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William P. Alston

Perceiving God. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1991. Pp. xii + 320. US\$36.95. ISBN 0-8014-2597-2.

This book is an important and compelling contribution to the currently vibrant topic of the epistemology of religious belief. Working from several decades of his own work in epistemology and the philosophy of perception, Alston argues that direct experiential awareness of God, or what he prefers to call the *perception* of God, makes an important contribution to the justification of religious beliefs. The thesis is not that the existence of God provides the best explanation of facts about religious experience, nor is it an argument from the latter to the former. Rather, it is the much more novel and dramatic thesis that people do sometimes perceive God and thereby acquire justification for beliefs about God in a way structurally like the way we acquire justified beliefs about physical objects through sense experience.

Alston's thesis has at least three features which make it very strong indeed. First, when Alston speaks of God and facts about God, he is arguing from a straightforwardly realist perspective, so there is no question of diminishing the import of his thesis by a retreat into subjectivism (4), Further, when he refers to religious or mystical perception, he is not talking about the rare, flashy types of mystical experience which involve sensory content, but the much more ordinary cases in which a person has direct, non-sensory experience which she takes to be of God. These would include situations in which the subject putatively experiences God as forgiving, loving, compassionate, powerful, etc. (43). Third, when Alston claims that such experiences form part of the grounds for justified religious beliefs, he is using a fairly strong notion of justification, one according to which the conditions for justification, suitably qualified to handle Gettier objections, are stronger than the conditions required to convert true belief into knowledge (284-5). A justified belief is based on an objectively adequate ground, one of which the subject can become aware upon reflection. These three aspects of the thesis make it both more difficult to defend than one might expect from the title, and, for the same reason, much more interesting.

An important concept in Alston's argument is that of a doxastic practice, developed from ideas found in Reid and Wittgenstein. By a 'doxastic practice' Alston means a way of forming beliefs and epistemically evaluating them. Examples include sense perception, introspection, memory, rational intuition, and reasoning of various kinds. He argues that it is rational to engage in any socially established doxastic practice that we do not have sufficient reasons for regarding as unreliable. The defense for this claim is partly that there are no non-circular ways of distinguishing reliable from unreliable doxastic practices, and partly that socially established practices can be and often are strengthened by self-support, typified by the way in which reliance on sense perception puts us in a position to predict the course of events. This

is an example of self-support because we cannot determine that our predictions are successful without relying on sense perception.

In the next stage of the argument Alston defends the claim that the formation of religious beliefs on the basis of mystical perception (M-beliefs) is a socially established doxastic practice. He finds that it exhibits all the defining characteristics of a doxastic practice, including self-support, but is too rich to constitute a single doxastic practice since different religions contain different systems of concepts and beliefs that furnish overriders for prima facie M-beliefs. Alston then finds it necessary to consider one major religious tradition as typical of a doxastic religious practice, and focuses most of the rest of the book on Christian practice.

The most difficult part of Alston's thesis to defend and the place at which readers are most likely to balk is the claim that beliefs formed on the basis of mystical perception justify distinctively Christian beliefs. Since there is a plurality of mystical, perceptual doxastic practices with mutually contradictory output belief systems, how can it be rational to accept one of these rather than another without sufficient external reason for regarding it as reliable? Here we face the worry that the best explanation of religious pluralism will leave the beliefs of Christian practice, and of any alternative religious perceptual practice, discredited. In response Alston argues that the rough agreement we find across cultural boundaries about the physical and social environment has seduced us into thinking that this must characterize any genuine mode of cognition. A better reading of the situation, he says, is that agreement is generally due to the fact that some areas are ideally suited to our cognitive powers, while other areas are not so amenable to human cognition due to the difficulty of the subject matter, even when genuine cognition is still achievable (267). In this respect Christian practice can be compared to mathematical exercises and target practice. What's more, there can be non-cognitive bars to getting things straight, and this is the essence of the Christian doctrine of Original Sin (268). Even on the 'worst-case scenario' in which there are no significant independent reasons for epistemically preferring Christian practice to its rivals, he valiantly concludes by the use of interesting, if not completely convincing, analogies that although this is not the epistemically best of all possible worlds, it is rational to continue to participate in an undefeated practice in the hope that inter-practice contradictions will be sorted out eventually.

Perceiving God addresses the issue of the justifiability of religious belief from the standpoint of the most advanced recent work in epistemology and the philosophy of perception. As such it ought to be taken seriously by any philosopher interested in the justification of belief-systems, not only by believers in theism.

Linda Zagzebski Loyola Marymount University

Robert Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum, eds.

Pornography: Private Right or Public Menace? Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books 1991. Pp. 248. US\$14.95. ISBN 0-87975-690-X.

The debate on pornography and censorship continues unabated. A steady rise in the rate of reported sexual assaults adds urgency to the debate, though no one is sure to what extent frequency of reports measures that of actual crimes. The present book reflects the recent phase of debate spawned by the U.S. Attorney General's Report (The Meese Commission) in 1986 and by the ordinance drafted by Andrea Dworkin and Catherine MacKinnon and adopted by Indianapolis and Minneapolis, though later judged unconstitutional.

The focal points of debate presented in this volume are those of definition, harm, and evidence of connection between pornography and harm. The editors have attempted to present a 'relatively comprehensive' look at important aspects of the issue (8). Part One presents excerpts from the 1970 U.S. Presidential Commission as well as the Meese Commission, enabling the reader to see the huge conflict between the two on matters of policy and assessment of empirical data, partly stemming from greatly increased dissemination of hard-core, violent pornography since 1970.

Apart from Commission excerpts, contributions are by Harry Brod, Susan Brownmiller, F.M. Christensen, Barbara Dority, Andrea Dworkin, Ronald Dworkin, Theodore A. Gracyk, Judith M. Hill, Tim LaHaye, William Linsley, Helen E. Longino, Rita Manning, Thomas Parker, Alan Soble, Gloria Steinem, Mary Jo Weaver and George Will.

The result is a highly readable collection, a mixed bag of philosophical, journalistic and homiletic styles, stimulating and accessible to the novice. Many passages are at least as interesting from the standpoint of rhetorical analysis as for content. It succeeds in bringing awareness to the different dimensions of current debate. Feminist, libertarian and traditionalist perspectives are represented, along with the burgeoning field of textual interpretation.

The book is not a replacement for Prometheus's earlier *Pornography and Censorship* (1983) by David Copp and Susan Wendell, which is better at giving basic, historically attuned, philosophical grounding for free speech positions, and for providing the raw material of empirical studies and court judgements. But it has in view a wider territory. Gracyk's article in particular is useful for pointing towards a more finely-tuned, interpretive approach to the question of defining and censoring pornography.

Taking into account the care and forcefulness with which the different positions are represented, the overall slant of this collection is anti-censor-ship. The context of argumentation is always the U.S. constitutional framework. The door is opened to representatives of a religious, family-oriented position (LaHaye and Parker) but leads to an ambush by Weaver who gives

an only partly qualified version of the view that Christian attitudes toward women conduce in hyperbolized form to pornography. The example of Jimmy Swaggart's disgrace is useful to her for reinforcing this argument.

The Canadian context for freedom of expression is very different, since the constitutionality of a law against hate propaganda has been upheld in *R. v. Keegstra* (1990), and on February 27, 1992 in *R. v. Butler*, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of a 1959 obscenity law. The Meese selection will be of interest to Canadian readers in light of the Supreme Court's favourable reference to the study, and its adoption of a threefold division of pornography into (1) explicit sex with violence, (2) explicit sex without violence but which subjects people to treatment that is degrading or dehumanizing, and (3) explicit sex without violence that is neither degrading nor dehumanizing — all in line with the Meese Report.

Brownmiller, Steinem, Andrea Dworkin and Longino have as their target for censorship dehumanizing, degrading sexually explicit materials that support male domination of women. This they distinguish from erotica which they do not wish to see proscribed. Hill makes the additional interesting case that restrictions on pornography are defensible without proof of actual physical harm caused. It is enough, she says, to show that women are degraded, lowered in value, by pornography. De-grading is a public phenomenon, she argues, and victim pornography, of the kind that portrays women as mindless, masochistic nymphomaniacs, defames womankind and thus de-grades them.

Of course one can argue, as Ronald Dworkin does (170), that much in the way of television and other advertising does the same thing to women. But the upshot need not be that censorship of pornography, being inconsistent, is therefore wrong. It may be instead that there should be tougher controls over commercial advertising. Certainly controls in Canada already exist, formally and informally, through the CRTC (analogous to the FCC in the U.S.) and the Canadian Advertising Foundation.

Soble argues that pornography is not defamatory because it is not propositional. That seems to me wrong. One can defame by suggestion as well as assertion. He also thinks that if pornography causes imitative harm, so do newspaper stories, and censorship on such grounds would be unsupportable in both cases. But there is a public interest and need for information that newspapers supply. A justification for risk-taking thus exists for newspapers and not for pornography.

Dority notes that there is a lot of sexual violence against women around the world in places where there is little or no pornography, and that women's rights have advanced here along with an increase in pornography. Both she and Linsley make the Miltonian point that members of the Meese Commission ought to have been dangerously affected by the pornographic materials if they are so harmful. A good debating shot, but not very weighty. Think of smoking. Lack of immediate production of cancer in everyone who smokes does not negate a causal connection.

Gracyk presents a convincing case for a sophisticated interpretive approach to assessing whether materials are pornographic or otherwise. Having denounced the 'intentional fallacy' (124) I doubt he would agree with the editors' Introduction, which states baldly that the intention or purpose 'is of crucial importance in deciding how to regard its sexually explicit representations' (9). It can be crucial, but not always. In *Huckleberry Finn* the intention to counteract racism, despite use of racist language, is apparent in the text itself. The intent is not so clear in Magritte's *The Rape* (125), depicting a woman's face with breasts for eyes and genital region for mouth, which a major critic saw as a protest against 'fixation and fetishization'. It seems to me context sensitivity should lead us to take account of a very different impact, say, door-to-door circulation of reproductions of *The Rape* would likely have, compared to that on art critics in a gallery exhibition. There is reason to guard against the elitism satirized by the story of 'The Emperor's New Clothes'.

Manning brings out the chilling effect of censorship on artistic endeavour, even when exceptions for artistic merit are allowed.

Will's article links in a powerfully emotive way lyrics of 2 Live Crew with the gang rape of a Central Park jogger. Never underestimate the rhetorical force of a good example. But when we turn to empirical analysis, uncertainty still reigns, as Christensen's sober and useful evaluation of the evidence indicates.

All in all, a variegated collection, uneven but stimulating. It should have a wide appeal and encourage new lines of inquiry.

Randal Marlin Carleton University

Robin Barrow

Utilitarianism: A Contemporary Statement. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar Publishing Company 1991. Pp. v + 195. US\$55.95. ISBN 1-85278-097-5.

It was eighteen years ago in 1973 that Bernard Williams, in his 'A Critique of Utilitarianism', prophesied the demise of utilitarianism, writing that 'the day cannot be too far off when we hear no more of it.' Pace Williams, however, that day has still not arrived, for in 1991 we have yet another contribution that attempts to defend utilitarian theory against the many criticisms that have been levelled against it. Barrow's book is a well-articulated, systematic, and sustained argument for utilitarian theory in general and rule-utilitari-

anism in particular. (Barrow concedes, albeit sometimes too quickly, that act-utilitarianism cannot overcome the numerous objections raised against it.) In addition to these merits the book contains both a name and subject index, as well as a bibliography. However, the book would have benefited from a more careful proofreading to correct both spelling mistakes and misnumbered footnotes (55).

Barrow begins by first distinguishing ideal theory from, to use a Rawlsian term, partial compliance theory. He argues that 'an ethical theory should be seen as an attempt to explicate what in ideal circumstances would constitute right conduct, rather than as an attempt to provide unambiguous prescription for conduct in the imperfect world we inhabit' (12). Therefore, he argues, it is no criticism of utilitarianism to argue that it cannot tell us what particular act to perform in the less-than-perfect real world. In accepting the traditional utilitarian thesis that happiness is the sole thing that is good in and of itself, Barrow does not commit himself to the view that utilitarianism is the ethical theory that would simply have us produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number. Rather, on Barrow's account, utilitarianism, as an ideal moral theory, would have us strive for a morally perfect world, where a morally perfect world is 'one in which everyone would be fully and therefore equally happy' (47).

With the ideal/real world distinction in hand, Barrow then proceeds to explicate the difference between three kinds of acts: right acts, justified acts, and morally intentioned acts. Right acts are those acts we ought to perform in an ideal world; we have, Barrow argues, a duty to perform these right acts 'even in the world as it is, where we can' (22). Justified acts are those acts we should perform in the particular circumstances of the less-than-perfect real world; we do not have, on Barrow's account, a duty to perform justified acts but if we do perform such justified acts, then our performance will be 'morally commendable' (22). Morally intentioned acts are those acts we perform sincerely, i.e., with the intention of producing happiness; if these sincerely performed acts do in fact produce happiness, then, on Barrow's account, they are justified and therefore morally commendable. If the morally intentioned act does not produce happiness, then it remains just that, a morally intentioned act: neither justified nor unjustified and neither right nor wrong.

Barrow's argument for rule-utilitarianism is threefold, but, nonetheless, it leaves much to be desired. Basically the argument is that, first, people are unreliable when it comes to individual judgement (111); second, rules are necessary for ordering and regulating a community in such a way as to ensure cohesion of both interests and attitudes (112); and third, the absence of rules in a community is likely to lead to both 'increased anxiety and frustration, and hence unhappiness, by dint of removing security' (112).

In addition to the positive arguments outlined above Barrow is also concerned to defend utilitarianism against some of the most compelling objections that have been raised against it. Thus he considers, among other things, the quantity or quality of happiness problem, the innocent scapegoat objection, the objection that utilitarianism doesn't give sufficient recognition

to other values such as truth, freedom, rights, et cetera, the problem that this theory cannot account for acts of supererogation, and that the theory is an impoverished moral theory.

Barrow has made a novel and important contribution to our understanding of utilitarian theory, especially with his arguments concerning the nature and function of ethical theories and his tripartite account of moral acts. If, as Barrow argues, an ethical theory should tell us what to do, not in the less-than-perfect real world, but rather under ideal conditions, then, when conjoined with his tripartite account of moral acts, it may indeed be possible to defend utilitarianism against at least some of the aforementioned objections and problems.

Kenneth F.T. Cust Bowling Green State University

Anne H. Bishop and John R. Scudder, Jr.

The Practical, Moral, and Personal Sense of Nursing: A Phenomenological Philosophy of Practice.

New York: State University of New York Press

1990. Pp. vii + 185.

US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0252-5); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0251-7).

Describing this study as the first philosophical articulation in English of the essence of nursing from a phenomenological perspective, Anne Bishop and John Scudder look to the current practice of nursing rather than attempt to develop new ways to understand and engage in practice. They say 'improvement of nursing does not come from philosophers or other outside "experts" prescribing new practice, but from nurses themselves actually recognizing and realizing the possibilities inherent in their practice, thus contributing to a living dynamic practice directed toward the future' (176). By discussing three senses of nursing — the practical sense (competencies and excellences), the moral sense (fostering the well-being of patients), and the personal sense (nurse-patient relationship) — they attempt to show how nursing practice is exercised as an 'in-between' situation (a privileged position enabling the nurse to foster team decisions in the plan of mutual care for the patient). Thus, say the authors, day-by-day care to patients, nursing's legitimate authority, and the in-between relationship, distinguishes nursing as a major health care practice: 'a practice in that it is an ordered way of caring for the

ill developed over time ... growing and evolving in response to its enduring meaning and to changes in general health care and in society (175).

A major contribution of this book for nursing as a profession is the emphasis the authors place on the sense of morality in practice, 'the primary moral responsibility on the nurse is excellent practice' (173). Even stronger they say 'since nursing has an intrinsic moral sense, an ethic of practice is required rather than applied ethic' - an ethic of practice that is expressed through a particular nurse's relationship with a particular patient. Most practicing nurses know this already but, say Bishop and Scudder, in nursing's effort to 'gain academic respectability' along side of the scientific and technological orientation of professions like medicine, the importance of relationship is sometimes forgotten. 'Recently, the use of the scientific model in which theory determines technique has been advocated by academic and professional leaders in nursing' (67), and when this happens practice can degenerate into technique. The effort to articulate nursing practice, as interaction with patients as persons to be helped rather than as problems to be solved, is not easy. The authors do this by pointing to the work of philosophers such as Gadamer, MacIntyre, and Zaner, as well as nursing scholars such as Benner and Gadow. What is missing in these discussions is the evidence from practice. The sometimes ponderous reading of the critique of these scholars would be enlivened by phenomenological description from practice, thus giving the import to that which the authors claim will enlighten practice.

Bishop and Scudder devote a chapter to each of the 'senses' of nursing, the practical, the moral and the personal. The moral and the personal, as integrally linked, point to the relationship with patients that nurses describe, in a survey done by the authors, as most fulfilling. This relationship, as an 'I-Thou' (from the work of Buber), is described as a 'triadic dialogue' as the nurse and patient together face the meaning and experience of illness for the patient, and therefore is a relationship that has an 'end beyond itself.' Again, the authors fall back to analysis and theory instead of pointing to actual practice to show what how triadic dialogue is experienced.

This book reminds nurses to look to nursing practice, rather than to scientific theory, for deeper understanding of the moral imperative of nursing that is inherent in nurses relationships with patients. Moral action of the nurse is to give competent, skilled nursing care to patients within the context of the meaning and experience of illness for patients. Such a reminder can assist in nurses re-focusing attention to ethics in every day practice and not solely on the complex ethical problems that must be attended to by the health care community together with society as a whole.

Vangie Bergum (Faculty of Nursing) University of Alberta

Peter Carruthers

The Metaphysics of the Tractatus. New York: Cambridge University Press 1990. Pp. xiv + 210. US\$42.50. ISBN 0-521-39131-8.

Both in this book and his earlier *Tractarian Semantics* Carruthers sets out to show that most of the early Wittgenstein's doctrines are more defensible than is usually thought. But, he thinks, whereas the semantic views are mostly true, the metaphysical ones are mostly false. He acknowledges that many of the later Wittgenstein's criticisms are 'facile'. But one of them, that of the Tractarian doctrine of 'logical objectivism' (the target of Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following), he believes, is not. We can all benefit, he claims, from understanding what is wrong with logical objectivism and the metaphysics which it presupposes.

Appropriating many of Dummett's views on semantic realism, Carruthers weaves together an account of the *Tractatus* which (as his principle of Charity demands) tries to maximize its interest for contemporary philosophers. In this he succeeds admirably, much of his discussion being deep and thought-provoking. Unfortunately he does not comply so well with his other guiding principle, Textual Fidelity.

Certain of his interpretations tend to drive all the others. These include his claims: that Tractarian objects are necessary existents; that their names have Fregean senses (cognitive content); that logic is in some sense 'prior' to metaphysics; that Wittgenstein's doctrine of the objectivity of logic involves Fregean senses and hence conceptual rather than metaphysical necessity; and that a defensible account can be given of the doctrines that elementary propositions and states of affairs are elementary. Since these interpretations are tightly interwoven, were even one of them weak the whole fabric would unravel. Yet, arguably, none withstands the strain of close comparison with the text.

Carruthers believes that 2.022-2.023 shows that Tractarian objects are necessary existents common to all possible worlds. However, in a footnote (181) he admits that these passages literally say only that all possible worlds have a *form* in common, this form being 'determined' (2.0231) by the objects, not identical to it. This is odd since elsewhere (91-912) he tells us that by 'the form of the world', Wittgenstein means the *set of logical possibilities* which the objects in various worlds determine; and such a set, he acknowledges, by no means requires that all possible worlds contain the very same objects.

Carruthers repeatedly claims that Wittgensteinian names aren't mere proxies for the objects they represent but carry with them idiolectic senses (8) or cognitive contents (4-5) so that our thought about reality isn't immediate but is 'always mediated by modes of presentation' (2). Such Fregean senses, he suggests, are needed for 'psychological explanation' (8): e.g., of how someone can believe the proposition that Fa but not believe that proposition

that Fb even when a is identical to b. Yet Wittgenstein explicitly denies that there can be difference of belief in such cases (4.241-4.243). For him names are referentially transparent, having only Bedeutung, never Sinn. Besides, since Wittgensteinian simple names never appear in idiolects, they can't have idiolectic senses.

Carruthers' commitment to Fregean senses for names and propositions infects what he says about the relationship between logic and metaphysics. Wittgenstein, he holds, thought that if we want to determine what is possible in the world we must 'confine ourselves to recognizing, on the basis of our knowledge of sense, what is possible or essential at the level of language' (20). But although Wittgenstein did claim, in 1913, that logic is the basis of metaphysics, he later came to think the contrary. In *Notebooks 1914-16* he emphasizes that it is a necessary condition of something being possible in language that it be possible in the world: 'The logical connection [between names in a proposition] must, of course, be one that is possible as between the things that the names are representatives of.' (*NB*26.12). And the same order of priority is evident again in his Tractarian view that the possibility of individual sign-combinations in language *shows* or *mirrors* 'the essence of the world' (3.3421), 'the logical form of reality' (4.121), or 'the formal-logical properties of ... the world' (6.12).

On Carruthers' account Wittgenstein's logical objectivism consists in the view that once we have determined what Fregean sense or concepts are to be associated with idiolectic expressions it is no longer up to us what logical properties and relations we project onto the world. All necessity is conceptual necessity, though Wittgenstein confusedly thought that some was metaphysical. But this interpretation flies in the face both of the afore-mentioned passages and of still others in which Wittgenstein asserts that internal, formal, logical properties and/or relations hold of or between objects (2.0233) and facts (4.122-4.1223) and situations (4.124-4.125) in the real world. So, too, does Carruthers' related claim that all necessity is truth-functional necessity — a doctrine which Ramsey (citing 4.123) correctly rejected in 1923.

