

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

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Subscriptions should be sent to the publisher:
Les abonnements peuvent être pris chez l'éditeur:

Academic Printing & Publishing

P.O. Box 4218, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6E 4T2

Publications Mail Registration No. 5550

ISSN 0228-491X
© 1994 Academic Printing & Publishing

Published six times a year

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James Bohman

New Philosophy of Social Science, Problems of Indeterminacy.

Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. Pp. x + 273.

US \$32.50 (ISBN 0-262-02343-1).

This dense, thoughtful book does for critical theory in its relation to the social sciences what Carl Hempel did for empiricism, what Peter Winch did for ordinary language philosophy, and what Alfred Schutz did for phenomenology.

Bohman's first chapter takes up traditional empiricism's discussion of causality in the social sciences. While rightly criticizing Hempel's covering law approach that generates true laws only if they are not general or general laws that cannot be true (i.e., yield accurate predictions), Bohman admits that Cook and Campbell's quasi-experimental method affords a mode of verifying causal hypotheses. It is not clear why Hempel's inevitable interpretative reference to the subjective viewpoint of actors precludes an 'objective criteria of application' since one of the central theses of Bohman's own book is that there can be objective (i.e., valid) interpretations of the subjective viewpoint of an actor. Bohman shows clearly how Parsons overemphasized the causal force of his great discovery — 'internalization' — and relied on a single, overly narrow logic of rational explanation employing an a priori action frame of reference. Bohman's own logic of rational explanation, paralleling that of Jürgen Habermas, is more diversified, but also a priori in the sense of being conceptually rather than inductively derived. In his presentation of exemplary cases of causal analysis, Bohman faults the Strong Programme for Sociology of Science for ignoring actors' intentionality and self-reflexivity and Durkheim for failing to explain how collective representations cause action.

The inadequacies of causal explanation, in Bohman's view, lead to post-empiricist philosophies of social science with their non-naturalistic logics of explanations, such as ordinary language philosophy's focus on rules, rational choice theories, ethnomethodology, and critical theory. Peter Winch's turn to the rule-governed behaviors of Wittgensteinian forms of life overlooks how reflective agents render rules indeterminate. Similarly, rational choice theory, based on the model of economic man, cannot explain the diversity of motives and reasoning processes of nonmaximizing behaviors such as voting. While these previous philosophies evade indeterminacy by reducing actors to rule-following conformists or maximizing fools, ethnomethodology emphasizes the indeterminacy of action which is a contingent and context-dependent, constructive achievement. However, it neglects how institutions distribute resources and interest positions. While all three of these philosophical strategies tend to overgeneralize their own successful explanation patterns to the whole domain of social action, critical theory, in Bohman's assessment, attempts to be comprehensive, but not exclusive, and introduces a critical, reflective capacity into the other accounts of action. The abstract,

formal level of critical theory and its comprehensiveness actually makes possible Bohman's refreshing, irenic, accommodating, but not uncritical attitude toward different research strategies. However, its abstractness and its legitimate penchant for evaluating the rationality of actions mandate that it acquire the sensitive interpretive skills of its counterparts — if it is to be critical of itself. Finally, Bohman's argument at the end of this chapter that the beneficial results of cooperation are a consequence of stable interaction and not its cause needs fuller development.

Bohman's third and best chapter, on interpretation and indeterminacy, addresses contextualist scepticism which argues that interpretation is universal and that it depends on background presuppositions that cannot be fully specified. Bohman shows that such interpretive holism itself is a formal theory resulting from transcendental reflection on the general conditions of interpretation (e.g., social conditions) that make statements or theories possible but do not say anything at all about their epistemic status or warrantability. The hermeneutic circularity and indeterminacy of post-empiricist philosophies of social science require a weak holism, cognizant of its own fallibilism, but unwilling to slide into wholesale scepticism. Bohman ends this chapter by arguing that Habermas's view of the sociologist as participant, evaluating as she seeks understanding, blunts relativism and yet preserves differences. Contextual and rational interpretation cooperate more often than Bohman at times recognizes since it is often the seeming irrationality of a foreign culture that provokes the most profound and sensitive contextual understanding of it.

In the fourth chapter on macro-micro relations, Bohman appears most clearly as the balanced, critical, and conciliatory philosopher he has been throughout the book. Bohman refocuses the theoretical debates about the relationship between macro and micro levels as an empirical, pragmatic question about linkage and not reduction. He asserts that greater explanatory completeness and credibility are achieved if macro-explanations elaborate micro-foundations and if micro-explanations, such as rational choice theory and ethnomethodology, articulate the macro-level factors often implicit in their accounts. Marx's macro-theory, contemporary analyses of institutions intermediate between the macro-micro levels, and Habermas's system-lifeworld framework point in the right direction.

In a final chapter on criticism and explanation, Bohman highlights the critical ethical dimension of the philosophy of the social science. Bohman does not substantiate the 'collapse' of the fact-value distinction (11) since even the value-directed choice of problems, which Max Weber also acknowledged, and the putting of one's findings at the service of a broader, evaluative critical project do not excuse the social scientist from establishing evidentially his conclusions. Bohman proceeds to illustrate how causal analysis, rational choice theory, and ethnomethodology, and macro-level explanations already generate social critiques similar to that of Marx's theory, for all its insufficiencies, or to Habermas's de-ideologizing concept of 'distorted communica-

tion'. Even though more extensive critique is called for, mere accurate description can be critical.

While Bohman disavows that his own work 'stands above the battle as a transcendental judge organizing social research', the claims of his critical theoretical conceptual framework, while fallible, are not on the same level as the empirical claims developed by the social scientific practices whose limits and situation with reference to each other Bohman's philosophy establishes. The great merit of this book, though, is to have recognized the diversity of these practices and to have revealed their indeterminacy because agents are rational and critical. In addition, because social scientific agents are critical and rational, the turn to a post-empiricist philosophy of social science does not warrant scepticism and social science need not rest content with the way society is but can even point the way to things to come.

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David Charles and Kathleen Lennon, eds.
Reduction, Explanation, and Realism.
Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992. Pp. viii + 478.
US \$95.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-824273-5);
US \$35.00 (paper: ISBN 0-19-875131-1).

Interest and research in inter-theoretic relations has become something of a growth industry in recent years. Since the seminal papers of Schaffner ('Approaches to Reduction', *Philosophy of Science*, 34, 137-47) and Sklar ('Types of Inter-Theoretic Reduction', *British Journal of the Philosophy of Science*, 18, 109-24) in 1967, dissatisfaction with the standard model of reduction, due primarily to the Logical Positivists, has led researchers to reexamine historical cases of putative reduction. The moral drawn is that the singular failing of the standard view is its insistence on purely formal criteria for inter-theoretic reduction and the concomitant tendency to 'fit' all cases of reduction to a single model. It has gradually emerged that, in fact, reduction is not a single relation but, rather, constitutes a virtual plethora of inter-theoretic relations varying continuously from complete incommensurability to relatively straightforward reduction. Moreover, as Nickles made clear ('Two Concepts of Intertheoretic Reduction', *The Journal of Philosophy*, LXX, 1973, 181-201), inter-theoretic relations vary along two dimensions: successional relations between theories at the same level and contemporary relations between theories of the same phenomena at different levels.

With respect to the latter sort, the realization that inter-theoretic relations vary continuously raises the possibility of genuinely materialistic alternatives to reduction. Particularly within such disciplines as psychology, biology and value theory, the relation of supervenience has been seen as a way of acknowledging the ultimate physical dependence of everything there is, while yet permitting the autonomy of such higher-level disciplines. Thus, it is possible, in principle at least, to chart a middle course between dualism and reductionism (ignoring elimination). And, '[i]t is the coherence and success of these anti-reductionist claims which constitute the principal focus of the papers in this collection' (2).

The brief introduction by the editors relates the debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism to the other themes that bind these essays together: explanation and realism. To be realistic with respect to some higher-level theory (i.e., some *special science*) is, *prima facie* at least, to assume that its generalizations constitute genuine *causal* laws. And this, in turn, commits one to the existence of the higher-level properties which figure in those laws. But then there are persuasive reasons for accepting some sort of reductive relation between the special science and (ultimately) basic physics. For, as Peter Smith points out, reductionism is not motivated merely by some 'radical physicalist prejudice'. Rather, '[i]t is just because we want to take entirely seriously the explanatory pretensions of psychology (for example), that we stand in need of some account of how it is that its explanatory structures work as well as they do, applied as they are to causal complexes, the operation of whose crucial parts are already adequately described by neuroscience' (25). So, if there is a prejudice underlying this motivation, it is the presumption that wholes are constituted of parts in such a way that the behaviour of the wholes is causally produced by the behaviour of the parts; and the entities of microphysics are the ultimate constituents of things. Implicit in this is the view that real causation occurs at the microphysical level.

Thus, the goal of reductionism is not foundational, either epistemic or ontological. Rather, it is to ensure that the explanations offered at all levels of theory are consistent with each other. So, from this perspective, the central motivation for reductionism is that a successful reduction of some special science would vindicate one's realism. A successful reduction vindicates the special laws by showing them to be derivable from (micro)physical laws (i.e., by showing them to be special cases of microphysical laws). And, similarly, a successful reduction vindicates the entities and properties of the special science by demonstrating that there are (micro)physical conditions which are jointly necessary and sufficient for their instantiation. Put the other way around, to the extent that we fail to produce such a reduction for some special science, it is a candidate for replacement (i.e., elimination).

The challenge to the anti-reductionist, then, is this: to provide an account of the relation between higher-level properties and the lower-level properties on which they supervene which establishes a genuine relation of dependence while ruling out causal over-determination and miraculous coincidences.

Since the physicalist is prepared to accept that real causation occurs at the microphysical level, the existence of autonomous higher-level causal laws and properties seems to imply causal over-determination of higher-level events. In addition, the anti-reductionist is required to explain how the predictions made at distinct levels of theory manage to march in step with each other. For if the higher-level laws are not special cases of the laws of basic physics, then it is difficult to see how one can manage to avoid postulating 'miraculous coincidences'. This is no small task, surely, and the essays in this book are a testament to the ingenuity and the scepticism brought to bear on these issues.

There are 15 essays conveniently ordered by topic. The first three (by Peter Smith, David Papineau and Graham Macdonald respectively) constitute very general and abstract discussions of reductionism and its motivations. Smith sets out a minimal conception of reduction and argues persuasively that all special sciences must be reducible in this sense (at least) if we are to have the various levels of theory hang together. Papineau takes aim at the views of Jerry Fodor on special sciences and the disunity of science and concludes that 'you can't have physicalism without reducibility [in cases where the] special categories ... enter into lawlike generalizations' (25). Reducibility is avoidable only in cases where the higher level theory provides us with teleological explanations. Macdonald urges a conclusion much like Papineau's: we must eschew higher-level *causal* explanations in favour of explanations in terms of selection mechanisms. In Macdonald's essay, there is a detailed discussion of the various interpretations of evolutionary theory.

The fourth essay, by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, focuses on social theory. They argue for a position which attempts to balance the motivations of *individualism*, the view that society is to be explained in terms of the properties and interactions of autonomous agents, with those of *collectivism*, the view that society is the unit of study and can only be understood from the top down as it were.

The next six essays all focus to a greater or lesser extent on the psychology/neurophysiology case: Cynthia Macdonald, 'Weak Externalism and Psychological Reduction'; Jennifer Hornsby, 'Physics, Biology, and Common-Sense Psychology'; Adrian Cussins, 'The Limitations of Pluralism'; Kathleen Lennon, 'Reduction, Causality and Normativity'; Brian Loar, 'Elimination versus Non-reductive Physicalism'; David Charles, 'Supervenience, Composition, and Physicalism'. Noteworthy are the articles by Hornsby and Loar. In an illuminating discussion, Hornsby attacks Dennett's instrumentalism by challenging the 'design stance' interpretation of Darwinian theory on which it rests. And Loar, in a very sceptical essay, questions the very possibility of a coherent anti-reductionist position which can avoid both instrumentalism and dualism (of a non-materialist sort).

There follow two essays on reductionism in value theory: James Griffin, 'Values: Reduction, Supervenience, and Explanation by Ascent'; Michael Smith, 'Valuing: Desiring or Believing?'. The next two essays are both critical of Derek Parfit's reductionist approach to personal identity: Quassim Cas-

sam, 'Reductionism and First-Person Thinking'; John Campbell, 'The First Person: The Reductionist View of the Self'. And finally, there is a paper by Justin Broackes concerning the autonomy of secondary properties, 'The Autonomy of Colour'.

There are two approaches one might take in putting together a topical collection of essays such as this: One might collect the best and/or the most controversial essays of the last, say, ten years or so. Or one might collect together contemporary essays by various noteworthy authors in the field(s). It is the latter approach adopted here. Thus, the present collection is presumably intended to constitute a statement on the state of the art. In this regard, the editors are to be congratulated for collecting together essays of such uniformly high quality.

The present volume is likely to prove invaluable as a research tool for some time to come for anyone concerned with these issues. It is also suitable for graduate courses in selected topics and as a secondary source for upper level undergraduate courses. On a negative note, one might have hoped for a more comprehensive bibliography and a better index (there is only an index of names), especially in a research source as significant as this.

Wayne I. Henry

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Gertrude D. Conway

Wittgenstein on Foundations.

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press

International, 1989. Pp. x + 184.

US \$49.95 (ISBN 0-391-03585-1).

Conway's work is a persuasive response to the common claim that the later Wittgenstein takes an 'anti-foundationalist' stance with regard to knowledge and meaning. She claims that Wittgenstein's retreat from the foundationalist account of the *Tractatus* does not evidence a repudiation of foundations in general, but merely of metaphysical-realist foundations. She argues that he came to a new account of foundations which 'derive from the human world' (4). This account is bound up with the notoriously underspecified term 'form of life'. The central chapters of the book constitute an interpretive exploration of Wittgenstein's use of this term.

Conway begins by rehearsing the Tractarian notion of foundations as 'bedrock': an independent structure guaranteeing the determinacy of linguistic sense (17). She then mentions some of the influences which led Wittgen-

stein to reconsider that notion. She stresses the ideas of 'form of life' and of 'ungrounded way of acting' as constitutive of the 'riverbed' notion of foundations characteristic of his later thinking.

The next chapter gets at the concept 'form of life' through a consideration of 'language games' and the rules implicit in them. Conway claims that an account of meaning as contextually bound need not lead to conventionalism. Human agreement about words is not arbitrary, but is grounded in agreement in action or in form of life.

She begins her treatment of the term 'form of life' by listing four extant types of interpretation of the term: the idea that it is synonymous with 'language game' (S. Stephen Hilmy); a biological interpretation (J.F.M. Hunter); a cultural or sociological contextualization (Peter Winch et. al.); and a natural-historical interpretation (Hanna Pitkin). She warns against the 'unwittgensteinian' over-specification of the fuzzy edges of this term.

Next Conway considers textual evidence from all the published collections of remarks in which the term is mentioned. She identifies two 'varying, though closely related' (57) accounts of the term. One is broad and comprehensive: the 'human form of life'. The other is narrower, nominating local matrixes of meaning.

The human form of life is a set of inevitable conventions dependent on general facts of nature and human response. They are not chosen but lived into; thus they are changeable, but only tectonically. This common form of life is the non-metaphysical foundation of objective meaning.

Local forms of life arise from the partially differing environments of varying human groups, and the cultural response to these environments. Again they are not chosen, but inform the various cultural matrixes within the common form of humanity. They form the foundation of culturally relative meaning, implicitly guiding our action. Conway further elucidates this usage of 'form of life' by discussing the 'world pictures' mentioned in *On Certainty*.

This twofold understanding of the term 'form of life' grounds Conway's defense of Wittgenstein against accusations of extreme relativism and conventionalism. Both those who label Wittgenstein as a relativist (Conway names Roger Trigg) and those who label Wittgenstein as a conventionalist (such as Michael Dummett) fail to grasp the idea of a general human form of life which mitigates cultural relativity and linguistic conventionalism. Wittgenstein is a 'generic relativist' (106): he claims that meaning is dependent on experience (not linguistic convention), but he also notes that all known intelligences actually have a common core of experience.

Wittgenstein's account stands against both a Platonic metaphysical realism and a Kantian or phenomenological grounding of truth in transcendental subjectivity. For Wittgenstein the ground of meaning is the network of human actions, a common humanity which must be gracefully acknowledged in order for philosophy (or indeed any discourse) to live (147).

Conway's final chapter proceeds to 'reconsider philosophy' from the Wittgensteinian point of view identified in the course of the foregoing

exploration. Wittgenstein has been quoted (and criticized) as demanding a purely descriptive role for philosophy. Conway agrees that one strand of his thought takes this tack. But she points out that another strand gives philosophy the task of untying knots in linguistic usage, of finding the deep grammar beneath the misleading surface grammar, and of restoring perspicuity. The tension between these two strands is deserving of more discussion than it gets here.

In the end Conway expresses frustration with Wittgenstein's unsystematic, aphoristic manner and his assignment of a limited role to philosophy. She proposes that one appropriate expansion of 'Wittgensteinian' philosophy would be to elaborate on his 'cursory' and 'inadequate' treatment of central terms like 'form of life'. Part of this task would be a 'philosophical anthropology', explicating existing forms of life. Another part of the task would be a personal recognition of the forms within which one dwells.

These suggestions are symptomatic of Conway's tendency to forget that Wittgenstein believed his key contribution to be a method, not a terminology. Despite her acknowledgement of Wittgenstein's anti-essentialist stance, she is nearly as determined as other interpreters to give an essential definition of the term 'form of life'. (She does allow it two meanings!) Yet if, following Wittgenstein, we elucidate this term through investigation of its use, we must first consider whether it was intended as a scientific name at all. The textual evidence, which Conway presents quite comprehensively, strongly suggests that its role is more suggestive than nominative. The vagueness of the 'referent' is not a mistake. Thus to ask for further specification of the phenomenon denominated by this term is something of a howler. Many phenomena — varying from broad to narrow — may productively be considered as 'forms of life'.

Conway's direct criticism of Wittgenstein's therapeutic conception of philosophy as too narrow, and her call for a 'positive heuristic function' for philosophy, also seem to miss the point. Forms of life may overlap, and for Wittgenstein the philosophical form of life serves as a technical adjunct to other horizons, which have greater generative resources. Conway's proposal to make philosophy generative threatens a return to metaphysics.

But such concerns do not alter the fact that the central claim of this book — that Wittgenstein can productively be read as a 'foundationalist' of 'forms of life' — is cogently argued and convincing.

Charles Creegan

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Arleen B. Dallery and Charles E. Scott
with **P. Holey Roberts, eds.**

Ethics and Danger. Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought.

New York: State University of New York
Press, 1992. Pp. x + 348.

US \$59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0983-X);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0984-8).

This volume is a collection of 21 papers divided into three sections: Part 1, Heidegger and Politics; Part 2, Heidegger's Thought; and Part 3, Ethical Currents in Continental Thought. There are contributions from Samuel IJsseling, William Richardson, Françoise Dastur, John Caputo, David Krell, Véronique Fóti, Babette Babich, Peg Birmingham, Tina Chanter, Rebecca Comay, John van Buren, Klaus Held, Joseph Flay, Robert Mugerauer, Edith Wyschogrod, Ladelle McWhorter, Mario Moussa, Cynthia Willett, Roger Bell, Bill Martin and Craig Vasey.

The title of the volume suggests that the papers included here address the ethical and political dimensions in the thought of Martin Heidegger. The conjoining of ethics and danger in that title, in association with Heidegger's name, evokes not only the question of Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, but also his claims concerning the close proximity of 'thought' to 'danger'. Beginning with the question 'Can we read Heidegger as a philosopher whose thought moves us without our belonging, in the reading, to an incipient fascism?' (p. vii) the Introduction seems to confirm that these issues — of Nazism, of danger and of the ethical — are indeed the main points of focus for the volume. Yet insofar as it addresses these issues the volume is something of a disappointment. Barely half of the essays included address the general question of the ethical in Heidegger, while the remainder cover a disparate range of topics from a Heideggerian approach to architecture to Rorty on Derrida to misogyny and feminism in Levinas.

The subtitle of the volume — 'Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought' — is probably a better indication of the volume's contents. Rather than being organised around one central theme, the collection includes a selection of essays on various aspects of Heidegger's thought, including his involvement with Nazism, but also including comparative discussions of Heidegger's work in relation to Benjamin, Aristotle, Husserl, Hegel and Derrida, as well as essays focusing more specifically on the work of Foucault, Derrida and Levinas.

The range of topics covered in the volume is mirrored in the range in quality of the contributions. Some of the essays are certainly rather slight and, while length is never an indication of worth, many of the essays are also quite brief. Yet there are also a number of good contributions, for instance: John Caputo's piece on 'Spirit and Danger'; John van Buren's

account of the early Heidegger's engagement with Aristotle; and Rebecca Comay's comparison of Heidegger and Benjamin on art and technology.

While there are some valuable contributions in the volume, it would clearly have benefited from a stronger editorial direction. Indeed it is to be regretted that the editors did not take the opportunity to assemble a stronger selection of papers that would take deal more fully with the complex of issues surrounding the matter of Heidegger's involvement with Nazism. Too much of that debate has tended to focus on the question of Heidegger's personal responsibility and with the responsibility of Heidegger's own thought. Yet there is no *necessary* connection between Heidegger's philosophical ideas as worked out, for instance, in *Being and Time* and his Nazism (as Lyotard has pointed out), just as there is no necessary connection between Frege's philosophy of language and his anti-semitism. Nevertheless, there is still, as Samuel IJsseling suggests in his contribution to this volume, an important question concerning our own position in relation to fascism — in terms of our own positions as philosophers and in terms of the position of the societies in which we philosophise. And Heidegger's work provides an important starting point for the investigation of that question. Indeed the question of our relation to fascism is a question that is all the more pressing given the insistence of philosophers such as Richard Wolin, *contra* Derrida, that it was only because Heidegger remained still entangled in the Western metaphysical tradition that he was prevented from being even more implicated in Nazi ideology and practice. Yet fascism arose out of European culture; and it persists in Europe today — indeed, in Bosnia and Armenia talk of 'ethnic cleansing' serves only to remind us of how much it is still alive. The question of the connections between European thought in general and the fascist excesses of this century, and between European thought and the Holocaust, is a question that will only be adequately explored, not through any self-absorbed contemplation of our own preoccupations nor through any pious attempt to judge Heidegger's involvement, but through a deeper understanding of European political and intellectual history. In this respect the contemporary preoccupation with Heidegger's political activities seems to have more to do with current intellectual alliances and enmities (and fears) than with questions concerning the nature of fascism or our relation to it. What is disappointing about a volume such as *Ethics and Danger*, then, is that it does not do more to move beyond some of these preoccupations to a fuller treatment of the deeper issues that are at stake here. One might reply that there are a number of other collections that do attempt to address these issues and that the aim of this volume is broader than just the exploration of issues arising from Heidegger's involvement with fascism, that it is concerned with the problems of ethics as such. But as a volume that explores the matter of ethics in contemporary European thought (a matter that deserves much more attention) the volume is simply not substantial enough — its approach is too ill-focused and the quality of papers too uneven.

