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Table of Contents • Table des matières

Laird Addis
Natural Signs: A Theory of Intentionality.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1989.
Pp. xii + 199. US $29.95. ISBN 0-87722-631-8.

In this well-written, provocative book, Laird Addis proposes a new theory of intentionality based on William of Ockham's fourteenth-century concept of natural signs. A natural sign is an intrinsically intentional entity, an entity which by its very nature represents another existent entity, and which in Addis' final analysis turns out more specifically to be a simple property of mental acts or occurrent conscious states.

The text is divided into three parts. 'Frame of Reference' articulates Addis' methodological and other philosophical presuppositions; 'The Theory of Natural Signs' provides historical background, presents the theory in full detail, and considers objections; 'Going Beyond' offers applications of the account in two problem areas, consciousness and time and consciousness and particularity. Addis attempts an amazing juggling act, trying to keep many philosophical balls in the air at the same time. These include not only an elaboration of natural sign theory in historical context, but commitment to parallelism as a version of mind-body dualism compatible with what he calls philosophical materialism, descriptionism in reference theory, a kind of later Brentanist reism, according to which intentional connections are possible only to *realia*, existent particulars, and a positive characterization of the mind as a structureless temporal but nonspatial entity.

Addis identifies historical precedents for some of his guiding ideas in Brentano, Meinong, Twardowski, Husserl, Sartre, Searle, and especially in Bergmann's treatment of intentionality as a logical rather than descriptive relation, but carefully dissociates himself from their positions where his views differ. The thesis that the mind is structureless is presented as a modified interpretation of Sartre's description of the mind as nothingness. Brentano's immanence theory of intentionality is rejected in favor of the Meinong-Twardowski distinction between content and object, where content (*Inhalt*) is interpreted as a precursor of the concept of natural signs, and the doctrine of transcendent intentionality as the mark of mental phenomena is accepted in limited form only, applying exclusively to occurrent conscious states, distinguished as primary mental states from three other kinds related to the primary intentionality of consciousness, namely, sensation and emotion, perception-related entities, and dispositional mental states, including belief.

Three categories of arguments for the existence of natural signs are adduced, scientific, phenomenological, and dialectical. Addis ultimately favors the dialectical, and wields it in support of Chisholm's thesis of the primacy of the intentional over the linguistic, in opposition to Sellars' and Rosenberg's contrary positions. Countercriticisms are raised against what Addis regards as a false metatheoretical dichotomy in Armstrong's defense of eliminative materialism, Hochberg's objections to Bergmann's theory of intentionality and non-Platonic propositions (also seen as an ancestor of

natural signs), and Putnam's dismissal of intentionality as a 'magical theory of reference'. Interspersed are reflections on the analytic-continental gap in contemporary thought, and the contributions and limitations of each, the relation between science and philosophy, and their alternative respective ideal starting places in the basic and the given.

As interesting as Addis' theory is, it leaves unanswered many serious difficulties about the concept of natural sign. The ontology of natural signs is puzzling in several ways. Addis concludes that natural signs are simple properties of mental acts or conscious states. But it seems problematic in that case to suppose that natural signs could explain or provide a theory of intentionality, since intentionality in the tradition to which Addis pays respect and cautiously aligns himself is also an irreducible and therefore presumably simple property of mental acts. If natural signs as properties are identical to intentional properties, then no explanation of intentionality is forthcoming, and Addis' theory reduces to a terminological variant of an intentional semantics and philosophy of mind that does not seek to explain intentionality itself. If natural signs are not just the intentional properties they are supposed to explain, then Addis' exposition leaves unanswered how the two kinds of properties are different, how they are related, and how the occurrence of natural signs or natural sign properties might be supposed to account for the occurrence of intentional properties.

It is odd in the first place to think of properties as signs, a problem Addis nowhere addresses. The foremost difficulty is that ordinary signs are objects rather than properties that signify by virtue of having intentional properties. Even Ockham, acknowledged as originally suggesting the term 'natural sign', writes in this context, as Addis recounts (ix): '... a conceptual term is a mental content or impression which naturally possesses signification ...' But of course mental contents and impressions are not or not ordinarily conceived as properties. There is deeper related conflict if not outright contradiction in Addis' later conclusion that intentionality is a logical property of conscious states and that conscious states have only temporal (T) properties, if logical properties as typically understood are nontemporal (N). The claim that conscious states have only temporal properties however is central to Addis' thesis that the mind has no structure, and his effort to capture the hidden sense of Sartre's pronouncement that the mind is nothingness. This discussion in contrast to much of the book is difficult to follow, since it is not clear why the mind might have structure if only it had at least some nontemporal properties, but lacks structure if it has only temporal properties. The possession of any properties, whether temporal or nontemporal, should suffice to confer structure of some sort on the mind. Conscious mental states moreover arguably do have at least the nontemporal properties of unity, individuality, number, and order, if not others. Addis, by the term 'structure', must intend something nonstandardly technical, but he nowhere attempts to explain his meaning. Again, natural signs are said to be necessarily simple, thanks to a modified version of Bradley's regress argument against relations. But as a particular example of a natural sign, Addis offers (83), *being-the-thought-that-light-travels-faster-than-sound*, which appears to contain as proper part

the equally suitable candidate for being a natural sign, *being- the-thought-that-light-travels*.

The accumulation of these among other questions leaves the reader with no clear understanding of what natural signs are supposed to be, nor of how exactly a theory of natural signs could possibly solve the philosophical difficulties promised on its behalf, including most notably the longstanding problems of explaining intentionality and the unity of consciousness.

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Timo Airaksinen and
Martin A. Bertman, eds.
Hobbes: War among Nations.
Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Company
1989. Pp. x+198. US $58.95.
ISBN 0-566-05769-7.

This collection of 14 articles on Hobbes originated in a conference at Helsinki in 1987 when scholars met to discuss the question whether World Government can be justified on Hobbesian principles. All of the papers address that question, some more directly than others. In such a collection one is bound to get a range of opinions and a range of quality, but all of these are of value in one way or another, and the collection can be quite strongly recommended to anyone interested in Hobbes and even to many interested only in world government. Hobbes, notoriously, maintained that the State can indeed be justified, but also that States exist only in a State of Nature with respect to each other. On the face of it, he left no room for world government.

Some contributors take the view that a World Government would be justified on Hobbesian principles, because it would be attacking the same problems among States that the State was supposed to solve among individuals. Those who argue that it cannot need to find a disanalogy, and many do; though there are, as usual, problems about the terms of reference. Is it that a *moral* justification for WG is impossible along Hobbesian lines? Or is it that there are structural factors operating which make it *unlikely* or impossible that it would ever come about, however desirable it might be?

One could argue both that a moral justification is possible, but also that Hobbesian considerations make it unlikely. And one could argue that moral and explanatory arguments cannot be that much at odds with each other, especially in Hobbes. Contributors to this volume defend each of these, and more.

Discussing the 14 essays in detail is impossible here, but three stand out. Timo Airaksinen's 'The Whiteness of the Whale: Thomas Hobbes and a Paradox of War and Fear' argues that we cannot go straight from the state of nature problem as it faces individuals to a similar problem at the world level, because unfortunately sovereigns, unlike their subjects, do not face serious personal danger from foreign wars. The comparative domestic tranquility of the Hobbesian sovereign is 'based on collective self-deception' (53). The sovereign does not fear for his natural life, but for his power base; and *that* fear does not lead the sovereign towards world government, even if ordinary fear leads natural persons towards the commonwealth.

I would add here that sovereignty is in any case over-rated as a guarantor of peace and security at the domestic level. As Airaksinen says, 'the sovereign is always in principle relatively unsuccessful, although his existence creates some additional distance from the original state of nature — but so do your parents, friends and business partners, too' (67-8). And he concludes that 'a world government is justified, even if it does not exist, because it is needed for the protection of the citizens — exactly in the same way as the domestic sovereign power is justified' (68). Maybe. But why expect a world government to do any better? Who doesn't share misgivings, expressed by many of these authors, at the prospect of world government?

Paul J. Johnson, in 'Death, Identity and the Possibility of a Hobbesian Justification for World Government', takes up a different problem — that of people's propensity for group identification. Hobbes's justification of government is individualistic. But people can and do develop strong group identities. And such persons are 'no longer ... motivated by a rational argument resting on the possibility of his own biological death as he is more concerned with his psychological life and the preservation of the values around which it is structured... For such persons Hobbes' arguments can have little if any force' (75-6).

Modern life subjects traditional ways of life to 'disruptive, disorganising forces. ... The individual, deprived of the certainties of traditional ways .. is strongly motivated to convert the traditional way of life into an ideology with which he can safely identify ... linguistic, sectarian and other groups clamor, and often go to war, for what they call freedom and independence, but which often is only the psychological security of relative simplicity' (76-7). The net result is that 'one can hardly be optimisitic' about the prospects of WG. 'Where biological death is no longer the dominant fear of human beings, it would seem that no Hobbesian justification of government could occur.... I regret such a pessimistic conclusion' (77).

Well, perhaps a solution is at hand in the delightful essay by Arthur Ripstein, 'Hobbes on World Government and the World Cup'. Hobbes' argument for local government, he points out, emphasises diffidence and competition among his triumvirate of causes of war. But what about glory? In respect of material goods, the state of nature is a prisoner's dilemma, in principle solvable by cooperation. Not so with glory, which on the face of it is zero-sum. Ripstein thickens out Johnson's analysis by pointing out that 'unlike ordinary desires, the effort expended in [glory's] pursuit is not

proportional to the agent's estimation of the probability of gaining it ...' (118). In times of war, unless one has more military resources than others do, '... those resources are of no use; power is nothing, balance of power everything.' And so, 'the sovereign must be all powerful to be able to raise the only threat that is *guaranteed* to hold even glory in check: that of life itself' (120).

What to do? In the international arena, the sovereign body can easily enough make war *unprofitable*; but to 'overawe' all so that the cost of invasion is so high that even glory will not lead to conflict ' ... is much harder ... There is no equivalent of the fear of violent death to compel nations to not invade for glory ... what is needed .. is a way of keeping glory under control' (125).

Hobbes argued for the independence of glory from its particular object — any sort of contest will do so long as it can be kept in control. 'One such forum is international sport, using the soccer arena as proxy for the global arena' (125-6). Such competitions display the desired features for containing glory: it 'must not be attainable by lowering the status of others. It must be made (comparatively) useless as a means to future goods; it must be allocated in a public way so that it cannot be easily misperceived, and the resources that can be devoted to its pursuit must be limited so that one cannot have too much invested to quit' (121). Neat! In world sports competitions, victory doesn't make you (very) rich, only famous; it's only gained by playing well, not by harming others; the criteria of success are explicit and do not lend themselves to misperception; and contests have well-defined ends, so competition cannot continue to escalate. Too, the diversity of sports makes it possible for those losing on some fronts to win on others.

'While it is doubtful that the battle of Waterloo was really won on the playing fields of Harrow and Eton,' Ripstein concludes, 'it may be that the best hope of avoiding a thermonuclear holocaust takes place every four years on the playing fields of Milano and Mexico City' (126). This brilliant and charmingly written analysis is perhaps the gem of the collection.

But most will repay careful attention. Occasional failures of editing, probably due to non-native English page editors, are to be found, but are mostly no trouble. (There's a nasty one on p. 60.) What matters is that there's much food for thought in the densely argued pages of this slim volume.

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F. Akkerman and **A.J. Vanderjagt, eds.**
Rudolph Agricola Phrisius (1444-1485) Proceedings of the International Conference at the University of Groningen 28-30 October 1985.
New York: E.J. Brill 1988. Pp. xvi+358.
US $45.00. ISBN 90-04-08599-8.

Rudolph Agricola is regarded as one of the great figures of renaissance humanism, at least so far as the northern renaissance is concerned. In particular, he was one of the leaders in what people have seen as the replacement of medieval logic by a specificially humanist and rhetorically oriented logic. His book on dialectical invention, *De Inventione Dialectica*, which was written ca.1479, though it was not published until 1515, was reprinted many times, and was almost universally praised.

As this useful collection of 26 essays shows, Agricola had a varied career. He was born in the Netherlands, and studied in Germany and Italy; he worked as an organist, as a public official, and as a university teacher; he learned Greek well enough to publish translations from the Greek, including a translation of the pseudo-Platonic dialogue *Axiochos*; he did critical work on Latin texts, and wrote Latin poetry which was technically correct but rather dull. These activities, examined in detail by various authors, go far to explain Agricola's importance as a humanist. All the appropriate features are there: the versatility, the knowledge of Greek, the philological interests, the emphasis on literature, the part played in the reintroduction of Plato to the West.

In a particularly interesting paper, Lisa Jardine examines the nature of Agricola's influence. Her thesis is stated on p.39: 'What the intellectual historian must find most striking about Rudolph Agricola's monumental reputation amongst sixteenth-century pedagogues is the extent to which that *reputation* exceeds any detectable influence.' Certainly this claim is born out by my own reading of logic texts in which Agricola is praised lavishly but heavily supplemented in ways he himself would have objected to. Jardine suggests that people turned to Agricola's writings because of his reputation, rather than his acquiring his reputation because of his writings, and that what people were most interested in about the writings was the emphasis on method, not just his own discussion of methods of organizing or analysing a discourse, but the methods of teaching he exemplified, including the use of declamations and written themes (as opposed to the medieval use of disputation), and the use of literary sources as illustrative material. Jardine sees Agricola as a key figure in an educational revolution which replaced, or at least supplemented, the scholastic philosophical curriculum with a rhetorical training in speaking and writing.

Two other insightful papers by P. Mack and C.G. Meerhoff, together with a weaker paper by F. Muller, deal directly with Agricola's contribution to logic. To understand what this contribution was, we need to consider the terms 'invention' and 'dialectic' which appear in the title of his main work, *De Inventione Dialectica*. Invention was the process of finding material for

arguments, particularly through the study of Topics, which are, very roughly, the headings under which material can be organized. Following Cicero's division, invention was contrasted with judgment, or the process of assessing the structure and validity of arguments. As Agricola's title suggests, he was not concerned with judgement, and this is the main reason why his book was never able to stand alone as part of the logic curriculum of sixteenth-century universities. 'Dialectic' is a term which is less easy to define. Some authors used 'dialectic' as a synonym of 'logic', others did not. For those who did not, at least three approaches were possible. One could present dialectic as the study of debate or disputation; one could present dialectic as the study of the Topics; or one could present dialectic as the study of probable argumentation. In the last case, a further distinction can be made, for probable argumentation could involve the investigation either of nondeductive strategies of persuasion, or of deductive arguments whose premisses happen to be probable rather than certain.

In Agricola we find an interweaving of all three approaches. As Meerhoff makes clear, Agricola emphasizes that dialectic is a means of oral communication, though he is perhaps more interested in the absorption of rhetorical techniques into dialectic than in unadorned debate. As Mack shows, the discussion of the Topics forms the core of Agricola's book; and it is in this context that probable argumentation is also presented. Unfortunately, as Mack notes at least twice, Agricola wavers between the two notions of probable argumentation. He tends to talk as if informal strategies are at issue, but then to use a deductive model. Though none of the authors takes up this point, I believe that this wavering, and the ultimately unsatisfactory nature of Agricola's approach to dialectic, is related to his handling of Topical maxims. In Boethius, whose discussion of Topics formed one of Agricola's main sources, the notion of a Topic had covered two things. First, a Topic was a maxim or maximal proposition, a self-evidently true universal generalization which could either be inserted into an argument as a premiss or which could be appealed to as providing a warrant for an argument. Some of these maxims were turned into formal deductive arguments by medieval logicians, who had a tendency to absorb invention into judgment, but others were not readily formalizable. As such, they provide the perfect nucleus for a developed informal logic. The second sense of Topic for Boethius was the Topic as the Differentia of a maximal proposition, that is, the characteristic that enables us to classify maximal propositions into groups. To list the Topics in this second sense is simply to list the headings under which material can be gathered: 'definition', 'genus', 'cause', 'opposite', 'similar', and so on. What we find in Agricola is a deliberate rejection of the maxims, and of material that might belong to judgment rather than invention. His attack has two parts. With respect to particular Topics, such as the Topics of antecedents and consequents, he claims that their only use is to present valid argument forms, for they have no distinctive material of their own. Hence they must be rejected in their Boethian form. In general, he argues that the purpose of any maxim is simply to present a necessary argument, and that they are quite inappropriate for all the cases in which we are dealing with probabilities. We

should note here that Agricola is clearly talking not just of the epistemological status of the premisses of an argument, but of a probabilistic and informal relationship between premisses and conclusion. He also claims that maxims are too restrictive, for they represent an attempt to force a wide range of material into a narrow compass; and that they are of no use to someone who really understands the nature of Topics. What we are left with, then, is the Topics solely as headings under which material can be organised. Their most obvious link with argumentation, both formal and informal, has been broken; and it is here, I think, that Agricola's weakness lies.

I have only been able to touch on some of the essays in this book. So far as I can judge, they all contain something of value. There is a very detailed bibliography of Agricola's own works followed by a long bibliography of secondary sources, an index of proper names, and a topographical index. There are 8 illustrations. The book is pleasant to look at and is refreshingly (albeit not entirely) free of typographical errors. All in all, the editors and the publisher are to be congratulated on a collection which should become a standard source for anyone interested in Agricola and his influence on sixteenth-century thought and education.

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Leonard Angel
How to Build a Conscious Machine.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1989. Pp. 131.
US $34.95. ISBN 0-8133-0944-1.

This little book has a simple plan with two parts. The first section (The Engineer's Project) offers a blueprint for the construction of a machine that will *appear* to be conscious. The second section (The Philosopher's Project) argues that in cases like this appearances are not deceiving, thus justifying the title's claim to show us how to build a conscious machine.

The goal of The Engineer's Project is to outline a computer program for a robot (call it PAL) with abilities to identify others as rational agents, learn language from them, and then use language to promote plans for its own survival. Angel claims that simulation of consciousness depends on a machine's ability to appropriately attribute intensional states to others — to identify another's perceptions, interests and propositional attitudes. The author calls this ability interagency attribution. His thesis is that its simulation is the key to designing a conscious machine.

To keep the engineering project managable, PAL inhabits a simple blocks world. PAL navigates a grid of cells that contain objects such as seeds, food,

predators, and another rational agent (let us call it Teacher) that is controlled by a human being. PAL represents his world in propositional logic. Pre-stored scripts and plans endow him with the ability to keep a history of the world and its contents, to plan seed planting, harvest, eating and protection from predators, to give an intentional analysis of Teacher's behavior, and to engage in the process of learning and using language in order to serve his ends. The idea is that PAL's interactions with Teacher and his world will appear to be conscious.

The description of PAL's abilities and linguistic education is clever and entertaining. Language is learned in an arena where PAL and Teacher are equal participants in a shared world of activities. I liked the idea that we may be able to simulate consciousness without having to (say) pass a Turing Test for a full range of cognitive abilities in the real world.

However, I am not all at convinced by this part of the book. There is a great deal of effort spent on explaining how PAL learns Teacher's language. However, language *learning* does not seem to me to be at the heart of the simulation of *consciousness*. What really matters is whether PAL makes *use* of language in novel ways to accomplish his goals. In PAL's barren environment, it is not clear to me exactly what behavior could count.

We are swayed toward viewing PAL's behavior as conscious because Angel's description of his program is (unavoidably) intentional. Still, the acid test is whether somebody who views PAL's *behavior alone* will think he is conscious, and here I have my doubts. (Angel grants this, in a way, by admitting that consciousness is a matter of degree, and that PAL lies at the weak end of the continuum.)

A second problem is that Angel underestimates how dificult it is to program the tasks PAL must perform, even in such a simple world. The description of PAL's program becomes sketchy at exactly the places that are hardest in AI: learning, generalization, concept formation, problem solving, control of reasoning, and timely access of relevant data. The classical approach he describes has failed to deliver on projects that are less complex.

Angel anticipates this objection, and claims that recognizing the role of interagency attribution will resolve the two most serious sources of failure in classical AI: module integration, and the frame problem. But interagency attribution, far from resolving these problems, makes them worse. Take the frame problem for example. The requirement that PAL make interagency attributions insures that PAL's data base will grow quickly as propositional attitudes are attributed to Teacher (and to himself). Intelligent action in a blocks world is hard enough to program, but the problem of quickly accessing information relevant to a given task gets much worse as intensional attributions pile up.

A solution of the frame problem requires detailed description of data structures and algorithms — something this book does not attempt. Given Angel's implicit admission that a truly convincing case of consciousness requires that PAL handle a more complex and interesting world, the frame problem becomes all the more pressing. Connectionists have challenged the view that intelligence depends on the explicit storage of propositional know-

ledge. Given the chronic emergence of problems with complex classical systems, the fair test for success in designing a machine that appears conscious would be delivery of a working product.

The Philosopher's Project is to show that when a machine appears conscious, it is conscious. Here Angel ably defends himself against critics like Searle who would object that PAL's symbol manipulation, however convincing in appearance, is purely formal and so cannot amount to consciousness.

Angel also introduces the notion of functional preemption to describe cases where a system has functional behavior that is incompatible with what would be predicted from its physical structure. He admits that one might use functional preemption to distinguish consciousness from the appearance of consciousness. This does not bother him, however, because he argues that functional preemption is highly unlikely.

This defense is intelligent, but a positive argument is still needed. It is suggested later that functional preemption is the only way to distinguish the appearance from the reality of consciousness. So if functional preemption does not happen in the brain (which is presumed to be conscious), no wedge can be driven between consciousness and its appearance.

My problem is that I cannot find the argument that functional preemption is a necessary condition for drawing the distinction. Perhaps Angel did not mean to make such a strong claim. But then, how does the positive argument go?

The book ends with an amusing dialogue that presents a mystical (and mystifying) solution to the problem of free will.

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Roger Ariew and **Daniel Garber, eds. and trans.**
G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company
1989. Pp. xviii+366.
US $37.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-87220-063-9);
US $10.95 (paper: ISBN 0-87220-062-0).

