

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

Editors • Directeurs

Roger A. Shiner
Department of Philosophy
4-108 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5
E-Mail
ROGER.A.SHINER@UALBERTA.CA

Andrew Light
Department of Philosophy
4-108 Humanities Centre
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada T6G 2E5
E-Mail
ANDREW.LIGHT@UALBERTA.CA

Alain Voizard
Département de philosophie
Université du Québec à Montréal
C.P. 8888, Succursale Centre-Ville
Montréal, QC
Canada H3C 3P8
E-Mail
R32740@ER.UQAM.CA

As a rule, C.P.R. publishes only invited reviews. However, we will consider for publication submitted reviews of new books in philosophy and related areas. Reviews must be a maximum of 1000 words and will be accepted in either French or English.

En général, R.C.C.P. ne publie que les comptes rendus qui sont explicitement invitées. Néanmoins, nous prendrions en considération la publication de comptes rendus soumis, si les auteurs traitent de livres philosophiques (ou de livres sur un sujet apparenté) qui viennent de paraître. Les comptes rendus devraient être de 1000 mots au maximum, et le manuscrit rédigé en français ou en anglais.

Subscription prices

for a volume of six double issues

Institutions
\$98 (Canadian)
US\$95/Cdn\$132 (Foreign)

Individuals
\$47 (Canadian)
US\$48/Cdn\$64 (Foreign)

Students
\$34 (Canadian)
US\$33/Cdn\$52 (Foreign)

Prix de l'abonnement

à un volume de six numéros

Institutions
\$98 (Canada)
US\$95/Cdn\$132 (Hors-Canada)

Individus
\$47 (Canada)
US\$48/Cdn\$64 (Hors-Canada)

Etudiants
\$34 (Canada)
US\$33/Cdn\$52 (Hors-Canada)

Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing

P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 4T2
Tel: (403) 435-5898 Fax: (403) 435-5852

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X
© 1996 Academic Printing & Publishing

Published six times a year

Volume XVI, No. 2
June • juin 1996

Table of Contents • Table des matières

Tom L. Beauchamp, ed., <i>Intending Death: The Ethics Of Assisted Suicide</i>	157
Robin Tapley	
Linda Marie Brooks, <i>The Menace of the Sublime to the Individual Self</i>	159
Albert W.J. Harper	
Patrick Fuery, <i>The Theory of Absence: Subjectivity, Signification, and Desire</i>	160
Laura Anders Canis	
William Gay and T.A. Alekseeva, <i>Capitalism with a Human Face: The Quest for a Middle Road in Russian Politics</i>	162
William L. McBride	
George Grant, <i>Philosophy in the Mass Age</i>	165
Steven Burns	
George Grant, <i>Time as History</i>	165
Steven Burns	
Lawrence Hatab, <i>A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy</i>	167
Drew A. Hyland	
James M. Humber and Robert F. Almeder, eds., <i>Reproduction, Technology, and Rights</i>	171
Elisabeth Boetzkes	
Luce Irigaray, <i>thinking the difference: For a Peaceful Revolution</i>	174
Kathleen A. O'Grady	
William Jordan, <i>Ancient Concepts of Philosophy</i>	176
Christopher Byrne	
Mark Kaplan, <i>Decision Theory as Philosophy</i>	179
Paul Weirich	
Daryl Koehn, <i>The Ground of Professional Ethics</i>	181
Kenneth F.T. Cust	
Laurence Lampert, <i>Leo Strauss and Nietzsche</i>	183
Robert Burch	
Hugh Lehman, <i>Rationality and Ethics in Agriculture</i>	185
Paul B. Thompson	
Barbara Levine, ed., <i>Works about John Dewey, 1886-1995</i>	188
Douglas Browning	
Bernard F.J. Lonergan, <i>The Collected Works of Lonergan. Volume Six. Philosophical and Theological Papers 1958-1964</i>	189
James B. Sauer	
Tibor R. Machan and Douglas B. Rasmussen, eds., <i>Liberty for the 21st Century: Contemporary Libertarian Thought</i>	192
Laurent Dobuzinskis	

John O'Neill, ed., <i>Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition: Texts and Commentary</i>	195
John G. Stevenson	
Terence Penelhum, <i>Reason and Religious Faith</i>	197
Kenneth L. McGovern	
Béla Szabados	
William H. Schaberg, <i>The Nietzsche Canon: A Publication History and Bibliography</i>	201
Lawrence J. Hatab	
Richard Sclove, <i>Democracy and Technology</i>	203
Thomas C. Hilde	
Drusilla Scott, <i>Everyman Revived: The Common Sense of Michael Polanyi</i>	206
Eric B. Dayton	
Sun-Joo Shin, <i>The Logical Status of Diagrams</i>	208
Philip L. Peterson	
Alan P.F. Sell, <i>Philosophical Idealism and Christian Belief</i>	210
Mark Owen Webb	
James S. Stramel, <i>How to Write a Philosophy Paper</i>	211
Hugh Clapin	
James Tully, <i>Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity</i>	213
Bruce Toombs	
Caroline Van Eck, James McAllister and Renée Van De Vall, eds. <i>The Question of Style in Philosophy and the Arts</i>	215
Rupert Read	
Peter van Inwagen, <i>God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology</i>	218
Erich von Dietze	
Enrique Villanueva, ed., <i>Truth and Rationality: Philosophical Issues 5</i>	220
Tina Wood	
Patricia Williams, <i>The Rooster's Egg: On the Persistence of Prejudice</i>	223
Annalise Acorn	
Robert A. Wilson, <i>Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind</i>	227
Agustín Vicente	

Tom L. Beauchamp, ed.

*Intending Death: The Ethics
Of Assisted Suicide.*

Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall 1996.

Pp. vi + 223.

n.p. ISBN 0-13-199555-3.

Intending Death is a collection of articles dealing with the significance of intentionality to the issue of euthanasia. The general purpose of the articles is to explore how intention might be related to the causation of death. The book is divided into three perspectives: the philosophical, the clinical, and the political-legal-economic. Each section is loosely constructed around a debate format so that within a particular perspective there are articles and responses presented consecutively.

The section on the 'Philosophical Perspectives' is by far the largest of the three. The section begins with a look at the basic problem of intending death. Buchanan suggests that the reason intending death is not a clear cut moral issue is because we are trying to reconcile two conflicting moral intuitions: (1) allegiance to the prohibition against intentionally taking innocent life versus (2) the conviction that there are some justified cases of intentional death. Buchanan's article is helpful in illustrating the various traditional approaches to the reconciliation of these two notions. One of the points made is that the doctrine of double effect is effective in settling the conflict. This idea is picked up in the next article where Macklin argues that if we take the notion of intention seriously then the basis on which we justify the permissibility of intentional killing is wrong. As she argues, if we take intention seriously we collapse the distinction between intention and foreseeability on which the doctrine of double effect rests. Macklin's argument is that if an end is foreseen, in any practical sense, it is intended. Frey engages in the argument at this point and suggests that it is not intention that should play an important part in determining the permissibility of killing, but rather causation. He sees causation as the key to determining moral responsibility. Carse disagrees with this assessment, claiming that intention does in fact deserve a place of importance in determining moral responsibility.

The argumentation of the 'Philosophical Perspectives' section does not follow a straight line, but rather a zig-zag course through the issues of intention and causation. Once the problem is illustrated, the authors pick a point of contention and expand the debate in that direction. Consequently, the debate on each issue does not resolve itself, nor come to any end point.

The second section addressing 'Clinical Perspectives' is weak only in its brevity. The focus of the discussion centres on the practical and clinical aspects of intention and causation, from the physicians' point of view. The main questions concern how killing is ever justified, how the active vs. passive debate figures into clinical practice, and how the physician-patient relationship affects and is affected by euthanasia. Using these questions results in a fresh look at physician involvement in death. One of the most

interesting discussions of this section is the one concerning whether or not a physician is the appropriate person to be 'intending' death.

While the section on 'Political, Legal, and Economic Perspectives' is also disappointingly short, the articles are provocative. In particular, Capron delivers an interesting take on the legal ramifications of killing or letting die. The discussion makes a start at unravelling the tangle that is the legal use of 'intention'. The only other issue taken up in detail in this section is that of permitting (or intending) death in order to conserve resources. Both discussions — of legal intention and of conservation of resources — are from the U.S. perspective. While informative and thought provoking, the discussions of this section do not directly pertain to situations in other countries, such as Canada, where the legal traditions and the delivery of health care are different.

While the book itself is well organized and interesting, the introduction by the editor leaves much to be desired. Especially in a collection of such divergent articles, a strong introduction helps the reader to grasp the salient issues to be discussed. The introduction tries to do too much too generally. The result is a limited and inadequate presentation of the background to the euthanasia debate.

Given the above observations, this book would be better suited to the advanced reader. A graduate course, for example, where one could assume a full background in the traditional approaches to euthanasia, would be an excellent place to take up the articles presented in this book. While this volume is more appropriate for the informed reader, in not wasting time or space on familiar arguments, it allows for the deeper exploration of what it may or may not mean for a physician, or anyone, to intend death.

In general, if one is interested in how intention, in a number of idioms, figures in the euthanasia debate, this book is instructive. If one is interested in current application of the doctrine of double effect, again, this book is instructive. If one is interested in a general but comprehensive look at euthanasia and assisted suicide, or the active and passive euthanasia debate, this book is of limited help.

Robin Tapley

McMaster University

Linda Marie Brooks

*The Menace of the Sublime to
the Individual Self.*

Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press 1996.

Pp. viii + 233.

n.p. ISBN 0-7734-8752-2

Kant's *Critique of Judgment* declares for an indeterminate universality of communication through aesthetic feeling without first appealing to the employment of concepts. Such universality is accomplished by a new appreciation of the entrepreneurial role of the imagination in its ventures (or adventures) into the covert world of aesthetic initiatives. The imagination in its powers of creative synthesis is able to compete with pure reason in its accommodation of ideas for the enrichment and eventual unity of all experience largely upon its own terms.

In the first two chapters of *The Menace of the Sublime* Brooks makes it clear that Kant found himself still far from his cherished goal of a unified field theory, as it were, a synthesis of the self in pure reason for all possible experience that is available to human consciousness. It is in the third *Critique* that he hopes to show, on the analogy of the unity to be found inherent in the harmonies of artistic form and the aesthetic judgment of taste, that an overall unified theory may be justified.

From the harmonies of the aesthetic world of feeling, Kant is prompted to explore the Sublime, that is, to appeal to a realm where there can only be experienced feelings of awe, wonderment or fear in the presence of the unknown. The Sublime, referred to by Brooks as the 'Negative Sublime', it is proposed, is available only as the ground of the Noumenon, a strategy noted for its unsteadiness according to commentators, and which Kant himself acknowledges to be reached only by analogy. In the first and second *Critiques* only pure reason could prove itself adequate for the goal of establishing a complete system of knowledge, but such totality, Kant has come to admit is unachievable in the phenomenal world alone without coming to terms with the world of morality and the supersensible. Nor can a flawless unity remain with the Sublime and its unsettling feelings of unease and anxieties for the human subject. The universality of aesthetic judgment has lost its ground in the Sublime as a bridge between sense and reason just because of the disharmonies occasioned by the cognitive faculties in the contemplation of the magnitude and grandeur of natural phenomena.

In chapter three Brooks gives consideration to the solution or solutions to the problem of unity advanced by the German poet Friedrich von Schiller (1758-1805) who took up the challenge of establishing a harmony between all that derives from a sensuous dependency in nature and whatever dwells on the high ground of moral freedom for humanity. Schiller, like Kant sought for autonomy in the supernatural for all objects, but by his best literary efforts, while recognizing the need, could not convincingly arrive at the desired synthesis. Beauty, defined as freedom in appearance as represented

in art and nature might at least mediate between the theoretical and the practical. It is beauty rather than the sublime that weds the two opposites, not because of a finalized proof, but simply due to an evercontinuous desire to preserve a sensuously drifting harmony endemic to the human soul. But the promise of an autonomous self seems to have faded into only an abstraction and remains problematic as an unattainable ideal.

While Kant could not reconcile the Sublime in providing for a complete aesthetic synthesis, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, strongly influenced by German Idealism repeatedly sought out the concept of a supersensible something, a *tertium quid* unsuccessfully pursued by Kant. Coleridge in his musings first seized upon the imagination, then looked to the agency of self, and ended by way of a religious aesthetic, a notion penetrating into the very heart of Being, the 'I Am That I Am' of the Old Testament. A response to the challenge of the 'unnatural' Sublime, an attempt to contain the limitless in experience into a final totality, to combine poetry and philosophy has swept the poet beyond even the limits of reason and rationality.

Linda Marie Brooks in her well organized presentation is more than competent in her field, having already written extensively on the literature of German Romanticism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. She has supplemented Kant's discussion of aesthetics and the Sublime as found in the third *Critique* with a remarkably thorough narrative of issues relating to the supersensible realm which were of interest not only to philosophers but to poets and men of letters as well.

Albert W.J. Harper

London, Ontario

Patrick Fuery

*The Theory of Absence: Subjectivity,
Signification, and Desire.*

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1995.

Pp. 182.

US \$52.95. ISBN 0-313-29588-3.

The time is ripe for a lucid book geared toward a general philosophical and psychoanalytic audience which is both sensitive to the subtleties of the oxymoronic project of theorizing absence, and at the same time able to cut through the jargon of postmodern philosophy. And there is always room for a new, clarifying thesis on a postmodern theme such as absence. Fuery has missed a golden opportunity. The alluringly titled *Theory of Absence*, despite its worthy intentions, takes the reader on a long, hard trudge for low pay.

The Theory of Absence attempts to gather together some of the most influential thinkers on subjectivity in French philosophy under the rubric of 'primary absence' — that is, nonderivative absence, absence independent of presence. Starting with Descartes' method of doubt, then leapfrogging two centuries to Sartre and Levinas on the Other, Lacan (and by extension Freud) on subjectivity, Derrida on interpreting texts, Kristeva and Barthes on desire, Deleuze and Guattari on social production, and Foucault's interpretation of systems of thought, to name a few, Fuery begins to argue that each of these builds in some sense upon a conception of primary absence: absence as essential to the development of signifying practices (4), and the desiring subject as determined by absences. The key figures in post-structuralism have been mentioned, but don't be fooled: a full two-thirds of the book are an exposition of Lacan's notion of subjectivity. One wonders therefore why Lacan is not mentioned in the title or the introduction.

But even as a commentary on Lacan, the book falls short of the task. Oddly, rather than defining key terms, a basic knowledge of Lacan is presupposed, using terms and concepts without defining them, or defining them only in relation to other Lacanian or Freudian terms. Nor does the book lead the reader through the Lacanian corpus with an organizing logic. Instead of explaining the significance of absence for Lacan, this treatment mystifies already difficult material. Simply marking the places where Lacan directly addresses absence is not the same thing as explicating the organic coherence in his thought on this matter. If you don't know Lacan, this won't help.

On the other hand, philosophers looking for an original interpretation of Lacan's work will be disappointed as well. This book advances no new thesis concerning Lacan. The fact that Lacan works with absence, lack, splitting, disintegration, fragmentation, and so on is already clear from even a cursory reading of his work. And additionally, Lacan aside, the ambitious and inherently philosophical thesis stated in the beginning — that subjectivity, desire, and signification are all fundamentally constituted by 'primary' absence — is never philosophically argued.

The book, echoing its title, is divided into three parts, indicating the 'key areas of primary absence' (2). The first part, as we've seen, considers absence as constitutive of subjectivity; the second casts desire as an 'operational system' of absence; and the final section discusses the interpretive value of absence in terms of semiotics. The long (104 pp.) section on Lacanian subjectivity is followed by a short (19 pp.) section entitled 'Absence and the Gaze', in which Fuery hopes to generate some theories of the gaze which go beyond the binary model of the gazing subject desiring the Other, 'the absent'. Fuery begins by raising some provocative questions around the issue of approaching 'the gaze' through absence, which could have structured the rest of the section. 'These [questions] should not be blind spots, or something out of the corner of the eye; they are of subjectivity, language/discourse and desire' (118). Why, then, aren't these questions explicitly addressed in this section?

The final section, 'Towards a Semiotics of Absence', deals largely with the 'Lacan/Derrida debate' (160) on the status of the sign, as it is enacted in Lacan's 'Seminar on *The Purloined Letter*' and Derrida's *Carte Postale*. The book, ending with a chapter on the 'absent signifier' and its operation in the text, could benefit from a concluding chapter to tie together all of these disjunct discussions.

On a technical note, Fuery's system for citations — in the text itself, only the author and date of the publication are mentioned — presents an obstacle for philosophers and other readers accustomed to text-centered writing. If you do not know the dates of the texts cited, you must look up each reference in the bibliography at the end of the book. Perhaps this citation style is a clue to the source of the trouble with this book. It's a problem of genre. Although published in the series 'Contributions to Philosophy', it is written in typical social sciences format; and Fuery is in the Department of English, Linguistics, and Media (Macquarie University). All too often, the exploration of postmodern philosophy is hindered rather than helped by the technical difficulties that arise from 'interdisciplinary studies'.

Two worthy and exciting projects emerge out of *The Theory of Absence*: an original theory of absence, and a new reading of Lacan. Regrettably, both are, as it were, absent. The meaning and vitality — the anxiety, uncertainty, and madness — of a subjectivity that would be formed by absence is squandered in this painfully academic treatment. *The Theory of Absence*, more often than not, suffers from the very malady it attempts to address: fragmentation and lack of orientation.

Laura Anders Canis

Pennsylvania State University, Altoona Campus

William Gay and T.A. Alekseeva

Capitalism with a Human Face: The Quest for a Middle Road in Russian Politics.

Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1996.

Pp. xxix + 235.

US \$58.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8135-1);

US \$22.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8136-X).

The American and Russian co-authors of this volume edited a path-breaking anthology (*On the Eve of the 21st Century: Perspectives of Russian and American Philosophers*) in 1994. The present work, which is entirely their own, was composed beginning at that time, revised the following year, and then published with the authors' full awareness (xxvi) of the great uncertainty attached to books about rapidly changing conditions. It is above all an

advocacy book, presenting a plea for the politicoeconomic 'middle road' named in the subtitle.

This road, which consists of supporting entrepreneurship while preserving social guarantees, is strongly defended against a background of repeated insistence on traditional and present Russian tendencies towards extremism, assertions of a self-reassuring sort that there is a Russian middle class, and the presentation of polling and other data, little cited outside Russia, showing great popular dissatisfaction with the government and a decline in the recently-created political parties. The overall impression with which the reader is left is one of both conceptual and social instability. For example, in a short section (128-30) on 'Difficulties in Identifying the Middle Class in Russia' it is said that, in addition to economic criteria, education is an important component in this process of identification, but that the present situation of Russia's educational system is confused and parlous. Therefore, the section concludes, 'these educational difficulties are not only a clear indication of the continued absence of a new middle class in Russia, but also suggest that its emergence may well be delayed even longer.' One is forced to ask just where this leaves either Russia or the book's readers or, of course, the idealized middle class itself.

Capitalism with a Human Face is organized into three main parts: 'Economy and Politics', 'Consciousness and Class', and 'Centrism'. Russia's economic situation, it is suggested, 'is worse than the United States faced in the 1920s' (13) (*sic* — the 1930s is what is probably intended). As far as 'consciousness' is concerned, a poll taken at the time of the beginning of the Russian Federation in 1992 and twice again during the following year is cited (100) to show a very broad sixfold division of popular orientations along two intersecting lines (socialists/capitalists, and those committed either to a grand 'imperial' state, to the CIS, or simply to the Russian nation), together with a seventh category labeled 'Reserve-/Undecided'; the percentage in this final category dropped from 41% in 1992 to 29% in fall 1993. As for 'centrism' in Russia today, it is at one point said to entail 'pursuing a tough, quasi-monetarist politics in the financial sphere, but with antimonetarist slogans and with simultaneous support for reformist and market economy slogans. In other words, ...moderately right politics under moderately left slogans' (191). In short, there is nothing very facile or straightforward about either the phenomena being analyzed or the analysis itself.

There are a few references to more philosophical themes and figures — for example, to Hobbes, said to have been considered the principal intellectual rival to Marx during the Soviet era (29); to the 'prudent advice' of Machiavelli to do what is necessary while never failing to reassure the people of your concern for their well-being (196); and occasionally to Marx himself. But the book is not intended primarily as profound philosophical analysis. On the other hand, its positive recommendations are based above all on a principled philosophical option for human values against 'a narrowly economic perspective' (205) that regards indulging the alleged requirements of 'the market' as the highest possible social activity.

It is in fact not clear that much better sense can be made of the current existential situation in Russia than what this book achieves; surely there are no standard systematic political theories that fit it at all well. The book provides some useful details about that situation — the rising crime rate, the loss of a sense of direction, and numerous other phenomena that have accompanied ‘the disintegration of a grand state’ (51) which, in its reduced form, is at the same time ‘the first major country to attempt to move from a “closed” society to an “open” one’ (193). Its overall perspective, however, is very murky, as perhaps befits its subject.

Perhaps. But as I write this review on my return flight from a short visit to Saint Petersburg, it occurs to me that this interesting book-length plea for preserving ‘the human face’ might have profited from devoting more attention to elements of daily life in Russia, in particular religion and the arts. While the city over the past weekend was witnessing one more confusing election in which a darling of Russian democrats during the heady early days of the great changes, Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, proved the polls wrong once again by losing to his challenger, there were at the same time celebrations of the great feast of Trinity Sunday in the churches, and art exhibits and cheap but excellent theatrical performances in various locales. Neither of these types of activity appeared particularly to attract the new-rich ‘Mafia’ crowd, to which, unlike religion and the arts, *Capitalism with a Human Face* pays deserved attention. Now, I do not pretend that these events drew anything close to a majority of the citizens, and I do not believe, like Hegel, that art, religion, and philosophy in dialectical order furnish the synthetic key to human activity as a whole, either in Russia or anywhere else. But discussions of politics and of political philosophy in a narrow sense may need to be complemented by discussions of other social institutions and practices in order for a more balanced picture of the society in question to emerge. That must surely be the case with contemporary Russia, particularly now that, whatever it is, it is no longer ‘totalitarian’.