Although the volume is indeed something of a disappointment, it does include some worthwhile contributions. Most readers interested in Heidegger or in modern European thought in general will find something of value here. The question is whether there is enough in the rather disparate selection of papers to make the volume as a whole a worthwhile purchase.

Jeff Malpas

Murdoch University, Australia

Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, eds.

A Companion to Epistemology.

Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell

1992. Pp. vii + 541.

US \$74.95 (ISBN 0-631-17204-1).

Epistemology — the theory of knowledge or justified belief — is central to philosophical research. So much so, in fact, that disputes in other areas of philosophy have often turned on epistemological matters. Blackwell Publishers are to be commended, therefore, for giving the philosophical community the first comprehensive guide to this subject.

This Companion is the second in the *Blackwell Companions to Philosophy* eight volume series. It was preceded by a volume on ethics, and will be followed by volumes on aesthetics, contemporary political philosophy, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, logic, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language. Taken together, the series is intended as 'a comprehensive survey of philosophy as a whole' (dust jacket).

As with most of the other volumes in the series, *A Companion to Epistemology* is arranged as a standard reference book, with over 250 alphabetically organized articles of lengths ranging from 250 to 3500 words on the leading contemporary and historical thinkers, theories, ideas, concepts and distinctions in epistemology. As not all entries are easily understood on their own, two inter-related methods of cross-referencing are used to direct the reader from one entry to another. One method is to be found within the text: here key terms or names are capitalized. This means that there is an entry on this topic or person, and it would be helpful for the present purposes to have a look at it. The other method is to be found at the end of most entries. This allows the editors to either pick out areas importantly related to the present entry, but which have not been emphasized in the text, or to note the central importance of those terms or names that have already been capital-

ized in the text. The Companion closes with a very extensive and user-friendly 14 page index.

The Blackwell series focuses primarily on Anglo-American philosophy, although other traditions have not been completely ignored; for instance, this Companion has a number of entries on Indian and continental epistemologies. Restricting the choice of topics this way, however, still presents the editors with two notable difficulties, both of which stem from the interdependence of philosophical areas. The first is a practical one. Which topics should be covered in this Companion rather than in one of the others? The second is a theoretical one. To what extent can epistemological issues covered by this Companion be separated from closely related issues in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science?

As a result of these concerns, there will be occasions when the reader will have to look to other Companions for more detailed coverage of some entries. Entries on individual thinkers, for example, focus only on their subject's work in epistemology (to the extent that is possible); they do not attempt to cover all their work in philosophy. The same goes for topics. The entry on religious belief is restricted simply to epistemological concerns, the entry on ethics is directed at its epistemological underpinnings, the entry on natural science is limited to the epistemology of science, etc. The happy outcome of this focusing, though, is a clear and thorough picture of the lay of the epistemological land.

To produce this volume, the Companion's two editors, Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, enlisted the help of 137 of the world's most distinguished English speaking epistemologists. While the majority of the contributors come from the US, 101 to be exact, 25 come from Britain, 5 from Canada, 4 from Australia, 1 from Israel, and 1 from South Africa. Each contributor provides one or more entries depending upon the scope and influence of their work. Determining the extent of an individual's contribution, however, is no mean feat. Although the editors have prefaced the Companion with a list of the contributors and their institutional affiliation, they have neglected to include along with this list the titles of their contributions. To determine this, the reader will have to look to the end of each entry. Those familiar with the present epistemological scene, however, will not be surprised by the pairing of contributor and entry, for example: W. Alston on foundationalism; K. Lehrer on coherentism; A. Goldman on reliabilism; L.J. Cohen on rationality; P. Horwich on theories of truth; B. Skyrms on theories of probability; D. Bloor on sociology of knowledge; J. Katz on analyticity; N. Rescher on idealism; W. Salmon on explanation; R. Popkin on modern scepticism; M.M. Adams on William of Ockham; B. Stroud on David Hume; and D. Pears on Ludwig Wittgenstein.

These contributors are leading figures in epistemology, individuals who have done much to shape our present understanding of philosophy. It is disappointing, therefore, that of the list just mentioned only William Alston receives his own biographical entry. In fact, the Companion has only 12 biographical entries on living philosophers, (W. Alston, D.M. Armstrong, R.

Chisholm, D. Davidson, J. Derrida, H.G. Gadamer, N. Goodman, J. Habermas, J. Hintikka, W.V. Quine, R. Rorty, and C. Hempel), and of this group, a third are continental thinkers and none are under the age of 62. Moreover, the biographical entries are not all similarly structured. Some provide personal details, while others simply summarize the philosopher's work. On the up side, however, all of them close with a list of the secondary sources as well as a list of the individual's important writings.

The entries on epistemological topics or issues are the most worthwhile in the Companion. While it would have been understandable for the contributors to have presented their own work as the most warranted position in the debate that they are describing, this appears not to be the case. The entries are fair-minded comprehensive surveys of the leading epistemological positions. And most often, in fact, more easily understood than the original work they describe. As a result, I suspect that *The Companion to Epistemology* will become the standard description of the relevant issues and players in epistemological debates for a long time to come.

The Companion is aimed primarily at the professional philosopher, although students from undergraduate level upwards will find it approachable, and in the cases where epistemology is their focus, they will find it to be an indispensable guide. It goes without saying, that a copy of this should be in every university library and graduate philosophy department, if not on the book shelf of every serious epistemologist.

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Randall R. Dipert

Artifacts, Art Works, and Agency.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1993.

Pp. XX + 273.

US \$44.95 (ISBN 0-87722-990-2).

This book seeks to provide a cohesive account of all manner of artifactual things and events. Dipert conducts his investigation in action-theoretic terms, primarily in terms of the notion of intention. The notion of intention serves in the first instance to distinguish artifacts from the other concrete things that form part of our environment (instruments, tools, and natural objects), and to establish various subcategories in the class of artifactual things and events (ordinary, communicative, expressive, and art work artifacts). Thus tools are distinguished from instruments because the latter are

merely intentionally used 'as is', while tools are intentionally modified for a certain use. By the same token, ordinary artifacts are distinguished from tools because the intentional modifications that distinguish a tool from a mere instrument are made with a view to other agents. As Dipert puts it, the intentionally modified properties are 'intended by the agent to be recognized by an agent at a later time as having been intentionally altered for that, or some other, use' (29-30). And ordinary artifacts are distinguished from the ever more complex communicative, expressive, and art work artifacts by similar appeal to the 'highest concretely and consciously contemplated purpose [intention?] with which we think of them' (106): from recognition of production for a certain use (ordinary artifacts) to recognition of rather more mysterious RIF (recognition implies fulfillment) intentions (art work artifacts). Apart from these various matters of classification, the book also contains discussions of interpretation (chapter 5) and evaluation (chapter 8), a chapter on the metaphysics of artifacts (chapter 7), an extended treatment of art works (chapters 9-11), and a final chapter on the conceptual boundaries that differentiate artificial from natural things (chapter 12). All of these discussions are similarly conducted in the action-theoretic ('intentionalist') terms Dipert delineates in the first chapters. Interpretation is said to involve an investigation of an object's deliberative history while evaluation is of the manner in which each level of the producer's intentions (low-, middle-, and high-level intentions) supports the actualization of the next (higher) level.

While the overall project may appear promising, the execution does not always live up to that promise. Part of the reason for this are the various distinctions and subdistinctions Dipert draws throughout the book (presumably in the interest of clarity). The differentiations of instrument from tool, tool from artifact, ordinary from expressive, communicative and art work artifact, for instance, are slow and laborious, detailed in often turgid prose. Dipert's definition of art works is typical: '[a]n art work is an artifact that is not conceived to have been made with an unsubordinated intention other than one that is such that its recognition implies its fulfillment' (112).

Of course, the complaint that the prose does not live up to one's desired level of elegance hardly proves detrimental for the overall purpose of the book. A more serious concern centers around Dipert's use of the notoriously vague notion of intention and the underlying intentionalist approach (Dipert identifies his philosophical heritage as being that of Brentano, Meinong, and Castañeda). He tells us at the outset 'that a developed philosophy of mind is necessary for a developed aesthetics and philosophy of art' (xi). Well perhaps, but why *this* (intentionalist) philosophy of mind? Dipert does not discuss alternative approaches, except in very general and sketchy terms. In the chapter on interpretation, for instance, he rejects what he takes to be the anti-intentionalist interpretive scheme (supposedly that is an ahistorical, isolationist functionalism). He states that he '*suspect/s*' that the use of 'anti-intentionalist interpretive schemata ... is suspicious, wrong, and perhaps even immoral if not used, like atomic fuel, with extraordinary care' (101) and concludes that 'artifactual historicism/intentionalism ... is eminently

sensible as a *general* epistemological policy' (100). But given that anti-intentionalism has not been given a balanced voice in the discussion, it is not at all clear why this should be so, why a properly conceived anti-intentionalist interpretive scheme is not just as sensible as the 'historicism/intentionalism' Dipert advocates. I *suspect* that Dipert hopes the success of his project (that the intentionalist philosophy of mind does in fact serve in the construction of a cohesive account of artifacts) will demonstrate the soundness of his philosophical and methodological presuppositions. However, that is a classic case of preaching to the converted. Those not already committed to the intentionalist approach will scarcely be convinced by the success of Dipert's account.

The problem inherent in Dipert's action-theoretic ('intentionalist') approach reemerges in his discussion of art work artifacts (chapters 9-11), otherwise by far the most interesting part of the book. Concerned to make his interpretive and evaluative scheme applicable to art works (and to avoid a pluralism of meaning and interpretation), Dipert ignores their most fascinating and puzzling aspect: that works can (sometimes) challenge their audiences to engage in thought and reflection that goes far beyond any determination of the author's or producer's intentions, if those are ever at issue. To be sure, Dipert acknowledges the 'essential obscurity' of art works, that 'describing the precise purpose of a given artwork, including the exact articulated content, brings us immediately to an impasse' (181). At the same time, however, he warns that the *essential* nature of that obscurity ought not to be overemphasized, that 'artistic phenomena and artistic purposes are not ... intrinsically unanalyzable' (187). Again, perhaps that is the case, but authorial intentions, even those of a merely postulated author, are simply not of primary importance in the apprehension and assessment of works. Works are meaningful and significant for an audience, yet Dipert virtually ignores the work's relation to its audience, as he also ignores the possibility that in virtue of the *essential* obscurity of art works their interpretation may well be a *creative* act (perhaps even an act of appropriation). Given that his action-theoretic ('intentionalist') approach is heavily weighed in favor of the work's producer that is perhaps not surprising, but it renders his account of art works unnecessarily one-sided.

Measured by Dipert's own standard it must be said that the book is successful. He sets out to provide an account of all artifactual things and events, and that is precisely what he delivers. But that success is bought at a price: the most interesting and the most puzzling aspect of art works, the ability some works have to displace their audience from what is ordinary is virtually ignored, and certainly remains unaccounted for.

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Marc Ereshefsky, éd.

The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of Species.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1992.

Pp. xvii + 405.

US \$50.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-262-05044-7);

US \$27.50 (paper: ISBN 0-262-55020-2).

Ce recueil rassemble 18 articles publiés entre 1963 et 1991. La première partie de l'ouvrage, qui regroupe des textes de biologistes, porte sur les différentes suggestions faites pour caractériser la notion d'espèce. La seconde, qui regroupe surtout des textes de philosophes, porte sur les problèmes philosophiques reliés à cette notion.

L'origine du problème est que la notion d'espèce se situe au carrefour de perspectives fort différentes. L'espèce est, bien entendu, une notion naïve, quasi pré-théorique, utilisée dans toutes les cultures et à toutes les époques. C'est également une notion qui est utilisée par les systématiciens pour établir le catalogue des vivants. Selon qu'on désire qu'un tel catalogue facilite les généralisations empiriques de tel ou tel type, la caractérisation de la notion d'espèce pourra exiger des apports théoriques de nature et d'importance variable. Ainsi, plusieurs types de caractéristiques biologiques peuvent être utilisés et à côté des caractéristiques plus superficielles, strictement morphologiques, on pourra trouver des caractéristiques d'ordre écologique, voire génétique. Finalement, l'espèce est aussi une notion qui est utilisée en théorie de l'évolution. Or, à l'intérieur de ce cadre, on peut caractériser l'espèce de bien des façons. Certains le font plutôt théoriquement, en faisant appel, comme Mayr, à une caractérisation attrayante sur le plan conceptuel. Un des problèmes ici, outre celui des choix théoriques qui peuvent rendre plus ou moins attrayante une de ces caractérisations théoriques, c'est que le systématicien, lui, aimerait bien une caractérisation intéressante sur le plan opérationnel. Or l'attrait théorique ne va pas de pair avec l'utilité opératoire. Certains biologistes sont prêts à sacrifier l'une ou l'autre de ces dimensions mais la plupart y vont de leur suggestion et défendent des caractérisations qui ont un certain attrait sur le plan théorique et qui sont utilisables en systématique.

La première partie de l'ouvrage débute, comme il se doit, avec l'article bien connu de Mayr où il présente et soutient ce qui allait devenir la définition la plus commune du terme 'espèce': les espèces sont des groupes de populations naturelles entre lesquelles il y a interfécondité et qui sont isolées reproductivement de tels autres groupes. Cette définition, concède Mayr, ne permettra pas toujours de déterminer aisément quel est le statut exact d'une population particulière et, par ailleurs, elle ne vaut que pour les espèces sexuées.

La critique faite par Sokal et Crovello de la caractérisation de Mayr est qu'opérationnellement elle rencontre passablement de difficultés et, au surplus, qu'elle fait appel à l'intuition que possède le biologiste de la valeur diagnostique des caractéristiques phénétiques qu'il rencontre chez les vi-

vants. Or, la caractérisation de Mayr visait notamment à remplacer l'utilisation de critères morphologiques et phénétiques. Finalement, les auteurs soutiennent que l'utilité théorique du concept n'est pas démontrée, qu'il est plutôt corrupteur et qu'on peut avantageusement le remplacer par celui de *populations locales* dans la théorie de l'évolution et par une notion purement phénétique d'espèce en taxinomie.

Ehrlich et Raven, quant à eux, s'attaquent à la caractérisation de Mayr en soutenant que l'idée sous-jacente de pool génétique commun est problématique parce que a) le flux génétique est moins omniprésent qu'on a tendance à le croire entre des populations que l'on voudrait spontanément considérer comme faisant partie de la même espèce, b) des populations isolées les unes des autres peuvent néanmoins être phénétiquement semblables, et c) des populations peuvent échanger des gènes tout en présentant des différences importantes. Les auteurs terminent, comme Sokal et Raven, en soulignant que sur le plan théorique ce sont les populations locales qui sont importantes. Van Valen va dans le même sens qu'eux. Wiley défend pour sa part une version modifiée de la caractérisation de G.G. Simpson en disant qu'elle est avantageuse notamment parce qu'elle est applicable aux vivants qui ne se reproduisent pas sexuellement et qu'elle inclut, comme cas particulier, la définition de Mayr.

La deuxième partie de l'ouvrage regroupe des textes de philosophes. Une large place y est consacrée à la confrontation entre Hull et Ghiselin d'une part et Kitcher et Ruse d'autre part à propos du statut ontologique des espèces. Les premiers considèrent qu'une part significative des problèmes qui entourent la notion d'espèce peuvent se résoudre si on adopte la perspective selon laquelle les espèces sont des individus plutôt que des classes. Ils considèrent notamment qu'une telle perspective permet d'éviter le problème de l'absence de lois en théorie de l'évolution, problème qui soulève la question de la scientificité de la théorie de l'évolution — si ce n'est de la biologie dans son ensemble. Il s'agit d'un débat qui est intéressant, même si personnellement nous ne le prenons pas trop au sérieux parce que la présence ou l'absence de lois du type de celles que l'on retrouve en physique ne nous semble pas nécessaire à la scientificité.

Hull, en dernière analyse, défend une caractérisation disjonctive de l'espèce qui a quatre composantes. Kitcher défend un réalisme pluraliste selon lequel les divers buts poursuivis par les biologistes les amènent à distinguer de différentes manières les groupes d'êtres vivants ce qui a pour conséquence qu'aucune de ces classifications n'est meilleure en soi. Il suggère que l'on reconnaisse la légitimité de cette pluralité de découpages qui, par ailleurs, ne posera pas plus de problèmes que n'en pose la multiplicité des concepts de gène. Ghiselin n'est pas d'accord avec ce dernier point, les caractéristiques d'«espèce» et de «gène» étant, d'après lui, trop dissemblables. En filigrane demeure le sentiment qu'une caractérisation disjonctive ou polysémique peut se tolérer sur le plan théorique parce qu'elle ne pose pas réellement de problèmes une fois que les choses ont été tirées

au clair mais qu'en taxinomie une telle façon de procéder demeure problématique.

Les textes introductifs de Ereshefsky aux deux parties de l'ouvrage sont bien conçus mais s'adressent, ce qui est normal, à un lecteur qui s'y connaît déjà en philosophie de la biologie. Malgré son caractère inévitablement hétérogène, l'ouvrage sera utile parce qu'il reprend plusieurs des articles dont la lecture est essentielle pour ceux qui s'intéressent à la nature des espèces.

Pierre Blackburn

Cégep de Sherbrooke

Joel Feinberg, ed.

Reason & Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy.

Eighth Edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth

1993. Pp. xiv + 607.

(ISBN 0-534-19722-1).

Like its predecessors, this eighth edition of *Reason & Responsibility* is aimed at the beginning student of philosophy. Though drawn from various historical periods, its sixty-eight texts were selected to fit under one of five specific headings: 'Reason and Religious Belief', 'Human Knowledge: Its Grounds and Limits', 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'Determinism, Free Will, and Responsibility', and 'Self-Love and the Claims of Morality'. Each of the headings is prefaced by Feinberg with a brief editorial overview outlining the contested terrain and its central themes.

This latest version of *Reason & Responsibility* contains fifteen new selections the most notable of which are Susan Okin's 'Justice and Gender' and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s 'Letter from Birmingham Jail'. And while seven of the texts were written expressly for the anthology, most of the remaining selections hold no surprises (Descartes' *Meditations* and Berkeley's *Dialogues*, which are reproduced *in toto*, substantial excerpts from Plato's *Republic*, Hume's *Dialogues and Inquiry*, and Mill's *Utilitarianism*, as well as the predictable appearance of such major figures in the philosophical tradition as Aristotle, Kant, Aquinas, Locke, Peirce, Ayer, and Sartre among others).

Feinberg explains the pedagogical rationale behind his selection of articles and the overall structure of the anthology on the grounds that 'introducing the modern college student to philosophy by means of a few

representative problems examined in great detail is far preferable to offering a "little bit of everything", with each "branch" of philosophy, each major "ism", and each major historical period represented with scrupulous impartiality ...' (xi). Granted, such an impartiality may be less than desirable; one might even argue that it is in fact impossible to achieve. My quarrel with Feinberg is not his partiality *per se* or the 'incompleteness' of his selection. Covering the entire twenty five hundred year history of western philosophy and the problems it has tried to grapple with is an endeavour whose magnitude would necessitate a reading list stretching over a study period far exceeding the one year limit typically allotted to the introductory course in philosophy.

But while Feinberg is quick to decry, and rightly so, the unproductive and superficial effects of what could only be characterised as 'fast food philosophy', it seems to me that the anthology is a typical example of that familiar scenario where the devil is thrown out the front window only to be snuck in later through the back door. Ultimately, *Reason & Responsibility* substitutes similar anthologies' general tendency to include as many excerpts from so-called canonical texts as possible with its editor's desire to expose students to *as many* of his own favourite philosophers discussing his own favourite themes *as he possibly can*. In fact, quantity is such a concern for Feinberg that he finds it noteworthy that this latest edition 'has been improved by the addition of fifteen new selections and the modification of some others so as not to increase the net bulk of the book' (xi)! The overall effect here is thus still the same: depth and quality are sacrificed for the sake of breadth and quantity as the student is bombarded with an inordinately large number of brief excerpts — which, aside from the six major selections, average only seven pages in length each — and inadequately expressed or defended points of view.

A successful introduction to the study and practice of philosophy must involve an unhurried and critical encounter with a limited set of texts and ideas. With the help of the instructor, such an encounter should assist the students in developing and sharpening their analytic techniques, in other words, their ability to read a text, identify its claims and arguments, and articulate their positions with respect to its assumptions and implications. Unfortunately, Feinberg's style of exposing his students to an 'argumentative give-and-take' (xi) can only achieve the pedagogically unsound effect of transforming the classroom into a wrestling arena where philosophers X and Y fight it out over the ontological proof with students merely cheering in the background for their favourite hero!

Of course, Feinberg is very much aware of this type of criticism which he preempts with the suggestion that the book could be used to teach an introductory course based on a solid reading of the six major selections with the more recent articles 'thrown in as a kind of dividend' (x). One cannot help but wonder as to whose 'dividend' it is when any competent instructor can fill in the gaps in a course based on a reading list comprised solely of the

complete text of the six classics in question to which students would have a much cheaper access!