Finally, Carruthers claims that Wittgenstein's doctrine of the independence of elementary propositions can be modelled in such a way as to make it true. An elementary proposition, he suggests, might have the form There exists a point-mass at the intersection of planes a,b, and c at time t' in which since 'no attempt is made to name point-masses or treat them as individuals' (141) the only names that occur will be of necessarily existent spatio-temporal coordinates. But this is inconsistent with Carruthers' repeated claim that elementary propositions must be singular not existentially general. It is also inconsistent with the Tractarian requirement that the names which feature in elementary propositions be names, not of points in (logical) space — points which could be empty (3.411) — but of the occupants of certain of these points, those objects (perhaps point-masses) which 'make up the substance of the world' (2.021).

Although these and other textual infidelities make Carruthers an unreliable guide to the *Tractatus*, the semantic, logical and metaphysical views he foists upon it are interesting in their own right and make his book well worth reading.

Raymond D. Bradley Simon Fraser University

Robert C. Coburn

The Strangeness of the Ordinary: Problems and Issues in Contemporary Metaphysics.
Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 1991.
Pp. 194.
US\$38.00. ISBN 0-8476-7606-7.

Granting that a good deal of tabloid metaphysics is trash, Robert Coburn comes up with 'the best account' of metaphysical discipline (x). 'Metaphysics is the discipline that is concerned with a variety of questions and problems that arise when one reflects upon certain notions that provide everyday thought and notions such as time, space, object, property, necessity, possibility, existence, fact, God, consciousness, causality, event, truth, proposition, and value' (x).

For specialists it is very welcome to see this shrewd and penetrating philosopher, whose articles have been respected for years, spread his first book before us: (1) The Persistence of Persons; (2) Freedom, Necessity, and Chance; (3) Materialism and the Mental; (4) The Possible and the Actual; (5) Essences, Origins and Branching Worlds; (6) The Passage of Time; (7) Metaphysical Theology and the Life of Faith; (8) Truth, Epistemological Optimism and the Limits of Science. An analytical feast! The feast is likely to choke the 'advanced undergraduates' for whom Coburn recommends the work. But some 'graduate students' and some 'professionals both within and outside the discipline of philosophy narrowly understood', if they are prepared to read and reread the pages with devotion, are likely to learn a great deal about reasoning. 'Taking one or two introductory courses' and reading his 'glossary of technical terms', however, are unlikely to 'make the book as widely accessible as possible' (x). What we philosophers teach, we too easily identify with what the near-beginner can learn.

'Metaphysical Theology and the Life of Faith' is probably the chapter with the widest interest for a mixed readership. There is a keen, but not exclusive focus on the Judæo-Christian tradition. This is taken to suffer from two historical patterns of exposition. The 'Mystical' or 'negative' tendency 'makes it analytic that God is absolutely ... "mystical", devoid of any feature(s) the possession of which would in any way restrict or define it, or distinguish it from anything else, actual or possible' (125). 'Such a being cannot exist alongside others.' Nor can it 'enter into causal relations with other things.' Only 'symbolic expressions' can be used in our faint attempts to approach God cognitively.

Coburn in his second footnote illustrates recent examples of this first *tradition* from Tillich's writings. He could more helpfully have illuminated a long tradition by showing how some far from Biblical ideas of Neo-Platonism affected alleged theism through writers like Pseudo-Dionysius and Eriugena. Their contrast with the ontology and semantics of the Testaments, combined with their attempts to cling to pure Scripture, do more than Tillich's demythologyzing and nods towards Heidegger to reveal a strange *tradition*.

Coburn is much more in sympathy with the other 'tendency' which treats God as a determinate particular, existing through time, the cause of many beings and events, acting on intentions and purposes, loving, etc. This is the 'anthropocentric' or 'positive' tendency. Coburn views religious writers as often prone to combine the literal tone of the second approach with the symbolic and sadly obscure pattern of the first. One might reply that if the believer's God is so different from humans in many ways, and if human's mystical experiences sometimes indicate a Being so unlike our species, then we may well need to use two modes of discourse (but with a lot more care) to speak of God in relation to His creatures. Perhaps, as Pseudo-Dionysius, Eriugena and Tillich partly grasped, a 'language' for a more Moorean pluralism and a language for a more Spinozistic sort of Monism will be valuable in tandem (Immanence and Transcendence).

Coburn proceeds to sketch what it is to be in forms of 'Faith state', principally Christian and potentially independent of the metaphysical traditions. He concludes his family of meanings: 'Neither the absence of "belief" in the anthropocentric sort nor ... of the mystical sort, after all, makes it impossible that one should have a sense of the numinous, be filled with peace, love and joy, hold the pursuit of worldly "success" in disdain, feel grateful for all the goods that grace one's life, participate in the religious ceremonies of a particular tradition and so on' (130). He goes on to point out that people may subscribe to such metaphysical doctrines, yet largely fail to show the features of the Coburnian 'Faith-states'. Clearly, he implies, the latter are more relevant to having a religious Faith than the former. Otto, Wittgenstein and Braithwaite appear to triumph. The discussion is very worthwhile, but suggests — as other passages do — that Coburn is unduly squeamish about the limits of intelligible discourse.

The two chapters on metaphysica and modality attack some efforts of leaders like Plantinga, Adams and Kripke in a masterly way. We should conclude that here as elsewhere the most acceptable view will, in all probability, fall short of meeting all the desiderata that we might wish it to meet. But a second conclusion also strikes me as reasonable, namely that further work may have to be done in this area of metaphysics before we even glimpse

the contours of what will eventually appear to be a reasonably attractive view' (87). Alas, there is no proper discussion of Categorially Possible Worlds and related ontologies — see my *Self-Knowledge and Social Relations* for a start.

Coburn's good book belongs on the professional philosopher's shelf.

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Lorraine Code

What Can She Know?

Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1991.

Pp. xiv + 349.

US\$42.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2476-3); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8014-9720-5).

This feminist overview and critique of traditional epistemology attempts so much. The main attack is on the subject/object distinction allegedly upheld by traditional epistemology. The distinction, it is claimed, underlies a conception of knowledge in terms of which knowledge of relationship is discredited, and knowledge of the self obscured. Traditional philosophical (mis)emphasis on self-sufficiency and autonomy reinforces this myopia, as do modern conceptions of the abstract self. A secondary target is the essentialism which lurks beneath the surface of so many accounts of feminine knowledge. It is repudiated on the grounds that it is unsubstantiated, and in any case, politically incorrect. In place of traditional epistemology Code defends an ecological, relational, approach to knowing which incorporates a methodology of case-by-case reasoning.

Code's project is all-encompassing and integrative. With so much on her plate, small wonder if her historical surveys, painted in swift broad strokes, create scholarly consternation. The subject-object distinction has been denied at least as often as it has been asserted. Treating it as a symptom of patriarchy is bound to strike even rather indifferent scholars as suspect. Similar objections may be registered against Code's accounts of self-sufficiency, autonomy, and essentialism. They bear little resemblance to the concepts which occur in the work of Aristotle, Kant, and object relations.

In a way, however, the scholarship does not matter. For what is really under attack is a certain ideology concerning subjects and objects, essentialism and autonomy, an ideology which is not officially recorded, not widely admitted, and yet, we suspect, functions, and has pernicious effects just the same.

The subscribers to this ideology are, not surprisingly, just as elusive as the ideology itself. For who today takes seriously the misogynist belief that women are more irrational than men? Yet Code treats this issue as if it were still alive. If she is right, then her real claim, which she does not make entirely clear, must be that in subscribing to a too narrow conception of legitimate knowledge, epistemologists inevitably regard those who lay claim to illegitimate forms of knowledge as irrational. Since women are most inclined to make such claims, too narrow a conception of knowledge leads to the conclusion that many women are irrational.

What is excluded by traditional conceptions of knowledge is the kind of knowledge involved in friendship, trust, and other such relationships. Code suggests that such knowledge is actually prior to all other kinds of knowledge, and is a condition of it. This truth, she thinks, has been submerged by the traditional 'malestream' emphasis on self-sufficiency and autonomy. Uncomfortable with closeness and community, malestream epistemology has denied the possibility of knowledge of other persons, and upheld, instead, knowledge of 'medium-sized objects.' The bizarre conclusion that we can never really be sure about other people leads us to close ourselves off from the dialogic knowledge produced through community, and it leads to scepticism regarding the capacities of unofficial knowers to know. This refusal is complicitous in the exclusion of the underprivileged from the halls of power. Thus medical doctors ignore or trivialize the complaints of their female patients, and psychologists and social welfare workers fail to listen when clients voice their needs. This refusal to listen to others, who have few credentials, and are underprivileged, is not restricted to women, but is extended to people of 'other' races and classes. In other words, the legitimacy of certain kinds of power is bolstered by the refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of unofficial sources of knowledge.

Since the possibility of gender-specific knowledge is rejected, what *she* can know turns out to be what anyone can know, and the fact that *she* tends to know it is attributable to culture rather than to nature. What she can know is the art of friendship, and of analogous sorts of relationships, an art which involves greater sensitivity, and higher levels of awareness and of listening, of receptiveness and reciprocity. What she can know, as well, are certain aspects of her self. Not the abstract isolated self of modernity, but the embedded, shifting, non-essentialist, yet self-reflective and critical self of history, of circumstance, and of discourse.

Recognition of the reciprocity between two subjects which is involved in the knowing of relationship aids in the deconstruction of the subject/object dichotomy. This deconstruction undermines the assumptions on which privileged knowers who treat subjects as objects depend. This sort of knowledge, moreover, occurs on a continuum, developing gradually, in the same way as relationships develop. And this teaches us not to see knowledge as an all or nothing affair. There are not then, those who know, and those who do not, but rather many learners, all in the process of learning more. The knower becomes a kind of artist, and the lessons of relationship are to be carried over

to nature and to the objects of science. It is the development of this knowledge which will ultimately counter the tendencies of the social sciences to dehumanize their subjects, which will ultimately undermine the powers which exclude and oppress.

This line of thinking is provocative in challenging the prevailing view that we cannot know other persons, and is richly suggestive in raising questions about the relation between method and product in the communicative arts. Code contents herself, however, with 'mapping the terrain'. We are left with suggestions only, and not even an incipient theory of what makes communicative reciprocity knowledge.

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George B. Connell and C. Stephen Evans, eds.

Foundations of Kierkegaard's Vision of Community: Religion, Ethics, and Politics in Kierkegaard. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1992. Pp. xxii + 245. US\$45.00. ISBN 0-391-03724-2.

Love, grown too intense, smothers. Love can become something, finally, that the beloved must escape in order to live. Love, grown too intense, idealizes the beloved, eradicates the flaws of the beloved, to such an extent that what is loved may no longer be the beloved, but the ideal. Love, that is, in a variety of ways, can *depersonalize* the beloved to the point at which it makes itself impossible, since love must be love of a *particular* person.

This is also a danger in philosophical exegesis, which is itself, in its best moments, an expression of love. You love the work of some philosopher, so you devote considerable attention to his writings, savoring them, trying to understand them in their particularity, thinking with them, in them, through them. Now it comes time to make your love public, to explain your love in terms people can understand. But in contrast to the richness and idiosyncrasy of the original work, your reflections on it are stilted, pedantic, mechanical. You have smothered the beloved with your love; you would have done better simply to gesture at the text and say: *this* is what I love. Or perhaps someone begins to point out flaws in the beloved text, flaws which you find intolerable, because you have idealized the text. Someone points out inconsistencies, omissions, implausible claims. You are now obliged to rectify

the inconsistencies, fill the omissions, render the implausible passages plausible. But now what you are writing about is not what you loved in the first place.

Forgive me for beginning by digressing. The point is that all those things happen in this book. It has long been common wisdom that Kierkegaard was an anti-social philosopher, a philosopher of the individual par excellence. But currently it is widely held that individuals are socially constructed. Now the scramble begins. We admire Kierkegaard. By all means, let us dig up passages in Kierkegaard that, with enough teasing, yield a 'vision of community.' When we're finished, it turns out that Kierkegaard was a social scientist. We have repaired the flaw. But what we now have is not what we loved to begin with.

This volume collects papers delivered at a Kierkegaard conference at St. Olaf College in 1988, and I hasten to add that several of them are exemplary. Stephen N. Dunning, for example, provides a very helpful discussion of independent thought and divine authority in Kierkegaard's epistemology. Mark Lloyd Taylor contributes to our understanding of the connection between Fear and Trembling and Repetition, which were published on the same day. George B. Connell carefully differentiates the ethics expressed by Judge William in Either/Or from the ethics of Kant. In a quite beautiful essay. Edward Mooney discusses the articulation of the human self by analogy to the story of Abraham and Isaac. Merold Westphal richly integrates the pseudonymous and Christian authorships in arguing that the religious stage of life ultimately places all ethical and political order in danger. Stephen Crites, in what is the best essay I know on The Sickness Unto Death, playfully uses and abuses the antisocial fulminations of the pseudonym Anti-Climacus to develop an idea of a community of prayer. Michele Nicoletti, in the paper that best fulfills the book's project, both respects Kierkegaard's hatred of politics and thoughtfully examines the political implications of his thought. Kierkegaard scholars will certainly find the book worth reading in virtue of these essays.

But there are far more problematic efforts here. Michael Plekon mounts an argument, or, more accurately, a series of assertions, to the effect that the Kierkegaard of Works of Love was, of all things, an orthodox theologian, i.e., a representative of Christendom. No comment. Louise Carroll Keeley defends Kierkegaard from the charge of acosmism (rejection of the world) by a heavy-handed exegesis that is accurate except in tone: it loses precisely the lightness that occasionally floats Kierkegaard out of the world. Eric J. Ziolkowski trots out every reference to Don Quixote in Kierkegaard's writings, which only shows that Kierkegaard never mounted a coherent reading of the novel. Nothing relevant to the purported theme of the anthology arises. Bruce Kirmmse seems, in the course of a sketchy account of all modernity, to claim that Kierkegaard was a sort of proto-Marxist. Think about that for a minute. Wanda Warren Berry, in a feminist reading, uses Kierkegaard's notion of forgiveness to answer the question of whether women should forgive men for millennia of oppression. The use of Kierkegaard here is utterly

gratuitous; anyone's concept of forgiveness would have done as well, and almost anyone's better, since, as Berry admits, she is talking about collective forgiveness and collective consciousness, concepts as foreign to Kierkegaard as can be. Charles Bellinger gives an intolerably superficial Kierkegaardian account of the holocaust and the cold war that proceeds along the following lines: 'The Nazis killed the Jews because they were panic-stricken before the redemptive future, to which God was calling them' (224), and 'the cold war ... is a struggle between the aesthetic and ethical spheres of existence' (224, 225). Aside from being intrinsically asinine, such claims read Kierkegaard as providing a structure for world history.

Finally, I think that beyond pointing up the joys and, more often, the dangers of exegesis, the essays in this volume have the effect of undercutting rather than accomplishing the project proclaimed by the book's title and its introduction. Many of these papers have no apparent relevance to Kierkegaard's alleged 'vision of community,' and those that do demonstrate that such a vision can only be inferred from stray remarks. At best, then, the premise of this book is paper-thin. At worst, it is an utterly misguided effort to save Kierkegaard from everything that makes him worth reading.

You always hurt the one you love.

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Robert Denoon Cumming

Phenomenology and Deconstruction: The Dream is Over.

Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

1991. Pp. 255.

US\$49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-226-12366-9); US\$17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-226-12337-7).

Spurred on by such thinkers as Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty, there has been a concerted effort by historians of 20th-century philosophy to determine whether our age constitutes a conclusion to the Western philosophical project. In his book *Phenomenology and Deconstruction*, Robert Denoon Cumming presents an historical overview of the intellectual exchange and divergence of the most decisive thinkers in 20th-century Continental thought, including Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. The distinctive mark of Cumming's analysis is his concentration on the development and subsequent abandonment of the idea of philosophical method, particularly as pioneered by Edmund Husserl with his formulation

of phenomenology as rigorous science. Cumming's thesis is that even when we witness the apparent opposition to any programmatic plan of inquiry, for example, in Heidegger's poetic, meditative thinking, an analogous concern still remains as to how philosophy can gain its bearings and chart its course (23).

Cumming begins with what might seem a rather innocuous assumption that Husserl's conception of phenomenology as 'rigorous science' constitutes the most paradigmatic sense of method (23, 27). Husserl voiced the call to 'return to the things themselves' that Heidegger later took in a noticeably different direction in his effort to re-ask the question of Being by adopting the existential analysis of human existence as his point of departure. Within the French school of phenomenology, Sartre later defined the intentionality of consciousness in ontological terms, while Merleau-Ponty took a more decisive turn by recovering the origin of meaning in bodily comportment. Together their thought paved new avenues for the practice of phenomenological method. Moreover, as Cumming aptly shows, the subsequent way in which the four phenomenologists confront, appropriate, and misunderstand each other defines the subtext in the development of twentieth-century thought that provides important clues into the strengths and weaknesses of each thinker's philosophy. The historicist delineation of these lines of debate notwithstanding, there remains a further concern of whether a deeper crisis in Western thought inaugurates the 'call' of phenomenology rather than the Husserlian genre suddenly emerging on the scene with its own agenda.

In a concise and consistent manner, Cumming identifies the different wrinkles that each of the philosophers develops within phenomenology, thereby allowing for a well-balanced and even presentation of each thinker's contribution. The student of phenomenology, as well of intellectual history, is sure to benefit from this detailed analysis. But the attempt to present so fair-mindedly the personal and ideological conflicts of Husserl and Heidegger, Heidegger and Sartre, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, may very well have the opposite effect of domesticating the controversies within thinking itself that create these divergences. For example, Cumming cites Heidegger's famous remark at the close of the second introduction to Being and Time that 'higher' than the actuality of phenomenology as a philosophical movement is its status as a possibility for thought (29). Cumming interprets this statement as Heidegger's early tendency to superimpose his own phenomenological agenda upon Husserl's, as the latter would subsequently view it. But while this divergence is decisive, it may also obscure the more important development of how dramatically Heidegger subjected his own phenomenology to critique and sought to radicalize it both by linking it to hermeneutics and by recovering its origin in the Greek experience of truth as Aletheia.

Cumming brings to light some important questions in sorting out the differences between Heidegger's approach to philosophy and Sartre's as documented in Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism'. Specifically, Cumming argues that the danger of Heidegger's criticism of Sartre's having 'vulgarized' philosophy by bringing it to the level of 'public accessibility' lies in diffusing

the impact of thought on worldly events (71,75). Even if we grant Heidegger's own premise that philosophy need not have such impact in order to be valuable, there still remains a question of whether a philosopher's willful withdrawal from the public arena may itself imply a tacit endorsement of the malicious acts perpetrated under a given political banner. The case in point lies in Heidegger's reluctance to ask what measures can be developed within his own thought to counter the dangerous forces unlocked by the movement of National Socialism he initially followed.

In a provocative fashion, Cumming shows how methodology in contemporary thought takes on and assumes an amorphous character; the idea of method initially assumes a 'dialectical' slant with Sartre and then takes on an intuitively sensory form in Merleau-Ponty, only to be offset through Heidegger's later proposal of the 'end of philosophy' and Derrida's execution of that plan in deconstruction (150, 155). The end of philosophy demands the abandonment of any 'systematic' approach like the dialectic in favor of affirming the more innovative influence of 'style' to be used like a 'brushstroke of a painter' (161). But in view of the apparent dissolution of all methods, Cumming argues that the need to mediate 'the failure of philosophers to understand each other' provides an alternative source to fuel philosophical dialogue that outstrips any simple portrayal of philosophy's end (186).

There is a degree of sophistication in Cumming's scholarship that merits attention, for example, his selection of certain key texts in Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. Yet this makes it all the more strange that Cumming would neglect to mention a key figure in the development of phenomenology in the 1920's, namely, Max Scheler. This figure, whom Ortega y Gasset described as the 'genius' of phenomenology, not only expanded Husserl's more theoretical concern for intentionality on a practical front, but also helped to inspire Heidegger's reformulation of human existence through the analytic of Dasein. Indeed, while Cumming emphasizes the fact that Heidegger dedicated Being and Time to Husserl (28), he misses the importance of Heidegger's dedicating Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) to the 'memory of Max Scheler.' While this omission does not mitigate the significance of Cumming's thesis, it does suggest another area that could be fruitfully explored.

One might well question whether Cumming's historicist approach does justice to the complexities both Heidegger and Derrida envisage when they examine the most elusive 'margins' of discourse from which the philosophical enterprise emanates. Yet there remains a plausibility to Cumming's claim that 20th-century thought is really an exercise in the crossfertilization of different methodologies. As such his book proves worthy insofar as it directs us to this fertile area of inquiry.

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Daniel Devereux and Pierre Pellegrin, eds.

Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote. Paris: Édition du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique 1991. Pp. 528. 370FF. ISBN 2-222-04403-0.

The proceedings of a seminar held on the île d'Oléron in the summer of 1987, this volume contains twenty-two essays, twenty of which have not appeared elsewhere, together with a brief, clear introduction by the editors and a full index of Aristotelian passages cited. Many of the essays focus on some aspect of Aristotle's scientific practice or methodology, several narrowly and technically, but others only rather tangentially. The contributors specialize in diverse areas of Aristotle's logic, metaphysics, and biology; most have more than an antiquarian interest in their subject, and cast their inquiries in ways designed to highlight Aristotelian import for questions of contemporary concern. Two dominant themes surface in most of the investigations. The authors want to know: (i) to what degree, if any, Aristotle's scientific practice conforms to the dialectical and epistemological methodologies sketched in his more theoretical writings, including especially the *Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics* and *de Anima*; and (ii) how, if at all, Aristotle's field investigations helped shape his conception of necessity, definition, teleology, and substance.