No one can be confident about predicting Russia’s short- or long-term future, and this book is very successful at showing why. If that future should, however, turn out to be less catastrophic than quite a number of observers expect, then this will be due in part to those deeper social structures that have managed at least thus far to survive the ravages of unbridled capitalism, as they ultimately survived the ravages of its predecessor system.

William L. McBride
Purdue University

George Grant

Philosophy in the Mass Age. Edited with an introduction by William Christian.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1995.

Pp. xxxii + 128.

\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-0438-5);

\$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7728-3).

George Grant

Time as History. Edited with an introduction by William Christian.

Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1995.

Pp. xlv + 81.

\$35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-0640-X);

\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-7593-2).

William Christian has taken on the role of biographer, editor and scholar of the late George Parkin Grant. These volumes are expanded reissues of two lecture series which Grant broadcast on the English radio network of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Grant's reputation rests as much on his personality as on his writings. Christian, in his admirable biography (*George Grant*, 1993), captures some of Grant's extraordinary presence. At the end of Chapter 22, which concerns Grant's departure from McMaster University in 1980, Christian describes the occasion when old friends, novelist Scott Symons, poet Bill Lee and journalist Charles Taylor, came to the Grants' home in Dundas for a last afternoon tea before the Grants moved back to Halifax. The quiet hospitality, the hugely challenging questions, the expansive intellectual atmosphere, the interludes of anecdote, the impression of Grant's great-heartedness are sketched with deep truth. Such conversations with Grant were not lightly to be forgotten; this one lasted some five hours.

Grant made a name for himself in Canadian Philosophy circles when he argued (in a study done for the Massey Royal Commission of the early 1950s) that the best current philosophical writing was going on in university departments other than Departments of Philosophy. However, armed with degrees in History and Theology, he had got a job in Dalhousie's Philosophy Department in 1947, and by 1959 he was in a position to contradict himself. He delivered a series of CBC lectures which constitute a brilliant introduction to moral philosophy through the history of Western thought. *Philosophy in the Mass Age* has chapters on ancient, mediaeval and enlightenment ethics, and on Marxism, Pragmatism and Existentialism, enclosed by accounts of the contemporary predicament and the limits of contemporary self-understanding. Robert Fulford described these lectures as stunningly effective, and they represented for a generation of Canadians what it means to think grandly and conservatively about the meaning of human life, and about the place of philosophy in Western culture.

This new and much longer edition of *Philosophy in the Mass Age* contains three main items not in my hard-cover first edition (1959, \$3.10). The controversial Preface to the second edition (1966), in which Grant claims to have been more moved at the time of writing by Hegel than he actually was, is included, along with the text of a final CBC programme in which Grant answered some questions from listeners. In this new chapter he speaks with wisdom and simplicity about the Cold War, the limits of utilitarianism, and the relations between history and philosophy. He also avers that 'when women are broken they seem capable of even greater perversions than men' (108). This is a thought which made some sense to an earlier generation; I confess that not only do I think it false, but I cannot reconstruct for myself what someone must have meant by it in order for it to have appeared plausible. The third new item is a substantial Introduction by William Christian. He discusses the Hegel question at useful length, but not my question about perversion.

Ten years after the 1959 lectures, his *Lament for a Nation* (1965) having nurtured a new generation of Canadian nationalists, Grant was invited to give the Massey Lectures for the CBC. If as modern people we desire to understand our own understanding of ourselves, he argued, we must understand our relation to history. The nineteenth-century masters had exposed the historical dimension of their subjects (Darwin, e.g.), and the main ideologies of the twentieth century called us to be resolute in our mastery of the future. *Time as History* requires us to 'ponder our orientation to the future together with the will to mastery' (17, but p. 11 in the 1st edition). Grant reads Nietzsche as the spiritual father of the contemporary world (as does Derrida after him). He suggests at the end that in the absence of a conception of time as eternity we are condemned to wander in a wilderness in which we cannot make sense of 'goodness' and 'meaning'.

These Massey Lectures are somewhat less accessible than the earlier ones. (Consider Grant's restatement of the Ontological Argument: 'human beings are not beyond good and evil,...the desire for good is a broken hope [in the absence of] perfection, because only the desire to become perfect does in fact make us less imperfect' [47/60]). It would take some analysis to reconnect that to Anselm. William Christian's new edition adds passages from the spoken lectures which Grant had left out of the published version. It also includes the text of a subsequent broadcast in which Grant discusses with the Greek Orthodox theologian, Dr. Charles Malik, charges that the lectures are over-generalized. Finally, it includes a long introduction in which Christian helpfully puts the 1969 lectures in the context of Grant's later teaching, study and writing about Nietzsche.

These are careful and scholarly reprints of works which have an imposing place in the history of Canadian letters.

Steven Burns

Dalhousie University
and University of King's College

Lawrence Hatab

A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy.

Chicago: Open Court 1995.

Pp. xv+325

US \$39.95. ISBN 0-8126-9295-0.

One of the commentators on the dust jacket of this challenging and important book notes that 'to many, a Nietzschean defense of democracy may seem oxymoronic ...'. Indeed, and if Hatab were arguing that Nietzsche was in fact a defender of democracy, in the face of the massive textual evidence to the contrary, it would be so. But Hatab understands full well that Nietzsche's explicit statements on democracy are almost always critical and usually polemical. Indeed, in the second chapter of the book, entitled 'Nietzsche contra Democracy: Deconstructing Equality', he sets out lucidly and in detail Nietzsche's critique of democracy and democratic values, especially, as Hatab shows, the value of 'equality'.

But it is the title of the third chapter that best reveals Hatab's defense of a 'Nietzschean' concept of democracy: 'Nietzsche contra Nietzsche: Democracy Without Equality'. That is, Hatab argues that Nietzsche's explicit and regular anti-democratic tirades do not necessarily follow logically from certain crucial elements in his own thinking. Or rather, they are valid for the 'metaphysical' justification of democracy which was the standard one at the time and the one with which Nietzsche would have been familiar, one whose decisive component is an insistence on the principle of *equality*, whether as a founding principle ('All men are created equal') or as a teleological goal ('All men *will* be equal in the truly just society of the future').

But, Hatab argues, one could defend a 'non-metaphysical' democracy, a 'postmodern' democracy, on consistent Nietzschean grounds. This is the guiding project of the book. It is a subtle and complex project, but I think it centers on two massive and crucial theses: the rejection of the premiss that democracy demands a notion of 'equality' for all humans (defended in the third chapter), and second, an emphasis on the 'agonistic' element in democracy, which, Hatab argues in the fourth chapter, entitled 'Agonistic Democracy', is thoroughly Nietzschean. The upshot is that '1) Nietzsche was wrong in rejecting democracy, because democracy can be more amenable to his way of thinking than he imagined. 2) Nietzsche nonetheless was right in depicting the flaws of *traditional* democratic theory, and in warning about egalitarian influences in politics' (54).

The deconstruction of equality in chapter 3 is not total: what is rejected is equality as a substantial quality ascribed to persons, that is, equality as a *metaphysical* principle. What is preserved, however, as suitably postmodern, is equality as a *procedural* principle, a principle affirmed, apparently, not for substantial but for pragmatic reasons. Thus, 'I argue that democratic values can be defended without any sense of equality that connotes some positive description or condition of human nature, or that stems from some kind of metaphysical essentialism' (59). Instead, 'democracy does require that all

citizens be given the same rights; that they all have the same access to and fair treatment by, the legal system; that they all have the same opportunity for political participation; and that all voices count the same in elections (one person, one vote). Such constructions, however, need not reflect or depend upon any version of substantive 'sameness' in human beings or in the outcomes of their lives. We can call these constructions functional and procedural parities that need not imply any kind of substantive or intrinsic equality' (57). Hatab's basic argument of this chapter, then, is that Nietzsche's polemic against democracy is primarily directed against what he regards as the absurd premiss that humans are, or even ought to be, equal. If that premiss is jettisoned, as Hatab believes it can be, Nietzsche should have no serious objections to the kind of 'procedural' equality adumbrated above, which, indeed, would simply allow Nietzsche's 'natural' aristocrats to emerge.

The argument of chapter 4, 'Agonistic Democracy', is that the best replacement for the 'metaphysical' principle of equality as the guiding value of democracy is 'agon', the contest. Here, Hatab argues that the very notion of democracy is subtly founded on the conviction that no one has a privileged access to 'the truth', and therefore that the best procedure is to have a 'contest of ideas', the outcome of which is to be determined by vote. Such a situation involves two affirmations that, as Hatab documents, are dear to Nietzsche's heart: perspectivism, the view that there is no 'truth' but only 'perspectives', and the agon, the notion of competition and the contest in which 'the best' can emerge. Thus, 'political "authority" in a democracy, therefore, is not something theoretically preestablished or fixed, but something continually earned, challenged, and altered in civic debate' (64). 'Democracy in an agonistic sense can be understood not precisely as "rule by the people," but as "agonarchy," or rule which is decided by a contest among the different perspectives in the political field' (65). And 'accordingly, if we remember that Nietzsche's concept of power is by no means limited to physical force, we can read something like the will to power into democracy' (63).

The deconstruction of metaphysical equality and the affirmation of 'agonarchy' in its stead having been defended both as the guiding principles of a new, postmodern democracy and as something which Nietzsche might have consistently affirmed, Hatab proceeds to show how these principles would play out in certain core dimensions of democratic praxis: it would be a democracy compatible with notions of excellence and merit (chapter 5), one which, as thoroughly perspectival (chapter 6) would affirm an ethics and politics 'without foundations' (chapter 7). Moreover, such themes as selfhood, rights, respect for others, and justice could be affirmed on non-metaphysical grounds (chapter 8). Throughout, Hatab preserves and develops the guiding themes of his book as both the basis of a postmodern, non-metaphysical democratic praxis and as compatible with a Nietzschean standpoint: the denial of all metaphysical or essentialist commitments to things like 'equality' or 'truth,' the emphasis on the primacy of agon, an emphasis on 'pragmatic' politics as against democratic theory, that is, on democracy not as a

foundational set of *beliefs* but on an unstable, changeable set of *procedures*, the affirmation of perspectivism (as against any 'essentialist' or metaphysical notion of 'truth'), and thus, the avoidance of any 'metanarratives' about democracy.

This is a powerful, engaging, challenging book. It will especially appeal to those of a postmodern bent who look to Nietzsche as an early champion of the view they hold but are appalled by the antidemocratic polemic he affirms. Now, with Hatab as their guide, they can affirm Nietzsche and a revised, postmodern democracy at once. The book is a challenging and critical evaluation and reinterpretation of Nietzsche, and also a fascinating rethinking of democracy without the presumed metaphysical baggage of 'equality' and 'truth'. It is thus a stimulating and valuable book for anyone interested in Nietzsche, postmodernism, or democracy. However, since the notion of agon is so crucial to the argument of the book, Hatab himself would presumably be disappointed if there were no one to contest his position. So let me take at least a few brief steps toward being his Nietzschean, agonistic friend.

I can think of no substantial criticisms that one could make from the postmodernist standpoint which Hatab sustains. The book has about it, in this sense, a wonderful consistency. The objections I would want to raise are really objections less about the specific argument of the book than about the postmodernist principles which inform it. Let me indicate just a few of those objections.

As we have seen, central to Hatab's argument is the rejection of claims which he occasionally labels 'essentialist', 'metaphysical', or, following the postmodern fashion, 'Platonist'. One crucial defect of this rejected position is its presumed claim that there *is* some 'absolute' truth to which a certain privileged standpoint (religious, philosophical, cultural, etc.) has access. As Hatab rightly observes, such a view is almost intrinsically anti-democratic: if I *know* that my view is right in some absolute way, why tolerate views that I know to be wrong in the name of democratic openness? A central democratic tenet, therefore, is the recognition of the finitude of all claims to truth. 'In the end, my respect for other persons and other viewpoints in democratic exchanges would seem to mean, ideally, that my beliefs are not absolute, that I do not have a lock on the truth, that other views might have some merit and might even improve upon my view in some way' (66). That seems to me entirely right. But from this recognition of the *finitude* of our claims to truth, Hatab, with Nietzsche and most postmodernists, moves directly, as the only apparent alternative to 'essentialism,' to *perspectivism*, the *absolute, non-open* rejection of *all* truth in favor of various perspectives. Thus, 'traditional democratic theory, however, must be deconstructed as well, so that democracy can be redescribed in nonessentialist terms. Aristocratic and democratic theories alike have shared a belief in truth' (73). To avoid this 'belief in truth', 'postmodern democracy can follow through by subjecting all truth claims to suspicion' (73). From the recognition of the finitude of all our truth claims, Hatab, with Nietzsche, moves directly to the repudiation of truth *per se*. What he leaves out, in this postmodern binary opposition, is Socrates.

I use 'Socrates' as a cover term for what I take to be *real* 'Platonism', the view that is actually exhibited in the dialogues, which is as far as possible from the postmodern parodies which make Plato a typical, indeed possibly the first, philosophical absolutist. To take possibly the most famous example, the so-called 'theory of Ideas' — which, incidentally, is never called a theory in any dialogue — this view is never once asserted as 'proved' or 'known with certainty' in any dialogue. Rather, it is always and at most asserted as a hypothesis that is *worthy of belief*. The argument of the dialogues is always that it will be *better* for us to believe in Ideas than not to, never that we know absolutely that they exist. That is, the context in which the Ideas and all other proposals in the dialogues are presented is the famous *Socratic aporia*. And what is *aporia*? It is precisely the recognition, exhibited definitively by Socrates, of the *finitude* of our truth claims, of the recognition of our *lack* of 'wisdom' or absolute knowledge in the essentialist sense.

Does this make Socrates a 'perspectivist'? Not at all. The subtle but crucial difference is that between recognizing the finitude of our truth claims and rejecting the very notion of truth *per se*. Socrates would never do the latter because he believes that, although he does not know the truth and knows no one who does, it is still better to *believe*, or *trust* that there is truth and that we should all strive together after it.

The question is, which view, the Socratic or the Nietzschean/postmodern, is more appropriate and conducive for a democratic praxis? I suggest that, against Hatab, it is the Socratic. If I recognize that neither I nor anyone else 'has a lock on the truth', then it is altogether plausible that *the best hope for gaining access to the truth* is to consider all views. I should, in Hatab's word, 'respect' all views because any one of them *might be right* (there being, I continue to trust Socratically, a 'right' in principle). But what if I am a postmodern perspectivist and believe that there is *no* truth, no 'right' in principle? Obviously, I will no longer respect other views 'because they might be right'. Why, on what grounds, should I then respect other views rather than just assert my own in any way I can, without regard for bourgeois liberal myths about respect, procedural justice, or non-violence? It seems to me that Hatab's own 'procedural' commitments to 'fair play', non-violence, and 'agonistic respect' in democracy only work — and I think they should work — if we accept the *Socratic*, non-postmodern view that my opponent might actually be right. But if there *is* no 'right', again, why should I restrain myself? A 'Socratic defense of democracy', I suggest, would be more plausible than a Nietzschean defense.

I close with a brief speculation regarding the source of what Hatab affirms as the 'suspicion' (70 ff.) of truth characteristic of postmodernism and therefore of the postmodern democratic praxis he advocates. Despite postmodernism's vociferous repudiation of 'modernity', I suggest that it remains Cartesian in at least one decisive and problematic sense. Either a given claim to truth must be *proved indubitably* or it should be *rejected absolutely*. And since, on good Socratic grounds, the indubitability of our access to truth is not available, the postmodernists reject the very possibility of there being

truth at all. Notwithstanding the proclaimed postmodern opposition to 'binary oppositions', *this* binary opposition is one they seem to affirm. What it leaves out is the pragmatic plausibility, so central in the Platonic dialogues, not of suspicion but of *trust*, the trust that there is truth, there is a 'better', toward which we should all strive, together.

Lawrence Hatab's book should be read as a challenging, thought-provoking reflection on some of the most decisive philosophical and political issues of our time.

Drew A. Hyland

Trinity College
Hartford, CT

James M. Humber and Robert F. Almeder, eds.

Reproduction, Technology, and Rights.

Totowa, NJ: Humana Press 1996.

Pp. ix + 157.

US \$44.50. ISBN 0-89603-326-0.

Reproduction, Technology, and Rights, as the thirteenth annual volume in the Biomedical Ethics Reviews series, purports to 'review and update the literature on issues of central importance in bioethics today' (vii). In light of this, the reader might expect this collection to cover such issues as the fetal harm debate, contract parenting, anonymous sperm donation, gene therapy, and population screening. In fact, the volume limits itself to three issues: abortion, in vitro fertilisation, and justice in macroallocation.

Part I consists of a debate over whether one can consistently be committed to equal rights while at the same time recognising both a woman's right to abortion on demand and a father's unconditional obligation to support his children. In the first essay, Steven D. Hales argues that since 'mothers' have 'a legitimate mechanism for avoiding future duties to children' (9) (namely, abortion), equality demands 'fathers' likewise be given such a mechanism. Allowing men rights of refusal to support their unwanted children approximates an 'ideal of moral parity' (12). Presenting a series of thought-experiments (based on contractual agreements), Hales attempts to discredit a woman's objection that pregnancy is unique and resistant to such analogies as 'a last-chance act of desperation to save a position from a counter-example it cannot otherwise defeat' (18). Nowhere in the essay is the notion of substantive rights or relevant differences seriously considered, nor (not surprisingly) does Hales express any scepticism about the full voluntariness

of women's sexual and reproductive choices. Indeed, he claims that women should, arguably, bear a greater nurturing burden than men since we assume the risk of this burden knowingly and, by failing to abort, accept it as ongoing (20).

In a subtle and refreshingly sensitive commentary, Humber identifies the main weaknesses of Hales' position: his misconstrual of women's right to terminate a pregnancy in instrumental terms as a means to avoid an unpleasant outcome, and the superficiality of his treatment of rights. Humber develops a useful (though politically alarming) analogy between women and the handicapped, showing, contra Hales, that equality may demand different treatment.

Hales' rebuttal, the third essay in Part I, engages the points made by Humber, making this section of the book a stimulating, self-contained discussion of a 'hot' issue in gender studies and social philosophy.

Part II is asymmetrical, with two essays on specific technological interventions — embryo manipulation and selective termination — and one essay on the right to reproductive assistance under scarce resources. The discussion of embryo manipulation by Kathleen Ganss Gibson and Joe B. Massey is somewhat disappointing, reiterating arguments concerning the moral status of embryos and their appropriate treatment that have been developed in more depth by others (e.g., Leon Kass and Samuel Gorovitz). Although they usefully distinguish between therapeutic and research uses of embryos, and between embryo-as-human and embryo-as-nonhuman perspectives, Gibson and Massey then gloss over the problems associated with both proxy consent to experimentation and the notion of respect for human tissue. Again, though they rightly note that concern for embryos might conflict with concern for women, they regrettably say little about what is at stake for women or how such conflicts might be resolved.

The discussion of selective termination by Walter Glannon, likewise, is disappointing in its lack of a feminist perspective (an excellent example of which, Christine Overall's 'Selective Termination in Pregnancy and Women's Reproductive Autonomy' does not even appear in the notes). The ethical problem of selective termination is treated as a test case in the debate over whether numbers should count in ethical decision-making. While Glannon's conclusion — that numbers *do* count for both utilitarians and Kantians — is surprising and well-supported, the abstraction of the discussion from the social circumstances of women requiring selective termination is distressing.

The highlight of this collection is Leonard J. Weber's discussion of justice in health care delivery, and the status of patients' claims to reproductive assistance. In his contribution, Weber helpfully distinguishes negative and positive rights and discusses the nature and status of the right to assisted reproduction. Rejecting the market model, he recommends three principles for just health care delivery: meeting basic needs, offering only beneficial services, and arriving at allocation criteria for non-basic needs by democratic means. Appealing to a functional model of medical necessity, Weber argues that, although not medically necessary, reproductive assistance such as in

vitro fertilisation should be offered by a caring society, other things being equal. The 'other things' are, its proven effectiveness and its status vis a vis other health care demands.

Part III of the collection looks at genetic knowledge, the first essay arguing that women may have an obligation to abort a severely anomalous fetus, the second presenting a number of argumentative strategies that might be followed by those with genetic disabilities to secure social support.

Bambi E.S. Robinson argues for a woman's obligation to abort on two grounds: first, that abortion does less harm than allowing a severely anomalous fetus to become a living child, than allowing it to die at birth, and than killing it at birth; second, that the burden of the parents in such cases is lessened more by abortion than by the other options. Robinson's first argument (which she admits is necessary to support her conclusion) depends upon notoriously difficult quality of life judgments. While she confidently claims that such judgments are possible in extreme cases (e.g., Tay-Sachs) she considers neither John Robertson's 'problem of egocentricity' (there is an insurmountable epistemic barrier between our psychology and that of the severely handicapped) nor the viewpoint of the disabled on this issue. Both should give her pause. Furthermore, although she rejects turning women's moral obligation to abort into a legal one, she overlooks the coercive effects of social pressure on women's moral decision-making.

