comportement. On y trouve une discussion d'un aspect de la personnalité qui est souvent négligé par les philosophes de l'esprit qui ne s'attardent qu'au rôle des croyances ou des désirs dans la prédiction du comportement. Les traits, comme ensemble de dispositions comportementales, constituent en effet une partie importante de l'arsenal prédictif que nous utilisons quotidiennement. L'idée que les personnes possèdent des traits sous forme de vertus morales ne doit cependant pas nous faire croire qu'elles réagissent indifféremment aux situations. L'auteur montre, en faisant une très belle revue de travaux en psychologie sociale, comment les situations peuvent affecter l'expression des traits, sans toutefois tomber dans le piège éliminativiste des situationnistes qui en nient l'existence.

Pour conclure, disons que le livre de Flanagan n'a qu'un seul défaut majeur: s'il comprend une analyse fine de diverses erreurs en éthique et en psychologie originant de conceptions inadéquates de la personnalité morale, il ne propose pas de façon suffisamment claire ce qu'il considère être une conception adéquate de cette dernière. Une fois le livre refermé, on est en effet bien en peine de reconstituer ce que devrait être une théorie appropriée de la personnalité morale. En dépit de ce problème, *Psychologie morale et éthique* représente un jalon important dans le débat sur le naturalisme en éthique et sur le naturalisme tout court.

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**Carolyn Bailey Gill, ed.**

*Maurice Blanchot: The Demand of Writing.*

New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. xiii + 234.

Cdn\$83.95: US\$59.95

(cloth: ISBN 0-415-12595-2);

Cdn\$20.95: US\$18.95

(paper: ISBN 0-415-12596-0).

Paul de Man noted that for Blanchot writing gains its very existence from reading, in which 'the two subjectivities involved, that of the author and that of the reader, co-operate in making each other forget their distinctive identity and destroy each other as subjects'. ('Impersonality in the Criticism of Maurice Blanchot', in *Blindness and Insight* [Minneapolis 1983] 64.) Indeed, the power of Blanchot's writing lies in *its effect* as much as its content, and while Blanchot writes *about* the unworking of the subject, he also seeks to accomplish it. Herein lies the difficulty in writing about Blanchot. To be true to Blanchot's project, one must duplicate the effect of his writing in any critical attempt to capture it; the criticism must 'destroy the subject' as much as the original work. No essay in this volume accomplishes this more effectively than Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier's 'On Unworking: The image in writing according to Blanchot', which accomplishes the unworking of its reader as well as concerning itself with the effect of 'the image' in unworking the subject. Readers who are already familiar with Blanchot should turn to this essay first.

Readers who want an introduction to Blanchot will be well served by the two helpful introductions by Leslie Hill and Roger Laporte. Both familiarize the reader with Blanchot's legacy by dividing it into periods in which Blanchot's focus was respectively criticism, fiction, and, more recently, a genre which defies classification. Both introductions also situate Blanchot in the philosophical and literary tradition of the 19th and 20th centuries. Hegel and Heidegger are cited as prominent influences, as are Bataille and Levinas, who are mentioned as not only having had a profound impact on Blanchot, but as having been influenced by him. Leslie Hill's introduction also offers a helpful discussion of Blanchot's right-wing politics during the 1930s, doing much to clarify a position that is not easy to understand from our own historical site.

Two papers are devoted to Blanchot's influential 1947 essay 'Literature and the right to death'. Rodolphe Gasché's essay, 'The felicities of paradox: Blanchot on the null space of literature', contrasts Blanchot's treatment of 'the work' with Hegel's (in Chapter V of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*), about which Blanchot wrote in his 1947 study. Gasché demonstrates that where Hegel regards 'the work' as a sublation of contradiction, Blanchot finds no such resolution. Christopher Fynsk's essay on the same piece, 'Crossing the Threshold: On "Literature and the right to death"', focuses on the Heideggerian influence on Blanchot by comparing the abyssal opening of Blanchot's *il y a* to the dissimulation of Being proffered by the horizon of death in

Heidegger. Death is, for Blanchot, as it is for Heidegger, 'the non-dialectical other of living existence' (74).

Three essays focus on Blanchot's conception of 'the work'. Paul Davies, in 'The work and the absence of the work', traces Blanchot's treatment of 'the work' through its transformation into what Blanchot came to call 'worklessness', or the absence of the work. Davies indicates that this transition represents a move away from Heidegger's conception of 'the work' as origin toward Blanchot's own conception of 'the work' 'as disastrous pre-origin' (105). Michael Newman, in his essay, 'The Trace of Trauma: Blindness, Testimony and the Gaze in Blanchot and Derrida', offers an interesting reading of several of Blanchot's works, including 'The Gaze of Orpheus' and *The Madness of the Day*. Newman identifies the crucial moment in Blanchot as 'the traumatic moment where the work encounters the impossibility of its origin in the absence of any present' (169); whereas, for Derrida, in Levinasian fashion, there is a present, but it is corrupted by the 'touch of the other' (169). A third essay approaches Blanchot's concept of the work from the perspective of his fiction: Ann Smock's paper on *L'Attente*, *L'Oubli*, 'Conversation', refers to 'the work' as the site of a meeting between reader and writer, but also as 'a place where they do not find themselves' (131). The conversation between the man and the woman in *L'Attente*, *L'Oubli* is this (non-)meeting place.

The relationship between Blanchot's politics and his literary work is sensitively handled by Michael Holland in 'A Wound to Thought' and by Jeffrey Mehlman in 'Pour Sainte Beuve: Maurice Blanchot, 10 March 1942'. Holland addresses the conception of violence in Blanchot's thought through the two different versions of the essay 'Nietzsche, Today', which was published in one version in 1958 and in another in 1968. Holland examines the two versions' differing relations to Heidegger and discovers greater enlightenment with respect to the dangers of fascism in the later one. Mehlman finds Blanchot to have taken a veiled but decisively anti-collaborationist stance through his position on Saint Beuve in a book review of Maxime Leroy's *La Politique de Sainte Beuve*: 'in a flagrant and glorious misreading of Leroy's book', writes Mehlman, 'Blanchot has pitted the two ideological dimensions of what would fuse as fascism against each other in an anti-collaborationist move' (226). Mehlman thus disputes those who would claim that Blanchot's journalistic career positioned him as a Vichy collaborator. Blanchot endorses Mehlman's reading in a short letter which is published in this volume.

The remaining papers in this volume address Blanchot's understanding of death. In 'Il y a — holding Levinas' hand to Blanchot's fire', Simon Critchley contrasts Heidegger with Levinas and Blanchot on death. However, the piece concerns itself primarily with Levinas rather than Blanchot. Gillian Rose's paper 'Potter's Field: Death worked and unworked' is a masterpiece and impossible to summarize. It deals with Blanchot's treatment of death, 'the work', action, meaning, and mourning — the crucial themes of Blanchot's thought — in comprehensive fashion, and provides much food for thought for those already familiar with Blanchot's *oeuvre*.



This volume of essays is both a useful introduction to Blanchot and an advanced and interesting study of his thought. The essays collected cover a broad range of Blanchot's writings, and offer a wide spectrum of views on him and his writings. This volume is a seminal text in the budding field of Blanchot scholarship in English.

**Victoria Burke**

**L.E. Goodman**

*The God of Abraham and the*

*God of the Philosophers.*

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1996. Pp. xvii + 275.

Cdn\$89.50: US\$49.95. ISBN 0-19-508312-1.

A friend of mine once complained in a book review that the author of the book holds the reader's head underwater for dangerous lengths of time. That book's author succeeded in suppressing the review, so I feel able to use the line here and report that *God of Abraham* leaves the reader gasping for breath. Part of the blame goes to Goodman, a blame that is a function of his virtues. This book insists on doing justice to its subject. Goodman compromises with nothing in trying to do his best to be worthy of the God of Abraham!

Part of the blame, though, goes to the reader. Most contemporary readers, maybe even especially the professional philosophers who read journals such as this one, will be as much at a loss as I am when being told that they are about to read 'a book of natural or philosophical theology' (vii). If something announces itself as a proof of the existence of God or an exploration of the relation between faith and reason, I know what to expect. I also know apologetics when I see them. Theories of justice, proofs of the existence of the external world, exhortations to follow the law, spiritually uplifting sermons — these are all familiar and comfortable genres of philosophy and religion. Goodman says that he neither 'presuppose[s] the veracity of Scripture or tradition' (vii) nor demonstrates their truth. What could he be doing instead?

The first chapter is called 'The Logic of Monotheism,' and that title could serve as a title for the whole work. Keeping the logic of monotheism in mind as the subject of this book helped me follow the argument, as I gradually came to understand better what the logic of monotheism is. I recommend three guiding threads that helped me learn a great deal from the book. My

first theme is present from the beginning. The Preface begins with a denial of Pascal's distinction between the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham. That claim that the true Gods of philosophy and of Abraham are the same is no mere introductory provocation but is central to Goodman's purpose. If the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham are the same, then the God of Abraham will not be the being many have taken Him to be, but will measure up to very demanding philosophical standards. Not only does the God of Abraham have to measure up to philosophic standards, but — and this I find even more challenging to readers of this journal — the God of the philosophers must measure up to the Bible! How different this is in Goodman's hands from the Deism which proves their identity by removing everything from the God of Abraham except a minimal religion that corresponds to a minimal philosophy!

In addition to the encounter of Judaism with philosophy, I want to point to two other guiding threads which Goodman does not stress but which I think animate his thinking in making his case for the identity of the two Gods. I conceive these two themes as analogous to a 'deductive' movement from principles to their consequences, and an 'inductive' movement from data to principles. The movement from principles to consequences is a movement from the act of creation to our own mitzvot and goodness. But rather than a deductive process — 'Since God rested on the seventh day, we should rest once a week' is not a very impressive inference — the logic of monotheism is a narrative and an ethical progress that goes from creation through Adam, to Noah, with the discovery of universal moral laws, to Abraham, and the discovery of monotheism, through his descendants and the creation of a covenant with Israel, to Moses and the establishment of Torah and law. The process doesn't end there, or here, but in a certain sense all the rest is commentary.