These topics do not surface in every essay. Indeed, no unifying theme runs through the entire volume: some essays head off in directions orthogonal to the main subjects of inquiry (so Muadlin's quirky, interesting 'Substances and Space-Time: What Aristotle would have said to Einstein', and Thom's 'Homéomères en théorie biologique d'Aristote à aujourd'hui'); and others proceed relatively aloof from the stated focus of the volume (so Frede's 'The definition of sensible substances in *Metaphysics Z'*, Broadie's 'Nature and craft in Aristotelian teleology', and Bolton's 'The epistemological basis of Aristotelian dialectic'). Even so, there is sufficient thematic unity for the papers to be mutually illuminating, and some of the papers which do not sit directly on the interface between Aristotle's philosophy and biology are the most engaging in the volume.

Among those papers taking up the main theme of the seminar in a central way, the most useful for those not already party to the principal lines of debate is G.E.R. Lloyd's lead piece, 'Aristotle's zoology and his metaphysics: the *status quaestionis*. A critical review of some recent theories'. Noting the surge of interest in Aristotle's biological writings in the last decades, Lloyd comments: 'It is no longer a matter of a handful of specialists studying the finer details of Aristotle's descriptions of the reproduction of octopuses' (7). Rather, '[a] wide variety of scholars have come to see that the zoological works present rich materials to test theories and interpretations of Aristotle's thought on many fundamental issues, in metaphysics, in philosophy of science and in psychology especially' (7). Lloyd rightly criticizes the often repeated claim that the biological writings provide a mere testing ground for

competing interpretations of the metaphysical and psychological writings. Insofar as this sort of contention underwrites much of the new, non-historical interest in Aristotle's biology, Lloyd's worries are central and important to the aims of the volume. The biological approach may sound initially promising. If, for example, two exegetes differ on the question of whether definition of essence refers ineliminably to matter, taken either specifically or generically (so that the definition of man necessarily refers to flesh or to some functionally suitable stuff), then one can simply peruse the biological treatises for: (i) methodological remarks favoring one interpretation over the other; or (ii) the actual definitions proffered, which should confirm one interpretation and refute the other.

In fact, matters are not nearly so clean. Beyond the predictable fact that the biological texts are subject to the same interpretive wrangles already so common in the rest of the corpus, proponents of the import of Aristotle's biology, most notably Pellegrin and Balme, have pushed theses far more radical than this picture suggests. If they are correct, far from merely settling traditional disputes among Aristotelian commentators, the biological treatises will undermine some disputes altogether, by showing how they rest on false conceptions of Aristotle's taxonomical methodology.

Pellegrin has promoted a moriological interpretation of Aristotle's biology, according to which primary substances are not the familiar mid-size spatio-temporally continuous objects of the *Categories* nor even the hylomorphic compounds of the *Metaphysics*, but rather their parts. A moriologically-driven biological taxonomy does not mesh, in any clear way, with Aristotle's more familiar accounts of substance; if correct, such a biology would force some rethinking about Aristotle's metaphysical projects, about his development, or about both. Balme offers similarly unsettling results: he thinks Aristotle's biology is not essentialist, a result precisely counter to what one would expect on the basis of Aristotle's protracted analysis of definition and essence in the *Posterior Analytics* and *Metaphysics*. Balme's view has won some support; it too, if correct, would force ground-level reconsideration of Aristotle's metaphysics.

Lloyd is sceptical about these claims: 'On the question of the proper objects of definition, on causation, on substance, the implications of the zoology are not, in my view, as far-reaching as some recent claims have it' (29). Lloyd's detailed discussions support this verdict, but readers of the volume have the benefit of reading Pellegrin's and Balme's own responses to Lloyd's conclusions.

Two additional papers of note make more modest claims about the role of biology in Aristotle's overarching system, and meet with more success. Cooper's 'Metaphysics in Aristotle's embryology' concludes that '...Aristotle's conception of animal form in the *GA [de Generatione Animalium]* has clear and significant consequences for his metaphysical theory of substantial form' (83). Cooper's detailed analysis of the contribution form makes to the inherited characteristics of a biological organism falls short of establishing such consequences. In the end, his analysis inclines him to believe that forms are

'more particular' (84) than the species forms sometimes wrongly proposed as the primary substances of Aristotle's mature metaphysical system. In arguing for this limited result, Cooper is cautious about whether the embryological evidence positively requires a doctrine of particular — as opposed to universal — forms in Aristotle. If there are universal forms, Cooper suggests, they will have to be of a 'lower order of generality' (84) than customarily supposed. The question of whether these lower order forms are actually particulars, that is, non-repeatable numerically distinct individual entities, will have to be made on other grounds. Here Cooper is duly restrained about the results of his investigation: the biological evidence does raise questions about the tenability of an interpretation of the *Metaphysics* many have found attractive. Even so, this evidence is far from decisive.

Charles's 'Aristotle on meaning, natural kinds and natural history' also takes a more circumspect approach to the relation between the biological and more theoretical writings. He is concerned to show how Aristotle's abstract accounts of meaning and definition in *Posterior Analytics* ii 8-10 find further development and specification in the *Historia Animalium*. He argues for something of a symbiotic relation between the enterprises: 'In the biological works, Aristotle does not merely follow a pre-set Analytics model of scientific investigation. Rather he is struggling to make that model at once more precise and more powerful' (167). Lennox offers a set of comments highlighting the differences between their approaches. He attempts to locate problems in Charles's suggestions that one begins zoological inquiry not only with a belief that animals are to be taxonomized according to their common natures, but armed in addition with robust conceptions of those common natures.

The debate between Charles and Lennox typifies the high level of exchange in this volume. The authors of the papers collected here are for the most part fully practiced philosophical exegetes. One nonetheless takes away the impression that the general timbre of Lloyd's piece must be well placed: the biological treatises have less to offer interpreters and defenders of Aristotle metaphysical, logical and psychological views than their champions are prone to suggest. Even so, all students of Aristotle will profit by consulting Biologie, Logique et Métaphysique chez Aristote.

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David Dyzenhaus

Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems.

Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1991. Pp. xx + 289.

Cdn\$82.50: US\$64.95. ISBN 0-19-825292-7.

D's book is an interesting and sobering work. Seven of its ten chapters discuss recent S. African legal history. The tale told of the employment of legal form in the service of apartheid, and of the courage of those judges who fought from the bench against the Nationalist regime, is a fascinating, simultaneously inspiring and depressing tale. As legal history, the book is written with passion and with care, and its importance is clear.

The book also has importance as a work of legal philosophy, work carried out in the remaining three chapters. I concentrate on that part here. The historical part forms an extended case-study to exemplify the position taken in the argumentative part. The ambitions of the book are great — nothing less than the jurisprudential Holy Grail of a definitive argument to refute legal positivism. Legal positivism claims the essence of law that it be capable of identification by a value-free test, that the concept of law is a descriptive or content-independent concept. Against positivism D deploys what he refers to as 'the Common Law tradition', a tradition of adjudication which sees courts and judges as natura sua upholders of individual rights and liberties, as committed to procedural fairness and natural justice, and so forth.

D also distinguishes from the approach of the Common Law tradition to adjudication something he calls the 'plain fact approach'. The plain fact approach 'clears up legal uncertainty by appeal to starkly evident matters of fact in the public record' (57). D shows how the judges who adopted the plain fact approach in cases having to do with, for example, the rights of parties affected by an administrative hearing to be heard served the interests of the Nationalist government. D also refers to many other judges who either filed minority dissents against the majority's plain fact approach, or adjudicated lower-level decisions standing alone, in accord with 'Common Law principles' as above understood, thus standing up for rights of plaintiffs to fair hearings and procedures.

There are prima facie two distinct questions here. First, that there were judges who fostered the goals of apartheid, and judges who courageously resisted the government, is clear. Moreover, there are real differences at the level of legal theory between legal positivism and anti-positivism. The central claim of D's book, however, is a claim as to a mapping of these distinctions on to one another, and not merely a mapping as a matter of historical fact, but one at a deeper level of conceptual necessity. The claim is that legal positivism must endorse the plain fact approach, cannot endorse the Common Law tradition, and thus that legal positivism is to be repudiated as a jurisprudential theory because it will in the nature of the case lead to immoral results. That is a very strong claim: but is it made out?

D has three main arguments for this major claim: the Common Law Principles Argument; the Pragmatic Contradiction Argument; and the Very Idea of Law Argument. First, D's criticism of positivism presupposes that there cannot be an adequate positivist account of Common Law principles. That is contentious. Both Joseph Raz and Neil MacCormick, in response to Ronald Dworkin's well-known criticism that legal positivism cannot explain principles of law, have developed accounts of 'principle' which are thoroughly positivistic. Raz offers two alternatives. i) Legal principles have a positivistic 'pedigree' simply because they are short-hand for a set of pedigreed rules, whether common law or statutory, of black-letter law. ii) Legal principles may be standards whose source is a developed custom among adjudicatory bodies of considering themselves bound to follow the principles in question. MacCormick goes further: for him, principles express the underlying purposes of detailed rules and specific institutions, in the sense that they are seen as rationalizing them in terms of consistent, coherent and desirable goals. This account would allow an academic commentator to enunciate correctly a principle of law, and so the account is broader than Raz's. D ignores such views as these; until some notice is taken of them, D's first argument cannot stand.

The second argument is the Pragmatic Contradiction Argument. Legal positivism has an obvious immediate reply to D's general line of criticism. The judges who interpreted statutes narrowly in favour of the government and against civil liberties exercised a discretionary choice in doing so; they displayed, and acted out of, their own reprehensible moral views. Likewise, the liberal judges who found for the plaintiff in so many of these cases did so by exercising a discretionary choice on behalf of far more enlightened values. A judge conceived of in positivist terms has a discretionary choice which moral values to follow, given that no direct answer to the legal question before the court is determined by settled law. Since this is the obvious positivist response, it is not surprising that David devotes some care to devising a reply as follows (see p.239). The positivist is committed, first, to the thesis that, in a hard case, the judge who exercises discretion in favour of the government of the day is so doing because she has discretion to do so. On the other hand, since the positivist is also (supposedly) committed to the plain fact approach to the interpretation of legislation, then, as long as the issue before the court is one of the interpretation of legislation, the judge does not have discretion; the judge is bound to interpret the legislation as the plain fact approach requires. So there is a contradiction. The judge both has and does not have discretion.

This argument presupposes that legal positivism must be committed to a strong doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, what D refers to as 'an authoritarian ideal of political responsibility' (239). D takes as his chief suspect Hobbes, and John Austin's Command Theory. Of course Hobbes and Austin were both positivists and committed to a strong doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. But many positivists are not so committed, paradigmatically Joseph Raz. Raz lays down as part of his account of the authority of law what

he calls the 'Dependence Thesis' — that 'all authoritative directives should be based, in the main, on reasons which already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directives' (*The Morality of Freedom* [Oxford: Clarendon 1986], 47). This thesis is combined with two other claims, that the 'service' conception of authority is the correct conception, and that authority should be conceived on the model of the activities of an arbitrator. According to the service conception of authority, the role and primary function of authorities is to serve the governed by mediating between people and the right reasons which apply to them. I do not see how this is an 'authoritarian' account of authority. Again, D's argument extrapolates from a positivism that suits his view to all forms of positivism; the extrapolation, however, is not justified.

The third argument, the Very Idea of Law Argument, I view more sympathetically. The argument, in the style of Lon Fuller or Dworkin, is that we will simply not call a normative system a legal system unless it at some point and in some way embodies a purposefulness towards the values of justice, fairness, equality, etc. If a claim such as this is sound, then indeed the relation between law and certain substantive values will be an internal one, and legal positivism can make no room for such an internal relation. This argument is highly intuitive, and I am much inclined to share the intuition. Nonetheless, from the perspective of legal positivism, the argument will seem unsatisfactory. That D is right about how the term 'legal system' is to be understood and positivists are wrong can only be for positivism a conclusion of the theoretical debate, not a premise in it. The argument seems, to a positivist, to beg the question against positivism.

I am therefore not persuaded that the Holy Grail of legal philosophy has been found. The quest must continue. (In fact, in *Norm and Nature: The movements of legal thought* [Oxford: Clarendon Law Series 1992], I argue that the quest is necessarily perennial. But that is a story for another time.) For all that D's gallant attempt arguably fails, the book is vigorous and challenging.

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R.E. Ewin

Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy of

Thomas Hobbes.

Boulder: Westview Press 1991. Pp. x + 212.

US\$39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-1239-6); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-1238-8).

Taylor and Warrender argue that Hobbes understood the laws of nature as full-fledged moral obligations, almost in the Kantian sense, except that Hobbes needed God to back up his system of duty and obligation. Peters, in his *Hobbes*, found out that Hobbes, just like Moore's Mill, confused actual desire and normative desirability. In 1956 this reminder of the naturalistic fallacy must have looked like an important point to make. Then, once game theory became a popular philosophical tool, Hobbes started to look like a thinker who is baffled by the prisoner's dilemma. And now when virtue ethics is back, Hobbes is bound to be seen as promoting a theory of virtues. Ewin claims that virtues provide such a firm moral foundation for the lives of the citizens that the sovereign is not needed in his customary Hobbesian coercive and potentially violent role. Of course, if people are virtuous, or in other words, if they follow the laws of nature as fully internalized rules, or if they are embodied as character traits, coercive power is bound to be less than necessary.

Is Hobbes a virtue theorist? Ewin claims he is. In order to prove this radical thesis he begins from Hobbes's compositive and analytical methods (17), examines the concepts of right reason, self-preservation, the state of nature, and natural law. He seeks to refute a number of recent Hobbes studies, arguing especially against those who play the theory of games. Jean Hampton and Gregory Kavka are targeted. This aspect of the book is very polemical. But, according to Ewin, even Hobbes himself misunderstood the implications of his own method, yet, as Ewin thinks, this can be corrected. The result is a picture of the true Hobbes whose doctrines are less extreme than those found in, say, Leviathan. In his last chapter 'The Virtues and the Roles of Reason' Ewin provides his own theory of virtues, and this feature makes the chapter different from the rest. Otherwise he provides ample references to Leviathan, De Cive, and The Elements of Law.

The following summarizes Ewin's view. He writes: 'He [Hobbes] took as his model for the virtues self-interested people calculating the policies that would best serve their long-term interests. He misled himself in doing that; the model will not do and does not fit what Hobbes says when he writes straightforwardly about the laws of nature as virtues. ... If Hobbes had not made that mistake ... he need not have committed himself to the more excessive elements in his theory of sovereignty and especially to the idea that public judgment must have unfettered rule over private judgment' (157). In the early chapters of the book Ewin admits that people who trust their own private judgments concerning practical matters are bound to quarrel. That is why the sovereign is needed, namely, to provide a public verdict of the

truth. The reader may get the impression that Ewin, by his repeated insistence on this point, is aiming at the standard interpretation. But this is not the case. The reader soon learns that the sovereign's influence can be reduced, simply because public judgments can be provided in a less coercive manner, in the cases where such judgments are needed at all.

One of Hobbes's crucial difficulties is said to be that he is unable to explain why people should alienate their right to self-preservation (71). If private judgments concerning rights are the main source of quarrel and war, and the sovereign eliminates this source, it seems that the sovereign must also legislate on the individual right to self-preservation. But no one can be expected to surrender such a vital right. Therefore, some room must be left for individual judgments, in opposition to the public ones, exemplified by those which are issued by the sovereign.

Ewin's methodological point seems to be something like this. Hobbes uses his compositive method to show how the commonwealth is constructed from simple elements. Ewin refers to the example of the circle in De Cornore (6). Hobbes has also the analytical method at his disposal, by means of which he can show what is contained in a commonwealth. Now, when Hobbes uses the former method, he must suppose that there are natural individuals in the state of nature, that is, in the state of mutual and permanent war. In order to get rid of this situation they find, by means of rational calculations, a useful solution and they agree on the employment of a sovereign. But this contains Hobbes's double mistake. He is, according to Ewin, committed to the view that the state of nature never existed. Moreover, if he is a virtue theorist, and he writes like one, he should have seen that prudential calculations do not lead to genuine virtues. One is not virtuous if one calculates and speculates on the consequences. It follows that people are social from the beginning, or in other words, they possess some of those virtues Hobbes classifies under the laws of nature. But then the strong sovereign is not necessary. He has no job to do as people are already able to live in peace and generate the required limited number of public judgments.

This is certainly a contestable view. This being so, it is pity that the book is not better than it is. There is only one passing reference to the new theories of virtue, but MacIntyre's influential view shines through. In many places the text is repetitive and its arguments sound like inconclusive promises of something which should be there. The following can be used as an example: 'I may lock my door at night, but ... I do not refuse to go forth in the day without a bodyguard. (If life were that bad, how could I trust the bodyguard?)' (197). It does not follow that when you need protection you cannot trust anybody. Indeed, many people 'sleep with a gun under the bed' and use bodyguards to escort their children to school.

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Ernest Gellner

Spectacles and Predicaments: Essays in Social Theory.

New York: Cambridge University Press 1991 (Unrevised paperback edition of 1979 book). US\$54.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-22486-1); US\$19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-42434-8).

Ernest Gellner, that non-sectarian Popperian social theorist who currently holds the Wyse Chair in Social Anthropology at Cambridge, is the author of fifteen provocative and well-written books, many chapters of which first appeared in some of the most prominent general intellectual periodicals in the English-speaking world. The reissuance of one of these books, more than a decade after its original publication, invites us to take the measure of Gellner's significance. I (and, I imagine, future historians will) find Gellner a puzzle. Although Gellner is consistently insightful and challenging on a host of issues that concern both professional philosophers and philosophically inclined social scientists, he has never held the spotlight. A diagnosis worth considering is one that is featured periodically in this book, namely, that Gellner mixes and matches ideas that are typically not packaged together in today's culture, and given that Gellner has never written a book (like, say, Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) designed explicitly to change the terms of contemporary philosophical debate, his position easily disappears from view when one surveys the contemporary debates.

This diagnosis is part of Gellner's most characteristic thesis, one that he recently has developed into a book, Plough, Sword, and Book (Chicago 1989). The thesis is that there is an inverse relation between social coherence and cognitive coherence. In other words, the sorts of idea combinations that tend to maintain a social order are also the ones that are likely to undermine critical inquiry (and vice versa). Gellner's paradigm case is the sacred book, all of whose sentences are held to be true by the devout. In that case, more intellectual energy will be spent on resolving surface contradictions through depth hermeneutics than on determining which sentences must be rejected in light of empirical support that has been shown for some others. An example that hits closer to the philosophical essays in this book is the status of the Cartesian problem of knowledge in Western culture. This problem has either been accepted in its entirety (by, say, epistemologists and many psychologists) or it has (in the case of Rorty) been rejected in its entirety. Gellner's attitude is more pick-and-choose. He focuses on Descartes less as an icon for professional philosophers and more as a symptom of the critical rationalism that certain forms of individualism have brought to the West. In that regard. the Cartesian project is continuous with the existentialist one in Gellner's mind, and both are worth sustaining in the struggle for an 'ethic of cognition.' This struggle, still underappreciated by professional philosophers, involves the realization that, contra Plato, 'the good' and 'the true', or 'the rational' and 'the real', may not always be on the same side. Only philosophies

designed to maintain a particular social order will claim otherwise. In Gellner's reading, then, Descartes' worst fear — that an evil demon might present him with a cognitively seamless world — is meant to be a call to distrust all ideologies.

While he offers an interesting interpretation of Descartes, Gellner fails to come to grips with the status of, say, Discourse on Method as itself a 'sacred book' for professional philosophy, which has led those interested in the future of the field to take an all-or-nothing stance toward it: either an orthodox reading of Descartes is given or no reading whatsoever. Rorty's rhetorical sensitivity to philosophy's status as a discipline made him a hit, whereas the essavistic ease with which Gellner moves philosophical texts out of the classroom and into wider cultural concerns has probably cost him credibility with professional philosophers. In a sense, Gellner shares with many Popperians the tendency to think that disciplinary formalities don't matter because they oughtn't matter in the pursuit of inquiry. No doubt, the journalistic origins of many of these essays contribute to this normative presumption. Yet, it is an ironic oversight for an anthropologist, especially one who spends a good deal of his time revealing the lengths to which non-Western cultures will go to maintain their identity in the face of alien challenges. Had Gellner been more willing to think of Anglo-American philosophy in a similar fashion in these essays (as he had in his first book, Words and Things, 1959), his work might have had the impact it deserves.

The essay that should most interest professional philosophers is Gellner's review of Feyerabend's Against Method. Both lovers and haters of the book have tended to respond in a less than nuanced fashion, but Gellner - who clearly detests the author's 'attitude' - manages to make some of the most telling criticisms that I have seen of Feyerabend's work. Gellner observes that epistemology is best seen in the business of comparing entire cultures (or paradigms) rather than specific theories, for which discipline-based tools of evaluation are readily available. Feverabend's stress on incommensurability shows that he recognizes epistemology's larger context, but he lacks the relevant tools to make the relevant cross-cultural comparisons. Since Feyerabend really only knows the history of physics in any detail, and not anthropology or cultural history, he tends to reduce the scope and complexity of a culture to the projection of a particular theory. Thus, early modern Western culture is reduced to Galileo's mechanics. This leads Feyerabend to some fairly naive views of cultural causation, which give pride of place to philosophical criteria where economic and political considerations would clearly have the upper hand.