In recent years the search for a good selection of Leibniz's writings that is suitable for undergraduate courses has been a rather frustrating one. Despite its value for scholars, Loemker's edition is far too daunting and expensive for most teaching purposes; other editions have tended to be either out of date or, what is worse, out of print. No doubt Leibniz himself is partly to blame for this state of affairs; if only he had written one indisputable philosophical

masterpiece, such as Descartes's *Meditations* or Spinoza's *Ethics*, his philosophy would be much more readily available. Fortunately, Ariew and Garber have helped to remedy this situation; they have added a worthwhile selection of Leibniz texts to the growing Hackett library of philosophical classics.

In conception this is an interesting and somewhat unusual volume. Ariew and Garber include many of the 'basic works' such as the *Discourse on Metaphysics* and the *Monadology*, but they do not confine themselves to these; they also devote a large portion of their volume to Leibniz's writings about his contemporaries. In this section Leibniz's famous letters to Clarke rub shoulders with lesser-known criticisms of Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and others. This part of the book is valuable not just because it helps to round out the historical context but also because it reminds the reader that, more than most philosophers, Leibniz needed the stimulus of disagreement with other thinkers in order to commit his ideas to paper. Not that Leibniz is merely negative in his reactions; certainly he did not see himself in this light. Often he is seeking to forge a new synthesis out of philosophical views with which he has at least partial sympathy.

Under the heading 'Basic Works' Ariew and Garber include some major texts that have not often found their way into English anthologies. The selections from the De Volder and Des Bosses correspondences, for instance, show Leibniz grappling with the thorny problems posed by his doctrine of monads. These exchanges are in many ways more illuminating than such curt, summary presentations of his later metaphysics as the *Monadology* and the *Principles of Nature and of Grace*. Readers who are fascinated by Leibniz's attempts to define the status of bodies within an idealist framework will find that Ariew and Garber are sometimes more helpful than even Loemker; unlike Loemker, for instance, they reproduce the remarkable letter in which Leibniz explains that he is not seeking to eliminate body, but only to reduce it (181). However, though they are generous with unfamiliar material, Ariew and Garber sometimes give relatively short measure to such classic texts as the Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence. Many readers have thought that when Leibniz told Arnauld that in every true proposition, the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject, he was stating a doctrine which was at the root of the whole correspondence. Surprisingly, Ariew and Garber do not print the letter in which these words occur. It is true that similar statements are found elsewhere in the volume, but that is not quite the same thing. From a pedagogical perspective, the omission of key parts of the Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence is regrettable.

Ariew's and Garber's translations are generally fluent, but in terms of accuracy they leave something to be desired. The severest test is of course posed by those texts which have not previously been translated into English, at least in full, and here, unfortunately, errors are rather easier to spot than they should be. Leibniz's polemical writings against Locke and Newton furnish some instructive examples. In the *Anti-Barbarus Physicus* Leibniz bemoans Locke's adoption of the Newtonian theory of gravitation by contrasting it with his earlier commitment to mechanism: '*Johannes Lockius in prima editione Tentamenti de intellectu statuit, ut dignum erat, ... ut nullum corpus*

moveretur nisi impulsu corporis tangentis ...' Garber and Ariew translate: 'John Locke, in the first edition of his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, judged that it is appropriate that no body is moved except through the impulse of a body touching it ...' (317). If this were what Leibniz wanted to say, he would have used the subjunctive instead of the indicative '*erat*'. The correct translation is: 'John Locke, in the first edition of his *Essay Concerning [Human] Understanding*, asserted, as was correct, ... that no body is moved except through the impulse of a body touching it ...'. In another piece where Locke is again the target, Ariew and Garber make a more serious error. Leibniz tells Lady Masham: '*Il est vray que l'illustre Mons. Locke a soutenu dans son excellent Essay ... que Dieu pourroit donner à la matière la force de penser, parce qu'il peut faire ce qui passe tout ce que nous pouvons concevoir.*' In Ariew's and Garber's hands this becomes: 'It is true that the illustrious Locke maintained in his excellent *Essay* ... that God can give matter the power of thinking because he can make everything we can conceive happen' (290). But the last clause of course means something quite different: 'because he can do what surpasses everything we can conceive.' (Perhaps Ariew and Garber were thinking of the English expression 'bring to pass'.) It is understandable, if unfortunate, that Ariew and Garber should make mistakes in translating works for the first time. But it is surprising that they should introduce errors into a classic text such as the *Discourse on Metaphysics* of which several good translations already exist. In a section of this work defending 'the utility of final causes in physics', Leibniz inveighs against '*quelques esprits forts pretendus*' who say that we see because it happens that we have eyes and not that eyes were made for seeing. According to Ariew and Garber, Leibniz is talking here about 'certain extremely pretentious minds' (52). Neither Loemker nor Lucas and Grint made this mistake; they correctly saw that Leibniz's target is 'certain would-be free-thinkers'.

This is a useful volume, but it needs to be treated with some caution. Since it is likely to be widely adopted, one must hope that Hackett will bring out a new edition in which such errors are corrected. It will then be much more useful.

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Thomas Baldwin
G.E. Moore.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1990. Pp. xviii+337. Cdn $112.00; US $93.00.
ISBN 0-415-00904-9.

This book will be a disappointment to serious students of Moore's philosophy. Baldwin is a Lecturer in Philosophy at Cambridge University, where Moore's unpublished works have been collected. The Moore Papers include, for example, Moore's notes on lectures he attended as a student, his Apostles's Papers, his Sunday Essays, the manuscript of lectures on ethics he delivered in 1898, his early diaries, and his correspondence. Baldwin has had unparalleled and, in the case of Moore's never published Preface to the second printing of *Principia Ethica*, unique access to Moore's unpublished work. Regrettably, very little of this material is used to cast light on Moore's published work. The result is a book that often is to deep understanding what veneer is to seasoned wood.

A case in point: The book's inside flap quotes Virginia Woolf's famous question, 'Did you ever read the book that made us all so wise and good: *Principia Ethica*?' Further down the column we are told that Baldwin 'draws on Moore's unpublished early papers . . ., and discusses the relationship between Moore's writings and those of the Bloomsbury Group, such as Clive Bell, J.M. Keynes, and Leonard Woolf.' This proves to be more in the nature of marketing hype than a description of what one finds in the book. There is *very* little by way of discussion concerning the relationship between Moore's thought and Bloomsbury's writings or way of life, and what little of it there is most certainly fails to live up to the book jacket's promise that Baldwin's book will 'appeal to readers with an interest in British intellectual life during the period 1900-50'. In order to tell a story that would have interested these readers Baldwin would have been required to make frequent use of the unpublished Moore. Whatever his reasons, Baldwin fails to do this. His book is the poorer as a result.

Baldwin's book, however, is unique in one respect: its ambitious scope. Unlike such recent work as Robert Sylvester's posthumously published *The Moral Philosophy of G.E. Moore* (Temple University Press 1990) and Dennis Rohatyn's *The Reluctant Naturalist: A Study of G.E. Moore's 'Principia Ethica'* (University Press of America 1987), which focus their interest largely on Moore's moral philosophy, and differing from earlier collections, such as Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz's *G. E. Moore: Essays in Retrospect*, which have tended to emphasize Moore's influence on 'analytic philosophy', broadly conceived, Baldwin's book, as he himself describes it, is 'the first to atempt to deal critically with all aspects of his [Moore's] work' (xi). For its reach, if not for its grasp, Baldwin's book will find a place among the growing number of studies that signal a genuine renaissance of interest in the philosophy of George Edward Moore.

Baldwin's book is divided into five major parts. Chapters I and II chart Moore's early infatuation with, and ultimate rejection of, absolute idealism.

Chapters III and IV contain Baldwin's exposition, and critical assessment, of Moore's ethical writings. Chapter V, a transitional chapter, concentrates on Moore's 1911 lectures, later published under the title *Some Main Problems of Philosophy*; here Baldwin is mainly interested in explaining why, in these lectures, Moore abandons some of the positions to be found in his earlier work, especially in the areas of metaphysics and theory of knowledge. In the concluding four chapters, Baldwin endeavors to explain how the major teachings of *Some Main Problems of Philosophy* set the agenda for Moore's later philosophy. Chapters VI and VII deal with Moore's understanding of, and his contributions to, 'analytic philosophy', while the final two chapters are concerned with his understanding of knowledge and scepticism. Whether, then, one is a student of the history of twentieth-century Anglo-American 'analytic philosophy', moral philosophy, epistemology, or metaphysics, Baldwin's book is likely to contain something of interest.

Few readers, however, will be sufficiently resolute of spirit to read the book in its entirety. In part this is true because people will come to Baldwin's book with their own 'compartmentalized' interests (say, in moral philosophy but not theory of perception); in part this is true because of Baldwin's less than engaging style and the numerous starts-and-stops that interrupt the flow of his narrative; but most of all it is true because of Baldwin's failure to offer — or, more fundamentally, even to attempt to offer — a way in which Moore's philosophical interests and development might be unified.

In Baldwin's hands, Moore's thought is served in separate courses, without any sense of wholeness, so that readers are left to guess for themselves what motivated Moore to ask the questions he did. Granted, there may not be any plausible way to bring unity to Moore's disparate writings (though his interest in avoiding scepticism, whether in moral judgment or in our ordinary judgments of perception, is a very strong candidate for a unifying principle); but in a book with the ambitious scope of Baldwin's one would prefer to see the author try and fail, grandly, rather than not try at all.

Baldwin does fail in a number of less grand ways. His eccentric treatment of intrinsic value is illustrative. As early as 1899, in a review of Fred Bon's *Über das Sollen und das Gute: eine begriffsanalytische Untersuchung*, Moore's distinctive views about intrinsic value are a matter of public record. In this review Moore chastises Bon for failing 'to notice the only notion which really serves to distinguish Ethics from any other study. What this is *called* matters no more than Herr Bon thinks it matters. What is important is that there is a perfectly distinct meaning, of which he says not a word, that I should prefer to denote by the word "good".'

What the word 'good' denotes, when this word is understood as interchangeable with 'intrinsically valuable', is what the science of Ethics studies, according to Moore, and it is because no other science can study it that Ethics is an autonomous discipline, in his view. Moreover, the fundamental object of this science is what the word 'good' denotes, not the virtues of human character or the obligatoriness of human actions. These latter ideas (human virtues and obligations) are themselves parasitic on the fundamental object denoted by the world 'good', so that, for example, Moore in *Principia* defines

'right action' as 'cause of a good result'. In Moore's view, in short, other, distinctively moral concepts, including 'ought' and 'duty', and the several virtues, are definable in terms of 'good', which is indefinable.

Baldwin seems to be cheerfully aware of all this. He nonetheless offers what he calls 'a rational reconstruction' (79) of Moore's views, according to which 'good' is analysable/definable in terms of 'obligation' (77ff.). Furthermore, because Baldwin believes that only agents have obligations, to say that a given state of affairs is good, *means* (roughly speaking) that, other things being equal, a (or the relevant) agent ought to act to bring it into existence.

Baldwin is free to call this 'a rational reconstruction' of Moore's thought if he so chooses, but anyone who has read Moore with any degree of care will undoubtedly call it something else. The plain fact is, Baldwin's 'rational reconstruction' leaves us with an understanding of Ethics from which what is most distinctively, most fundamentally Moorean has been removed.

In his defense Baldwin might maintain that this removal is necessary if one is to have a possibly tenable ethical theory. What Baldwin cannot reasonably propose is that the resulting theory is Moorean, in any serious historical sense. The wonder of it is, Baldwin makes this proposal, seriously. For this reason, if for no other, Baldwin's name and his book are certain to enjoy a history of their own as future Moorean scholarship unfolds.

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Ermanno Bencivenga
Looser Ends, The Practice of Philosophy.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1989. Pp. xxii+161.
US $35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1807-0);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1808-9).

Laurence Goldstein
The Philosopher's Habitat, An Introduction to Investigations in, and Applications of, Modern Philosophy.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1990. Pp. xvii+251.
US $49.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-04224-0);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-04225-9).

When non-philosophers want to find out what philosophy is they look at what philosophers do. When philosophers want to find out what philosophy is they do 'metaphilosophy'. Laurence Goldstein's *The Philosopher's Habitat, An*

Introduction to Investigations in, and Applications of, Modern Philosophy is addressed to the former audience, Ermanno Bencivenga's *Looser Ends, The Practice of Philosophy* is addressed to the latter. With such different audiences the two books have, in fact, little in common thematically. And insofar as both can be broadly characterized as exercises in the self-examination and self-presentation of philosophy, what they show, if not say, about philosophy they do so largely unwittingly.

Goldstein's book is clearly industry-driven, in this case the PHIL 101 industry. This, of itself, is no grounds for criticism. One way or another everything published in philosophy nowadays is industry-driven, not least the snippets of Plato, Descartes and Mill found in the 'Greatest Hits' anthologies that Goldstein is competing with. But in this context such explicit reflection on philosophy as Goldstein allows himself consists of the introductory pitch to his market, viz., the students (the customers) and, as importantly, the instructors (the de facto buyers at the university bookstores). 'I have no doubt', Goldstein says, 'that, over a broad academic area, those students who wish to acquire a richer understanding of (or who hope to make contributions to) other subjects in which they are particularly interested have a great deal to gain from studying modern philosophical writing' (xiv). This may be meant to expand market share, but it has the smell of a bribe. Goldstein's introduction goes on to advise that 'the important thing is to first get gripped by the problems ... ' (xv), but his twenty-one brief chapters run the gamut too superficially to be gripping. And I think that the reaction of most instructors would be that their 101 lecture notes are already every bit as good as Goldstein's.

As a presentation of the sort of thing philosophy is, Bencivenga's book is very different from Goldstein's, but in its way just as unsatisfactory. Bencivenga carries around a big insight, which he says he gets from Kant, to the effect that the notion of experience, rather than the notion of an object, is primary (x). The reverse ordering belongs to the traditional framework or 'paradigm' in philosophy; the primacy of the notion of experience belongs to the new 'Copernican' order (ibid.). Bencivenga semanticizes this paradigm shift and uses it in analyzing such philosophical topics as reference, Meinongian and other intentional objects, and freedom. But he does so with little conviction, and this, oddly, is what gives him his metaphilosophical thesis: it doesn't much matter whether his or any other analysis is right or wrong, what matters — what philosophy's job is — is to shake people up by offering them imaginative alternative big pictures such as 'will suddenly make us see the world, or part of it, with new eyes' (34).

Why does *that* matter? Proposing new theories and paradigms 'is a phenomenon of vast empirical implications, in that it implicitly sets projects for action, indicates a direction for inquiry, makes us look for things we cannot find and in the process run into more of those we can find' (46). Like what, for example? 'For example, it suggests that the best way to find a cure for AIDS is not to try to come up with an accurate representation of the behavior of human cells or antibodies or what have you, but, rather, to give a group of people who are skilled at these things (largely because they have done them

often) a great deal of time to play with cells and tissues, and tools to look at them and take them apart. The more such people you bring in, the more time you make them spend on the matter, and the more tools you give them to play with, the more likely it is that one of them will hit upon a successful concatenation of moves' (60). But I don't see how what are discussed here can be construed as *alternatives* (or, to use an irritating solecism that occurs throughout the book, how they can be given that 'construe').

In any case the suggestion that philosophy can influence research into a cure for AIDS is fanciful, desperate, and ultimately rather pathetic. This is philosophy floundering to justify itself, not to the undergraduate with a shopping list, but to itself, by making itself 'relevant'. 'The existence of intellectuals is an economical and relatively safe way to maximize those cultural mutations that might prove useful to society' (142). Philosophy will save the world.

Now this does tell us something about philosophy as a subject which is 'tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question', to use a phrase of Wittgenstein's (a philosopher whom Bencivenga badly misunderstands). But this book, like Goldstein's, also tells us something about current philosophy as an academic industry which puts a premium on ink spilled.

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Hector-Neri Castañeda
Thinking, Language, and Experience.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1989. Pp. ix+302. US $29.50.
ISBN 0-8166-1672-8.

This collection of studies provides a very useful, unified presentation and defense of Castañeda's ontological and semantic system — a rich and highly original theory of the structure of experience, widely known as 'Guise Theory'. Of the fourteen studies in the collection, half were previously published and have been newly revised, including such classics as 'Indicators and Quasi-Indicators' (1967) and 'Thinking and the Structure of the World' (1974); the remainder, expressly written for this volume, provide a unifying framework and a systematic account of the main connections between thinking, language and reality from the perspective of the all-important phenomenon of *singular reference*. Part I of the book deals with singular reference through the use of such linguistic resources as proper names, singular descriptions, and indexical expressions both in direct and indirect discourse. Part II deals with singular reference in the context of various modalities of experience,

such as perception, deliberation and intentional action, fictional discourse, belief attribution, and philosophical skepticism. Part III focuses on a formulation and defense of Guise Theory: it contains the above cited 1974 paper and a long reply to Alvin Plantinga (also previously published).

The central thesis of the book is that reflection on the rich and subtle data on singular reference — understood as 'reference to individuals *insofar as* they are thought of as individuals' (3) — leads to an ontology of individuals construed not as the ordinary individuals of (Aristotelean) common sense, but as individual 'guises' or thought-of structures of properties corresponding *roughly* to the Fregean senses of definite descriptions (240). This complex and fascinating theory (of which I can only try to convey the general flavour and some of its motivating assumptions) is founded on a sort of Kantian 'transcendental idealism' (or 'Metaphysical Internalism', as Castañeda prefers to call it in ch. 10): it grants the irrefutability of Cartesian skepticism and only attempts to understand the (phenomenal) world accessible to us in our experience. But there is a linguistic twist: since 'thinking is always representational and, hence [sic], symbolic or linguistic' (3), and since natural languages 'embody a shared conception of the world and of our types of experience' (4), we can investigate the structure of the experienced world by employing the method of *phenomenological linguistics*, 'the structural analysis of the experiential resources of a [indeed, of *any*] natural language' (70). And because singular reference is a 'fundamental phenomenon at the root of every exercise of our thinking powers' (3), Castañeda's 'grand strategy' is to study singular reference in its diverse manifestations in language use.

Crucial to Castañeda's interpretation of the linguistic data is an assumption about the nature of language which, in important respects, runs counter to the 'externalist' outlook of current causal/social theories of meaning and reference. Without denying the social reality of language and its causal connections with the world — fundamental facts for understanding the evolution and acquisition of language — Castañeda insists (as did Wilfrid Sellars, Castañeda's early mentor) that a language is not only a means of (intersubjective) communication but also, and primarily, a means of *autonomous thinking*: 'A mature speaker of a language must be able to use language to think of the world and his [sic] experiences by herself and for herself, autonomously, independently of other speakers' control: Her idiolect is her basic linguistic reality' (8). Rejecting Wittgenstein's anti-private-language position (against which he argued in previous work), Castañeda sees a natural language as 'a family of intersecting idiolects' (8); and a person's idiolect 'is internally connected with what is thought' (23). (One wonders, however, if a symbolic system's being 'internally connected with what is thought' suffices to establish its privacy or autonomy: hasn't Burge argued that the *content of what is thought* is itself somehow 'external' to the subject's mind?)

The focus and foundation of Castañeda's account of singular reference is thus subjective, 'thinking (purported) reference,' rather than social, intersubjective, 'doxastic' reference (9). Furthermore, 'the singularity of reference does not belong to the language system, not even to an idiolect as such, but

to a particular speech [or *thinking*] act' (53). This subjectivist and pragmatist outlook motivates Castañeda's account of singular reference in its various modalities. His startling view of proper names is that they 'are *never* genuine singular terms' (43): since a proper name N can apply to more than one individual, it is really a count noun and can thus be treated as a restricted variable of quantification ranging over the class of individuals having the (nominalistic) property *being called N* (36-37). But while neither *being N* nor *being called N* are as such individuating properties, they 'ride piggyback' over the named individuals' identifying traits that each name user has 'stored in her file' (40-4). Proper names are thus 'not purely, or directly, referential ... no proper name can harpoon its nominatum without the identifying mediation of some attribute' (50). But what gets harpooned — the 'strict nominatum' — is neither the whole, ordinary, 'massive' object with its infinity of properties, nor its substratum, essence or *haecceitas* but an individual 'slice' of the ordinary, 'massive' object, as determined by the particular 'mode of presentation' of the object in a particular speech context.

Reference to particulars is thus always contextual and ultimately 'confrontational', for one must place the intended referent 'in present experience thereby constituting it as a present or presented referent' (68). The fundamental mechanism of reference is thus *indexical* reference, performed through the use of demonstrative and personal pronouns, as well as verbal tenses in direct discourse. Indexical reference for Castañeda is perforce 'personal' and 'ephemeral' (70), there being no intrinsic or enduring nature to the 'thisness' or 'thatness' of the objects one confronts in one's experience (their *esse* is *percipi*; 71). To allow for the possibility of intersubjective communication one thus needs mechanisms 'especially devised to transmute our indexical references ... into interpersonal and enduring representations' (69). These are the mechanisms of *quasi-indexical reference*, by which indexical reference is *attributed* to others in indirect discourse. (When I utter 'John said that he would be rich,' I use 'he' and 'would be' quasi-indexically to attribute to John indexical reference to himself and to a future time.) But while these atributions 'presuppose that *we share one and the same world*' (89), one must represent 'one fragment of the other's view of the world in one's own terms, *as part of one's world or of an extension thereof*' (90).