The key event in that narrative is the binding of Isaac. Goodman's brilliant reading confronts Kierkegaard's interpretation in which the religious transcends the ethical much as faith must transcend reason. Goodman disputes both points. 'Abraham's choice is part of what gives meaning to the very act of creation ... Abraham spared Isaac, and in that way gave him to God' (22). It is by seeing the binding of Isaac as the successor to creation, with monotheism integrating all values, that Goodman can deny Kierkegaard's 'suspension of the ethical'. In a theme repeated throughout the book, the binding of Isaac shows that 'I can encounter God with the aid of morality, or art, or the beauty of nature — but never despite them. In violence or violation, or the romantically appealing notions of the arbitrary, actively uncaring, or chaotic, I encounter nothing divine but the mere reflex of human horror and alienation, dressed up in mystery ... It is the goodness of God, integrating all affirmative values, that renders the God of Abraham universal' (28). And just as 'Abraham's choice is part of what gives meaning to the very act of creation,' so too Moses and the law give meaning to Abraham and monotheism.

The title of Goodman's first chapter, 'The Logic of Monotheism', is misleading if we think of logic in its modern senses in which it must exclude the



ethical, much as Spinoza reduced biblical narrative to logical necessity. Monotheism unfolds not logically but ethically in the narrative that leads from creation to law, summed up in the title of the third chapter, 'Monotheism and Ethics'. This narrative progression, then, from creation to the giving of Torah, leads Goodman into perceptive and detailed examinations of 'The Doable Good: The Individual and the Community' (chapter 4), 'Ethical Monism and Ethical Pluralism,' (chapter 5), 'Monotheism and Ritual,' (chapter 6), and the 'Biblical Laws of Diet and Sex' (chapter 7). He told us that 'the subject of this book is the nexus between God and values' (viii), and as the book progresses that declaration takes on meaning. *God of Abraham* contains sustained and deep discussions of familiar problems with understanding God and our relation to Him.

I am most impressed with the combination of honesty and ambition that mark this book. Goodman accomplishes a lot without the special pleading that gives faith a deservedly bad name. If the God of Abraham is the God of the philosophers, obeying 613 commandments is the least of our worries, since Israel is called upon to be a nation of philosophers. When the God of Abraham is the God of the philosophers, both Gods are more interesting, more perfect, and more worth imitating, than when they are distinct.

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**Antonio Gramsci**

*Prison Notebooks: Volume Two,*

ed. and trans. Joseph Buttigieg.

New York: Columbia University Press 1996.

Pp. xii + 736.

US\$45.00. ISBN 0-231-10592-4.

Joseph Buttigieg's great labours to publish a definitive English-language edition of Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* continue. His edition is based directly on the primary Italian edition, edited by Valentino Gerratana, that was published by Einaudi in 1975 in four volumes. Volume I appeared in 1991 covering Gramsci's first two notebooks. Volume II contains Gramsci's numbered notebooks 3, 4 and 5. The notes are printed in sequential order, although this is not necessarily the chronological order of their writing since Gramsci worked simultaneously on a number of notebooks. This edition also contains all those notes which Gramsci subsequently reworked into other notebooks and then crossed through; these 'deleted' notes are distinguished by a smaller print font. While Volume I contained a great mass of very short notes, mostly brief comments and bibliographic details on what Gramsci had

been reading. Volume II contains many such small items, but it also contains a feast, the first versions of some of Gramsci's notes on his central themes that will be discussed in more detail below.

It seems almost churlish to complain, not least because there is so much to celebrate, but it must be noted that Buttigieg's edition is not 'user-friendly'. With Gerratana's Italian edition all four volumes were published simultaneously; this made it possible for the reader to use Volume 4, devoted exclusively to Notes and a numbers of Indexes, to guide the reader through the complexity of Gramsci's sequential and revised or rewritten notes. It is to be hoped that the five-year gap between the first two volumes of Buttigieg's English translation does not mean we will have to wait another ten years before having access to the all-important indexes.

It is extremely difficult to read the two volumes published to date without the aid of an index since the notes cover a wide range of topics. I ended up pursuing my reading of the volume under review with the Gerratana index volume at my elbow. Buttigieg decided to place his detailed and copious notes at the back of each volume so that we have 400 pages of Gramsci's notes and 300 pages supplied by the editor. He has also decided to provide only a name index for individual volumes. The list of Gramsci's individual notes, listed by title or opening phrase, is for some strange reason hidden away after the editor's notes. These in any case are not much of a guide to content. For example, the heading 'Father Bresciani's Progeny' is used frequently and tends to designate comments on contemporary popular literature while 'Past and Present' indicates anything from commentary on factional disputes inside the Italian Communist Party to observations on historiography.

As an experiment I read Notebook 3 sequentially (166 notes). It was fascinating, giving me a sense of the range of Gramsci's interests, but passing from brief bibliographic notes on Italian periodicals of the late-1920s to early formulations of key Gramscian themes was an uneven process. For Notebooks 4 and 5 (95 and 161 notes) I used the Gerratana index and organised grouping of notes on substantive themes that appealed to my own interests; thus, for example my first group was 'Americanism' and my last 'Structure/Superstructure' and such other obvious categories as 'hegemony' and 'intellectuals' on the way. This certainly made the task a more familiar exercise in reading.

Amidst the sparks of interest aroused by some of his shorter entries, it was a pleasure to come across, reread and ponder anew some classic passages. For example Gramsci describes the 'modern crisis' as consisting 'precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass' (33). I had not remembered that Gramsci proceeded to comment that one key feature of crisis is that its solution is often 'blocked.' It was all too easy to read Gramsci as making a prescient comment on postmodernism with his observation that 'the death of the old ideologies manifests itself as skepticism' (33).



Fortunately, one is rescued from this kind of temptation to turn Gramsci into some universal theory of history capable of rubbing some of the rough edges off Marx. Gramsci dazzles by the contemporaneity of his interests and brings us back to a more concrete and conjunctural level. In his early attempts to come to grip with the phenomenon of 'Americanism' he is insistent on the need to break out of the contemporary debate about whether Europe is being 'invaded' by American culture. The question to be posed he insists is whether he is witnessing a 'transformation of the material bases of civilization' (17).

This volume contains some of the most sustained and developed of Gramsci's writing. Of particular interest are a concentration of notes in which he engages with Marxist theory itself, in particular, with its own theoretical and philosophical status. One strand opens up his criticism of the Soviet theorist Nikolai Bukharin (generally gathered under references to 'The Popular Manual'. (The 'Popular Manual' refers, it seems, to the French edition of the 1921 Russian text that was published most recently in English as *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* [University of Michigan Press 1969].) Gramsci has given Bukharin a 'bad press' and he has come to be presumed an exponent of a positivist 'mechanical materialism'. This perhaps does less than justice to Bukharin who was one of the most original minds of the early Bolsheviks and a courageous critique of the Stalinization of Russian politics and Soviet Marxism. In retrospect Bukharin and Gramsci probably shared more than divided them; the question is whether Gramsci's historicism and Bukharin's empiricism are compatible. What ignites Gramsci's criticism is Bukharin's attempt to fashion Marxism along the lines of the natural sciences and to insist on the methodological primacy of material relations.

What is evident is that Gramsci was aware of the extent to which Marxism was theoretically beset by the dual errors of economism on one side and voluntarism on the other (177). Gramsci appeals to 'dialectics' to resolve this tension. In this he was not alone, although in radically different ways Lenin, Trotsky, Luckas and many others invoked the dialectic as a way of hanging on to both strands within the Marxist tradition. But neither in this volume nor, I suggest elsewhere, does Gramsci make 'dialectics' do much useful work other than serving as a reminder against veering too sharply towards one wing or the other. The result is that Gramsci himself is capable of producing formulations which, taken in isolation, make it possible to read him as economistic or as voluntaristic.

In another set of long passages under the general heading of 'Structure and Superstructure' in Notebook 4 are to be found the crucial phases of Gramsci's articulation of his linked concepts of 'hegemony' and 'intellectuals'. Not only does he develop the contrast between 'economic corporate' and 'hegemonic' consciousness, but he immediately links it to a devastating critique of the tendency of Marxism to lapse into an 'historical economism' when it focuses only on the immediate interests of the working class and thereby loses much of its innovative and critical capacity. Some of his passages are deeply prophetic. 'Every time historical materialism is converted into or equated

with vulgar materialism, the opposite error is bound to occur: namely, the conversion of historical materialism into idealism or even into religion' (193).

Thankfully Gramsci himself interrupts any temptation we may have to turn his reflections and conjectures, produced under such abnormal conditions, into fixed and settled dicta. He insists, as much to himself as to any possible reader that we should 'remember that all these notes are provisional and written as they flow from the pen, they must be reviewed and checked in detail because they undoubtedly contain imprecisions, anachronisms, wrong approaches, etc., that do not imply wrongdoing because the notes have solely the function of quick memorandum' (158). With his warning in mind we can mine the great wealth he bequeathed as stimulation for our enquiries. But don't throw away your all-important *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* that was edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith back in 1971. It is only when one reads Gramsci's raw sequential notes in Buttigieg's new edition that one realises what a superb job Hoare and Nowell-Smith did, giving the reader a sense of the fragmentary character of the original notes while providing a thematic linkage of the core of Gramsci's intellectual and political contribution.

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### **Simon A. Hailwood**

*Exploring Nozick: Beyond Anarchy,  
State and Utopia.*  
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Co.  
(for Avebury Press) 1996. Pp. vii + 184.  
US\$54.95. ISBN 1-85972-485-X.

Unfortunately, Hailwood's book does not take the reader much beyond *ASU*. Although he writes well about Nozick's next book, *Philosophical Explanations*, the treatment is more compressed and selective than it should be. As for *The Examined Life* and *The Nature of Rationality*, there isn't much evidence that Hailwood has studied these texts closely or considered the problems and prospects of assimilating them into his understanding of *ASU* and *PE*.

Hailwood's book's recent transformation from a Ph.D. thesis is evident, especially in the close analysis of the argument of *ASU*, designed to gratify thesis examiners but twenty years too late to be a contribution to the literature. The book is divided into three parts. Part One, 'The Libertarian Phase or John Wayne in a State of Natural Righteousness', focuses on



problems generated by the rugged individualist independent who refuses to contract with the dominant protection agency, a John Wayne type who is jealous of his natural rights; closely following R. Wolff, especially *Robert Nozick: Property, Justice, and the Minimal State*, Hailwood concludes that Nozick's principle of compensation does not do the work of spanning the gap between anarchism and the minimal state; its extension of the agency's protection to the John Waynes doesn't legitimately compensate for taking away their natural right to punish violations of their rights. Part Two, 'Utopian Neutrality', purports to show that Nozick's 'utopia of utopias' will not do because it does not satisfactorily argue that imperialists or reactionaries, who want everyone to live in their utopia, would be won over to the meta-utopian framework. Part Three, 'Value and Complex Responsiveness', criticizes Nozick's theory of value as (degree of) organic unity on the grounds that it is vague and unduly platonic.