Richard T. Hull's essay on the just claims of dyslexic children completes the volume. To defeat immunity claims by the non-handicapped, he suggests four argumentative strategies. Veatch's stewardship approach is considered, along with three secular counterparts: Rawls 'difference principle', Reiman's 'nonsubjugation' principle, and Goodin's 'non-exploitation' principle. The essay is largely expository and, although useful for its expressed purpose, sits ill in a collection on reproductive technology. Disclaimers in the introduction and conclusion to the effect that in the age of the 'genomic' human such arguments will become increasingly important, seem transparently contrived.

The reader who is looking for an update on the ethics of reproductive technology will be sold short by this volume. Not only is the feminist perspective (which is at the forefront of reproductive ethics) entirely absent; the collection is hardly representative of the current debates. However, eclectic and frustrating as it is, *Reproduction, Technology, and Rights* contains some exciting debate and (in the article by Weber) at least one treasure.

Elisabeth Boetzkes

McMaster University

Luce Irigaray

thinking the difference: For a Peaceful Revolution.

Trans. Karin Montin.

New York: Routledge 1994.

Pp. xviii + 118.

Cdn \$56.50: US \$45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-90814-0);

Cdn \$17.50: US \$13.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90815-9).

The texts of writers like Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous and Luce Irigaray are sometimes so exasperatingly difficult to read that it is a joy to be presented with a clear account of their theoretical work. But while Kristeva demonstrates a philosophical reading of literary texts, and Cixous, an art-theory hybrid, Irigaray appears to be working toward a methodology that combines theory with *political practice*. She actively seeks to resolve the tension between her brand of philosophical-psychoanalysis and activism by providing pragmatic solutions with a theoretical base, conveyed in a style that is more oral than textual. *thinking the difference* aptly demonstrates this deliberate methodology: the essays in the volume were first presented as a series of lectures, and accordingly, are clearly written, relaxed and unaffected. Irigaray's objective is equally plain: she presents a fusion of philosophical, political, and ethical issues intended for the academic and activist combined.

thinking the difference was originally presented in four distinct sessions delivered to members of the *Partito comunista italiano* between 1986 and 1989. Each of the lectures is framed by Irigaray's early theory of *sexual difference* (delineated in *Spéculum de l'autre femme* and *Ce sexe qui n'en est pas un*, particularly). In *thinking the difference* Irigaray continues to maintain that understanding and respecting the distinctness of the sexes is the foundation for a full human subjectivity and, by extension, should be the substratum of any comprehensive political agenda that aims to safeguard women's civil liberties.

Irigaray contrasts this theory principally with the rosy promises of egalitarianism. Egalitarian political platforms, she claims, preserve an asexual subjectivity that is a dangerous and deluding fiction. Constitutional rights that are based on the paradigm of a national or universal subject often act in an abstruse manner to shield the very rights that they were meant to protect, particularly the rights of women. Irigaray is not short on examples to support her claim; she peppers the text with illustrations to demonstrate the failure of the egalitarian model to protect the rights of women, and supplements these examples with helpful suggestions for countering the weighty presence of the so-called 'neutral' subject.

The first three essays in the volume provide a solid, though sweeping analysis of the social constructions (religious, linguistic, genealogical and legislative) that function to exclude women from the organization and production of culture. Women are infantilized by social structures which operate solely on a male paradigm and deny them a full civil subjectivity. And rights,

Irigaray contends, necessitate responsibilities. There exists no civil legislation to delineate the rights specific for women, nothing that recognizes that women have a distinct collective history from men, and there is no definitive understanding of their gender (both individual and collective).

But the law does not address *any* of its citizens according to their sexed corporeality; the universal subject only serves a 'neutered' person, *neither man nor woman*. Just as there are no properly defined legislative rights for women, the universal subject also masks the sexual distinctness of men. Civil identity cannot rest on an understanding of 'one', but must be based on the understanding of 'two': men and women. Irigaray is calling for an ethical (and legislative) system that is specifically sexed and can accommodate both men and women as fully developed persons. She models her new ethics on the dynamics of the heterosexual couple.

In these first three sections of *thinking the difference*, Irigaray primarily relies on legal remedies to address gender inequalities. Her pragmatic suggestions sometimes reveal a naive faith in the efficacy of legislation. Her willingness to grant excessive power to the state to enforce these laws is, perhaps, most troubling. And readers of Irigaray have heard much of this before, though perhaps not so clearly and concisely. It is the fourth and final section of the text, however, that is the most compelling and inventive.

In 'The Forgotten Mystery of Female Ancestry' Irigaray tantalizes the reader with a theory that is, as yet, in its infancy. Irigaray begins by noting that there has been a general effacement of positive mother-daughter myths and images in contemporary Western society. It is difficult for women to come together, she notes, to unite in love and understanding, when there exists no representation, no unified genealogy *between women* to provide them with a model. If women are trapped in an infantilized state, without images or symbols that can articulate their erotic economy, there is no ground on which to build an individualized subjectivity. A symbolic representation of a genealogy between women can provide the necessary substratum for an individual subjectivity, as well as the basis for a healthy relationship between men and women.

It is the *mother-daughter relationship* that Irigaray believes constitutes the most natural social model for a bond between women. Irigaray's aim is not only civil, but spiritual; representations of the mother-daughter relation, while buttressing the search for a distinctly sexed civil subjectivity, also present the much needed model of a *divinity* that is based on the relations between women. It is only here that the reader understands the radical proposition that Irigaray puts forth: *a subject can only come into being through the divinization of a love relationship in which she is represented*. Irigaray details the absolute need for a deification of the mother-daughter relationship to provide a stable ground for women's individual identity.

In places Irigaray harkens back to a Golden Age of female unity, where the mother-daughter relationship was properly represented in images and symbols and worshipped in divinity. Her archaeological and anthropological accounts here appear not only dubious, but downright utopic. A thoughtful

reader, however, should not dismiss the importance of Irigaray's mother-daughter vision because of weak historical underpinnings. Instead, one should ask why it is necessary at all to provide such utopic examples. What need does this fill in Irigaray the theorist? What motivation does it serve for Irigaray the activist?

It was not surprising to find in her prefatory notes that the four lectures were written directly in light of the Chernobyl disaster. The tone is unlike the erotic, playful and poetic ambiguity that makes up much of her other work. In *thinking the difference* Irigaray is apocalyptic, full of foreboding and warnings for the future; charged with urgency and import, this is a text set for the coming millennium.

Kathleen A. O'Grady

Trinity College

University of Cambridge

William Jordan

Ancient Concepts of Philosophy.

London: Routledge 1993.

Pp. xiii + 207.

Cdn \$19.95: US \$15.95. ISBN 0-415-08940-9.

Given its title and the fact that it appears as a volume in Routledge's series, 'Issues in Ancient Philosophy', one would expect this work to offer a fairly advanced discussion of its announced topic. In fact, as its Preface makes clear, it is addressed primarily to undergraduates, and would be more appropriately entitled an introduction; the survey of ancient Greek philosophy from the Presocratics to the Hellenistic Sceptics that it provides and the discussion of the more general philosophical topics raised by that survey take place at too preliminary a level to be very satisfying to a professional philosopher or an advanced student of ancient Greek philosophy.

Once one adjusts to the intended level, the novelty of the approach taken by the author becomes clear; throughout the book, the views of the various ancient philosophers surveyed are compared with those of several twentieth-century philosophers, chiefly Anglo-American analytical philosophers. Such a comparison is not unusual at more advanced levels of discussion, but it is novel to organize an introduction in this way. In effect, Jordan attempts to introduce undergraduates to ancient Greek philosophy by way of a dialogue between ancient philosophers on the one hand, and one current and very influential school of philosophy, on the other. Furthermore, in this dialogue,

Jordan is not merely a neutral observer; he takes the side of the ancients at least to the extent that he argues that the questions dealt with by ancient Greek philosophers were, in the main, genuinely philosophical ones, that is, questions that philosophers even today would, or should, recognize as belonging to their discipline. As a result, Jordan is riding two horses at once: on the one hand, he attempts to make the best possible sense of the views put forward by the Greeks; on the other, he defends the appropriateness of their approach against those modern critics who would argue that the reflections of ancient Greek philosophers are simply beside the point philosophically. Given Jordan's intended audience, one might say that he is attempting to persuade undergraduates that the study of ancient Greek philosophy is still a suitable point of entry into philosophy itself.

Nevertheless, in the end, Jordan's defense of ancient Greek philosophy has the effect of damning with faint praise. Against modern analytical philosophers, Jordan argues that the central questions of philosophy are not simply restricted to questions raised by the philosophy of language; it is still true today, he argues, just as much as in antiquity, that philosophers are concerned with understanding the nature of reality and how we fit into it. Yet, when it comes to understanding and evaluating the views of the ancient Greek philosophers, modern analytical philosophy still determines the method and sets the standard. The effect of this orientation is not so much that Jordan completely misreads the views of the ancient philosophers; I discovered only one obvious error: on p. 89, Jordan mixes up Simmias and Cebes when describing the objections to Socrates's initial arguments for the immortality of the soul in the *Phaedo*, and he also makes Cebes compare the soul to a cloak, when in fact Cebes compares the soul to the weaver of a cloak and the body to the cloak itself. Rather, Jordan's presentation and evaluation of ancient Greek philosophy is intended to appeal to modern analytical philosophers, and thus is grounded in their presuppositions. As a result, Parmenides, for example, receives the highest praise of all the Presocratics because he is seen as attempting '... to discover truths of metaphysics through examining necessary conditions of linguistic experience and knowledge' (36). Similarly, Aristotle's greatest contribution is said to be found in his philosophical method, which, Jordan claims, is '... refreshingly independent of his substantive philosophical doctrines' (106). Finally, Plato's contribution to philosophy is seen to consist chiefly in the interesting questions he raises, which are memorably captured by a series of intriguing images; the proper elucidation of these questions, however, had to await the advent of modern analytical philosophy, or, in some instances, something else equally foreign to ancient philosophy, modern existentialism.

This narrow view of ancient philosophy is not greatly widened by the views of the other commentators on ancient philosophy cited in this book; most of the commentators discussed by Jordan also approach their subject from within modern analytical philosophy. As is so often the case with such commentators, little is made of the possibility that Socrates's profession of ignorance in the *Apology* and other allegedly early dialogues might be ironic.

Consequently, the aporetic effect of Socratic elenchus, or refutation, is seen as contradicting the claim that human virtue is like a skill or craft, which requires some positive knowledge on the part of the practitioner. Nor is there any indication that the aporetic dialogues might end without any apparent answer to the question discussed because of the shortcomings of Socrates's interlocutor, someone, for example, as philosophically inept as Meno. Given the philosophical orientation of Jordan's intended audience and of the commentators on ancient Greek philosophy that he consults, it is not surprising that his final evaluation of ancient philosophy turns out as it does: the Greeks may have been asking the right questions, but their answers, on the whole, are not worth a great deal.

The point here is not that one should approach ancient philosophy uncritically and as an object of veneration; that would betray the ancients' own understanding of philosophy. Still, if modern philosophy and science really do offer greater insight into these matters, then it is not clear that the study of ancient Greek philosophy really is all that useful. One might argue that the ancient Greek approach to questions of continuing philosophical concern is still worth studying, but this would suggest the rather unusual view that, contrary to what the proponents of the modern revolution in science and philosophy thought, the ancient Greeks were correct in their method of inquiry, but incorrect in their results. If neither their method of posing the questions, nor the results of their inquiries are superior to those of modern philosophy, then we should not bother with the ancient Greeks. Indeed, if we are to follow the ancient Greeks' own prescription in this regard, ancient Greek philosophy should be abandoned if it is only being studied for antiquarian reasons. In the end, it is perhaps appropriate that this book should be addressed primarily to undergraduates because, like the ancient Greeks, they are only beginners in philosophy, who need to learn how to do it by beginning with less difficult problems and simpler answers.

Christopher Byrne

St. Francis Xavier University

Mark Kaplan

Decision Theory as Philosophy.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Pp. xv + 227.

US \$54.95. ISBN 0-521-47505-8.

Kaplan explains the bearing of decision theory on epistemology. He relies on F.P. Ramsey's insight that rational preferences reveal rational degrees of belief or confidence. First, he argues that principles of rational preference force rational degrees of confidence to satisfy basic probability laws, given some simplifying assumptions about preferences, which he claims can be rescinded using the techniques of the statistician, L.J. Savage (43). Next, he argues that degrees of confidence take over the role of beliefs in regulating action, but contrary to R.C. Jeffrey's view, leave a role for belief and knowledge, the traditional concerns of epistemology (103). He claims that belief that P is readiness to assert that P in the context of inquiry, where the sole goal is asserting the truth. Although P's assertability is regulated by degrees of confidence, it does not amount to a state of confidence, but a preference given a limited objective. Epistemology's job is to investigate rational degree of confidence as a guide to action, rational belief taken as assertability, and the circumstances in which rational belief is knowledge. Kaplan's probabilistic epistemology rejects common Bayesian views that rational attitudes of confidence are invariably precise, and are governed by diachronic principles such as the principle of conditionalization and the principle of reflection. Throughout, his arguments are kept as nonmathematical as possible. Proofs and supplementary technical material appear in appendices. His writing is poised and full of verve. He provides an accessible introduction and important contribution to decision-theoretic epistemology.

Two of Kaplan's main claims are (1) that his justification of probability laws for degrees of confidence is generalized by Savage, and (2) that degrees of confidence, while they do much of the work of beliefs, leave an important role for beliefs. These claims invite investigation. Kaplan's justification of the probability laws for degrees of confidence defines a degree of confidence that P as a monetary value for a gamble that P (15). Then it advances an abstract version of the Dutch Book Argument, foregoing bookies for the sake of explicitness about assumptions. The argument is careful, detailed, and rigorous — well worth study. The claim that the argument can dispense with the simplifying assumptions, in contrast, is unsupported. In fact, contrary to Kaplan's claim, Savage does not generalize the argument. Savage's work on probability in *The Foundations of Statistics* (New York: Dover, 1972) fails to provide a general justification of the probability laws for two reasons. First, it makes simplifying assumptions too. On p. 14 it assumes that the relevant consequences of acts are not act-specific but producible with arbitrary probabilities, even as sure-things. This eliminates risk as a relevant consequence, and so imposes neutrality toward risk. Second, unlike Kaplan, Savage does not define a degree of confidence as the monetary value of a gamble. On pp.

31-8 he defines degrees of confidence for an agent as the values of a probability function that agrees with the agent's preference ranking of gambles. He defines a probability ordering of events in terms of a preference ranking of gambles on the events, and shows that, given certain restrictions on the preference ranking, there is just one probability function over events that agrees with their ordering according to probability, and so with the preference ranking. Savage's axioms of preference are not used to argue that rational degrees of confidence satisfy the probability laws. Savage assumes that degrees of confidence satisfy the probability laws in order to derive degrees of confidence from the preference ranking of gambles. The basic probability laws that a probability function obeys by definition are used to show the uniqueness of a probability function agreeing with the preference ranking. Since degrees of confidence are defined as the values of that unique probability function, they satisfy the probability laws by definition.

Kaplan's claim that degrees of confidence do not completely usurp the role of belief in epistemology arises in the face of Jeffrey's contrary claim that degrees of confidence suck the marrow out of beliefs — they take over the role of guiding action. Kaplan argues that belief is needed for, among other things, an account of acceptance of scientific theories. He rejects several views of belief and proposes his own. He says, 'You count as believing P just if, were your sole aim to assert the truth (as it pertains to P), and your only options were to assert that P , assert that $\sim P$ or make neither assertion, you would prefer to assert that P ' (109). He argues that his view of belief resolves the preface and lottery paradoxes, and respects belief's fallibility and requirements of deductive cogency. The price of his account of belief is acceptance of rational beliefs in the improbable, that is, cases of rational belief in a proposition with a low degree of confidence. Such beliefs arise on his view because the aim of truth comprises conflicting subsidiary goals of comprehensiveness and error-avoidance. To increase comprehensiveness, it may be rational to risk error, and assert a proposition attracting little confidence (145). Kaplan concedes that this consequence of his account of belief shows that he does not explicate belief in the ordinary sense (142). The concession amounts to abdication to Jeffrey, as I interpret his view. Jeffrey discards ordinary belief, and Kaplan finds no role for ordinary belief. Kaplan's treatment of belief confirms Jeffrey's radical probabilism. Belief, having been deposed from its action-guiding role, can do no better than vie for the role of assertability. It has no niche of its own.

Kaplan provides a carefully considered, nicely written, modest version of Bayesianism — Bayesianism shorn of troublesome claims about rational confidence's precision and its revision in light of new evidence. He gives the Bayesian challenge to belief, as well as other important issues in probabilistic epistemology, attention they deserve. I recommend his book to all interested in decision theory's relevance to epistemology.

Paul Weirich

University of Missouri-Columbia

Daryl Koehn

The Ground of Professional Ethics.

New York: Routledge 1994.

Pp. x + 224.

US \$55.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-11666-X);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-11667-8).

This book is one of a series of books on professional ethics, called the Professional Ethics Series. The series is edited by Andrew Belsey of the Centre for Applied Ethics at the University of Wales and Ruth Chadwick of the Centre for Professional Ethics at the University of Central Lancaster. In this particular book, Koehn seeks to articulate the moral relationship between professionals and their clients in order to discover what, if anything, legitimates the professional/client relationship. In the course of doing so — the three professions of law, medicine, and the clergy are the focus of her attention — she concludes that the moral foundation of professions is a public pledge by professions that they will meet the conditions (outlined below) for being trustworthy. While her conclusion may be, at least in part, true, the arguments she advances in support of it are not convincing.

Eliot Friedson's position on professions is that they emerge and achieve the dominance they ultimately rise to primarily on the basis of the public's perception that they will subscribe to and maintain the fiduciary responsibility of their professional ethic. On the eve of the twenty-first century the public's perception that the professions of law, clergy, and medicine have lived up to their professional ethic has become increasingly suspect, and for several reasons. Jokes about lawyers are common; the clergy is suffering from numerous sexual scandals; and the profession of medicine is, as claimed by James Todd (President of the American Medical Association) suffering from a 'crisis in confidence' owing largely to the problems of nosocomial infections, iatrogenic injuries, fraud, self-referrals, and physician induced demand for medical services.

While Koehn concedes that these three professions may be in trouble with respect to the public's perception of them, she thinks that these professions may be able to redeem themselves in the eyes of their public by being 'true to their covenants' (180). However, in order to do this, professionals (as well as clients) must first be aware and convinced of the moral ground or moral nature of the public's trust in professions. To this end Koehn explores several issues that arise during the course of client/professional relationships: the limits of professional discretion, the role of self-enforcement by professions, the nature of a profession's relationship to the public good, and the limits of client confidentiality. In addition, she also argues, albeit not very convincingly, that health, justice, and salvation are intrinsic goods (69-88). Given that the rest of her argument rests on the claim that health, justice, and salvation are indeed intrinsic goods, one would have expected a more thorough philosophical examination of these

concepts. However, all the reader is treated to is a brief overview of the concepts and, with respect to health, the following argument. 'If we take health then to be at least in part the balanced functioning of a well-habited whole, we can readily see why it is good in the eyes of both the individual client and the community at large. Individuals desire health because they love life' (75). While this claim may be true it is no reason to claim that health is an intrinsic good, especially when intrinsic goods are goods valued for their own sake and, in Koehn's case, she says individuals value health, not for its own sake, but rather because they love life. The arguments advanced in favor of justice and salvation being intrinsic goods are equally unconvincing.

However, given that health, justice, and salvation are indeed intrinsic goods, Koehn then goes on to identify seven conditions necessary for clients in particular, and the public in general, to trust professionals. The conditions are: 1) 'the professional must aim at the client's good' (54); 2) the professional must act on the client's behalf (54); 3) the willingness to act on the client's behalf must be both sustained and open-ended (54); 4) professionals must be competent (55); 5) professionals must hold the client responsible for following the professional's recommended course of action (65); 6) professionals must be allowed to serve the client's good with discretion; that is, using his professional judgement; and 7) 'the professional must be bound to monitor her own behavior' (56). If these conditions are met, and if the professions in question make a 'unilateral, unqualified' (67) public pledge to meet these conditions, then, Koehn argues, the moral legitimacy of those professions is established.

In addition to the positive arguments advanced for the moral foundation of professions, Koehn also considers some alternative accounts. In particular she devotes two chapters to explicating and criticizing the expert and the contract models of professional authority. Her objections to the expert model are several: there is no link between expertise and trustworthiness; being an expert imposes no moral obligation to help a particular person; the division of labor among experts precludes a unified goal; 'expertise erodes trust by undermining the distinctive professional roles around which client expectations of help coalesce' (28); and experts treat clients as individuals and not members of larger groups, such as the family or community.

The principle proponent of the contract model is Robert Veatch. Koehn argues that Veatch's contract model fails for the following reasons: the nature of a contract is such that it precludes trust; the contract model has no option for dealing with clients that are unequal in the sense that they 'cannot negotiate a meaningful contract' (43); the contract model minimizes client responsibility by requiring little more of the client than identifying what the client wants done; the contract model fails to acknowledge a professional responsibility to all who need the professional's help; and the contract model merely responds to the identified desires of the client, which may or may not be in the client's best interest.

In summary, while the arguments may be less than convincing, the book is well written and it should prove interesting to those who are concerned about the nature and moral foundation of professions. In addition, the book includes a bibliography and a name and subject index.

Kenneth F.T. Cust

Central Missouri State University

Laurence Lampert

Leo Strauss and Nietzsche.

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1996.

Pp. x + 229.

US \$22.50. ISBN 0-226-46825-9.