Generally speaking, Gellner is most successful as an analyst of the contemporary geopolitical scene. Rewarding in this regard is his exchange with the French political theorist Raymond Aron over the relative priority of 'revolution' and 'liberalization' in the modernization of traditional societies. Whereas Aron subscribes to the French Revolution model of revolution following in the wake of uncontrollable liberalization, Gellner, always with one eye turned to Russia and Eastern Europe, sees liberalization as the

aftermath of failed revolutions that have turned authoritarian. Analysts today would have to say that Gellner's views here have been vindicated — for how long remains to be seen. Nevertheless, one of the most widely discussed theoretical books in American foreign policy circles today, Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (Free Press 1992), extends Gellner's liberalization thesis to the entire world — and even acknowledges Gellner as a source of the thesis. Little did Gellner realize in 1979 that he would become one of the ideologues of 'The New World Order' of the 1990s!

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> Lewis Hahn and Paul Schilpp, eds. The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright. The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. XIX. La Salle, IL: Open Court 1989, pp. xviii + 942. US\$99.95. ISBN 0-87548-372-0.

In our times most philosophers work in at most two or three of the sub-fields of our subject. Even when someone is said to have a wide range of interests, this means usually that the person works in several sub-fields. To have a philosophy is more than that. It is to have an all-pervasive view of reality, values, and rationality, presented in a unified perspective. We philosophers seem to live in a schizophrenic world. For while many of us encourage younger practitioners to specialize and concentrate on a corner of a sub-field, the philosophers we tend to admire — and thus the ones appearing in the Library of Living Philosophers — have an overall philosophy in the sense suggested.

Von Wright contributed to logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, theory of action, and ethics. This volume covers those contributions, and contains a reply by von Wright to the critical essays making up the bulk of the book. Von Wright, however, did not merely contribute to many fields. The contributions add up to an outline of a view of human nature, action, rationality, and values. This alone makes him an important thinker. But he is also important from a historical point of view. For he is a transitional philosopher and pioneer, writing on topics which became central foci of discussions only later. For example, his *Explanation and Understanding* was published in 1971, before explorations of cognitive states other than belief and knowledge became popular. His key ethical works, *Norms and Action*, and *Varieties of Goodness* came out in 1963. These books raise many of the questions that became important in the literature of virtue ethics, much later.

Von Wright had close contact with Wittgenstein. While he does not resemble the latter in style, he shares with his famous contemporary scope and concerns. It is unfortunate that von Wright's writings on religion and literature are not available in English, but a fine essay in this book by Tranøy gives a flavor of von Wright's approach to these topics.

It would be impossible to review within the scope of this paper all of the articles on von Wright and all of his replies. This review is restricted to the material on ethics — roughly one-third of the volume. The essays revolve around four topics: the role of virtues in ethics, what is the good of man, the viability of the distinction between allegedly strictly moral senses of 'good' and 'right' and other senses, and the relation between reason and attitude in ethics. Von Wright's addressing these issues sets him apart from most modern philosophers, even though in classical times these were the key issues in ethics.

For classical philosophy medicine is a paradigm for a sound normative discipline. Thus it is interesting that unlike most contemporary philosophers von Wright discusses health and illness in some detail (224-6, 779). He sees that health cannot be described in purely hedonistic terms. He characterizes health as the absence of illness, and the latter in terms of loss of functional potential. This functional characterization raises the question whether some functions are more essential than others. Von Wright seems to be committed to this, though he seems reluctant to embrace full-fledged essentialism.

Unlike Plato, von Wright does not construe ethics as analogous to medicine. Ethics centers on the 'good of man', and this is based on subjective choices, while von Wright does not want to say the same about health and illness. The essays by Kurt Baier and Frankena deal with this, and the other main issues. Both of these papers, as well as others, such as Prawitz's essay on causation, are excellent philosophic contributions, apart from what they tell us about von Wright.

The good of man is based on preferential choices made by humans under ideal circumstances (233). The commentators point out that von Wright's idealization conditions are not very demanding. It seems, however, that the idealizations have to be more normative than either von Wright or his critics would admit. Any characterization of an ideal agent has to contain priorities between physical and psychological parts. For example, is this or that part of our emotional make-up more important than others, and is our rationality more important than emotions like love and compassion? Thus there can be no value-neutral characterization of an ideal ethical agent. This issue is not taken up by either von Wright or the other essayists.

The judgments made under idealization define the good of man, but not in an egoistic way. For example, the choices involve acts of love, but these are seen by von Wright as good not only for others but also for the agent (789). As in the cases of the ethics of Plato and Aristotle, so also von Wright's ethics is neither purely egoistic or altruistic. While some of the critics find fault with this, it can be seen also as an advantage.

The main books on ethics by our author appeared eight years before Rawls' book on justice. Yet there is much here about virtue. As Foot points out, von Wright's conception of virtue is instrumental, and centers on character traits needed to control our passions (276). Several writers complain that this account does not cover all of the traditional virtues. Such criticism is unfortunate in two ways. First, we have not one but two only partially overlapping traditional lists of virtues, one from the Greek and the other from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Secondly, even if not in detail, in spirit von Wright's conception is close to the classical Greek conception of virtue. He construes the virtues as the character traits required in order to be in a position to make the right value judgments. This reminds one of Aristotle's conception of virtue which - though different in detail - regards the virtues as constituents of the 'phronimos', or 'agent with sound judgment'. To do good things is to act as the 'phronimos' would. This is not circular either in Aristotle or in the ethics of von Wright. In plain English it means that one has to choose the right role model, not only for occupations and roles, but also for life in general. This conception of virtue is more informative and thought provoking than current conceptions that say merely that the addition of the cultivation of virtues to moral psychology is a good corrective to extreme rule-bound conceptions of our ethical lives. It is also different from misguided attempts to regard virtue ethics as by itself an alternative to Kantian and utilitarian ethics. Virtues can be incorporated into utilitarianism as means to or constitutive of happiness, and into Kantian ethics as instrumental to becoming a dutiful person.

Von Wright's ethics turns out to be, not surprisingly, teleological and consequentialist. While duty is described as what we must do to work for the welfare of others, it is also not without good consequences for the agent. Again, justice is the recognition that it is good for everyone if goods are shared in a fair way in a community.

These reflections lead us to a key difference between von Wright and writers like Baier and Frankena. Frankena complains that in von Wright's ethics there is no purely 'moral' good or right. But Frankena might as well raise this 'complaint' against Plato and Aristotle. On this issue there is a fundamental split in Western ethics. One side sees what is described commonly as 'moral goodness' as merely one of the many aspects of what it is to be a good human. It is the aspect that pertains to our relations with other humans. The good relations should be of high quality, like friendship and compassion. Within this conception the allegedly purely moral qualities like honesty, fairness, or keeping promises, are no more or less moral and have no higher claims on us than qualities like friendship or compassion. Plato and Aristotle both thought that the human who has good character and lives well will not want to harm others, and would want to live in a cooperative community. Although not explicit on this point, von Wright's ethics seems to be committed to this outlook too.

In contrast, the other side thinks that moral obligations constitute a realm separate from the realm of what is good or valuable for humans. On that view

a person could be morally good even if lacking many of the characteristics that would make that person good in a non-moral sense. Again, having all of the human goods will not make up for what is perceived as moral deficiency.

Within these two approaches the question: 'Why be moral?' has different contents. For the 'separatist' it is a difficult question since she cannot appeal either to self-interest in the defense, or to moral considerations on pain of circularity. Within the 'classical' view the question asks for a demonstration that a life lived in a cooperative community adhering to some principle of justice is a part of the human good.

Mention of justice leads to the last of the fundamental issues taken up by von Wright that will be treated in this review. Von Wright sees the moral will as underlying ethics; he summarizes this as 'love thy neighbor'. He then ponders the question: Can we have a duty to love? (799) He sees this as a fundamental question to which his ethics leads but has not solved yet. One should add that there is a strong argument against the hypothesis. For a duty is something that we can meet or not meet; in the typical case it is up to us. But love is a feeling or attitude, and feelings are not voluntary. I can be commanded to do this or not do that, but how could one command me to feel love or compassion? This would be like commanding someone to believe that the desk in front of him is brown, regardless of what color it actually has. At most we can work on getting ourselves into states of mind in which we can develop the recommended feeling, or if possessed work on maintaining it. This argument raises problems not only for von Wright but also for both classical and Judeo-Christian ethics. It is a great merit on von Wright's ethical writings that it brings these deep issues, rarely discussed in analytic philosophy, to the fore.

So far the main themes, both in von Wright and in the most interesting commentaries on ethics, have been sketched in rough outlines. At the outset it was pointed out that von Wright can be said to have 'a philosophy', at least in rough shape. Ethics is perhaps central to it. This semi-modern, semi-Aristotelian ethics is couched within the philosophy of human nature and thus a philosophy of the social sciences that takes intentionality as the key mark setting off humans as objects of sciences; thus creatures with intentions from other objects of scientific study. This view, in turn, is framed by a philosophy of science that is not positivistic in its outlook. That is to say, it stresses insight and understanding and not only a deductively structured set of propositions that are believed or also known. Hence the interest not only in straight deductive and inductive logic, but also in the logic of modalities. In the background of all of this lie deep reflections on the meaning of life and on whether love or reason lies at the base of our outlook on life and other human beings.

Von Wright's philosophy is not merely of historical interest, but challenges the contemporary philosopher of today in fundamental ways.

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Albert A. Johnstone

Rationalized Epistemology: Taking Solipsism Seriously.

Albany: State University of New York Press

1991. Pp. xviii + 361.

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Johnstone proposes 'to resolve three long-standing skeptical problems' (xi): 'Is the world real ... ?' 'Does that part of the world unperceived by oneself cease to exist?' and, 'Is there any external world corresponding to one's representations?' (15) A negative answer to any of these generates a form of solipsism. Since a negative answer can take different forms — for instance if the world is not real it might be a dream, a hallucination, or a demon-inspired delusion — there are more than three kinds of solipsism. Johnstone distinguishes nine (xvii). He holds that an acceptable epistemology must provide a warrant for positive answers to the skeptical questions and for asserting that any kind of solipsism is false.

Johnstone holds that skeptical theses can be satisfactorily answered only by a return to a foundationalist epistemology in the tradition of Husserl and Russell. For Johnstone, foundationalism holds that knowledge originates from the data of experience, 'something less that full-blown objects', in conjunction with rational principles, including rules of inference, which are necessarily true. The denial of this view, which Johnstone calls 'objectualism', holds 'that any cognitive enterprise presupposes in some manner ... the existence of everyday objects, full-blown material things' (19). He rejects the name 'coherentism' for this position, insisting that foundationalism is consistent with the criterion of coherence.

To substantiate the claim on behalf of foundationalism, much of the book is devoted to analyses of putative refutations of solipsism from other positions. Johnstone argues that solipsism is not absurd, irrelevant, or unreasonable. He spends a good deal of time arguing that, solipsism, apart from one specific type, is not, in any sense, parasitic — that it does not, as Strawson puts it, involve 'the pretended acceptance of a conceptual scheme and at the same time the silent repudiation of one of the conditions of its existence' (176).

Strawson and Wittgenstein dismiss solipsism on the ground that it is conceptually or linguistically parasitic. Johnstone undercuts this claim by attacking Wittgenstein's private language argument and holding that solipsism can be formulated in a private language. He also argues that solipsism is thinkable nonlinguistically.

In Johnstone's foundationalism, the 'foundations' are to be found in sense experience by introspection, which is '... simply more careful perception of the sort practiced by the radical skeptic or solipsist' (240). Skepticism, he asserts, must be confronted on its own ground. Moreover, philosophy must begin with first-person experience, since this is the basis of all our knowledge;

but our analysis of such experience is fallible. He attacks solipsism as being based on faulty analysis of experience.

One of Johnstone's principal aims is '... to uncover the warrant there may be for beliefs of a very rudimentary nature, such as the belief in the permanence of material objects' (239). His account of experiential data begins with 'a brief examination of some of the general structures of the various sense fields' (242). He finds that there are three sense fields — the visual, the auditory, and the tactile-kinaesthetic. The last of these, which includes bodily feelings, is largely disregarded in traditional epistemology. Hume, in his discussion of the self, fails to note that the visual and auditory fields are 'each anchored to a rudimentarily three-dimensional voluminous heaviness, elongated and ramified in shape, flexible and mobile' (256). Descartes, for his part, errs in locating joy and anger in the soul. In doing so he fails to note the physical side of a strong emotion such as a furious rage. On Johnstone's analysis, all subjective states include feelings, and feelings are states of the body; thus introspection shows the self to be corporeal.

This conclusion is one main premise of Johnstone's arguments against solipsism. Another is that we are free 'to do or not to do'. We find that our attention is free to wander at will, and that we can move any one of several parts of our body as we wish; such activity is uncompelled and, when undertaken, spontaneous. These two principles are used in a thought-experiment to test the claim that objects cease to exist when not perceived by oneself. The example is purely tactual; it is a test 'with regard to the felt presence of an obstacle encountered by a foot when the leg is kicked forward from a bent position' (291). The subject kicks or refrains from kicking according to her impulse of the moment; the kicks occur 'at quasi-randomly chosen times.' Each kick encounters the obstacle. On the solipsistic hypothesis, the obstacle must exist at all and only the times of the kicks, a claim implausible enough to warrant the belief that the obstacle exists when unperceived.

To deal with claims that the world is unreal — a personal illusion or the conjuration of a deceiving demon — Johnstone uses 'The Principle of Insignificant Reason' (PIR): 'It is quite irrational to affirm any simply conceivable empirical hypothesis that is but one of an unlimited number of rival evidentially equivalent hypotheses' (320). For instance it is irrational to affirm that my coffee mug is really a lobster, because there is an infinitude of other things which it could equally well be affirmed to be. Similarly, it is irrational for the solipsist to choose himself as the hub of the universe; the world could equally well be someone else's illusion. Johnstone cites the Chinese sage, Chuang Tzu, who, 'having dreamt one night that he was a butterfly, wondered whether he was now a butterfly dreaming that it was Chuang Tzu' (326).

For a Cartesian the reason for the solipsist's privileged status is his certainty of his own existence. But the situation is altered by Johnstone's conclusion that 'the tactual body is integral to the perceiving subject.' It follows that '... any impartial (rational) solipsist who declares the sensuous world to be unreal, must, by an involuntary self-referential manoeuvre,

include himself or herself in the unreal world. To make an exception of his or her tactile-kinaesthetic body would violate PIR since one might with as much reason make an exception of any of an indefinitely great number of items' (323). Earlier in the book, Johnstone uses this line of argument to discredit Descartes' cogito argument (272-6).

Limitations of space prevent discussion of the other types of solipsism. The importance of this book surely lies in its introspective phenomenology, its use of Hume's method, careful and skeptical scrutiny of experience, to escape from the skepticism of Hume.

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Anthony Paul Kerby

Narrative and the Self.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1991.
Pp. 141.
US\$22.50. ISBN 0-253-33143-9.

This book is firmly embedded in recent continental tradition that treats the self and its world in terms of semiotic transformation. But, unlike much of the writing in that vein, Kerby's is refreshingly lucid and free of jargon.

The work is particularly useful when we take it in the spirit that Kerby presents it: 'as something of a survey of contemporary, particularly European, thought regarding the scope and function of narrative language to(sic) the status of the human subject' (113-14). But it isn't a comprehensive review of the tradition so much as a very plausible distillation from it with noted correction and important enhancement.

The central dispute is with foundationalism (a term that Kerby does not use) concerning self, language, and history. The ego as a Cartesian substance, language as a transparent vehicle for meaning, and history as a mere set of facts are rejected. They become the anvil for striking the new conceptions of the self as an activity, language as a swim of meanings, and history always being remade in the present. The operation of the constant transformation is carried through by interpretation. And the interpretation is radical. We are not given an inviolable content that is to be formulated and construed in a different manner than before (44). Rather, the object, be it self, language, or history, are always permeated with interpretation.

But does this lead us to relativism, the opposing extreme of foundationalism? No, because the processes of interpretation take place within a social context furnishing materials and limits for ongoing human agency. The key idea is that the self is not an object so much as an activity diachronically adding here, subtracting there, highlighting this, pushing that into the background, moulding and remoulding itself, its language and its world and doing all this by narration. Thus a person's life is not a chronicle of events, an accumulation of unrelated occurrences, but an integrated story in which parts have meaning in virtue of what came before and what follows. Narration occurs as a use of language, and language is inalienable from its freight of meaning, so a subject is always formulating a story when reflecting on his or her life, not displaying an already existing self. The ongoing plasticity of the ego and its social world is given form and meaning through the retelling of stories that comprise the life and world of the subject.

The central role that narrative plays here is not new. (Kerby's most famous touchstone is Paul Ricoeur.) But Kerby offers us an important physiology for how the self makes itself particular. The narrative that one makes of his or her life operates in what he calls the quasi-narrative background. This is prethematic experience, inchoately historical and suitable for conscious manipulation into narrative (7 ff.). The important point is that whatever falls within the horizon of the materials out of which the person formulates his or her life, for instance memories, desires, goals, the world at large - all the intentional objects of the lived life — are already predisposed to the narrative craft. Narrative becomes something on the order of a transcendental schema for what is allowed in this world of story telling. Furthermore, the story teller has three functionally different aspects, three different 'I's so to speak. In narrating, the subject is speaking, this is the site of the utterance; also a subject of speech is projected by the utterance like an implied author is created in the act of telling the story; and finally the spoken self is the self affected by the utterance (13, 105-108). This loop is how the self makes itself and its world.

Kerby's book is valuable insofar as it is a platform upon which we can ask a number of questions and see promising future philosophical endeavor. That endeavor can be greatly aided by the very rich literature in Anglo-American philosophy of language and mind. It often parallels what is occurring on the continent. Kerby's statement, 'This substantial self ... is no more (nor less) than a fiction ... a social and linguistic construct, a nexus of meaning rather than an unchanging entity' (34), could have come right out of Daniel Dennett's new book, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown 1991). Considerable work has been done on 'I' as an indexical, especially the seminal paper by Castañeda ("He": A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness', Ratio, VIII 130-157) and continuing through the writings of Perry and Boer and Lycan. New proposals in cognitive science, e.g., Gerald Edelman, The Remembered Present (New York: Basic Books 1989), offer us precise theories of how consciousness makes itself and its past. In regard to the issues of Descartes bashing and antifoundationalism, Wittgenstein, Ryle and their recent philosophical progeny could be used. Anyone pursuing the issues raised by the present book should take advantage of this stuff. In short, we

may be able to produce particularly strong offspring from the miscegenation of traditions.

Finally, a number of important questions emerge for me. The major desideratum is what the self is and how it comes to be. From his discussion of a patient suffering from Korsakoff's syndrome, which includes a profound impairment of short-term memory, Kerby seems to be saying that an individual will not, in fact, be a self or subject unless he or she is able to create and sustain a process of meaningful structure. And the meaningful structure is that of narrative. But why narrative? Is this the only way that human life becomes meaningful? Chronicle is out because it is the mere concatenation of event. But it does not then follow that narrative is the only alternative. The semantic fabric that one weaves of one's life may well display not a story but a picture, not a developing plot but a repainting of a canvas done in an unsystematic way. Kerby uses the predominant postmodern metaphor of literature, a diachronic art form. But is it obvious that human life has, except in the literally physiological sense, a beginning, a middle and an end? Furthermore, if narrative is the right way to go, further thought should be given to the way that it is conceived. It's an art concept, and Kerby talks about it in aesthetic valuational terms (39). Evidently, some narration is better than none because it grants closure, coherence, continuity and so on where we would otherwise have mere collection. In a broad sense, he and others who follow this line of thought present us with an aesthetic phenomenology of the self. This in turn suggests interesting speculations for future work about personal development and the relation of life to art.

The present book tills the ground and lays the plan for an extended, comprehensive effort. I am quite sure that Kerby will not disappoint us.

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> Donald Livingston and Marie Martin, eds. Hume as Philosopher of Society, Politics and History. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press

1991. Pp. xix + 168. US\$45.00 ISBN 1-878822-03-9.

This volume collects essays which were first published in the Journal of the History of Ideas between 1941 and 1984. In its pages one finds a portrait of David Hume which is unfamiliar to many professional philosophers. The various authors draw not only on the Treatise and Enquiries but also on

Essays, Moral, Political and Literary, The History of England, The Natural History of Religion, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and on Hume's autobiography and letters.

Collected on the 250th anniversary of the publication of the *Treatise*, these essays not only present the political, economic, religious and historical writings of Hume as interesting in their own right; they also illustrate that his subsequent works can fruitfully be seen as applications of the science of human nature developed in his masterpiece. Indeed, his conception of human nature finds its expression in his later philosophical and historical writings. Seen as extensions on the project he outlines in Book I of the *Treatise*, Hume's later writings are both informed by his epistemology and provide needed content for it in turn.

In both the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry into Human Understanding* Hume relies upon the constancy of human nature. Indeed, his very enterprise, of establishing a science of man which would serve as the foundation for all the other sciences, requires this assumption if it is not to be absurd. But the role of a constant human nature in his political philosophy and historical methodology has not been sufficiently studied. This book can usefully be read as a contribution to such a study. It examines in many lights the limits on the constancy of human nature which can be defended philosophically as well as on some of its applications in the social sciences. The essentialist commitments implicit in the positing of a constant human nature are also interestingly highlighted in a number of the contributions. Essentialism is a blanket covering a multitude of sins but these essays show that Hume was not guilty of them all.

Christopher Berry argues that Hume's theory of a constant human nature requires 'an analytic separation of (constant) man from his (variable) environment or, more generally, his culture' (8). Indeed, he accuses Hume of relying on 'a static ahistorical acultural essential human nature' (9). Man so understood can be abstracted from his specific cultural experience. The remaining essays seem to refute this strong statement of Hume's conception of human nature. In both his philosophical writings and his methodology in the social sciences Hume seems to belie such an interpretation.