Last but not least, I would like to offer a final comment on the anthology's table of contents and a suggestion to Feinberg for the inevitable ninth edition. A successful introduction to philosophy would not only encourage students to pursue a study of the field in greater depth but would also instill in them critical thinking habits which would benefit their intellectual pursuits beyond this particular course. The latter could perhaps be successfully achieved through a reading list which would address more accurately and concretely these students' interests and the contemporary problems and concerns they have to deal with. A table of contents with sixteen selections spanning one hundred and eleven pages on reason and religious belief juxtaposed with a lone thirteen page entry on gender and an equally solitary eight page article on race hardly reflects the students' social and political realities and comes dangerously close to tokenism. Also, and in the same vein, *Reason & Responsibility's* lack in terms of a discussion of any of the major themes in the epistemology and politics of science (or technology) and art (or cultural production in general) only reinforces the popular misconception that philosophy as a discipline is a restricted domain with hardly anything to offer the non-specialist.

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A. Philips Griffiths, ed.

A.J. Ayer: Memorial Essays.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.

Pp. v + 239.

US \$19.95 (ISBN 0-521-422469).

This book is based on the 1990-1 Royal Institute of Philosophy lecture series. These lectures were dedicated to the memory of A.J. Ayer who died in 1989.

Some of the essays are designed to indicate Ayer's place in the social and intellectual milieu to which he belonged. Richard Wollheim, who was a former colleague of Ayer, reminisces about Ayer as a person and as a teacher. Anthony Quinton, who knew Ayer in Oxford, attempts to locate his place in the history of philosophy. In doing so Quinton does an excellent job of tracking down the main doctrines of *Language Truth and Logic* to their various sources.

Other essays are devoted to examining these doctrines. D.M. Mackinnon, F. Copleston and S.R. Sutherland still feel the sting of Ayer's attack on metaphysics and religion and feel obliged to rally to their defence. F. Copleston argues that if metaphysical theories are considered as world views rather than as sets of factual statements then the urge to consider them as meaningless will be diminished. S.R. Sutherland makes an interesting comparison between the Verification Principle and the language of Newspeak that appears in Orwell's 1984. He argues just as Newspeak makes certain thoughts impossible so does the ruthless application of the Verification Principle. Ted Honderich conducts a detailed examination of the Phenomenalism of *Language Truth and Logic* and the Constructivism that replaced it, in Ayer's letter work *The Central Questions of Philosophy*.

Another doctrine that gets an airing is the Emotive Theory of Ethics. David Wiggins suggests that in light of Ayer's latter writings Ayer could have adopted a form of subjectivism along Humean lines.

Bernard Williams deals with the question of whether it is possible for someone who subscribes to the Emotive Theory to rationally justify what he takes to be moral action. This question is pertinent, since Ayer was committed to a number of causes such as Humanism and the Labour Movement and believed that he was justified in being committed.

Not all the essays are devoted to examining the various tenets of Ayer's philosophy. Some branch out and discuss topics they think Ayer would have found interesting. Hilary Putnam discusses intentionality in perception while Donald Davidson discusses the problems that are involved in what he takes to be three main kinds of knowledge — knowledge of the contents of one's own mind, knowledge of the external world and knowledge of other minds. Rather surprisingly he winds up holding a position somewhat akin to the latter Wittgenstein. Each kind of knowledge, according to Davidson, is essential for the other two.

Although the essayists all have different things to say about Ayer there seems to be a general agreement that his best work was his first work — *Language Truth and Logic*. Although Ayer tried for the rest of his life to write a better book he never really succeeded. There is also general agreement that what makes *Language Truth and Logic* great is not its originality. Ayer derived all the major doctrines from other sources. What makes it a great book is that Ayer managed to weave all of them together into a seamless whole and to present it with dazzling lucidity.

Almost in the spirit of book-ends the book is bracketed at the beginning with a paper Ayer had intended to deliver to the World Congress of Philosophy in Brighton in 1988 and at the end with a penetrating interview with Ayer conducted by Ted Honderich. This is a book Ayer aficionados will not want to be without.

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Charles B. Guignon, ed.

The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger.

Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1993. Pp. xx + 389.

US \$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-38570-9);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-38597-0).

The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger is a welcome addition both to the *Cambridge Companion* series, and to the burgeoning Heidegger literature being written in the English-speaking world. It joins the *Critical Reader* of 1992 (Basil Blackwell), edited by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall, in the attempt to bring the philosophy of Martin Heidegger into the mainstream of contemporary Anglo-American discourse.

Charles Guignon has collected thirteen papers and has contributed an introduction, covering a wide variety of topics and offering a number of suggestive ways of reading Heidegger. Given the difficulty of the source texts, Guignon's contributors admirably refrain (for the most part) from rendering Heidegger's thought as hermetic and inaccessible to non-initiates. While few of the articles stand out as ground-breaking or especially original, this is not necessarily a fault; the aim of Guignon and Cambridge University Press seems to be to present difficult, disputed, but influential philosophy in a manner which is readily accessible to a general readership. The end result is akin to a philosophical *tapas* bar, serving up the daunting body of Heidegger's work in small, easily digestible portions.

Guignon provides a rough organizational schema for the *Companion* in his introduction: the first three essays 'provide an overview of Heidegger's life-work', followed by four essays focussing 'primarily on themes developed in *Being and Time*', then four topical essays concerning 'such areas of enquiry as psychotherapy, ecology, aesthetics, politics, and theology'. The concluding two essays by Charles Taylor and Richard Rorty 'present two different assessments of Heidegger's philosophical contribution' (3). *Being and Time* provides the lodestone for the majority of papers, perhaps because that book proves more accessible and appropriable to contemporary Anglo-American concerns. In general, this collection of essayists is uncomfortable with Heidegger's later, post-metaphysical thought, often complaining of its obscurity while resorting to blunt paraphrase of its central themes (*Ereignis*, the fourfold, the history of being, poetic saying) without very much informative explanation.

The four essays devoted specifically to *Being and Time* accomplish the task of providing a succinct, lucid overview of the work, covering the key topics of worldhood, the 'hermeneutic circle', temporality, Being-towards-death, and historicity. Robert J. Dostal's paper on 'Time and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger' and David Couzens Hoy's essay on hermeneutics are especially helpful for understanding these key themes.

The general preference among the contributors for *Being and Time* over later Heidegger texts becomes explicit in Rorty's essay ('Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Reification of Language', excerpted from Rorty's *Essays*

on Heidegger and Others). Rorty favours the early 'pragmatist' Heidegger over the later mytho-poetic Heidegger, whose 'reification of language' (352) amounts to 'a failure of nerve' (350), a failure which Rorty contrasts with the superiority of the later Wittgenstein over the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein. Rorty is congenial towards the contextual, holistic account of human involvement and social practices in the phenomenology of *Zuhandenheit* or readiness-to-hand contained in the first Division of *Being and Time*, while reproaching Heidegger for adopting an extra-historical vantage point in his later investigations of the history of philosophy, and for his tendencies to treat language as a supra-social 'house of Being'. While less tendentious than Rorty, Charles Taylor also emphasizes the importance of Heidegger's holism and pragmatism in 'Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger'. Taylor argues that Heidegger's account of being-in-the-world as contextual and non-atomistic offers a serious alternative to the dominant traditional models of rationality and cognition which support contemporary information-processing or computational models of mind.

The later Heidegger receives some attention courtesy of Michael Zimmerman, Hubert L. Dreyfus, and Frederick Olafson. Zimmerman argues that Heidegger's treatment of nothingness in *Being and Time*, carried over into later thinking concerning *Gelassenheit* (releasement) and the fourfold, are related to Mahayana Buddhist conceptions of self and cosmos. Dreyfus writes on the connections between nihilism, art, technology, and politics, providing a careful and nimble reading of 'The Question Concerning Technology', showing how for Heidegger, art could be a 'saving power', offering us a more meaningful alternative to the calculative-instrumentalist *ethos* of technologically 'enframed' modern humanity. But his account goes off track when he tries to draw a connection between Heideggerian *Ereignis* or 'event of appropriation' and the Woodstock music festival, a contentious, if not risible comparison.

Frederick Olafson's contribution, 'The Unity of Heidegger's Thought', provides an overview of Heidegger's entire career, arguing that the discontinuity between early and late Heidegger, conventionally referred to as the 'turn' by some Heidegger scholars, is exaggerated; he claims that Heidegger's sole preoccupation was with the meaning of being as presence, and thus there is a unity to his thought. But he does acknowledge a 'profound and fateful shift' (109) in Heidegger's thought, which he describes as 'the shift from existence as the ground of presence to presence as the ground of existence' (114). Olafson's choice of terminology here is problematic, and can be misleading, in that his characterization subdues the extent to which Heidegger's overarching concern is with a critique of a metaphysics of presence, coterminous with what Dorothea Frede identifies as a critique of traditional (Aristotelian) substance ontology in her preliminary overview, 'The Question of Being: Heidegger's Project'. At a very basic level, Heidegger rejects the privileging of presence over absence and the privileging of static, perduring *hypokeimenon* over transient, accidental appearances. The stress for Heidegger is always on presence as presencing, which comes to pass in tandem with

the absencing of concealment and withdrawal (a point which Zimmerman rightly makes [243]). In short, the matter concerns *aletheia*, truth considered as the double structure of concealment and unconcealment. None of the essayists take up the crucial question of truth in the development of Heidegger's thought at any length, which is a serious lack in the collection.

The weakest pieces in the collection are the ones fixated upon Heidegger's biography. There is currently a surfeit of publications concerning Heidegger's life and politics, and neither Thomas Sheehan ('Reading a Life: Heidegger and Hard Times') nor John Caputo ('Heidegger and Theology') shed much light on the connection between Heidegger's philosophy and life. Sheehan's haphazardly constructed article, largely gleaned from Hugo Ott's *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, charts three stages of Heidegger's life's way: Heidegger as reactionary Catholic intellectual, railing against Modernism; Heidegger as radical phenomenologist, critic of his mentor Husserl, and proponent of social and philosophical rejuvenation; and Heidegger as anti-Semitic scoundrel, lamenting the 'jewification' [*Verjudung*] of German intellectual life. Sheehan's style jarringly oscillates between chatty tabloid-style reportage (calling his first Freiburg lecture course 'pretty gutsy stuff' [78]) and recondite mystification through perfunctory checklist summaries of Heidegger's thought, reaching a stylistic nadir in this sentence: 'Heidegger calls the "origin" of disclosure *das Er-eignis*, which we can translate as "em-propriation": the event that brings disclosive comportment and disclosable entities together into their asymptotic "own" (*proprius, eigen*), that is, into the openness of disclosure' (90).

Caputo's paper, 'Heidegger and Theology', also draws heavily on Ott's biography, in claiming that Heidegger's changing relationship towards religion underlies the philosophical shifts in his career, a thesis which oversimplifies the complexity of influences on the development of Heidegger's thought.

Aside from the shortcomings of the biographical pieces, the selection of topics could be called into question. Notably lacking is any study of the importance of ancient Greek philosophy for Heidegger. In an otherwise extensive bibliography, Guignon fails to mention the important paper on the concept of *physis* in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, though the study of Plato ('Plato's Doctrine of Truth') is mentioned. There is also one serious editorial lapse to note: the jacket description promises 'an in-depth study of what has been called Heidegger's second greatest work, the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*'. No such in-depth study is included. Scant mention is made of the lengthy *Contributions to Philosophy* (subtitled *Vom Ereignis*, and only published in the last decade), which Heidegger composed in the late 1930s, simultaneous to his Nietzsche lecture courses. Otherwise, Heidegger's legacy is well-treated by this new collection, which should prove helpful in the dissemination of his thought in the English speaking world.

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Christina Howells, ed.

The Cambridge Companion to Sartre.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1992.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-38114-2);

US \$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-38812-0).

As the title indicates, this is the volume in Cambridge University Press's new series of companion volumes devoted to the thought of Jean-Paul Sartre. It consists of nine essays, an editor's introduction and conclusion, and an appendix by Pierre Verstraten, which could have been an essay, devoted to the topic of Sartre and Hegel. The essays are arranged in terms of the following headings: Phenomenology and Existentialism; Psychology and Ethics; and History and Structure. There is also a chronological biography and a ten page bibliography, consisting of a listing of translations of Sartre's works into English, books dealing with Sartre, journal issues devoted to Sartre, a few articles and a few relevant 'other works'.

The authors of the contributions are all well-known Sartre scholars, including Hazel Barnes, Ronald Aronson, Peter Caws, and Thomas R. Flynn among others. It is not exactly clear what Cambridge means by a companion volume since there is no series introduction included, but the dust jacket does indicate that the volumes in this series are meant to serve as 'a reference work for students and nonspecialists' where 'one aim of the series is to dispel the intimidation such readers often feel when faced with the work of a difficult and challenging thinker'. One good point is that all of the essays included were specially commissioned for this volume, none are reprints available elsewhere, although it must also be said that some are more successful than others; in particular where the author does not presuppose an acquaintance with Sartre's immense *oeuvre* but rather leads the reader by the hand, so to speak, with enough information that said reader can grasp the overall development and mutual fit of Sartre's many works with one another. On the other hand, none of the essays is presented as an introduction to Sartre's thought, so it is not clear that the intimidation factor is completely eliminated, but those with some commitment to making sense of Sartre should find everything in this volume comprehensible. The themes considered run from the obvious, e.g. Sartre's ontology, to the new and innovative — for example, Flynn on Sartre and the poetics of history, or Aronson on Sartre and progress.

In the end, editor Howells attempts to pull everything together and perhaps relate Sartre to more contemporary discussions in her conclusion on Sartre and the deconstruction of the subject, where she suggests that Sartre's critique of the transcendental ego and the monadic subject is in fact not far removed from more contemporary discussions, usually associated with those called deconstructionists. A larger point might be that there is more continuity to twentieth century French philosophy than the combative style of many of its practitioners and their love for the avant garde might lead one to believe.

In sum, I don't think this is a volume one could read without some prior, not just concurrent, acquaintance with Sartre; nor am I sure one would start here

and then feel compelled to read Sartre, at least not all of Sartre, but for those with some interest in his thought already, the book is well worth dipping into where the essays address topics of interest — and those with a deeper interest in Sartre will want to read it from cover to cover. It certainly is a volume that belongs in every library collection, both graduate and undergraduate.

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Paul Oskar Kristeller

Greek Philosophers of the Hellenistic Age.

Columbia University Press 1993. Pp. xiv + 157

US \$35.00 (ISBN 0-231-07952-4).

Styles change, even scholarly styles. Professor Kristeller's series of lectures (first delivered in 1989 at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa) falls into a style I might call 'intimate'. The work relies on the intimacy of long years of familiarity with his subject, with his colleagues and with his students, many of whom, doubtless, will instantly recognise the targets of his frequently barbed, often gratuitous and unargued observations on contemporary scholarship and philosophical culture. But the work suffers seriously from this presumption of intimacy. It has not travelled well from the lecture theatre to the printed page.

Professor Kristeller provides a guided tour, chronologically arranged, through the doctrines associated with the key Greek philosophers and philosophical movements which followed Aristotle, starting with Epicurus in the 3rd BCE and ending with Antiochus of Ascalon in 1st CE. But the agenda for the tour is mixed, and consequently we are shown less than we could expect or hope from such an experienced tour guide. Kristeller himself feels the tension. Toward the end he writes:

A series of eight lectures would hardly be able to give an even summary picture of all ancient philosophy after Aristotle — that is, from the followers of Plato and Aristotle down to Plotinus or to Proclus and St. Augustine. Only an ambitious undertaking ... would make it possible to show the vast treasure of concepts and ideas, of knowledge and theories that late Antiquity transmitted to medieval and modern thought and that could serve even contemporary and future thought, were it not for the obstinate tendency — partly due to dogmatic and ideological presuppositions, and partly due to total ignorance and to a refusal to learn what one does not yet know — to reduce our whole intellectual heritage to the religious tradition called Judeo-Christian, and perhaps also to Aristotelian philosophy. (p. 153)

Our failure to secure and maintain access to Ancient thought is a central preoccupation of the book. It is an urgent concern for philosophy and history as figures like Heidegger and Collingwood have shown. It is a crucial problem in this post- (or is it 'pre-') Modern period. But the complex theoretical and practical problems of historical knowledge and 'influence' (p. 64, and a somewhat more focused musing on p. 79) are, unfortunately, not explored directly in Kristeller's lectures. Instead we have been given a distinguished Scholar's disillusioned recriminations. Professor Kristeller's account loses, thereby, the illuminating precision one might hope would produce a synoptic portrait of this stratum of our culture.

It is a shame. Columbia University Press' editorial staff should surely have been more effective. We need tools to recover the treasures Kristeller hints at. We also need to face squarely the root causes of the growing ignorance of the Hellenistic Philosophers and their value to us. Kristeller is right on both counts. Other works like Armstrong's 1949 *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy* and Owens' 1959 *A History of Ancient Western Philosophy* continue to provide the best overviews of the terrain, but as parts of larger maps, so that the spotlight is not as focused as we need it to be on the Hellenistic period itself.

Style is style, and it counts for a lot, however. Kristeller's polemical challenge is timely. It will have been valuable if it sparks interest among those who will take seriously his valid claim that there is rich contemporary treasure to be found among the Hellenistic thinkers. Kristeller is right. We need urgently to design and maintain efficient tools for recovering and properly exploiting that treasure.

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Joseph Mali

The Rehabilitation of Myth: Vico's New Science.

Cambridge University Press 1992.

Pp. xv + 275.

US \$59.95 (ISBN 0-521-41952-2).

While one might not guess it from the title, this book should be of interest to a fairly broad spectrum of philosophical scholars, including many who would privately insist they don't give a tinker's dam about Vico (or about myth either, for that matter). The book's more general pertinence deserves emphasizing, presuming as I do that Vico is apt to be — at best — a peripheral figure in most English-speaking philosophy departments, having some place in 'philosophy of history', say, and referred to admiringly only by the likes of

Isaiah Berlin and R.G. Collingwood. But in his effort to interpret and assess Vico's accomplishment, Mali offers extensive and quite useful discussions of the history and philosophy of science and social science, of political theory, of poetry, of linguistics and linguistic philosophy, of history and historiography, as well as of the various standard treatments of myth. Thus, most people sharing a scholarly interest in these fields would find the book a profitable read, and may incidentally discover that they're more interested in Vico than they realized.

The book's title is borrowed from an essay by Jean-Pierre Vernant, 'Reason in Myth', which argues that a truly scientific appreciation of the significance of myths requires a radical revision in the view that (he contends) has pervaded the Western intellectual tradition since antiquity: that myths are simply fictitious and irrational. Whereas, more intelligently interpreted, myths can be profoundly revealing, about both man's nature and his past. The growing acceptance of this view in modern times has led to what Vernant terms 'the rehabilitation of myth' — the recognition that far from being absurd, myths manifest a different 'form of intelligence', one that poses a peculiar challenge to the capacity of 'scientific intelligence' to understand. It is Mali's contention that 'this *rehabilitation of myth* was first conceived by Giambattista Vico', and moreover that he thereby 'initiated a seminal process of revisionism in various spheres of knowledge', culminating in a '*New Science of humanity*' with a grounding very different from that of modern natural science (2, 3). The bulk of Mali's interpretive effort is given over to a detailed spelling out of the four main dimensions of Vico's revisionary work: his revision of the conception of science; of civilization (i.e., of the origin of political life, and of the understanding of human nature on which it is based); of mythology; and of history. A longish (50-75 page) chapter is devoted to each of these 'revisions', with Mali first sketching the antecedent view (e.g., Newtonian and Cartesian views of science; Hobbesian-Lockean views of man and the state; Platonic and Baconian views of myth), and then showing how and why Vico undertook to revise them. And while the subjects they treat are naturally sequential, my impression is that the individual chapters are fairly intelligible on their own. Along the way, Mali shows how Vico anticipates many of the views we associate with names more familiar today (e.g., Freud, 82; Wittgenstein, 4; Levi-Strauss, 184; Kuhn, 18) as well as advances criticisms of Newtonian, Cartesian, and positivistic science that have since come to be widely accepted.

Lest all this be misunderstood, however, I should make clear that Mali is not claiming any new *historical* importance for Vico. Indeed, all three versions of the *New Science* (1728, 1730, 1744) were largely ignored in his own lifetime, and it was only in the 19th Century — awash in Romantic notions about history and mythology — that Vico began to attract much serious attention (Goethe was an early admirer, as were Michelet and Coleridge). His stock slowly rose, especially upon gaining the advocacy of Croce and later Collingwood, and his influence spread beyond scholarly circles (the poetry of Yeats and the major novels of Joyce are probably the

most notable examples; Mali includes a few brief but provocative observations about Joyce, whose interpretation of Vico he endorses, 269-71). Incidentally, anyone interested in a fuller treatment of Vico's gradual emergence from obscurity will find that Max Fisch's and Thomas Bergin's extended Introduction to Vico's *Autobiography* (Cornell University Press, 1944) is still the best account readily available.

So, despite Vico's low visibility in North American philosophy departments, Vichian studies is, and has been for some years, a thriving academic industry. Italian scholars, of course, figure prominently, but Vico has achieved a kind of cosmopolitan following — and not only among academic philosophers, but among historians, anthropologists, linguists, sociologists of religion, etc. Mali shows himself to be well-acquainted with the relevant literature, not only the studies directly addressing Vico's work, but also much of the important scholarship in the fields to which Vico's work applies. But since Vico's writings, and the *New Science* in particular, have hardly been the victims of scholarly neglect, the question naturally arises: what special purpose or merit does Mali claim for his own study? He contends that an understanding of myth as "true narration" is the single most important notion in Vico's entire *New Science*, and accordingly he endeavors 'to elaborate the full meaning and implications of [this] singular notion' (2, 3) — and to do so, moreover, using to interpret Vico's book the same 'poetic characters' and 'poetic logic' that Vico himself used to interpret the human world (which Vico regarded as made up of institutions based on language, calling for a science more akin to the interpretation of poetic texts than to mathematical physics). But I must add that Mali's promise of a distinctly Vichian interpretation of Vico does not seem to me to have been redeemed. That is, I doubt he has really cracked Vico's code. True, he at times expressly imitates Vico (e.g., 132), even to the point of finding symbolic significance in the squabble between the priests and the scholars that disrupted Vico's funeral (267). And Mali appreciates that most readers find Vico's style utterly 'baffling' (8); he is aware that in Vico's case, literary form and style are not merely decorative but somehow expressive of his purpose (9), and that it is sometimes his purpose to be ambiguous (76); that Vico criticized views on moral and political as well as epistemological grounds (48-9); that Vico wrote in a time when heterodoxical views were subject to persecution (35); and that Vico was, after all, a professor of *rhetoric*. But still, he takes everything Vico says, including his professions of orthodoxy, pretty much at face value (38, 75), and struggles mightily to resolve the resulting contradictions (with mixed success).