It is from this radical subjectivity that Castañeda attempts to reconstruct our intersubjective world. Starting with a Platonistic ontology of properties as 'the ultimate components of the world' (239), we construct *individual guises* — bundles of properties which constitute themselves in our experience as the 'ontological atoms of individuation' (193), the 'thin' objects that definite descriptions present to consciousness (one such object for each description). The 'massive', ordinary objects of our shared world are themselves bundles of 'consubstantiated' (extensionally equivalent) individual guises. Guises may satisfy several other relations ('self-consubstantiation', 'consociation', 'conflation', etc.) too intricate to discuss here; they make up a Platonistic framework within which our ordinary, phenomenologically sound world view can be *perspicuously* reconstructed in a way that allows the resolution of many familiar puzzles. (E.g., Frege's puzzle about the Morning Star and the

Evening Star is resolved by noting that the identity 'the MS = the ES' is strictly *false* since 'the MS' and 'the ES' denote *distinct* though 'consubstantiated' guises which may fail to be 'consociated' in someone's experience.) Many will find this unmistakably intensionalist ontology unpalatable; but it's doubtful that anyone will find anything *internally* incoherent in it.

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William Corlett
Community Without Unity: A Politics of Derridian Extravagance.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press 1989.
Pp. ix+261. US $37.50. ISBN 0-8223-0723-4.

A long-standing debate within modern political theory has involved individualists who favour personal rights and self-interests and collectivists who advocate communal identity and responsibility. Each side has accused the other of neglecting what they see as an important aspect of human existence, with pernicious results in practice. This debate has recently resurfaced, though in modified form, between thinkers like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin who supposedly embrace a more individualistic liberalism (at least in method) and their so- called communitarian critics like Alastair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel. Corlett's book relates to this debate, though it offers a different approach which should precipitate much discussion. Its uniqueness lies in utilizing the poststructuralist thought of Jacques Derrida 'to supplement the double bind of individualism and collectivism' (13). Corlett wants to show how the idea and practice of community, defined as mutual service and defence, need not involve suppressing individual differences and that a 'community without unity' is indeed possible.

To accomplish this aim Corlett divides the book into three main parts, together with a crucial supplement. In Part I, entitled 'Subjugation,' Corlett lays the groundwork for his thesis by distinguishing between 'reassuring' and 'extravagant' ways of thinking about community and the attendant concept of subjectivity. A reassuring interpretation is one which attempts to halt the flux of time and secure a permanent meaning of self and other, while an extravagant interpretation celebrates the accident and chaos present in everyday life. The reassuring interpretation views community as either resting on the principle of remunity (reciprocal exchange for services rendered) or the principle of communion (shared values and beliefs). Both these descriptions of community, however, presuppose ideas about subjectivity which really accounts for their differences. Whereas the community-as-re-

munity theorists hold that individuals are actually prior to, and more important than, society at large, the community-as-unity theorists attack this 'atomistic liberalism' for being unrealistic and believe an individual's identity is situated in, and derived from, social contexts. The problem with this more communitarian position is its possible threat in practice to personal liberty and privacy. Community on this scheme often translates into state domination and the suppression of individual rights.

This problem of community is further developed in the work of Michel Foucault, which Corlett uses to reveal how mutual service often turns out to be just another form of the manifold power exercised within society. This manifold power revolves around the notion of the subject both in its individual (community as remunity) and collective (community as unity) senses. Indeed, the whole opposition between individualism and collectivism is just part of this more pervasive form of power which has the subject at the centre of its discourse. Being subject and being a subject, therefore, are inseparably intertwined.

Before proceeding to outline his more extravagant interpretation of community, which aims to supplement the individual/collective distinction, Corlett, in Part II of his book called 'Reassurance', traces both individualist and collectivist impulses to a need to transmit and conserve self-images across time. Using a model borrowed from J.G.A. Pocock, Corlett illustrates how Foucault (and Pocock himself) assume an elapsing time continuum from past to future which suggests at least a tacit commitment to temporal unity. And this acceptance of temporal unity or linear time is so reassuring because anything that cannot be comprehended within it is automatically excluded. Corlett then demonstrates the costs of such exclusion in the work of two previous statesmen, Lincoln and Burke.

The third part of the book, named 'Extravagance', outlines Derrida's idea of différance which acts to supplement, not replace, the forces of reassurance. This is possible because différance is that primordial play that is responsible for the creation of binary oppositions (e.g., individual/collective) and yet exposes their non-absoluteness. In other words, différance is a movement which is anterior to meaning but what makes meaning both possible and changeable in the first place. There is thus always an excess that makes a final unity impossible. This is extravagance.

In his important supplement, Corlett draws out the political implications of Derrida's work in order to disclose how individual differences are compatible with community as mutual service. This all hinges on linking the idea of gift-giving with that of Derridian extravagance. The practice of giving gifts parallels différance in that it is done freely and accidentally, without calculation. It thus transcends any form of domination and humiliation since there is no motive of manipulation involved. Whether Corlett is right about the benign nature of gift-giving is an important question that cannot be answered here. His point, however, seems to be that just as meanings can never be fully fixed because of the radical movement of différance, one's identity or subjectivity can never be absolutely patterned because of the chaotic nature of freely giving gifts. It is the gift-giving itself which determines who one is, at

least temporarily, and not some prior system of meaning. And since each act of giving both implicates those involved in a communal network that is accidental (giver/receiver) as well as reveals different individual possibilities (in the freely chosen gifts), a community without unity or domination is thereby attainable.

There is much to ponder from Corlett's book. It tackles a difficult issue with style, confidence, and a creative imagination. But although there is much to commend it, at least two immediate problems emerge. The first concerns the fact that Corlett assumes there are political insights to be garnered from Derrida's writings, a view that has been seriously challenged by some critics like Thomas McCarthy who believe deconstruction leads us in the direction of the ineffable regarding politics. Moreover, Derrida himself, in an interview with Richard Kearny, conceded that his specific political activities have remained incommensurate with his project of deconstruction. These are important points that Corlett should have taken into account and dealt with accordingly.

The other difficulty involves Corlett's assumption that the political implications of Derrida's work are left-leaning and that they might serve to strengthen the case for a social democracy. This may be true, but again there are numerous critics, such as Gerald Graff, who argue that deconstruction is in fact politically reactionary. This contention should also have been addressed by Corlett in some manner.

Despite these drawbacks, *Community Without Unity* is a challenging work that deserves serious consideration.

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James. T. Cushing
and **Ernan McMullin, eds.**
Philosophical Consequences Of Quantum Theory: Reflections On Bell's Theorem.
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press 1989.
Pp. xii+314.
US $39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-268-01579-1);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-268-01578-3).

In 1964 J.S. Bell considered the quantum mechanical predictions for spin correlation measurement statistics generated by space-like separated pairs of particles in the singlet spin state. He derived a mathematical inequality which must be satisfied by any deterministic theory of these statistics which respects an intuitive locality condition from relativity theory according to

which there must be no action-at-a-distance. Bell then showed that the quantum predictions for these correlations violate the inequality. Experiments have since confirmed the accuracy of the quantum predictions. Apparently it is all up for local determinism. Since then, Bell's results have been extended to rule out local stochastic theories of the kind employed in discussions of statistical causality (with special reference to local 'common cause' explanations of the statistical correlations). The present volume consists of fifteen papers by well-known philosophers of science. It will be evident to anyone who reads this important collection that there is some considerable room for differences of opinion concerning the precise philosophical ramifications of Bell's theorem and its variants. The text also includes a valuable bibliography of works on the foundations of quantum theory.

The volume opens with a paper by James Cushing which provides a useful historical introduction to the EPR paradox and Bell's theorem, as well as the concerns of the other contributors. The paper contains an interesting appendix discussing Stapp's derivation of a Bell-type inequality. The metaphysical implications of Bell's theorem and quantum mechanics are teased out in Abner Shimony's paper, where the possibility of a 'peaceful coexistence' between quantum mechanics and relativity is discussed. Shimony also provides some interesting speculations concerning the possibility of what he terms 'stochastic variants of quantum mechanics' in which the usual deterministic linear dynamics are abandoned.

David Mermin's paper concerns what he terms 'the baseball principle', according to which what is done at one location can have no immediate effects at other locations (whether or not one watches a baseball game on TV can have no effect on the outcome of the game). Mermin finds that there is no way to apply the baseball principle to individual events of the kind discussed by Bell.

Jon Jarrett's paper is a must for anyone who wishes to comprehend Bell's theorem. Jarrett provides a very clear account of the philosophical theory of local realism, and of the Bell-type arguments and experiments counting against it. The claim is made that the Bell-type arguments support the claim that quantum mechanics is local but not complete. According to Jarrett, the full implications of the Bell theorems are not yet understood. One aspect of this is raised in his concluding remarks where it is suggested that that the incompleteness of quantum mechanics raises questions about the individuation of physical objects. Linda Wessels' paper provides a critical examination of the basic assumptions employed in typical derivations of Bell-type theorems. Something must be given up in the light of Bell's result — and a rejection of any of Wessels' candidate assumptions will result in a significant revision in the common sense conception of physical objects. As Wessels points out, it is possible to discover what is strange about the quantum world by focussing on the Bell results.

Bas van Fraassen's paper explores Bell's theorem as a result having negative implications for the 'common cause' model of explanation of statistical correlations. His conclusion is that it is possible to have reasonable expectations about the world when they are predicted by well-confirmed

theories. The justification of our expectations may thus be separated from issues surrounding the construction of causal models.

Jeremy Butterfield agrees with Jarrett that completeness rather than locality should be abandoned in the light of Bell's theorem. Like Shimony, he believes in a peaceful coexistence between quantum mechanics and relativity theory. The issues of interest are presented in the form of a space-time analysis of the correlation phenomena. The paper contains an excellent discussion of the difference between deterministic and stochastic hidden variables theories. There is also a useful discussion of Reichenbach's 'common cause' approach to the explanation of statistical correlations and van Fraassen's results. In Michael Redhead's paper the central concern is with stochastic hidden variables theories. The paper may be regarded as a valuable supplement to Redhead's other work on these topics and may help the reader to understand this issue as it is raised by the other contributors.

Henry Stapp addresses the issue of formulating an ontology adequate for the purposes of quantum mechanics — and it contains a very readable account of the ontological dilemmas posed by the quantum theory. By contrast, Arthur Fine provides an excellent presentation of the basic probabilistic issues underlying the Bell-type inequalities. Fine relates the significance of the quantum mechanical violations of the inequalities to his important earlier work on the 'no joint distribution' theorems of quantum mechanics. Fine's conclusions are refreshingly conservative. He does not think that the Bell-type correlations are inherently mysterious or that they need a special explanation over and above an understanding of the unique probabilistic structure of quantum mechanics. The issue of explanation receives further treatment by R.I.G. Hughes, who explores the possibility of providing the Bell-type correlations with an explanation which accomplishes its end through an analysis of the structure of quantum theory.

Paul Teller is another philosopher who does not believe that there is a conflict between quantum mechanics and relativity theory. He sees the source of the alleged conflict as lying in some erroneous ontological assumptions we typically make when assessing the Bell-type correlations. In particular we may have to abandon the common sense assumption that relational properties supervene on the non-relational intrinsic properties of physical systems. According to the philosophy of relational holism, there exist non-supervening relations, and these render the puzzling correlations as not requiring further explanation.

Don Howard is another contributor who does not think that the Bell-type correlations justify claims about the violation of relativistic locality requirements. As he puts it (225), '... the source of this 'nonlocality' is ... a kind of ontological holism or inseparability ... in which spatio-temporally separated but previously interacting physical systems lack separate physical states and perhaps also separate physical identities.' Once again, the issue of object individuation gets raised.

Henry Folse's paper is an entertaining and speculative work concerned with how Bohr might have responded to Bell's theorem had he lived to see it. The volume closes with a paper by Ernan McMullin which constitutes a

historical survey of various attempts to explain action-at-a-distance. The paper may usefully be read independently of a specific interest in Bell's theorem.

The papers collected here demonstrate how analytic philosophy of science should be done. Quantum mechanics may be mysterious in some of its aspects, but those who wish to peddle mysticism on the basis of quantum theory would do well to stay away from this excellent collection of philosophical essays.

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William Desmond
Philosophy and Its Others.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1990. Pp. xiii+396.
US $59.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0307-6);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0307-4).

The title and the introduction to this book would suggest that it is to explore the relation of philosophy to other types of thought, and give an account of what philosophy is. But while one is given a picture of the kinds of philosophy and other sorts of thinking of which Desmond disapproves, and of what he thinks philosophy ought to be, this turns out to be an endeavour quite different from what has gone on in the philosophical tradition. In fact, Desmond does not seem particularly interested in what is usually called philosophy; he is more concerned to illuminate his own 'metaxological' (from the Greek, 'middle' or 'between') sense of being and philosophy. What has been lacking in philosophy prior to Desmond is just this metaxological sense of being, and it is just this lack that accounts for the myriad evils and failings of contemporary society.

Desmond sees the situation of recent philosophy as torn between two alternatives — those who believe, along with Hegel, that difference is subordinate to identity, and those who espouse the Wittgensteinian option that human meaning is marked by a 'pluralism of different forms' (2). Hence unity versus plurality, or univocity versus plurivocity. Desmond is not seeking some dialectical truce between these two camps — because, presumably, dialectic consumes rather than respects the other — but an elaboration of being and philosophy as metaxological, as containing both, as 'midway between the totalizing wholeness represented by the Hegelian option and the discontinuous plurality of the Wittgensteinian option' (3).

The book begins with a long chapter in which various characters — the scholar, technician, scientist, poet, priest, revolutionary, hero and sage — who are among philosophy's others — are epitomized. There is nothing particularly revealing about these sketches, they might better be called caricatures, except that they portray these forms tricked out in Desmond's own terminology. Example: 'A frequent charge leveled today against the ambitious thought of the great thinkers is that it is conceptually imperialistic. But heroic thought need not be thus tyrannical. It may just be this self-transcending openness to otherness. We find again the double mediation of thought. The inward otherness of the philosophic self breaks through its own domesticated selfhood (dialectical self-mediation) in thought's restless search of more radical otherness (metaxological self-mediation)' (54).

Apparently the philosopher is always tempted to degenerate into one of these characters, but of course philosophy contains elements of all of them, the philosopher is 'all and none of the figures portrayed' (60). As we might expect from this, '*the* philosophical voice does not exist: there are many voices and philosophy itself is plurivocal' (60). So the philosopher speaks somewhere between plurivocity and babble, always provisional, always lacking totalization and closure.

The next three chapters — about half the book — discuss the aesthetic, the religious and the ethical as ways of being. The attempt here is to delineate the basis of, say, aesthetic being at the most fundamental level rather than to discuss the usual philosophical problems in aesthetics or religion or ethics. The self represents an original upsurge or energy of being, an energy that manifests itself on a sensuous, self-aware level in the aesthetic, that seeks 'ultimacy' on the religious level, and which displays a 'mindfulness' of self and other on the ethical level. The results of these three chapters is further demonstration that the self's other is both internal and external, or, in an attempt to escape Desmond's language one might say that there is a truth to both subjectivity and objectivity, a truth rooted in the nature of being itself.

The last two chapters are concerned with 'mindfulness' an echo, perhaps of the notion of care in *Being and Time*, although Desmond does not think that a univocal definition of mindfulness can be given (209). He does insist that philosophy is metaxological mindfulness, that is 'thought thinking both itself and its others' (209) but this is not particularly helpful because all of the ways of being that are discussed, not just philosophy, are characterized by mindfulness. These two chapters concern themselves first with thought thinking its other and then with thought singing its other. These are perhaps the most interesting parts of the book, consisting of meditations on metaxological being which are attacks, some of them quite clever, on the ways in which thinking is currently characterized.

In the various modes in which thought thinks its other, whether this be in logic, or in solitude and inwardness, or in thought's dealing with failure, there is revealed repeatedly an opposition between thought and its other that is internal to being in which thought is 'breaking on otherness' (257). In thought singing its other the concern is 'metaphorical modes of mind' which are 'real un-veilings' of being (262). This singing-unveiling is captured in meditations

on the sense of the golden, of the elemental, and finally, of death and time that reveal being as 'beyond the lie of denatured subjectivity and devitalized nature' (284).

This is stylistically a difficult book to read; for an author who rails against the imperialism of the 'Corbybantic deconstructionist' (xiii), Desmond's own linguistic twists and turns give him an imperialistic voice as annoying as those he criticizes. Further, if one thinks about the metaxological sense of being it is difficult to see — despite Desmond's aversions to the contrary — that there is much in this notion beyond Hegel. But the most serious fault is that the book reveals so little of the nature of philosophy. The account of the philosophical tradition that is contained here hovers far above that tradition, seeing it in terms of gross stereotypes; and there are no arguments in the book (Desmond would see that as a capitulation to univocity, I suspect) but nor is there a phenomenology that would show with any depth or richness the figures of mind and being. The text is burdened by numerous misprints and an excess of end-notes.

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George di Giovanni, ed.
Essays On Hegel's Logic.
Albany: State University of New York Press
1990. Pp. xii+218.
US $39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-7914-0291-6);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-7914-0292-4).

As George di Giovanni tells us in the Preface, 'this volume contains the papers and replies delivered at the Tenth Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America that was held at Loyola University of Chicago on October 7-9, 1988' (ix). There are eleven papers in this book and six replies, all of them in one way or another relating to Hegel's *Science of Logic*. These eleven papers cover a variety of topics, both concerning the method and content of the Logic. But they can be divided into four specific groupings: 1) those that deal with some problem concerning the starting point of the Logic, or some problem concerning the dialectical moves in the first chapter; 2) those that deal with some issue relating to Hegel's Doctrine of Essence, which comprises book II of the Logic; 3) those that are less concerned about what goes on within the Logic as with what role the Understanding plays in background to the Logic; 4) those who try and establish the Logic's relation to the 'tradition', especially that tradition pertaining to Kant and Aristotle.

In the first group we find the following papers: William Maker's 'Beginning', Richard Winfield's 'The Method of Hegel's *Science of Logic*', Philip Grier's 'Abstract and Concrete in Hegel's Logic', and Cynthia Willett's 'The Shadow of Hegel's *Science of Logic*'. The second group is composed of Daniel Dahlstrom's 'Between Being and Essence ...', Laura Byrne's 'Hegel's Criticisms of Spinoza's Concept of the Absolute', and Gabriella Baptist's 'Ways and Loci of Modality ....'. Joseph Flay's 'Hegel's Science of Logic: Ironies of the Understanding' and John Burbidge's 'Where is the Place of the Understanding?' comprise the third group. And finally, David Duquette's 'Kant, Hegel and the Possibility of a Speculative Logic' and Edward Halper's 'Hegel and the Problem of the Differentia' belong to the fourth group.

There are some good papers to be found in this collection. Grier's paper is excellent. He deals with the problem of abstraction in connection to Hegel's claim that his universals are concrete. He argues that the *Science of Logic* develops from the most abstract and least concrete universal, i.e., Being, to the least abstract and most concrete universal, i.e., Concept. He explains both how this happens and what is Hegel's rationale in clear and distinct terms. He shows good scholarship and is sensitive to 'systematic' concerns. I would also recommend Willett's paper, which makes some interesting points about Hegel's concept of Becoming and its relation to Pre-Socratic philosophy. Again this paper is clearly written and both novice and scholar will appreciate it. Unfortunately the other papers are either erroneous or poorly written. For example, William Maker, who deals with the Logic's relation to Hegel's Jena Phenomenology, seems to be unaware that Hegel changed his mind about the constitution of the System from the time of the Logic's first edition in 1812/13 to the second edition in 1830. His paper is an attempt to solve a contradiction that just is not there. This paper is also poorly written and edited.

The second group is interesting for its variety, if for nothing else. Dahlstrom's paper is more theatre than philosophy. His position is that Hegel is employing logical disguise in the section called Reflection: 'A disguise remains an attenuated guise, awaiting decipherment' (102). The disguise is the immediacy of Being, the fixed and finite forms found in book I of the Logic, but what truth is found under this guise Dahlstrom does not tell us. But even if he did, his reading of Hegel can hardly be seen as more than burlesque. Not so with Byrne's paper, which is heady going all the way through. She tends to spend too much time explicating non-essential texts, e.g., the early parts of Essence, and not enough time in explaining why Hegel is attacking Spinoza for 'externality' and for having an infinite number of attributes. She seems to think that Hegel just does not understand Spinoza, because Spinoza can ground his plurality of attributes in definitions: 'As we have seen, E1Def6 grounds the attributes in substance's absolute infinity, and Hegel's assertions about the empirical and intellectual origin of the attribute are apparently unfounded' (123). She seems unable to fathom the fact that Hegel sides with Leibniz and Fichte on the Spinoza question, and the simple fact that Spinoza grounds his theories in definitions does not make them less external, nor less objectionable. Baptist's paper is the worst written in the book. This

is probably due to the fact that she is not a native English speaker. But the paper itself has no clear focus; it covers Hegel's entire intellectual development from 1794 until 1830 in under 25 pages. I would consider this the poorest paper in this collection, despite the fact that she is dealing with an important and interesting subject of the role of Actuality in Hegel's logical thinking.

The third group presents us with Flay offering the suggestion that the 'logic' of Hegel's Logic is rhetoric, and that the dialectical moves of the first sections depend on the play of irony in the categories. This is another piece of theatre, perhaps inspired by Kierkegaard. It should not be taken too seriously. Burbidge's paper develops a thesis that he has already argued in his book, *On Hegel's Logic*. This paper is much better than anything he says in his book, and it is worth reading. He points out that the role of the understanding can be seen in the particularizing function of the categories, and that one has to look at the Doctrine of the Concept (book III of the Logic) to see and appreciate the role of the Understanding.

In the last group we find two opposing views: Duquette argues that Hegel is against the entire metaphysical tradition since Aristotle, cf. p. 9; that the central determining concept of the Logic is quantitative, i.e. being-for-self; and that Hegel is anticipating Heidegger and the Ontological Difference thesis. Halper argues that 'Hegel's conception of the categories is the mirror image of Aristotle's' (196). Hegel is, then, in the metaphysical tradition; he recognizes that the differentia are qualitative; Hegel is in league with Plato. Of these two, Halper has certainly the better paper.

In fine, there are some good papers in this collection, but they are outnumbered by the mediocre ones.