The discussion in Part Three, engaging Nozick's current views, is of particular interest, but it is too compressed, too selective, and too limited. A better book would have taken the reader more deeply into *The Nature of Rationality*, which is barely touched on, and *The Examined Life* and *Philosophical Explanations*, both of which are discussed too selectively. For instance, Hailwood interprets Nozick as follows, alluding to *Philosophical Explanations*: 'Nozick's answer to Glaucon's question — "Why be moral?" — is that the cost of immorality is a value cost. It is not primarily a cost to be measured in terms of irrationality. Instrumentally speaking, immorality can be perfectly rational, given immoral goals' (107). This passage is rich in false suggestions, and it would not have been written if Hailwood had paid attention to *The Nature of Rationality*, which challenges the instrumental rationality enshrined in the orthodox account of maximizing expected utility, proposing instead a 'decision value' account which maximizes the weighted sum of expected utility and 'symbolic utility'. So Hailwood's remark about instrumental rationality overlooks one of the main themes of *The Nature of Rationality*. And further, Nozick's answer to Glaucon's question links morality and rationality, rather than viewing immorality and irrationality, in Hailwood's fashion, as different and unconnected costs. To quote Nozick in *The Nature of Rationality*: 'Being ethical is among our most effective ways of symbolizing (a connection to) what we value most highly, and that is something a rational person would not wish to forgo' (63).

Or consider another example in which, this time, *The Examined Life* is given short shrift. 'There [in ASU] the ability to formulate one's own overall conception of the good life was supposed to support the libertarian side constraint. From the standpoint of the value seeking BMC [basic moral characteristic] of *Philosophical Explanations*, it is clear that possessing libertarian rights is not necessarily required for an appropriate level of self shaping; and that individual self shaping is not necessarily the supreme end under all conditions' (113). But Nozick is pretty emphatic in *The Examined Life* that the libertarian side constraint is still in place in his moral thinking, but now it is related by a principle of 'minimum mutilation' to moral

considerations which may outweigh libertarian rights. He defines an 'ethic of respect' which 'mandates respecting another adult person's life and autonomy (as well as a younger person's potential adulthood)', and he notes that 'the ethic of respect — one version of it — is presented in my book *Anarchy, State and Utopia*' (212). But now Nozick thinks that ethics is not captured solely in terms of libertarian values, but rather 'is built in four layers', including a layer of responsiveness to other people's reality and value: 'The layers are related by a principle of minimum mutilation: Follow the principles of respect, and when it is necessary to deviate from them in order to achieve responsiveness, do this in a way that involves the minimum violation or perturbation of the norms of respect' (212).

There is a divide between *ASU* and Nozick's subsequent work, as though he was reacting to the excesses and blind spots of the first book. Already in *Philosophical Explanations* he is developing a theory of personal identity, a theory of value, and a theory of philosophy itself which lead away from many important aspects of *ASU*. Knitting this post-*ASU* work together and assessing it is an important task, regrettably not done in the book under review. In my view Hailwood should have left the discussion of *ASU* in his thesis, and developed the third part of the book only after assimilating *The Examined Life* and *The Nature of Rationality*, not to mention large areas of *Philosophical Explanations* that he overlooks.

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**Nancy A. Harrowitz and**

**Barbara Hyams, eds.**

*Jews and Gender: Responses to Otto Weininger.*

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1995.

Pp. x + 341.

US\$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 1-56639-248-9);

US\$27.95 (paper: ISBN 1-56639-249-7).

In 1869-70 Jews in Mannheim, Berlin and Vienna attended performances of Richard Wagner's new *Mastersingers* to hiss what they took to be his vicious caricature of them in the character of Beckmesser. Beckmesser had been conceived as a parody of the critic, Eduard Hanslick, too formalist and traditional to understand real artistic creativity (represented in the opera by Walther von Stolzing, an amateur who wins the Singers' Guild song contest). Wagner ultimately modified the part to include stumbling gait, unrhythmic speech, melody resembling the chant of a synagogue cantor, and vocal lines



which obliged a bass to sing well above his range in a 'screeching' tone. This final parodic feature, related as it is to the unconscious association of circumcision with castration, and thus to the inadequate femaleness attributed to the Jewish male, makes a leaping psychological association between Jews and gender. (On these matters see Barry Millington, 'Nuremberg Trial: Is there anti-semitism in *Die Meistersinger*?', *Cambridge Opera Journal* 3:3 (1991) 247-60.)

This social context partly explains why Otto Weininger was instantly fashionable when he published *Sex and Character* in Vienna in 1903. He presented a chemical, biological, political, psychological, philosophical account of the fundamental archetypes: Woman (W) and Man (M); he argued that each human is a mixture of the types M and W (thus arousing the ire of Fliess and Freud, who claimed to have discovered human bisexuality first); and he insisted that to be dominated by W-nature was to succumb to 'passivity ... to the flesh ... to sleep of the spirit ... to procreation' (23), while to fulfill an M-destiny required prodigious effort, creativity, genius. At the end of the book he identifies Jewish nature with W-nature (all the while protesting that he wrote of ideal archetypes, not of particular individuals who would instantiate these archetypes only partially). But it is this, to us profoundly shocking, association of anti-semitism and anti-feminism which is the subject of the present collection of essays.

Part I, besides the editors' introduction, contains two essays of general assessment: Jacques Le Rider writes a post-script to his 1982 book, raising new questions about Weininger's implicit anti-masculinism, and his idea that 'those who hate Jewishness the most are those who are most suffused by it' (30). Hannelore Rodlauer has discovered unpublished Weininger manuscripts, and informatively explores Weininger's education, high-lighting the steady influence of Houston Stewart Chamberlain (the anti-semitic Wagnerian), and Weininger's deep but shifting debt to Kant.

Half of the book (Part III) is devoted to readings of novelists and poets. A good deal of what is exposed, however, amounts only to *parallels* with Weininger's views. It is sometimes doubted whether the authors actually read Weininger (see such disclaimers on pp. 187 [Jeffrey Mehlman writing on Apollinaire], 198 [Gerald Stieg on Kafka], 208 [Marilyn Reizbaum on Joyce], 239 [Alberto Cavaglion on Svevo]). Elfriede Pöder, writing on Joyce's Molly Bloom, argues that textual evidence of Weininger's influence is not crucial: 'intertextuality' will suffice. She quotes Barthes: 'to search for the "sources of" and "influence upon" a work is to satisfy the myth of filiation' (298). The evidence that great authors of our century shared Weininger's prejudices is, nonetheless, striking. In Pöder's case, she shows how Molly corresponds 'rather consistently to the combined characteristics that Weininger defined as feminine' (227).

Part II contains seven essays on the intellectual context of Weininger's work. The editors, themselves, contribute papers on Nazi ideology, and on the influential criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, who extended his analysis of the criminal character to include the character of women. Sander L. Gilman

writes about the controversy with Freud, while John M. Hoberman focuses on the critique of Jewish masculinity (or the Jewish male's reputed lack of it). The central paper for philosophers is Allan Janik's 'How did Weininger influence Wittgenstein?' which extends his previous exploration of the significance of Weininger for the early Wittgenstein (*Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger*, 1985). In looking for influences we are not looking for specific themes which the later Wittgenstein adopted from Weininger, for there are none. In Janik's illuminating metaphor: 'To understand Haydn's influence upon Mozart's string quartets is to learn how exposure to Haydn's work affected Mozart's understanding of just what sort of problems the string quartet actually presented' (62). In this spirit, Janik re-reads *Sex and Character* as both an empirical and a conceptual investigation of idealized concepts through which we gain a false understanding of ourselves. Viewing oneself as Male, for instance, requires having certain expectations of oneself, and making certain demands on others as Female which come to have the character of transferring one's own actual lack onto the other in a misunderstood search for fulfilment. Weininger opposed feminism which he took to consist of women rejecting one stereotype by attempting to conform to the other. The Abstract Type 'Conformist' (Weininger's 'Jew') is also not the solution to the problem. However rewarding Janik's reading of Weininger may be, the deep point is that our own concepts impose (self-)deception upon us.

Janik then sketches Wittgenstein's *very different* concerns. Philosophical problems are not solved by theories (where there is theory there is only science), but they are deep disquietudes rooted in our very language itself. Language can only be understood as 'interwoven with action' ... Wittgenstein's uniqueness and standing in modern philosophy attach to his dual emphasis upon the facts that the human form of life is constituted by language and that there are quasi-transcendental reasons why we are continually tempted to overlook or misinterpret ourselves when we theorize about language ...' (63-5). Thus we can see Wittgenstein's 'work of clarification', the most radical critique of language and philosophy in our century, as a Weiningerian struggle against self-deceit imposed through our own concepts.

Despite his extraordinary influence in the first half of the 20th century, Weininger's work is not as accessible in English as it might be. The 1906 translation of *Sex and Character* was called 'beastly' by Wittgenstein (279, n25). There is no translation of the posthumous *Diary and Letters to a Friend*, nor of the collection of essays, *Über die letzten Dinge (Of the Ultimate Things)*, although the Harrowitz/Hyams bibliography does overlook a translation of one of those essays, 'Metaphysics', which appeared in the *Journal of Philosophical Research* in 1990. *Jews and Gender* gives a broad overview of the work being done in Europe and North America on this cultural phenomenon, and invites further research and reflection.

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**Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosencrantz**  
*Substance — Its Nature and Existence.*  
New York: Routledge 1997. Pp. xi + 218.  
US\$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-11250-8);  
US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-14032-3).

In a brief introduction Hoffman & Rosencrantz explicate the folk-ontological concept of substance, that of physical entities existing separately from our minds and perceptions, entities different from events, properties, tropes, etc. For H&R any satisfactory definition of substance should respect these basic intuitions. (They also allow the possibility of non-physical substance, allegedly conceivable despite its apparent incoherence as a concept, and use this supposed possibility as a benchmark for testing theories of substance later.)