Robert McRae argues that Hume's conception of political philosophy was largely shaped by his hope of developing a unified body of science with the science of man (or psychology) at its centre. Politics was understood to be subordinate to, and directly dependent upon, the science of man. The empiricist model of scientific reasoning was extended to the political realm, and matters political were treated as 'psychological phenomenon whose causes must be found' (27). Thus one had to look for psychological explanations of political obligation, for example. Hence we see Hume employing custom as the psychological cause which is operative in explaining the obligation to justice and government. All political institutions are the product of human contrivance and artifice; this is merely a fact of history. That men feel a sense of obligation toward such institutions through the effects of custom producing fictitious relations in the imagination is a determination of the science of

politics conceived as a branch of philosophical inquiry within the enterprise of constructing a science of man.

Hume's epistemology and psychology can be seen as central not only to his political theory, but also to his historical, economic and religious writings. This is true of both his methodology and his substantive theories. In economics, for example, Hume is noteworthy for introducing psychological factors as part of the data relevant to monetary theory and for his use of the variable of time in differentiating between long run and short run economic analyses. Likewise in international trade, Hume argued that an adequate understanding of trade can only be developed against a background of the psychological explanations of its mechanisms.

In their discussion of Hume's economic theory both Lyons and Hundert rely on Hume's psychology to explain his economics. Thus they take it as given that there is a universal passion of avarice, for example. Lyons argues that Hume also introduced what he calls an 'achievement motive' as a basic psychological motivation to trade. Hundert takes up Lyons' suggestion that Hume posits an achievement motive within individuals as the source of their economic activity. He then uses this motivational explanation to 'analyze social action in terms of the interaction of man's natural propensities with his material environment' (41). Thus he supposes that men share a natural desire for productive activity, while recognizing that the social conditions of the labouring classes undermined the efficacy of that propensity to labour. Hundert argues that Hume thus presupposes not only a shared desire for material possessions but also a desire for work and improvement common to the race (42). The radical nature of Hume's analysis lay in its psychological equalitarianism. Hume made no distinction between the natural inheritance of different classes of men. He held that all men first and foremost seek happiness, and that this primarily consisted of action and pleasure. In order to achieve happiness men worked, for in working toward a certain material reward, pleasure, action, and avarice were satisfied, while difficulty was overcome' (42). Given the universality of motives to labour, if those in the lower ranks of life seemed to be idle and irrational then this must be a result of their social situation. One had only to alter the patterns of rewards and punishments which denied the labouring classes the natural inducements to work to change the behaviour of members in those classes.

Donald Siebert, in a very capable essay, looks at another of 'the essential and universal properties of human nature': that of religious belief (58). Men are naturally led to a belief in supernatural powers by their ignorance of causes conjoined with their anxiety for their future well-being. The desire for causes leads them to posit an invisible power which they then appeal to for assistance, blame in hardship and praise in the face of good fortune.

Religious belief can be contrasted with pious zeal, however, which arises from the attempt to make that invisible power concrete, when men attempt to understand the nature of the God they have created. As this enterprise is manifestly absurd, men shift their gaze to sensible, visible objects with which they suppose the invisible power is connected, and this gives rise to idolatry.

Rather than attempt to undermine this natural propensity, Hume thought it would be better to ensure that idolatry would be a useful rather than a malign influence in society. It is Siebert's thesis that Hume moved away from his early dismissal of idolatry and religious rites as useless mummery toward a growing recognition that such practices had important consequences for the morals of men and so for social well-being which required that they at least be used well.

The role which human nature plays in Hume's philosophy can, perhaps, be most clearly seen by an examination of his historical writings. 'It's [history's] chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations' (EHU). The essentialism implicit in this passage is uncontroversial, and Hume has been smartly criticized by philosophers of history for it.

S. Wertz examines the view, held by many of Hume's critics, that his philosophy and methodology of history are flawed because of his static view of human nature and his belief in an identifiable set of characteristics which are universal, essential human characteristics. Those who think that Hume has committed some sort of fallacy in his historical reasoning base their accusations on the claim that historical conclusions can be drawn only from historical premises: 'an historical judgment or conclusion should be based on historical statements — not on non-historical assumptions... Human nature is assumed to remain constant, and from this nonhistorical premise we are supposed to infer historical particulars (continuities)' (77). So Wertz describes the charge against Hume by his critics. He argues in his paper that such a charge is unfounded.

The interaction between history and human nature is more complicated than can be fully discussed here, but understanding that there is interaction, rather than deduction, is important. History plays a dual role. It provides the data from which the principles of human nature can be inferred (probabilistically) and provides the historian with the tools for explaining the actions of men, the origins of institutions and the diversity of history.

While recognizing the constancy of the passions, for example, Hume nonetheless acknowledges that what excites them is often a matter of human conventions and custom which are variable. Corey Venning reminds us in his article that Hume is not committed to any unsettling theory of historical necessity. While all psychological explanations depend upon the uniformity of consequences from uniform causes, such a uniformity of causes is not also presupposed by Hume's conception of human nature: 'only causes uniform in all respects can be counted on to produce uniform consequences. In politics causes include not only 'diversity of character, prejudices and opinions' of men, but also circumstantial variations which ... produces a consequence different from those which precede it. Hume was modest in his claims for social science. Given what is firmly known about human nature, some general truths in politics may be fixed, but these general truths are few...' (149-50).

For anyone wishing to attain a richer understanding of the philosophy of David Hume, this collection will be immensely rewarding. It is as useful for identifying the limits of the social sciences as for pointing to the general truths which can be attained within them.

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Don MacNiven, ed.

Moral Expertise: Studies in Practical & Professional Ethics.
New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall 1991.
Pp. xix + 231.
US\$55.00. ISBN 0-415-03576-7.

The fifteen articles in this book were originally presented at a series of seminars on practical and professional ethics at York University, Toronto, in 1987. Some papers are grouped in pairs under one heading or take the form of commentaries, others stand alone. Given the wide scope of the seminars. it is not surprising to find that there is a correspondingly wide range in topics of the papers, all the way from the ethics of planetary engineering to the relation of theology to practical ethics; however, several papers focus on the topic of professional codes of ethics. MacNiven provides a useful introductory overview of the papers and also attempts to advance his notion of a moral expert whose reasoning involves 'an organic creative process' rather than mechanical deduction starting from first principles. MacNiven also sees the moral expert as working in an interdisciplinary fashion with other professionals. In my opinion, MacNiven does not provide an entirely convincing nor clear account of moral expertise; nevertheless, he claims that there is a unity in all the articles in that all supposedly provide an 'interdisciplinary creative dialogue with moral philosophy.' (xii) I now consider briefly some of the main sections of the book.

A section on ethics and social science consists of two articles. The first, by David Weisenthal, deals with ethical issues in social psychology and in particular the use of deception in experiments. The paper contains a considerable amount of empirical data which shows a recent trend away from deception. While this may seem at first sight to be all to the good, Weisenthal suggests that it may very well represent a conservative tendency to avoid studying controversial subjects, such as people's behavior towards authority! The second article by James Check and Neil Malamuth relates the manner in which ethical considerations were dealt with practically in their sex and

aggression research. The article, in my opinion, is weak on self-criticism but strong on self-congratulation. For example, under voluntary participation it is mentioned that students, at the University of Manitoba, may either participate in seven hours of experiments or write a paper. Other jurisdictions have considered that this practice constitutes coercion. Such provisions have been regarded as violating both state and federal laws protecting research subjects in the United States, as is mentioned in the Weisenthal paper (21).

The section on theology and practical ethics contains two articles. The first article, by Michael Creal, has a clear presentation of two different religious approaches to practical ethics; that of liberation theology, and an approach associated with authors such as Niehbuhr and Lasch which he terms biblical realism. In his short commentary, Sol Tanenzapf points out that influential thinkers in these two groups employ not only Christian ethical principles but supplement them by complex and often controversial analyses of the particular contexts in which they are applied. This is particularly true he notes of Liberation Theology and its Marxist analytical structures.

There are two main sets of articles which deal at some length with professional codes of conduct. A useful article by Reg Lang and Sue Hendler provides us with a survey of professional planners' views on specific types of ethical issues arising in their field, and suggests what might be incorporated in a code of ethics. Harry Arthurs, in a well written and lively article, takes a rather less positive approach to a code of professional ethics in the legal profession. Arthurs notes, for example, that from 1920 to 1974 the Canadian Bar Association Code was never debated within the association, and that there is almost no evidence that it really had much if any impact on disciplinary proceedings! It is education and socialization that provide actual compliance with professional norms. Arthurs wants to study and teach legal ethics from an anthropological or sociological perspective, not as a form of moral discourse (100). The commentator on Arthur, Leslie Green, shows the inadequacy of this approach, in that Arthur provides no critical prescriptive framework from which to judge legal practices. These two articles together are among the more interesting contributions to this collection.

An article by Peter Pelz attempts to show how what he calls socialist and capitalist views of justice might find common ground in the concept of equal opportunity. While the paper may be found interesting by those who are in favor of welfare state measures and are trying to find devices by which to convince libertarian capitalist types that various welfare measures are justified, it involves a simplified view of both capitalist and socialist outlooks and does not even consider the issue of ownership of the means of production!

The article by H. Bassford on medical ethics exhibits a superior grasp of ethical theory as compared to many of the articles in this collection, and Bassford makes a valuable distinction between role-specific and general moral norms as well as defending medical ethics against some forms of scepticism. The one feminist contribution to this collection by Thelma Mc-

Cormack documents male bias in approaches to ethical issues concerning human reproduction.

Rounding out the collection are articles on ethics and industrial strategy by H. Wilson and on ethics and politics by David Shugarman. Professors teaching in different areas of practical ethics will no doubt find at least one if not several of these articles of value as collateral reading for their students.

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Vann McGee

Truth, Vagueness & Paradox: An Essay on the Logic of Truth.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1991. Pp. 280.
US\$30.00. ISBN 0-87220-087-6.

McGee's book on the liar paradox is the product of a rare combination of talents. He combines mathematical acumen and creativity with a keen interest in and firm grasp of the central philosophical issues. The book's project is both well-motivated philosophically and well-executed mathematically. McGee develops here some truly powerful mathematical results and tools, which will be useful in a wide range of approaches to the theory of truth, not only to the particular approach which McGee himself takes. While I am not convinced, in the end, of the correctness of McGee's solution to the liar paradox, I am certain that his solution will prove to be a formidable contender for very widespread acceptance.

McGee's principal philosophical motivation is to secure the thesis of the unity of science and, in particular, to show how a unified theory of general linguistics is possible, despite Tarski's widely accepted claim that avoiding the liar paradox necessitates the fragmentation of linguistics into an infinite hierarchy of languages and theories. McGee believes that the liar paradox shows our naive theory of truth to be inconsistent. Naively, we accept the Tarskian schema,

' ϕ ' is true if and only if ϕ ,

as holding true for every sentence ϕ in our language. However, it is possible to construct a liar sentence λ which is provably equivalent to the sentence λ is not true. Plugging λ into the Tarskian schema gives us λ is true if and only if λ is not true, a contradiction. Nonetheless, as McGee quite plausibly argues, the notion of truth is indispensable to the science of linguistics.

Consequently, McGee believes, we must replace our ordinary, inconsistent theory of truth with one (1) that maintains the theoretical value of the notion of truth, (2) that agrees with our ordinary practice in a wide range of cases, (3) that (unlike our naive theory) is not inconsistent with obviously true facts of mathematics and observation, and (4) that does not entail claims which are (by the theory's own lights) untrue.

The most widely accepted solution to the problem of the liar is that of Tarski. Tarski concluded that it is impossible to give a correct theory of truth for the sentences of a language in that very language. Instead, the theory of truth for the sentence of a given language (the object language) must be stated in an essentially richer, more expressive language (the meta-language). If a theory of truth is wanted for the sentences of this richer language, one must resort to a still richer language, and so on, through a transfinite hierarchy. McGee sees this Tarskian solution as incompatible with the thesis of the unity of science. If there is no truly universal language in which a general semantics (including a theory of truth) for all languages can be stated, then there is no universal theory of linguistics. There can however be a universal theory of the natural world; consequently, Tarski's solution necessarily places language outside the natural order.

Before presenting his own solution, McGee discusses two related approaches: Kripke's three-valued construction, and the rule-of-revision semantics of Gupta, Herzberger and Belnap. McGee applies the tools of the mathematical theory of inductive definitions (developed by Kleene and Moschovakis) to the theory of truth developed by Kripke in his 1975 paper 'Outline of a Theory of Truth' (Journal of Philosophy 72:690-716). McGee shows how to use Kripke's theory to construct the infinite hierarchy of Tarskian meta-languages. (The trick is to use sentences which are assigned to the extension of truth at level α in Kripke's construction as symbols for the ordinal α itself.) He demonstrates a number of useful results, for example, that there are no two disjoint coinductive sets E and A such that (E,A) is a fixed point of the Kripke construction (Theorem 5.19).

McGee argues that Kripke's theory runs afoul of one of the essential features of a good scientific theory: that it make no claim which, by its own lights, is untrue. McGee relies here upon the so-called 'strengthened liar argument'. According to Kripke's theory, the liar sentence λ is neither true nor false. Hence, it is not true. But, that λ is not true is precisely what λ itself says. Thus, Kripke's theory entails λ , a sentence which, according to Kripke's theory itself, is not true. This difficulty can be resolved only by making a distinction between λ as it occurs in the object language and as it occurs in the meta-language, exactly the sort of linguistic ascent which McGee contends is incompatible with the unity of science.

McGee also considers attempts, such as that of Feferman 1984 (Journal of Symbolic Logic 49:75-111), to use the Kripke construction while avoiding the ascent to a meta-language. Feferman takes the three truth-values of the Kripke construction quite seriously and therefore advocates abandoning classical, two-valued logic. McGee plausibly argues that the methodological

cost of this approach is simply too high. Moreover, Feferman's axiom system enables us to prove untrue sentences and thus runs afoul of one of McGee's methodological maxims.

McGee provides a detailed and accurate presentation of the rule-of-revision semantics of Gupta, Herzberger and Belnap. He argues, convincingly to me, that it is implausible to suppose that the transfinite, non-recursive constructions of this revision theory correspond in any way to the psychological mechanisms which underlie ordinary practice, contrary to Herzberger's and Gupta's claims to be providing a model of 'naive semantics'. More importantly, these theories all require an essentially richer meta-language and so are irrelevant to McGee's concern to formulate a fully general linguistics in a single, universal language.

McGee's own solution is inspired by Carnap's idea of partial definition of theoretical predicates ('Testability and Meaning', *Philosophy of Science* 3 (1936):419-71, 4 (1937):2-40). For example, a dispositional predicate like 'soluble' could be partially defined by the following postulate:

 $\forall x(x \text{ is placed in water} \rightarrow (x \text{ is soluble} \leftrightarrow x \text{ dissolves}))$

This partial definition divides objects into three categories: the definitely soluble, the definitely not soluble, and things which are neither definitely soluble nor definitely not soluble (having never been placed in water). McGee generalizes this idea as follows. A partial interpretation is a pair (A,Γ) , where A is an ordinary, classical model of some language L (the fully interpreted part of the language) and Γ is a set of sentences of some language L' which extends L (by adding partially interpreted predicates, for example). Definite truth and definite falsity are fixed by van Fraassen's method of supervaluations: a sentence ϕ is definitely true if and only if it is true in every expansion of A to a model of Γ , and it is definitely false if it is false in every such expansion. Sentences which are true in some such expansions and false in others are neither definitely true nor definitely false.

McGee also makes use of a proof-theoretic version of this trichotomy. According to this alternative conception, a sentence φ is definitely true just in case it is logically derivable from Γ and the set of sentences true in A (where the process of logical derivation includes an infinitary A-rule: if $\psi(x)$ can be proved to be true for every element in the universe of A, then $\forall x \psi(x)$ can be proved). The sentence φ is definitely false if its negation is definitely true. This proof-theoretic definition of definite truth proves to be more tractable mathematically.

Definite truth is clearly not bivalent. If Harry is a borderline case of baldness, then 'Harry is bald' is neither definitely true nor definitely false. Analogously, the liar sentence λ is neither definitely true nor definitely false. Although we are forced to admit that definite truth is not bivalent, McGee points out that we are not forced to any such conclusion about truth simpliciter. There is no reason why we cannot continue to agree with the commonsense principle that every meaningful sentence is either true or false. We can conclude that the liar sentence is either true or false, but admit that we

cannot say which it is (in a very strong sense of 'cannot', since it is neither definitely true nor definitely false). Thus, McGee's theory treats truth simpliciter and definite truth very differently: the first may be assumed to be bivalent, and the second is known not to be.

There is another crucial difference between truth and definite truth in McGee's theory: it is definitely true that all truths are consistent, but it is not definitely true that all definite truths are consistent. Therefore, it is conceivable that the set of definite truths is a proper superset of the set of truths: there may be falsehoods which are nonetheless definitely true!

This admittedly surprising conclusion is grounded in Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. Definite truth [in (A,Γ)] means: derivable from the meaning postulates in Γ , together with the atomic facts in A. Unfortunately, the meaning postulates we lay down may be (unknown to us) internally inconsistent or inconsistent with the facts of A. In such a case, since everything follows in classical logic from an inconsistency, every sentence would be definitely true and definitely false. (It is unclear to me why truth in such a case should remain consistent and bivalent.) We cannot make it part of the meaning of definite truth that definite truth is consistent, on pain of inconsistency. This is where Gödel's theorem comes in. Gödel proved that no consistent formal system can prove its own consistency. Definite truth is, in McGee's theory, a formalization of a kind of ideal provability (in McGee's system). Thus, McGee's system cannot assert the soundness of definite truth. It cannot contain an axiom like: '0=1' is not definitely true. Nor will it include, for every sentence φ , the following schema:

(DT) If ' ϕ ' is definitely true, then ϕ .

In fact, based on a theorem of Löb, McGee adds the following schema to his system:

 $\operatorname{Def}('(\operatorname{Def}('\phi') \to \phi)') \to \operatorname{Def}('\phi').$

That is, if it is definitely true that if ' ϕ ' is definitely true, then ϕ , this must be because ' ϕ ' itself is definitely true.

Although McGee rejects the Tarskian schema T and the definite truth schema DT, his system does validate the corresponding rules of inference:

R1. From ϕ , deduce $\text{Tr}'\phi'$. R2.From $\text{Tr}'\phi'$, deduce ϕ . R3.From $\neg \phi$, deduce $\neg \text{Tr}'\phi'$. R4.From $\neg \text{Tr}'\phi'$, deduce $\neg \phi$. From ϕ , deduce $\text{Def}'\phi'$. From $\text{Def}'\phi'$, deduce ϕ .

McGee illustrates that a number of intuitively correct informal arguments involving the notion of truth can be proved in a formal system containing these rules and not containing T or DT.

However, the informal arguments McGee discusses or no less intuitively correct when they take place within the context of a conditional proof, where the inference rules are unavailable. For example, suppose I have from a very

reliable source the information that: if the Pope is the vicar of Christ, then everything the Pope says is true. Suppose that the Pope and Luther made exactly the following statements:

Pope:(1)At least one thing Luther says is true. Luther:(2)If the Pope is the vicar of Christ, then I am a heretic. (3)2 + 2 = 5.

Intuitively, we can reach the following conclusion: if the Pope is the vicar of Christ, then Luther is a heretic. We know that if the Pope is the vicar of Christ, then everything he says is true. Therefore, (1) is true, and so at least one of (2) and (3) are true. (3) is false, so (2) must be true. By hypothesis, the Pope is the vicar of Christ, so Luther is a heretic. By conditional proof, if the Pope is the vicar of Christ, then Luther is a heretic. QED. McGee must reject this argument as fallacious, since it involves using the rule R2 in the context of a conditional proof. Consequently, McGee's theory is in serious trouble in respect of meeting the condition of agreeing with ordinary practice. The use of the T schema in the context of conditional proofs is the rule rather than the exception. McGee's theory agrees with ordinary practice only when such uses are avoided.

A second problem with McGee's theory concerns its generalization to the epistemic analogues of the liar paradox (such as Kaplan and Montague's Paradox of the Knower). In a chapter on logical necessity, McGee relies upon the logic of provability developed by Solovay and Boolos. In this logic, the T axiom schema (if '\varphi' is necessary, then \varphi) is rejected and an axiom schema corresponding to Löb's theorem is adopted instead: Nec'[Nec'o' → o]' → Nec'o'. Presumably, McGee would take the same approach in dealing with the various epistemic and doxastic paradoxes. This would have a number of highly undesirable consequences, in addition to the intrinsic implausibility of claiming that we cannot know that knowledge of φ implies φ . In higher-order probability theory, we would have to give up Miller's principle, which entails that the probability of ϕ conditional on the proposition that the absolute probability of \(\phi \) is 1 is itself 1. We would be unable to use an extremely plausible reflection axiom about the justifiability of belief, namely: $J - J\phi \rightarrow - J\phi$, that is, if it is justifiable to believe that ϕ is not justifiably believable, then indeed \(\phi \) is not justifiably believable.

Finally, I am not convinced that the unity of science depends on the availability of a universal language. McGee's argument consists of two inferences: (1) if no universal language, then no universal theory, and (2) if no universal theory, then no unity of science. I have doubts about both arguments. Concerning the first point, I would argue that, even in the absence of a universal language, it would be possible to state a universal theory of truth (along Tarskian lines) schematically, by means of Russellian typical ambiguity. This universal theory would be a kind of pattern or template which could be instantiated (as needed) in any of the languages of the Tarskian hierarchy. [See Appendix C of my Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality, 1991.]