This book has the 'value of honest books' in Nietzsche's sense. From its intended readership — those who know the writings of Strauss, Nietzsche and Plato, or presume to — it will 'lure out their aversions and hatreds.'

Lampert praises Strauss (not himself) as first among the 'special readers' Nietzsche sought (1). 'In the one little essay Strauss wrote on Nietzsche ..., "Note on the Plan of *Beyond Good and Evil*," Nietzsche is reborn posthumously, reborn as himself.' Half of this book consists then in a paragraph by paragraph commentary on this essay, proposed without 'winks and nods' or 'secret things to whisper' (15).

Yet 'every opinion is also a hideout.' Esoterically, Strauss is 'nearest ... to Nietzsche' (1), though on the specific issue of philosophical strategy still sides with Plato. Yet Lampert winks: perhaps this esoteric strategic allegiance is not as true to Plato as it seems. Nietzsche appears to adopt a philosophical strategy directly opposed to Plato's. Yet Lampert nods: perhaps in our time Nietzsche's strategy is truest to Platonic philosophy. Overall, Lampert whispers: Is not what Nietzsche demands — *Nur wer sich wandelt, bleibt mit mir verwandt* — the true timeless principle of Platonism?

Ostensibly, Lampert argues that Strauss, Nietzsche and Plato share kinship via the tradition of 'Platonic political philosophy.' His conception of this tradition derives proximately from Strauss's reading of the *Republic*, though it is based ultimately on the 'new history of philosophy' made possible by Nietzsche (121). For Strauss, the true center of the *Republic* is Socrates's taming of Thrasymachus, the master rhetorician being co-opted by the philosopher into a subordinate role 'ministerial' to philosophy. The Platonic political philosopher rules by means of 'a secret spiritual kingship mediated by the art of persuasion' (154), retiring behind the 'rhetoric of innocence' in

order 'to be an "investigator" living privately as a member of an imperfect society trying to humanize it within the limits of the possible' (128). Such philosophers share the conviction that the 'interests of philosophy are the highest interests of humanity' (117), that it is the 'natural right' of the philosopher 'to rule the world' (163), and that in order to rule securely the philosopher must bring rhetoric and poetry under philosophy's 'legislative sway,' using them 'exoterically' to philosophy's advantage (156). Above all, these 'genuine philosophers share the fundamental Platonism,' that is, an 'erotic attachment to the whole of which they are the rational investigators' (122).

What then is essentially 'Platonic' are not the familiar doctrines of Platonic 'dogmatism' (e.g., the theory of ideas, immortality, eternal truths). Lampert not only suggests that Strauss himself did not believe these doctrines to be true, but also insinuates that Strauss did not believe that Plato believed them to be true (164, 138ff.). Instead, Platonic dogmatism is the pious mask Plato needed to 'persuade the multitude that philosophy is not vicious' (153). 'What is timeless in Plato turns out not to be timeless entities, but a timeless strategy that recognizes the fundamental and permanent problem faced by philosophy,' that is, how properly to secure philosophy's worldly rule (146-7; 163-4).

'A complete skeptic about Plato' (164), Lampert's Strauss is also a skeptic about Straussianism. He does 'not hold as timelessly true those twin pillars of a popular Straussianism alleged of him by both friends and enemies: he was not ultimately a loyalist to God and nation because he was not ultimately a loyalist at all' (130). Instead, Lampert's Strauss is a 'zetetic' philosopher, persistently questioning and imbued with Socratic skepticism. Yet he is also a 'dissembler with reasoned grounds for dissembling' (133), exoterically affirming God and nation, while esoterically accepting as 'true' Nietzsche's 'doctrine that God is dead' (139; 191). Strauss returns to Plato strategically to recover 'the Platonic notion of the noble delusion,' in particular, the 'public belief in just gods and immortal souls' (173). He does not consider these beliefs true, but he holds that philosophy and the public good require that the multitude believe them.

Nietzsche too is 'a complete skeptic' about Plato's dogmatism (30). Nevertheless, he revives Platonic eros, a 'love of the whole that necessarily edifies' (57), and thereby 'recovers and makes explicit the essential passionate core of philosophy that has made every great thinker a "Platonist"' (56). Nietzsche's intent and Plato's are the same: 'to rule the world' (128), 'to produce a new human type' (159). Moreover, both know the difference between exoteric and esoteric and both offer a comprehensive vision of the world. Yet, unlike Plato, Nietzsche defends the cause of philosophy without *pious masks* (127).

It is on the issue of 'the proper politics for philosophy today' that Lampert's Strauss departs from Nietzsche (167; 22-3). Both agree that 'the conditions that endangered philosophy at its first appearance ... forced upon it the ascetic mask it has worn ever since.' Yet, for Nietzsche, 'all that has really

altered.' Modern experience allows genuine philosophers to give up their old lies and openly 'conduct an experiment with truth.' By contrast, Strauss 'implicitly denies that anything essential has really altered that could end philosophy's need to be furtive' (167). Here Lampert himself purports to side with Nietzsche, charging Strauss with 'a failure of historical sense' (184; cf. 171, 173). Were Plato philosophizing today, Lampert might expect him to concur.

Detailed discussion of this book should wait upon those who read it '*lento*.' Suffice it here to question one small point. Strauss claims that the 'whole doctrine' of *Beyond Good and Evil* is 'a vindication of God' in the form of a 'non-theistic religiosity' (192-5). Yet he avows 'no access' to the 'nerve of Nietzsche's theology,' referring instead to a 'worthy treatment' by Karl Reinhardt. That Strauss should make his only reference to another Nietzsche-interpretation at the point when the issue is access to the nerve of Nietzsche's 'whole doctrine' is surely remarkable. Equally remarkable is that Lampert should not pursue the reference (57). He chastises Strauss for offering 'only an old God' (173). But when it comes to saying why the once and future divinities Nietzsche re-introduces are truly fitting, he speaks *sotto voce*.

Lampert adopts a strategy of avowed innocence and probity. Perhaps a 'monster' lurks here too — *proste Lampert opithen te Lampert messe te Chimaira* (2)?

Robert Burch

University of Alberta

Hugh Lehman

Rationality and Ethics in Agriculture.

Moscow, ID: University of Idaho Press 1995.

Pp. xi + 228.

US \$24.95. ISBN 0-89301-179-7.

Lehman offers nine essays on the rationality of contested claims about agriculture production and research, plus four essays defending normative positions. The section on rationality is a careful and serious examination of claims to the effect that those who do not agree with the received views of agricultural and food scientists are irrational. Lehman explains that critics of agriculture are trying to change social practice, and as such use 'noisy' tactics that attract attention. Although this conduct is not consistent with the social norms of science, it is not evidence of irrationality (5). He argues

that since risks are permeated by value judgments, there is a significant latitude for differing opinions on the risk of agricultural chemicals or other production practices within the bounds of rationality (22-5). Lehman considers whether policy can be determined by reason alone. He argues that it depends on what one means by 'reason,' but that the emotions have an appropriate role, in any case (44-7).

Lehman's next six essays bring philosophical treatments of rationality to bear on questions such as whether it is rational to attribute or deny beliefs and desires to animals, whether moral reasoning itself is rational (and the notions of rationality used in ethics), whether holistic approaches to research are rational, and finally whether commitment to family farming is rational. In each case, Lehman considers different interpretations of rationality, concluding that a position is rational to the extent that one may hold it consistently with obvious or scientifically well established claims about reality. He defends the view that rational people may disagree on animal cognition or the value of family farming. While this may seem a mild view, it is a sound rejection of claims actually proffered by many defenders of the status quo in agriculture. In reviewing a debate on family farms between poet and essayist Wendell Berry and economist Michael Boehlje, for example, Lehman documents Berry's substantive empirical and normative claims. He then demonstrates that Boehlje makes no attempt to rebut any of them, relying instead on the sweeping claim that Berry's views are based on emotion, hence 'irrational'.

Those of us who have experience working with agricultural issues can attest that this is a too frequent pattern of conduct among those whose scientific credentials indicate that they should know better. While I have usually interpreted this behavior as ad hominem bullying, Lehman works patiently and respectfully through all the possible meanings that someone who actually thought his opponents were irrational might have in mind. This makes *Rationality and Ethics in Agriculture* a great book for scientists and policy makers who work on agriculture and food issues. Philosophers may not learn much from the first nine chapters, but they may find them useful as citations or for teaching.

Lehman's last four chapters are of more general interest. In 'Ethical Grounds for Sustainable Agriculture', he reviews several conceptions of sustainability that occur in the literature. He argues that it is possible to have agricultural production systems that are sustainable (in the sense that they can continue indefinitely) without also being profitable, and that it is possible for a production system to be economically efficient without being sustainable. He notes authors who promote social causes such as more equitable labor practices or small farms under the banner of sustainability, and rejects their views on the ground that they do not show why the unjust practices cannot be sustained. Sustainable practices are not necessarily just. He ends by endorsing sustainable agriculture in light of obligations to future generations, but notes that the endorsement must be qualified by examining other ethical dimensions.

One of those dimensions is impact on animals. In 'Marginal Cases and Killing Animals', Lehman critiques the *reductio* argument for vegetarianism which equates the morality of killing of animals for food with that of killing marginal human beings. Lehman demonstrates that despite the psychological effectiveness of the Marginal Cases argument, it utilizes premises that are not consistent with the basic claims of either utilitarian or alternative approaches to ethical theory. In the next chapter, he argues that some forms of confinement production may be consistent with Singer's principle of equal consideration of interests and with Rachels' qualified speciesism. Here Lehman's empirical knowledge of animal agriculture serves him well, and this chapter merits the attention of anyone interested in extending a general principle of concern for animals to an argument against so-called factory farming.

The final chapter takes up the case against agricultural biotechnology. Lehman defends 'the argument for cautious development' which states that 'in light of the potential for surprise, due to the reliance on a rapidly changing area of science, and ... the potentiality for harm on a large scale, ... and in light of the fact that in many cases the benefits to be derived ... are marginal, we should continue to carefully test and evaluate such technologies for a relatively long time prior to permitting them to be deployed on a large scale' (207-8). Here Lehman attempts to convert the rationality arguments of the first chapter into ethical arguments. He shows convincingly why concern about agricultural biotechnology is not 'irrational'. But it is not clear that the rationality of the case for cautious development also implies that it should become a moral imperative. It is always crucial to ask risk assessment questions in a comparative mode. I would argue that there are many specific modifications of plants and microorganisms with ecological risks that can be characterized in far greater detail than conventional forms of plant breeding, immunology and pharmacology. Perhaps we should exhibit more caution in traditional areas of science, yet the burden of proof should be applied case by case, rather than unilaterally. The evidence does not warrant a sweeping conclusion against any deliberate release of products derived from biotechnology.

Paul B. Thompson

Texas A&M University

Barbara Levine, ed.

Works about John Dewey, 1886-1995.

Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press
1996. Pp. x + 526.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8093-2056-8);

US \$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8093-2056-4);

US \$49.95 (CD-ROM: ISBN 0-8093-2062-2).

This volume is an updated and much expanded replacement for the second edition of the *Checklist of Writings about John Dewey* (1978). It contains hundreds of newly discovered items from the period prior to 1978 and over 2000 items from that time to the present, including many from 1995. Of interest is the fact that, whereas the previous *Checklist* listed the first work in English about Dewey as appearing in 1887, among the newly discovered items are two from 1886. Of course it cannot be expected that all items prior to 1995 have been identified and, given the increasing interest in Dewey today, one would ordinarily expect a new edition in a few years. However, as this review is published, a CD-ROM version of the book, which contains an addendum of over 150 additional listings, will have been made available for sale from the same publisher. Moreover, these additional listings, as well as periodic updates to the book, are already available on the internet at the Dewey Center home page at <http://www.siu.edu/~deweyctr>. Whoever purchases this book or the CD-ROM will certainly find it a constantly renewable bargain.

Levine has provided us with a model for future works of this sort. It is surely one of the best formatted and user-friendly bibliographies of secondary sources in the field of philosophy. It is divided into four sections: (1) books and articles about John Dewey, (2) reviews of Dewey's works, (3) author index of all multiple authors but the first listed, reviewers, and responders, and (4) title key-word index. (There is no listing of theses, dissertations, unpublished works, encyclopedia entries, or papers presented at meetings.) The books (in boldface) and articles are listed alphabetically by author, multiple writings by one author are arranged chronologically, and each separate entry is assigned a number. Reviews, replies, and responses, both to Dewey's own work and books and articles about John Dewey, are listed with author directly under the numbered listing. For example, the following is the first few lines of a listing under Alexander, Thomas M.:

A-34_____. **John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience, and Nature:**

The Horizons of Feeling. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987.

[Reviewed in *American Journal of Education* 98 (1989): 83-88

(William M. Shea); *British Journal of Aesthetics* 28 (1988): 385-87

(Kingsley Price); ...] [Seven additional reviews are listed.]

It is worth mentioning that the entries are in a readable 10 point Times font, there is no crowding of material, and there is a space between each listing. The result of such care and attention to detail is an exceptionally readable resource book. Even the paperback edition is special: it is bound in signatures and will surely hold up to hard use.

It is difficult to find fault with this work. Every piece of writing straightforwardly about Dewey which I had thought might be overlooked was not. There are a few books which, though not mainly about Dewey, contain extended discussions of him which I did not find listed, but this oversight (if it is an oversight and not an editorial decision) can be easily remedied by updates. And I am inclined to think that major encyclopedia articles should be included. But now I'm nit-picking. Levine is to be commended and the Southern Illinois University Press, which has already published the thirty-seven volumes of *The Collected Works of John Dewey*, is to be blessed.

Douglas Browning

The University of Texas at Austin

Bernard F.J. Lonergan

*The Collected Works of Lonergan. Volume six.
Philosophical and Theological Papers
1958-1964.* Robert Croken, Frederick Crowe,
and Robert Doran, eds.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1996.
Pp. v + 272 and appendices.
\$60.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8020-3473-X);
\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8020-3474-8).

The essays composing this volume are transcriptions of tape-recorded lectures that Lonergan gave in various venues between 1958 and 1964. L. did not intend them for publication. So they bear the 'earmarks' of the lecture style. Typescript drafts, where they existed, were only approved by L. as classnotes. He did not edit them for continuity or consistency. They had no footnotes or citations of references. L. himself lectured from outlines or memory; so lecture and existing notes sometimes vary. Consequently, transcribing these lectures to text must face many problems. Given these problems and limitations, the editors of this volume have done a superb job in making these lectures available as texts. The texts are clear and coherent. Minor continuity problems are deftly solved. The editors do not

intrude on L., but they do provide clarification where necessary. The lectures cover a broad range of philosophical and theological concerns. They include 'The Redemption', 'Method in Catholic Theology', 'The Philosophy of History', 'The Origins of Christian Realism', 'Time and Meaning', 'Consciousness and the Trinity', 'Exegesis and Dogma', 'The Mediation of Christ in Prayer', 'The Analogy of Meaning', 'Philosophical Positions with Regard to Knowing', and 'Theology as Christian Phenomenon'. In short, the volume is an admirable addition to the *Collected Works* series.

It is also an important work, because these lectures are, without doubt, a major contribution to Lonergan scholarship. First, they are windows on an important period of L.'s philosophical and theological development. Second, as oral presentations L. does not take it for granted that hearers have the luxury of readers to reread the text or follow the compact logical development of arguments. Their style is more freewheeling, expansive, and suggests that the ideas are works-in-progress. This is not to say, however, that they are not substantive, significant, and insightful. They are, but the ideas exhibit the freedom of a 'tryout' or trial balloon that one does not find in L.'s more self-consciously public work. Consequently, these lectures allow the reader to 'watch' ideas expand by development and subsequently compact by familiarity. For example, 'Philosophical Positions on Knowing' covers thirty pages in this volume. The same material is later compacted to fewer than four pages in *Method*.

Understanding the importance of these lectures requires understanding their history. L. delivered the eleven lectures in this volume during the period after the publication of *Insight* (1957) and before *Method in Theology* (1972). In this period, L. was applying the philosophical implications of *Insight* to theology. Consequently, L. was moving rapidly toward a new conception of theology and method. His mind was churning out a steady stream of new ideas and new avenues for exploration that would eventually result in the breakthrough of the 'eight functional specialities' in 1965. These lectures address key themes that L. develops more formally in *Method* including his philosophy of history, the meaning of human historicity, the move from substance to subject, the stages of meaning, especially meaning as constitutive of the humanly constituted world, the three fundamental human communities, intersubjectivity, differentiations of consciousness and the resulting world of the human subject. Thus, these lectures have the air of a workshop or laboratory. In them we watch L., the philosopher and theologian, at work and grasp, in a way studying his published writing cannot, his appropriation of his model of method as grounded by the intentional consciousness of the subject.

This volume will be of interest to two audiences. First, it will interest Lonergan scholars seeking to understand the major influences and key pivotal moments of transition in the road leading to *Method* and beyond. The editors miss few opportunities to draw such development to the readers attention as, for example, on p. 209 in a 'question and answer session'

following a lecture they note, 'this paragraph shows Lonergan on the verge of a major development in his conception of theology.'

Second, the lectures will be helpful to the nonspecialist trying to open the dense compact prose of *Method* for the first time, because the ideas, if anything, are expansively developed rather than overdeveloped. Those who are familiar with L's style know his writing is compact and underwritten, the fruit of a thorough process of distillation and refinement. By his own admission, L. was also a 'theologian's theologian'. Consequently, his major work, like *Method*, requires a substantial background in theology and philosophy that he presumes of his readers. This makes his work notoriously difficult for students. These essays are invaluable precisely because L. originally delivered them orally. L's lecture style is less dense and compact than his writing style. He presumes less about his audiences' intellectual formation. He allows his listeners to follow the development of his thought. He uses extended and well-developed examples. For example, chapter 3 in *Method* on meaning is so compact as to be telegraphic. There are almost no examples, frequent references to *Insight* and the like. However, in 'The Analogy of Meaning' and 'The Mediation of Christ in Prayer' L provides examples, references, and allusions that unpack key terms like *mediation*, *development*, *skills*, *operations*, *meaning*, and *subject*. I know from personal experience that students can use these essays profitably to 'unpack' the dense prose of *Method* and to achieve the personal insights that L. desired to lead students to.

The technical apparatus of the book is a masterpiece of editing. Each essay in this volume is comprehensive and comprehensible in spite of the problems inherent in offering oral presentations as readable essays. Editorial notes on transcription problems do not overwhelm the text, but give ample data for the discussion of future scholars about what L. meant. The footnotes, which are editorial, and not from L., offer useful information as to possible sources of L.'s thinking, references to texts used, and other data about the text. The editors provide a very thorough and complete system of cross-references to the lectures in this volume and other Lonergan works. The notes provide sound introductions to L.'s basic positions, for specialists and nonspecialists alike. However, the editors resist the temptation 'to look backward and forward to uncover all the influences at work in these years' (p. xiii). Yet, they do post some useful milestones to L.'s development. Consequently, one does not need to know L's work to follow these lectures, but the cross-references offer directions for those seeking to place these lectures within L's work. Some notes are needlessly pedantic as, for example, the note on 'subjectivity' on p. 226. Here the editors seem to be 'reading' L.'s mind, but the text makes L.'s intention clear without the note. L., always a consummate scholar, often referenced his work to Greek and Latin terms without translation. The editors provide a lexicon of these terms. However, it seems incomplete because it does not include all the terms and lacks German and French references. It would also be helpful to have the page of citations for the terms. As with all of the volumes in

this series the index is exceptionally complete. It is in essence a concordance that will prove extremely important to future scholars and students studying L.'s work.

James B. Sauer
St. Mary's University
San Antonio, Texas

**Tibor R. Machan and
Douglas B. Rasmussen, eds.**
*Liberty for the 21st Century:
Contemporary Libertarian Thought.*
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1995.
Pp. xiii + 386.
US \$67.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-8057-6);
US \$26.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-8058-4).

At a time when social democracy is in retreat and when market economies are becoming the norm throughout the world, one would think that the fundamental principles of liberalism hardly need to be defended. Libertarians think otherwise. From their standpoint, statism remains a serious threat to political and economic freedoms. As long as state bureaucracies continue to carry out many functions that go far beyond the imperatives of defence and the maintenance of law and order, libertarians claim that our most basic individual rights are not secure.

This book is divided into three parts. The first is devoted to a discussion of the fundamental premises of libertarianism. The second discusses a rather eclectic range of issues that one might think could not be properly handled by agencies other than the state. A final part attempts to address commonly expressed criticisms as well as to refute alternative philosophical perspectives (e.g., communitarianism).

The editors of this volume are well known advocates of the libertarian cause and the other thirteen contributors like them are, with one exception, academic philosophers from North America (Jan Narveson is the only Canadian in that group).

Space lacks here to examine in detail the contents of the nineteen papers that make up this book. Instead, I wish to discuss the thematic unity of each part and comment on the extent to which this clearly partisan book achieves its objective of demonstrating that libertarianism is the political philosophy of our times.

The themes interwoven through the thirteen chapters forming the first and third parts sketch out the contours of libertarianism. (Despite the fact that these chapters were written by twelve authors who do not agree on everything, there is a remarkable convergence of views among them; this could be explained by the need to achieve internal coherence in the ideological battles that libertarians relish.) If one starts from the assumption that although human beings are inescapably social, they are not merely social creatures, an individual's freedom to pursue his or her own freely chosen goals ought to be treated as the most fundamental right, and he or she can expect others to respect this right. Paradoxically, our common humanness is rooted in our individual differences. It follows that we have a 'right against forcible interference,' as John Hospers puts it (7). Since justice ought to be the primary goal of politics, the essential, indeed the only, function of government must be the preservation of negative freedoms. All other goals can be pursued in the private sphere; the right to hold property and to freely engage in market exchanges is the best means toward whatever ends one wishes to achieve. The only way to bring about this arrangement, according to Narveson, is through a social contract. Not just any social contract, however. Only the most minimal form of government is acceptable. Some libertarians, including Aeon Skoble in this volume, go one step further and advocate the pure and simple absence of governmental structures (anarchy). Most of the other authors subscribe to the idea of a very modest watchman state.