The first chapter briefly surveys the concept of substance in history. H&R distinguish two different threads in Aristotle — substance as that which undergoes change versus that which is neither said of nor in a subject — and the weaknesses of both are clearly laid out. Next the idea of substance as a substratum, an unknowable supporting the perceivable properties of objects, is traced out of references in Descartes and Locke. The independence theory, substance as that which exists without the aid of anything else, is pursued from scholasticism through Descartes to the monism of Spinoza. Finally the cluster theory — arising in response to perceived inadequacies in the substratum theory — is outlined; here physical substance is either eliminated altogether (Berkeley) or identified with a collection of qualities and impressions (Hume). Throughout the chapter the emphasis is on clear exposition of theories of substance, where necessary clarifying vaguenesses and errors in these philosophers; no attempt is made to solve historical problems, such as whether Locke *really* believed in a substratum theory, let alone that imputed to him by Berkeley.

In Chapter 2 H&R select as their best candidate the independence theory — S is a substance if it has a certain type of ontological independence from other entities — and try to make this definition clear and satisfactory. They divide entities into abstract and concrete, and then the concrete further into substance, time, place, privation, etc. (With the unfortunate consequence that a non-physical substance would be a concrete entity!) Substance is defined as an ontological category at a middle-level of generality — level C category — and S is first defined as a substance if it is an instance of a level C category such that that category could have a *single* instance throughout an interval of time. Of all level C categories substance ‘is *unique* in possessing the potential to have an instance which is independent-within-its-kind’ (50), a definition compatible with both Spinozan monism and a plurality of substances. Properties cannot satisfy this definition, argue H&R, because there could not be just one property — a property’s instantiation entails co-properties and higher-order properties. The same is shown for tropes, places, times and limits, and temporally extended events, as H&R carefully extend and fortify their definition to meet these challenges. Further refine-

ment of the independence condition is then supplied to exclude privations and collections.

In chapter 3 H&R distinguish between mereological compounds, physical solids, and living things such as human beings. A further distinction is made with the folk-ontological use of 'substance' to refer to quantities of matter or stuff. H&R argue that the stuff-use is ontologically posterior to the count-use of physical solids. They support the common-sense intuition that the parts of a mereological compound must have principles of unity or organization which the compound itself need not have. The unity of mereological compounds is here scientifically based upon the fundamental forces of physics, and in terms of a dynamic equilibrium among parts.

Chapter 4, the longest chapter, deals with the unity of organisms. An attempt is made to distinguish organic life from non-organic existence and from parts of organic entities. Aristotelian functional considerations help to support the ontological dependence of organs upon organisms, but H&R update this analysis, replacing teleology with evolutionary processes. Organic life is defined in terms of an 'ability to engage in the causally interrelated activities of absorption, excretion, metabolism, or growth' (105) sufficient to distinguish organisms from plausible candidates like viruses. H&R then define an organism's life-processes as natural in terms of conformity to its hereditary blue-print, enabling them to distinguish vital parts (heart, liver) from non-vital (hair, appendix) and non-natural (transplanted hearts, artificial legs). The unity of an organism is cashed out in terms of a central control or regulation of its life-processes, enabling H&R to define the non-basic biotic parts of an organism as functionally subordinate to the whole in terms of this regulatory relationship. Problem-cases — cancers, parasites, Siamese twins — are considered but do not threaten H&R's definition.

The final chapter looks at kinds of physical substance, distinguishing between atomic objects, compounds which have their parts essentially, and non-living compounds capable of undergoing mereological change. The possibility of Democritean atoms is defended against Leibniz, and the existence of compound objects is supported by our scientific and everyday intuitions. Mereological essentialism is undermined by the problem of increase, and H&R use the classic example of the ship of Theseus to attack the idea that artifacts are genuine substances. Wiggins' natural-kind analysis is subjected to criticism, and van Inwagen's belief that compound inanimate objects, lacking any principle of organization, ought not to exist in any well-ordered ontology is satisfactorily rebutted. There is a brief appendix comparing organisms with natural kinds.

Though listed as 'specifically written for students', H&R's book is a challenging read whose definitions are explicated with great rigour and exactness. Although listed as an introduction to the subject, there is much to inform and engage the professional philosopher also, even if some overlaps with their previous, more specialist, book on substance. A major strength is their willingness to ensure that their metaphysical conclusions are guided by and consistent with both our common-sense intuitions and the best



available fruits of science, particularly biology, thus avoiding some of the more perverse revisionist or eliminativist conclusions of contemporary metaphysicians. The chapter on the unity of organisms may be of particular interest to philosophers of personal identity confronted with thought-experiments of bizarre human changes — H&R offer the possibility of making more sense of things like brain-transplants. But the whole is generally an admirably clear attempt at explicating what has been, as the historical chapter shows, one of the more muddled concepts of classical metaphysics.

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**Alec Hyslop**

*Other Minds.*

Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995.

Pp. vii + 159.

US\$80.00. ISBN 0-7923-3245-8.

Almost every introductory philosophy of mind course devotes at least a little time to discussing and dismissing the traditional analogical argument for the existence of other minds, typically using it as a foil, or perhaps as a segue into an introduction to Wittgenstein's treatment of the mind. Unfortunately, this practice can lead both students and philosophers alike to reject the analogical argument out of hand, when in fact, the issue isn't nearly so straightforward.

Alec Hyslop's recent book, entitled *Other Minds*, offers a spirited and thorough defence of the argument from analogy. Hyslop begins by arguing that the problem of other minds is an epistemological problem stemming from the fact that (i) we have direct knowledge of (some) of our own mental states, and (ii) we don't have direct knowledge of (any of) the mental states of others (7). In the course of making this argument, Hyslop dismisses claims made by philosophers such as Nagel and McGinn to the effect that the real problem is a conceptual, not an epistemological one. According to Hyslop, because we can remember pains we had in the past, we can use such memories as a model for imagining others having pain. Hyslop also makes it quite clear that the problem of other minds is a problem faced by all ontological positions, or at least, all positions which don't rely on a transcendental argument. This is because all ontological solutions to the mind/body problem turn on an asymmetry between first- and third-person ascriptions;

either you are trying to prove that others have minds too (dualism, functionalism), or you are trying to show that others are also like you in not having 'anything extra' (eliminative materialism). Thus, Hyslop claims, in the end all roads lead to the argument from analogy.

While Hyslop considers and rejects various solutions to the problem, he clearly believes the argument from scientific inference to be the analogical argument's chief competitor. Hyslop defuses the inferential approach by fairly convincingly demonstrating that it implicitly relies upon a crucial appeal to one's own case (i.e., it is simply a variation of the argument from analogy). Hyslop then goes on to give a sustained and comprehensive defence of the analogical argument, devoting a great deal of energy to addressing two broad sorts of objections: (i) those which claim that it is logically impossible to check up on the conclusion of the argument, and (ii) those that focus on the fact that it is a generalization from only one case.

Hyslop's book provides a useful overview of the various purported solutions to the problem of other minds, but what makes it interesting is the positive thesis Hyslop develops. And while ultimately I don't think that Hyslop spends enough time considering transcendental solutions to the problem, he does offer an extensive and convincing defence of the analogical argument. While a little dry at times, this book should be useful for both the student of philosophy and any professional who needs to be reminded that perhaps the classic argument from analogy isn't just an antiquated curiosity.

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**G.W. Leibniz**

*New Essays on Human Understanding*. Trans. and ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. New York: Cambridge University Press 1996. Pp. cxix + 527.

US\$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-57211-8);

US\$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-57660-1).

The *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* constitutes a fountainhead on Leibniz's vast philosophic system. It is intended as a commentary in dialogic form on John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, even though it digresses freely when the opportunity arises. Nonetheless, it seems that Leibniz had a particular concern, i.e., the defence of 'the idea of a simple, immaterial and naturally immortal soul,' which may serve as 'the clue through the labyrinth' of the *Essays* (Nicholas Jolley, *Leibniz and Locke*:



*A Study of the New Essays on Human Understanding* [Clarendon Press 1984], 7ff.; also see, e.g., Robert M. Adams, *Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist* [Oxford University Press 1994], 364-75).

Although the editors of this translation of the *Essays* note a number of 'defects' in the work, they claim that it 'is coming to stand high in the regard of Leibniz scholars', quoting Jolley who 'calls it "a philosophical classic"' and Catherine Wilson (*Leibniz's Metaphysics: A Historical and Comparative Study* [Manchester University Press 1989]) according to whom the work 'is undoubtedly Leibniz's best composition' (xi). Remnant and Bennett forgo, however, to give a fully rounded reflection of Jolley's or Wilson's judgments on the *Essays*. Just preceding the material quoted by the editors Jolley notes that, besides being 'rambling,' 'as an objective commentary on Locke's ideas it is marred by polemical distortion' (9), while Wilson claims that it 'is full of misreadings, red herrings, irrelevancies, associations leading off into personal recollection or anecdote' (233).

Compared with their 1981 edition of the *Essays*, the editors' somewhat blind enthusiasm for Leibniz's way of doing philosophy over and against Locke's has been toned down slightly in the new introduction, though it can still clearly be detected. For example, as evidence of Leibniz's 'powerful, restless, superbly sharp intelligence' they point at 'the beautifully crisp handling on p. 384 of Locke's supposedly necessary truth that where there is no property there can be no injustice...' (xxx). Remnant and Bennett (also see their 1981 edition, xvi) seem to applaud Leibniz for his objections which consist in claiming that if 'everything was held in common, there could nevertheless be injustice,' because there can be injustice even if an individual does not have exclusive right to a thing, and that there is reason to believe that it is 'impossible that there should be no "property"'. It is to be noted, however, that Locke's claim is quite consistent with these observations. In fact, Locke develops precisely these points in his *Two Treatises of Government* where he notes that it is illicit to appropriate common land (if there is a 'compact' to keep it in common; II, 35), and that our concept of property in things is derivative of the notion that 'every Man has a *Property* in his own *Person*' (II, 26). Hence, it is quite impossible that there should be no property, given that there are persons in existence.

Essentially the book under review is a corrected reissue of Remnant and Bennett's 1981 translation of the *Nouveaux essais* with a substantially expanded Introduction (from 5 pages to 23 pages), a new Chronology of Leibniz's life, and a new, up-to-date section on Further Reading. While they omit the Acknowledgements from their first edition, they retain the lengthy, very useful Notes section (57 pages), the List of References (the 'Bibliography' of the first edition), the two indices and the List of Examples, Illustrations and Anecdotes.