Concerning the second point, I do not see why the unity of science need be threatened by the absence of a universal theory of linguistics. If our theory of truth for an object language consists of an interpreted formal language, then the object language and meta-language cannot be identical, since the universe of discourse of the interpreted language is a set which belongs to the universe of discourse of the meta-language but does not belong to itself. Thus, the universe of the object language must be a proper subset of the universe of the meta-language. If our philosophical attitude toward mathematical objects (like sets) is in a broad sense constructivist, then we might hold that sets are in some sense constructed by or epiphenomena of our own mathematical activity. This would explain, in terms acceptable I think to the naturalist, why it is impossible for a human language to be semantically closed: in the process of creating a linguistic theory adequate for human language at its contemporaneous state of development, we (in some sense) bring into existence new mathematical objects that are not in the universe of discourse of the language under investigation. According to this picture (suggested by Charles Parsons in his paper 'Sets and Classes', Nous 8 (1974): 1-12), what we now take to be proper classes will be sets, from the point of view of later, more inclusive theories. The impossibility of constructing a linguistic theory which accurately accounts for all present and future languages would be analogous to the impossibility (according to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle) of measuring simultaneously the position and momentum of a particle. In both cases, the act of observing disturbs the system being observed. This need not place language outside the natural order, any more than the uncertainty principle places subatomic particles outside nature.

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C.J. Misak

Truth and the End of Inquiry.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1991. Pp. xiii + 182.
US\$49.95: Cdn\$58.95. ISBN 0-19-824231-X.

Cheryl Misak presents and defends an account of truth deriving from the founder of American pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce. She distinguishes Peirce's account of truth from a logical definition of 'truth' and from a criterion for truth. She contends that Peirce's pragmatist account specifies what one can expect of true hypotheses for the course of experience. Her initial formulation of Peirce's pragmatic maxim is: '[A] person does not have

a complete grasp of a predicate F if she is unable to say what would be the consequences of hypotheses of the sort "a is F" (4). Misak eventually expands on this maxim as follows: '[W]e [as philosophers] ought to formulate hypotheses the truth or falsity of which would have experiential effects.... A philosophical truth is flawed if there is no way its truth might make any difference in the world' (34). Pragmatism, on Misak's construal, requires that we acknowledge the consequences of hypotheses for experience as definitive of what those hypotheses mean.

Peirce's pragmatic maxim, according to Misak, is not designed to define 'truth', but rather to yield 'a pragmatic elucidation of the term.' A pragmatic elucidation will identify what we can expect of true hypotheses, where the expectation must be 'pragmatically significant', i.e., must 'really lead us to expect something of the course of experience' (42). Such an elucidation, Misak argues, leaves us with Peirce's view that 'truth is the property of hypotheses that would be believed if inquiry were pursued as far as it could fruitfully go' (44). Adding more than this property, according to Peirce, will leave us with 'transcendental metaphysics' rather than pragmatism.

If, following Peirce, we elucidate truth in terms of ideal inquiry, we shall have to explain how truth relates to familiar conceptions of objectivity. On a conception of truth familiar since Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, if a proposition is true, it specifies how things are objectively, or (equivalently) what is the case conceiver-independently. The relevant kind of objectivity does not exclude objective truths about conceivers themselves; it rather excludes dependence of the existence of an objective state of affairs on one's conceiving of that state of affairs. On this familiar approach to objectivity, the quest for objective truth is the quest for beliefs that represent objective states of affairs: states of affairs whose existence does not depend on one's conceiving of them. Skepticism, relative to this approach, is just the view that we lack nonquestionbegging reasons for holding that our quest for objective truth is (ever) successful.

Misak's Peircean account of truth seeks to accommodate intuitions about objectivity with the following view: 'The pragmatic view of reality is that reality is the "object" of true beliefs — it is what true beliefs are about. Reality is what beliefs in the final opinion would fix on' (131). Given this view of reality, Misak infers that 'truth-value … is an objective matter — it does not depend on what anyone happens to think' (132). Truth, however, does not transcend inquiry, according to Misak; for 'if inquiry would no longer be able to improve on a hypothesis, then that hypothesis is true' (166). At this point, Misak resorts to rhetorical questions: 'What more could we aim for? What is added by wondering whether the hypothesis is *really* true?' The answers seem straightforward: We could aim for beliefs that represent objective states of affairs; and we could wonder whether the best human inquiry would provide actually delivers such beliefs.

Given the familiar conception of objectivity noted above, we shall resist identifying objective truth with a hypothesis on which inquiry would no longer be able to improve. We shall then acknowledge a possibility that undercuts any such identification: a possibility where the best that human inquiry would do with respect to a hypothesis fails to yield a hypothesis that is objectively true — i.e., a hypothesis that actually represents objective states of affairs of the aforementioned sort. Even if Peircean truth is such that no argument would change our minds about it under ideal conditions, it does not therefore qualify as objective truth in the sense noted. The consideration that no argument would change our minds may obtain in virtue of an objectively unreliable feature of human inquirers, rather than in virtue of considerations reliably indicating the objective truth of the hypothesis in question. Misak's Peircean conception of truth thus fails to capture the familiar conception of objective truth deriving from Aristotle.

We cannot fault an Aristotelian conception of objective truth on the ground that it allows that 'a belief that would be forever empirically adequate and explanatory might still be false' (166). Proponents of an Aristotelian conception acknowledge this as a crucial feature of their conception of objectivity. Objectivity of the Aristotelian sort is not guaranteed by evidential/explanatory considerations, even under ideal conditions of inquiry. We have no such guarantee inasmuch as human inquirers may very well suffer a cognitive defect entailing that the best they would do in inquiry falls short of actual representation of objective states of affairs. We can, of course, redefine 'objectivity' to involve something less than Aristotelian objectivity; but then we shall have changed the subject — the kind of objectivity — that has engaged most epistemologists since Aristotle. Peirce's approach to truth does indeed change the subject; and, in doing so, it fails to lay a conceptual basis for raising and treating the worries about objectivity that have motivated epistemologists since antiquity.

Misak offers a plausible reconstruction of Peirce's views, but one is left wondering how her reconstruction contributes to traditional questions about objective truth. A redefinition of 'objective truth', in terms of ideal inquiry, seems to leave those traditional questions altogether untouched. Skeptical worries about our achieving objective truth cannot be answered by changing the subject. The worries persist even when one chooses, for whatever reason, to talk about something else. Perhaps we should simply acknowledge that Peirce offered nothing to answer traditional skeptical worries, but chose rather to focus on matters less worrisome — matters of ideal human inquiry. This is arguably the most plausible diagnosis of Peirce's approach to truth.

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Leslie A. Mulholland

Kant's System of Rights. New York: Columbia University Press 1990. Pp. xvii + 403. US\$49.00. ISBN 0-231-06874-3.

Studies of Kant's political philosophy have increased in quantity and quality, though they have shied away from the details of Kant's arguments. Leslie Mulholland's book offers a detailed, systematic reconstruction of Kant's political principles. The 'system of rights' is the right theme to tie together Kant's views, starting from Kant's basis of rights and responsibility in the *Groundwork*, through the 'Doctrine of Right' in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, to Kant's views on history and international relations. Mulholland contends that Kant is much more a natural law than a social contract theorist, that Kant's concepts of free persons and of rights are the only adequate ones (306), that peremptory rights (either to rule or to own) are only possible in a republic (344), and that Kant stakes a middle ground between Nozick and Rawls on the issue of allowable state control over private property (401).

Chapters 1-4 concern the foundations of Kant's normative theory, largely in the *Groundwork*. Chapters 5-8 explore Kant's theory of rights, including Kant's distinction between right and virtue, the universal principle of rights, the innate right to freedom, and acquired rights (mostly to property). Chapters 9-11 treat Kant's view of the general will, constitutional rights, and principles of domestic and international policies of the state. Chapter 12 reconsiders the elements of natural law in Kant and places his views in relation to contemporary discussions.

Mulholland holds that Kant is a natural law theorist in two regards: a sense of morality is part of common sense, and the requirements of morality can be known through reason; Kant does not hold that human law depends on divine law or on revelation (13). Mulholland argues that the universality requirement of Kant's Categorical Imperative rests on logical rather than on normative grounds. To be a law, a principle must hold for agents regardless of their inclinations. In practical matters, however, our inclinations are what distinguish us. Hence a principle which holds for a person independently of his private inclinations must be capable of holding for anyone who can act on it' (65). Kant's formality requirement thus generates as a corollary the relevant universality across (relevant) agents.

Mulholland contends that the two main formulations of Kant's Categorical Imperative diverge. The law of nature formula rests solely on what principles can hold universally among human agents. Reciprocity is fundamental to this formula: one cannot obligate others to do what one is unwilling to be obligated by another to do (136). The humanity imperative, however, ultimately includes what Mulholland calls 'the deed principle': one cannot obligate another to do something, unless the other person voluntarily does something to accept the obligation (136). Consent to obligation is fundamental to this formula (137). Mulholland holds that Kant frequently appeals to

this latter principle, that the tension between these two principles runs through Kant's political theory, and that ultimately Kant rescinds the deed principle in favor of the natural law formula.

Mulholland argues that Kant's theory justifies Mill's principle that only self-protection can warrant interference with others' actions (144). Kant's discussion of the innate right to freedom of action is the lynch pin of his theory of justice, yet his arguments for and from it are sketchy. Mulholland tries to show how this innate right can be justified, along with its important corollaries (land-use, self-mastery, and children's rights to upbringing), solely by appeal to the deed principle and the principle of universality (215-28).

Kant's argument for property rights begs the question (249-50). Mulholland reconstructs Kant's argument to show that a Kantian title to acquire property rights is based on our right to develop and exercise our innate freedom, where this right ultimately is limited by one's acquired obligation not to prevent others from similarly developing and exercising their innate freedom (250-51). Kant's justification of property directly feeds his argument for the general will. Since we each need to use land in order to act outwardly at all, each of us is committed to unhindered use of some piece of land. Since each of us is similarly situated in this regard, and we cannot avoid one another, our need for unhindered use of land commits us by reciprocity not to hinder others in their use of their land (280). To make this effective requires a system of universally compossible titles to land use; this just is (part of) the object of the general will.

There is a basic flaw in this work: the 'deed principle' is not Kant's. Mulholland purports to find the deed principle expressed in Kant's argument against false promises (Groundwork Ak IV 429-30; quoted 136), Kant's definition of 'deed' (Metaphysics of Morals Ak VI 223; quoted 202-3), Rechtslehre §9 (quoted 267), and a note from Kant's Nachlass (Ak XXIII 295; quoted 267). Onora O'Neill argued persuasively in two 1985 articles, 'Consistency in Action' and 'Between Consenting Adults' (rpt. in: Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy [New York: Cambridge University Press 1989], 81-125), that the important concept of consent involved in Kant's humanity imperative is the modal concept of the possibility of others consenting to the principle embodied in one's maxim; this models universality by hypothetical consent. Kant's definition of 'deed' is the fourth in a series of definitions that begins with the definition of obligation: 'Obligation is the necessity of a free action under a categorical imperative of reason' (Ak VI 222). Kant then states that an 'action is called a deed insofar as it comes under obligatory laws ...' (Ak VI 223). Deeds are actions that stand under the categorical imperative! They are not, and are not restricted to, acts by which one acquires an obligation by voluntarily committing oneself to it. The last two of Mulholland's passages are torn from context; the sentences immediately preceding and following each of them show that they, too, define 'deed' along the lines just quoted from Kant. To show that Kant rescinded 'the deed principle' in favor of the law of nature formula is much ado about nothing. and Mulholland fails to ask what becomes of his use of that principle, in

reconstructing Kant's doctrine of innate rights, if Kant ultimately rescinds it. While there are other flaws, too, this book also has many other worthwhile points. Mulholland's study should stimulate much wider and better analysis of Kant's politics.

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> Andrew Oldenquist and Menachem Rosner, eds. Alienation, Community, and Work. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1991. Pp. viii + 211. US\$42.95.ISBN 0-313-27541-6.

This book is a collection of essays based on presentations at two conferences, one in the United States and one in Yugoslavia. The contributors are eight social scientists and three philosophers. An introductory essay by the editors provides a useful orientation to the problems and issues discussed in the subsequent papers. The papers debate the meaning, theoretical usefulness, and applicability of various conceptions of alienation. Perhaps the principal division is between those who favor a subjective conception of alienation and those who favor an objective conception. Subjectivists understand alienation in terms of psychological states of powerlessness, anomie, estrangement, etc., whereas Objectivists define alienation in terms of undesirable social structures. The latter conception originates in Marx's theory of alienation, which identifies capitalist relations of production (private property) and the associated market economy as the primary alienating social structures.

These two conceptions and the associated sociological research programs are discussed in detail by Seeman in 'Sentiments and Structures'. This essay provides a good overview of how sociologists have thought about alienation (and how this thinking has shaped their research) over the past thirty years. Subjectivists such as Seeman do not ignore the social structures that are responsible for the undesirable psychological states, though until recently they have paid more attention to the psychological states at the expense of the structures. As the editors point out on p. 4, the problem for subjectivists is that by defining alienation in terms of psychological states, they run the risk of being unable to distinguish genuine alienation from instances in which people have those psychological states for reasons having nothing to do with alienation (e.g., mental illness, being in prison).

Objectivists, on the other hand, identify people as alienated provided only that they live or work in a social environment that meets the objective criteria for alienation. This means that someone can be alienated even if he or she seems to be the picture of psycho-social health. So, for example, on the Marxist conception, skilled workers in high-tech factories who enjoy their jobs are nonetheless alienated because they do not own the means of production and are 'forced' to sell their labor power. Of course, objectivists (including Marx) maintain that in point of fact, undesirable psychological states do attend alienating social structures, though once attention turns to the empirical details, the picture turns out to be more complex than Marxists are comfortable in admitting.

These two conceptions of alienation may not be mutually exclusive and indeed a number of these authors attend equally to situational features and psychological states. For example, Rosner in his article on alienation in the Israeli kibbutz explains how feelings of alienation can occur despite the fact that a kibbutz does not have an alienating social structure. He also explains how that social structure precludes other common manifestations of alienation.

Given the historical roots of discussions of alienation in Marx, it is not surprising that alienation in connection with work is the focus of much social science research and many of these articles. Agassi maintains that job redesign and marginal changes toward greater democracy in the workplace can improve both profits and the psycho-social well being of workers. This contrasts with the Marxian view that revolutionary change in the structure of ownership is necessary to alleviate alienation. On the other hand, the empirical work of Leviatan on Israeli kubbutzim seems to support the Marxist view, since the de-alienating structures the kubbutzim have employed are at odds with capitalist ownership relations. Karlsson also supports the Marxist view by arguing that his detailed empirical research on some Swedish factories shows that changes in work organization can increase job satisfaction while leaving other manifestations of alienation unaffected.

David Schweitzer's 'Alienation, Dis-Anomie, and Durkheim' is a useful overview of Durkheim's work related to alienation. According to Durkheim's organic conception of society, psycho-social health requires individuals to be integrated into a network of social entities that answer to various social needs. Failure in this connection leads to anomie, a species of alienation characterized by unrealistic expectations, lack of moral discipline, rootlessness, etc. An important cause of anomie is the extreme fragmentation of work that characterizes industrial society; Durkheim's remedy for this is non-radical change in the workplace. Schweitzer discusses a common criticism of organic theories of society (such as Durkheim's), namely, that they encourage a subordination of the individual to the group and are unnecessarily deferential toward the status quo. Schweitzer argues that this criticism does not apply to Durkheim.

Oldenquist also understands alienation as a loss of (sense of) community. He decries what he sees as the excessive individualism of Western Europe and the United States and believes that combatting alienation requires that social entities have more of a hold on individuals than they currently do. This essay contains an especially clear statement of the collectivist-communitarian vision of the good society. One problem is that it is unclear how social entities are to be evaluated. Oldenquist maintains that communitarians are not committed to favoring Nazi rallies, but he does not say enough about how to distinguish good social entities from bad ones.

A question that lurks around the edges of many of these essays is whether or not alienation can be eliminated or only ameliorated. The only author to address this question squarely is John Lachs. Lachs maintains that many of the things we do in modern society require the mediation of others. Writing a letter, renting an apartment, putting food on the table all require the cooperation of countless individuals. This has a variety of undesirable consequences, including a reduced sense of responsibility for our actions. However, Lachs maintains that this mediation 'provides immense benefits at considerable cost' (121), which leads him to reject calls for revolutionary social change as utopian and to favor more modest reforms.

This is a useful collection of essays in that it provides a good overview of how social scientists have thought about alienation, together with a philosophical appreciation of some of the complexities involved in this concept. Most, though not all, of the essays are solid pieces of work, and some (e.g., Lachs') rise above that level.

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Christine Overall, ed. and William P. Zion, assoc. ed.

Perspectives on AIDS: Ethical and Social Issues. Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1991. Pp. xi + 179. Cdn\$16.95: US\$10.95. ISBN 0-19-540749-0.

HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus) and AIDS (Acquired Immuno-deficiency Syndrome) have exposed our attitudes, beliefs and values about sexuality and economic, political, and gender power relationships. As the title promises, this collection of essays delivers a variety of perspectives which force us to reexamine these attitudes. If your knowledge and beliefs in this area have been shaped by the popular press and public television science and nature shows, they will be radically challenged and reformed by this well-edited collection of excellent (Canadian) essays.

Part I, 'Culture and Context', critically examines the ways in which we as members of a society have received the AIDS epidemic. Part 2, 'Ethical and Social Issues', gives specific answers to questions such as whether or not health care workers have a duty to treat Persons With AIDS (Benjamin Freedman), and if the interests of society in developing a cure take precedence over the rights of Persons With AIDs (PWAs) to use drugs which have not been tested in randomized clinical trials (John Dixon). The position is repeatedly affirmed that, while stopping the spread of the disease is an overriding public health objective, in order to be morally acceptable it must be done in the least restrictive way possible.

I must emphasize that each essay in this collection is challenging and enlightening, but the space limitations of this review allow specific mention of only a few. The first, by Arthur Schafer, sets the dissonant tone that characterizes the entire AIDS phenomenon. Schafer warns that 'our social responses to AIDS pose a serious threat to the shared attitudes and values that define us as a moral community' (1). He goes on to discuss the problems we have dealing with AIDS and PWAs — our tendency to 'blame the victim' and alienate our fellow human beings, our xenophobia, and the irrationality which shapes much of our reaction to the disease. I cannot help but wonder if the values Schafer worries about losing, which surely ground many of these reactions, are so precious after all.

Editor Christine Overall's own contribution is a feminist view of how AIDS effects women, and more interestingly, how our attitudes about women effect how we perceive that they are affected by AIDS. For example, infected women are typically seen not as PWAs, but rather potential infectors of men, children and fetuses. Also, campaigns which place the moral responsibility for protection on women by urging them to insist that their partners wear condoms ignore the inequality of the male-female sexual relationship, and the lack of power and control which often shapes women's experience.

Jerome Bickenbach suggests that we consider AIDS as a disability and a handicap in order to free it from the sexual 'spin' which shapes our thinking about it. I have spoken to a person with a disability about this suggestion. My acquaintance understood and acknowledged immediately that AIDS is indeed a disability. In my mind, this intuitive and personal response gave as much credibility to Bickenbach's suggestion as his careful analysis and convincing argument.

William Zion's article locates AIDS within the Hebrew-Christian tradition — a tradition, he argues, that does not judge but expresses itself in love and tolerance. His article is followed by a fascinating account by James Miller of how the literary labelling of PWAs as victims, saints and martyrs causes and perpetuates, at least in part, our marginalization of them.

The relationship between a health care team and a patient is one ideally based on communication, negotiation and caring, and leads to shared decision-making and informed consent. Michael Yeo suggests that this would be a suitable model for sexual relationships as well, placing the responsibility for personal (and societal) protection against the spread of AIDS squarely on

the shoulders of individual sexual partners. His essay develops this suggestion after explaining why his approach is 'liberal' (relying on consent and eschewing sexual moralizing). Yeo addresses obvious objections to his view, but here we see the limitations of his analogy. The informed consent process in the provision of health care has certain values and is in itself a goal. This is also true of consent in sexual relationships, but it also has a goal — that of controlling the spread of AIDS.

H.A. Bassford considers other ways of achieving this goal. One is quarantine, or isolation, of PWAs, which is practiced in Cuba. Another is universal, mandatory testing. According to Bassford neither are likely to achieve the objective of limiting the spread of the disease, and as well are morally unacceptable. More promising ways to change behaviour, he argues, are education and the provision of social supports.

I reached the end of the essays written by the contributing academics with a confident feeling that I had now achieved a thorough grounding in the ethical issues with which bioethics should be concerned. I was reminded of the action gap between the philosophical and the political in the last essay, written by activist B. Lee. Lee shifts the emphasis somewhat from the responsibility we all have to prevent the spread of AIDS, and the rights PWAs have as members of society, to the often forgotten but essentially important responsibility of our community to care for and about the sick, and the 'collective responsibility to provide support and services to the infected and ill' (169).

This book provides a variety of viewpoints, challenging ideas and arguments, and a wealth of references for further study. These references are needed and will be used. While the editors have succeeded in including the points of view of the liberal, feminist, religious, legal, political, and deconstructionist contributors, it is a short book. The theory informing these views is (necessarily) missing. The uninformed reader will be left somewhat unsatisfied and skeptical about arguments which seem to start in the middle. Students should be inspired to fill the gaps in their knowledge, which makes this book perfect for a senior undergraduate or graduate philosophy or bioethics course.

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Karl Pfeifer

Actions and Other Events: The Unifier-Multiplier Controversy. New York: Peter Lang 1989. Pp. 203. US\$24.95. ISBN 0-8204-1044-6.

- (Q1) If Donald's pulling the trigger caused the gun's firing, did Donald's killing Alvin cause that firing?
- (Q2) If he turned on the light by flipping the switch did he flip the switch by turning on the light?
- (Q3) Given that Alvin dies twelve hours after Donald shoots him, does Alvin's death occur twelve hours after Donald kills him?