Mali speaks of Vico's work as a 'deconstruction of rational modern theories of mind, man, and society' (14, my emphasis), and Mali may in fact have derived some inspiration from this latest wave of French sophistry. But — mercifully — his analysis does not overtly rely on Foucault or Derrida or Lacan (the book contains but one flattering reference to Foucault; 27). Instead, Mali seems much more beholden to Peter Winch, and sees the latter's 'Understanding a Primitive Society' to be very much of a piece with Vico's view (cf. 56-60). Thus, according to Mali, Vico (like Winch), 'allowed

for as many kinds of reason as there are nations to develop and hold to them' (52). Pray tell, then, which kind did he use himself (one wants to ask), and how does his theory fare among the other kinds? I have several more limited criticisms of this book (e.g., I think Mali completely misunderstands Plato's treatment of myth, 153-60), but this would be my most general reservation about it: that Mali views Vico too much through Winchian eyes. Those who believe that Winch's epistemological position is coherent and profound may not be disturbed by this. But I don't, so I am. Still, I found it an interesting, informative, and thoughtful book.

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Peter McCormick
Modernity, Aesthetics, and the Bounds of Art.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990.
Pp. xiii + 349.
US \$46.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2452-6);
US \$15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9740-x).

John Rajchman
Philosophical Events: Essays of the '80s.
New York: Columbia University Press 1991.
Pp. x + 169.
US \$33.50 (ISBN 0-231-07210-4).

In ways not immediately evident, these books make a tentative fold in the contemporary debate about the future direction of philosophy, generally, and the bearing on that track of the specialization in philosophy called aesthetics. The debate in question, about the relative convergence of analytic and hermeneutic approaches to philosophy, commonly involves, if only because of an unnegotiated consensus about the value of aesthetics for these otherwise opposed views, some commentary on the production and appreciation of art or some agreeable aestheticization of erstwhile metaphysical, epistemological, or political themes. As we shall see, the texts reviewed here so position themselves in this debate. Readers trained in the analytic tradition may find the philosophical terrain or themes fastened on by these writers one-sidedly hermeneutic. Still, a fair attempt is made by both McCormick and Rajchman to genuinely expand their generally continentalist views to incorporate the concerns and contributions of Anglo-American authors to

their readings of the philosophical tradition since Kant. Overall, both books are very clearly written and free from obscurantist jargon.

Peter McCormick describes the purpose of his work as exploring 'in a philosophical and historical way the intellectual background' bridging contemporary Anglo-American and Continental 'understanding[s] of the relations between philosophy and the arts' (xi). He draws a delicate, storied line from the divergent analytic and hermeneutic philosophies of art and aesthetic experience back to what he believes is their root disagreement, the interpretation of eighteenth century aesthetics, and especially Kant. Beginning with an appraisal of the relations between interpretation, history, theory, and truth in the representative figures of Arthur Danto and Hans-Georg Gadamer, he argues that the differences separating these thinkers in particular owes its origins to the disagreement between the Anglo-American and European schools generally over whether Kant's philosophical synthesis marked a *terminus ad quem* or a *terminus a quo* to re-evaluate the accomplishments of philosophy from Hegel onwards. Following this introduction, the bulk of the book attempts to trace an alternative line forward from an obscure, bi-partisan critique of Kant which defines what McCormick calls the 'realist tradition' in aesthetics, the line connecting the aesthetics in Dilthey, Brentano, Husserl, Twardowski, Meinong, and Ingarden.

But, first, McCormick tries, in what he calls an 'Interlude', to suggest that the conflict between the anglo- and euro-centric readings of Kant is present within the analytic tradition of aesthetics itself. Referring to the debate between Stolnitz and Dickie, capsuled as a disagreement over the relative weight of disinterestedness in distinguishing aesthetic attitudes from taste, McCormick figures Dickie's attribution of the origins of aesthetic attitude theory to nineteenth century German thinkers as illustrating a profound split from analytic allegiances to the eighteenth century British aesthetics of taste. He divides Stolnitz, Saxena, and Margolis against Dickie, Kivy, and Fischer to suggest that this split is significant not incidental. And he hopes to argue that the differences separating Stolnitz from Dickie can be resolved by the same alternate development from the Kantian project in aesthetics that he calls the 'realist tradition', which has its origins, again, in a heretofore unnoticed reading of Kant, that provided the nineteenth century critic Bernard Bolzano.

The discussion of Bolzano, best known in Germany, and as a logician, mathematician, and philosopher of science, is remarkably brief for the work McCormick has set out for it, work made all the more difficult by the avowed obscurity of Bolzano's work on aesthetics and criticisms of Kant. From *Über den Begriff des Schönen: Eine Philosophische Abhandlung* (Prague 1843), McCormick summarizes Bolzano's main objections to Kant's 'definition' of the beautiful as: depending on 'unusual and merely stipulated' senses of key words, 'too broadly construed' and unable to counter the example of persons whose pleasure results from strictly conceptual acquaintance with an object, as substantively and verbally contradictory, and as indicating by 'Kant's peculiar use of the word "feeling" ... that he is not talking about feeling at all

but is dealing with a kind of knowing' (127-30). In these objections, McCormick means to show 'an extraordinarily persistent concern for conceptual clarity, argumentative thoroughness, and systematic development, which has often been claimed by analytic philosophers' (143).

McCormick culls Bolzano's own view from the even more obscure glossary reference (in 'Bolzano's Begriff 1821') to Bolzano's unpublished notes from 1818. 'The beautiful object is one whose purposefulness is of such a nature that it can be recognized even confusedly. This purposefulness is objective. It is related to just what we think of as what brings to the fore the same thoughts that possess this purposefulness.... but purposefulness must not be too deeply hidden because otherwise it would only be recognizable through a strenuous reflection which would result in clear judgements' (Glossary 76). Here, McCormick believes Bolzano echoes the 'reliance on a dark doctrine of intuition, apprehension, judgement, and finally consciousness', reverberating through much of hermeneutic philosophy (143). Together with the criticisms cited above, McCormick believes Bolzano mounts a response to Kant that 'avoids the progressive reading of Kantian aesthetics as the culmination of eighteenth century thinking and the regressive reading of Kantian aesthetics from a later Hegelian perspective as a strongly cognitive program that must be overcome' (157).

Before he is finished, McCormick will name Putnam and Habermas as respective heirs to these two, tortured lines of thought and judge contributions of the former as too narrow and unself-conscious while deciding the critical theory of the latter makes unredeemable pretensions to generalizability. The overall value of McCormick's book is to make clear the contributions of several marginal figures in the tradition of aesthetics and to redraw the divisions of modern philosophy within the bounds of the philosophy of art.

John Rajchman writes essays on architecture, Duchamp, the museum, modernism, postmodernism, 'voyeurism', and critical theory to redescribe the events transacted in the neopragmatic, poststructuralist, communications-theoretical divide McCormick's text tries to span. Rather than show how these otherwise diverse responses of philosophy to forms of social action including art are or ought to be brought together under one rubric, Rajchman is ready to entertain the differences and glean from their varied contributions what best serves the particular issues before him. Rajchman's book and the view articulated in it are admittedly and significantly influenced by the writings of Michel Foucault and the interpretation of Foucault developed in Rajchman's *Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). But, for just that reason, they are diverse, multiple, and complex.

Philosophical Events is a collection of essays contributed to journals or presented for symposia from 1985 to 1990. Many of the journals include venues not regularly visited by philosophers: *October*, *New German Critique*, *Flash Art International*, and *Art in America*. Assembling these texts between hard covers, then, conveniences readers with correspondingly eclectic tastes

in philosophy and art as well as scholars interested in exploring the range of Rajchman's views. More importantly, and perhaps exclusively, this text avails readers of a philosophical statement about *events* and the philosophy of the *event*. Building from what he had called an 'historical nominalism' in Foucault, Rajchman develops a sustained 'reflection on what an *event* is' (viii) linking these several essays, all of them philosophical *events* on their own merit, in what comprises an 'event series' of Rajchman's thought.

The thrust of Rajchman's take on the issues confronting contemporary philosophers is given in the opening essay, 'Translation Without a Master', where Rajchman pits Foucault's inventive critical theories against the utopianism of Rorty and the communicative rationality of Habermas. But the key *events* in this series of essays are those titled 'Habermas' Complaint', 'Foucault's Art of Seeing', and 'What's New in Architecture?' In the first, Rajchman locates the unstated grievance at the heart of Habermas' *Philosophical Discourses on Modernity* in a fear of the anti-democratic irrationalism of Nazi fascism and 'a sense of vast intellectual failure we might have spared ourselves had we looked for the timeless presuppositions and aspirations of rational consensus, and derived from them a "grounding" of the wordy version of solidarity Rorty thinks is identical to what Americans call "liberalism"' (29). He argues that Habermas' critique fails because it construes modernity as an *acquisition* to be defended rather than as an *event* opening onto new possibilities of social and subject formation.

In 'Foucault's Art of Seeing', Rajchman elaborates on Deleuze's nomination of Foucault as a philosophical seer or '*voyant*', the 'art of exposing the unseen *évidences* that make the things we do acceptable or tolerable to us' (73). The spatiality of Foucault's thought is, thus, given a visible dimension, 'since what is seeable is part of what "structures thought in advance"' (71). Finally, in 'What's New in Architecture?', Rajchman sketches the philosophy of the *event* in Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze. 'The emergence or the arrival of a disparate multiplicity — that is roughly what Derrida understands as an *event*' (155). Derrida comprehends the invention in the *event*, 'the unforeseen chance or possibility in a history of another history' (156). With respect to architecture, then, an *event* opens the uninhabitable to habitation, *Heimlichkeit*, in impossible ways, ways that do not leave us the same.

That view is advanced by Rajchman by consideration of Gilles Deleuze's distinction between the possible and the virtual, the former construed as 'the concept of something which might exist but does not', the latter as 'a reality of which we do not yet possess the concept' (160). A 'virtual multiplicity' or disparate set of what we can not yet conceptualize is, thus, more interesting, more active than the merely possible since it can be actualized by a creative process of differentiation that poses the concept of the multiplicity. This creative actualization is what Deleuze calls an *event*. The *event*, so called, sets in a series what can not be conceived when and where we live. It gives the *event* a history and a singularity from which Foucault has said we can 'separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the

possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think ... the undefined work of freedom' ('What is Enlightenment?' 14).

For Foucault, the event is the occasion for becoming other than we are, not becoming *like* a form we do not presently possess, but of becoming what we do not yet know how to conceive, of positing ourselves in a virtual series of actualities. The *event* is the possibility of this becoming-other which must be diagnosed in all the 'archi-tectural' spaces we inhabit. In the space Rajchman's essay inhabit, between the hard covers of a book, his texts establish a series of prior actualities which the reader has the chance to creatively actualize as several conceivable events. Rajchman's book, itself, creatively doubles the logic of a complex philosophical concept it successively and successfully expounds over the course of several different and interesting diagnoses of the disposition or *dispositif* of contemporary philosophy and art.

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John McCumber

The Company of Words: Hegel, Language and Systematic Philosophy.

Evanston: Northwestern University Press 1993.

Pp. xx + 442.

US \$59.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8101-1055-5);

US \$22.50 (paper: ISBN 0-8101-1082-2).

For McCumber, Hegel's system is primarily about words. On the one hand words are generated out of a complex of previously defined words. On the other hand, words used historically are refined so that they lose personal and cultural idiosyncrasies and come to match their systematic homophones. Since the word that names the most complete set of 'markers' is in principle no different from the word that is most indeterminate, the set of systematic terms forms a complete circle.

Yet this does not mean that Hegel's system is closed to revision. 'Revisions are not only possible but continual: an adequate vocabulary is something that the philosopher, no matter what her culture and even in her early years, must help create as well as passively learn' (331).

This thesis is argued in detail through a carefully constructed architectonic. For the book is divided into four parts, discussing: truth, thought, words and systematic expression. In each part there is first an 'analysis', which moves from a debate between left-wing and right-wing interpreters to a reconstruction of Hegel's position that grasps the dilemma by its horns.

Analysis is followed by a 'demarcation', in which McCumber dialogues with contemporary philosophers of language showing how their positions leave openings for the Hegelian perspective. Davidson and Wittgenstein turn out to be the most significant interlocutors. Each part then concludes with a 'narrative', where McCumber highlights from the history of philosophy themes that anticipated the position Hegel finally adopted. Here Plato and Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Hume and Kant share in the discourse.

The result is an intricate weaving of motifs. Truth as correspondence with reality is replaced by the attribute of Nobility. By this, McCumber means the ordering of words in a genuine, or appropriate way. 'The Nobility of a word is its capacity to sum up, in an organized way, a variety of other contents: other words, sensory phenomena, and in a final analysis social practices' (116).

Thought functions in two ways. In Systematic dialectics, on the one hand, collections of markers are used to define a new term, which is, in turn used to derive a set of markers. This mutual implication integrates the new marker with the earlier set, and the new grouping becomes the base for a succeeding stage. Historical dialectic is not so neat. It 'undertakes to reconstruct history as a Noble enterprise, and in so doing to make plain the Nobility of the present: its ongoing power to reconcile past oppositions' (148).

A similar duality applies to words. Representative names internalize the intuitions of ordinary experience. Names as such are arbitrary, and can be assigned their own distinctive meaning. The latter, then, fit the requirements of systematic dialectics, while the former are the product of history.

The two strands are reconciled when we come to the expression of the system. On the one hand, a particular 'mental sound' is selected for a name as such because of its association with historically based representative names. On the other hand, a representative name is critically refined by adding and dropping markers until it comes to match the systematic meaning of its corresponding name as such. This happens in the context of a given historical language, and is determined as well by the social setting of teacher and student, or speaker and hearer. Because each historical language is specific, the System would take quite different shapes in English or Chinese from what it acquired in Hegel's German. Indeed, it is this ongoing dialectic that opens the System to constant revision.

McCumber's thesis is attractive. The open-ended dialogue between theoretical demands and the actual products of experience portrays a dynamic and exciting Hegel. The method of exposition, however, makes it difficult for a reader to see how this reading is justified by the texts. In a sense McCumber presupposes a reader who is so thoroughly familiar with the Hegelian corpus that she can recognize the validity (or the Nobility?) of his proposals. And he assembles texts from quite different contexts as if they could all be used for a single interpretative purpose. At the same time, the discussions of other philosophers, whether from the tradition or from contemporary philosophy of language, analyze specific texts to uncover the ambiguities and lacunae that can be exploited for Hegelian purposes.

More basically, one wonders whether the sharp division between names as such and representative names is justified. Since McCumber ultimately brings them together into a single social-cultural dynamic, one wants to ask how he can find such a radical break between paragraph 462 and paragraph 463 of the *Encyclopaedia (Philosophy of Mind)*. Recollecting representative names is an activity of Verbal Memory, he says; but Mechanical Memory works with names as such, in which meaning and Being are one. The two are quite distinct and indeed opposed to each other.

This reading of the two paragraphs, however, radically disrupts the progressive articulation of Nobility that is supposed to characterize the System.

Nonetheless, when one comes to the end of *The Company of Words*, one has learned a lot about the Hegelian project. The difference between pure logic and the *Realphilosophie* is taken seriously. And one is brought into the company of a teacher who challenges students to think carefully about the words they use, and the way those words are woven into a structure of Nobility.

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Margaret Moore

Foundations of Liberalism.

Oxford: Clarendon Press 1993. Pp. 222.

US \$45.00 (ISBN 0-19-827385-1).

Recently, the conceptual tug of war between liberals and communitarians has been going largely in the liberals' favour. Critics such as Kymlicka, Gutman and Buchanan have questioned the communitarian claim that liberalism depends on an unrealistic and impoverished conception of human beings as essentially discrete and atomistic 'selves'. Prominent liberal theorists such as Rawls, Raz and Dworkin have taken some pains to show that their theories can accommodate the communitarian view that political principles must be grounded in the social, historical and cultural contexts of specific societies. As well, communitarians have had to defend themselves against the charge that their program commits them to either a futile relativism, a conservative traditionalism, or both.

In *Foundations of Liberalism* Moore attempts to resuscitate the communitarian enterprise by reaffirming the link between influential liberal theories and an untenable form of atomism, by arguing that recent liberal

attempts to incorporate the communitarian commitment to contextuality lead to irreconcilable tensions between the substance of liberal principles and the mode of justification, and, finally, by arguing that communitarians can endorse an anti-foundational, contextual methodology without lapsing into relativism or conservatism. It is a very ambitious project, especially for a book of just over 200 pages.

Of the three undertakings, the third is the most original and compelling. In the first two, Moore is fairly derivative, rehearsing the familiar communitarian contention that neither traditional 'individualist' liberals nor contemporary 'revisionist' liberals can address the twin problems of 'integrity' and 'motivation'. The first refers to the problem of integrating the standpoint of a real person, complete with contextually structured interests, with the impartial stance required by liberal principles. The second asks why, under these conditions, real people would feel compelled to act on liberal principles. Moore argues that both liberals who identify justice with a form of impartiality and liberals who see justice as an outgrowth of self-interest rely on a conception of persons as essentially autonomous choosers of ends. And since liberal principles are intended to safeguard and promote this capacity for choice, they cannot easily appeal to people who *have made* choices, and who are concerned to advance their goals.

Moore makes this line work reasonably well against writers like Gewirth and Gauthier, who advance explicitly universal programs. Because they rely on conceptual connections between morality, autonomy, impartiality and individual rationality, they are left defending bare, abstract frameworks, which do not easily serve any substantive interests that individuals might have. Similarly this kind of analysis scores a few points against liberal perfectionists like Raz, who maintains that liberal principles make substantive rather than merely formal contributions to human lives, but is still committed to the conceptual primacy of autonomy.

However, Moore's discussion of Rawls is more problematic and generally constitutes the weakest part of the book. In discussing *A Theory of Justice* Moore simply reproduces the claim, developed principally by Sandel, that Rawls's description of the original position depends on an atomistic conception of persons as choosers who are conceptually prior to their ends. Rawls's treatment of impartiality in terms of a veil of ignorance which prevents parties in the original position from knowing any particular facts about themselves, together with the assumption of non-tuism, are marshalled as evidence.

But Rawls has recently argued that the veil of ignorance was never intended as an absolute, conceptual definition of impartiality. Rather it models the kind of impartiality judged appropriate to the choosing of principles of justice by people living in the specific context of modern, democratic and pluralistic societies. The original position is thus an heuristic device which makes possible the philosophical articulation of public principles of justice which are, or could be, supported by an overlapping consensus among the parties that make up these kinds of societies. Rawls's principles are

justified because diverse groups can find (probably diverse) moral reasons for endorsing them.

In treating Rawls's recent writings as virtually independent of *A Theory of Justice* Moore overlooks the fact that the conditions in the original position were never presented as a conceptual abstraction. Rawls claims to have based his description on 'reflective equilibrium', the result of a complex interaction between contextually specific intuitions about justice and the conditions appropriate to the choosing of principles of justice, and philosophically articulated principles. Still, Moore goes on to argue that Rawls's appeal to contextuality must ultimately be unsuccessful because the neutral liberal principles he advocates clash with the contextual mode of justification. As Moore puts it 'Grounding political principles designed to protect the autonomy of individuals in terms of their embodiment in communal institutions ... undermines the autonomy of the person which it is intended to support' (125). Autonomy which is socially inculcated and sanctioned by community fiat is simply incompatible with liberal notions of autonomy.

Moore also rejects the suggestion that liberal principles are justified as the most extensive public principles that groups in a pluralistic society can collectively endorse. Public and private principles will inevitably conflict, and individuals and groups will have no reason to support public principles whenever they may hope to impose their own views.

Moore concludes that liberalism cannot be given a communitarian interpretation, which is strange since in Part 3 she argues, convincingly, that liberalism is best understood as a comprehensive conception of the good, complete with a distinctive commitment to the value of autonomy. Here Moore makes the excellent point that this understanding of liberalism is available from the perspective of any conception of the good which does not value autonomy to the same degree.

But then, if liberalism cannot justify itself in terms of context-specific values, and context-independent values are demonstrably unavailable, why do so many societies seem to operate quite smoothly under the aegis of overtly liberal principles? A possible response would bring together two elements. First, Moore's communitarianism which resolves motivational and integrity problems by arguing that people come to accept the authority of general principles because they have been socially, culturally and linguistically educated into conceiving of them as their own values. And second, Rawls's observation that while principles of justice are political, they are also more narrowly moral to the extent that they are endorsed by parties committed to diverse conceptions of the good. Liberal principles may originally have been adopted as public principles of justice for the purely instrumental purpose of allowing the peaceful coexistence of specific hostile groups. But over time, the experience of living with these principles could lead the same groups to accord an independent value to public justice. The public/private distinction and the priority of autonomy would thus come to have an intrinsic value for the various parties. This seems like a plausible, communitarian account, in which principles are adopted in response to specific social and historical

contexts. And this kind of view need not lead to a vicious relativism since all conceptions of the good, liberalism included, are open to evaluations and revision through interaction with other conceptions of the good.