As commentators on the 1981 edition (R. Mattern, *Philosophical Review* 93 [1984], 315-9; C.M. Sherover, *Review of Metaphysics* 37 [1983], 129-30) had written, this is a very readable translation, although it has been criticised for being somewhat free. Specific sorts of errors had been alleged in the

commentaries on the 1981 edition, some of which have been corrected in this version. For example, Mattern's suggestions that the French *contextures* should not be rendered as 'compounds' on p. 318, nor *l'interieur des choses* as 'inner natures' on pp. 69-70, nor *histoire* as 'description' on p. 426 all were heeded. As proposed by her, Remnant and Bennett also introduced a note on Newton in the Notes section to draw together the various texts that make veiled reference to him. Sherover's complaints, however, apparently were not noted. He claimed that 'the mode of translating key terms is often arbitrary, inconsistent, and even seems to confuse distinctions of usage which Leibniz was seemingly careful to make.' The term *aperception*, for example, is translated as 'aware' (rather than 'apperception'), the term *primitif* generally as 'primary', the word *preuve* sometimes as 'proof' and sometimes as 'evidence'. My own survey of the translation in the new edition discovered some further minor infelicities.

In the *New Essays*' sections corresponding to Locke's infamous *Essay* II. viii, for example, Locke's spokesperson Philathethes begins the conversation by asking *Que disons nous des idées des qualités privatives? Il me semble que les idées du repos, des ténèbres et du froid sont aussi positives que celles du mouvement, de la lumière et du chaud.* (129) Remnant and Bennett, however, introduce right into the translation the confusion between ideas and qualities, which has plagued the interpretation of Locke ever since Berkeley, by only making reference to 'qualities' in the first sentence and then proceeding to speak of 'ideas' in the second: 'What shall we say about privative *qualities*? It seems to me that the *ideas* of rest, darkness and cold are just as positive as those of motion, light and heat' (emphasis added).

The translation seems a bit muddled, moreover, in the section corresponding to *Essay* II. viii. 21. Here the discussion concerns Locke's claim that heat and cold (ideas of secondary qualities) are not really in things but only certain (secondary) qualities or powers because a fluid like water may appear warmer to one hand than to the other. Leibniz's spokesperson replies that *la chaleur n'est pas une qualité sensible ou puissance de se faire sentir tout à fait absolue...*, but the translation says 'warmth is not a sensible quality (i.e., a power of being sensorily detected) of an entirely absolute kind ...' (emphasis added; 132). It would seem rather that the English should say something like '... or power that causes sensation ...'

Further down Leibniz's spokesperson Theophilus continues with classical examples of variety in sensory perception reports arising from one and the same object such as from honey which, though '*doux absolument, paroisse amer ... à quelques malades ...*' (132). Remnant and Bennett translate the latter as 'to certain invalids [it] appears sour' instead of the straightforward 'to certain sick people ... it appears bitter.' Perhaps this sort of problem arises because they try not to be anachronistic in their English, but it does not promote an accurate apprehension of Leibniz's text.

Despite these difficulties with Remnant and Bennett's translation and general approach, I concur with Mattern in her conclusion on the 1981 edition that overall this is a superb translation, richly supported by the introduction



and other supplementary materials, which makes serious Leibniz scholarship feasible for the English language philosopher. Here, moreover, is a mine of contemporary commentaries on Locke's *Essay* from one of Europe's most capable thinkers, even if Leibniz was not always sympathetic (or fair) to the Father of Empiricism. Remnant and Bennett's translation makes an invaluable contribution to both Leibniz and Locke scholarship by providing an excellent entry into the important dialectic between these two giants in the history of European philosophy.

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**Don MacNiven**

*Creative Morality.*

New York: Routledge 1995.

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US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-00030-0).

It would seem that when MacNiven wrote this work he had two goals in mind. One was to introduce the beginner in philosophy to a number of moral problems and the other was to say something new.

MacNiven sets out to achieve the first goal by presenting the reader with a number of arresting examples. Some of the examples have been drawn directly from real life while others have been rescripted. Chapter III deals with academic honesty. Here the reader is presented with the case of the gifted grade 13 high school student who, owing to family pressures, finds it necessary to buy an essay from a commercial firm. Chapter V deals with a case based on the activities of the Squamish Five. Here, Bill who has already decided to plant a bomb at an armaments factory, has asked his friend John to send in a warning phone call in order to ensure that the plant is cleared before the bomb is detonated. Should John make the call? Chapter VI introduces us to a case concerned with euthanasia, Chapter VII to a life boat example and Chapter VIII deals with affirmative action and abortion.

In each case MacNiven's goal is to show that most of us think about these problems from one of two philosophical perspectives — the Utilitarian and the Kantian, and that in each case each perspective leads to a different conclusion. For example, in the buying the essay case, the Utilitarian would recommend that the boy buy the essay since this would maximize happiness,

while the Kantian would recommend that he does not since the required cheating would involve not treating people with respect.

MacNiven finds the fact that the Utilitarian and the Kantian stance lead to different conclusions unsatisfactory. And so he feels obliged to put something that he hopes will be new and creative in their place. MacNiven recommends that in each case we adopt what he calls an idealistic stance. This is derived from F.H. Bradley's theory of Self-Realization. Unfortunately the doctrine is presented in an obscure and unconvincing manner. At least, though, the reader comes away with the feeling that neither Mill nor Kant is on their own up to the job of solving these dilemmas.

As well as not presenting the doctrine of Self-Realization in a convincing manner, MacNiven does not, or so it seems to me, present either Utilitarianism or Kantianism in a convincing light. Although both are well described, the reader is not presented with any of the important reasons for accepting either. This is especially so with Kant. Here no mention is made of the Categorical Imperative. MacNiven presents 'respect for other people as ends' as the starting point, but gives no reason why we should respect other people as ends. As well as all this Utilitarianism is claimed to be subjective and relativistic. Both claims it seems to me are false. Both Bentham and Mill argued that we ought to act so as to create the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. Bentham even attempted to work out a calculus which would aid us in determining which act will provide a greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. What could be less subjective than that?

The topic of relativism comes up in Chapter IX where MacNiven deals with the question of whether businessmen should apply different moral standards when doing business abroad. For example, should they give bribes to politicians in order to get contracts in South Korea if that is the way that business is done there? The whole discussion however is vitiated by a failure to distinguish between ethical relativism and cultural relativism. Most everyone will agree that what is *believed* to be right or right or wrong varies from place to place but not so many agree that what *is* right and what *is* wrong varies from place to place. No doubt the Utilitarian, or at least the Rule Utilitarian, will accept that what is right in one society might not be right in another. For example, if there are many more women than men in society A and an equal number of men and women in society B then the Utilitarian principle may suggest that society A should be polygamous while society B should be monogamous. But it doesn't follow from this that the Utilitarian will be in favor of whatever social practices are accepted in a given society. For example female circumcision may be a common practice in Uganda but it doesn't follow from this that this practice will be recommended for Uganda by the Utilitarian. In fact it's very likely that he will recommend that steps be taken to eliminate it.

A question I always find myself asking myself concerning a book like this is would I be prepared to use it as a text for an introductory class in moral problems. In this case I think I would, largely because the cases considered



are so striking and the arguments used by the Utilitarian and the Kantian are so convincingly presented. The fact that there are so many philosophical gaps is not really a deterrent, since the need to fill them gives the instructor something to do.

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**Alex Michalos**

*A Pragmatic Approach to Business Ethics.*

Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 1995.

Pp. 262.

US\$36.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8039-7084-6);

US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8039-7085-4).

*A Pragmatic Approach to Business Ethics* is a unique and valuable contribution to business ethics. Alex Michalos, a political scientist at the University of Northern British Columbia, attempts to justify his moral theory, to establish that business people rationally and morally ought to support business ethics, and to apply his pragmatic moral reasoning to such issues as a progressive wealth tax, tobacco advertising, and NAFTA.

Michalos has extensive experience teaching ethics to business people. He easily draws them into thinking about the relation between morality and business activity. This viewpoint, more readily than others, conforms to the methodology of his pragmatic moral theory and his account of rationality. The consequentialist, weighing-measuring methodology of pragmatic moral reasoning appears indistinguishable from the cost-benefit analysis of economics. Explicating rationality so that '...an action is rational insofar as it produces benefits that are at least as great as its costs... [and] ...an action is irrational insofar as its costs outweigh its benefits' (15) establishes that *his* moral reasoning has the same starting point as business reasoning. These similarities may persuade some business people to engage in moral reasoning; however, Michalos minimizes the shortness of the jump from business to moral reasoning.

Michalos' pragmatic reasoning contains rich notions of good and bad consequences, beneficence, impartiality, equality and justice. His democratic, social and egalitarian ideals fit moral reasoning. However, they are not obviously part of business reasoning. Establishing that each constraint on action applies in both contexts reveals the jump from business to moral reasoning is large not small.

Michalos does not crudely reduce moral reasoning to the rationality employed by the self-interested 'economic man'. Nevertheless, his one-feature account of the difference between moral and business reasoning is partial, misrepresenting their incompatibility. Claiming a moral action is '...just a rational action in which the recipient population is regarded as everyone affected by the action' (18) will not do. These differences in *who* is to be counted, ignore potential differences in *how to count*. The cost and benefit composition, that is, what is to be counted and the value of particular costs and benefits, appears to differ significantly in moral and business reasoning. Arguably, the biggest obstacles to demonstrating that rationality requires business people to support business ethics emerge while examining these questions.

Michalos' pragmatic approach to morality is based upon an epistemology straddling objectivist and subjectivist approaches to moral truth. A pessimist about the possibility of proving first principles, he nonetheless believes that reasoning can make the choice of moral beliefs and actions reasonable. His arguments make it reasonable to believe his claims are true (2). Not forswearing truth, Michalos employs it less frequently than either preference for, or consensus about a belief. Hence, subjectivism, and attendant relativism, prevail. Because good reasons are not self-identifying in scientific or non-scientific reasoning, what counts as a good reason depends upon '...what a broader community collective agrees to count as such' (14). Consensus is the only alternative to self-evident truths. This epistemological story enables understanding of a problematic assumption underlying many arguments, namely, universal acceptance or high level of agreement indicates a belief's epistemological worth. But the story unwarrantedly ascribes more subjectivity than rationality to the process of arriving at agreement about good reasons. Michalos obscures the fact that consensus itself could rest upon reasoning. Focusing on consensus, on choosing rather than the basis for choosing, remains unjustified.

