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En général, C.R.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

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This book contains 27 papers delivered at the third Symposium of History of
Logic, which took place at the University of Navarra in Pamplona in 1993.
The papers cover work in logic in all three great periods: ancient, medieval,
and modern. There's something interesting for anyone interested in any one
of the three periods. I have selected seven papers for discussion in the hope
of encouraging readers to browse in the book on the alert for something which
will prove of particular interest to them.

In 'Aristotle's Theory of Predication' M. Mignucci suggests a part-whole
relation to interpret predication as we have it Aristotle's syllogisms. When
the term Animal is predicated of all dogs, it is tempting to treat the subject
as a class, thereby making sense of taking part of or the whole of the class.
A part-whole notion fits in here. But what of the predicate term Animal? Does
Aristotle think that the predicate expression *animal* both has sense, a
universal, and reference to the class of animals? Since Aristotle resists
quantification of the predicate term, it seems possible to take him to deny
reference to a class in favor of sense alone: the premise would then predicate
the universal of each member of the class of dogs. On this reading the premise
does not say that one class is a subclass of another class. Mignucci also denies
that the inclusion relation is the way to go. Mignucci's alternative suggestion
regarding the part-whole relation deserves close consideration.

In 'Aristotle's Regress Argument' Robin Smith suggests that '... the most
interesting thing about the *Posterior Analytics* and about Aristotle's logical
theory in general, is that he was able to think about proof in a way that none
of his successors could until the present century' (24). Smith suggests that
Aristotle's syllogistic was constructed *primarily* as a proof-theoretic devise;
proofs themselves become objects of formal study in order to see what
structure a demonstrative science could have. The question Aristotle sets out
to answer is how to solve the regress argument according to which no
demonstrative science can be grounded; for it would seem that every proof
requires a proof. How then can there be a foundation? Aristotle answers by
arguing that infinite chains are impossible; semantic conditions must be
imposed on any model for a deductive science — conditions which make
infinite premise regresses impossible. There cannot be an infinite sequence
of middle terms; for if there were always a middle of which an extreme term
is predicated and the middle of a subject, certain things true both of predi-
cation and of nature could not be so. These arguments, scattered through the
chapters Smith considers *Posterior Analytics* I 19-22, show in what ways a
deductive system must be anchored both in discourse and in nature.

In 'Alexander of Aphrodisias, Cicero, and Aristotle's Definition of Possibility' H. Weidemann discusses modal issues involved in questions of determinism. Weidemann follows classical suggestions through the Middle Ages to modern work by Peirce and Prior. A difficulty arises from within the Aristotelian tradition and can be put in this way: whatever event has been or is now will by now have had a cause relative to which the event is necessary. With respect to the future an event is contingent if things can go this way or that. Aristotle does not think that there is already a cause sufficient for the event. It is less clear whether he thinks that a description of the event is already true; if he does, he would certainly think that the description, though true, is not necessary relative to how things are now. Further, if Aristotle holds a causal theory of truth (according to which the cause of an event makes the statement that there is such an event true), then before there is a cause sufficient for the event, its description is yet not true; but from its not yet being true it does not follow that it is already false. For there is also no cause sufficient for ruling out the event. So with respect to future contingencies Aristotle implicitly restricts bivalence. Cicero proves to be an astute observer of the difficulties of avoiding fatalism, on the one hand, and throwing over bivalence on the other. Weidemann gives Cicero a sympathetic hearing. Weidemann himself seems to prefer a possible routes semantics, according to which possible routes run from past to future.

In 'Modes of Skepticism in Medieval Philosophy' Alan Perreiah argues that there is more to medieval skepticism than acknowledged: '... the same form of argumentation was crucial both to skeptics and to Boethius in raising doubt about the possibility of knowledge' (70). Perreiah concludes: '... several components of Pyrrhonian skepticism — namely, the standard doubtful topics, the aporetic form of argumentation, the suspension of judgment and the aim of serenity, were also essential elements of medieval thought' (74).

In 'Necessity and the Galilean Revolution' Adrian Dufour suggests that '... it is possible to interpret the history of at least one part of the scientific revolutions as a progressive discovery of the contingency of the world.' His point is that giving up the underlying substantial forms and replacing them by a law contingent in itself implicated introducing contingency in the course or development of natural phenomena. Dufour makes good use of William Wallace's work in tracing the uses of expressions which pick out the two forms of modality mentioned in discussing Smith's paper above: both hypothetical and relative necessity.

In 'The *Triplex Status Naturae* and its Justification' Allan Bäck offers, in effect, a transcendental deduction on behalf of deriving a consistent theme from some difficult arguments of Avicenna. '... The justification that I am going to present starts from common features of experience, and then seeks to argue that the threefold distinction of quiddity presents necessary preconditions or presuppositions of those features.'

What is a necessary condition of a common feature? Is it that in order to count something as a common feature, one of three things must obtain? Either the feature is a universal or a particular; and, if a particular, it must

be material or non-material and non-universal? We learn that the common features are claims: what must obtain in order for the claims to be consistent and true. For example: Socrates is a man; man is a species; whiteness is a color. What must obtain in order for such propositions to be true? How then is it to be shown that Avicenna's threefold distinction of quiddity is a necessary condition for their truth? An account of the truth of 'whiteness is a color' cannot refer to a spatial particular as the referent of 'whiteness'; for whiteness is not a spatial particular; whiteness is a universal — a quiddity in itself. But we say that Socrates is white; the word 'white' indicates a universal.

There are truths, and these truths cannot be accounted for without positing distinctions among three kinds of quiddities: universals as if separate; universals as combined and universals as abstracted and in the mind. The point of offering a transcendental deduction on Avicenna's behalf is to show that these distinctions are necessary for the truth and consistency of relevant claims. A critical question is whether the distinction is among respects of something, a quiddity or rather a distinction among three different kinds of things: material, spatial things, temporal, non-material things, and universals.

In 'The Doctrine of Descent in Jeronimo Pardo: Meaning, Inference, Truth' Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe discusses '… the complexity of the scholastic view of descent stems from the attempt to find a reply to three different questions at the same time: those pertaining to the meaning of propositions, the relationships of inference between propositions, and the truth conditions of propositions' (174). Pérez-Ilzarbe explores the work of J. Pardo concerning descent from a universally quantified proposition to individual cases: for example, from 'Everything running is an ass' to 'This running thing is an ass'. Pardo applies nominalist insights and faces a difficulty which arises when quantification is accounted for in terms of reference to particulars (particularly when there is *suppositio*, that is, a term standing for given existing individuals). Suppose that the proposition 'Everything running is an ass' is asserted at a time when only men are running. The term 'everything running' supposits for this man, that man, etc. By descent we infer that this running thing is an ass, and by explication infer that this running man is an ass. But the inference is not only false but impossible; since the original proposition is possible but the secondary proposition impossible, the descent must be faulty. For the term 'everything running' does not stipulate what its supposita are. The problems which Pardo faces and which Pérez-Ilzarbe explores seem to me insoluble within the nominalist framework: first, because of the question of reference and meaning and, second, because of intersubstitutivity on behalf of reference.

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Dispositional properties are those properties 'whose instantiation entails that the thing which has the property would change, or bring about some change, under certain conditions' (1). That an object has a certain dispositional property entails certain counterfactuals. For example, that a substance has solubility entails that it would dissolve if put in water.

Categorical properties, on the other hand, are intrinsic properties instantiated in the object — properties such as molecular structure. That, at least, is one traditional way the distinction has been made.

The three authors advocate different positions on the relationship between categorical and dispositional properties. Armstrong believes that dispositional properties of an object reduce to its categorical properties. While Place agrees with Armstrong that the ultimate truthmaker both for counterfactual claims and ascriptions of dispositions is the categorical properties of the object, Place does not believe that dispositions actually reduce to the categorical. The fragility of a glass, for Place, depends 'in a causal sense' (29) on the glass' microstructure; the categorical properties of an object cause it to have certain dispositional properties. Place holds with Hume that cause and effect cannot be numerically identical. So the dispositional cannot reduce to the categorical. Martin holds a third view. No property, he claims, can be sensibly described as purely categorical or purely dispositional. Every property is both dispositional and categorical. It makes no sense to speak of reducing the purely dispositional to the purely qualitative, much as it makes no sense to talk of the world as 'really' only being constituted by the purely categorical. In this, Martin seems to somewhat agree with Place. But, since Place reserves a place in the world for purely dispositional (and categorical) properties, Martin parts with him as well.

The book is set up as two separate debates — one between Armstrong and Place, the other including Martin. The authors succeed in each of their capacities — critical (of the others' positions) and defensive (of their own). However, there are a few recurring problems.

Armstrong: How are categorical properties the truthmakers for causal counterfactuals? The first step is to view properties as universals. The second is to invoke laws of nature. Laws of nature, for Armstrong, are relations between universals and not mere regularities. That is, the laws must 'entail corresponding regularities without reducing to such regularities' (17). That a categorical property (say, a certain microphysical structure) is instantiated (as in a glass), given the existing laws of nature entails that a second universal will be instantiated (the glass will shatter).

A large chunk of the book is given over to Armstrong's theory of universals. One problem, however, seems most pressing. Armstrong disavows Plato-

nism. There is no Realm of Universals, and no universals would exist if not instantiated in particulars. Each universal fully exists in every particular in which it is instantiated. Here is Martin's objection to Armstrong's position. 'In theology, the Trinity, Three in One, is allowed to be a mystery, impenetrable to the finite mind. Armstrong's view of a universal as existing only in its instantiations takes a kind of "theological" twist. A specific universal exists as numerically identical and "fully" in "each" of the non-identical spatially and temporally distinct instantiations. ... For all the world this appears to be a "divided object" ' (179-80). Armstrong is well aware of the problem, but he never quite kills it. Martin seems to have the last word (at least in this book).

Place: Place's position is that the categorical properties of an object cause its dispositional properties. On that basis he determines that dispositional properties cannot reduce to categorical properties. He makes this argument throughout the book (on pp. 29-30, 108, 115, and 153, among others). It is essential to his position (it is his argument), but neither Armstrong nor Martin seem to question it explicitly. Even granting the Humean assumption that the cause must be distinct from its effect, why suppose that an object's categorical properties cause its dispositional properties? After all, another Humean assumption is that a cause must precede its effect. There is no mention by Place of the instantiation of categorical properties preceding the instantiation of dispositional properties. It seems like an odd sort of claim to make. Place might or might not object to the second Humean assumption. This would involve a lengthy discussion of what Martin calls 'old conundrums. If the cause is *prior* to and not contemporaneous with the effect then it is "too early" ... If the cause is at any stage *contemporaneous* with the effect then ... the cause is "too late" because at that stage the effect is already happening' (136).

Martin: Despite some convoluted writing, Martin's contributions seem generally the most sophisticated and thought-provoking of the three authors. However, there are problems with any double-aspect theory like the one he presents. Martin is no conceptualist (one who sees universals and kinds as mind-generated instead of really existing entities — see pp. 140-6 for his discussion of conceptualism and a criticism of Place; see pp. 157-60 for Place's replies), so he must be making a claim about the world when he says that every property has both a categorical and a dispositional aspect. Now, what is an aspect, except perhaps a second order property (a property of a property)? He presumably would not say that every first order property has both a categorical and a dispositional aspect, but second order properties are purely one or purely the other. He is not allowed to say merely that we view properties categorically or dispositionally — that they are not really one or the other. He is, as mentioned, a staunch anti-conceptualist. And the regress option doesn't seem very palatable. It is unclear what options are left.

Despite these few problems, the book as a whole is tight and well-edited (Crane's introduction can stand on its own in introductory courses). It is impossible to provide an unproblematic sophisticated treatment of disposi-

tions. The topic is so difficult that even the most cautious claims bring a flood of deeper questions. The authors handle this problem admirably. You will have very few objections to one chapter that are not addressed in subsequent chapters.

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The question of valuation in American twentieth-century philosophy and aesthetics is a collection of nine essays reflecting the research activity of the Department of Philosophy and Sociology of the University of Gdansk, Poland. Chaired by Bohdan Dziemidok, the department has an established reputation in Poland as a leading centre for studies in aesthetics and axiology. The editors of the book, Andrzej Ceynowa, Bohdan Dziemidok and Marek Janiak, as well as all other Polish contributors (Romuald Piekarski, Barbara Mazur, Barbara Smoczynska and Krzysztof Polit) have either worked at Gdansk or completed their Ph.D's under Dziemidok's supervision. The remaining two authors are Roger A. Shiner of the University of Alberta and Arnold Berleant of Long Island University who visited Gdansk and presented papers to the department's faculty.

The question of valuation is the Gdansk philosophers' first book foray into the field of American aesthetics, preceded only by Ceynowa's post-doctoral thesis on Black Theatre. Yet the editors hope it will be just one in a planned series of studies on American culture. The book's nine articles are divided into two parts; the first three papers deal with issues in general axiology whereas the second part is composed of six articles on specific problems of valuation in American aesthetics. The first part opens with Roger Shiner's 'Valuation and feeling', followed by Bohdan Dziemidok's 'Naturalist Perspective in American axiology. Two versions of the "interest theory": D.W. Prall

and R.B. Perry' and Romuald Piekarski's 'Clarence I. Lewis's general theory of valuation'.

In the second, aesthetics part of the book the opening slot is given, again, to a North American philosopher, Arnold Berleant and his 'Social valuation of art'. The next four articles deal with the concepts of value and valuation of a work of art in four prominent American aestheticians, Pepper, Margolis, Beardsley and Dickie. Those are: Barbara Mazur's 'Stephen C. Pepper on the aesthetic valuation of art', Marek Janiak's 'Interpretation and valuation of works of art in Joseph Margolis' aesthetics', Barbara Smoczynska's 'Monroe C. Beardsley's idea of the theory of aesthetic valuation' and Krzysztof Polit's 'Problems of value and valuation of a work of art in George Dickie's institutional theory of art'. And finally the book closes with 'Emergence of the valuation criteria in American Black Aesthetics' by the coeditor Andrzej Ceynowa.

Both parts are characteristically heterogeneous, in the way that reflects the different interests of the Polish and North American authors and perhaps also their distinct approaches to philosophy. Though separated by their philosophical disciplines and subject-matters, Shiner's and Berleant's articles are both issue-orientated and focused on some of the more basic problems of valuation. In 'Valuation and Feeling' Shiner addresses the issue of the relation between an act of valuation and accompanying emotions. Against the backdrop of selected examples, Shiner advances the thesis that the connection between valuation and feeling is neither analytical nor contingent. This view put him at odds with both cognitivism and emotivism, or in general, attitude theories of evaluation. However, Shiner stops short of attempting to pinpoint the specific character of that relation. The way he characterizes it is mainly negative. In his view, the contentious relation between valuation and feeling is in fact a relation between valuation and *disposition* to a specific feeling. In consequence, all we can safely predicate of a person who values is that his valuations must, at least *sometimes*, be emotional. Those who bid to define the connection between feelings and valuation succumb, Shiner claims, to the temptation for undue generalization. Yet his own analyses seem to suggest that some kind of law-like generalization would best characterize the connection between feelings and valuations. If he is right and that connection is neither strictly analytical nor purely contingent, then a weaker conceptual relation, causal psychological or semantic, must be at play to account for the observed regularities of their co-occurrence. It would be worthwhile to try specifying those regularities, however this part of Shiner's essay remains yet to be written.

Berleant's 'Social valuation of art' is yet another defense of art's independence from the social roles it is often expected to fulfill. His argument is based on a specific understanding of the social function, or value, of art. In Berleant's view, the latter consists in the ability to generate new experiences in the wide audience who becomes both the recipient and adjudicator of art. Since social order and art are parts of the same cultural process which provides the benchmark for evaluation of art, criteria for social valuation are

completely internal to art itself. This allows Berleant to claim paradoxically that art performs its social function best when it has no social function to perform. Sweeping and elegant as it is, Berleant's argument is however weakened by its dependence on the arguable definition of social value of art.

The Polish contributors have chosen a much narrower focus. With exception of Ceynowa who canvasses the history of a broader phenomenon of the Black Aesthetics movement, their articles discuss the aesthetic or axiological views of a selected American philosopher. The *genre* of such analyses is predominantly academic. From Dziemidok to Polit, the Gdansk philosophers are preoccupied with the questions of proper categorization, labelling and mutual dependencies. Not infrequently, a paper's section is summed up with a sentence like '[Prall's] concept [of interest theory] was relationist, relativist, naturalist, emotivist and humanist' (30). Sounds dry and uninspiring? No contest. On the positive side, however, the classificatory approach affords a firmer grip of the often volatile and insufficiently surveyed domain of aesthetic concepts. Pigeon-holing a philosopher can be just the obverse of making sense of his position, relative to other philosophers and current discussions among the commentators.

As far as the latter are concerned, Polish references prevail, and no wonder. *The question of valuation in American twentieth-century philosophy and aesthetics* is in part an attempt to assimilate American twentieth-century philosophy and aesthetics for the domestic use of Polish philosophy. The presentationary purpose of the Polish contributions takes at places a toll on their critical edge. The essays are mainly analyses of evolution in a philosopher's position and rarely go beyond internal critique. What their authors do is trace inconsistencies and diagnose problems.

Still, the American reader *can* find some of the articles interesting, or even illuminating. (Or, rather, he *would* if they were supplemented with an English language abstract, at the very least.) The Polish perspective on the American aesthetics is at times different from the American own. It draws from a separate set of categories which have been influenced by Ingarden's studies of ontology of values. Hence, *relationism* — a distinct position which is intermediate between subjectivism and objectivism. Dziemidok and Piekarski argue that Perry, Prall and Lewis are, in fact, relationists. Yet the concept of relationism remains largely unknown in American aesthetics.

The ontological perspective of the Gdansk philosophers lets them trace specific problems of American aesthetics back to some unresolved issues in the ontology of values. Just a handful of examples: Piekarski finds that Lewis' vacillation over the issue of verifiability of aesthetic evaluations derives from his ambiguous stance on constitution of values. Though values depend for their existence on human subjects, Lewis wants to maintain that valuation is nonetheless objective. In similar vein, Polit blames Dickie for neglecting the ontological status of values. His concept of work of art, and the institutional theory concept of art in general, argues Polit, is divorced from aesthetic experience or aesthetic value. In consequence, it cannot account for the success of avant-garde art. In the cases of Lewis and Dickie alike, the problem

lies ultimately with the tension between the presumed objective character of aesthetic evaluation and its individual, experiential side. In fact, Janiak claims that the same holds true of Margolis. Margolis requires that his appreciative judgements be both justifiable and subjective. The two conditions cannot be met simultaneously, argues Janiak, for the first of them appeals to reasons and shuns individual taste that founds subjective preferences.

Obviously, these few examples can give nothing more than a sample of the philosophical tone of *The question of valuation in American twentieth-century philosophy and aesthetics*. The limitation of space did not allow me to comment on all articles. Despite its methodological unity, *The question of value* is a diverse book, a fruit of philosophical research of several people. The intrigued readers are invited to reach over the barrier of language to the authors themselves and contribute, in this way, to the ongoing philosophical discussion in Gdansk.

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Marcel Conche
Pyrrhon ou l'apprence.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1994.
Collection Perspectives critiques. Pp. 326.
Prix 172FF. ISBN 2-13-046001-1.

Ce livre est la réédition, revue et augmentée, de l'ouvrage publié sous le même titre il y a plus de vingt ans (Villers sur mer, Éditions de Mégare, 1973). Comme plusieurs autres travaux de Marcel Conche, cette étude était plus ou moins passée inaperçue et elle n'a pas eu l'importance qu'on aurait dû lui reconnaître dans les études sur le premier scepticisme. Cette nouvelle édition permet de réparer les choses. Il s'agit d'un travail de premier calibre, élaboré selon une méthode d'une grande rigueur, fondé sur une érudition exemplaire et écrit avec beaucoup d'inspiration. Le propos de l'auteur est de tenter de retrouver, derrière l'image imposée par Sextus Empiricus, la vraie nature de la pensée de Pyrrhon. L'entreprise est risquée et suppose un recours méticuleux à une doxographie très complexe. Les premiers chapitres mettent en place les éléments de cette doxographie relatifs à la biographie, en particulier les éléments repris des historiens concernant la vie d'Alexandre et les motifs propédeutiques de la sagesse indienne. Natif d'Elis, disciple d'Anaxarque d'Abdère, Pyrrhon suivit son maître dans les campagnes d'Al-

exandre dont il fit la connaissance en 332. L'auteur propose une synthèse excellente et très vivante de nos connaissances sur le milieu entourant Alexandre au cours de ces expéditions, et il accorde beaucoup d'importance au contact avec les sages indiens (38). C'est par eux que Pyrrhon aurait eu la révélation de l'irréalité de tout ce qui semble réel. Poursuivant lui-même un idéal de sagesse, désireux de «dépouiller l'homme complètement», Pyrrhon va tenter de donner une nouvelle signification au travail de la raison.