Moore successfully sketches out the direction in which any viable communitarian theory must proceed. The idea that traditions are rich and open enough to supply the resources needed to effect conceptual and political change is a crucial addition to the communitarian repertoire. At the same time, more attention should be paid to the singular success liberalism has enjoyed in political theory and practice. A more detailed and charitable reading of Rawls might provide the necessary elements.

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Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift

Liberals and Communitarians.

Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell 1992

Pp. xiv + 302.

US \$19.95 (paper; ISBN 0-631-18378-7).

In the early 1980s major works by Alasdair MacIntyre (*After Virtue*, 1981), Michael Sandel (*Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, 1982), Michael Walzer (*Spheres of Justice*, 1983), and Charles Taylor (*Philosophical Papers*, 1985) questioned several core assumptions of liberalism. The central issues included the nature of the self, the virtues of individualism, the universality of moral judgments, the objectivity of these judgments, and the neutrality of the state with respect to conceptions of the good life. The composite 'communitarian' critique is difficult to represent accurately, in part because of the diffuseness of both it and its target, in part because partisanship impedes a balanced viewpoint. One result is that it has not been easy for students to gain an initiation to the debate. The authors of this volume address these problems deliberately and successfully. Their useful introductory work organizes the challenge posed by the four main critics according to the above five assumptions and takes John Rawls as the representative liberal. The disadvantages of omission and regimentation are more than compensated for by the organizational clarity permitted by this structure of discussion. The problem of balance is addressed through the fact that Swift identifies with liberalism while Mulhall inclines towards communitarianism.

Rawls's view has two main components, one a commitment to individual freedom and civil liberties, the other an argument favouring a roughly

egalitarian distribution of social goods. Mulhall and Swift focus on the former as the major object of communitarian critics. Michael Sandel has become famous for his sharp attack on a conception of justice that, as he represents it, presupposes that persons are individuated prior to their acquisition of socially defined ends. The treatment of his criticism is very clear, so that it is easy to see where it is overstated without the authors having to belabour the obvious. MacIntyre's primary objection that liberalism fails to escape the egoistic predicament of contemporary morality is nicely distinguished from Sandel's position that it rests upon faulty metaphysical presuppositions. Careful discriminations among heterogeneous communitarian views are a mark of the discussion generally. The account of Taylor's subtle discussion of the Rawlsian priority-of-right thesis, however, accurately notes some important affinities with MacIntyre. It also points out that liberal individualism may be deeply defensible as long as it acknowledges the social structures underpinning such values as autonomy. Walzer's criticism, based upon his thesis that all goods are social goods, may not get a fully sympathetic statement, since the authors allow themselves to be diverted early into charges of relativism that they only later find to be exaggerated.

The following part of the book traces the development of Rawls's views, or his statement of those views, since *A Theory of Justice*. Mulhall and Swift recommend reading his new 'political liberalism' as a deliberate response to the communitarian critiques, although the new view was first stated in the Dewey Lectures of 1980, before those critiques were published. They rightly point out that the concerns were in the air. (In partial confirmation of their suggestion, I might mention a note from Rawls, dated April 1977, saying that some similar criticisms in my 'Socialist Justice' [*Ethics*, 1976] 'raise questions that trouble me most'). By the latter half of the 1980s, however, the wind had begun to change. In the last part of their book, the authors turn to the views of Richard Rorty and Joseph Raz as illustrations of liberal philosophies that may be less subject to communitarian criticisms than Rawls's original statement was. This part provides a convenient introduction to discussions that are now more lively than the original liberal-communitarian debate.

The book accurately reflects the overall debate in allowing the liberal view to establish the agenda. Discussion begins with an exposition of Part I of Rawls's *Theory of Justice*. The strategy is appropriate given Rawls's success in restoring vitality to political philosophy and the dominance of liberal thinking generally in official euro-American society. It would be interesting, though, to have a treatment in which a comprehensive and systematic communitarian account of the good life and the role of the state was given first and the critics were liberal. Such a treatment would encourage consideration of female voices and Marxist views of community, both of which tend to be sidelined by the liberal agenda. This order of discussion might also show the desirability of distinguishing between the 'communal' and the 'social', which does not here occur. The tendency to assimilate 'ontology' to 'metaphysics' might also be scrutinized: Ronald Dworkin's practice-conception of

ontology (cf. 'Liberal Community', *California Law Review*, 1989), for example suggests an interesting alternative to Taylor's reflections on the self.

However others might contribute to the wider issues raised in the liberal-communitarian debate, Mulhall and Swift have written an excellent book. Only a few editorial deficiencies deserve mention. The authors repeatedly apologize for their 'selective and simplistic' accounts of views and issues, although once would be sufficient in an introductory work of this kind. Notes are inconveniently placed at the end of each chapter rather than in a single place. The bibliography is limited: in a work of this sort a 'further reading' section would be most useful. A fuller index would also better serve the students for whom the book is intended ('the good' is not indexed, for example) as well as reflecting the analytical vigour of the works' conceptual outline.

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Kevin R. Murphy

Honesty in the Workplace.

Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole 1993.

US \$24.50 (ISBN 0-534-15492-1).

Not a philosophical work, this may nevertheless be considered as background or supplementary reading for business ethics courses and I shall review it on that basis. It does contain a chapter on ethics, and the concepts of honesty and integrity are analyzed to some extent, but the book is written from a social science standpoint and its intended audience includes practical people concerned with the effects of theft or fraudulence on their organizations. It is firmly grounded in reality and students will like it for this reason. The research is thorough, much of it original with the author, who also presents critically the results of other researchers. The presentation is clear.

Honesty in human behavior, except in the case of 'saints and sociopaths', is not simply a matter of individual personal character, Murphy argues, but more usually dependent on a situation. One of the main determinants, in his view, of an individual's honesty is the set of normative beliefs and assumptions of a group of coworkers or organizational officials concerning what is acceptable behavior, for instance what is to be considered theft and what is an acceptable perk, such as expense-account padding. Commitment to an organization can result, on the one hand, in a high degree of honesty with respect to, say, stealing from the organization but on the other hand this same commitment can result in crimes on behalf of the organization, such as

suppression of the truth about safety concerns. Whistle-blowing, in the face of the usual adverse consequences, is a form of honesty involving characteristics of the individual, the job, the work-group and the organization as a whole.

The level of ethical sophistication of most people is dismayingly low, if the studies Murphy cites are correct. According to these, and in terms of Kohlberg's theory of the development of moral reasoning, it is rare for adults' moral reasoning to go beyond the kind of conventional morality which stresses respect for authority, order and 'duty'. Haven't war crimes tribunals assumed and demanded more than that? There is much for teachers of ethics to do.

Murphy's moral demands are moderate. There can be too much honesty for an organization's good, as when a supervisor's personnel evaluations are so painfully truth-telling that morale suffers. An honest advertising policy, though good for society, can have negative effects: 'an admission on the part of a cereal manufacturer that its product is a tasteless amalgam of sugar and overprocessed ingredients rarely found in nature would probably spare consumers from the ill-advised use of its product, but the organization would not survive long' (186). Murphy is less than enthusiastic about the practices of polygraph examiners, which extend to lies, trickery (extending even to the use of packs of 52 identical playing cards) as well as 'fourth degree' interrogation in order to get admissions of truth about wrongdoing. Although 'at first glance ... hardly ... appropriate for a procedure designed to get at the truth' (91) only use of such stratagems make polygraphs (now illegal in the U.S. for screening job applicants) effective. Murphy finds the frequently fraudulent, overblown claims of marketers of integrity tests disgraceful: 'Indeed, if you want to see examples of dishonesty in the workplace, you need not look much further than the marketing brochures for some integrity tests' (129).

Much of the book is purely empirical, reporting estimates of the amount of employee theft or assessing the effectiveness of various means of attempting to have an honest workforce. Among the more interesting of Murphy's assumptions is that honesty and dishonesty are not, as one might think, on a continuum, because, behaviorally speaking, efforts to increase honesty are not the same as efforts to decrease dishonesty. Security measures exemplify the latter; ethics committees, ethical training and ethical codes (when not merely a public relations tool) are instances of the former.

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Stephen Palmquist

Kant's System of Perspectives: An architectonic interpretation of the Critical philosophy.

Lanham, MD: University Press of America

1993. Pp. xii + 478.

US \$57.50 (ISBN 0-8191-8927-8).

Stephen Palmquist offers an architectonic interpretation of Kant's philosophy, but with a theocentric twist: As he sees it, the structure of Kant's thought leads to a 'Critical mysticism'. The main text is divided into four parts of three chapters each. The book also includes extensive appendices and a bibliography. While these clarify the development of Palmquist's ideas, they are of less use to the Kant scholar.

Part One sets out principles of interpretation and introduces a 'Geometry of Logic' which is purported to shed light on Kant's architectonic. Palmquist suggests that the figures (crosses, circles, etc.) so introduced may represent archetypes submerged in Kant's thought (18). The rest of Part One argues for a 'perspectival' understanding of Kant's philosophy: that each of the many perspectives governing Kant's thought offers 'a different way of interpreting the nature of one and the same set of things' (64). Palmquist identifies three 'levels of perspectives' — *reflective* perspectives, critical *standpoints*, and philosophical *Perspectives* — under which individual perspectives are to be grouped. Although Kant used the term 'perspective' only in physical contexts, Palmquist holds that the elements of Kant's formalism are implicitly perspectival. Rather than offering a direct defence of this claim, Palmquist argues that, together with the architectonic logic, the perspectival interpretation reveals the structural coherence of Kant's critical works.

Part Two applies Palmquist's perspectival interpretation to major themes in Kant's epistemology. Chapter IV relates the a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic distinctions to Palmquist's *reflective* perspectives. Here Palmquist makes some departures from Kant's own usage of these terms, and reduces the roles of such faculties as imagination and sensibility in Kant's epistemology. Palmquist admits to tinkering with the text on some issues, but says his reinterpretation is a corrective to Kant's architectonic akin to Kepler's correction of Copernicus (10). Chapter V represents both the central pillar in Palmquist's interpretation of Kant's epistemology, and its greatest deviation from standard readings. Palmquist argues that Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism is based on the insight that faith must precede transcendental reflection (157-9). Consequently, for Kant, the objective reality of objects is grounded in a transcendental faith in the reality of the thing-in-itself (151).

The grade of textual support Palmquist draws on for his view of transcendental idealism may be judged by a typical example: On p. 160, Palmquist has Kant asserting that 'faith ... provides ... a clear light to enlighten philosophy itself'. As a reading of Kant's critical views, the quotation is immediately rendered suspect since it is drawn from the pre-critical *Univer-*

sal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755). As it happens, the quote does not even represent a pre-critical doctrine: it is part of a hypothetical objector's complaint that in the sort of natural history Kant offers, '... an unholy philosophy tramples underfoot the faith which provides for it a clear light to enlighten philosophy itself' (a5r-a8r).

The most interesting and useful section of the book is Part Three, where Palmquist provides a formalistic comparison of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Chapter VII gives a detailed interpretation of the theoretical *standpoint*, which consists of: four stages of representation; a three-step synthesis at each stage of representation; and, twelve determinations of an object (239). Chapter VIII draws a close structural parallel between the theoretical and practical *standpoints* (285). However, the structural analogy is not carried through in the case of the *Critique of Judgment*. In Chapter IX, Palmquist says that the judicial *standpoint* focuses on the noncognitive rather than logical form, and is therefore unique (292). Nevertheless, the judicial *standpoint* includes a teleological principle licensing a subsumption of theoretical and practical *standpoints* (291).

However, at this point Palmquist's perspectival interpretation limits the depth of his analysis. For faculties such as the imagination also weave significant unifying threads through the critical philosophy. Palmquist, who refers to imagination as a 'floating faculty' omits it from his framework of interpretation (60, n23). Hence, he skips over the issue of how schema of the productive imagination make intuitions and categories fit together in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Palmquist also glosses over the Typic of the second *Critique*, where Kant says the imagination supplies the formal characteristics of causal laws permitting maxims of action to be judged in relation to the moral law. Synthetic operations due to imagination figure centrally in the first half of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, yet Palmquist's focus emphasizes the second half and teleology. In short, an adequate account of subsumption under the judicial *standpoint* may require canvassing the role of imagination in Kant's thought. A serious consideration of the importance of such faculties as imagination seems to be in order at this point in Palmquist's interpretation.

In the fourth and final section of the book, Palmquist begins to draw out theocentric implications of the critical philosophy. His theocentric reading of the architectonic depends on (1) casting teleology as the principal epistemic thread linking together Kant's critical philosophy, and on (2) the view that teleology in the critical system leads to a critical theology (304-5). Given that there may be other ways of accounting for the bridging by the judicial *standpoint*, (1) requires a substantive defense that is not provided here. Moreover, Palmquist's linking of teleology and theology (305), fails to give textual support for the real issue in relation to (2): whether Kant is claiming theology to be a central task of critical philosophy. These are two important points which Palmquist will need to address in forthcoming work if he is to show Kant's pantheon of critical works houses a theocentric metaphysics.

Palmquist's readers will find the perspectival interpretation of Kant's architectonic a fascinating exercise. However, they may be disappointed that Palmquist so often fails to deem it necessary to back controversial interpretations with substantial arguments and adequate textual support. Indeed, it is difficult to assess whether his book is intended as an exposition of or as a redeployment of the critical philosophy. For Palmquist at once claims to offer an accurate interpretation of the critical philosophy and to be licensed to make adjustments to it (24). Palmquist should expect critics who take him to be attempting an accurate interpretation of Kant's philosophy to examine the agreement between his exegesis and specific segments of Kant's corpus. Hopefully, Palmquist will see the necessity of providing a defense of his interpretation along these lines in the future.

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Alvin Plantinga

Warrant: The Current Debate.

Oxford University Press: New York 1993.

Pp. xii + 228.

US \$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-507861-6);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-19-507862-4).

Alvin Plantinga

Warrant and Proper Function.

Oxford University Press: New York 1993.

Pp. xii + 243.

US \$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-19-507863-2);

US \$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-685-56686-2).

Warrant: The Current Debate (WCD) and *Warrant and Proper Function* (WPF) are opening volumes in a projected trilogy to be completed by *Warranted Christian Belief*. Plantinga's topic is warrant — that, he says, which, added to true belief, constitutes knowledge. WCD critically assesses recent analytic epistemology, focussing on proposals from Chisholm, Bonjour, van Fraassen, Pollock, Alston, Dretske, and Goldman concerning justification, rational belief, or knowledge, and finding them wanting in themselves and as helps to understanding warrant. WPF develops in detail a major alternative which harkens back to Thomas Reid, and earlier still to Aristotle and Aquinas. WCD and WPF already form an outstanding contribution to contemporary epistemology and merit serious attention from all who are interested in the field. They may also be read separately with profit and understanding.

According to WPF, a belief is warranted for someone if and only if (i) it was produced by cognitive faculties in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which they were designed to function, (ii) the cognitive faculties involved in the production of the belief are functioning properly in that environment, as they were designed to, (iii) the purpose of their so functioning is to produce true beliefs in that sort of environment, and (iv) it is objectively likely that they will produce true beliefs by so functioning in that sort of environment. We call other cases 'warranted' by analogically extending this central notion of warrant. The degree to which a belief is warranted is an increasing function of the degree of belief produced by such properly functioning faculties, so long as the degree of belief reflects the degree of reliability with which the faculties yield true belief in the circumstances. What degree of warrant knowledge requires is contextually variable, but Plantinga has little to say about what the variables are. In any case, knowledge requires warrant and truth, but not any degree of warrant combined with truth is sufficient for knowledge. Moreover, although in some cases perhaps being maximally warranted is sufficient for truth, in general being warranted isn't.

A properly functioning organism or artifact functions in accordance with its design plan: a set of triples consisting of circumstances C, responses R, and purposes P. Its design plan includes only some of the responses to circumstances it will have while retaining its approximate structure in situations involving currently obtaining natural laws. In the case of parts like kidneys, P will be a proximate purpose, e.g. removing waste, rather than an ultimate purpose, e.g. aiding survival. Reliable cognitive functioning that isn't part of our design plan is only 'accidentally' reliable, and its products still unwarranted. Cognitive responses also might accord with our design plan but still be unwarranted because their purpose isn't truth, e.g. if we by design maintain our determination to live by believing that we will live no matter what others tell us. (If, however, such an 'optimistic override' fails, and we believe we'll die when the doctor tells us, we will be warranted because the module responsible for our belief (reliance on testimony) *was* designed for truth and worked properly.) Finally, our cognitive design can specify how to repair or circumvent cognitive malfunctioning, and how proper cognitive functioning is to change through maturation and learning.

The bulk of WPF explores the putative elements of our cognitive design plan: how we acquire knowledge and warranted belief concerning ourselves, others, and the world around us, past, present, and future; how we acquire knowledge and warranted belief by introspection, memory, testimony, induction; how *a priori* knowledge is possible; the nature of evidence, and how some propositions can be probable or warranted on the basis of others. It is rich with insight into particular issues in epistemology, as well as excursions into philosophy of mind and metaphysics.

Plantinga's constraints on warrant contrast strikingly with current proposals for justification — modest foundationalist or coherentist, internalist or reliabilist. For example, a person dying of thirst in the desert who seems

to see an oasis and takes himself to be seeing one may be justified in his belief so long as he has no defeaters for his belief, i.e. reasons for thinking himself mistaken or his situation misleading. Similarly a person to whom a stick in water looks bent may be *prima facie* justified in thinking it is bent. (Reliabilists might also require that forming perceptual beliefs in this way yields more truth than error in this world; coherentists might require instead that background beliefs give him coherent reason for trusting his perceptual belief.) Yet he won't be warranted for Plantinga in his perceptual belief whatever experiences or background beliefs may be present or absent, because his circumstances are not among those for which our perceptual faculties were designed to yield true belief (WPF, 38-40).

Our perceptual faculties are designed to produce these beliefs in situations of illusion, but this is a compromise in our design in which truth (the main purpose of the whole perceptual system) was traded off for efficiency (given various constraints on our design). Satisfying these other constraints is the direct purpose of the segment of our design plan governing production of illusory perceptual beliefs, truth only its indirect purpose. For warranted belief, truth must be the direct purpose of the relevant segments of the design plan. If from our justified but unwarranted perceptual belief we go on to conclude that an oasis is nearby and happen to be right — it's just off to the side — our true conclusion may be justified but still won't be warranted and won't constitute knowledge.

For perceptual knowledge then that our cognitive design fine grainedly differentiate illusory and non-illusory circumstances and the direct purposes of perceptual belief in these circumstance. It can't simply coarse grainedly specify the relevant perceptual beliefs as responses to relevant experiences and background beliefs in the actual world and worlds like it for the sake of getting truth on the whole more often than not. Yet designers needn't be fine grained in thinking up designs and setting out specifications. So what independent reasons are there for thinking our cognitive design fine grained and for thinking paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge manifest such design? Plantinga needs to address these questions more explicitly. Also why shouldn't proper cognitive functioning successfully aimed at truth on the whole (even just coarse grainedly or for the most part) suffice for warrant? Here, Plantinga may just note that warranted true belief won't then suffice for knowledge and stipulate that warrant, unlike justification, is that which makes true belief knowledge. Moreover, since it's always at least as if there is a fine grained design, perhaps he can claim, warrant just requires, and paradigm warrant exemplifies, functioning at least as if in accord with a fine grained cognitive design for truth.

In any case, the overall consistency of Plantinga's account seems questionable. He argues that warrant for our memory beliefs requires that whatever original beliefs we had concerning what we now recall were warranted, and warrant for beliefs based on testimony of others requires that our informants be testifying to something they warrantably believe. It doesn't require evidence for the reliability of our memory or the trustworthiness of our inform-

ants. However, we don't have knowledge when our earlier belief or our informant's belief is unwarranted but just happens to be true — though we might, in the absence of any reason for distrusting our memory or informants, still be justified in our recollections or in our credulity (WPF, 86). Yet surely, for the purpose of true belief, what matters directly is whether our original belief or our informants belief be true, not warranted? Warrant is neither necessary nor sufficient for truth, though in general believing what was once warranted or what is warranted for our informant may reliably yield more truth than error and be well suited to that purpose, just as, in general, one's senses may. Testimony, Plantinga argues, shows how our cognitive design plan doesn't involve us merely as individuals but requires functioning together in certain wayss (WPF, 82). Nonetheless, that doesn't give any preference to warrant over true belief as the circumstance that allows us to acquire true belief from each other, and as the circumstance for which credulity is directly designed to yield truth. It isn't any more plausible, for example, to explain inter-personal credulity historically by reference to the regularity with which we acquired true belief in the face of warranted testimony than to the regularity with which we acquired it in the face of true testimony. Nor do our cognitive systems any more directly detect or respond differentially to others' warrant than to their truth. In the absence of independent information they settle for belief, whether in the face of truth or falsity, warrant or its absence.

Plantinga contrasts the normative character of proper functioning and warrant with that of justification — for him a fundamentally deontological notion of being within one's rights, or fulfilling epistemic duty and of being blameless and responsible in doing so. Confusing warrant and justification is a legacy from Descartes and Locke. It leads epistemologists to internalism: we must be able to tell just by reflection or introspection, and cannot make a non-culpable mistake about, what epistemic duty requires and whether a belief has the properties that makes it warranted — otherwise it wouldn't be in our power to ensure we didn't continue to hold unjustified beliefs. It also leads to evidentialism or at least coherentism: beliefs must either be self-evident, or conform to principles of evidence or rules of thought specifying what sorts of experiences or beliefs or ways of conceiving, and what sorts of relations among beliefs must obtain, for any beliefs to be warranted.