Michalos associates his argumentative technique with the philosophical methodology of the Middle Ages. Theses are defended by refuting plausible opposing arguments and Michalos examines many. Frequently, however, an opposing argument is presented unsatisfactorily or a refutation misses the scope or core of the opponent's argument. For example, in Chapter 3, Michalos defends the thesis that '...business people ought to be morally responsible agents not merely in their role as citizens of a moral community, but in their role as people engaged in competitive enterprise' (22). Fourteen opposing arguments are purportedly refuted. The *Reduced Economic Efficiency* (33) challenge to Michalos' thesis argues that business people cannot have moral responsibilities *qua* business persons from the assertion that a morally responsible business person cannot be maximally efficient economically. The refutation narrowly interprets the expression 'one who is not economically maximally efficient' to mean one who is wasteful. But, wastefulness is not the only, nor the most significant inefficiency challenge. Treating a part as the whole, Michalos moves to the next challenge, but the



reader is left asking for more. The *Inconsistency argument* (40) maintains, contra Michalos, that business activity and morally responsible actions are logically inconsistent, since, in the former the aim is to do better than others, whereas in the latter the aim is to try not to have some come out better than others. The refutation is based upon the fact that games unite these two purportedly inconsistent aims. 'Hence, because chess games are thoroughly competitive and morally unobjectionable, it is logically possible for something to be so' (41). The game analogy is flawed. Games do not combine the two aims claimed to be inconsistent. The rules of games may ensure all competitors an equal probability of winning, but this is not one with aiming 'both to make someone and no one come out better'. This combination of aims is no less absurd in the context of games than it was in the inconsistency argument.

Michalos introduces so many arguments that always expecting a comprehensive analysis might be unreasonable. Brevity of presentation and an off-handed manner of refutation would generate less concern if occasionally the reader was reminded that issues are not being thoroughly examined. Instead, tidily packaged arguments are permitted to misrepresent the complex chain of argumentation characteristic of moral reasoning. Lacking detailed examination of arguments, the pragmatic approach looks more like psychological persuasion than providing warrant for belief.

Michalos' book can contribute significantly to explaining why business ethics should not be ignored by business people. Its philosophical value is best explained by Kai Nielsen's insight into the way philosophy ought to be done. Nielsen claims critical reflection on ethical questions requires placing moral convictions, moral principles and our best factual knowledge into a context containing the most warranted theories in psychology and the social and physical sciences ('The Transformation of Philosophy', *Metaphilosophy*, July/October 1989). Michalos brings to moral reasoning epistemological and moral frameworks, the theoretical backdrop and factual knowledge of an engaged social scientist, and a political party candidate's first hand knowledge about political processes. Unintentionally, he demonstrates that applied philosophy must have this interdisciplinary framework.

Combine Michalos' interdisciplinary perspective, experience in teaching business people, his enthusiasm for what he is about — the result is a valuable resource for business ethics courses. I highly recommend it for undergraduate or graduate courses, whether under the auspices of philosophy departments or business programs. Instructor and student will benefit from its presentation of theoretical questions and issues. Eight chapters, including the issue chapters, have been published previously. Containing the central tenets of the pragmatic approach, any issue chapter could be used in contemporary issues courses to examine the nature of applied philosophy and issues not covered in standard anthologies.

**Sandra Tomsons**

Sir Wilfred Grenfell College (Memorial University)

**Jerry Z. Muller, ed.**

*Conservatism — An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David Hume to the Present.*

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

1997. Pp. 450.

US\$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-03712-4);

US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-03711-6).

Muller here collects a variety of writers under the banner of Conservatism, beginning with some from the eighteenth century — Hume, Burke and Justus Möser, Louis de Bonald, Joseph de Maistre, and James Madison (like Hume, widely considered a liberal); from the nineteenth there is C. Rufus Choate, Matthew Arnold, James Fitzjames Stephen, and W.H. Mallock; and in the twentieth, Joseph Schumpeter, William Graham Sumner, T.E. Hulme, Carl Schmitt, Winston Churchill, Michael Oakeshott, Friedrich Hayek, Edward Banfield, Irving Kristol, Peter Berger and John Neuhaus, Hermann Lübbe, Arnold Gehlen, and Philip Rieff (1966). Many of these names are probably unfamiliar to most readers, as they were to me, and will surely strike everyone as a mixed bag. The variety of meanings attached to that expression is recognized by the editor, who notes that ‘Conservatives have ... defended royal power, constitutional monarchy, representative democracy, and presidential dictatorship; high tariffs and free trade; centralism and federalism; a society of inherited estates, a capitalist, market society, and one or another version of the welfare state’ (3). And as he says, de Maistre opens a chapter on ‘the best species of government’, with ‘a statement that could have been penned by Jeremy Bentham ... “The best government ... is that which ... is capable of producing the great possible sum of happiness and strength, for the greatest possible number of men, during the longest possible time.”’ (6).

Despite this impressive testimony to the doubtful meaningfulness of the term, Muller nevertheless thinks that there are some common themes to conservative political writing, especially a concern with conserving institutions — but conserving what is valuable: ‘... ideological conservatism arises from the anxiety that valuable institutions are endangered by contemporary developments or by proposed reforms’ (3). But who would not want to preserve valuable institutions? The question must be, what makes them valuable; and none of these thinkers, or any sane person, thinks that an institution is valuable just because it exists: is human sacrifice recommended for the Mayans simply because they did actually practice it? Still, Muller proposes that Conservatism ‘affirms institutions as such,’ rather than specific institutions (12). Why are they thought to embody value? The conservative’s answer is that they were, after all, formed over the years, and people must have thought them useful. But that doesn’t explain the bad ones.

Perhaps the case is this: if it doesn’t matter very much which particular institution we have, then we should tend to prefer the ones we already have. And that seems plausible — the costs of transition are, after all, likely to be



considerable, and if the new are neither better nor worse than the old, why not just avoid those costs and stick with the old? But is there anything interestingly 'conservative' about that argument? One would have hoped that it's just common sense to choose the least costly method of doing anything. Perhaps we should identify conservatism with the tendency to emphasize the costs of change. But this can at most be a difference of degree. In any case, to speak of costs is to raise the question of what 'costs' are to be understood to consist of, and how to measure them. I think reflection on this would lead to a more useful view of conservatism, but in a short review, that is another matter.

Despite Muller's good efforts — and his introductions, especially to the obscurer writers, are most useful — the notion of conservatism in their writings emerges without much real structure. We have disparate arguments; no 'conservative' agrees with them all; nor do all agree even on any one of them. Moreover, it is hard to see that there is a real matter of principle at stake in most. This is the more obvious when we consider that, in Muller's (plausible) view, conservatism is not a rigid adherence to established institutions, but only the giving them of a benefit of doubt, so that if we wish to alter one, we need to give real argument, in terms of human happiness, for change, whereas we need none for leaving things as they are. But anyone should affirm that: disruption is a cost.

Conservatism is often thought of as identified with the defense of property. There is an intriguing excerpt from *Aristocracy and Evolution* by W.H. Mallock, a self-designated conservative and supporter of a 'Liberty and Property Defence League', defending the utility of property. It is fascinating that the archetypically liberal thesis that people have a right to liberty, which liberty extends to actions in the 'economic' sphere, should be identified with Conservatism. The inclusion of Sumner, Schumpeter, Hayek, and Lübbe, all of whom defend market institutions against governmental authority to intervene, is significant here. To let people do as they want rather than imposing requirements for the supposed good of 'society' or in the interests of supposed ideals of 'equality' and the like are paradigmatically liberal. Something has gone very wrong when they are classified in the opposite column. But this short notice does not allow for the development of a clearer and more useful notion.

Muller has certainly brought together an interesting set of readings, which provide food for thought regardless of labels. He also provides useful introductions and good thumbnail biographical sketches. The distinction of conservative and liberal can be traced much farther back than Hume — who also can be seriously argued to be a 'liberal' despite his political toryism; and it seems a bit surprising that neither Hegel nor some of his nineteenth-century German (or English) followers are included (only twentieth-century German writers are found here). But it is already a thick volume, and we can only be grateful for the presence between one set of covers of so much out-of-the-way but interesting material.

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**Norton Nelkin**

*Consciousness and the Origins of Thought.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. xv + 341.

US\$59.95. ISBN 0-521-56409-3.

Norton Nelkin's posthumously published *Consciousness and the origins of thought* defends a rationalist and internalist theory of mind. It's *rationalist* in that it emphasizes the cognitive/propositional over the phenomenal, and the active over the receptive: specifically, Nelkin works hard to downplay the passive experience of phenomenal states, not only as *the* epistemological foundation for human knowledge, but even as being central to sense perception or (more startlingly) pain. It's *internalist* because, for Nelkin, there being an external world is not conceptually necessary for the existence of mental content: that is, his semantics is solipsistic in principle, even though he eschews scepticism in practice. Additionally, he insists that our first epistemic access is to the contents of our own minds. Here too, then, the view is internalist. Nelkin gives his avowedly Descartes-inspired picture a non-Cartesian twist, however: his is a *materialistic* rationalism, which freely employs clinical cases, and other empirical research. The overall result — combining Cartesian rationalism/internalism with contemporary scientific methodology and materialism — is what Nelkin calls *Scientific Cartesianism*.

To get the general feel of the book, consider two examples of Nelkin's severe anti-phenomenalism. Example one: he argues that a sense datum is *visual* not because of its 'raw feel', but because the resulting perceptual judgment derives from stimulations of the eye. He writes: 'The senses are best defined by processes that end with judgment-types and begin with organ stimulations...' (30). That is why, to mention just one of his many arguments, non-humans might be able to *see*, without having even quasi-human visual phenomenology. Therefore, concludes Nelkin, judgment isn't (*pace* Empiricism) just a 'sequel' to perception; instead, judgment (rather than qualia) is the very heart of perception. Second anti-phenomenalist example. Nelkin contends that even the nature of *pain* has little to do with the associated pain-feeling: pain, says Nelkin, is not the same as pain-phenomena (62). Here is but one reason. While pain may form a natural kind, pain-phenomena likely do not: paying attention only to their associated sensations, it's far from clear that, e.g., headaches and pin-pricks belong together, in a single kind, while nausea falls outside this kind. Conclusion: what headaches and pin-pricks share, *qua* pains, is something functional/cognitive, not something phenomenal. Nelkin doesn't deny that visual or pain phenomena exist, of course. Indeed, they are among the causes of perceptual and pain judgments. But, to adopt Wittgenstein's metaphor, they are but a beetle-in-a-box, incapable of *constituting* the agent's mental state.