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John Fletcher and **Andrew Benjamin, eds.**
Abjection, Melancholia, and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall 1990. Pp. ix+213. Cdn $66.00: US $55.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-415-04155-4); Cdn $17.95: US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-04190-2).

This volume illustrates some of the ongoing drama as Anglo-American academia confronts recent developments in French theory. The work of Julia Kristeva is a fitting occasion. Bristling with techniques taken from such diverse fields as logic, mathematics, linguistics, structural anthropology,

literary criticism, philosophy, her complex, sometimes tortured, psychoanalytic analyses of literary texts seem to have a reassuring rigor missing from the more flamboyant of the French avant-garde. Nevertheless, the going is never easy, as North American and British theorists from a variety of disciplines historically conditioned by the sober strictures of ego psychology, analytic philosophy, functionalism, new criticism, attempt to assimilate Kristeva's 'semiotic', 'maternal abject', 'symbolic soma', 'cyclical time'.

In many of the articles included in this collection, all that is possible is exegesis. The writers attempt only to explain, with mixed results, Kristeva's new interest in romantic literature, her view of the body, her use of geometry, her interest in adolescence. Others search for elucidating parallels in de Man's theories of metaphor, in Lacan's mirror stage, in Levinas' theory of love, in T.S. Eliot's horror of femininity. Most, at some point, become incomprehensibly embroiled in the tangles of Kristeva's psychoanalytic constructions.

For the purposes of understanding the significance of this formidable body of high theory, the most useful contribution is Leslie Hill's historical article, 'Julia Kristeva: Theorizing the Avant-Garde?' Hill places Kristeva among her contemporaries, as the theorist of an ongoing struggle of the contemporary French avant-garde to find an identity as they reject Communism, embrace Maoism, and finally endorse the pluralistic acultural 'melting pot' of America. Not unrelated to this locating of Kristevan thought in its French environment is a problematic touched on in many of the articles and discussed in detail in several: Kristeva's ambivalence toward maternity, the women's movement, women's writing, and femininity.

Kristeva's intellectual relations have been with the forefathers of the French avant-garde, Nietzsche, Bataille, de Sade; its bards, Mallarmé, Lautreamont, Sollers, Robbe-Grillet; its theorists, Barthes, Lacan, Derrida. Given these exclusively male relations, it is not surprising that there is a sense of strain as Makiko Minow-Pinkney, in her study of Virginia Woolf, tries to instate a woman writer as an example of Kristeva's dialogue between semiotic drives and symbolic structure, and that Maud Ellman, in 'Eliot's Abjection', is on firmer ground with her exploration of Eliot's notorious gynophobia. Although they do little to resolve it, three articles explore the problem of Kristeva's relation to women and feminism in some detail: Alison Aimley's 'The Ethics of Sexual Difference', Tina Chanter's 'Female Temporality and the Future of Feminism' and Elizabeth Gross's 'The Body of Signification'.

Aimley notes Kristeva's dual attitude toward maternity. On the one hand, the 'abject' mother is the abyss of psychotic fusion escaped only by entrance into male oriented culture; women are trapped in the mother role, which constitutes their oppression. On the other hand, there are hints, in Kristeva's 'Stabat Mater' for example, of maternal strength in the image of the Virgin Mary. Aimley relates Kristeva's ambivalence to a problem in contemporary feminist practice and theory: should a maternal ethics of care be rejected as oppressive or might there be new, empowering ethical possibilities in maternal relations?

Tina Chanter points to Kristeva's distinction between linear 'masculine' historical time and women's cyclical time and her corresponding analysis of

feminist history as two-staged, focused first on national struggles for equal rights, then on transhistorical, symbolic feminine identity. Although Kristeva rejects both in favor of avant-garde 'diversity', Chanter points out that even here there is ambivalence, as Kristeva admits that it may be necessary to 'take the risk' of stage two, and find in the maternal, as an 'irreducible' feminine experience, new sources of value related to love, art, expressiveness.

Elizabeth Gross, after a protracted analysis of Kristeva's relation to Freud and Lacan returns to the same theme. The source of culture, according to Kristeva, is fear of the mother; our very ability to signify has its origins in the rejection of the mother as abject and our entrance into male culture in which women, maternally identified, will always be at a disadvantage. Gross reacts against this 'horror' of the feminine. She notes that Kristeva's recent *Tales of Love* are always stories of men's love for women; she notes that there are no stories of lesbian love. Kristeva, in her philosophy of signification, does not acknowledge a sexed speaking subject; the mother cannot speak. But, asks Gross, doesn't a sexed body produce a different discourse?

But even these feminist interventions are tentative, weakened by awe at the ornate epicycles of Kristevan theory. As an introduction to Kristeva, this volume might be useful for someone willing to abandon herself to tracing some of the circles, hoping to learn to keep afloat in these complex currents. It might be interesting to someone, already an adept, who welcomes further articulations. The articles here, however, will not accomplish the necessary task of locating the common metaphysical roots of continental and Anglo-American thought. French theory remains an edifice, touchable, traceable, admirable, but not permeable.

The meaning of what Kristeva is *saying* about our Western experience — self-focused, exploitative, violent, anti-woman — has yet to be elucidated. For this to happen, some of the ground rules of postmodern methodology must be broken. Speech and writing, if it is meaningful at all, is spoken by someone and about something. Until the subject, Kristeva, and her references to the material reality in which she and we live are made clear, Kristeva will escape our understanding and our response.

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Gary Gutting
Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason.
New York: Cambridge University Press 1989.
Pp. xiii+306.
US $39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-521-36619-4);
US $12.95 (paper: ISBN 0-521-36698-4).

This is the first sustained attempt to explain some of Foucault's books to American mainline philosophers. It is, as the title implies, chiefly directed towards members of the profession called philosophy of science, whose problems and interests derive from logical empiricism. It is now de rigeur to mention Foucault in most intellectual enterprises. He has acquired an enormous readership, perhaps greater than that of any other philosopher of the sixties and seventies. Nowhere is his popularity greater than in the United States. The largest auditoriums at the greatest universities could not contain the throngs of undergraduates who would come to hear him — but philosophers in the positivist tradition paid him no heed. The joking 'Philosopher's Lexicon' which defined proper names of philosophers as if they were words of English — often to fine effect — defined a foucault as a terrible blunder with this example in usage: 'he committed an egregious foucault'. I know of no philosopher brought up on Carnap and Quine who has been able to make much of Foucault.

Gutting does a good job of explaining, to this audience, some of the things that Foucault was doing. His genre is far removed from Foucault's. Here we have the didactic plain person's pedagogue: background to a book — content of the book — summary of criticisms of that content — brief evaluation of those criticisms — on to the next book. No nonsense here: 'Foucault's 'critique' is once again merely a matter of gratuitously denying...'. Since such and such discussions 'include some of the most convoluted and obscure passages in *The Order of Things*, readers can be easily fooled into thinking that there is a level of profound criticism that they have failed to penetrate' (223).

Gutting restricts himself to the first half of Foucault's career, namely the work up to and including *The Order of Things* (French edition, 1966) plus the meta-book *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969) which was supposed to give the methodology of preceding work. The meta-book was written at a moment, as Gutting puts it, of 'the high tide of Foucault's flirtation with rationalist structuralism' (264), and it is not the place to go to find out what Foucault's work is all about. Gutting writes about books, not the innumerable interviews and 'introductions'. He omits only *Raymond Roussel* (1963), the marvellous essay on the surreal writer, which would drive his intended audience up the wall. Thus we have a study of the work on madness and clinical medicine, but not the later material on the prison (*Discipline and Punish*) nor the long drawn out and incomplete history of sexuality. That later work is often called, after Foucault, 'genealogy' as opposed to the 'archaeology' up to 1969.

Gutting makes no systematic attempt to study 'influences' on Foucault, but he does do a service to the professional philosophers of science by providing

a brief introduction to the two most important French thinkers about the history and philosophy of science, namely Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem. Bachelard's 25 books about (for lack of another word) aesthetics are well enough known to anglophone students of literature (you wouldn't know about that, however, from Gutting). His dozen books about science are in contrast ignored, only one being translated. The only English book about Bachelard's philosophy of science is not very readable.

Bachelard's conception of scientific knowledge as proceeding by 'mutations' and 'cuts' overcoming 'obstacles' or 'blocks' preceded anglophone passion for scientific revolution by three decades, just as his theories of experimental science and technology anticipated the current 'philosophy of science' enthusiasm for experiment by half a century. Bachelard was the first to make plain 'the role of scientific instruments in the constitution of scientific reality' (31). His conception of the physical manifestations of knowledge, which in turn feed back into the knowledge itself, is presented only for the physical sciences. But it laid the basis for understanding the relationships between knowledge and power, even when the knowledge is physiological or social, and the instruments are the apparatus of an institution or the state. Gutting gives some idea of the lode in Bachelard's writing that will be re-mined on this side of the Atlantic. But he does not quite convey how and why Bachelard became very much a Parisian best-seller when Foucault was writing. And you'd hardly guess, from this presentation, that Bachelard was highly 'relevant' in '68.

Canguilhem, the very dean of French historians of science, is a much less sensational figure, although, as Foucault wrote, without Canguilhem there would have been no Lacan, no Althusser, no — Foucault. Canguilhem, trained as a medical doctor, is one of the great students of the sciences of living things. Unlike most anglophone philosopher/historians, Canguilhem does not think of theories as his subject matter, but rather of 'concepts', that is, of certain related ideas not characterized either by their precursors nor by the theories in which they occur. They are rather the organizing notions which determine which kinds of assertions can be made, which determine at a particular time what are the candidates for truth value and good sense. Altogether contrary theories may employ the same concepts, which are the motor not of actual but of possible knowledge. The way in which Bachelard's 'epistemological blocks' are overcome is by the creation of a new set of conceptual arrangements which open up new fields of possibility. This way of thinking about possibility is dead against any search for precursors; even when the same words are used, the fact that they are used in expressing a different domain of possibilities makes them fundamentally different. Canguilhem is the most important philosopher, of any persuasion, whose detailed historical examples put real flesh on the very idea of a conceptual scheme.

Gutting notes how completely Foucault appropriated this way of thinking about knowledge, and that it is at the core of the idea of an 'episteme' and of a 'discursive formation'. He goes so far as to say that 'In sum, in *The Order of Things's* application of 'archeological' analysis to individual empirical disciplines, there is nothing that goes beyond the methodology of Canguil-

hem's history of concepts' (218). But for Canguilhem, (at least as read by Gutting) when a body of concepts do firm up to the point where we have not only truth-value candidates but also known truths, positive knowledge within a new discipline, the discipline stays in place. Gutting argues that Foucault provides a history of what we might call philosophical concepts ('representation', 'Man') that pervade a discipline and may enter our discussions at one break in time, and leave at another: 'Foucault's extension of the history of concepts undermines the privileged role of disciplines in the history of thought and knowledge' (219).

Gutting has thus situated Foucault within a venerable tradition of French writing about science, little known to the philosophy of science professionals. Notice that the standard anglophone questions about rationality and scientific realism simply don't arise as interesting once one switches focus from theories to concepts. Bachelard indeed called himself an 'applied rationalist' but not because he had some concern with rational theory choice. He was interested in the way in which the mind constructs concepts and the hand makes instruments; once the concepts and the instruments are there, reasons and reality trundle along obediently, without problems. Undoubtedly many anglophone readers find this difficult to grasp, and in the end, their worries come out in the waffling about whether Foucault is a 'relativist' — read 'nihilist'.

The placing of Bachelard and Canguilhem at the start of Gutting's study is excellent. Unfortunately he writes of the relationships among these men as if they were all in the Notre Dame graduate school, so that Foucault (and Althusser) are, in just that sense, made to appear as Canguilhem's 'students'. This is a valuable book for expounding French thinking about science but not a reliable one for 'influence': Dumézil, perhaps Foucault's only guru, is just barely mentioned, twice, in connection with myths, and then as if he had the same role in Foucault's intellectual life as Levi-Strauss.

Another feature of Gutting's study should interest more readers than those targeted by his book. There's a very good chapter on Foucault's different essays about madness. It is now quite well known that *Madness and Civilization* is a very greatly abridged version of *Folie et déraison* (1961). It has recently been argued with perhaps too much anger that the abridged English translation has grossly distorted anglophone perceptions of Foucault's early work. It is less well known that Foucault published two books on madness, each of which appeared in a very substantially revised form, for a total of four rather distinct titles. Gutting uses this sequence to show how Foucault's early ideas developed. In a way, this may be a little reassuring — for we see that Foucault's conceptions did not emerge full-formed. It may also help anyone with preconceived ideas grasp how very different Foucault is from the thinkers who dominated his first forays.

For despite a certain flamboyance, Foucault's *Maladie mentale et personnalité* (1954) is a rather ordinary work of the time. Had there not been subsequent genius, one would have said this was a pedestrian early fifties blend of Marxist rhetoric, phenomenology (contra Gutting, I'd say more Merleau-Ponty than Sartre) and Heidegger. Heidegger was the *one* author

that young French Marxists were forbidden to read after the war, so of course they all knew him by heart. The only sign of real imagination was the use of L. Binswanger's *Traum und Existence*, for whose French translation Foucault had written an extensive 'introduction' which is more like a set of first reflections on existential psychotherapy and conceptions of the mind. The upshot was a combination of a nostalgic vision of madness of an earlier era, and a social theory of insanity as a mental affliction of bourgeois society.

Foucault really did have the romantic notion that somehow madness contained some truth prior to reason, and this to some extent endured even when he was writing *Folie et déraison*. He consciously and explicitly repented that mistake. Gutting argues that it persisted (262f). There may be a confusion here between the rejected idea, that madness was truly understood long ago and that it contains a species of thought that surpasses reason, and a persisting fantasy that insane mavericks such as Artaud or Roussel can break through the routines of talk and thought. They can do so, fantastically, not because they have the truth (of, in Gutting's words, an infrarational sort) but because they — break. Compare Foucault's much later rejection of Maoist people's courts — not because of their summary (in)justice, but because they were courts at all. Anglo-American high culture has some trouble with Foucault's inclination less for revolution than for revolt, and one finds the same incredulity expressed in this middlebrow book.

That matter aside, phenomenology, Marxism and Heidegger were outgrown by the time Foucault commenced his main work on 'folie'. (Anyone who thinks Foucault is permeated with Heidegger should read the early work to see what it is to be permeated by Heidegger). Foucault had read enough philosophy, and started reading. He burst out of his jejune meditations. He no longer considered how the mad represent to themselves, no longer discussed the image, the imaginary and the imagination, and instead analyzed what was said about the mad, and what was done to them. This was a history of concepts indeed, but also of how concepts were applied to dominate others.

The books studied are reported well in the style I described at the outset. Gutting may persuade some in his audience that there are different ways of thinking about 'scientific reason' than are found in the pages of *Philosophy of Science*. He provides the most cautious of rebuttals to the criticisms most often circulated. Does Foucault get his historical facts right? Right enough for the projects he undertook to continue. Does he claim that there is no such thing as objective knowledge? Nowhere, says Gutting. What Foucault does do is to provide a way of criticizing knowledge. The model upon which we should read Foucault's is (almost) that of a new Kant.

This is a good insight. Foucault's masterpiece, of the first half of his life, is *The Order of Things*. The project began early, as part of a reflection on Kant's *Anthropologie*. Another 'introduction' to a translation! The dividing point in Foucault's book is precisely the study of Man. At a certain point in his annual logic lectures, Kant added a new question, 'What is Man?' *The Order of Things* has innumerable messages, but one of them is the way in which successive 'knowledges' gave way to each other. These knowledges are not univocal, but often competing ways of answering something like the same question. The

very questions and the range of possible answers — cf. Canguilhem — disappear. Notoriously Foucault enthusiastically and optimistically thought that the human sciences of today were also just about to disappear. Each such 'knowledge' is embedded in what Canguilhem called, reviewing Foucault, 'an historical a priori'. Where Kant used his theory to stop pure reason going beyond its limits, Foucault used his to draw attention to the historical limits of applied reason. This is what Gutting finds most attractive in Foucault, and the chief way in which positivist philosophers of science can improve their sensibilities about and sensitivity to the limits of scientific reason.

This is an excellent book for its purpose. Readers familiar with Foucault will think that it tries too hard to domesticate Foucault for an American philosophical audience. Certainly one would never guess, from this study, why all those people thronged to hear Foucault, or why he is now so constantly and uncritically referred to in such a wide range of writings and conversations. Nor would one pick up what Foucault said of himself later, in connection with his work on madness — 'What after all was I writing about then, but power?' Gutting has nevertheless written a wonderfully clear book about the tamer side of a remarkable author, even if it does not even tell us why this author so resented the very concept, 'author'.

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Colin Howson and **Peter Urbach**
Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach.
La Salle, IL: Open Court 1989. Pp. xiv+312.
US $39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8126-9084-2);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8126-9085-0).

Howson and Urbach compare two schools of thought about inductive reasoning: (a) Bayesianism and (b) objectivism, the school that eschews subjective probabilities. They conclude that Bayesianism is much better supported.

Their criticism of objectivism has two parts. First, they attack objectivist accounts of the confirmation of nonstatistical hypotheses. They argue that these accounts, such as Popper's, are unable to explain basic facts about confirmation, for example, the fact that the lower the probability of the evidence apart from the hypothesis the more the evidence confirms the hypothesis (88). Next, they attack objectivist accounts of the confirmation of statistical hypotheses. For example, they argue that (a) Fisher's significance tests rest on an arbitrary choice of a test statistic, a choice that cannot be justified by the criterion of minimal sufficiency (137-40); (b) Fisher's requirement of randomization for tests of causal hypotheses is unjustified (146-54);

(c) Neyman and Pearson's significance tests rest on an arbitrary choice of a null hypothesis (168-9); and (d) Neyman's method of interval estimation relies on an arbitrary choice of a confidence interval among those with a given coefficient of confidence, a choice that cannot be justified by the criterion of minimum width (195-7). They also argue that objectivistic statistics lacks a satisfactory account of acceptance and rejection of a hypothesis (e.g., 162-5). They claim that acceptance, for instance, cannot mean acceptance as true, since all acknowledge that a hypothesis supported by a statistical test may be false. Nor can acceptance mean willingness to act as if the hypothesis were true, since no one is willing to do that unreservedly, given the possibility that the hypothesis is false.

Their argument for Bayesianism has two steps. First, they extol the virtues of Bayesianism. They observe that it provides a unified treatment of the confirmation of statistical and nonstatistical hypotheses. And they claim that it avoids the criticisms raised against objectivism. For instance, it provides a justification of the requirement that a test statistic be sufficient (248-50). Second, they defend Bayesianism against common objections. For instance, they respond to complaints about conditionalization, Miller's paradox, the problem of 'old' evidence, and the charge that Bayesianism makes induction subjective. Since many take the last objection to be the crucial one, let us examine their response to it.

In a section devoted to the issue of subjectivity, they say that Bayesianism is an account of the revision of probabilities in the light of new evidence. It does not treat the origin of prior probabilities. It takes them as given. Then they claim that Bayesianism so understood is completely objective. Revision in accordance with Bayes's theorem is a requirement of rationality, not a matter of subjective taste (288-90).

This response to the charge of subjectivity is disappointing. It defends Bayesianism simply by putting subjective factors outside the theory. Doing this may make Bayesianism itself objective, but it still leaves open the possibility that the product of Bayesian reasoning is discredited by its subjective source.

The authors also sketch a stronger line of response. They observe that for Bayesian reasoners differences about the prior probability of an event are usually swamped out by incoming evidence. That is, the posterior probability assignments converge as the evidence grows (235-41 and 290). To be sure, there are exceptions. But they claim that the exceptions are unavoidable consequences of the subjective side of inductive reasoning (254). At the beginning of the book they suggest that this is their main line of response to the charge of subjectivity. They say that they will defend Bayesianism by arguing that inductive reasoning inevitably involves certain subjective factors and that Bayesianism does exactly what is necessary to accommodate these factors (11). However an argument along these lines is not fully presented.

Howson and Urbach attempt to marshal familiar points about Bayesianism and objectivism into a coherent case for Bayesianism. But they advance some novel proposals as well. One prominent new proposal appears during

a discussion of the objective probabilities involved in statistical hypotheses. The authors propose a way of defending von Mises's frequentist interpretation of objective probabilities against the charge that it makes them nonempirical. They argue that a hypothesis about the objective probability of an event relative to a collective can be confirmed by empirical evidence via Bayes's theorem. They claim that the objectivity of the confirmation (relative to an assignment of non-zero prior probabilities to the hypothesis and evidence) is assured by a version of the Principal Principle. They say that if someone knows the objective probability of an event relative to a collective, and knows nothing relevant about the event except that it belongs to the collective, then the event's subjective probability for the person is equal to its objective probability relative to the collective (227-30).

This version of the Principal Principle is mistaken, however. According to von Mises, an event may have different objective probabilities relative to different collectives. In view of this possibility, knowledge of the objective probability of an event relative to a collective does not mandate a subjective probability assignment for the event. Even if it is not known that the event has different objective probabilities relative to other collectives, the possibility that it does provides a reason to withhold an assignment of subjective probability. Standard versions of the Principal Principle avoid this objection by grounding subjective probability assignments on knowledge of *nonrelative* objective probabilities.

The authors give a Dutch book argument for their version of the Principal Principle (227-8). But it does not address the rationale for withholding a subjective probability assignment. Also, in another context, they consider and reject interval-valued subjective probabilities, claiming that point-valued subjective probabilities are justified as a convenient idealization (68-70). However, it is clear that this reason for assuming the existence of point-valued subjective probabilities cannot be turned into a reason for making point-valued subjective probability assignments despite a paucity of information.

Howson and Urbach's main goal is to elucidate the debate between Bayesians and objectivists, and this goal is accomplished admirably. The history of the debate is insightfully reviewed. Necessary technical material is clearly and concisely presented. References to the literature are ample. And arguments are thoroughly and perspicaciously explored. Those looking for an introduction to contemporary views about induction cannot do better than this book.