A triple 'No!' might seem to justify the multiplicative claim that each question assigns two different though related actions to the same agent. If, to the contrary, each assigns just the one action, but under two different descriptions, as unifiers (e.g. Anscombe and Davidson) may or do allege, what should be the answers? As a unifier Pfeifer argues, first, that Goldman's level-generational criteria for multiplication lead eventually to incoherence. But let us skip to his more constructive approach, and then to the subsequent more general inquiry into event-identity which he appends.

By identifying the killing with the causing of death, and the latter with the trigger-pulling, the Davidsonian answer to Q1 is that the killing is indeed the cause of the gun's firing. While not dissenting, Pfeifer has a worry. The specification of an event as killing, unlike that of an event as trigger-pulling, hardly ranks as an explanation of the gun's firing. Hence, to loosen the causal specification-explanation bond, he purports to show how an unsophisticated savage may recognise his trigger-pulling as the cause of certain damage, while yet not knowing what explains the latter. But that is just a failure to comprehend intermediate links, and does not prevent the causal specification from being explanatory. Far better, then, just to acknowledge that the conditions, under which specifications of causes of effects just as such causes (e.g. as killings) can explain these or other effects, are more limited than (or different from) those under which specifications of these causes in other terms (e.g. as trigger-pullings) are explanatory.

In response to Q2 Pfeifer wants to discredit the initially plausible claim that the turning on of the light is not by the turning on of the light. That was the premise from which Goldman deduced that, if the turning on is by the switch-flipping, then it is not identical with the latter. But Pfeifer's ingenious scenarios suggest that the by-relation between the turning on and the switch-flipping is reversible. From this he concludes, with the help of some formal regimentation, that Goldman's premise is false. As a back-up he borrows an analogical argument of Norvin Richards' to show that in any case the inference from the premise to the non-identity claim is invalid.

Q3 is the crux. If the killing includes the victim's death, or else precludes any interval between itself and the latter, it is not identical with the

trigger-pulling. In that case the Davidsonian answer to Q1 would be wrong. Here Pfeifer is content to argue that for certain quite commonplace uses of 'kill' and 'death', if not for all, neither condition is fulfilled. But now the more general question must arise. Under what conditions do two different descriptions capture the same event?

For Goldman and Kim the conditions are implicit in the descriptions themselves. The same event is not captured, unless the descriptions ascribe the same properties. For Pfeifer the conditions are given by Davidson's causal (same causes and effects) criterion of event-identity. Whether his defence of this criterion against certain circularity, cosmological and isolational objections is decisive must here give way to a more basic issue. Do we really need a criterion? That handy distinction of Donnellan's between referential and attributive uses of descriptions suggests a proviso. Where in a referential use two definite descriptions (e.g. 'That man in the corner' and 'The red-haired gent') actually secure reference for the same people at the same time, whether what they refer to is the same object seems no longer in doubt. What need, then, for a criterion? It need only arise where they apply attributively, i.e. uniquely to something whichever of several it might be.

Accordingly, where what is described is an event, what we need instead, given that the descriptions are both referential, is a unifier's emendment to the Goldman-Kim position. Roughly this states (a) that a property-difference need only entail an event-difference where it holds between independently variable properties, and (b) that where the same thing cannot instantiate at least one of the two properties ascribed without the other during the same time, then what the descriptions capture is the same event. What this states are conditions the satisfaction of which may already be implicit, at least in context and with the help of some background knowledge, in the descriptions themselves. Primarily, then, what it specifies is not a criterion from the satisfaction of which event-identity may be inferred. Thus in the context it may be sufficiently plain that the ascribability of trigger-pulling is not independent of the ascribability of the causing the death. Where, on the other hand, one description at least, e.g. 'Donald's causing Alvin's death', only applies attributively, i.e. to an event whatever that event may be, (e.g. Donald's trigger-pulling or something else), then some criterion of identity may indeed be required. (Notice that in this application Davidson's criterion fits the unifying answers to Q1 and Q3 quite neatly. But what about the identification of Donald's trigger-pulling and causing the gun to fire? Would one say that they have the same immediate effect?) In sum, Pfeifer fails to distinguish sharply enough between an analysis of what event-identity is and a criterion for the day-to-day identification of events, where it is insufficiently clear from their descriptions whether they satisfy the conditions set forth in the analysis.

The critical tenor of these comments underscores the provocative impact of Pfeifer's study more effectively than words of praise. The latter, however, should not go unsaid in what remains of this review's quota of space. He writes in a limpid uncluttered style, pays scrupulous attention to the leading

contenders in the field, and remains ever alert to how arguments for positions he opposes might be further developed or strengthened. Altogether he has carried the debate with vigour and insight well beyond the point at which he entered.

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Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. New York: Cambridge University Press 1990. Pp. viii + 239. US\$47.50. ISBN 0-521-37527-4.

The classic theoretical papers analyzing nuclear deterrence — W. Kaufmann's "The Requirements of Deterrence', (1956) Thomas Schelling's 'The Threat that Leaves Something to Chance', and 'The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack', (1960), date from the early years of the thermonuclear era. This early work reflects strategic conditions prevailing in the late 1950s, during which the United States possessed nuclear first strike capacity against the Soviet Union and during which prominent alarmists in the United States, like Albert Wohlstetter in 'The Delicate Balance of Terror' (1959), claimed that the Soviet Union possessed first strike capacity against the United States. The terrifying instability generated by opposed squadrons of nuclear bombers was somewhat relieved in the 1960s by the introduction of missile submarines, and by 1970 each superpower possessed second strike capacity against the other.

The arrival of mutual second strike capacity did not produce a strategic literature comparable to the classic work of Kaufmann and Schelling. The analysis of nuclear deterrence languished through the 1970s and was re-ignited only by the dark irrationalities of the Reagan years. Some of the most interesting work in the dark years was undertaken by Robert Powell, who has consolidated his papers in this book, the most comprehensive analysis of mutual second strike capacity to date. Powell's methods go far beyond Schelling's and incorporate innovations in mathematical modelling characteristic of one sort of modern social science. Schelling's methods were quasigame theoretic, and involve strategic choices taken once for the entire game; Powell's models involve sequences of strategic choices reflecting the unfolding character of events and changes in information and belief that occur as the game proceeds. More importantly, the Nash equilibria that set the gold

standard for rational conduct in the game theoretic context are replaced by sequential equilibria as desiderated by Kreps, Wilson and others. (Similar changes in a less algebraic setting had been introduced by Brams and Wittman in the early 1980s.) It comes as a welcome relief that non-sequential equilibrium strategies that produce head-on crashes in chicken games often fail as sequential equilibria, which require rationality in each sub-game as well as the game as a whole.

It was Bertrand Russell who first identified nuclear brinkmanship with the game of Highway Chicken, 'played by youthful degenerates', and Chicken, brinkmanship, and crisis stability occupy most of Powell's attention. Nuclear brinkmanship involves confrontations, threats, and pre-war maneuvers between nuclear powers, not the actual use of nuclear weapons. It is a contest of resolve, transpiring mainly in the minds of leaders, and as such it seems specially suited to decision theoretic analysis.

It is not possible in a review of this length to consider the mathematical development of Powell's arguments. His results include that (a) the state with the greatest resolve does not always prevail, (b) the state with greater resolve may be less likely to prevail, (c) the elimination of misperception during a crisis is not necessarily stabilizing, (d) the introduction of 'easy' escalatory steps makes states less likely to challenge the status quo, (e) the presence of first strike advantages need not increase the rationality of striking first, (f) an increase in nuclear powers reduces crisis stability. Many of these results challenge the conventional wisdom, or wisdoms, of the nuclear left and right.

There is also a most intriguing impossibility theorem that it can never be rational to launch a nuclear attack, even if one has first strike advantages and even if one is fairly confident that a nuclear attack is forthcoming from the other side. Of course, if one had first strike advantages and one was certain that an attack is forthcoming then it would be rational to attack pre-emptively, but it is part of Powell's proof that this certainty will never exist, provided that (i) states retain collective control over whether or not there will be a nuclear exchange, i.e., that Nature cannot start a nuclear war, (ii) each state can attack only once, (iii) each state has assured second strike capacity, and (iv) each state believes (Powell mistakenly says 'knows') that i-iii are true.

I welcome any result demonstrating the irrationality of nuclear use, but one might wonder about condition i. Powell correctly notes that accidental nuclear war is impossible, but he does not distinguish accidental nuclear war from *unauthorized* nuclear war, which is possible, given control procedures for nuclear submarines. Such unauthorized use would produce a war 'from nature' from the standpoint of the leadership. Nevertheless, the deep stability theorized by Powell may contribute to our understanding of how the superpowers avoided war and rode out the nuclear crises of 1962 and 73.

Powell does not analyze these or any other historical events, and his pages are devoid of the concrete examples and extra-nuclear allusions that made Schelling's studies so vivid. His tart comment, 'the superpowers have little experience with nuclear crises, and no one wants any more' (184), only partially excuses the unremittingly formal character of Powell's presentation. His proof that 'the threat that leaves something to chance' is formally indistinguishable from 'limited nuclear options' is deductively sound, but two policies that differ in procurement, targeting, declaratory rhetoric, and moral rating according to the just war theory would seem to differ in everything that really matters.

Powell overdramatizes when he argues that the emergence of second strike capacity produces a 'new logic of war'. Mutual second strike capacity has existed only between a few nations for a few years. It generates an anomaly, not a revolutionary realignment, in the array of strategic situations. Even if nuclear proliferation increases, the new nuclear states, especially those without navies, may never obtain secure second strike capacity. But we should hope that in the future there will be fewer nuclear states and less brinkmanship. Abstract without being general, this is a Pythagorean eulogy to a world well lost.

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Samuel Pufendorf

On the Natural State of Men: The 1678 Latin Edition and English Translation. Michael Seidler, trans. and ed.
Lewiston, ON and Queenston, ME: Edward Mellen Press 1990. Pp. x + 140.
Cdn\$49.95: US\$49.95. ISBN 0-88946-299-2.

The name of Samuel Pufendorf appears regularly in historical accounts of Natural Law theory: Seidler claims that his *De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem* became 'the standard European textbook on natural law for the next hundred years' (9). Yet the specifics of his theory seem now rarely analyzed or debated. S and his publisher have therefore done the scholarly community a genuine service in making conveniently available a key P text and placing it in historical and intellectual context. S presumably chose *De statu hominum naturali* because it is P's 'longest self-contained treatment of the natural state' and 'his last word on the subject' (27-8).

S's work divides into an introduction dealing with P's life and works, the modern Natural Law tradition, P's theory of man's natural state and its similarities and contrasts with other contemporary theories (70 pp.); a select

bibliography (7 pp.); remarks on text and translation (5 pp.); the Latin text of *De statu* (25 pp.); and S's translation and notes to it (31 pp.). The very human dedication, 'for Sarah and Alex for all the waiting', deserves the reassurance that the wait was worth it. S has given us a decidedly workmanlike execution of his project, more dedicated to being useful to interested scholars than to making his own reputation by daring and individualistic interpretations. P is not patronized or exploited; he is helped to speak seriously to the concerns of present thinkers.

P himself appears as a thinker less concerned with enunciating an original and distinctive position than with surveying relevant evidence and existing theories — Aristotle, Hobbes, Grotius, Thomasius — and coming to a more balanced decision on the issues they raise. That judgment is based on his conclusions rather than on his career, which was in fact often beset by controversy, e.g., with the German defenders of the old Imperial ideal or with the Lutheran theologians at Lund. He also had supporters, however, and in terms of his tutorial, university, and royal court appointments (Sweden, Prussia), and the regular succession of his publications (five on Natural Law) his career must be accounted distinguished. One indication of what might be called his philosophical eclecticism is what S calls his 'rational-empirical method' (62), which bows both to Descartes and Bacon, and specifically in the area of practice.

The state of nature is appropriately studied, not because it ever existed in any historical purity, but because this hypothetical reconstruction of human life without what it owes to 'human intervention' (110) would have the paedagogical effect of 'making citizens love and devote themselves to the civil state's preservation' (42). The analysis is more complicated than in Hobbes because P recognizes a pre-civil-state society where, though insecurely, some products of human co-operation and discovery are shared. In fact, in a number of respects P's position seems intermediate between Aristotle, who called the state natural, and Hobbes, who insisted that it was conventional (P himself seems to have preferred to identify with Hobbesian modernity rather than with Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition). Thus P's precivil society suggests the history Aristotle proposes, from matings and households to villages, before the city state is finally organized. Also while Aristotle opts for the rule of law even over rulers, and Hobbes identifies law with the declared will of the sovereign, P exempts monarchs from legal obligation, but urges them to conform to their general prescriptions for their subjects. If Aristotle seems sanguine on the role of friendship in the cohesion of states, and Hobbes more convinced of inevitable enmity without enforced law, P emphasizes both; on the one hand 'nothing is more miserable...than constant solitude and nothing more pleasant than social intercourse' (127, cf. 117); on the other, 'there is among humans an innate wickedness that enjoys harming others as much as possible [which even Hobbes denies]...that can never be entirely extirpated...' (129, cf. 126). Reminded by P's attempted even-handedness and by the concessions of both Aristotle and Hobbes, one can conclude that it is not because they see distinct and incommensurable worlds that

philosophers reach different prescriptive conclusions; and a shared range of evidence is reassuring to the Natural Law proponent.

Speaking of P's royal court appointments, S finds him 'always eager to serve the stronger monarch' (11), and indeed P dismissed any claim to greater liberty or naturalness in democracy or aristocracy with the rather cavalier remark that all regimes enforce obedience to law (119-20). Still, he hailed the British Glorious Revolution, rejected as irrational taking 'an uncertain fear of the future as a pretext for threatening certain and present evil against another' (130), and found it 'intolerable insolence' to interpret 'the Greek doctrine of natural slavery' as a 'right to subdue others like wild game or...drag them into slavery against their will' (125).

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Hans Reiss, ed.

Kant's Political Writings.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Second edition. Translated by H.B. Nisbet.

Pp. xv + 309.

US\$44.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-39185-7); US\$14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-39837-1).

This collection of the political writings of Kant is part of the new Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. The much-used first edition of 1970 has been enlarged by three additional Kant selections (with helpful editorial introductions), as well as by a postscript and expanded bibliography by Reiss. The additional Kant selections are 'What is Orientation in Thinking?', 'Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History', and two reviews of Herder's Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind. The selections retained from the first edition are 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose'; 'An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"; 'On the Common Saying: "This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice"; Perpetual Peace; selections from the Doctrine of Right (Part I of The Metaphysics of Morals); 'A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: "Is the Human Race Continually Improving?"" (Part II of The Contest of Faculties); and a one-page selection from Critique of Pure Reason on the practical significance of the idea of the perfect constitution. Reiss has also retained his long introduction to the first edition, covering the historical background and main ideas of Kant's political philosophy.

The three additional Kant selections illustrate that during the past twenty years a broadened understanding of Kant's political thought has emerged within Anglo-American philosophy. Notably, under the influence of, among others, Yirmiahu Yovel, Kant's philosophy of history is now commonly seen as integral to his political thought, while Hans Saner, Hannah Arendt, Ronald Beiner, and, more recently Onora O'Neill, have made prevalent the view that the *First* and *Third Critiques* belong — in a sense — to Kant's political work because they significantly address (among other political topics) the nature and importance of the public use of reason. Reiss discusses this issue in his Postscript, the part of his anthology that is of greatest interest to scholars of Kant's political thought. The issue is also central to 'What is Orientation in Thinking?'

Some other topics of the Postscript are 'Property as the Basis of the Legal Order', 'Morality and Politics', and 'Kant and the French Revolution'. Reiss embraces the view that there is no inconsistency between Kant's rejection of the right of active resistance or revolution and his claim that the enthusiasm of the spectators of the French Revolution is a sign of moral progress. On Reiss's account, the two claims are compatible in that the enthusiasm of the spectators concerns only the republican aims of the revolution, not the political struggle itself. The argument fails, I think, because Kant's prediction that the enthusiasm of the spectators 'assures' future progress presupposes that the spectators, like the revolutionaries, will sooner or later act on their republican aims. Reiss also poses the question whether Kant's rejection of the right of rebellion is still justifiable considering twentieth-century totalitarianism, especially Nazism. One way of defending Kant is to argue that the totalitarian state involves, in effect, a return to the state of nature so that '[i]ndividual self-help, another ideal of the Enlightenment, becomes the order of the day' (264-5). Reiss himself rejects the argument, stating that 'it could apply only if all authority had genuinely ceased to exist and anarchy actually prevailed. (Usually, of course, totalitarian states are particularly authoritarian and thus, at least on the surface, anything but anarchic.)' (265). This conclusion is drawn too quickly, for it is based on an overly narrow view of the state of nature as anarchy rather than as also comprising systematic arbitrary coercion. Yet, it is hard to disagree with Reiss's overall conclusion that 'the problem of the right of revolution cannot be settled within the framework of Kant's political thought' (267).

A final topic of the Postscript is 'Kant's Argument Against World Government'. Reiss shares and emphasizes Kant's worry that a world government would be antithetical to diversity and individual freedom. He neglects to stress here that Kant also recognized that peace is unstable without world government. Kant's federation of states is a compromise necessitated by the 'unsocial sociability' of states and humans. Recent political events underline the depth of Kant's view, as well as the courageous hope behind his proposal.

For new students of Kant's political philosophy, Reiss's new edition is very helpful in offering an accessible but thorough editorial introduction to Kant's political thought; a fairly comprehensive selection of Kant's political work;

and an up-to-date, detailed bibliography. The main shortcoming was and remains that the selection from the *Doctrine of Right* is too limited in not covering Kant's theory of property. This shortcoming has become, however, more bearable now that Cambridge University Press has just published a much needed *complete* translation (by Mary Gregor) of *The Metaphysics of Morals*.

Reiss wrote in his 1970 introduction that 'Kant should be accorded a prominent place in the history of Western political thought, a place which has far too long been denied to him. He ought to be ranked among the leading political thinkers of all times' (39). Reiss's 1991 Postscript and bibliography make it abundantly clear that Kant has at last received this deserved recognition within the English-speaking world (cf. 250).

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> Byron M. Roth and John D. Mullen Decision-Making: Its Logic and Practice. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 1991. Pp. xiii + 419. US\$34.00. ISBN 0-8476-7619-6.

Decision-Making is an introduction to decision theory in a broad sense, designed as an elementary textbook for courses in philosophy, psychology, business and political science. I will review it from the perspective of the philosophy curriculum. This book emphasizes the practical. Both the Preface and Introduction open with promises 'to improve the way you think about decisions' (1). While this pragmatism raises some philosophical questions, to which I shall return at the end, it is well served by the book's two didactic methods: reviews of studies of empirical decision-making and formal methods for normative decision-making.

Three chapters catalog various causes of errors in practical reasoning. Chapter 2, Psychological Impediments to Sound Decision-Making, is a broad survey, covering topics like groupthink and stress, including Tversky and Kahneman's fascinating empirical studies of the framing effect. Chapter 4 is an excellent introduction to the pitfalls of reasoning about probability. Chapter 5, Reasoning about Causes, covers more controversial ground, including Sowell's appeal to demographic differences to undermine claims that discrimination causes differences in wealth. The material covered in these diagnostic chapters is interesting social science. I would prefer to see it treated more scientifically. Students are ill-served by an approach that

stresses identifying in each case *the* fallacy and by examples which cry out for a single correct answer. I would like to see more complex case studies and fuller references to the scientific debates of these issues. (The Alar case, mentioned below, cites a single letter to the editor of *The Wall Street Journal*.)

The book's second method involves formal tools for decision-making. Chapters 3 and 6 stand out as especially clear accounts of methods for structuring decisions, without and with risk, respectively. The authors introduce decision trees effectively and follow the helpful strategy of isolating more technical material in a series of four appendices, on measurement, alternative decision rules, mixed strategies and bargaining in 3-person games. However, even the appendices make but modest demands on the reader's mathematical skills. One small complaint about the otherwise clear technical apparatus: the typesetting is poor. For example, sloppy floating figures obscure some of the references in the text (171).

The book is literally filled with examples. There are long worked examples in the text and ample exercises at the end of each chapter, both of which are useful. In addition, the authors tend to pile on hosts of small examples to illustrate their points. The discussion of causation jumps from aspirin to sweetener to cigarettes to radiation to cyanide (in Chilean fruit) to Alar in the space of four pages (148-51). At best this is distracting, especially when the examples are repeated and the perspective on problems is so unreflectively provincial and often involves cryptic American acronyms (e.g. 'IRA' in a financial context). It is also criticizable from an ethical point of view to discuss issues like the impact of Alar or cigarettes with a breezy paragraph when either would be worth far more serious consideration - indeed, each is the subject of a recent book. On a related point, the authors claim that their book is suitable for courses in ethics. However, aside from a short discussion of the role of self-interest in decision theory, they unfortunately make no serious effort to integrate ethical goals or side-constraints into their discussion.