Selon les témoignages qui nous ont été transmis, Pyrrhon n'aurait rien écrit. Si on doit éviter de fixer les traits de sa pensée à compter de l'exposé de Sextus, comment convient-il de procéder? Selon l'auteur, il faut s'appuyer sur les témoignages d'Aristoclès de Messène, cité par Eusèbe (*Praep. evang.* XIV, 17-21) et de Diogène Laërce (IX, 62-7) qui cite le témoignage d'Antigone de Caryste. L'essentiel de la présente étude consiste en une analyse détaillée du témoignage d'Aristoclès, comprenant une traduction (59) et un commentaire élaboré en plusieurs sections. L'auteur note avec justesse que la critique d'Aristoclès fait écho aux critiques d'Aristote à l'endroit du scepticisme pré-pyrrhonien (*Metaph*, Gamma et Kappa), en particulier au refus des principes de contradiction et du tiers exclus. Le point de départ du pyrrhonisme est donc la mise en question de l'idée d'être selon Aristote. «Pyrrhon refuse l'alternative entre l'être et le non-être ; il découvre une forme du rien qui ne se pense pas par rapport à l'être : l'apparence» (81). Ce n'est donc pas le concept de phénomène qui guide la lecture de Conche, mais bien celui d'une disposition à l'égard de la vanité de l'apparence. Cette lecture lui permet de donner une interprétation cohérente de la pensée pyrrhonienne de l'action.

L'étude est complétée par des chapitres sur les rapports avec le scepticisme phénoméniste ultérieur et sur les tropes d'Enésidème, où l'auteur cherche une confirmation de son interprétation générale. Philosophie de l'inconstance et de la variation, la pensée de Pyrrhon représente pour l'auteur un refus radical de tout fondement. Elle n'a donc pas de portée spécifiquement épistémologique et elle semble plutôt portée ultimement par un projet ironique qui la relie en son fond au cynisme. L'originalité et la pertinence de cette interprétation résident dans la détermination à construire un portrait autonome du pyrrhonisme. Les bases textuelles sont très restreintes et la démonstration repose sur une synthèse brillante de la première pensée hellénistique, à laquelle elle rend toute sa diversité. Pyrrhon apparaît dans ce contexte comme un penseur rebelle à tous les courants majeurs, de la métaphysique aristotélicienne de la substance aux dérives de l'éléatisme. Ce portrait est-il juste ? Comme dans toutes les études reposant sur des doxographies complexes, il y a beaucoup de spéculation dans le portrait proposé par Conche. Mais il y a aussi beaucoup d'intuition et un enthousiasme très communicatif à l'égard de l'idéal de la sagesse, à la fois cosmopolite et ataraxique, du philosophe compagnon d'Alexandre. Cette approche nous change des ennuyeuses discussions sur le phénomène.

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H-G. Gadamer
La Philosophie herméneutique. Trad. Jean
Grondin.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1996.
Pp. 261.
Cdn$64.00. ISBN 2-13-047344-2.

Le titre d'un ouvrage n'est jamais le pur accès encore extérieur, à une matière. Quelle que soit sa prétention manifeste — celle de la délimitation de l'oeuvre dans son histoire fût-elle d'abord chronologique — il n'échappe pas à l'interprétation appelée par sa position immédiate. Celle-ci n'est donc pas un simple support — moyen d'entrée, voie de perception — d'où peut émerger un agencement textuel. Le titre d'une œuvre porte déjà en lui — en ce sens, il est comme la singularité du nom propre intraduisible — l'espace propre d'une pensée qui apparaît dès lors dans son exemplarité. La 'philosophie herméneutique' peut mieux qu'aucun autre titre illustrer ce dernier propos, tant il appelle dans son libellé immédiat ce discernement dont la tâche est d'en libérer l'enjeu. Cet ouvrage du grand philosophe allemand Hans-Georg Gadamer est la traduction d'essais extraits de quelques pièces majeures de ses *Gesammelte Werke*, livrant au lecteur le parcours décisif d'une pensée d'une profondeur et d'une difficulté réelles. La 'philosophie herméneutique' (le titre) rassemblant ce parcours de 1953 à 1993, est une appellation créée par le traducteur Jean Grondin, destinée à manifester les lieux sensibles de l'herméneutique, a donc pour valeur d'établir par son originalité, la ligne maîtresse de ces textes qui se rapportent les uns aux autres. Dans cette cohésion réussie, l'enchaînement chronologique s'efface pour laisser se déployer la singularité de l'œuvre présente dans son titre. Il importe ici afin de tenter de la découvrir, de montrer à partir de quelques essais déterminants du présent ouvrage, la teneur dense et problématique de la philosophie herméneutique.

Au fond, chacun des textes constituant l'ouvrage amorce et éclaircit la problématique de l'herméneutique, ne misant jamais sur une définition dernière, évitant ainsi de neutraliser la recherche du mouvement qui la caractérise. L''Autoprésentation' (*Selbstdarstellung*) de Gadamer écrite à partir de 1973 et complétée en 1990, en témoigne à travers les riches faits de vie qu'elle rapporte. L'autobiographie intellectuelle a le mérite, qu'on pense ici au geste analogue de la *Selbstdarstellung* de Freud ou de Benjamin ('Curriculum vitae'), récemment encore à celui de Ricœur dans sa *Réflexion faite*, de ramener l'oeuvre à ses intuitions essentielles. C'est le sens possible des années de formation et des rencontres, que de laisser percevoir la mise à jour difficile et disciplinée de la pensée. Gadamer aura dès 1923 auprès de Heidegger pris la mesure de 'l'expérience herméneutique fondamentale (hermeneutische Grunderfahrung)', celle qui vise à se servir 'de la pensée historique pour reconquérir les interrogations de la tradition (in die Wiedergewinnung der Fragestellungen der Tradition einzubringen)' afin de rendre 'les anciennes questions (...) si compréhensibles et si vivantes qu'elles rede-

venaient les nôtres' (18). Dans sa situation première, l'expérience herméneutique fondamentale fait signe en direction de la philosophie grecque et livre la continuité du problème théorique qui préoccupe l'œuvre gadamérienne. La réacquisition (Wiedergewinnung) des termes problématiques de la tradition philosophique n'est possible que si elle rapporte (einbringen) le questionnement ou la question, dans l'espace d'une contestation de la fondation ultime (Letztbegründung) où se fait jour la primauté du langage. 'C'est auprès des grecs', écrit Gadamer, 'que l'on peut apprendre que la pensée philosophique n'est pas obligée de souscrire à l'idée directrice (systématique) d'une fondation ultime dans un principe supérieur si elle veut être capable de rendre raison (daß Denken der Philosophie nicht dem systematischen Leitgedanken einer Letztbegründung in einem obersten Grundsatz folgen muß, um Rechenschaft geben zu können). Elle se tient toujours déjà sous la direction de l'expérience originelle du monde que lui procure la capacité conceptuelle et intuitive du langage qu'elle a à penser jusqu'au bout. C'est le secret des dialogues de Platon que de nous l'enseigner ([das Denken der Philosophie] hat im Weiterdenken ursprünglicher Welterfahrung die Begriffs- und Anschauungskraft der Sprache, in der wir leben, zu Ende zu denken. Das zu lehren, schien mir das Geheimnis des platonische Dialogs)' (19).

La densité de cette séquence est manifeste tant elle rassemble au travail, les motifs inquiets de l'herméneutique. Quelle est cette pensée qui en appelle à la *présence* (Gegenwart) *secrète* du dialogue platonicien (167) pour désigner le droit originel d'un langage dont la constitution (Verfaßheit) (46, 61) ne se rapporte plus au principe d'une fondation ultime? En quoi se nomme dans le deuxième membre de cette séquence cruciale, l'événement *infondé*, l'autonomie (Autonomie) du langage (61)? Que le 'philosophe éveille la force d'intuition du langage (die Anschauungskraft der Sprache) (60) ne revient pas par un geste d'exclusion au profit de la seule intuition, à nier la conceptualité en cours dans toute langue. La tâche de la philosophie herméneutique est au contraire d'ériger la prétention du langage à l'universalité (Universalität) parce qu'il 'représente une capacité humaine de linguisticité (Sprachlichkeit) qui est indissolublement liée à la raison comme telle' (42). Le sens de cette universalité du langage, s'il reste difficile à entendre au nom de la seule justification 'que le langage peut tout embrasser en tant que *logos*' (42) doit orienter la compréhension vers la recherche approfondie de cette linguisticité évoquée. En somme, c'est l'herméneutique comme pratique de l'interprétation et de la compréhension — ce en quoi elle rejoint son étymologie — appelée à s'ériger en philosophie, '(prenant) nécessairement la forme d'une réflexion théorique qui aspire à l'universalité' comme le souligne J. Grondin dans son Avant-propos, qui doit montrer en quoi il existe quelque chose de tel que 'la linguisticité principielle de la compréhension (prinzipielle Sprachlichkeit des Verstehens)' (46). C'est dans cette expression qu'il faut éclaircir le sens possible de 'l'universalité de l'herméneutique', quitte à ne mesurer que provisoirement la complexité du problème. La question immédiate qui peut se dresser sur la voie de cet éclaircissement est la suivante: que faut-il entendre par 'linguisticité principielle de la compréhension' si, par ailleurs,

comme cela fut répondu plus haut, la 'pensée philosophique n'est pas obligée de souscrire à l'idée directrice (systématique) d'une fondation ultime dans un principe supérieur si elle veut être capable de rendre raison ?' (19). En quoi le principe (Prinzip) concerné dans la linguisticité 'principielle' de la compréhension échappe-t-il à la *présence* de ce 'principe supérieur (oberster Grundsatz)' dont peut se défaire l'expérience philosophique ? Quelle différence y a-t-il entre un *Prinzip* et un *Grundsatz* pour que la linguisticité n'aliène pas la compréhension par la pression de la 'fondation ultime' ?

Le discernement requis par ces distinctions majeures et réel, comme en témoigne la radicale attention que lui réserve Gadamer dans un passage décisif de cette *Philosophie herméneutique* à la recherche de sa singulière légitimité. Pour en livrer l'acuité, il convient d'insister d'abord sur sa teneur hautement problématique qui tracera le lien organique de l'ouvrage. Il aura pour portée de mettre en scène la rencontre de l'herméneutique avec la déconstruction, 'au centre des réflexions de Gadamer au cours de la dernière décennie' comme le remarque avec justesse J. Grondin (8). Accédant dans une radicalité avouée au problème de l'universalité de l'herméneutique, donc à la question du statut de la 'linguisticité principielle (prinzipielle Sprachlichkeit)' (46) qui la rend possible, Gadamer s'emploie à mettre en suspens la commode affiliation du langage à la philosophie: 'la question qui se pose d'elle-même est celle de savoir ce qu'est au juste la langage de la philosophie (was ist die eigentliche Sprache der Philosophie ?). À qui apartient le langage de la philosophie ? Et est-ce que cela existe vraiment le langage de la philosophie (Gibt es das überhaupt die Sprache der Philosophie)? Ce que l'on découvre ici, c'est le problème (Aufgabe) du langage lui-même et son potentiel (Potential), dont la vitalité (Lebendigkeit) se manifeste dans toutes les langues, mais aussi derrière toutes les ruines (Trümmern) d'un passé oublié (einer sprachlosen Vergangenheit) et l'histoire prélangagière de l'humanité. Je n'entends pas par là une quelconque langue originaire (Ursprache) ou le tronc commun d'une langue indo-germanique originelle qui se trouverait au fondement de la plupart des langues culturelles de l'Europe et que tâche de reconstruire la linguistique. Je pense plutôt à la linguisticité comme telle (die Sprachlichkeit als Solche) à travers et à partir de laquelle les langues ont pu se constituer (bilden können) et qu'a aussi pu se constituer la pluralité des langues qui ne sont pas seulement celles de notre horizon culturel' (41, 42).

La portée de cette mise au point — dont on doit dire l'effort de traduction qu'elle requiert — est d'une remarquable intensité. Dans un geste de dissolution partielle à l'endroit de la philosophie, Gadamer fait surgir *pour lui-même* le problème du langage (son devoir, sa tâche, *die Aufgabe der Sprache*) et de son potentiel. Il s'agit de *faire droit* dans la linguisticité à l'histoire d'un langage dont l'instance de légitimation n'est pas le 'langage de la métaphysique' ('y a-t-il quelque chose de tel?' [162]) ni par conséquent, la 'métaphysique de la présence'(158) qui *oblitèrent* l'histoire de l'humanité. La linguisticité témoigne, dans la constellation de ses étapes historiques de langage (ses étapes historiques langagières dirait-on également, sprachgeschichtliche Etappen) (41) du passé et des ruines (Trümmern) de l'hu-

manité entière, *ranimant* ses événements laissés sans voix, privés de langage (sprachlose Vergangenheit). La linguisticité met fin au privilège — et c'est en ce sens qu'elle ne dépend pas du primat d'une langue originaire (Ursprache) ou indo-germanique — de l'horizon culturel européen dictant au langage le processus de sa fondation. Mais elle ne renonce pas pour autant, au nom de l'universalité dont elle veut témoigner (celle du langage de toute l'humanité, de toutes les langues de l'humanité) à engager dans la philosophie l'opération d'une 'destruction' du fondement (Grund) pouvant mener à la compréhension d'une autre *institution* — *constitution* du langage (bilden). L'universalité de l'herméneutique est donc la recherche léguée par Heidegger d'un 'nouveau langage' (156) *à portée* d'une 'destruction' (Destruktion) qui libère la pensée (de la présence) de ses schèmes aliénés.

L'experience herméneutique nomme ainsi la méditation de la *puissance témoignante* de la linguisticité comme étant son éthique propre. Qu'il y ait dans la linguisticité une 'pulsion vers le mot (Drang zum Wort) qui s'agite en toute langue possible' (229) qui la porte à un inconditionnel dialogue 'quels qu'en soient le lieu, l'objet où l'interlocuteur — partout où quelque chose est venu au langage (etwas zur Sprache kommt), que cette alterité soit celle d'une chose, d'un mot ou d'une flamme (Gottfried Benn) voilà qui constitue l'universalité de l'expérience herméneutique' (158). Dans la profondeur réelle de cette expérience, il y a sans doute sa proximité et sa séparation d'une pensée de la déconstruction dont l'éthique du témoignage invoque la 'singularité exemplaire ou témoignante de l'existence *martyrisée*' (Jacques Derrida, *Le monolinguisme de l'autre* [Paris: Galilée 1996], 50) au-delà de tout dialogue, dans un monolinguisme.

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Grant Gilmore
The Death of Contract. 2nd edition,
ed. Ronald K.L. Collins.
Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1995.
Pp. xxxii + 182.
US$14.95. ISBN 0-8142-0676-X.

The standard plain-vanilla conceptualization of the difference between the law of contract and the law of tort goes this way. A contract is a mutual exchange of promises between two parties. They agree formally on the terms of the exchange. They thus undertake voluntarily obligations to one another, which the law will enforce to the extent of the agreement. Compensation is

based on the content of the agreement. A tort is a civil wrong (i.e., one falling short of criminality) done by one party to another, for which wrong the law judges that compensation must be paid, be the wrong deliberate or accidental. Compensation is judged according to a general normative standard, the so-called duty of care to one's neighbour. In contract, one's 'neighbour' is only the party with whom one has contracted, to the extent of the contract. In tort, one's 'neighbour' is any party whom the reasonable person could foresee to be affected by one's actions. In tort, but not in contract, I can legally wrong someone with whom I have no contractual relationship.

Until three decades or so ago, such a conception of the nature of contract vis à vis tort dominated legal practice. It had its ideological roots in the late nineteenth century and the laissez-faire approach to trade. Philosophically, theory held that the ground of contractual obligation lay in the exercise of the will, in promising, in consent, in voluntary undertakings. In tort, non-deliberate wrongs became the paradigm of a tort. The difference between tort and contract could not have been ostensibly clearer.

The difference, though, began to be eroded. It was always true that there were fuzzy edges around the central notion of a contract. The key notion of 'consideration', the 'quid pro quo' one contractor gives up for the benefit received from the other, was thought essential to preserve the idea of a contract as a *mutual* exchange. But it is a notoriously slippery term. A mistake may relieve a party of obligation, but only when it is a 'fundamental mistake'; when is a mistake 'fundamental' and when is it not? Contracts may be void when signed under duress or undue influence; when unconscionable; when contrary to public policy (encouraging immorality or being in restraint of trade, for example). What do those terms mean? The courts began to use the discretion given them by these and other underdetermined concepts more and more to settle contractual disputes according to the court's own conception of what ought to be the case, from the perspective of equity, policy, or other relevant general value.

The consequence of this development, however, for the plain-vanilla view of the difference between contract and tort should be obvious. The more that courts settled cases on their own perception of what should be so, the less they paid attention to the original agreement, the original acts of will and their contents, which created the contract. The more that courts de-emphasized the intentions of the parties to the contract and emphasized general social norms, the more adjudication in the law of contract began to look like, and to behave like, adjudication in the law of tort. In the extreme case, people began to wonder why there were two distinct branches of the law at all, when (seemingly) the same set of principles about appropriate compensation for wrong caused governed both kinds of case.

How better to draw attention dramatically to such a state of affairs than to talk of 'The Death of Contract'? Grant Gilmore, who taught in the Yale Law School, gave a set of lectures under that title at Ohio State in 1970, and they were published in revised form with full annotation in 1974. As he said (95), he described a situation where '"contract" is being reabsorbed into the

mainstream of "tort"'. Partly because of the lecture context, but also partly through personal predilection, Gilmore proceeds by examining certain specific cases in some detail, treating them as illustrative of a general trend, which he assumes his audience will readily endorse. He is an entertaining writer, with a nice sense of irony, and of how the law can be an ass as well as an agent for good.

The original book appeared at the beginning of what turned out to be some twenty or more years of ferment in legal theory about the foundations of contractual obligation, provoked by the boundary-blurring activities of the courts. Charles Fried and Randy Barnett defended classical theories of will and consent respectively. P.S. Atiyah argued that contract was based on promise, but interpreted the notion of 'promise' to import a crucial element of social norm. Hugh Collins, Duncan Kennedy and Clare Dalton represented the opposite view, of arguing that the law of contract is based on communitarian, not individualist, normative principles (Collins), or that it is in doctrine radically indeterminate and courts' decisions are pure exercises of political power (Kennedy, Dalton). Sideways on to all this stood Richard Posner and others of the Law and Economics movement, focussing not on doctrine but on legal regimes as promoters (or otherwise) of economic efficiency. All of these writers are jurisprudentially more inclined and more sophisticated than Gilmore, but he was there at the beginning, and he coined the famous phrase.

The republication of *The Death of Contract* is not the only sign of continuing interest in Gilmore and the topic. The prestigious *Northwestern University Law Review* has devoted its Fall 1995 issue to a contemporary reconsideration of Gilmore's book. The reprint has a 23-page introduction by the editor, Ronald Collins. It contains an interesting brief biography of Gilmore, but otherwise is too hagiographical for my taste. The book stands on its own two feet as one of the salient texts of contemporary legal theory. It's an enjoyable and informative read for anyone with an interest in the law, its strengths and its foibles. And for anyone interested in the jurisprudence of contract law, it is a fundamental text.

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Hans-Johann Glock
A Wittgenstein Dictionary.
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1996. Pp. ix + 405.
US$54.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-631-18112-1);
US$21.95 (paper: ISBN 0-631-18537-2).

This book is an encyclopedic guide to key terms, issues and problems in Wittgenstein's philosophy. The opening paragraph explains that the book 'addresses three kinds of readers' (1). First, it aims to explain central terms and issues in the study of Wittgenstein's work, not only to philosophers, but those in other academic fields. Second, it offers students working on Wittgenstein an account of the principal exegetical and substantive problems. Third, it provides a state-of-the-art discussion, as well as some new ideas, for Wittgenstein scholars. The dictionary entries (31-390) are preceded by a 'Sketch of an intellectual biography' (11-29), which provides not only a brief orientation for readers without prior knowledge of analytic philosophy, but also summarizes Glock's construal of the chief stages in the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and indicates his relationship to some of the principal influences on his thought outside the analytic tradition, such as Schopenhauer, Boltzmann, and Weininger.

The dictionary entries consist of a series of alphabetically arranged entries on topics in Wittgenstein's philosophy, most of them only a few pages long. Cross-references and a thorough index make it easy to find relevant and related entries. In keeping with the aims of the book, a wide range of topics is covered, yet a good deal of carefully chosen detail is packed into each entry. A list of the entries for the first few letters of the alphabet gives a good idea of the variety of material covered: aesthetics; anthropology; aspect-perception; Augustinian picture of language; autonomy of language, or arbitrariness of grammar; avowal; behavior and behaviorism; belief; bipolarity; calculus model; causation; certainty; color; consciousness; contextualism; criteria; determinacy of sense; elementary proposition; ethics; explanation. These entries are an impressive combination of compressed exposition, analysis, and criticism. Glock deftly summarizes the continuities and contrasts in Wittgenstein's writing at different stages of his career, citing numerous well-chosen references in the primary texts. Freed from the demands of a conventional monograph, Glock squeezes a great deal of valuable and well-chosen information into the space available. He has a thorough knowledge of the Wittgenstein texts, moving between the different phases of his work with ease, and makes good use of the unpublished Wittgenstein papers. Glock is also particularly good on the role of formal logic in Wittgenstein's philosophy, providing exposition that will be particularly valuable to the philosophy student with only a little logic. Another strength is the emphasis on Kantian themes.