Why does any of this matter? Though Nelkin doesn't dwell on it, his work dovetails nicely with attempts to capture everything *essential* about the



mental in terms of cognitive, intentional, propositional states. Passive experience of phenomena does exist, but it is not the essence of mentality: not even of consciousness, sensation, *et al.* The book therefore nicely complements work by, for example, Daniel Dennett and Michael Tye. (Indeed, I expect that one's taste for Dennett's *Consciousness Explained* would well predict one's reaction to Nelkin's book. If you loved *CE*, you'll love this. On the other hand, if you hated *CE*...)

Nelkin provides a wealth of arguments — many of them wholly unfamiliar, at least to me — for his surprising conclusions. So, on the positive side, readers will learn a great deal from the book, of substantial interest. Moreover, when Nelkin's conclusions are tentative, and his arguments speculative, he openly admits this. But these are not unequivocal virtues. To begin with, the discussions are frequently overly conjectural. Moreover, Nelkin often 'lays it on too thick', introducing so many cases, thought experiments, and other evidence that the flow of argument is obscured. This isn't unrelated to the book's origins: because it grew out of a series of earlier publications, the text exhibits an inevitable disjointedness, and a quirky choice of emphasis.

I have other concerns as well. First, there are two very surprising omissions in Nelkin's discussion of Scientific Cartesianism. Omission number one: in defending internalism, the only view he rebuts is Dennettian instrumentalism! He mentions Burge-Putnam cases exactly once, dismissing them as 'mere intuition pumps' (250). Omission number two: though he defends internalism, individualism, nativism, mental realism, and scientific naturalism about the mind, Nelkin never once mentions Chomsky, his most obvious ally. My second concern is that Nelkin's discussion of opposing views is sometimes quite eccentric. To take one example, in Chapter 8 Nelkin says that 'according to Instrumentalists, no propositional-attitude states actually exist' (195). Things are actually more tricky, of course: instrumentalists often maintain that mental states are real enough (i.e., they're not like goblins and unicorns), although their 'reality' consists in nothing more than the predictive-explanatory power of certain theories. It's not that Nelkin gets instrumentalists wrong, exactly. It's just that the unwary may be misled by his idiosyncratic presentation. Finally, the book would have greatly benefitted from a more substantial methodological preamble, clarifying issues like: Why are merely imaginable cases relevant to Nelkin's purportedly proto-scientific project? (That he takes them to be relevant is clear. He writes, about commissurotomy, hemianopia and other patients: '... it is at least empirically and *theoretically* possible that these are cases of perception without phenomena, and *only the possibility is needed to make my point*' (57: my emphasis).) And what exactly is the subject matter here — certain states/events/processes; or certain 'concepts'; or the meaning/use of certain words? (For example, in Chapter 2 it was quite unclear whether anti-phenomenalist conclusions were being drawn about the colour red, the concept RED, or the meaning/use of the word 'red'. Serious treatment of meta-philosophical preliminaries might have cleared this up.)

One final, and quite striking, peculiarity. The book is divided into three parts, one of which is called 'consciousness'. Moreover, this word appears in the book's title. And yet the actual discussion of consciousness seems essentially otiose: it could be skipped without significant loss. Nor, to my mind, was 'the origin of thought' a central theme. Of course, there's a good chance I'm missing something. But to me 'Scientific Cartesianism' seems a much more apt designation for this volume.

In sum, the book addresses many novel questions in imaginative and striking ways. Unfortunately, it is somewhat fractured, overly speculative, and suffers from lamentable omissions and exegetical quirks. My overall assessment, then, is that one might better read the individual articles upon which the book is based. Whatever its weaknesses, however, the book makes clear that, with Nelkin's untimely death, the discipline lost a promising and gifted philosopher.

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**Patrick Riley**

*Leibniz's Universal Jurisprudence.*

*Justice as the Charity of the Wise.*

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

1996. Pp. xiii + 338.

US\$39.95. ISBN 0-674-52407-1.

Any book on Leibniz is a daunting endeavor, for Leibniz himself wrote so few. Only the *Theodicy* (1710) appeared during his lifetime, and it is a mess — the outcome of many years of conversation and reflection finally cobbled together between two covers. While not bad as philosophy, it leaves much to be desired as a book. The *New Essays*, essentially a commentary on Locke's *Essay*, borrowed its organizational principle from that work but was graciously withheld from publication upon Locke's death in 1704. The rest of Leibniz's still unfathomed opus consists mainly of drafts, sketches, outlines, 'essays', letters, and a seemingly infinite number of learned snippets, some quite elegant and finished, to be sure, but most penned on the run to yet another idea or project.

Leibniz's baroque mind took its monadic role seriously in trying to reflect everything. Yet the project failed, predictably, on account of both his essential and accidental limitations. Like the differently intentioned Andrew Marvell (1650), Leibniz had neither 'world enough' nor time. This was partly because



of the sheer extent and depth of his diverse inquiries, but also because of his inability to focus for long on only one or a few things. The problem is painfully evident in his history of the House of Hannover which he had originally been hired to write, and which had reached only the eleventh century when Georg Ludwig went to England as George I (1714) and conveniently left the aged Leibniz behind to finish the work.

Leibniz's moral and political thought is a particularly difficult challenge, since it was developed through so many short summaries and sketches and, as Riley shows, is linked virtually to every other idea Leibniz's synthetic mind ever entertained, mathematics and physics included. Though the general topic has received notable treatments in other languages, particularly French (Grua, Sève, Robinet), there is nothing of this scale and thoroughness in English. Riley's book, the product of nearly a lifetime, is a work of tremendous erudition that demonstrates convincingly the primacy of the practical in Leibniz's overall endeavor. It is a well crafted piece, and Riley is in total command of his sources. Indeed, he provides many new, in-text translations of materials not heretofore available. Moreover, there are well integrated discussions of Leibniz's efforts at theodicy and confessional unification (the same thing, since disorder is a form of evil), and perceptive comparative analyses of Bossuet, Fénelon, and Malebranche, for instance.

Yet Leibniz's tendencies toward diffusion and repetition, and his frequent 'summarizing', are sometimes at cross-purposes with his expositor's aims of clarity and completeness. Thus, portions of the book are muddled by excessive quotation, and the ever detailed discussion of multiple (only slightly varying) texts from different periods of Leibniz's career occasionally creates redundancies. This result is partly owing to Riley's evident enthusiasm for his author, and to his concern to show that Leibniz can parry or elude particular critical challenges. There is always another text ... Lest this be misunderstood, Riley is scrupulously fair in his treatment of difficulties in Leibniz's position, but perhaps he follows him into too many windings in the attempt to elude them. After a while, one almost knows what Leibniz will (must) say. The average reader may sometimes feel as in a labyrinth, albeit a slightly familiar one.

Part of this problem might have been alleviated with a more explicit Contents page reflecting the numerous subdivisions of each chapter and their place in the entire scheme. Perhaps it was the cost-conscious publisher who skimmed here. A similar but more serious complaint concerns the puzzling absence of a Bibliography. Given Riley's extensive textual analyses and the inclusion of much new material not available to readers, as well as the book's status as the most extensive treatment of its theme in English, there is simply no scholarly excuse for the omission. Furthermore, the notes might have been placed at the bottom of each page, allowing other scholars an easier look behind the scenes during Riley's intricate performance. As it is, one must rummage through some fifty pages of endnotes for precise references and comments.

Leibniz's pivotal notion of justice as the 'charity of the wise,' which Riley discovers in all aspects of his thought, is a synthesis of Platonic essentialism (idealism) and Pauline *caritas*, and explicitly opposed to the moral and legal positivism of Hobbes. H-P. Schneider argued some years ago that Leibniz belonged to a 'Christian' natural law tradition which saw itself in continuity with the Middle Ages, rather than to the 'modern' natural law tradition of Hobbes, Locke, and Pufendorf. (Grotius is claimed by both.) Riley accepts and emphasizes this contrast, declining offers (e.g., Ursula Goldenbaum's) to link Leibniz more closely with Hobbes and Spinoza. Yet Leibniz's case against the demonized Hobbes is unconvincing. Indeed, it frequently seems programmatic, with Hobbes essentialized into a merely paradigmatic opposition. The same weakness is evident in Leibniz's (and Riley's) treatment of Pufendorf, who is cast as another (Hobbesian) voluntarist, with no acknowledgment of his own extensive and carefully qualified criticisms of Hobbes. Riley regards Leibniz's 'Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf' (1706) as the 'magisterial' capstone of his lifelong Hobbes criticism (212). Yet it may also be seen — more accurately — as an inadequate (focusing only on Pufendorf's short pedagogical compendium *De officio*) and refuted (by Barbeyrac) dismissal of a thinker whose worldly successes Leibniz envied and on whom he heaped much (private) abuse.

This is no minor point. Given the centrality of Pufendorf in the voluntarist tradition that led through Pietism and Crusius to Kant, his general importance to the eighteenth century, and his rejection of the Protestant Aristotelianism toward which Leibniz's was sympathetic, a closer comparison of the two thinkers might have shed considerable light on the struggle among the three basic moral options (voluntarism, intellectualism/realism, and moral sensism) of the pre-Kantian period. At the least, the book would have had the devil's advocate it sometimes lacks.

**Michael J. Seidler**

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**Horacio Spector**

*Autonomy and Rights:*

*The Moral Foundations of Liberalism.*

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford

University Press 1994. Pp. 196.

Cdn\$105.00: US\$60.00. ISBN 0-19-823921-1.

The classical conception of liberalism is the view that 'people have fundamental moral rights the respect for which and protection of which are the necessary condition of the moral legitimacy of government and the decisions it adopts' (1). This account commonly focuses on negative individual rights that require government or individuals to refrain from certain actions, but on Spector's view is more plausibly interpreted to allow the possibility of lower level positive moral rights as well.

Spector's aim is to defend a theory concerning the moral foundations of classical liberalism, and his focus is a thesis common to all libertarian political doctrines. This '*basic libertarian thesis*' both 'affirms that individuals have moral rights involving ... the moral impermissibility of interfering with their choices and actions' (7), and maintains that the negative rights that it asserts exist, prevail over other possible competing moral rights or reasons. Spector rejects justifications based on utilitarianism, contractarianism, and natural rights. He develops a new liberal justification of the libertarian thesis based on the recognition of a distinctively liberal value, personal autonomy, and the obligation to protect positive freedom.