WCD is full of insightful criticisms of the details of recent accounts of justification and rationality in belief. But it's main point is that they aren't central to the theory of knowledge. Coherence in one's overall beliefs or degrees of belief isn't necessary for warrant for simple perceptual or mathematical beliefs, and there can always be environments in which well-functioning persons are warranted without the experiences required by whatever putative rules of evidence are proposed. Moreover, a paranoid who thinks demons have made his inclinations to believe untrustworthy and makes it his duty to suppress them, but, resentful of the strain of duty, irresponsibly lapses and thinks he sees something orange when it looks orange may still be warranted in his belief. (Why isn't his warrant undermined by his

background beliefs, or by his recollections of past ways of interpreting experience? The counterexample seems at best borderline.) On the other hand, a person can be trying his best to do his epistemic duty, or be coherent in his beliefs, or conform to any rules of evidence, but due to brain lesion or pathological disturbance, demon or Alpha Centaurian intervention, not be functioning properly in an environment appropriate for his faculties. His beliefs may be justified, but they aren't warranted. Even if they happen to be true, they won't be anything near knowledge. Plantinga's examples may be more bizarre than Gettier's, but his opponents may still respond: of course a further fourth condition must be satisfied for warrant and knowledge. Plantinga criticizes some suggestions for fourth conditions, but future fine tuning might escape his criticism. Alternatively, he can just insist he has a simpler, less *ad hoc* account of why warrant is missing in these cases and other cases fourth conditions are concocted for: cognitive faculties aren't functioning properly in a congenial environment in accord with a design plan successfully aimed at truth. Earlier, we saw some reason to question his success.

Plantinga concludes WCD with complementary critiques of constraints placed by Pollock, and reliabilists like Alston and Goldman, on justified belief. Conformity to internalized or innately programmed epistemic norms governing thinking is insufficient for warrant since we could have been given different norms — by God — and our norms therefore aren't necessarily correct. On the other hand, indicators and belief forming mechanisms can be accidentally reliable, and insufficient for warrant, because our reliance on them isn't part of our cognitive design at all, or isn't for the purpose of getting true belief, or is reliable only in circumstances they weren't designed for.

He also argues that theirs are accounts of justification only in an extended analogical sense — because of their continued talk of rules, permission, evidence, or bases for belief. We can hardly feel that someone should be ashamed of herself or blameworthy just for violating their constraints any more than for violating Plantinga's (WCD, 179). Thus we can hardly think theirs any more than his as really accounts of justification or any other part of the deontological stable. However, the deontological stable seems less tightly reined than Plantinga suggests. People can be ashamed of their local football team's standing or feel guilty about their national past, and many Greeks, e.g. those Sophocles' character Tiresias represents, may have thought Oedipus wasn't justified, indeed was guilty, in unwittingly killing his father and marrying his mother. Pride and shame express our self-identifications immediately, and only thereby, if at all, our sense of what was up to us, and judgements of justification immediately express what we think can be shown to be lawful — perhaps only by external authorities or judges. Granted, these may be undesirable practices, from which we moderns are being gradually weaned, but must we think them expressions of conceptual or factual confusion as Plantinga suggests?

WPF ends with a blockbuster critique of metaphysical naturalism: naturalism in epistemology flourishes only in the context of an acceptance of a supernatural creator and designer. First, there is no adequate purely naturalistic explication of function and proper function, and by implication, proper functioning. Thus if there really are such things, naturalism is false. Take the rough suggestions that the function of a trait in a certain kind of thing is, in the case of natural things, that effect or power that has historically made it a stable feature in the kind, or had a propensity to ensure survival. Plantinga objects to their necessity, but most importantly to their sufficiency. Suppose a heart beats only 15 times per minute but, due to a perforated aorta, it's doing so has survival value for its owner and for many of its owner's ancestors who passed their sort of heart and their heart condition on. It still isn't functioning properly, he asserts (WPF, 210). (Another example concerns the reproductively stable products of Nazi genetic experiments.)

However, suppose we factor out the chauvinistic consideration that the heart clearly wouldn't be functioning properly in me and most of my fellow humans, and the broadly moral consideration that it's working that way in its context is perhaps not the most desirable condition for human beings. (Curiously, Aquinas' fifth way, which Plantinga quotes approvingly, apparently rests the evidence for real proper functioning on the moral consideration that action regularly achieves the 'best result'.) Then Plantinga's assertion concerning these particular people in their particular situation with their hearts is no longer so compelling. For the sake of an attractive naturalistic account that avoids commitment to supernaturalism, perhaps we should clearly reject his judgement. Plantinga suggests that we already have a common notion of function that we apply perfectly coherently in paradigm cases to artifacts and natural things alike and isn't in need of revision (WPF 196-8). Yet suppose we find ourselves before the pearly gates being told by our creator that it was never part of his plan for hearts to beat 72 times per minute for the purpose of circulating blood — it was merely an unintended byproduct due to evolution that it achieved this effect in this way. Should we change our judgements concerning well-functioning hearts and revise all our biology texts? Maybe, but it's not clear we should, rather than just claim that, with all due respect, God's purposes were irrelevant to the truth of *our* judgements and had no place in *our* notion of proper function or its explication. Plantinga's next point suggests that this response would be irrational.

Second, acceptance of (N) metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating and irrational, unlike belief (IT) that we were created by God in his image working perhaps through evolutionary means. That's because of Darwin's doubt (D): the *objective* likelihood of (R) our cognitive faculties yielding mostly truth in their normal environments, given (N), (C) the sort of cognitive faculties we have, and (E) their creation through evolutionary mechanisms, is either low or something we should be agnostic about. But D undercuts and defeats the rationality of any beliefs the naturalist who accepts E might have, and of any defeaters he has, except for D itself. The naturalist thus has an

ultimately undefeated defeater for his own acceptance of N and E, and also for his own acceptance of N, at least given that if N, then E. Perhaps the theist can't non-circularly appeal to his theistic beliefs to show his beliefs are mostly true, but at least his position isn't self-defeating.

However, even if we think God necessarily accepts every truth, surely there are many ways in which we and our cognitive capacities could be made in his image besides having beliefs that are non-accidentally true for the most part, so that the probability of R given IT is also either low or something to be agnostic about? Of course, to adapt a suggestion of BonJour's about demon plans, the theist's beliefs might be more elaborate about God's plans (EIT) so that the probability of R given EIT isn't something to be agnostic about and EIT isn't self-defeating. But the same surely could be said for the probability of R on EE: an elaborate picture of the world in which evolution happened to work so that the probability of reliable thinkers wasn't something to be agnostic about. Nor need the naturalist be *ad hoc* in thinking this probability to the point. Plantinga allows him to assume the prior objective probability of R is high (WPF, 228), but any high objective probability it has must be conditional on some highly specific concrete similarities to the actual world (WPF, 162). In any case, the objective probability of conjectures that are either necessarily true or necessarily false — metaphysical ones like theism or naturalism presumably as much as mathematical ones — is either 1 or 0 (WPF, 163). If N's is 1, it is irrelevant to R's since the probability of R on C and E and N is just the probability of R on C and E. If N's is 0, R's objective probability on N and C and E is incalculable — perhaps grounds for agnosticism. But the theist seems to be in the same position. Perhaps some other notion of probability will serve Plantinga's purposes better. His argument is bound to generate controversy for a long time, as will both his volumes.

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**Douglas B. Rasmussen and
Douglas J. Den Uyl**

*Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defense
of Liberal Order.*

La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Co. 1991.
Pp. vii + 268.

US \$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9119-9);

US \$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9120-2).

In light of the abundance of classically based critiques of liberalism, it may seem misguided to attempt a reconciliation of Aristotelian and liberal principles, yet this is precisely what Rasmussen and Den Uyl have set about to do in their book. Indeed their attempt is conducted in the spirit of striking an Aristotelian mean between a teleological conception of human nature and a 'Lockean' notion of individual liberty, between a natural end of human nature and natural rights, between humanism and individualism, between ancient and modern. In so doing, their hope is to provide liberalism with the 'secure moral footing it desperately needs' (225).

The authors are not claiming Aristotle's thought is liberal, rather that it provides an inspiration moral foundation for the potential within liberalism. They therefore provide an analysis of the most enduring features of 'Aristotelianism' which include 'commitment to teleology, ... the grounding of ethics in human nature, the natural sociability of man, the primacy of reason over passion, ... and realism' (2).

Recognizing that modern thought has brought many of these features into question, they begin with a defense of Aristotelianism against relativism and the naturalistic fallacy. They argue that the indeterminacy of Aristotelian ethics does not support relativism, but instead provides the basis for flexibility and for 'recognition of the value of diversity and pluralism, and a basic commitment to individual judgement and responsibility' (27). Of course, these are also central features of liberalism. However these attributes are undermined by liberalism's lack of substantive moral foundation.

The requisite moral foundation can be located in human nature. A novel argument is offered in support of this foundation, and against the charge that invoking such a foundation for morals entails the naturalistic fallacy. The argument that some facts may include evaluative elements is by now familiar, but the authors investigate the teleological character of those elements. Teleology constitutes the most accurate explanation of nature because there are 'some facts which cannot be adequately understood without appealing to a natural end or function' (43). For humans, this end is not merely physiological, but rational and moral as well. The authors call this end 'human flourishing', arguing that it entails living rationally, a distinctly human excellence indispensable to every 'human action that is right or end that is good'. Further, since understanding and free choice are essential for an action to be moral, 'autonomy or self-directedness is an inherent feature of any

activity being constitutive of human well-being' (71). Autonomy is thus *'the virtue which makes all other virtues possible'* (113).

The authors argue that an Aristotelian natural-end ethics can justify Lockean natural rights. Such an ethics can provide the necessary moral foundation for the inviolability of the individual, upon which natural rights depend, affording support for the Kantian proscription against treating other human beings as means (73). Natural rights, which exist prior to any agreement based on 'certain natural attributes' (83), are negative, inalienable and absolute, and are essential to the possibility of human flourishing (84). They are not contingent upon our actually flourishing, but are based on our potential for so doing (109).

Based on our natural right to autonomous action, they assert a right to the consequences of such action, including property. The authors claim that in order for human beings 'to flourish, they need to maintain control of what they have produced' (116). Further, since they've argued that the right in question is a negative right which cannot be suspended because of the undesirable consequences of its exercise, there can be no justification for redistribution of justly acquired property, i.e., acquired without violation of others' negative rights. For example, the authors acknowledge that education benefits the whole community, but argue that state control of education is unacceptable because it entails restriction of (negative) natural rights. They suggest that common goods such as money, dams and bridges could be provided by the market (253, n42), calling into question the justifiability of taxation. Their trust in the market hinges on its being 'based upon the principle of a respect for individual rights' (160). Indeed they claim that the market is exemplary of one of Aristotle's forms of friendship, i.e. friendships of utility, which are more stable than the higher forms of friendship because they are circumscribed by formal rules (183).

There is a fundamental tension within this attempted reconciliation of Aristotelianism and liberalism, for Aristotle's teleology considered consequences relevant to, but not determinative of, right. However on their procedural view even unjust consequences cannot justify curtailment of natural rights. Aristotle opposed unlimited acquisition on, among others, the grounds that it interfered with development of virtue and could result in a destabilizing degree of disparity. Property for Aristotle was only a means to the good life (*Politics*, BkI:VIII). The authors acknowledge Aristotelian opposition to unlimited acquisition and the market, however they offer nothing more in their defense than a rebuttal of two interpreters of Aristotelian opposition to the market. They leave the problem of unlimited acquisition unaddressed, presuming that an Aristotelian moral foundation can be reconciled with the arguments of Ayn Rand, F.A. Hayek and Robert Nozick, to name but three thinkers cited in support of unlimited acquisition. It is difficult to imagine Aristotle justifying, as Nozick does, someone's right to sell their cure for a fatal disease on whatever terms they choose, say, denying access to a cure for AIDS to haemophiliacs.

Their justification rests on the assumption that wealth is created, i.e. the result of a transformation of material things by an individual (119-21). It ignores the possibility that such a transformation is rarely accomplished by an individual in isolation, but rests on a cooperative social foundation, and that therefore at least some property rights may not be exclusively those of the producer. Since such rights are practically dependent on social stability (205), and many thinkers including Aristotle have argued that excessive disparity of wealth is destabilizing, restriction of the property rights of some could be justified in order to provide a stable foundation for human flourishing to all members of the order which enable such acquisition. Further, things like publicly funded education could be justified to facilitate human flourishing for those whose parents are incapable of providing it.

Had the authors recognized the importance of some of the other elements of Aristotle's theory to the moral foundation they wish to borrow, their rigorous defence of the teleological foundations of morality could have borne more palatable fruit. For it is perhaps plausible that Aristotelianism can provide a substantive foundation for some form of liberalism, but not one which fails to recognize the implications of unlimited and exclusive property rights for both the individual and the society of which s/he is integrally a part.

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Anthony Savile

Kantian Aesthetics Pursued.

Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1993.

Pp. viii + 184.

US \$45.00 (ISBN 0-7486-0439-1).

Most of the highly convoluted arguments in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* are subject to vivid debate nowadays. In *Kantian Aesthetics Pursued* Savile elaborates on some of these arguments and refutes some misconceptions of them, thus making this brilliant aesthetic theory seem obvious instead of incoherent: an accomplishment unparalleled in contemporary Kant scholarship. Lucky for us, Savile directs his lucid arguments exclusively at the crucial problems of Kantian aesthetics, not at more fashionable ones like the sublime. In what follows, by disagreeing on certain points with Savile I by no means intend to downplay these evident qualities.

According to Savile Kant's aesthetic theory is as objectivist as it is subjectivist, a thesis in defence of which Savile provides several interesting arguments. Most importantly, he urges us to distinguish the contents of a judgement of taste from its grounds, so that at last we may come to understand why the judgement of taste, though being the outcome of an essentially empirical event, an aesthetic experience, nevertheless lays claim to universal assent: the claim to universality derives from the grounds of the judgement of taste, whereas the synthetic a posteriority of the judgement of taste pertains to its content, which Savile thinks can actually be true or false. As he sees it, beauty is an objective property, albeit a dispositional one, making that object beautiful that has the 'propensity to call forth ... a response of delight ...' (p. 14). In our judgements we refer to this objective property, although our grounds to do so lie in a felt delight. Savile, however, does not address the consequent problem of what it means for such a delight to be a perception of an objective beauty. Oddly, Savile does not address the subjective experience at all.

In his earlier book *Aesthetic Reconstructions*, Savile has argued that the universality claim of the judgement of taste boils down to the expectation that ideal judges, suitably equipped with taste, will feel this delight when confronted with the beautiful property. In explaining the task Hume puts to the judges of furnishing a standard of taste Savile rejects a so-called constitutive reading that takes the critics' verdicts to be truthmaking, and proposes an evidential reading: a critic too must properly discern the relevant objective properties, and since true judges are normal people of flesh and blood they are trustworthy only in those areas that fit their character, preferences and background. So the critic's judgement should not convince us of the beauty of an object, but should make us experience the object from a different angle. In the end Savile comes a long way in making Hume's article on the standard of taste appear to convey a more or less Kantian point of view. His idea that Kant's aesthetic is evidential itself remains controversial, however.

Savile also deals with Kant's distinction between determinate, determinable, and indeterminate concepts, which relates to the problem that although we can argue about taste, we cannot settle disputes, since no decisive proof for the beauty of an object is available: the antinomy of taste. After explaining what it means to conceptually determine an object, Savile expands on Kant's view of the concept of beauty, which is not determinate because we cannot know in advance by applying a rule whether an object is beautiful or not, nor determinable because due to the essential creativity of genius we will never find such a rule. Beauty, therefore, must reside in the indeterminate supersensible, which is neither a kind of reality that we cannot apprehend because of our limited cognitive apparatus, nor the location of the allegedly objective aesthetic qualities, as that would leave critics empty handed. Instead we should conceive of the supersensible as a limit concept, in keeping with the use Kant puts to the concept of the noumenal as being merely a reminder of where our questioning must stop. Again, although beauty will indeed be the effect of distinct objective

properties it cannot be defined in terms of some essential causality, let alone in terms of a supersensible cause. Since a detailed description of the relevant properties will sufficiently clarify our judgements, no reference to a noumenal reality is needed. Although I agree with this reminder, I nevertheless think Savile's view is too restrictive. Kant in his aesthetics appears to ascribe (a more substantial role) to the limitation provided by 'the supersensible'. Perhaps we better think of aesthetic values as thematizing these limitations as well as the presupposed powers of the symbolism involved in the relevant aesthetic idea.

Savile takes up the interpretation he provided in *Aesthetic Reconstructions* of Kant's idealist notion of purposiveness without purpose as a 'non-designed functionality', a spiritual analogue of food, the edibility of which is not an intrinsic property. Kant's presumed ineptitude to account for the mere possibility of art apparently originates here, since art is definitely designed. We know this means that the beauty of an art work will at best be a dependent beauty, but quite apart from the question of how exactly to conceive of this 'dependency' Savile views the involved perfection as not sufficient but merely necessary for beauty: if an object is imperfect with regard to some determinate concept, this will preclude the mere possibility of its beauty. Again, I think this is more in keeping with Hume than with Kant.

In the hierarchy of the arts that Kant bases on their respective power to generate aesthetic ideas wordless music is ranked below the representative arts, because evidently it does not represent, let alone carry aesthetic ideas. Savile goes into Kant's remarks on music at great lengths, and explains the communicability of music by distinguishing merely sensuous sound from tone relating to the scale. Smell, touch and taste do not yield their own art forms because of their incapacity to generate a form analogous to musical tone rather than because of their lack of communicability. In the end Kant's low ranking of music proves undeserved, as we can easily conceive music's tone as stimulating aesthetic reflection in like manner as the representative arts. In the last chapter Savile argues against the faulty comparison of modern architecture with sculpture, concluding that '... it is a far-reaching mistake to think that architecture acts on us ultimately symbolically. It is far more direct than that, because it affects our perceptions and does not, as symbols do, bypass perception on the way to our intellect' (p. 180).

All in all, I think Savile puts too much Hume into his Kantian aesthetics. I also think we could make more of these aesthetics by specifying the freedom of the aesthetic play of the cognitive faculties. Savile has a reason for his tacit characterization of aesthetic experience as harmonious rather than slightly jarring, though. It enables him to safeguard the notion of aesthetic truth, with which Kant allegedly ensures the continuity between cognitive and aesthetic judgements. However, Savile does not argue this point, and I'm not sure if I can agree. Clearly Kant explicitly separates aesthetic from cognitive judgements from the very beginning. By disregard-

ing the subjective aspect of beauty Savile also hinders proper insight in the historical nature of aesthetic autonomy, which one can provide by a more appropriate account of the impact of common sense within aesthetic experiences. As mentioned above, however, these points of disagreement do nothing to downplay the prominent clarity and importance of Savile's arguments. No aesthetician can afford to do without them.

The investigations were supported by the Foundation for Philosophical Research (SWON), which is subsidized by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).

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Gottfried Gabriel and Christiane Schildknecht, hrsg.

Literarische Formen der Philosophie.

Stuttgart: Verlag J.B. Metzler 1990.

Pp. viii + 196.

(ISBN 3-476-00690-5).

Christiane Schildknecht

Philosophische Masken: Literarische Formen der Philosophie bei Platon, Descartes, Wolff und Lichtenberg.

Stuttgart: Verlag J.B. Metzler 1990.

Pp. 192.

(ISBN 3-476-00717-0).

Ever since Plato banished poetry from the just regime — ironically, in a dialogue having an essential narrative structure, an *eikon* at its 'logical' center, and a myth at its conclusion — philosophy has looked askance at literature. Metaphors, figures of speech, dramatic flourishes might be thought to favor or hinder the promulgation of philosophical truths, but they are accidental to the truth attained. In the extreme version of this story, the accidental is cast as decidedly villainous. Not merely is 'figurative language' so much 'frippery ornament' to the essential tasks of philosophy, in its ambiguity and pretense to real reference, it is virtually 'unclean', befuddling and up-staging the 'majestic simplicity of good sound sense' (Bentham). Its true danger lies therefore not in its being literally false but in its being a sham, a mere 'semblance of thinking' which comes on the scene unabashedly as if possessing genuine truth-value (Frege).

In fashionable circles today, however, this story is retold with a quite different plot. In place of the primacy of nominal reference, we are now advised à la Saussure 'that signs, taken singly, do not signify anything, that each one of them does not so much express a meaning as mark a divergence of meaning between itself and other signs' (Merleau-Ponty). Hence 'the ability of language to signify a thought or a thing directly is only a secondary power derived from the inner life of language' itself. Thus metaphor, trope, and the like cannot straightway be condemned as deviations from original literal purity and serious speech, literal reference itself coming into play only through a prior interaction of signs. This tale, too, has its extreme version. Linguistic meaning not only originates from the interactions of signs, but this interaction is both 'omni' and 'infinite'. It constitutes a 'differential network' in which 'nothing, neither among the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There is only everywhere differences and traces of traces' (Derrida). Traditional philosophy is thereby deprived, though not on skeptical grounds that its 'word' falls short of what lies outside it, there being on this account no 'outside' to the open play of significations, no positive entities and no center to 'arrest and ground the substitutions'. The traditional role of philosophy to make the absent occluded 'true in itself' totally present by means of the literal word is played as merely one more substitution within the open-ended interweaving of text(s).

Both *Literarische Formen der Philosophie* (hereinafter cited as LFP) and *Philosophische Masken* (hereinafter cited as PM) move explicitly between these extremes. 'The view that the use of literary forms in philosophy is *merely* rhetoric, the contents of which can be reduced to propositional form (scientism), as well as the contrary view that such a use shows that philosophy *too* is rhetoric, which consequently relativizes philosophy in its systematic claim (deconstructionism), are both opposed' (LFP, viii). The task is to answer positively the question of 'a methodical meaning of literary forms in philosophy' in order to 'indicate an alternative between scientific and deconstructivist approaches' (PM, 11). Both texts center upon epistemological matters, 'the question concerning *the forms of the presentation of philosophy*' being taken as 'inseparably tied to the question concerning *the epistemological concept of philosophy*' (PM, 14). At issue is the expression of philosophical truth in *writing*, the notion of 'literary form' being taken in this broad sense. In apparent sympathy with 'deconstruction', the general line of both texts is that 'the literary form of philosophy is not merely external to it, that on the contrary the form of presentation has or, after all, can have a methodical function' (LFP, viii; PM, 14). On the other hand, in sympathy with 'scientism' both texts insist that this line 'does not imply that the difference between literature and philosophy is abolished [*aufgehoben*]', which is to say, 'that by no means is the methodical claim of philosophical texts called into question' (LFP, viii; PM, 14). What is called into question is the 'exclusivity' of propositional truth in philosophy, 'not the concept of propositional truth' itself (PM, 14).