The treatment of the secondary literature is rather selective for a work of reference. Although Glock does name philosophers who influenced Wittgenstein, or who were influenced by him, he very rarely identifies figures in the

secondary literature when discussing alternative interpretations. Instead, he repeatedly makes use of the expression 'some commentators ...' While Wittgenstein scholars will have no trouble knowing who is intended, Glock's other readers are left with no way of connecting the various interpretations set out in the text with the list of secondary sources at the back of the book, or of knowing which approaches are being overlooked. This is unfortunate, for despite the dictionary format, Glock's book is informed by his conviction that Wittgenstein's philosophy should be read from an argumentative and analytic perspective, and he has little patience for those who stress the rhetorical and non-argumentative dimension of Wittgenstein's work. In his 'Notes on the use of this book', Glock writes: 'Some commentators suggest that Wittgenstein does not engage in a rational debate with other philoso-phers, but merely tries to convert them to his point of view. ... Although Wittgenstein's philosophical method is revolutionary in seeking to under-mine even the assumptions underlying previous debates, he does so by way of arguments that can be assessed for their soundness' (2). Here, he takes it for granted that we face a dilemma: either rational debate or irrational conversion. As a result, Glock seems to think it is enough to point to arguments in Wittgenstein's writing to prove the superiority of his methods, as against those who stress the role of persuasion in Wittgenstein. But Wittgenstein's writings contain both reasoned arguments and persuasive writing, and he is often at his best when he is doing both at once. While some commentators who stress the persuasive character of his work underesti-mate the role of argument in his writing, that is no reason for presenting us with a false dichotomy between the two. Wittgenstein's repeated insistence that reasons come to an end, and that 'at the end of reasons comes *persuasion*' (*On Certainty*, §612) make it quite clear that he was well aware of the limitations of argument as a way of changing someone's way of seeing things.

Glock's single-minded focus on argument in his interpretation of Wittgen-stein's writing has far-reaching consequences for the character of this book. In some ways, it makes the task of writing a work of reference easier, as it allows him to concentrate on presenting 'as clear-cut a position as Wittgen-stein's prudent qualifications allow' (2). On the other hand, while he acknow-ledges that 'Wittgenstein's work possesses a scintillating beauty lacking in other analytical philosophers' (28) he has little to say about the relationship between the literary character of Wittgenstein's writing and the arguments he finds there. While Glock is entitled to his methodological convictions, it is unfortunate that they lead him to overlook the work that has been done on the intimate dialectic between argument and persuasion in Wittgenstein's work, and to fail to even consider those interpreters within the analytic tradition who contend that Wittgenstein should not be construed as arguing for theses. In particular, Peter Winch, Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond and those who have been influenced by them are conspicuous by their absence. (There are no references at all to Cavell's work, and his name does not occur in the bibliography. Diamond's recent book is listed in the bibliography, but

there is no discussion of her reading of Wittgenstein. The only reference to Winch concerns his philosophy of social science.)

Despite these caveats, this book is an excellent exposition of Wittgenstein as an argumentative analytic philosopher.

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Lewis Gordon
Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism.
Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press
1995. Pp. xiv + 222.
n.p. (cloth: ISBN 0-391-03868-0);
US$17.50 (paper: ISBN 0-391-03872-9).

This book should have a significant effect in reviving interest in existential phenomenology and Sartrean phenomenology in particular, which too many theorists today have written off as hopelessly humanist or excessively voluntarist. Gordon makes a strong case for reassessing the potential of existential phenomenology to illuminate and analyze social issues. He also develops new phenomenological accounts of embodied existence, this time without assuming that anybody's lived experience can stand in for the whole but recognizing that we need a multitude of accounts to reveal the complex cultural meanings distributed differentially through society.

The overall purpose of the book is to develop a phenomenological description and analysis of the lived structure of antiblack racism, which is simply a description of salient aspects of the world in which we all live: white, black, and other. Antiblack racism evolves out of the desire to deflect the Look of the Other, in this case the enslaved/exploited Other. The master or colonizer does not want to see himself as he appears in the eyes of his slave, for there lies guilt, accusation, and blame. Thus the Master seeks to deflect this Look, or transcend the slave's transcendence, through a racism that erases the slave's subjectivity or power to judge, to value, and to impose meaning. And so it happens that whites' fear of what a 'black mirror' would reveal results in their subjugation of the very possibility of a black look.

This is the source of antiblack racism; its effect, Gordon asserts, is to posit racialism as a value in the world. Racialism imputes essential natures based on whiteness or blackness. By imputing these as essential, or objective and externally caused, racialism reveals itself as bad faith because it denies that these natures and values are chosen. And thus, the racist reaps the reward

of clarity against ambiguity and confusion: the world is divided up neatly, and one can *see* and thus know who is evil, and who is not.

So far, Gordon's analysis follows closely on Sartre's account of antisemitism, and takes up Sartre's own view in 'The Respectful Prostitute' that antiblack racism in the New World has largely replaced the psychic space and political role of antisemitism in the Old World. But at this point, Gordon's analysis begins to diverge from Sartre in order to reveal the specificity of the form that bad faith takes in antiblack racism. Building on Frantz Fanon and Ralph Ellison, Gordon suggests that black being in this antiblack world signifies, above all else, absence: that is, the absence of identity in the full sense of a self, a perspective, or a standpoint with its own self-referential point of view. Consider the paradigmatic Master who knows nothing about the interior life of his slave, about his moods, his religious beliefs, his dreams. What is absent here is not physical presence, but a recognized interiority: that is, intellect, sensibility, point of view.

In *Anti-Semite and Jew* Sartre also posits Jewish identity as an absence, but Sartre gives a different, much inferior reason than Gordon gives: Sartre's argument is that Jewishness is an empty category because the Jews are an unhistorical people, i.e., a dispersed people who were therefore unable to create a civilization that could reflect on individual Jews. Sartre characterizes Jewish life through the centuries as constituted by 'martyrdom' and 'passivity'. This analysis is based on Sartre's ignorance of Jewish history and is soundly refuted by Michael Walzer in his preface to the new edition of the book. Fortunately, although Gordon uses Sartre's term — absence — he does not follow Sartre's conceptualization of what absence means but instead looks to Fanon and Ellison.

In one sense, blackness signifies absence because blackness can only reflect or mirror, and can never reveal. Ellison uses this idea in *Invisible Man* when he says that 'it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination — indeed, everything and anything except me' (quoted in Gordon, 98). In another sense, the absence means that when a nonblack person sees a black person, all that is seen is blackness, and not the person; thus, as Fanon put it, 'the corporeal schema crumble[s], its place taken by a racial epidermal schema' (quoted in Gordon, 99). Fanon suggests that therefore the black cannot 'be seen in his individuality. To see him as black is to see enough. Hence to see him as black is not to see *him* at all' (99).

Gordon also suggests that blackness signifies absence in the sense that black people are in need of justification in a way that whites and sometimes other nonblacks are not assumed to require. White presence is inherently justified, that is, legitimate; its presence does not need to be explained or defended. Black presence, on the other hand, requires justification. This claim reminded me that when three black men were chased and beaten when their car broke down in Howard Beach, the line of argument taken by the lawyer who defended their assailants (which was echoed by then New York

City Mayor Koch) was, basically, 'What were they doing there? This is an all white community. They had already passed several pay phones. Why were they in Howard Beach at all if they weren't looking for trouble?' Their very presence in a Howard Beach pizzeria required justification; without it, Koch himself implied that a white reactive hysteria was understandable.

In an anti-black world the justification for black presence can only come from nonblacks. To have value is to be valued by a white. But interestingly, Gordon suggests that though whites hold the keys to value, a rejection by blacks is the worst possible insult for anyone. Why? Because to be rejected by a black is like a man being rejected by a prostitute: if I am rejected by someone who, it is assumed, can reject no one and is higher than no one, this is the worst insult I can receive.

Gordon analyzes black antiblackness as a separate phenomenon involving the interiorization of racism, and he offers insightful commentary on the use of the word 'nigger' by blacks. He suggests that, like the man who throws himself into water to avoid getting damp, a black person will sometimes throw him or herself into blackness by the use of this word. But there is an inherent paradox in saying 'I am a nigger': one who knows what he is cannot be a nigger, since it is by definition devoid of subjective perspective, so that to claim it as one's identity is simultaneously to disclaim it.

Gordon also offers a powerful analysis of the phenomena of 'exoticism', in which nonblacks confer a positive value on blackness. Sometimes this appears to be white self-deprecation (I have heard this sort of thing from white students: 'I admire blacks; I wish I was part of such a colorful, interesting culture; white culture is so bland' etc.). Gordon argues that the exoticizing of black people is not the antithesis of racism but is motivated by the desire to be with others but in such a way that one stands before innocent eyes. One maintains for oneself the right to judge and bestow value, and one views the black other as there for the taking, a kind of poodle which only enlightened white sensibility can appreciate.

Gordon uses existential ontology to reveal the deep level of racialization at work in the structure of existence. Though we are free to choose, 'what we must choose *as* is already set for us' (133). It is always, for example, a black man who chooses, whatever it is he chooses, which makes blackness (or, I would argue, other racialized categories of identity as well) the foundation for all of our actions, choices, affects, and so on. Such a primary significance for race is contingent rather than necessary, for Gordon, but today, here, now, this is a fundamental feature of our world, and thus an ontological reality.

I have found that such analyses make this book very useful in the classroom, especially for initiating discussions and heightening students' reflectiveness on matters concerning race. The category 'antiblack racism' itself provides a helpful corrective to the usual ahistorical definition of racism as a group-prejudice that can be directed anywhere, by anyone. However, there are questions about how far a Sartrean model of the self can go toward developing a meaningful social ontology. Sartre's account of the self is excessively minimalistic — it encompasses only the freedom to choose, and

thus is not a referent or a 'what.' For Sartre, the 'me', rather than the 'I', is a 'what': the 'me', or self-referring object of my consciousness, has a history, a biography, an ongoing process of states and qualities. The 'I', which is for Sartre the real self, the self that chooses, is necessarily located below or beyond concrete embodiment or specific social location. Hence, social location exists for Sartre just as the situation exists: something external to my self with which I must necessarily deal — I must interpret it, react or respond to it, etc. — but the 'I' is ontologically prior to, transcendent of, and therefore undetermined by, its concrete embodied encasement, which suggests that Sartre did not himself successfully transcend the legacy of mind/body dualism that he criticized so forcefully.

This issue has important political implications. For Sartre, the human difference we must recognize today, the diversity of oppressed identities we must defend, is a necessary but only transitional stage to universal individualism in which group differences disappear. As Walzer says, Sartre's plan is 'difference now; unity later'. The Jew, or the black, will disappear in the future proletarian society. Why? For three reasons: (1) because socialism will interpellate individuals in a more rational fashion by their relations to production, rather than their relations to ethnic/cultural histories, and in socialism those relations to production will (eventually) become homogeneous, as all forms of social alienations are repaired, with the result that group-related social identities will become outmoded; (2) because, like Hegel, Sartre believes that self/Other relations have an inherent tendency toward conflict, hatred, and oppression, in which the self is constantly seeking to deflect the disempowering Look of the Other, and thus when selves and Others are categorized into groups, social hostility between groups is inevitable; and (3) because for Sartre our essential self consists only in the power to negate whatever is in the realm of the given, and thus each self is free to interpret the meaning of its embodied location and to chart its future in infinite ways. Thus, Sartre is essentially an individualist, aiming for universal individualism, despite the fact that he recognizes the current reality of group-related identities and the necessity for identity-based political organizing. Walzer concludes from this that, for Sartre, there is no possibility for a permanent multiculturalism. And this is not only in *Anti-Semite and Jew*. Even in 'Black Orpheus' Sartre argues 'negritude is *for* destroying itself; it is a "crossing to" and not an "arrival at," a means and not an end ... the [proud] colored man looks to the end of particularism in order to find the dawn of the universal' (327-9).

One doesn't need to be a separatist to be skeptical of the value of this colorless future, or of its likely possibility. If our goal is to be able to be recognized as choosing freely without being always seen as 'choosing *as*' then universal individualism would seem to be Gordon's goal as well.

An individualist ontology both exaggerates our individual power and obscures the means by which individuals can truly become empowered. It describes one's choices as ultimately one's private own: bad faith is an affliction of single individuals for which they must take total responsibility

and which they alone and in isolation can overcome. The model of enlightened authenticity becomes a Kierkegaardian lone individual going against the unthinking crowd. The elitist implications of such a non-conformist ethical ideal have been noted by Richard Schmitt, who describes the existentialist hero of Sartre's novel *Nausea* as struggling in private with an alienation that gives him a sense of superiority over the bourgeois church-goers who are too dumb to experience the anguish of freedom and responsibility (*Alienation and Class* [Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company 1983]). Now Gordon's figures may seem far different from Roquentin, but they have one important thing in common. Sartre's antihero developed the capacity for authenticity through the destruction of his normal self-identity. He came to recognize, rightly in Sartre's view, that his public self, the self that 'knew how to behave' conventionally and that fit into social environments, was a dangerous delusion without real ontological status. This awareness was precisely what precipitated his nausea and his increasing alienation from all others.

The capacity to go against convention and respond to an inner call for integrity is surely a necessary part of antiracism; I don't contest this point. But the capacity to successfully withstand social convention should not be presented as heroic individualism. In reality, the solution to bad faith lies most often in community because meaningfulness, as Schmitt argues — whether the meaning conferred on identity or on choices — is fully accessible only in community. The alternative to bad faith is not the destruction of identity but the enactment of an identity based on responsible, reflective choice within the context of a historical agenda larger than any individual life's project. This is not a recipe for making the individual subordinate to the collective, but for making the individual's life explicable in the context of a substantive meaningfulness that only a community can produce. Thus, I would argue that for both the nonblack person seeking to be antiracist, and the person of color seeking a liberated life, the road ahead is not the annihilation of group or social identity, but a reconfigured community, in which individuals can participate in meaningful projects.

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Amy Gutmann's and Dennis Thompson's *Democracy and Disagreement* is premised on the notion that conflicts about fundamental moral values are an inherent and unavoidable part of democratic life. Unlike a number of contemporary liberal thinkers like John Rawls, G and T do not envision a utopian world awaiting us in which moral accord will one day reign. Their book is a rough outline of how we might live in democratic societies given the perennial nature of moral conflict over public policy.

G and T reject two traditional conceptions of democracy — proceduralism and constitutionalism — and the way they deal with moral conflict. They reject proceduralism on the grounds that it fails to show sufficient respect for substantive moral values. For example, '[a] majority vote alone cannot legitimate an outcome when the basic liberties or opportunities of an individual are at stake' (31). And while constitutionalism expresses substantive moral values, it is rejected on the grounds that it suffers from abstractness. Overarching constitutional principles require interpretation, and expression in the real world at a level of specificity that would resolve conflicts (35).

Democracy and Disagreement offers an alternative democratic path that is intended to avoid the failings of proceduralism and constitutionalism while incorporating the best of both. G and T call it 'deliberative democracy'. As its nomenclature denotes, this conception of democracy emphasizes the importance of deliberation — honest, mutually respectful debate and discussion — between those who hold opposing political views. In a deliberative democracy, ethical ideals would come to be expressed in public policy not through majoritarianism or constitutional guarantees, but through consensus and compromise following real moral debate.

Deliberative democracy depends on three fundamental 'dispositions'. First, 'reciprocity', which is the 'capacity to seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake' (52-3). The principle underlying this disposition is neither prudence, which stems from motives of self interest, nor impartiality, which requires altruism of citizens. Reciprocity requires, rather, a 'desire to justify to others,' an expectation which respects the ability of humans to see beyond themselves but does not require of them an angelic self abnegation. Second, 'publicity', which is the requirement that '[t]he reasons that officials and citizens give to justify political actions and the information necessary to assess those reasons ... be public' (95). Third, 'accountability', which concerns two issues of representation: *who* gives reasons, and *to whom* such reasons are owed. In a deliberative democracy, both voters and candidates must give reasons for their positions in *moral* terms, and such reasons must address the interests not just of the majority or even of all electors, but the interests of others outside the process (e.g., political refugees might be argued to

deserve reasons from public officials debating an exclusionary immigration bill).

G and T acknowledge that mere 'dispositions' cannot provide a substantive moral content to politics, and that simple deliberative democracy would still leave a large domain of insoluble disagreement on public policy. As a result, they argue for substantive moral content in the form of an unwritten 'Constitution of Deliberative Democracy'. The latter includes basic liberty, by which they mean 'personal integrity and voluntary contracts' (237). In deliberative democracies, citizens should be secured an *adequate* level of basic goods (273), as well as 'fair opportunity'. What constitutes personal integrity, an adequate level of basic goods, or fair opportunity is itself subject to debate.

Democracy and Disagreement makes a clear, cogent, and well organized argument for deliberative democracy. Its discussion is underscored with an excellent and wide-ranging use of real world cases as exemplars of the points G and T wish to make, cases often representing areas of the greatest public inability to agree. For example, public funding of abortions (in the chapter on reciprocity) (88); governmental secrecy (publicity) (104); the export of hazardous wastes (accountability) (149); surrogate parenthood (liberty) (245); workfare (welfare) (300); and affirmative action preferential hiring at American Telephone & Telegraph (fair opportunity) (307), among other subjects. G's and T's call for more deliberation, more mutual respect, and an elevation of the tone of public discourse is well taken. We could indeed stand more moral debate and less screaming in today's political climate.

Despite the clarity of the case it makes for deliberative democracy, *Democracy and Disagreement* is not without flaws. At times, it can appear overly optimistic. Deliberative democracy is a philosophy whose tenets, within limits, are situationally dependent. Both the content (liberty, welfare, fair opportunity) and the processes of deliberative democracy are ever subject to definition and interpretation through deliberation (348). G and T envision no written constitution outlining, defining, and protecting the values of reciprocity, publicity, and accountability in a given society: these processes would depend rather on the dispositions, capabilities, and energies of legislators and voters for their expression in the day-to-day political world. Is it a realistic expectation that citizens will be able to devote such energies to sophisticated reasoning about *process* before even beginning to think about a given issue?

Perhaps the most significant flaw in *Democracy and Disagreement* is that, while claiming to take disagreement seriously, it at times underestimates the reality of that disagreement. The issue of abortion, for example, pits 'pro-life' groups, many made up of staunch and sincere Christian believers, against equally staunch and sincere 'pro-choice' feminists. In such circumstances, deliberative democracy would have such groups respond to each other with respect, acknowledge the impossibility of 'complete understanding' as regards these types of moral dilemmas, and 'agree to disagree.' But is this not in reality suggesting that each moral group abandon its own

very definitive moral code — Biblical or feminist 'truth' — and embrace the transcendent one — a logical admission of the limits of reason — offered alternatively by deliberative democracy?

In spite of these problems, this is an engaging and worthwhile work. The authors note in their introduction that '[w]e do not claim that this book provides a comprehensive theory of deliberative democracy, but we do hope that it contributes toward its future development by showing the kind of deliberation that is possible and desirable in the face of moral disagreement in democracies' (1). In short, this book is an admirable start in the deliberation about deliberation.

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This anthology of eight articles stems from a 1992 conference at the University of Alberta. It ranges from enthusiastic applications to highly critical arguments concerning postmodernism. Contributors include literary theorists, law professors, a political scientist and a philosopher. This diversity is impressive because it gives us an adequate sample of postmodernist thought, and questionable because if difference is taken too far it will endanger the book's coherence.

The editors observe: 'This book itself embodies differences on difference' (19). 'Difference' is a postmodern concept that is in need of radical clarification, and this book attempts to perform that important task, not systematically, but by involving many different voices in separate conversations without adequate contact among them. Usually opposed to 'identity', difference is also known as alterity, otherness, heterogeneity, multiplicity or an emphasis on the distinctness of individuals. This book modestly *explores* the political consequences of theories of differences rather than attempting to

decisively remove the ambiguity and slipperiness of the concept once and for all. However, once we realize that there are difficulties in defining and controlling postmodern language, the question becomes: What is the difference between good and bad differences? Or, When should difference be cultivated, celebrated, avoided, or overcome?

Postmodernism (and perhaps this is also true of its relatives such as deconstruction, post-structuralism, etc.) is an indefinable word, but it makes up for this paradox by aspiring to be an elusive but progressive political movement. It involves a refusal to fix ideas for the sake of argument, but this attempt to argue with ideas that are never defined perspicuously is not supposed to be problematic because there has been a 'narrative turn' and 'arguments are made up of stories' (7) according to the editors. If arguments are made up of premises and conclusions and logical relationships, and there are undeniable differences between the standards of story-telling and good argument, then postmodernism is founded on what Ryle would call a category-mistake.