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T.H. Irwin
Aristotle's First Principles.
Don Mills, ON and New York: Oxford University Press 1988. Pp. xviii+702.
Cdn $137.50: US $75.00. ISBN 0-19-824717-6.

This book is very long — and it is not always easy to read. But few, I suspect, who do make it through to the end will feel that their labours have been in vain. It is, in short, a typical Irwin product. It is at times heavy and repetitious, particularly in the earlier sections. But its great strength is that, in spite of its length and scope, Irwin never loses his grip upon a central, organising thesis.

The thesis is that, while no developmental account of Aristotle's philosophy can ever hope to establish itself as true beyond reasonable doubt, nevertheless it can be made plausible if one can outline a sequence of problems and solutions which would have led a rational thinker from one set of doctrines to another. This is what Irwin tries to do.

The problem for Aristotle, as Irwin sees it, is an entirely general one. How is one to establish and support realist claims about metaphysics on the epistemologically fragile foundations of empirical inquiry and human intuition? Specifically for Aristotle, how is the tool of dialectic, essentially an adversarial argumentative method designed to tease out inconsistencies in one's opponents' positions, up to the positive foundational task for which Aristotle apparently intends it? Crucially, how can such a method supply us not merely with arbitrary first principles, but with First Principles — not just with a set of axioms that will articulate the system, but with the *real* principles upon which the world, and not merely our picture of it, depend?

Irwin's treatment falls into three sections. In the first, 'The Emergence of the Problem', he presents an Aristotle (principally of the *Organon* and the *Physics*) gradually becoming aware that dialectic, as it stands, seems incapable of providing the type of independently justified conclusions which the establishment of realist science requires. Indeed, he sees the whole of the methodological arguments and puzzles of the early period (I shall speak in Irwin's developmental language) as leading up to *Metaphysics* III, the grand statement of the fundamental problems of 'first philosophy' which the bulk of the *Metaphysics* is intended to solve.

The second major difficulty that Aristotle, on Irwin's account, runs into involves the doctrine of substance. The Aristotle of the *Categories* behaves as though ordinary language, and ordinary intuitions about language suitably sanitized by the dialectical process will serve uniquely to yield the Aristotelian view that basic subjects of predication (and hence the ultimate particulars in the world) are individuals. But as Irwin persuasively shows, his argument cannot yield this strong conclusion — at best he shows that language and intuition are compatible with this picture — and even that does not seem to entail metaphysical realism. Indeed, things are worse than that: grammatical analysis, applied to the category of relation, actually yields

results in conflict with Aristotle's preferred ontology. This raises the question of matter, form, and their relations — and the related (non-identical) question of the relations of universals to particulars. For Aristotle recognises the attraction of the view that essences are what is basic, since it is via essence that we explain what a thing is. Yet essences are not individual: there is no definition of Socrates. In one way, then, we are driven to think of individuals, in their rugged ontological independence, as being the basic features of the world. But by an equally plausible line of reasoning we are led to conclude that what is basic to the world are essences, not their instances. How are we to resolve this crisis?

The problems are compounded in the picture of science presented in *Posterior Analytics*. There, Aristotle insists in good realist fashion that each science be founded upon basic, necessary, non-arbitary axiomatic principles: explanation must stop somewhere — it proceeds neither in a circle nor to infinity. But how are these to be discovered? Here again dialectic seems woefully inadequate; and Aristotle attempts to answer the question via *nous*, standardly if inadequately rendered as 'intuition'; we grasp essences (and hence first principles) as a result of acquaintance with instances of them (this is sometimes, quite misleadingly, described as induction). The first principles are not *justified*: for what could justify the bedrock? But they are, in some sense, to be self-evident. Irwin presents Aristotle's position with great clarity and sympathy — but he does not skate over the difficulties it involves.

In the second section, Irwin presents a maturing Aristotle grappling in the *Metaphysics* with precisely these problems. The picture that emerges is detailed, complex, and challenging. Irwin's Aristotle is recognisably the Aristotle of Frede's recent study; a philosopher who sees that what is required metaphysically to place form where it ought to be, at the basis of all metaphysics, is a concept of *individual* form. This concept is very hard to get a grip upon — metaphysics in the formal mode is notoriously evanescent. But Irwin makes the case for this reading of the central books of the *Metaphysics* by a detailed, and to my mind highly persuasive, close reading of the text. In Irwin's hands *Metaph* Z suddenly seems less of a rag-bag than it used to.

As to the status of science, we turn naturally to *Metaph* Γ; Irwin offers a reading of the argument for the principle of non-contradiction that is typically thorough and sensitive; he makes the principle primarily ontological in import, and has Aristotle attempting to pin back a sceptic into an implicit acceptance of subject-predicate form, and hence of the metaphysical order this implies. Thus, on Irwin's account, the PNC argument is an integral part of the case for substance (and it exhibits dialectic at work in a way that can have positive results). I'm not so sure — I'm inclined to read its force as being largely semantic, and its conclusions as being independent of a subject-predicate account of logical grammar.

The final section of the book treats of Aristotle's applications of his solution to the problem of general metaphysics in philosophy of mind and moral and political philosophy. Here specialist and non-specialist will find much of

interest, although I suspect the latter will be better served. The strength of the book to the specialist lies principally, I think, in the cogency and elegance of the Aristotle who emerges from his long struggle with the concept of substance.

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Douglas Kellner
Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond.
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1989.
Pp. 246.
US $35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8047-1738-9);
US $11.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8047-1757-5).

Kellner begs two questions in this otherwise impressive overview of the trajectory of the writings of Jean Baudrillard over the past twenty years and raises another that must be fronted by whoever situates herself in the contemporary intellectual scene described by the post-isms. The book's weakness and its strength derive respectively from the questions begged and raised and its impressiveness from the quiet authority with which it transverses the body of its subject's work and the French milieu in which it was wrought. Transverses but does not pierce, however, and one might wish for more penetrating analysis of the various poststructural strategies used to show how language creates its effect and thereby to begin to erase the effect. But this is to want a different book and, indeed, testifies to the power of what was written to whet the reader's appetite for a complementary dish.

Kellner echoes what is not infrequently heard, namely, that the early work of a contemporary French thinker is better than the later work, and what this means in general is that the critic has little taste for poststructuralism and is impatient with what may seem a perverse refusal on poststructuralism's part to argue, justify, or in some other way motivate its claims. The distaste and impatience leads Kellner prematurely to beg the question against the poststructural asservation that the electronic and genetic revolutions have disrupted our conceptual geography. He allows that change is afoot but asserts that continuity, not rupture and disruption, rules. The difference between the analogic and the digital, the smooth and the broken, marks the difference between Marxism and (post)structuralism. And here is the second question begged. Poststructuralism fails just because it is not dialectical, because it does not mediate the contradictions it finds, preferring instead to unearth as yet undreamed of contradictions, because it is not

historical in the nineteenth-century sense of history as progression, preferring instead to entertain the proposition that history is a kaleidescope. In short, the book under review is a Marxist critique of Baudrillard.

Kellner begins by asking if Baudrillard is simply the latest French fad or a thinker whose 'provocative and novel' ideas deserve serious study. He thinks Baudrillard popular and influential enough and, more important, politically dangerous enough to call for his 'mapping out, contextualizing and critically appraising Baudrillard's work as a whole' (2). Baudrillard is, Kellner shows, sometimes racist, sometimes sexist, and not the leftist that his English-speaking readers think him to be. He is not on the right either although his political critiques of the 1980s are of the left and his work from the late 1970s on is 'replete with attacks on feminism, the peace and anti-nuclear movement, the ecology movement and other political tendencies generally termed "progressive"' (198). This speaks to a narrow sense in which Baudrillard presents a danger to causes embraced by Kellner, but there is, he argues, a danger to the welfare of humankind broader than the reach of the labels 'left' and 'right' looming on the horizon of the universe of discourse described by the post-isms, a discourse which claims to have gone beyond the categories of left and right and to have shown politics to be undermined by media simulations. For such a discourse, Kellner points out, 'will not help the millions being harmed, even killed, as a result of the domestic and foreign policies of the Reagans, Bushes, Thatchers, Bothas and Pinochets of the world' (215).

The question to be confronted by whoever would enter the discourse of the post-isms is: 'How is an ethics and its natural extension, a politics, possible within the theory according to which the human subject just is a simulation, a surface, the site through which ceaselessly pass successions of signifiers?' The strength of Kellner's book is that he forces the question, and its twin weakness is that it rejects out of hand any theory that does not yield a radical social theory and politics and the dialectics and mediation he holds to be central to them. Baudrillard's criticisms of the left and right are found by Kellner to reduce to the claim that neither has appreciated the changes in society which have resulted in the virtual inapplicability of the familiar concepts of the social and the political. And Kellner will not even entertain the proposition that such concepts might need to be rethought.

On the chart he makes of Baudrillard's course the first five books beginning with *Le système des objets* (1968) cast Baudrillard as a revolutionary theorist whose work inhabits the same universe as does Marxism. By *L'échange symbolique et la mort* (1976) there is a complete break from Marx and the turn that ends up in 'capitulation to the hegemony of the right and a secret complicity with aristocratic conservatism' (215) has been taken. As his subject becomes more Nietzschean, more nihilistic, as he turns from the political to the metaphysical, Kellner becomes arch, sarcastic, impatient — he does not like the later Baudrillard. Baudrillard is said to be at the end of his serious theoretical work with *Les stratégies fatales* (1983) and his succeeding works to 'take on a "postmodern" style which pastiches previous texts (his own), mixes together various subject matters, and eventually provides a

frozen, glaciated hyperrealization of texts increasingly more Baudrillardian than Baudrillard, in which he provides his own model which is endlessly reproduced' (210-11). This, Kellner implies, is self-evidently absurd, as is the notion that reality could be anything other than 'that realm of necessity, materiality, the force of circumstances, institutions, power, events and developments that we cannot evade' (212). Case closed, and what could have been a crucial exchange is stopped before it has barely begun.

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Richard Kraut
Aristotle on the Human Good.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1989. Pp. viii+379.
US $37.50. ISBN 0-691-07349-X.

In the final book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that perfect happiness is contemplation, a point which he says 'agrees with what has been said before, and also with the truth' (*EN* X 7, 1177a17-19). Since, in book I, Aristotle appears to endorse the view that happiness includes many goods, and since the bulk of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is devoted to discussion of ethical virtue, it comes as a surprise to find that the life of ethical virtue now seems to be merely runner-up to the life of contemplation (*EN* X 8, 1178a8-10). In his thought-provoking book on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Richard Kraut argues that Aristotle's treatment of contemplation in book X is perfectly consistent with the rest.

According to Kraut, Aristotle's view is as follows: The best type of happiness is contemplation; the second best is the exercise of ethical virtue. The philosopher has the first type of happiness as his ultimate goal. The statesman has the second. All the goods of human life are ranked in a hierarchy, with contemplation at the top, and ethically virtuous activity next in line. The top goods 'regulate' the lower goods, and the lower goods 'causally promote' the higher. Although the philosopher's *happiness* will not include any goods besides contemplation (and here Kraut's interpretation runs against the tide of much recent interpretation of Aristotle), the philosopher's *life* will, because the philosopher will need a certain amount of external goods, and, more important, ethical virtue, in order to contemplate. Therefore Aristotle's discussion of ethical virtue is relevant to both sorts of happiness mentioned in book X.

Kraut's Aristotle holds that the more contemplation a life has, the happier it is and, for someone living the next best happy life, the more ethical activity the better). Therefore, according to Kraut, Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is far from vacuous; the mean is whatever best promotes contemplation (or, for the statesman, whatever will promote more ethical activity).

Kraut spends a considerable amount of time and ingenuity distinguishing various kinds of egoism and arguing that Aristotle espouses none of them, for the linch-pin of Kraut's interpretation, according to Kraut, is the claim that Aristotle is not an egoist of any stripe. If Aristotle were an egoist, claims Kraut, it would be false that the philosopher needs ethical virtue for a happy life. If it is false that the philosopher needs ethical virtue, Aristotle's discussion is inconsistent and so Kraut's project fails (76-7).

The success of Kraut's project, however, does not depend on the denial that Aristotle is an egoist in the way Kraut supposes. In particular, it does not depend on the denial that Aristotle is a benign egoist (someone who thinks that one should act in such a way as to maximise one's own good, and that maximising one's own good will never prevent others from maximising theirs [80-2]). In fact, if Kraut does deny that Aristotle is a benign egoist, the *Nicomachean Ethics* is inconsistent after all.

I consider the following illustration, which Kraut presents several times in his book: An old man is ill and his son is a philosopher. According to Kraut, if the son helps his father, he will have to sacrifice time for contemplation and so will not be maximising his own good. Nevertheless, according to Kraut, Aristotle would say that the son ought to help his father. Therefore, Aristotle is not an ethical egoist.

The conclusion is dubious. Let us suppose that ethical virtue is necessary for contemplation (because, as Kraut argues on Aristotle's behalf, the philosopher will need to have a good character [175-7]). It is then possible to argue that Kraut has misdescribed the son's situation. If the philosopher needs ethical virtue, we should assume that the son has it. In that case, if his father is ill, the son will not be able to 'switch off' his ethical scruples and contemplate. In the circumstances, given his character and moral sensitivity, contemplation will not be an option, for he will be far too distracted to contemplate. (Kraut himself makes a similar point when he explains why the death of friends will prevent the philosopher from contemplating [256].) Therefore, the best the son can do for himself in the situation is to help his father. There is therefore no conflict between the son's maximal good and his father's. In the situation, they cannot but converge. A benign egoist, contra Kraut, need not deny that the son ought to help his father. (The examples Kraut cites from Aristotle can be redescribed in a similar way.)

Now let us suppose, with Kraut, that Aristotle is not a benign egoist. He thinks that the son faces a real conflict of interest when his father is ill. Contemplation is a genuine option in the circumstances. According to Kraut's Aristotle, the philosopher's ultimate goal is contemplation. Why then should the philosophical son not contemplate when his father is ill? Kraut cannot reply that such a choice would be unethical. First, ethical virtue comes below contemplation in the hierarchy of ends and so cannot override it. Secondly,

if contemplation is really the limit (*horos*) or standard which gives substance to Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, as Kraut argues (161-2), it will be ethically right for the son to contemplate! Yet this is hardly consistent with the sort of ethically virtuous activity prescribed elsewhere in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Therefore, if Kraut is right in holding that the philosopher needs ethical virtue, Kraut need not deny that Aristotle is a benign egoist. On the other hand, if Kraut does deny that Aristotle is a benign egoist, and if the rest of his interpretation of Aristotle is correct, then the sort of ethical virtue required for the philosopher's happiness cannot be the same as the full-blooded ethical virtue described elsewhere in the *Nicomachean Ethics*; Aristotle is inconsistent.

As these brief comments show, Kraut's book should appeal not only to Aristotelians, but to anyone interested in the connections between egoism, ethics and the happy life. *Aristotle and the Human Good* contains much to contemplate, and to enjoy.

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David Rapport Lachterman
The Ethics of Geometry:
A Genealogy of Modernity.
New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall
1989. Pp. xiv+255. Cdn $59.50: US $49.50
(cloth: ISBN 0-415-90053-0); Cdn $21.95:
US $17.95 (paper: ISBN 0-415-90141-3).

What is it about modern philosophy which makes it modern, and different from the ancient? According to *The Ethics of Geometry*, modernity is characterized by 'Kant's philosophical triumph,' which equates truth with the construction of concepts, and which acknowledges for the first time the fertility of the human mind. Kant's Copernican revolution, in turn, is the outcome of a change in the manner of doing mathematics which began with Descartes. This latter claim is the main theme of a book which is little concerned with either ethics or geometry, as usually understood; the preoccupations of the author are better represented by its sub-title, *A Genealogy of Modernity*.

As the main title itself might suggest, the terms used are often given a peculiar sense. A translation guide or a running lexicon would be helpful. The key word 'construct' is to be read in the past tense, as 'constructed', and refers to any mental creation, without its being restricted to an algorithmic

formulation. Essentially, construction is a modified Kantian synthesis. 'Ethics' does not refer to anything like a moral discrimination between persons (xi); rather it refers to mores, to *ethos*, to the settled ways humans have of acting. In the concluding section, which sums up the text under the heading 'Morals *par provision*', it is immediately made clear that 'morals' refers to lessons learned. Nor does 'geometry' appear to have its usual sense. The critical point about geometry is the radical new form it takes under Descartes, although by this is not meant its reduction to algebra by means of coordinatization. Rather geometry was made constructive (in the above sense) by Descartes, when he dealt freely with curves of his own invention, rather than with the known, static circles and lines of Euclid. That the mind creates or 'constructs' its own experience, then, and the Kantian revolution in thought which flowered from this seed, was brought to Kant through mathematical ideas spawned by Descartes, and developed by Leibniz and others.

If these changes in the meanings of common terms are slightly exasperating, more annoying is a certain afflatus sometimes adopted by philosophers who believe that we create our own surroundings: 'On the reading of modernity proposed in the body of this work, to be "modern" in the most exacting and exalting sense is to be carried along this trajectory from mathematical construction (in its precise technical sense) to self-deification. The mind is not nature's mirror; it is nature's generative or creative source' (ix).

Those who see in Gauss, Lobachevsky, and Riemann the architects of a genuine revolution in mathematics, occurring in the post-Kantian period, and probably influenced by Kantian epistemology, will not find any arguments against this common view, which nevertheless stands in opposition to that of the text. Indeed no modern mathematics is considered at all; nobody's views on mathematics, except those of Euclid, Descartes, and Lachterman, play a part in the argument. While the latter does bring some erudition and copious detail to his discussions of the other two, he can hardly be said to have *established* the claims about modern mathematics which he announces. Modernity in mathematics, he holds, does not rest on the axiomatic method. In fact, the moderns turned away from demonstration (something he takes to be static and formal) to construction ('the construction of problems and equations,' which he approves of as dynamic and creative). This is a shift from algebra to geometry — 'from the interior forum of the mind to the external forum of space and body' (viii).

As a portrait of modern *mathematics*, which it is claimed to be, this presents an unrecognisable face; whatever might be said about axiomatics, mathematics continues to have demonstration at its very core. Nevertheless, Lachterman raises an interesting historical question about modern *philosophy*: did mathematics, which has obviously influenced science and natural philosophy, also play a part in the origins of transcendentalism? On this point, which is obviously closer to his main concern, Lachterman offers more in the line of plausible argument.

The mathematics of the last two hundred years seems of little interest to Lachterman; but he is rather more concerned about contemporary postmodernism, and about how to discount its claim to represent the true revolution-

ary present. The postmodernist holds that the ancients and the moderns differ little in their inspiration, practising metaphysics as they both do. Such a doctrine is sufficiently refuted for Lachterman, however, when the radical gulf is noted between the static dogmatism of the ancients, and the transcendentalism initiated by Descartes and perfected by Kant. Deconstruction should instead be seen as the continuation of a flow which starts at the Kantian watershed.

It is difficult to think of the move from Greek geometry to Descartes as a change toward constructivity. On this point, Lachterman is aware that his definitions may cause problems. However, even on his terms, it is hard to see any superior creativity in modern mathematics. What mathematical creations, in later times, can surpass the first steps of the Greek geometers, who isolated the pure notions of line and circle, of postulate and demonstration?

The difference is rather that the Greeks *thought* that they were exploring real given entities, while the moderns do not think so; it emerges from a study — a 'long excursus' — into the notion of existence, which had remained 'ontologically inert' until it was clarified and justified in the Kantian concept of objective existence. 'For mathematical constructibility to carry the weight it supposedly does, it must be an unambiguous and indubitable proof of the *existence* (or 'objective reality') of the constructible mathematical concept' (91). Lachterman seeks therefore to undermine the orthodox view (held even by Kant) that Euclid's constructions yield the requisite objective reality for mathematical entities.

The text thus assumes throughout, for both mathematics and for larger concerns, that more than logical possibility is required for 'real possibility' (109), although the further requirements do not involve finiteness or algorithmic steps, but rather some transcendental argumentation.

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Helen E. Longino
Science as Social Knowledge:
Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1990. Pp. xi+262.
US $35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-691-07342-2);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-691-02051-5).

Longino's goal in this book is to develop an analysis of scientific knowledge that reconciles the objectivity of science with the role of contextual values in its social and cultural construction. Whereas *constitutive* values are gener-

ated from an understanding of the goals of science and determine what constitutes acceptable scientific method and practice, *contextual* values belong to the larger social and cultural environment within which science is done. The task Longino sets herself is to show how contextual values can play an important role even in 'good' science without thereby undermining the objectivity of the scientific enterprise. She calls her view 'contextual empiricism' because it is empiricist in treating experience as the basis of scientific knowledge claims and contextual in its insistence upon the relevance of contextual values to the construction of knowledge.

Longino stakes out her own position by contrasting it with the positions of positivists and wholists. Although she agrees with the positivists that data can be specified independently of the hypotheses and theories for which they have evidential relevance, she takes issue with the positivist understanding of the nature of that evidential relationship. The crucial link in the argument is Longino's stress on the role played by background assumptions and beliefs in mediating the relationship between hypotheses and evidence. Given appropriately differing background beliefs, the same state of affairs can be taken as evidence for differing and even conflicting hypotheses. So two parties can *rationally* infer different conclusions from the same evidence. Furthermore, these mediating background assumptions will often introduce contextual values which cannot be eliminated without introducing constraints far too restrictive for the analysis of evidential relations in the actual practice of science.

The position does not deteriorate into wholism, according to Longino, and there is no need to embrace incommensurability because however difficult it may be to ferret out background assumptions, they are articulable. And once articulated, they can be subjected to criticism. The critical function of scientific inquiry is heavily emphasized because it is central to the argument that a form of scientific objectivity can be defended even when we recognize that contextual values permeate scientific inference.