Finally, the book shuns philosophical reflection. For example, the subtitle would seem to promise some account of the link between the logic and the practice of decision-making but none is offered. As in the case of logic and mathematics generally, a basic philosophical question arises: why do logical methods work in practice? As we ask in logic why some inferences preserve truth, so here we should ask why rational agents - what? Fare better? But then we must face the fact that there are gaps between rational procedures and practical success, most notably in the case of non-zero sum games, like the prisoner's dilemma. The authors are aware of the complexities of rational choice in mixed motive situations. Their discussion of the prisoner's dilemma is quite subtle, and they include a welcome contrast to the game of chicken and connections to deep issues in the theory of bargaining. Nonetheless, they gloss over the fundamental question about the pragmatic grounding of rational choice. In the place of analysis or argument, they offer reassurance that rationality leads to success 'in the long run' or simply conflate simply success with rationality, as when they write: 'rational and effective methods'

(195) and 'genetically rational in that they are gene preserving' (265). Perhaps taking logic as the model for the theory of rational decision-making is part of the problem. The authors label as *fallacies* deviations from the received theory of rational choice, such as a concern for sunk costs (321). They seem to be aware that sensitivity to sunk costs may aid in solving decision problems by binding the will. 'Nevertheless, from a practical point of view every decision should be judged from the present moment' (39). This is an odd conclusion. From a *practical* point of view, an agent trying to quit smoking, who cannot legally bind herself to a contract with herself to quit, might do well to commit resources to an anti-smoking programme, and see these committed resources as further reasons to quit smoking. It appears to be an open question whether this disposition is practically effective. The authors confuse the dictates of a theory of rationality with what is practical.

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Robert Stern

Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object. New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1990. Pp. xi + 169. US\$54.00. ISBN 0-415-02593-1.

Robert Stern offers an interpretation of Hegel which aims to draw attention to the 'holistic' nature of Hegel's metaphysics. He does this by examining Hegel's metaphysical model of the object, which shows that objects cannot be treated as compounds of more fundamental atomistic entities. Rather, objects have a unity that is not analysable into a plurality of self-subsistent and externally related parts (vi). In Chapter One, 'Kant and the Doctrine of Synthesis', he begins with an account of Kant's model of the object, which, he argues, fails to move beyond the 'pluralistic' models of his predecessors. According to the 'substratum' model of Locke, the individual is an unintelligible 'somewhat' underlying a multitude of attributes, whereas in Hume's 'bundle' model, the individual is nothing but a cluster of properties. In Kant's scheme, Stern writes, the object still remains a complex of intrinsically unrelated, atomistic entities which form a merely relational unity by means of the transcendental subject. In Chapter Two, 'Hegel Contra Kant', Stern traces the historical background against which Hegel's rejection of the critical philosophy must be understood, namely the growing dissatisfaction

with the Enlightenment legacy of mechanistic models of the state, of the reduction of the human mind to a mere plurality of faculties, and of the fragmented, compartmentalized view of nature. Against the pervasive 'pluralism' of the times, Hegel set out to confirm the 'holistic' nature of reality.

In Chapter Three, 'Ontology and Structure in Hegel's Logic', Stern argues that Hegel develops a model of the object which shows that it is a manifestation of a universal substance-form constituting an indivisible unity. Stern begins this central chapter by arguing that 'Hegel's analysis of the categories of universal and individual in the Logic arises from his account of the use consciousness makes of these categories in the Phenomenology of Spirit' (42). The development of consciousness through a variety of inadequate forms of knowledge 'is not based on some idea of historical necessity or goal-directed evolution as is sometimes alleged' (44). Rather, it is the result of the tensions between the categories of universal and individual, tensions born from consciousness' misguided opposition of these categories which it strives to overcome. In the Phenomenology, consciousness is using these categories in a merely unreflective way, 'consciousness is not itself aware that it is the dialectic of universal and individual which lies at the root of the difficulties Hegel describes' (54). In the Logic, Stern writes, these categories are given explicit treatment and Hegel develops a metaphysics in which the unity of the categories is evident. Here the reader will find the heart of Stern's argument in the form of a 'holistic' interpretation of Hegel's analysis of the Notion, Judgment and Syllogism. In the analysis of the Notion, 'Hegel puts forward a distinctive account of universal and individual, from which his model of the object is then derived' (55). Hegel accepts the Aristotelian view according to which every universal is exemplified in an individual although he dismisses Aristotle's treatment of universals as accidental attributes or quality-predicates. Hegel argues that 'concrete universals (such as 'man' or 'dog') constitute the nature of the individual as a whole, in so far as they represent the essence of the thing per se' (59). By means of this 'twist' Hegel is able to reject both the 'substratum' and 'bundle' models of the object. This becomes especially clear in Hegel's analysis of the forms of judgment which shows that 'only the most inadequate judgments predicate a property-universal of the individual, and that consciousness only comes to be aware of the "essential nature" of things when it grasps the species-form that the individual exemplifies' (65). In his treatment of the syllogism, Hegel maintains that 'the argument must be based on a proposition which states the universal essence of the individual' (65). Hence Hegel's account of inadequate types of syllogism is in fact, Stern claims, 'an argument for his conception of universality and his treatment of the latter as the substantial form of the individual' (65).

In Chapter Four, 'Unity and Structure in Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*', Stern argues that it is Hegel's analysis of the individual as the exemplification of a substance-kind which leads him to criticize and reject reductionist approaches to nature. In the final chapter, 'The Unity of the Object and the Unity of the Subject', Stern returns to his discussion of the distinction

between Kant's subjective idealism and Hegel's objective idealism, the importance of which, he claims, has been misunderstood by many commentators. He argues that Hegel did not interpret Kant as a 'phenomenologist' nor was Hegel's objective idealism a claim to knowledge of 'things in themselves'. Hegel identified Kant's idealism as subjective because it employed 'the activity of the synthesizing subject to explain the genesis and structure of the object, while Hegel's idealism is objective in treating the substance-universal which it exemplifies as constituting the unity of the individual' (110). Stern concludes that Hegel's critique of Kant is especially significant given that much of contemporary philosophy is dominated 'by the same sort of pluralistic ontology that we find in Kant' (121).

Stern's book is exceptionally clear and well written. His attention to the research of previous commentators is selective: his presentation is largely based on his own reading of Hegel. However, Stern fails to address aspects of Hegel's thought which are important for his argument, for example, the role teleology plays in Hegel's metaphysics. This omission is significant for, as he himself writes, 'the teleological approach is ... used by Hegel to get us from the atomistic thinking of mechanics to the holistic thinking of organics' (97). The sketchy account of the historical context of Hegel's rejection of Kant in the second chapter is disappointing as well. For example, Stern makes no mention whatsoever of Fichte or Schelling. That being said, however, his analysis of the metaphysical issues which underlie the differences between Kant and Hegel provides a good introduction for students of German idealism and may also be of interest to Hegel scholars for its unusual perspective on Hegel's Logic and Philosophy of Nature.

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A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Young Man. From the Diary of David Hume Pinsent 1912-1914. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell 1990. Pp. xxi + 119. US\$29.95. ISBN 0-631-17511-3.

There is a recent awareness in Wittgenstein studies that for him philosophy is personal: a way of working on oneself, a battle with self-deceptions, prejudices and preconceived ideas that thwart the enterprise if left undetected. This attitude survived the remarkable changes that have led scholars to mark off the early from the later Wittgenstein.

These fragments from David Pinsent's *Diary* give a lively picture of the fusion between Wittgenstein's philosophical and personal concerns. David Pinsent was a student at Cambridge, of pure mathematics with a leaning to philosophy. The *Tractatus* is dedicated to his memory. Having heard of his death in an airplane accident in 1918, Wittgenstein wrote to Pinsent's mother: 'David was my first and only friend ... only in him did I find a real friend, the hours I spent with him have been the best in my life ... The *Tractatus* will always be connected with him in my memory.'

Friendship involves shared interests. Among these were love of music, especially of Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, Mozart; Schubert songs which they performed together, Wittgenstein whistling and Pinsent playing the piano; an aversion from modern music, riding, rowing, walking; and taking trips to Iceland and Norway.

The book is mistitled, for there is no attempt to draw a portrait of Wittgenstein. *Travels with Wittgenstein* seems more appropriate because the diaries recount two trips the two friends took: the first to Iceland in the Fall of 1912, and the second to Norway in the Fall of 1913.

Picture the two friends riding Icelandic ponies on rough boulder stricken ground; gazing at moorlands covered with lava stones and heather; watching the Aurora Borealis and waiting for gurgling Geysers to spout.

When Wittgenstein took a holiday, his problems of life and logic went with him. Wittgenstein is working on the foundations of logic and discusses his work with Pinsent. His own estimate of his work alternates between 'I have solved all the important basic problems', and 'Perhaps all of my work in Logic is of no real use.'

Here are some fragments that catch the eye:

a) Wittgenstein's Emotional Life: There are brief and rough sketches of a turbulent emotional life. He is moody, jealous, depressed, fussy; when Pinsent engages in conversation with a 'splendid bounder', Wittgenstein insists on dining alone; when Pinsent joins a 'gregarious Englishman' for a smoke, Wittgenstein refuses to accompany him, saying 'I (Pinsent) could travel with him all the time if I wanted.' Subsequently Wittgenstein broods over his conduct and is overwhelmed with 'piteous self-disgust' and brutal self-criticism. 'He is really in an awful neurotic state'; cannot help these 'fits of self-disgust'. Eventually Pinsent realizes how to resolve these frictions: by having it all out with him; 'I can always reconcile things with him when I am frank and open.'

- b) The obsession with premature death and suicide: Wittgenstein confesses to terrible loneliness, thoughts of suicide that plague him and cowardice at never daring to kill himself. The conviction that he is going to die soon recurs. Pinsent is sane and soothing in his response: there is absolutely no reason why he should not live yet for a long time. Pinsent would not mind to relive his own life so far. Wittgenstein would.
- c) The Idea of Self-Exile: Occurs to him as a solution to problems that plague him. Living in a community like Cambridge, he perpetually feels contempt for others and irritates them by his nervous temperament. 'Unless he is a great man, there is no excuse for this.' Again, he could do more and better work in Logic if he is undisturbed and undistracted by concerts. So, Wittgenstein swears he can never do his best except in exile.
- d) Wittgenstein's Women: On the topic of women's suffrage: Wittgenstein is against it. For 'all the women he knows are such idiots.' Apparently when he was at Manchester he was put off by the spectacle of women students flirting with the professors. This disgusted him. It showed that 'women are not dead-earnest about their studies.' Pinsent is for women's suffrage and adds: if financial conditions preclude marriage before 30 and if living together is taboo, what other alternative apart from flirting etc., is left for a sexual life?

Here are a few comments and questions. Concerning (a): the piteous fits of self-disgust and self-criticism may amount to an attempt at self-purification as an essential condition for doing philosophy. Recall Russell asking Wittgenstein: What are you thinking about? Logic or your sins? Wittgenstein replied: Both. About (b): The fear of death haunts him. This is easy to understand given his father's recent death and his brother's suicides. Yet he saw this fear as cowardice. And how could a coward do decent work in Logic and Philosophy? Decent work requires courage. So he tries to overcome this fear.

A propos (c): The idea of self-exile seems to link with later views about the philosopher not being a citizen of a community of ideas. To get a perspicuous view of our concepts, the philosopher needs a proper distance. There is also a longing for genius when he says: Unless a man is great, there is no excuse for being an irritant to others. Rather than irritating others, he chooses to work towards greatness.

The aversion to women is disturbing. Yet it persists. Recall his comment to Malcolm: 'whatever you do, do not marry a lady-philosopher.' Again, Wittgenstein is reported to have said to Elizabeth Anscombe, referring to some women students who took philosophy lightly: 'Now that the women

have left, we can really do philosophy.' This smells of sexism. But it makes me wonder: Was this a remark about sex? Or rather a remark about some people who are not in dead earnest? I am inclined to think the latter. For why would one say such a thing to a woman unless to admit that *she* is in dead earnest? Let us be frank: Wittgenstein, like all of us, has blemishes on his face.

In conclusion: Readers of Wittgenstein will welcome the publication of these diaries. They, together with *Culture and Value* and Ray Monk's biography *The Duty of Genius*, provide us with the context and background for Wittgenstein's philosophical work. While the work becomes vulnerable to abusive criticism at the hands of philistines, it has, like the life of the worker, the grandeur to withstand such assaults.

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Donald Wiebe

The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought.

Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press 1991. Pp. xiv + 261.
Cdn\$39.95. ISBN 0-7735-1015-X.

Wiebe's rather startling thesis is that religious thought and the discipline of theology are logically incompatible. Relying on Levy-Bruhl's dichotomy thesis, he attempts to establish that 'the history of the development of the human mind reveals the existence of at least two mutually exclusive modes of thought ... one mythopoeic ... the other scientific [and] that the scientific ... emerged from within a preexisting mythopoeic matrix ... with [which it] is incompatible' (226). He then argues that 'religious thought (at least in the Greek, Hebrew, and Christian traditions) is essentially mythopoeic and theology essentially scientific ... [and thus] that theology ... stands in the same relation to religion as philosophic/scientific thinking in general stands to the mythopoeic mind' (226).

The breadth and depth of Wiebe's reading is very evident and one can scarcely accuse him of failing to cross disciplines in his thinking. In the main, he does a very good job both of summarizing material that he takes to be relevant to his argument and of setting out the argument in support of his position. There are, however, some unfortunate lapses. For instance, what is one to make of his claim 'that the two [religious thought and theology] are incommensurables, for I shall show that, in one very important sense at least,

religious belief is not knowledge. In another respect, however, I shall maintain that religious belief is "knowledge," but that in that respect it is incompatible with our critical scientific knowledge and consequently incompatible with theology ...' (34). It would certainly benefit the reader wishing to evaluate this claim if Wiebe were to set out what he takes to be the relation between knowledge and 'knowledge' and make clear how it is possible for these two species of knowledge to be logically incompatible.

Apart from matters of clarity, more substantial criticisms of Wiebe's position emerge. For example, it seems methodologically suspect to argue that, because in some thinkers philosophic/scientific thought is at odds with religious belief, this is necessarily the case. Some philosophical systems are logically incompatible with the supernaturalism that is usually a feature of religious thought, others are not. Wiebe makes much of the fact that there existed an implicit tension between the philosophic thought of the Milesians and the mythopoeic matrix from which it emerged, but this is scarcely surprising, given the implicit materialism of those thinkers. It seems quite possible to point to thinkers where it is far from clear that there existed any tension between their philosophic/scientific beliefs and their religious beliefs. For example, R.M. Burns, speaking of the scientific revolution associated with Newton, writes of 'the existence of one integrated religioscientific philosophical outlook, which was at the basis of the scientific achievements of such men as Boyle and Newton ... to speak of a "conflict" between science and religion [in the thought of these men] is quite inappropriate. Far from being in actual or potential conflict, scientific attitudes and religious belief can be shown to exist symbiotically in the thought of such leading intellects of the period as Boyle, Wilkins or Glanvill' (The Great Debate on Miracles [East Brunswick, NJ: Associated University Presses 1981], 12-13).

I suspect that Wiebe wants to rest his case for the logical incompatibility of religious thought and theology not upon empirical date, but upon some other grounds. But what are these other grounds? He makes much of the fact that in supernaturalistic (religious) systems of thought reason is not autonomous, whereas in naturalist (philosophical/scientific) systems of thought it is. It is on this basis that he is able to claim that Plato is less philosophical than his Milesian predecessors. Wiebe's claim seems to be that religious thought inevitably subordinates reason in order to safeguard supernaturalism, whereas philosophical/scientific thought allows reason free rein and hence arrives at naturalism. If this is the argument it clearly begs the question. Many thinkers argue that reason establishes supernaturalism, rather than naturalism, and that it is the naturalist who is being less than fully rational.

This tendency simply to assume what needs to be proven manifests itself at other points in the text. One reads with dismay the easy assertion that an agentic or teleological view is essentially primitive and mythopoeic and stands in stark contrast to the philosophical/scientific causal view characterizing modern thought (61). Why agents cannot be causes or why a teleological view could not be philosophical is not argued. It is true that if one

grants Wiebe his assumptions his thesis follows, but it is far from evident that he is entitled to these assumptions. The fact that his position entails that anyone who functions both in the sphere of religious belief and in philosophical/scientific inquiry must, to some degree at least, suffer from intellectual schizophrenia seems a good reason to subject such assumptions to close scrutiny.

Despite these flaws, this book deserves to be read. It argues a difficult thesis with erudition and considerable skill. In the final analysis, I do not think its central claim can be defended, but, in making clear where it goes wrong, it can help cast considerable light on the relation between religious faith and theology.

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> Michael Yeo, chief author Concepts and Cases in Nursing Ethics. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press 1991. Pp. xii + 272. Cdn\$18.95. ISBN 0-921149-82-4.

The aim of Concepts and Cases in Nursing Ethics is to 'present a unified perspective on the ethical dimension of contemporary nursing' (1). Yeo co-authors each of the main chapters with a different individual: with Trudy Molke on Beneficence, Jean Dalziel on Autonomy, Sandra Mitchell on Truthfulness, Irene Krahn on Confidentiality, Gail Donner on Justice, and Ann Ford on Integrity. Each chapter begins with a brief discussion of the key concept or principle followed by three cases which highlight the concept within a typical health care setting. These cases are supported with instructive commentary. Study questions and an extensive list of further readings are also included. Five appendices provide the relevant Codes and Guidelines.

The introductory chapter offers a concise overview of nursing ethics and bioethics in general. The authors propose that to incorporate ethics into the nursing process one needs to assess the immediate situation for its ethical content (if any); then review the options available; and then decide upon and implement the morally best option. One is not told how to decide which option is best, on the grounds that 'there can be no mechanical formula for resolving ethical issues when they arise' (17). Finally one is to review the situation so as to learn from it. This procedure motivates the way the issues are presented and tackled throughout the book.

Chapter two on beneficence includes a case which deals with a natural extension of the topic of beneficence, namely how to decide between the good of the one versus the good of the many. While Yeo and Molke offer many possible alternatives to obtain a reasonable balance between these two possibly conflicting states, they conclude that if a suitable arrangement cannot be reached then a choice will have to be made (48). This conclusion has the unsatisfying effect of taking us back to the starting point of the whole debate. At first glance the failure to offer concrete solutions seems troubling. However, the authors seem to have a policy of neither dictating nor arguing for specific views. Instead what is stressed is that 'ultimately, what constitutes a reasonable balance is a matter between the nurse and his or her conscience' (30). While this comment is in the context of the above issue, it is clear that establishing balance amongst the general principles is (rightly or wrongly) left up to the reader.

Making ethical decisions in the health care system is not a simple matter. This fact is brought to the forefront via Yeo and Dalziel's piece on autonomy. Here the interconnections between autonomy, informed consent, competency and paternalism are successfully presented. Still, we are given four different meanings of autonomy (as free action, as effective deliberation, as authenticity, and as moral reflection) without much critical analysis. Whether autonomy should be identified with any of these meanings, or whether they are instead severally necessary but jointly insufficient conditions, is not considered.

Although the authors remark that respecting client autonomy can lead to nurses assuming an advocacy role (62) this option is to be rejected since the advocacy model is grounded in the judiciary. The judiciary is an *adversarial* system where every client's advocate is considered to be on equal footing. Clearly this doesn't fit with the seemingly hierarchal physician-nurse relationship. Gadow's notion of 'existential advocacy' is subsequently introduced but this too remains to be satisfactorily explicated. The advocacy model may explain the current preference of the term 'client' over 'patient' however, *Concepts* often interchanges the two terms.

The methodological device of asking questions is used throughout *Concepts*. This device becomes wearisome and its function is not always clear. *Concepts* fails to distinguish between those questions which serve to foster classroom discussion and those which are meant as possible directives within the ethical situation proper. While medical personnel can answer questions such as 'Are other people in a position to exert a coercive influence?' (60) by examining the situation, the more theoretical questions such as 'What constitutes a truly voluntary choice?' (60) requires greater philosophical acumen. These two sorts of questions differ greatly and thus require different treatments but they are often jumbled in the text.

The next chapter discusses truthfulness. Unfortunately Yeo and Mitchell do not deal significantly with how truth specifically relates to the role of the nurse and how this relation delineates the differences between nurses and physicians. The authors, citing Sissela Bok, distinguish between truth in a

factual sense and truth in a moral sense, and between telling a true statement and being truthful (94). The claim is that one can give a true statement but be untruthful (e.g., by using medical jargon knowing that the other does not comprehend it). Conversely one can be truthful but state something false (e.g., by sincerely believing what is in fact not the case). This distinction could be better expressed in terms of 'telling the truth', 'stating what one believes' and 'being straightforward'. Nevertheless, the proffered distinction goes a long way in showing how one's presentation of the truth can have impact upon the inherent health professional-client imbalance of power. As well, the degree to which clients can be empowered by being informed is an insightful offshoot of this discussion.

This chapter's third case-study involves a health professional making an implicit promise not to tell the client the truth. In their commentary Yeo and Mitchell state: It can be argued that they should never have made such an agreement but since they did they are obligated by it' (110). Why so? Why is the principle of promise keeping always morally superior to one of 'truth-telling'? And isn't the awareness of a decision's being wrong prima facie grounds for not following it through? The general problem here lies with the tendency of the authors to say 'it can be argued' instead of giving us the actual argument.

The final chapter tells us that integrity consists of moral autonomy, fidelity to promises, steadfastness and wholeness. We are also warned that integrity isn't to be confused with self-righteousness, and that steadfastness isn't to be confused with dogmatic rigidity. Saying so, however does not make it so: here again assertion has taken the place of argumentation.

Often in the book, many of the above sorts of important issues are given only a passing mention. Still, this text effectively provides a useful spring-board for further discussion in nursing ethics. Intriguing themes run throughout the work including the promotion of open dialogue as means to avoid misunderstanding and future problems. With supplements drawn from the text's suggested readings many of my concerns will be overcome. All in all, *Concepts* reveals the complexities of ethics in nursing today.

Jeff McLaughlin University of Alberta Editor's Note

The anglophone editor of

Canadian Philosophical Reviews Revue Canadienne de Comptes rendus en Philosophie

is pleased to announce the acquisition of an address for **electronic mail** on the University of Alberta's mainframe computer.

Correspondents and contributors are encouraged to use the address for replying to invitations, submissions of reviews and any other messages.

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Any institution's computing services department will be able to advise on how to access the address.

R.A. Shiner