The critique generally directed at libertarians is that they are promoting an uncaring ideology that rests on the false premise that humans are selfish individuals unconcerned with the well-being of others or society at large. In four separate papers, written either together or individually, Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen respond to these objections. First, the fact of stating that the only purpose of government is to protect individual freedoms does not entail that the social policy goals of the welfare state cannot be achieved better, and without the use of coercive instruments, in the private sphere. Second, an Aristotelian perfectionist ethics is compatible with libertarianism; but because each individual is unique, his or her developmental purpose will differ, hence the need for maximum freedom. However, it is reasonable to think that caring for others and building flourishing communities will be goals about which many individuals will agree and will seek to achieve cooperatively; indeed, in the absence of such communal ties, self-development would be impossible. Gregory Johnson also makes the case that the best defence of libertarianism rests on moral considerations. While it is true, or so thinks Johnson, that a libertarian political system would be more efficient at generating wealth and protecting the freedoms that most North Americans value, efficiency arguments of this sort are not enough to establish convincingly the superiority of libertarianism over competing ideologies.

The issue-oriented chapters are more disappointing, unwittingly underlining the utopian character of pure libertarianism. If one is already convinced that collectivism is a dangerous impasse, the arguments presented

above may seem rather attractive. However, it is harder to suspend belief in reading about the 'solutions' proposed by libertarians to complex practical problems. Eric Mack's attempt to identify circumstances under which the use of strictly defensive forces would be justified stands out as the most pragmatic of these papers. Students of strategic issues would probably object though that the dogmatic isolationism recommended by Mack might place western liberal democracies — the only countries where a move toward libertarianism is remotely possible — in a vulnerable position. Stephen Yates' attack on affirmative action uses many good arguments against what is admittedly a flawed idea, but as far as discrimination and racial prejudices are concerned, all solutions are probably imperfect. It is not the market alone and by itself that causes deeply entrenched inequalities; on the contrary, free market economies rely on self-correcting processes capable of undermining irrational discriminatory practices. However, it remains to be proven that public policies in that area are totally ineffective. One cannot take too seriously the peremptory statement offered by Yates, without empirical justification, that 'prevailing approaches to civil rights are not working' (139). Machan's discussion of business ethics leaves out the question of enforcement. Mike Gemmel's chapter on environmentalism is the weakest of all; it is well established that market mechanisms are often far better than government regulation in protecting the environment, but instead of carefully examining this point, Gemmel spends much time trying to convince the reader that there is no problem with the environment in the first place! James Chesher's defence of private schools is eloquent and convincing up to a point, but nothing he says refutes the need for public schools, as long as access to private schools is not restricted. Finally, while many analysts have come to the realization that drug prohibition is often more a problem than a solution, the arguments advanced by Mark Thornton in favour of pure and simple legalization are sometimes rather weak (e.g., in a legalized regime he thinks that 'deadly products that were created by prohibition would be eliminated' [198]. But that is a moot point).

On the whole, the papers are of good quality. However, the fact that all the authors are 'true believers' creates a sort of lassitude; the inclusion of a few critical pieces might have produced a more dynamic tension which, in the end, could have strengthened the case for a return to a more robust form of liberalism.

Laurent Dobuzinskis

(Department of Political Science)

Simon Fraser University

John O'Neill, ed.

*Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition:
Texts and Commentary.*

Albany: State University of New York Press 1996.

Pp. x + 331.

n.p. (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-2713-7);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-2714-5).

The famous dialectic of lordship and bondage (or master and slave, as the French have it) from the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* is the focus of this collection, which reprints the relevant paragraphs (178-96) from Miller's translation of the *Phenomenology*, along with sixteen pieces of explication and commentary, both historical and contemporary, prefaced by the editor's introduction. Aside from the latter, all are previously published, and the emphasis is on classic texts: Marx's critique from the 1844 manuscripts, Kojève's influential lectures from the thirties; Hyppolite's 1946 commentary; Sartre's discussion in *L'être et le néant*; Lukacs from *Der junge Hegel*; Habermas on the Jena *Philosophie des Geistes* from *Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologie'*; Gadamer from his series of studies on Hegelian dialectic. These have all been long available in translation, and it is these translations which are reprinted here.

The remaining selections are journal articles or selections from books which originally appeared in the 1970s and 1980s. These include several which deal with the Marxist and Freudian traditions as they have intersected with the Hegelian and with each other: Shlomo Avineri on labor, alienation and social classes in the Jena *Realphilosophie* lectures of 1803-04 and 1805-06; Edward S. Casey and J. Melvin Woody on Hegel and Lacan; Jessica Benjamin from her book *The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination*. Involved in some of these themes as well are the essays by Henry S. Harris, who examines the relation between the Jena lectures and the *Phenomenology*, arguing *inter alia* that capitalist development, as an ever-deepening breakdown of self-recognition, represents 'a problem that Hegel ... cannot be said ever to have solved' (248); and by Judith N. Shklar, who, in an excerpt from her *Freedom and Independence: A Study of the Political Ideas of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind*, explicates the relation of Hegelian freedom to his perspective in relation to the French revolution on the one hand and the Greek epic hero and *polis* citizen on the other. George Armstrong Kelly attempts to show that Kojève has given an overly social interpretation of the master-slave dialectic. Ludwig Siep, in a paper apparently translated (by Charles Dudas) for this volume, argues against Leo Strauss' contention that this section of the *Phenomenology* reflects the influence of Hobbes.

On a rather different tack, Howard Adelman essays a translation of 'thought back into myth', interpreting Hegel's dialectic of domination, bondage, labor and freedom in terms of the Biblical myths of Adam and Eve, Cain and Abel, God and Noah. Henry Sussman, finally, employs a literary-critical

analysis to present the *Phenomenology* as '... a diachronic account of a panoply of learned disciplines placed in tandem *and* a metaphoric generator, producing the metacritical structures and terms that describe its own existence as a text' (320).

O'Neill hopes that these texts and commentaries will '... help convince us that we cannot afford to trash our Hegelian-Marxist culture ...' (1). It's a tradition O'Neill sees as endangered by the postmodernist onslaught, and what he's particularly concerned to save is its '... narrative of the rise of human consciousness from within the world of nature and a historical society that recognizes itself through such a story' (1). This is a laudable aim, but it's unclear how this anthology effects it, or even argues for it. The only selection which can be said to break relatively new ground in relating this particular Hegelian dialectic to contemporary discussions is that of Benjamin, which is also the most recent (1988) of the book's contents aside from the editor's introduction. O'Neill at one point employs currently overused terms in an attempted demonstration of the collection's relevance: 'The overall effect of these selections is to show how the Hegelian-Marxist topos is a contested one, shot through with the problematic of difference in class, race, and gender, and thus how it constitutes a model of decanonization along the lines of contemporary debate in the academy' (2). But while the authors here certainly advance different interpretations, and sometimes disagree with each other, this exhibits a 'contested topos' only in the most trivial sense, and doesn't constitute decanonization at all.

Leaving aside O'Neill's editorial hyperbole, this collection will probably find its primary function in courses and seminars relating to Hegel, and it could be a useful one for that purpose: the lordship-bondage dialectic has been of particular interest to a wide variety of commentators in this century, and at the same time offers an excellent entry point for the study of both the Hegelian dialectic and the *Phenomenology*.

The texts reprinted here mostly conduce well to this objective: on the one hand a fairly wide variety of approaches are illustrated, and on the other the historically important French tradition and Marxist connections are given particular attention. Some editorial decisions could well be questioned, though. Why, for example, is it important to include a paper commenting on one of Strauss' claims? On the omission side, since several selections deal crucially with the Jena lectures (Lukacs, Habermas, Avineri, Harris, and Siep), and since a translation of at least the 1805-06 lectures has been available for over a decade (*Hegel and the Human Spirit*, translated with commentary by Leo Rauch [1983]), it's difficult to see why relevant passages are not included here. And of course the (loosely defined) analytic tradition — Kaufmann, Findlay, Taylor, etc. — is conspicuous by its absence.

Finally, the value of this anthology to students is somewhat lessened (and its worth as an artifact of scholarly publishing declines even more considerably), due to the large number of egregious misprints and typographical errors, which average slightly less than one for every three pages of text and range from the trivial to the profound: the vast majority are merely annoying,

but a few sentences are unintelligible due to the omission of words. The name of one contributor (Judith Shklar) is given three different spellings at various points, and the errors even infect the selection from Hegel where, besides the usual typos, inappropriate hyphens are inserted in each occurrence of 'in itself' and 'for itself' (resulting in a text with a rather Sartrean air). In the pages of acknowledgements, some five different bibliographic conventions are followed, with errors in the applications, at times, of four of them.

John G. Stevenson

Columbia College, Chicago

Terence Penelhum

Reason and Religious Faith.

Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1996.

Pp. 166.

US \$44.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-2035-6);

US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-2036-4).

Terence Penelhum, in his insightful book, seeks to negotiate the minefield presently separating the two solitudes of faith and reason. The relationship between religious belief and philosophy has never been an easy one. Even to the major natural theologians of the medieval period, for whom faith provided an apparent antidote to the limits of reason, the reconciliation of the two posed special problems that lead to controversy. In recent times the gulf has widened. Philosophers, who see themselves as custodians of our rationality, measured faith against the evolving canons of reasonableness — and found it wanting. Religious believers are, as a consequence, often dismissed, their faith exposed as a superstition arising from a pathological condition in need of the purgative ministrations of a skeptical reason. Not surprisingly, religious believers tend to shun what they perceive as the narrow and arbitrary apertures of reason, opting instead for extreme forms of fideism which seem to flourish in the soil of the absurd.

The book adopts a resolutely non-partisan standpoint and is committed to understanding and appreciating the mental life of both believers and secular humanists. It is exemplary as a study of minds, those of others and our own. But this attractive feature generates a methodological problem. In the introduction, Penelhum asserts that 'this book does not assume the faith commitment that a theologian assumes but it does deal with questions a theologian must explore.' He begins by distancing himself from the subject matter, by adopting the 'phenomenological' manner of the 'student of relig-

ion.' This determination to remain neutral with respect to the faith experience, to inspect it from the outside, leads directly to a problem of considerable magnitude. There are some (Penelhum suggests Aquinas and Pascal) who hold that only those who believe in God are in a position to identify and recognize examples of faith. On some important classical accounts of faith, no one can identify it without having it, or at least accepting as true what the faithful person believes. It seems to follow that someone who does not believe in God or who stands outside the faith experience is forced to deny that there are genuine examples of it. And if there are no genuine examples of faith, the task of the philosopher, 'to understand what is meant when we say someone has faith and to consider questions about its rationality and relationship to our capacity to discover truth,' appears not to exist. Hence, those outside the religious tradition are not in a position to acknowledge the religious experience. How then does one come to understand what faith is or, whether it exists at all?

Penelhum's resolution of the problem is to affirm that faith exists, at least as a phenomenon.

I proceed here in the following way: I take for granted that the word *faith* is the name of a state of mind and of personality that exists and is characteristic of followers of at least some of the major religions of the world.

Perhaps to preserve the philosophical integrity of the enterprise, Penelhum distinguishes between philosophical and theological questions to which faith gives rise. While the latter examines concerns 'that believers raise,' the 'philosophical student' seeks to examine the conceptual meaning of faith and its relation 'to our human capacities to discover truth.' Nonetheless, the fact that he acknowledges the reality of faith in this way suggests a kind of faith act which has the effect of legitimizing faith to the extent that it compromises the neutrality of what is contrived as a second-order analysis. In any event, there is, at the outset, an ambivalence in Penelhum's characterization of the faith experience which is, after all, the principle subject matter of the book. This feature, which we might call the 'insider-outsider problem', reappears in various forms. Penelhum's attempt to deconstruct it represents one of the book's chief contributions.

In the second chapter Penelhum offers an historical sketch intended to provide the reader with a brief account of the views of some important philosophers on the nature of faith and, to bring into relief two modern views both of which respond to the 'central epistemological preoccupation' which Descartes bequeathed to philosophy. The first is a deep skepticism directed towards religious claims, a skepticism which is grounded in epistemic foundationalism to which allegiance endures. Such skepticism led philosophers, such as Hume, to pose anthropological accounts of religious belief and practice as 'a response to the fears generated by unpredicted natural disasters.' The other view is a form of fideism which is also grounded in a skeptical view of the capacity of reason to function in the world of faith. This position

is ascribed principally to Pascal and Kierkegaard, who both argue that faith must be embraced in the face of indifferent or hostile reason. The gulf between reason and faith, which Aquinas' natural theology attempted to bridge, once more reasserted itself.

In the third chapter, Penelhum examines the connection between believing and willing. It is commonly argued that beliefs are voluntary and reasoned conclusions are not. Yet the idea that one can decide to believe is logically strange. Surely such decisions cannot be at variance with what is known to be true. Nor is believing simply an action, although it is sometimes, according to Penelhum, a product of action. Beliefs have a natural history which we can, through our actions, control or influence. Pascal suggests that non-ratiocinative factors, such as attending religious ceremonies, can lead to faith for the person who desires it. Such inner assent, which has its own history and is rooted in non-rational causes, is not antithetical to reason and has established a toe-hold that reasoning has found difficult to dislodge. Penelhum is less sanguine about what he calls the 'radical fideism' espoused by Kierkegaard and Bayle. Their views require, he argues, 'repressing, not excising, the reasoned conclusion', a standpoint characterized as self-deception.

In the fourth chapter, Penelhum proceeds to a conceptual examination of faith. While acknowledging that there are other views, he is clearly committed to the idea that faith is propositional and that the propositions uttered by believers are taken by them to be true. He starts with the view, ascribed to Aquinas and Kierkegaard, that 'in faith one has subjective certainty on matters that are objectively uncertain.' He then argues that neither subjective certainty nor objective uncertainty are necessary conditions for faith. To insist that subjective certainty is required is to blur the distinction between ideal faith and faith as it is for us. He likens faith to courage or temperance which we do not judge a person to be without because of an uncharacteristic lapse. So it is with lapses in faith. The believer who has doubts does not show by this fact alone that he does not have faith. At the same time, what is believed need not be objectively uncertain either. Although he admits that 'it is a matter of controversy whether knowledge includes belief or whether it is a completely different state of affairs,' Penelhum claims that 'there is no reason in the discernible logic of faith that someone who has it should not know that what he or she confesses is true.' He rejects the view that objective uncertainty is a condition of faith, a view which he admits will seem 'counterintuitive to some', but which do not lead, he assures us, to consequences that are 'as radical as they may appear.'

Penelhum then turns his attention to the central epistemological question of the rationality of faith through an examination of what he calls the Basic Belief Apologetic particularly as found in the writings of Alvin Plantinga and William Alston. The Basic Belief Apologetic begins with the premise that the criteria of rationality assumed by foundationalist thinkers is too narrow. It is suggested that there is an analogy between religious belief on the one hand and those ordinary beliefs that we have of the external world or of the mental

life of other people. Religious beliefs are thus seen as rational because they arise from certain experiences; they have a special phenomenology. This argument, Penelhum suggests, has the value of freeing philosophical defenders of religion from the restrictions of a foundationalist tradition that has run its course. His conclusion is that those who believe on the basis of such experiences may believe in a doxastically responsible manner. At the same time, such experiences would appear to have little effect on the non-believer, thereby enhancing what Penelhum calls 'the religious ambiguity of the world'. It is this problem to which he turns his attention in the final chapter.

This ambiguity reveals itself in a stalemate between the theist and the naturalist, as well as among the religions themselves. Are philosophers not entitled, as a consequence, to don the mantle of skepticism? Penelhum clearly eschews this route. Where there is ambiguity between serious and doxastically responsible views, the philosopher's task, whether theist or atheist, is to disambiguate. He thus sees the goal of rationality, and that of the philosopher, as exposing and resolving doxastic conflict. The world's ambiguity is a fact we should not disguise from ourselves but seek as far as possible to remove. Indeed, Penelhum suggests that this is a special task for philosophically competent believers; this, in turn, leads to a call for a resuscitation of natural theology. For it is the purpose of natural theology to furnish arguments, grounded in the shared scientific experience of the believer and the unbeliever, that will mediate the gulf separating these two solitudes and thereby disambiguate the world. This process can, of course, cut both ways. Arguments may arise that prove false the premises on which religious faith is based. However, the basic drift of Penelhum's argument is otherwise; it calls for a sustained attempt to examine the basic principles of modern science, developing doxastically responsible arguments that bear on the world of the believer. This is, after all, what Aquinas did in relation to the Aristotelian scientific world view that he learned from Albertus Magnus.

Throughout the book there is a sustained effort to break down the dichotomies that divide us as a result of the fragmentation of the uneasy relation between faith and reason. The integrity of each is acknowledged but Penelhum does not yield to the temptations of an easy relativism. The project of disambiguation, which is the function of reason in this debate, is to move us towards the elimination of either theism or atheism. Should natural theology produce arguments of an apodictic or even probable nature that gird the religious world view, naturalism becomes difficult to defend on rational grounds. Such arguments could work the other way, demonstrating the irrationality of religious belief.

It is instructive that Penelhum's last words are directed towards philosophers who are persons of faith. Perhaps this is because they are suspected of feeling the religious ambiguity of the world more keenly than others. Or perhaps they are being charged with a special doxastic obligation towards those for whom faith has no meaning. In any event, such persons are exhorted to 'try their best to find disambiguating arguments in favor of the faith they

live by.' This was, in fact, the project of Aquinas, and Penelhum feels that the 'topical value of the enterprise has not diminished.'

In this interesting book, Penelhum manages to introduce and elucidate the nature of the problems of religious epistemology and say something fresh and distinctive about them. Together with *Faith*, a text in which Penelhum brings together traditional and contemporary sources on the subject, *Reason and Religious Faith* is highly recommended for upper-level courses in the philosophy of religion.

Kenneth L. McGovern

Campion College
University of Regina

Béla Szabados

University of Regina

William H. Schaberg

*The Nietzsche Canon: A Publication History
and Bibliography.*

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1995.

Pp. xvi + 281.

US \$36.50. ISBN 0-226-73575-3.

This work contributes a very interesting and informative supplement to the story of Nietzsche's life. Schaberg concentrates on Nietzsche as an author, giving us a genealogical account of the actual production of Nietzsche's published works during his lifetime — what Schaberg calls a 'bibliobiography' (189). Drawing mostly from letters, Schaberg gives extensive details concerning the book production process, Nietzsche's manner of writing and editing, his (often contentious) relationships with his publishers, his financial circumstances, and finally every aspect of his books as books — their physical features (size, color, decoration, type of paper and print, front and back covers, title page), their price, printing figures, and sales figures. For bibliophiles and scholars interested in these topics, Schaberg's work can be considered definitive in terms of its precision and inclusiveness.

There are many fascinating things to learn in this study. Among them is the great extent to which Nietzsche cared about the physical and aesthetic elements of his books (although I suspect that such interests are not uncommon among serious authors). We also learn that Nietzsche had a pretty lousy business sense in his dealings with publishers and printers. For that matter, the same would have to be said for one of Nietzsche's

publishers, Schmeitzner, who continued to publish eleven of Nietzsche's books that hardly sold at all. Sales figures provide specific evidence of the degree to which Nietzsche went unrecognized as a writer in his lifetime. As Schaberg tells us on p. 130, in 1886, after the publication of fourteen books, two-thirds of the copies of Nietzsche's works remained unsold; altogether only 5527 copies out of 15,250 printed were in circulation. Things improved later, of course, after Nietzsche's breakdown. An 1893 inventory showed that 22,894 books had been sold out of 31,950 printed (188). At the time of Nietzsche's death in 1900, more than 137,000 copies of his books were in print; and at the end of the First World War, over 250,000 copies of *Zarathustra* were in circulation (189).

In general terms, Schaberg is convincing in his contention that no biography of Nietzsche can ignore or underestimate his almost excessive preoccupation with his books, especially with their reception and survival in the face of nonrecognition (189). I might add that one payoff here is some refreshing relief from the silly extremes of certain contemporary objections to 'authorship' that seek to undercut or bypass the connection between writers and texts. From a practical and existential standpoint, Nietzsche would scoff at such things.

What can we learn about Nietzsche's thought from a study such as this? Schaberg argues that many details of the publishing process shed light on the works themselves (189-90). For example: *On the Genealogy of Morals* was originally meant as a supplement to *Beyond Good and Evil*; remarks about *The Antichrist* reveal the ambiguity regarding Nietzsche's intentions about writing and publishing *The Will to Power*; the chaotic flurry of changes and re-editing in the production of the last works before Nietzsche's breakdown (*Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, *Twilight of the Idols*, *The Antichrist*, *Ecce Homo*) show why these books should not be assumed to have the same kind of textual integrity as earlier works. These are all valuable insights.