By showing the methodical importance of literary form and the concealed role of non-propositional truth in a number of examples from the history of philosophy, a strong case against scientism is made. Nonetheless, the issue is construed in traditional terms. There is little or no radical reconsideration, for example, of the relation of cognition itself to expression; of the question of the priority of writing or speaking; of the original authoritative sense of propositional, object-related knowledge; of truth as correspondence; or of the fundamentally apophantic and discursive structure of language. Instead, in both texts inquiry is limited to determining whether and how the epistemological concept of philosophy can (or must) be 'expanded' beyond the limits of direct, literal 'saying' toward an indirect 'showing' of truth. From that starting point, literary forms of philosophy can in principle prove to serve a methodical function 'only *via negationis*, ... as *non*-propositional, *non*-discursive, *pre*-predicative forms of knowing' (PM, 15).

Sympathy to the scientistic and deconstructive extremes is thus not (nor ever could be) meted out equally. Scientism is challenged directly on grounds native to scientism itself, that its conception of philosophical truth is simply too narrow to attempt to convey the full range of knowable truth. In contrast, 'deconstruction' is immediately set aside on grounds, the absolute *a priori* significance of which deconstruction purports to challenge. The basic charge is that a supposed 'indifferent identification' (*Gleichmacherai*) of philosophy and literature in deconstruction does not so much address as illicitly dissolve the question of the literary forms of *philosophy*. For it would likewise dissolve any epistemological intent of philosophy and hence any issue concerning how different forms of presentation might *methodically* serve that intent (LFP viii, 1; PM 14). Yet, in its defence, the avowed posture of deconstruction is not to mount an absolute discourse against truth — 'this is impossible and absurd, as is every heated accusation on this subject' (Derrida). Nor is the intent to *reduce* philosophy indifferently to literature, as if the terms assumed initially to define this juxtaposition and thence the supposed reduction were themselves an absolute given, marking out an exhaustive continuum (scientism — deconstruction) along which perforce one must take a stand. What deconstruction proposes instead is a therapy, whereby the unquestioned value of truth and of philosophy as the cognition of truth is analyzed, all the while recognizing in truth 'the normal prototype of the fetish' that we cannot do without. It may well be that this posture is all bluff, that if we cannot do without the 'fetish' of truth, then *eo ipso* the authority of truth must go irrefragably without saying. Still, one need not be committed to deconstruction to question whether the originating need and distinctive role of philosophy is exclusively or even predominantly the desire for knowledge and irrefutable truths, that propositional truth is the archetypal form of truth beyond which we at best 'expand', and whether in philosophy meaning ought to be interpreted strictly on the model of truth. Insofar as LFP and PM formulate the problem of the literary forms of philosophy in traditional, epistemologi-

cal terms as a question of propositional versus non-propositional truth, neither text considers the identification of the basic sense of philosophy with the guaranteed cognition of truth to be problematic. Hence neither text confronts seriously the issue of whether the attempt to question this sense radically can be made in the name of a different, yet still distinctive, *meaning* of philosophy. Instead, both texts assume that any such attempt amounts to the self-contradictory demise of philosophy.

LFP is comprised of 10 essays, most of the authors having, or having had, an association with Konstanz University. The first two essays are of a more general nature, dealing respectively with the issue of 'Literary Form and Non-Propositional Knowledge in Philosophy' (G. Gabriel), and the question, 'Can one philosophize poetically?' (H. Fricke). Seven of the remaining eight essays deal with the issue of literary form in the writings of a specific philosopher: Plato (T.A. Szlezák), Seneca (D. Teichert), Descartes (C. Schildknecht), Hume (B. Gräfrath), Kant (C. Wilson), Herder (U. Gaier), Merleau-Ponty (S. de Chadarevian). The eighth essay (T. Rentsch) considers the form of the *quaestio* in medieval philosophy. Appended is a selective bibliography, compiled from a computer search of the (German and English language) literature on literary form through the University of Konstanz library. Deliberately excluded are (most) references to secondary literature on philosophers who explicitly appear to philosophize in a narrowly 'literary' way (e.g., Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Montaigne). Also only those 'deconstructive' texts that contribute to the 'explicit thematization of the literary form of philosophy' are noted (which, for the reasons indicated above, means rather few) [LFP, 178]. Included is a very useful person- and subject- index to the bibliography.

PM is a 'slightly revised version' of the author's Ph.D. dissertation (Konstanz, 1989), the chapter, 'Descartes oder die monologische Form der Philosophie' (Chapter, II) appearing in a 'slightly altered form' in LFP. The theme is succinctly stated: 'Literary form makes it possible to see the forms of philosophical knowledge that lie behind the mask of the sayable. Through it, an understanding of philosophical knowledge as *non-propositional* knowledge can be gained, which, though directly opposed to the apophantic structure of language, can only be communicated linguistically masked' (PM, 16). This may be understood in two ways. On the one hand, a specific form of writing may be used philosophically to expose traditional philosophy and its literalist prejudices, contributing thereby to 'the *demasking* of science-oriented understandings of philosophy'. On the other hand, literary form 'can also itself serve ... as a deliberate *mask* of philosophical thoughts' (PM, 16). As the title indicates, PM is concerned with this latter role. Using the examples of Plato, Descartes, Wolff, and Lichtenberg, it investigates the connection between literary form and philosophical content in the dialogue, monologue, textbook, and aphoristic form. With Plato, Descartes and Lichtenberg, the task is to show in each case how the specific literary form serves an understanding of philosophical knowledge as non-propositional. With

Wolff, it is a matter of showing that 'ultimately the form covers-over the methodical deficiencies of his philosophy' (PM, 17).

Individual chapters in both texts stand on their own, and can be profitably consulted as a reader's interest in a specific philosopher dictates. Those having a more general interest in the philosophy/literature interface, and having traditional concerns pro or con about scientistic literalism, will find both texts illuminating and persuasive. The aficionados of deconstruction probably will not.

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Albert Shalom

The Body/Mind Conceptual Framework and the Problem of Personal Identity: Some Theories in Philosophy, Psychoanalysis & Neurology.

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International 1985. Pp. xxii + 511.
US \$22.50 (paper: ISBN 0-391-03576-2).

In the Introduction to *The Body/Mind Conceptual Framework and the Problem of Personal Identity*, Albert Shalom writes that the book 'can be conceived as being divided into two, very unequal, parts: a very long critical part, and a very much shorter proposal for a reorientation in the conceptual analysis of personal identity' (xix). Shalom tries in the balance of the Introduction to clarify the connection between the critical first part of the book and the synthetic second part. However, the attempt fails. Shalom's book does not consist of only a single pair of related parts. On the contrary, Shalom has assembled four separate and loosely related projects into a single book. The first project is a meta-philosophical statement about the importance and proper place of basic presuppositions in philosophical theories. The second project is a critical survey of major modern figures in the mind-body dispute. The third is an in-depth analysis of Freud's relevance to the mind-body dispute. Finally, the fourth project is a short proposal for a new conception of personal identity.

Shalom devotes Part One of his book to the meta-philosophical project. He argues, using the early Wittgenstein as an example, that philosophical views are products of 'basic presuppositions' (3). Basic presuppositions are background assumptions that determine how we conceptualize a problem. Although Shalom defines them more broadly than Kuhn's scientific paradigms, they correspond approximately to frameworks or conceptual schemes.

Parts Two, Three and Five of Shalom's book compose the critical project. In the ten chapters that make up these three sections, Shalom considers views of Wittgenstein, Strawson, Herbert Feigl, U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart, David Armstrong, Norbert Wiener, Derek Parfit, Julian Jaynes, R.W. Sperry, and Thomas Nagel, as well as others. Shalom's explications of the views of these diverse theorists are mostly penetrating and illuminating. But, Shalom too often interprets his subjects as subscribing to 'science' as a basic philosophical presupposition. That is, he accuses them of believing that the method of the physical sciences constitutes the only valid way of approaching the mind-body problem or the problem of personal identity. Consequently, his criticisms are shallow: he recurses to his basic philosophical presupposition — that the individual subject constitutes 'an essential and inherent limit to the scientific enterprise' (5). This bias prevents Shalom from engaging most of these extraordinary thinkers on their terms and leaves his dismissals of their views wanting.

Part Four of Shalom's book contains his third project: a careful analysis of Freud's work and an argument for its relevance to the mind-body problem. Shalom gives a detailed account of the development of Freud's thought. He shows particular insight about the relation between the *Project for a Scientific Psychology* and Freud's later work. Shalom reads Freud as never having fully abandoned the attempt, begun with the *Project*, to found psychology on physiology. Consequently, the various psychological agencies of Freud's later work bear an ambiguous relation to the underlying physiology. Shalom demonstrates that Freud conceived of the psychical as a set of independent quasi-physiological agencies, each with its own drives and desires. Shalom argues that Freud's fragmented view of the self precludes a unified account of personal identity. Nonetheless, Shalom takes Freud to be the foremost modern thinker on the mind-body problem and bases his theory of personal identity on modified Freudian ideas.

The fourth and final project in Shalom's book comes in Part Six, which consists of the final four chapters. This is Shalom's own attempt at framing a theory of personal identity. Shalom has found each theory he considered in the critical project wanting in the same respect: subscribing to the mind-body duality as a basic philosophical presupposition. Conceptualizing the problem of personal identity in terms of mind and body prevents any of these theories from ever solving it. Shalom proposes, instead, to take personal identity as a basic philosophical presupposition. Shalom conceives of personal identity in terms of a potential for subjectivity inherent in physical matter. The laws of our physical sciences may be accurate in their descriptions of the physical universe, but they are not complete. The physical sciences cannot account for subjectivity.

The four projects in Shalom's book might have been better carried out in separate books, but they do relate in significant ways. Shalom takes seriously the project of uncovering and analysing basic presuppositions that he demonstrates in the first project. He uses it to explicate and critique the views of all the theorists he considers, including Freud, as well as in developing and situating his own theory of personal identity. Shalom's critiques of previous theories on the mind-body problem and personal identity do serve their

purpose: to demonstrate that the mind-body duality stands in the way of a satisfactory theory of personal identity. And Shalom's exegesis of Freud is not only worthy for its own sake but also foreshadows Shalom's own theory of personal identity.

Besides its other virtues, Shalom's book has become more relevant since its publication in 1985. It is an early and often unrecognized contribution to the current debate on consciousness. Like Searle, Shalom believes that machines cannot be conscious. But, Shalom founds and defends his position more carefully than Searle does. What is more, Shalom understands the historical origins of the debate, as he shows in the first five sections of his book. Shalom's book also compares favorably with more recent books on personal identity, for example John Canfield's 1990 *The Looking Glass Self*.

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D.S. Shwayder

Statement and Reference: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Our Conceptual Order.

Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992.

Pp. xv + 459.

US \$129.00 (ISBN 0-7923-1803-X).

This book is Volume 1 of a projected 3-volume work. Its primary task is to elucidate a theory of statements as vehicles of truth and falsity that is grounded in a theory of action, especially of what Shwayder dubs 'conventional action'. For Shwayder, 'Acts are (physical) happenings of a certain kind, ... movements in or of the bodies of live animals' (14). Moreover, actions are happenings the live animal meant to occur. *Conventional actions* are actions that are both 'conformative' in the sense of rule-following and 'proficient' in the sense that they are learned behaviors involving 'knowing-how-to' (36-8). That is, such action 'is conformative action underlain by enabling rules for indicating all conditions of success for the action kind in question, these conditions to exclude all possible circumstances of failure' (57).

Speech is for Shwayder one kind of conventional action (42). Hence, language actions can be broken down into an Austinian list of 'constative' and 'performative' utterances, most centrally *assertion*. For assertions, he argues, are the vehicles by which *statements* are produced (Chapter 2).

'Statements are products of ... assertions successfully undertaken' (69). And 'an assertion ... is an act of meaning by saying ... what one thinks one knows to be so' (69). While assertions 'are episodic particulars, localized in space and time', statements 'may perhaps have dates, but not places' (77). To

say that statements are products of assertions, as Shwayder does, would seem to imply that until the relevant assertion is made, the corresponding statement does not exist. However, he wants to be more liberal than that: 'A statement exists at such time as

- (i) conditions are satisfied for doing a certain kind of assertion
- (ii) all of the conditions of success that would be indicated in such an assertion are satisfied' (82).

Chapter 3 is devoted to clarifying and defending his notion of a statement. He tells us, 'statements are both verifiable and falsifiable by application of procedures which must be known to anyone who is prepared to assert or to understand assertions of those statements' (217). Further, if 'an assertion succeeds and a statement is produced, then a successful application of its indicated verification procedure proves that the statement is true and a successful application of the indicated falsification procedure proves that the statement is false' (218). Shwayder then dubs these procedures 'tests' and tells us that the availability of such tests is necessary for the existence of a statement (234-5).

To identify *what* statement has been produced in a successful act of assertion, we are to specify pairs of tests, since different statements will have different verifying and falsifying procedures, or tests. Statements are hereafter to be represented as, but not identified with, their respective pairs of tests (235-6).

Finally, Shwayder provides an analysis of our notion of objects in which objects are conceived of as 'objects of thought or as "referents"' (256). This qualifies his theory, he says, as the transcendental idealist sort.

The remainder of the work consists of summaries of some 21 chapters to appear in volumes 2 and 3 of the work.

It must be said that the work is not unproblematic. First, Shwayder insists that 'My ... doctrinal inclinations are "materialist"' (29). However, he concedes that statements are not fully material: 'Statements are "temporal" things' (82), but not spatial. He agonizes over the spectre of metaphysical dualism haunting his theory, concluding that 'the dualism by which my ideology is threatened is [merely] of the "double-aspect" "spinozistic" kind' (29). But it's dubious that Shwayder can get off this easily. For one thing, it's dubious that *any* conventional action is strictly material, since while ordinary actions are in principle capable of complete description in a materialist language, conventional actions are not, this because such a description has as an essential part of it reference to the *prescriptive* content of the underlying enabling rules. And in order for such reference to occur, that content would have to be reduced to a materialist language, which appears impossible. To add to the problem, his argument for his claim that statements are temporal is not convincing. Indeed, it begins to look as if statements are not material at all. Hence, Shwayder is probably logically committed to a much more robust dualism than he is willing to countenance.

Second, there is a problem over the existence of statements. Either statements are products of assertions or they are not. If they are, it's dubious that two assertions could produce the same statement, for temporal reasons and for the reason that the assertions constitute distinct causal origins. But if statements can exist unasserted when 'conditions are satisfied for doing a certain kind of assertion', as Shwayder claims, then there is a different problem. For one of those conditions is that the assertor *A* believe something *F*. Evidently this *F* is not to be identified with a statement, and so it begins to look very much like a Fregean proposition, something Shwayder wants to shun because of the problem of 'access'. But if Shwayder must, as it seems, appeal to something like a Fregean proposition to advance the argument that statements can exist unasserted, then why not just stick with some version of Frege's account? It's ontologically neater, at least, and surely this *F* is a live candidate for being the primary vehicle of truth and falsity as well as the object of access.

Still, the book is well worth the read. Especially interesting, provocative and illuminating are Shwayder's extensive commentaries on Aristotle, Kant, Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. And his theory itself provides an enlightening way of evaluating the promises and failures of other competing theories.

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Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, eds.

From Africa to Zen: An Invitation to World Philosophy.

Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
1993. Pp. xix + 298.

US \$65.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8476-7774-5);

US \$24.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8476-7775-3).

The fast development of modern technology in communication and information has changed our vision of the world. The earth seems so small that every nation virtually exists as a member of this Global village. Science has been recognized as an enterprise without national territories; commercial business has been strongly influenced by the global market; politicians everywhere love to show their international sensitivity. But how much do we really know about other members of the village? Can we truly make sense of other cultures? Given the present situation, it seems very odd for philosophers still

to think that only analytic and continental philosophy can count as kinds of philosophy genuinely worth studying.

From Africa to Zen obviously issues a long overdue invitation to world philosophy. It addresses a deep need for a text introducing the vast riches and wisdom found in the diversified traditions of Africa, Arabia, Latin America, China, Japan, India, Persia, and the American Indians. This book contains a collection of nine essays on 'non-Western' World Philosophy with a short introduction by Solomon and Higgins. There is no prearranged order or structure to be imposed on the collection. The editors simply provide an opportunity for allowing the voices of the world of philosophy to speak for themselves, thereby offering a possibility for western philosophers to appreciate how various cultures see and think about the world. In a sense, this book is an intellectual guide, leading us on a philosophical tour around many mysterious, unknown, esoteric but rich cultures. I will discuss different cultural groupings in turn.

Asian thought: Chinese, Indian and Japanese philosophies. D. Hall and R. Amers in their 'Understanding Order: The Chinese Perspective' discuss Chinese philosophy's understanding of order and of the people of the Han (the majority of Chinese). Contrary to Western metaphysics associated with logos and cosmos, the Chinese understanding of order is essentially social and aesthetic. In contrast to the liberal tradition of Western society and people, the Chinese have been described as continuously living in authoritarian states without basic protection of their inalienable rights and their private life for more than two thousand years. S. Phillips's 'Indian Philosophies' offers a description of a brief history of Indian philosophy. Despite the complex and multidimensional nature of Indian philosophy, Phillips simply introduces most schools of philosophy without detailed discussion (such as Yoga, Mimamsa, Vaisesika and Nyaya, Vedantay). The section on Mahayana Buddhist Philosophies is short but very good. It captures the mystic, skeptic, idealistic and religious characteristics of Indian Buddhism. G. Parkes in his 'Ways of Japanese Thinking' tries to explain the Mishima type of seppuku (suicide — known as the essence of Japanese patriotism or a ritual action that consummated one's life as an aesthetic whole) against the philosophical background of Shinto, Confucianism, Taoism and Chinese Buddhism. Japanese philosophy, rather than being performed through abstract thinking, tends to concentrate on concrete things and a practical way of living within the world. Thus, Parkes strongly believes that the best way to capture the essence of Japanese philosophy is 'to look at Japanese art and architecture, see Japanese films, study Japanese martial arts, go to Japanese restaurants' (27).

Islamic thought: Arabic and Persian Philosophy. E. Ormsby mainly gives a short survey of the history of Arabic philosophy between the 9th and 12th centuries, from Al-Kindi, through Al-Razi, Al-Farabi to Avicenna and Averroes. Arabic philosophy is characterized as being historic and encyclopedic. It is historic in the sense that Arabic philosophy has been occupied by the tradition of the pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle. It is encyclopedic in the

sense that Arabic scholars attempted to interpret and comment on ancient Greek philosophy in an Aristotelian fashion. However, the Greek tradition was Arabicized, because the central task of Arabic philosophy is to search for a balance between faith and reason. Persian philosophy is divided into two periods: Pre-Islamic times and Post Islamic thought. In the former period, Zoroastrianism was the most influential doctrine concerning the existence of Ahura Mazda (Wise Lord) and the moral problem of good and evil. In the later period, Shi'ism has been the dominant Persian Islamic thought, which played an essential role in forming the modern self-concept of Iranian Islam. In summary, H. Sepasi-Tehrani and J. Flesch describe Persian philosophy as 'an ongoing dialectic between an anti-authoritarian pull away from other cultures and an authoritarian attempt to establish a culture of its own' (185).

African Philosophy. J. Trimier in her 'The Myth of Authenticity: Personhood, Traditional Culture, and African Philosophy' depicts a very interesting picture of African philosophy. 'Give me back — my black dolls — so that I can play the games of my instincts ...', writes a black poet, Leon Damas. Giving a philosophical interpretation of a 'black doll' — a symbol of African personhood — constitutes a focal point of African philosophy. Instead of articulating an abstract, rational, individualistic and ahistorical theory of personhood like most Western philosophy, African philosophers have eagerly searched for the self-identity of their own philosophy — the cultural and philosophical authenticity of the 'black soul' in its own colonialized culture, alienated society, deconstructive ethno-environment and religious history. Trimier's paper indeed gives us a lucid guide towards understanding how Yoruba religion and culture have been estranged in the racial myth of African personhood.

American Indian Philosophy. One of my native Indian students in the history of Western philosophy once told me that her people share a rather similar view with those ideas expressed by contemporary environmental and ecological ethics. I was puzzled by her remarks because the latter views obviously have come into fashion only recently in Western philosophy. J. Callicott and T. Overholt, in their 'Traditional American Indian Attitudes towards Nature', have certainly solved my puzzle. They not only provide an account of how a particular way of living influences the American Indian worldview of animism and ethics, but they also discuss its practical implications for American Indian philosophy in our environmentally troubled society. As they suggest, 'American Indian mythology could put imaginative flesh and blood on the dry skeleton of the abstract environmental sciences. ... North American culture and civilization should mix and merge with the rich legacy of its native peoples' (78).

Latin American Philosophy. J. Valadez provides a dictionary type of account of pre-Columbian and modern philosophical perspectives in Latin America. After he introduces pre-colonial Latin American cosmologies and scientific-religious worldviews, Valadez briefly discusses three cultures in pre-Columbian Latin America: the Mayan world, the Aztec world and the world of the Inca. The colonial period is characterized as syncretism. The

modern period of Latin American philosophy is largely influenced by traditional Marxism — particularly the Marxist social and political theory of class struggle.

From Africa to Zen ends with R. McDermott's 'Esoteric Philosophy', in which he precisely points out the value of the book — 'Try to go beyond your ordinary thinking, ... and try to transform your thinking into a kind of intellectual "seeing"' (269). In many centuries, Western philosophy has dominated the stage of World philosophy. This phenomenon has its deep cultural, historical and intellectual reasons. Maybe it is time to introduce non-Western philosophy and culture, if reality has already brought us to the Global Village. *From Africa to Zen* certainly issues an invitation to all of Western philosophers to appreciate World Philosophy. It is an initial step, and, although it necessarily treats its subject superficially, it is definitely welcome.