The editors begin by referring to Linda Hutcheon's historical distinction between Sixties postmodernism (which opposed the establishment idealistically) and Seventies/Eighties postmodernism which is more ambivalent, but involves 'the rejection of hierarchy, suspicions about authority and textual closure, and the impossibility of representation and consensus' (4). Second, they develop a contrast between Lyotard's incredulity towards legitimizing narratives and Habermas's insistence that a crisis in legitimation does not mean we should give up on truth, reason and enlightened politics. This second attempt at a definition collapses when they conclude: 'How postmodernism is best interpreted remains an open question even after the difference between Habermas and Lyotard' (8).

The book is divided into a theoretical part and an applied part with four essays each. The theoretical essays are more interesting for philosophers, though Richard Devlin's applied essay on the 1981 Irish prisoners' hunger strike puts identity politics to a serious test. He argues that postmodernism opens the way for valuing normally excluded perspectives but at the same time cheapens all 'perspectives by arguing that they are but an interpretation with no necessary connection to reality, truth, or justice' (191). The problem for any reflective postmodernist concerns balancing a desire to be open with a need to be critical. Thus, at best, a fixation on difference in general leads to an open-ended ambivalence about the prospects for political change.

The theoretical part opens with Ross Chambers' discussion of the scapegoating process central to communities that dominate others. After warning the reader that 'nothing in theory can be proved' (25), Chambers goes on to argue that denigrated groups should invite those who put them down to join the denigrated group rather than seek admission to the dominant group. Chambers develops a contrast between 'family' type concepts (such as 'gender') and 'context' type concepts (such as 'ideology') which is muddleheaded because there is no clear line to draw between concepts that can be used to discriminate and concepts that cannot be used to discriminate.

Jennifer Nedelsky's 'Reconceiving Rights as Relationship' is the most lucid essay because it argues cogently that the concept of rights can be redeemed despite the objections that rights are inherently individualistic, alienating in that they create barriers between people, and obfuscating. Her strategy is to understand rights primarily in terms of the relationships that they construct among people rather than as legal abstractions existing in ideal moral space. Her 'claim is that we will do a better job of making all these difficult decisions involving rights if we focus on the kind of relationships that we actually want to foster and how different concepts and institutions will best contribute to that fostering.'

Christine Sypnowich argues that the obsession with difference is not novel, and ultimately shows that postmodernists want desperately to be different and instead end up being platitudinous once their literary disguises have been stripped away. She develops a series of objections which suggest that postmodern strategies are inadequate means for improving equality and justice. Her collection of doubts may prove valuable to anyone rehearsing the contrast between illegitimate appeals to differences and their progressive use.

Christopher Norris delivers a one-dimensional attack on Foucault and Rorty as agents of irrationalism and anti-truth. Agreeing with Habermas, he regards postmodernism as 'a retrograde cultural phenomenon which unwittingly runs into many of the dead-end antinomies encountered by thinkers in previous phases of anti-Enlightenment reaction' (96).

The applied essays by Sheila Noonan, Pamela McCallum and Claude Denis tend to be obsessed with difference rather than wary of its political outcomes. Thus, the book juxtaposes positive and negative reactions to postmodernism without forcing an overall judgment. Yet a tendency for over-enthusiastic wordplay separates the 'posties' from their critics and mainstream philosophy. Wittgenstein might have said that postmodernism is a *surrender* to bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. If being different means giving up on clear communication, what politics is left? I share some of Norris' scepticism about postmodernism because the desire for novelty appears to have overrun the need to communicate appropriately. This book exhibits what happens when differences are not subject to systematic judgment and thus has value for philosophers tempted to become postmodern.

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Brian D. Ingraffia
Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology:
Vanquishing God's Shadow.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xi + 284.
US$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-047136-2);
US$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-56840-4).

According to Brian Ingraffia, the deconstructive effort of postmodern theory centres around an atheistic premise which conflates the 'ontotheology' of classical Greek philosophy with Biblical theology. Ingraffia's central argument is that philosophical critiques of modernity from Nietzsche to Derrida target a metaphysical tradition inspired by ontotheology. Nietzsche's attack on Christianity is continued in the work of Heidegger and Derrida, who are 'intent on completing Nietzsche's project of vanquishing God's shadow' (1-2). Furthermore, in the view of Ingraffia, it is the critique of religion mounted by Ludwig Feuerbach that shapes the 'anti-Christian' Enlightenment impulses radicalized by Marx and Freud and which continue in postmodernism and deconstruction. Although postmodernism 'seeks to destroy or deconstruct the very place and attributes of God' (1), it does so while labouring under the misapprehension that Biblical theology is the same as ontotheology. Ingraffia takes great pains to distinguish ontotheology from Biblical theology, arguing that the 'God of biblical revelation' is not the 'god of ontotheology' (5).

The contours of Nietzsche's, Heidegger's and Derrida's critique of Western metaphysics are carefully explored by Ingraffia. He argues that the attack on the 'grand narratives' of modernity and philosophical metaphysics have got the wrong god, as it were. The attack on Christianity and God found in Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida is based upon a misunderstanding that arises out of a distortion and misrepresentation of God that is 'perverted by Greek conceptuality' (237). For Ingraffia, the false god of metaphysics is not the true God of biblical revelation and faith. The mistake at the centre of Nietzsche's 'anti-Christianity' (108) is taken up and largely repeated by Heidegger in particular although somewhat differently by Derrida. Ingraffia argues as well that there is a 'secularized' thread of Christian ideas running through Nietzsche and Heidegger, although Derrida 'seems to break completely with religious tradition ... no doubt as a result of the fact that unlike Nietzsche and Heidegger he was not raised in a Christian tradition' (232-3). Derrida is a Jew.

Although Ingraffia's presentation of certain ideas of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida is adequate, the motivation and nature of his critique is primarily theological and anti-modern. In his discussion of Heidegger's concept of guilt and conscience, Ingraffia warns that '[i]f we use Heidegger's existential conception of guilt to "guide" and "correct" our conception of sin, we will not elucidate the biblical revelation concerning sin, but rather replace this revelation with a philosophical conception of finitude which excludes the

biblical understanding of anthropos as created and in sinful rebellion against its Creator' (149). Ingraffia thinks that adopting such views threatens to 'lead us yet further astray from biblical revelation' (149). Toward the end of the book Ingraffia asserts that we need to disengage biblical theology from the 'ideologies of individualism and self-reliance,' especially warning against the 'limits' of 'Marxist' and 'feminist critiques' of religion, since they are informed by 'modern, Enlightenment' (238) rejections of theology.

The major weakness that structures Ingraffia's entire argument concerns his uncritical privileging of Christianity which he never argues for, but merely asserts as taken for granted. His reference to feminism fails to mention the large and growing number of feminist theologians who have raised important critical issues concerning the sexism of the Christian theological and ecclesial traditions. Passing reference to *Galatians* 3:28, that in Christ 'there is neither male nor female' is sufficient evidence for Ingraffia that biblical theology is not sexist. In an intriguing footnote (262, n.25), Ingraffia suggests that being Christian somehow protected people from embracing Nazism during the Second World War without acknowledging that many Christians did collaborate with the Nazis. The farthest he goes in this direction is to comment on the Christian 'church's' — not churches — response to Nazism as 'mixed'. This suggestion as well disregards research demonstrating the anti-Jewish elements within Christological doctrines such as elaborated by Rosemary Radford Ruether in *Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism* (1974). In the same footnote Ingraffia further suggests an association between modernity and fascism in pointing out what he sees as the compatibility between Nazism and Heidegger's philosophy (262 n.25), and where he interprets Heidegger as doing 'battle with Christianity' by setting 'the Enlightenment ideal of autonomy against the biblical call to death to the self through Christ' (164).

Ingraffia's uncritical privileging of Christianity is underlined by his continuous use of the term 'Judaeo-Christian', which not only collapses Judaism into Christianity but also treats the Hebrew bible and Judaism as mere preparations for and anticipations of Christianity. In this sense Ingraffia reproduces the unfortunate theological bias that assumes Christianity to have superceded Judaism by representing the 'new' Israel, thus reading the entire Hebrew bible in terms of the Easter event. He refers, for example, to the 'Christian account of creation as narrated in the *Hebraic* scriptures' (229, my italics) and discusses the Hebrew scriptures and divine laws as having meaning only with respect to their fulfilment in Christ. At no time does Ingraffia consider that Jews may regard their own scriptures rather differently, and that an exclusive Christian faith interpretation of the Jewish religion that subsumes it within Christianity might be offensive to the Jewish people.

Ingraffia's critique of postmodernism and deconstruction, however, does result in an important but not widely acknowledged insight into their latent conservativism and regressivism. Ironically, the conservative implications of postmodernism intersect with Ingraffia's own conservative tendencies,

which he even seems to recognize when he writes that 'the work of decon-struction only breaks the false logos of rationalism. *In breaking the Enlight-enment faith in reason, of our concept of the truth as residing in self-presence, as our own, Derrida [and postmodernism] can be useful for Christian thinkers'* (224, my italics). Although Ingraffia operates from a position of an uncritical religious faith in the truth of Christianity while describing the philosophers under discussion as 'atheistic thinkers' (223), he does indicate their shared repudiation of Kant's conviction of thinking 'within the limits of reason alone'. For Ingraffia, modernity and rationality are enemies as they are for postmodernists, although for different reasons. This insight is perhaps the most valuable contribution of the book, and needs to be developed further elsewhere.

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Terence Irwin and **Gail Fine**
Aristotle: Introductory Readings.
Indianapolis: Hackett 1996. Pp. xvii + 359.
US$34.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-340-9);
US$9.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87200-339-5).

This collection is abridged from Irwin and Fine's *Aristotle: Selections* (Hack-ett 1995), and will most likely be used in introductory courses in ancient philosophy. It is well suited for that purpose, containing a relatively small but judicious selection of texts in translations that combine faithfulness to the Greek with accessibility to the modern nonspecialist reader. It also contains a brief introduction, a useful glossary, and a very short list of suggestions for further reading. Instructors will likely want to supplement these suggestions with their own bibliographies.

As one would expect, the selections focus mainly on Aristotle's major philosophical works, especially the *Physics, Metaphysics, de Anima*, and *Nicomachean Ethics*. They include the most important chapters from the *Categories* and *de Interpretatione*, although the representation from the *Topics* and *Analytics* is rather sparse. The only excerpts from the biological works are Aristotle's remarks on method in *Parts of Animals* I 1 and I 5. The *Physics* selections include Aristotle's discussion of the principles of coming to be in *Phys* I 7-8, the whole of Book II, several discussions of Zeno's paradox,

and the heart of the argument for the unmoved mover in *Phys* VIII 5-6. The *Metaphysics* material includes most of Books I and IV, as well as Aristotle's account of separate substance in *Metaph* XII 6-10 and an intelligent selection from the central books. The omission of Aristotle's discussion of motion in *Phys* III 1-3 is surprising, however, and students are liable to receive an oversimplified impression of the character of Aristotelian metaphysics owing to the absence of *Metaph* VI 1.

The selections from the *de Anima* and the *Ethics* are made on similar principles, emphasizing the major themes while leaving out details such as the discussions of the individual virtues in *EN* III-IV and the individual sense faculties in *de An* II 7-10. The *Politics* and *Poetics* are less generously represented, and there are no selections from the *Rhetoric*.

The translations are excellent, remaining faithful to the original while yielding a clear sense in a natural English prose style. Although the translators do not always translate the same Greek word with the same English word, variations are carefully noted in the glossary. The occasional doubt arises; for instance, is it really best to inform newcomers to Aristotle that the nature of a physical substance is its 'shape'? (*morphê*, 193b18). This lapse is all the more surprising in that one of the virtues of this translation is its carefulness in avoiding word choices likely to mislead novices.

There are now several good collections of Aristotle selections on the market. The omissions noted above are significant enough that instructors seeking a comprehensive overview will probably turn instead to Ackrill's *New Aristotle Reader* (Princeton University Press 1987), Apostle and Gerson's *Selections* (Peripatetic Press 1982), or the larger compilation from which the present collection is abridged. This inexpensive set of introductory readings will provide ample material for many instructors' purposes, however, and will serve admirably to introduce the newcomer to much of Aristotle's finest philosophical work.

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David Farrell Krell's *folie à deux* with Friedrich Nietzsche comes close to being the perfect disclosure of Nietzsche's philosophy and life. Krell has set himself the task of revealing the mind and life of this genius by telling his story from the perspective of the final decade of his life, recounting Nietzsche's life and philosophy by means of Nietzsche's own stream-of-consciousness, in the midst of the desolation of his mental collapse. This ingenious device realizes the full, lived expanse of Nietzsche's philosophy.

James Joyce once replied, to those who criticized him for his inclusion of 'explicit' material in *Ulysses*, 'This race and this country and this life produced me — I shall express myself as I am' (Joseph Collins, 'A Fine Madness,' *New York Times Book Review*, May 28, 1922 [reprinted 10/6/96: p. 23]). Similarly, by portraying Nietzsche's last ten years, Krell has done for Nietzsche what in the end he couldn't do for himself — he gives voice to the logic of the insanity that Nietzsche's race, country and life engendered in him. This portrait of the decay of the individual who brought the concept of decadence to philosophy intimately examines not only that philosophy, but also the processes of a brilliant mind gone mad. The streams of Nietzsche's consciousness chronicle, not so much delusions about the world, but more importantly the twisted realities of his own intellectual universe. Krell includes Nietzsche's personal history (relying on Curt Paul Janz's three-volume *Friedrich Nietzsche Biographie*), and at the same time alludes to 'every name in history' that Nietzsche, in the end, claimed as his identity.

Following a general chronology of Nietzsche's life are four parts, each with its own chronology listed before it, providing the reader with a chronology of events as a point of reference. The reader also has recourse to the actual medical reports from the Basel and Jena asylums which punctuate the flow of Nietzsche's inflamed consciousness: 'February 10: Very loud. Often enraged, renders inarticulate screams, no external motive — February 20: No longer recognizes the beginning of his most recent book — February 23: Suddenly regales a fellow patient with a series of 'kicks' ... (88, 90-1).

Yet there is much more to *Nietzsche: A Novel* than the translations of the unpublished medical reports, the lively new translation of Nietzsche's letters, a brilliant intertwining philosophy and life, and a chilling portrait of the deterioration of a great man. Certainly the book could be contrasted with other recent biographies of Nietzsche (it is incomparable to Carl Pletsch's similarly intentioned and albeit competent *Young Nietzsche: Becoming a Genius* [New York: Macmillan 1991]), or contrasted with the other novel on Nietzsche published recently (Irvin D. Yalom's *When Nietzsche Wept* [New York: Harper Collins 1992], unlike Krell's, is neither philosophy nor a

biography). But *Nietzsche: A Novel* is innovative where the others are conventional. This book calls into question the status of *any* biography as non-fiction. Krell is honest about the mythicization of his subject, implicitly claiming that such a subject has always already disappeared into the mythical — which is especially true of the subject 'Nietzsche', who mythicized not only himself, but his entire milieu. For after all, why do we read biographies, if not to penetrate the inner world of the biographand, to *become* that person, to experience the unexpurgated banal flesh of that life? Krell's work leads one to the conclusion that there is no better way for a biographer to provide this than by setting himself free from the deadening doldrums of factuality, simply by calling the biography 'fiction', which it always already is.

Compare Krell's boldness with the caution exercised on another extraordinary life, in David Macey's *The Lives of Michel Foucault* (New York: Pantheon 1993): 'Accounts of the bad relations between Foucault and his father have no doubt been inflated ... One factor that might lend credence to the rumored loathing of his father was Foucault's refusal to use the name Paul-Michel ... It is possible to see this as evidence of a refusal to identify with his father, but the temptation to indulge in psychological speculation should be tempered by two other possible explanations ...' (11-12). Krell, on the other hand, concocts a conversation that Nietzsche imagines between himself and his father, which shows not only the probabilities, but also the possibilities, of that relationship for Nietzsche: '—And for the rest of my life I was certain that I was dying of your implanted seed, Father, that you were the seed of death in me ... I felt it that winter in Naumburg and the following spring in Sorrento, the most vital spring of my life; felt the germ of death bursting through the husk, flourishing thriving burgeoning smothering all of life's tender shoots, crowding them out, suffocating all my other thoughts. —I loved you, my boy. From my impossibly far remove, I loved you. I watched over you and guarded you. I was your amulet against them. —Them? —Against the women, son. Have no pretense before me. You know it was they who engendered the death in you. I was the very spirit of life ...' (295).

In *Nietzsche: A Novel*, a decade is as dense as a lifetime, and for this Krell is indebted to James Joyce. Just as *Ulysses* chronicles one day in the life of a man, *Nietzsche: A Novel* relates the mundane events of one decade in the sanitarium, to the hours and days and years — the entire lifetime, both inner and outer — of one man. Krell, like Joyce, disposes of narrative sequential ordering, most notably in the use of Nietzsche's letters. In parodies of Nietzsche's own philosophical prose, in chaotic conversations and palaver, in alliterated chatter with studied incoherence, in mixtures of erudition and compulsive wordplay, and in the mingling of past, present and future, Nietzsche comes to life in his complexity, and with more accuracy than any 'factual' biography ever could have. One thing is, however, plain: it has taken a profoundly learned philosopher to write this biography, and it will take the same to fully appreciate it.

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This lucid and useful book is a sustained argument for the following position: that social freedom is best construed as a triadic relation between an autarchic agent A, another autarchic agent B, and some choice or action x, which is such that B is socially unfree to do x iff A is morally responsible for the non-suppression of some obstacle to B's doing x. In making this case, Kristjánsson also argues for the position that 'it is methodologically possible to construct an authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and critical but non-relative' (207).

Kristjánsson begins by firmly allying himself with the general framework of 'negative' freedom, which concerns itself primarily with the absence of external constraint, as opposed to that of 'positive' freedom, which focuses more upon the notion of self-direction. He then proceeds to analyse what is to *count* as an external constraint, and, partly through critique of non-responsibility views of negative freedom (such as Hobbes'), tries to show that 'a necessary condition of a constraint is that an agent is morally [and not merely causally] *responsible* for its existence' (38, my emphasis) — that is, it is legitimate to either praise or blame the constraining agent for the obstacle, either because she imposed it herself, failed to prevent someone else from imposing it, or failed to remove it after it had been created.

Having thrown in his lot with the responsibility view of negative freedom, however, Kristjánsson then proceeds to roundly criticise all the other exponents of the view, such as Benn and Weinstein and David Miller, finding problems with their various accounts of the nature of obstacles and of responsibility. Along the way, Kristjánsson argues that constraints are best seen as a sub-class of the non-moral class of 'obstacles', and also develops his own account of responsibility: 'An agent A is morally responsible for the non-suppression of an obstacle O to B's choices/action when it is appropriate to request from A a justification of his non-suppression of O, and that in turn is when there is an objective *reason*, satisfying a minimal condition of plausibility, why A, given that he is a normal, reasonable person, could have been expected (morally or factually) to suppress O' (74).

Kristjánsson then turns to fending off potential attacks by the positive liberty theorists (such as Charles Taylor). In particular, he insists that someone cannot make *themselves* unfree: that is, A and B in the above triadic definition cannot be the same person. Kristjánsson argues that several so-called 'positive' theories of liberty, such as those of L. Crocker and I. Hunt, are in fact negative theories in disguise, and asserts that 'everything which can be correctly said about freedom by means of a positive-liberty vocabulary, can be said with even greater clarity within the confines of negative accounts' (114).

Kristjánsson also discusses some of the relations between freedom and related concepts. For example, he claims that freedom does not presuppose the actual exercise of autonomy, but only 'autarchy' — the general psychological constitution necessary for autonomy (126). And he argues that the notions 'constraining B's freedom' and 'exercising power over B' are co-extensional (151) — that is, the political notions of freedom and power are much more closely linked than is usually recognised.

Finally, Kristjánsson makes some methodological observations, proposing four necessary conditions for fruitful conceptual study: (1) respect for common usage; (2) internal and external coherence; (3) serviceability and non-relativity; and (4) accounting for conceptual contestedness. He attacks the standard descriptive-prescriptive distinction, and says that 'I have tried to show that freedom-talk has a particular point or purpose in human relations, and have argued critically for a particular definition of "(social) freedom" that best conveys this point. In the end, I claim to have proposed a definition that is *objective* in the sense of being objectively useful to those interested in certain relations between agents, relations which are of widespread importance for human beings' (194).

Social Freedom is a book with many virtues and few imperfections. Its wide-ranging, if polemical, discussion of the various positions in the debate on freedom serves as a useful survey, and the level of argumentation is generally high. The discussion proceeds in a careful and focused manner, and is often very convincing. Kristjánsson's style is formal and clear, but every so often there is a charming, and sometimes very Icelandic, flash of colour: he is prone to quoting Pindar or the *Edda*, or observing that unsympathetic readers might see his arguments as 'much cry and little wool' (167). On the other hand Kristjánsson's dismissals of competing views are sometimes excessively quick, even for a book of this scope: for example, moralised accounts of freedom (theories in which something can be a constraint on freedom only if it is morally wrong — Robert Nozick is a prominent proponent of such a view) are ruled out of court in little more than a paragraph (20).