Longino's strategy in outlining a modified account of objectivity is to treat scientific inquiry as a set of necessarily *social* practices, rather than as the disembodied application of a set of rules or even as the mere sum of individual practices. Objectivity becomes on this account a characteristic of the community's practice of science rather than a product of abstract methodology or a property of individual practice. One of the chief requirements of the community is that it attempt to articulate background assumptions and subject them to criticism. Because these background assumptions will typically incorporate nonempirical elements (including contextual values), it is essential that the critical function of the scientific community exhibit a *conceptual* as well as an empirical dimension.

Up to this point, *Science as Social Knowledge* might be dismissed as just another attempt to mediate the debate between self-styled 'rationalist' philosophers of science and various sociologists of knowledge — competent and respectable, but not newsworthy. What gives this book particular value, however, is Longino's ability to flesh out her argument by drawing on extensive case studies developed by herself and other feminist critics of

science. These case studies give texture and substance to the foregoing rather abstract analysis. They don't simply illustrate the position, they constitute the best argument in its favor. They also begin to bridge the regrettable gap between 'mainstream' philosophy of science and the feminist literature.

The case studies are meant chiefly to show how contextual values can affect the description of data, local background assumptions in a specific area of inquiry, and the global assumptions that set up a framework of inquiry. Two of the chief case studies involve respectively human evolutionary studies and behavioral endocrinology.

In human evolutionary studies, the Man-the-Hunter model of human development was largely taken for granted until feminist theorists (sometimes noting that as much as 80 percent of early subsistence diets came from female gathering activities) proposed the Woman-the-Gatherer model as an alternative. Longino's point is not that the alternative model must be accepted as true but that its availability reminds us that the same data (sometimes under different descriptions) can be seen to support conflicting hypotheses. The unconscious importation of background assumptions based on gender relations in twentieth-century white middle-class populations into the study of early humans made it seem that the Man-the-Hunter story was dictated by the evidence. Only when those background assumptions were made explicit and questioned by feminists could it be seen that the same data could support rival hypotheses.

In the case of behavioral neuroendocrinology, the situation is slightly different: no direct rival to the dominant linear-hormonal rival has yet been developed to account for gender role behavior, cognition, and brain differentiation. In order to show how contextual values influence the description of data and mediate inferences from evidence to hypothesis in the linear-hormonal model, Longino presses into service a 'social-cognitive' model of the brain developed for other purposes by Gerald Edelman. It incorporates a different set of background assumptions about causality and human action. Thus, it permits the development of a biological explanation of behavior, including sex-differentiated behavior, quite different from that of the linear-hormonal model. Social and intentional factors play a major role in explanations emanating from the alternative model whereas these are relegated to the periphery on the dominant model.

Again Longino's point is not that Edelman's model must be accepted as true but that its ability to account for the same evidence as the linear-hormonal model reminds us of the role played by contextual values embedded in background assumptions. Throughout this discussion, she is at pains to insist that she is not dismissing behavioral neuroendocrinology as 'bad science' (in the sense of silly, sloppy, or fraudulent science). Instead she is attempting to show how even 'good' science may be permeated by contextual values.

In light of this, what should be the attitude of feminists toward science? What happens to the notion of a 'feminist science'? Longino believes that if we focus on science as practice rather than content, 'we can reach the idea of feminist science through that of doing science as a feminist' (188). This

requires us to deliberately use background assumptions appropriately at variance with those of mainstream science. If, however, oppositional science is to be successful, it must always be *local*; and it must be respectful of some of the standards of the specific scientific community in question. Wholesale replacement of existing science by a 'feminist paradigm' is not on the agenda proposed here.

This is a very useful and sensible book. There are few authors sufficiently well-versed in both analytic philosophy of science and feminist theory to be able to illuminate each with the insights of the other. Philosophers of science have tended to ignore the feminist critiques, dismissing them as social studies of science rather than 'real' philosophy. Because Longino's book is so firmly rooted in the traditional literature, it is sometimes rather less exciting than most feminist literature; but it demonstrates clearly that philosophy of science would be enriched if it attended more closely to the feminist critiques of science. Feminists, too, have much to learn from this book. Longino provides a way of recognizing and doing justice to some of the ways in which science is permeated by gender values without embracing any version of postmodern relativism. There is certainly more to be said on the subject of gender values and objectivity; but this book advances the discussion in significant ways.

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Victor Lowe
Alfred North Whitehead. The Man and His Work, vol. 2: 1910-1947, ed. J.B. Schneewind. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1990. Pp. xi+389.
US $38.95. ISBN 0-8018-3960-2.

We tend to think of Whitehead, the man, in terms of the portrait of him drawn by Russell: a sympathetic teacher and dedicated scholar so engrossed in his work that he never answers his mail and has been known to ignore vistors (like Russell) who 'stood in front of him at a distance of no more than a yard and watched him covering page after page with symbols. He never saw us, and after a time we went away with a feeling of awe' (*Portraits From Memory* [London 1956], 96). Mystery is added by the fact that Whitehead kept no diary, never saved his lecture notes, and instructed his wife Evelyn to burn all his papers upon his death. And yet, because we have so tantalizingly few personal details, we are eager to know more.

Victor Lowe was uniquely qualified to satisfy this need. An engineering student who was attracted to philosophy by reading *Science and the Modern World*, he studied with Whitehead at Harvard and soon became recognized as the preeminent authority on his life and work. For more than two decades he worked on this biography, the first volume appearing in 1985. Lowe died in November, 1988, having finished twelve chapters of the second volume, covering Whitehead's life and thought from 1910 through 1929. It is to the credit of J.B. Schneewind, his chairman at Johns Hopkins, and Leemon McHenry, his research assistant, that this book has been finished and made available to us. Although it is necessarily incomplete, it provides us with as full a picture of the man and his work as we are likely to get.

Especially interesting are the more than sixty pages of letters from Whitehead in America to his son North in England. They show a playful side of the man that others have only hinted at. Whitehead comes across as a loving father and grandfather, and a protective husband to his wife, Evelyn, who seemed to suffer from constant bouts of illness. Some of the letters tell us about the writing of his books. For example, in the letter of May 16, 1926, Whitehead says he wants to follow up the success of *Science and the Modern World* with 'something purely addressed to philosophers — *short* and *clear* [his italics], if I can make it so! But I reckon that it will take me about two years to get that ready' (326). Such was the original intent behind *Process and Reality*.

Whitehead's life from 1910 to 1924 was a busy one. He began the period unemployed, having resigned his lectureship at Trinity College and moved to London. At age 53, he was finally able to land a job as professor of applied mathematics at the Imperial College of Science and Technology. Lowe stresses Whitehead's abiding interest in mathematics and education. In his years in London, he published ten addresses and two essays on education. He also showed skill as a university administrator, displaying a shrewdness that few of his fellow committee members could match. In a later letter from Harvard, he bemoans the lack of influence that American universities have on government policy, contrasting it to his own experience on the Senate of the University of London which was 'one of almost continual influence on the policy of Governmental bodies' (317). Despite being Dean of the Faculty of Science and Chairman of the Academic Council of the Senate, he managed to carry out an impressive amount of research, particularly in natural science and mathematics.

In 1924, he was offered an appointment as Professor of Philosophy at Harvard. The golden age of James, Royce, Palmer, Münsterberg, and Santayana had come to an end and the Department was determined to find a suitably strong replacement. Whitehead accepted enthusiastically, observing in a letter to a friend: 'The post might give me the welcome opportunity of developing in systematic form my ideas on Logic, the Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics, and some more general questions, half philosophical and half practical, such as Education' (134). As Russell puts it, 'In England, Whitehead was regarded only as a mathematician, and it was left to America to discover him as a philosopher' (*Portraits*, 93).

And discover him, America did, with classes, public lectures, and major philosophical works appearing at an astonishing rate. Lowe gives us a detailed analysis of *Science and the Modern World* (1926), *Religion in the Making* (1926), *Symbolism: Its Meaning and Effect* (1927), *The Aims of Education* (1929), and, most importantly, *Process and Reality* (1929). The latter began as Gifford Lectures for 1927-8, which Whitehead initially intended to call, 'The Concept of Organism'. He saw it as a new approach to philosophy which would not be bookish but would express the fact directly observed. To do so required evolving one way of speaking 'which applies equally to physics, physiology, psychology, and to our aesthetic experiences' (333). He approved of Locke's general view of the situation and felt Locke's great merit was that 'he knows a lot more than metaphysics' (329).

It cannot be said that Whitehead's Gifford Lectures were a popular success. The previous Gifford lecturer had been the physicist, Arthur Eddington, a gifted speaker who had drawn an audience of 600 for his entire course. The same audience turned out for Whitehead's first lecture, only to find it completely unintelligible. Even the distinguished Professor of Mathematics E.T. Whittaker remarked that 'if he had not known Whitehead well he would have suspected that it was an imposter making it up as he went along ...' (250). By the tenth and last of his lectures, Whitehead's audience was said to have shrunk to two: Kemp Smith and A.E. Taylor (cf. 250). Typically, this appeared to upset Evelyn much more than Whitehead himself. When the book itself was published, Whitehead seemed resigned to its unpopularity, writing his son that 'It represents what *I* [his italics] can make of the world in general. But I do not expect a good reception from professional philosophers. It deserts the ordinary ways of putting things at the present moment. Also it is more speculative than philosophy in the recent past. In my opinion philosophers have been running into funkholes and so the subject has lost all interest' (341).

Lowe's book ends with *Process and Reality*, though he planned further chapters on Whitehead's years of retirement and death and a concluding chapter assessing Whitehead's philosophy as a whole. Schneewind completes the chapter on Whitehead's last writings and subsequent honours, using materials from Lowe's files. The final chapter is a reprint of 'Whitehead's Philosophy as I See It', which Lowe had written for a collection edited by Ernest Wolf-Gazo, *Process in Context* (Bern: Peter Lang 1988). It is a fitting end to what became his life work. His labours have not been in vain.

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Joyce McCarl Nielsen, ed.
Feminist Research Methods:
Exemplary Readings in the Social Sciences.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1990.
Pp. vii+262.
US $39.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8133-0604-3);
US $16.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8133-0577-2).

This text provides a valuable collection of feminist research that addresses the fundamental epistemological challenges feminism presents to the more traditional social science traditions and procedures. The editor's introduction is an excellent summary of social science methodological issues and trends that have been called into question by feminist epistemological inquiry in the last few decades. Nielsen notes that one of the consequences of feminist critiques has been a rejection of the 'either/or stance about irrefutable knowledge' (27) that had characterised previous epistemological inquiry. The relativist alternative is, however, not necessarily the conclusion that such feminist reformulations produce. For Nielsen, and others, the hermeneutic tradition can generate a process of inquiry that incorporates a dialectical perspective that, in turn, provides for a 'fusion of horizons' as a (temporary) end-point to the research. The key to this approach is, however, a social and material base of freedom and equality from which the inquiry might proceed. It is of course just such a base that is the fundamental problem in research practice and the contributions to this volume often leave this problem aside. This lacuna does not distract in any immediately important way from the value of the contributions to this volume although it is a fundamental issue for epistemological inquiry, whether or not such inquiry is informed by feminist perspectives.

The eleven contributions to the text are divided into theoretical explications of feminist reformulations and empirical studies that attempt to define and work through, in a critical fashion, gender conscious research. The contributions are diverse in origin, being drawn from sociology, anthropology, history, political science and literature. This diversity is accompanied by a crossing of traditional disciplinary boundaries that has become the hallmark of much feminist research so that, for example, the contribution by Sherna Berger Gluck, 'Laura Ellsworth Seiler: In the Streets', combines an oral history approach with a basis in anthropological fieldwork techniques as well as incorporating recent formulations from feminist literary analysis.

The eleven contributions are all previously published pieces and they are divided into two sections, the first dealing with 'Feminist Research Methods', the second with the more empirical 'Exemplary Readings'. The first, more theoretical section contains four feminist classics. Evelyn Fox Keller discusses the masculine contours of traditional empiricist science; Marcia Weskott's contribution examines the implications of the dual position that women often occupy in intellectual pursuits as insiders/outsiders and the potential that this has as a source of knowledge and self-criticism; Judith Cook and Mary Margaret Fonow provide a valuable five-point guide to the

principles of feminist methodology that has its origins in the techniques of consciousness raising so vital to feminist theory and practice; and Kathryn Anderson, Susan Armitage, Dana Jack and Judith Witt provide a provocative article on oral history utilizing the *verstehen* social science tradition and incorporating an interdisciplinary focus.

The remaining seven articles in the Exemplary Readings section are well-chosen illustrations of the issues raised in the editor's introduction as well as the four pieces in the first section. In this section two contributions are particularly noteworthy in what is generally an impressive collection of research. The first is Anna Lowehaupt Tsing's article on 'The Vision of a Woman Shaman', in which anthropological fieldwork in Indonesia is enriched by feminist literary criticism to provide the means by which the woman shaman's innovations can be understood as both exposure and opposition to traditional male actions. The second is by Myra Marx Ferree; 'Between Two Worlds: German Feminist Approaches to Working-Class Women and Work'. Ferree points out that a closer attention to the multiple and often contradictory meanings and consequences for women of paid labour and domestic labour in relation to class position forces a re-evaluation of the 'either/or' conceptualizations of the two spheres. In addition, the re-evaluation suggests that individual resistance on the part of working class women often reinforces rather than mitigates their marginalization.

In general this is a book which is highly recommended for senior undergraduate and post-graduate courses. The exemplary pieces provide a rich resource for the theoretical analyses both in the text itself as well as in other texts. The interdisciplinary coverage is particularly important and, in all the articles, is used in innovative and challenging ways. In general, this is a text that is a pleasure to read and an incentive for further inquiry.

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J. Roland Pennock
and **John W. Chapman, eds.**
Markets and Justice.
New York: New York University Press 1989.
Pp. xi+336. US $53.50. ISBN 0-8147-1421-8.

Justice and Markets is the thirty-first annual volume in the American Society of Legal and Political Philosophy's NOMOS series. It incorporates eleven papers given at the annual meeting of the Society in 1986 on an assortment of justice- and market-related themes. The editors, J. Roland Pennock and

John W. Chapman, have tried to superimpose some structure on the collection by arranging the papers under four general heads (Contractualism and Capitalism, Capitalism and Justice, Markets and Character, and On the Frontier), but the divisions are for the most part somewhat arbitrary. It is therefore fortunate that they have supplied a reasonably detailed guide to the contents of the volume in their excellent summarising introduction.

In the opening paper — which, at forty pages (exclusive of footnotes), is much the longest in the book — John Gray argues for the superiority of a market capitalist economy to market socialism. Despite the 'contractarian' billing the paper is given and despite the attempt he makes to give a Hobbesian twist to the Rawlsian contractarianism from which his argument takes off, Gray's central claims can be given a non-contractarian formulation without any significant loss. His defence of 'private property and market exchange' has two parts. The 'efficiency' claim is, at bottom, epistemological: since 'the knowledge that the public authority needs for successful economic planning simply is not, and cannot be available to it, ... market institutions make it available to society in the medium of price information' (29). The 'justice' claim is that since principles of justice must be '*neutral* in respect of the opposed forms of life that the society contains,' a just economic system must not favour any particular 'ideal of productive enterprise' over any other (40): '(i)t is in virtue of its capacity to permit many different forms of enterprise that the private-property regime is endorsed by the principle of neutrality and a socialist economic system condemned as unjust' (41).

Gray's position is discussed by three of the other contributors, Andrzej Rapaczynski, Joshua Cohen and Jan Narveson. Rapaczynski dismisses both the efficiency and the justice arguments. He thinks Gray mistakenly takes central state planning to be a defining feature of socialist economies. Indeed, even in contexts in which he is constrained to concede that a market socialist society might well have a highly decentralised banking system, with competition among state banks, Gray continues to invoke arguments about the inefficiency of central state planning on the dubious ground that 'a truly free market for banking must somehow "unravel" the rest of the socialist economy' (64). As for Gray's justice argument, Rapaczynski thinks it unpersuasive because the touted neutrality of the free market with respect to competing productive ideals is hard to credit. 'Dogmatic commitment to the free market' is at odds, for example, with willingness to subsidise the 'inefficient fishing methods of the Alaskan Eskimos (or) the weaving methods of the Navajo Indians' (67).

Cohen challenges both the claim that market socialism must be inefficient and the claim that it is unjust. In response to Gray's ('Vienna-Virginia') epistemological argument, he suggests that 'there are important parallels with respect to information and trustworthiness between officials in capitalist democracies and in (hypothetical) democratic, market socialist systems' (77-8). He also points out that an argument which shows that efficiency cannot be achieved in a centralised planned economy is in no sense an argument for 'full liberal ownership.' 'There are, for example, endless varieties of a "mixed system" in which firms that are publicly owned and worker-

managed exist alongside capitalist firms, as well as systems in which enterprises are cooperatively owned' (74). In rejecting Gray's justice argument against market socialism, Cohen points out that a private property system is no more 'neutral' in relation to competing 'productive ideals' than market socialism. Slavery is ruled out by the former just as decisively as 'wage labor' is by the latter.

Narveson too comments on Gray. He agrees with Gray's position on the justice and efficiency of private property and market exchange, endorses his Hobbesian contractarian argument for this position, but dissents from his reluctance to assign priority among values to individual liberty.

Like Narveson, Gerald F. Gaus favors an economic system which assigns a central place to the right to liberty. Unlike Narveson, however, he denies that there is any non-conventional right to property. Indeed, 'the right to natural liberty is an obstacle to justifying ownership. ... The essence of ownership is to restrict the liberty of others vis-à-vis that which is owned; and, according to the right to natural liberty, any such exclusionary claim must be justified to those others' (101). He would like to be in a position to construct a desert-based theory of property, but he thinks 'the intuitive appeal of desert-based theories of property begins to evaporate when we squarely face the problem of exclusionary rights over natural resources' (105).

Jonathan Riley also tries to argue for a desert-grounded system of private property, hoping thereby to show that capitalists need not be insensitive to distributive justice considerations. He exploits to this end the key (Millian) intuition that individuals ought to be secured in the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor. It is not clear, however, how the requisite desert-basis is to be supplied for the institution of private property. As Riley notes, a 'worker may well deserve to own the fruits of his own labor and saving but he does not deserve to own the raw materials required for most types of labor to take place under modern industrial circumstances' (140-1); nor can he be said to deserve 'the rents that accrue to his natural endowments' (142). Riley's solution to these problems seems to be that there are efficiency reasons for permitting private ownership, even though the efforts and exertions of the owner furnish only *part* of the story behind the acquisition of property. But if this is his solution, it is not at all clear how the *justice* of a system of private property has been vindicated. And it will therefore not be at all clear how Riley thinks he has shown that capitalism and distributive justice are compatible.

The four papers in Part III (Markets and Character) are reasonably closely related in theme: all of them discuss 'questions as to what life in a market society does to people' (5). For Margaret Radin, '(t)he way to a less commodified society is to see and foster the nonmarket aspect of much of what we buy and sell, rather than to erect a wall to keep a certain few things completely off the market and abandon everything else to market rationality' (178). Eric Mack agrees that there is a non-market aspect to many market activities and interactions, but aims 'to allay fears about rampant commodification, especially the sort of fears that inspire politically imposed limitations on the scope

of the market' (201). Narveson too, in the part of his paper devoted to a response to Radin, maintains that 'it is radically mistaken to think that markets imply commodification in Radin's sense' (271). In the final paper in this section, Robert E. Lane argues that there is no firm empirical basis for the supposition that the market is to blame for 'the commodification of human relations' (233).

There are two papers in the final section. Bernard Saffran presents 'an economist's perspective' on recent work on 'markets and justice,' especially the sort of work (on 'incentive, informational and strategic issues') which serves to 'highlight some of the profound difficulties in implementing utopian theories of justice' (305). The other paper, 'Disrupting Voluntary Transactions,' by Cass R. Sunstein, is perhaps the most tightly argued paper in the collection. Sunstein argues that while there are solid (autonomy and welfare) reasons for respecting voluntary market transactions, the distribution of advantage and disadvantage effected by such transactions is only presumptively defensible. In situations of a large number of different sorts, considerations of justice — and of autonomy and welfare too — support 'disruption' of voluntary transactions. 'Sometimes transactions will be individually rational and collectively irrational; sometimes people will seek to vindicate second-order preferences by banning voluntary transactions; sometimes an absence of information will call for regulation; sometimes transactions are based on preferences that have adapted to the absence of available opportunities; sometimes legal regulation can counteract intrapersonal collective action problems, found in preferences endogenous to consumption. For various reasons, moreover, some items should not be treated as commodities at all' (299-300). While the case for intervention in these cases is only presumptive (and while 'government action may make things worse rather than better'), doctrinaire attachment to the (resolutely anti-interventionist) free market ideal can be expected to lead to 'considerable injustice' as well as to loss of 'opportunities for collective improvements' (300).

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Graham Priest, Richard Routley
and **Jean Norman, eds.**
Paraconsistent Logic:
Essays on the Inconsistent.
Hamden, CT: Philosophia Verlag 1989.
Pp. xxi+716. US $234.50. ISBN 3-88405-058-3.

What is there to say about the inconsistent? Those devoted to classical logic insist that the answer must be 'everything and/or nothing': the inconsistent is ipso facto trivial. This volume explores a variety of more interesting answers. A paraconsistent logic (the term was coined in 1976, by F. Miro Quesada) is a formal system which does not trivialize inconsistent premise sets — minimally, closing a negation inconsistent premise set under a paraconsistent implication relation will not always produce the set of all formulae.

There are two motivations for paraconsistency. The motivation that seems closest to the editors' hearts is the startling claim that there are true contradictions. Examples they propose include the paradoxes of naive set theory and semantics. Applying paraconsistent logic to such 'dialethias' requires a radical rethinking of logic, especially of negation, as well as a fundamental change in our understanding of how things stand in the world. The editors call this sort of position 'strongly paraconsistent'.