I have only a few minor quibbles about some of Schaberg's reflections on the relevance of the material he has gathered. We are told that Nietzsche's fights with his publishers, his deep concern about his books and their fate, his hopes for fame and acceptance, show us a picture quite different from the lofty philosopher who championed the genius, the free spirit, and the overman. Instead we see Nietzsche as an 'ordinary human being, subject to the same desires and sufferings that infuse our own individual lives' (xvi). First of all, any reader of Nietzsche's letters will already have recognized Schaberg's point. Second, if we replace 'ordinary' with 'worldly', we might not see much of a conflict between Nietzsche's thought and Nietzsche's behavior in his own life. It is actually traditional conceptions of a disembodied, detachable self and of philosophy as a kind of transcendent enterprise that would find Nietzsche's *worldly* interests and passions to be unbecoming or surprising. I have never considered Nietzsche's philosophy and his own bearing in life to be somehow inconsistent or on different planes. To *care* about life in all its messy, taxing, and contentious aspects is a mark of Nietzschean affirmation. One irony that

Schaberg could have noticed and articulated is the seeming inconsistency between Nietzsche's notorious critique of morality and his often heated and self-righteous complaints about broken promises and failed obligations on the part of publishers; indeed, Nietzsche's sense of aggrievement at one point led him to bring suit against the publisher Schmeitzner. Imagine, an 'immoralist' taking someone to court!

Lawrence J. Hatab

Old Dominion University

Richard Sclove

Democracy and Technology.

New York: Guilford Press 1995. Pp. xiv + 338.

US \$18.95. ISBN 0-89862-860-1.

A decade ago Langdon Winner presented a now famous and widely-cited argument that technological artifacts are political in the sense that when we make a choice regarding an artifact we concomitantly and mostly unwittingly make a choice of accompanying administrative structures and strategies. Some of these structures may be compatible with democratic control and oversight, others may necessitate authoritarian administration. But technology embodies otherwise contested notions of who we are, who we want to be, where we want to go, etc., so, which sort of approach, authoritarian or democratic, do we want to pursue in respect to which sorts of technologies and which possible future? If that is truly the choice, it should be an easy one in principle.

Richard Sclove's recent book, *Democracy and Technology*, presumes this political nature of technology. The book is most literally a guide for democratic technological design and government. Although the book's broad base often tends towards the tenuous, its relative novelty lies in its summation of a variety of contemporary theoretical themes and its often interesting normative suggestions regarding what a democratic technological order entails conceptually and how to get there practically.

Sclove starts from the simple premises that our social circumstances are to a large extent formed and affected by technologies — we live in a technological society — and that a democracy worthy of the name must enable citizens to participate in the development and direction of their society, and thus in technological design, implementation, and administration. Sclove argues, as have many others, that technologies as they exist now are fundamentally undemocratic in both purpose and structure. For Sclove it is not

that technology is autonomous in a fatalistic Ellulian sense but rather, given that technologies are 'socially contingent,' technological development is socially directed 'by market forces, economic self-interest, distant bureaucracies, or international rivalry' (27) instead of a democratic citizenry. 'Undemocratic' in Sclove's sense then means that which is contrary to a broader participatory democracy — what Benjamin Barber has called 'strong democracy.' Sclove's basic argument thus follows: *'If citizens ought to be empowered to participate in determining their society's basic structure, and technologies are an important species of social structure, it follows that technological design and practice should be democratized'* (27). This basic notion of participatory democracy has been argued in various forms and more increasingly of late.

Sclove notes that technologies, once operating in a culture, become institutionalized in ways that may perpetuate centralization and hierarchy and so we come to see this version of a technological order as natural, and the artifact itself may become 'inflexible' to restructuring. If we are to set out on a mission to democratize technology, the problem of cultural assumptions about technology becomes the major obstacle since the democratic participants are culturally bound to the extant technological order. Sclove's suggestion is to involve citizens from an artifact's very inception while an artifact is still 'flexible'.

Most of the remainder of the book details how to go about such a transformation and, Sclove hopes, this will not require revolutionary social upheaval but adoption of and adherence to a set of 'design criteria' regarding community, work, politics, decentralization, economic self-reliance, ecological sustainability, and democratic social structures which the principle of strong democracy would generate.

Now, exactly what these criteria are requires much more space than available in a review. The problem with several of these criteria, however, is that hardly any are philosophically indisputable in their own right, although Sclove thinks democratic structures would resolve such matters. In some cases Sclove appears to have acknowledged the practical difficulties of certain of his criteria, say, parochial side-effects of communitarian social formations. But in others loaded catch-phrases are rather conspicuously unclear. For example, Sclove uses the notion of 'sustainability' as if it were unambiguous as a concept. For Sclove, sustainability is both something morally entailed by strong democracy as well as something a strong democratic culture would strive for based on the realization of responsibilities to future generations, to maintaining democratic controls, and to balancing out global economic inequities. Sustainability appears as an ideal product of a truly democratic order and as such is determined through this order. Perhaps this is a generously fallibilistic approach to coming to an understanding of sound ecological practice, but it leaves the notion of sustainability as a design criterion helplessly lost in the circle of its own realization. And then we still don't know what it might be in order to get

if off the ground. 'Decentralization' and 'communitarian' have different problems of their own as design goals in Sclove's account.

There are a few things missing in Sclove's book that may have been helpful for his account. Sclove discusses examples of the democratic restructuring of blue-collar labor towards more 'self-actualizing' work, but what of white-collar work in our technological era? One can increasingly argue that de-skilling, 'down-sizing', and alienation also exist at non-blue-collar levels including the realm of those near the top of the technological order. This raises more interesting questions about the relation of work and cultural belief in a high-technology era. In addition to the clarity of the project of empowering those who do not have any power or self-determination in work in the first place, how can we come to terms with humans possibly being rendered obsolete or merely instrumental as a result of their own socio-economic, cultural norms (whether we are sympathetic with the interests of a particular class or not) in a broader sense? Surely, this is a question for a democratic technology.

Such a task of a democratic technology may appear huge, ideal, and utopian. And, unfortunately, upon reading this book one is still left with the uneasy feeling of futility in the face of this project. Although Sclove insists that revolution is not what is required, this project appears nonetheless to be one of utter socio-economic overhaul. However, Sclove acknowledges that the ideal of strong democracy is most likely to be approached in piecemeal fashion, democratizing a workplace here, maintaining ecologically sound practices there. Democracy just is this ongoing and active experiment.

In short, the book is a call for renewed activism towards more democratic, egalitarian, and ecological social/technological structures — the idea of having government in our hands rather than simply 'off our backs'. As such, it is recommended for activists and citizens concerned about technology, environment and society, and for policy-makers.

Thomas C. Hilde

Texas A&M University

Drusilla Scott

*Everyman Revived: The Common Sense of
Michael Polanyi.*

Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1995.

Pp. viii + 215.

US \$19.00. ISBN 0-8028-4079-5.

This small book on Michael Polanyi was first published in 1985 by The Book Guild Ltd, Lewes, Sussex and is now returned to print by a different publisher. In it Drusilla Scott attempts to make available for the ordinary reader an introduction and interpretation of Michael Polanyi's philosophical thought. The book is explicitly directed toward the spiritually-oriented, lay intellectual who is concerned about the materialism and emptiness of the scientific world view, and it attempts to show that the thought of Michael Polanyi can provide a mediating picture of knowledge which is both irreducibly personal and scientifically adequate, and which makes a space for moral, aesthetic and religious values. It is in this objective, and Scott's execution of it, that one is to find both the strengths and weaknesses of the book. I should say at once that this book is not directed towards professional philosophers, and that so taken it would have serious inadequacies, but it is well written and provides a coherent and useful introduction to the thought of an intellectual who saw himself as contributing to public debate about science and society. The book is accordingly appropriate to its subject in a way that a parallel book on, say, Quine, would not be.

Scott uses an allegorical theme, the medieval mystery play *Everyman*, to organize the chapters of her book. Everyman, an ordinary fellow, is summoned by Death to account to God for his life; he turns to his various friends for help but in the end only Knowledge and Good Deeds stay with him till the end, while Fellowship, Beauty, Strength, Five Wits and Discretion desert him. On Scott's reading, traditional religion denied Everyman his common sense friends, requiring faith and piety. In prescientific days common sense knowledge was grounded in the skills of ordinary life and offered little threat to religion. In the modern age knowledge has lost its ground in ordinary life and is now founded on scientific procedure and result. Knowledge can no longer be identified with faith but, instead of freeing Everyman from domination, modern science offers an even more terrible oppression. When his old friend Knowledge denies his humanity and will deal only with physics and chemistry, Everyman's access to life and value is cut off and he is filled with despair. This is Everyman's plight: the reductive myth of contemporary scientism offers knowledge cut off from its living ground and thus despair, whereas religion offers meaning and value but is no longer credible.

In Polanyi's rethinking of the logic of discovery, in his grounding of articulate knowledge in tacit structures and in his account of the emergence of hierarchical levels of biological and cognitive control, Scott finds advice for Everyman which grounds knowledge once again in common sense and rein-

states his friends, Fellowship, Beauty, Strength, Five Wits and Discretion. In successive chapters, Scott introduces the reader to various parts of Polanyi's thought using the allegory of Everyman as a unifying device. The chapter on scientific discovery reinstates Beauty, that on tacit knowledge reinstates Five Wits, the one on truth and a free society reinstates Fellowship, and so on. The chapter on tacit knowledge is excellent, and the chapters on truth, freedom and society offer a clear exposition of Polanyi's diagnosis of the corrosive effect of the combination of scepticism and moral fervour which he identifies with the modern world view. In the later chapters, Scott presents Polanyi's account of the hierarchical structure of biological structures showing how knowledge and meaning appear as emergent principles of control at new levels of structure and activity. The later chapters become increasingly speculative and problematic. Whereas in the early chapters, the villains are scientific philosophers who misconceive the meaning of science, in the later chapters the content of science in the form of evolutionary theory comes under attack. The problem of how to understand the emergence of levels of biological control calls for careful and serious philosophical and scientific work. Polanyi recognizes his views on emergence to be speculative and his argument against reductionism in biology is accordingly modest in scope. In attacking Darwinism as false, Scott goes both beyond Polanyi's claims and her own competence. Where Polanyi is content with metaphor, Scott offers us a bold world picture of levels of meaning ever more complex and real.

At the end of the book Scott argues that Polanyi's thought makes room for the spiritual dimension of human life and indeed for the divine revelations of the Bible. She acknowledges that she is taking a step which Polanyi himself did not make (or perhaps made only in the privacy of his own heart) although it is clear that she was headed toward this point all along and that it is because she finds Polanyi a vehicle for mediating faith of a traditional sort with scientific knowledge that she has taken us on this journey.

For my taste, the early parts of the book are the best. Scott understands Polanyi's epistemology well and presents it with clarity. Her moral tale of the evils of modernity is less interesting, the issues are drawn too broadly and the contrasts are too stark. While Polanyi does have an interesting account of the value crisis of modern culture, it is but one among many, and Scott's account is too uncritical to be very illuminating. The final parts are the least satisfying to me. If you are not a theist looking for a way of drawing science and religion together into a single speculative whole, her argument will not be compelling. In her account of Polanyi, Scott provides us with a theological/scientific world view rather than an academic philosophy, and to me the academic Polanyi is the more interesting. As a critical introduction to Polanyi the book is inadequate. I would, nonetheless, happily introduce it to a certain kind of spiritually concerned lay reader who wants to see how things fit together. This task Scott accomplishes with intelligence, modesty and spirit.

Eric B. Dayton

University of Saskatchewan

Sun-Joo Shin

The Logical Status of Diagrams.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.

Pp. xi + 197.

US \$39.95. ISBN 0-521-46157-X.

This book is mistitled. It is not about the logical status of diagrams. Rather, it is about the status (or nature) of one kind of diagram — Venn's. Shin is concerned to show that the use of Venn diagrams need not be merely heuristic and that the 'worry about the misuse of diagrams does not justify the general prejudice against diagrams' (5); though sometimes Shin expresses this motivation awkwardly — e.g., 'Diagrams ... have never been permitted as valid or real proofs' (185). Shin defends Venn diagrams by developing a formal system in which 'well-formed diagrams' replace the 'well-formed formulae' of a typical formal axiomatic system. Each diagram of Venn-I (Shin's first formal diagram system of Chapter 3) has an explicit syntax and semantics. The syntax consists of the formation rules for the diagrams and the transformation rules which permit the 'obtaining' of a new diagram from a given sequence of diagrams — i.e., obtainability is the diagram-system correlate of derivability in an ordinary formal system. The semantics consists of set-theoretic interpretations of the diagrams. Diagrams may well be symbol-like, but they are not for Shin simply *linguistical* symbols or strings of them. However, if one takes realistic pictures to be like predicates as Nelson Goodman (*Languages of Art*, Hackett 1976) does, then diagrams would seem to be even more linguistical than such pictures, thereby making diagrams very close to being linguistic symbols.

It's hard to imagine that someone would be surprised that a system like Shin's Venn-I could be defined so that every diagrammed argument form with a diagrammed conclusion 'obtainable' by the transformation rules can be shown to be valid, and *vice versa*, via a reasonable set-theoretic semantics for the system (which soundness and completeness Shin demonstrates in Chapter 3). For the surprised reader, imagine the transformation rules of Venn-I to be those rules which you use when applying Venn diagrams to syllogisms, wherein you determine whether the conclusion is already portrayed in the diagram when you diagram the premises. Rather than developing the Venn-I syntax by way of such 'containments', Shin chooses to 'obtain' new diagrams for conclusions from diagrams for premises. Shin does not take such obtainability to show that a syllogism, for example, is valid (semantically). Rather, Venn diagrams are taken to be syntactic-like objects to which a semantics is assigned. I would be inclined to object that this tends to formalize away the peculiar utility of Venn diagrams — viz., that they *show* the semantics for something else by *being* diagrams. But that is not the tack Shin takes. Shin manifests an understandable preference (prejudice?) for the formal-systems methods of orthodox contemporary logic. But what if one had another preference (prejudice?) — say, for geometry? I happen to believe, for example, that the geometrical proof — via diagrams, or drawing

in the sand or whatever — of the Pythagorean Theorem is superior to the typical algebraicized (so-called) proofs of it. Shin's procedure of syntacticizing Venn diagrams seems open to a charge of circularity — viz., explaining *expressions* of set-theoretic types of relations (as occur in 'All men are mortal, all Greeks are men, so all Greeks are mortal' [inclusion] and 'All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, so Socrates is a mortal' [membership]) via *using* set-theoretic relations in the semantics of Venn diagram representations (interpretations, formalizations) of the expressions. A mathematically geometrical (unalgebraicized) use of Venn diagrams, could permit escape from that circle. Some readers will doubtless find such an escape to be explaining the obscure (expressions of set-theoretic relations) via the more obscure (geometry) — especially if they would seek a set theoretic construction of geometry. It seems to me, however, that a geometricized basis for logic might well be *epistemologically* prior to a set-theoretic one. But perhaps I think this because I studied geometry before studying logic, and found it lovelier.

Shin precedes the development of Venn-I with a brief history of Venn diagrams (in Chapter 2), adopting Peirce's modifications (with a disjunction-creating line permitted to join symbols for individuals). Venn-I is a reliable instrument for validating all the traditional syllogisms wherein existential import is not crucial. It can also validate many other forms exceeding the bounds of the syllogism. Shin calls many argument forms 'syllogisms' and uses 'categorical syllogisms' for the orthodox Aristotelian variety. I found her appreciation of the traditional syllogism weak, due to (i) this loose usage, (ii) her total unconcern (cf. note 2, p. 46) with existential import (particular categoricals are always called 'existentials'), (iii) the inapplicability (indeed, insensitivity) of everything Shin says to the issues about distribution (Peterson, P.L. 'Distribution and Proportion.' *Journal of Philosophical Logic* **24** (1995) 193-225), and (iv) the lack of any mention of (or even possible distant connection to) recent interesting research results about the syllogism and such diagrams (Sommers, F. *The Logic of Natural Language* (Clarendon Press, 1982), Englebretsen, G. 'Linear Diagrams for Syllogistic (with Relations)' *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* **33** (1992), and Edwards, A.W.F. 'Venn Diagrams for Many Sets.' *New Scientist* **121** (1646) (1989) 51-6).

Shin's system Venn II (Chapter 4) is more interesting. It's a system that is eventually (in Chapter 5) shown to be translatable into a first-order monadic predicate calculus (one containing all the logical connectives, compound forms, but no individual constants). This is impressive because it is achieved by extending the use of only one very simple device from the diagrams of Venn I. The device is the Peircean disjunction-creating straight line (optionally) connecting individual symbols. By allowing whole diagrams to be connected by this disjunction-creating line, all the needed logical relations can be acknowledged. Shin proves that this system is sound and complete (Chapter 4). Then any argument form expressed in some system of first-order monadic predicate logic (without identity) can be soundly and completely represented with a Venn diagram extension.

Shin argues in conclusion (Chapter 7, anticipated in the introduction) that the prejudice against diagrams in logic and mathematics has been effectively combatted by the developments of Venn I and II. True or not, Shin *has* shown that systems of *diagrams* can be developed that precisely parallel axiomatic formal systems for monadic predicate logic (though Shin is significantly silent on relations, not to mention 'intermediate' quantities). Shin correctly points out what diagram systems and verbal systems can both do (e.g., represent disjunction information) that realistic pictures (e.g. photos) can't. However, Shin's arguments do little to approach a general theory of diagrams (diagrams falling between, say, pictures and verbal systems) — especially in light of the very promising beginnings for such a theory to be found in Nelson Goodman's *Languages of Art* (cf. pp. 170-3, 229-31), a book Shin includes in the bibliography but makes no other reference to or use of (sad to say).

Philip L. Peterson
Syracuse University

Alan P.F. Sell
Philosophical Idealism and Christian Belief.
New York: St. Martin's Press 1995.
Pp. x + 338.
US \$45.00. ISBN 0-312-12746-4.

Like many philosophical movements before it, British Idealism found adherents among Christian believers. Like many adherents of philosophical movements before them, these thinkers thought it necessary to reconcile their philosophical doctrines with their religious tenets. Idealism presented several special problems for this attempt. Sell's book is an account of how seven British idealists — Edward Caird, T.H. Green, J.R. Illingworth, Henry Jones, A.S. Pringle-Pattison, A.E. Taylor, and C.C.J. Webb — grappled with those problems. The first chapter sets the stage by describing the intellectual climate of Britain with the arrival of Hegel's idealism, with special attention to how Hegel's idealism was modified by native British thought, including empiricism and Scottish realism. The second introduces the lives and thought of seven idealists, whose productive periods ranged from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the present century. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters detail the problems Christian doctrine poses for idealism, and describes the seven's attempts to solve those problems. The first problem is that idealism threatens to dissolve either God's transcendence or His immanence, depending on the version of idealism in question.

The second is that idealism seems to deny the reality and independence of the individual, which makes trouble for the doctrine of the Atonement. The third is that idealism seems to have no way of accounting for sin, since all human actions are equally expressions of the Absolute. A special consequence of that problem is that idealism can make no special role for Christ as different from other men. The book concludes with a summary chapter. There are copious notes, a very thorough and useful bibliography, an index of persons, and an index of subjects.

Sell gives a detailed and sympathetic presentation of the views he is discussing (primarily because he lets the idealists speak in their own voices by making use of extensive quotations), but he does not shy away from their inadequacies, either. This book is an outstanding contribution to the literature, both on Christian theology and on British Idealism. For those who are students of the period or the movement, it is an indispensable resource. Even for those who are not, it constitutes an excellent introduction to the period that was the background both for Anglo-American analytic philosophy and for Continental phenomenology.

Mark Owen Webb

Texas Tech University

James S. Stramel

How to Write a Philosophy Paper.

Lanham, MD: University Press of America 1995.

Pp. viii + 73.

US \$9.50. ISBN 0-8191-9778-5.

This marvelous little book belies its title and extravagant cover to provide an excellent introduction to the basics of philosophical argument. While ostensibly about how to write a good philosophy essay, a large proportion of this book is devoted to exposition of the principles of clear philosophical thinking. I like this aspect of the book so much I plan to adopt it in my own first year Introduction to Critical Thinking and Argument course.

Consisting of 6 chapters, Stramel's book covers the nature of the philosophical enterprise, basic argument forms and common fallacies, analytical tools such as conceptual analysis, dilemmas, reductios etc., and philosophical virtues such as clarity, consistency, conciseness and so on. The last two chapters are dedicated specifically to writing philosophy essays, and include good advice about understanding what is expected from essay questions, drafting early ideas, and the development of argument.

The intended audience of this book, to judge by the cover art, is a student who is having trouble writing a philosophy essay, and, perhaps desperately, looks around for some help. There is no doubt that this will be an excellent resource for such a student, and it is one which is designed for self-directed learning. But I think it is better thought of as a text, or supplementary text, for a short course in critical thinking. All the elements of an introductory course in philosophical argument are here, explained clearly and concisely.

Of course, no book of this short length could hope to cover in detail all the issues raised by a serious consideration of philosophical method. As a practical introduction to students however, which concentrates on what will help them get going in doing philosophy, it is excellent.

I have some minor complaints. The account of dilemmas, for example, is somewhat misleading, mostly through brevity. Although he provides a helpful formal description of a dilemma, Stramel fails to indicate to readers that the primary use of dilemmas is in showing a difficulty with a philosophical position.

I suppose that it is a fact of life that no two philosophers will agree on a list of fallacies, but there are some particularly odd ones here, to my way of thinking. For example, the fallacy of 'Hypothesis Contrary to Fact' is apparently '[t]he claim that one can know with certainty what *would have* happened if a past event or condition had been different' (20). Thus the use of counterfactual reasoning is apparently straightforwardly fallacious, and the scientist's claim that a counterfactual situation would have turned out a certain way based on the laws of that science, is also fallacious.

Despite these quibbles, I heartily recommend this book as a concise, accessible, readable and remarkably comprehensive introduction to philosophical method for students, and as a textbook for teachers of critical thinking or introductory philosophy.

Hugh Clapin

Australian National University

James Tully

*Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism
in an Age of Diversity.*

New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.