More substantively, Kristjánsson's theory of social freedom seems in the end importantly indeterminate; not as an analysis of the relation itself, but as an account of what the concept *comes to*. Someone constrains another's social freedom, on Kristjánsson's account, iff they can be held morally responsible for the constraint: but just when we are to ascribe moral responsibility is (of course) not specified. Kristjánsson argues fervently and quite plausibly that the demand for such a condition does not amount to descent into relativity or essential contestedness. But he must admit that his particular analysis of social freedom relies heavily upon some yet-to-be-specified theory of the good, and without such an account it is relatively formless. On one conception of the good, his theory of freedom amounts to libertarianism; on another, it supports welfare liberalism; on yet another, perhaps, it is a prop for communitarianism. This indeterminacy is not necessarily a problem — indeed, it could be regarded as a virtue that all the various points on the compass rose of political philosophy can be shown to be arguing about the

same concept of freedom. But it does suggest that much substantive work on freedom remains to be done even after Kristjánsson's analysis.

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Timur Kuran
Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1995. Pp. xv + 423.
US$45.00. ISBN 0-674-70757-5.

Preference falsification is the kind of lying one does when one misrepresents one's beliefs and desires. In *Private Truths, Public Lies* Timur Kuran develops a multi-disciplinary social-scientific theory to accommodate this common but largely ignored phenomenon. In the process he shows not only that the consequences of this sort of lying are socially and politically harmful, but also that the social sciences need to undergo something of a paradigm shift to understand them.

Kuran's analysis of preference falsification begins with an individual's need to choose a public preference on a given issue. Knowing that the issue will be resolved according to the aggregation of public preferences, and that he will be judged by others according to the preference he conveys, the individual's choice is guided by three considerations. He must gauge the strength of his urge to express his true feelings. He must consider the satisfaction to be gained or lost when society resolves the issue the way he wishes or otherwise. And he must weigh the costs and benefits of being perceived as someone who holds this or that opinion. In the terms of Kuran's framework, one chooses a public preference by trying to maximize the total of one's expressive, intrinsic, and reputational utilities respectively.

This sort of calculus is well understood by those who wish to shape public opinion about a given issue. Activists, factions, interest groups, and political actors in general use their resources to persuade or pressure people to publicly support their stance on an issue. When such efforts are intense, and when the issue in question is sensitive enough, an individual may find it prudent to express preferences and beliefs which he does not hold.

This dualism between one's private and public selves, perhaps harmless or beneficial in some circumstances, can be socially and politically damaging. In the short term, preference falsification conceals actual public opinion and

distorts public discourse. In the long term, it undermines private beliefs and desires, as well as our attempts to understand and predict social phenomena.

Kuran illustrates these consequences by applying his analysis to a range of issues, paying special attention to race relations and affirmative action in the US, the caste system in India, and the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. In each case, wide-spread unwillingness to air actual beliefs and preferences contributes to the endurance of a social system which most people do not want. Pressured by activists and the weight of (false) public opinion, isolated from the knowledge that others feel as they do, individuals refrain from debating the merits and drawbacks of the status quo. For example, some forms of affirmative action have only recently been debated openly in the United States, even though polls have long shown them to enjoy less than unanimous popular support. The public policy that flows from such stunted public discourse tends to reinforce the existing social arrangement, strengthening or expanding the institutions which directly or indirectly keep it in place. Later generations, inheriting what amounts to a settled question (albeit one settled by preference falsification rather than by open debate), may come to support the status quo sincerely. What they want and know will have been shaped by the lies of their predecessors.

For the social scientist, preference falsification presents a unique challenge. The considerations faced by the individual who needs to choose a public preference are not the subject of any one discipline. Kuran's 'dual-preference model' synthesizes concepts and methods from psychology, economics, and sociology, among others. Like any multi-disciplinary endeavor, this theory must negotiate between conflicting assumptions and adapt theoretical tools designed for more narrow purposes. Particularly troubling for the scientist is the fact that preference falsification is by definition concealed. Most straightforward methods of gauging public opinion will be unable to detect, much less measure it. Some techniques have recently been devised to uncover people's real preferences, but as Kuran points out, they are still far from reliable.

A different kind of challenge presented by preference falsification is the sort of unavoidable unpredictability it creates. The unpredictability stems partly from the fact that people vary greatly when it comes to the amount of pressure needed to make them convey a given preference on a given issue. Small changes in the mixture of preferences expressed in an individual's environment may lead him to choose a new public preference. His change may in turn create just enough pressure to convince someone else to change. On the other hand, it might not. When circumstances are right, as they were in Eastern Europe at the end of the last decade, the expression of new preferences by a small number of people can cause something of a snowball effect. A social or political system that looks stable can unravel all at once, surprising even sophisticated observers. But since we cannot know just where each person's threshold is, nor who will be exposed to the additional pressure created by anyone's change, we cannot know when such changes will happen. Where preference falsification is wide-spread, public opinion is

discontinuous and sensitive to very small events: its stability cannot be determined. The 'predictable unpredictability' of public opinion suggests that the idea fundamental to some scientific traditions, that social relationships are 'simple, continuous, harmonious, predictable, controllable and efficient,' must be reconsidered.

There is not enough room here to do justice to this book's breadth and richness. It is well-written and accessible, and it draws on Kuran's reading in many disciplines. For just these reasons it will be of value to many different kinds of readers. The technical sections are explained clearly. The case studies are engaging and informed. The chapters on affirmative action are provocative, perhaps controversial, but certainly timely.

A particular strength of Kuran's argument is that it privileges neither individual choices nor social forces, but rather shows the circular relationship between the individual and the social, the private and the public. If Kuran is correct, concealment and misrepresentation result in the loss, not the protection, of what we desire and know.

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Joachim Lacrosse
L'amour chez Plotin. Érôs hénologique, érôs noétique, érôs psychique.
Bruxelles: Editions Ousia 1994. Pp. 143.
Prix 77FF. ISBN 2-87060-044-5.

L'amour constitue une des questions emblématiques de la tradition platonicienne dans l'Antiquité et pourtant, même quand elles font retour à la Renaissance, par exemple dans l'œuvre de Marsile Ficin, les formulations produites dans le cadre de cette tradition nous semblent souvent obscures. Les réinterprétations successives ont contribué à produire cette obscurité, notamment dans l'exégèse néoplatonicienne du *Banquet* et du *Phèdre*. Déjà chez Platon, comme l'avait montré magnifiquement Léon Robin (*La théorie platonicienne de l'amour*, 1964, 2e éd.), l'amour est associé aussi bien à l'explication du mouvement dialectique vers l'objet de la connaissance qu'à l'exhortation morale cherchant à conduire le philosophe vers l'expérience de l'ineffabilité et de la rencontre mystique. Sur tous ces plans, le désir de s'unir paraît aussi puissant que le désir de s'élever et de se fondre dans une réalité supérieure. Quand Plotin, héritier de cette tradition, cherche à interpréter les textes de Platon, il ne peut éviter de les transformer en étendant leur

signification aux dimensions de l'édifice métaphysicque mis en place par les *Ennéades*.

Dans son effort pour exposer la pensée de Plotin concernant l'amour, l'auteur adopte dans ce court ouvrage la méthode qui semble la plus adéquate. Il présente d'abord, en leur consacrant le chapitre le plus élaboré de son travail, les assises platoniciennes de l'interprétation de Plotin de même que les écarts et les ruptures introduits par la transformation de sa métaphysique. Avec beaucoup de justesse, il montre comment Plotin confie à l'amour une fonction qui déborde d'emblée les perspectives de la dialectique. En instituant non seulement l'Intellect (le Noûs) comme sujet métaphysique du monde intelligible, en lieu et place d'un monde d'objets, mais également en posant la diversité hypostatique de l'Âme universelle, de l'âme du monde et des âmes individuelles comme support d'un amour contemplatif et d'une conversion vers le principe supérieur, Plotin fait de l'amour un principe qui traverse toute la métaphysique et s'achève dans l'Un Lui-même. L'auteur fait donc voir comment cette interprétation des textes platoniciens les déborde entièrement, en les entraînant vers une érotique métaphysique dont l'achèvement est, à chaque stade, motivé par sa finalité mystique. On peut donc parler à bon droit d'un «déplacement sublimant de la pensée de Platon» (30). Ce processus va de pair avec une forme d'ontologisation des notions platoniciennes: Plotin en effet hypostasie ses principes et dans le cas de l'Un, il ne craint pas de l'identifier au Bien, ce qui déjà fixe dans une transcendance essentielle, ce qui n'était dans la *République* que l'Idée du Bien. Cette hiérarchie des principes s'accompagne d'une hiérarchie des amours, ainsi que l'enseigne le traité III, 5.

Lecteur attentif des travaux de P. Hadot sur ce traité, l'auteur met à profit également le commentaire de A. Wolters. Des questions comme celle de la fonction des mythes et celle de la cohérence des interprétations reçoivent ici un trairement très intéressant, notamment en ce qui concerne le rôle du récit et de la généalogie. Quant à l'exposé de l'interprétation plotinienne elle-même du mythe du *Banquet*, l'auteur l'effectue en suivant les diverses figures mythologiques. La méthode est pédagogique, elle permet une lecture systématique des motifs thématiques (les Aphrodites, Poros, Penia, Erôs, etc ...), mais elle n'ajoute pas beaucoup aux commentaires de Wolters et de Hadot.

Le deuxième chapitre est consacré à l'amour comme vecteur de la conversion dans les hypostases de l'âme et de l'Intellect: l'âme cherche en effet à imiter le rapport qu'entretient l'Intellect avec l'Un. L'auteur distingue donc une érotique psychique et une érotique noétique, illustrant toutes deux la nature profondément érotique du mouvement par lequel l'être émané de l'Un désire y retourner. L'auteur examine l'amour comme pathos de l'âme, toujours déjà marqué par l'ambivalence, et son dépassement dans l'amour démonique. Il discute également le rôle de la dialectique et des vertus dans la purification. Sa lecture est d'abord sensible au dépassement de perspectives purement propédeutiques et elle se fonde sur l'imitation de l'érotique noétique. C'est en effet sur ce plan supérieur que l'amour manifeste sa

véritable nature: il est d'abord désir du Bien. Le traité VI,7 joue ici un rôle crucial, puisqu'on y retrouve la représentation de l'amour comme emportement de la pensée vers son principe, de l'engendré vers son géniteur. Par le biais d'une lecture de ce texte, l'auteur nous met en présence du dépouillement prescrit par Plotin à tout amour désireux d'être fidèle à la vérité de l'amour qui est la rencontre du Bien.

Le chapitre final se centre sur l'érôs hénologique. Prenant appui sur des passages aussi rares que précieux du traité VI,8 et prenant le contre pied des interprétations courantes, l'auteur veut donner à l'amour de l'Un pour Lui-même une signification ontologique. Peut-on, en effet, l'interpréter comme don, et non seulement comme repli sur soi ou comme métaphore de la pure concentration ? Les formulations proposées me semblent excessives, surtout quand elles en viennent à engager une signification providentielle (112). L'auteur a sans doute raison cependant d'insister sur l'implication mutuelle de l'amour et de la présence, ce qui permet d'interpréter la présence universelle comme un amour universel. De la même manière, cette présence est saisie comme absence dans la distance, rendant possible (118) la compréhension de l'origine de l'amour comme recherche de la présence.

En dépit de sa brièveté, ce livre fournit une riche synthèse de la pensée de l'amour dans la métaphysique de Plotin. Plusieurs questions difficiles demeurent à peine effleurées — par exemple celle de la mystique — mais c'est la rançon de toutes les lectures thématiques d'une œuvre métaphysique. Parmi les commentaires contemporains, ce livre vient néanmoins se situer en bonne place dans la foulée des questions soulevées par John Rist (*Eros and Psyché*, 1967), auxquelles il apporte un heureux contrepoint.

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Every war leaves behind its orphans amongst the rubble. With the end of the Cold War, Marxist academics seem like just such human flotsam. Despite the fact that most fiercely deny any relationship with collapsed Communist regimes, they are still lost and forlorn; victims of the general wreck. The crisis in Marxism is palpable and clearly bewildering for them. They gather

together for warmth and reassurance. They hold conferences on the future of Marxism, when what they are anxiously discussing is the future of themselves.

This volume is the product of just such a conference, entitled 'Whither Marxism?'. There are ten papers of various kinds, from high theory to practical advice. All suggest a certain anxiety as to whether they are not so much 'avant garde scholars', as the editors quaintly call them, as left-behind-by-history scholars.

It must be said that the collection varies greatly in quality and relevance. There is a piece by Keith Griffin and Azizur Khan on how the Chinese are managing the transition to a market economy more successfully than the East Europeans, and another by Carlos Vilas on how poverty and disadvantage are increasing in South America. But while interesting, neither paper directly addresses the volume's stated theme: 'the connection between the death of communism and the fate of Marxism' (xi). Another kind of obliqueness comes from Abdul Janmohamed and Gyatri Spivak whose respective contributions imply (as they float off on a cloud of high theory) that the future of Marxism lay in the intricacies of French post-structuralism.

Others are more clear but not necessarily more useful. A piece by Ashot Galoian tells us that nationalism was very important in the early days of the Soviet Union, and has become very important again since its collapse. The editors helpfully add that the lesson for Marxism is that it needs to take more account of nationalism in the future. Well, indeed.

The remaining papers address the central question more directly. Least committed is Andrei Marga. He insists that while Marxism-Leninism was a distortion, nonetheless classical Marxism must share some responsibility for the horrors of Communism. Marx's theory of human nature is chiefly at fault, concentrating too narrowly upon labour at the expense of other needs such as freedom. However, rebuilding would result in what could no longer justify the label 'Marxism'. But then, why start from Marx in the first place? What we seem to have here is a personal struggle with old beliefs.

By contrast, Zhang Longxi takes a rather conventional New Left line, arguing that it is the scientism and determinism of the late Marx that has failed. The utopianism of the young Marx of the *Paris Manuscripts* is what remains alive and a source of inspiration. However, with Su Shaozhi we have a rather different view: that Marx was correct in more of his analysis than the Marxist-Leninists allowed. The Menshevics had in fact spoken truly when they argued that undeveloped countries could not just jump a stage or telescope revolutions, but had to go through a bourgeois phase like the West. Su Shaozhi interprets the present Chinese adoption of the free market in terms of learning the lessons of capitalism for development. The lessons of democracy also need to be learnt. The paper concludes rather vaguely (and begging more questions than can easily be computed) that if these lessons are learnt Marxism has a bright future.

Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff's contribution is also positive. With a few deft and fairly plausible theoretical adjustments they are able to retain

a clear faith in an ultimate Marxist victory. The mode of production in Communist states is properly understood as state capitalist. We can then see the history of the Twentieth Century in terms of an oscillation between various forms of state capitalism (from Stalinism to New Deal) and various forms of private capitalism. Swings towards state capitalism have as yet failed to make the transition to socialism, but eventually, Resnick and Wolff believe, it will happen. Only at the end, when they rhetorically ask, 'When?', does the note of anxiety creep in.

Douglas Kellner's contribution is perhaps most characteristic of the book as a whole, caught somewhere between realism and commitment, doubt and hope. Initially it seems confident enough. Those who believe Marxism obsolete are foolish or ignorant. The aberration of Soviet totalitarianism was the responsibility of Rousseau and Hegel, not Marx, who, it seems, was a model democrat all along. Like capitalism, Marxism is always in crisis, always revising itself. The present crisis presents an ideal opportunity for reshaping Marxist politics.

Kellner's ideal is a Marxism that is 'without guarantees, teleology, and foundations, will be more open, tolerant, sceptical, and modest than previous versions' (25). Much of classical Marxism is obsolete, but much can still be used. Politically Marxism can remain at least part of the radical spectrum (and presumably a tiny part of the total spectrum, since we are all liberal democrats now). Marxism can apparently contribute to a society in which 'all classes' can be involved in self government (21) and where capitalism is properly regulated (22). Thus, the classless society and the end of capitalism are among the obsolete parts, apparently to be replaced by feminism, multiculturalism and concern for the environment. Many (both friend and foe) may wonder what is left here that is distinctly Marxist.

This 'bouquet of papers' (sic, xi) hardly offers a new way forward for Marxism, since there is little that is fresh or arresting. But if these contributors are perhaps themselves doomed to obsolescence, this is not necessarily so of Marxism itself. It is in fact very difficult to actually kill an ideology. In the 1960s we all thought *laissez faire* liberalism was dead and buried, only to see it, a decade later, striding about the world in rude health. It seems likely that socialism of some kind will revive in the future, if only as Keynesian social democracy. And who knows in the longer term. What seems less certain is that capitalism, socialism or anything else can constitute the end of history. The world turns, time passes, and ideologies have their day; sometimes more than once.

Whether our band of 'avant garde scholars' will live to see some future revival of Marxism, fully armed and confident, is perhaps doubtful. They can only wait and hope. In the meanwhile, there are always conferences.

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The work of Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) failed to attract the attention it deserved in the philosophical community until long after his death. Perhaps this is in part because, as Cecilia Miller remarks in her recent book, 'one can hardly fail to notice ... the quite amazing jumble of ideas and ... lack of precise terminology' in his writing (120). However, despite his analytical shortcomings Vico was an original thinker. In recent years there has been a revival of interest in this Neapolitan scholar, marked by several compelling attempts to discern the order in the apparent chaos and to establish his relevance for contemporary thought. For Miller, the most important of modern interpreters is Isaiah Berlin, who has highlighted 'Vico's original methods of examining history' (6). In this view, while most of his contemporaries wrote under the harsh glare of rationalism, Vico dared to emphasize the role of the non-rational aspect of human nature in society and history. As Miller remarks, 'Vico's fundamental importance in the history of European ideas lies in his strong anti-Cartesian, anti-French and anti-Enlightenment views' (1). Miller's book seeks to deepen Berlin's insight through a close textual study of Vico's intellectual development and a defense of the centrality of the imagination in his historical thinking.

Miller makes two major claims about Vico. First, she argues that the standard view of Vico's intellectual development is wrong. While most scholars have claimed that Vico broke decisively with Cartesian epistemology in 1710, Miller asserts that his struggle with Descartes began much earlier. To prove this point she examines in some detail his early writings. In the first chapter she surveys Vico's seven *Orations* that he wrote from 1699 to 1707 and notes that even before the supposed break Vico was in sharp opposition to Descartes 'even if he himself did not fully recognize it until later in his life' (15). Most importantly, he always believed that imagination offered 'a much more profound method' to understand the world than reason (14), which suggests that even at an early stage in his development Vico was committed to one of his central claims: Because the social world, unlike the natural world, is created through human activity, it can be fully comprehended (27). Rather than any sudden break, then, there was a 'slow shift in Vico's thought' (25).

Miller's second major claim is that the focus of many scholars on Vico's well-known cyclical view of history misses the central theoretical importance of the imagination (*fantasia*) in his work. Indeed, the work she devotes to establishing the first claim helps establish her second as well. If, as Miller claims, in his early writings Vico was already not a Cartesian, then we can expect to find that the imagination was privileged over reason there too.

Interestingly, Miller goes on to claim that Vico's best known work, the third edition of *The New Science*, does not emphasize the fundamental ideas of his *oeuvre*. The early works 'are much undervalued,' she writes, 'and it is in *Il diritto universale* and the first two editions of *La scienza nuova* that Vico expressed his ideas on social groups and human history in the most sophisticated form' (41).

In her last two chapters, Miller turns from a presentation of the textual and historical foundations of her claim to a reconstruction of Vico's position itself. She shows that '[l]anguage was ... the means by which knowledge of the past could be obtained' (143). It was through the study of myth and poetic language that Vico sought to understand early societies. But, as Miller emphasizes, Vico was not interested what language revealed about any particular society, but about the development of primitive society in general (109). Because language was crucial in the production of culture, and because this creative activity was common to all societies at a similar stage of development, Vico thought that he could discern the common structure of social life through an analysis of language. Thus, Vico established a 'mental dictionary,' a list of fundamental concepts that allows the historian to 'enter' and 'descend' into the life of all past cultures (117).

In conclusion, Miller distinguishes three roles for the imagination in the production of historical life and the process of historical inquiry. First, imagination was the creative process whereby primitive peoples made 'sense of their physical and social environments' (120). Second, it was the 'spirit of a particular age' (120). And third, it describes 'the function we must ourselves employ to unlock the minds ... of these past civilisations' (120). In other words, Miller argues, imagination is nothing less than Vico's 'new science' itself (125), the link between past cultures and ourselves.