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Patricia H. Werhane

Skepticism, Rules, and Private Languages.

Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press

International Inc. 1992. Pp. xi + 196.

US \$45.00 (ISBN 0-391-03750-1).

Wittgenstein held that the pre-eminent feature of his philosophy was its novel methodology, central to which was a horror of philosophical 'theses' or theorizing.

Skepticism, Rules and Languages concludes as follows: 'A philosopher who persists in thinking the relation of an understood rule to its indefinite, unlimited range of applications to be a deep mystery calling for the production of ingenious ... theories — such a philosopher has not entered into the rich legacy of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations.' This appears a thoroughly Wittgensteinian precept. If the book it concludes is true to it, a follower of Wittgenstein will hardly cavil.

But *Skepticism, Rules and Language* (G. Baker and P. Hacker; Oxford: Blackwell 1984) is not the title under review.

Werhane's *Skepticism, Rules and Private Languages* concludes: 'The notion of a rule is that bedrock on which language-games, customs, institutions, and thus forms of life function in a multitude of ways to create, develop, and change that most important human phenomenon, language' (190). If this

is to be more than a vagary, one needs to know how a *notion* can be a 'bedrock'. And how could rules be more basic than *lebensformen*?

Whereas Baker and Hacker's book critiqued Kripke's Wittgenstein, Werhane's book criticises various 'Community Views' drawing on Wittgenstein on language: Kripke's, Wright's, Fogelin's, Peacocke's, Malcolm's. Werhane's only discussion of the massive Baker/Hacker *corpus* concerns the differentiation of 'rules' from 'rule-following', which differentiation she takes significantly to contribute to the 'Wittgensteinian literature'. Disagreeing with the Baker/Hacker emphasis on the 'internal relation' between rule and application, she writes: 'I want to separate rules from rule-following, because we actually do this so that rules are functional mechanisms which act as normative standards for directing and evaluating rule-following at least to the extent that not every application counts as "following a rule" or "following a rule correctly." It is likely that this distinction is important to Wittgenstein, too. Otherwise he would not say "there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation"' (158). But thus to cite this famous injunction of Wittgenstein's is to presuppose that, on the 'internal relations' view, '[having in mind] an interpretation of a rule is a criterion for understanding (grasping) a rule' (158-9). This evinces a complete misreading of Baker and Hacker, whose *entire argument* is directed toward showing that — as Wittgenstein sometimes states explicitly — when one grasps or follows a rule, *one does no interpreting*. Werhane mistakenly understands rule-followings to be interpretations (Viz. p. 124: '[T]he notion of a rule is distinct from language-games (interpretations) in which rule-following practices are embodied'). The idea of rules as normative standards set up above rule-followings, though initially intriguing, dissociates or *sunders* rules from action.

Furthermore, Werhane's rigidly distinguishing between rules and rule-following leaves one *wholly* at a loss as to how to take her idea that rules are 'the real bedrock'. How could a super-structural standard conceivably play the role of being 'the *bedrock* on which language-games ... and thus forms of life function' (190, *italics mine*)?

Such deep unclarity is made trickier to unravel by frequent smaller errors. For example: 'One of the reasons for various revisionary attempts at reformulating the private language arguments is to explain Wittgenstein's ubiquitous expression, "form of life"' (6). For a serious commentator on Wittgenstein to term the expression 'form of life' '*ubiquitous*' is a serious error. The expression occurs only five terms in *Philosophical Investigations*, and virtually *never* elsewhere in Wittgenstein's *corpus*. There are good grounds for thinking that this expression cannot bear the weight (exegetical and philosophical) which a number of commentators (Werhane included) have placed on it, and that the less concentration by followers of Wittgenstein on 'forms of life' in the future, the better. Several papers (none of which Werhane ever cites) have made this point.

Is Werhane seriously interested in following Wittgenstein? She applies extremely liberal criteria in deciding who is 'Wittgensteinian'; merely claiming to give an interpretation of his writings appears sufficient to qualify one.

But this would abolish the distinction between *seeming* (to oneself) to be following a rule / a philosopher, and actually *doing* so ...

Now, in the 'Preface', Werhane raises the pertinent question of 'whether there needs to be another book on the later Wittgenstein' (ix). The response: 'this work is not so much an essay on the *Philosophical Investigations* as it is a development of Wittgensteinian thought ...' (ix). But this may simply beg the question against those who would see Werhane's practice as 'Wittgensteinian' only in the kind of way that Khrushchev or Brezhnev were 'Marxian'. In any case, like Kripke, Werhane is not consistent in this policy, as one of her three main aims is nevertheless stated to be, '[k]eeping in mind what Wittgenstein set out to accomplish in his later writings, ... to make explicit the original [private language] arguments as Wittgenstein developed them and to reiterate their implications for traditional philosophy' (8). Just how is *this* aim supposed to sit with the following remark: 'This book ... takes some of Wittgenstein's best known statements and arguments in the *Philosophical Investigations* and reorganizes them into a coherent set of theses' (12)?

Many readers will find Werhane's book to be vitiated almost at the outset by her *methodology* and frequent lapses of *exegetical reliability*. Thus it is hard to foresee this text's audience; for only specialists in Wittgensteinian philosophy of mind and language are likely to be sufficiently interested to read more than the dust-jacket, but such specialists are precisely the readers most liable to bridle at the failings just noted, and at the complete absence from the body of the text of important interpreters of Wittgenstein such as Diamond, Winch, Cavell, Hallett, von Savigny, Boghossian, Budd, Rorty and Hacking. It isn't clear that you can write on a topic exhaustively detailed by Baker and Hacker, yet ignore writers such as Diamond and Budd, who are among the most influential of those disagreeing with the Community Views on *different grounds* from Baker and Hacker. In sum, while Werhane's formulation on p. 77 is nice: 'A language-game is a nexus of linguistic and nonlinguistic rule-governed activities', if one seeks a critical discussion of *rules* and *rule-skepticism*, this book has been very largely anticipated.

Werhane's extended attempt at taxonomising anti-*private language* arguments has more promise. She mentions the following distinct conditions (which can be applied or suspended in several combinations) on putatively private languages: <1> comprehensibility only to the speaker; <2> the subject-matter being 'immediate private sensations' (24); <3> the subject-matter being 'phenomena that can be known only to the speaker' (24); <4> development in physical isolation; <5> in *principle*, or only in *fact*, satisfying the preceding conditions. Unfortunately, the term 'private' itself is never explicated. Thus Werhane's Baker/Hacker-sounding conclusion, 'The private language arguments have to do with the privacy of *language* and not with the privacy of the subject-matter for a language or with the absence of a community' (188), lacks support. Too little is said about the 'stage-setting' required for language; nothing, about the possibility that Wittgenstein's methodology simply precludes 'theses' such as, 'Because the notion of a rule

is the basis of language, and because rules cannot be private, the idea of a private language is an absurdity' (189).

Other chapters peruse Hume's radically privatist theory of mind, and the Hintikkas' 'Language-game Thesis' (which features Werhane's only mention of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*).

There are some grammatical infelicities in the text. It is occasionally hard to distinguish the author's peculiar writing style from clear typesetting/printing errors.

The indices are thorough. This book may serve as a resource for those entering into the Analytic secondary literature on rules and private language. Perhaps it is such an audience that *Skepticism, Rules and Private Languages* seeks.

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Ludwig Wittgenstein

The Published Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Past Masters electronic text database. InteleX Corporation, Clayton, GA: 1993.

ASCII Database Size: 7,000,000 characters.

Folio File Size: 4,500,000 characters.

Individuals: US \$135; Institutions: US \$325.

First, the good news. Nearly all of Wittgenstein's published philosophical writing is now available in electronic form, in the language in which it was originally written, for a fraction of the cost of the original books. The texts are prepackaged with Folio Views, a program that allows the user to carry out quite sophisticated searches of any or all texts it contains and display or print the results with impressive ease and speed, displaying the result of complex searches almost as fast as one can type the words. The program, which can be installed on any PC with a hard drive, will already be familiar to anyone who has used any of the other Past Masters editions. The current catalog includes excellent and affordable editions of the chief works by many of the canonical figures in the history of philosophy, from Plato to Sidgwick. Folio Views presupposes very little computer literacy. It takes only a few minutes to learn how to navigate around the database and conduct simple searches; the more advanced features, such as searching for logical combinations of terms, or adjusting the format of the display, are clearly explained, both in the manual and in on-line assistance.

The principal advantage of such an electronic edition is that it can provide a comprehensive concordance and index, allowing the reader to move in-

stantly to whichever results of a search for a term or logical combination of terms requires further examination. For instance, a search for every occurrence of the terms 'criterion' and 'criteria' (41 paragraphs) 'Kriterien', 'Kriterium', and 'Kriteriums', (197 paragraphs), and the various forms of 'symptom' (25 paragraphs) takes less than a minute; one simply presses the space bar to start a search, types the first few letters of the term one is interested in, and chooses it and its cognates from a comprehensive list. A reader can then rapidly browse a concordance-style 'focussed' list in which each occurrence of the chosen terms is highlighted, expand the display so that the whole paragraph is displayed, or explore the context of individual passages in more detail. One can only wish that the authors of previous discussions of these terms could have had such easy access to the wide range of both mathematical and psychological examples that Wittgenstein used, or been able to systematically review the evidence that shows how his use of these terms might have changed after his often-cited explanation of the terms in the *Blue Book*. Queries about Wittgenstein's use of particular terms that would previously have taken many hours of searching can now be answered as a matter of course. And the results of any search can be saved on disk or printed. The program is sufficiently simple and rapid that one can use it on the spot in a classroom to display passages or search for terms, and can reasonably expect students to make use of it in writing research papers.

Now, the bad news. Unfortunately, the quality of the transcription of the texts into the electronic format is not up to the very high standards of previous Past Masters editions. Nor is the present edition in any sense complete: there are some gaps in the coverage of Wittgenstein's published works, and the published work is only a small fraction of Wittgenstein's literary legacy. Despite these failings, this edition will be invaluable to anyone studying Wittgenstein, at least until the Norwegian Wittgenstein Project's comprehensive electronic transcription of the Wittgenstein papers is available; while it will take some time to complete, the first part of their work should be available by 1996. But any potential buyer of the Intelix package should be aware of its limitations, which will be summarized in the remainder of this review.

It is seriously misleading to call the collection 'The Published Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein'; a more accurate, if less marketable, title might have been 'Most of the Published Philosophical Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, c. 1982.' First, the collection does not include the *Prototractatus*, originally published in 1971. This is a particularly unfortunate omission in view of its intimate relationship to both the *Tractatus* and the material in the *Notebooks 1914-1916*. Nor does the database contain any of Wittgenstein's published correspondence. As a result, much biographically interesting material and some extremely important philosophical correspondence is excluded. Wittgenstein's preface to his spelling dictionary for Austrian schoolchildren and the dictionary itself, one of the few items he saw to the press, are also omitted.

Furthermore, the database does not include anything written by Wittgenstein that was published after 1982. This includes the 'Philosophy' chapter

from the Big Typescript (permission was not granted by the *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, where it first appeared in 1989), the so-called *Geheime Tagebücher* (1985/1991), the *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume II* (1992) and the new material in *Philosophical Occasions: 1912-1951* (1993). Perhaps this can be rectified in a second edition. Otherwise, some explicit indication of a cut-off date would be appropriate.

But the greatest drawback in terms of the choice of sources concerns the German texts that were used in constructing the database. Instead of using the most recent Suhrkamp edition, revised by Joachim Schulte in 1984, they are all based on the earlier Blackwell editions, which use a different pagination; nor is the pagination in the Schulte edition indicated. Unfortunately, Schulte's revised edition makes use of hundreds of editorial corrections supplied by von Wright and Nyman. While most of these corrections concern relatively minor matters, such as corrections to punctuation, many address errors that substantially affect the sense, such as mistakes in construing Wittgenstein's writing, incorrect word order, and even a number of missing sentences and paragraphs. Schulte does not provide lists of alterations incorporated into his edition, so there is little clear editorial indication of the extent of the alterations. But in the case of *Zettel*, where Professors von Wright and Nyman gave me access to a copy of the corrections that had been incorporated into the new edition, there are frequently as many as ten corrections per page: the previous edition is seriously outdated. Those who plan to use any quotations from the database should first check them against the current edition; anyone interested in Wittgenstein's style should be aware that the punctuation of some of the works in the database is particularly unreliable.

Owing to space limitations, the current edition does not include any of the over 385 diagrams included in the published texts. (For present purposes, a diagram is anything that cannot be conveniently represented by the ASCII alphabet.) This drawback is not noted in the publicity for the database, but it is set out in the introductory matter, which also explains that it will be rectified on a forthcoming CD, and that buyers of the current version will be able to credit its cost toward the purchase of the CD.

Quite without warning, other aspects of the published texts that were used as the source for the database have also been left out. None of the footnotes or editorial prefaces are included. The blank lines that Wittgenstein left between certain paragraphs, an indication of the break between one section and the next, are not included. This is not a problem in the case of Part I of the *Philosophical Investigations*, as references for that text are given by section number. But for most of the other works, where references are given by the page and line number of the first line of each paragraph, one has to refer back to the published text to find out where one section ends and another begins. Another undocumented limitation, and one that could easily be corrected even in the present format, is that it is currently impossible to use the search facility to locate the diagrams, as the code used for diagrams

in the text is three asterisks, and an asterisk functions as a 'wild card' in Folio Views searches.

Browsing casually through the database, I noticed a number of worrying errors. The front matter lists a paper entitled 'Ursache und Wirkung' as 'URSACHE UND WIRKUNG.' The poem on page 12 of *Culture and Value* has been turned into prose. While the little arrow after the word 'this' on p. 307 of the 'Notes for Lectures ...' is correctly marked by the sign for a diagram, the two other uses of an arrow further down that page are not shown at all. As the 1980 edition of *Culture and Value* was the only text used in constructing the database that was available to me while writing this review, I decided to proof-read the first ten pages of that book against the Past Masters edition. The results were extremely disappointing: I found 14 divergences from the published text; in addition, none of the information about the dating of the remarks or as to where one remark stops and another starts was to be found (information that is provided in full in the German text and to a limited extent in the bilingual edition that had been used by the transcribers). Only one of the points of difference was an unproblematic improvement: 'Entwicklingen', (3.16 — references are to page and line number) a misspelling, had been corrected to 'Entwicklungen'. Another rather more debatable improvement was the modernization of Wittgenstein's spelling of 'explicit' (8.12) to the contemporary 'explizit', especially as there is no indication that such revisions were made. Presumably the editors constructed word lists from their raw transcriptions and corrected them by using a standard dictionary. The other twelve divergences from the text were all straightforward errors. The most serious was a dropped line, 'Zu einem Vorwort:', (6.7) the heading to an early draft of the preface to the *Philosophical Remarks*. I also found a missing word ('—das', 4.23), five places where the spelling of a word was changed or punctuation altered (3.16, 4.37, 6.3, 6.17, 8.1) and five places where italics were not shown (1.18, 4.2, 4.26, 8.14, 9.19). While the sample is too small to be a statistically significant indicator of the number of errors in the entire database, it does show that readers cannot regard it as a reliable transcription of the source texts.

As 'The Published Works of Ludwig Wittgenstein' is not a comprehensive edition of Wittgenstein's published works, is not based on the most recent editions, and does not appear to be a reliable transcription of the texts that were used, it would be foolhardy to place too much trust in any results that it produces. It is quite likely that the counts produced for the occurrence of frequently used key terms will miss a few instances of the term, and that any substantial quotations one prints out will contain at least one error. But if that forces people to carefully check the results of using this database against the relevant texts, and to give some thought to its limitations, it will not be an unqualified misfortune.

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Will Wright

*Wild Knowledge: Science, Language, and
Social Life in a Fragile Environment.*

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Pp. xiv + 236.

US \$39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-2050-4);

US \$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-2051-2).

Wild Knowledge is a short but densely argued critique of scientific knowledge, and a proposal for a more adequate, 'ecological' model of knowledge grounded in the formal structure of language. Wright argues that science as a form of knowledge is primarily a programme of social legitimation which has led to social instability and ecological disaster. Science has committed us to a vision of an 'objective' external nature which is 'incoherent' because it fails to recognize the relevance which social concerns have to the validity of knowledge claims while at the same time it legitimates social action on technical grounds. Traditionally, social stability was the responsibility of religion but science has largely replaced it because different scientific hypotheses can appeal to a common set of mathematical intuitions, which allow it to be self-critical in a way which religion cannot be. Wright mounts a discussion of the history of science, to show how science with its appeal to autonomous 'natural' individuals in a rational contract with each other displaced religion as the principal form of social legitimation. However this 'free market' of individuals detached from larger social concerns can only legitimate certain forms of social institutions, in particular ones which lead to ecological catastrophe. So while science is superior to religion in its ability to criticize itself, it cannot legitimate sustainable social institutions. Wright then attempts to construct an ecologically adequate reflexive and critical account of knowledge modeled on language as an active structure which strives to sustain its own formal possibility. On this model knowledge would have an absolute commitment to internal criticism and human sustainability which could not be captured or 'tamed' by any particular institutional vision of the human life. Only through commitment to such a truly 'wild' knowledge will we be able to legitimate social institutions which are sustainable.

Wright's book is marred by a pervasive fuzziness and looseness of language which allows him to treat different subject matters (which have only the vaguest affinities with each other) as though they are the same, and thus to give his narrative an appearance of coherence it does not have. As a result it is easy to take cheap shots at it. For example, Wright argues that science is incoherent and must be replaced by ecology, but of course ecology is (a branch of) science, and so on. Nonetheless there are interesting ideas in the book and the claims it makes are worth investigating. Accordingly I shall trace some of his major claims and briefly critique them.

Of crucial importance to his argument is the claim that science is incoherent because it postulates realism regarding the objects of its knowledge claims, and Wright spends the first chapter canvassing various contempo-

rary philosophical anti-realist arguments to make his point. Let us grant him the point: scientific knowledge is merely pragmatic or phenomenal or perspectival. In the second chapter Wright compares religion and science as belief systems, from an 'anthropological' perspective. When anthropologists study religion in a society they disconnect the question of the truth of the religion's core beliefs from the power of those beliefs to legitimate social structures. Largely on the strength of the claims in the first chapter Wright proposes to bracket the truth of scientific claims and study science anthropologically as a belief system primarily directed at social legitimation. There are two things wrong with this move. First, this argument equivocates on 'realism'. When pragmatists and perspectivists object to realism in science they are doing metaphysics not science — they are not objecting to the presumption of truth in the ordinary sense internal to the theory. But when anthropologists disregard the truth claims of religions that they are studying it *is* because they object to the presumption of truth in the ordinary sense internal to the religion (they do not believe, for example, that prayer brings rains). Anti-realism in religion, in the metaphysical sense discussed by philosophers, would be something like the claim that God is (really) the horizon of ultimate concern (as opposed to the 'realist' claim that God is (really) an entity of infinite power, etc.). The second problem is that religion — in the broad sense in which it is directed toward social legitimation — explicitly traffics in values, whereas science just as explicitly does not. To be fair we must note that it is the burden of Wright's third chapter to show that the Galilean revolution in science had a secret politics. Thus along with the new science came a new politics — the state of nature, the social contract, capitalism. That these social changes occurred simultaneously, indeed that they were part of a single pattern of intellectual change, is not in doubt. Wright, however, provides no compelling evidence that the new science was the cause, nor indeed that it is the 'realism' of science which is the cause within the cause; his history of science is just too simplistic. In any case, the separation of value and fact and the independence of scientific claims from their social uses is an enlightenment development. Rather astonishingly, given Wright's intentions, there is no mention of the Enlightenment, of the purification and self-criticism of disciplines and the resulting fragmentation of knowledge, of the discrediting of theology as science (because in its orderly inquiry does not converge on agreement). Or perhaps this is not so astonishing, because if one takes the *Aufklärung* seriously one will not imagine that the task of social legitimation is anything but its own task with its own critical standards, and one will not berate the sciences because it is not their task.

Despite this absence in Wright's historical narrative, the Kantian problem of the possibility of knowledge and its legitimation emerges in chapter seven (and with no reference to Kant). Given the direction Wright had taken to this point one might have expected him to advocate a Kantian solution with a pragmatic turn, perhaps à la Habermas. Instead Wright's candidate for the ground of knowledge is language, but language construed in an anti-realist

way where it 'no longer referred to an absolute, unassailable reality but to its own continued possibility, as a reflexive issue legitimating sustainable social practices'. Wright refers knowledge to a set of formal values organized around the idea of sustainability. Language, according to Wright, is not about a world outside itself but instead refers to the conditions of its own flourishing. The last chapters attempt to flesh out this claim.

I think Wright's claims about language are potentially very interesting. The idea that language is a set of legitimation procedures whose content is only fixed by structural features of language use, together with a naturalist account of the person and a big dose of moral theory — my gosh there is material for a book here. Unfortunately this isn't the book. The accumulation of vagueness is so enormous by the final chapters that it is almost impossible to understand what Wright's claim is. In particular it is not clear why our immersion of language should have any particular value consequences for us, why sustainability is a formal goal, or indeed, if it is not about the world, why should we think language is *about* anything. Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Nietzsche, all by some accounts, thought that language 'goes all the way down' but it is not clear that any of them would think that ecological sustainability was what language was *about*. Despite a hefty dose of words like 'formal', 'analytic' and 'necessary', there is just no argument for the claim that sustainability is the formal goal of language (whatever that means). It seems to me that the most charitable reading of Wright's thesis is that it is a romantic attempt to put *telos* back in the world which the enlightenment project of self-clarification of the disciplines took out. It is an attempt to construct a natural theory of value by way of a theory of inquiry. Unfortunately, Wright doesn't seem to realize that this is old territory already well travelled by Peirce, Dewey, and others.

Wild Knowledge is not a good book. There are fine moments in the book — particularly Wright's remarks about health and sustainability. But it appears to have been written in haste, and the line of argument that the realism of science is the root of our ills is flawed. Wright has not shown us that the ecological perspective he proposes isn't just good science doing its job.

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Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews

Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

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W.E. Cooper