The second motivation focuses instead on implication and inference, arguing that there are non-trivial inconsistent theories, and paraconsistent logic is thus needed to account for how we can make inferences based on such theories. This is compatible with classical views of the semantics of negation which rule out the actual truth of inconsistent sentences, so logics nonstandard enough to satisfy this motive for paraconsistency need not be so radical as to allow for true contradictions. The editors call paraconsistent positions which achieve only this second aim 'weakly paraconsistent'.

There are three broad types of paraconsistent logic, each pursuing a different strategy for rendering inconsistency less pyrotechnic. Papers from each of the three 'schools' of paraconsistency appear in the collection.

Non-adjunctive approaches restrict the conjunction of formulae in the premise set. Thus they avoid trivialization in a way reminiscent of Wittgenstein's suggestion: they don't go 'through' the contradictions that follow classically from an inconsistent premise set. The chief motive for non-adjunctive paraconsistent logics is the inferential one: though the premise set is unsatisfiable, by not conjoining all its claims, we can restrict its implications and avoid triviality. The conservatism of non-adjunctive responses exasperates the editors (to the point of suggesting, in their survey of various approaches, that the non-adjunctive approach isn't really paraconsistent at all). But more can be said for such views than Priest and Routley recognise.

Classical inference demands the preservation of truth and nothing more. But when the premise set is unsatisfiable, preserving truth is not enough — there is no truth left to preserve. So if preservation is the key to inference, we must aim at preserving something more. Schotch and Jennings (306-27)

propose that we should preserve the 'level' of the set, i.e., the minimum number of consistent sets the set can be partitioned into. The result is an implication relation that is classical when the premise set is consistent, and restricts conjunction more and more strongly as the level of the premise set increases. Of course, contradictions remain beyond the pale here, since no partition of a set including a contradiction can have only consistent elements.

The 'positive-plus' approaches, pioneered by da Costa and Arruda, preserve the positive portion of intuitionistic logic, but weaken negation, allowing for evaluations making both A and ~A true, as well as (A ∧ ~A). These systems are aimed at strong paraconsistency, in particular seeking to provide the basis for a paraconsistent set theory. But they achieve this at the cost of weakening negation drastically. In the base system, C_ω, negation is characterized by only the two axioms, A v ~A and ~~A → A. The result is that many fundamental classical principles fail for negation in these systems, including {~A} ⊨ ~(A ∧ B), {A} ⊨ ~~A, {~(A v B} ⊨ ~A, and {~A ∧ ~B} ⊨ ~(A v B). And one may well doubt, as the editors do, whether such an operator can properly be called negation.

Finally, relevance approaches blame the 'fallacies of relevance' for the explosion of inconsistent premises, and reject implications like {~A} ⊨ A → B, {A} ⊨ B → A, and {~A, A v B} ⊨ B, which 'spread' the implications of inconsistency to all formulae. Unlike the non-adjunctive approach, the relevance approach allows even individual contradictory claims to appear in the set of premises without trivializing the consequence set. And unlike the positive-plus approach, it preserves a strong negation operator. The implication relation is restricted as in the positive-plus systems, by allowing models in which even contradictions may receive designated values. Thus the relevance approach, at least as pursued by Priest and Routley, is strongly paraconsistent. Their ambitious aims, explored in several of the papers, include the construction of paraconsistent foundations for mathematics, of expressively complete language containing its own truth and satisfaction predicates, and a formally clarified reconstruction of the core of dialectic philosophy.

As 'strong paraconsistentists' prepared to assert the existence of dialethias, the editors look askance at 'weak paraconsistentists', who propose merely to reform our inferential practise. This leads to the one critical remark I will make. The editorial material in the book might have done its work better had Priest and Routley been content just to set the stage, letting the papers speak for themselves. But as major contributors as well, they have had to wear two hats.

In fact, this book combines what could have been two books, the first a collection of important papers by some of the leading figures in paraconsistent logic, and the second a wide-ranging critical introduction to the subject by the editors. Many of the papers are technically demanding, accessible only to professionals and graduate students with a serious interest in formal logic. But the editorial chapters could easily be the basis of an upper-level undergraduate course.

I think it is too early yet to settle the worth of strong paraconsistency. If the right results emerge from paraconsistent semantics and set theory, something really tremendous will have been achieved. But until the results arrive, the question hangs in the balance. However, weak paraconsistency seems to be amply justified already. Not every inconsistent theory is trivial. If they were, we couldn't say much of interest about many philosophical theories! We need some account of how to reason about the consequences of inconsistent theories, and that is precisely what weakly paraconsistent positions aim to provide.

Unfortunately, the book is absurdly expensive. But it is also an indispensable resource for anyone interested in the area. The bibliography, prepared by S. Giambrone, is very helpful. And the chapters by the editors on the history, state-of-the-art, and applications of paraconsistency provide the only general introduction to the subject now in print. Finally, the volume contains important papers by many of the leading figures in paraconsistent logic. In spite of the price, I recommend the book highly.

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Joëlle Proust
Questions of Form: Logic and the Analytic Proposition from Kant to Carnap.
Trans. Anastasios Albert Brenner.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1989. Pp. xxii+302.
US $35.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1760-0);
US $15.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1761-9).

This work was well received in France when it first appeared in 1986 as an attempt to bridge the chasm between the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental traditions in philosophy. Focusing on the analytic proposition as it arises within the Kantian framework, Proust traces the continuity and discontinuity to be encountered in these traditions as this form of proposition is taken up, and given a central role, in the works of Bolzano, Frege and Carnap. Concluding comments about Popper illustrate and emphasize the essential tensions which are disclosed as Proust employs a descriptive method which she calls 'comparative topics'.

Recognizing that the analytic-synthetic distinction as it is employed by Kant is specifically tailored to the requirements of his transcendental enterprise, Proust explores the senses in which the 'transcendental' factor continues to play a role in the work of later figures examined. Within Kant's work,

this term refers to the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, and is always used in relation to the subject and the unity of apperception. When Bolzano's work is considered, however, the term must be given a different significance. Bolzano's concern with the 'proposition in itself', and the 'repesentation in itself' has the effect of asserting a dogmatic ontology (258) which carries us back to a precritical notion of truth in a framework which Proust refers to as 'ontotranscendental' (107). The result of this transformation is a broadening of the realm of logic, but one in which analyticity is dependent on truth (in fact, 'truth in itself') (62).

As Proust moves on through the logicist enterprise of Frege, analyticity is portrayed as 'the mortar for building up the system of arithmetic' (111) — although a special argument is required to justify the claim that the analytic proposition plays a central role in Frege's work. In addition, it must be noted that here the term 'transcendental' takes on an even more tenuous status. While it would be legitimate to understand Frege as concerned with seeking out the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, the human subject and the unity of apperception are no longer relevant: 'While answering a similar question, the transcendental is now set in another discursive formation. It obeys other constraints, the Kantian subject having been discredited for a while' (258).

The same limitations recur again, of course, in the context of Carnap's attempt to replace philosophy with the logic of science (237). Carnap, however, is found to resemble Kant in that he seeks 'the general conditions of a universal and necessary objective knowledge' in 'a priori forms' — with one essential shift: 'a priori legitimacy comes totally under the jurisdiction of syntax.' With this reservation noted, Proust concludes: 'All the synthetic functions of Kantian transcendental philosophy (unity of matter and form in the description of the phenomenon, as well as architectonic unity) are henceforth ensured by the universal forms of a possible language ...' (247). Surely the analogy is a bit overdone at this point.

It must be acknowledged that the brevity of this sketch does nothing to enhance the legitimate insights brought forth as the work progresses. In setting the stage for her investigation, Proust provides an excellent analysis of the relationship between Kant and the works of both Hume and Leibniz. Then there is a clear presentation of just how Kant was able to defend his analytic-synthetic distinction against the disciples of Leibniz. But it is even more interesting to view the work of Bolzano as a framework within which the Kant-Leibniz controversy can be resolved with still greater precision.

Moreover, while the method of 'comparative topics' seems to violate the norms of rigorous philosophic investigation (certainly from this reader's perspective), it must nonetheless be admitted that the conclusions drawn are interesting. For example, when Proust characterizes Carnap's particular brand of logicism by saying that it substitutes the jurisdiction of the formal for that of Kant's transcendental subject, the result is to draw a clear distinction between the project of Carnap and those of Bolzano and Frege. The similarity of Carnap's work to the earlier tradition is shown by displaying it as 'one of the attempts to dissociate criticism from the examination of the

subjective power of knowing, in order to associate it with bringing out the objective *medium* that knowing already presupposes.' But within this framework she distinguishes the unique contribution of Carnap: 'What constitutes the novelty of this endeavor, compared with the antecedent ones of Bolzano and Frege, is that the universality of truth (the set of truths in themselves, or logical laws) is now shifted to the universality of the rule (the rules of universal syntax)' (248).

Again, by laying the essential groundwork in the relationship between logic and the empiricist tradition, Proust is able to provide a perspective from which to comment on the more contemporary scene. Her analysis indicates, for example, that if the analytic-synthetic distinction must be recognized as a dogma of empiricism, it is no more illegitimate than the broader commitment to the method of logical analysis — which, as Popper notes, is the essential characteristic distinguishing recent empiricism and positivism (249). Proust employs this framework to point out, on the one hand, that most of the replies to Quine's famous article simply miss the real issue; and on the other, that by using Quine as a clearly contrasting figure, the essential unity of the tradition embracing Kant, Bolzano, Frege and Carnap can be correctly discerned (251-2).

My own response to this work, therefore, is that it illuminates a good deal more than it is able to establish. But the insights offered in the course of its presentation make the book well worth reading. Perhaps it will stimulate more detailed analyses of particular relationships among the figures involved; and the role of analyticity in the work of each figure would be an excellent focus to retain. On the basis of the present volume alone, however, the impasse between Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy will not be significantly altered. It should be noted in conclusion that, on the whole, Brenner has done a good job of translating difficult material.

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Philip J. Regal
The Anatomy of Judgment.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1990. Pp. xii+368.
US $39.50 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1823-2);
US $14.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1824-0).

The Anatomy of Judgment is centrally concerned with the question of how we can think more clearly. It is impressive in its breadth and sincerity, but ultimately suffers from inconsistency and the inability to put forth and defend a coherent claim.

Regal begins by motivating the problem — giving examples of cases where prejudiced judgment has led to disastrous social and moral consequences. This shows that it is of the utmost practical importance to think clearly and objectively. He continues by outlining some of the general influences which interfere with our ability to think clearly. Using material from neuroscience, anthropology, literature, science fiction, the history of science, cognitive psychology, linguistics, and philosophy, Regal describes threats to clear thinking from such diverse sources as the structure of our brains, the influence of culture, and the conceptual framework imposed on us by our philosophical history.

This discussion is followed by an account of some of the ways in which humans have attempted to transcend the limitations of ordinary judgment and discover the truth. Regal discusses myth, religion, and philosophy in both the Eastern and Western traditions, and then turns to an account of modern empirical science, which he believes to be the pinnacle in humankind's search for the Truth. The rest of the book offers specific practical advice for the individual who wishes to think clearly (the advice is basically to follow the scientific method, and to be careful to avoid influences which corrupt its proper employment), and ends with a scathing and impassioned indictment of the current university system, which Regal believes creates serious barriers to the pursuit of Truth and objectivity.

There is a great deal to like about this book, but Regal is ultimately not able to carry off his project, and falls prey to the very illness which he would cure. Regal's accounts of historical events, the plots of novels, and the practices of other cultures are completely fascinating, but the theoretical structure which these examples are meant to support is confusing and contains deep tensions.

The proported purpose of Regal's book is to show that open-mindedness and critical self-appraisal are essential to clear thinking. He gives us example after example showing that over-confidence and lack of reflection in judgment is a dangerous business. Yet within this very call to broad-mindedness and skepticism Regal simply assumes that he has the Truth about a number of controversial issues. For example, in arguing that we cannot assume the judgments of our common sense to be true, he tells us that among the Seri Indians adult males of the same family do not speak to one another. When they are asked the reason behind this practice they cannot respond; it is just commonsense. Regal's way of drawing his moral here is telling. He cautions: 'Many of our food, sexual and dress taboos and other superstitious customs do not flatter us in foreign eyes' (89). But he continues: 'We can often claim an advantage in that many of our silliest beliefs have been weeded out over the last few hundred years by science. ... Still, we have quite a few erroneous commonsense ideas left in our society ...' (90). We wonder how he knows so well which food, dress and sex taboos are silly, and how science has played a role in showing us that they are.

There are many more such pronouncements throughout the book, such as when Regal tells us that the Christians were mistaken to link the downfall of Rome to depravity, and that '... diverted by myths, it was difficult for the

society to see the real cause-and-effect relationships at work and to take corrective actions' (177). Or when he calls the bloodiness of the French Revolution a 'mistake' (302). It is hard to reconcile Regal's confidence that he knows the truth about political, moral and social matters with his overriding message of the need for humility concerning one's judgments. It can only be assumed that he feels entitled to these claims because he has employed critical thinking in arriving at them, and so speaks from a position of enlightenment. We are, however, never told in any detail what this method is. We know that it involves open-mindedness and self-criticism, but beyond the vague injunction to avoid prejudice and sources of error, its content seems to be given by the claim that it is basically the same as the scientific method. We are, however, never told in any detail what that is either, nor do we know where Regal gets his unflagging confidence in this method as the means of finding truth in *all* realms of human judgment. This broad-reaching efficacy is simply assumed, and no systematic defense is ever given.

Regal does acknowledge some problems with science, but only because he sees the pure scientific method contaminated by external influences. It is in the discussion of the shortcomings of modern science that Regal's assumptions of true knowledge become most troubling. He does not engage sophisticated philosophical worries concerning the nature of science and what the scientific method yields. Instead he launches an attack on the politics of scientific funding and the modern university system, which he says encourages careerism, and insincerity. There is doubtless a great deal of legitimacy in Regal's complaints, but his tone is often self-righteous: (He tells us that the new corporate science of the 'multiversity' esteems 'advocacy, competition, specialization, management, and mastery of ritualistic methods.' [197]) And self-congratulatory: ('I sit and have sat on important committees at my university and nationally and have done some good. But this is not really much power in the larger scheme. I would have to convince people from my college to state and federal legislators, that people 'out there,' such as students *very* badly want the changes that many of us already agree are needed...' [312]) Regal is obviously sincere, and he may be right, but here he is suddenly the vehement proponent of a particular plan. There is no sense of openness and broad-mindedness surrounding the issue of university reform, and after 300-odd pages urging us to think for ourselves this authoritarian tone sits badly.

Philip Regal cares deeply about the capacity of individuals to think clearly and live well. He cares also that our universities help promote clear thought. His goal is commendable, and he may have a number of useful policy ideas. Unfortunately his book fails to present and defend these in a coherent and comprehensible manner.

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Grace G. Roosevelt
Reading Rousseau In the Nuclear Age.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1990.
Pp. x+275. US $44.95. ISBN 0-87722-679-2.

Rousseau is generally considered to have made only a marginal contribution to international relations and the present work seeks to correct that impression. By reconstructing the unfinished manuscript on *The State of War* (included in translation as an appendix, along with the *Summary* and *Critique* of the Abbe de Saint Pierre's Project For Perpetual Peace) Roosevelt shows how issues of international life occupied Rousseau's attention early in his productive life. The vital distinction between *amour de soi*, as legitimate self preservation, and *amour propre*, the social competitive instinct, had, in his mind, implications for global, as well as domestic tranquillity.

The book is divided into three parts: The State of War, The Politics of Peace, and Political Education For Peace. The first reviews Rousseau's conceptions of human nature and the state, and explains how these views lead him to be more conscious of the destructiveness of international conflict than other theorists, such as Hobbes. A chapter in this section also explores Rousseau's hostility toward Grotius, and towards the Dutch humanist's ideas of sociability. The Politics of Peace includes a discussion of Rousseau's response to Diderot over the question of a universal general will. Rousseau argued that man has no innate feelings of a common unity but becomes habituated to submission to a broader value through his participation in a particular political community. Progress also depends upon education.

Politics and education are related for purposes of public virtue and not, as is often the motive, to further economic competition with other nations. Happiness, for Rousseau, consisted of the satisfaction of limited needs. He insisted that reason and imagination had to be developed in the young in ways that did not stimulate acquisitive desires. In the final section, in a chapter entitled Natural Education and Geopolitical Virtue, the author relates Rousseau's pedagogical principles to his international outlook.

Global responsibility is linked to moral development and education seeks to prevent the development of dependencies which can become a source of conflict. An interesting analysis of *Considerations on the Government of Poland* shows how the growth of a secure national identity can be derived from a detachment from international culture. In *Emile's* world, by contrast, the movement is outward towards the challenges of cosmopolitan life.

The book makes a good case for its paramount claim that Rousseau's developing interest in international relations had a substantial impact upon his political and educational philosophy. It also demonstrates the relevance of his global reflections to the contemporary problems of world justice and peace.

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Stephen G. Salkever
Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
1990. Pp. 238. US $35.00. ISBN 0-691-07803-3.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle claims that moral philosophers 'must be content ... to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true ... to reach conclusions that are no better' (1094b20-4). Stephen Salkever's careful and thought-provoking study examines in great detail the meaning and importance of Aristotle's flexible approach to moral action. S. sees great strength in a theory, whose intention is 'to inform rather than control or replace practical choice, as well as to warn against misleading principles that abstract human interest or possibility — even the highest or most definitive — from the complex range of human needs' (147). S.'s interpretation of Aristotle's moral methodology avoids the modern error of attributing a relativistic basis for the concept of human happiness; it also refutes the erroneous view that Aristotle's teleology implies a single determined concept of human goodness. S. correctly focuses upon the importance of the tradition of moral teaching that looks to the good person (*spoudaios*), rather than one which depends upon abstract rules and concepts.

S. understands the biological basis of Aristotle's moral science not to be rigidly determinist, but rather to permit a range of possibilities for human goodness (73-4). Though not specifically stated, this view rests upon Aristotle's understanding of the human soul. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle's main concern is the definition of human goodness (*eudaimonia*), for which many possible activities are considered. Sensual pleasure, practical wisdom and contemplation, offered as possible definitions of happiness, correspond to the powers of the soul described in the *Ethics*. As S. notes, Aristotle never determines precisely the proportion of good actions needed to produce human happiness or flourishing (105-6). While contemplation is clearly indispensable to happiness (*EN* 1177a12-18), there is no clear resolution to the question of the relationship of the contemplative life to the political. Aristotle leaves the question open (as well as the question concerning the need for external goods), because he realizes that different people have different capacities for attaining excellence. But since happiness is the perfection of the human soul (*psuchē*) and not the intellect (*nous*) alone, sensitive, rational and intellectual activities are required to produce human happiness. Aristotle's position allows for a wide and complex range of human actions that produce a good life.

S.'s second major concern is to demonstrate the relevance of Aristotle's philosophy 'to someone preparing for an active life in the contemporary world' (3). To this end, he includes lengthy discussions on the feminist critique of Greek virtue theory, and the problems of the exercise of individual virtue within a liberal democracy. Though S. is well aware of Aristotle's derogatory statements concerning the status of women, he chooses to emphasize Aris-

totle's (and Plato's) critique of the traditional view that elevates *andreia* (courage, bravery, virility) to the supreme human virtue. S. believes that the substitution of moral courage for physical bravery allowed for the possibility that women may be included among the most highly virtuous citizens within the state. While S.'s understanding of Aristotle's ideal of moral virtue may permit women to be included among the *phronimoi*, it is doubtful whether Aristotle himself would have numbered women among the excellent members of the *polis*. S.'s discussion concerning the shift in emphasis in Platonic and Aristotelian moral thought would have benefitted from a consideration of the works of W.K.C. Guthrie and W. Jaeger, since both classicists have studied extensively the movement from physical to moral courage in the writings of Greek authors. Though S. makes no mention of these works, his discussion is a reasoned and thoughtful defense of the liberating aspects of Aristotle's moral philosophy.

S. sees the basis of Aristotelian virtue to lie in a genuine self-interest, which not only overcomes the individual's desire to increase power or resources, but which may also contribute to the public good (237-9). S. understands the concept of virtue to refer to an act of goodness accompanied by genuine pleasure, and not as an activity which subdues a passion or inclination. If the institutions of a democratic society were to promote an Aristotelian ideal of virtue with its emphasis on the individual's joy in promoting genuine goodness, a liberal society with its tolerance for a diversity of opinions and actions could only benefit. While many may disagree with S.'s analysis, he has again opened channels for further fruitful debate.

S.'s propensity to generalize and dismiss the moral and political philosophy of authors not specifically studied (Thomas Aquinas, Kant and Nietzsche among others) relies too greatly on secondary studies and ignores primary texts. S.'s facile dismissal, for example, of Thomas Aquinas' 'Aristotelianism' as infused with Christian bias, is made without foundation, and without regard for the deep and complex understanding that Thomas brought to the Aristotelian *corpus*. The summary rejection of Kantian 'deontology' and Nietzschian 'romanticism' may also cause some dismay. Despite this criticism, S.'s study remains absolutely essential for any serious student of Aristotle's moral and political philosophy, and extremely important for anyone concerned with the problems of the foundations of a just and democratic society.

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Wesley C. Salmon
Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
1990. Pp. xiv+234.
US $14.95 ISBN 0-8166-1825-9.

Nobody can fail to be struck by the complexity and sophistication of recent philosophical reflection on scientific explanation. In this 'personal odyssey' (180) Wesley Salmon unravels some of the threads and dispels some of the mystery by reviewing a number of important issues concerning explanations that exercised philosophers between 1948 and 1988. Taking the historical approach to be 'the best way' to obtain 'a more than superficial understanding of [the] issues' (ix), Salmon carefully examines the 'covering law model', the 'statistical relevance model', the 'causal-mechanical conception', the pragmatic theory of explanation and much else besides. More helpfully still he candidly recognizes the shortcomings of the various approaches that have been defended, his own included.