However, Miller's account is not always compelling, for a variety of reasons. Although Miller clearly states that she is not interested in Vico's sources or his followers but in close textual analysis of his texts (7), when she does invoke other philosophers, her description of their views is often based on secondary sources and is sometimes overstated. For instance, she claims on the basis of the first part of the *Discourse on Method* that 'Descartes despised history' (1), whereas what he really says is that though there is a use for history one ought not spend too much time on it.

More significantly, Miller avoids any sustained criticism or defense of Vico's views. Perhaps this is because she follows Vico in believing that 'the history of anything is a sufficient explanation of it' (138). Certainly she is correct to claim that 'Vico cannot be placed neatly into the tradition of Western philosophy' (7). Yet she also claims a variety of modern parallels, from Donald Davidson (45) to Michel Foucault (117). Moreover, she takes care to note that, in her interpretation, although imagination is central, there is still a place for reason and empirical verification in historical inquiry (146). Therefore, it is surprising that Miller does not subject Vico's ideas to a more strenuous critique. Her focus throughout remains historical rather than philosophical. Miller's book will certainly have something to offer the Vico

scholar, but will have less interest for the general reader looking for a critical assessment of Vico's claims.

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This fine collection consists of sixteen essays, only two of which have previously been published and all of which are worth reading carefully. Leslie Green opens the collection, arguing that even those who find arguments based on finding reflective equilibrium appropriate in political theory cannot use the widespread acceptance of the state's legitimacy to ground an argument justifying the state. In 'Philosophical Anarchism' John Simmons provides a nice survey of the literature, an excellent schema of the different varieties of anarchist theories, and a defence of weak aposteriori anarchism.

The late Gregory Kavka's 'Why Even Morally Perfect People Would Need Government' argues that even 'people who always act on flawless moral belief systems would need a forcible mechanism — claiming unique legitimacy — to authoritatively settle practical disagreements' (43). Of Kavka's four reasons angels need government, his most interesting argument is (nor surprisingly) the game-theoretic one. Interactions between angels, like interactions between egoists, lead to prisoner's dilemmas and public goods problems. And (unlike most other contributors to this volume) Kavka thinks even angels' 'moral aims will be better achieved if all are mutually coerced by government than if they act independently in the light of their flawless moral beliefs' (45).

In 'Market-Anarchy, Liberty, and Pluralism' Jan Clifford Lester claims that contemporary 'so-called liberals' fail to 'take liberty seriously and so cannot see that anarchy and the market are libertarian'. Unimpressive though his argument for this generalization is, he intriguingly claims that (many; Lester would claim, all) 'rights that are inconsistent with liberty have malign unintended consequences' because of the perverse incentives and moral hazards they create. Though Lester fails to provide the empirical evidence supporting his claim, his argument is strong enough to show that liberals should be more cautious about not cutting off our noses to spite our

faces when political rights are given the force of law. In 'Justifying the State' (a revised version of an article originally appearing in *Ethics*) David Schmidtz rehearses his distinction — which will be familiar to many readers because of the crucial role it plays in Schmidtz's *The Limits of Government* — between teleological and emergent justifications for the state. Schmidtz is primarily interested in emergent justification of the state and, like most libertarian/anarchist thinkers, fails to consider the obvious (utilitarian) teleological justifications. Jonathan Wolff, in 'Anarchism and Skepticism', seeks a way to fairly represent the debate between the statist and the anarchist. He argues that the appropriate analogy is with Quine's way of representing the debate between naturalized epistemology and epistemic skepticism. (Quine holds that, as long as science is doing tolerably well at predicting future sense data, the skeptic's dream hypothesis should be regarded as unsupported. But, were the predictive accuracy of science to wane, skepticism would deserve our support.) There is a lot to be said for mining other areas of philosophy in order to fairly characterize the debate, but, though Wolff's suggestion is intriguing, it seems ultimately misguided. We have a natural, direct, way to test the statist position, the consequentialist one. It is obvious that people do worse in really bad states than they would under anarchy. And, though most contributors to this book would disagree, the reverse is also true — we fare much better in a really good state than we would under anarchy. But the epistemological analogy seems unworkable here for it isn't clear that lousy sciences — say Creationism — do much worse than skepticism in predicting new sense data. So Quine's suggestion, whatever its merits in epistemology, is insufficiently isomorphic with the statist/anarchist debate to be of help. Wolff's paper includes an excellent concise presentation of Thomas Scanlon's work.

Howard Harriott's 'Games, Anarchy, and the Nonnecessity of the State' provides a clear, concise, non-technical, but thorough account of various game-theoretic non-coercive solutions to various prisoner's dilemmas/public goods problems, while Anthony de Jasay's 'Self Contradictory Contractarianism' questions the prospects for a contractarian justification of the state.

In 'The Rights of Chickens: Rational Foundations for Libertarianism?', which (excepting Kavka's article) I found the most impressive, Peter Danielson argues that libertarian contractarians' exclusive focus on prisoner's dilemmas leads them to underestimate other challenges. In particular, chicken (a game where each player prefers Cooperate/Defect and Defect/Cooperate to mutual defection) requires a solution, one it is not clear the libertarian has the resources to provide. I hope that Danielson's article will stimulate the serious responses it clearly deserves, for it poses a serious challenge to libertarians.

Cheyney Ryan's 'The State and War Making' examines the surprisingly neglected topic of what (if anything) gives states the legitimate power to go to war and thereby expose their citizens to grave bodily danger. Ryan suggests that many liberal discussions of liberty and neutrality might better be recast in terms of peace. (Hobbes, Locke, and classical liberals favor what

Martin Luther King Jr. has called negative peace, whereas Rousseau, Rawls, and, one would suppose, the utilitarians argue for positive peace.) I wish that Ryan had included a discussion of the recent debates over whether democracies ever go to war with each other.

David Friedman's 'Anarchy and Efficient Law' offers a wonderfully insightful account of Richard Posner's law and economics project. Whereas Posner tries to show that most of the common law can be explained by supposing that judges seek to maximize economic efficiency, Friedman takes an enlighteningly different tact, arguing that, were people to purchase legal services in a free market, the resulting legal system would be economically efficient.

Each editor contributed a helpful article, which collectively serve to insightfully unite threads in the other articles. But, the title notwithstanding, this is not a collection of essays for and against the state, for no essays defend the modern liberal welfare state. As titled, it is like a collection of articles defending various versions of atheism — mentioning in passing that theism provides some folks minor psychological comfort — titled collection *For and Against Religion*! The volume should be titled *Libertarianism versus Anarchism* or even *Against and Against the State*!

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John Roemer
Theories of Distributive Justice.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1996. Pp. 342.
US$39.95. ISBN 0-674-87919-8.

Roemer describes this book as an attempt to present political philosophy to economists in a 'digestible' form. One cannot help but find it disheartening that, in the process, he manages to make it unintelligible to the vast majority of philosophers. Nevertheless, given that this book is intended primarily to be used as a textbook for graduate students in economics, it would be inappropriate to complain about the Bourbaki ethos permeating the text. The informal presentation that accompanies the more technical material is enough to convey the general significance of the results, and the book has enough clarity and insight on a wide range of issues to merit the attention of any philosopher with a professional interest in the theory of distributive justice.

Roemer's concern about the state of communication between economists and philosophers is in fact two-fold, and his attention in the book is divided evenly between the two problems that he perceives. As far as the contributions of economists to debates over distributive justice go, Roemer is of the opinion that they have been, for the most part, simply unhelpful. This he diagnoses as the result of a general lack of 'sophistication' on normative issues. Philosophical audiences will therefore be flattered to learn that Roemer (a professor of economics), believes that economics should be the 'handmaiden' of philosophy in these discussions, and further, that he does 'not believe that the economist's way of thinking has produced, or will ever produce, important new insights into what distributive justice is. The key new concepts in the last thirty years in the theory of distributive justice — primary goods, functionings and capability, responsibility in its various forms, procedural versus outcome justice, midfare — have all come from the philosophical way of thinking' (3).

This is not to suggest, however, that philosophers get off easy. While Roemer spends the first half of the book developing some rather biting criticism of the economics literature, the second half is devoted to a critical review of the central philosophical contributions to the theory of distributive justice. Here he argues that philosophers, for want of technical sophistication, have on occasion produced distributive schemes that are dangerously close to incoherence (such as Rawls's application of the difference principle to an unspecified 'index' of primary goods [167]), or else, due to lack of familiarity with economic modelling techniques, have laboriously rediscovered special cases of more general economic results (thus he attributes the 'Byzantine complexity' of Ronald Dworkin's hypothetical insurance market to 'the result of a clever but economically untrained philosopher struggling to rediscover a subtle economic idea' [248n]).

The most philosophically interesting material in the first half of the book consists of Roemer's critique of three well-known results from the economics literature — Arrow's impossibility theory, Nash's bargaining solution, and Harsanyi's arguments for utilitarianism — all centered around a common theme. He attempts to show that these results, which appear to say extremely powerful and general things about the nature of distributive justice, upon closer inspection turn out not to say very much at all. Roemer argues that these results derive their apparent force from the fact that they start out with extremely thin presuppositions, yet proceed to make determinate and significant conclusions. This is an illusion, according to Roemer, because the presuppositions are not actually weak — their thinness has the effect of impoverishing the information structure of the model, making it easier to produce very general claims.

For instance, it is often regarded as a strength of Arrow's impossibility theorem that one need 'only' presuppose ordinal utility scales in order for it to obtain. Roemer shows, however, that with certain improvements in the information about agents' preferences, e.g., if utility information permitting interpersonal comparison becomes available, then the theorem no longer

holds. Similarly, he argues that Nash's bargaining solution, which appears to offer a general solution to any distribution problem, relies upon the information structure being restricted to the utility functions of agents. When information is introduced about the underlying economic environment, e.g., the identity of the goods that are being distributed, Nash's axioms no longer pick out a unique solution. Finally, he suggests that Harsanyi's results do not actually pertain to 'the ethically controversial doctrine of utilitarianism' (162) because the concept of utility he uses has been stripped of the characteristics that give its maximization moral salience.

The second half of the book, which deals with the philosophical literature, has chapters devoted (loosely) to Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin and to Roemer's own work on equality of opportunity. The Rawls chapter explores some of the tensions that arise from Rawls's commitment to resource egalitarianism, and the position that he assigns agent responsibility. The Nozick chapter offers a good review of the critical literature, focusing on the way that certain innocuous-looking Lockean assumptions actually undergird a number of very controversial libertarian conclusions. For instance, Roemer presents the argument that neo-Lockean views require the assumption that, before being appropriated by an individual, goods be *unowned*, rather than collectively owned. This chapter is followed by an extremely lucid and helpful presentation of Dworkin's views on welfare and resource egalitarianism.

If there is a general complaint that can be made about Roemer's approach, it is that his fondness for axiomatic models leads him to develop a style of analysis that is often overly static. Apart from a brief discussion on implementation in the Nozick chapter, there is no attention paid to the question of how these different conceptions of distributive justice might be institutionalized. For instance, despite Roemer's enormous emphasis on the quality of information available to social planners about preferences, there is no discussion of adverse selection. But surely any scheme of resource distribution that is sensitive to agents' preferences will also have the effect of changing their incentives to reveal a given pattern of preference, just as any system that involves redistribution of resources among individuals according to sociological type will restructure the environment in which the original type-specific behavioural norms emerged. It is not clear that these sorts of dynamic considerations can reasonably be treated as exogenous to the distribution problem in the way that Roemer's style of analysis would suggest.

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Bernard Rollin
The Frankenstein Syndrome: Ethical and
Social Issues in the Genetic Engineering of
Animals.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xiv + 241.
US$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47230-X);
US$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47807-3).

In *The Frankenstein Syndrome*, Bernard Rollin continues his nearly two-dec-
ade long endeavor to decipher humanity's complex ethical relations with
animals using the tools of analytic philosophy. His self-described goals with
regard to this particular examination of genetically-engineered animals are
'to dissect out … and to disambiguate the genuine moral issues from the
spurious ones' and 'at the same time … consider the best vehicle for prag-
matically dealing with these matters in society' (6). For these tasks Rollin
takes as his 'Rosetta stone' (2) the Frankenstein myth, which he rightly
recognizes as a prominent, though often distorted, historical vehicle for the
expression of Western cultural attitudes and values towards science and
technology. Indeed, this book might be best read as an attempt to resurrect
Mary Shelley's original concerns about scientists and their scientific produc-
tions, and apply them to the emergent contemporary field of animal gene
manipulation — a field in which Rollin insists that 'reified' (4) popular ideas
of raging monsters and mad scientists have unnecessarily hampered efforts
to develop rational, 'common sense' social policies. Each chapter is thus
dedicated to addressing one of three versions of what the author colloquially
calls 'the Frankenstein thing.'

The first chapter examines the claim that genetic engineering of animals
is inherently wrong because, like Victor Frankenstein's attempt to create life,
it breeches the natural order of things. Rollin suggests that arguments along
these lines fall into two categories: 'portentous but vacuous' (66) appeals to
theological tenets or language, including the anti-reductionist stance of
outspoken critics, like Jeremy Rifkin, who emphasize species integrity; and
the 'overblown' (44) intrinsic value appeals of environmental ethicists, like
Holmes Rolston, who portray animals as proper objects of direct moral
concern. Rollin indicates how these lines of reasoning draw on Western
philosophical traditions, yet he concludes that they are ultimately mislead-
ing because they 'attempt to transcend all views of natural objects as
instrumental' (58) and, in the process, they presume a rigid dichotomy
between nature and culture. Since 'humans have been altering nature since
they crawled out of the primordial ooze …' (63), Rollin argues, circumspection
about genetic engineering should not result from beliefs about the wicked-
ness of the practice itself or of those scientists who employ it. Just as Shelley
thought her Dr. Frankenstein was misunderstood as an innately diabolical
scientist, then, Rollin believes that we might more productively direct our

concern toward the unanticipated *consequences* that could result from gene manipulation.

In turn, Rollin devotes his second chapter to what he sees as the more 'highly troubling' (66) social and scientific dangers of genetically-engineered animals, as embodied in the recurrent popular image of Frankenstein's rampaging monster. Rollin attributes the 'cavalier' (71) tendency of researchers and biotechnology companies to ignore potential risks to science's well-entrenched value-free ideology. He also briefly discusses the philosophical concerns surrounding risk assessment — notably including that we have 'no history,' (82) and therefore no good knowledge base, for understanding animals with deliberately altered genomes. But above all, Rollin laments the 'paternalism' (94) and 'arrogance' (99) of expert decision-making that has heretofore governed genetic engineering policy, 'for plainly biotechnology will stand or fall with public acceptance, not with the progress of science' (102). By way of a solution to this problem Rollin suggests a 'democratic' (105) method for public involvement: a 'law that mandates dialogue and deliberation' between scientists and citizens which would 'consider public response from the very beginning ...' (107-8). Relevant risks to be discussed would include such things as: unwittingly selecting for pathogens; the fidelity of transgenic disease models (such as AIDS mice) versus their infectious nature; environmental dangers to local ecosystems; and broader socioeconomic concerns (such as to farmers). Thus just as Shelley's original monster only became evil as a result of rejection by its creator, Rollin's analysis implies that, with regard to genetically-engineered animals, we have the most to fear from ourselves — that is, our collective unwillingness to engage in the inescapably political process of evaluating these new forms of biotechnology and determining the means through which we might regulate them within our existing value system while still 'reap[ing] the benefits' (136) of their use.

The third and final chapter then shifts to a broader consideration of the genetically-engineered animals themselves — the 'plight of the creatures' which, like Frankenstein's own creation, are often consigned to an inevitable life of pain and suffering. Rollin details what he calls 'the new social ethic for animals' (155), which 'recognizes that animals are ends in themselves' (160). This belief, he contends, emerged worldwide sometime between the 1960s and the 1980s, largely through the increased awareness of animal use in biomedical research and confined factory farming. Consequently, Rollin argues, those who are engaged in genetically engineering animals must now self-consciously strive to respect each animal's 'nature' or *'telos.'* Further, they should embrace a principle of 'conservation of welfare': to 'control pain, suffering, ... and other forms of unhappiness ... in the animals they manipulate' (169) such that these animals are 'no worse off ... after the new traits are introduced into the genome than the parent stock was prior to [this] insertion' (179). This might be properly accomplished, he then provocatively suggests, either through more genetic manipulation — e.g., engineering food animals to fit environments for which they are not now behaviorally suited — or through anatomic obliteration of subjective experience — e.g., rendering

decerebrate the live animal disease models, especially those with painful terminal conditions. So in conclusion, just as Shelley's monster eventually confronted its scientist-inventor regarding its welfare, Rollin demands that we somehow come to terms with the particular ways in which genetically-engineered animals *qua* animals resist a purely instrumental characterization.

As a teacher, scientist, and public speaker, Rollin's ideas will influence policy debates over these issues. It is admirable, then, that this book attempts to transcend 'science war' polemics by insisting on the mutual attainability of complex understandings of animals across the nature/culture divide and meaningful political interventions on their behalf. That said, Rollin's analysis is framed at once too broadly and too narrowly to prove an effective lever. Contemporary commentators are too frequently interpreted within centuries-long disputations (like nominalism vs. realism) that have little relevance to the context of the authors' own works. Also, Rollin ignores the directly relevant pre-1960s historical roots of the so-called 'new social ethic', which if included would suggest important differences in its interpretation and acceptance across nations and culture. Finally, though purporting to be interested in consequences, Rollin artificially separates out debates over genetically-engineered animal tools from those over the applied scientific ends in medicine and health care that these tools promise to help achieve. He presumes that the value of the genetic research for which these animals are used is completely unproblematic, thus breaking with Shelley's earlier and more satisfying effort to consider both the relations between experimentalists and their technologies and the ambivalent hopes and fears invested in the scientific enterprise.

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Critical thinkers have always wanted to ask questions not only about ideas, but about the social origins of those same ideas. The appeal of Marx's multi-perspectival analysis has been based, at least in part, on his claim that the ideas which were the objects of his criticism could themselves be explained by the social conditions in which they took shape. But the last decade has seen big ideas like Marx's fall on hard times, and many have come to see his theoretical ambitions as subject to the same social distortions as those of his ideological enemies. Enter Michael Rosen, who wants to account for the success of the concept of ideological false consciousness as well as to demonstrate precisely why it fails.

Where Wilhelm Reich asks 'why the majority of those who are hungry *don't* steal, and why the majority of those who are exploited *don't* strike', Rosen wants to ask why it is that the theory of ideology thinks it can account for these phenomena with easy reference to a systemic false consciousness. In an intellectual journey which is avowedly both historical and critical, Rosen answers that Marx's critique of political economy fails on its own terms. Although Marx presents his inquiry as one based on the principles of natural science, Rosen argues (259) that his conception of society as a self-maintaining system 'requires an ontological commitment that is not justified according to the explanatory standards of the natural sciences'. As a consequence, the believer in ideological false consciousness must throw out either his pretentions to be a natural scientist or his veiled ontological premises.

But Rosen's work is much more than a post-mortem on Marx's theory of ideas. His is an intellectual tour de force, tracing the origins of the idea of political false consciousness through authors like Plato, Machiavelli and Adam Smith, analysing the concept to reveal potential confusions between what is irrational and what is false, and concluding with three well considered chapters on Hegel, Marx and the critical theorists respectively. It is rare to find an author who can talk about writers as disparate as G.A. Cohen and Theodor Adorno in the same breath, and even rarer to find one who can do it so effortlessly. Rosen's success is to combine the rigour of traditional conceptual analysis with a sense of historical perspective which has more in common with continental thinkers.

His conclusions, however, cannot help but be somewhat depressing. Having ploughed deep into what he calls the Western tradition of rationalist thought, Rosen is led to the belief that the errors which he finds in Marx are symptomatic of the errors of the entire Western tradition. Their mistake, he contends, is to locate the good life for humans in the subjection of one's self

to one's own conscious rational choice. Since reason alone is unsatisfactory as an ideal, and since we can no longer hope to use it to forge a science of society, Rosen (257) falls back on Walter Benjamin, who seeks to replace the science of society with an 'intuitive' and 'tacit' shared knowledge, uncertain as to its objective validity.

Here Rosen is dangerously misguided. Having given up the ghost of scientific critique, he is too ready to introduce the self-critical philosophical speculations of the Frankfurt School. But without the faculty of human reason as a measure of our critique, in whose name can we hope to criticise and what can we hope to win? Rosen's verdict (275), that we pursue 'a genuinely anti-rationalist understanding of the self that will not simply capitulate to unreason', is hardly inspirational.

It is at least arguable that Rosen has made a crime out of what ought to be a radical virtue. That Marx's professed standpoint is one of 'positive humanism', and that his critique is premised on the creative power of universal human reason, is something which has often been lost on Marxologists. In his *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, Marx details his commitment to the concept of 'the distinctness, and yet the unity of consciousness and being' and it is this commitment which enables him to claim that he can grasp the object of political economy along the lines of the model provided by the natural sciences.