Pp. xvi + 253.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-47117);

US \$16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-47694).

As do many excellent works of political and legal philosophy, James Tully's *Strange Multiplicity* is a book which crosses frontiers. Written by a philosopher, this book will also be of interest to scholars in a number of fields in the social sciences, humanities, and law. The book combines analysis and social criticism, proceeding in part by philosophical argument and in part by interpreting what Tully presents as the foundational texts of contemporary constitutionalism, to produce a very original theory with much to recommend it. Tully's concern is with what he calls the 'politics of cultural recognition' (1) — that is, with the claims to recognition of nationalist movements, ethnic minorities, 'immigrants, exiles and refugees', women, aboriginal peoples, supranational movements and various other groups which are frequently excluded from the traditional post-colonial constitutional practices and institutions of the contemporary West (2-5). This focus might be taken to indicate that Tully is offering either a liberal or communitarian multiculturalism theory. Not so, however: *Strange Multiplicity* cannot usefully be slotted into such classifications and Tully specifically calls his theory 'inter-cultural' (2) rather than 'multicultural'. As for critique, his most astringent attacks are directed at liberal philosophers and politicians of the eighteenth century — in particular, Locke, Kant, and their followers.

He begins with a very broad and holistic concept of culture. Liberals, communitarians, nationalists and others have a tendency to treat cultures as closed systems which, depending on your theoretical orientation, either inform, or determine, or provide a context for the kinds of choices people make or have available to them. Thus 'multicultural' or 'pluralistic' theories tend to be treated as ways to make room, within the context of a dominant culture, for minority competitors. The goal of the resulting 'modus vivendi' or 'overlapping consensus' is usually some form of coexistence of 'separate, bounded, and internally uniform' cultures — Tully calls this the 'billiard ball' theory. He contrasts with it his own view of cultures as 'overlapping, interactive, and internally negotiated' (10), in tension with themselves and each other, and continually 'shifting position' vis-à-vis one another (10-29). Cultures compete, but they also negotiate.

Armed with this view, and with a compelling visual image in the form of Bill Reid's famous sculpture *the Spirit of Haida Gwaii* (the 'black canoe' which has stood outside the Canadian Embassy in Washington since 1991), Tully argues from the premise that given the 'bewildering' diversity of human culture and cultural expression, contemporary constitutions must be 'reconceived as what might be called a "form of accommodation" of cultural

diversity. A constitution should be seen as a form of activity, an inter-cultural dialogue in which the culturally diverse sovereign citizens of contemporary societies negotiate agreements on their forms of association over time' (30). This activity must of course be carried out in 'appropriate' ways, that is, ways which 'consist in the negotiation and mediation of claims to recognition in a dialogue' and incorporate what Tully identifies as the three conventions of constitutionalism: 'the conventions of mutual recognition, continuity, and consent' (209).

The last of these is doubtless most familiar. It is drawn from a dictum of Roman law and is a cornerstone of both the social contract tradition and contemporary democratic theory: 'what touches all should be agreed to by all' (122). To be legitimate, social and political institutions require the consent of those they govern. The second is related to this: peoples' ways of life must not be changed unless they explicitly consent to the changes. To do otherwise is to violate their free agency. As to the first convention, it appears to be both logically and historically prior to the others, since throughout history, and especially in the history of colonial expansion and decline, powerful cultures have failed or refused to recognize the cultural identities of many others they encounter — for example, the Aboriginal 'others' of North America.

It is here that Tully's harsh condemnation of 18th-century political philosophy becomes central to his argument. According to Tully, Locke's theory (and Kant's after it) was designed specifically to justify the subjugation of the 'savages' of North America. Rather than possessing a perfectly legitimate form of direct democracy, as Tully argues (78), Locke thought these peoples lived in a state of nature, at the lowest stage of cultural and economic development, and not at all as organized nations. American land was therefore vacant under natural law, and 'since the Amerindians [had] no governments to deal with and no rights in their hunting and gathering territories, they [violated] the law of nature when they [tried] to stop Europeans from settling and planting in America' (73). 'Locke's account,' according to Tully, thus 'covers over the real history of the interaction of European imperialism and Aboriginal resistance. The invasion of America, usurpation of Aboriginal nations, theft of the continent, imposition of European economic and political systems, and the steadfast resistance of the Aboriginal peoples are replaced with the benign progress of modern constitutionalism' (78). Similar condemnation awaits Kant (79-82) and his followers.

Tully does not stop with criticism, however. He also employs an historical and documentary analysis of the history of negotiations with aboriginal peoples to show that the three conventions of constitutionalism were in fact applied to and by them (116-24). From there he moves on to propose ways in which justice can be restored through a reconception of constitutionalism in the light of the three conventions (183-212). While his main focus is on Aboriginal examples, he also applies his theory to the sovereignty debate in Quebec (140-88) and to women (178-82).

We might question some of the arguments in *Strange Multiplicity*. Some Wittgenstein scholars may find Tully's use of the *Philosophical Investiga-*

tions (103-16) to be provocative, for example. As well, 'traditional' liberals, communitarians and nationalists will find much to quarrel with in this book, though the latter two will likely also find much that is to their liking. Overall, however, *Strange Multiplicity* is a text that will greatly reward all those who take an interest in the questions it poses and who are prepared to be challenged by the answers it offers.

Bruce Toombs

Champlain Regional College
St-Lambert, Quebec

**Caroline Van Eck, James McAllister and
Renée Van De Vall, eds.**

The Question of Style in Philosophy and the Arts.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1995.
Pp. xi + 245.
US \$49.95. ISBN 0-521-47341-1.

This volume consists of 12 papers, plus an appendix containing a dialogue written by H. von Kleist, an introduction, and a useful index. None of the papers have been published before, though a couple are *précis* of books.

An attempted but somewhat arbitrary categorisation of the papers — there is much overlap between their areas, much of it conducive to the text's unity — finds 4 centering on philosophy (mostly undifferentiatedly Analytic and Continental), 2 on the visual arts, 3 on architecture (and industrial design), at least 2 on the topic of 'personal style', and 1 on (the writing of) history. According to the dust-jacket, 'the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed a change in the perception of the arts and of philosophy... [T]his book examine[s] the circumstances, features, and consequences of this historical transition, exploring in particular new aspects and instances of the inter-relatedness of content and its formal representation...'.¹

The first paper in the collection, appropriately enough, is Berel Lang's important essay, 'The style of method: repression and representation in the genealogy of philosophy'. Lang's well-exemplified argument that the style in which philosophy is done is to an unrecognised extent implicated in its method, and that it is this fact which most philosophy, from Plato through Kant to the modern Analytic idiom, has endeavoured most desperately to repress, is a vital jumping-off point for any contemporary analysis of the question of style in philosophy. But this makes it perhaps all the more unfortunate that the editors were not able to include in the volume Gary

Shapiro's reply to Lang, from when Lang first gave this paper at the APA — in which Shapiro argued (and Lang seemed unable to deny) that Lang ran the risk of defeating himself through not paying attention to the style of his own paper, which is in the main straightforwardly exegetical in a manner most akin to that of ... the modern Analytic idiom.

The papers which follow, on the visual arts and on architecture, tend to be on topics of rather restricted interest (certainly so far as the readers of this journal are likely to be concerned); e.g., theatrical *motifs* in certain of Hogarth's prints. And the majority of these papers also tend to be hampered by a paucity of illustrations of their subject-matters. One cannot expect most readers already to have ready to hand representative — still less particular — pictures or designs done by Ingres, Boffrand or Schwitters.

The real problems begin, though, in the philosophical support sought for the 'theories of style' that these papers — and, still more, those specifically on philosophy and on style as personal — seem to be reaching for. By far the two most frequently cited writers in this collection are Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. But the treatments of both are eccentric.

Most of the use of Nietzsche is uninformed by the best of recent scholarship on him. For example, Nehamas's important and highly-apposite 'Nietzsche: Life as Literature' earns only the barest of mentions. Still more surprising is the complete lack of substantive discussion of Derrida's influential tour-de-force, 'Spurs: Nietzsche's styles' (with the exception of Nicholas Davey's somewhat interesting paper). The surprise is in virtue of there being a loosely post-modernish, deconstructivistish feel to the approaches of most of the papers.

The use to which Wittgenstein gets put, from the Introduction to the collection on, is more troubling still. I lost count of the number of times that the contributors to this collection invoke his famous 'Whereof one cannot speak ...', yet without any apparent awareness that the best of recent Wittgenstein scholarship (I am thinking of Diamond, Conant, Winch — all of whom, not incidentally, have important things to say also about the style(s) of Wittgenstein's authorship) holds that this line does *not* license mysticism, nor talk of 'the ineffable', nor the supposed distinction between plain nonsense and 'deep' nonsense. And nor is there any real attention paid to significant recent work directly applying Wittgenstein's mature philosophy to aesthetic questions and to the work of artistic criticism, such as Hagberg's writing, or Guetti's.

There is then no efficacious philosophic 'foundation' for most of the thoughts about the concept of style in the title under review, and in fact one is in most cases completely unclear as to what the contributors take 'style' to be. Moreover, the papers in this collection tend too often to give the *impression* of lacking a real sensibility for the *nuances* of style not only of their subject-matters, but also of the writing and self-presentation of their philosophical 'authorities'.

One reason for this 'impression' being given is the (for Cambridge) unusually high frequency of typographical errors in the text.

It may be that a more substantial reason is that several of the pieces in the collection were translated. The style may have been lost in translation. If so, it is a pity — and perhaps yet a greater pity that none of these papers thematizes the question of translation as an immensely important and *actionable* issue in the study of style.

But one suspects that the problem is deeper. For it has to be said that von Kleist's 'On the theatre of marionettes', effectually translated by Dorothea Franck, is much more *stylish*, and arguably more thought-provoking, than any of the original essays in this book. One wonders why none of the authors in this collection were seriously ready to risk using an *original* format, or at least one of the many formats that the history of philosophy and of critical discussions of the arts offers one: such as the dialogue, the confession, the exhibition catalogue, or the *pastiche*. Rather than, that is, what one actually encounters through most of this book: a more-than-usually-tired academic prose, segmented into papers each with, in almost every case, a massively predictable format.

The reader will probably by now have gathered that I was in the end rather disappointed in this collection (for reasons mostly implicit in my remarks earlier concerning even Lang's — relatively successful — paper). Most — if by no means all — of the contributions in this book seem in some respect or another to represent rather undistinguished scholarship. But more ironically, and tellingly, their styles vary from potentially 'self-refuting' through ugly to simply unreadable (in which category one has to place in particular Charles Altieri's 'Personal style as articulate [!!] intentionality', which quite defeated me however many times I tried to wend my way through it).

If the question is of the style *or* of the content of this volume 'on' questions of style, then the answer must I am afraid be pretty negative.

Rupert Read

(*Sociology and Interdisciplinary Studies*)
Manchester Metropolitan University

Peter van Inwagen

God, Knowledge, and Mystery:

Essays in Philosophical Theology.

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1995.

Pp. 284.

US \$42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2994-3);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-8186-4).

This work in three parts holds appeal particularly for those unfamiliar with van Inwagen's work. All chapters are previously published material, tied together through short introductory sections. Each essay is in some sense a defence of orthodox Christian belief (6).

The central approach is based on the contention that philosophical argument is of value to theological debate for four reasons: i) Philosophy is, by definition, unfettered by theological presuppositions (2); ii) The *method* of theology is frequently indistinguishable from the method of philosophy (2); iii) Philosophers' ideas and conclusions are often absorbed into theology (e.g., Kant, Heidegger): yet, much of the philosophy imported into theology seems imperfectly understood, and appears to be accepted with no clear sense of the provisional nature of philosophical ideas and conclusions; iv) 'The philosopher is not likely to be impressed by a piece of text that looks like an argument but is only an assertion' (2-3).

Part 1 deals with well established debates around the question of God's existence and the problem of evil. Essays 1 and 3 in this section are somewhat technical. Part 2 is the most readily accessible. Here van Inwagen applies philosophy to current theological issues and responds to attacks on specific Christian beliefs. And, Part 3 is a more detailed and theoretically complex discussion of the themes of Trinity and Incarnation, requiring some background in analytical philosophy.

Chapter 1 engages some of the ontological arguments for God's existence. He affirms that whilst empirical investigation is important to make sense of our assertions about the world (33), it will not answer the 'God' question. He endeavours to refute some of the ontic arguments on the rationality of theistic belief (such as Plantinga's), not because he thinks theistic belief is irrational but because: 'No argument I know of for the conclusion that it is irrational to believe that God exists has any force whatever' (41). Many rational people believe that God exists; thus, he claims, it is not irrational to believe. However, he does not question whether such belief is held on rational or irrational grounds, for even rational people can form conclusions for irrational reasons. Similarly, an argument for God's existence may fail to establish its conclusion, even if that conclusion is true.

The mainstay of the argument in Chapter 2 is that even if there is an omniscient, loving and providential God who creates and sustains all things, there are nevertheless states of affairs (evils) that have no explanation whatever. Evil is argued to be due to chance and not part of God's intention (60ff). This notion of chance leaves open the doctrines of choice and free will.

The question however remains: which situations in the world either have or do not have an explanation, (e.g., the number of hairs on your head, or the existence of life)? If evil (sin, suffering, disease and death) has no explanation and is not brought about by God, whilst being a part of what this omniscient, omnipotent God has created and can foresee, then we are left without real resolution to some of the fundamental 'God' questions including the issue of God's apparent choice not to interfere in the affairs of the world.

The argument continues in Chapter 3 where van Inwagen suggests that evil does not render belief in God irrational. Whilst particular evils may constitute a difficulty for theism, they do not attain the status of *evidence* that rules out theism (94-5). Chapter 4 then offers a theodicy which seeks to establish dialogue rather than providing a comprehensive resolution. It moves away from causality as explanation, and instead speculates on the need for coherent connections between various 'levels' in the universe from the molecular to the organic — a world sufficiently complex to contain life as we know it also 'requires' some sense of conflict which we experience as evil (119).

Part 2 is probably the most interesting section of the book. Here van Inwagen applies his philosophy to current theological issues. He seeks to comment on Genesis 1-3 (Chapter 5), arguing against both 'Genesac literalism' (on the grounds that theologians have long argued against a literal reading of Genesis) (129f) and 'saganism' (a theory of an expanding, evolving universe which scientists question and do not accept too literally) (130f). 'My first step in reconciling the thesis that Genesis is the revealed Word of God with the findings of science is ... to contend that what Genesis is right about is of great intrinsic importance and that what it is wrong about is of little intrinsic importance' (138-9).

Chapter 6 argues against elevating the importance of critical studies (investigations such as authorship, dates, and historical reliability) of the New Testament, whilst recognising its breadth of influence. Users of any recent translation of the Bible will be exposed to the judgments of critical scholars. The Christian church though has a particular 'shape' due in part to the assumptions made about the *content* and *authority* of Scripture, which critical studies will not change. Van Inwagen believes there are independent grounds for believing what the Church presuppose to be true (166).

A wider framework of discussion on World Religions recognises some of the inconsistencies between them (Chapter 7). However, these have nothing to do with 'the root and essence' (192) of religion. Each is a response to a single divine reality, which has arisen and developed under different geographical, cultural, economic, historical and social circumstances (193).

Part 3 addresses the doctrines of the Trinity and of Incarnation. Traditionally they are described as 'mysteries', that is that they cannot be demonstrated as being true by the use of human reason alone (219), indeed they *seem* impossible. They are both 'straightforwardly logically self-contradictory ...' (7). Van Inwagen endeavours to restate them in a way that is free from

formal contradiction. This section is perhaps of most interest to the specialist reader with a grasp of both theology and of formal logic.

Overall the book provides an interesting array of philosophical insights into theology. Some of the older pieces could fruitfully have been rewritten to take account of ensuing debates, and some broader interaction with the literature of epistemology would also have been pertinent, given the book's title. All in all it is an interesting way of making available relatively specialist debates to a wider audience.

Erich von Dietze

(University Chaplain)

Curtin University of Technology
Perth, Western Australia

Enrique Villanueva, ed.

Truth and Rationality: Philosophical Issues 5.

Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing
Company 1994. Pp. 282.

US \$42.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-925922-69-9);

US \$25.00 (paper: ISBN 0-925922-19-2).

The fifteen papers in this collection, in metaphysics and epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language, include some delightful and refreshing surprises. A number of them are shaped by culture currents outside of analytic philosophy, a sort of east meets west: the postmodern meets the analytic. Hardcore analytic philosophers turn the tools of analysis to the task of developing a kind of postmodern analytic narrative on issues at the heart of their tradition. There is here the glimmer of a twilight of the idols of the analytic.

One highlight is Peter Railton's 'Truth, Reason and the Regulation of Belief'. Railton offers a deconstruction, and reconstruction, of the notion of *objectivity* in science. He claims that in rejecting the traditional notion of objectivity he moves with the confluence of research from many disciplines. He argues that the traditional notion fails to take into account the normative, value-laden, character of what goes on in philosophy and other fields. According to Railton's 'caricature' of what goes on, 'objectivity arises not so much at the level of the individual investigator as at the social level, a perhaps unintended consequence of competition for funds, glory, and other scarce resources in circumstances in which innovation that enhances prediction and control is rewarded' (83). Railton thinks that this caricature is not so far-

fetched. According to his 'revisionist' reconstruction, the scientist, under heavy epistemological pressure to maximize prediction and control, comes to *accept*, not necessarily *believe*, whatever enhances that prediction and control.

Normative epistemology is also a theme in a symposium on Ernest Sosa's epistemology. In 'Virtue Perspectivism: A Response to Foley and Fumerton', Sosa defends his application of virtue ethics to epistemology. He sums up his view as follows: 'In speaking of the agent's actions that are *right* and of the cognizer's beliefs that are *knowledge*, we speak implicitly of the virtues, practical or intellectual, seated within the subject, which give rise to that action or belief ...' (33). For Sosa, it's not the nature of the belief that is the main measure of knowledge, but something about the nature of the believer.

In 'The Epistemology of Sosa', Richard Foley sees Sosa's view as making the self-awareness of the subject so important as to make it 'doubtful whether any of us very often has knowledge' (10). Richard Fumerton, in 'Sosa's Epistemology', also asks how, on Sosa's view, the subject could ever have a *justified* true belief.

In his 'Meaning and Normativity', Allan Gibbard explores the normative in the philosophy of language. He cites Saul Kripke's work on Wittgenstein's 'rule-following argument' as a recent ground-breaker in its recognition of the importance of value in meaning theory. Gibbard holds that 'classical moves in metaethics need to be included in a normative theory of meaning' (96). His contribution here lays the groundwork for building that bridge. He advocates naturalism in ethics and argues that it leads directly to a normative theory of meaning. The research potential surrounding the issues that Gibbard raises seems enormous.

Paul Horwich, in 'What Is It Like to Be a Deflationary Theory of Meaning?', lends yet another voice to the dialogue on normativity, agreeing with Gibbard that meaning is normative and naturalistic. Horwich claims that Kripke and others think that a naturalistic account of the normative nature of meaning may be 'impossible'. He counters that such an account is right under our nose. Since meaning is simply *use*, the normativity of meaning is not an *intrinsic* property.

Given that normativity is hot in epistemology and philosophy of language, it's not surprising to find in this collection George Graham and Terry Horgan's 'Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy'. The 'end of philosophy' is the end of *a priori* analysis and the beginning of 'post-analytic metaphilosophy' (PAM). PAM is an ideology that is '*empirical*, interdisciplinary ... encompassing such fields as psychology, linguistics, social anthropology, and philosophy' (221). Graham and Horgan argue that philosophers are tilting at windmills trying to solve philosophical problems using *a priori* conceptual analysis. Philosophers need empirical data: intuitions, thought experiments and puzzles. They claim that 'an adequate account of the ideology of philosophically puzzling concepts should make it possible to explain why any normal ... cognizer will, when confronted with a given philosophical problem, experience philosophical puzzlement intuitively'

(227). They trace the spirit of this view to Aristotle, and they use David Lewis' notion of 'score-keeping' to flesh out the methodology of PAM.

James Tomberlin, in 'Whither Southern Fundamentalism? A Query for Graham and Horgan', attempts to show that PAM cannot be used to solve certain classic philosophical problems. A nice counterpoint to Graham and Horgan's piece is Paul Boghassian's 'Analyticity and Conceptual Truth'. Boghassian makes the bold claim that analytic philosophy is not even *possible* without 'a hefty helping of *a priori* conceptual analysis' (117). His focus is the relation between Quine's famous attack on analyticity and the metaphysical status of meanings. Against a 'prevailing consensus', Boghassian argues that rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction is incompatible with meaning realism. How this view relates to his claim that analytic philosophy is not possible without *a priori* conceptual analysis is an open issue.

The philosophy of Quine is the focus of three other pieces, by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Martin Davies and Joao Monteiro. These treat 'warhorses' in the Quinean repertoire.

Stephen Schiffer's 'The Language-of-Thought Relation and Its Implications' is a sketch of a compositional semantics in which truth conditions are linked to neurophysiology. Like Gibbard, Schiffer argues that the mental supervenes on the physical.

Finally, Jaegwon Kim's wonderful piece, 'Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence', asks us to think harder and deeper about the relationship between our epistemological *models* of the world and the world itself. Kim argues that views like the one shaping Hempel's covering law model do not explain how our models' representations of the world are connected to events in the world itself. Kim advocates an epistemological reconstruction, an 'explanatory realism', in which the link between model and world is foundational.

Marcelo Sabates joins Kim in arguing against so-called 'internalistic' models of explanation.

The dialogues in these papers collectively provide fertile ground for research projects within the analytic tradition *and beyond*.