Briefly stated Salmon's historical story runs like this. The major event of the first decade was the appearance of Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim's 'Studies in the Logic of Explanation', in which explanation was taken to involve the deduction of 'explananda' from laws and antecedent conditions. In the second decade, work in the area thrived with the discovery of counter-examples to the 'deductive-nomological' model and with Hempel's attempt to extend his account to cover statistical explanations. Then in the third decade important arguments were advanced for replacing the Hempelian requirement for statistical explanations (that the explananda be highly probable given their explanans) with the requirement of statistical relevance (that the explanans 'make a difference' to the explananda). Finally in the fourth decade there was a dwindling of interest in models accompanied be a revived interest in causality and the role of pragmatic considerations.

The heroes of this story are Hempel, Alberto Coffa and Peter Railton (and I might add Salmon himself). Salmon is sympathetic to Hempel's approach and it is only reluctantly that he rejects his requirement of high probability for statistical explanations, his treatment of explanations as arguments, his separation of explanation from causality, and his preference for formal models. As for Coffa and Railton, Salmon takes them to have performed the singular service of directing attention to the objective conception of explanation, a conception that he himself favours. He praises Coffa for propounding an account that avoids treating explanation as epistemically relativized and he judges Railton's 1980 dissertation, in which a 'mechanistic' account is defended, to be 'quite possibly the best thing written on scientific explanation since Hempel's "Aspects [of Scientific Explanation]"' (120).

Salmon concludes that the consensus of the first decade has not survived (ix) and that there is 'not to any very noticeable extent' a new one (180). What we can now see — and Salmon is remarkably frank about this — is that neither the statistical-relevance model, the propensity model, the pragmatic theory nor even the causal-mechanical conception provides us with a fully

satisfactory alternative to Hempel's account. Nonetheless Salmon remains optimistic. Somewhat unexpectedly given his earlier remarks, he suggests in a brief conclusion entitled 'Peaceful Coexistence?' that it may be possible to reconcile the 'unification' account (a successor to Hempel's account), the causal-mechanical account and the pragmatic account by regarding the first as a 'top-down' view, the second as a 'bottom-up' one and the third as subsidiary to the other two.

Salmon's narrative makes it clear how different recent contributions are from Hempel's early work both in style and content. True, philosophers continue to focus on a small range of examples — a tendency deplored by Salmon (117); intuition continues to be called on when the going gets tough (compare pp. 118 and 144); and the cogency of notions continues to be thought of as standing and falling with the existence of precise analyses for them (compare pp. 130 and 148). But it is also true that philosophers now proceed with a much closer eye on scientific practice and with a much keener appreciation of the general philosophical implications of the various options open to them. As Salmon emphasizes, philosophers no longer expect to get clear about explanation without also getting clear about causality, mechanism, lawlikeness, physical indeterminacy and the relative merits of empiricism, realism and pragmatism.

While this wider perspective is surely all to the good, one can be forgiven for wondering whether the exercise still has a clear purpose. Despite Salmon's characterization of the fourth decade as 'a time of maturation' (117), it is difficult to shake the impression that the debate has become amorphous, some would even say aimless. Hempel's attempt to develop models of explanation doubtless made good sense given his concern with distinguishing genuine explanations from pseudoexplanations involving final causes, entelechies and the like (4 and 26). But it is not so easy to see the need for a general philosophical account of explanation when the Hempelian project is set aside. In particular if the aim is — as it now seems to be — one of understanding scientific practice, why can't we get by with a perspicuous account of the multitude of ways in which scientists proceed?

Be this as it may, there can be no denying the value of this volume — and not only as 'an introductory book' (ix). It should not be criticized because it is, as Salmon himself warns us, not 'unbiased history' (180), Salmon having been a major participant in the debates of the last two decades. Nor should it be criticized because it has little to say about the philosophical and cultural context in which philosophical ideas about scientific explanation have been proposed and discussed, Salmon's express concern being with the ideas themselves and whether they are any good. It is all too rare for those centrally involved in philosophical debates to take the time to reconsider their roles in them and to clear the way for future philosophical reflection. Whatever happens in the fifth decade we can be sure that Salmon's contribution to the discussion, so well documented here, will have to be accorded the same careful attention that he bestows on the classics.

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Peter Sloterdijk
Critique of Cynical Reason.
Trans. Michael Eldred.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1988. Pp. xlii+558.
US $45.00 (cloth: ISBN 0-8166-1585-3);
US $19.95 (paper: ISBN 0-8166-1586-1).

When the first edition of this book appeared in German as *Kritik der zynischen Vernunft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1983), it caused a considerable stir. Some German reviewers hailed it as 'one of the most significant and intelligent books of these years' (Jörg Drews, *Die Zeit*, May 6, 1983); others panned it as a 'cult book' (Reinhard Merkel, *Der Spiegel*, May 13, 1983). And Neil Wilson dismissed what had quickly become a best-seller: 'The book is not a critique — but a parody on it in which its style is imitated and distorted: a misleading gesture of sympathy without content' (*New German Critique* 1987: 59). With its publication in English — and the translation is superb, although the occasional recourse to British vocabulary may irk North American readers slightly — a most ambitious work can have a wider audience and contribute to genuine discussion of its merits.

The basic distinction which drives Sloterdijk's diagnosis is between *kynicism* and *cynicism*. The former is represented at the beginning of the Western philosophical traditions by Diogenes of Sinope. It was he who countered idealism and abstractionism by foregrounding his own embodiment and the carnality of existence. Like Bakhtin and Foucault, Sloterdijk sees in carnevalization the potential for a liberating calling-into-question of values, social hierarchies and the hegemony of reason. The offensive quality of committing erstwhile 'private' acts, such as urinating and masturbating, in public, establishes the material counterposition to idealism.

Kynicism begins as a radical enlightening, but over time it has, according to Sloterdijk, been reduced to mere cynicism. Cynicism recalls the critical gestures of the kynic and appropriates the kynic's tactical superiority, while nevertheless occulting the human body and thus individual subjectivity. Sloterdijk argues genealogically, tracing a descent from Diogenes through the figures of Lucian, Mephistopheles and the Grand Inquisitor down to 'Anyone' (Heidegger's 'Man'). The Anyone is severed from an authentic awareness of human embodiment, extending unto banning of death from awareness. Having sundered itself from mortality, the Anyone can be completely cynical about what it means to be human and what it means to deprive others of their humanity.

Because he insists that this devolution of kynicism into cynicism has real consequences, Sloterdijk devotes a large section of the book to a reading of Weimar Germany (1918-1933) as a realm where cynicism was the predominant mode. Perhaps the most provocative of the many arguments in this section is Sloterdijk's suggestion that it is necessary to grasp the situation of Heidegger's work, especially *Sein and Zeit*, within this historical context. Sloterdijk reads Heidegger, surprisingly enough, as belonging to the tradi-

tion of kynicism. Sloterdijk goes on to examine the discourse on technology which proceeded from World War I and continued through Weimar into the Nazi era. His analyses of the cynical acceptance of technology's domination over the human body will become essential reading for those concerned with the challenge still posed by technology.

Few traditional historians of ideas will welcome Sloterdijk's version of the Enlightenment. The difficulty here is partly linguistic, partly contextual. The German verb 'aufklären' means 'to enlighten' but is also routinely used to mean 'sex education'. The irony lampooned by Sloterdijk is that under the pretense of uncovering the wonder of human sexuality, the bourgeois Enlightenment thinking of the eighteenth century pushes the body into secrecy. The subjugation and disciplining of the body can now be seen to have been characteristic of the German states in the eighteenth century, a concomitant to the programs of 'enlightened absolutism'. Rather than liberating subjects, the cynical, dis-embodied rationality of official Aufklärung became an instrument for maintenance of the status quo.

While this description of the Enlightenment contradicts whiggish notions of the progress of reason, it is valuable for returning the discussion to the texts. Much remains to be done, but Sloterdijk affords us the possibility of re-integrating figures such as Hamann and Wieland into the history of (kynical) Enlightenment. Above all, this study should provoke productive re-readings of the most ruthless kynik of them all, Kant. The title and strategy of Sloterdijk's book are by no means parodistic. After much cynicism has been cleared away, who other than Kant could appear on the final pages of the book? The critique of cynical reason is a critique of those philosophical enterprises which have repeatedly eviscerated Kant, severing him from his body and his environment, in order to deflect the challenge he presents to bourgeois society.

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Baruch Spinoza
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.
Trans. Samuel Shirley.
New York: E.J. Brill 1989. Pp. vi+316.
US $62.50. ISBN 90-04-09099-1.

Here at last is a new translation of Spinoza's TTP, one of the truly monumental and revolutionary works of the 17th century. It is the first complete English translation based on Carl Gebhardt's standard edition (*Spinoza Opera*, Vol. III (Heidelberg: Carl Winter 1925). Hitherto, the only complete

English translation was that of R.H.M. Elwes (*The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza*, Vol. I (London: George Bell & Sons 1883). As Shirley states in the Translator's Foreword, Elwes' translation was based on the Bruder edition which has been 'superceded.' For this reason alone it is inadequate. But in addition the Elwes version is often too loose and inaccurate to satisfy present-day standards of scholarship. The only other translation is that of A.G. Wernham (*Benedict de Spinoza: The Political Works* [Oxford: Oxford U. Press 1965]. Wernham's translation is based on Gebhardt and is more reliable than Elwes, but it is highly abridged (the parts not directly related to politics are omitted). Shirley states that he has followed Gebhardt's text 'with few exceptions that are noted' and that 'hebrew texts and letters have been omitted except where necessary to the sense.' For Biblical quotations, Shirley uses the Authorized Version except when Spinoza's version differs, in which case he follows Spinoza. All the *Adnotationes* (39 as opposed to 33 in Elwes) are translated (except for three minor ones). Spinoza's long paragraphs have been broken up (45). There is an extensive Index of Biblical References, an Index to Classical Authors, and a General Index. There is no Glossary. Page and line references to Gebhardt are not provided (which is most unfortunate, since their inclusion would have been a great aid and convenience).

A long (44-page) Introduction by Brad S. Gregory provides useful and extensive information on the political situation in the Netherlands at the time of the publication of the TTP (1670), the complicated relations between various religious and political factions, and Spinoza's relation to Hobbes, La Peyrère, and Fischer. Gregory also discusses Spinoza's motives for writing the TTP and gives an interesting and detailed account of the (almost universally) adverse reaction to it. He rightly emphasizes that the 'persuasive intention' of the TTP and the consequent 'linguistic play and manipulation' by means of which Spinoza 'twists' old Biblical (and, one might add, philosophical) terms to give them 'new, unorthodox meanings that are compatible with his own philosophy' (40-3).

My overall impression of Shirley's translation is that it achieves an admirable balance between accuracy and readability. It is neither excessively literal nor excessively loose, and is free both of neologisms and slang. I found no places in which the reader would be seriously misled as to Spinoza's meaning. For the most part there is consistency in the rendering of terms. Thus, Shirley's translation makes it possible for the first time for the English reader to understand the TTP without reading or consulting the original Latin. It is unquestionably more accurate and readable than Elwes' rendition, which in many cases is either mistaken, misleading, or unclear. The following extracts may serve to illustrate this.

... *Hinc concludo, neminem jure suo naturali absolute privari posse, sed subditos quaedam quasi naturae jure retinere, quae iis adimi non possunt sine magno imperii periculo, quaeque adeo ipsis vel tacite conceduntur, vel ipsi expresse cum iis, qui imperium tenent, stipulantur* (Gebhardt III, 11). '... I conclude that nobody can be absolutely deprived of his natural right, and that by a quasi-natural right subjects do retain some rights which cannot be

taken from them without imperilling the state, and which therefore are either tacitly conceded or explicitly agreed by the rulers' (Shirley, 56). '... I conclude that no one can be deprived of his natural rights absolutely, but that subjects, either by tacit agreement, or by social contract, retain a certain number, which cannot be taken from them without great danger to the state' (Elwes, 10).

Et sane ex hoc, quod Deus Christo, sive ejus menti sese immediate revelaverit, & non ut Prophetis, per verba, & imagines, nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam quod Christus res revelatas vere percepit, sive intellexit; tum enim res intelligitur, cum ipsa purâ mente extra verba & imagines percipitur (Gebhardt III, 64-5). 'And surely this fact, that God revealed himself to Christ, or to Christ's mind, directly, and not through words and images as in the case of the prophets, can have only this meaning, that Christ perceived truly, or understood, what was revealed. For it is when a thing is perceived by pure thought, without words or images, that it is understood' (Shirley, 107-8). 'Inasmuch as God revealed Himself to Christ, or to Christ's mind immediately, and not as to the prophets through words and symbols, we must needs suppose that Christ perceived truly what was revealed, in other words, He understood it, for a matter is understood when it is perceived simply by the mind without words or symbols' (Elwes, 64).

My only *general* (but relatively minor) complaint about the translation is that it could at times adhere more closely to the Latin text. Consider the following examples from Spinoza's Preface. Shirley renders *affectibus* by 'emotional attitudes' (56) (Elwes writes 'passions'): why not 'affects' or 'emotions'? *Bonisque moribus* in Shirley is 'morality' (57) (Elwes writes 'morality'): why not 'good customs' or 'good morals'? *Philosophe lector* in Shirley is 'learned reader' (56) (Elwes correctly writes 'Philosophical Reader'). *Qui liberius philosopharentur* in Shirley is 'for whom a more liberal approach to philosophical questions' (56) (Elwes writes 'whose philosophy is hampered'): why not simply 'who would philosophize more freely'?

Shirley, then, is to be commended for providing us with a much needed and superior translation. Although a final decision must be postponed until Edwin Curley publishes his new translation in Volume II of *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, Shirley's version is at present clearly to be preferred.

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Charles Taylor
Sources of the Self:
The Making of the Modern Identity.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
1989. Pp. xii+601.
US $37.50. ISBN 0-674-82425-3.

What is it to be a human agent? Taylor's ambitious book gives what seems to be a comprehensive account of how 'we' in modern times would answer this question if we were conscious of the implications, determinants and structure of our own practical self-understanding. The aim is not to show the basis on which that understanding rests, for nothing so intricate and pervasive can rest on any single basis, but to explain its internal ramifications.

The evolution of modernity, we learn, is the emergence of a developed notion of the 'self', the idea that self-understanding is not so much the understanding of the world in which one is a part as the exploration of what in oneself makes understanding possible. Most of the book is given over to what looks like a kind of history of this development. Looks like, but is not. As Taylor says (chapter 12), a real history would not take the form of an elucidation of authoritative or exemplary texts, which is what he provides, but would examine religious and moral movements, economic and technical developments, in the community at large. What Taylor undertakes is not to show where these ideas came from, but to cite the texts that make the developments as intelligible and persuasive as they can be made. This disavowal of historical ambitions is a smart move on Taylor's part. To reduce the diversity of human actions to a system of describable changes and tendencies is always to be guilty of ideology, of substituting a (probably self-serving) schematism for reality. To avow that one is doing no more than providing an explanation for what is already supposed to need explaining is innocent.

Taylor preserves his innocence by not being naive. His main theoretical point amounts to the claim that railing against 'ideology' is demonstrably foolish. Anyone's practical understanding of human nature, of how one is to make a life in the world, must be based on some master ideas ('hypergoods'), and those who claim (as many do) to dispense with such organizing notions and horizons can invariably be diagnosed as exponents of ideas which they never bring to conscious formulation and consequently can neither criticize nor defend.

How are hypergoods to be chosen? In practical thinking, Taylor argues, as in all inquiries, one should be guided not by a simplifying methodology borrowed from this or that preferred discipline, but by the best available account of the actual phenomena; and these are the intricacies of action and motivation of the world as it is. His underlying insight, he says, is that 'we tend in our culture to stifle the spirit' (520). We do this because there is no agreed framework in which such questions can be raised, and the bare questioning of frameworks is fruitless. What can be done, and what Taylor does, is to show that the way modernity has successively called frameworks into question has its own structure. It cannot have a basis, of course, which

is why the spiritual dimension can be called into question; but it does have an intelligible dynamic. It is this dynamic that Taylor explores with admirable lucidity and learning. In its scope and synthesizing power, and in the generous wisdom that informs it, it is a great achievement.

The weight of Taylor's book depends on the density of its expositions, which a review cannot convey. Roughly, the route traced starts with Plato's turn away from Homer, and passes through Augustine's God-centered inwardness and Descartes' autonomous version of that, before turning to Locke's reduction of inwardness to a dimensionless point and Montaigne's practical debunking of personal identity. Then we explore the 'affirmation of ordinary life' that Montaigne's self-questioning implies, passing through Reformation levelling, the theory of sentiments inaugurated by Shaftesbury, and deism, the collapse of which leaves 'nature' dominant in various understandings. The questioning of 'nature' itself leaves us with a self-knowledge which has no content but itself, as developed in modern theories of artistic epiphany. And so we end in an intricate muddle that has hardly changed since Victorian times. Nietzsche is much invoked, as usual in expositions of modernism. Other names in favour are Kierkegaard and Dostoievski, Heidegger and Habermas. Among literary figures, much is made of Mallarmé, Rilke, Eliot, Pound, T.E. Hulme and other luminaries of the modernist pantheon. Writers of the last half-century do not appear, and structuralists, post-structuralists and deconstructionists are barely mentioned.

The picture that Taylor paints for us looks in its outlines somewhat as follows. We moderns have something like a consensus on our moral imperatives, the overarching values whereby other goods are good: universal benevolence, freedom, and the affirmation of everyday life. What we deeply differ about is the deep sources of our morality, as our history has developed them: theism, dispassionate reason, and the varieties of expressivism. Of these sources, Taylor puts most faith in theism of the Judaeo-Christian sort. But it is essential that no good be denied, that no value be pursued to its end without regard to other goods. The important thing therefore is to keep insights anchored in some vision of order, and for individuals to find 'a new language of personal resonance to make crucial goods alive for us again' (513). This is something Taylor cannot do for us.

What are we to make of all this? There is nothing petty or facile about it, and no conceit. It is conceived on a grand scale and executed with subtlety and learning. Jerome Bruner is quoted on the dust jacket as saying that it is 'surely one of the most important philosophical works of the last quarter of a century' (not perhaps so grand a claim), in which 'Charles Taylor emerges as one of the truly great practitioners of philosophy in our century.' Is it? Does he?

One cannot be sure about these things. A radically new perspective is likely to seem absurd when first met, or may be completely missed. What impresses most at first sight may be a mere reblocking of old hat. But I for one do not find what Bruner finds. After John Rawls' *On Justice*, for instance, things were never the same again. Like it or not, his approach became something one had to take into account. And it seemed evident on a first reading that

this would be so. That is what it means to be an 'important philosophical work' by a 'great practitioner.' But while I was reading Taylor's book, though I was impressed by its scope and moved by its urgency, I found nothing to change my view of anything. Though I was in sympathy with most of it, and do not flatter myself that I had known it or thought of it all before, I read without excitement. In fact, I had to compel myself to keep reading, and the question that continually forced itself on my mind was: 'Why is this book not better than it is? Or, why cannot I see the merits of this book?' and at the end my feeling was one of relief that there was no more of it and I could stop.

My reaction to Taylor's book may well be a mere product of repressed envy or confused incomprehension. But if it responds to something in the book itself, it is that it is completely professorial in content, reference and manner. The modernity that is its topic is conceived as a construct from professorial concerns, eked out by the literature that the professoriate has chosen for study. Professors are cited for their opinions and thanked for their help. Nothing in the book seems to represent experience of and feeling about the world Taylor lives in. His own explanation for what strikes me in this way is that it is his task to make modernity acceptable by making it intelligible. But what counts as intelligibility is a system of connections established in the classroom. Important philosophers, the philosophers whom Taylor cites, never write like that. However engrossed they become in interdisciplinary tangles, they all convey a sense of life, of what matters and what is real outside the library and the seminar. Granted that Taylor and I are professors, and the people who read his book and this review are almost all professors, most of our families and the people we meet outside the common-room are not. But they are just as real people as we are, and if there is a 'modern identity' it must be theirs too. Taylor writes as if this were not so. In the first paragraph of this review the word 'we' appeared in quotes. It did so because it never becomes clear just who the 'we' are whose self-understanding is explicated. And this is a very profound failure in the book.

True, Taylor admits that modernity is not ubiquitous. But he seems to think that it is what is distinctive in the way we live now. And it seems to me not to account for very much of the actual ways the people I know think and act, or even of the public world in which they do so. Taylor wants to show how we can be put in touch with the sources of our spirituality. But it does not feel like our spirituality to me. It smells of moth-balls. If this is modernity, even the 'we' implicit in Taylor's account live in a post-modern age.

Why would anyone write such a very long book? One reads a quarter-million words of close print with resentment and impatience, especially since so much of it is a recapitulation (however well chosen, brilliantly stated, tellingly interrelated) of professorial commonplaces. Surely the author must have expected this reaction and discounted it. Why? One possibility is that he is impatient with the blinkered pedantry and glib superficiality of so much in today's academic journals. Perhaps he thinks that only against the richness and depth of a historical and systematic background such as his book provides can serious philosophical work be done. If so, he may be right, and to find his work tedious is to show oneself unready for philosophy.

One point of substance in the book is disturbing. Taylor expresses a preference for theism of the Judaeo-Christian sort as a source of moral strength, and indeed the book could only have been written within Christendom and from a profoundly Christian sensibility. But what does Taylor mean by 'theism', exactly? So far as I could see, there is not one sentence of explanation anywhere in the book. Perhaps Taylor thinks it is obvious. But it is not obvious to me. I do not know what he, as a philosopher, means by 'theism', or how whatever he does mean is to be related to what churches actually teach and have taught. I do not know just what he finds distinctive in the Judaeo-Christian approach. And I think what is most deeply the matter with this admirable book, if anything is, is a deep evasiveness appearing in the guise of academic scruple. The book is not sufficiently troubled by troublesome issues. One of Taylor's favourite authorities is Rilke; but it is not the Rilke who wrote that *Jeder Engel ist schrecklich*, 'Every angel is terrible.'

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Editors' Note

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R.A. Shiner