After describing Isaiah Berlin's distinction between positive and negative freedom, Spector develops a convincing version of what he calls 'negative liberalism,' encompassing those theories that recognize negative freedom as a fundamental social value. Negative liberalism 'holds that the social and political order must be built on the ideal of maximum negative liberty and rejects ... any attempt to have this role occupied by any form of positive freedom' (9). In response to discussion and criticism by Joel Feinberg, Charles Taylor and others, Spector's version of negative liberalism allows that negative freedom can be curtailed by acts but not omissions, by physical compulsion as well as threats, and whether or not the behavior is desired by the victim. It allows, moreover, that negative freedom can be measured by act tokens as described by Donald Davidson.

Negative liberalism defends libertarianism by focusing on negative freedom as paramount among the possible liberal values, and views observance of pre-eminent negative rights as the natural means for maximization of negative freedom. Despite its plausibility, Spector argues that negative liberalism suffers from two forms of inherent instability. First, it is conceptually unstable because it relies on separating positive and negative freedom entirely, which Gerald MacCallum has persuasively argued is impossible. Second, it cannot justify why negative freedom is valuable but positive freedom is not equally valuable; and, recognizing the value of the latter, it cannot justify maximizing negative freedom but not positive freedom. These

difficulties, Spector concludes, render negative liberalism unsatisfactory for defending the basic libertarian thesis.

Spector provides an alternative liberal defense of the libertarian thesis using an approach that 'admits whole-heartedly that positive freedom is an intrinsic value but rejects the maximizing conception of practical rationality in favour ... of a non-consequentialist conception' (64-5). Spector begins by distinguishing deontological and consequentialist theories, clarifying at least three ways that his approach is deontological. First, it allows moral considerations based not on the effects of human conduct but on the nature of the agent's intervention. Second, it does not entail value-monism or the commensurability of intrinsic values. Third, it holds that reasons against certain actions are only valid for the agents of those actions.

Spector also reviews analyses of rights as justified claims and the correlativity of rights and duties developed by Wesley Hohfeld, Joel Feinberg, Ronald Dworkin and others. Relying on their accounts, Spector defends rights as characteristically sufficient reasons for overriding other sorts of moral reasons, and endorses the assumption that moral rights may be viewed as logically derived from moral duties of special importance. In particular, the negative moral rights at the core of libertarianism are derived from duties not to damage positive freedom. According to Spector, 'it is clear that in upholding the pre-eminence of negative moral rights one is committed to the thesis that the duty not to actively attack positive freedom prevails over the duty to prevent any injury to positive freedom' (101). He defends this latter thesis through a lengthy discussion of acts and omissions, including related analyses by Philippa Foot, Judith Thomson, H.L.A. Hart and others. His argument is designed to justify the pre-eminent moral importance of duties to respect others' positive freedom.

Spector indicates and endorses the sense in which positive freedom may be viewed as vested with intrinsic value. Despite the intrinsic value of positive freedom, however, it does not follow that it should be maximized. In contrast, Spector argues that the concept of positive freedom is central to the idea of self-reflective evaluation. Individuals are separate 'as moral agents and ... as possible beneficiaries or victims of the behaviour of others' (178). This separateness is reflected in the distinct worth of each person's positive freedom, and helps explain why each person's positive freedom is agent-relative. Spector's claim is that positive freedom is inextricably bound to personal autonomy. More specifically, duties to protect positive freedom, those duties correlated with negative libertarian rights, 'are based ultimately upon the value of personal autonomy' (90). They are justified by their preservation and enhancement of personal autonomy.

In sum, Spector argues that the overriding duty not to actively injure positive freedom finds its support in the value of personal autonomy. Thus it is reasonable to hold that each person has a pre-eminent moral right, correlated with the duty of others not to actively damage his positive freedom. This affirms the basic libertarian thesis.



Interwoven summaries of recent literature in moral and political theory may remind readers of the style of a dissertation, from which this book developed; yet Spector always utilizes these sources to respond to criticisms or to defend portions of his analysis. His early arguments on negative liberalism and his alternative deontological approach are more careful and forceful than the latter discursive portions on positive freedom and personal autonomy. Moreover, the title should have explicitly highlighted the focus on libertarianism prominent in work including Robert Nozick's. Nevertheless, *Autonomy and Rights* provides a well organized, thoughtful, and novel defense of an important thesis in political philosophy.

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**John Stewart, ed.**

*Beyond the Symbol Model: Reflections on the  
Representational Nature of Language.*

Albany: State University of New York Press  
1996. Pp. vi + 343.

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In this age of disposable diapers and computers, it just logically follows to some that fields of inquiry should be disposable as well. From John Stewart's perspective, semiotics as a whole is worth no more than, say, a 286 computer and should be supplanted by the brand new 'Constitutive Articulate Contact' model. He uses conversational analysis (a development of pragmatics branch of semiotics) as proof of his allegations against semiotics and utmost testing of CAC's superiority. The problem is that all he is able to find is not only obvious (that Judy and John find they are alike and different) but overlooks aspects that positively render his conclusion false, such as the cases where the conversation is ironical or where the main clues are given in the kinesic, rather than the verbal, register. Stewart's chapter is really a 50-page abstract of his approximately 300-page thesis in his previous 1995 book. His Heidegger-inspired criticism against dichotomies such as subject-object can be more fairly applied to Stewart's own semiotic/post-semiotic, representational/constitutive, sign/languageing, the symbol model/CAC and others.

Gary Madison faithfully echoes Stewart. In an equal glottocentric vein, he reduces being to speaking and conflates semiotics with analytic philosophy of language. Taking Ricœur's idea of narrativity, he feels entitled to declare the falsity of science and to solve the millenary problem of defining

freedom. For Madison, 'to be a human, a speaking, storytelling animal, is to be free' (90). Refugees from Zaire have appalling stories to tell, but they are far from being free.

Instead of the theoretical 'knowing-that' or the technical 'knowing-how', John Shotter urges us to consider the 'knowing-from-within' as a sensuous, embodied knowledge that occurs in the boundaries of our being where meaning is shaped and dialogically negotiated by social agents. One would expect that Peirce's concept of abduction would have been assessed here. Shotter proposes focusing more upon concrete everyday ways of talking (pragmatics do, in fact, explicitly address these cases) and urges us to make theory in a less elitist and monological style. Theoretical discourse, however, cannot be totally monological, since the academic community to which it is addressed is necessarily always already considered in the structure, style of language, representation of the state of the question, definition of problem, references, discussions and anticipation of objections that might be raised.

Gillian Roberts and Janet Beavin Bavelas center around speech act theory and propose correcting Austin's 'illocutionary force' to a more collaborative 'interlocutionary force' of shared responsibility in communication. It is hard to understand how, according to this view, an utterance such as 'I promise to pay tomorrow' can have a shared responsibility, since its illocutionary force belongs to the speaker alone. Roberts and Bavelas propose a dual perspective, insider and outsider, and contend that an outsider must observe at least three utterances to understand their meaning (141). Such a quantitative approach, however, is not particularly relevant in the example above, while the qualitative (intonation, kinesics and other cues) certainly is, for a sarcastic tone might turn meaning to its opposite.

The second section of the book, entitled 'Postmodern Rediscoveries', is initiated by Ernst Behler who writes a biography of Nietzsche and comments that rhetorical strategies prevail on the topic of language in N's writings. What remains unclear is what exactly does Nietzsche have to do with semiotics. The best defense for semiotics comes, unexpectedly, from what Stewart tried to harvest for his own post-semiotic aims, Andrew Smith's perspicuous contribution. He directly engages in confronting the Peircean and the Lyotardian views by a well-constructed imaginary dialogue. Rather than taking an antisemiotic position, Smith argues against the Augustinian conversion of meaning into Bakhtinian monologism. Smith is eloquent in reminding us the theoretical, political and ethical implications of Lyotard's concept of 'differend' and stresses the condition of the so called 'disabled' people against whom bodily and cultural differences are engulfed by dominant discourse. Smith allows us to view Lyotard as a Peircean who injects a political dimension into the concept of limitless semiosis. Smith's reminder of the differend is an important corrective against semiotics apolitical tendency in taking convention and consensus too much for granted (as Umberto Eco's solution of limitless semiosis by *sensus communis* against Derridean endless play of signifiers in Eco's recent *The Limits of Interpretation*).



The third section is connivingly entitled 'Resuscitations of Semiotic Dimensions'. From the perspective of systemic sociolinguistics, John Wilson handles conversational analysis, focusing on sensitivity of the speaker to the hearer's reaction, which is, although not made explicit, a concrete exemplification of Bakhtinian dialogical hybridization. What remains unfortunately lacking in Wilson's valuable contribution is his account on the representational, expected by the title 'Discourse Worlds and Representation'. All we are left with is an indirect allusion: 'language is our central clue to a speaker's world'. Wilson evades the term 'representation' and uses 'instantiation'. Why not explicitly say that language refers to the speaker's world, and partly expresses and represents it?

Somehow blurry is Clarke's attempt to defend what he calls 'Semiotic' as being 'vertical' (in opposition to 'horizontal semiotics' by which he seems to mean French semiology). Apart from renaming Peirce as Charles Saunders (sic), this defense of the semiotic really boils down to re-stating Austin's speech act theory and re-using three of the six Jakobsonian functions without ever giving any credit nor mention to Jakobson nor Buhler.

Wendy Leeds-Hurwitz rightly contends that non-verbal communication has to be taken into account and insists that communication, rather than language, should be the object of semiotics.

Instead of explicitly defending 'the symbol model', as would be expected from a well known researcher of pragmatics, Marcelo Dascal's original contribution opened a chapter for himself by analyzing the 'Beyond Enterprise' upon a corpus of more than 20 'beyond' texts. He proposes a taxonomy of 5 types of BEs: building upon, inner critique, confinement, desacralization and deconstruction. Dascal fruitfully applies Lakoff and Johnson's concept of metaphorical mappings, integrates discourse analysis and pragmatics as an eloquent, though implicit, case for semiotics' flexibility and interdisciplinarity.

Although Stewart's original intention in this book seems to have been, in Dascalian terms, a destructive desacralization enterprise, it was turned by the contributors into a 'building upon' modality. To Stewart's credit, however, this book's main assets are his careful introductions to each chapter, an appeal to reflect on the representational, the inclusion of diverging perspectives and, lastly and mostly, triggering the production of some significant and original texts.

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