One suspects, however, that Rosen's challenge to critical social science will only find its match not in philosophical reasoning but in practical critique. It is interesting that Rosen concludes with a glance at rational choice theory and the prisoners' dilemma game. The logic of this game, according to him, confirms that collective inaction may not be the result of the insidious effect of ideological distortion but a simple problem of coordination. Where Rosen uses public choice theory to show Marxism up, the task for radicals is to respond in kind, employing the arsenal of modelling techniques provided by public choice theory to show up the existing state of society. It is not inconceivable that a whole host of highly contemporary issues — new systems of regulatory governance, the loss of faith in the rule of the majority, to name but a few — might be explained by a logic traceable through the new concepts provided by public choice theory. The two concepts of the risk-averse individual in situations of uncertainty and that of a public good seem obvious candidates for investigation. This kind of contemporary critique would, like Marx's, attempt to explain the origins of ideas as well as attempting to forge a science. It might even serve to explain Rosen's uncertainty about the possibility of a social science, together with his rejection of human reason as a good in itself.

James Harkin
(*Sub-faculty of Politics*)
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Shortly before his death, Jean-Paul Sartre apparently recanted some of his most cherished philosophical views. In a series of interviews with disciple Benny Lévy, he disavowed many of the most basic principles of 'Sartrean' existentialism, and embraced some decidedly un-Sartrean ethical and religious teachings. *Hope Now* is a transcript of these interviews. Ably translated by Adrian van den Hoven, and prefaced with an excellent introduction by Ronald Aronson, *Hope Now* is a provocative and puzzling work of interest to all Sartre scholars. While it is not the deathbed conversion that some claim, it is an intriguing footnote to an even more intriguing life.

Much of the controversy surrounding *Hope Now* has to do with the role of Sartre's interlocutor. Several of Sartre's intimates, including Simone de Beauvoir, have accused Lévy of distorting Sartre's words, and even of fabricating parts of the interviews. And it is striking that the views Sartre recants in *Hope Now* tend to be ones that Lévy — a former Maoist turned devout Jew — also rejects. Some of these views are metaphysical and epistemological. Sartre attacks, for instance, the account of selfhood advanced in *Being and Nothingness*. He claims that this work portrays the self as 'too independent' — that although *Being and Nothingness* understands the self as essentially related to other selves, it still fails to see that 'everything that takes place for consciousness at any given moment is necessarily linked to, and often is even engendered by, the presence of another' (71).

More frequently, Sartre's targets are his earlier thoughts on politics. *Hope Now* contains what is probably the fiercest critique of Marxism in Sartre's corpus. 'I don't believe that the relationship of production is the primary one' (86), he says. And he dismisses his youthful involvement with communism by joking that 'an intellectual needs to find something to cling onto' (64). By 1980, Sartre has abandoned not only his support for the communist party, but his belief in all revolutionary action (92-3). He has not, however, decided to work for change within France's party system. In *Hope Now*, Sartre despairs that 'the left no longer exists' (74), and that 'voting is a fragmentary act that has no connection with one's work or with the totality of one's personal concerns' (84). Sartre ends his life without any faith in Western politics, and without any optimism that things will improve.

But if these are the views Sartre rejects in 1980, then what does he embrace? Briefly, in *Hope Now*, Sartre endorses a philosophy that can only be described as Levinasian. He adopts views of the self and the other which would not be out of place in *Totality and Infinity*. And like Levinas, the Sartre of *Hope Now* conceives of ethics as first philosophy. He insists that 'every consciousness, no matter whose, has a dimension that I didn't study in my

philosophical works and that few people have studied, for that matter: the dimension of obligation' (69). Every consciousness is immediately aware of an 'inner constraint' (70) on its treatment of the other. Moreover, ethics somehow 'goes beyond the real' (70). To borrow Levinas's phrase, it concerns what is 'otherwise than being.'

Most intriguing of all, *Hope Now* contains a highly Levinasian interest in Judaism. Once prompted by Lévy, Sartre argues that there are several things of philosophical importance in the Jewish faith. One is an anti-Hegelian philosophy of history. He claims that 'there is a real unity of Jews in historical time, and that real unity is not due to their being gathered together in a historical territory but to actions and writings and bonds that don't derive from the idea of a homeland, except for the last few years' (104). Sartre is also drawn to Jewish messianism, which he thinks 'could be used for non-Jews for other purposes' (107) — particularly ethical purposes. Judaism looks forward to a 'new world' which 'will be made out of this one but in which things will be differently arranged' (105). In this world, humans will stand in genuinely ethical relations to one another. Sartre considers this messianic ideal useful both because it 'possesses no Marxist element,' and because it transcends 'the rules and prescriptions aspect of ethics that prevails today' (106).

The most pressing question, obviously, is this: What are we to make of *Hope Now*? Three points should be made. First, the views expressed in *Hope Now* are a good deal more consistent with Sartre's earlier work than one might initially think. Sartre addresses the same questions that dominate all of his thought: the nature of the subject, the place of ethics, the fate of politics. True, he addresses them differently in *Hope Now*; but he still addresses them, and this is no insignificant fact. Second, even when *Hope Now* is inconsistent with Sartre's earlier thought, one should not take these inconsistencies too seriously. The interview format is new to Sartre, and he admits that it might distort his views. He warns that dialogue 'has completely changed my mode of inquiry' (73), yielding not Sartrean thoughts but 'plural thoughts that we have formed together, which constantly yield me something new' (74). One should therefore hesitate to give *Hope Now* precedence over Sartre's own writings.

Finally, whatever inconsistencies remain in this work might not, at the end of the day, be very important. Sartre was largely uninterested in his own contradictions. He not only dismisses them as 'unimportant' (57) in *Hope Now*; he was *never* afraid to change his mind. Consider his ever-evolving thoughts on humanism, for example. What mattered to Sartre was not creating perfectly polished books, but doing justice to what Husserl called the things themselves. One can often avoid contradictions by subordinating the things themselves to scholarly finesse. 'But then,' as Sartre puts it, 'why live?' (52).

Robert Piercey
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This wide-ranging collection of essays on supervenience should be the last word on the subject — in both sense of 'last word'. The eighteen papers in Savellos's and Yalçin's volume collectively examine, with considerable rigour, every significant use to which the concept has been put, and every definition of the notion that has been offered in the literature. The general conclusion which a reader is likely to draw is that supervenience has become a concept whose explication is more difficult than any of the problems with respect to which it is invoked as part of putative solutions. This, I would argue, is good grounds for having done with the notion altogether.

The volume is well-organized, in that the opening essays, by McLaughlin and Klagge, clearly survey the various forms of supervenience that have been defined in the literature: strong-local, weak-local, strong-global and weak-global. Rather than recite all of these definitions, I will summarize, following several authors represented here, the considerations that have produced this fissuring of the concept. Supervenience has been intended to serve advocates of non-reductive materialism in two ways. First, it has been offered as a means of explicating co-dependence: properties a and b are co-dependent just in case any change in a entails a change in b, and/or vice-versa. Since this sort of relation is symmetric, it is necessary but not sufficient for the materialist aspect of non-reductive materialism. Therefore, supervenience has also been asked to do part of the job that reductive relations provide for old-fashioned materialism: a is a supervenient property, and b is a base property, if a and b stand in a relation of co-dependence, and a's being instantiated in a given case depends on b's being instantiated. Recognition that a given relation can either be logically necessary, nomologically necessary, or contingent, leads to the distinctions between stronger and weaker formulations of supervenience relations. And recognition that the relations described above could, in principle at least, hold either between individual types of properties or between sets of types of properties generates the distinctions amongst varieties of local supervenience, on the one hand, and global supervenience, on the other.

Such is the full logical space within which distinct sorts of supervenience can be distinguished. As the discussions in the book indicate, however, the actual space containing only the interesting sorts is rather smaller. On one hand, if a supervenience relation fails to be counterfactual-supporting, then it is of little relevance to the framing of generalizations. Therefore, the definitions of supervenience that are taken seriously demand that the relation be nomological in some sense. On the other hand, few of the philosophers assembled here wish to eschew naturalism by insisting that a supervenience relation must hold across all logically possible worlds; the relevant sense of

necessity demanded, therefore, is in almost all cases physical rather than logical. Even within these constraints, however, there is room for varying gradations of strength: physical necessity may be defined in terms of causal laws that hold across all physically possible worlds. where 'physically possible' is understood extensionally, or as referring only to those worlds that are nearby according to the currently accepted laws of physics, where the idea of what constitutes a 'nearby' world is relative to our degree of confidence in the current laws, conditional on our evidence.

The dominant question in the supervenience literature, and, therefore, that running through the volume at hand, has been pressed, and answered in the negative, by Kim: is it possible to formulate a definition of the supervenience relation that does not collapse into reductionism? The fact that most philosophers agree with Kim that strong supervenience, especially strong-local supervenience, fails to preserve non-reducibility has provided the principal motivation for weaker and more global conceptions. This, in turn, sets the stage for the two sorts of investigation which occupy most of the book: (1) To what extent can weaker or more global supervenience definitions be formulated such as to avoid implying strong supervenience?; and (2) To what extent do various formulations of supervenience actually help to solve particular philosophical problems to which they are most often applied: the relation between mind and brain, the relation between moral properties and psychological ones, and the relation between epistemic properties and evidence? Roughly speaking, the first half of the book is devoted to the more general investigations of type (1), and the second half to questions of type (2).

Post (73-100) argues that global supervenience is a useful notion, distinguishable from other versions of supervenience concepts, but should be invoked not as a sweeping metaphysical doctrine, but only where empirical facts in particular cases allow for 'focused determination', that is, actual specification of the properties responsible for the dependence of the non-physical on the physical. He also argues that the relevant sort of dependence need not advert to causal laws — an important issue for anyone convinced by Nancy Cartwright's arguments to the effect that science does not furnish us with such things, at least if we require of a causal law that it be *true*.

Bacon (101-9) is one of the few unequivocal defenders of a particular form of supervenience — in his case, weak supervenience. This defense mainly requires showing that strong supervenience does not entail weak. His argument, however, suffices only for a very modest conclusion, namely that attempts at establishing the entailment have not been successful. This obviously falls short of showing that the entailment does not, nevertheless, hold.

Grimes (110-23) compares two other varieties of supervenience, in this case strong/local and weak/global. He argues that the concepts are logically distinct, but that neither will serve the ambitions of non-reductive materialists, since neither places sufficient constraints on the determination relation. This conclusion is about as sceptical about the utility of supervenience as one

could imagine, since if one accepts Grimes's conclusion that even strong/local supervenience is too permissive to be a genuine form of materialism, then it is hardly surprising that less powerful definitions fail the same test.

Bonevac (124-39) argues for strong supervenience, but in a way that expels baby and bath-water together. He accepts Kim's argument that if all real causal relations are physical, and the non-physical strongly supervenes on the physical, then reductive, as opposed to non-reductive, materialism is true 'in the eyes of God'. However, he argues that the supervenience notion is nevertheless useful because we are likely to forever lack epistemic access to the causal relations holding at certain supervening levels of ontology, such as that of the mental. However, this last point is disputed only by eliminativists. Bonevac therefore seems to have side-stepped the central question, which is precisely that of whether we can be materialists without having to be either eliminativists, on the one hand, or instrumentalists about mental entities and epiphenomenalists about mental causation, on the other.

Space does not permit me to individually summarize all of the remaining essays in the volume, which, as it progresses, become increasingly concerned with the plausibility of particular applications of the supervenience concept, rather than in the relations between its various versions. I have surveyed the earlier papers in order to give inductive weight to my general conclusion, which is that untangling the relevant logical relations between supervenience concepts simply adds a new philosophical problem to our existing stock, and shows no signs of being more tractable than the problems with respect to which supervenience was supposed to assist us. Among the authors in the book, those who share my view most explicitly are Moser and Trout (187-217), who conclude that 'overall ... the prospects for nonreductive supervenience-physicalism seem bleak' (214). In the space remaining, I will offer a general diagnosis of my own, much reinforced by having read these essays, as to why this is so.

Most of the authors here who defend one or another version of supervenience against its rivals — e.g., Bonevac, Macdonald (140-57), Heil (158-68), Loewer (218-25), and Papineau (226-43) — all accept two premises which, if true, would leave us with no choice but to wade into the quagmire explored, but left no less deep, by the present collection. The first is that ontological commitment is to be based on currently accepted universal causal laws, and that such laws are generally to be found in physics, which must therefore form a 'base' for the non-reductive materialist. As noted above, however, Nancy Cartwright has provided us with persuasive grounds for doubting this. The second premise is a very strong interpretation of the 'primacy of physics' principle, which is at odds with the naturalism to which most of the authors here pay lip-service. It is true that theories in the special sciences which are at odds with our currently accepted physics have not been taken seriously in the history of science. As naturalists, we must take this fact seriously. But it need not be interpreted as requiring a metaphysical conviction on the part of scientists that all causal relations are physical, or that all properties of aggregates of non-physical entities must be decomposable into properties of

physical entities. Since the trend in most sciences has lately been anti-reductivist, it is more plausible to interpret the underlying metaphysical conviction as a more modest, negative one: that whereas physical generalizations are intended to apply counterfactually across at least a large subset of the possible worlds, the special sciences are responsible only for data from *this* world. Whether or not it is possible to explicate this intuition without invoking a concept of supervenience is a question that remains open. The present volume, I submit, gives us grounds for hoping so.

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Peter R. Schmidt and **Thomas C. Patterson eds.**
Making Alternative Histories:
The Practice of Archeology and History in
Non-Western Settings.
Santa Fe: School of American Research Press.
Pp. xiii + 312.
US$40.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-933452-92-6);
US$18.00 (paper: ISBN 0-933452-93-4).

Peter Schmidt is an American academic who, for the last two decades, has engaged in extensive archeological research and teaching in Africa. One of the concerns that has guided his work is how archeology and other forms of historical research can be used to recover the histories of peoples that have been erased, marginalized, or misrepresented for reasons pertaining to maintenance of state or elite interests (xii). At the same time, Schmidt has found that 'advocacy for alternative views on the use of archeology and history sometimes leads to censure by colleagues on methodological grounds' (1). Methodological censure is, of course, one way in which a dominant paradigm sustains itself, but according to Schmidt, 'its effect is also to forge an even stronger bond between anthropologists and other social scientists from the First World and the Third who are mutually concerned with alternative views of constructing the past' (1).

Making Alternative Histories is an example of this sort of effect: it is the product of a seminar, conceived of by Peter Schmidt and Thomas Patterson, and hosted by the School of American Research in April 1992, in which a diverse group of First and Third world academics assembled to discuss how to respond to the erasure of local histories brought about by colonialism, neocolonialism, and by the practice of traditional Western archeology and

history. Eleven people participated in the SAR conference, including six archeologists, an historian, an educator, a socio-political theorist, a physical anthropologist, and a philosopher of science (Alison Wylie). The book consists of an essay from each of the participants, as well as an introduction by Schmidt and Patterson. The essays deal with theoretical and political issues related to the representation of Third World peoples, not only in Africa, but also Latin America, India, and the United States.

Making Alternative Histories is dominated by two central themes: one is how archeology can be used to recuperate the erasure of local histories brought about by colonialism and neocolonial forces; the other is how traditional archeology itself constitutes a neocolonial force that misrepresents local histories and perpetuates the oppression of Third World peoples. These two themes come together as a challenge to the provincialism of traditional archeology, 'with its framing of problems in strictly Eurocentric categories that reproduce false distinctions between scientific, mythic, and historical domains of knowledge' (14). With respect to positive proposal for change, members of the group insist that the range of data that is legitimized by traditional archeologists be broadened to include oral traditions (208), and that the sociopolitics of the institutions within which histories are constructed must be reshaped to ensure that they are inclusive of, and responsive to, the needs and interests of those whose history is at issue (267). Collectively, these essays provide an impressive study, rich in detail, of the theoretical presuppositions and political implications of one part of Western science. In addition to its obvious appeal to archeologists and historians, this book will also be of interest to any philosopher concerned with question of objectivity in science.

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Alan Soble
Sexual Investigations.
New York: New York University Press 1996.
Pp. xv + 319.
US$26.95. ISBN 0-8147-8004-0.

Soble continues his quest for the essence of sex. That sex has an essence he does not doubt; that is his underlying thesis throughout this book, comprising six chapters: Ethics, Masturbation, Analysis, Health, Beauty, and Pornography. In philosophical ideology this book is strictly analytic. It gives short shrift to social constructivism in general; in particular, some readers will be struck by Soble's ability to write yet another book about the philosophy of sex without even once referring to Foucault. Whether the reader is struck with admiration or outrage at this will depend on her own ideology. Each of the chapters stands in its own right as an analysis of a conceptual area in human sexuality, Soble's use of blunt descriptive language may render this book unsuitable for teaching, although it is unlikely to shock graduate students at most institutions. The final chapter, 'Pornography', is guaranteed to offend some people very much, more for its political content than its graphic sexual language, although it contains both.

'Ethics' constitutes partly a plea for 're-eroticization' to repair the damage done by Christian theologians and philosophers from St. Paul to Kant, and partly a rejection of modern characterizations, from Bertrand Russell's to Susan Estrich's, of adult women as incapable of genuinely consenting to heterosexual sex outside of strictly (and strictly nonexistent) egalitarian circumstances. Soble particularly criticizes 'Pauline access' — the doctrine that spouses must not refuse sex to one another, so that neither spouse will be tempted to seek sexual pleasure outside marriage. The basis of this criticism is Soble's odd assertion that (7) '... constant access to a partner in matrimony kills desire.' This claim is repeated — 'desire in marriage is dead' (8); 'Pauline access to one's spouse causes boredom rather than lust' (9) — but not argued for. In any event, the theme here is *consent*. Soble is dissatisfied with Paul's (and Kant's) assertion that marriage entails perpetual and irrevocable consent to sex, and equally dissatisfied with the approach exemplified by Antioch University's notorious 'Sexual Offense Policy,' which states (48) 'Don't ever make any assumptions about consent.'

In 'Masturbation' Soble wonders at the condemnation of solitary sex by contemporary liberal theorists as well as sexual conservatives. The problem, he finds, is that thinkers on both the left and right mistakenly assume that sex is essentially interpersonal. Rejecting this 'binary framework,' Soble proposes (83) 'a *unitary framework*, in which ... sexual desire is the desire for certain pleasurable sensations ...' rather than for another person as such. Recent calls for gay marriage rights are, in Soble's view, regrettable concessions to the ideology of 'compulsory pairing.' The point is that sex should not have to be justified by its promotion of either the intimacy praised by New Age men or conservative pro-family pair-bonding; the pleasure of sex is its

own justification, regardless of the number of persons participating in any particular sex act.

'Analysis' begins with a discussion of the necessary and sufficient conditions for adultery. Doing so, Soble says, 'will lead us into interesting philosophical territory' (111). Indeed it does — the same territory traversed by the newspaper editor who told his staff 'the only words not allowed in the *Tribune* are ...', the problem being that once you put a boundary around a slippery concept such as sex or language, some mischief-maker will find exceptions. We are treated (111) to Michael Wreen's definition of 'adultery': 'X's engaging in sexual intercourse with Y at time *t* is an act of adultery if and only if either X or Y is married at time *t*, and X and Y are not married to each other at that time.' This definition cries out for counterexamples. Just as there is no analytic definition of adultery there is none of 'sexual act', which might lead to 'the thesis that sexuality has no transcultural essence' (124). But this thesis is mistaken, as Soble argues convincingly; sexual pleasure and/or sexual intent, for starters, are sufficient conditions for an act to be sexual in any context. If we can find sufficient conditions, why not necessary conditions? This is much more difficult, but 'not being able to state the essence of sex is one thing, quite another to think it has no essence' (142).

'Health' is concerned with the medicalization of sex, the attempts to evaluate sex in terms of its effect on physical hygiene or psychological well-being. Soble points out, correctly, that such medicalization, despite its pretensions, is never value-free. (Foucault readers will recognize this idea.) '"Health sexuality" turns out to be a notion derived as much from political philosophy as from theology and ethics; it should come as no surprise that various social forces fight to control this concept and its application to our lives' (174).

'Beauty' analyzes the notion of 'lookism' as unjust discrimination. Should one feel guilty about being sexually attracted to only a limited range of physical types? Soble thinks not. Physical attractiveness, he finds, is a source of spiritual uplift in an otherwise mean universe, and people ought to feel free to pursue it, along with 'the morally and intellectually attractive' (193), for its own sake. Whether one's notion of attractiveness is biologically mandated or socially constructed, Soble leaves an open question.

'Pornography' is the most difficult chapter. It addresses the serious charges of coercion and misogyny made by Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, and many others. The tone is dismissive, which will anger many, but the arguments reward careful attention. This chapter asks the question, if we have so much trouble discerning the meaning of sexual *acts*, how can we confidently 'discern the messages of *representations* of sexual acts'? (214, emphasis added) What is it about pornography that is so objectionable? Its degradation of women! But need a consumer of pornography read it as degrading? Not necessarily, Soble says — degradation, humiliation, objectification are in the eyes of the beholder. To focus on genitalia — whether in photographs or during, say, oral sex — is necessarily to reify the body into its parts, but does not entail disrespect for the body's owner. Pornography is

polysemous. It means just what the consumer wants it to mean. If the consumer is brutal and misogynist, that is his fault, not the photograph's or film's, Soble says. 'Genuine brutality in photographic pornography has been and still is almost impossible to come across' (240). Soble is perhaps too disingenuous here. Whether brutality need be actual to be harmful is, of course, not a settled question at all, as any parent who ever censored a child's television viewing knows.