Tina Wood

Villanova University

Patricia Williams

The Rooster's Egg: On the Persistence of Prejudice.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1996.

Pp. 262.

\$22.00. ISBN 0-674-77942-8.

In *The Rooster's Egg: On the Persistence of Prejudice* Patricia Williams brings her searing and formidable intellect to a vast array of the images, texts and practices of American popular culture, analysing them along lines of race, gender, class, culture, and sexual orientation. The collection of essays covers such diverse topics as Rush Limbaugh's right wing radio program and the restaurant 'Rush Rooms' it has given rise to; Bill Cosby as performer of cultural whiteface; Sally Jesse Raphael and Oprah Winfrey as the manufacturers of both counterfeit intimacy and counterfeit public discourse; the O.J. Simpson trial as a fantasy land of affirmative action babies made good, or bad, or both; the construction of black welfare mothers as the cause of all the ills of America; the popular depiction of Hillary Clinton as the unfit wife and mother emasculating her husband and the nation; and Tonya Harding as the new white trash — to name but a very few.

Her staggering capacity for exquisite zingers like — 'Clarence Thomas is to Malcolm X what "Unforgettable. The perfume. By Revlon." is to Nat King Cole.' (125) is repeatedly demonstrated throughout the book. Likewise, her ability to craft prose of amazing beauty and deep spiritual power is confirmed. One striking example of her poetic strength is found in her discussion of the intense and loving relationship to language — and the relationship to ancestors that is experienced through language — that a Ghanaian student described to her in explaining his oral tradition. Envisioning a world in which an attitude of profound care was felt toward words Williams writes:

From time to time I try to imagine this world of which he spoke — a culture in whose mythology words might be that precious, in which words were conceived as vessels for communications from the heart; a society in which words are holy, and the challenge of life is based upon the quest for gentle words, holy words, gentle truths holy truths. I try to imagine for myself a world in which the words one gives one's children are the shell into which they shall grow, so one chooses one's words carefully, like precious gifts, like magnificent inheritances, for they convey an excess of what we have imagined, they bear gifts beyond imagination, they reveal and revisit the wealth of history. How carefully, how slowly, and how lovingly we might step into our expectations of each other in such a world. (212)

This sentiment can perhaps be taken as expressing the most positive formulation of one of the central themes of the book: that conversations about race, gender, class, and homophobia must be encouraged and fostered in our culture, and that we must not continue to view such conversations as bad or too frightening or as presumptively coerced by the menacing forces of PC —

that we must not allow our attention to continue to be deflected from the repressed energies lurking behind our silences on these topics.

The question the book raises is: how can we create space for conversations about race, gender, class, and homophobia when a) these issues are charged with a mega-voltage of the electricity of disappointment, loss, annihilation, betrayal, resentment, hostility, and anger, and b) discussion of these issues either does or at least threatens to put the question of each participant's personal worth on the table. The substance of the book itself is an example of an enormous contribution to conversation about race and other issues of difference. However, the poignance with which Williams raises the question of how we are to overcome the silencing effects of the emotions around race and gender inspires and creates a craving for more direct discussion of strategies for realizing that goal.

Williams grapples with the issue when she juxtaposes two stories (198-9). In the first story she narrates her annoyance at a white friend who trivialized the powerful and rich images of African-American life portrayed in *To Sleep with Anger*. After seeing the film his only remark was: 'I wanted to rush right out and get some of that wonderful old-fashioned dark heavy furniture for my house.' Williams explains her annoyance at his assessment of the film — cashed out in a currency of objects and aesthetics rather than experience and history. She gives us insight into her desire to meet his comment with a sharp response that would reveal both his ignorance and the total absence of reciprocity of their emotional stake in the issue. Immediately upon concluding this story, Williams goes on to tell a parallel story in which she was the unwitting offender. In this next story, Williams recalls a moment in which she, at the age of 23, remarked to a blonde Chicana that she did not 'look Chicano'. The woman responded with an alarming and hurtful blast of anger and information. Williams, recalling her reaction to the response, writes:

I suppose I felt a little like those who these days feel so victimized by what they call political correctness. But it was vitally important for me to get past that moment of injured defensiveness: for even as I snuffled into the Kleenex that she thrust impatiently at me with instructions to grow up and stop dripping, I realized that a part of me was pained because I felt as if I had betrayed myself in a way that was deeply humiliating: I was remembering all those bothersome times when people had come up to me and said, "You don't talk like a black person." (119)

The insights embedded in Williams' discussion of the incident are absolutely essential to any progress in the project of forging strategies for creating space for discussions of issues of difference. Her narration of the difficulty of overcoming the initial response of defensiveness and indignant self-protection in such a situation highlights the difficulty of entering into conversation where there are likely to be hidden traps of wildly asymmetrical emotional meanings. As she narrates it, Williams' effort to overcome her defensiveness was motivated by a recognition of her own self-betrayal. Her identification

of this particular motivation to overcome defensiveness in conversation raises the question of how we as a society can diversify the range of motivations or inspirations that can potentially be drawn upon to overcome or ride out the impulse to react defensively in situations of the eruption of anger around issues of race, gender, and homophobia.

Williams' work makes it clear that in order to succeed in changing our cultural sensibilities around conversations about race we must find new ways of hanging in with the dialogue in encounters where one person experiences the exchange as completely mystifying, intimidating, and hurtful and the other experiences it as flagrantly violative and insulting. In discussing other facets of the task of creating space for such conversations Williams notes that a successful process will 'involve not only imagining how it feels to be in someone else's shoes, but *asking*'. She writes:

...the willingness to ask about another's feelings (without resentment, without condescension, without sneering — to really ask) is no small social courtesy.

Williams' work challenges us to provide a diverse range of ways to — and reasons for — overcoming — breathing through — the initial impulse to defensiveness and presumption of understanding in conversations across lines of difference.

One of the other central topics of Williams' book is the vast gap between the social construction of the black single welfare mother in America and lived experience of black single motherhood. Here her discussion is informed and fired by her recent adoption of a son. Williams highlights her own position of privilege, noting that in her letter to prospective birth mothers she contemplated writing: 'Your child will grow up riding the subways and knowing the finer shades of the chardonnay-and-caviar lifestyle of the middlebrow and not-so-famous' (219). Williams demonstrates, however, the ways in which her experience of parenting was nevertheless invaded by the powerful rhetoric of the blight of single black unwed motherhood (171). She writes:

What is striking to me is how much social resistance I have encountered despite the tremendous privilege of my shining lawyerly middle classness. If things are this hard for someone like me who has everything, they have got to be unbearably difficult for women who have much less. (171)

Williams masterfully and persuasively dismantles the right wing myth of the Black teen welfare mother as a pervasive and evil monster devouring American society noting that:

Statistics show that welfare to single mothers constitutes 1 percent of the federal budget, 3 percent if food stamps are added. Only 38 percent of AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) recipients are African-American. Of all welfare households, only 8.1 are headed by

teen mothers. Fifty-two percent of those teenagers are nineteen years old (7).

Indeed, much of the book involves Williams' explication and exposure of right wing myths of extravagant hand-outs given to black women on welfare or outrageously unfair privileging of blacks and other minorities in the labour market. She reveals the manner in which these ungrounded myths legitimate and make plausible a white sense of social victimization. While Williams clearly exposes the fatuousness of these myths, her documentation of the facts leaves something to be desired. In a chapter entitled 'The Unbearable Autonomy of Being', Williams discusses Dan Quayle's attack on Murphy Brown. There, Williams forcefully demonstrates the danger and destructiveness of Quayle's misinformed rhetoric, crafted to instill hysterical anticipation of a terrifying chaos caused by the absence of men in the family. She further illustrates the way in which the phenomenon of single motherhood has been racialized. However, notwithstanding the power of Williams' rebuttal to Quayle, her factual claims would be stronger if they were accompanied by more meticulous documentation.

For example, Williams makes the following statement without citing any sources:

Contrary to public opinion, births among black women have been decreasing since the 1960s; infant mortality rates are scandalously high (higher in Harlem than in Bangladesh); and shortened life expectancy, unattended medical conditions, and lack of health care are such serious problems among blacks that, once women enter their twenties, complication from pregnancy becomes a serious health risk. (175)

Indeed, the whole chapter — the force of which is heavily dependent upon factual information — does not contain a single reference. While such references no doubt exist, the absence of citation of sources is disappointing since the power of the book would be more impressive still, if the sources for verification of the statistics Williams refers to were made more readily available to the reader. While Williams' journalistic style gives the book her characteristic accessibility and charm, her neglect of scholarly precision makes her book less useful than it might be as ammunition against the powerful arsenal of the right.

Williams' book gives a superbly graphic and eloquent critical rendering of the right wing sensibility around issues of race and gender, manifested in a multiplicity of diverse instances of American popular culture. However, I would suggest that Williams' positive vision is not as strong here as it was in her first book, *The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a law professor* (Harvard, 1991). In *The Rooster's Egg* I found myself often overwhelmed by the way in which Williams presents the right wing point of view as though it were absolutely all pervasive. Of course, my sense that the ubiquity of the right wing perspective that Williams evokes is hyperbolic may stem from the fact that I live in Canada and not America. However, while Williams' replicas of right wing views are accurate and instructive they sometimes create a

sense of monolithic conservative sensibility that is so powerful and pervasive and has such a solid grip on the popular imagination that it could never be jarred even slightly — let alone overcome. For my own part, I find this belief in the power, pervasiveness, permanence of racism and sexism and other forms of bigotry to be destructive of the energy and enthusiasm that is, I think, necessary to nurture a desire to continue to engage in the conversations Williams calls for.

Annalise Acorn

(Faculty of Law)

University of Alberta

Robert A. Wilson

*Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds:
Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind.*

Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University
Press 1995.

Pp. xii + 273.

US \$49.95. ISBN 0-521-47402-7.

One of the 'big battles' in the Philosophy of Cognitive Science is the one fought between externalists and individualists around the notions of mental content. Externalists favor a wide content, individuated according to historical and environmental features, whereas individualists defend a narrow one, an inexpressible kind of content believed to strongly supervene on the physical constitution of the subject. Although the discussion is still on, many valuable attempts have been made to establish some kind of consensus on this topic.

Robert Wilson's intelligent and careful book is a smart step in the direction of anti-individualist wide psychology and a good help to clarify the terms of the debate. Taken from the perspective of philosophy of science, the constraints on psychological taxonomies and explanation are the focus to analyse the wide-narrow controversy. Individualism, it is said, sets constraints on the kinds we want to use for psychological explanation, namely, only those that supervene on intrinsic properties of the individual. This limitation turns individualism into a revisionist proposal, because, as Twin Earth examples show, usual intentional explanations do not respect the supervenience principle. Individualists then have to prove that their revisionism obeys good reasons.

The supervenience principle is a strong general metaphysical point that conflicts with some of our practices. Many of the types conforming our sciences are relational, they do not supervene on intrinsic physical properties

(e.g. the property of being highly specialized or even that of being a planet). An individualist may want to understand the controversy as one about metaphysics vs. explanatory practices, which one comes first and which one constrains the other. In fact, some of the friends of narrow content seem to conceive the problem ultimately on those terms. From this point of view, for Wilson the choice is clear: he opts for the primacy of our practices and a rejection of further metaphysical constraints: in his own words, 'where explanation goes, ontology must follow'. This slogan is controversial, but it is also a starting point; it does not establish anything on the debate. An externalist must still find arguments, first for the better explanatory adequacy of wide contents over narrow ones and, second, against reasons individualists might have for the need of supervenient properties in *psychology* (other than the general metaphysical one).

Wilson starts his work at this last point. First, he considers the *a priori* arguments for individualism that say that science individuates by causal powers. According to them, relational properties can be accepted insofar as they are genuinely causal (not conceptually connected to their effects), but wide contents, conceptually connected to intentional behaviors, are rejected. Wilson's reply is that this fact cannot be established on *a priori* grounds, because whether one relational property is causally responsible for some effect can only be known *a posteriori*. Next, he puts forward what he calls 'an empirical argument' for narrow content (or fat syntax), which is the argument from computationalism: if cognitive sciences individuate mental processes only *qua* computational processes, and computational processes supervene on the intrinsic physical states of an individual, then cognitive sciences individuate states and processes that supervene on intrinsic physical states and processes. Wilson finds this argument so compelling that he chooses to reject the second premise. Computation, he claims, is not confined to the limits of skin and skull: formal properties of the environment are sometimes part of the computational/cognitive process. However, this wide computationalism is not very plausible, nor necessary: Wilson himself seems to forget about it for the rest of the book, as he is not concerned with computation but with intentional explanation.

Once he has made sure that individualism as a general constraint on psychological taxonomies cannot be defended on these grounds, he goes on to argue for wide contents' explanatory adequacy. A first problem he has to confront is the claim that a wide psychology would require the completion of the rest of the sciences before it could be even started. This accusation, put forward by Fodor against externalists, is dismissed by Wilson: he acknowledges that there is some sort of dependency between psychology and other sciences, but adds that it is the sort of non-fatal dependency that is common to find between sciences.

Another problem, both classic and more serious that any externalist has to face is the one posed by Putnam's puzzle, which seems to show the explanatory sterility (epiphenomenalist character) of externalist contents: two people can differ in their wide contents while behaving exactly in the

same way. To this, Wilson responds by making two wise claims, namely, that appearances notwithstanding, wide psychology has greater causal depth than its rivals, and that it is theoretically more appropriate. The virtue of causal depth is defined as 'the idea that causes should be resilient across slight counterfactual changes' (188). In this respect, wide contents are better than hyperconcrete, too fine-grained narrow ones. On the other hand, it is easy to understand why externalist contents have better theoretical appropriateness: cause and effect must be pitched at the same level of explanation, and, as contents have to explain actions, that is to say, intentional (and thus relational) behaviors, contents must be intentional and therefore relational. We could conclude that the perspectives for a narrow psychology are not very promising. Nonetheless, after considering and rejecting some of the proposals for a narrow psychology already in the market, Wilson closes his discussion by commending a conciliatory view of the debate: individualism as a general constraint on psychological explanation cannot be sustained, but this does not mean that some areas of psychology cannot be found to be better served by making use of individualist explanations.

Wilson's is not a knock-down against pan-individualism, but a smart defence of wide psychology, and, as said in the beginning, a smart step towards it. Besides, it contains a novel and interesting final (albeit brief) discussion concerning the relation between individualism in psychology and other kinds of individualisms (methodological, biological and political), giving some hints for further research.

Agustin Vicente

Logika eta Zientziaren Filosofia Saila
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
Donostia, Spain

NEW from APP

Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean

Edited by Richard Bosley, Roger A. Shiner and Janet D. Sisson

Original essays on one of antiquity's most famous ethical ideas. The collection discusses the interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine, and also relates the doctrine to contemporary ethical theory and practice.

Contributors: Richard Bosley, David Glidden, Alphonso Gómez-Lobo, Stephen Leighton, Mark McCullagh, George N. Terzis, J.E. Tiles, Thomas M. Tuozzo, William Welton and Ronald Polansky.

Introduction by Janet D. Sisson. Includes select bibliography of writings on the Mean.

Price: **\$59.95** cloth **\$21.95** paper 1996
ISBN: 0-920980-64-3 cloth 0-920980-65-1 paper 242 pp

Some Philosophical Issues in Moral Matters

Joseph Owens Edited by Dennis J. Billy and Terence Kennedy

The collected ethical writings since 1965 of the distinguished Aristotle scholar and moral philosopher. The volume includes all seventeen of Fr. Owens' well-known papers on Aristotle's ethical theory, as well as ten papers on Aquinas and issues in contemporary ethical theory.

Distributed by APP for Editiones Academiae Alphonsianae, Rome.

Price: **\$29.95** paper 500 pp 1996

Order from

ACADEMIC PRINTING AND PUBLISHING
P.O.Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta
CANADA T6E 4T2

Tel. (403) 435-5898 FAX (403) 435-5852

Prices are in Cdn\$ inside Canada, US\$ outside Canada
Canadian residents, please add 7% G.S.T.

Please include \$3.25 postage and handling for first book,
\$0.85 for each subsequent book.

VISA/Mastercard accepted

From Our Backlist

The Sciences in Greco-Roman Society

Edited by T.D. Barnes

Original essays on science and society in late Antiquity. Based on papers given at a conference honouring 150 years of the teaching of Classics at the University of Toronto.

Contributors: Andrew Barker, Roger Beck, Alexander Jones, James G. Lennox, David Pingree.

Price:	\$54.95	cloth	\$19.95	paper	1995
ISBN:	0-920980-60-0	cloth	0-920980-61-9	paper	144 pp

Virtue, Love and Form: Essays in Memory of Gregory Vlastos

Edited by Terence Irwin and Martha Nussbaum

Revised papers from a memorial conference at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1992. 'Advances the discussion of substantive issues in substantive ways' (*Phronesis*)

Contributors: Julia Annas, Mary Whitlock Blundell, Alan Code, Donald Davidson, Gail Fine, Terrence Irwin, Richard Kraut, Jonathan Lear, Robert Meister, Martha Nussbaum, Gerasimos Santas, Bernard Williams.

Price:	\$59.95	cloth	\$23.95	paper	1994
ISBN:	0-920980-50-3	cloth	0-920980-51-1	paper	258 pp

The Language of the Cave

Reprinted

Edited by Andrew Barker and Martin Warner

Original essays on themes in Plato's *Republic*. Based on a lecture series sponsored by Classics, Comparative Literature and Philosophy at the University of Warwick. 'Recommended for all collections on Plato, and in philosophy and literature' (*Choice*). 'Intelligent and stimulating collection of essays' (*Classical Review*)

Price:	\$54.95	cloth	\$24.95	paper	1994
ISBN:	0-920980-52-X	cloth	0-920980-53-8	paper	208 pp

Order from

ACADEMIC PRINTING AND PUBLISHING

P.O.Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta
CANADA T6E 4T2

Tel. (403) 435-5898 FAX (403) 435-5852

GST Regn# R117100016

Prices are in Cdn\$ inside Canada, US\$ outside Canada
Canadian residents, please add 7% G.S.T.

Please include \$3.25 postage and handling for first book, / \$0.85 for each subsequent book.

VISA and Mastercard accepted

LUMEN

Proceedings of the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies

Lumen (formerly Man and Nature/L'homme et la nature) consists of selected papers from the annual meetings of the Society. The contents are interdisciplinary in character, dealing with the art, literature, theatre, music and philosophy, and the economic, political, and social life of the period. Contributions are in both English and French. The contributors represent both the leading scholars in Canada on the eighteenth century and distinguished international guest contributors.

The volumes differ in size and are priced accordingly. Volumes I to XIV (1982-1995) are all available. The volumes range from \$14.95 to \$29.95. Individual volumes may be purchased as separate books, or a series subscription may be ordered on a standing basis.

Now Published

Volume XIV (1995), Paul Wood, ed. \$29.95

Special prices on back issues:

Vols. I - XIV complete: 40% discount = \$325.00

Any 5-9 volumes: 30% discount Any 2-4 volumes: 25% discount

Order from

ACADEMIC PRINTING AND PUBLISHING

P.O.Box 4218 Edmonton Alberta

CANADA T6E 4T2

Tel (403) 435-5898 FAX (403) 435-5852

GST Regn# R117100016: above prices do NOT include GST

VISA and Mastercard accepted

Biology & Society

REFLECTIONS ON METHODOLOGY
EDITED BY MOHAN MATTHEN & R.X. WARE



Canadian Journal
of Philosophy
Supplementary
Volume 20, 1994

Edited by
Mohan Matthen
and **R.X. Ware**

Contents:
Gender and the Biological Sciences
Kathleen Okruhlik
Evolutionary Biology and Cultural Values: Is It Irremediably Corrupt?
Michael Ruse
Humankind(s)
Nancy Holmstrom
Individualisms
Andrew Levine
Biological and Social Constraints on Cognitive Processes: The Need for Dynamical Interactions Between Levels of Inquiry
William Bechtel
Methodological Individualism and Reductionism in Biology
John Dupré
Individualism and Local Control
Ronald de Sousa
The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels of Organization, Perspectives, and Causal Thickets
William C. Wimsatt
Managing Complexity and Dynamics: Is There a Difference Between Biology and Physics?
Paul Thompson

Price: CDN\$30.00 (in Canada)
US\$30.00 (outside Canada)
ISSN 0229-7051
ISBN 0-919491-20-0

Order from: University of Calgary Press
c/o UBC Press
6344 Memorial Road
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2

Postage and handling (Canada / USA) is \$5.00 (1-3 books). Postage and handling (outside Canada) is \$9.00. Canadian residents, please add 7% GST to the total cost of the book(s) plus the postage and handling. Price outside Canada in US dollars.

The *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* is published quarterly, in March, June, September, and December. In addition to these regular issues, the *CJP* publishes annually a supplementary volume of original papers on a selected theme of contemporary philosophical interest. This supplementary volume is free to individual and student subscribers to the journal in that year. Supplementary volumes may also be purchased separately from UBC Press.

Correspondence regarding subscriptions, renewals, and single issues should be addressed to *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, c/o University of Calgary Press, 2500 University Drive N.W., Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4.

1995 volume/four issues:

Institutions
Individuals
Students
Single issues

Canada
Cdn. \$40.00
25.00
15.00
9.00

Foreign
US \$40.00
25.00
15.00
9.00

University of Calgary Press
2500 University Drive N.W.
CALGARY, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4

Individual ☐ Student ☐ x_____

Please send me information on
CJP Supplementary Volumes ☐

Name _____

Address _____

City _____

Country _____ Postal Code _____

Visa ☐ Mastercard ☐

No. _____ Expiry Date _____