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L.W. Sumner
Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford
University Press 1996. Pp. xii + 239.
Cdn$59.50/US$39.95. ISBN 0-19-824440-1.

Undismayed by the damage that economists and politicians in different ways have done to the term 'welfare', Sumner offers a carefully developed systematic argument for restoring the term to a better use. In his view, this makes welfare identical with well-being or with authentic happiness, which is informed satisfaction with an autonomous life. Hence, he offers a happiness theory of welfare. It is a subjective theory, but it is neither hedonism nor a desire theory, which Sumner, after sweeping objective theories off the stage, treats as its main rivals. As no objective theory does, they make welfare mind-dependent, that is to say, dependent on the attitudes of the person whose welfare is in question. Sumner makes much of an analogy with secondary qualities. Whether a person is doing well in life is a fact about the world, just like an object's being red, but it is a fact that depends on the response of a normal observer in normal circumstances. However, it is not just a matter of feeling pleasant sensations, since enjoyments that reach much further must be taken into account; nor is it just a matter of fulfilling desires, since (for one thing) events may fulfill some of our desires without our being there to enjoy the events.

This argument moves on from stage to stage to few visible slips. At every stage it is illuminating. At every stage it keeps up enough suspense to impel readers to go on to see how the next stage will work out. This will be true even for readers thoroughly familiar with the topics and the texts that Sumner takes up. Sumner has something new and penetrating to say about all of them. Thus overall it is a very accomplished book. Its full value will be

appreciated only given devoted, protracted discussion in a seminar where it figures as the *pièce de résistance*.

Some of the questions that would come up can be foreseen. First, does the analogy with secondary qualities go through on just the issue that it is meant to clarify, the factuality of enjoyments? The observers on whose perceptions secondary qualities like color are dependent are the whole set of normal observers, who can correct each other's judgments. Anyone persistently deviating from the judgment of other observers that a given cloak is scarlet will be reckoned color-blind. But in the case of the enjoyments that enter a given person's welfare, the set of normal observers according to Sumner is just the person herself. If she has enough information to appreciate what she is missing, and she chooses enjoyments autonomously, her attitude settles the matter for other observers, even if they find her tastes bizarre.

Doesn't the received conception of welfare or well-being at least allow us more choice in treating such cases? Consider a hang-glider pilot (a 'bird'), who in spite of breaking one limb or another in a series of nasty falls, continually chooses to glide again; or someone inviting early death by indulging heavily in *Ecstacy*. If they're informed, autonomous, and enjoying themselves thoroughly, Sumner would say that their welfare is at a high level. But are we not under some pressure to say, instead, that they are jeopardizing or undermining their welfare? Will it dispose of the 'bird' to say that his welfare is being jeopardized, but that all that means is that he risks a final crash that will put the enjoyment of gliding to an end? At the very least, do we not have here a case of welfare that has, built in, a big avoidable risk of ruin? Is it not very odd to have a case of welfare so self-defeating? The ecstasist's case invites even more strongly the judgment that she is neglecting her own welfare.

But then her case raises a second question. Can welfare be in every part as subjective as the analogy with secondary qualities, if it went through, would make it? Sumner is on strong ground in rejecting any theory of welfare that does not allow for a subjective element; but why should welfare be subjective in every part? He recognizes that there may be hybrid theories, part objective, part subjective, but he regards them as being by definition subjective overall. Needs, could an account be supplied that would make them objective, might figure, he allows at one point, in the objective part of a hybrid theory, but he does not seriously examine the attractions of a hybrid theory of just this sort. Would not a hybrid theory make better sense of both the hang-glider 'bird' and the ecstatic? The 'bird' would be jeopardizing not just the continuation of his present enjoyments, but an indispensable component of his welfare (health or safety), on which the whole set of normal observers might insist; the drug-user would be forfeiting this component. To say that meeting needs is not enough to have one's life go well does not imply that one's welfare can give them the go-by. Moreover, terms that Sumner would equate are not only more indeterminate than he would make them; they pull apart. We would speak more easily of the 'bird' and the ecstatic as acting against their interest than against their happiness.

Sumner regards current accounts of needs as themselves subjective, in one case because just what are to be regarded as needs and as provisions for them is recognized to be subject to dispute. But here — a third question — hasn't his use of 'subjective' gone astray? The analogy with secondary qualities does not come to bear at all. People dispute what are to be regarded as needs because they dispute what is to be regarded as normal functioning. But once this is settled, then whether something is needed is as objective as a fact could be: Failure to provide it leads causally to functioning short of the standard. Is which is the faster footrunner to be discovered by having them race to a goal 100 yards away or 150? It is in either case an objective fact (more so than a secondary quality) who gets to the goal first. Is a certain level of statistical evidence (or even evidence merely statistical at the highest possible level) enough to establish a causal link between smoking and cancer? What is going on in the smokers is not made subjective by the dispute any more than its effect on normal functioning under any plausible definition.

Is it even true — a fourth question — that a person's authentic and autonomous subjective judgment about her satisfaction in life sets at nought judgment by other observers? Sumner does briefly mention external indicators as giving us more to go on than what the person herself says; but does he give the indicators full weight? We look for accord between what a person says and her behaviour. In some borderline cases we take her testimony as decisive, but do we in all? She says she is perfectly happy, but time and again we find her weeping in corners. She is not happy; she is not satisfied with her life.

In the final chapter of his book, Sumner argues for 'welfarism' (ugly term) — the position that welfare correctly interpreted is the sole final good to be pursued in ethics. Again, one might wonder why he is not content with its being indispensable to ethics as meeting needs may be indispensable to welfare, fruitful in philosophical lessons though it is (as he amply demonstrates) to try out the stronger thesis. To adapt an argument of G.E. Moore's: You contemplate two future societies. In both everyone's life-satisfaction is assured. In one the sources of satisfaction include refined art and music and other features of high civilization, and include, too, mutual support and shared enjoyment focused on these things; in the other society the satisfactions come without refinements. Would it not be better, as something to aim at in ethics, to bring the first society into being? Would this really involve an unwarranted assimilation of aesthetic value to ethical value? Linguistic practice is not determinate enough to compel the distinction. The case invokes a consideration at home in perfectionism; but it escapes the nerve of the objection that Sumner has to accepting from perfectionism an aim additional to welfare, that it involves imposing a 'value requirement' on people already happy enough with other sources of happiness.

Is there not another direction (visible from the beginning of the book) in which we might look for a value additional to welfare, namely, in its distribution? Consider two societies again, in which everyone's life-satisfaction is assured, but in the one case at various levels, in the other, all at much the

same level, higher than the levels for some in the first society, lower than the levels for others there. Might one not aim with insistent commitment at having the second society rather than the first? Does this confuse the good to be aimed at with the rightness of the ways to attain it? That is not clear. Furthermore, is linguistic practice determinate enough to support such a firm distinction between the good and the right in ethics?

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Thomas Szasz, the distinguished Professor of Psychiatry, has long ploughed his own furrow on the subject of the mind. In the past he has been best known for his writings on topics connected to the mind and things mental. In this book he has, at last, directed his thinking at the mind itself.

For Szasz the mind is something in the real world but only insofar as 'paying attention to' and 'taking heed of' can be said to be actual constituents of the environment. Thanks to Szasz's adroit arguments, this view turns out to be less restrictive definition of mind than it would first appear to be. The book offers not a grammatical presentation of uses of the word 'mind' but rather a carefully set out explanation of how the word 'mind' features in our mental life. This explanation is achieved by constant reference to mental phenomena engaged in mental life. In this way the mind may be judged to be the active engagement of thinking, termed by Szasz to be 'self-conversation'.

The point of regarding the mind to be 'self-conversation' is not simply psychological analysis; Szasz aims far wider. That the mind engages the self makes room for thinking about the self. Such thinking, for Szasz, forms the basis of personal responsibility. Once this is established the thinker, as an active agent in the world, becomes a moral agent. Thus self-conversation becomes the source of personal action informed both by the environment and now by self-conversation. Others too are to be regarded as moral agents in just this way. However, the very nature of self-conversation dictates that no

others can take part in the moral deliberation and decision making. The individual thinker becomes an individual moral agent in that responsibility for the individual's actions can only lie with that individual alone.

Szasz develops a further point here. That thinking, as self-conversation, is private (in the way set out by Szasz) means that no others can have access to an individual's thoughts. Thus these thoughts may make up conversations within the self that would be ruled problematic were self-conversation not to be private in this way. The thinker is thus able to discuss situations and resolve dilemmas without having to face the questions of moral responsibility that would arise in a public conversation. The thinker need submit their self-conversations to the mores of the public domain. In this way the mind becomes the operation of a useful tool tied directly to the instantiation of moral agency.

It is not clear that Szasz's subsequent discussion of strict individual moral responsibility follows from his conception of mind as self-conversation. Szasz ties moral responsibility tightly to self-conversation and problems arise from the strength of this tie. It would be difficult, for instance, to prosecute actions for conspiracy from this grounding alone. A more open grounding would help matters but at the cost of weakening the strict view of mind as self-conversation.

Szasz does not rest here. Taking the view of mind as self-conversation to be described, explained and understood in terms of attending, heeding and similar verbs, allows the development of a position in opposition to the functional approach to mind. In particular Szasz chooses to attack the view of mind as in some way reducible to the activities of the brain. This view is taken by Szasz to be the defining characteristic of modern neuroscience.

The functional analysis of modern neuroscience also recognises the role of these verbs but takes them to be indicative of the activities of a thing, and that thing is said to be the mind. Furthermore, this thing that is mind may be shown through the operation of neuroscience to reduce to a thing that is called the brain. Such reductive, functional analyses therefore rely on the description and account of the mind in terms of nouns.

For Szasz there is no such reduction and so there is no such role for nouns. Mind is a particular conversational phenomenon characterised by explanation in terms of particular mind-describing verbs. Once we consider mind in terms of adverbs it is but a short step to considering the activities of the mind as sentences and hence conversations. Szasz thus opposes the reduction of mind to brain with a view that reduces mind to language and in particular to a special use of language, that is self-conversation.

It would be wrong however to take Szasz's analysis to be a grammatical analysis. His concern with verbs and nouns is not to show a grammatical distinction but rather to show a difference in the picture of the mind between himself and neuroscience. His picture allows him to match his view of the mind with his view of the activity of the mind as self-conversation. Szasz's analysis of mind is therefore a conversational analysis, rather than a grammatical analysis.

Now, if the mind may be described in terms of verbs by Szasz and treated reductively as a noun by neuroscience then why may the mind not be both described in terms of these verbs and be treated to investigation in such a reductive manner? It could in fact be true that whilst the mind may be taken to be activities best regarded as self-conversations and described using appropriate verbs, the mind may also be taken to be a thing best regarded as the brain and described using nouns. Szasz may have the mind as self-conversation and yet this mind, this self-conversation, may still admit analysis in the reductive terms of modern neuroscience.

Furthermore, by arguing that mind is to be described in terms of verbs and not in terms of a noun or nouns, Szasz has not argued that the verbs and nouns used by neuroscience contradict those used by Szasz. The opposition as presented is not a contradiction. Even within the framework set out by Szasz himself there remains room for both views to co-exist. It is not therefore necessary for us to be reductionist about mind in respect of either brain or language.

Many other topics are discussed with erudition in this wide ranging book. In concentrating on the philosophical issues it is possible to miss the breadth of Szasz's considerable learning, though it is these philosophical issues that form the core arguments of the work.

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This book is an overview of cognitive science intended as an introductory text for undergraduates. Thagard has deliberately kept it short, stating in the preface that he is 'highlighting the forest rather than the trees.'

There are two parts to the book. Part I outlines major approaches to cognitive science, all of which fall within the scope of 'the central hypothesis of cognitive science: Thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that operate on those structures' (10). Thagard calls this the Computational-Representational Understanding of Mind, or CRUM for short. Part II, comprising the final third of the book, is devoted to an overview of challenges to

CRUM, considering problems such as emotions, consciousness, being-in-the-world (a la Drefus) and implications of Gödel's theorem.

The presentation of major variants of CRUM provided in Part I devotes a chapter each to approaches based on logic, rules, concepts, analogies, images and connections (chapters 2-7). These chapters share a common structure: the basics of the approach are explained (e.g., the use of predicate calculus for representations in the logic approach), and are then systematically evaluated. The evaluations are also presented in a common pattern, examining the approaches' representational power, computational power (for problem solving, learning, etc.), plausibility (both psychological and neurological) and practical applicability.

This structure is well-suited for an introduction to cognitive science, serving to present the field as a coherent entity (the objectives and evaluation criteria apply throughout), yet at the same time portraying the diversity of the research programs of cognitive science. This way, the contributions of the traditional disciplines (e.g., psychology, computer science) and the issues arising in particular problem areas (e.g., memory, learning) show up throughout the text wherever they are relevant.

The final chapter of Part I provides an evaluation of the comparative success of the competing approaches to CRUM discussed in the previous 6 chapters. Rather than favouring any of these approaches, Thagard reaches the unabashedly eclectic conclusion that these approaches tend 'to capture different aspects of mind' (128). Thus he encourages continuing pursuit of all the research programs he discusses in Part I. Whether or not this conclusion is justified, it is surely a reasonable perspective for an introductory text, whose readers have yet to commit themselves to any particular research program.

On the negative side, Thagard's presentation of these approaches to CRUM suffers from too much brevity and ill-chosen examples. Far too often, the work of cited researchers is described in only one or two sentences. For example, in discussing the role of analogy in the production and comprehension of language, we are told that 'various linguists, philosophers and psychologists have viewed metaphor as a pervasive and valuable feature of language, not as an exceptional or deviant use' (86). Thagard does provide references, but the text would be far more informative, and more interesting as well, if a lively example were presented from the material in the references. There is simply not enough information supplied here to motivate students to dig into the referenced material. It is left to the instructor to do a lot of important work that is usually performed by the author of a quality textbook.

There is one striking exception to this excessive brevity. This occurs in Part II where Thagard discusses Penrose's attack on CRUM based on a version of Gödel's theorem (chapter 11). Thagard goes into some detail in his discussion, providing the student with plenty of material to enhance understanding and provoke interest. This approach to the issues could be applied

to the rest of the text with some advantage. Curiously, Thagard chose perhaps the most esoteric of all the issues in the book for elaboration.

Elsewhere, where Thagard does provide examples (in explaining the basics of each approach), the examples are often ill-chosen. Far too many are based on mundane aspects of student life such as attending classes, registering, dating, etc. Presumably the aim here was to have examples that are understandable by any student, but the result is sometimes so banal as to be insulting to the reader's intelligence.

Thagard does well to show students that CRUM is not the whole story in cognitive science. The final third of the book (Part II) discusses several serious challenges to CRUM. Like his approach in Part I, Thagard provides a common structure to these chapters. He first outlines the challenge (e.g., how can emotions, which are crucial to motivating actions, be incorporated into our understanding of cognition?), and then discusses four broad possible responses: Denial of the validity of the challenge; expansion of CRUM to handle the challenge (using standard CRUM methods); supplementing CRUM with new concepts/methods to include the material raised by the challenge; or abandoning CRUM entirely for the sake of an alternative strategy. In the case of most of these challenges, Thagard acknowledges its value in revealing an important aspect of cognition that CRUM has ignored or failed to explain. But he also insists that CRUM captures important aspects of cognition, and must not be abandoned. His usual suggestion is that CRUM should be supplemented with new concepts and methods to handle new domains. Once again, he endorses an eclectic approach.

As an introductory text to cognitive science, this book is on the right track. It would be quite useful as a core text to guide an introductory course. References provide abundant pointers for expansion of the course content and for guiding students' work. However, Thagard has left it to the instructor to fill in a lot of detail, and to create more lively examples.

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Susan Wendell
The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability.
New York: Routledge 1996. Pp. viii + 206.
Cdn$84.95/US$59.95
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-91046-3);
Cdn$23.95/US$16.95
(paper: ISBN 0-415-90417-1).

Susan Wendell, a professor of women's studies who has spent twenty years teaching and working on feminist social and political theory, has written this book for a wide audience including (but not primarily for) professional philosophers. She focuses on physical rather than mental disability; she herself suffers from mylagic encephalomyelitis or chronic fatigue syndrome, which is characterized by severe pain as well as fatigue, and is now recognized as a disease by the Centers for Disease Control and a neurological disorder by the World Health Organization. She considers disability a social and experiential as well as a biological phenomenon, and defines it as any lack of ability to perform in ways necessary for survival in an environment or to participate in any major aspect of life in a given society. Disability theorists have maintained for two decades that disability is socially constructed — mainly by the failure to give the certain individuals the help needed to function fully within their society, including the opportunity to find meaningful work and procure an income at a basic maintenance level. If disability is constructed, Wendell points out, it can be deconstructed by providing such access and opportunity.

Wendell discusses disability as stigma and as 'Other' but prefers to regard disability as a form of 'difference.' Drawing on and critiquing certain perspectives on standpoint epistemology, she argues that the disabled have accumulated a significant body of knowledge from different standpoints that may be worthy of note to society in general. Someone paralyzed from the waist down, for example, may have insightful perspectives on the nature of intimacy. This brings up the difficult issue, she continues, of whether the vulnerable and imperfect body should be valued and protected or transcended. (Either or both, I should think, depending on the circumstances.)

Wendell is particularly concerned with 'Mind Over Body and the Myth of Control'. The myth that modern 'objective' science can control nature and the body does not bode well for bodies considered to be abnormal or associated with pain, illness, limitation, suffering or the process of dying. Society tends to idealize the young, healthy, active, public, and (preferably) male body; unfortunately, many feminists reject what they regard as weak or docile bodies as well. Certain disabilities are often attributed to failures of attitude, will, or morality, as if physical or biological factors should be discounted as causes of disease or impediments to healing. There is also a myth that if one takes proper care of the body, one will stay well and fit until death. Positive bodily awareness comes not from striving for an ideal, Wendell observes, but

from accepting the reality of change, aging, and eventual disability. Once it is accepted that most of us will become disabled before death, society will be more likely to meet the needs of the disabled. Further, if we learn more about pain and loss of ability we might have less fear of the negative body and less desire to master and control the body.

Wendell is heartened by recent feminist syntheses of the morality of justice and the 'ethics of care', and by an emphasis on the reciprocity involved between the cared for and the caregiver. The caregiver needs care, and those cared for should not be regarded as completely passive. The disabled should be able to avoid being institutionalized whenever possible, to avoid being dependent upon the good will of family members for care, and to make important decisions about basic care. Abortion and euthanasia are topics in which disability theory can inform feminist ethics. Genetic screening and abortion of fetuses with disabilities, for example, may suggest to the disabled that their lives are not worth living. On the topic of euthanasia, Wendell notes that while suicide is legal in Canada, this option is not likely to exist for an individual paralyzed, say, from the neck down. This predicament has significant implications for the issue of assisted suicide. Disability theory reinforces the feminist position that an ethic of care must consider personal feelings while pursuing social justice.

Wendell's most original contribution is in her final chapter on transcendence of the body. Traditionally, bodily transcendence has often been associated with bodily disdain. Recent cultural feminist theory, in contrast, seeks to celebrate the pleasures of the female body. Poststructuralist theory takes a different tack, viewing the body as a social construct. Yet cultural theories often ignore the fact that overcoming bodily alienation does not necessarily mean that 'all will be well' with the body, and poststructuralist theories fail to account for suffering that is not cultural but specifically *bodily* suffering. Wendell has found that if pain and disability are focused on and accepted without resistance they can be transformed into something else — a mental image, a train of thought, an emotion, a desire to get warmer or to sleep. When she stopped looking for cures for her physical limitations, she was able to reconstruct her life and learn from her disability. (She recognizes the accidental nature of illness, however, and does not believe that she 'needed to learn' what her disability has taught her.) It helps to remind herself that she can still be happy when her body is in pain, that her quality of life is not entirely dependent on the state of her body. Her thoughts and sense of being can be pulled back into her brain, where she can reside. (Others have sought to achieve a transpersonal transcendence beyond the individual ego.) Once we learn to live with suffering as well as pleasures, Wendell concludes, we may find that there is a place in feminist ethics for transcendence of the body.

Many feminists would take issue with Wendell's courageous stands on abortion and euthanasia; yet her seemingly controversial thoughts on transcendence should be persuasive, especially for those readers who have known great bodily suffering. Although my own suffering has taken the form of depression rather than physical pain, her thoughts on transcendence should

help me to accept my disorder and to cope should it strike again. The book is highly recommended to those who are, have been, or will be disabled in any way (which, as Wendell points out, includes nearly all of us). It is also recommended to everyone else.

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